CMP Associates Regulation Blog

There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:

Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP four trillion dollars below trend. US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.2 percent per year from 1929 to 2023 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united_11.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html), with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.5 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2020 and 1.9 percent from 2007 to 2023. GDP in IIQ2024 is 15.7 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent.
Private fixed investment stagnating initially followed by growth at 2.3 percent SAAR in IIQ2024 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united_11.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html).
Twenty-two million or 12.4 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with cyclically stagnating or declining real wages (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/08/increase-in-jul-2024-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/07/increase-in-jun-2024-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/06/increase-in-may-2024-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/05/increase-in-apr-2024-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/04/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/03/the-fomc-maintains-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/02/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/01/increase-in-dec-2023-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/12/increase-in-nov-2023-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/11/increase-in-oct-2023-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/10/increase-in-sep-2023-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/09/the-federal-open-market-committee-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/08/increase-in-jul-2023-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/07/increase-in-jun-2023-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/06/federal-open-market-committee-fomc-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/05/increase-in-apr-2023-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/04/increase-in-mar-2023-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/03/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/02/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/01/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/12/federal-open-market-committee-fomc-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/11/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/09/us-consumer-price-increased-83-percent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/08/increase-in-jul-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/07/increase-in-jun-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/06/federal-open-market-committee-fomc-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/05/us-consumer-prices-increase-83-percent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/increase-in-mar-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/increase-in-feb-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/increase-in-jan-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/increase-in-sep-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/increase-in-aug-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/decrease-in-dec-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-fed-will-be-patient-adjusting.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-on00000000e-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/in-light-of-progress-on-inflation-and.html and https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/08/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/07/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/06/in-support-of-its-goals-committee.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/05/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/04/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/03/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/02/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/01/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/12/the-fomc-maintains-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/11/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/08/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/07/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/06/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/05/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/03/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/02/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/01/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/12/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/11/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/10/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/09/federal-open-market-committee-fomc-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/08/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/07/consumer-prices-of-theunited-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/06/consumer-prices-of-theunited-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/increase-in-mar-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/increase-in-feb-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/increase-in-jan-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/real-disposable-income-decreasing-02.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/increase-in-sep-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/increase-in-aug-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)

Output of manufacturing (SIC) in Jul 2024 at 41.8 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 28.1 percent below trend measured from 1999 to 2006. Output of manufacturing (NAICS) at 46.7 percent below trend measured from 1986 to 2006 and 28.7 percent below trend measured from 1999 to 2006 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/manufacturing-increased-cumulatively-16.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/08/in-support-of-its-goals-committee.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/06/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/05/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/05/in-support-of-its-goals-committee.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/04/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/03/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/01/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/12/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally_29.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/12/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/11/the-federal-open-market-committee-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/09/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted_29.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/09/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/07/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/07/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/05/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/04/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted_29.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/04/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/02/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/01/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/12/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/12/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/10/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/10/us-gdp-contracted-at-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/09/us-gdp-contracted-at-seasonally.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/08/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/inflation-accelerating-worldwide.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/the-fomc-decided-to-raise-target-range.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/united-states-producer-prices-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/united-states-producer-prices-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/federal-open-market-committee-leaves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/us-industrial-production-increased-3.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/growth-of-industrial-production-of-54.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the US Department of Labor provides both seasonally adjusted (SA) and not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) or unadjusted data with important uses (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012Feb3; 2011Feb11):

“Most series published by the Current Employment Statistics program reflect a regularly recurring seasonal movement that can be measured from past experience. By eliminating that part of the change attributable to the normal seasonal variation, it is possible to observe the cyclical and other nonseasonal movements in these series. Seasonally adjusted series are published monthly for selected employment, hours, and earnings estimates.”

Requirements of using best available information and updating seasonality factors affect the comparability over time of United States employment data. In the first month of the year, the BLS revises data for several years by adjusting benchmarks and seasonal factors (page 4 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015), which is the case of the data for Jan 2015 released on Feb 6, 2015:

“In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2014. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which enumerates jobs covered by the unemployment insurance tax system. The benchmark process results in revisions to not seasonally adjusted data from April 2013 forward.

Seasonally adjusted data from January 2010 forward are subject to revision. In addition, data for some series prior to 2010, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted, incorporate revisions. The total nonfarm employment level for March 2014 was revised upward by 91,000 (+67,000 on a not seasonally adjusted basis, or less than 0.05 percent). The average benchmark revision over the past 10 years was plus or minus 0.3 percent. Table A presents revised total nonfarm employment data on a seasonally adjusted basis for January through

December 2014.

An article that discusses the benchmark and post-benchmark revisions and other technical issues can be accessed through the BLS website at www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesbmart.pdf.

Information on the data released today also may be obtained by calling (202) 691-6555.”

There are also adjustments of population that affect comparability of labor statistics over time (page 5 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015):

“Effective with data for January 2015, updated population estimates have been used in the household survey. Population estimates for the household survey are developed by the U.S. Census Bureau. Each year, the Census Bureau updates the estimates to reflect new information and assumptions about the growth of the population since the previous decennial census. The change in population reflected in the new estimates results from adjustments for net international migration, updated vital statistics and other information, and some methodological changes in the estimation process. In accordance with usual practice, BLS will not revise the official household survey estimates for December 2014 and earlier months. To show the impact of the population adjustments, however, differences in selected December 2014 labor force series based on the old and new population estimates are shown in table B.”

There are also adjustments of benchmarks and seasonality factors for establishment data that affect comparability over time (page 4 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015):

“In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today [Feb 6, 2015] have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2014. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which enumerates jobs covered by the unemployment insurance tax system. The benchmark process results in revisions to not seasonally adjusted data from April 2013 forward. Seasonally adjusted data from January 2010 forward are subject to revision. In addition, data for some series prior to 2010, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted, incorporate revisions.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal factors in the release for Dec 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf):

“Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2011 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2015 through November 2015 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal factors in the release for Dec 2016 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf):

“Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2012 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2016 through November 2016 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised establishment data for seasonal and benchmarks in the release for Jan 2016 (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2016 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 4 for more information about these changes.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised establishment data for seasonal and benchmarks in the release for Jan 2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors using an improved methodology to select models. Also, household survey data for January 2017 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 4 for more information about these changes.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal adjustment in the release for Dec 2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2013 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2017 through November 2017 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 6, along with additional information about the revisions.”

All comparisons over time are affected by yearly adjustments of benchmarks and seasonality factors. All data in this blog comment use revised data released by the BLS (http://www.bls.gov/).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal adjustment in the release for Dec 2018 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Revision of Seasonally Adjusted Household Survey Data. Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2014 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2018 through November 2018 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised payroll establishment data with the release of the estimates for Jan 2019 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_02012019.htm): “ Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2019 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning at the end of this news release for more information about these changes.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised the Establishment Survey Data with the release of estimates for Jan 2018 on Feb 20, 2018 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2017. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which counts jobs covered by the Unemployment Insurance (UI) tax system. In addition, the data were updated to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) from the 2012 NAICS. This update resulted in minor changes to several detailed industries. The normal benchmark process revises not seasonally adjusted data from April 2016 forward and seasonally adjusted data from January 2013 forward. However, some data were also revised further back in their history than normal due to the implementation of 2017 NAICS and other minor technical changes related to rounding and re-aggregation of some series. The total nonfarm employment level for March 2017 was revised upward by 146,000 (+138,000 on a not seasonally adjusted basis, or +0.1 percent). On a not seasonally adjusted basis, the average absolute benchmark revision over the past 10 years is 0.2 percent. The effect of these revisions on the underlying trend in nonfarm payroll employment was minor. For example, the over-the-year change in total nonfarm employment for 2017 was revised from +2,055,000 to +2,173,000 (seasonally adjusted). Table A presents revised total nonfarm employment data on a seasonally adjusted basis from January to December 2017. All revised historical establishment survey data are available on the BLS website at www.bls.gov/ces/data.htm. In addition, an article that discusses the benchmark and post-benchmark revisions and other technical issues is available at www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesbmart.htm.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) informs that “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2019 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 6 for more information about these changes” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) informs that “Revision of Seasonally Adjusted Household Survey Data. Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2015 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2019 through November 2019 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informs that “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. In addition, several changes have been made to household survey data, including the annual update of population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 4 for more information” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informs that “Revision of Seasonally Adjusted Household Survey Data Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2016 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2020 through November 2020 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 7, along with additional information about the revisions” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informs that “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2021 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes at the end of this news release for more information about the revisions” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informs that “Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal | adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2017 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2021 through November 2021 (as originally published and as revised) |appear in table A at the end of this news release, along with additional information about the revisions.” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informs that “Changes to The Employment Situation Data Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2022 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 5 for more information.” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informs that “Revision of Seasonally Adjusted Household Survey Data Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2018 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2022 through November 2022 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 6, along with additional information about the revisions.” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informs of revisions of establishment survey data: “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking

process, the NAICS 2022 conversion, and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors.

Also, household survey data for January 2023 reflect updated population estimates. (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

“See the notes at the end of this news release for more information.”. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also revised population estimates: “Effective with data for January 2023, updated population estimates were incorporated into the household survey. Population estimates for the household survey are developed by the U.S. Census Bureau. Each year, the Census Bureau updates the estimates to

reflect new information and assumptions about the growth of the population since the

previous decennial census. The change in population reflected in the new estimates

results from adjustments for net international migration, updated vital statistics, and

improvements in estimation methodology.” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informed revision of household data:

“Revision of Seasonally Adjusted Household Survey Data Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2019 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2023 through November 2023 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”( https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf)

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informed revision of establishment data:

“Revisions to Establishment Survey Data

In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released

today have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs

for March 2023. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly

Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which counts jobs covered by the

Unemployment Insurance (UI) tax system. The benchmark process results in

revisions to not seasonally adjusted data from April 2022 forward; seasonally

adjusted data from January 2019 forward are subject to revision. In addition,

data for some series prior to 2019, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted,

incorporate other revisions.

The seasonally adjusted total nonfarm employment level for March 2023 was

revised downward by 266,000. On a not seasonally adjusted basis, the total

nonfarm employment level for March 2023 was revised downward by 187,000, or

-0.1 percent. Not seasonally adjusted, the absolute average benchmark revision

over the past 10 years is 0.1 percent.

The over-the-year change in total nonfarm employment for March 2023 was revised

from +4,048,000 to +3,836,000 (seasonally adjusted). Table A presents revised

total nonfarm employment data on a seasonally adjusted basis from January to

December 2023.

All revised historical establishment survey data are available on the BLS website at

www.bls.gov/ces/data/home.htm. In addition, an article that discusses the benchmark

and post-benchmark revisions and other technical issues is available at

www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesbmart.htm.

Table A. Revisions to total nonfarm employment, January to December 2023, seasonally

adjusted

(Numbers in thousands)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| |

| Level | Over-the-month change

|---------------------------------------------------------------------

Year and month | | As | | | As |

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | | | | |

2023 | | | | | |

| | | | | |

January......... | 154,773 | 155,007 | -234 | 482 | 472 | 10

February........ | 155,060 | 155,255 | -195 | 287 | 248 | 39

March........... | 155,206 | 155,472 | -266 | 146 | 217 | -71

April........... | 155,484 | 155,689 | -205 | 278 | 217 | 61

May............. | 155,787 | 155,970 | -183 | 303 | 281 | 22

June............ | 156,027 | 156,075 | -48 | 240 | 105 | 135

July............ | 156,211 | 156,311 | -100 | 184 | 236 | -52

August.......... | 156,421 | 156,476 | -55 | 210 | 165 | 45

September....... | 156,667 | 156,738 | -71 | 246 | 262 | -16

October......... | 156,832 | 156,843 | -11 | 165 | 105 | 60

November........ | 157,014 | 157,016 | -2 | 182 | 173 | 9

December(p)..... | 157,347 | 157,232 | 115 | 333 | 216 | 117

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(p) = preliminary

Adjustments to Population Estimates for the Household Survey

Effective with data for January 2024, updated population estimates were incorporated

into the household survey. Population estimates for the household survey are developed

by the U.S. Census Bureau. Each year, the Census Bureau updates the estimates to reflect

new information and assumptions about the growth of the population since the population

base year, typically the last decennial census. The change in population reflected in

the new estimates results from adjustments for net international migration, updated vital

statistics, and improvements in estimation methodology.

In accordance with usual practice, BLS will not revise the official household survey

estimates for December 2023 and earlier months. However, to show the impact of the

population adjustments, table B displays differences in selected December labor force

series based on the old and new population estimates.

The adjustments decreased the estimated size of the civilian noninstitutional population

in December by 625,000, the civilian labor force by 299,000, employment by 270,000,

and unemployment by 28,000. The number of people not in the labor force decreased by

326,000. The total unemployment rate, employment-population ratio, and labor force

participation rate were unaffected.

Data users are cautioned that these annual population adjustments can affect the

comparability of household data series over time. Table C shows the effect of the

introduction of new population estimates on the change in selected labor force measures

between December 2023 and January 2024.

Additional information on the population adjustments and their effects on national labor

force estimates is available at www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cps-pop-control-adjustments.pdf.

Population controls for veterans, which are derived from a Department of Veterans Affairs

population model and are updated periodically, did not change with the release of data

for January 2024.”

See the Employment Situation Technical Note https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.tn.htm

A2 Number of People in Job Stress. There are two approaches to calculating the number of people in job stress. The first approach consists of calculating the number of people in job stress unemployed or underemployed with the raw data of the employment situation report as in Table I-2. The data are seasonally adjusted (SA). The first three rows provide the labor force and unemployed in millions and the unemployment rate of unemployed as percent of the labor force. There is decrease in the number unemployed from 7.163 million in Jul 2024 to 7.115 million in Aug 2024. The number unemployed decreased to 6.834 million in Sep 2024. The rate of unemployment decreased from 4.3 percent in Jul 2024 to 4.2 percent in Aug 2024, decreasing at 4.1 percent in Sep 2024. An important aspect of unemployment is its persistence for more than 27 weeks with 1.630 million in Sep 2024 corresponding to 23.9 percent of the unemployed. The longer the period of unemployment the lower are the chances of finding another job with many long-term unemployed ceasing to search for a job. Another key characteristic of the current labor market is the high number of people trying to subsist with part-time jobs because they cannot find full-time employment or part-time for economic reasons. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals, who would have preferred full-time employment, were working part time because their hours had been reduced or because they were unable to find full-time jobs” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number of part-time for economic reasons increased from 4.566 million in Jul 2024 to 4.830 million in Aug 2024, decreasing to 4.624 million in Sep 2024. Another important fact is the marginally attached to the labor force. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey” (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number in job stress unemployed or underemployed of 13.134 million in Sep 2024 consists of:

6.834 million unemployed (of whom 1.630 million, or 23.9 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more) compared with 7.115 million unemployed in Aug 2024 (of whom 1.533 million, or 21.5 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more).

· 4.624 million employed part-time for economic reasons in Sep 2024 (who suffered reductions in their work hours or could not find full-time employment) compared with 4.830 million in Aug 2024.

· 1.676 million who were marginally attached to the labor force in Sep 2023 (who were not in the labor force but wanted and were available for work) compared with 1.359 million in Aug 2024.

Table I-2, US, People in Job Stress, Millions and % SA

	Sep 2024	Aug 2024	Jul 2024
Labor Force Millions	168.699	168.549	168.429
Unemployed Millions	6.834	7.115	7.163
Unemployment Rate (unemployed as % labor force)	4.1	4.2	4.3
Unemployed ≥27 weeks Millions	1.630	1.533	1.535
Unemployed ≥27 weeks %	23.9	21.5	21.4
Part Time for Economic Reasons Millions	4.624	4.830	4.566
Marginally Attached to Labor Force Millions	1.676	1.359	1.628
Job Stress Millions	13.134	13.304	13.357
In Job Stress as % Labor Force	7.8	7.9	7.9

Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table I-3 repeats the data in Table I-2 but including Feb and additional data. What really matters is the number of people with jobs or the total employed, representing the opportunity for exit from unemployment. The final row of Table I-3 provides people employed as percent of the population or employment to population ratio. The number has remained relatively constant around 59 percent, reaching 60.1 in Nov 2017, 60.1 in Dec 2017, 60.6 in Jul 2018, 60.3 in Aug 2018, 60.4 for Sep 2018, 60.5 in Oct 2018, 60.6 in Nov 2018, 60.6 in Dec 2018, 60.6 in Jan 2019, 60.7 in Feb 2019, 60.6 in Mar 2019, 60.5 in Apr 2019, 60.6 in May 2019, 60.7 in Jun 2019, 60.8 in Jul 2019 and 60.8 in Aug 2019. The employment to population ratio fell from an annual level of 63.1 percent in 2006 to 58.6 percent in 2012, 58.6 percent in 2013 and 59.0 in 2014 with the lowest level at 58.4 percent in 2011. The employment population ratio NSA reached 59.4 in Dec 2015, 59.6 in Dec 2016, 60.0 in Dec 2017, 60.4 in Dec 2018, 60.9 in Dec 2019, 57.3 in Dec 2020, 59.4 in Dec 2021, 60.0 in Dec 2022 and 60.0 in Dec 2023. The SA level in Table I-3 is 60.2 in Sep 2024.

Table I-3, US, Unemployment and Underemployment, SA, Millions and Percent

	Sep 2024	Aug 2024	Jul 2024	Jun 2024
Labor Force	168.699	168.549	168.429	168.009
Participation Rate	62.7	62.7	62.7	62.6
Unemployed	6.834	7.115	7.163	6.811
UNE Rate %	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.1
Part Time Economic Reasons	4.624	4.830	4.566	4.220
Marginally Attached to Labor Force	1.676	1.359	1.628	1.548
In Job Stress	13.134	13.304	13.357	12.579
In Job Stress % Labor Force	7.8	7.9	7.9	7.5
Employed	161.864	161.434	161.266	161.199
Employment % Population	60.2	60.0	60.0	60.1

Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2024. There was a big drop of the number of people employed from 147.315 million at the peak in Jul 2007 (NSA) to 136.809 million at the trough in Jan 2010 (NSA) with 10.506 million fewer people employed. Recovery has been anemic compared with the shallow recession of 2001 that was followed by nearly vertical growth in jobs. Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2024. The number employed in Sep 2024 was 162.046 million (NSA) or 14.731 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 269.080 million in Sep 2024 or by 37.122 million. The number employed increased 10.0 percent from Jul 2007 to Sep 2024 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 16.0 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Sep 2024 would result in 170.866 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 269.080 million). There are effectively 8.820 million fewer jobs in Sep 2024 than in Sep 2007, or 170.866 million minus 162.046 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Chart I-1, US, Employed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2024

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-2 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the number of people employed in the US from 2001 to 2024. There was recovery since 2010 but not sufficient to recover lost jobs. Many people in the US who had jobs before the global recession are not working now and many who entered the labor force cannot find employment. There is sharp contraction of employment in Mar and Apr 2020 with recovery in May 2020-Sep 2024 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-2, US, Employed, 12-Month Percentage Change NSA, 2001-2024

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The foundation of the second approach derives from Chart I-3 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics providing the level of the civilian labor force in the US. The civilian labor force consists of people who are available and willing to work and who have searched for employment recently. The labor force of the US NSA grew 9.4 percent from 142.828 million in Jan 2001 to 156.255 million in Jul 2009. The civilian labor force is 7.9 percent higher at 168.569 million in Sep 2024 than in Jul 2009, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. Chart I-3 shows the flattening of the curve of expansion of the labor force and its decline in 2010 and 2011. The ratio of the labor force of 154.871 million in Jul 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.958 million in Jul 2007 was 66.8 percent while the ratio of the labor force of 168.569 million in Sep 2024 to the noninstitutional population of 269.080 million in Sep 2024 was 62.6 percent. The labor force of the US in Sep 2024 corresponding to 66.8 percent of participation in the population would be 179.745 million (0.668 x 269.080). The difference between the measured labor force in Sep 2024 of 168.569 million and the labor force in Sep 2024 with participation rate of 66.8 percent (as in Jul 2007) of 179.745 million is 11.176 million. The level of the labor force in the US has stagnated and is 11.176 million lower than what it would have been had the same participation rate been maintained. Millions of people have abandoned their search for employment because they believe there are no jobs available for them. Millions lost their employment in the lockdown of economic activity of the COVID-19 event. The key issue is whether the decline in participation of the population in the labor force is the result of people giving up on finding another job in addition to job contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-3, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, SA, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-4 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of the labor force in the US. The rate of growth fell almost instantaneously with the global recession and became negative from 2009 to 2011. The labor force of the US collapsed and did not recover cyclically. Growth in the beginning of the summer originates in younger people looking for jobs in the summer after graduation or during school recess.

Chart I-4, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 12-month Percentage Change, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-5 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the labor force participation rate in the US or labor force as percent of the population. The labor force participation rate of the US fell from 66.8 percent in Jan 2001 to 62.6 percent NSA in Sep 2024, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. The annual labor force participation rate for 1979 was 63.7 percent and also 63.7 percent in Nov 1980 during sharp economic contraction. This comparison is further elaborated below. Chart I-5 shows an evident downward trend beginning with the global recession that has continued throughout the recovery beginning in IIIQ2009. The critical issue is whether people left the workforce of the US because they believe there is no longer a job for them and if that number will increase in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-5, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Population in Labor Force SA, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

Chart I-6 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of unemployed in the US. The number unemployed rose from the trough of 6.272 million NSA in Oct 2006 to the peak of 16.147 million in Jan 2010, declining to 13.400 million in Jul 2012, 12.696 million in Aug 2012 and 11.741 million in Sep 2012. The level unemployed fell to 11.741 million in Oct 2012, 11.404 million in Nov 2012, 11.844 million in Dec 2012, 13.181 million in Jan 2013, 12.500 million in Feb 2013 and 9.984 million in Dec 2013. The level of unemployment reached 6.524 million in Sep 2024, all numbers not seasonally adjusted, in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-6, US, Unemployed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-7 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the rate of unemployment in the US or unemployed as percent of the labor force. The rate of unemployment of the US rose from 4.7 percent in Jan 2001 to 6.5 percent in Jun 2003, declining to 4.1 percent in Oct 2006. The rate of unemployment jumped to 10.6 percent in Jan 2010 and declined to 7.6 percent in Dec 2012 but increased to 8.5 percent in Jan 2013 and 8.1 percent in Feb 2013, falling back to 7.3 percent in May 2013 and 7.8 percent in Jun 2013, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. The rate of unemployment not seasonally adjusted stabilized at 7.7 percent in Jul 2013 and fell to 6.5 percent in Dec 2013 and 5.4 percent in Dec 2014. The rate of unemployment NSA decreased to 4.8 percent in Dec 2015 and 4.5 percent in Dec 2016, reaching 3.9 percent in Dec 2017. The NSA rate of unemployment was at 3.7 percent in Dec 2018, 3.4 percent in Dec 2019 and 6.5 percent in Dec 2020. The NSA unemployment rate was 3.7 percent in Dec 2021, 3.3 percent in Dec 2022 3.5 percent in Dec 2023 and 3.9 percent in Sep 2024 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-7, US, Unemployment Rate, SA, 2001-2024

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-8 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of unemployed. There was a jump of 81.8 percent in Apr 2009 with subsequent decline and negative rates since 2010. On an annual basis, the level of unemployed rose 59.8 percent in 2009 and 26.1 percent in 2008 with increase of 3.9 percent in 2010, decline of 7.3 percent in 2011 and decrease of 9.0 percent in 2012. The annual level of unemployment decreased 8.4 percent in 2013 and fell 16.1 percent in 2014. The annual level of unemployment fell 13.7 percent in 2015 and fell 6.6 percent in 2016, decreasing 9.9 percent in 2017. The level of unemployment decreased 12.4 percent in Dec 2017 relative to a year earlier and decreased 4.0 percent in Dec 2018 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment decreased 8.7 percent in Dec 2019 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment increased 317.7 percent in Apr 2020 and increased 34.4 percent in Mar 2021 relative to a year earlier in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The level of unemployment decreased 59.0 percent in Apr 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreased 57.0 percent in May 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment decreased 45.3 percent in Jun 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreased 45.4 percent in Jul 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployed decreased 40.0 percent in Sep 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreased 35.1 percent in Oct 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment decreased 38.6 percent in Nov 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreased 42.7 percent in Dec 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment decreased 10.3 percent in Dec 2022 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment increased 10.4 percent in Dec 2023 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment increased 7.9 percent in Sep 2024 relative to a year earlier.

Chart I-8, US, Unemployed, 12-month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-9 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the number of people in part-time occupations because of economic reasons, that is, because they cannot find full-time employment. The number underemployed in part-time occupations not seasonally adjusted rose from 3.732 million in Jan 2001 to 5.270 million in Jan 2004, falling to 3.787 million in Apr 2006. The number underemployed seasonally adjusted jumped to 9.114 million in Nov 2009, falling to 8.171 million in Dec 2011 but increasing to 8.305 million in Jan 2012 and 8.238 million in Feb 2012 but then falling to 7.943 million in Dec 2012 and increasing to 8.099 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons seasonally adjusted reached 4.627 million in Dec 2018 and 4.665 million in Nov 2018. Without seasonal adjustment, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 9.354 million in Dec 2009, declining to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 and 8.166 million in Dec 2012 but increasing to 8.324 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA stood at 7.990 million in Dec 2013, 6.970 million in Dec 2014 and 6.179 million in Dec 2015. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA stood at 5.707 million in Dec 2016. The number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 5.060 million in Dec 2017. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons stood at 4.740 million in Dec 2018 and 4.247 million in Dec 2019. The longer the period in part-time jobs the lower are the chances of finding another full-time job. The number of part-time for economic reasons NSA jumped to 10.684 million in Apr 2020 and 6.245 million in Dec 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The level of part-time for economic reasons reached 4.049 million in Dec 2021, 3.991 million in Dec 2022 and 4.324 million in Dec 2023. The level of part-time for economic reasons stood at 4.297 million in Sep 2024.

Chart I-9, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, SA, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-10 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics repeats the behavior of unemployment. The 12-month percentage change of the level of people at work part-time for economic reasons jumped 84.7 percent in Mar 2009 and declined subsequently. The declines have been insufficient to reduce significantly the number of people who cannot shift from part-time to full-time employment. On an annual basis, the number of part-time for economic reasons increased 33.5 percent in 2008 and 51.7 percent in 2009, declining 0.4 percent in 2010, 3.5 percent in 2011 and 5.1 percent in 2012. The annual number of part-time for economic reasons decreased 2.3 percent in 2013 and fell 9.1 percent in 2014. The annual number of part-time for economic reasons fell 11.7 percent in 2015 and fell 6.7 percent in 2016. The number of part-time for economic reasons decreased 7.6 percent in Dec 2016 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reason fell 11.3 percent in Dec 2017 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell 6.3 percent in Dec 2018 relative to a year earlier and decreased 10.4 percent in Dec 2019 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons jumped 138.3 percent in Apr 2020 relative to a year earlier and 37.2 percent in Feb 2021 relative to a year earlier in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The level of part-time for economic reasons increased 0.6 percent in Mar 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreased 52.9 percent in Apr 2021 relative to a year earlier, decreasing 51.6 percent in May 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased 48.0 percent in Jun 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreased 46.3 percent in Jul 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased 41.4 percent in Aug 2021 relative to a year earlier, decreasing 30.6 percent in Sep 2021 relative to a year earlier, decreasing 35.4 percent in Oct 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreasing 35.9 percent in Nov 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased 35.2 percent in Dec 2021 and decreased 32.0 percent in 2021 relative to 2020. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased 1.4 percent in Dec 2022 relative to a year earlier and decreased 20.0 percent relative to 2021. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased 8.3 percent in Dec 2023 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased 14.8 percent in Sep 2024 relative to a year earlier.

Chart I-10, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons NSA 12-Month Percentage Change, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-11 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the same pattern of the number marginally attached to the labor force jumping to significantly higher levels during the global recession and remaining at historically high levels. The number marginally attached to the labor force not seasonally adjusted increased from 1.295 million in Jan 2001 to 1.691 million in Feb 2004. The number of marginally attached to the labor force fell to 1.299 million in Sep 2006 and increased to 2.609 million in Dec 2010 and 2.800 million in Jan 2011. The number marginally attached to the labor force was 2.540 million in Dec 2011, increasing to 2.809 million in Jan 2012, falling to 2.608 million in Feb 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell to 2.352 million in Mar 2012, 2.363 million in Apr 2012, 2.423 million in May 2012, 2.483 million in Jun 2012, 2.529 million in Jul 2012 and 2.561 million in Aug 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell to 2.517 million in Sep 2012, 2.433 million in Oct 2012, 2.505 million in Nov 2012 and 2.427 million in Dec 2013. The number marginally attached to the labor force reached 2.260 million in Dec 2014 and 1.833 million in Dec 2015. The number marginally attached to the labor force stood at 1.684 million in Dec 2016. The level marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.623 million in Dec 2017. The level of marginally attached to the labor force stood at 1.556 million in Dec 2018 and 1.246 million in Dec 2019. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 2.197 million in Dec 2020. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.671 million in Dec 2021. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.260 million in Dec 2022. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.567 million in Dec 2023. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.676 million in Sep 2024.

Chart I-11, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-12 provides 12-month percentage changes of the marginally attached to the labor force from 2001 to 2024. There was a jump of 56.1 percent in May 2009 during the global recession followed by declines in percentage changes but insufficient negative changes. On an annual basis, the number of marginally attached to the labor force increased in four consecutive years: 15.7 percent in 2008, 37.9 percent in 2009, 11.7 percent in 2010 and 3.5 percent in 2011. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 2.2 percent on an annual basis in 2012 but increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012, fell 13.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013, falling 10.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. The number marginally attached to the labor force increased 4.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 and fell 4.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and 8.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013. The annual number of marginally attached to the labor force fell 6.2 percent in 2013 and fell 6.5 percent in 2014. The annual number of marginally attached to the labor force fell 11.4 percent in 2015. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 7.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 and fell 6.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 18.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015 and decreased 8.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016. The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017. The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 4.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2018 and decreased 19.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019. The level of marginally attached to the labor force increased 64.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2020 and increased 29.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 23.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021 and decreased 24.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2022. The level of marginally attached to the labor force increased 24.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2023. The level of marginally attached to the labor force increased 12.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2024.

Chart I-12, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Table I-4 consists of data and additional calculations using the BLS household survey, illustrating the possibility that the actual rate of unemployment could be 9.0 percent and the number of people in job stress could be around 22.1 million, which is 12.4 percent of the effective labor force. Unemployment increased sharply while employment declined rapidly in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-october-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-january-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-february-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-march-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-may-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-october-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm). There is increasing employment and reduction of unemployment in the gradual return of economic activity in May 2020-Sep 2024. The first column provides for 2006 the yearly average population (POP), labor force (LF), participation rate or labor force as percent of population (PART %), employment (EMP), employment population ratio (EMP/POP %), unemployment (UEM), the unemployment rate as percent of labor force (UEM/LF Rate %) and the number of people not in the labor force (NLF). All data are unadjusted or not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA). The numbers in column 2006 are average in millions while the monthly numbers for Sep 2023, Aug 2024 and Sep 2024 are in thousands, not seasonally adjusted. The average yearly participation rate of the population in the labor force was in the range of 66.0 percent minimum to 67.1 percent maximum between 2000 and 2006 with the average of 66.4 percent (https://www.bls.gov/data/). Table I-4b provides the yearly labor force participation rate from 1979 to 2024. The objective of Table I-4 is to assess how many people could have left the labor force because they do not think they can find another job. Abraham, Hatiwanger, Sandusky and Spletzer (2016) find that “unemployment duration has a strongly negative effect on the likelihood of subsequent employment.” Row “LF PART 66.2 %” applies the participation rate of 2006, almost equal to the rates for 2000 to 2006, to the noninstitutional civilian population in Sep 2023, Aug 2024 and Sep 2024 to obtain what would be the labor force of the US if the participation rate had not changed. In fact, the participation rate fell to 62.7 percent by Sep 2023 and was 62.8 percent in Aug 2024 and 62.6 percent in Sep 2024, suggesting that many people simply gave up on finding another job. There is also abrupt decrease in employment and increase in unemployment in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Row “∆ NLF UEM” calculates the number of people not counted in the labor force because they could have given up on finding another job by subtracting from the labor force with participation rate of 66.2 percent (row “LF PART 66.2%”) the labor force estimated in the household survey (row “LF”). Total unemployed (row “Total UEM”) is obtained by adding unemployed in row “∆NLF UEM” to the unemployed of the household survey in row “UEM.” The row “Total UEM%” is the effective total unemployed “Total UEM” as percent of the effective labor force in row “LF PART 66.2%.” The results are that:

there are an estimated 9.562 million unemployed in Sep 2024 who are not counted because they left the labor force on their belief they could not find another job (∆NLF UEM), that is, they dropped out of their job searches
the total number of unemployed is effectively 16.086 million (Total UEM) and not 9.562 million (UEM) of whom many have been unemployed long term
the rate of unemployment is 9.0 percent (Total UEM%) and not 3.9 percent, not seasonally adjusted, or 4.1 percent seasonally adjusted
the number of people in job stress is close to 22.751 million by adding the 9.220 million leaving the labor force because they believe they could not find another job, corresponding to 12.8 percent of the effective labor force.

The row “In Job Stress” in Table I-4 provides the number of people in job stress not seasonally adjusted at 22.059 million in Sep 2024, adding the total number of unemployed (“Total UEM”), plus those involuntarily in part-time jobs because they cannot find anything else (“Part Time Economic Reasons”) and the marginally attached to the labor force (“Marginally attached to LF”). The final row of Table I-4 shows that the number of people in job stress is equivalent to 12.4 percent of the labor force in Sep 2024.

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/us-consumer-price-index-increased-79.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/us-consumer-price-index-increased-75.html). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. The number of hiring relative to the number unemployed measures the chances of becoming employed. The number of hiring in the US economy has declined by 10 million and does not show signs of increasing in an unusual recovery without hiring Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 60 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2024 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIQ2024 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/gdp2q24-3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $16,743.2 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $16,269.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($16,743.2/$16,269.1) -1]100 = 2.9%] or accumulating the quarter-on-quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united_11.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IVQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1997 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united_11.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $10,090.6 billion of chained 2017 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9951.9 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2024 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 62.9 percent. GDP in IIQ2024 would be $27,548.1 billion (in constant dollars of 2017) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4324.2 billion than actual $23,223.9 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 22.1 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.4 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html). US GDP in IIQ2024 is 15.7 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $16,915.2 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $23,223.9 billion in IIQ2024 or 37.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.9 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.8 percent per year from Sep 1919 to Sep 2024. Growth at 2.8 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.7431 in Dec 2007 to 169.5214 in Sep 2024. The actual index NSA in Sep 2024 is 99.4333 which is 41.3 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing output grew at average 1.5 percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.5 percent per year, the index would increase to 136.9765 in Sep 2024. The output of manufacturing at 99.4333 in Sep 2024 is 27.4 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.3270 in Jun 2007 to the low of 84.5996 in Jun 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.5996 in Apr 2009 to 99.9001 in Sep 2024 or 18.1 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6449 in Dec 2007 to 186.1954 in Sep 2024. The NAICS index at 99.9001 in Sep 2024 is 46.3 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6449 in Dec 2007 to 138.7855 in Sep 2024. The NAICS index at 99.9001 in Sep 2024 is 28.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-4, US, Population, Labor Force and Unemployment, NSA

	2006	Sep 2023	Aug 2024	Sep 2024
POP	229	267.428	268.856	269.080
LF	151	167.718	168.763	168.569
PART%	66.2	62.7	62.8	62.6
EMP	144	161.669	161.348	162.046
EMP/POP%	63.1	60.5	60.0	60.2
UEM	7	6.049	7.415	6.524
UEM/LF Rate%	4.6	3.6	4.4	3.9
NLF	77	99.710	100.092	100.511
LF PART 66.2%		177.037	177.983	178.131
∆NLF UEM		9.319	9.220	9.562
Total UEM		15.368	16.635	16.086
Total UEM%		8.7	9.3	9.0
Part Time Economic Reasons		3.742	4.757	4.297
Marginally Attached to LF		1.492	1.359	1.676
In Job Stress		20.602	22.751	22.059
People in Job Stress as % Labor Force		11.6	12.8	12.4

Pop: population; LF: labor force; PART: participation; EMP: employed; UEM: unemployed; NLF: not in labor force; ∆NLF UEM: additional unemployed; Total UEM is UEM + ∆NLF UEM; Total UEM% is Total UEM as percent of LF PART 66.2%; In Job Stress = Total UEM + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached to LF

Note: the first column for 2006 is in average millions; the remaining columns are in thousands; NSA: not seasonally adjusted

The labor force participation rate of 66.2% in 2006 is applied to current population to obtain LF PART 66.2%; ∆NLF UEM is obtained by subtracting the labor force with participation of 66.2 percent from the household survey labor force LF; Total UEM is household data unemployment plus ∆NLF UEM; and total UEM% is total UEM divided by LF PART 66.2%

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 3) of secular stagnation, economic progress consists of growth of real income per person driven by growth of productivity. The “constituent elements” of economic progress are “(a) inventions, (b) the discovery and development of new territory and new resources, and (c) the growth of population” (Hansen 1939, 3). Secular stagnation originates in decline of population growth and discouragement of inventions. According to Hansen (1939, 2), US population grew by 16 million in the 1920s but grew by one half or about 8 million in the 1930s with forecasts at the time of Hansen’s writing in 1938 of growth of around 5.3 million in the 1940s. Hansen (1939, 2) characterized demography in the US as “a drastic decline in the rate of population growth. Hansen’s plea was to adapt economic policy to stagnation of population in ensuring full employment. In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 8), population caused half of the growth of US GDP per year. Growth of output per person in the US and Europe was caused by “changes in techniques and to the exploitation of new natural resources.” In this analysis, population caused 60 percent of the growth of capital formation in the US. Declining population growth would reduce growth of capital formation. Residential construction provided an important share of growth of capital formation. Hansen (1939, 12) argues that market power of imperfect competition discourages innovation with prolonged use of obsolete capital equipment. Trade unions would oppose labor-savings innovations. The combination of stagnating and aging population with reduced innovation caused secular stagnation. Hansen (1939, 12) concludes that there is role for public investments to compensate for lack of dynamism of private investment but with tough tax/debt issues.

The current application of Hansen’s (1938, 1939, 1941) proposition argues that secular stagnation occurs because full employment equilibrium can be attained only with negative real interest rates between minus 2 and minus 3 percent. Professor Lawrence H. Summers (2013Nov8) finds that “a set of older ideas that went under the phrase secular stagnation are not profoundly important in understanding Japan’s experience in the 1990s and may not be without relevance to America’s experience today” (emphasis added). Summers (2013Nov8) argues there could be an explanation in “that the short-term real interest rate that was consistent with full employment had fallen to -2% or -3% sometime in the middle of the last decade. Then, even with artificial stimulus to demand coming from all this financial imprudence, you wouldn’t see any excess demand. And even with a relative resumption of normal credit conditions, you’d have a lot of difficulty getting back to full employment.” The US economy could be in a situation where negative real rates of interest with fed funds rates close to zero as determined by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) do not move the economy to full employment or full utilization of productive resources. Summers (2013Oct8) finds need of new thinking on “how we manage an economy in which the zero nominal interest rates is a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economy activity holding our economies back to their potential.”

Former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (2014Jan8) finds three major risks in prolonged unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing: (1) incentive of delaying action by political leaders; (2) “financial moral hazard” in inducing excessive exposures pursuing higher yields of risker credit classes; and (3) major risks in exiting unconventional policy. Rubin (2014Jan8) proposes reduction of deficits by structural reforms that could promote recovery by improving confidence of business attained with sound fiscal discipline.

Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) provides clear thought on the lack of relevance of Hansen’s contention of secular stagnation to current economic conditions. The application of secular stagnation argues that the economy of the US has attained full-employment equilibrium since around 2000 only with negative real rates of interest of minus 2 to minus 3 percent. At low levels of inflation, the so-called full-employment equilibrium of negative interest rates of minus 2 to minus 3 percent cannot be attained and the economy stagnates. Taylor (2014Jan01) analyzes multiple contradictions with current reality in this application of the theory of secular stagnation:

Secular stagnation would predict idle capacity, in particular in residential investment when fed fund rates were fixed at 1 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. Taylor (2014Jan01) finds unemployment at 4.4 percent with house prices jumping 7 percent from 2002 to 2003 and 14 percent from 2004 to 2005 before dropping from 2006 to 2007. GDP prices doubled from 1.7 percent to 3.4 percent when interest rates were low from 2003 to 2005.
Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the application of secular stagnation based on low interest rates because of savings glut and lack of investment opportunities. Taylor (2009) shows that there was no savings glut. The savings rate of the US in the past decade is significantly lower than in the 1980s.
Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the low ratio of investment to GDP currently and reduced investment and hiring by US business firms.
Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the financial crisis and global recession were caused by weak implementation of existing regulation and departure from rules-based policies.
Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the recovery from the global recession was constrained by a change in the regime of regulation and fiscal/monetary policies.

In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share s_i of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate y_i of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):

Y = ∑_is_iy_i (1)

This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):

∆Y = ∑_i∆s_iy*_i+ ∑_i∆y_is*_i (2)

The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆s_i multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*_i, or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆y_i, multiplied by the average share of the group s*_i,or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:

“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”

Table I-4b and Chart I-12-b provide the US labor force participation rate or percentage of the labor force in population. It is not likely that simple demographic trends caused the sharp decline during the global recession and failure to recover earlier levels. The civilian labor force participation rate dropped from the peak of 66.9 percent in Jul 2006 to 62.6 percent in Dec 2013, 62.5 percent in Dec 2014, 62.4 percent in Dec 2015 and 62.4 in Dec 2016. The civilian labor force participation rate reached 62.4 in Dec 2017, and 63.1 percent in 2019. The civilian labor force participation rate was at 62.9 percent in Nov 2018 and 62.8 percent in Dec 2018. The civilian labor force participation was 63.0 in Dec 2019. The civilian labor force participation rate was 61.3 in Dec 2020. The civilian labor force participation rate was 61.7 percent in Dec 2021. The civilian labor force participation rate was 62.0 in Dec 2022. The civilian labor force participation rate was 62.2 in Dec 2023. The civilian labor force participation was 62.6 in Sep 2024. The civilian labor force participation rate was 63.7 percent on an annual basis in 1979 and 63.4 percent in Dec 1980 and Dec 1981, reaching even 62.9 percent in both Apr and May 1979. The civilian labor force participation rate jumped with the recovery to 64.8 percent on an annual basis in 1985 and 65.9 percent in Jul 1985. Structural factors cannot explain these sudden changes vividly shown visually in the final segment of Chart I-12b. Seniors would likely delay their retiring especially because of the adversities of financial repression on their savings. Labor force statistics are capturing the disillusion of potential workers with their chances in finding a job in what Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) characterize as accentuated cyclical factors. The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/us-consumer-price-index-increased-79.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/us-consumer-price-index-increased-75.html). “Secular stagnation” would be a process over many years and not from one year to another. This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals.

Table I-4b, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2024

Year	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Dec	Annual
1979	62.9	64.5	64.9	64.5	63.8	63.8	63.7
1980	63.5	64.6	65.1	64.5	63.6	63.4	63.8
1981	63.9	64.6	65.0	64.6	63.5	63.4	63.9
1982	63.9	64.8	65.3	64.9	64.0	63.8	64.0
1983	63.4	65.1	65.4	65.1	64.3	63.8	64.0
1984	64.3	65.5	65.9	65.2	64.4	64.3	64.4
1985	64.6	65.5	65.9	65.4	64.9	64.6	64.8
1986	65.0	66.3	66.6	66.1	65.3	65.0	65.3
1987	65.6	66.3	66.8	66.5	65.5	65.5	65.6
1988	65.5	66.7	67.1	66.8	65.9	65.9	65.9
1989	66.2	67.4	67.7	67.2	66.3	66.3	66.5
1990	66.5	67.4	67.7	67.1	66.4	66.1	66.5
1991	66.0	67.2	67.3	66.6	66.1	65.8	66.2
1992	66.4	67.6	67.9	67.2	66.3	66.1	66.4
1993	66.3	67.3	67.5	67.0	66.1	66.2	66.3
1994	66.5	67.2	67.5	67.2	66.5	66.5	66.6
1995	66.4	67.2	67.7	67.1	66.5	66.2	66.6
1996	66.7	67.4	67.9	67.2	66.8	66.7	66.8
1997	67.0	67.8	68.1	67.6	67.0	67.0	67.1
1998	67.0	67.7	67.9	67.3	67.0	67.0	67.1
1999	67.0	67.7	67.9	67.3	66.8	67.0	67.1
2000	67.0	67.7	67.6	67.2	66.7	67.0	67.1
2001	66.6	67.2	67.4	66.8	66.6	66.6	66.8
2002	66.5	67.1	67.2	66.8	66.6	66.2	66.6
2003	66.2	67.0	66.8	66.3	65.9	65.8	66.2
2004	65.8	66.5	66.8	66.2	65.7	65.8	66.0
2005	66.0	66.5	66.8	66.5	66.1	65.9	66.0
2006	66.0	66.7	66.9	66.5	66.1	66.3	66.2
2007	65.8	66.6	66.8	66.1	66.0	65.9	66.0
2008	66.0	66.6	66.8	66.4	65.9	65.7	66.0
2009	65.5	66.2	66.2	65.6	65.0	64.4	65.4
2010	64.8	65.1	65.3	65.0	64.6	64.1	64.7
2011	64.1	64.5	64.6	64.3	64.2	63.8	64.1
2012	63.8	64.3	64.3	63.7	63.6	63.4	63.7
2013	63.5	64.0	64.0	63.4	63.2	62.6	63.2
2014	62.9	63.4	63.5	63.0	62.8	62.5	62.9
2015	63.0	63.1	63.2	62.7	62.3	62.4	62.7
2016	62.7	63.2	63.4	62.9	62.8	62.4	62.8
2017	62.8	63.3	63.5	63.0	63.0	62.4	62.9
2018	62.8	63.4	63.5	62.7	62.7	62.8	62.9
2019	62.8	63.4	63.6	63.2	63.1	63.0	63.1
2020	60.7	61.8	62.0	61.8	61.4	61.3	61.7
2021	61.5	62.1	62.3	61.8	61.7	61.7	61.7
2022	62.3	62.5	62.6	62.4	62.2	62.0	62.2
2023	62.5	62.9	63.1	62.9	62.7	62.2	62.6
2024	62.5	63.0	63.2	62.8	62.6

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-12b, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2024

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Broader perspective is in Chart I-12c of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The United States civilian noninstitutional population has increased along a consistent trend since 1948 that continued through earlier recessions and the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 and the cyclical expansion after IIIQ2009.

Chart I-12c, US, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Thousands, NSA, 1948-2024

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The labor force of the United States in Chart I-12d has increased along a trend similar to that of the civilian noninstitutional population in Chart I-12c. There is an evident stagnation of the civilian labor force in the final segment of Chart I-12d during the current economic cycle, with growth below historical trend. This stagnation is explained by cyclical factors similar to those analyzed by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) that motivated an increasing population to drop out of the labor force instead of structural factors. Large segments of the potential labor force are not observed, constituting unobserved unemployment and of more permanent nature because those afflicted have been seriously discouraged from working by the lack of opportunities.

Chart I-12d, US, Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 1948-2024

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The rate of labor force participation in the US is in Chart I-12E from 1948 to 2024. There is sudden decline during the global recession after 2007 without recovery explained by cyclical factors (Lazear and Spletzer2012JHJul22) as many potential workers stopped their searches disillusioned that there could be an opportunity for them in sharply contracted markets.

Chart I-12E, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1948-2024

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

IA4 Job Creation. What is striking about the data in Table I-8 is that the numbers of monthly increases in jobs in 1983 and 1985 are higher than in 2010 to 2019. The civilian noninstitutional population grew by 48.8 percent from 174.215 million in 1983 to 259.175 million in 2019 and labor force higher by 46.6 percent, growing from 111.550 million in 1983 to 163.539 million in 2019. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 259.175 million in 2019 to 261.445 million in 2021 and the labor force decreased from 163.539 million in 2019 to 161.204 million in 2021. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 261.445 million in 2021 to 263.973 million in 2022 and the labor force increased from 161.204 million in 2021 to 164.287 million in 2022. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 263.973 million in 2022 to 266.942 million in 2023 and the labor force increased from 164.287 million in 2022 to 167.116 million in 2023.

Closing the economy to mitigate the infection of COVID-19 could deepen the global recession. Gradual reopening in May-2020 to Sep 2024 is recovering jobs. The number employed in Sep 2024 was 162.046 million (NSA) or 14.731 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 269.080 million in Sep 2024 or by 37.122 million. The number employed increased 10.0 percent from Jul 2007 to Sep 2024 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 16.0 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Sep 2024 would result in 170.866 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 269.080 million). There are effectively 8.820 million fewer jobs in Sep 2024 than in Sep 2007, or 170.866 million minus 162.046 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs. Total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 254 thousand in Sep 2024 and private payroll employment increased 223 thousand. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm): “Our analysis suggests that the net effect of these hurricanes [Harvey and Irma] was to reduce the estimate of total nonfarm payroll employment for September. There was no discernible effect on the national unemployment rate. No changes were made to either the establishment or household survey estimation procedures for the September figures.” A hurdle in analyzing the labor market is the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm). Nonfarm jobs seasonally adjusted increased from 153,536 thousand in Sep 2022 to 156,667 thousand in Sep 2023 and increased to 159,105 thousand in Sep 2024. Private jobs seasonally adjusted increased from 131,265 thousand in Sep 2022 to 133,764 thousand in Sep 2023, increasing to 135,684 thousand in Sep 2024. This situation will continue to challenge measurement (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm) and the return to fuller employment is unpredictable.

Table I-8, US, Monthly Change in Jobs, Number SA

Month	1981	1982	1983	2008	2009	2010	Private
Jan	90	-330	219	1	-782	-12	-21
Feb	72	-2	-73	-71	-752	-93	-78
Mar	105	-129	173	-70	-820	163	121
Apr	73	-284	274	-219	-669	250	199
May	13	-43	280	-190	-355	530	103
Jun	194	-242	377	-158	-467	-144	112
Jul	111	-344	416	-197	-342	-81	90
Aug	-36	-158	-308	-283	-181	3	152
Sep	-88	-180	1118	-450	-239	-83	90
Oct	-97	-276	273	-465	-180	280	230
Nov	-209	-121	355	-748	-2	134	144
Dec	-276	-15	355	-698	-252	82	103
			1984			2011	Private
Jan			443			3	11
Feb			484			215	258
Mar			272			224	247
Apr			363			326	334
May			306			100	155
Jun			381			232	197
Jul			310			56	171
Aug			243			131	163
Sep			312			223	257
Oct			285			211	196
Nov			353			144	171
Dec			125			201	218
			1985			2012	Private
Jan			265			341	349
Feb			131			278	277
Mar			339			224	228
Apr			196			83	95
May			274			107	127
Jun			147			73	54
Jul			189			145	162
Aug			192			176	173
Sep			205			183	174
Oct			188			160	182
Nov			210			159	179
Dec			166			243	239
			1986			2013	Private
Jan			123			189	207
Feb			115			285	273
Mar			87			142	153
Apr			187			186	187
May			127			214	219
Jun			-93			179	203
Jul			318			122	147
Aug			115			243	227
Sep			346			185	181
Oct			187			220	225
Nov			187			273	260
Dec			201			55	78
			1987			2014	Private
Jan			169			184	190
Feb			241			159	148
Mar			245			277	269
Apr			335			311	291
May			229			202	223
Jun			172			333	270
Jul			347			243	237
Aug			173			181	227
Sep			227			307	265
Oct			491			240	220
Nov			234			284	269
Dec			289			278	263
			1988			2015	Private
Jan			92			196	183
Feb			461			269	251
Mar			275			94	102
Apr			243			277	242
May			230			337	330
Jun			364			156	153
Jul			224			294	259
Aug			124			141	131
Sep			339			135	155
Oct			263			319	303
Nov			341			226	201
Dec			281			273	257
			1989			2016	Private
Jan			263			113	96
Feb			266			215	191
Mar			194			255	215
Apr			170			190	184
May			122			45	30
Jun			114			251	270
Jul			42			363	254
Aug			51			149	154
Sep			249			297	258
Oct			107			108	136
Nov			276			119	137
Dec			84			222	195
			1990			2017	Private
Jan			353			226	214
Feb			243			212	202
Mar			205			128	125
Apr			34			197	191
May			163			216	204
Jun			23			199	186
Jul			-35			184	170
Aug			-212			135	199
Sep			-90			92	69
Oct			-146			147	119
Nov			-154			229	211
Dec			-52			146	141
			1991			2018	Private
Jan			-117			146	156
Feb			-320			387	342
Mar			-162			226	218
Apr			-217			146	129
May			-102			329	324
Jun			88			213	180
Jul			-48			55	101
Aug			12			251	219
Sep			31			87	81
Oct			29			164	159
Nov			-62			97	103
Dec			30			182	144
			1992			2019	Private
Jan			37			258	261
Feb			-55			5	-12
Mar			49			227	183
Apr			154			308	258
May			133			38	95
Jun			69			204	162
Jul			82			90	122
Aug			124			221	168
Sep			31			203	175
Oct			181			100	83
Nov			145			208	169
Dec			220			126	109
			1993			2020
Jan			295			253	192
Feb			249			264	184
Mar			-52			-1411	-1376
Apr			303			-20477	-19560
May			275			2619	3139
Jun			181			4615	4582
Jul			309			1585	1476
Aug			149			1534	1084
Sep			245			1046	1098
Oct			280			673	844
Nov			256			268	349
Dec			334			-243	-236
			1994			2021
Jan			274			398	286
Feb			181			527	538
Mar			461			831	747
Apr			347			319	267
May			336			451	447
Jun			314			778	677
Jul			370			939	880
Aug			292			465	451
Sep			354			480	496
Oct			205			860	899
Nov			415			631	626
Dec			303			566	539
			1995			2022
Jan			328			251	263
Feb			189			862	865
Mar			214			494	495
Apr			158			272	239
May			-15			286	258
Jun			236			420	418
Jul			91			690	540
Aug			262			243	244
Sep			241			255	248
Oct			149			361	331
Nov			139			258	195
Dec			157			136	133
			1996			2023
Jan			-7			482	359
Feb			416			287	226
Mar			256			146	91
Apr			166			278	231
May			333			303	254
Jun			281			240	185
Jul			246			184	148
Aug			185			210	150
Sep			201			246	196
Oct			261			165	98
Nov			286			182	152
Dec			196			290	214
			1997			2024
Jan			218			256	196
Feb			312			236	181
Mar			314			310	232
Apr			295			108	108
May			267			216	206
Jun			265			118	97
Jul			296			144	99
Aug			-20			159	114
Sep			485			254	223
Oct			346
Nov			307
Dec			321

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Charts numbered from I-38 to I-41 from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide a comparison of payroll survey data for the contractions and expansions in the 1980s and after 2007. Chart I-38 provides total nonfarm payroll jobs from 2001 to 2024. The sharp decline in total nonfarm jobs during the contraction after 2007 has been followed by initial stagnation and then inadequate growth in 2012 and 2013-2020 while population growth continued. There is sharp contraction in the final segment in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-38, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-39 provides total nonfarm jobs SA from 1979 to 1997. Recovery is strong throughout the decade with the economy growing at trend over the entire economic cycle. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the decline of the curve in 1990 followed by incipient recovery.

Chart I-39, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1997

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Most job creation in the US is by the private sector. Chart I-40 shows the sharp destruction of private payroll jobs during the contraction after 2007. There has been growth after 2010 but insufficient to recover higher levels of employment, adjusting for population growth, prevailing before the contraction. At current rates, recovery of employment may spread over several years in contrast with past expansions of the business cycle in the US. There is sharp contraction in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-40, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

In contrast, growth of private payroll jobs in the US recovered vigorously during the expansion in 1983 through 1985, as shown in Chart I-41. Rapid growth of creation of private jobs continued throughout the 1980s. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the decline of the curve in 1990 followed by recovery.

Chart I-41, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1997

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/global-financial-risk-mediocre-united.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

The NBER dates recessions in the US from peaks to troughs as: IQ80 to IIIQ80, IIIQ81 to IV82 and IVQ07 to IIQ09 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). Table I-12 provides total annual level nonfarm employment in the US for the 1980s and the 2000s, which is different from 12-month comparisons. Nonfarm jobs rose by 4.859 million from 1982 to 1984, or 5.4 percent, and continued rapid growth in the rest of the decade. In contrast, nonfarm jobs are down by 7.636 million in 2010 relative to 2007 and fell by 951,000 in 2010 relative to 2009 even after six quarters of GDP growth. Monetary and fiscal stimuli have failed in increasing growth to rates required for mitigating job stress. The initial growth impulse reflects a flatter growth curve in the current expansion. Nonfarm jobs declined from 137.981 million in 2007 to 136.363 million in 2013, by 1.618 million or 1.2 percent. Nonfarm jobs increased from 137.981 million in 2007 to 150.904 million in 2019, by 12.923 million or 9.4 percent. The US noninstitutional population or in condition to work increased from 231.867 million in 2007 to 259.175 million in 2019, by 27.308 million or 11.8 percent. The ratio of nonfarm jobs of 137.981 million in 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.867 was 59.5. Nonfarm jobs in 2019 corresponding to the ratio of 59.5 of nonfarm jobs/noninstitutional population would be 154.209 million (0.595x259.175). The difference between actual nonfarm jobs of 150.904 million in 2019 and nonfarm jobs of 154.209 million that are equivalent to 59.5 percent of the noninstitutional population as in 2007 is 3.305 million fewer jobs. The proper explanation for this loss of work opportunities is not in secular stagnation but in cyclically slow growth. The NBER dates recessions in the US from peaks to troughs as: IQ80 to IIIQ80, IIIQ81 to IV82 and IVQ07 to IIQ09 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 60 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2024 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIQ2024 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/gdp2q24-3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $16,743.2 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $16,269.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($16,743.2/$16,269.1) -1]100 = 2.9%] or accumulating the quarter-on-quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united_11.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IVQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1997 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united_11.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $10,090.6 billion of chained 2017 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9951.9 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2024 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 62.9 percent. GDP in IIQ2024 would be $27,548.1 billion (in constant dollars of 2017) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4324.2 billion than actual $23,223.9 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 22.1 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.4 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html). US GDP in IIQ2024 is 15.7 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $16,915.2 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $23,223.9 billion in IIQ2024 or 37.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.9 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.8 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Aug 2024. Growth at 2.8 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.7431 in Dec 2007 to 169.1333 in Aug 2024. The actual index NSA in Aug 2024 is 100.6046 which is 40.5 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing output grew at average 1.5 percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.5 percent per year, the index would increase to 136.8073 in Aug 2024. The output of manufacturing at 100.6046 in Aug 2024 is 26.5 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.3270 in Jun 2007 to the low of 84.5996 in Jun 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.5996 in Apr 2009 to 100.9925 in Aug 2024 or 19.4 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6449 in Dec 2007 to 185.6645 in Aug 2024. The NAICS index at 100.9925 in Aug 2024 is 45.6 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6449 in Dec 2007 to 138.5914 in Aug 2024. The NAICS index at 100.9925 in Aug 2024 is 27.1 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Employment in Thousands

Year	Total Nonfarm	Year	Total Nonfarm
1980	90,533	2000	132,011
1981	91,297	2001	132,073
1982	89,689	2002	130,634
1983	90,295	2003	130,330
1984	94,548	2004	131,769
1985	97,532	2005	134,033
1986	99,500	2006	136,435
1987	102,116	2007	137,981
1988	105,378	2008	137,224
1989	108,051	2009	131,296
1990	109,527	2010	130,345
1991	108,425	2011	131,914
1992	108,799	2012	134,157
1993	110,931	2013	136,363
1994	114,393	2014	138,939
1995	117,401	2015	141,824
1996	119,828	2016	144,335
1997	122,941	2017	146,607
1998	126,146	2018	148,908
1999	129,228	2019	150,904
		2020	142,186
		2021	146,285
		2022	152,520
		2023	156,051

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

Chart I-43 provides annual nonfarm jobs from 2000 to 2019. Cyclically slow growth in the expansion since IIIQ2009 has not been sufficient to recover nonfarm jobs. Because of population growth, there are 3.304 million fewer nonfarm jobs in the US in 2019 than in 2007.

Chart I-43, US, Annual Nonfarm Jobs, NSA, Thousands, 2000-2019

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

Chart I-44 provides annual nonfarm jobs in the US from 1980 to 1999. Much more rapid cyclical growth as in other expansions historically allowed steady and rapid growth of nonfarm job opportunities even with similarly dynamic population growth.

Chart I-44, US, Annual Nonfarm Jobs, NSA, Thousands, 1980-1999

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

The highest average yearly percentage of unemployed to the labor force since 1940 was 14.6 percent in 1940 followed by 9.9 percent in 1941, 8.5 percent in 1975, 9.7 percent in 1982 and 9.6 percent in 1983 (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2006/pdf/cpsaat1.pdf). The rate of unemployment remained at high levels in the 1930s, rising from 3.2 percent in 1929 to 22.9 percent in 1932 in one estimate and 23.6 percent in another with real wages increasing by 16.4 percent (Margo 1993, 43; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 214-5). There are alternative estimates of 17.2 percent or 9.5 percent for 1940 with real wages increasing by 44 percent. Employment declined sharply during the 1930s. The number of hours worked remained in 1939 at 29 percent below the level of 1929 (Cole and Ohanian 1999). Private hours worked fell in 1939 to 25 percent of the level in 1929. The policy of encouraging collusion through the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), to maintain high prices, together with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), to maintain high wages, prevented the US economy from recovering employment levels until Roosevelt abandoned these policies toward the end of the 1930s (for review of the literature analyzing the Great Depression see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 198-217).

Table I-13, US, Total Nonfarm and Total Private Jobs Destroyed and Subsequently Created in Two Recessions IIIQ1981-IVQ1982 and IVQ2007-IIQ2009, Thousands and Percent

	Total Nonfarm Jobs	Total Private Jobs
06/1981 #	92,288	75,969
11/1982 #	89,482	73,260
Change #	-2,806	-2,709
Change ∆%	-3.0	-3.6
12/1982 #	89,383	73,185
05/1984 #	94,471	78,049
Change #	5,088	4,864
Change ∆%	5.7	6.6
11/2007 #	139,090	116,291
05/2009 #	131,626	108,601
Change %	-7,464	-7,690
Change ∆%	-5.4	-6.6
12/2009 #	130,178	107,338
05/2011 #	131,753	108,494
Change #	1,575	1,156
Change ∆%	1.2	1.1
05/1983 #	90,005	73,667
05/1984 #	94,471	78,049
Change #	4,466	4,382
Change ∆%	4.9	5.9
05/2010 #	130,801	107,405
05/2011 #	131,753	109,203
Change #	952	1,798
Change ∆%	0.7	1.7
Change # by ∆% as in 05/1984 to 05/1985	6,409*	6,337**
Difference in Jobs that Would Have Been Created	5,457 = 6,409-952	4,539 = 6,337-1,798

*[(130,801x1.049)-130,801] = 6,409 thousand

**[(107,405)x1.059 – 107,405] = 6,337 thousand

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html

Table IB-1, US, Earnings per Hour and Average Weekly Hours SA

Earnings per Hour	Sep 2023	Jul 2024	Aug 2024	Sep 2024
Total Private	$34.01	$35.07	$35.23	$35.36
Goods Producing	$34.46	$35.84	$35.97	36.14
Service Providing	$33.91	$34.90	$35.06	$35.17
Average Weekly Earnings
Total Private	$1,169.94	$1,199.39	$1,208.39	$1,209.31
Goods Producing	$1,374.95	$1,422.85	$1,431.61	$1,441.99
Service Providing	$1,129.20	$1,158.68	$1,163.99	$1,164.13
Average Weekly Hours
Total Private	34.4	34.2	34.3	34.2
Goods Producing	39.9	39.7	39.8	39.9
Service Providing	33.3	33.2	33.2	33.1

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Average weekly hours in Table IB-2 fell from 34.8 in Dec 2007 at the beginning of the contraction to 33.7 in Jun 2009, which was the last month of the contraction. Average weekly hours rose to 34.4 in Dec 2011 and oscillated to 34.8 in Dec 2012 and 34.7 in Dec 2013. Average weekly hours of all employees decreased to 34.6 in Dec 2014 and 34.5 in Dec 2015. Average weekly hours stood at 34.3 in Dec 2016. Average weekly hours reached 34.5 in Dec 2017, increasing to 34.9 in Dec 2018. Average weekly hours moved to 34.7 in Dec 2019, 34.8 in Dec 2020, 34.8 in Dec 2021 and 34.4 in Dec 2022. Average weekly hours moved to 34.4 in Dec 2023. Average weekly hours were 34.6 in Sep 2024. The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (https://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent months.

Table IB-2, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, NSA 2006-2024

Year	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Dec	Annual
2006	34.1	34.4	34.7	34.5	34.3	34.4
2007	34.3	34.5	34.8	34.5	34.8	34.8	34.4
2008	34.2	34.8	34.3	34.5	34.2	33.9	34.3
2009	33.6	33.7	33.8	34.3	33.7	33.8	33.8
2010	34.4	34.1	34.2	34.7	34.1	34.2	34.1
2011	34.6	34.3	34.4	34.4	34.3	34.4	34.3
2012	34.2	34.4	34.7	34.5	34.8	34.8	34.5
2013	34.3	34.9	34.4	34.5	34.9	34.7	34.4
2014	34.4	34.9	34.5	34.6	34.5	34.6	34.5
2015	34.4	34.5	34.5	35.1	34.3	34.5	34.5
2016	34.6	34.4	34.4	34.4	34.4	34.3	34.4
2017	34.3	34.4	34.8	34.4	34.3	34.5	34.4
2018	34.4	34.6	34.9	34.6	34.8	34.9	34.5
2019	34.3	34.9	34.3	34.5	34.8	34.7	34.4
2020	34.6	34.6	34.5	35.1	34.5	34.8	34.6
2021	35.2	34.8	34.7	35.1	34.5	34.8	34.7
2022	34.8	34.6	34.5	34.5	34.5	34.4	34.5
2023	34.2	34.3	34.7	34.4	34.3	34.4	34.4
2024	34.2	34.7	34.1	34.3	34.6

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart IB-1 provides average weekly hours of all employees seasonally adjusted. There was sharp contraction during the global recession. Hours returned to levels before and above the contraction. There is recent decrease.

Chart IB-1, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, SA 2006-2024

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Calculations of inflation adjusted real weekly earnings by the BLS are in Table IB-5. Average weekly earnings fell 3.2 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Aug 2011, decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2011 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2011. Average weekly earnings fell 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2011 and fell 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2011. Average weekly earnings declined 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 and fell 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars were virtually flat in Mar 2012 relative to Mar 2011, decreasing 0.2 percent. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 1.7 percent in Apr 2012 relative to Apr 2011 but fell 1.7 percent in May 2012 relative to May 2011, increasing 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2012 and 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2012. Real weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 and 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2012 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2012 and 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 and virtually stagnated with gain of 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013, increasing 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013. Real weekly earnings fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 and fell 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013. Real weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013, 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013 and 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014 and 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014 and changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Real average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Real weekly earnings decreased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015 and increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015. Average weekly earnings increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015 and 4.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015 and increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016. Average weekly earnings contracted 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015 and contracted 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016 and increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016 and increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016 and increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016 and decreased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016. Average weekly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016 and increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017. Average weekly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2017 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2017 and increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2017 and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2017 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2018 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2018 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2018 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018 and decreased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 3.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2019 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2019 and increased 3.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2019 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 7.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 7.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 4.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 6.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 4.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 6.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 5.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2021. Average weekly earnings increased 2.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2021. Average weekly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2022. Average weekly earnings fell 3.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 5.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 2.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2023. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2023. Average hourly earnings decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2023. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars decreased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2023. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2023. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2023. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2023. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2024. Average weekly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2024. Real average weekly earnings decreased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2024. Real average weekly earnings decreased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2024. Real average hourly earnings increased 3.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2024. Table I-5 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average weekly earnings in 2011 and into 2013 with oscillations according to carry trades causing world inflation waves (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-70-percent-in.html). On an annual basis, average weekly earnings in constant 1982-1984 dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $354.18 in 2013, by 2.0 percent or at the average rate of 0.3 percent per year (data in https://www.bls.gov/data/). Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars of $352.92 in 2010 fell 0.4 percent to $351.56 in 2011. Annual average weekly earnings increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $356.84 in 2014 or by 2.8 at the average rate of 0.4 percent. Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $364.57 in 2015 by 5.0 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $367.11 in 2016 by 5.8 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $369.69 in 2017 by 6.5 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $372.90 in 2018 by 7.4 percent at the average rate of 0.7 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $376.70 in 2019 by 8.5 percent at the average rate of 0.7 percent per year. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer high-quality goods than a year earlier. Average weekly earnings increased from $376.70 in 2019 to $391.94 in 2020 by 4.0 percent and increased 0.1 percent from $391.94 in 2020 to $392.32 in 2021, decreasing 2.9 percent from $392.32 in 2021 to $380.76 and changed 0.1 percent from $380.76 in 2022 to $381.01 in in 2023 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The fractured US job market does not provide an opportunity for advancement as in past booms following recessions because of poor job creation with 22.1 million unemployed or underemployed (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/us-gdp-contracted-at-real-seasonally.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.

Table IB-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, NSA 2006-2024

Year	Jul	Aug	Sep	Dec
2006	345.81	340.43	344.02	351.16
2007	349.84	344.97	352.53	352.91
2008	334.32	338.41	338.90	354.11
2009	345.30	352.16	346.41	350.29
2010	351.55	358.27	352.80	355.14
2011	349.30	346.97	348.46	353.80
2012	355.63	348.33	355.81	361.34
∆%12M	1.8	0.4	2.1	2.1
2013	350.49	350.94	360.10	361.82
∆%12M	-1.4	0.7	1.2	0.1
2014	351.88	353.78	354.96	362.19
∆%12M	0.4	0.8	-1.4	0.1
2015	358.95	368.80	361.10	367.57
∆%12M	2.0	4.2	1.7	1.5
2016	364.83	364.21	366.61	367.53
∆%12M	1.6	-1.2	1.5	0.0
2017	374.60	366.67	367.71	371.98
∆%12M	2.7	0.7	0.3	1.2
2018	375.30	370.50	378.41	384.65
∆%12M	0.2	1.0	2.9	3.4
2019	372.45	375.72	383.57	384.98
∆%12M	-0.8	1.4	1.4	0.1
2020	389.07	398.51	390.36	398.67
∆%12M	4.5	6.1	1.8	3.6
2021	387.54	395.31	388.63	390.94
∆%12M	-0.4	-0.8	-0.4	-1.9
2022	374.95	375.67	377.65	380.86
∆%12M	-3.2	-5.0	-2.8	-2.6
2023	385.15	377.81	378.45	384.21
∆%12M	2.7	0.6	0.2	0.9
2024	378.58	381.58	389.68
∆%12M	-1.7	1.0	3.0

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics