Cumulative Growth of US Manufacturing of 2.2 Percent From Nov 2020 to Apr 2021 at Annual Equivalent 4.4 Percent and increasing 0.4 Percent in Apr 2021, US Manufacturing 24.4 Percent Higher Than A Year Earlier In the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, US Manufacturing Underperforming Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, Rules, Discretionary Authorities and Slow Productivity Growth, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part I

 

Cumulative Growth of US Manufacturing of 2.2 Percent From Nov 2020 to Apr 2021 at Annual Equivalent 4.4 Percent and increasing 0.4 Percent in Apr 2021, US Manufacturing 24.4 Percent Higher Than A Year Earlier In the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, US Manufacturing Underperforming Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, Rules, Discretionary Authorities and Slow Productivity Growth, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021.

I United States Industrial Production

IIB Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates

II Rules, Discretionary Authorities and Slow Productivity Growth

II IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

I United States Industrial Production. This Section I provides data and analysis showing the underperformance in manufacturing in the lost cycle of the global recession without output underperforming below trend worldwide and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:

• Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP three trillion dollars below trend (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.1 percent per year from 1929 to 2020, with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2020 and 1.3 percent from 2007 to 2020. GDP in IQ2021 is 18.1 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent.
• Private fixed investment stagnating initially followed by cumulative increase of 34.7 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2021 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html).
• Twenty eight million or 16.5 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with cyclically stagnating or declining real wages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/decrease-in-dec-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-fed-will-be-patient-adjusting.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-on00000000e-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
• Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)

• Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/accelerating-inflation-with-deepening.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/new-nonfarm-hires-of-6.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/nonfarm-hires-jump-64.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/global-recession-with-output-in-us.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/united-states-imbalances-of-internal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contracting-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-rising.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/impact-of-monetary-policy-on-exchange.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
• Productivity growth fell from 2.1 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2019 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.4 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2019, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/united-states-inflation-rules.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/financial-markets-stress-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/ii-rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)

• Output of manufacturing (SIC) in Apr 2021 at 36.5 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 24.7 percent below trend since 1986. Output of manufacturing (NAICS) at 37.8 percent below trend measured from 1986 to 2006 and 21.4 percent below trend measured from 1999 to 2006 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/federal-open-market-committee-leaves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/us-industrial-production-increased-3.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/growth-of-industrial-production-of-54.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)

• Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
• Worldwide waves of inflation (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/rising-inflation-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-41-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-40-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-334-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-331-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/weekly-rise-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/sharp-worldwide-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
• Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/federal-open-market-committee-leaves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/us-industrial-production-increased-3.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/growth-of-industrial-production-of-54.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier) (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
• Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
• 43 million in poverty and 29 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1999 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
• Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 49.8 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2020 when it would have grown over 52.5 percent at trend of 3.3 percent per year in real terms from IVQ1945 to IVQ2020. Financial assets increased $50.6 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $12.1 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation increased 12.1 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/rising-inflation-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/destruction-of-household-nonfinancial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html).

Industrial production increased 0.7 percent in Apr 2021 and increased 2.4 percent in Mar 2021 after decreasing 3.5 percent in Mar 2021, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 27, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to the growth rates for total IP for recent years were small and positive, with the estimates for 2016 and 2017 a bit higher and the estimates for 2015 and 2018 slightly lower.[2] Total IP is still reported to have increased from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014 before declining in 2015 and rebounding in mid-2016. Subsequently, the index advanced around 7 1/2 percent over 2017 and 2018.

Capacity for total industry expanded modestly in each year from 2015 to 2017 before advancing 1 1/2 percent in 2018; it is expected to advance about 2 percent in 2019. Revisions for recent years were very small and showed slightly less expansion in most years relative to earlier reports.

In the fourth quarter of 2018, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 79.4 percent, about 3/4 percentage point above its previous estimate and about 1/2 percentage point below its long-run (1972–2018) average. The utilization rate in 2017 is also higher than its previous estimate.”

The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm):

“Total industrial production increased 0.7 percent in April. The indexes for mining and utilities increased 0.7 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively; the index for manufacturing rose 0.4 percent despite a drop in motor vehicle assemblies that principally resulted from shortages of semiconductors. An important contributor to the gain in factory output was the return to operation of plants that were damaged by February's severe weather in the south central region of the country and had remained offline in March. The weather-induced drop in total industrial production in February and the subsequent rebound in March are now estimated to have been larger than reported last month. At 106.3 percent of its 2012 average in April, total industrial production has moved up 16.5 percent from its level in April 2020 (the trough of the pandemic), but it was 2.7 percent below its pre-pandemic (February 2020) level. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector rose 0.5 percentage point in April to 74.9 percent, a rate that is 4.7 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” In the six months ending in Apr 2021, United States national industrial production accumulated change of 2.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent, which is lower than growth of 16.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2021. Excluding decline of 3.5 percent in Feb 2021, growth in the remaining five months from Nov 2020 to Apr 2021 accumulated to 6.1 percent or 15.4 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production increased 2.4 percent in one of the past six months, 1.1 percent in one month, 0.9 percent in two months, 0.7 percent in one month and minus 3.5 percent in one month. Industrial production decreased at annual equivalent 2.0 percent in the most recent quarter from Feb 2021 to Apr 2021 and increased at 12.2 percent annual equivalent in the prior quarter from Nov 2020 to Jan 2021. Business equipment accumulated change of 5.5 percent in the six months from Nov 2020 to Apr 2021, at the annual equivalent rate of 11.3 percent, which is lower than growth of 40.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2021. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): ” Capacity utilization for the industrial sector rose 0.5 percentage point in April to 74.9 percent, a rate that is 4.7 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration, weakening growth in past months and deep contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. There is recent recovery.

Table I-1, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, SA, ∆% 

	Apr 21	Mar 21	Feb 21	Jan 21	Dec 20	Nov 20	Apr 21/ Apr 20
Total	0.7	2.4	-3.5	0.9	1.1	0.9	16.5
Market Groups
Final Products	0.3	1.4	-1.7	0.9	1.2	0.7	24.3
Consumer Goods	0.3	0.4	-1.6	0.2	1.7	0.3	20.6
Business Equipment	0.2	3.7	-2.6	2.1	0.5	1.6	40.4
Non Industrial Supplies	0.0	1.7	-2.0	0.3	1.4	0.3	14.7
Construction	-0.9	4.4	-3.2	0.9	1.4	0.6	16.0
Materials	1.3	3.6	-5.5	1.0	0.8	1.3	10.8
Industry Groups
Manufacturing	0.4	3.1	-4.0	1.2	0.7	0.9	23.0
Mining	0.7	8.9	-9.5	2.2	0.8	3.6	-2.4
Utilities	2.6	-9.0	7.8	-3.1	3.8	-2.5	1.9
Capacity	74.9	74.4	72.7	75.3	74.7	73.9	-0.1

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Manufacturing increased 0.4 percent in Apr 2021 and increased 3.1 percent in Mar 2021 after decreasing 4.0 percent in Feb 2021, seasonally adjusted, increasing 24.4 percent not seasonally adjusted in the 12 months ending in Apr 2021, as shown in Table I-2. Manufacturing increased cumulatively 2.2 percent in the six months ending in Apr 2021 or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.4 percent. Excluding the decrease of 4.0 percent in Feb 2021, manufacturing increased 6.4 percent from Nov 2020 to Apr 2021 or at the annual equivalent rate of 16.2 percent. Table I-2 provides a longer perspective of manufacturing in the US. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 with recovery followed by renewed deterioration/improvement in more recent months as shown by 12 months’ rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession, but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily with some strength at the margin. There is renewed deterioration and improvement. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 27, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to the growth rates for total IP for recent years were small and positive, with the estimates for 2016 and 2017 a bit higher and the estimates for 2015 and 2018 slightly lower.[2] Total IP is still reported to have increased from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014 before declining in 2015 and rebounding in mid-2016. Subsequently, the index advanced around 7 1/2 percent over 2017 and 2018.

Capacity for total industry expanded modestly in each year from 2015 to 2017 before advancing 1 1/2 percent in 2018; it is expected to advance about 2 percent in 2019. Revisions for recent years were very small and showed slightly less expansion in most years relative to earlier reports.

In the fourth quarter of 2018, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 79.4 percent, about 3/4 percentage point above its previous estimate and about 1/2 percentage point below its long-run (1972–2018) average. The utilization rate in 2017 is also higher than its previous estimate.”

Manufacturing decreased 22.3 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 18.3 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2019. Manufacturing increased 15.4 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2020. Manufacturing in Dec 2020 is lower by 10.3 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. Manufacturing increased 18.4 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Apr 2021. Manufacturing in Apr 2021 is 7.9 percent below the peak in Jun 2007. US economic growth has been at only 2.0 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 47 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2021 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/gdp1q21_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2021 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event would have accumulated to 47.9 percent. GDP in IVQ2020 would be $23,318.7 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4231.1 billion than actual $19,087.6 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 28.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 16.5 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2021.htm). US GDP in IQ2021 is 18.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,087.6 billion in IQ2021 or 21.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Apr 1919 to Apr 2021. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 162.7065 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965 which is 36.5 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 166.9656 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965, which is 38.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.8 percent between Dec 1986 and Apr 2021. Using trend growth of 1.8 percent per year, the index would increase to 137.3810 in Apr 2021. The output of manufacturing at 103.3965 in Apr 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 104.9873 in Apr 2021 or 21.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 168.7632 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 37.8 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 133.5630 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 21.4 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-2, US, Monthly and 12-Month Rates of Growth of Manufacturing ∆%

	Month SA ∆%	12-Month NSA ∆%
Apr 2021	0.4	24.4
Mar	3.1	3.4
Feb	-4.0	-4.7
Jan	1.2	-0.9
Dec 2020	0.7	-2.5
Nov	0.9	-3.1
Oct	1.5	-3.0
Sep	0.1	-5.8
Aug	1.7	-5.9
Jul	4.2	-6.9
Jun	7.7	-10.7
May	3.8	-16.6
Apr	-15.8	-20.4
Mar	-5.0	-5.4
Feb	0.0	-0.2
Jan	-0.1	-0.8
Dec 2019	0.2	-1.1
Nov	0.9	-0.9
Oct	-0.6	-1.7
Sep	-0.6	-1.2
Aug	0.6	-0.5
Jul	-0.4	-0.7
Jun	0.6	0.1
May	0.1	0.2
Apr	-0.9	-0.8
Mar	-0.1	0.8
Feb	-0.5	0.9
Jan	-0.6	2.3
Dec 2018	0.6	2.2
Nov	0.2	1.7
Oct	-0.1	1.9
Sep	0.0	3.5
Aug	0.4	3.3
Jul	0.4	2.5
Jun	0.7	1.8
May	-0.8	1.3
Apr	0.4	3.3
Mar	0.0	2.5
Feb	1.1	2.4
Jan	-0.4	1.3
Dec 2017	-0.1	2.3
Nov	0.3	2.7
Oct	1.3	2.5
Sep	-0.2	1.4
Aug	-0.3	2.1
Jul	-0.2	2.3
Jun	0.1	2.4
May	-0.2	2.7
Apr	1.1	1.3
Mar	-0.3	1.8
Feb	-0.1	1.4
Jan	0.6	0.7
Dec 2016	0.3	0.9
Nov	0.1	0.1
Oct	0.3	-0.1
Sep	0.4	-0.1
Aug	-0.4	-1.5
Jul	0.3	-1.5
Jun	0.3	-0.9
May	0.0	-1.7
Apr	-0.4	-1.0
Mar	-0.2	-2.1
Feb	-0.6	-0.8
Jan	0.7	-0.9
Dec 2015	-0.3	-2.0
Nov	-0.3	-1.8
Oct	0.0	-0.8
Sep	-0.4	-1.7
Aug	-0.3	-0.6
Jul	0.7	-0.4
Jun	-0.4	-1.1
May	0.0	-0.2
Apr	-0.1	-0.1
Mar	0.3	0.0
Feb	-0.7	0.5
Jan	-0.4	2.0
Dec 2014	-0.3	1.6
Nov	0.8	1.8
Oct	-0.1	1.0
Sep	0.0	1.1
Aug	-0.5	1.3
Jul	0.4	2.0
Jun	0.4	1.4
May	0.3	1.3
Apr	-0.2	0.9
Mar	0.8	1.5
Feb	1.0	0.2
Jan	-1.1	-0.6
Dec 2013	0.0	0.1
Nov	0.0	1.2
Oct	0.1	1.9
Sep	0.1	1.2
Aug	0.9	1.3
Jul	-0.9	0.3
Jun	0.2	0.7
May	0.3	0.9
Apr	-0.4	1.0
Mar	-0.1	0.6
Feb	0.5	0.7
Jan	-0.3	0.8
Dec 2012	0.8	1.6
Nov	0.7	1.7
Oct	-0.4	0.7
Sep	-0.1	1.6
Aug	-0.2	2.1
Jul	-0.1	2.4
Jun	0.2	3.4
May	-0.4	3.4
Apr	0.5	3.8
Mar	-0.5	2.8
Feb	0.3	4.2
Jan	0.8	3.5
Dec 2011	0.7	3.1
Nov	-0.3	2.7
Oct	0.5	2.8
Sep	0.3	2.6
Aug	0.4	2.1
Jul	0.6	2.3
Jun	0.1	1.7
May	0.1	1.5
Apr	-0.6	2.7
Mar	0.6	4.2
Feb	0.1	4.8
Jan	0.2	4.8
Dec 2010	0.5	5.5
Nov	0.0	4.6
Oct	0.1	5.8
Sep	0.0	6.1
Aug	0.1	6.8
Jul	0.6	7.5
Jun	-0.1	9.2
May	1.4	8.9
Apr	0.8	7.2
Mar	1.2	5.1
Feb	0.0	1.7
Jan	1.1	1.6
Dec 2009	-0.2	-2.9
Nov	1.0	-5.8
Oct	0.2	-8.9
Sep	0.9	-10.4
Aug	1.1	-13.5
Jul	1.5	-15.3
Jun	-0.3	-17.9
May	-1.1	-17.9
Apr	-0.7	-18.6
Mar	-1.9	-17.8
Feb	-0.1	-16.7
Jan	-3.0	-17.0
Dec 2008	-3.5	-14.5
Nov	-2.4	-11.8
Oct	-0.6	-9.2
Sep	-3.5	-8.8
Aug	-1.2	-5.2
Jul	-1.2	-3.7
Jun	-0.7	-3.2
May	-0.5	-2.3
Apr	-1.1	-1.0
Mar	-0.3	-0.5
Feb	-0.6	1.1
Jan	-0.4	2.5
Dec 2007	0.1	2.1
Nov	0.6	3.5
Oct	-0.3	2.9
Sep	0.5	2.9
Aug	-0.3	2.7
Jul	0.1	3.6
Jun	0.3	3.1
May	-0.1	3.2
Apr	0.7	3.7
Mar	0.9	2.6
Feb	0.4	1.6
Jan	-0.5	1.2
Dec 2006		2.7
Dec 2005		3.6
Dec 2004		4.1
Dec 2003		2.3
Dec 2002		2.4
Dec 2001		-5.3
Dec 2000		0.8
Dec 1999		5.2
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2020		1.8
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2019		1.9
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2018		2.0
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2017		2.0
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2016		2.0
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2015		2.0
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2014		2.2
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2013		2.2
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 1999		4.3
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2006		1.5
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2006		3.3
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2017		0.4
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2018		0.5
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2019		0.4
∆% Peak 112.3113 in 06/2007 to 103.3123 in 12/2019		-8.0
∆% Trough 87.3028 in 04/2009 to 103.3123 in 12/2019		18.3
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2020		0.2
∆% Peak 112.3113 in 06/2007 to 100.7618 in 12/2020		-10.3
∆% Peak 112.3113 in 06/2007 to Trough 87.3028 in 4/2009		-22.3
∆% Trough 87.3028 in 04/2009 to 100.7618 in 12/2020		15.4
∆% Trough 87.3028 in 04/2009 to 103.3965 in 04/2021		18.4
∆% Peak 112.3113 in 06/2007 to 103.3965 in 04/2021		-7.9

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm

Chart I-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides industrial production, manufacturing and capacity since the 1970s. There was acceleration of growth of industrial production, manufacturing and capacity in the 1990s because of rapid growth of productivity in the US (Cobet and Wilson (2002); see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). The slopes of the curves flatten in the 2000s. Production and capacity have not recovered sufficiently above levels before the global recession, remaining like GDP below historical trend. The final data point for Apr 2021. There is sharp contraction of output in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event followed by continuing recovery. There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Apr 1919 to Apr 2021. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 162.7065 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965 which is 36.5 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 166.9656 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965, which is 38.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.8 percent between Dec 1986 and Apr 2021. Using trend growth of 1.8 percent per year, the index would increase to 137.3810 in Apr 2021. The output of manufacturing at 103.3965 in Apr 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 104.9873 in Apr 2021 or 21.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 168.7632 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 37.8 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 133.5630 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 21.4 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-1, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg1.gif

Additional detail on industrial production and capacity utilization is in Chart I-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Production of consumer durable goods fell sharply during the global recession by more than 30 percent and is oscillating above the level before the contraction. Output of nondurable consumer goods fell around 10 percent and is some 5 percent below the level before the contraction. Output of business equipment fell sharply during the contraction of 2001 but began rapid growth again after 2004. An important characteristic is rapid growth of output of business equipment in the cyclical expansion after sharp contraction in the global recession, stalling in the final segment followed by recovery. Output of defense and space only suffered reduction in the rate of growth during the global recession and surged ahead of the level before the contraction, declining in the final segment. Output of construction supplies collapsed during the global recession and is well below the level before the contraction. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but recovered sharply above the level before the contraction with alternating recent decline/improvement. There are deep contractions in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event with recovery beginning in May 2020-Apr 2021.

Chart I-2, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg3.gif

The modern industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is captured in Chart I-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (for the literature on M&A and corporate control see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009a), 143-56, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 49-59, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 46-49). The slope of the curve of total industrial production accelerates in the 1990s to a much higher rate of growth than the curve excluding high-technology industries. Growth rates decelerate into the 2000s and output and capacity utilization have not recovered fully from the strong impact of the global recession. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but recovered sharply above the level before the contraction with alternating recent decline/improvement followed by stability. Growth in the current cyclical expansion has been more subdued than in the prior comparably deep contractions in the 1970s and 1980s. Chart I-2 shows that the past recessions after World War II are the relevant ones for comparison with the recession after 2007 instead of common comparisons with the Great Depression (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html). The lower part of Chart I-3 shows recent strong growth of energy compared with non-energy. There are deep contractions in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event with recovery beginning in May 2020-Apr 2021.

Chart I-3, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, Selected Industries

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg2.gif

United States manufacturing output from 1919 to 2021 monthly is in Chart I-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The second industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is quite evident in the acceleration of the rate of growth of output given by the sharper slope in the 1980s and 1990s. Growth was robust after the shallow recession of 2001 but dropped sharply during the global recession after IVQ2007. Manufacturing output recovered sharply but has not reached earlier levels and is losing momentum at the margin. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Apr 1919 to Apr 2021. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 162.7065 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965 which is 36.5 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 166.9656 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965, which is 38.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.8 percent between Dec 1986 and Apr 2021. Using trend growth of 1.8 percent per year, the index would increase to 137.3810 in Apr 2021. The output of manufacturing at 103.3965 in Apr 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 104.9873 in Apr 2021 or 21.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 168.7632 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 37.8 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 133.5630 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 21.4 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-4, US, Manufacturing Output, 1919-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Industrial production increased 0.7 percent in Apr 2021 and increased 2.4 percent in Mar 2021 after decreasing 3.5 percent in Mar 2021, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 27, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to the growth rates for total IP for recent years were small and positive, with the estimates for 2016 and 2017 a bit higher and the estimates for 2015 and 2018 slightly lower.[2] Total IP is still reported to have increased from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014 before declining in 2015 and rebounding in mid-2016. Subsequently, the index advanced around 7 1/2 percent over 2017 and 2018.

Capacity for total industry expanded modestly in each year from 2015 to 2017 before advancing 1 1/2 percent in 2018; it is expected to advance about 2 percent in 2019. Revisions for recent years were very small and showed slightly less expansion in most years relative to earlier reports.

In the fourth quarter of 2018, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 79.4 percent, about 3/4 percentage point above its previous estimate and about 1/2 percentage point below its long-run (1972–2018) average. The utilization rate in 2017 is also higher than its previous estimate.”

The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm):

“Total industrial production increased 0.7 percent in April. The indexes for mining and utilities increased 0.7 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively; the index for manufacturing rose 0.4 percent despite a drop in motor vehicle assemblies that principally resulted from shortages of semiconductors. An important contributor to the gain in factory output was the return to operation of plants that were damaged by February's severe weather in the south central region of the country and had remained offline in March. The weather-induced drop in total industrial production in February and the subsequent rebound in March are now estimated to have been larger than reported last month. At 106.3 percent of its 2012 average in April, total industrial production has moved up 16.5 percent from its level in April 2020 (the trough of the pandemic), but it was 2.7 percent below its pre-pandemic (February 2020) level. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector rose 0.5 percentage point in April to 74.9 percent, a rate that is 4.7 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” In the six months ending in Apr 2021, United States national industrial production accumulated change of 2.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent, which is lower than growth of 16.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2021. Excluding decline of 3.5 percent in Feb 2021, growth in the remaining five months from Nov 2020 to Apr 2021 accumulated to 6.1 percent or 15.4 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production increased 2.4 percent in one of the past six months, 1.1 percent in one month, 0.9 percent in two months, 0.7 percent in one month and minus 3.5 percent in one month. Industrial production decreased at annual equivalent 2.0 percent in the most recent quarter from Feb 2021 to Apr 2021 and increased at 12.2 percent annual equivalent in the prior quarter from Nov 2020 to Jan 2021. Business equipment accumulated change of 5.5 percent in the six months from Nov 2020 to Apr 2021, at the annual equivalent rate of 11.3 percent, which is lower than growth of 40.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2021. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): ” Capacity utilization for the industrial sector rose 0.5 percentage point in April to 74.9 percent, a rate that is 4.7 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration, weakening growth in past months and deep contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. There is recent recovery. Manufacturing decreased 22.3 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 18.3 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2019. Manufacturing increased 15.4 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2020. Manufacturing in Dec 2020 is lower by 10.3 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. Manufacturing increased 18.4 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Apr 2021. Manufacturing in Apr 2021 is 7.9 percent below the peak in Jun 2007. US economic growth has been at only 2.0 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 47 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2021 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/gdp1q21_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2021 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event would have accumulated to 47.9 percent. GDP in IVQ2020 would be $23,318.7 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4231.1 billion than actual $19,087.6 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 28.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 16.5 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2021.htm). US GDP in IQ2021 is 18.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,087.6 billion in IQ2021 or 21.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Apr 1919 to Apr 2021. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 162.7065 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965 which is 36.5 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 166.9656 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965, which is 38.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.8 percent between Dec 1986 and Apr 2021. Using trend growth of 1.8 percent per year, the index would increase to 137.3810 in Apr 2021. The output of manufacturing at 103.3965 in Apr 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 104.9873 in Apr 2021 or 21.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 168.7632 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 37.8 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 133.5630 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 21.4 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 87.5 percent in IVQ2020. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Apr 2021, there were 144.398 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 122.407 million NSA in Apr 2021 accounted for 84.8 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 144.398 million, of which 12.246 million, or 10.0 percent of total private jobs and 8.5 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 102.175 million NSA in Apr 2021, or 70.8 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.5 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 9.1 percent in US national income in IVQ2020 and durable goods 5.4 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

	IIIQ2020	% Total	IVQ2020	% Total
National Income WCCA	17,129.3	100.0	17,959.1	100.0
Domestic Industries	16,917.9	98.8	17,749.2	98.8
Private Industries	14,875.1	86.8	15,714.2	87.5
Agriculture	124.0	0.7	152.1	0.8
Mining	96.4	0.6	126.9	0.7
Utilities	207.7	1.2	217.5	1.2
Construction	904.0	5.3	980.5	5.5
Manufacturing	1529.3	8.9	1627.0	9.1
Durable Goods	920.0	5.4	968.3	5.4
Nondurable Goods	609.2	3.6	658.7	3.7
Wholesale Trade	919.1	5.4	955.9	5.3
Retail Trade	1200.6	7.0	1255.4	7.0
Transportation & WH	518.0	3.0	559.8	3.1
Information	701.5	4.1	743.6	4.1
Finance, Insurance, RE	3269.0	19.1	3368.9	18.8
Professional & Business Services	2590.6	15.1	2735.6	15.2
Education, Health Care	1761.4	10.3	1844.3	10.3
Arts, Entertainment	573.8	3.3	645.8	3.6
Other Services	479.8	2.8	501.0	2.8
Government	2042.8	11.9	2034.9	11.3
Rest of the World	211.3	1.2	209.9	1.2

Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; Percentages Calculates from Unrounded Data; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Motor vehicle sales and production in the US have been in long-term structural change. Table VA-1A provides the data on new motor vehicle sales and domestic car production in the US from 1990 to 2010. New motor vehicle sales grew from 14,137 thousand in 1990 to the peak of 17,806 thousand in 2000 or 29.5 percent. In that same period, domestic car production fell from 6,231 thousand in 1990 to 5,542 thousand in 2000 or -11.1 percent. New motor vehicle sales fell from 17,445 thousand in 2005 to 11,772 in 2010 or 32.5 percent while domestic car production fell from 4,321 thousand in 2005 to 2,840 thousand in 2010 or 34.3 percent. In IIQ2018, light vehicle sales accumulated to 4,500,220, which is higher by 1.8 percent relative to 4,419,349 a year earlier in IIQ2017 (http://www.motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html). Total not seasonally adjusted light vehicle sales reached 1512.2 thousand in Apr 2021, increasing 111.4 percent from 715.3 thousand in Apr 2020 (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86). The seasonally adjusted annual rate of light vehicle sales in the US reached 18.5 million in Apr 2021, higher than 18.0 million in Mar 2021 and higher than 8.7 million in Apr 2020 (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86).

Table VA-1A, US, New Motor Vehicle Sales and Car Production, Thousand Units 7

	New Motor Vehicle Sales	New Car Sales and Leases	New Truck Sales and Leases	Domestic Car Production
1990	14,137	9,300	4,837	6,231
1991	12,725	8,589	4,136	5,454
1992	13,093	8,215	4,878	5,979
1993	14,172	8,518	5,654	5,979
1994	15,397	8,990	6,407	6,614
1995	15,106	8,536	6,470	6,340
1996	15,449	8,527	6,922	6,081
1997	15,490	8,273	7,218	5,934
1998	15,958	8,142	7,816	5,554
1999	17,401	8,697	8,704	5,638
2000	17,806	8,852	8,954	5,542
2001	17,468	8,422	9,046	4,878
2002	17,144	8,109	9,036	5,019
2003	16,968	7,611	9,357	4,510
2004	17,298	7,545	9,753	4,230
2005	17,445	7,720	9,725	4,321
2006	17,049	7,821	9,228	4,367
2007	16,460	7,618	8,683	3,924
2008	13,494	6,814	6.680	3,777
2009	10,601	5,456	5,154	2,247
2010	11,772	5,729	6,044	2,840

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gap_hist.xlsx

Table VA-1B provides the seasonally adjusted annual rate of total vehicle sales in the United States. The rate decreased from 17.749 in Jun 2019 and 17.224 in Feb 2020 to 9.062 in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. The rate recovered to 12.412 in May 2020 and 13.360 in Jun 2020, 15.002 in Jul 2020, 15.540 in Aug 2020 and 16.733 in Sep 2020 in gradual return to economic activity. The rate for Nov 2020 decreased to 16.192 and increased to 16.687 in Dec 2020 and 17.295 in Jan 2021, decreasing to 16.353 in Feb 2021 and increasing to 18.475 in Mar 2021. The rate increased to 19.006 in Apr 2021 (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86).

Table VA-1B, United States, Annual Rate, Total Vehicle Sales, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate

January	2019			17.312
February	2019			17.107
March	2019			17.838
April	2019			17.164
May	2019			17.869
June	2019			17.749
July	2019			17.534
August	2019			17.607
September	2019			17.650
October	2019			17.283
November	2019			17.447
December	2019			17.298
January	2020			17.320
February	2020			17.224
March	2020			11.750
April	2020			9.062
May	2020			12.412
June	2020			13.360
July	2020			15.002
August	2020			15.540
September	2020			16.733
October	2020			16.838
November	2020			16.192
December	2020			16.687
January	2021			17.295
February	2021			16.353
March	2021			18.475
April	2021			19.006

Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA

Data for Apr 2021 and updates: https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86

Chart I-4 of the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, provides the complete data set of SAAR of total car sales in the US. The SAAR of 9.062 in Apr 2020 is lower than the lowest rate in the global recession at 9.223 in Feb 2009.

Chart I-4, SA Annual Rate of Total Car Sales in the United States, Jan 1976 to Dec 2020

Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA

Chart I-4, SA Annual Rate of Total Car Sales in the United States, Jan 1976 to Dec 2020

Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA

Chart I-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve provides output of motor vehicles and parts in the United States from 1972 to 2021. Output virtually stagnated since the late 1990s with recent increase followed by the highest decrease in the data history in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and sharp recovery after easing of lockdown.

Chart 1-5, US, Motor Vehicles and Parts Output, 1972-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides output of computers and electronic products in the United States from 1972 to 2021. Output accelerated sharply in the 1990s and 2000s and surpassed the level before the global recession beginning in IVQ2007. There is sharp contraction in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. There is initial recovery in May 2020-Apr 2021

Chart I-6, US, Output of Computers and Electronic Products, 1972-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shows that output of durable manufacturing accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s with slower growth in the 2000s perhaps because processes matured. Growth was robust after the major drop during the global recession but appears to vacillate in the final segment. There is sharp contraction in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. There is initial recovery in May 2020-Apr 2021.

Chart I-7, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 1972-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-8 provides output of aerospace and miscellaneous transportation from 1972 to 2021. The drop in the in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event is much sharper than the drop in the global recession after 2007. There is sharp recovery from May 2020 to Apr 2021 but without return to trend.

Chart I-8, US, Output of Aerospace and Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment, 1972-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Manufacturing is underperforming in the lost cycle of the global recession. Manufacturing (NAICS) in Apr 2021 is lower by 5.0 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007, as shown in Chart V-3A. Manufacturing (SIC) in Apr 2021 at 103.3965 is lower by 7.9 percent relative to the peak at 112.3113 in Jun 2007. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Apr 1919 to Apr 2021. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 162.7065 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965 which is 36.5 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 166.9656 in Apr 2021. The actual index NSA in Apr 2021 is 103.3965, which is 38.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.8 percent between Dec 1986 and Apr 2021. Using trend growth of 1.8 percent per year, the index would increase to 137.3810 in Apr 2021. The output of manufacturing at 103.3965 in Apr 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 104.9873 in Apr 2021 or 21.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 168.7632 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 37.8 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 133.5630 in Apr 2021. The NAICS index at 104.9873 in Apr 2021 is 21.4 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Dec 2007 to Apr 2021

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jun 2007 to Apr 2021

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3B provides the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States, or those available for work. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 231.713 million in Jun 2007 to 261.103 million in Mar 2021 or 29.390 million.

Chart V-3B, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 2007 to Apr 2021

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3C provides nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 2007 to Apr 2021. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs fell from 13.987 million in Jun 2007 to 12.246 million in Apr 2021, or 1.741 million.

Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 2007 to Apr 2021, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Apr 2021. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade. There is sharp decline in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. There is initial recovery in May 2020-Apr 2021.

Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Apr 2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3E provides the US noninstitutional civilian population, or those in condition of working, from Jan 1948, when first available, to Apr 2021. The noninstitutional civilian population increased from 170.042 million in Jun 1981 to 261.103 million in Apr 2021 or 91.061 million.

Chart V-3E, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 1948 to Apr 2021

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3F provides manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 1939 to Apr 2021. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs decreased from a peak of 18.890 million in Jun 1981 to 12.246 million in Apr 2021.

Chart V-3F, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 1939 to Apr 2021, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

The Empire State Manufacturing Survey Index in Table VA-1 provides continuing deterioration that started in Jun 2012 well before Hurricane Sandy in Oct 2012. The current general index has been in negative contraction territory from minus 2.7 in Aug 2012 to minus 7.5 in Jan 2013 and minus 1.1 in May 2013. The current general index changed to 24.3 in May 2021. The index of current orders has also been in negative contraction territory from minus 3.0 in Aug 2012 to minus 10.9 in Jan 2013 and minus 7.8 in Jun 2013. The index of current new orders changed to 28.9 in Apr 2021. There is strength in the general index for the next six months at 36.6 in May 2021 and strength in new orders at 35.3.

Table VA-1, US, New York Federal Reserve Bank Empire State Manufacturing Survey Index SA Current General Index

	Current General Index	Current New Orders	Future General Index	Future New Orders
10/31/2011	-5.7	1.7	14.5	19.4
11/30/2011	4.9	1.6	35.4	30.3
12/31/2011	11.7	10.1	45.4	43.2
1/31/2012	11.5	8.7	50.7	44.4
2/29/2012	17.5	7.1	46.3	37.6
3/31/2012	15.5	4.4	43.8	37.8
4/30/2012	7.8	4.1	40.5	38.4
5/31/2012	14.2	7.1	32.5	32
6/30/2012	1.6	3	27.9	28.4
7/31/2012	3.2	-3.3	24.4	21.8
8/31/2012	-2.7	-3	18.6	14.6
9/30/2012	-6.9	-10.3	27	28
10/31/2012	-4.6	-6.6	20.1	22.3
11/30/2012	-0.8	6.1	18.1	15.1
12/31/2012	-5.8	0.3	18.9	18.8
1/31/2013	-7.5	-10.9	21.7	23.7
2/28/2013	9.2	12.4	32	26.8
3/31/2013	4.9	4.7	34.7	33
4/30/2013	4.5	2.8	30.7	35.8
5/31/2013	-1.1	-3.1	26.6	30.3
6/30/2013	4.5	-7.8	27.8	22.4
7/31/2013	5.2	2.3	34.1	33.3
8/31/2013	9.7	2.8	35.7	30.8
9/30/2013	7.7	2.9	40.3	38.2
10/31/2013	3.6	9.5	41.3	36.9
11/30/2013	2.2	-2.5	38.1	39.4
12/31/2013	3.2	1.1	36.4	27.5
1/31/2014	12.8	8.1	35.8	37.5
2/28/2014	6.8	1.9	39.8	43.5
3/31/2014	2.8	0.8	34.6	36.4
4/30/2014	4.1	-0.4	39.1	35.2
5/31/2014	17.5	8.6	43.6	38.6
6/30/2014	15.8	13.1	41.2	44.3
7/31/2014	21	16.5	30.7	27.4
8/31/2014	16.1	15.6	45.5	50.2
9/30/2014	29.4	17.3	47	46.1
10/31/2014	6.2	1.8	42.3	42.2
11/30/2014	12	10.3	47.7	47.6
12/31/2014	-2.5	0.4	35.3	35.2
1/31/2015	12.5	6.9	46.6	41
2/28/2015	10.6	3.1	26.9	28.7
3/31/2015	3.7	-6.3	30.1	26.1
4/30/2015	0.1	-4.7	38.4	35.2
5/31/2015	3.9	3.7	31.2	35
6/30/2015	-4.8	-6.9	25.9	27
7/31/2015	1.7	-5	29.4	33.3
8/31/2015	-13.9	-14.6	32.4	30.5
9/30/2015	-12.7	-11.9	24.3	24.8
10/31/2015	-13.7	-15.3	22.8	22.9
11/30/2015	-9.7	-11.4	22.3	19.4
12/31/2015	-5.9	-6.1	33.1	23.7
1/31/2016	-16.6	-20.6	12.1	15.3
2/29/2016	-12.9	-10	13.6	19.5
3/31/2016	-2.5	3	24.2	36.8
4/30/2016	8.9	10.7	32	39.1
5/31/2016	-7.4	-2.8	29.2	24
6/30/2016	3.1	6.6	33.1	37.6
7/31/2016	1.4	-1.5	31	30.9
8/31/2016	-5.6	0.7	24.5	28.4
9/30/2016	-1.6	-6.4	35.8	33.5
10/31/2016	-9.5	-2.8	36.1	38.1
11/30/2016	1.9	2.9	29.9	26.8
12/31/2016	9.6	9.3	47.2	45
1/31/2017	7.5	6.8	49.5	40.3
2/28/2017	20.1	13.5	39.2	39.6
3/31/2017	15.6	17	36.4	33.9
4/30/2017	6.2	9.9	43.2	36.1
5/31/2017	0.7	-2.2	40.8	35.6
6/30/2017	18.8	16.1	41.3	42
7/31/2017	11.8	13.8	36.6	34.9
8/31/2017	22.7	20	43.3	40.9
9/30/2017	23.6	23.7	42.5	44.9
10/31/2017	26.6	19.4	45.8	45
11/30/2017	19.1	18.2	48.9	50.5
12/31/2017	20.1	17	43.7	39.4
1/31/2018	19.4	16.6	49.1	48.5
2/28/2018	17.5	14.9	48.4	45.4
3/31/2018	23.5	16.1	43.1	42.8
4/30/2018	17.4	11.7	23.5	22.8
5/31/2018	17	15.9	32.2	34.9
6/30/2018	25.8	21.5	38.5	35.5
7/31/2018	21.6	19.2	31	36.1
8/31/2018	24.1	15.8	33.8	35.6
9/30/2018	19	16.1	32.6	35.5
10/31/2018	19.4	20.5	30.3	35.6
11/30/2018	21.1	16.6	32.7	37
12/31/2018	11.1	12.4	27.1	30.3
1/31/2019	4.8	6.3	21.2	21.7
2/28/2019	10.3	8.1	30.9	34.4
3/31/2019	5.1	3.6	27.9	29
4/30/2019	9.4	7.4	17.4	24.3
5/31/2019	14.4	8.2	29.7	33
6/30/2019	-6.4	-9.7	25.5	28.4
7/31/2019	4.2	-0.4	29.3	34.2
8/31/2019	4.2	5.6	25.1	31.1
9/30/2019	2.2	1.9	15.5	23.4
10/31/2019	3.3	3.7	17.8	24
11/30/2019	2.5	3.1	19.8	25.2
12/31/2019	3.3	1.7	26.1	30.8
1/31/2020	4.8	6.6	23.6	31.4
2/29/2020	12.9	22.1	22.9	27.5
3/31/2020	-21.5	-9.3	1.2	17.6
4/30/2020	-78.2	-66.3	7	11.7
5/31/2020	-48.5	-42.4	29.1	35
6/30/2020	-0.2	-0.6	56.5	52.9
7/31/2020	17.2	13.9	38.4	41.9
8/31/2020	3.7	-1.7	34.3	37.2
9/30/2020	17	7.1	40.3	39.1
10/31/2020	10.5	12.3	32.8	37.7
11/30/2020	6.3	3.7	33.9	32.9
12/31/2020	4.9	3.4	36.3	32.3
1/31/2021	3.5	6.6	31.9	34.8
2/28/2021	12.1	10.8	34.9	35.6
3/31/2021	17.4	9.1	36.4	37.9
4/30/2021	26.3	26.9	39.8	41.1
5/31/2021	24.3	28.9	36.6	35.3

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html

Chart VA-1 of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides indexes of current and expected economic activity. There were multiple contractions in current activity after the global recession shown in shade. Current activity is weakening relative to strong recovery in the initial expansion in 2010 and 2011 with recent oscillating recovery and weakness. There is sharp improvement in the current index by strong positive reading with strong improvement in the future index in positive reading. There is deterioration in Dec 2020-Jan 2021 with improvement in Feb-Apr 2021 followed by mild deterioration in May 2021. Chart update: https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html

Chart VA-1, US, US, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Diffusion Index of Current and Expected Activity, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html

Table VA-2, US, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, SA

	Current General Index	Current New Orders	Future General Index	Future New Orders
Jan-11	16.5	20.1	43.8	35.9
Feb-11	28.9	19.8	41.9	38.7
Mar-11	36.4	34.1	57.0	55.5
Apr-11	13.0	13.7	35.7	30.9
May-11	6.2	8.3	26.2	25.3
Jun-11	-0.5	-5.2	8.5	8.6
Jul-11	7.1	4.1	28.6	32.2
Aug-11	-19.5	-17.5	12.6	26.6
Sep-11	-10.7	-5.6	18.1	19.6
Oct-11	6.2	5.9	26.1	28.6
Nov-11	4.0	1.5	36.4	36.2
Dec-11	2.4	4.4	33.7	38.6
Jan-12	7.5	10.7	43.4	43.5
Feb-12	10.4	11.6	30.3	32.2
Mar-12	8.8	-0.1	30.4	37.1
Apr-12	5.7	0.6	39.9	42.4
May-12	-0.8	2.3	24.9	35.5
Jun-12	-12.6	-17.8	25.4	34.3
Jul-12	-12.7	-3.6	21.5	25.6
Aug-12	-2.6	1.6	20	25.5
Sep-12	0.2	0.7	31.6	42.8
Oct-12	-1.1	-4.7	17.1	20.7
Nov-12	-10.6	-7.4	16.6	22.6
Dec-12	2.4	2.6	22.4	29
Jan-13	-1.4	-2	28.8	31.9
Feb-13	-5.3	0.6	32	39
Mar-13	2	0.1	35.5	38.1
Apr-13	0.4	0.7	30.6	34.4
May-13	0.2	-4	39.5	42.2
Jun-13	12.7	11.7	37.2	40
Jul-13	15.9	7.4	41.6	52.4
Aug-13	8.2	8.9	38.5	38.8
Sep-13	20.6	19.3	48.8	51.5
Oct-13	13.5	23.1	55.4	61.2
Nov-13	4.6	8.8	42	46
Dec-13	3.8	12	41.1	44.6
Jan-14	15.2	7.9	38	40.8
Feb-14	2.3	4.7	43.9	39.5
Mar-14	12.5	6.5	42.4	38.7
Apr-14	17	17.3	39.3	38.6
May-14	18.5	14.8	43.8	42.5
Jun-14	14.1	10.4	53.3	55.3
Jul-14	21.4	28.7	53.6	48.8
Aug-14	22.9	15.4	61.9	51.3
Sep-14	21.7	13.8	46.1	44.8
Oct-14	18.1	16.8	50.8	49
Nov-14	35.5	29.7	50.1	44.3
Dec-14	21.6	14.5	47.2	43.9
Jan-15	13.2	10.1	54	47
Feb-15	10.5	8.4	35	46.1
Mar-15	7.3	0.8	37.7	37.8
Apr-15	9.9	4.5	39.7	33.6
May-15	6.1	5.4	38.1	35.1
Jun-15	8.2	11.2	43.4	47.5
Jul-15	4.4	2.3	40.2	45.4
Aug-15	5.8	6.6	34.9	39.2
Sep-15	-3.8	10.5	36.8	41.7
Oct-15	-4.9	-6.4	34.8	36.4
Nov-15	-3.8	-7.6	37.5	44.3
Dec-15	-9	-8.9	18.6	29.7
Jan-16	-4	-3	18.3	21.3
Feb-16	-6.8	-6	15.8	20
Mar-16	9	5.5	26.9	35.6
Apr-16	-1	-0.5	39.9	43.6
May-16	-4.8	-1.7	39.7	40.3
Jun-16	4.4	-0.9	36.6	37.6
Jul-16	0.9	10.1	36	35.2
Aug-16	5.4	-1.5	41.9	42.8
Sep-16	12.1	2.8	37	38.3
Oct-16	10.5	19.4	36.2	40.2
Nov-16	9.4	19.4	29.8	35.1
Dec-16	22.6	15.5	45.5	44.8
Jan-17	24.8	24.9	54.7	52.3
Feb-17	39.7	35.1	50.3	49.2
Mar-17	32	31.4	56.4	59.1
Apr-17	23.7	28.5	46.2	55.5
May-17	34.3	25.2	40.2	49.5
Jun-17	28.2	27.3	38.3	39.6
Jul-17	20.4	5.3	38.5	44.6
Aug-17	20.7	22.9	42.4	50.2
Sep-17	24	26.7	54.1	58.6
Oct-17	27.2	21	46.4	43.6
Nov-17	23.1	26.5	47.9	49.1
Dec-17	29.3	29.3	50	54.6
Jan-18	23	9.6	45.4	48.2
Feb-18	30.7	29.5	40.1	49.7
Mar-18	23.8	30.3	46.8	50.2
Apr-18	25.3	22.2	43	41.1
May-18	32.2	41.3	41.5	43.7
Jun-18	21.7	21.2	38.3	41.2
Jul-18	20.8	24.9	26.8	29.8
Aug-18	10.1	12.1	36.8	36.8
Sep-18	21.3	18.5	36	35.9
Oct-18	20.5	15.5	31.9	39
Nov-18	10.6	12.2	26.4	39.1
Dec-18	10.9	14.8	29.1	36.3
Jan-19	14.8	16.7	29.7	31.8
Feb-19	-0.7	1.5	29	30.5
Mar-19	14.9	6.4	23.1	24.2
Apr-19	11	16	22.2	27
May-19	17.5	14.2	22.3	24.8
Jun-19	1.5	8	24.2	33.7
Jul-19	16.6	18.4	33.6	41.6
Aug-19	13.1	21.6	31.8	42
Sep-19	12.2	22.5	23.1	34.4
Oct-19	6.8	22.5	32.6	37.3
Nov-19	8.4	10.1	34.4	37.3
Dec-19	2.4	11.1	34.8	33.6
Jan-20	17	18.2	38.4	41.9
Feb-20	36.7	33.6	45.4	54
Mar-20	-12.7	-15.5	35.2	36.7
Apr-20	-56.6	-70.9	43	36.5
May-20	-43.1	-25.7	49.7	54.7
Jun-20	27.5	16.7	66.3	67.9
Jul-20	24.1	23	36	55.6
Aug-20	17.2	19	38.8	55.1
Sep-20	15	25.5	56.6	56.9
Oct-20	32.3	42.6	62.7	51.6
Nov-20	26.3	37.9	44.3	48.1
Dec-20	11.1	2.3	39.2	41.5
Jan-21	30.1	24.2	51.3	44.6
Feb-21	28.7	25.7	40	38.1
Mar-21	44.5	38.2	59.1	48.2
Apr-21	50.2	36	66.6	59.5
May-21	31.5	32.5	52.7	50.3

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

https://www.philadelphiafed.org

The index of current new orders of the Business Outlook Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in Chart VA-2 illustrates the weakness of the cyclical expansion. The index weakened in 2006 and 2007 and then fell sharply into contraction during the global recession. There have been twelve readings into contraction from Jan 2012 to May 2013 and generally weak readings with some exceptions. The index of new orders moved into expansion in Jun-Oct 2013 with moderation in Nov-Dec 2013 and into Jan 2014. The index fell into contraction in Feb 2014, recovering in Mar-Apr 2014 but weaker reading in May 2014. There is marked improvement in Jun-Jul 2014 with slowing in Aug-Oct 2014 followed by acceleration in Nov 2014. New orders deteriorated in Jan-Apr 2015, improving in May-Jun 2015. New orders deteriorated in Jul-Aug 2015 and improved in Sep 2015. New orders deteriorated in Oct-2015 to Dec 2015, contracting at slower pace in Jan 2016. There is sharper contraction in Feb 2016 and an upward jump in Mar 2016 followed by deterioration in Apr-Jun 2016. New orders improved in Jul 2016, deteriorating in Aug 2016 and improving in Sep 2016. Improvement continued in Oct-Nov 2016 with mild deterioration in Dec 2016 followed by improvement in Jan-Feb 2017, softening in Mar-Jul 2017, recovering in Aug-Sep 2017. There is deterioration in Oct 2017 followed by improvement in Nov-Dec 2017. There is deterioration in Jan 2018 followed by improvement in Feb 2018 and improvement in Mar 2018. The index deteriorates in Apr 2018, improving in May 2018. The index deteriorates in Jun 2018, improving in Jul 2018 and deteriorating in Aug 2018. The index improves in Sep 2018, deteriorating in Oct 2018. The index weakens in Nov 2018, improving in Dec 2018. The index improves in Jan 2019, deteriorating in Feb 2019. The index improves in Mar 2019, improving in Apr 2019. The index deteriorates in May-Jun 2019, improving in Jul 2019. The index improves in Aug 2019, improving in Sep 2019. The index stabilizes in Oct 2019, deteriorating in Nov 2019. The index improves in Dec 2019 and Jan 2020. The index improves in Feb 2020. The index contracts in Mar-Apr 2020. There is improvement in the index to softer negative level in May 2020. The index improves to positive in Jun 2020-Apr 2021. The index deteriorates in May 2021.

Chart VA-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, Current and Future Activity Indexes

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/

The index of current new orders of the Business Outlook Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in Chart VA-2 illustrates the weakness of the cyclical expansion. The index weakened in 2006 and 2007 and then fell sharply into contraction during the global recession. There have been twelve readings into contraction from Jan 2012 to May 2013 and generally weak readings with some exceptions. The index of new orders moved into expansion in Jun-Oct 2013 with moderation in Nov-Dec 2013 and into Jan 2014. The index fell into contraction in Feb 2014, recovering in Mar-Apr 2014 but weaker reading in May 2014. There is marked improvement in Jun-Jul 2014 with slowing in Aug-Oct 2014 followed by acceleration in Nov 2014. New orders deteriorated in Jan-Apr 2015, improving in May-Jun 2015. New orders deteriorated in Jul-Aug 2015 and improved in Sep 2015. New orders deteriorated in Oct-2015 to Dec 2015, contracting at slower pace in Jan 2016. There is sharper contraction in Feb 2016 and an upward jump in Mar 2016 followed by deterioration in Apr-Jun 2016. New orders improved in Jul 2016, deteriorating in Aug 2016 and improving in Sep 2016. Improvement continued in Oct-Nov 2016 with mild deterioration in Dec 2016 followed by improvement in Jan-Feb 2017, softening in Mar-Jul 2017, recovering in Aug-Sep 2017. There is deterioration in Oct 2017 followed by improvement in Nov-Dec 2017. There is deterioration in Jan 2018 followed by improvement in Feb 2018 and improvement in Mar 2018. The index deteriorates in Apr 2018, improving in May 2018. The index deteriorates in Jun 2018, improving in Jul 2018 and deteriorating in Aug 2018. The index improves in Sep 2018, deteriorating in Oct 2018. The index weakens in Nov 2018, improving in Dec 2018. The index improves in Jan 2019, deteriorating in Feb 2019. The index improves in Mar 2019, improving in Apr 2019. The index deteriorates in May-Jun 2019, improving in Jul 2019. The index improves in Aug 2019, improving in Sep 2019. The index stabilizes in Oct 2019, deteriorating in Nov 2019. The index improves in Dec 2019 and Jan 2020. The index improves in Feb 2020. The index contracts in Mar-Apr 2020. There is improvement in the index to softer negative level in May 2020. The index improves to positive in Jun 2020-Apr 2021. The index deteriorates in May 2021.

Chart VA-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, Current New Orders Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021.