CMP Associates Regulation Blog: July 2022

Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System Increases the Fed Funds Rate Target Range to 2 ¼ to 2 ½ Percent or Increase of 0.75 Percentage Points at the Highest Pace Since 1994 with Probable Additional Increases, US GDP contracted at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (SAAR) of 0.9 percent in IIQ2022 and contracted at SAAR of 1.6 percent in IQ2022, Consumer Prices of the United States Increased 9.1 percent in 12 Months Ending In Jun 2022, Which is the Highest since 9.6 percent in Nov 1981, followed by the Second highest of 8.9 percent in Dec 1981 and the Third highest of 8.6 percent in May 2022, US Consumer Prices Increased at Annual Equivalent 10.9 Percent in Apr-Jun 2022 and at 1.3 Percent in Jun 2022 or 16.8 Percent in Annual Equivalent, Consumer Prices Excluding Food and Energy Increased at Annual Equivalent 7.9 Percent in Apr-Jun 2022 and Increased 0.7 Percent in Jun 2022 or 8.7 Percent Annual Equivalent, Energy Consumer Prices Increased at Annual Equivalent 39.5 Percent in Apr-Jun 2022 and Increased 7.5 Percent in Jun 2022 or 138.2 Percent Annual Equivalent, Consumer Food Prices Increased at Annual Equivalent 13.1 Percent in Apr-Jun 2022 and Increased 1.0 Percent in Jun 2022 or 12.7 Percent Annual Equivalent, Stagflation, Recession Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

Note: This Blog will post only one indicator of the US economy while we concentrate efforts in completing a book-length manuscript in the critically important subject of INFLATION.

Carlos M. Pelaez

I United States Inflation

IB Long-term US Inflation

IC Current US Inflation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

Preamble. United States total public debt outstanding is $30.6 trillion and debt held by the public $23.9 trillion (https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/datasets/debt-to-the-penny/debt-to-the-penny). The Net International Investment Position of the United States, or foreign debt, is $17.8 trillion at the end of IQ2022 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/intinv122.pdf). The United States current account deficit is 4.8 percent of GDP in IQ2022, increasing from 3.7 percent in IVQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/trans122.pdf). The Treasury deficit of the United States reached $2.8 trillion in fiscal year 2021 (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/). Total assets of Federal Reserve Banks reached $8.9 trillion on Jul 27, 2022 and securities held outright reached $8.5 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). US GDP nominal NSA reached $24.9 trillion in IIQ2022 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). US GDP contracted at the real seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 1.6 percent in IQ2022 and contract at the SAAR of 0.9 percent in IIQ2022 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Total Treasury interest-bearing, marketable debt held by private investors increased from $3635 billion in 2007 to $16,439 billion in Sep 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021) or increase by 352.2 percent (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/). John Hilsenrath, writing on “Economists Seek Recession Cues in the Yield Curve,” published in the Wall Street Journal on Apr 2, 2022, analyzes the inversion of the Treasury yield curve with the two-year yield at 2.430 on Apr 1, 2022, above the ten-year yield at 2.374. Hilsenrath argues that inversion appears to signal recession in market analysis but not in alternative Fed approach.

Chart CPI-H provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index of the United States with 9.1 percent in Jun 2022, which is the highest since 9.6 percent in Nov 1981, followed by the second highest of 8.9 percent in Dec 1981 and the third highest of 8.6 percent in May 2022.

Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart VII-3 of the Energy Information Administration provides the US retail price of regular gasoline. The price increased to $4.330 per gallon on Jul 25, 2022 from $3.136 a year earlier or 38.1 percent.

Chart VII-3, US Retail Price of Regular Gasoline, Dollars Per Gallon

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/weekly/

Chart VII-4 of the Energy Information Administration provides the price of the Natural Gas Futures Contract increasing from $2.581 per million Btu on Jan 4, 2021 to $8.893 per million Btu on Jul 26, 2022 or 244.6 percent.

Chart VII-4, US, Natural Gas Futures Contract 1

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1d.htm

Chart VII-5 of the US Energy Administration provides US field production of oil decreasing from a peak of 12,966 thousand barrels per day in Nov 2019 to the final point of 11.628 thousand barrels per day in Apr 2022.

Chart VII-5, US, US, Field Production of Crude Oil, Thousand Barrels Per Day

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=M

Chart VII-6 of the US Energy Information Administration provides imports of crude oil. Imports increased from 245,369 thousand barrels per day in Jan 2021 to 252,916 thousand barrels in Jan 2022, moving to 247,199 thousand barrels in Apr 2022.

Chart VII-6, US, US, Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Thousand Barrels

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUS1&f=M

Chart VI-7 of the EIA provides US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2020. There was sharp increase in production in the final segment that reached consumption in 2020.

Chart VI-7, US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2020, Million Barrels Per Day

https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php

Chart VI-8 provides the US average retail price of electricity at 12.78 cents per kilowatthour in Dec 2020 increasing to 14.47 cents per kilowatthour in Mar 2022 or 13.2 per cent.

Chart VI-8, US Average Retail Price of Electricity, Monthly, Cents per Kilowatthour,

https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.M~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.M&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.M&freq=M&start=200101&end=202203&ctype=linechart&ltype=pin&rtype=s&maptype=0&rse=0&pin=

Chart VII-9 provides the fed funds rate and Three Months, Two-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields. Unconventional monetary policy of near zero interest rates is typically followed by financial and economic stress with sharp increases in interest rates.

Chart VII-9, US Fed Funds Rate and Three-Month, Two-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Jan 2, 1994 to Jul 28, 2022

Source: Federal Reserve Board of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Chart VI-14 provides the overnight fed funds rate, the yield of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, the yield of the 30-year constant maturity bond and the conventional mortgage rate from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. In Jan 1991, the fed funds rate was 6.91 percent, the 10-year Treasury yield 8.09 percent, the 30-year Treasury yield 8.27 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 9.64 percent. Before monetary policy tightening in Oct 1993, the rates and yields were 2.99 percent for the fed funds, 5.33 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 5.94 for the 30-year Treasury and 6.83 percent for the conventional mortgage rate. After tightening in Nov 1994, the rates and yields were 5.29 percent for the fed funds rate, 7.96 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 8.08 percent for the 30-year Treasury and 9.17 percent for the conventional mortgage rate.

Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Chart VI-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. There does not appear acceleration of consumer prices requiring aggressive tightening.

Chart VI-15, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. Inflation collapsed during the recession from Jul 1990 (III) and Mar 1991 (I) and the end of the Kuwait War on Feb 25, 1991 that stabilized world oil markets. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Policy tightening had adverse collateral effects in the form of emerging market crises in Mexico and Argentina and fixed income markets worldwide.

Chart VI-16, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Twelve-Month Percentage Change, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and r^e the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+r^e). Thus, g = [(r/r^e) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dr^e>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

Inflation and unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment. Chart VI-1B for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart VI-1B cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s. The loans were used in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on inflation and the economy. This interpretation is consistent with the case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises frm the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a plausible interpretation of this pattern.”

The reading of the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the output gap and inflation expectations:

“So, inflation is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’ or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with ‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen in economies well below potential.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”

Chart VI-1B provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that period. Chart VI-1B used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of unemployment in large urban centers.

Chart VI1-B, Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987

Source: ©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.

The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm). The FOMC updated in the statement at its meeting on Dec 16, 2015 with maintenance of the current level of the balance sheet and liftoff of interest rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm) followed by the statement of Jul 27, 2022 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20220727a.htm):

Jul 27, 2022

Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement

For release at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Recent indicators of spending and production have softened. Nonetheless, job gains have been robust in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Inflation remains elevated, reflecting supply and demand imbalances related to the pandemic, higher food and energy prices, and broader price pressures.

Russia's war against Ukraine is causing tremendous human and economic hardship. The war and related events are creating additional upward pressure on inflation and are weighing on global economic activity. The Committee is highly attentive to inflation risks.

The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent and anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective.

In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on public health, labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments.

Voting for the monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michael S. Barr; Michelle W. Bowman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Susan M. Collins; Lisa D. Cook; Esther L. George; Philip N. Jefferson; Loretta J. Mester; and Christopher J. Waller.

Implementation Note issued July 27, 2022

There are several important issues in this statement.

Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate:” (https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed.htm): “The Federal Reserve System is the central bank of the United States. It performs five general functions to promote the effective operation of the U.S. economy and, more generally, the public interest. The Federal Reserve:

conducts the nation’s monetary policy to promote maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates in the U.S. economy;
promotes the stability of the financial system and seeks to minimize and contain systemic risks through active monitoring and engagement in the U.S. and abroad;
promotes the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions and monitors their impact on the financial system as a whole;
fosters payment and settlement system safety and efficiency through services to the banking industry and the U.S. government that facilitate U.S.-dollar transactions and payments; and
promotes consumer protection and community development through consumer-focused supervision and examination, research and analysis of emerging consumer issues and trends, community economic development activities, and the administration of consumer laws and regulations.”

“The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent and anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective.”
New Advance Guidance. “The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent and anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective. In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on public health, labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments” (emphasis added).
New Quantitative Easing and Other Measures: “In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20220504b.htm).”
”Forecast Dependent Policy. In the Opening Remarks to the Press Conference on Jan 30, 2019, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20190130.pdf): “Today, the FOMC decided that the cumulative effects of those developments over the last several months warrant a patient, wait-and-see approach regarding future policy changes. In particular, our statement today says, “In light of global economic and financial developments and muted inflation pressures, the Committee will be patient as it determines what future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate may be appropriate.” This change was not driven by a major shift in the baseline outlook for the economy. Like many forecasters, we still see “sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near … 2 percent” as the likeliest case. But the cross-currents I mentioned suggest the risk of a less-favorable outlook. In addition, the case for raising rates has weakened somewhat. The traditional case for rate increases is to protect the economy from risks that arise when rates are too low for too long, particularly the risk of too-high inflation. Over the past few months, that risk appears to have diminished. Inflation readings have been muted, and the recent drop in oil prices is likely to Page 3 of 5 push headline inflation lower still in coming months. Further, as we noted in our post-meeting statement, while survey-based measures of inflation expectations have been stable, financial market measures of inflation compensation have moved lower. Similarly, the risk of financial imbalances appears to have receded, as a number of indicators that showed elevated levels of financial risk appetite last fall have moved closer to historical norms. In this environment, we believe we can best support the economy by being patient in evaluating the outlook before making any future adjustment to policy.” In the opening remarks to the Mar 20, 2019, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20190320.pdf): “In discussing the Committee’s projections, it is useful to note what those projections are, as well as what they are not. The SEP includes participants’ individual projections of the most likely economic scenario along with their views of the appropriate path of the federal funds rate in that scenario. Views about the most likely scenario form one input into our policy discussions. We also discuss other plausible scenarios, including the risk of more worrisome outcomes. These and other scenarios and many other considerations go into policy, but are not reflected in projections of the most likely case. Thus, we always emphasize that the interest rate projections in the SEP are not a Committee decision. They are not a Committee plan. As Chair Yellen noted some years ago, the FOMC statement, rather than the dot plot, is the device that the Committee uses to express its opinions about the likely path of rates.”

Focus is shifting from tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds now currently at 2 ¼ to 2 ½ percent and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Markets overreacted to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases to $25 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 1 ½ to 1 ¾ percent (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20220727a.htm): “The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent and anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective. In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's assessments will take into account a wide range of information, including readings on public health, labor market conditions, inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and financial and international developments” (emphasis added). The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H Powell, stated after the FOMC meeting on Dec 15, 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20211215.pdf): “All FOMC participants forecast that this remaining test will be met next year. The median projection for the appropriate level of the federal funds rate is 0.9 percent at the end of 2022, about a half a percentage point higher than projected in September. Participants expect a gradual pace of policy firming, with the level of the federal funds rate generally near estimates of its longer-run level by the end of 2024. Of course, these projections do not represent a Committee decision or plan, and no one knows with any certainty where the economy will be a year or more from now.” There are multiple new policy measures, including purchases of Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Fed (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200610a.htm): “To support the flow of credit to households and businesses, over coming months the Federal Reserve will increase its holdings of Treasury securities and agency residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities at least at the current pace to sustain smooth market functioning, thereby fostering effective transmission of monetary policy to broader financial conditions. In addition, the Open Market Desk will continue to offer large-scale overnight and term repurchase agreement operations. The Committee will closely monitor developments and is prepared to adjust its plans as appropriate.” In the Opening Remarks to the Press Conference on Oct 30, 2019, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20191030.pdf): “We see the current stance of monetary policy as likely to remain appropriate as long as incoming information about the economy remains broadly consistent with our outlook of moderate economic growth, a strong labor market, and inflation near our symmetric 2 percent objective. We believe monetary policy is in a good place to achieve these outcomes. Looking ahead, we will be monitoring the effects of our policy actions, along with other information bearing on the outlook, as we assess the appropriate path of the target range for the fed funds rate. Of course, if developments emerge that cause a material reassessment of our outlook, we would respond accordingly. Policy is not on a preset course.” In the Opening Remarks to the Press Conference on Jan 30, 2019, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20190130.pdf): “Today, the FOMC decided that the cumulative effects of those developments over the last several months warrant a patient, wait-and-see approach regarding future policy changes. In particular, our statement today says, “In light of global economic and financial developments and muted inflation pressures, the Committee will be patient as it determines what future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate may be appropriate.” This change was not driven by a major shift in the baseline outlook for the economy. Like many forecasters, we still see “sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation near … 2 percent” as the likeliest case. But the cross-currents I mentioned suggest the risk of a less-favorable outlook. In addition, the case for raising rates has weakened somewhat. The traditional case for rate increases is to protect the economy from risks that arise when rates are too low for too long, particularly the risk of too-high inflation. Over the past few months, that risk appears to have diminished. Inflation readings have been muted, and the recent drop in oil prices is likely to Page 3 of 5 push headline inflation lower still in coming months. Further, as we noted in our post-meeting statement, while survey-based measures of inflation expectations have been stable, financial market measures of inflation compensation have moved lower. Similarly, the risk of financial imbalances appears to have receded, as a number of indicators that showed elevated levels of financial risk appetite last fall have moved closer to historical norms. In this environment, we believe we can best support the economy by being patient in evaluating the outlook before making any future adjustment to policy.” The FOMC is initiating the “normalization” or reduction of the balance sheet of securities held outright for monetary policy (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190130c.htm) with significant changes (https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20190320.pdf). In the opening remarks to the Mar 20, 2019, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20190320.pdf): “In discussing the Committee’s projections, it is useful to note what those projections are, as well as what they are not. The SEP includes participants’ individual projections of the most likely economic scenario along with their views of the appropriate path of the federal funds rate in that scenario. Views about the most likely scenario form one input into our policy discussions. We also discuss other plausible scenarios, including the risk of more worrisome outcomes. These and other scenarios and many other considerations go into policy, but are not reflected in projections of the most likely case. Thus, we always emphasize that the interest rate projections in the SEP are not a Committee decision. They are not a Committee plan. As Chair Yellen noted some years ago, the FOMC statement, rather than the dot plot, is the device that the Committee uses to express its opinions about the likely path of rates.”

In the Introductory Statement on Jul 25, 2019, in Frankfurt am Main, the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, stated (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2019/html/ecb.is190725~547f29c369.en.html): “Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We expect them to remain at their present or lower levels at least through the first half of 2020, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to our aim over the medium term.

We intend to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the asset purchase programme for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising the key ECB interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation.” At its meeting on September 12, 2019, the Governing Council of the ECB (European Central Bank), decided to (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ecb.mp190912~08de50b4d2.en.html): (1) decrease the deposit facility by 10 basis points to minus 0.50 percent while maintaining at 0.00 the main refinancing operations rate and at 0.25 percent the marginal lending facility rate; (2) restart net purchases of securities at the monthly rate of €20 billion beginning on Nov 1, 2019; (3) reinvest principal payments from maturing securities; (4) adapt long-term refinancing operations to maintain “favorable bank lending conditions;” and (5) exempt part of the “negative deposit facility rate” on bank excess liquidity.

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided to lower the target range of the federal funds rate by 0.50 percent to 1.0 to 1¼ percent on Mar 3, 2020 in a decision outside the calendar meetings (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200303a.htm):

March 03, 2020

Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement

For release at 10:00 a.m. EST

The fundamentals of the U.S. economy remain strong. However, the coronavirus poses evolving risks to economic activity. In light of these risks and in support of achieving its maximum employment and price stability goals, the Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/2 percentage point, to 1 to 1‑1/4 percent. The Committee is closely monitoring developments and their implications for the economic outlook and will use its tools and act as appropriate to support the economy.

Voting for the monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michelle W. Bowman; Lael Brainard; Richard H. Clarida; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Neel Kashkari; Loretta J. Mester; and Randal K. Quarles.

For media inquiries, call 202-452-2955.

Implementation Note issued March 3, 2020

W = Y/r (1)

I D Current US Inflation. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and large-scale purchases of long-term securities for the balance sheet of the central bank is proposed to prevent deflation. The data of CPI inflation of all goods and CPI inflation excluding food and energy for the past six decades does not show even one negative change, as shown in Table CPIEX.

Table CPIEX, Annual Percentage Changes of the CPI All Items Excluding Food and Energy

Year	Annual ∆%
1958	2.4
1959	2.0
1960	1.3
1961	1.3
1962	1.3
1963	1.3
1964	1.6
1965	1.2
1966	2.4
1967	3.6
1968	4.6
1969	5.8
1970	6.3
1971	4.7
1972	3.0
1973	3.6
1974	8.3
1975	9.1
1976	6.5
1977	6.3
1978	7.4
1979	9.8
1980	12.4
1981	10.4
1982	7.4
1983	4.0
1984	5.0
1985	4.3
1986	4.0
1987	4.1
1988	4.4
1989	4.5
1990	5.0
1991	4.9
1992	3.7
1993	3.3
1994	2.8
1995	3.0
1996	2.7
1997	2.4
1998	2.3
1999	2.1
2000	2.4
2001	2.6
2002	2.4
2003	1.4
2004	1.8
2005	2.2
2006	2.5
2007	2.3
2008	2.3
2009	1.7
2010	1.0
2011	1.7
2012	2.1
2013	1.8
2014	1.7
2015	1.8
2016	2.2
2017	1.8
2018	2.1
2019	2.2
2020	1.7
2021	3.6

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data

Chart I-12 provides the consumer price index NSA from 1913 to 2022. The dominating characteristic is the increase in slope during the Great Inflation from the middle of the 1960s through the 1970s. There is long-term inflation in the US and no evidence of deflation risks.

Chart I-12, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 1913-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-13 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 1914 to 2022. The only episode of deflation after 1950 is in 2009, which is explained by the reversal of speculative commodity futures carry trades that were induced by interest rates driven to zero in a shock of monetary policy in 2008. The only persistent case of deflation is from 1930 to 1933, which has little if any relevance to the contemporary United States economy. There are actually three waves of inflation in the second half of the 1960s, in the mid-1970s and again in the late 1970s. Inflation rates then stabilized in a range with only two episodes above 5 percent.

Chart I-13, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, 12- Month Percentage Change 1914-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Table I-2 provides annual percentage changes of United States consumer price inflation from 1914 to 2021. There have been only cases of annual declines of the CPI after wars:

World War I minus 10.5 percent in 1921 and minus 6.1 percent in 1922 following cumulative increases of 83.5 percent in four years from 1917 to 1920 at the average of 16.4 percent per year
World War II: minus 1.2 percent in 1949 following cumulative 33.9 percent in three years from 1946 to 1948 at average 10.2 percent per year
Minus 0.4 percent in 1955 two years after the end of the Korean War
Minus 0.4 percent in 2009.
The decline of 0.4 percent in 2009 followed increase of 3.8 percent in 2008 and is explained by the reversal of speculative carry trades into commodity futures that were created in 2008 as monetary policy rates were driven to zero. The reversal occurred after misleading statement on toxic assets in banks in the proposal for TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009).

There were declines of 1.7 percent in both 1927 and 1928 during the episode of revival of rules of the gold standard. The only persistent deflationary period since 1914 was during the Great Depression in the years from 1930 to 1933 and again in 1938-1939. Consumer prices increased only 0.1 percent in 2015 because of the collapse of commodity prices from artificially high levels induced by zero interest rates. Consumer prices increased 1.3 percent in 2016, increasing at 2.1 percent in 2017. Consumer prices increased 2.4 percent in 2018, increasing at 1.8 percent in 2019. Consumer prices increased 1.2 percent in 2020. Consumer prices increased 4.7 percent in 2021 during fiscal, monetary, and external imbalances. Fear of deflation based on that experience does not justify unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates that has failed to stop deflation in Japan. Financial repression causes far more adverse effects on allocation of resources by distorting the calculus of risk/returns than alleged employment-creating effects or there would not be current recovery without jobs and hiring after zero interest rates since Dec 2008 and intended now forever in a self-imposed forecast growth and employment mandate of monetary policy. Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzed 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). Jon Hilsenrath demonstrates that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.

Table I-2, US, Annual CPI Inflation ∆% 1914-2021

Year	Annual ∆%
1914	1.0
1915	1.0
1916	7.9
1917	17.4
1918	18.0
1919	14.6
1920	15.6
1921	-10.5
1922	-6.1
1923	1.8
1924	0.0
1925	2.3
1926	1.1
1927	-1.7
1928	-1.7
1929	0.0
1930	-2.3
1931	-9.0
1932	-9.9
1933	-5.1
1934	3.1
1935	2.2
1936	1.5
1937	3.6
1938	-2.1
1939	-1.4
1940	0.7
1941	5.0
1942	10.9
1943	6.1
1944	1.7
1945	2.3
1946	8.3
1947	14.4
1948	8.1
1949	-1.2
1950	1.3
1951	7.9
1952	1.9
1953	0.8
1954	0.7
1955	-0.4
1956	1.5
1957	3.3
1958	2.8
1959	0.7
1960	1.7
1961	1.0
1962	1.0
1963	1.3
1964	1.3
1965	1.6
1966	2.9
1967	3.1
1968	4.2
1969	5.5
1970	5.7
1971	4.4
1972	3.2
1973	6.2
1974	11.0
1975	9.1
1976	5.8
1977	6.5
1978	7.6
1979	11.3
1980	13.5
1981	10.3
1982	6.2
1983	3.2
1984	4.3
1985	3.6
1986	1.9
1987	3.6
1988	4.1
1989	4.8
1990	5.4
1991	4.2
1992	3.0
1993	3.0
1994	2.6
1995	2.8
1996	3.0
1997	2.3
1998	1.6
1999	2.2
2000	3.4
2001	2.8
2002	1.6
2003	2.3
2004	2.7
2005	3.4
2006	3.2
2007	2.8
2008	3.8
2009	-0.4
2010	1.6
2011	3.2
2012	2.1
2013	1.5
2014	1.6
2015	0.1
2016	1.3
2017	2.1
2018	2.4
2019	1.8
2020	1.2
2021	4.7

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-14 provides the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1957 to 2022. There is long-term inflation in the US without episodes of persistent deflation.

Chart I-14, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1957-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-15 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1958 to 2022. There are three waves of inflation in the 1970s during the Great Inflation. There is no episode of deflation.

Chart I-15, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1958-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

The consumer price index of housing is in Chart I-16. There was also acceleration during the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The index flattens after the global recession in IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Housing prices collapsed under the weight of construction of several times more housing than needed. Surplus housing originated in subsidies and artificially low interest rates in the shock of unconventional monetary policy in 2003 to 2004 in fear of deflation.

Chart I-16, US, Consumer Price Index Housing, NSA, 1967-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-17 provides 12-month percentage changes of the housing CPI. The Great Inflation also had extremely high rates of housing inflation. Housing is considered as potential hedge of inflation.

Chart I-17, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, 12- Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1968-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

ID Current US Inflation. Consumer price inflation has fluctuated in recent months. Table I-3 provides 12-month consumer price inflation in Jun 2022 and annual equivalent percentage changes for the months from Apr 2022 to Jun 2022 of the CPI, the core CPI and major segments. The final column provides inflation from May 2022 to Jun 2022. CPI inflation increased 9.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2022. The annual equivalent rate from Apr 2022 to Jun 2022 was 10.9 percent in the episode of shifting energy sources; and the monthly inflation rate of 1.3 percent annualizes at 16.8 percent. Prior inflation rates fluctuate in accordance with inducement of risk appetite or frustration by risk aversion of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. At the margin, the decline in commodity prices in sharp recent risk aversion in commodities markets caused lower inflation worldwide (with return in some countries in Dec 2012 and Jan-Feb 2013) that followed a jump in Aug-Sep 2012 because of the relaxed risk aversion resulting from the bond-buying program of the European Central Bank or Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). Carry trades moved away from commodities into stocks with resulting weaker commodity prices and stronger equity valuations. There is reversal of exposures in commodities but with preferences of equities by investors. Geopolitical events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East together with economic conditions worldwide are inducing risk concerns in commodities at the margin magnified by policies shifting energy sources. With zero or very low interest rates, commodity prices would increase again in an environment of risk appetite, as shown in past oscillating inflation. Excluding food and energy, core CPI inflation was 5.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2022, 7.9 percent in annual equivalent from Apr 2022 to Jun 2022 and 0.7 percent in Jun 2022, which annualizes at 8.7 percent. There is no deflation in the US economy that could justify further unconventional monetary policy, which is now open-ended or forever with very low interest rates and cessation of bond-buying by the central bank but with reinvestment of interest and principal, or QE→∞ even if the economy grows back to potential. The FOMC is engaged in increases in the Fed balance sheet. Financial repression of very low interest rates is constituted protracted distortion of resource allocation by clouding risk/return decisions, preventing the economy from expanding along its optimal growth path. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues. On Jun 15, 2022, the FOMC increased interest rates with the following guidance (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20220615a.htm): “The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1‑1/2 to 1-3/4 percent and anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in the Plans for Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet that were issued in May. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective.”

W = Y/r (1)

Table I-3, US, Consumer Price Index Percentage Changes 12 months NSA and Annual Equivalent ∆%

	% RI	∆% 12 Months Jun 2022/Jun 2021 NSA	∆% Annual Equivalent Apr 2022 to Jun 2022 SA	∆% Jun 2022/May 2022 SA
CPI All Items	100.000	9.1	10.9	1.3
CPI ex Food and Energy	77.912	5.9	7.9	0.7
Food	13.423	10.4	13.1	1.0
Energy	8.665	41.6	39.5	7.5
Shelter	32.285	5.6	7.0	0.6
Medical Care Services	6.821	4.8	6.6	0.7
Transportation Services	5.855	8.8	29.3	2.1

% RI: Percent Relative Importance

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Table I-4 provides relative important components of the consumer price index. The relative important weights for Jun 2022 are in Table I-3.

Table I-4, US, Relative Importance, 2009-2010 Weights, of Components in the Consumer Price Index, US City Average, Dec 2012

All Items	100.000
Food and Beverages	15.261
Food	14.312
Food at home	8.898
Food away from home	5.713
Housing	41.021
Shelter	31.681
Rent of primary residence	6.545
Owners’ equivalent rent	22.622
Apparel	3.564
Transportation	16.846
Private Transportation	15.657
New vehicles	3.189
Used cars and trucks	1.844
Motor fuel	5.462
Gasoline	5.274
Medical Care	7.163
Medical care commodities	1.714
Medical care services	5.448
Recreation	5.990
Education and Communication	6.779
Other Goods and Services	3.376

Refers to all urban consumers, covering approximately 87 percent of the US population (see http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiovrvw.htm#item1). Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiri2011.pdf http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiriar.htm http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiri2012.pdf

Chart I-18 provides the US consumer price index for housing from 2001 to 2022. Housing prices rose sharply during the decade until the bump of the global recession and increased again in 2011-2012 with some stabilization in 2013. There is renewed increase in 2014 followed by stabilization and renewed increase in 2015-2022. The CPI excluding housing would likely show much higher inflation. The commodity carry trades resulting from unconventional monetary policy have compressed income remaining after paying for indispensable shelter.

Chart I-18, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, NSA, 2001-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-19 provides 12-month percentage changes of the housing CPI. Percentage changes collapsed during the global recession but have been rising into positive territory in 2011 and 2012-2013 but with the rate declining and then increasing into 2014. There is decrease into 2015 followed by stability and marginal increase in 2016-2019 followed by initial decline in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) with sharp recovery.

Chart I-19, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

There have been waves of consumer price inflation in the US in 2011 and into 2022 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-70-percent-in.html) that are illustrated in Table I-5. The first wave occurred in Jan-Apr 2011 and was caused by the carry trade of commodity prices induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates. Cheap money at zero opportunity cost in environment of risk appetite was channeled into financial risk assets, causing increases in commodity prices. The annual equivalent rate of increase of the all-items CPI in Jan-Apr 2011 was 4.9 percent and the CPI excluding food and energy increased at annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent. The second wave occurred during the collapse of the carry trade from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity futures because of risk aversion in financial markets created by the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The annual equivalent rate of increase of the all-items CPI dropped to 1.8 percent in May-Jun 2011 while the annual equivalent rate of the CPI excluding food and energy increased at 2.4 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent CPI inflation rose to 3.2 percent while the core CPI increased at 2.4 percent. The fourth wave occurred in the form of increase of the CPI all-items annual equivalent rate to 1.8 percent in Oct-Nov 2011 with the annual equivalent rate of the CPI excluding food and energy remaining at 2.4 percent. The fifth wave occurred in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 with annual equivalent headline inflation of 1.8 percent and core inflation of 2.4 percent. In the sixth wave, headline CPI inflation increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Feb-Apr 2012 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The seventh wave in May-Jul occurred with annual equivalent inflation of minus 1.2 percent for the headline CPI in May-Jul 2012 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The eighth wave is with annual equivalent inflation of 6.8 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 but 5.7 percent including Oct. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Nov 2012 was minus 2.4 percent under the new shock of risk aversion and 0.0 percent in Dec 2012 with annual equivalent of 0.0 percent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent of the headline CPI was 6.2 percent in Feb 2013 and 1.2 percent for the core CPI. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent was minus 3.0 percent in Mar-Apr 2013 and 0.6 percent for the core index. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.4 percent in May-Sep 2013 and 2.2 percent for the core CPI. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent CPI inflation in Oct-Nov 2013 was 1.8 percent and 1.8 percent for the core CPI. Inflation returned in the fourteenth wave at 2.4 percent for the headline CPI index and 1.8 percent for the core CPI in annual equivalent for Dec 2013 to Mar 2014. In the fifteenth wave, inflation moved to annual equivalent 1.8 percent for the headline index in Apr-Jul 2014 and 2.1 percent for the core index. In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 0.0 percent in Aug 2014 and 1.2 percent for the core index. In the seventeenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 0.0 percent for the headline CPI and 2.4 percent for the core in Sep-Oct 2014. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.3 percent for the headline index in Nov 2014-Jan 2015 and 1.2 percent for the core. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.2 percent for the headline index and 2.2 percent for the core index in Feb-Jun 2015. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 2.4 percent in Jul 2015 for the headline and core indexes. In the twenty-first wave, headline consumer prices decreased at 1.2 percent in annual equivalent in Aug-Sep 2015 while core prices increased at annual equivalent 1.8 percent. In the twenty-second wave, consumer prices increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent for the central index and 2.4 percent for the core in Oct-Nov 2015. In the twenty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 0.6 percent for the headline CPI in Dec 2015 to Jan 2016 and 1.8 percent for the core. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent was minus 1.2 percent and 2.4 percent for the core in Feb 2016. In the twenty-fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 4.3 percent for the central index in Mar-Apr 2016 and at 3.0 percent for the core index. In the twenty-sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.0 percent for the central CPI in May-Jun 2016 and 2.4 percent for the core CPI. In the twenty-seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent for the central CPI and 1.2 percent for the core in Jul 2016. In the twenty-eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent for the headline CPI in Aug 2016 and 2.4 percent for the core. In the twenty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 3.0 percent in Sep-Oct 2016 while the core CPI increased at 1.8 percent. In the thirtieth wave, annual equivalent CPI prices increased at 2.4 percent in Nov-Dec 2016 while the core CPI increased at 1.8 percent. In the thirty-first wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Jan 2017 while the core index increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-second wave, CPI prices changed at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Feb 2017 while the core increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-third wave, CPI prices changed at annual equivalent 0.0 percent in Mar 2017 while the core index changed at 0.0 percent. In the thirty-fourth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Apr 2017 while the core index increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-fifth wave, CPI prices changed at 0.0 annual equivalent in May-Jun 2017 while core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-sixth wave, CPI prices changed at annual equivalent 0.0 percent in Jul 2017 while core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-seventh wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Aug-Sep 2017 while core prices increased at 1.8 percent. In the thirty-eighth wave, CPI prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Oct-Nov 2017 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2017-Feb 2018 while core prices increased at 2.8 percent. In the fortieth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Mar 2018 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-first wave, CPI prices increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent in Apr-May 2018 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-second wave, CPI prices increased at 1.8 percent in Jun-Sep 2018 while core prices increased at 1.8 percent. In the forty-third wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Oct 2018 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-fourth wave, CPI prices changed at minus 0.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2018-Jan 2019 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-fifth wave, CPI prices increased at 4.5 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Apr 2019 while core prices increased at 2.0 percent. In the forty-sixth wave, CPI prices increased at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in May-Jun 2019 while core prices increased at 1.8 percent. In the forty-seventh wave, CPI prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Jul 2019 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-eighth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent in Aug-Sep 2019 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at 2.8 percent annual equivalent in Oct-Dec 2019 while core prices increased at 2.0 percent. In the fiftieth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2020 and core prices at 3.0 percent. In the fifty-first wave, CPI prices decreased at annual equivalent 4.7 percent in Mar-May 2020 while core prices decreased at 2.4 percent. In the fifty-second wave, CPI prices increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent in Jun-Jul 2020 and core prices increased at 4.9 percent. In the fifty-third wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent and core prices increased at 3.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2020. In the fifty-fourth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and core prices at 1.2 percent in Oct 2020. In the fifty-fifth wave, CPI prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2020-Jan 2021 and core prices at 1.2 percent. In the fifty-sixth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 6.2 percent in Feb-Mar 2021 and core prices at 3.0 percent. In the fifty-seventh wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 9.2 percent in Apr-Jun 2021 and core prices at 10.0 percent. In the fifty-eight wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Jul-Sep 2021 and core prices at 3.2 percent. In the fifty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 10.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2021 while core prices increased at 6.8 percent. In the sixtieth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 8.3 percent and core prices increased at 7.0 percent in Dec 2021-Feb 2022. In the sixty-first wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 15.4 percent and core prices at 3.7 percent in Mar 2022. In the sixty-second wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Apr 2022 and core prices at 7.4 percent. In the sixty-third wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 14.7 percent in May-Jun 2022 and core prices at 8.1 percent. The conclusion is that inflation accelerates and decelerates in unpredictable fashion because of shocks or risk aversion and portfolio reallocations in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity derivatives. There are recent increases in shifting sources of energy.

Table I-5, US, Headline and Core CPI Inflation Monthly SA and 12 Months NSA ∆%

	All Items SA Month	All Items NSA 12 month	Core SA Month	Core NSA 12 months
Jun 2022	1.3	9.1	0.7	5.9
May	1.0	8.6	0.6	6.0
AE May-Jun	14.7		8.1
Apr	0.3	8.3	0.6	6.2
AE Apr	3.7		7.4
Mar	1.2	8.5	0.3	6.5
AE Mar	15.4		3.7
Feb	0.8	7.9	0.5	6.4
Jan	0.6	7.5	0.6	6.0
Dec 2021	0.6	7.0	0.6	5.5
AE Dec-Feb	8.3		7.0
Nov	0.7	6.8	0.5	4.9
Oct	0.9	6.2	0.6	4.6
AE Oct-Nov	10.0		6.8
Sep	0.4	5.4	0.3	4.0
Aug	0.3	5.3	0.2	4.0
Jul	0.5	5.4	0.3	4.3
AE Jul-Sep	4.9		3.2
Jun	0.9	5.4	0.8	4.5
May	0.7	5.0	0.7	3.8
Apr	0.6	4.2	0.9	3.0
AE Apr-Jun	9.2		10.0
Mar	0.6	2.6	0.3	1.6
Feb	0.4	1.7	0.2	1.3
AE ∆% Feb-Mar	6.2		3.0
Jan	0.2	1.4	0.0	1.4
Dec 2020	0.3	1.4	0.1	1.6
Nov	0.1	1.2	0.2	1.6
AE ∆% Nov-Jan	2.4		1.2
Oct	0.1	1.2	0.1	1.6
AE ∆% Oct	1.2		1.2
Sep	0.2	1.4	0.2	1.7
Aug	0.4	1.3	0.4	1.7
AE ∆% Aug-Sep	3.7		3.7
Jul	0.5	1.0	0.6	1.6
Jun	0.5	0.6	0.2	1.2
AE ∆% Jun-Jul	6.2		4.9
May	-0.1	0.1	-0.1	1.2
Apr	-0.8	0.3	-0.4	1.4
Mar	-0.3	1.5	-0.1	2.1
AE ∆% Mar-May	-4.7		-2.4
Feb	0.1	2.3	0.2	2.4
Jan	0.2	2.5	0.3	2.3
AE ∆% Jan-Feb	1.8		3.0
Dec 2019	0.2	2.3	0.1	2.3
Nov	0.2	2.1	0.2	2.3
Oct	0.3	1.8	0.2	2.3
AE ∆% Oct-Dec	2.8		2.0
Sep	0.2	1.7	0.2	2.4
Aug	0.1	1.7	0.2	2.4
AE ∆% Aug-Sep	1.8		2.4
Jul	0.2	1.8	0.2	2.2
AE ∆% Jul	2.4		2.4
Jun	0.0	1.6	0.2	2.1
May	0.1	1.8	0.1	2.0
AE ∆% May-Jun	0.6		1.8
Apr	0.4	2.0	0.2	2.1
Mar	0.4	1.9	0.2	2.0
Feb	0.3	1.5	0.1	2.1
AE ∆% Feb-Apr	4.5		2.0
Jan	0.0	1.6	0.2	2.2
Dec 2018	0.0	1.9	0.2	2.2
Nov	-0.1	2.2	0.2	2.2
AE ∆% Nov-Jan	-0.4		2.4
Oct	0.2	2.5	0.2	2.1
AE ∆% Oct	2.4		2.4
Sep	0.2	2.3	0.2	2.2
Aug	0.2	2.7	0.1	2.2
Jul	0.1	2.9	0.2	2.4
Jun	0.1	2.9	0.1	2.3
AE ∆% Jun-Sep	1.8		1.8
May	0.3	2.8	0.2	2.2
Apr	0.2	2.5	0.2	2.1
AE ∆% Apr-May	3.0		2.4
Mar	0.1	2.4	0.2	2.1
AE ∆% Mar	1.2		2.4
Feb	0.3	2.2	0.2	1.8
Jan	0.4	2.1	0.3	1.8
Dec 2017	0.2	2.1	0.2	1.8
AE ∆% Dec-Feb	3.7		2.8
Nov	0.3	2.2	0.1	1.7
Oct	0.1	2.0	0.3	1.8
AE ∆% Oct-Nov	2.4		2.4
Sep	0.5	2.2	0.1	1.7
Aug	0.4	1.9	0.2	1.7
AE ∆% Aug-Sep	5.5		1.8
Jul	0.0	1.7	0.1	1.7
AE ∆% Jul	0.0		1.2
Jun	0.1	1.6	0.1	1.7
May	-0.1	1.9	0.1	1.7
AE ∆% May-Jun	0.0		1.2
Apr	0.1	2.2	0.1	1.9
AE ∆% Apr	1.2		1.2
Mar	0.0	2.4	0.0	2.0
AE ∆% Mar	0.0		0.0
Feb	0.2	2.7	0.2	2.2
AE ∆% Feb	2.4		2.4
Jan	0.4	2.5	0.2	2.3
AE ∆% Jan	4.9		2.4
Dec 2016	0.3	2.1	0.2	2.2
Nov	0.1	1.7	0.1	2.1
AE ∆% Nov-Dec	2.4		1.8
Oct	0.2	1.6	0.1	2.1
Sep	0.3	1.5	0.2	2.2
AE ∆% Sep-Oct	3.0		1.8
Aug	0.2	1.1	0.2	2.3
AE ∆ Aug	2.4		2.4
Jul	-0.1	0.8	0.1	2.2
AE ∆% Jul	-1.2		1.2
Jun	0.3	1.0	0.2	2.2
May	0.2	1.0	0.2	2.2
AE ∆% May-Jun	3.0		2.4
Apr	0.4	1.1	0.3	2.1
Mar	0.3	0.9	0.2	2.2
AE ∆% Mar-Apr	4.3		3.0
Feb	-0.1	1.0	0.2	2.3
AE ∆% Feb	-1.2		2.4
Jan	0.0	1.4	0.2	2.2
Dec 2015	-0.1	0.7	0.1	2.1
AE ∆% Dec-Jan	-0.6		1.8
Nov	0.1	0.5	0.2	2.0
Oct	0.1	0.2	0.2	1.9
AE ∆% Oct-Nov	1.2		2.4
Sep	-0.2	0.0	0.2	1.9
Aug	0.0	0.2	0.1	1.8
AE ∆% Aug-Sep	-1.2		1.8
Jul	0.2	0.2	0.2	1.8
AE ∆% Jul	2.4		2.4
Jun	0.3	0.1	0.2	1.8
May	0.3	0.0	0.1	1.7
Apr	0.1	-0.2	0.2	1.8
Mar	0.3	-0.1	0.2	1.8
Feb	0.3	0.0	0.2	1.7
AE ∆% Feb-Jun	3.2		2.2
Jan	-0.6	-0.1	0.1	1.6
Dec 2014	-0.3	0.8	0.1	1.6
Nov	-0.2	1.3	0.1	1.7
AE ∆% Nov-Jan	-4.3		1.2
Oct	0.0	1.7	0.2	1.8
Sep	0.0	1.7	0.2	1.7
AE ∆% Sep-Oct	0.0		2.4
Aug	0.0	1.7	0.1	1.7
AE ∆% Aug	0.0		1.2
Jul	0.1	2.0	0.2	1.9
Jun	0.1	2.1	0.1	1.9
May	0.2	2.1	0.2	2.0
Apr	0.2	2.0	0.2	1.8
AE ∆% Apr-Jul	1.8		2.1
Mar	0.2	1.5	0.2	1.7
Feb	0.1	1.1	0.1	1.6
Jan	0.2	1.6	0.1	1.6
Dec 2013	0.3	1.5	0.2	1.7
AE ∆% Dec-Mar	2.4		1.8
Nov	0.2	1.2	0.2	1.7
Oct	0.1	1.0	0.1	1.7
AE ∆% Oct-Nov	1.8		1.8
Sep	0.0	1.2	0.2	1.7
Aug	0.2	1.5	0.2	1.8
Jul	0.2	2.0	0.2	1.7
Jun	0.2	1.8	0.2	1.6
May	0.0	1.4	0.1	1.7
AE ∆% May-Sep	1.4		2.2
Apr	-0.2	1.1	0.0	1.7
Mar	-0.3	1.5	0.1	1.9
AE ∆% Mar-Apr	-3.0		0.6
Feb	0.5	2.0	0.1	2.0
AE ∆% Feb	6.2		1.2
Jan	0.2	1.6	0.2	1.9
Dec 2012	0.0	1.7	0.2	1.9
Nov	-0.2	1.8	0.1	1.9
AE ∆% Nov-Jan	0.0		2.0
Oct	0.3	2.2	0.2	2.0
Sep	0.5	2.0	0.2	2.0
Aug	0.6	1.7	0.1	1.9
AE ∆% Aug-Oct	5.7		2.0
Jul	0.0	1.4	0.2	2.1
Jun	-0.1	1.7	0.2	2.2
May	-0.2	1.7	0.1	2.3
AE ∆% May-Jul	-1.2		2.0
Apr	0.2	2.3	0.2	2.3
Mar	0.2	2.7	0.2	2.3
Feb	0.2	2.9	0.1	2.2
AE ∆% Feb-Apr	2.4		2.0
Jan	0.3	2.9	0.2	2.3
Dec 2011	0.0	3.0	0.2	2.2
AE ∆% Dec-Jan	1.8		2.4
Nov	0.2	3.4	0.2	2.2
Oct	0.1	3.5	0.2	2.1
AE ∆% Oct-Nov	1.8		2.4
Sep	0.2	3.9	0.1	2.0
Aug	0.3	3.8	0.3	2.0
Jul	0.3	3.6	0.2	1.8
AE ∆% Jul-Sep	3.2		2.4
Jun	0.0	3.6	0.2	1.6
May	0.3	3.6	0.2	1.5
AE ∆% May-Jun	1.8		2.4
Apr	0.5	3.2	0.1	1.3
Mar	0.5	2.7	0.1	1.2
Feb	0.3	2.1	0.2	1.1
Jan	0.3	1.6	0.2	1.0
AE ∆% Jan-Apr	4.9		1.8
Dec 2010	0.4	1.5	0.1	0.8
Nov	0.3	1.1	0.1	0.8
Oct	0.3	1.2	0.1	0.6
Sep	0.2	1.1	0.1	0.8
Aug	0.1	1.1	0.1	0.9
Jul	0.2	1.2	0.1	0.9
Jun	0.0	1.1	0.1	0.9
May	-0.1	2.0	0.1	0.9
Apr	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.9
Mar	0.0	2.3	0.0	1.1
Feb	-0.1	2.1	0.0	1.3
Jan	0.1	2.6	-0.1	1.6

Note: Core: excluding food and energy; AE: annual equivalent

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/

The behavior of the US consumer price index NSA from 2001 to 2022 is in Chart I-20. Inflation in the US is very dynamic without deflation risks that would justify symmetric inflation targets. The hump in 2008 originated in the carry trade from interest rates dropping to zero into commodity futures. There is no other explanation for the increase of the Cushing OK Crude Oil Future Contract 1 from $55.64/barrel on Jan 9, 2007 to $145.29/barrel on July 3, 2008 during deep global recession, collapsing under a panic of flight into government obligations and the US dollar to $37.51/barrel on Feb 13, 2009 and then rising by carry trades to $113.93/barrel on Apr 29, 2012, collapsing again and then recovering again to $105.23/barrel, all during mediocre economic recovery with peaks and troughs influenced by bouts of risk appetite and risk aversion (data from the US Energy Information Administration EIA, https://www.eia.gov/). The unwinding of the carry trade with the TARP announcement of toxic assets in banks channeled cheap money into government obligations (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There is sharp increase in 2021 and into 2022.

Chart I-20, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 2001-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-21 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 2001 to 2022. There was no deflation or threat of deflation from 2008 into 2009. Commodity prices collapsed during the panic of toxic assets in banks. When stress tests in 2009 revealed US bank balance sheets in much stronger position, cheap money at zero opportunity cost exited government obligations and flowed into carry trades of risk financial assets. Increases in commodity prices drove again the all-items CPI with interruptions during risk aversion originating in multiple fears but especially from the sovereign debt crisis of Europe. There are sharp increases in 2021-2022.

Chart I-21, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

The trend of increase of the consumer price index excluding food and energy in Chart I-22 does not reveal any threat of deflation that would justify symmetric inflation targets. There are mild oscillations in a neat upward trend.

Chart I-22, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 2001-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-23 provides 12-month percentage change of the consumer price index excluding food and energy. Past-year rates of inflation fell toward 1 percent from 2001 into 2003 because of the recession and the decline of commodity prices beginning before the recession with declines of real oil prices. Near zero interest rates with fed funds at 1 percent between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004 stimulated carry trades of all types, including in buying homes with subprime mortgages in expectation that low interest rates forever would increase home prices permanently, creating the equity that would permit the conversion of subprime mortgages into creditworthy mortgages (Gorton 2009EFM; see https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Inflation rose and then collapsed during the unwinding of carry trades and the housing debacle of the global recession. Carry trades into 2011 and 2012 gave a new impulse to CPI inflation, all items and core. Symmetric inflation targets destabilize the economy by encouraging hunts for yields that inflate and deflate financial assets, obscuring risk/return decisions on production, investment, consumption and hiring. There is sharp increase in 2021-2022.

Chart I-23, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Both the US and Japan experienced high rates of inflation during the US Great Inflation of the 1970s (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, http://www.johnbtaylor.com/ http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). It is difficult to justify unconventional monetary policy because of risks of deflation similar to that experienced in Japan. Fear of deflation as had occurred during the Great Depression and in Japan was used as an argument for the first round of unconventional monetary policy with 1 percent interest rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. The 1 percent interest rate combined with quantitative easing in the form of withdrawal of supply of 30-year securities by suspension of the auction of 30-year Treasury bonds with the intention of reducing mortgage rates. For fear of deflation, see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, and Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95. The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.htm

The reading of the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the output gap and inflation expectations:

Chart VI1-B, Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987

W = Y/r (1)

Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/