Cumulative Growth of US Manufacturing of 1.5 Percent From Feb 2021 to Jul 2021 at Annual Equivalent 3.0 Percent and Increasing 1.4 Percent in Jul 2021, US Manufacturing 7.9 Percent Higher Than A Year Earlier in the Global Recession, with Output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the Lockdown of Economic activity in the COVID-19 Event and the Through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), US Manufacturing Underperforming Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, United States Higher Inflation, World Inflation Waves, Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Stagflation Risk and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part I

 

Cumulative Growth of US Manufacturing of 1.5 Percent From Feb 2021 to Jul 2021 at Annual Equivalent 3.0 Percent and Increasing 1.4 Percent in Jul 2021, US Manufacturing 7.9 Percent Higher Than A Year Earlier in the Global Recession, with Output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the Lockdown of Economic activity in the COVID-19 Event and the Through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), US Manufacturing Underperforming Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, United States Higher Inflation, World Inflation Waves, Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Stagflation Risk and Government Intervention in Globalization

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021.

I United States Industrial Production

II Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates

I World Inflation Waves

IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IC United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

I United States Industrial Production. This Section I provides data and analysis showing the underperformance in manufacturing in the lost cycle of the global recession without output underperforming below trend worldwide and in the global recession with output in the US reaching in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:

• Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP three trillion dollars below trend (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-65-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.1 percent per year from 1929 to 2020, with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2020 and 1.3 percent from 2007 to 2020. GDP in IIQ2021 is 17.6 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent.
• Private fixed investment stagnating initially followed by cumulative increase of 36.5 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2021 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-65-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html).
• Twenty six million or 15.0 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with cyclically stagnating or declining real wages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/decrease-in-dec-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-fed-will-be-patient-adjusting.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-on00000000e-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
• Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)

• Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/accelerating-inflation-with-deepening.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/new-nonfarm-hires-of-6.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/nonfarm-hires-jump-64.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/global-recession-with-output-in-us.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/united-states-imbalances-of-internal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contracting-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-rising.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/impact-of-monetary-policy-on-exchange.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
• Productivity growth fell from 2.1 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2019 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.4 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2019, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/united-states-inflation-rules.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/financial-markets-stress-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/ii-rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)

• Output of manufacturing (SIC) in Jul 2021 at 37.7 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 26.9 percent below trend since 1986. Output of manufacturing (NAICS) at 41.0 percent below trend measured from 1986 to 2006 and 25.2 percent below trend measured from 1999 to 2006 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/federal-open-market-committee-leaves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/us-industrial-production-increased-3.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/growth-of-industrial-production-of-54.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)

• Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
• Worldwide waves of inflation (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in_29.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/rising-inflation-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-41-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-40-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-334-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-331-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/weekly-rise-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/sharp-worldwide-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
• Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/federal-open-market-committee-leaves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/us-industrial-production-increased-3.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/growth-of-industrial-production-of-54.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier) (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
• Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
• 43 million in poverty and 29 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1999 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
• Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 54.6 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2021 when it would have grown over 53.8 percent at trend of 3.3 percent per year in real terms from IVQ1945 to IQ2021. Financial assets increased $55.5 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $14.1 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation increased 15.3 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/rising-inflation-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/destruction-of-household-nonfinancial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html).

Industrial production increased 0.9 percent in Jul 2021 and increased 0.2 percent in Jun 2021 after increasing 0.8 percent in May 2021, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on May 28, 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. The most prominent features of the revision are an update of the base year to 2017 for the indexes, a conversion of the industry-group indexes to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the incorporation of comprehensive annual production data for 2017 through 2019, and the incorporation of new survey utilization rate data for 2019 and 2020.[1]

On net, the revisions to total IP for recent years are negative. Notably, the updated rates of change are 1 to 1-1/2 percentage points lower per year from 2017 through 2019.[2] The cumulative effect of these revisions leaves the level of total IP in April 2021 about 3-1/2 percent below its late-2007 peak before the Great Recession; previously, total IP in April 2021 was slightly above its peak before the Great Recession. The incorporation of detailed data for manufacturing from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2017 Economic Census (EC) and the 2018 and 2019 Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASMs) accounts for the majority of the differences between the current and the previously published estimates. The revisions to the rates of change for 2020 are small, and the magnitude of the sharp drop (17 percent) in total IP at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 is very similar to the magnitude reported earlier.

Annual capacity growth is revised down about 1 percentage point, on average, from 2017 to 2019 and is little changed in 2020. After these revisions, capacity for total industry is estimated to have grown about 3 percent less between 2016 and the end of 2020 than previously estimated.

In the fourth quarter of 2020, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 73.4 percent, about 1/2 percentage point below its previous estimate and about 6-1/4 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average. The utilization rate for 2019 is also about 1/2 percentage point lower than the previous estimate, but revisions to utilization rates for 2017 and 2018 are very small.”

The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm):

“Industrial production increased 0.9 percent in July after moving up 0.2 percent in June. In July, manufacturing output rose 1.4 percent. About half of the gain in factory output is attributable to a jump of 11.2 percent for motor vehicles and parts, as a number of vehicle manufacturers trimmed or canceled their typical July shutdowns. Despite the large increase last month, vehicle assemblies continued to be constrained by a persistent shortage of semiconductors; the production of motor vehicles and parts in July was about 3-1/2 percent below its recent peak in January 2021. The output of utilities decreased 2.1 percent in July, while the index for mining rose 1.2 percent. At 101.1 percent of its 2017 average, total industrial production in July was 6.6 percent above its year-earlier level but 0.2 percent below its pre-pandemic (February 2020) level. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector rose 0.7 percentage point in July to 76.1 percent, a rate that is 3.5 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” In the six months ending in Jul 2021, United States national industrial production accumulated change of 1.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.3 percent, which is lower than growth of 6.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2021. Excluding decline of 3.0 percent in Feb 2021, growth in the remaining five months from Feb 2021 to Jul 2021 accumulated to 4.8 percent or 11.8 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production increased 2.8 percent in one of the past six months, 0.8 percent in one month, 0.9 percent in one month, 0.2 percent in one month, 0.0 percent in one month and minus 3.0 percent in one month. Industrial production increased at annual equivalent 7.9 percent in the most recent quarter from May 2021 to Jul 2021 and decreased at 1.1 percent annual equivalent in the prior quarter from Feb 2021 to Apr 2021. Business equipment accumulated change of 2.0 percent in the six months from Feb 2020 to Jul 2021, at the annual equivalent rate of 4.0 percent, which is lower than growth of 9.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2021. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “Capacity utilization for the industrial sector rose 0.7 percentage point in July to 76.1 percent, a rate that is 3.5 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration, weakening growth in past months and deep contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Table I-1, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, SA, ∆% 

	Jul 21	Jun 21	May 21	Apr 21	Mar 21	Feb 21	Jun 21/ Jun 20
Total	0.9	0.2	0.8	0.0	2.8	-3.0	6.6
Market Groups
Final Products	1.6	-0.3	1.1	-0.9	1.7	-2.0	5.5
Consumer Goods	1.0	-0.5	1.0	-0.5	1.2	-2.1	2.2
Business Equipment	2.8	-0.6	1.7	-1.9	2.9	-2.8	9.7
Non Industrial Supplies	0.8	-0.4	0.5	-0.2	2.7	-2.4	7.1
Construction	0.9	-1.1	-0.6	-1.4	4.7	-3.9	6.3
Materials	0.4	0.9	0.7	1.0	3.9	-4.2	7.4
Industry Groups
Manufacturing	1.4	-0.3	1.1	-0.3	3.4	-3.7	7.4
Mining	1.2	0.5	1.5	-0.3	11.9	-8.9	12.1
Utilities	-2.1	3.1	-1.5	2.8	-8.6	7.4	-3.8
Capacity	76.1	75.4	75.3	74.7	74.7	72.7	0.1

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Manufacturing increased 1.4 percent in Jul 2021 and decreased 0.3 percent in Jun 2021 after increasing 1.1 percent in May 2021, seasonally adjusted, increasing 7.9 percent not seasonally adjusted in the 12 months ending in Jul 2021, as shown in Table I-2. Manufacturing increased cumulatively 1.5 percent in the six months ending in Jul 2021 or at the annual equivalent rate of 3.0 percent. Excluding the decrease of 3.7 percent in Feb 2021, manufacturing increased 5.4 percent from Feb 2020 to Jul 2021 or at the annual equivalent rate of 13.4 percent. Table I-2 provides a longer perspective of manufacturing in the US. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 with recovery followed by renewed deterioration/improvement in more recent months as shown by 12 months’ rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession, but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily with some strength at the margin. There is renewed deterioration and improvement. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on May 28, 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. The most prominent features of the revision are an update of the base year to 2017 for the indexes, a conversion of the industry-group indexes to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the incorporation of comprehensive annual production data for 2017 through 2019, and the incorporation of new survey utilization rate data for 2019 and 2020.[1]

On net, the revisions to total IP for recent years are negative. Notably, the updated rates of change are 1 to 1-1/2 percentage points lower per year from 2017 through 2019.[2] The cumulative effect of these revisions leaves the level of total IP in April 2021 about 3-1/2 percent below its late-2007 peak before the Great Recession; previously, total IP in April 2021 was slightly above its peak before the Great Recession. The incorporation of detailed data for manufacturing from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2017 Economic Census (EC) and the 2018 and 2019 Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASMs) accounts for the majority of the differences between the current and the previously published estimates. The revisions to the rates of change for 2020 are small, and the magnitude of the sharp drop (17 percent) in total IP at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 is very similar to the magnitude reported earlier.

Annual capacity growth is revised down about 1 percentage point, on average, from 2017 to 2019 and is little changed in 2020. After these revisions, capacity for total industry is estimated to have grown about 3 percent less between 2016 and the end of 2020 than previously estimated.

In the fourth quarter of 2020, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 73.4 percent, about 1/2 percentage point below its previous estimate and about 6-1/4 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average. The utilization rate for 2019 is also about 1/2 percentage point lower than the previous estimate, but revisions to utilization rates for 2017 and 2018 are very small.”

Manufacturing decreased 22.4 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 13.5 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2019. Manufacturing increased 10.9 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2020. Manufacturing in Dec 2020 is lower by 13.9 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. Manufacturing increased 14.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jul 2021. Manufacturing in Jul 2021 is 11.5 percent below the peak in Jun 2007. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 48 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/gdp2q21_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-65-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.2 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 3.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-65-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 49.0 percent. GDP in IIQ2021 would be $23,499.3 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4141.1 billion than actual $19,358.2 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 26.0 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 15.0 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2021.htm). US GDP in IQ2021 is 17.6 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,358.2 billion in IIQ2021 or 22.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2021. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 157.4993 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964 which is 37.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 166.0220 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964, which is 40.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Jul 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.3011 in Jul 2021. The output of manufacturing at 98.1964 in Jul 2021 is 26.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 98.4851 in Jul 2021 or 16.2 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 167.0441 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 41.0 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 131.6239 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 25.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-2, US, Monthly and 12-Month Rates of Growth of Manufacturing ∆%

	Month SA ∆%	12-Month NSA ∆%
2021-07	1.4	7.9
2021-06	-0.3	10.3
2021-05	1.1	18.6
2021-04	-0.3	24.0
2021-03	3.4	3.8
2021-02	-3.7	-4.1
2021-01	1.5	-0.4
2020-12	0.6	-2.3
2020-11	0.6	-2.9
2020-10	1.5	-2.5
2020-09	0.1	-5.3
2020-08	1.6	-5.2
2020-07	4.0	-6.4
2020-06	7.3	-10.3
2020-05	4.6	-16.0
2020-04	-15.8	-20.4
2020-03	-4.4	-5.5
2020-02	0.0	-0.9
2020-01	-0.2	-1.7
2019-12	0.0	-2.0
2019-11	0.7	-1.9
2019-10	-0.7	-3.1
2019-09	-0.6	-3.1
2019-08	0.5	-2.4
2019-07	-0.4	-2.9
2019-06	0.2	-2.0
2019-05	0.1	-1.9
2019-04	-0.8	-2.9
2019-03	-0.1	-1.1
2019-02	-0.5	-1.0
2019-01	-0.7	0.5
2018-12	0.2	0.5
2018-11	-0.4	0.1
2018-10	-0.5	0.5
2018-09	0.0	2.3
2018-08	0.2	2.3
2018-07	0.2	1.7
2018-06	0.5	1.2
2018-05	-0.8	0.8
2018-04	0.6	2.7
2018-03	0.1	1.8
2018-02	0.9	1.6
2018-01	-0.4	0.6
2017-12	-0.2	1.3
2017-11	0.0	1.5
2017-10	1.0	1.3
2017-09	0.0	0.3
2017-08	-0.3	0.7
2017-07	-0.2	0.6
2017-06	0.0	0.8
2017-05	-0.1	0.9
2017-04	1.1	-0.3
2017-03	-0.3	0.4
2017-02	-0.1	0.2
2017-01	0.3	-0.2
2016-12	0.0	0.1
2016-11	-0.1	-0.4
2016-10	0.1	-0.4
2016-09	0.2	-0.3
2016-08	-0.5	-1.5
2016-07	0.2	-1.3
2016-06	0.2	-0.6
2016-05	0.0	-1.3
2016-04	-0.2	-0.6
2016-03	-0.1	-1.7
2016-02	-0.3	-0.5
2016-01	0.5	-0.8
2015-12	-0.3	-1.9
2015-11	-0.3	-1.7
2015-10	-0.1	-0.7
2015-09	-0.3	-1.7
2015-08	-0.5	-0.7
2015-07	0.8	-0.4
2015-06	-0.4	-1.2
2015-05	0.0	-0.3
2015-04	0.0	-0.1
2015-03	0.3	-0.1
2015-02	-0.7	0.5
2015-01	-0.5	1.9
2014-12	-0.2	1.6
2014-11	0.7	1.7
2014-10	-0.1	0.9
2014-09	0.0	1.1
2014-08	-0.6	1.2
2014-07	0.5	2.0
2014-06	0.3	1.4
2014-05	0.3	1.4
2014-04	0.0	1.0
2014-03	0.8	1.5
2014-02	0.9	0.3
2014-01	-1.0	-0.5
2013-12	-0.2	0.1
2013-11	0.0	1.2
2013-10	0.1	1.9
2013-09	0.1	1.2
2013-08	0.9	1.4
2013-07	-0.8	0.3
2013-06	0.1	0.7
2013-05	0.3	0.9
2013-04	-0.3	0.9
2013-03	-0.1	0.5
2013-02	0.4	0.7
2013-01	-0.3	0.7
2012-12	0.7	1.6
2012-11	0.6	1.6
2012-10	-0.2	0.7
2012-09	-0.2	1.6
2012-08	-0.1	2.2
2012-07	-0.2	2.5
2012-06	0.3	3.4
2012-05	-0.4	3.4
2012-04	0.5	3.8
2012-03	-0.5	2.8
2012-02	0.3	4.1
2012-01	0.8	3.5
2011-12	0.7	3.0
2011-11	-0.2	2.6
2011-10	0.5	2.7
2011-09	0.3	2.6
2011-08	0.5	2.0
2011-07	0.6	2.2
2011-06	0.1	1.7
2011-05	0.0	1.5
2011-04	-0.5	2.8
2011-03	0.6	4.5
2011-02	0.2	4.9
2011-01	0.1	4.9
2010-12	0.5	5.5
2010-11	0.1	4.6
2010-10	0.1	5.9
2010-09	0.0	6.1
2010-08	0.1	6.8
2010-07	0.6	7.5
2010-06	0.0	9.4
2010-05	1.3	9.0
2010-04	0.8	7.4
2010-03	1.3	5.2
2010-02	-0.1	1.8
2010-01	1.1	1.8
2009-12	-0.2	-2.8
2009-11	1.0	-5.8
2009-10	0.1	-8.9
2009-09	1.0	-10.4
2009-08	1.1	-13.5
2009-07	1.6	-15.3
2009-06	-0.2	-17.9
2009-05	-1.1	-18.0
2009-04	-0.7	-18.6
2009-03	-1.9	-17.7
2009-02	-0.1	-16.7
2009-01	-3.2	-17.1
2008-12	-3.3	-14.4
2008-11	-2.5	-11.7
2008-10	-0.7	-9.1
2008-09	-3.4	-8.6
2008-08	-1.2	-5.1
2008-07	-1.1	-3.6
2008-06	-0.7	-3.3
2008-05	-0.6	-2.5
2008-04	-1.0	-1.2
2008-03	-0.4	-0.6
2008-02	-0.7	1.0
2008-01	-0.2	2.4
2007-12	0.1	2.0
2007-11	0.5	3.4
2007-10	-0.2	2.8
2007-09	0.3	2.8
2007-08	-0.3	2.6
2007-07	0.0	3.6
2007-06	0.3	3.1
2007-05	-0.1	3.3
2007-04	0.7	3.8
2007-03	0.9	2.7
2007-02	0.3	1.7
2007-01	-0.4	1.3
2006-12	1.5	2.8
2005-12	0.1	3.5
2004-12	0.7	4.1
2003-12	0.0	2.2
2002-12	-0.6	2.4
2001-12	0.2	-5.4
2000-12	-0.6	0.7
1999-12	0.7	5.2
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2020		1.6
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2019		1.8
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2018		1.9
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2017		1.9
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2016		1.9
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2015		2.0
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2014		2.1
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2013		2.2
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 1999		4.3
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2006		1.4
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2006		3.3
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2017		0.3
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2018		0.3
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2019		0.2
∆% Peak 110.8954 in 06/2007 to 97.7118 in 12/2019		-11.9
∆% Trough 86.0957 in 04/2009 to 97.7118 in 12/2019		13.5
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2020		0.03
∆% Peak 110.8954 in 06/2007 to 95.4579 in 12/2020		-13.9
∆% Peak 110.8954 in 06/2007 to Trough 86.0957 in 4/2009		-22.4
∆% Trough 86.0957 in 04/2009 to 95.4579 in 12/2020		10.9
∆% Trough 86.0957 in 04/2009 to 98.1964 in 07/2021		14.1
∆% Peak 110.8954 in 06/2007 to 98.1964 in 07/2021		-11.5

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides industrial production, manufacturing and capacity since the 1970s. There was acceleration of growth of industrial production, manufacturing and capacity in the 1990s because of rapid growth of productivity in the US (Cobet and Wilson (2002); see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). The slopes of the curves flatten in the 2000s. Production and capacity have not recovered sufficiently above levels before the global recession, remaining like GDP below historical trend. The final data point for May 2021. There is sharp contraction of output followed by continuing recovery in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2021. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 157.4993 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964 which is 37.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 166.0220 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964, which is 40.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Jul 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.3011 in Jul 2021. The output of manufacturing at 98.1964 in Jul 2021 is 26.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 98.4851 in Jul 2021 or 16.2 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 167.0441 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 41.0 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 131.6239 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 25.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-1, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg1.gif

Additional detail on industrial production and capacity utilization is in Chart I-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Production of consumer durable goods fell sharply during the global recession by more than 30 percent and is oscillating above the level before the contraction. Output of nondurable consumer goods fell around 10 percent and is some 5 percent below the level before the contraction. Output of business equipment fell sharply during the contraction of 2001 but began rapid growth again after 2004. An important characteristic is rapid growth of output of business equipment in the cyclical expansion after sharp contraction in the global recession, stalling in the final segment followed by recovery. Output of defense and space only suffered reduction in the rate of growth during the global recession and surged ahead of the level before the contraction, declining in the final segment. Output of construction supplies collapsed during the global recession and is well below the level before the contraction. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but recovered sharply above the level before the contraction with alternating recent decline/improvement. There are deep contractions in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-2, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg3.gif

The modern industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is captured in Chart I-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (for the literature on M&A and corporate control see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009a), 143-56, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 49-59, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 46-49). The slope of the curve of total industrial production accelerates in the 1990s to a much higher rate of growth than the curve excluding high-technology industries. Growth rates decelerate into the 2000s and output and capacity utilization have not recovered fully from the strong impact of the global recession. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but recovered sharply above the level before the contraction with alternating recent decline/improvement followed by stability. Growth in the current cyclical expansion has been more subdued than in the prior comparably deep contractions in the 1970s and 1980s. Chart I-2 shows that the past recessions after World War II are the relevant ones for comparison with the recession after 2007 instead of common comparisons with the Great Depression (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-65-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html). The lower part of Chart I-3 shows recent strong growth of energy compared with non-energy. There are deep contractions in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-3, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, Selected Industries

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg2.gif

United States manufacturing output from 1919 to 2021 monthly is in Chart I-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The second industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is quite evident in the acceleration of the rate of growth of output given by the sharper slope in the 1980s and 1990s. Growth was robust after the shallow recession of 2001 but dropped sharply during the global recession after IVQ2007. Manufacturing output recovered sharply but has not reached earlier levels and is losing momentum at the margin. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2021. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 157.4993 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964 which is 37.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 166.0220 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964, which is 40.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Jul 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.3011 in Jul 2021. The output of manufacturing at 98.1964 in Jul 2021 is 26.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 98.4851 in Jul 2021 or 16.2 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 167.0441 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 41.0 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 131.6239 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 25.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-4, US, Manufacturing Output, 1919-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Industrial production increased 0.9 percent in Jul 2021 and increased 0.2 percent in Jun 2021 after increasing 0.8 percent in May 2021, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on May 28, 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. The most prominent features of the revision are an update of the base year to 2017 for the indexes, a conversion of the industry-group indexes to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the incorporation of comprehensive annual production data for 2017 through 2019, and the incorporation of new survey utilization rate data for 2019 and 2020.[1]

On net, the revisions to total IP for recent years are negative. Notably, the updated rates of change are 1 to 1-1/2 percentage points lower per year from 2017 through 2019.[2] The cumulative effect of these revisions leaves the level of total IP in April 2021 about 3-1/2 percent below its late-2007 peak before the Great Recession; previously, total IP in April 2021 was slightly above its peak before the Great Recession. The incorporation of detailed data for manufacturing from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2017 Economic Census (EC) and the 2018 and 2019 Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASMs) accounts for the majority of the differences between the current and the previously published estimates. The revisions to the rates of change for 2020 are small, and the magnitude of the sharp drop (17 percent) in total IP at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 is very similar to the magnitude reported earlier.

Annual capacity growth is revised down about 1 percentage point, on average, from 2017 to 2019 and is little changed in 2020. After these revisions, capacity for total industry is estimated to have grown about 3 percent less between 2016 and the end of 2020 than previously estimated.

In the fourth quarter of 2020, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 73.4 percent, about 1/2 percentage point below its previous estimate and about 6-1/4 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average. The utilization rate for 2019 is also about 1/2 percentage point lower than the previous estimate, but revisions to utilization rates for 2017 and 2018 are very small.”

The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm):

“Industrial production increased 0.9 percent in July after moving up 0.2 percent in June. In July, manufacturing output rose 1.4 percent. About half of the gain in factory output is attributable to a jump of 11.2 percent for motor vehicles and parts, as a number of vehicle manufacturers trimmed or canceled their typical July shutdowns. Despite the large increase last month, vehicle assemblies continued to be constrained by a persistent shortage of semiconductors; the production of motor vehicles and parts in July was about 3-1/2 percent below its recent peak in January 2021. The output of utilities decreased 2.1 percent in July, while the index for mining rose 1.2 percent. At 101.1 percent of its 2017 average, total industrial production in July was 6.6 percent above its year-earlier level but 0.2 percent below its pre-pandemic (February 2020) level. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector rose 0.7 percentage point in July to 76.1 percent, a rate that is 3.5 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” In the six months ending in Jul 2021, United States national industrial production accumulated change of 1.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.3 percent, which is lower than growth of 6.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2021. Excluding decline of 3.0 percent in Feb 2021, growth in the remaining five months from Feb 2021 to Jul 2021 accumulated to 4.8 percent or 11.8 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production increased 2.8 percent in one of the past six months, 0.8 percent in one month, 0.9 percent in one month, 0.2 percent in one month, 0.0 percent in one month and minus 3.0 percent in one month. Industrial production increased at annual equivalent 7.9 percent in the most recent quarter from May 2021 to Jul 2021 and decreased at 1.1 percent annual equivalent in the prior quarter from Feb 2021 to Apr 2021. Business equipment accumulated change of 2.0 percent in the six months from Feb 2020 to Jul 2021, at the annual equivalent rate of 4.0 percent, which is lower than growth of 9.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2021. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “Capacity utilization for the industrial sector rose 0.7 percentage point in July to 76.1 percent, a rate that is 3.5 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration, weakening growth in past months and deep contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing decreased 22.4 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 13.5 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2019. Manufacturing increased 10.9 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2020. Manufacturing in Dec 2020 is lower by 13.9 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. Manufacturing increased 14.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jul 2021. Manufacturing in Jul 2021 is 11.5 percent below the peak in Jun 2007. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 48 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/gdp2q21_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-65-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.2 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 3.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-65-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 49.0 percent. GDP in IIQ2021 would be $23,499.3 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4141.1 billion than actual $19,358.2 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 26.0 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 15.0 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2021.htm). US GDP in IQ2021 is 17.6 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,358.2 billion in IIQ2021 or 22.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2021. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 157.4993 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964 which is 37.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 166.0220 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964, which is 40.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Jul 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.3011 in Jul 2021. The output of manufacturing at 98.1964 in Jul 2021 is 26.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 98.4851 in Jul 2021 or 16.2 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 167.0441 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 41.0 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 131.6239 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 25.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 87.6 percent in IQ2021. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Jul 2021, there were 146.517 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 125.694 million NSA in Jul 2021 accounted for 85.8 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 146.470 million, of which 12.441 million, or 9.9 percent of total private jobs and 8.5 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 104.970 million NSA in Jul 2021, or 71.7 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.5 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 9.6 percent in US national income in IQ2021 and durable goods 5.8 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

	IVQ2020	% Total	IQ2021	% Total
National Income WCCA	18,175.3	100.0	18,643.9	100.0
Domestic Industries	17,924.7	98.6	18,409.0	98.7
Private Industries	15,855.4	87.2	16,328.4	87.6
Agriculture	145.5	0.8	160.0	0.9
Mining	58.1	0.3	116.7	0.6
Utilities	203.1	1.1	204.2	1.1
Construction	976.5	5.3	996.2	5.3
Manufacturing	1708.7	9.4	1787.7	9.6
Durable Goods	1038.0	5.7	1085.1	5.8
Nondurable Goods	670.8	3.7	702.6	3.8
Wholesale Trade	1006.7	5.5	1014.1	5.4
Retail Trade	1287.0	7.1	1373.1	7.4
Transportation & WH	543.8	3.0	533.6	2.9
Information	761.3	4.2	771.8	4.1
Finance, Insurance, RE	3325.8	18.3	3361.0	18.0
Professional & Business Services	2829.9	15.6	2913.7	15.6
Education, Health Care	1907.0	10.5	1961.7	10.5
Arts, Entertainment	613.7	3.4	624.6	3.4
Other Services	497.2	2.7	509.9	2.7
Government	2069.3	11.4	2080.7	11.2
Rest of the World	250.6	1.4	234.8	1.3

Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; Percentages Calculates from Unrounded Data; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Motor vehicle sales and production in the US have been in long-term structural change. Table VA-1A provides the data on new motor vehicle sales and domestic car production in the US from 1990 to 2010. New motor vehicle sales grew from 14,137 thousand in 1990 to the peak of 17,806 thousand in 2000 or 29.5 percent. In that same period, domestic car production fell from 6,231 thousand in 1990 to 5,542 thousand in 2000 or -11.1 percent. New motor vehicle sales fell from 17,445 thousand in 2005 to 11,772 in 2010 or 32.5 percent while domestic car production fell from 4,321 thousand in 2005 to 2,840 thousand in 2010 or 34.3 percent. In IIQ2018, light vehicle sales accumulated to 4,500,220, which is higher by 1.8 percent relative to 4,419,349 a year earlier in IIQ2017 (http://www.motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html). Total not seasonally adjusted light vehicle sales reached 1296.5 thousand in Jun 2021, increasing 17.8 percent from 1101.0 thousand in Jun 2020 (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86). The seasonally adjusted annual rate of light vehicle sales in the US reached 14.8 million in Jul 2021, lower than 15.4 million in Jun 2021 and higher than 14.7 million in Jul 2020 (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86).

Table VA-1A, US, New Motor Vehicle Sales and Car Production, Thousand Units 7

	New Motor Vehicle Sales	New Car Sales and Leases	New Truck Sales and Leases	Domestic Car Production
1990	14,137	9,300	4,837	6,231
1991	12,725	8,589	4,136	5,454
1992	13,093	8,215	4,878	5,979
1993	14,172	8,518	5,654	5,979
1994	15,397	8,990	6,407	6,614
1995	15,106	8,536	6,470	6,340
1996	15,449	8,527	6,922	6,081
1997	15,490	8,273	7,218	5,934
1998	15,958	8,142	7,816	5,554
1999	17,401	8,697	8,704	5,638
2000	17,806	8,852	8,954	5,542
2001	17,468	8,422	9,046	4,878
2002	17,144	8,109	9,036	5,019
2003	16,968	7,611	9,357	4,510
2004	17,298	7,545	9,753	4,230
2005	17,445	7,720	9,725	4,321
2006	17,049	7,821	9,228	4,367
2007	16,460	7,618	8,683	3,924
2008	13,494	6,814	6.680	3,777
2009	10,601	5,456	5,154	2,247
2010	11,772	5,729	6,044	2,840

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gap_hist.xlsx

Table VA-1B provides the seasonally adjusted annual rate of total vehicle sales in the United States. The rate decreased from 17.832 in Jun 2019 and 17.337 in Feb 2020 to 8.961 in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The rate recovered to 12.438 in May 2020 and 13.447 in Jun 2020, 15.089 in Jul 2020, 15.677 in Aug 2020 and 16.703 in Sep 2020 in gradual return to economic activity. The rate for Nov 2020 decreased to 16.339 and increased to 16.761 in Dec 2020 and 17.287 in Jan 2021, decreasing to 16.390 in Feb 2021 and increasing to 18.154 in Mar 2021. The rate increased to 18.782 in Apr 2021, decreasing to 17391 in May 2021, 15.865 in Jun 2021 and 15.232 in Jul 2021. (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86).

Table VA-1B, United States, Annual Rate, Total Vehicle Sales, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate

January	2019				17.265
February	2019				17.185
March	2019				17.656
April	2019				16.997
May	2019				17.840
June	2019				17.832
July	2019				17.597
August	2019				17.645
September	2019				17.714
October	2019				17.230
November	2019				17.557
December	2019				17.339
January	2020				17.306
February	2020				17.337
March	2020				11.635
April	2020				8.961
May	2020				12.438
June	2020				13.447
July	2020				15.089
August	2020				15.677
September	2020				16.703
October	2020				16.852
November	2020				16.339
December	2020				16.761
January	2021				17.287
February	2021				16.390
March	2021				18.154
April	2021				18.782
May	2021				17.391
June	2021				15.865
July	2021				15.232

Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA

Data for Jul 2021 and updates: https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86

Chart I-4 of the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, provides the complete data set of SAAR of total car sales in the US. The SAAR of 8.961 in Apr 2020 is lower than the lowest rate in the global recession at 9.223 in Feb 2009.

Chart I-4, SA Annual Rate of Total Car Sales in the United States, Jan 1976 to Jul 2021

Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA

Chart I-4, SA Annual Rate of Total Car Sales in the United States, Jan 1976 to Ju 2021

Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA

Chart I-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve provides output of motor vehicles and parts in the United States from 1972 to 2021. Output virtually stagnated since the late 1990s with recent increase followed by the highest decrease in the data history in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and sharp recovery after easing of lockdown.

Chart 1-5, US, Motor Vehicles and Parts Output, 1972-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides output of computers and electronic products in the United States from 1972 to 2021. Output accelerated sharply in the 1990s and 2000s and surpassed the level before the global recession beginning in IVQ2007. There is sharp contraction in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is initial recovery in May 2020-Jul 2021.

Chart I-6, US, Output of Computers and Electronic Products, 1972-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shows that output of durable manufacturing accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s with slower growth in the 2000s perhaps because processes matured. Growth was robust after the major drop during the global recession but appears to vacillate in the final segment. There is sharp contraction in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is initial recovery in May 2020-Jul 2021.

Chart I-7, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 1972-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-8 provides output of aerospace and miscellaneous transportation from 1972 to 2021. The drop in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) is much sharper than the drop in the global recession after 2007. There is sharp recovery from May 2020 to Jul 2021 but without return to trend.

Chart I-8, US, Output of Aerospace and Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment, 1972-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Manufacturing is underperforming in the lost cycle of the global recession. Manufacturing (NAICS) in Jul 2021 is lower by 9.2 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007, as shown in Chart V-3A. Manufacturing (SIC) in Jul 2021 at 98.1964 is lower by 11.5 percent relative to the peak at 110.8954 in Jun 2007. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2021. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 157.4993 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964 which is 37.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 166.0220 in Jul 2021. The actual index NSA in Jul 2021 is 98.1964, which is 40.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Jul 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.3011 in Jul 2021. The output of manufacturing at 98.1964 in Jul 2021 is 26.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jun 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 98.4851 in Jul 2021 or 16.2 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 167.0441 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 41.0 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 131.6239 in Jul 2021. The NAICS index at 98.4851 in Jul 2021 is 25.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Dec 2007 to Jul 2021

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jun 2007 to Jul 2021

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3B provides the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States, or those available for work. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 231.713 million in Jun 2007 to 261.469 million in Jul 2021 or 29.756 million.

Chart V-3B, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 2007 to Jul 2021

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3C provides nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 2007 to Jun 2021. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs fell from 13.987 million in Jun 2007 to 12.441 million in Jul 2021, or 1.546 million.

Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 2007 to Jun 2021, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 2007 to Jun 2021, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Jul 2021. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade. There is sharp decline in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Jul 2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3E provides the US noninstitutional civilian population, or those in condition of working, from Jan 1948, when first available, to Jul 2021. The noninstitutional civilian population increased from 170.042 million in Jun 1981 to 261.469 million in Jul 2021 or 91.427 million.

Chart V-3E, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 1948 to Jun 2021

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3F provides manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 1939 to Jul 2021. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs decreased from a peak of 18.890 million in Jun 1981 to 12.441 million in Jul 2021.

Chart V-3F, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 1939 to Jun 2021, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

The Empire State Manufacturing Survey Index in Table VA-1 provides continuing deterioration that started in Jun 2012 well before Hurricane Sandy in Oct 2012. The current general index has been in negative contraction territory from minus 2.7 in Aug 2012 to minus 7.5 in Jan 2013 and minus 1.1 in May 2013. The current general index changed to 18.3 in Aug 2021. The index of current orders has also been in negative contraction territory from minus 3.0 in Aug 2012 to minus 10.9 in Jan 2013 and minus 7.8 in Jun 2013. The index of current new orders changed to 14.8 in Aug 2021. There is strength in the general index for the next six months at 46.5 in Aug 2021 and strength in new orders at 42.7.

Table VA-1, US, New York Federal Reserve Bank Empire State Manufacturing Survey Index SA Current General Index

	Current General Index	Current New Orders	Future General Index	Future New Orders
10/31/2011	-5.7	1.7	14.5	19.4
11/30/2011	4.9	1.6	35.4	30.3
12/31/2011	11.7	10.1	45.4	43.2
1/31/2012	11.5	8.7	50.7	44.4
2/29/2012	17.5	7.1	46.3	37.6
3/31/2012	15.5	4.4	43.8	37.8
4/30/2012	7.8	4.1	40.5	38.4
5/31/2012	14.2	7.1	32.5	32
6/30/2012	1.6	3	27.9	28.4
7/31/2012	3.2	-3.3	24.4	21.8
8/31/2012	-2.7	-3	18.6	14.6
9/30/2012	-6.9	-10.3	27	28
10/31/2012	-4.6	-6.6	20.1	22.3
11/30/2012	-0.8	6.1	18.1	15.1
12/31/2012	-5.8	0.3	18.9	18.8
1/31/2013	-7.5	-10.9	21.7	23.7
2/28/2013	9.2	12.4	32	26.8
3/31/2013	4.9	4.7	34.7	33
4/30/2013	4.5	2.8	30.7	35.8
5/31/2013	-1.1	-3.1	26.6	30.3
6/30/2013	4.5	-7.8	27.8	22.4
7/31/2013	5.2	2.3	34.1	33.3
8/31/2013	9.7	2.8	35.7	30.8
9/30/2013	7.7	2.9	40.3	38.2
10/31/2013	3.6	9.5	41.3	36.9
11/30/2013	2.2	-2.5	38.1	39.4
12/31/2013	3.2	1.1	36.4	27.5
1/31/2014	12.8	8.1	35.8	37.5
2/28/2014	6.8	1.9	39.8	43.5
3/31/2014	2.8	0.8	34.6	36.4
4/30/2014	4.1	-0.4	39.1	35.2
5/31/2014	17.5	8.6	43.6	38.6
6/30/2014	15.8	13.1	41.2	44.3
7/31/2014	21	16.5	30.7	27.4
8/31/2014	16.1	15.6	45.5	50.2
9/30/2014	29.4	17.3	47	46.1
10/31/2014	6.2	1.8	42.3	42.2
11/30/2014	12	10.3	47.7	47.6
12/31/2014	-2.5	0.4	35.3	35.2
1/31/2015	12.5	6.9	46.6	41
2/28/2015	10.6	3.1	26.9	28.7
3/31/2015	3.7	-6.3	30.1	26.1
4/30/2015	0.1	-4.7	38.4	35.2
5/31/2015	3.9	3.7	31.2	35
6/30/2015	-4.8	-6.9	25.9	27
7/31/2015	1.7	-5	29.4	33.3
8/31/2015	-13.9	-14.6	32.4	30.5
9/30/2015	-12.7	-11.9	24.3	24.8
10/31/2015	-13.7	-15.3	22.8	22.9
11/30/2015	-9.7	-11.4	22.3	19.4
12/31/2015	-5.9	-6.1	33.1	23.7
1/31/2016	-16.6	-20.6	12.1	15.3
2/29/2016	-12.9	-10	13.6	19.5
3/31/2016	-2.5	3	24.2	36.8
4/30/2016	8.9	10.7	32	39.1
5/31/2016	-7.4	-2.8	29.2	24
6/30/2016	3.1	6.6	33.1	37.6
7/31/2016	1.4	-1.5	31	30.9
8/31/2016	-5.6	0.7	24.5	28.4
9/30/2016	-1.6	-6.4	35.8	33.5
10/31/2016	-9.5	-2.8	36.1	38.1
11/30/2016	1.9	2.9	29.9	26.8
12/31/2016	9.6	9.3	47.2	45
1/31/2017	7.5	6.8	49.5	40.3
2/28/2017	20.1	13.5	39.2	39.6
3/31/2017	15.6	17	36.4	33.9
4/30/2017	6.2	9.9	43.2	36.1
5/31/2017	0.7	-2.2	40.8	35.6
6/30/2017	18.8	16.1	41.3	42
7/31/2017	11.8	13.8	36.6	34.9
8/31/2017	22.7	20	43.3	40.9
9/30/2017	23.6	23.7	42.5	44.9
10/31/2017	26.6	19.4	45.8	45
11/30/2017	19.1	18.2	48.9	50.5
12/31/2017	20.1	17	43.7	39.4
1/31/2018	19.4	16.6	49.1	48.5
2/28/2018	17.5	14.9	48.4	45.4
3/31/2018	23.5	16.1	43.1	42.8
4/30/2018	17.4	11.7	23.5	22.8
5/31/2018	17	15.9	32.2	34.9
6/30/2018	25.8	21.5	38.5	35.5
7/31/2018	21.6	19.2	31	36.1
8/31/2018	24.1	15.8	33.8	35.6
9/30/2018	19	16.1	32.6	35.5
10/31/2018	19.4	20.5	30.3	35.6
11/30/2018	21.1	16.6	32.7	37
12/31/2018	11.1	12.4	27.1	30.3
1/31/2019	4.8	6.3	21.2	21.7
2/28/2019	10.3	8.1	30.9	34.4
3/31/2019	5.1	3.6	27.9	29
4/30/2019	9.4	7.4	17.4	24.3
5/31/2019	14.4	8.2	29.7	33
6/30/2019	-6.4	-9.7	25.5	28.4
7/31/2019	4.2	-0.4	29.3	34.2
8/31/2019	4.2	5.6	25.1	31.1
9/30/2019	2.2	1.9	15.5	23.4
10/31/2019	3.3	3.7	17.8	24
11/30/2019	2.5	3.1	19.8	25.2
12/31/2019	3.3	1.7	26.1	30.8
1/31/2020	4.8	6.6	23.6	31.4
2/29/2020	12.9	22.1	22.9	27.5
3/31/2020	-21.5	-9.3	1.2	17.6
4/30/2020	-78.2	-66.3	7	11.7
5/31/2020	-48.5	-42.4	29.1	35
6/30/2020	-0.2	-0.6	56.5	52.9
7/31/2020	17.2	13.9	38.4	41.9
8/31/2020	3.7	-1.7	34.3	37.2
9/30/2020	17	7.1	40.3	39.1
10/31/2020	10.5	12.3	32.8	37.7
11/30/2020	6.3	3.7	33.9	32.9
12/31/2020	4.9	3.4	36.3	32.3
1/31/2021	3.5	6.6	31.9	34.8
2/28/2021	12.1	10.8	34.9	35.6
3/31/2021	17.4	9.1	36.4	37.9
4/30/2021	26.3	26.9	39.8	41.1
5/31/2021	24.3	28.9	36.6	35.3
6/30/2021	17.4	16.3	47.7	44.5
7/31/2021	43	33.2	39.5	34.2
8/31/2021	18.3	14.8	46.5	42.7

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html

Chart VA-1 of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides indexes of current and expected economic activity. There were multiple contractions in current activity after the global recession shown in shade. Current activity is weakening relative to strong recovery in the initial expansion in 2010 and 2011 with recent oscillating recovery and weakness. There is sharp improvement in the current index by strong positive reading with strong improvement in the future index in positive reading. There is deterioration in Dec 2020-Jan 2021 with improvement in Feb-Apr 2021 followed by mild deterioration in May 2021. The future index deteriorates in Jul 2021 while the current index improves. The future index improves in Aug 2021 while the current index deteriorates. Chart update: https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html

Chart VA-1, US, US, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Diffusion Index of Current and Expected Activity, Seasonally Adjusted

Update: https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview#tabs-1

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html

Table VA-2 shows improvement after prior deterioration followed by current soft improvement of the Business Outlook Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. There is sharp deterioration in Mar-May 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The general index moved out of contraction of 5.3 in Feb 2013 to expansion at 19.4 in Aug 2021. New orders moved from 0.6 in Feb 2021 to expansion at 22.8 in Aug 2021. There is expansion in the future index at 33.7 in Aug 2021 and in future new orders at 38.0 in Aug 2021.

Table VA-2, US, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, SA

	Current General Index	Current New Orders	Future General Index	Future New Orders
Jan-11	16.5	20.1	43.8	35.9
Feb-11	28.9	19.8	41.9	38.7
Mar-11	36.4	34.1	57.0	55.5
Apr-11	13.0	13.7	35.7	30.9
May-11	6.2	8.3	26.2	25.3
Jun-11	-0.5	-5.2	8.5	8.6
Jul-11	7.1	4.1	28.6	32.2
Aug-11	-19.5	-17.5	12.6	26.6
Sep-11	-10.7	-5.6	18.1	19.6
Oct-11	6.2	5.9	26.1	28.6
Nov-11	4.0	1.5	36.4	36.2
Dec-11	2.4	4.4	33.7	38.6
Jan-12	7.5	10.7	43.4	43.5
Feb-12	10.4	11.6	30.3	32.2
Mar-12	8.8	-0.1	30.4	37.1
Apr-12	5.7	0.6	39.9	42.4
May-12	-0.8	2.3	24.9	35.5
Jun-12	-12.6	-17.8	25.4	34.3
Jul-12	-12.7	-3.6	21.5	25.6
Aug-12	-2.6	1.6	20	25.5
Sep-12	0.2	0.7	31.6	42.8
Oct-12	-1.1	-4.7	17.1	20.7
Nov-12	-10.6	-7.4	16.6	22.6
Dec-12	2.4	2.6	22.4	29
Jan-13	-1.4	-2	28.8	31.9
Feb-13	-5.3	0.6	32	39
Mar-13	2	0.1	35.5	38.1
Apr-13	0.4	0.7	30.6	34.4
May-13	0.2	-4	39.5	42.2
Jun-13	12.7	11.7	37.2	40
Jul-13	15.9	7.4	41.6	52.4
Aug-13	8.2	8.9	38.5	38.8
Sep-13	20.6	19.3	48.8	51.5
Oct-13	13.5	23.1	55.4	61.2
Nov-13	4.6	8.8	42	46
Dec-13	3.8	12	41.1	44.6
Jan-14	15.2	7.9	38	40.8
Feb-14	2.3	4.7	43.9	39.5
Mar-14	12.5	6.5	42.4	38.7
Apr-14	17	17.3	39.3	38.6
May-14	18.5	14.8	43.8	42.5
Jun-14	14.1	10.4	53.3	55.3
Jul-14	21.4	28.7	53.6	48.8
Aug-14	22.9	15.4	61.9	51.3
Sep-14	21.7	13.8	46.1	44.8
Oct-14	18.1	16.8	50.8	49
Nov-14	35.5	29.7	50.1	44.3
Dec-14	21.6	14.5	47.2	43.9
Jan-15	13.2	10.1	54	47
Feb-15	10.5	8.4	35	46.1
Mar-15	7.3	0.8	37.7	37.8
Apr-15	9.9	4.5	39.7	33.6
May-15	6.1	5.4	38.1	35.1
Jun-15	8.2	11.2	43.4	47.5
Jul-15	4.4	2.3	40.2	45.4
Aug-15	5.8	6.6	34.9	39.2
Sep-15	-3.8	10.5	36.8	41.7
Oct-15	-4.9	-6.4	34.8	36.4
Nov-15	-3.8	-7.6	37.5	44.3
Dec-15	-9	-8.9	18.6	29.7
Jan-16	-4	-3	18.3	21.3
Feb-16	-6.8	-6	15.8	20
Mar-16	9	5.5	26.9	35.6
Apr-16	-1	-0.5	39.9	43.6
May-16	-4.8	-1.7	39.7	40.3
Jun-16	4.4	-0.9	36.6	37.6
Jul-16	0.9	10.1	36	35.2
Aug-16	5.4	-1.5	41.9	42.8
Sep-16	12.1	2.8	37	38.3
Oct-16	10.5	19.4	36.2	40.2
Nov-16	9.4	19.4	29.8	35.1
Dec-16	22.6	15.5	45.5	44.8
Jan-17	24.8	24.9	54.7	52.3
Feb-17	39.7	35.1	50.3	49.2
Mar-17	32	31.4	56.4	59.1
Apr-17	23.7	28.5	46.2	55.5
May-17	34.3	25.2	40.2	49.5
Jun-17	28.2	27.3	38.3	39.6
Jul-17	20.4	5.3	38.5	44.6
Aug-17	20.7	22.9	42.4	50.2
Sep-17	24	26.7	54.1	58.6
Oct-17	27.2	21	46.4	43.6
Nov-17	23.1	26.5	47.9	49.1
Dec-17	29.3	29.3	50	54.6
Jan-18	23	9.6	45.4	48.2
Feb-18	30.7	29.5	40.1	49.7
Mar-18	23.8	30.3	46.8	50.2
Apr-18	25.3	22.2	43	41.1
May-18	32.2	41.3	41.5	43.7
Jun-18	21.7	21.2	38.3	41.2
Jul-18	20.8	24.9	26.8	29.8
Aug-18	10.1	12.1	36.8	36.8
Sep-18	21.3	18.5	36	35.9
Oct-18	20.5	15.5	31.9	39
Nov-18	10.6	12.2	26.4	39.1
Dec-18	10.9	14.8	29.1	36.3
Jan-19	14.8	16.7	29.7	31.8
Feb-19	-0.7	1.5	29	30.5
Mar-19	14.9	6.4	23.1	24.2
Apr-19	11	16	22.2	27
May-19	17.5	14.2	22.3	24.8
Jun-19	1.5	8	24.2	33.7
Jul-19	16.6	18.4	33.6	41.6
Aug-19	13.1	21.6	31.8	42
Sep-19	12.2	22.5	23.1	34.4
Oct-19	6.8	22.5	32.6	37.3
Nov-19	8.4	10.1	34.4	37.3
Dec-19	2.4	11.1	34.8	33.6
Jan-20	17	18.2	38.4	41.9
Feb-20	36.7	33.6	45.4	54
Mar-20	-12.7	-15.5	35.2	36.7
Apr-20	-56.6	-70.9	43	36.5
May-20	-43.1	-25.7	49.7	54.7
Jun-20	27.5	16.7	66.3	67.9
Jul-20	24.1	23	36	55.6
Aug-20	17.2	19	38.8	55.1
Sep-20	15	25.5	56.6	56.9
Oct-20	32.3	42.6	62.7	51.6
Nov-20	26.3	37.9	44.3	48.1
Dec-20	11.1	2.3	39.2	41.5
Jan-21	30.1	24.2	51.3	44.6
Feb-21	28.7	25.7	40	38.1
Mar-21	44.5	38.2	59.1	48.2
Apr-21	50.2	36	66.6	59.5
May-21	31.5	32.5	52.7	50.3
Jun-21	30.7	22.2	69.2	68.4
Jul-21	21.9	17	48.6	45.3
Aug-21	19.4	22.8	33.7	38

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

https://www.philadelphiafed.org

Chart VA-2 of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia provides current and future general activity indexes from Jan 2008 to Aug 2021. There are multiple contractions of current activity There are major drops in 2008 and 2009 in the Global Recession. The index shows weakness from 2011 to 2015. There is a major drop in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Recovery was rapid and sharp but there is following weakness in both future and current activity.

Chart VA-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, Current and Future Activity Indexes

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/

The index of current new orders of the Business Outlook Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in Chart VA-2 illustrates the weakness of the cyclical expansion. The index weakened in 2006 and 2007 and then fell sharply into contraction during the global recession. There have been twelve readings into contraction from Jan 2012 to May 2013 and generally weak readings with some exceptions. The index of new orders moved into expansion in Jun-Oct 2013 with moderation in Nov-Dec 2013 and into Jan 2014. The index fell into contraction in Feb 2014, recovering in Mar-Apr 2014 but weaker reading in May 2014. There is marked improvement in Jun-Jul 2014 with slowing in Aug-Oct 2014 followed by acceleration in Nov 2014. New orders deteriorated in Jan-Apr 2015, improving in May-Jun 2015. New orders deteriorated in Jul-Aug 2015 and improved in Sep 2015. New orders deteriorated in Oct-2015 to Dec 2015, contracting at slower pace in Jan 2016. There is sharper contraction in Feb 2016 and an upward jump in Mar 2016 followed by deterioration in Apr-Jun 2016. New orders improved in Jul 2016, deteriorating in Aug 2016 and improving in Sep 2016. Improvement continued in Oct-Nov 2016 with mild deterioration in Dec 2016 followed by improvement in Jan-Feb 2017, softening in Mar-Jul 2017, recovering in Aug-Sep 2017. There is deterioration in Oct 2017 followed by improvement in Nov-Dec 2017. There is deterioration in Jan 2018 followed by improvement in Feb 2018 and improvement in Mar 2018. The index deteriorates in Apr 2018, improving in May 2018. The index deteriorates in Jun 2018, improving in Jul 2018 and deteriorating in Aug 2018. The index improves in Sep 2018, deteriorating in Oct 2018. The index weakens in Nov 2018, improving in Dec 2018. The index improves in Jan 2019, deteriorating in Feb 2019. The index improves in Mar 2019, improving in Apr 2019. The index deteriorates in May-Jun 2019, improving in Jul 2019. The index improves in Aug 2019, improving in Sep 2019. The index stabilizes in Oct 2019, deteriorating in Nov 2019. The index improves in Dec 2019 and Jan 2020. The index improves in Feb 2020. The index contracts in Mar-Apr 2020. There is improvement in the index to softer negative level in May 2020. The index improves to positive in Jun 2020-Apr 2021. The index deteriorates in May-Aug 2021.

Chart VA-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, Current New Orders Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021.