World Inflation Waves, United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities, Theory and Reality of Economic History and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Executive Summary
I World Inflation Waves
IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy
IA1 Theory
IA2 Policy
IA3 Evidence
IA4 Unwinding Strategy
IB United States Inflation
IC Long-term US Inflation
ID Current US Inflation
II United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
IIA1 Transmission of Monetary Policy
IIA2 Functions of Banks
IIA3 United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
IIA4 Theory and Reality of Economic History and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
Executive Summary
ESI World Inflation Waves. This section provides analysis and data on world inflation waves.
The critical fact of current world financial markets is the combination of “unconventional” monetary policy with intermittent shocks of financial risk aversion. There are two interrelated unconventional monetary policies. First, unconventional monetary policy consists of (1) reducing short-term policy interest rates toward the “zero bound” such as fixing the fed funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent by decision of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since Dec 16, 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm). Second, unconventional monetary policy also includes a battery of measures to also reduce long-term interest rates of government securities and asset-backed securities such as mortgage-backed securities.
When inflation is low, the central bank lowers interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand in the economy, which consists of consumption and investment. When inflation is subdued and unemployment high, monetary policy would lower interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand, reducing unemployment. When interest rates decline to zero, unconventional monetary policy would consist of policies such as large-scale purchases of long-term securities to lower their yields. A major portion of credit in the economy is financed with long-term asset-backed securities. Loans for purchasing houses, automobiles and other consumer products are bundled in securities that in turn are sold to investors. Corporations borrow funds for investment by issuing corporate bonds. Loans to small businesses are also financed by bundling them in long-term bonds. Securities markets bridge the needs of higher returns by savers obtaining funds from investors that are channeled to consumers and business for consumption and investment. Lowering the yields of these long-term bonds could lower costs of financing purchases of consumer durables and investment by business. The essential mechanism of transmission from lower interest rates to increases in aggregate demand is portfolio rebalancing. Withdrawal of bonds in a specific maturity segment or directly in a bond category such as currently mortgage-backed securities causes reductions in yield that are equivalent to increases in the prices of the bonds. There can be secondary increases in purchases of those bonds in private portfolios in pursuit of their increasing prices. Lower yields translate into lower costs of buying homes and consumer durables such as automobiles and also lower costs of investment for business. There are two additional intended routes of transmission.
1. Unconventional monetary policy or its expectation can increase stock market valuations (Bernanke 2010WP). Increases in equities traded in stock markets can augment perceptions of the wealth of consumers inducing increases in consumption.
2. Unconventional monetary policy causes devaluation of the dollar relative to other currencies, which can cause increases in net exports of the US that increase aggregate economic activity (Yellen 2011AS).
Monetary policy can lower short-term interest rates quite effectively. Lowering long-term yields is somewhat more difficult. The critical issue is that monetary policy cannot ensure that increasing credit at low interest cost increases consumption and investment. There is a large variety of possible allocation of funds at low interest rates from consumption and investment to multiple risk financial assets. Monetary policy does not control how investors will allocate asset categories. A critical financial practice is to borrow at low short-term interest rates to invest in high-risk, leveraged financial assets. Investors may increase in their portfolios asset categories such as equities, emerging market equities, high-yield bonds, currencies, commodity futures and options and multiple other risk financial assets including structured products. If there is risk appetite, the carry trade from zero interest rates to risk financial assets will consist of short positions at short-term interest rates (or borrowing) and short dollar assets with simultaneous long positions in high-risk, leveraged financial assets such as equities, commodities and high-yield bonds. Low interest rates may induce increases in valuations of risk financial assets that may fluctuate in accordance with perceptions of risk aversion by investors and the public. During periods of muted risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets cause temporary waves of inflation that may foster instead of preventing financial instability. During periods of risk aversion such as fears of disruption of world financial markets and the global economy resulting from collapse of the European Monetary Union, carry trades are unwound with sharp deterioration of valuations of risk financial assets. More technical discussion is in IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy.
Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now open ended in perpetuity, or QE→∞, as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):
“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”
Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):
“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.
Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.
The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”
Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:
“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”
The actual objective is attempting to bring the unemployment rate to 5.2 percent but because of the lag in effect of monetary policy impulses on income and prices policy uses “projections” such that the target of monetary policy is a forecast of unemployment and inflation. Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at 1.7 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent on average during cyclical expansions in the postwar period while growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 13 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not provided the impulse for growth and were not required in past successful cyclical expansions.
First, Data and calculations show it would take decades to bring the labor market to normal levels at the current rate of job creation. The number of 166,000 new private new jobs created in Jan 2013 is nearly identical to the average 165,900 per month in Mar-Dec 2012 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The US labor force stood at 154.088 million in Oct 2011 and at 155.779 million in Oct 2012, not seasonally adjusted, for increase of 1.691 million, or 140,917 per month. The US labor force stood at 153.683 million in Nov 2011 and 154.953 million in Nov 2012, not seasonally adjusted, for increase of 1.270 million or 105,833 per month. The US labor force stood at 153.373 million in Dec 2011 and 154.904 million in Dec 2012, not seasonally adjusted, for increase of 1.531 million or 127,583 per month. The US labor force stood at 153.485 million in Jan 2012 and 154.794 million in Jan 2013 for increase of 1.309 million or 109,000 per month. The labor force increased from 153.617 million in 2011 to 154.975 million in 2012 by 1.358 million or 113,167 per month. The average increase of 165,900 new nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Mar to Dec 2012 or 166,000 created in Jan 2013 is insufficient even to absorb 113,167 new entrants per month into the labor force. The difference between the average increase of 165,900 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Mar to Dec 2012 and the 113,167 average monthly increase in the labor force from 2011 to 2012 is 52,733 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 31.4 million in job stress in the US currently. The provision of 52,733 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 595 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (31.4 million divided by 52,733) or 49.6 years (595 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Jan 2013 not seasonally adjusted stood at 154.794 million with 13.181 million unemployed or effectively 20.354 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 1.6 years (1 million divided by product of 52,733 by 12, which is 632,796). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.740 million (0.05 times labor force of 154.794 million) for new net job creation of 5.441 million (13.181 million unemployed minus 7.740 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 8.6 years (5.441 million divided by 632,796). Under the calculation in this blog there are 20.354 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 12.614 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 19.9 years (12.614 million minus 0.05(161.967 million) divided by 632,796, using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in the US fell from 146.743 million in Oct 2007 to 141.614 million in Jan 2013, by 5.129 million, or 3.5 percent, while the noninstitutional population increased from 232.715 million in Oct 2007 to 244.663 million in Jan 2013, by 11.948 million or increase of 5.1 percent, using not seasonally adjusted data. There is actually not sufficient job creation to merely absorb new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
Second, calculations show that actual growth is around 1.7 to 1.9 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Growth is not only mediocre but sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 31.4 million people corresponding to 19.4 percent of the effective labor force of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). In the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012, US real GDP grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (IQ2011), 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, revised 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012 and -0.1 percent in IVQ2012. GDP growth in IIIQ2012 was revised from 2.7 percent seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) to 3.1 percent but mostly because of contribution of 0.73 percentage points of inventory accumulation and one-time contribution of 0.64 percentage points of expenditures in national defense that without them would have reduced growth from 3.1 percent to 1.73 percent. Equally, GDP growth in IVQ2012 is measured in the advanced estimate as minus 0.1 percent but mostly because of deduction of divestment of inventories of 1.27 percentage points and deduction of one-time national defense expenditures of 1.28 percentage points. The annual equivalent rate of growth of GDP for the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 is 2.0 percent, obtained as follows. Discounting 0.1 percent to one quarter is 0.025 percent {[(1.001)1/4 -1]100 = 0.025}; discounting 2.5 percent to one quarter is 0.62 percent {[(1.025)1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 4.1 percent to one quarter is 1.0 {[(1.04)1/4 -1]100; discounting 2.0 percent to one quarter is 0.50 percent {[(1.020)1/4 -1]100); discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)1/4 -1]100}; discounting 3.1 percent to one quarter is 0.77 {[(1.031)1/4 -1]100); and discounting -0.1 percent to one quarter is -0.025 percent {[(0.999)1/4 – 1]100}. Real GDP growth in the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 accumulated to 3.6 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 0.9997) - 1]100 = 3.6%}. This is equivalent to growth from IQ2011 to IVQ2012 obtained by dividing the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of IVQ2012 of $13,647.6 billion by the SAAR of IVQ2010 of $13,181.2 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 and Table II-6 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html) and expressing as percentage {[($13,647.6/$13,181.2) - 1]100 = 3.5%} with a minor rounding discrepancy. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 is 1.8 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 0.9997)4/8 -1]100 = 1.8%], or {[($13,647.6/$13,181.2)]4/8-1]100 = 1.8%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table II-6 below, obtaining the average for eight quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. Growth in the four quarters of 2012 accumulates to 1.57 percent {[(1.02)1/4(1.013)1/4(1.031)1/4(0.999)1/4 -1]100 = 1.57%}. This is equivalent to dividing the SAAR of $13,647.6 billion for IVQ2012 in Table II-6 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html) by the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 except for a rounding discrepancy to obtain 1.54 percent {[($13,647.6/$13,441.0) – 1]100 = 1.54%}. The US economy is still close to a standstill especially considering the GDP report in detail. Excluding growth at the SAAR of 2.5 percent in IIQ2011 and 4.1 percent in IVQ2011 while converting growth in IIIQ2012 to 1.3 percent by deducting from 3.1 percent one-time inventory accumulation of 0.73 percentage points and national defense expenditures of 0.64 percentage points and converting growth in IVQ2012 by adding 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions to obtain 2.54 percent, the US economy grew at 1.7 percent in the remaining six quarters {[(1.00025x1.0032x1.005x1.0032x1.0077x0.0063)4/6 – 1]100 = 1.7%} with declining growth trend in three consecutive quarters from 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, to 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012 that is more like 1.73 percent without inventory accumulation and national defense expenditures and -0.1 percent in IVQ2012 that is more likely 2.54 percent by adding 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditures. Weakness of growth is more clearly shown by adjusting the exceptional one-time contributions to growth from items that are not aggregate demand: 2.53 percentage points contributed by inventory change to growth of 4.1 percent in IVQ2011; 0.64 percentage points contributed by expenditures in national defense together with 0.73 points of inventory accumulation to growth of 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012; and deduction of 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce released on Wed Jan 30, 2012, the first or advanced estimate of GDP for IVQ2012 at minus 0.1 percent seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp4q12_adv.pdf). In the four quarters of 2012, the US economy is growing at the annual equivalent rate of 1.9 percent {([(1.021/4(1.013)1/4(1.0173)1/4(1.0254)1/4]-1)100 = 1.89%} by excluding inventory accumulation of 0.73 percentage points and exceptional defense expenditures of 0.64 percentage points from growth 3.1 percent at SAAR in IIIQ2012 to obtain adjusted 1.73 percent SSAR and adding 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions and 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment to growth of minus 0.1 percent SAAR in IVQ2012 to obtain 2.54 percent.
In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation QE→∞ cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates that would cause losses in bond portfolios with high duration and make government fiscal affairs even more unsustainable. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.
Table ESI-1 provides annual equivalent rates of inflation for producer price indexes followed in this blog of countries and regions that account for close to three quarters of world output. The behavior of the US producer price index in 2011 and into 2012 shows neatly multiple waves. (1) In Jan-Apr 2011, without risk aversion, US producer prices rose at the annual equivalent rate of 10.0 percent. (2) After risk aversion, producer prices increased in the US at the annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent in May-Jun 2011. (3) From Jul to Sep 2011, under alternating episodes of risk aversion, producer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. (4) Under the pressure of risk aversion because of the European debt crisis US producer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 0.6 percent in Oct-Nov 2011. (5) From Dec 2011 to Jan 2012, US producer were flat at the annual equivalent rate of 0.0 percent. (6) Inflation of producer prices returned with 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Mar 2012. (7) With return of risk aversion from the European debt crisis, producer prices fell at the annual equivalent rate of 4.7 percent in Apr-May 2012. (8) New positions in commodity futures even with continuing risk aversion caused annual equivalent inflation of 3.0 percent in Jun-Jul 2012. (9) Relaxed risk aversion because of announcement of sovereign bond-buying by the European Central Bank caused restrained induced carry trades that resulted in annual equivalent producer price inflation in the US of 12.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2012. (10) Renewed risk aversion caused unwinding of carry trades of zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures with annual equivalent inflation of minus 3.5 percent in Oct-Dec 2012. (10) In Jan 2013, producer prices rose at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent with more relaxed risk aversion at the margin. Resolution of the European debt crisis if there is not an unfavorable growth event with political development in China would result in jumps of valuations of risk financial assets. Increases in commodity prices would cause the same high producer price inflation experienced in Jan-Apr 2011 and Aug-Sep 2012. An episode of exploding commodity prices could ignite inflationary expectations that would result in an inflation phenomenon of costly resolution. There are nine producer-price indexes in Table ESI-1 for seven countries (two for the UK) and one region (euro area) showing very similar behavior. Zero interest rates without risk aversion cause increases in commodity prices that in turn increase input and output prices. Producer price inflation rose at very high rates during the first part of 2011 for the US, Japan, China, Euro Area, Germany, France, Italy and the UK when risk aversion was contained. With the increase in risk aversion in May and Jun 2011, inflation moderated because carry trades were unwound. Producer price inflation returned after Jul 2011, with alternating bouts of risk aversion. In the final months of the year producer price inflation collapsed because of the disincentive to exposures in commodity futures resulting from fears of resolution of the European debt crisis. There is renewed worldwide inflation in the early part of 2012 with subsequent collapse because of another round of sharp risk aversion. Sharp worldwide jump in producer prices occurred recently as a result of the combination of zero interest rates forever or QE→∞ with temporarily relaxed risk aversion. Producer prices are moderating or falling currently because of renewed risk aversion that causes unwinding of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures. Unconventional monetary policy fails in stimulating the overall real economy, merely introducing undesirable instability as monetary authorities cannot control allocation of floods of money at zero interest rates to carry trades into risk financial assets. The economy is constrained in a suboptimal allocation of resources that is perpetuated along a continuum of short-term periods results in long-term or dynamic inefficiency in the form of a trajectory of economic activity that is lower than what would be attained with rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
Table ESI-1, Annual Equivalent Rates of Producer Price Indexes
INDEX 2011-2013 | AE ∆% |
US Producer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2012 | -3.5 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012 | 12.7 |
AE ∆% Jun-Jul 2012 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% Apr-May 2012 | -4.7 |
AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan-2012 | 0.0 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011 | 0.6 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 4.9 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 1.8 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 10.0 |
Japan Corporate Goods Price Index | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jan 2013 | 3.7 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2012 | -1.8 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | -5.8 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | -0.6 |
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011 | -2.2 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 5.9 |
China Producer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% Oct 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Sep 2012 | -5.8 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011 | -3.1 |
AE ∆% Jan-Jun 2011 | 6.4 |
Euro Zone Industrial Producer Prices | |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Sep-Oct 2012 | 1.2 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 7.4 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012 | -3.9 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012 | 8.3 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011 | 0.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.0 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 12.0 |
Germany Producer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | 10.0 NSA 2.4 SA |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2012 | -1.6 NSA 1.6 SA |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012 | 4.9 NSA 5.5 SA |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | -2.8 NSA –0.4 SA |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 4.9 NSA 0.8 SA |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 1.2 NSA 0.0 SA |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011 | 1.8 NSA 3.7 SA |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.8 NSA 3.7 SA |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 0.6 NSA 3.7 SA |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 10.4 NSA 6.5 SA |
France Producer Price Index for the French Market | |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012 | -4.7 |
AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2012 | 8.1 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012 | -8.1 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012 | 8.7 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.8 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | -3.5 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 11.7 |
Italy Producer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2012 | -2.1 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 6.8 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2012 | 4.3 |
AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2012 | 7.4 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011 | 0.4 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-April 2011 | 10.7 |
UK Output Prices | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2012 | 4.0 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | -5.3 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 7.9 |
AE ∆% Nov 2011-Jan-2012 | 1.6 |
AE ∆% May-Oct 2011 | 2.0 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 12.0 |
UK Input Prices | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jan 2013 | 8.1 |
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2012 | 1.6 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 14.0 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012 | -21.9 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012 | 18.1 |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2011 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% May-Oct 2011 | -3.1 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 35.6 |
AE: Annual Equivalent
Sources:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html
http://www.insee.fr/en/default.asp
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html
Similar world inflation waves are in the behavior of consumer price indexes of six countries and the euro zone in Table ESI-2. US consumer price inflation shows similar waves. (1) Under risk appetite in Jan-Apr 2011 consumer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 4.6 percent. (2) Risk aversion caused the collapse of inflation to annual equivalent 3.0 percent in May-Jun 2011. (3) Risk appetite drove the rate of consumer price inflation in the US to 3.3 percent in Jul-Sep 2011. (4) Gloomier views of carry trades caused the collapse of inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 to annual equivalent 0.6 percent. (5) Consumer price inflation resuscitated with increased risk appetite at annual equivalent of 1.2 percent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. (6) Consumer price inflation returned at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Apr 2012. (7) Under renewed risk aversion, annual equivalent consumer price inflation in the US was 0.0 percent in May-Jul 2012. (8) Inflation jumped to annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. (9) Unwinding of carry trades caused negative annual equivalent inflation of 0.8 percent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 but some countries experienced higher inflation in Dec 2012 and Jan 2013. Inflationary expectations can be triggered in one of these episodes of accelerating inflation because of commodity carry trades induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates in perpetuity or QE→∞ or almost continuous time. Alternating episodes of increase and decrease of inflation introduce uncertainty in household planning that frustrates consumption and home buying. Announcement of purchases of impaired sovereign bonds by the European Central Bank relaxed risk aversion that induced carry trades into commodity exposures, increasing prices of food, raw materials and energy. There is similar behavior in all the other consumer price indexes in Table ESI-2. China’s CPI increased at annual equivalent 8.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2011, 2.0 percent in Apr-Jun, 2.9 percent in Jul-Dec and resuscitated at 5.8 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Mar 2012, declining to minus 3.9 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but resuscitating at 4.1 percent in Jul-Sep 2012, declining to minus 1.2 percent in Oct 2012 and 0.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2012. High inflation in China at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Nov-Dec 2012 is attributed to inclement winter weather that caused increases in food prices. Continuing pressure of food prices caused annual equivalent inflation of 11.4 percent in China in Dec 2012 to Jan 2013. The euro zone harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) increased at annual equivalent 5.2 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, minus 2.4 percent in May-Jul 2011, 4.3 percent in Aug-Dec 2011, minus 3.0 percent in Dec 2011-Jan 2012 and then 9.6 percent in Feb-Apr 2012, falling to minus 2.8 percent annual equivalent in May-Jul 2012 but resuscitating at 5.3 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. The recent shock of risk aversion forced minus 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2012. As in several European countries, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 4.9 percent in the euro area in Dec 2012. The price indexes of the largest members of the euro zone, Germany, France and Italy, and the euro zone as a whole, exhibit the same inflation waves. The United Kingdom CPI increased at annual equivalent 6.5 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, falling to only 0.4 percent in May-Jul 2011 and then increasing at 4.6 percent in Aug-Nov 2011. UK consumer prices fell at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 but increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent from Feb to Apr 2012. In May-Jun 2012, with renewed risk aversion, UK consumer prices fell at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the UK at average annual equivalent of 4.5 percent in Jul-Dec 2012 with inflation in Oct 2012 caused mostly by increases of university tuition fees. Inflation returned at 4.1 percent annual equivalent in Jul-Sep 2012 and was higher in annual equivalent producer price inflation in the UK in Jul-Oct 2012 at 4.0 percent for output prices and 14.0 percent for input prices in Jul-Aug 2012 (see Table ESI-1).
Table ESII-2, Annual Equivalent Rates of Consumer Price Indexes
Index 2011-2013 | AE ∆% |
US Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Nov 2012-Jan 2013 | -0.8 |
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012 | 4.9 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | 0.0 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 1.2 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011 | 0.6 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 3.3 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 4.6 |
China Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jan 2013 | 11.4 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2012 | 0.0 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2012 | 4.1 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012 | -3.9 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Mar 2012 | 5.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011 | 2.9 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2011 | 2.0 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2011 | 8.3 |
Euro Zone Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012 | 4.9 |
AE ∆% Nov 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012 | 5.3 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | -2.8 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 9.6 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | -3.0 |
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011 | 4.3 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 5.2 |
Germany Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | -5.8 NSA 0.0 SA |
AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2012 | 1.5 NSA 1.5 SA |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 4.9 NSA 3.7 SA |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | -1.2 NSA 1.2 SA |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 4.5 NSA 2.0 SA |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 1.8 NSA 0.6 SA |
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011 | 1.7 NSA 1.9 SA |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 0.6 NSA 3.0 SA |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2011 | 3.0 NSA 2.4 SA |
France Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Nov 2012-Jan 2013 | -1.6 |
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | -2.0 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 5.3 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 0.0 |
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011 | 2.7 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011 | -0.8 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 4.3 |
Italy Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jan 2013 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2012 | -0.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | 1.2 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 5.7 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 4.3 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 1.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 4.9 |
UK Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | -5.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Dec 2012 | 4.5 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | -3.0 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 6.2 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | -0.6 |
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011 | 4.6 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011 | 0.4 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 6.5 |
AE: Annual Equivalent
Sources:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html
http://www.insee.fr/en/default.asp
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html
ESII United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities. Selected assets and liabilities of US commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, in billions of dollars, from Report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are provided in Table ESII-1. Data are not seasonally adjusted to permit comparison between Jan 2012 and Jan 2013. Total assets of US commercial banks grew 4.5 percent from $12,604.4 billion in Jan 2012 to $13,174.5 billion in Jan 2013. US GDP in 2012 is estimated at $15,676.0 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Thus, total assets of US commercial banks are equivalent to around 84 percent of US GDP. Bank credit grew 5.3 percent from $9493.0 billion in Jan 2012 to $9996.3 billion in Jan 2013. Securities in bank credit increased 8.2 percent from $2521.4 billion in Jan 2012 to $2728.6 billion in Jan 2013. A large part of securities in banking credit consists of US Treasury and agency securities, growing 8.2 percent from $1722.1 billion in Jan 2012 to $1862.5 billion in Jan 2013. Credit to the government that issues or backs Treasury and agency securities of $1862.5 billion in Jan 2013 is about 18.6 percent of total bank credit of US commercial banks of $9996.3 billion. Mortgage-backed securities, providing financing of home loans, grew 5.5 percent, from $1270.8 billion in Jan 2012 to $1340.4 billion in Jan 2013. Loans and leases were less dynamic, growing 4.2 percent from $6971.6 billion in Jan 2012 to $7267.7 billion in Jan 2013. The only dynamic class is commercial and industrial loans, growing 12.4 percent from Jan 2012 to Jan 2013 and providing $1516.3 billion or 20.9 percent of total loans and leases of $7267.7 billion in Jan 2013. Real estate loans increased only 1.3 percent, providing $3560.8 billion in Jan 2013 or 49.0 percent of total loans and leases. Consumer loans increased only 2.3 percent, providing $1130.8 billion in Jan 2013 or 15.6 percent of total loans. Cash assets are measured to “include vault cash, cash items in process of collection, balances due from depository institutions and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm). Cash assets in US commercial banks increased 3.7 percent from $1683.5 billion in Jan 2012 to $1746.2 billion in Jan 2013 but a single year of the series masks exploding cash in banks as a result of unconventional monetary policy, which is discussed below. Bank deposits increased 9.0 percent from $8502.1 billion to $9267.2 billion. The difference between bank deposits and total loans and leases in banks increased from $1530.5 billion in Jan 2012 to $1999.5 billion in Jan 2013 or by $469.0 billion, which is similar to the increase in securities in bank credit by $207.2 billion from $2521.4 billion in Jan 2012 to $2728.6 billion in Jan 2013 and to the increase in Treasury and agency securities by $140.4 billion from $1722.1 billion in Jan 2012 to $1862.5 billion in Jan 2013. Loans and leases increased $296.1 billion from $6971.6 billion in Jan 2012 to $7267.7 billion in Jan 2013. Banks expanded both lending and investment in lower risk securities partly because of the weak economy and credit disappointments during the global recession that has resulted in an environment of fewer sound lending opportunities. Lower interest rates resulting from monetary policy may not necessarily encourage higher borrowing in the current loss of dynamism of the US economy with real disposable income per capita in IVQ2012 higher by 1.0 percent than in IVQ2007 (Table IB-1 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html) in contrast with 10.9 percent higher if the economy had performed in long-term growth of per capita income in the United States at 2 percent per year from 1870 to 2010 (Lucas 2011May) and growth of real disposable income by 15.7 percent in the cycle from IQ1980 to IQ1986 that was higher than trend growth of 13.2 percent.
Table ESII-1, US, Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, NSA, Billions of Dollars
Jan 2012 | Jan 2013 | ∆% | |
Total Assets | 12,604.4 | 13,174.5 | 4.5 |
Bank Credit | 9493.0 | 9996.3 | 5.3 |
Securities in Bank Credit | 2521.4 | 2728.6 | 8.2 |
Treasury & Agency Securities | 1722.1 | 1862.5 | 8.2 |
Mortgage-Backed Securities | 1270.8 | 1340.4 | 5.5 |
Loans & Leases | 6971.6 | 7267.7 | 4.2 |
Real Estate Loans | 3515.3 | 3560.8 | 1.3 |
Consumer Loans | 1105.4 | 1130.8 | 2.3 |
Commercial & Industrial Loans | 1348.9 | 1516.3 | 12.4 |
Other Loans & Leases | 1002.1 | 1059.9 | 5.8 |
Cash Assets* | 1683.5 | 1746.2 | 3.7 |
Total Liabilities | 11,174.0 | 11,682.7 | 4.6 |
Deposits | 8502.1 | 9267.2 | 9.0 |
Note: balancing item of residual assets less liabilities not included
*”Includes vault cash, cash items in process of collection, balances due from depository institutions and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks.”
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rates (SAAR) of change of selected assets and liabilities of US commercial banks from the report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are provided in Table ESII-2 annually from 2007 to 2011 and for Dec 2012 and Jan 2013. The global recession had strong impact on bank assets as shown by declines of total assets of 6.0 percent in 2009 and 2.7 percent in 2010. Loans and leases fell 10.2 percent in 2009 and 5.8 percent in 2010. Commercial and industrial loans fell 18.6 percent in 2009 and 9.0 percent in 2011. Unconventional monetary policy caused an increase of cash assets of banks of 158.3 percent in 2008, 48.1 percent in 2009 and 47.8 percent in 2011 and at the SAAR of 22.4 percent in Aug 2012 but contraction by 49.6 percent in Sep 2012 and 6.3 percent in Oct 2012 followed by increase of 55.4 percent in Nov 2012, minus 19.3 percent in Dec 2012 and 47.9 percent in Jan 2013. Acquisitions of securities for the portfolio of the central bank injected reserves in depository institutions that were held as cash and reserves at the central bank because of the lack of sound lending opportunities and the adverse expectations in the private sector on doing business. The truly dynamic investment of banks has been in securities in bank credit, growing at the SAAR of 15.4 percent in Jul 2012, 2.6 percent in Aug 2012, 5.3 percent in Sep 2012, 4.7 percent in Oct 2012, 0.8 percent in Nov 2012 and 22.6 percent in Dec 2012 with decline at 2.5 percent in Jan 2013. Throughout the crisis banks allocated increasing part of their assets to the safety of Treasury and agency securities, or credit to the US government and government-backed credit, with growth of 15.5 percent in 2009 and 15.1 percent in 2010 and at the rate of 16.3 percent in Jul 2012, declining to the rate of 3.4 percent in Aug 2012, 2.1 percent in Sep 2012 and 0.7 percent in Oct 2012 but falling at the rate of 2.1 percent in Nov 2012, increasing at 18.4 percent in Dec 2012 but falling at 8.2 percent in Jan 2013. Deposits grew at the rate of 10.5 percent in Jul 2012, with the rate declining as for most assets of commercial banks to the rate of 6.2 percent in Aug 2012 but increasing to 7.2 percent in Sep 2012, 8.4 percent in Oct 2012, 5.5 percent in Nov 2012, 20.7 percent in Dec 2012 and 2.8 percent in Jan 2013. The credit intermediation function of banks is broken because of adverse expectations on future business and is not easily mended simply by monetary and fiscal policy. Incentives to business and consumers are more likely to be effective in this environment in recovering willingness to assume risk on the part of the private sector, which is the driver of growth and job creation.
Table ESII-2, US, Selected Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, ∆%
2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | Dec 2012 | Jan 2013 | |
Total Assets | 7.9 | -6.0 | -2.7 | 5.3 | 2.4 | 7.3 | 9.5 |
Bank Credit | 2.1 | -6.6 | -2.7 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 10.8 | 3.6 |
Securities in Bank Credit | -2.0 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 1.7 | 7.5 | 22.6 | -2.5 |
Treasury & Agency Securities | 3.1 | 15.5 | 15.1 | 2.9 | 8.5 | 18.4 | -8.2 |
Other Securities | -8.4 | -5.1 | -7.1 | -0.8 | 5.3 | 31.7 | 9.9 |
Loans & Leases | 3.3 | -10.2 | -5.8 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 6.3 | 5.9 |
Real Estate Loans | -0.2 | -5.6 | -5.5 | -3.8 | -1.1 | -0.3 | 4.4 |
Consumer Loans | 5.1 | -3.3 | -7.0 | -0.8 | 1.1 | 3.8 | -2.3 |
Commercial & Industrial Loans | 12.9 | -18.6 | -9.0 | 9.4 | 11.3 | 17.7 | 11.8 |
Other Loans & Leases | 1.7 | -23.3 | 0.3 | 19.3 | 5.9 | 15.7 | 10.9 |
Cash Assets | 158.3 | 48.1 | -7.9 | 47.8 | -3.0 | -19.3 | 47.9 |
Total Liabilities | 10.6 | -7.2 | -3.4 | 5.5 | 2.1 | 10.3 | 14.0 |
Deposits | 5.4 | 5.2 | 2.4 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 20.7 | 2.8 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of cash assets in US commercial banks from 1973 to 2012. Unconventional monetary policy caused an increase in cash assets in late 2008 of close to 500 percent at SAAR and also in following policy impulses. Such aggressive policies were not required for growth of GDP at the average rate of 5.7 percent in 13 quarters of cyclical expansion from IQ1983 to IV1985 while the average rate in 14 quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012 has been at the rate of 2.1 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The difference in magnitude of the recessions is not sufficient to explain weakness of the current cyclical expansion. Bordo (2012Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) find that growth is higher after deeper contractions and contractions with financial crises. There were two consecutive contractions in the 1980s with decline of 2.2 percent in two quarters from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and 2.7 percent from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 that are almost identical to the contraction of 4.7 percent from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 (Table ESII-3 below). There was also a decade-long financial and banking crisis during the 1980s. The debt crisis of 1982 (Pelaez 1986) wiped out a large part of the capital of large US money-center banks. Benston and Kaufman (1997, 139) find that there was failure of 1150 US commercial and savings banks between 1983 and 1990, or about 8 percent of the industry in 1980, which is nearly twice more than between the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1934 through 1983. More than 900 savings and loans associations, representing 25 percent of the industry, were closed, merged or placed in conservatorships (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 74-7). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) that received $150 billion of taxpayer funds to resolve insolvent savings and loans. The GDP of the US in 1989 was $5482.1 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the partial cost to taxpayers of that bailout was around 2.7 percent of GDP in a year. US GDP in 2011 is estimated at $15,075.7 billion, such that the bailout would be equivalent to cost to taxpayers of about $412.5 billion in current GDP terms. A major difference with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for private-sector banks is that most of the costs were recovered with interest gains whereas in the case of savings and loans there was no recovery.
Chart ESII-1, US, Cash Assets, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides quarterly SAARs of bank credit at US commercial banks from 1973 to 2012. Rates collapsed sharply during the global recession as during the recessions of the 1980s and then rebounded. In both episodes rates of growth of bank credit did not return to earlier magnitudes.
Chart ESII-2, US, Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides deposits at US commercial banks from 1973 to 2013. Deposits fell sharp during and after the global recession but then rebounded in the cyclical expansion
Chart ESII-3, US, Deposits, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is similar behavior in the 1980s and in the current cyclical expansion of SAARs holdings of Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks provided in Chart II-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the period 1973 to 2013. Sharp reductions of holdings during the contraction were followed by sharp increases.
Chart ESII-4, US, Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides SAARs of change of total loans and leases in US commercial banks from 1973 to 2013. The decline in the current cycle of SAARs was much sharper and the rebound did not recover earlier growth rates. Part of the explanation originates in demand for loans that was high during rapid economic growth at 5.7 percent per year on average in the cyclical expansion of the 1980s in contrast with lower demand during tepid economic growth at 2.1 percent per year on average in the current weak expansion.
Chart ESII-5, US, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is significant difference in the two cycles of the 1980s and the current one in quarterly SAARs of real estate loans in US commercial banks provided in Chart ESII-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The difference is explained by the debacle in real estate after 2006 compared to expansion during the 1980s even in the midst of the crisis of savings and loans and real estate credit. In both cases, government policy tried to influence recovery and avoid market clearing.
Chart ESII-6, US, Real Estate Loans in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is significant difference in quarterly SAARs of change of consumer loans in US commercial banks in the 1980s and during the current cycle as shown in Chart ESII-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Quarterly SAARs of consumer loans in US commercial banks fell sharply during the contraction of 1980 and oscillated with upward trend during the contraction of 1983-1984 but increased sharply in the cyclical expansion. In contrast, SAARs of consumer loans in US commercial banks collapsed to high negative magnitudes during the contraction and have increased at very low magnitudes during the current cyclical expansion.
Chart ESII-7, US, Consumer Loans in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Table ESII-3 provides the data required for broader comparison of the cyclical expansions of IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and the current one from 2009 to 2012. First, in the 13 quarters from IQ1983 to IQ1986, GDP increased 19.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.7 percent; real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 14.9 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.4 percent; RDPI per capita increased 11.9 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent; and population increased 2.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. Second, in the 14 quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012, GDP increased 7.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent. In the 13 quarters of cyclical expansion real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 4.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent; RDPI per capita increased 4.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent; and population increased 2.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. Third, since the beginning of the recession in IVQ2007 to IVQ2012, GDP increased 2.4 percent, or barely above the level before the recession. Since the beginning of the recession in IVQ2007 to IVQ2012, real disposable personal income increased 5.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.9 percent; population increased 4.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita is 1.0 percent higher than the level before the recession. Real disposable personal income is the actual take home pay after inflation and taxes and real disposable income per capita is what is left per inhabitant. The current cyclical expansion is the worst in the period after World War II in terms of growth of economic activity and income. The United States grew during its history at high rates of per capita income that made its economy the largest in the world. That dynamism is disappearing. Bordo (2012 Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) provide strong evidence that recoveries have been faster after deeper recessions and recessions with financial crises, casting serious doubts on the conventional explanation of weak growth during the current expansion allegedly because of the depth of the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 of 4.7 percent and the financial crisis.
Table ESII-3, US, GDP, Real Disposable Personal Income, Real Disposable Income per Capita and Population in 1983-85 and 2007-2011, %
# Quarters | ∆% | ∆% Annual Equivalent | |
IQ1983 to IVQ1986 | 13 | ||
GDP | 19.6 | 5.7 | |
RDPI | 14.9 | 4.4 | |
RDPI Per Capita | 11.9 | 3.5 | |
Population | 2.7 | 0.8 | |
IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012 | 14 | ||
GDP | 7.5 | 2.1 | |
RDPI | 7.1 | 2.0 | |
RDPI per Capita | 4.5 | 1.3 | |
Population | 2.5 | 0.7 | |
IVQ2007 to IVQ2012 | 21 | ||
GDP | 2.4 | 0.5 | |
RDPI | 5.1 | 0.9 | |
RDPI per Capita | 1.0 | 0.2 | |
Population | 4.1 | 0.8 |
RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart ESII-8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides cash assets in commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Acquisitions of securities for the portfolio of the central bank were processed by increases in bank cash reserves. There is no comparable experience in US economic history and such flood of money was never required to return US economic growth to trend of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita income after events such as recessions and wars (Lucas 2011May). It is difficult to argue that higher magnitudes of monetary and fiscal policy impulses would have been more successful. Discovery of such painless and fast adjustment by gigantic impulses of monetary policy of zero interest rates and trillions of dollars of bond buying would have occurred earlier with prior cases of successful implementation. Selective incentives to the private sector of a long-term nature could have been more effective.
Chart ESII-8, US, Cash Assets in Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-9 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides total assets of Federal Reserve Banks in millions of dollars on Wednesdays from Dec 18, 2002 to Feb 20, 2013. This is what is referred as the leverage of the central bank balance sheet in monetary policy (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-62, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b) 224-27). Consecutive rounds of unconventional monetary policy increased total assets by purchase of mortgage-backed securities, agency securities and Treasury securities. Bank reserves in cash and deposited at the central bank swelled as shown in Chart II-8. The central bank created assets in the form of securities financed with creation of liabilities in the form of reserves of depository institutions.
Chart ESII-9, US, Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday Level, Millions of Dollars, Dec 18,2002 to Feb 20, 2013
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Chart ESII-10 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides deposits in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Deposit growth clearly accelerated after 2001 and continued during the current cyclical expansion after bumps during the global recession.
Chart ESII-10, US, Deposits in Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-11 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2012. Holdings stabilized between the recessions of 2001 and after IVQ2007. There was rapid growth during the global contraction especially after unconventional monetary policy in 2008 and nearly vertical increase without prior similar historical experience during the various bouts of unconventional monetary policy. Banks hoard cash and less risky Treasury and agency securities instead of risky lending because of the weakness of the economy and the lack of demand for financing sound business projects.
Chart ESII-11, US, Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-12 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides total loans and leases in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2012. Total loans and leases of US commercial banks contracted sharply and have stalled during the cyclical expansion.
Chart ESII-12, US, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-13 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides real estate loans in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Housing subsidies and low interest rates caused a point of inflexion to higher, nearly vertical growth until 2007. Real estate loans have contracted in downward trend partly because of adverse effects of uncertainty on the impact on balance sheets of the various mechanisms of resolution imposed by policy. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Push for cheaper credit hits wall,” on Dec 24, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324660404578197782701079650.html), provides important information and analysis on housing finance. Quantitative easing consists of withdrawing supply of mortgage-backed securities by acquiring them as assets in the Fed balance sheet. Lending banks obtain funds for mortgages by bundling them according to risk and other characteristics and selling them to investors, using the proceeds from the sale to provide the loans to homebuyers or refinancing homeowners. Banks earn net revenue to remunerate capital required for operations from the spread between the rate received from mortgage debtors and the rate implicit in the yield of the mortgage-backed securities. Nick Timiraos (Ibid) finds that the spread was around 0.5 percentage points before the financial crisis of 2007, widening to 1 percentage point after the crisis but jumping to 1.6 percentage points after the Fed engaged in another program of buying mortgage-backed securities, oscillating currently around 1.3 percentage points. The spread has widened because banks have higher costs originating in regulation, litigation on repurchasing defaulted mortgages, loss in case of default and more prudent but more costly scrutiny of property appraisals and income verification. As a result, even if quantitative easing does lower yields of mortgage-backed securities there would not be proportionate reduction in mortgage rates and even less likely construction and sales of houses.
Chart II-13, US, Real Estate Loans in Bank Credit, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-14 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides consumer loans in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Consumer loans even increased during the contraction then declined and increased vertically to decline again. There was high demand for reposition of durable goods that exhausted and limited consumption again with increase in savings rates in recent periods.
Chart ESII-14, US, Consumer Loans in Bank Credit, Not Seasonally Adjusted, US Commercial Banks, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-15 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides commercial and industrial loans not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Commercial and industrial loans fell sharply during both contractions in 2001 and after IVQ2007 and then rebounded with accelerated growth. Commercial and industrial loans have not reached again the peak during the global recession.
Chart ESII-15, US, Commercial and Industrial Loans in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart ESII-16 is quite revealing in analyzing the state of bank credit in the US economy. The upper curves are deposits and loans and leases in bank credit. Historically since 1973, the level and rate of change of deposits and loans and leases in bank credit were almost identical. The lower two curves are Treasury and agency securities in bank credit and cash assets with treasury and agency securities moving closely with cash assets until the 1990s when Treasury and agency securities exceeded cash assets. The shaded area of the recession from IV2007 to IIQ2009 shows a break in the level and rate of movement of the series. Deposits continued to expand rapidly through the recession and the following expansion period. Loans and leases fell and barely recovered the level before the recession while deposits moved nearly vertically well above the level before the recession. While Treasury and agency securities in bank credit continued to expand at a higher rate, reaching a level well above that before the recession, cash assets jumped as the counterpart of excess reserves in banks that financed quantitative easing or massive outright purchases of securities for the balance sheet of the Fed. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and outright purchases of securities has result in sharp increases of deposits, cash assets and Treasury and agency securities in bank credit but not in loans and leases. Much is said about the almost impossible task of evaluating monetary policy in terms of costs and benefits. Before the financial crisis, Chairman Greenspan (2004) analyzes monetary policy and its limitations (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 13-4, 212-13) that do not differ from those of private financial institutions:
“The Federal Reserve's experiences over the past two decades make it clear that uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape. The term "uncertainty" is meant here to encompass both "Knightian uncertainty," in which the probability distribution of outcomes is unknown, and "risk," in which uncertainty of outcomes is delimited by a known probability distribution. In practice, one is never quite sure what type of uncertainty one is dealing with in real time, and it may be best to think of a continuum ranging from well-defined risks to the truly unknown.
As a consequence, the conduct of monetary policy in the United States has come to involve, at its core, crucial elements of risk management. This conceptual framework emphasizes understanding as much as possible the many sources of risk and uncertainty that policymakers face, quantifying those risks when possible, and assessing the costs associated with each of the risks. In essence, the risk management approach to monetary policymaking is an application of Bayesian decision making.
This framework also entails devising, in light of those risks, a strategy for policy directed at maximizing the probabilities of achieving over time our goals of price stability and the maximum sustainable economic growth that we associate with it. In designing strategies to meet our policy objectives, we have drawn on the work of analysts, both inside and outside the Fed, who over the past half century have devoted much effort to improving our understanding of the economy and its monetary transmission mechanism. A critical result has been the identification of a relatively small set of key relationships that, taken together, provide a useful approximation of our economy's dynamics. Such an approximation underlies the statistical models that we at the Federal Reserve employ to assess the likely influence of our policy decisions.
However, despite extensive efforts to capture and quantify what we perceive as the key macroeconomic relationships, our knowledge about many of the important linkages is far from complete and, in all likelihood, will always remain so. Every model, no matter how detailed or how well designed, conceptually and empirically, is a vastly simplified representation of the world that we experience with all its intricacies on a day-to-day basis.
Given our inevitably incomplete knowledge about key structural aspects of an ever-changing economy and the sometimes asymmetric costs or benefits of particular outcomes, a central bank needs to consider not only the most likely future path for the economy but also the distribution of possible outcomes about that path. The decision makers then need to reach a judgment about the probabilities, costs, and benefits of the various possible outcomes under alternative choices for policy.”
“Whale” trades at official institutions do not receive the same media attention as those in large private banking institutions such as the teapot storm over JP Morgan Chase.
Chart II-16, US, Deposits, Treasury and Government Securities in Bank Credit and Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
ESIII Theory and Reality of Economic History and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation. Fear of deflation as had occurred during the Great Depression and in Japan was used as an argument for the first round of unconventional monetary policy with 1 percent interest rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 and quantitative easing in the form of withdrawal of supply of 30-year securities by suspension of the auction of 30-year Treasury bonds with the intention of reducing mortgage rates (for fear of deflation see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, and Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95). The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html
If the forecast of the central bank is of recession and low inflation with controlled inflationary expectations, monetary policy should consist of lowering the short-term policy rate of the central bank, which in the US is the fed funds rate. The intended effect is to lower the real rate of interest (Svensson 2003LT, 146-7). The real rate of interest, r, is defined as the nominal rate, i, adjusted by expectations of inflation, π*, with all variables defined as proportions: (1+r) = (1+i)/(1+π*) (Fisher 1930). If i, the fed funds rate, is lowered by the Fed, the numerator of the right-hand side is lower such that if inflationary expectations, π*, remain unchanged, the left-hand (1+r) decreases, that is, the real rate of interest, r, declines. Expectations of lowering short-term real rates of interest by policy of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) fixing a lower fed funds rate would lower long-term real rates of interest, inducing with a lag investment and consumption, or aggregate demand, that can lift the economy out of recession. Inflation also increases with a lag by higher aggregate demand and inflation expectations (Fisher 1933). This reasoning explains why the FOMC lowered the fed funds rate in Dec 2008 to 0 to 0.25 percent and left it unchanged.
The fear of the Fed is expected deflation or negative π*. In that case, (1+ π*) < 1, and (1+r) would increase because the right-hand side of the equation would be divided by a fraction. A simple numerical example explains the effect of deflation on the real rate of interest. Suppose that the nominal rate of interest or fed funds rate, i, is 0.25 percent, or in proportion 0.25/100 = 0.0025, such that (1+i) = 1.0025. Assume now that economic agents believe that inflation will remain at 1 percent for a long period, which means that π* = 1 percent, or in proportion 1/100 =0.01. The real rate of interest, using the equation, is (1+0.0025)/(1+0.01) = (1+r) = 0.99257, such that r = 0.99257 - 1 = -0.00743, which is a proportion equivalent to –(0.00743)100 = -0.743 percent. That is, Fed policy has created a negative real rate of interest of 0.743 percent with the objective of inducing aggregate demand by higher investment and consumption. This is true if expected inflation, π*, remains at 1 percent. Suppose now that expectations of deflation become generalized such that π* becomes -1 percent, that is, the public believes prices will fall at the rate of 1 percent in the foreseeable future. Then the real rate of interest becomes (1+0.0025) divided by (1-0.01) equal to (1.0025)/(0.99) = (1+r) = 1.01263, or r = (1.01263-1) = 0.01263, which results in positive real rate of interest of (0.01263)100 = 1.263 percent.
Irving Fisher also identified the impact of deflation on debts as an important cause of deepening contraction of income and employment during the Great Depression illustrated by an actual example (Fisher 1933, 346):
“By March, 1933, liquidation had reduced the debts about 20 percent, but had increased the dollar about 75 percent, so that the real debt, that is the debt measured in terms of commodities, was increased about 40 percent [100%-20%)X(100%+75%) =140%]. Unless some counteracting cause comes along to prevent the fall in the price level, such a depression as that of 1929-1933 (namely when the more the debtors pay the more they owe) tends to continue, going deeper, in a vicious spiral, for many years. There is then no tendency of the boat to stop tipping until it has capsized”
The nominal rate of interest must always be nonnegative, that is, i ≥ 0 (Hick 1937, 154-5):
“If the costs of holding money can be neglected, it will always be profitable to hold money rather than lend it out, if the rate of interest is not greater than zero. Consequently the rate of interest must always be positive. In an extreme case, the shortest short-term rate may perhaps be nearly zero. But if so, the long-term rate must lie above it, for the long rate has to allow for the risk that the short rate may rise during the currency of the loan, and it should be observed that the short rate can only rise, it cannot fall”
The interpretation by Hicks of the General Theory of Keynes is the special case in which at interest rates close to zero liquidity preference is infinitely or perfectly elastic, that is, the public holds infinitely large cash balances at that near zero interest rate because there is no opportunity cost of foregone interest. Increases in the money supply by the central bank would not decrease interest rates below their near zero level, which is called the liquidity trap. The only alternative public policy would consist of fiscal policy that would act similarly to an increase in investment, increasing employment without raising the interest rate.
An influential view on the policy required to steer the economy away from the liquidity trap is provided by Paul Krugman (1998). Suppose the central bank faces an increase in inflation. An important ingredient of the control of inflation is the central bank communicating to the public that it will maintain a sustained effort by all available policy measures and required doses until inflation is subdued and price stability is attained. If the public believes that the central bank will control inflation only until it declines to a more benign level but not sufficiently low level, current expectations will develop that inflation will be higher once the central bank abandons harsh measures. During deflation and recession the central bank has to convince the public that it will maintain zero interest rates and other required measures until the rate of inflation returns convincingly to a level consistent with expansion of the economy and stable prices. Krugman (1998, 161) summarizes the argument as:
“The ineffectuality of monetary policy in a liquidity trap is really the result of a looking-glass version of the standard credibility problem: monetary policy does not work because the public expects that whatever the central bank may do now, given the chance, it will revert to type and stabilize prices near their current level. If the central bank can credibly promise to be irresponsible—that is, convince the market that it will in fact allow prices to rise sufficiently—it can bootstrap the economy out of the trap”
This view is consistent with results of research by Christina Romer that “the rapid rates of growth of real output in the mid- and late 1930s were largely due to conventional aggregate demand stimulus, primarily in the form of monetary expansion. My calculations suggest that in the absence of these stimuli the economy would have remained depressed far longer and far more deeply than it actually did” (Romer 1992, 757-8, cited in Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 210-2). The average growth rate of the money supply in 1933-1937 was 10 percent per year and increased in the early 1940s. Romer calculates that GDP would have been much lower without this monetary expansion. The growth of “the money supply was primarily due to a gold inflow, which was in turn due to the devaluation in 1933 and to capital flight from Europe because of political instability after 1934” (Romer 1992, 759). Gold inflow coincided with the decline in real interest rates in 1933 that remained negative through the latter part of the 1930s, suggesting that they could have caused increases in spending that was sensitive to declines in interest rates. Bernanke finds dollar devaluation against gold to have been important in preventing further deflation in the 1930s (Bernanke 2002):
“There have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from US history is Franklin Roosevelt’s 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the US deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934. The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market”
Fed policy is seeking what Irving Fisher proposed “that great depressions are curable and preventable through reflation and stabilization” (Fisher 1933, 350).
The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago argues that (Charles Evans 2010):
“I believe the US economy is best described as being in a bona fide liquidity trap. Highly plausible projections are 1 percent for core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) inflation at the end of 2012 and 8 percent for the unemployment rate. For me, the Fed’s dual mandate misses are too large to shrug off, and there is currently no policy conflict between improving employment and inflation outcomes”
There are two types of monetary policies that could be used in this situation. First, the Fed could announce a price-level target to be attained within a reasonable time frame (Evans 2010):
“For example, if the slope of the price path is 2 percent and inflation has been underunning the path for some time, monetary policy would strive to catch up to the path. Inflation would be higher than 2 percent for a time until the path was reattained”
Optimum monetary policy with interest rates near zero could consist of “bringing the price level back up to a level even higher than would have prevailed had the disturbance never occurred” (Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford 2003, 207). Bernanke (2003JPY) explains as follows:
“Failure by the central bank to meet its target in a given period leads to expectations of (and public demands for) increased effort in subsequent periods—greater quantities of assets purchased on the open market for example. So even if the central bank is reluctant to provide a time frame for meetings its objective, the structure of the price-level objective provides a means for the bank to commit to increasing its anti-deflationary efforts when its earlier efforts prove unsuccessful. As Eggertsson and Woodford show, the expectations that an increasing price level gap will give rise to intensified effort by the central bank should lead the public to believe that ultimately inflation will replace deflation, a belief that supports the central bank’s own objectives by lowering the current real rate of interest”
Second, the Fed could use its balance sheet to increase purchases of long-term securities together with credible commitment to maintain the policy until the dual mandates of maximum employment and price stability are attained.
In the restatement of the liquidity trap and large-scale policies of monetary/fiscal stimulus, Krugman (1998, 162) finds:
“In the traditional open economy IS-LM model developed by Robert Mundell [1963] and Marcus Fleming [1962], and also in large-scale econometric models, monetary expansion unambiguously leads to currency depreciation. But there are two offsetting effects on the current account balance. On one side, the currency depreciation tends to increase net exports; on the other side, the expansion of the domestic economy tends to increase imports. For what it is worth, policy experiments on such models seem to suggest that these effects very nearly cancel each other out.
Krugman (1998) uses a different dynamic model with expectations that leads to similar conclusions.
The central bank could also be pursuing competitive devaluation of the national currency in the belief that it could increase inflation to a higher level and promote domestic growth and employment at the expense of growth and unemployment in the rest of the world. An essay by Chairman Bernanke in 1999 on Japanese monetary policy received attention in the press, stating that (Bernanke 2000, 165):
“Roosevelt’s specific policy actions were, I think, less important than his willingness to be aggressive and experiment—in short, to do whatever it took to get the country moving again. Many of his policies did not work as intended, but in the end FDR deserves great credit for having the courage to abandon failed paradigms and to do what needed to be done”
Quantitative easing has never been proposed by Chairman Bernanke or other economists as certain science without adverse effects. What has not been mentioned in the press is another suggestion to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) by Chairman Bernanke in the same essay that is very relevant to current events and the contentious issue of ongoing devaluation wars (Bernanke 2000, 161):
“Because the BOJ has a legal mandate to pursue price stability, it certainly could make a good argument that, with interest rates at zero, depreciation of the yen is the best available tool for achieving its mandated objective. The economic validity of the beggar-thy-neighbor thesis is doubtful, as depreciation creates trade—by raising home country income—as well as diverting it. Perhaps not all those who cite the beggar-thy-neighbor thesis are aware that it had its origins in the Great Depression, when it was used as an argument against the very devaluations that ultimately proved crucial to world economic recovery. A yen trading at 100 to the dollar is in no one’s interest”
Chairman Bernanke is referring to the argument by Joan Robinson based on the experience of the Great Depression that: “in times of general unemployment a game of beggar-my-neighbour is played between the nations, each one endeavouring to throw a larger share of the burden upon the others” (Robinson 1947, 156). Devaluation is one of the tools used in these policies (Robinson 1947, 157). Banking crises dominated the experience of the United States, but countries that recovered were those devaluing early such that competitive devaluations rescued many countries from a recession as strong as that in the US (see references to Ehsan Choudhri, Levis Kochin and Barry Eichengreen in Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 205-9; for the case of Brazil that devalued early in the Great Depression recovering with an increasing trade balance see Pelaez, 1968, 1968b, 1972; Brazil devalued and abandoned the gold standard during crises in the historical period as shown by Pelaez 1976, Pelaez and Suzigan 1981). Beggar-my-neighbor policies did work for individual countries but the criticism of Joan Robinson was that it was not optimal for the world as a whole.
Is depreciation of the dollar the best available tool currently for achieving the dual mandate of higher inflation and lower unemployment? Bernanke (2002) finds dollar devaluation against gold to have been important in preventing further deflation in the 1930s (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm):
“Although a policy of intervening to affect the exchange value of the dollar is nowhere on the horizon today, it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934.17 The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.”
Should the US devalue following Roosevelt? Or has monetary policy intended devaluation? Fed policy is seeking, deliberately or as a side effect, what Irving Fisher proposed “that great depressions are curable and preventable through reflation and stabilization” (Fisher, 1933, 350). The Fed has created not only high volatility of assets but also what many countries are regarding as a competitive devaluation similar to those criticized by Nurkse (1944). Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment.
Friedman (1969) finds that the optimal rule for the quantity of money is deflation at a rate that results in a zero nominal interest rate (see Ireland 2003 and Cole and Kocherlakota 1998). Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) argue that central bankers are not inclined to implement policies that could result in deflation because of the interpretation of the Great Depression as closely related to deflation. They use panel data on inflation and growth of real output for 17 countries over more than 100 years. The time-series data for each individual country are broken into five-year events with deflation measured as average negative inflation and depression as average negative growth rate of real output. Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) find that the Great Depression from 1929 to 1934 is the only case of association between deflation and depression without any evidence whatsoever of such relation in any other period. Their conclusion is (Atkeson and Kehoe 2004, 99): “Our finding thus suggests that policymakers’ fear of anticipated policy-induced deflation that would result from following, say, the Friedman rule is greatly overblown.” Their conclusion on the experience of Japan is (Atkeson and Kehoe 2004, 99):
“Since 1960, Japan’s average growth rates have basically fallen monotonically, and since 1970, its average inflation rates have too. Attributing this 40-year slowdown to monetary forces is a stretch. More reasonable, we think, is that much of the slowdown is the natural pattern for a country that was far behind the world leaders and had begun to catch up.”
In the sample of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), there are only eight five-year periods besides the Great Depression with both inflation and depression. Deflation and depression is shown in 65 cases with 21 of depression without deflation. There is no depression in 65 of 73 five-year periods and there is no deflation in 29 episodes of depression. There is a remarkable result of no depression in 90 percent of deflation episodes. Excluding the Great Depression, there is virtually no relation of deflation and depression. Atkeson and Kehoe (2004, 102) find that the average growth rate of Japan of 1.41 percent in the 1990s is “dismal” when compared with 3.20 percent in the United States but is not “dismal” when compared with 1.61 percent for Italy and 1.84 percent for France, which are also catch-up countries in modern economic growth (see Atkeson and Kehoe 1998). The conclusion of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), without use of controls, is that there is no association of deflation and depression in their dataset.
Benhabib and Spiegel (2009) use a dataset similar to that of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) but allowing for nonlinearity and inflation volatility. They conclude that in cases of low and negative inflation an increase of average inflation of 1 percent is associated with an increase of 0.31 percent of average annual growth. The analysis of Benhabib and Spiegel (2009) leads to the significantly different conclusion that inflation and economic performance are strongly associated for low and negative inflation. There is no claim of causality by Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2009).
Delfim Netto (1959) partly reprinted in Pelaez (1973) conducted two classical nonparametric tests (Mann 1945, Wallis and Moore 1941; see Kendall and Stuart 1968) with coffee-price data in the period of free markets from 1857 to 1906 with the following conclusions (Pelaez, 1976a, 280):
“First, the null hypothesis of no trend was accepted with high confidence; secondly, the null hypothesis of no oscillation was rejected also with high confidence. Consequently, in the nineteenth century international prices of coffee fluctuated but without long-run trend. This statistical fact refutes the extreme argument of structural weakness of the coffee trade.”
In his classic work on the theory of international trade, Jacob Viner (1937, 563) analyzed the “index of total gains from trade,” or “amount of gain per unit of trade,” denoted as T:
T= (∆Pe/∆Pi)∆Q
Where ∆Pe is the change in export prices, ∆Pi is the change in import prices and ∆Q is the change in export volume. Dorrance (1948, 52) restates “Viner’s index of total gain from trade” as:
“What should be done is to calculate an index of the value (quantity multiplied by price) of exports and the price of imports for any country whose foreign accounts are to be analysed. Then the export value index should be divided by the import price index. The result would be an index which would reflect, for the country concerned, changes in the volume of imports obtainable from its export income (i.e. changes in its "real" export income, measured in import terms). The present writer would suggest that this index be referred to as the ‘income terms of trade’ index to differentiate it from the other indexes at present used by economists.”
What really matters for an export activity especially during modernization is the purchasing value of goods that it exports in terms of prices of imports. For a primary producing country, the purchasing power of exports in acquiring new technology from the country providing imports is the critical measurement. The barter terms of trade of Brazil improved from 1857 to 1906 because international coffee prices oscillated without trend (Delfim Netto 1959) while import prices from the United Kingdom declined at the rate of 0.5 percent per year (Imlah 1958). The accurate measurement of the opportunity afforded by the coffee exporting economy was incomparably greater when considering the purchasing power in British prices of the value of coffee exports, or Dorrance’s (1948) income terms of trade.
The conventional theory that the terms of trade of Brazil deteriorated over the long term is without reality (Pelaez 1976a, 280-281):
“Moreover, physical exports of coffee by Brazil increased at the high average rate of 3.5 per cent per year. Brazil's exchange receipts from coffee-exporting in sterling increased at the average rate of 3.5 per cent per year and receipts in domestic currency at 4.5 per cent per year. Great Britain supplied nearly all the imports of the coffee economy. In the period of the free coffee market, British export prices declined at the rate of 0.5 per cent per year. Thus, the income terms of trade of the coffee economy improved at the relatively satisfactory average rate of 4.0 per cent per year. This is only a lower bound of the rate of improvement of the terms of trade. While the quality of coffee remained relatively constant, the quality of manufactured products improved significantly during the fifty-year period considered. The trade data and the non-parametric tests refute conclusively the long-run hypothesis. The valid historical fact is that the tropical export economy of Brazil experienced an opportunity of absorbing rapidly increasing quantities of manufactures from the "workshop" countries. Therefore, the coffee trade constituted a golden opportunity for modernization in nineteenth-century Brazil.”
Imlah (1958) provides decline of British export prices at 0.5 percent in the nineteenth century and there were no lost decades, depressions or unconventional monetary policies in the highly dynamic economy of England that drove the world’s growth impulse. Inflation in the United Kingdom between 1857 and 1906 is measured by the composite price index of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) at minus 7.0 percent or average rate of decline of 0.2 percent per year.
Simon Kuznets (1971) analyzes modern economic growth in his Lecture in Memory of Alfred Nobel:
“The major breakthroughs in the advance of human knowledge, those that constituted dominant sources of sustained growth over long periods and spread to a substantial part of the world, may be termed epochal innovations. And the changing course of economic history can perhaps be subdivided into economic epochs, each identified by the epochal innovation with the distinctive characteristics of growth that it generated. Without considering the feasibility of identifying and dating such economic epochs, we may proceed on the working assumption that modern economic growth represents such a distinct epoch - growth dating back to the late eighteenth century and limited (except in significant partial effects) to economically developed countries. These countries, so classified because they have managed to take adequate advantage of the potential of modern technology, include most of Europe, the overseas offshoots of Western Europe, and Japan—barely one quarter of world population.”
Cameron (1961) analyzes the mechanism by which the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain spread throughout Europe and Cameron (1967) analyzes the financing by banks of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) provide consumer price inflation in England since 1750 and MacFarlane and Mortimer-Lee (1994) analyze inflation in England over 300 years. Lucas (2004) estimates world population and production since the year 1000 with sustained growth of per capita incomes beginning to accelerate for the first time in English-speaking countries and in particular in the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. The conventional theory is unequal distribution of the gains from trade and technical progress between the industrialized countries and developing economies (Singer 1950, 478):
“Dismissing, then, changes in productivity as a governing factor in changing terms of trade, the following explanation presents itself: the fruits of technical progress may be distributed either to producers (in the form of rising incomes) or to consumers (in the form of lower prices). In the case of manufactured commodities produced in more developed countries, the former method, i.e., distribution to producers through higher incomes, was much more important relatively to the second method, while the second method prevailed more in the case of food and raw material production in the underdeveloped countries. Generalizing, we may say -that technical progress in manufacturing industries showed in a rise in incomes while technical progress in the production of food and raw materials in underdeveloped countries showed in a fall in prices”
Temin (1997, 79) uses a Ricardian trade model to discriminate between two views on the Industrial Revolution with an older view arguing broad-based increases in productivity and a new view concentration of productivity gains in cotton manufactures and iron:
“Productivity advances in British manufacturing should have lowered their prices relative to imports. They did. Albert Imlah [1958] correctly recognized this ‘severe deterioration’ in the net barter terms of trade as a signal of British success, not distress. It is no surprise that the price of cotton manufactures fell rapidly in response to productivity growth. But even the price of woolen manufactures, which were declining as a share of British exports, fell almost as rapidly as the price of exports as a whole. It follows, therefore, that the traditional ‘old-hat’ view of the Industrial Revolution is more accurate than the new, restricted image. Other British manufactures were not inefficient and stagnant, or at least, they were not all so backward. The spirit that motivated cotton manufactures extended also to activities as varied as hardware and haberdashery, arms, and apparel.”
Phyllis Deane (1968, 96) estimates growth of United Kingdom gross national product (GNP) at around 2 percent per year for several decades in the nineteenth century. The facts that the terms of trade of Great Britain deteriorated during the period of epochal innovation and high rates of economic growth while the income terms of trade of the coffee economy of nineteenth-century Brazil improved at the average yearly rate of 4.0 percent from 1857 to 1906 disprove the hypothesis of weakness of trade as an explanation of relatively lower income and wealth. As Temin (1997) concludes, Britain did pass on lower prices and higher quality the benefits of technical innovation. Explanation of late modernization must focus on laborious historical research on institutions and economic regimes together with economic theory, data gathering and measurement instead of grand generalizations of weakness of trade and alleged neocolonial dependence (Stein and Stein 1970, 134-5):
“Great Britain, technologically and industrially advanced, became as important to the Latin American economy as to the cotton-exporting southern United States. [After Independence in the nineteenth century] Latin America fell back upon traditional export activities, utilizing the cheapest available factor of production, the land, and the dependent labor force.”
The experience of the United Kingdom with deflation and economic growth is relevant and rich. Table ESIII-1 uses yearly percentage changes of the composite index of prices of the United Kingdom of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004). There are 73 declines of inflation in the 145 years from 1751 to 1896. Prices declined in 50.3 percent of 145 years. Some price declines were quite sharp and many occurred over several years. Table ESIII-1 also provides yearly percentage changes of the UK composite price index of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) from 1929 to 1934. Deflation was much sharper in continuous years in earlier periods than during the Great Depression. The United Kingdom could not have led the world in modern economic growth if there were meaningful causality from deflation to depression.
Table ESIII-1, United Kingdom, Negative Percentage Changes of Composite Price Index, 1751-1896, 1929-1934, Yearly ∆%
Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% |
1751 | -2.7 | 1797 | -10.0 | 1834 | -7.8 | 1877 | -0.7 |
1753 | -2.7 | 1798 | -2.2 | 1841 | -2.3 | 1878 | -2.2 |
1755 | -6.0 | 1802 | -23.0 | 1842 | -7.6 | 1879 | -4.4 |
1758 | -0.3 | 1803 | -5.9 | 1843 | -11.3 | 1881 | -1.1 |
1759 | -7.9 | 1806 | -4.4 | 1844 | -0.1 | 1883 | -0.5 |
1760 | -4.5 | 1807 | -1.9 | 1848 | -12.1 | 1884 | -2.7 |
1761 | -4.5 | 1811 | -2.9 | 1849 | -6.3 | 1885 | -3.0 |
1768 | -1.1 | 1814 | -12.7 | 1850 | -6.4 | 1886 | -1.6 |
1769 | -8.2 | 1815 | -10.7 | 1851 | -3.0 | 1887 | -0.5 |
1770 | -0.4 | 1816 | -8.4 | 1857 | -5.6 | 1893 | -0.7 |
1773 | -0.3 | 1819 | -2.5 | 1858 | -8.4 | 1894 | -2.0 |
1775 | -5.6 | 1820 | -9.3 | 1859 | -1.8 | 1895 | -1.0 |
1776 | -2.2 | 1821 | -12.0 | 1862 | -2.6 | 1896 | -0.3 |
1777 | -0.4 | 1822 | -13.5 | 1863 | -3.6 | 1929 | -0.9 |
1779 | -8.5 | 1826 | -5.5 | 1864 | -0.9 | 1930 | -2.8 |
1780 | -3.4 | 1827 | -6.5 | 1868 | -1.7 | 1931 | -4.3 |
1785 | -4.0 | 1828 | -2.9 | 1869 | -5.0 | 1932 | -2.6 |
1787 | -0.6 | 1830 | -6.1 | 1874 | -3.3 | 1933 | -2.1 |
1789 | -1.3 | 1832 | -7.4 | 1875 | -1.9 | 1934 | 0.0 |
1791 | -0.1 | 1833 | -6.1 | 1876 | -0.3 |
Source:
O’Donoghue, Jim and Louise Goulding, 2004. Consumer Price Inflation since 1750. UK Office for National Statistics Economic Trends 604, Mar 2004, 38-46.
Lucas (2011May) estimates US economic growth in the long-term at 3 percent per year and about 2 percent per year in per capita terms. There are displacements from this trend caused by events such as wars and recessions but the economy then returns to trend. Historical US GDP data exhibit remarkable growth: Lucas (2011May) estimates an increase of US real income per person by a factor of 12 in the period from 1870 to 2010. The explanation by Lucas (2011May) of this remarkable growth experience is that government provided stability and education while elements of “free-market capitalism” were an important driver of long-term growth and prosperity. The analysis is sharpened by comparison with the long-term growth experience of G7 countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan) and Spain from 1870 to 2010. Countries benefitted from “common civilization” and “technology” to “catch up” with the early growth leaders of the US and UK, eventually growing at a faster rate. Significant part of this catch up occurred after World War II. If deflation causes depressions as embedded in the theory of unconventional monetary policy, the United Kingdom would not have been a growth leader in the nineteenth century while staying almost half of the time in deflation.
Chart ESIII-1 provides the consumer price index NSA from 1913 to 2013. The dominating characteristic is the increase in slope during the Great Inflation from the middle of the 1960s through the 1970s. There is long-term inflation in the US and no evidence of deflation risks.
Chart ESIII-1, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 1914-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart ESIII-2 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 1914 to 2013. The only episode of deflation after 1950 is in 2009, which is explained by the reversal of speculative commodity futures carry trades that were induced by interest rates driven to zero in a shock of monetary policy in 2008. The only persistent case of deflation is from 1930 to 1933, which has little if any relevance to the contemporary United States economy. There are actually three waves of inflation in the second half of the 1960s, in the mid 1970s and again in the late 1970s. Inflation rates then stabilized in a range with only two episodes above 5 percent.
Chart ESIII-2, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, 12- Month Percentage Change 1914-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Table ESIII-2 provides annual percentage changes of United States consumer price inflation from 1914 to 2013. There have been only cases of annual declines of the CPI after wars: (1) World War I minus 10.5 percent in 1921 and minus 6.1 percent in 1922 following cumulative increases of 83.5 percent in four years from 1917 to 1920 at the average of 16.4 percent per year; (2) World War II: minus 1.2 percent in 1949 following cumulative 33.9 percent in three years from 1946 to 1948 at average 10.2 percent per year (3) minus 0.4 percent in 1955 two years after the end of the Korean War; and (4) minus 0.4 percent in 2009. The decline of 0.4 percent in 2009 followed increase of 3.8 percent in 2008 and is explained by the reversal of speculative carry trades into commodity futures that were created in 2008 as monetary policy rates were driven to zero. The reversal occurred after misleading statement on toxic assets in banks in the proposal for TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There were declines of 1.7 percent in both 1927 and 1928 during the episode of revival of rules of the gold standard. The only persistent deflationary period since 1914 was during the Great Depression in the years from 1930 to 1933 and again in 1938-1939. Fear of deflation on the basis of that experience does not justify unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates that has failed to stop deflation in Japan. Financial repression causes far more adverse effects on allocation of resources by distorting the calculus of risk/returns than alleged employment-creating effects or there would not be current recovery without jobs and hiring after zero interest rates since Dec 2008 and intended now forever in a self-imposed forecast growth and employment mandate of monetary policy.
Table ESIII-2, US, Annual CPI Inflation ∆% 1914-2012
1914 | 1.0 |
1915 | 1.0 |
1916 | 7.9 |
1917 | 17.4 |
1918 | 18.0 |
1919 | 14.6 |
1920 | 15.6 |
1921 | -10.5 |
1922 | -6.1 |
1923 | 1.8 |
1924 | 0.0 |
1925 | 2.3 |
1926 | 1.1 |
1927 | -1.7 |
1928 | -1.7 |
1929 | 0.0 |
1930 | -2.3 |
1931 | -9.0 |
1932 | -9.9 |
1933 | -5.1 |
1934 | 3.1 |
1935 | 2.2 |
1936 | 1.5 |
1937 | 3.6 |
1938 | -2.1 |
1939 | -1.4 |
1940 | 0.7 |
1941 | 5.0 |
1942 | 10.9 |
1943 | 6.1 |
1944 | 1.7 |
1945 | 2.3 |
1946 | 8.3 |
1947 | 14.4 |
1948 | 8.1 |
1949 | -1.2 |
1950 | 1.3 |
1951 | 7.9 |
1952 | 1.9 |
1953 | 0.8 |
1954 | 0.7 |
1955 | -0.4 |
1956 | 1.5 |
1957 | 3.3 |
1958 | 2.8 |
1959 | 0.7 |
1960 | 1.7 |
1961 | 1.0 |
1962 | 1.0 |
1963 | 1.3 |
1964 | 1.3 |
1965 | 1.6 |
1966 | 2.9 |
1967 | 3.1 |
1968 | 4.2 |
1969 | 5.5 |
1970 | 5.7 |
1971 | 4.4 |
1972 | 3.2 |
1973 | 6.2 |
1974 | 11.0 |
1975 | 9.1 |
1976 | 5.8 |
1977 | 6.5 |
1978 | 7.6 |
1979 | 11.3 |
1980 | 13.5 |
1981 | 10.3 |
1982 | 6.2 |
1983 | 3.2 |
1984 | 4.3 |
1985 | 3.6 |
1986 | 1.9 |
1987 | 3.6 |
1988 | 4.1 |
1989 | 4.8 |
1990 | 5.4 |
1991 | 4.2 |
1992 | 3.0 |
1993 | 3.0 |
1994 | 2.6 |
1995 | 2.8 |
1996 | 3.0 |
1997 | 2.3 |
1998 | 1.6 |
1999 | 2.2 |
2000 | 3.4 |
2001 | 2.8 |
2002 | 1.6 |
2003 | 2.3 |
2004 | 2.7 |
2005 | 3.4 |
2006 | 3.2 |
2007 | 2.8 |
2008 | 3.8 |
2009 | -0.4 |
2010 | 1.6 |
2011 | 3.2 |
2012 | 2.1 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
The producer price index of the US from 1947 to 2013 in Chart ESIII-3 shows various periods of more rapid or less rapid inflation but no bumps. The major event is the decline in 2008 when risk aversion because of the global recession caused the collapse of oil prices from $148/barrel to less than $80/barrel with most other commodity prices also collapsing. The event had nothing in common with explanations of deflation but rather with the concentration of risk exposures in commodities after the decline of stock market indexes. Eventually, there was a flight to government securities because of the fears of insolvency of banks caused by statements supporting proposals for withdrawal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as explained by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). The bump in 2008 with decline in 2009 is consistent with the view that zero interest rates with subdued risk aversion induce carry trades into commodity futures.
Chart ESIII-3, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, NSA, 1947-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart ESIII-4 provides 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index from 1948 to 2013. The distinguishing event in Chart I-7 is the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The shape of the two-hump Bactrian camel of the 1970s resembles the double hump from 2007 to 2013.
Chart ESIII-4, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1948-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Annual percentage changes of the producer price index from 1948 to 2012 are shown in Table ESIII-3. The producer price index fell 2.8 percent in 1949 following the adjustment to World War II and fell 0.6 percent in 1952 and 1.0 percent in 1953 around the Korean War. There are two other mild decline of 0.3 percent in 1959 and 0.3 percent in 1963. There are only few subsequent and isolated declines of the producer price index of 1.4 percent in 1986, 0.8 percent in 1998, 1.3 percent in 2002 and 2.6 percent in 2009. The decline of 2009 was caused by unwinding of carry trades in 2008 that had lifted oil prices to $140/barrel during deep global recession because of the panic of probable toxic assets in banks that would be removed with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There is no evidence in this history of 65 years of the US producer price index suggesting that there is frequent and persistent deflation shock requiring aggressive unconventional monetary policy. The design of such anti-deflation policy could provoke price and financial instability because of lags in effect of monetary policy, model errors, inaccurate forecasts and misleading analysis of current economic conditions.
Table ESIII-3, US, Annual PPI Inflation ∆% 1948-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
1948 | 8.0 |
1949 | -2.8 |
1950 | 1.8 |
1951 | 9.2 |
1952 | -0.6 |
1953 | -1.0 |
1954 | 0.3 |
1955 | 0.3 |
1956 | 2.6 |
1957 | 3.8 |
1958 | 2.2 |
1959 | -0.3 |
1960 | 0.9 |
1961 | 0.0 |
1962 | 0.3 |
1963 | -0.3 |
1964 | 0.3 |
1965 | 1.8 |
1966 | 3.2 |
1967 | 1.1 |
1968 | 2.8 |
1969 | 3.8 |
1970 | 3.4 |
1971 | 3.1 |
1972 | 3.2 |
1973 | 9.1 |
1974 | 15.4 |
1975 | 10.6 |
1976 | 4.5 |
1977 | 6.4 |
1978 | 7.9 |
1979 | 11.2 |
1980 | 13.4 |
1981 | 9.2 |
1982 | 4.1 |
1983 | 1.6 |
1984 | 2.1 |
1985 | 1.0 |
1986 | -1.4 |
1987 | 2.1 |
1988 | 2.5 |
1989 | 5.2 |
1990 | 4.9 |
1991 | 2.1 |
1992 | 1.2 |
1993 | 1.2 |
1994 | 0.6 |
1995 | 1.9 |
1996 | 2.7 |
1997 | 0.4 |
1998 | -0.8 |
1999 | 1.8 |
2000 | 3.8 |
2001 | 2.0 |
2002 | -1.3 |
2003 | 3.2 |
2004 | 3.6 |
2005 | 4.8 |
2006 | 3.0 |
2007 | 3.9 |
2008 | 6.3 |
2009 | -2.6 |
2010 | 4.2 |
2011 | 6.0 |
2012 | 1.9 |
Deflation would also be in evidence in long-term series of prices in the form of bumps. The GDP implicit deflator series in Chart ESII-5 from 1929 to 2012 shows sharp dynamic behavior over time. There is decline of the implicit price deflator of GDP by 25.8 percent from 1929 to 1933 (data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). In contrast, the implicit price deflator of GDP of the US increased from 106.227 (2005 =100) in 2007 to 109.529 in 2009 or by 3.1 percent and to 115.360 in 2012 or by 5.3 percent relative to 2009 and 8.6 percent relative to 2007. The implicit price deflator of US GDP increased in every quarter from IVQ2007 to IVQ2012 with only a decline from 109.539 in IQ2009 to 109.325 in IIQ2009 or by 0.2 percent (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Wars are characterized by rapidly rising prices followed by declines when peace is restored. The US economy is not plagued by deflation but by long-run inflation.
Chart ESII-5, US, GDP Implicit Price Deflator 1929-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart ESII-6 provides percent change from preceding quarter in prices of GDP at seasonally-adjusted annual rates (SAAR) from 1980 to 2012. There is one case of negative change by 0.8 percent in IIQ2009 that was adjustment from 3.1 percent in IIIQ2008 and 2.5 percent in both IQ2008 and IIQ2008 caused by carry trades from policy interest rates being moved to zero into commodity futures reversed by the fear of toxic assets in banks in the proposal of TARP in late 2008 (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There has not been actual deflation or risk of deflation threatening depression in the US that would justify unconventional monetary policy.
Chart ESII-6, Percent Change from Preceding Period in Prices for GDP Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1980-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart ESII-7 provides percent change from preceding year in prices of GDP from 1929 to 2012. There are four consecutive years of declines of prices of GDP during the Great Depression: 3.9 percent in 1930, 9.9 percent in 1931, 11.4 percent in 1932 and 2.6 percent in 1933. There were two consecutive declines of 1.9 percent in 1938 and 1.3 percent in 1939. Prices of GDP were unchanged in 1949 after increasing 11.5 percent in 1946, 11.1 percent in 1947 and 5.7 percent in 1948, which is similar to experience with wars in other countries. There are no other negative changes of annual prices of GDP in 72 years from 1939 to 2012.
Chart ESII-7, Percent Change from Preceding Year in Prices for Gross Domestic Product 1930-2012
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Nicholas Georgescu-Rogen (1960, 1) reprinted in Pelaez (1973) argues that “the agrarian economy has to this day remained a reality without theory.” The economic history of Latin America shares with the relation of deflation and unconventional monetary policy a more frustrating intellectual misfortune: theory without reality. MacFarlane and Mortimer-Lee (1994, 159) quote in a different context a phrase by Thomas Henry Huxley in the President’s Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science on Sep 14, 1870 that is appropriate to these issues: “The great tragedy of science—the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.”
I World Inflation Waves. This section provides analysis and data on world inflation waves. IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy provides more technical analysis. Section IB United States Inflation analyzes inflation in the United States in two subsections: IC Long-term US Inflation and ID Current US Inflation. There is similar lack of reality in economic history as in monetary policy based on fear of deflation as analyzed in Subsection IIA4 Theory and Reality of Economic History and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation
The critical fact of current world financial markets is the combination of “unconventional” monetary policy with intermittent shocks of financial risk aversion. There are two interrelated unconventional monetary policies. First, unconventional monetary policy consists of (1) reducing short-term policy interest rates toward the “zero bound” such as fixing the fed funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent by decision of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since Dec 16, 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm). Second, unconventional monetary policy also includes a battery of measures to also reduce long-term interest rates of government securities and asset-backed securities such as mortgage-backed securities.
When inflation is low, the central bank lowers interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand in the economy, which consists of consumption and investment. When inflation is subdued and unemployment high, monetary policy would lower interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand, reducing unemployment. When interest rates decline to zero, unconventional monetary policy would consist of policies such as large-scale purchases of long-term securities to lower their yields. A major portion of credit in the economy is financed with long-term asset-backed securities. Loans for purchasing houses, automobiles and other consumer products are bundled in securities that in turn are sold to investors. Corporations borrow funds for investment by issuing corporate bonds. Loans to small businesses are also financed by bundling them in long-term bonds. Securities markets bridge the needs of higher returns by savers obtaining funds from investors that are channeled to consumers and business for consumption and investment. Lowering the yields of these long-term bonds could lower costs of financing purchases of consumer durables and investment by business. The essential mechanism of transmission from lower interest rates to increases in aggregate demand is portfolio rebalancing. Withdrawal of bonds in a specific maturity segment or directly in a bond category such as currently mortgage-backed securities causes reductions in yield that are equivalent to increases in the prices of the bonds. There can be secondary increases in purchases of those bonds in private portfolios in pursuit of their increasing prices. Lower yields translate into lower costs of buying homes and consumer durables such as automobiles and also lower costs of investment for business. There are two additional intended routes of transmission.
3. Unconventional monetary policy or its expectation can increase stock market valuations (Bernanke 2010WP). Increases in equities traded in stock markets can augment perceptions of the wealth of consumers inducing increases in consumption.
4. Unconventional monetary policy causes devaluation of the dollar relative to other currencies, which can cause increases in net exports of the US that increase aggregate economic activity (Yellen 2011AS).
Monetary policy can lower short-term interest rates quite effectively. Lowering long-term yields is somewhat more difficult. The critical issue is that monetary policy cannot ensure that increasing credit at low interest cost increases consumption and investment. There is a large variety of possible allocation of funds at low interest rates from consumption and investment to multiple risk financial assets. Monetary policy does not control how investors will allocate asset categories. A critical financial practice is to borrow at low short-term interest rates to invest in high-risk, leveraged financial assets. Investors may increase in their portfolios asset categories such as equities, emerging market equities, high-yield bonds, currencies, commodity futures and options and multiple other risk financial assets including structured products. If there is risk appetite, the carry trade from zero interest rates to risk financial assets will consist of short positions at short-term interest rates (or borrowing) and short dollar assets with simultaneous long positions in high-risk, leveraged financial assets such as equities, commodities and high-yield bonds. Low interest rates may induce increases in valuations of risk financial assets that may fluctuate in accordance with perceptions of risk aversion by investors and the public. During periods of muted risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets cause temporary waves of inflation that may foster instead of preventing financial instability. During periods of risk aversion such as fears of disruption of world financial markets and the global economy resulting from collapse of the European Monetary Union, carry trades are unwound with sharp deterioration of valuations of risk financial assets. More technical discussion is in IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy.
Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now open ended in perpetuity, or QE→∞, as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):
“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”
Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):
“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.
Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.
The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”
Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:
“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”
The actual objective is attempting to bring the unemployment rate to 5.2 percent but because of the lag in effect of monetary policy impulses on income and prices policy uses “projections” such that the target of monetary policy is a forecast of unemployment and inflation. Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at 1.7 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent on average during cyclical expansions in the postwar period while growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 13 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not provided the impulse for growth and were not required in past successful cyclical expansions.
First, Data and calculations show it would take decades to bring the labor market to normal levels at the current rate of job creation. The number of 166,000 new private new jobs created in Jan 2013 is nearly identical to the average 165,900 per month in Mar-Dec 2012 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The US labor force stood at 154.088 million in Oct 2011 and at 155.779 million in Oct 2012, not seasonally adjusted, for increase of 1.691 million, or 140,917 per month. The US labor force stood at 153.683 million in Nov 2011 and 154.953 million in Nov 2012, not seasonally adjusted, for increase of 1.270 million or 105,833 per month. The US labor force stood at 153.373 million in Dec 2011 and 154.904 million in Dec 2012, not seasonally adjusted, for increase of 1.531 million or 127,583 per month. The US labor force stood at 153.485 million in Jan 2012 and 154.794 million in Jan 2013 for increase of 1.309 million or 109,000 per month. The labor force increased from 153.617 million in 2011 to 154.975 million in 2012 by 1.358 million or 113,167 per month. The average increase of 165,900 new nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Mar to Dec 2012 or 166,000 created in Jan 2013 is insufficient even to absorb 113,167 new entrants per month into the labor force. The difference between the average increase of 165,900 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Mar to Dec 2012 and the 113,167 average monthly increase in the labor force from 2011 to 2012 is 52,733 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 31.4 million in job stress in the US currently. The provision of 52,733 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 595 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (31.4 million divided by 52,733) or 49.6 years (595 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Jan 2013 not seasonally adjusted stood at 154.794 million with 13.181 million unemployed or effectively 20.354 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 1.6 years (1 million divided by product of 52,733 by 12, which is 632,796). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.740 million (0.05 times labor force of 154.794 million) for new net job creation of 5.441 million (13.181 million unemployed minus 7.740 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 8.6 years (5.441 million divided by 632,796). Under the calculation in this blog there are 20.354 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 12.614 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 19.9 years (12.614 million minus 0.05(161.967 million) divided by 632,796, using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in the US fell from 146.743 million in Oct 2007 to 141.614 million in Jan 2013, by 5.129 million, or 3.5 percent, while the noninstitutional population increased from 232.715 million in Oct 2007 to 244.663 million in Jan 2013, by 11.948 million or increase of 5.1 percent, using not seasonally adjusted data. There is actually not sufficient job creation to merely absorb new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
Second, calculations show that actual growth is around 1.7 to 1.9 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Growth is not only mediocre but sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 31.4 million people corresponding to 19.4 percent of the effective labor force of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). In the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012, US real GDP grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (IQ2011), 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, revised 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012 and -0.1 percent in IVQ2012. GDP growth in IIIQ2012 was revised from 2.7 percent seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) to 3.1 percent but mostly because of contribution of 0.73 percentage points of inventory accumulation and one-time contribution of 0.64 percentage points of expenditures in national defense that without them would have reduced growth from 3.1 percent to 1.73 percent. Equally, GDP growth in IVQ2012 is measured in the advanced estimate as minus 0.1 percent but mostly because of deduction of divestment of inventories of 1.27 percentage points and deduction of one-time national defense expenditures of 1.28 percentage points. The annual equivalent rate of growth of GDP for the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 is 2.0 percent, obtained as follows. Discounting 0.1 percent to one quarter is 0.025 percent {[(1.001)1/4 -1]100 = 0.025}; discounting 2.5 percent to one quarter is 0.62 percent {[(1.025)1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 4.1 percent to one quarter is 1.0 {[(1.04)1/4 -1]100; discounting 2.0 percent to one quarter is 0.50 percent {[(1.020)1/4 -1]100); discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)1/4 -1]100}; discounting 3.1 percent to one quarter is 0.77 {[(1.031)1/4 -1]100); and discounting -0.1 percent to one quarter is -0.025 percent {[(0.999)1/4 – 1]100}. Real GDP growth in the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 accumulated to 3.6 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 0.9997) - 1]100 = 3.6%}. This is equivalent to growth from IQ2011 to IVQ2012 obtained by dividing the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of IVQ2012 of $13,647.6 billion by the SAAR of IVQ2010 of $13,181.2 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 and Table II-6 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html) and expressing as percentage {[($13,647.6/$13,181.2) - 1]100 = 3.5%} with a minor rounding discrepancy. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 is 1.8 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 0.9997)4/8 -1]100 = 1.8%], or {[($13,647.6/$13,181.2)]4/8-1]100 = 1.8%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table II-6 below, obtaining the average for eight quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. Growth in the four quarters of 2012 accumulates to 1.57 percent {[(1.02)1/4(1.013)1/4(1.031)1/4(0.999)1/4 -1]100 = 1.57%}. This is equivalent to dividing the SAAR of $13,647.6 billion for IVQ2012 in Table II-6 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html) by the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 except for a rounding discrepancy to obtain 1.54 percent {[($13,647.6/$13,441.0) – 1]100 = 1.54%}. The US economy is still close to a standstill especially considering the GDP report in detail. Excluding growth at the SAAR of 2.5 percent in IIQ2011 and 4.1 percent in IVQ2011 while converting growth in IIIQ2012 to 1.3 percent by deducting from 3.1 percent one-time inventory accumulation of 0.73 percentage points and national defense expenditures of 0.64 percentage points and converting growth in IVQ2012 by adding 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions to obtain 2.54 percent, the US economy grew at 1.7 percent in the remaining six quarters {[(1.00025x1.0032x1.005x1.0032x1.0077x0.0063)4/6 – 1]100 = 1.7%} with declining growth trend in three consecutive quarters from 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, to 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012 that is more like 1.73 percent without inventory accumulation and national defense expenditures and -0.1 percent in IVQ2012 that is more likely 2.54 percent by adding 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditures. Weakness of growth is more clearly shown by adjusting the exceptional one-time contributions to growth from items that are not aggregate demand: 2.53 percentage points contributed by inventory change to growth of 4.1 percent in IVQ2011; 0.64 percentage points contributed by expenditures in national defense together with 0.73 points of inventory accumulation to growth of 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012; and deduction of 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce released on Wed Jan 30, 2012, the first or advanced estimate of GDP for IVQ2012 at minus 0.1 percent seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp4q12_adv.pdf). In the four quarters of 2012, the US economy is growing at the annual equivalent rate of 1.9 percent {([(1.021/4(1.013)1/4(1.0173)1/4(1.0254)1/4]-1)100 = 1.89%} by excluding inventory accumulation of 0.73 percentage points and exceptional defense expenditures of 0.64 percentage points from growth 3.1 percent at SAAR in IIIQ2012 to obtain adjusted 1.73 percent SSAR and adding 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions and 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment to growth of minus 0.1 percent SAAR in IVQ2012 to obtain 2.54 percent.
In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation QE→∞ cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates that would cause losses in bond portfolios with high duration and make government fiscal affairs even more unsustainable. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.
Table IA-1 provides annual equivalent rates of inflation for producer price indexes followed in this blog of countries and regions that account for close to three quarters of world output. The behavior of the US producer price index in 2011 and into 2012 shows neatly multiple waves. (1) In Jan-Apr 2011, without risk aversion, US producer prices rose at the annual equivalent rate of 10.0 percent. (2) After risk aversion, producer prices increased in the US at the annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent in May-Jun 2011. (3) From Jul to Sep 2011, under alternating episodes of risk aversion, producer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. (4) Under the pressure of risk aversion because of the European debt crisis US producer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 0.6 percent in Oct-Nov 2011. (5) From Dec 2011 to Jan 2012, US producer were flat at the annual equivalent rate of 0.0 percent. (6) Inflation of producer prices returned with 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Mar 2012. (7) With return of risk aversion from the European debt crisis, producer prices fell at the annual equivalent rate of 4.7 percent in Apr-May 2012. (8) New positions in commodity futures even with continuing risk aversion caused annual equivalent inflation of 3.0 percent in Jun-Jul 2012. (9) Relaxed risk aversion because of announcement of sovereign bond-buying by the European Central Bank caused restrained induced carry trades that resulted in annual equivalent producer price inflation in the US of 12.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2012. (10) Renewed risk aversion caused unwinding of carry trades of zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures with annual equivalent inflation of minus 3.5 percent in Oct-Dec 2012. (10) In Jan 2013, producer prices rose at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent with more relaxed risk aversion at the margin. Resolution of the European debt crisis if there is not an unfavorable growth event with political development in China would result in jumps of valuations of risk financial assets. Increases in commodity prices would cause the same high producer price inflation experienced in Jan-Apr 2011 and Aug-Sep 2012. An episode of exploding commodity prices could ignite inflationary expectations that would result in an inflation phenomenon of costly resolution. There are nine producer-price indexes in Table IA-1 for seven countries (two for the UK) and one region (euro area) showing very similar behavior. Zero interest rates without risk aversion cause increases in commodity prices that in turn increase input and output prices. Producer price inflation rose at very high rates during the first part of 2011 for the US, Japan, China, Euro Area, Germany, France, Italy and the UK when risk aversion was contained. With the increase in risk aversion in May and Jun 2011, inflation moderated because carry trades were unwound. Producer price inflation returned after Jul 2011, with alternating bouts of risk aversion. In the final months of the year producer price inflation collapsed because of the disincentive to exposures in commodity futures resulting from fears of resolution of the European debt crisis. There is renewed worldwide inflation in the early part of 2012 with subsequent collapse because of another round of sharp risk aversion. Sharp worldwide jump in producer prices occurred recently as a result of the combination of zero interest rates forever or QE→∞ with temporarily relaxed risk aversion. Producer prices are moderating or falling currently because of renewed risk aversion that causes unwinding of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures. Unconventional monetary policy fails in stimulating the overall real economy, merely introducing undesirable instability as monetary authorities cannot control allocation of floods of money at zero interest rates to carry trades into risk financial assets. The economy is constrained in a suboptimal allocation of resources that is perpetuated along a continuum of short-term periods results in long-term or dynamic inefficiency in the form of a trajectory of economic activity that is lower than what would be attained with rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
Table IA-1, Annual Equivalent Rates of Producer Price Indexes
INDEX 2011-2013 | AE ∆% |
US Producer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2012 | -3.5 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012 | 12.7 |
AE ∆% Jun-Jul 2012 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% Apr-May 2012 | -4.7 |
AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan-2012 | 0.0 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011 | 0.6 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 4.9 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 1.8 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 10.0 |
Japan Corporate Goods Price Index | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jan 2013 | 3.7 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2012 | -1.8 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | -5.8 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | -0.6 |
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011 | -2.2 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 5.9 |
China Producer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% Oct 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Sep 2012 | -5.8 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011 | -3.1 |
AE ∆% Jan-Jun 2011 | 6.4 |
Euro Zone Industrial Producer Prices | |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Sep-Oct 2012 | 1.2 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 7.4 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012 | -3.9 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012 | 8.3 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011 | 0.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.0 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 12.0 |
Germany Producer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | 10.0 NSA 2.4 SA |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2012 | -1.6 NSA 1.6 SA |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012 | 4.9 NSA 5.5 SA |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | -2.8 NSA –0.4 SA |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 4.9 NSA 0.8 SA |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 1.2 NSA 0.0 SA |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011 | 1.8 NSA 3.7 SA |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.8 NSA 3.7 SA |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 0.6 NSA 3.7 SA |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 10.4 NSA 6.5 SA |
France Producer Price Index for the French Market | |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012 | -4.7 |
AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2012 | 8.1 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012 | -8.1 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012 | 8.7 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.8 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | -3.5 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 11.7 |
Italy Producer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2012 | -2.1 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 6.8 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2012 | 4.3 |
AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2012 | 7.4 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011 | 0.4 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-April 2011 | 10.7 |
UK Output Prices | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2012 | 4.0 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | -5.3 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 7.9 |
AE ∆% Nov 2011-Jan-2012 | 1.6 |
AE ∆% May-Oct 2011 | 2.0 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 12.0 |
UK Input Prices | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jan 2013 | 8.1 |
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2012 | 1.6 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 14.0 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012 | -21.9 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012 | 18.1 |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2011 | -1.2 |
AE ∆% May-Oct 2011 | -3.1 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 35.6 |
AE: Annual Equivalent
Sources:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html
http://www.insee.fr/en/default.asp
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html
Similar world inflation waves are in the behavior of consumer price indexes of six countries and the euro zone in Table IA-2. US consumer price inflation shows similar waves. (1) Under risk appetite in Jan-Apr 2011 consumer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 4.6 percent. (2) Risk aversion caused the collapse of inflation to annual equivalent 3.0 percent in May-Jun 2011. (3) Risk appetite drove the rate of consumer price inflation in the US to 3.3 percent in Jul-Sep 2011. (4) Gloomier views of carry trades caused the collapse of inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 to annual equivalent 0.6 percent. (5) Consumer price inflation resuscitated with increased risk appetite at annual equivalent of 1.2 percent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. (6) Consumer price inflation returned at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Apr 2012. (7) Under renewed risk aversion, annual equivalent consumer price inflation in the US was 0.0 percent in May-Jul 2012. (8) Inflation jumped to annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. (9) Unwinding of carry trades caused negative annual equivalent inflation of 0.8 percent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 but some countries experienced higher inflation in Dec 2012 and Jan 2013. Inflationary expectations can be triggered in one of these episodes of accelerating inflation because of commodity carry trades induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates in perpetuity or QE→∞ or almost continuous time. Alternating episodes of increase and decrease of inflation introduce uncertainty in household planning that frustrates consumption and home buying. Announcement of purchases of impaired sovereign bonds by the European Central Bank relaxed risk aversion that induced carry trades into commodity exposures, increasing prices of food, raw materials and energy. There is similar behavior in all the other consumer price indexes in Table IA-2. China’s CPI increased at annual equivalent 8.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2011, 2.0 percent in Apr-Jun, 2.9 percent in Jul-Dec and resuscitated at 5.8 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Mar 2012, declining to minus 3.9 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but resuscitating at 4.1 percent in Jul-Sep 2012, declining to minus 1.2 percent in Oct 2012 and 0.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2012. High inflation in China at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Nov-Dec 2012 is attributed to inclement winter weather that caused increases in food prices. Continuing pressure of food prices caused annual equivalent inflation of 11.4 percent in China in Dec 2012 to Jan 2013. The euro zone harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) increased at annual equivalent 5.2 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, minus 2.4 percent in May-Jul 2011, 4.3 percent in Aug-Dec 2011, minus 3.0 percent in Dec 2011-Jan 2012 and then 9.6 percent in Feb-Apr 2012, falling to minus 2.8 percent annual equivalent in May-Jul 2012 but resuscitating at 5.3 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. The recent shock of risk aversion forced minus 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2012. As in several European countries, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 4.9 percent in the euro area in Dec 2012. The price indexes of the largest members of the euro zone, Germany, France and Italy, and the euro zone as a whole, exhibit the same inflation waves. The United Kingdom CPI increased at annual equivalent 6.5 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, falling to only 0.4 percent in May-Jul 2011 and then increasing at 4.6 percent in Aug-Nov 2011. UK consumer prices fell at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 but increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent from Feb to Apr 2012. In May-Jun 2012, with renewed risk aversion, UK consumer prices fell at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the UK at average annual equivalent of 4.5 percent in Jul-Dec 2012 with inflation in Oct 2012 caused mostly by increases of university tuition fees. Inflation returned at 4.1 percent annual equivalent in Jul-Sep 2012 and was higher in annual equivalent producer price inflation in the UK in Jul-Oct 2012 at 4.0 percent for output prices and 14.0 percent for input prices in Jul-Aug 2012 (see Table IA-1).
Table IA-2, Annual Equivalent Rates of Consumer Price Indexes
Index 2011-2013 | AE ∆% |
US Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Nov 2012-Jan 2013 | -0.8 |
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012 | 4.9 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | 0.0 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 1.2 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011 | 0.6 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 3.3 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 4.6 |
China Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jan 2013 | 11.4 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2012 | 0.0 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2012 | 4.1 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012 | -3.9 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Mar 2012 | 5.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011 | 2.9 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2011 | 2.0 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2011 | 8.3 |
Euro Zone Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012 | 4.9 |
AE ∆% Nov 2012 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012 | 5.3 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | -2.8 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 9.6 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | -3.0 |
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011 | 4.3 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011 | -2.4 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 5.2 |
Germany Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | -5.8 NSA 0.0 SA |
AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2012 | 1.5 NSA 1.5 SA |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 4.9 NSA 3.7 SA |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | -1.2 NSA 1.2 SA |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 4.5 NSA 2.0 SA |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 1.8 NSA 0.6 SA |
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011 | 1.7 NSA 1.9 SA |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 0.6 NSA 3.0 SA |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2011 | 3.0 NSA 2.4 SA |
France Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Nov 2012-Jan 2013 | -1.6 |
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012 | -2.0 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 5.3 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 0.0 |
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011 | 2.7 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011 | -0.8 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 4.3 |
Italy Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jan 2013 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2012 | -0.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | 1.2 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 5.7 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | 4.3 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011 | 2.4 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011 | 1.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 4.9 |
UK Consumer Price Index | |
AE ∆% Jan 2013 | -5.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Dec 2012 | 4.5 |
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012 | -3.0 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012 | 6.2 |
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012 | -0.6 |
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011 | 4.6 |
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011 | 0.4 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011 | 6.5 |
AE: Annual Equivalent
Sources:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html
http://www.insee.fr/en/default.asp
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html
IIA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy. Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, provides analysis of the policy of purchasing large amounts of long-term securities for the Fed’s balance sheet. The new analysis provides three channels of transmission of quantitative easing to the ultimate objectives of increasing growth and employment and increasing inflation to “levels of 2 percent or a bit less that most Committee participants judge to be consistent, over the long run, with the FOMC’s dual mandate” (Yellen 2011AS, 4, 7):
“There are several distinct channels through which these purchases tend to influence aggregate demand, including a reduced cost of credit to consumers and businesses, a rise in asset prices that boost household wealth and spending, and a moderate change in the foreign exchange value of the dollar that provides support to net exports.”
The new analysis by Yellen (2011AS) is considered below in four separate subsections: IIA1 Theory; IIA2 Policy; IIA3 Evidence; and IIA4 Unwinding Strategy.
IIA1 Theory. The transmission mechanism of quantitative easing can be analyzed in three different forms. (1) Portfolio choice theory. General equilibrium value theory was proposed by Hicks (1935) in analyzing the balance sheets of individuals and institutions with assets in the capital segment consisting of money, debts, stocks and productive equipment. Net worth or wealth would be comparable to income in value theory. Expected yield and risk would be the constraint comparable to income in value theory. Markowitz (1952) considers a portfolio of individual securities with mean μp and variance σp. The Markowitz (1952, 82) rule states that “investors would (or should” want to choose a portfolio of combinations of (μp, σp) that are efficient, which are those with minimum variance or risk for given expected return μp or more and maximum expected μp for given variance or risk or less. The more complete model of Tobin (1958) consists of portfolio choice of monetary assets by maximizing a utility function subject to a budget constraint. Tobin (1961, 28) proposes general equilibrium analysis of the capital account to derive choices of capital assets in balance sheets of economic units with the determination of yields in markets for capital assets with the constraint of net worth. A general equilibrium model of choice of portfolios was developed simultaneously by various authors (Hicks 1962; Treynor 1962; Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965; Mossin 1966). If shocks such as by quantitative easing displace investors from the efficient frontier, there would be reallocations of portfolios among assets until another efficient point is reached. Investors would bid up the prices or lower the returns (interest plus capital gains) of long-term assets targeted by quantitative easing, causing the desired effect of lowering long-term costs of investment and consumption.
(2) General Equilibrium Theory. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004, 88) argue that “the possibility monetary policy works through portfolio substitution effects, even in normal times, has a long intellectual history, having been espoused by both Keynesians (James Tobin 1969) and monetarists (Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer 1973).” Andres et al. (2004) explain the Tobin (1969) contribution by optimizing agents in a general-equilibrium model. Both Tobin (1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973) consider capital assets to be gross instead of perfect substitutes with positive partial derivatives of own rates of return and negative partial derivatives of cross rates in the vector of asset returns (interest plus principal gain or loss) as argument in portfolio balancing equations (see Pelaez and Suzigan 1978, 113-23). Tobin (1969, 26) explains portfolio substitution after monetary policy:
“When the supply of any asset is increased, the structure of rates of return, on this and other assets, must change in a way that induces the public to hold the new supply. When the asset’s own rate can rise, a large part of the necessary adjustment can occur in this way. But if the rate is fixed, the whole adjustment must take place through reductions in other rates or increases in prices of other assets. This is the secret of the special role of money; it is a secret that would be shared by any other asset with a fixed interest rate.”
Andrés et al. (2004, 682) find that in their multiple-channels model “base money expansion now matters for the deviations of long rates from the expected path of short rates. Monetary policy operates by both the expectations channel (the path of current and expected future short rates) and this additional channel. As in Tobin’s framework, interest rates spreads (specifically, the deviations from the pure expectations theory of the term structure) are an endogenous function of the relative quantities of assets supplied.”
The interrelation among yields of default-free securities is measured by the term structure of interest rates. This schedule of interest rates along time incorporates expectations of investors. (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1985). The expectations hypothesis postulates that the expectations of investors about the level of future spot rates influence the level of current long-term rates. The normal channel of transmission of monetary policy in a recession is to lower the target of the fed funds rate that will lower future spot rates through the term structure and also the yields of long-term securities. The expectations hypothesis is consistent with term premiums (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1981, 774-7) such as liquidity to compensate for risk or uncertainty about future events that can cause changes in prices or yields of long-term securities (Hicks 1935; see Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1981, 784; Chung et al. 2011, 22).
(3) Preferred Habitat. Another approach is by the preferred-habitat models proposed by Culbertson (1957, 1963) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966). This approach is formalized by Vayanos and Vila (2009). The model considers investors or “clientele” who do not abandon their segment of operations unless there are extremely high potential returns and arbitrageurs who take positions to profit from discrepancies. Pension funds matching benefit liabilities would operate in segments above 15 years; life insurance companies operate around 15 years or more; and asset managers and bank treasury managers are active in maturities of less than 10 years (Ibid, 1). Hedge funds, proprietary trading desks and bank maturity transformation activities are examples of potential arbitrageurs. The role of arbitrageurs is to incorporate “information about current and future short rates into bond prices” (Ibid, 12). Suppose monetary policy raises the short-term rate above a certain level. Clientele would not trade on this information, but arbitrageurs would engage in carry trade, shorting bonds and investing at the short-term rate, in a “roll-up” trade, resulting in decline of bond prices or equivalently increases in yields. This is a situation of an upward-sloping yield curve. If the short-term rate were lowered, arbitrageurs would engage in carry trade borrowing at the short-term rate and going long bonds, resulting in an increase in bond prices or equivalently decline in yields, or “roll-down” trade. The carry trade is the mechanism by which bond yields adjust to changes in current and expected short-term interest rates. The risk premiums of bonds are positively associated with the slope of the term structure (Ibid, 13). Fama and Bliss (1987, 689) find with data for 1964-85 that “1-year expected returns for US Treasury maturities to 5 years, measured net of the interest rate on a 1-year bond, vary through time. Expected term premiums are mostly positive during good times but mostly negative during recessions.” Vayanos and Vila (2009) develop a model with two-factors, the short-term rate and demand or quantity. The term structure moves because of shocks of short-term rates and demand. An important finding is that demand or quantity shocks are largest for intermediate and long maturities while short-rate shocks are largest for short-term maturities.
IIA2 Policy. A simplified analysis could consider the portfolio balance equations Aij = f(r, x) where Aij is the demand for i = 1,2,∙∙∙n assets from j = 1,2, ∙∙∙m sectors, r the 1xn vector of rates of return, ri, of n assets and x a vector of other relevant variables. Tobin (1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973) assume imperfect substitution among capital assets such that the own first derivatives of Aij are positive, demand for an asset increases if its rate of return (interest plus capital gains) is higher; and cross first derivatives are negative, demand for an asset decreases if the rate of return of alternative assets increases. Theoretical purity would require the estimation of the complete model with all rates of return. In practice, it may be impossible to observe all rates of return such as in the critique of Roll (1976). Policy proposals by the Fed have been focused on the likely impact of withdrawals of stocks of securities in specific segments, that is, of effects of one or several specific rates of return among the n possible rates. There have been at least seven approaches on the role of monetary policy in purchasing long-term securities that have increased the classes of rates of return targeted by the Fed:
(1) Suspension of Auctions of 30-year Treasury Bonds. Auctions of 30-year Treasury bonds were suspended between 2001 and 2005. This was Treasury policy not Fed policy. The effects were similar to those of quantitative easing: withdrawal of supply from the segment of 30-year bonds would result in higher prices or lower yields for close-substitute mortgage-backed securities with resulting lower mortgage rates. The objective was to encourage refinancing of house loans that would increase family income and consumption by freeing income from reducing monthly mortgage payments.
(2) Purchase of Long-term Securities by the Fed. Between Nov 2008 and Mar 2009 the Fed announced the intention of purchasing $1750 billion of long-term securities: $600 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities and agency debt announced on Nov 25 and $850 billion of agency mortgaged-backed securities and agency debt plus $300 billion of Treasury securities announced on Mar 18, 2009 (Yellen 2011AS, 5-6). The objective of buying mortgage-backed securities was to lower mortgage rates that would “support the housing sector” (Bernanke 2009SL). The FOMC statement on Dec 16, 2008 informs that: “over the next few quarters the Federal Reserve will purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and its stands ready to expand its purchases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm). The Mar 18, 2009, statement of the FOMC explained that: “to provide greater support to mortgage lending and housing markets, the Committee decided today to increase the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its purchase of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion. Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090318a.htm). Policy changed to increase prices or reduce yields of mortgage-backed securities and Treasury securities with the objective of supporting housing markets and private credit markets by lowering costs of housing and long-term private credit.
(3) Portfolio Reinvestment. On Aug 10, 2010, the FOMC statement explains the reinvestment policy: “to help support the economic recovery in a context of price stability, the Committee will keep constant the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities at their current level by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in long-term Treasury securities. The Committee will continue to roll over the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities as they mature” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100810a.htm). The objective of policy appears to be supporting conditions in housing and mortgage markets with slow transfer of the portfolio to Treasury securities that would support private-sector markets.
(4) Increasing Portfolio. As widely anticipated, the FOMC decided on Dec 3, 2010: “to promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to expand its holdings of securities. The Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. In addition, the Committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20101103a.htm). The emphasis appears to shift from housing markets and private-sector credit markets to the general economy, employment and preventing deflation.
(5) Increasing Stock Market Valuations. Chairman Bernanke (2010WP) explained on Nov 4 the objectives of purchasing an additional $600 billion of long-term Treasury securities and reinvesting maturing principal and interest in the Fed portfolio. Long-term interest rates fell and stock prices rose when investors anticipated the new round of quantitative easing. Growth would be promoted by easier lending such as for refinancing of home mortgages and more investment by lower corporate bond yields. Consumers would experience higher confidence as their wealth in stocks rose, increasing outlays. Income and profits would rise and, in a “virtuous circle,” support higher economic growth. Bernanke (2000) analyzes the role of stock markets in central bank policy (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-100). Fed policy in 1929 increased interest rates to avert a gold outflow and failed to prevent the deepening of the banking crisis without which the Great Depression may not have occurred. In the crisis of Oct 19, 1987, Fed policy supported stock and futures markets by persuading banks to extend credit to brokerages. Collapse of stock markets would slow consumer spending.
(6) Devaluing the Dollar. Yellen (2011AS, 6) broadens the effects of quantitative easing by adding dollar devaluation: “there are several distinct channels through which these purchases tend to influence aggregate demand, including a reduced cost of credit to consumers and businesses, a rise in asset prices that boosts household wealth and spending, and a moderate change in the foreign exchange value of the dollar that provides support to net exports.”
(7) Let’s Twist Again Monetary Policy. The term “operation twist” grew out of the dance “twist” popularized by successful musical performer Chubby Chekker (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWaJ0s0-E1o). Meulendyke (1998, 39) describes the coordination of policy by Treasury and the FOMC in the beginning of the Kennedy administration in 1961 (see Modigliani and Sutch 1966, 1967; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/collapse-of-household-income-and-wealth.html):
“In 1961, several developments led the FOMC to abandon its “bills only” restrictions. The new Kennedy administration was concerned about gold outflows and balance of payments deficits and, at the same time, it wanted to encourage a rapid recovery from the recent recession. Higher rates seemed desirable to limit the gold outflows and help the balance of payments, while lower rates were wanted to speed up economic growth.
To deal with these problems simultaneously, the Treasury and the FOMC attempted to encourage lower long-term rates without pushing down short-term rates. The policy was referred to in internal Federal Reserve documents as “operation nudge” and elsewhere as “operation twist.” For a few months, the Treasury engaged in maturity exchanges with trust accounts and concentrated its cash offerings in shorter maturities.
The Federal Reserve participated with some reluctance and skepticism, but it did not see any great danger in experimenting with the new procedure.
It attempted to flatten the yield curve by purchasing Treasury notes and bonds while selling short-term Treasury securities. The domestic portfolio grew by $1.7 billion over the course of 1961. Note and bond holdings increased by a substantial $8.8 billion, while certificate of indebtedness holdings fell by almost $7.4 billion (Table 2). The extent to which these actions changed the yield curve or modified investment decisions is a source of dispute, although the predominant view is that the impact on yields was minimal. The Federal Reserve continued to buy coupon issues thereafter, but its efforts were not very aggressive. Reference to the efforts disappeared once short-term rates rose in 1963. The Treasury did not press for continued Fed purchases of long-term debt. Indeed, in the second half of the decade, the Treasury faced an unwanted shortening of its portfolio. Bonds could not carry a coupon with a rate above 4 1/4 percent, and market rates persistently exceeded that level. Notes—which were not subject to interest rate restrictions—had a maximum maturity of five years; it was extended to seven years in 1967.”
As widely anticipated by markets, perhaps intentionally, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Sep 21 that it was again “twisting time” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20110921a.htm):
“Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August indicates that economic growth remains slow. Recent indicators point to continuing weakness in overall labor market conditions, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending has been increasing at only a modest pace in recent months despite some recovery in sales of motor vehicles as supply-chain disruptions eased. Investment in nonresidential structures is still weak, and the housing sector remains depressed. However, business investment in equipment and software continues to expand. Inflation appears to have moderated since earlier in the year as prices of energy and some commodities have declined from their peaks. Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee continues to expect some pickup in the pace of recovery over coming quarters but anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only gradually toward levels that the Committee judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. Moreover, there are significant downside risks to the economic outlook, including strains in global financial markets. The Committee also anticipates that inflation will settle, over coming quarters, at levels at or below those consistent with the Committee's dual mandate as the effects of past energy and other commodity price increases dissipate further. However, the Committee will continue to pay close attention to the evolution of inflation and inflation expectations.
To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the Committee decided today to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. The Committee intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less. This program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate.
To help support conditions in mortgage markets, the Committee will now reinvest principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. In addition, the Committee will maintain its existing policy of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.
The Committee also decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.
The Committee discussed the range of policy tools available to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. It will continue to assess the economic outlook in light of incoming information and is prepared to employ its tools as appropriate.”
The FOMC decided at its meeting on Jun 20, 2012, to continue “Let’s Twist Again” monetary policy until the end of 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120620a.htm http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_120620.html):
“The Committee also decided to continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. Specifically, the Committee intends to purchase Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years at the current pace and to sell or redeem an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of approximately 3 years or less. This continuation of the maturity extension program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. The Committee is prepared to take further action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”
IIA3 Evidence. There are multiple empirical studies on the effectiveness of quantitative easing that have been covered in past posts such as (Andrés et al. 2004, D’Amico and King 2010, Doh 2010, Gagnon et al. 2010, Hamilton and Wu 2010). On the basis of simulations of quantitative easing with the FRB/US econometric model, Chung et al (2011, 28-9) find that:
”Lower long-term interest rates, coupled with higher stock market valuations and a lower foreign exchange value of the dollar, provide a considerable stimulus to real activity over time. Phase 1 of the program by itself is estimated to boost the level of real GDP almost 2 percent above baseline by early 2012, while the full program raises the level of real GDP almost 3 percent by the second half of 2012. This boost to real output in turn helps to keep labor market conditions noticeably better than they would have been without large scale asset purchases. In particular, the model simulations suggest that private payroll employment is currently 1.8 million higher, and the unemployment rate ¾ percentage point lower, that would otherwise be the case. These benefits are predicted to grow further over time; by 2012, the incremental contribution of the full program is estimated to be 3 million jobs, with an additional 700,000 jobs provided by the most recent phase of the program alone.”
An additional conclusion of these simulations is that quantitative easing may have prevented actual deflation. Empirical research is continuing.
IIA4 Unwinding Strategy. Fed Vice-Chair Yellen (2011AS) considers four concerns on quantitative easing discussed below in turn. First, Excessive Inflation. Yellen (2011AS, 9-12) considers concerns that quantitative easing could result in excessive inflation because fast increases in aggregate demand from quantitative easing could raise the rate of inflation, posing another problem of adjustment with tighter monetary policy or higher interest rates. The Fed estimates significant slack of resources in the economy as measured by the difference of four percentage points between the high current rate of unemployment above 9 percent and the NAIRU (non-accelerating rate of unemployment) of 5.75 percent (Ibid, 2). Thus, faster economic growth resulting from quantitative easing would not likely result in upward trend of costs as resources are bid up competitively. The Fed monitors frequently slack indicators and is committed to maintaining inflation at a “level of 2 percent or a bit less than that” (Ibid, 13), say, in the narrow open interval (1.9, 2.1).
Second, Inflation and Bank Reserves. On Jan 12, 2012, the line “Reserve Bank credit” in the Fed balance sheet stood at $2450.6 billion, or $2.5 trillion, with the portfolio of long-term securities of $2175.7 billion, or $2.2 trillion, composed of $987.6 billion of notes and bonds, $49.7 billion of inflation-adjusted notes and bonds, $146.3 billion of Federal agency debt securities, and $992.1 billion of mortgage-backed securities; reserves balances with Federal Reserve Banks stood at $1095.5 billion, or $1.1 trillion (http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). The concern addressed by Yellen (2011AS, 12-4) is that this high level of reserves could eventually result in demand growth that could accelerate inflation. Reserves would be excessively high relative to the levels before the recession. Reserves of depository institutions at the Federal Reserve Banks rose from $45.6 billion in Aug 2008 to $1084.8 billion in Aug 2010, not seasonally adjusted, multiplying by 23.8 times, or to $1038.2 billion in Nov 2010, multiplying by 22.8 times. The monetary base consists of the monetary liabilities of the government, composed largely of currency held by the public plus reserves of depository institutions at the Federal Reserve Banks. The monetary base not seasonally adjusted, or issue of money by the government, rose from $841.1 billion in Aug 2008 to $1991.1 billion or by 136.7 percent and to $1968.1 billion in Nov 2010 or by 133.9 percent (http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/hist/h3hist1.pdf). Policy can be viewed as creating government monetary liabilities that ended mostly in reserves of banks deposited at the Fed to purchase $2.1 trillion of long-term securities or assets, which in nontechnical language would be “printing money” (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html). The marketable debt of the US government in Treasury securities held by the public stood at $8.7 trillion on Nov 30, 2010 (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/2010/opds112010.pdf). The current holdings of long-term securities by the Fed of $2.1 trillion, in the process of converting fully into Treasury securities, are equivalent to 24 percent of US government debt held by the public, and would represent 29.9 percent with the new round of quantitative easing if all the portfolio of the Fed, as intended, were in Treasury securities. Debt in Treasury securities held by the public on Dec 31, 2009, stood at $7.2 trillion (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/2009/opds122009.pdf), growing on Nov 30, 2010, to $1.5 trillion or by 20.8 percent. In spite of this growth of bank reserves, “the 12-month change in core PCE [personal consumption expenditures] prices dropped from about 2 ½ percent in mid-2008 to around 1 ½ percent in 2009 and declined further to less than 1 percent by late 2010” (Yellen 2011AS, 3). The PCE price index, excluding food and energy, is around 0.8 percent in the past 12 months, which could be, in the Fed’s view, too close for comfort to negative inflation or deflation. Yellen (2011AS, 12) agrees “that an accommodative monetary policy left in place too long can cause inflation to rise to undesirable levels” that would be true whether policy was constrained or not by “the zero bound on interest rates.” The FOMC is monitoring and reviewing the “asset purchase program regularly in light of incoming information” and will “adjust the program as needed to meet its objectives” (Ibid, 12). That is, the FOMC would withdraw the stimulus once the economy is closer to full capacity to maintain inflation around 2 percent. In testimony at the Senate Committee on the Budget, Chairman Bernanke stated that “the Federal Reserve has all the tools its needs to ensure that it will be able to smoothly and effectively exit from this program at the appropriate time” (http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20110107a.htm). The large quantity of reserves would not be an obstacle in attaining the 2 percent inflation level. Yellen (2011A, 13-4) enumerates Fed tools that would be deployed to withdraw reserves as desired: (1) increasing the interest rate paid on reserves deposited at the Fed currently at 0.25 percent per year; (2) withdrawing reserves with reverse sale and repurchase agreement in addition to those with primary dealers by using mortgage-backed securities; (3) offering a Term Deposit Facility similar to term certificates of deposit for member institutions; and (4) sale or redemption of all or parts of the portfolio of long-term securities. The Fed would be able to increase interest rates and withdraw reserves as required to attain its mandates of maximum employment and price stability.
Third, Financial Imbalances. Fed policy intends to lower costs to business and households with the objective of stimulating investment and consumption generating higher growth and employment. Yellen (2011A, 14-7) considers a possible consequence of excessively reducing interest rates: “a reasonable fear is that this process could go too far, encouraging potential borrowers to employ excessive leverage to take advantage of low financing costs and leading investors to accept less compensation for bearing risks as they seek to enhance their rates of return in an environment of very low yields. This concern deserves to be taken seriously, and the Federal Reserve is carefully monitoring financial indicators for signs of potential threats to financial stability.” Regulation and supervision would be the “first line of defense” against imbalances threatening financial stability but the Fed would also use monetary policy to check imbalances (Yellen 2011AS, 17).
Fourth, Adverse Effects on Foreign Economies. The issue is whether the now recognized dollar devaluation would promote higher growth and employment in the US at the expense of lower growth and employment in other countries.
IB United States Inflation. Monetary policy pursues symmetric inflation targets of maintaining core inflation of the index of personal consumption expenditures (core PCE) in an open interval of 2.00 percent. If inflation increases above 2.00 percent, the central bank could use restrictive monetary policy such as increases in interest rates to contain inflation in a tight range or interval around 2.00 percent. If inflation falls below 2 percent, the central bank could use restrictive monetary policy such as lowering interest rates to prevent inflation from falling too much below 2.00 percent. Currently, with about thirty million unemployed and underemployed (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html) and depressed hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html), there may even be a policy bias to raise or at least ignore inflation, even with falling real wages, maintaining accommodation as a form of promoting full employment. There are two arguments in favor of symmetric inflation targets preventing inflation from falling to very low levels.
1. Room for interest rate policy. Nominal interest rates hardly ever fall below zero. In economic jargon, the floor of zero nominal interest rates is referred to as “the zero bound.” Symmetric targets are proposed to maintain a sufficiently high inflation rate such that interest rates can be lowered to promote economic activity when recession threatens. With inflation close to zero there is no room for lowering interest rates with policy tools.
2. Fear of Deflation. Inflation is a process of sustained increases in prices. Deflation is a process of sustained decreases in prices. The probability of deflation increases as inflation approximates zero. The influence of fear of deflation in monetary policy is discussed in Pelaez and Pelaez (International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95).
IB United States Inflation. Subsection IC Long-term US Inflation evaluates long-term inflation in the US, concluding that there has not been deflation risk since World War II. Subsection ID Current US Inflation finds no evidence in current inflation justifying fear of deflation.
IC Long-term US Inflation. Key percentage average yearly rates of the US economy on growth and inflation are provided in Table I-1 updated with release of new data. The choice of dates prevents the measurement of long-term potential economic growth because of two recessions from IQ2001 (Mar) to IVQ2001 (Nov) with decline of GDP of 0.4 percent and the drop in GDP of 4.7 percent in the recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (June) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) followed with unusually low economic growth for an expansion phase after recession (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). Calculations show that actual US GDP growth is around 1.7 to 1.9 percent per year that will perpetuate unemployment/underemployment (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). This rate of 1.7 to 1.9 percent is well below trend growth of 3 percent per year from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Weakness of growth is more clearly shown by adjusting the exceptional one-time contributions to growth from items that are not aggregate demand: 2.53 percentage points contributed by inventory change to growth of 4.1 percent in IVQ2011; 0.64 percentage points contributed by expenditures in national defense together with 0.73 points of inventory accumulation to growth of 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012; and deduction of 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce released on Wed Jan 30, 2012, the first or advanced estimate of GDP for IVQ2012 at minus 0.1 percent seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp4q12_adv.pdf). In the four quarters of 2012, the US economy is growing at the annual equivalent rate of 1.9 percent {([(1.021/4(1.013)1/4(1.0173)1/4(1.0254)1/4]-1)100 = 1.89%} by excluding inventory accumulation of 0.73 percentage points and exceptional defense expenditures of 0.64 percentage points from growth 3.1 percent at SAAR in IIIQ2012 to obtain adjusted 1.73 percent SSAR and adding 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions and 1.27 percentage points of inventory divestment to growth of minus 0.1 percent SAAR in IVQ2012 to obtain 2.54 percent. In the two periods from 1929 to 2012 and 1947 to 2012 the average rate of growth of GDP was 3.2 percent, which is almost the same as 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 measured by Lucas (2011May). From 1929 to 2012 nominal GDP grew at the average rate of 6.2 percent and 6.6 percent from 1947 to 2012; the implicit deflator increased at the average rate of 2.9 percent from 1929 to 2012 and at 3.3 percent from 1947 to 2012. Between 2000 and 2012, real GDP grew at the average rate of 1.6 percent per year, nominal GDP at 3.9 percent and the implicit deflator at 2.2 percent. The annual average rate of CPI increased was 3.2 percent from 1913 to 2012 and 3.7 percent from 1947 to 2012. Between 2000 and 2012, the average rate of CPI inflation was 2.5 percent per year and 2.0 percent excluding food and energy. From 2000 to 2013, the average rate of CPI inflation was 2.4 percent and 2.0 percent excluding food and energy. The average annual rate of PPI inflation was 3.1 percent from 1947 to 2012. PPI inflation increased at 3.0 percent per year on average from 2000 to 2012, 2.9 percent on average from 2000 to 2013 and at 1.8 percent excluding food and energy from 2000 to 2012 and 1.8 percent from 2000 to 2013. Producer price inflation of finished energy goods increased at average 6.9 percent between 2000 and 2012 and 6.3 percent between 2000 and 2013. There is also inflation in international trade. Import prices increased at 3.2 percent per year between 2000 and 2012 and 2.8 percent between 2000 and 2013. The commodity price shock is revealed by inflation of import prices of petroleum increasing at 13.5 percent per year between 2000 and 2012 and at 11.9 percent between 2000 and 2013. The average percentage rates of increase of import prices excluding fuels are much lower at 1.9 percent for 2002 to 2012 and 1.7 percent for 2002 to 2013. Export prices rose at the average rate of 2.4 percent between 2000 and 2012 and at 2.3 percent from 2000 to 2013. What spared the US of sharper decade-long deterioration of the terms of trade, (export prices)/(import prices), was its diversification and competitiveness in agriculture. Agricultural export prices grew at the average yearly rate of 6.2 percent from 2000 to 2012 and at 6.5 percent from 2000 to 2013. US nonagricultural export prices rose at 2.1 percent per year from 2000 to 2012 and at 1.9 percent from 2000 to 2013. The share of petroleum imports in US trade far exceeds that of agricultural exports. Unconventional monetary policy inducing carry trades in commodities has deteriorated US terms of trade, prices of exports relative to prices of imports, tending to restrict growth of US aggregate real income. These dynamic inflation rates are not similar to those for the economy of Japan where inflation was negative in seven of the 10 years in the 2000s. There is no reality of the proposition of need of unconventional monetary policy in the US because of deflation panic.
I-1, US, Average Growth Rates of Real and Nominal GDP, Consumer Price Index, Producer Price Index and Import and Export Prices, Percent per Year
Real GDP | 2000-2012: 1.6% 1929-2012: 3.2% 1947-2012: 3.2% |
Nominal GDP | 2000-2012: 3.9% 1929-2012: 6.2% 1947-2012: 6.6% |
Implicit Price Deflator | 2000-2012: 2.2% 1929-2012: 2.9% 1947-2012: 3.3% |
CPI | 2000-2012: 2.5% Annual 1913-2012: 3.2% 1947-2012: 3.7 |
CPI ex Food and Energy | 2000-2012: 2.0% |
PPI | 2000-2012: 3.0% Annual 1947-2012: 3.1% |
PPI ex Food and Energy | 2000-2012: 1.8% |
PPI Finished Energy Goods | 2000-2012: 6.9% 2000-2013: 6.3% |
Import Prices | 2000-2012: 3.2% |
Import Prices of Petroleum and Petroleum Products | 2000-2012: 13.5% |
Import Prices Excluding Petroleum | 2000-2012: 1.3% |
Import Prices Excluding Fuels | 2002-2012: 1.9% |
Export Prices | 2000-2012: 2.4% |
Agricultural Export Prices | 2000-2012: 6.2% |
Nonagricultural Export Prices | 2000-2012: 2.1% |
Note: rates for price indexes in the row beginning with “CPI” and ending in the row “Nonagricultural Export Prices” are for Jan 2000 to Jan 2012 and for Jan 2000 to Jan 2013 using not seasonally adjusted indexes. Import prices excluding fuels are not available before Dec 2001.
Sources: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ http://www.bls.gov/ppi/ http://www.bls.gov/mxp/home.htm
Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and large-scale purchases of long-term securities for the balance sheet of the central bank is proposed to prevent deflation. The data of CPI inflation of all goods and CPI inflation excluding food and energy for the past six decades show only one negative change by 0.4 percent in the CPI all goods annual index in 2009 but not one year of negative annual yearly change in the CPI excluding food and energy measuring annual inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/world-financial-turbulence-global.html). Zero interest rates and quantitative easing are designed to lower costs of borrowing for investment and consumption, increase stock market valuations and devalue the dollar. In practice, the carry trade is from zero interest rates to a large variety of risk financial assets including commodities. Resulting commodity price inflation squeezes family budgets and deteriorates the terms of trade with negative effects on aggregate demand and employment. Excessive valuations of risk financial assets eventually result in crashes of financial markets with possible adverse effects on economic activity and employment.
Producer price inflation history in the past five decades does not provide evidence of deflation. The finished core PPI does not register even one single year of decline. The headline PPI experienced only six isolated cases of decline (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/world-financial-turbulence-global.html):
-0.3 percent in 1963,
-1.4 percent in 1986,
-0.8 percent in 1998,
-1.3 percent in 2002
-2.6 percent in 2009.
Deflation should show persistent cases of decline of prices and not isolated events. Fear of deflation in the US has caused a distraction of monetary policy. Symmetric inflation targets around 2 percent in the presence of multiple lags in effect of monetary policy and imperfect knowledge and forecasting are mostly unfeasible and likely to cause price and financial instability instead of desired price and financial stability.
Chart I-1 provides US nominal GDP from 1929 to 2012. The chart disguises the decline of nominal GDP during the 1930s from $103.6 billion in 1929 to $56.4 billion in 1933 or by 45.6 percent (data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The level of nominal GDP reached $101.4 billion in 1940 and exceeded the $103.6 billion only with $126.7 billion in 1941. The only major visible bump in the chart occurred in the recession of IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 with revised cumulative decline of real GDP of 4.7 percent. US nominal GDP fell from $14,291.5 billion in 2008 to $13,973.7 billion in 2009 or by 2.2 percent but rose to $14,498.9 billion in 2010 or by 3.8 percent, to $15,075.7 billion in 2011 for an additional 4.0 percent for cumulative increase of 7.9 percent relative to 2009 and to $15,676.0 billion in 2012 for an additional 4.0 percent and cumulative increase of 12.2 percent relative to 2009. US nominal GDP increased from $14,028.7 in 2007 to $15,676.0 billion in 2012 or by 1.7 percent (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the current business cycle with the Great Depression is misleading (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). Tendency for deflation would be reflected in persistent bumps. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1929 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.6 percent cumulatively and fell 45.6 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html).
Chart I-1, US, Nominal GDP 1929-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart I-2 provides US real GDP from 1929 to 2012. The chart also disguises the Great Depression of the 1930s. In the four years of 1929 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.6 percent cumulatively and fell 45.6 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7; data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Persistent deflation threatening real economic activity would also be reflected in the series of long-term growth of real GDP. There is no such behavior in Chart I-2 except for periodic recessions in the US economy that have occurred throughout history.
Chart I-2, US, Real GDP 1929-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Deflation would also be in evidence in long-term series of prices in the form of bumps. The GDP implicit deflator series in Chart I-3 from 1929 to 2012 shows sharp dynamic behavior over time. There is decline of the implicit price deflator of GDP by 25.8 percent from 1929 to 1933 (data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). In contrast, the implicit price deflator of GDP of the US increased from 106.227 (2005 =100) in 2007 to 109.529 in 2009 or by 3.1 percent and to 115.360 in 2012 or by 5.3 percent relative to 2009 and 8.6 percent relative to 2007. The implicit price deflator of US GDP increased in every quarter from IVQ2007 to IVQ2012 with only a decline from 109.539 in IQ2009 to 109.325 in IIQ2009 or by 0.2 percent (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Wars are characterized by rapidly rising prices followed by declines when peace is restored. The US economy is not plagued by deflation but by long-run inflation.
Chart I-3, US, GDP Implicit Price Deflator 1929-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart I-4 provides percent change from preceding quarter in prices of GDP at seasonally-adjusted annual rates (SAAR) from 1980 to 2012. There is one case of negative change by 0.8 percent in IIQ2009 that was adjustment from 3.1 percent in IIIQ2008 and 2.5 percent in both IQ2008 and IIQ2008 caused by carry trades from policy interest rates being moved to zero into commodity futures reversed by the fear of toxic assets in banks in the proposal of TARP in late 2008 (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There has not been actual deflation or risk of deflation threatening depression in the US that would justify unconventional monetary policy.
Chart I-4, Percent Change from Preceding Period in Prices for GDP Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1980-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart I-5 provides percent change from preceding year in prices of GDP from 1929 to 2012. There are four consecutive years of declines of prices of GDP during the Great Depression: 3.9 percent in 1930, 9.9 percent in 1931, 11.4 percent in 1932 and 2.6 percent in 1933. There were two consecutive declines of 1.9 percent in 1938 and 1.3 percent in 1939. Prices of GDP were unchanged in 1949 after increasing 11.5 percent in 1946, 11.1 percent in 1947 and 5.7 percent in 1948, which is similar to experience with wars in other countries. There are no other negative changes of annual prices of GDP in 72 years from 1939 to 2012.
Chart I-5, Percent Change from Preceding Year in Prices for Gross Domestic Product 1930-2012
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
The producer price index of the US from 1947 to 2013 in Chart I-6 shows various periods of more rapid or less rapid inflation but no bumps. The major event is the decline in 2008 when risk aversion because of the global recession caused the collapse of oil prices from $148/barrel to less than $80/barrel with most other commodity prices also collapsing. The event had nothing in common with explanations of deflation but rather with the concentration of risk exposures in commodities after the decline of stock market indexes. Eventually, there was a flight to government securities because of the fears of insolvency of banks caused by statements supporting proposals for withdrawal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as explained by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). The bump in 2008 with decline in 2009 is consistent with the view that zero interest rates with subdued risk aversion induce carry trades into commodity futures.
Chart I-6, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, NSA, 1947-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-7 provides 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index from 1948 to 2013. The distinguishing event in Chart I-7 is the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The shape of the two-hump Bactrian camel of the 1970s resembles the double hump from 2007 to 2013.
Chart I-7, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1948-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Annual percentage changes of the producer price index from 1948 to 2012 are shown in Table I-1A. The producer price index fell 2.8 percent in 1949 following the adjustment to World War II and fell 0.6 percent in 1952 and 1.0 percent in 1953 around the Korean War. There are two other mild decline of 0.3 percent in 1959 and 0.3 percent in 1963. There are only few subsequent and isolated declines of the producer price index of 1.4 percent in 1986, 0.8 percent in 1998, 1.3 percent in 2002 and 2.6 percent in 2009. The decline of 2009 was caused by unwinding of carry trades in 2008 that had lifted oil prices to $140/barrel during deep global recession because of the panic of probable toxic assets in banks that would be removed with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There is no evidence in this history of 65 years of the US producer price index suggesting that there is frequent and persistent deflation shock requiring aggressive unconventional monetary policy. The design of such anti-deflation policy could provoke price and financial instability because of lags in effect of monetary policy, model errors, inaccurate forecasts and misleading analysis of current economic conditions.
Table I-1A, US, Annual PPI Inflation ∆% 1948-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
1948 | 8.0 |
1949 | -2.8 |
1950 | 1.8 |
1951 | 9.2 |
1952 | -0.6 |
1953 | -1.0 |
1954 | 0.3 |
1955 | 0.3 |
1956 | 2.6 |
1957 | 3.8 |
1958 | 2.2 |
1959 | -0.3 |
1960 | 0.9 |
1961 | 0.0 |
1962 | 0.3 |
1963 | -0.3 |
1964 | 0.3 |
1965 | 1.8 |
1966 | 3.2 |
1967 | 1.1 |
1968 | 2.8 |
1969 | 3.8 |
1970 | 3.4 |
1971 | 3.1 |
1972 | 3.2 |
1973 | 9.1 |
1974 | 15.4 |
1975 | 10.6 |
1976 | 4.5 |
1977 | 6.4 |
1978 | 7.9 |
1979 | 11.2 |
1980 | 13.4 |
1981 | 9.2 |
1982 | 4.1 |
1983 | 1.6 |
1984 | 2.1 |
1985 | 1.0 |
1986 | -1.4 |
1987 | 2.1 |
1988 | 2.5 |
1989 | 5.2 |
1990 | 4.9 |
1991 | 2.1 |
1992 | 1.2 |
1993 | 1.2 |
1994 | 0.6 |
1995 | 1.9 |
1996 | 2.7 |
1997 | 0.4 |
1998 | -0.8 |
1999 | 1.8 |
2000 | 3.8 |
2001 | 2.0 |
2002 | -1.3 |
2003 | 3.2 |
2004 | 3.6 |
2005 | 4.8 |
2006 | 3.0 |
2007 | 3.9 |
2008 | 6.3 |
2009 | -2.6 |
2010 | 4.2 |
2011 | 6.0 |
2012 | 1.9 |
The producer price index excluding food and energy from 1973 to 2013, the first historical date of availability in the dataset of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), shows similarly dynamic behavior as the overall index, as shown in Chart I-8. There is no evidence of persistent deflation in the US PPI.
Chart I-8, US Producer Price Index, Finished Goods Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1973-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-9 provides 12-month percentage rates of change of the finished goods index excluding food and energy. The dominating characteristic is the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The double hump illustrates how inflation may appear to be subdued and then returns with strength.
Chart I-9, US Producer Price Index, Finished Goods Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1974-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The producer price index of energy goods from 1974 to 2013 is provided in Chart I-10. The first jump occurred during the Great Inflation of the 1970s analyzed in various comments of this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html) and in Appendix I. There is relative stability of producer prices after 1986 with another jump and decline in the late 1990s into the early 2000s. The episode of commodity price increases during a global recession in 2008 could only have occurred with interest rates dropping toward zero, which stimulated the carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in commodity futures. Commodity futures exposures were dropped in the flight to government securities after Sep 2008. Commodity future exposures were created again when risk aversion diminished around Mar 2011 after the finding that US bank balance sheets did not have the toxic assets that were mentioned in proposing TARP in Congress (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009). Fluctuations in commodity prices and other risk financial assets originate in carry trade when risk aversion ameliorates.
Chart I-10, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Energy Goods, NSA, 1974-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-11 shows 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index of finished energy goods from 1975 to 2013. This index is only available after 1974 and captures only one of the humps of energy prices during the Great Inflation. Fluctuations in energy prices have occurred throughout history in the US but without provoking deflation. Two cases are the decline of oil prices in 2001 to 2002 that has been analyzed by Barsky and Kilian (2004) and the collapse of oil prices from over $140/barrel with shock of risk aversion to the carry trade in Sep 2008.
Chart I-11, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Energy Goods, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1974-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-12 provides the consumer price index NSA from 1913 to 2013. The dominating characteristic is the increase in slope during the Great Inflation from the middle of the 1960s through the 1970s. There is long-term inflation in the US and no evidence of deflation risks.
Chart I-12, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 1914-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart I-13 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 1914 to 2013. The only episode of deflation after 1950 is in 2009, which is explained by the reversal of speculative commodity futures carry trades that were induced by interest rates driven to zero in a shock of monetary policy in 2008. The only persistent case of deflation is from 1930 to 1933, which has little if any relevance to the contemporary United States economy. There are actually three waves of inflation in the second half of the 1960s, in the mid 1970s and again in the late 1970s. Inflation rates then stabilized in a range with only two episodes above 5 percent.
Chart I-13, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, 12- Month Percentage Change 1914-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Table I-2 provides annual percentage changes of United States consumer price inflation from 1914 to 2013. There have been only cases of annual declines of the CPI after wars: (1) World War I minus 10.5 percent in 1921 and minus 6.1 percent in 1922 following cumulative increases of 83.5 percent in four years from 1917 to 1920 at the average of 16.4 percent per year; (2) World War II: minus 1.2 percent in 1949 following cumulative 33.9 percent in three years from 1946 to 1948 at average 10.2 percent per year (3) minus 0.4 percent in 1955 two years after the end of the Korean War; and (4) minus 0.4 percent in 2009. The decline of 0.4 percent in 2009 followed increase of 3.8 percent in 2008 and is explained by the reversal of speculative carry trades into commodity futures that were created in 2008 as monetary policy rates were driven to zero. The reversal occurred after misleading statement on toxic assets in banks in the proposal for TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There were declines of 1.7 percent in both 1927 and 1928 during the episode of revival of rules of the gold standard. The only persistent deflationary period since 1914 was during the Great Depression in the years from 1930 to 1933 and again in 1938-1939. Fear of deflation on the basis of that experience does not justify unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates that has failed to stop deflation in Japan. Financial repression causes far more adverse effects on allocation of resources by distorting the calculus of risk/returns than alleged employment-creating effects or there would not be current recovery without jobs and hiring after zero interest rates since Dec 2008 and intended now forever in a self-imposed forecast growth and employment mandate of monetary policy.
Table I-2, US, Annual CPI Inflation ∆% 1914-2012
1914 | 1.0 |
1915 | 1.0 |
1916 | 7.9 |
1917 | 17.4 |
1918 | 18.0 |
1919 | 14.6 |
1920 | 15.6 |
1921 | -10.5 |
1922 | -6.1 |
1923 | 1.8 |
1924 | 0.0 |
1925 | 2.3 |
1926 | 1.1 |
1927 | -1.7 |
1928 | -1.7 |
1929 | 0.0 |
1930 | -2.3 |
1931 | -9.0 |
1932 | -9.9 |
1933 | -5.1 |
1934 | 3.1 |
1935 | 2.2 |
1936 | 1.5 |
1937 | 3.6 |
1938 | -2.1 |
1939 | -1.4 |
1940 | 0.7 |
1941 | 5.0 |
1942 | 10.9 |
1943 | 6.1 |
1944 | 1.7 |
1945 | 2.3 |
1946 | 8.3 |
1947 | 14.4 |
1948 | 8.1 |
1949 | -1.2 |
1950 | 1.3 |
1951 | 7.9 |
1952 | 1.9 |
1953 | 0.8 |
1954 | 0.7 |
1955 | -0.4 |
1956 | 1.5 |
1957 | 3.3 |
1958 | 2.8 |
1959 | 0.7 |
1960 | 1.7 |
1961 | 1.0 |
1962 | 1.0 |
1963 | 1.3 |
1964 | 1.3 |
1965 | 1.6 |
1966 | 2.9 |
1967 | 3.1 |
1968 | 4.2 |
1969 | 5.5 |
1970 | 5.7 |
1971 | 4.4 |
1972 | 3.2 |
1973 | 6.2 |
1974 | 11.0 |
1975 | 9.1 |
1976 | 5.8 |
1977 | 6.5 |
1978 | 7.6 |
1979 | 11.3 |
1980 | 13.5 |
1981 | 10.3 |
1982 | 6.2 |
1983 | 3.2 |
1984 | 4.3 |
1985 | 3.6 |
1986 | 1.9 |
1987 | 3.6 |
1988 | 4.1 |
1989 | 4.8 |
1990 | 5.4 |
1991 | 4.2 |
1992 | 3.0 |
1993 | 3.0 |
1994 | 2.6 |
1995 | 2.8 |
1996 | 3.0 |
1997 | 2.3 |
1998 | 1.6 |
1999 | 2.2 |
2000 | 3.4 |
2001 | 2.8 |
2002 | 1.6 |
2003 | 2.3 |
2004 | 2.7 |
2005 | 3.4 |
2006 | 3.2 |
2007 | 2.8 |
2008 | 3.8 |
2009 | -0.4 |
2010 | 1.6 |
2011 | 3.2 |
2012 | 2.1 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart I-14 provides the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1960 to 2013. There is long-term inflation in the US without episodes of persistent deflation.
Chart I-14, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1957-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart I-15 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1960 to 2013. There are three waves of inflation in the 1970s during the Great Inflation. There is no episode of deflation.
Chart I-15, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1958-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
The consumer price index of housing is provided in Chart I-16. There was also acceleration during the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The index flattens after the global recession in IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Housing prices collapsed under the weight of construction of several times more housing than needed. Surplus housing originated in subsidies and artificially low interest rates in the shock of unconventional monetary policy in 2003 to 2004 in fear of deflation.
Chart I-16, US, Consumer Price Index Housing, NSA, 1967-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart I-17 provides 12-month percentage changes of the housing CPI. The Great Inflation also had extremely high rates of housing inflation. Housing is considered as potential hedge of inflation.
Chart I-17, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, 12- Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1968-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
ID Current US Inflation. Consumer price inflation has fluctuated in recent months. Table I-3 provides 12-month consumer price inflation in Jan 2013 and annual equivalent percentage changes for the months of Nov 2012 to Jan 2013 of the CPI and major segments. The final column provides inflation from Dec 2012 to Jan 2013. CPI inflation in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 reached 1.6 percent, the annual equivalent rate Nov 2012 to Jan 2013 was minus 0.8 percent in the new episode of risk aversion in commodities and the monthly inflation rate of 0.0 percent annualizes at 0.0 percent. These inflation rates fluctuate in accordance with inducement of risk appetite or frustration by risk aversion of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. At the margin, the decline in commodity prices in sharp recent risk aversion in financial markets caused lower inflation worldwide (with return in some countries in Dec 2012) that was followed by a jump in Aug-Sep 2012 because of the relaxed risk aversion resulting from the bond-buying program of the European Central Bank or Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). With zero interest rates, commodity prices would increase again in an environment of risk appetite. Excluding food and energy, CPI inflation was 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 and 2.0 percent in annual equivalent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013. There is no deflation in the US economy that could justify further quantitative easing, which is now open-ended or forever with zero interest rates and bond-buying by the central bank, or QE→∞, even if the economy grows back to potential. Financial repression of zero interest rates is now intended as a permanent distortion of resource allocation by clouding risk/return decisions, preventing the economy from expanding along its optimal growth path. Consumer food prices in the US have risen 1.6 percent in 12 months ending in Jan 2013 and at 1.6 percent in annual equivalent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013. Monetary policies stimulating carry trades of commodities futures that increase prices of food constitute a highly regressive tax on lower income families for whom food is a major portion of the consumption basket especially with wage increases below inflation in a recovery without hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html) and without jobs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). Energy consumer prices decreased 1.0 percent in 12 months, decreased 21.3 percent in annual equivalent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 and decreased 1.7 percent in Jan 2013 or at minus 18.6 percent in annual equivalent as carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures are unwound and repositioned during alternating risk aversion and risk appetite originating in the European debt crisis and increasingly in growth and politics in China. For lower income families, food and energy are a major part of the family budget. Inflation is not persistently low or threatening deflation in annual equivalent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 in any of the categories in Table I-2 but simply reflecting waves of inflation originating in carry trades. An upward trend is determined by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures positions with episodes of risk aversion causing fluctuations.
Table I-3, US, Consumer Price Index Percentage Changes 12 months NSA and Annual Equivalent ∆%
% RI | ∆% 12 Months Jan 2013/Jan | ∆% Annual Equivalent Nov 2012 to Jan 2013 SA | ∆% Jan 2012/Dec 2012 SA | |
CPI All Items | 100.000 | 1.6 | -0.8 | 0.0 |
CPI ex Food and Energy | 76.127 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 0.3 |
Food | 14.312 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.0 |
Food at Home | 8.598 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 0.0 |
Food Away from Home | 5.713 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 0.1 |
Energy | 9.561 | -1.0 | -21.3 | -1.7 |
Gasoline | 5.274 | -1.5 | -36.0 | -3.0 |
Electricity | 2.850 | 0.5 | 7.0 | 1.1 |
Commodities less Food and Energy | 19.574 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
New Vehicles | 3.189 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 0.1 |
Used Cars and Trucks | 1.844 | -1.3 | -2.0 | 0.2 |
Medical Care Commodities | 1.714 | 1.5 | -2.0 | 0.1 |
Apparel | 3.564 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 0.8 |
Services Less Energy Services | 56.553 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 0.3 |
Shelter | 31.681 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 0.2 |
Rent of Primary Residence | 6.545 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 0.2 |
Owner’s Equivalent Rent of Residences | 24.041 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 0.2 |
Transportation Services | 5.848 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 0.5 |
Medical Care Services | 5.448 | 3.6 | 3.3 | 0.2 |
% RI: Percent Relative Importance Oct 2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
The weights of the CPI, US city average for all urban consumers representing about 87 percent of the US population (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiovrvw.htm#item1), are shown in Table I-4 with the BLS update of Mar 7, 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiri2011.pdf). Housing has a weight of 41.020 percent. The combined weight of housing and transportation is 57.895 percent or more than one half of consumer expenditures of all urban consumers. The combined weight of housing, transportation and food and beverages is 73.151 percent of the US CPI. Table I-3 provides relative importance of key items in Jan 2013.
Table I-4, US, Relative Importance, 2009-2010 Weights, of Components in the Consumer Price Index, US City Average, Dec 2011
All Items | 100.000 |
Food and Beverages | 15.256 |
Food | 14.308 |
Food at home | 8.638 |
Food away from home | 5.669 |
Housing | 41.020 |
Shelter | 31.539 |
Rent of primary residence | 6.485 |
Owners’ equivalent rent | 23.957 |
Apparel | 3.562 |
Transportation | 16.875 |
Private Transportation | 15.694 |
New vehicles | 3.195 |
Used cars and trucks | 1.913 |
Motor fuel | 5.463 |
Gasoline | 5.273 |
Medical Care | 7.061 |
Medical care commodities | 1.716 |
Medical care services | 5.345 |
Recreation | 6.044 |
Education and Communication | 6.797 |
Other Goods and Services | 3.385 |
Note: reissued Mar 7, 2012. Refers to all urban consumers, covering approximately 87 percent of the US population (see http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiovrvw.htm#item1). Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiri2011.pdf http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiriar.htm
Chart I-18 provides the US consumer price index for housing from 2001 to 2013. Housing prices rose sharply during the decade until the bump of the global recession and increased again in 2011-2012 with some stabilization currently. The CPI excluding housing would likely show much higher inflation. Income remaining after paying for indispensable shelter has been compressed by the commodity carry trades resulting from unconventional monetary policy.
Chart I-18, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, NSA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart I-19 provides 12-month percentage changes of the housing CPI. Percentage changes collapsed during the global recession but have been rising into positive territory in 2011 and 2012 but with the rate declining recently.
Chart I-19, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
There have been waves of consumer price inflation in the US in 2011 and into 2012 (Section IA and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html) that are illustrated in Table I-5. The first wave occurred in Jan-Apr 2011 and was caused by the carry trade of commodity prices induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates. Cheap money at zero opportunity cost in environment of risk appetite was channeled into financial risk assets, causing increases in commodity prices. The annual equivalent rate of increase of the all-items CPI in Jan-Apr 2011 was 4.6 percent and the CPI excluding food and energy increased at annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent. The second wave occurred during the collapse of the carry trade from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity futures as a result of risk aversion in financial markets created by the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The annual equivalent rate of increase of the all-items CPI dropped to 3.0 percent in May-Jun 2011 while the annual equivalent rate of the CPI excluding food and energy increased at 3.0 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent CPI inflation rose to 3.3 percent while the core CPI increased at 2.0 percent. The fourth wave occurred in the form of decrease of the CPI all-items annual equivalent rate to 0.6 percent in Oct-Nov 2011 with the annual equivalent rate of the CPI excluding food and energy remaining at 2.4 percent. The fifth wave occurred in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 with annual equivalent headline inflation of 1.2 percent and core inflation of 2.4 percent. In the sixth wave, headline CPI inflation increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Feb-Mar 2012 and core CPI inflation at 1.8 percent but including Apr, the annual equivalent inflation of the headline CPI was 2.4 percent in Feb-Apr and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The seventh wave in May-Jul occurred with annual equivalent inflation of 0.0 percent for the headline CPI in May-Jul 2012 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The eighth wave is with annual equivalent inflation of 6.2 percent in Aug-Oct 2012 but 4.9 percent including Oct. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Nov 2012 was minus 2.4 percent under the new shock of risk aversion and 0.0 percent in Dec 2012 with annual equivalent of minus 0.8 percent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The conclusion is that inflation accelerates and decelerates in unpredictable fashion that turns symmetric inflation targets in a source of destabilizing shocks to the financial system and eventually the overall economy. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and withdrawal of bonds to lower long-term interest rates distorts risk/return decisions required for efficient allocation of resources and attaining optimal growth paths and prosperity.
Table I-5, US, Headline and Core CPI Inflation Monthly SA and 12 Months NSA ∆%
All Items SA Month | All Items NSA 12 month | Core SA | Core NSA | |
Jan 2013 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 1.9 |
Dec 2012 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.1 | 1.9 |
Nov | -0.2 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 1.9 |
AE ∆% Nov-Jan | -0.8 | 2.0 | ||
Oct | 0.2 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 2.0 |
Sep | 0.5 | 2.0 | 0.2 | 2.0 |
Aug | 0.5 | 1.7 | 0.1 | 1.9 |
AE ∆% Aug-Oct | 4.9 | 2.0 | ||
Jul | 0.0 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 2.1 |
Jun | 0.1 | 1.7 | 0.2 | 2.2 |
May | -0.1 | 1.7 | 0.2 | 2.3 |
AE ∆% May-Jul | 0.0 | 2.0 | ||
Apr | 0.0 | 2.3 | 0.2 | 2.3 |
Mar | 0.3 | 2.7 | 0.2 | 2.3 |
Feb | 0.3 | 2.9 | 0.1 | 2.2 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr | 2.4 | 2.0 | ||
Jan | 0.2 | 2.9 | 0.2 | 2.3 |
Dec 2011 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.2 | 2.2 |
AE ∆% Dec-Jan | 1.2 | 2.4 | ||
Nov | 0.1 | 3.4 | 0.2 | 2.2 |
Oct | 0.0 | 3.5 | 0.2 | 2.1 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov | 0.6 | 2.4 | ||
Sep | 0.3 | 3.9 | 0.1 | 2.0 |
Aug | 0.3 | 3.8 | 0.2 | 2.0 |
Jul | 0.2 | 3.6 | 0.2 | 1.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep | 3.3 | 2.0 | ||
Jun | 0.1 | 3.6 | 0.2 | 1.6 |
May | 0.4 | 3.6 | 0.3 | 1.5 |
AE ∆% May-Jun | 3.0 | 3.0 | ||
Apr | 0.3 | 3.2 | 0.2 | 1.3 |
Mar | 0.5 | 2.7 | 0.1 | 1.2 |
Feb | 0.4 | 2.1 | 0.2 | 1.1 |
Jan | 0.3 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 1.0 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 4.6 | 2.1 | ||
Dec 2010 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 0.1 | 0.8 |
Nov | 0.2 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 |
Oct | 0.3 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.6 |
Sep | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 |
Aug | 0.2 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.9 |
Jul | 0.2 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.9 |
Jun | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.9 |
May | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.1 | 0.9 |
Apr | 0.0 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.9 |
Mar | 0.0 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 1.1 |
Feb | -0.1 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 1.3 |
Jan | 0.1 | 2.6 | -0.1 | 1.6 |
Note: Core: excluding food and energy; AE: annual equivalent
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
The behavior of the US consumer price index NSA from 2001 to 2013 is provided in Chart I-20. Inflation in the US is very dynamic without deflation risks that would justify symmetric inflation targets. The hump in 2008 originated in the carry trade from interest rates dropping to zero into commodity futures. There is no other explanation for the increase of the Cushing OK Crude Oil Future Contract 1 from $55.64/barrel on Jan 9, 2007 to $145.29/barrel on July 3, 2008 during deep global recession, collapsing under a panic of flight into government obligations and the US dollar to $37.51/barrel on Feb 13, 2009 and then rising by carry trades to $113.93/barrel on Apr 29, 2012, collapsing again and then recovering again to $105.23/barrel, all during mediocre economic recovery with peaks and troughs influenced by bouts of risk appetite and risk aversion (data from the US Energy Information Administration EIA, http://www.eia.gov/). The unwinding of the carry trade with the TARP announcement of toxic assets in banks channeled cheap money into government obligations (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009).
Chart I-20, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
Chart I-21 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 2001 to 2013. There was no deflation or threat of deflation from 2008 into 2009. Commodity prices collapsed during the panic of toxic assets in banks. When stress tests in 2009 revealed US bank balance sheets in much stronger position, cheap money at zero opportunity cost exited government obligations and flowed into carry trades of risk financial assets. Increases in commodity prices drove again the all items CPI with interruptions during risk aversion originating in multiple fears but especially from the sovereign debt crisis of Europe.
Chart I-21, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
The trend of increase of the consumer price index excluding food and industry in Chart I-22 does not reveal any threat of deflation that would justify symmetric inflation targets. There are mild oscillations in a neat upward trend.
Chart I-22, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
Chart I-23 provides 12-month percentage change of the consumer price index excluding food and energy. Past-year rates of inflation fell toward 1 percent from 2001 into 2003 as a result of the recession and the decline of commodity prices beginning before the recession with declines of real oil prices. Near zero interest rates with fed funds at 1 percent between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004 stimulated carry trades of all types, including in buying homes with subprime mortgages in expectation that low interest rates forever would increase home prices permanently, creating the equity that would permit the conversion of subprime mortgages into creditworthy mortgages (Gorton 2009EFM; see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Inflation rose and then collapsed during the unwinding of carry trades and the housing debacle of the global recession. Carry trades into 2011 and 2012 gave a new impulse to CPI inflation, all items and core. Symmetric inflation targets destabilize the economy by encouraging hunts for yields that inflate and deflate financial assets, obscuring risk/return decisions on production, investment, consumption and hiring.
Chart I-23, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
Headline and core producer price indexes are in Table I-6. The headline PPI SA increased 0.2 percent in Jan 2013 and increased 1.3 percent NSA in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013. The core PPI SA increased 0.3 percent in Jan 2013 and rose 1.8 percent in 12 months. Analysis of annual equivalent rates of change shows inflation waves similar to those worldwide. In the first wave, the absence of risk aversion from the sovereign risk crisis in Europe motivated the carry trade from zero interest rates into commodity futures that caused the average equivalent rate of 10.0 percent in the headline PPI in Jan-Apr 2011 and 4.0 percent in the core PPI. In the second wave, commodity futures prices collapsed in Jun 2011 with the return of risk aversion originating in the sovereign risk crisis of Europe. The annual equivalent rate of headline PPI inflation collapsed to 1.8 percent in May-Jun 2011 but the core annual equivalent inflation rate was much higher at 2.4 percent. In the third wave, headline PPI inflation resuscitated with annual equivalent at 4.9 percent in Jul-Sep 2011 and core PPI inflation at 3.7 percent. Core PPI inflation was persistent throughout 2011, jumping from annual equivalent at 1.5 percent in the first four months of 2010 to 3.1 percent in 12 months ending in Dec 2011. Unconventional monetary policy is based on the proposition that core rates reflect more fundamental inflation and are thus better predictors of the future. In practice, the relation of core and headline inflation is as difficult to predict as future inflation (see IIID Supply Shocks in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html). In the fourth wave, risk aversion originating in the lack of resolution of the European debt crisis caused unwinding of carry trades with annual equivalent headline PPI inflation of 0.6 percent in Oct-Nov 2011 and 1.8 percent in the core annual equivalent. In the fifth wave from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012, annual equivalent inflation was 0.0 percent for the headline index but 4.3 percent for the core index excluding food and energy. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Feb-Mar 2012 was 2.4 percent for the headline PPI and 2.4 percent for the core. In the seventh wave, renewed risk aversion caused reversal of carry trade commodity exposures with annual equivalent headline inflation of minus 4.7 percent in Apr-May 2012 while core PPI inflation was at annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 3.0 percent in Jun-Jul 2012 and 4.3 percent for the core index. In the ninth wave, relaxed risk aversion because of the announcement of the impaired bond buying program or Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) of the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html) induced carry trades that drove annual equivalent inflation of producer prices of the United States at 12.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 0.6 percent in the core index. In the tenth wave, renewed risk aversion caused annual equivalent inflation of minus 3.5 percent in Oct-Dec in the headline index and 0.8 percent in the core index. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in the headline index in Jan 2013 and 2.4 percent in the core index. It is almost impossible to forecast PPI inflation and its relation to CPI inflation. “Inflation surprise” by monetary policy could be proposed to climb along a downward sloping Phillips curve, resulting in higher inflation but lower unemployment (see Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro and Gordon 1983 and past comments of this blog http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). The architects of monetary policy would require superior inflation forecasting ability compared to forecasting naivety by everybody else. In practice, we are all naïve in forecasting inflation and other economic variables and events.
Table I-6, US, Headline and Core PPI Inflation Monthly SA and 12-Month NSA ∆%
Finished | Finished | Finished Core SA | Finished Core NSA | |
Jan 2013 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 1.8 |
AE ∆% Jan | 2.4 | 2.4 | ||
Dec 2012 | -0.3 | 1.3 | 0.1 | 2.0 |
Nov | -0.4 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 2.2 |
Oct | -0.2 | 2.3 | -0.1 | 2.1 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec | -3.5 | 0.8 | ||
Sep | 1.0 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 2.4 |
Aug | 1.0 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 2.6 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep | 12.7 | 0.6 | ||
Jul | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.6 |
Jun | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 2.6 |
AE ∆% Jun-Jul | 3.0 | 4.3 | ||
May | -0.6 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 2.7 |
Apr | -0.2 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 2.7 |
AE ∆% Apr-May | -4.7 | 1.2 | ||
Mar | 0.1 | 2.8 | 0.2 | 2.9 |
Feb | 0.3 | 3.4 | 0.2 | 3.1 |
AE ∆% Feb-Mar | 2.4 | 2.4 | ||
Jan | 0.1 | 4.1 | 0.4 | 3.1 |
Dec 2011 | -0.1 | 4.7 | 0.3 | 3.0 |
AE ∆% Dec-Jan | 0.0 | 4.3 | ||
Nov | 0.4 | 5.6 | 0.1 | 3.0 |
Oct | -0.3 | 5.8 | 0.2 | 2.9 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov | 0.6 | 1.8 | ||
Sep | 0.9 | 7.0 | 0.3 | 2.8 |
Aug | -0.3 | 6.6 | 0.1 | 2.7 |
Jul | 0.6 | 7.1 | 0.5 | 2.7 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep | 4.9 | 3.7 | ||
Jun | -0.1 | 6.9 | 0.3 | 2.3 |
May | 0.4 | 7.1 | 0.1 | 2.1 |
AE ∆% May-Jun | 1.8 | 2.4 | ||
Apr | 0.7 | 6.6 | 0.3 | 2.3 |
Mar | 0.7 | 5.6 | 0.3 | 2.0 |
Feb | 1.1 | 5.4 | 0.3 | 1.8 |
Jan | 0.7 | 3.6 | 0.4 | 1.6 |
AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 10.0 | 4.0 | ||
Dec 2010 | 0.9 | 3.8 | 0.2 | 1.4 |
Nov | 0.6 | 3.4 | 0.0 | 1.2 |
Oct | 0.7 | 4.3 | -0.1 | 1.6 |
Sep | 0.4 | 3.9 | 0.2 | 1.6 |
Aug | 0.4 | 3.3 | 0.1 | 1.3 |
Jul | 0.3 | 4.1 | 0.1 | 1.5 |
Jun | -0.3 | 2.7 | 0.1 | 1.1 |
May | 0.0 | 5.1 | 0.3 | 1.3 |
Apr | -0.2 | 5.4 | 0.0 | 0.9 |
Mar | 0.7 | 5.9 | 0.2 | 0.9 |
Feb | -0.7 | 4.2 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
Jan | 1.0 | 4.5 | 0.3 | 1.0 |
Note: Core: excluding food and energy; AE: annual equivalent
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/ppi/
The US producer price index NSA from 2000 to 2013 is shown in Chart I-24. There are two episodes of decline of the PPI during recessions in 2001 and in 2008. Barsky and Kilian (2004) consider the 2001 episode as one in which real oil prices were declining when recession began. Recession and the fall of commodity prices instead of generalized deflation explain the behavior of US inflation in 2008.
Chart I-24, US, Producer Price Index, NSA, 2000-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Twelve-month percentage changes of the PPI NSA from 2000 to 2013 are shown in Chart I-25. It may be possible to forecast trends a few months in the future under adaptive expectations but turning points are almost impossible to anticipate especially when related to fluctuations of commodity prices in response to risk aversion. In a sense, monetary policy has been tied to behavior of the PPI in the negative 12-month rates in 2001 to 2003 and then again in 2009 to 2010. Monetary policy following deflation fears caused by commodity price fluctuations would introduce significant volatility and risks in financial markets and eventually in consumption and investment.
Chart I-25, US, Producer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change NSA, 2000-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The US PPI excluding food and energy from 2000 to 2013 is shown in Chart I-26. There is here again a smooth trend of inflation instead of prolonged deflation as in Japan.
Chart I-26, US, Producer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 2000-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Twelve-month percentage changes of the producer price index excluding food and energy are shown in Chart I-27. Fluctuations replicate those in the headline PPI. There is an evident trend of increase of 12 months rates of core PPI inflation in 2011 but lower rates in 2012.
Chart I-27, US, Producer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2000-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The US producer price index of energy goods from 2000 to 2013 is in Chart I-28. There is a clear upward trend with fluctuations that would not occur under persistent deflation.
Chart I-28, US, Producer Price Index Finished Energy Goods, NSA, 2000-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-29 provides 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index of energy goods from 2000 to 2013. The episode of declining prices of energy goods in 2001 to 2002 is related to the analysis of decline of real oil prices by Barsky and Kilian (2004). Interest rates dropping to zero during the global recession explain the rise of the PPI of energy goods toward 30 percent. Bouts of risk aversion with policy interest rates held close to zero explain the fluctuations in the 12-month rates of the PPI of energy goods in the expansion phase of the economy. Symmetric inflation targets induce significant instability in inflation and interest rates with adverse effects on financial markets and the overall economy.
Chart I-29, US, Producer Price Index Energy Goods, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2000-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-3 provides 12-month percentage changes of the CPI all items, CPI core and CPI housing from 2001 to 2013. There is no evidence in these data supporting symmetric inflation targets that would only induce greater instability in inflation, interest rates and financial markets. Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130130a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.”
Table I-7, CPI All Items, CPI Core and CPI Housing, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA 2001-2013
Jan | CPI All Items | CPI Core ex Food and Energy | CPI Housing |
2013 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
2012 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 1.9 |
2011 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 0.4 |
2010 | 2.6 | 1.6 | -0.5 |
2009 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 2.2 |
2008 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 3.0 |
2007 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 3.0 |
2006 | 4.0 | 2.1 | 4.3 |
2005 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.0 |
2004 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
2003 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 2.6 |
2002 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 2.0 |
2001 | 3.7 | 2.6 | 4.9 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Banking was important in facilitating economic growth in historical periods (Cameron 1961, 1967, 1972; Cameron et al. 1992). Banking is also important currently because small- and medium-size business may have no other form of financing than banks in contrast with many options for larger and more mature companies that have access to capital markets. Personal consumptions expenditures have share of 71.1 percent of GDP in IVQ2012 (Table II-10 ) http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or_4.html). Most consumers rely on their banks for real estate loans, credit cards and personal consumer loans. Thus, it should be expected that success of monetary policy in stimulating the economy would be processed through bank balance sheets.
IIA3 United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities. Selected assets and liabilities of US commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, in billions of dollars, from Report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are provided in Table II-1. Data are not seasonally adjusted to permit comparison between Jan 2012 and Jan 2013. Total assets of US commercial banks grew 4.5 percent from $12,604.4 billion in Jan 2012 to $13,174.5 billion in Jan 2013. US GDP in 2012 is estimated at $15,676.0 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Thus, total assets of US commercial banks are equivalent to around 84 percent of US GDP. Bank credit grew 5.3 percent from $9493.0 billion in Jan 2012 to $9996.3 billion in Jan 2013. Securities in bank credit increased 8.2 percent from $2521.4 billion in Jan 2012 to $2728.6 billion in Jan 2013. A large part of securities in banking credit consists of US Treasury and agency securities, growing 8.2 percent from $1722.1 billion in Jan 2012 to $1862.5 billion in Jan 2013. Credit to the government that issues or backs Treasury and agency securities of $1862.5 billion in Jan 2013 is about 18.6 percent of total bank credit of US commercial banks of $9996.3 billion. Mortgage-backed securities, providing financing of home loans, grew 5.5 percent, from $1270.8 billion in Jan 2012 to $1340.4 billion in Jan 2013. Loans and leases were less dynamic, growing 4.2 percent from $6971.6 billion in Jan 2012 to $7267.7 billion in Jan 2013. The only dynamic class is commercial and industrial loans, growing 12.4 percent from Jan 2012 to Jan 2013 and providing $1516.3 billion or 20.9 percent of total loans and leases of $7267.7 billion in Jan 2013. Real estate loans increased only 1.3 percent, providing $3560.8 billion in Jan 2013 or 49.0 percent of total loans and leases. Consumer loans increased only 2.3 percent, providing $1130.8 billion in Jan 2013 or 15.6 percent of total loans. Cash assets are measured to “include vault cash, cash items in process of collection, balances due from depository institutions and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm). Cash assets in US commercial banks increased 3.7 percent from $1683.5 billion in Jan 2012 to $1746.2 billion in Jan 2013 but a single year of the series masks exploding cash in banks as a result of unconventional monetary policy, which is discussed below. Bank deposits increased 9.0 percent from $8502.1 billion to $9267.2 billion. The difference between bank deposits and total loans and leases in banks increased from $1530.5 billion in Jan 2012 to $1999.5 billion in Jan 2013 or by $469.0 billion, which is similar to the increase in securities in bank credit by $207.2 billion from $2521.4 billion in Jan 2012 to $2728.6 billion in Jan 2013 and to the increase in Treasury and agency securities by $140.4 billion from $1722.1 billion in Jan 2012 to $1862.5 billion in Jan 2013. Loans and leases increased $296.1 billion from $6971.6 billion in Jan 2012 to $7267.7 billion in Jan 2013. Banks expanded both lending and investment in lower risk securities partly because of the weak economy and credit disappointments during the global recession that has resulted in an environment of fewer sound lending opportunities. Lower interest rates resulting from monetary policy may not necessarily encourage higher borrowing in the current loss of dynamism of the US economy with real disposable income per capita in IVQ2012 higher by 1.0 percent than in IVQ2007 (Table IB-1 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html) in contrast with 10.9 percent higher if the economy had performed in long-term growth of per capita income in the United States at 2 percent per year from 1870 to 2010 (Lucas 2011May) and growth of real disposable income by 15.7 percent in the cycle from IQ1980 to IQ1986 that was higher than trend growth of 13.2 percent.
Table II-1, US, Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, NSA, Billions of Dollars
Jan 2012 | Jan 2013 | ∆% | |
Total Assets | 12,604.4 | 13,174.5 | 4.5 |
Bank Credit | 9493.0 | 9996.3 | 5.3 |
Securities in Bank Credit | 2521.4 | 2728.6 | 8.2 |
Treasury & Agency Securities | 1722.1 | 1862.5 | 8.2 |
Mortgage-Backed Securities | 1270.8 | 1340.4 | 5.5 |
Loans & Leases | 6971.6 | 7267.7 | 4.2 |
Real Estate Loans | 3515.3 | 3560.8 | 1.3 |
Consumer Loans | 1105.4 | 1130.8 | 2.3 |
Commercial & Industrial Loans | 1348.9 | 1516.3 | 12.4 |
Other Loans & Leases | 1002.1 | 1059.9 | 5.8 |
Cash Assets* | 1683.5 | 1746.2 | 3.7 |
Total Liabilities | 11,174.0 | 11,682.7 | 4.6 |
Deposits | 8502.1 | 9267.2 | 9.0 |
Note: balancing item of residual assets less liabilities not included
*”Includes vault cash, cash items in process of collection, balances due from depository institutions and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks.”
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rates (SAAR) of change of selected assets and liabilities of US commercial banks from the report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are provided in Table II-2 annually from 2007 to 2011 and for Dec 2012 and Jan 2013. The global recession had strong impact on bank assets as shown by declines of total assets of 6.0 percent in 2009 and 2.7 percent in 2010. Loans and leases fell 10.2 percent in 2009 and 5.8 percent in 2010. Commercial and industrial loans fell 18.6 percent in 2009 and 9.0 percent in 2011. Unconventional monetary policy caused an increase of cash assets of banks of 158.3 percent in 2008, 48.1 percent in 2009 and 47.8 percent in 2011 and at the SAAR of 22.4 percent in Aug 2012 but contraction by 49.6 percent in Sep 2012 and 6.3 percent in Oct 2012 followed by increase of 55.4 percent in Nov 2012, minus 19.3 percent in Dec 2012 and 47.9 percent in Jan 2013. Acquisitions of securities for the portfolio of the central bank injected reserves in depository institutions that were held as cash and reserves at the central bank because of the lack of sound lending opportunities and the adverse expectations in the private sector on doing business. The truly dynamic investment of banks has been in securities in bank credit, growing at the SAAR of 15.4 percent in Jul 2012, 2.6 percent in Aug 2012, 5.3 percent in Sep 2012, 4.7 percent in Oct 2012, 0.8 percent in Nov 2012 and 22.6 percent in Dec 2012 with decline at 2.5 percent in Jan 2013. Throughout the crisis banks allocated increasing part of their assets to the safety of Treasury and agency securities, or credit to the US government and government-backed credit, with growth of 15.5 percent in 2009 and 15.1 percent in 2010 and at the rate of 16.3 percent in Jul 2012, declining to the rate of 3.4 percent in Aug 2012, 2.1 percent in Sep 2012 and 0.7 percent in Oct 2012 but falling at the rate of 2.1 percent in Nov 2012, increasing at 18.4 percent in Dec 2012 but falling at 8.2 percent in Jan 2013. Deposits grew at the rate of 10.5 percent in Jul 2012, with the rate declining as for most assets of commercial banks to the rate of 6.2 percent in Aug 2012 but increasing to 7.2 percent in Sep 2012, 8.4 percent in Oct 2012, 5.5 percent in Nov 2012, 20.7 percent in Dec 2012 and 2.8 percent in Jan 2013. The credit intermediation function of banks is broken because of adverse expectations on future business and is not easily mended simply by monetary and fiscal policy. Incentives to business and consumers are more likely to be effective in this environment in recovering willingness to assume risk on the part of the private sector, which is the driver of growth and job creation.
Table II-2, US, Selected Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, ∆%
2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | Dec 2012 | Jan 2013 | |
Total Assets | 7.9 | -6.0 | -2.7 | 5.3 | 2.4 | 7.3 | 9.5 |
Bank Credit | 2.1 | -6.6 | -2.7 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 10.8 | 3.6 |
Securities in Bank Credit | -2.0 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 1.7 | 7.5 | 22.6 | -2.5 |
Treasury & Agency Securities | 3.1 | 15.5 | 15.1 | 2.9 | 8.5 | 18.4 | -8.2 |
Other Securities | -8.4 | -5.1 | -7.1 | -0.8 | 5.3 | 31.7 | 9.9 |
Loans & Leases | 3.3 | -10.2 | -5.8 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 6.3 | 5.9 |
Real Estate Loans | -0.2 | -5.6 | -5.5 | -3.8 | -1.1 | -0.3 | 4.4 |
Consumer Loans | 5.1 | -3.3 | -7.0 | -0.8 | 1.1 | 3.8 | -2.3 |
Commercial & Industrial Loans | 12.9 | -18.6 | -9.0 | 9.4 | 11.3 | 17.7 | 11.8 |
Other Loans & Leases | 1.7 | -23.3 | 0.3 | 19.3 | 5.9 | 15.7 | 10.9 |
Cash Assets | 158.3 | 48.1 | -7.9 | 47.8 | -3.0 | -19.3 | 47.9 |
Total Liabilities | 10.6 | -7.2 | -3.4 | 5.5 | 2.1 | 10.3 | 14.0 |
Deposits | 5.4 | 5.2 | 2.4 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 20.7 | 2.8 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of cash assets in US commercial banks from 1973 to 2012. Unconventional monetary policy caused an increase in cash assets in late 2008 of close to 500 percent at SAAR and also in following policy impulses. Such aggressive policies were not required for growth of GDP at the average rate of 5.7 percent in 13 quarters of cyclical expansion from IQ1983 to IV1985 while the average rate in 14 quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012 has been at the rate of 2.1 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The difference in magnitude of the recessions is not sufficient to explain weakness of the current cyclical expansion. Bordo (2012Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) find that growth is higher after deeper contractions and contractions with financial crises. There were two consecutive contractions in the 1980s with decline of 2.2 percent in two quarters from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and 2.7 percent from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 that are almost identical to the contraction of 4.7 percent from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 (Table I-3 below). There was also a decade-long financial and banking crisis during the 1980s. The debt crisis of 1982 (Pelaez 1986) wiped out a large part of the capital of large US money-center banks. Benston and Kaufman (1997, 139) find that there was failure of 1150 US commercial and savings banks between 1983 and 1990, or about 8 percent of the industry in 1980, which is nearly twice more than between the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1934 through 1983. More than 900 savings and loans associations, representing 25 percent of the industry, were closed, merged or placed in conservatorships (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 74-7). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) that received $150 billion of taxpayer funds to resolve insolvent savings and loans. The GDP of the US in 1989 was $5482.1 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the partial cost to taxpayers of that bailout was around 2.7 percent of GDP in a year. US GDP in 2011 is estimated at $15,075.7 billion, such that the bailout would be equivalent to cost to taxpayers of about $412.5 billion in current GDP terms. A major difference with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for private-sector banks is that most of the costs were recovered with interest gains whereas in the case of savings and loans there was no recovery.
Chart II-1, US, Cash Assets, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides quarterly SAARs of bank credit at US commercial banks from 1973 to 2012. Rates collapsed sharply during the global recession as during the recessions of the 1980s and then rebounded. In both episodes rates of growth of bank credit did not return to earlier magnitudes.
Chart II-2, US, Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides deposits at US commercial banks from 1973 to 2013. Deposits fell sharp during and after the global recession but then rebounded in the cyclical expansion
Chart II-3, US, Deposits, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is similar behavior in the 1980s and in the current cyclical expansion of SAARs holdings of Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks provided in Chart II-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the period 1973 to 2013. Sharp reductions of holdings during the contraction were followed by sharp increases.
Chart II-4, US, Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides SAARs of change of total loans and leases in US commercial banks from 1973 to 2013. The decline in the current cycle of SAARs was much sharper and the rebound did not recover earlier growth rates. Part of the explanation originates in demand for loans that was high during rapid economic growth at 5.7 percent per year on average in the cyclical expansion of the 1980s in contrast with lower demand during tepid economic growth at 2.1 percent per year on average in the current weak expansion.
Chart II-5, US, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is significant difference in the two cycles of the 1980s and the current one in quarterly SAARs of real estate loans in US commercial banks provided in Chart II-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The difference is explained by the debacle in real estate after 2006 compared to expansion during the 1980s even in the midst of the crisis of savings and loans and real estate credit. In both cases, government policy tried to influence recovery and avoid market clearing.
Chart II-6, US, Real Estate Loans in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is significant difference in quarterly SAARs of change of consumer loans in US commercial banks in the 1980s and during the current cycle as shown in Chart II-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Quarterly SAARs of consumer loans in US commercial banks fell sharply during the contraction of 1980 and oscillated with upward trend during the contraction of 1983-1984 but increased sharply in the cyclical expansion. In contrast, SAARs of consumer loans in US commercial banks collapsed to high negative magnitudes during the contraction and have increased at very low magnitudes during the current cyclical expansion.
Chart II-7, US, Consumer Loans in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Table II-3 provides the data required for broader comparison of the cyclical expansions of IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and the current one from 2009 to 2012. First, in the 13 quarters from IQ1983 to IQ1986, GDP increased 19.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.7 percent; real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 14.9 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.4 percent; RDPI per capita increased 11.9 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent; and population increased 2.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. Second, in the 14 quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012, GDP increased 7.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent. In the 13 quarters of cyclical expansion real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 4.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent; RDPI per capita increased 4.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent; and population increased 2.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. Third, since the beginning of the recession in IVQ2007 to IVQ2012, GDP increased 2.4 percent, or barely above the level before the recession. Since the beginning of the recession in IVQ2007 to IVQ2012, real disposable personal income increased 5.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.9 percent; population increased 4.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita is 1.0 percent higher than the level before the recession. Real disposable personal income is the actual take home pay after inflation and taxes and real disposable income per capita is what is left per inhabitant. The current cyclical expansion is the worst in the period after World War II in terms of growth of economic activity and income. The United States grew during its history at high rates of per capita income that made its economy the largest in the world. That dynamism is disappearing. Bordo (2012 Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) provide strong evidence that recoveries have been faster after deeper recessions and recessions with financial crises, casting serious doubts on the conventional explanation of weak growth during the current expansion allegedly because of the depth of the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 of 4.7 percent and the financial crisis.
Table II-3, US, GDP, Real Disposable Personal Income, Real Disposable Income per Capita and Population in 1983-85 and 2007-2011, %
# Quarters | ∆% | ∆% Annual Equivalent | |
IQ1983 to IVQ1986 | 13 | ||
GDP | 19.6 | 5.7 | |
RDPI | 14.9 | 4.4 | |
RDPI Per Capita | 11.9 | 3.5 | |
Population | 2.7 | 0.8 | |
IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012 | 14 | ||
GDP | 7.5 | 2.1 | |
RDPI | 7.1 | 2.0 | |
RDPI per Capita | 4.5 | 1.3 | |
Population | 2.5 | 0.7 | |
IVQ2007 to IVQ2012 | 21 | ||
GDP | 2.4 | 0.5 | |
RDPI | 5.1 | 0.9 | |
RDPI per Capita | 1.0 | 0.2 | |
Population | 4.1 | 0.8 |
RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart II-8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides cash assets in commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Acquisitions of securities for the portfolio of the central bank were processed by increases in bank cash reserves. There is no comparable experience in US economic history and such flood of money was never required to return US economic growth to trend of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita income after events such as recessions and wars (Lucas 2011May). It is difficult to argue that higher magnitudes of monetary and fiscal policy impulses would have been more successful. Discovery of such painless and fast adjustment by gigantic impulses of monetary policy of zero interest rates and trillions of dollars of bond buying would have occurred earlier with prior cases of successful implementation. Selective incentives to the private sector of a long-term nature could have been more effective.
Chart II-8, US, Cash Assets in Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-9 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides total assets of Federal Reserve Banks in millions of dollars on Wednesdays from Dec 18, 2002 to Feb 20, 2013. This is what is referred as the leverage of the central bank balance sheet in monetary policy (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-62, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b) 224-27). Consecutive rounds of unconventional monetary policy increased total assets by purchase of mortgage-backed securities, agency securities and Treasury securities. Bank reserves in cash and deposited at the central bank swelled as shown in Chart II-8. The central bank created assets in the form of securities financed with creation of liabilities in the form of reserves of depository institutions.
Chart II-9, US, Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday Level, Millions of Dollars, Dec 18,2002 to Feb 20, 2013
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Chart II-10 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides deposits in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Deposit growth clearly accelerated after 2001 and continued during the current cyclical expansion after bumps during the global recession.
Chart II-10, US, Deposits in Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-11 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2012. Holdings stabilized between the recessions of 2001 and after IVQ2007. There was rapid growth during the global contraction especially after unconventional monetary policy in 2008 and nearly vertical increase without prior similar historical experience during the various bouts of unconventional monetary policy. Banks hoard cash and less risky Treasury and agency securities instead of risky lending because of the weakness of the economy and the lack of demand for financing sound business projects.
Chart II-11, US, Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-12 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides total loans and leases in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2012. Total loans and leases of US commercial banks contracted sharply and have stalled during the cyclical expansion.
Chart II-12, US, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-13 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides real estate loans in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Housing subsidies and low interest rates caused a point of inflexion to higher, nearly vertical growth until 2007. Real estate loans have contracted in downward trend partly because of adverse effects of uncertainty on the impact on balance sheets of the various mechanisms of resolution imposed by policy. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Push for cheaper credit hits wall,” on Dec 24, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324660404578197782701079650.html), provides important information and analysis on housing finance. Quantitative easing consists of withdrawing supply of mortgage-backed securities by acquiring them as assets in the Fed balance sheet. Lending banks obtain funds for mortgages by bundling them according to risk and other characteristics and selling them to investors, using the proceeds from the sale to provide the loans to homebuyers or refinancing homeowners. Banks earn net revenue to remunerate capital required for operations from the spread between the rate received from mortgage debtors and the rate implicit in the yield of the mortgage-backed securities. Nick Timiraos (Ibid) finds that the spread was around 0.5 percentage points before the financial crisis of 2007, widening to 1 percentage point after the crisis but jumping to 1.6 percentage points after the Fed engaged in another program of buying mortgage-backed securities, oscillating currently around 1.3 percentage points. The spread has widened because banks have higher costs originating in regulation, litigation on repurchasing defaulted mortgages, loss in case of default and more prudent but more costly scrutiny of property appraisals and income verification. As a result, even if quantitative easing does lower yields of mortgage-backed securities there would not be proportionate reduction in mortgage rates and even less likely construction and sales of houses.
Chart II-13, US, Real Estate Loans in Bank Credit, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-14 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides consumer loans in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Consumer loans even increased during the contraction then declined and increased vertically to decline again. There was high demand for reposition of durable goods that exhausted and limited consumption again with increase in savings rates in recent periods.
Chart II-14, US, Consumer Loans in Bank Credit, Not Seasonally Adjusted, US Commercial Banks, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-15 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides commercial and industrial loans not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Commercial and industrial loans fell sharply during both contractions in 2001 and after IVQ2007 and then rebounded with accelerated growth. Commercial and industrial loans have not reached again the peak during the global recession.
Chart II-15, US, Commercial and Industrial Loans in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart II-16 is quite revealing in analyzing the state of bank credit in the US economy. The upper curves are deposits and loans and leases in bank credit. Historically since 1973, the level and rate of change of deposits and loans and leases in bank credit were almost identical. The lower two curves are Treasury and agency securities in bank credit and cash assets with treasury and agency securities moving closely with cash assets until the 1990s when Treasury and agency securities exceeded cash assets. The shaded area of the recession from IV2007 to IIQ2009 shows a break in the level and rate of movement of the series. Deposits continued to expand rapidly through the recession and the following expansion period. Loans and leases fell and barely recovered the level before the recession while deposits moved nearly vertically well above the level before the recession. While Treasury and agency securities in bank credit continued to expand at a higher rate, reaching a level well above that before the recession, cash assets jumped as the counterpart of excess reserves in banks that financed quantitative easing or massive outright purchases of securities for the balance sheet of the Fed. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and outright purchases of securities has result in sharp increases of deposits, cash assets and Treasury and agency securities in bank credit but not in loans and leases. Much is said about the almost impossible task of evaluating monetary policy in terms of costs and benefits. Before the financial crisis, Chairman Greenspan (2004) analyzes monetary policy and its limitations (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 13-4, 212-13) that do not differ from those of private financial institutions:
“The Federal Reserve's experiences over the past two decades make it clear that uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape. The term "uncertainty" is meant here to encompass both "Knightian uncertainty," in which the probability distribution of outcomes is unknown, and "risk," in which uncertainty of outcomes is delimited by a known probability distribution. In practice, one is never quite sure what type of uncertainty one is dealing with in real time, and it may be best to think of a continuum ranging from well-defined risks to the truly unknown.
As a consequence, the conduct of monetary policy in the United States has come to involve, at its core, crucial elements of risk management. This conceptual framework emphasizes understanding as much as possible the many sources of risk and uncertainty that policymakers face, quantifying those risks when possible, and assessing the costs associated with each of the risks. In essence, the risk management approach to monetary policymaking is an application of Bayesian decision making.
This framework also entails devising, in light of those risks, a strategy for policy directed at maximizing the probabilities of achieving over time our goals of price stability and the maximum sustainable economic growth that we associate with it. In designing strategies to meet our policy objectives, we have drawn on the work of analysts, both inside and outside the Fed, who over the past half century have devoted much effort to improving our understanding of the economy and its monetary transmission mechanism. A critical result has been the identification of a relatively small set of key relationships that, taken together, provide a useful approximation of our economy's dynamics. Such an approximation underlies the statistical models that we at the Federal Reserve employ to assess the likely influence of our policy decisions.
However, despite extensive efforts to capture and quantify what we perceive as the key macroeconomic relationships, our knowledge about many of the important linkages is far from complete and, in all likelihood, will always remain so. Every model, no matter how detailed or how well designed, conceptually and empirically, is a vastly simplified representation of the world that we experience with all its intricacies on a day-to-day basis.
Given our inevitably incomplete knowledge about key structural aspects of an ever-changing economy and the sometimes asymmetric costs or benefits of particular outcomes, a central bank needs to consider not only the most likely future path for the economy but also the distribution of possible outcomes about that path. The decision makers then need to reach a judgment about the probabilities, costs, and benefits of the various possible outcomes under alternative choices for policy.”
“Whale” trades at official institutions do not receive the same media attention as those in large private banking institutions such as the teapot storm over JP Morgan Chase.
Chart II-16, US, Deposits, Treasury and Government Securities in Bank Credit and Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
IIA4 Theory and Reality of Economic History and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation. Fear of deflation as had occurred during the Great Depression and in Japan was used as an argument for the first round of unconventional monetary policy with 1 percent interest rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 and quantitative easing in the form of withdrawal of supply of 30-year securities by suspension of the auction of 30-year Treasury bonds with the intention of reducing mortgage rates (for fear of deflation see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, and Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95). The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html
If the forecast of the central bank is of recession and low inflation with controlled inflationary expectations, monetary policy should consist of lowering the short-term policy rate of the central bank, which in the US is the fed funds rate. The intended effect is to lower the real rate of interest (Svensson 2003LT, 146-7). The real rate of interest, r, is defined as the nominal rate, i, adjusted by expectations of inflation, π*, with all variables defined as proportions: (1+r) = (1+i)/(1+π*) (Fisher 1930). If i, the fed funds rate, is lowered by the Fed, the numerator of the right-hand side is lower such that if inflationary expectations, π*, remain unchanged, the left-hand (1+r) decreases, that is, the real rate of interest, r, declines. Expectations of lowering short-term real rates of interest by policy of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) fixing a lower fed funds rate would lower long-term real rates of interest, inducing with a lag investment and consumption, or aggregate demand, that can lift the economy out of recession. Inflation also increases with a lag by higher aggregate demand and inflation expectations (Fisher 1933). This reasoning explains why the FOMC lowered the fed funds rate in Dec 2008 to 0 to 0.25 percent and left it unchanged.
The fear of the Fed is expected deflation or negative π*. In that case, (1+ π*) < 1, and (1+r) would increase because the right-hand side of the equation would be divided by a fraction. A simple numerical example explains the effect of deflation on the real rate of interest. Suppose that the nominal rate of interest or fed funds rate, i, is 0.25 percent, or in proportion 0.25/100 = 0.0025, such that (1+i) = 1.0025. Assume now that economic agents believe that inflation will remain at 1 percent for a long period, which means that π* = 1 percent, or in proportion 1/100 =0.01. The real rate of interest, using the equation, is (1+0.0025)/(1+0.01) = (1+r) = 0.99257, such that r = 0.99257 - 1 = -0.00743, which is a proportion equivalent to –(0.00743)100 = -0.743 percent. That is, Fed policy has created a negative real rate of interest of 0.743 percent with the objective of inducing aggregate demand by higher investment and consumption. This is true if expected inflation, π*, remains at 1 percent. Suppose now that expectations of deflation become generalized such that π* becomes -1 percent, that is, the public believes prices will fall at the rate of 1 percent in the foreseeable future. Then the real rate of interest becomes (1+0.0025) divided by (1-0.01) equal to (1.0025)/(0.99) = (1+r) = 1.01263, or r = (1.01263-1) = 0.01263, which results in positive real rate of interest of (0.01263)100 = 1.263 percent.
Irving Fisher also identified the impact of deflation on debts as an important cause of deepening contraction of income and employment during the Great Depression illustrated by an actual example (Fisher 1933, 346):
“By March, 1933, liquidation had reduced the debts about 20 percent, but had increased the dollar about 75 percent, so that the real debt, that is the debt measured in terms of commodities, was increased about 40 percent [100%-20%)X(100%+75%) =140%]. Unless some counteracting cause comes along to prevent the fall in the price level, such a depression as that of 1929-1933 (namely when the more the debtors pay the more they owe) tends to continue, going deeper, in a vicious spiral, for many years. There is then no tendency of the boat to stop tipping until it has capsized”
The nominal rate of interest must always be nonnegative, that is, i ≥ 0 (Hick 1937, 154-5):
“If the costs of holding money can be neglected, it will always be profitable to hold money rather than lend it out, if the rate of interest is not greater than zero. Consequently the rate of interest must always be positive. In an extreme case, the shortest short-term rate may perhaps be nearly zero. But if so, the long-term rate must lie above it, for the long rate has to allow for the risk that the short rate may rise during the currency of the loan, and it should be observed that the short rate can only rise, it cannot fall”
The interpretation by Hicks of the General Theory of Keynes is the special case in which at interest rates close to zero liquidity preference is infinitely or perfectly elastic, that is, the public holds infinitely large cash balances at that near zero interest rate because there is no opportunity cost of foregone interest. Increases in the money supply by the central bank would not decrease interest rates below their near zero level, which is called the liquidity trap. The only alternative public policy would consist of fiscal policy that would act similarly to an increase in investment, increasing employment without raising the interest rate.
An influential view on the policy required to steer the economy away from the liquidity trap is provided by Paul Krugman (1998). Suppose the central bank faces an increase in inflation. An important ingredient of the control of inflation is the central bank communicating to the public that it will maintain a sustained effort by all available policy measures and required doses until inflation is subdued and price stability is attained. If the public believes that the central bank will control inflation only until it declines to a more benign level but not sufficiently low level, current expectations will develop that inflation will be higher once the central bank abandons harsh measures. During deflation and recession the central bank has to convince the public that it will maintain zero interest rates and other required measures until the rate of inflation returns convincingly to a level consistent with expansion of the economy and stable prices. Krugman (1998, 161) summarizes the argument as:
“The ineffectuality of monetary policy in a liquidity trap is really the result of a looking-glass version of the standard credibility problem: monetary policy does not work because the public expects that whatever the central bank may do now, given the chance, it will revert to type and stabilize prices near their current level. If the central bank can credibly promise to be irresponsible—that is, convince the market that it will in fact allow prices to rise sufficiently—it can bootstrap the economy out of the trap”
This view is consistent with results of research by Christina Romer that “the rapid rates of growth of real output in the mid- and late 1930s were largely due to conventional aggregate demand stimulus, primarily in the form of monetary expansion. My calculations suggest that in the absence of these stimuli the economy would have remained depressed far longer and far more deeply than it actually did” (Romer 1992, 757-8, cited in Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 210-2). The average growth rate of the money supply in 1933-1937 was 10 percent per year and increased in the early 1940s. Romer calculates that GDP would have been much lower without this monetary expansion. The growth of “the money supply was primarily due to a gold inflow, which was in turn due to the devaluation in 1933 and to capital flight from Europe because of political instability after 1934” (Romer 1992, 759). Gold inflow coincided with the decline in real interest rates in 1933 that remained negative through the latter part of the 1930s, suggesting that they could have caused increases in spending that was sensitive to declines in interest rates. Bernanke finds dollar devaluation against gold to have been important in preventing further deflation in the 1930s (Bernanke 2002):
“There have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from US history is Franklin Roosevelt’s 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the US deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934. The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market”
Fed policy is seeking what Irving Fisher proposed “that great depressions are curable and preventable through reflation and stabilization” (Fisher 1933, 350).
The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago argues that (Charles Evans 2010):
“I believe the US economy is best described as being in a bona fide liquidity trap. Highly plausible projections are 1 percent for core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) inflation at the end of 2012 and 8 percent for the unemployment rate. For me, the Fed’s dual mandate misses are too large to shrug off, and there is currently no policy conflict between improving employment and inflation outcomes”
There are two types of monetary policies that could be used in this situation. First, the Fed could announce a price-level target to be attained within a reasonable time frame (Evans 2010):
“For example, if the slope of the price path is 2 percent and inflation has been underunning the path for some time, monetary policy would strive to catch up to the path. Inflation would be higher than 2 percent for a time until the path was reattained”
Optimum monetary policy with interest rates near zero could consist of “bringing the price level back up to a level even higher than would have prevailed had the disturbance never occurred” (Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford 2003, 207). Bernanke (2003JPY) explains as follows:
“Failure by the central bank to meet its target in a given period leads to expectations of (and public demands for) increased effort in subsequent periods—greater quantities of assets purchased on the open market for example. So even if the central bank is reluctant to provide a time frame for meetings its objective, the structure of the price-level objective provides a means for the bank to commit to increasing its anti-deflationary efforts when its earlier efforts prove unsuccessful. As Eggertsson and Woodford show, the expectations that an increasing price level gap will give rise to intensified effort by the central bank should lead the public to believe that ultimately inflation will replace deflation, a belief that supports the central bank’s own objectives by lowering the current real rate of interest”
Second, the Fed could use its balance sheet to increase purchases of long-term securities together with credible commitment to maintain the policy until the dual mandates of maximum employment and price stability are attained.
In the restatement of the liquidity trap and large-scale policies of monetary/fiscal stimulus, Krugman (1998, 162) finds:
“In the traditional open economy IS-LM model developed by Robert Mundell [1963] and Marcus Fleming [1962], and also in large-scale econometric models, monetary expansion unambiguously leads to currency depreciation. But there are two offsetting effects on the current account balance. On one side, the currency depreciation tends to increase net exports; on the other side, the expansion of the domestic economy tends to increase imports. For what it is worth, policy experiments on such models seem to suggest that these effects very nearly cancel each other out.
Krugman (1998) uses a different dynamic model with expectations that leads to similar conclusions.
The central bank could also be pursuing competitive devaluation of the national currency in the belief that it could increase inflation to a higher level and promote domestic growth and employment at the expense of growth and unemployment in the rest of the world. An essay by Chairman Bernanke in 1999 on Japanese monetary policy received attention in the press, stating that (Bernanke 2000, 165):
“Roosevelt’s specific policy actions were, I think, less important than his willingness to be aggressive and experiment—in short, to do whatever it took to get the country moving again. Many of his policies did not work as intended, but in the end FDR deserves great credit for having the courage to abandon failed paradigms and to do what needed to be done”
Quantitative easing has never been proposed by Chairman Bernanke or other economists as certain science without adverse effects. What has not been mentioned in the press is another suggestion to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) by Chairman Bernanke in the same essay that is very relevant to current events and the contentious issue of ongoing devaluation wars (Bernanke 2000, 161):
“Because the BOJ has a legal mandate to pursue price stability, it certainly could make a good argument that, with interest rates at zero, depreciation of the yen is the best available tool for achieving its mandated objective. The economic validity of the beggar-thy-neighbor thesis is doubtful, as depreciation creates trade—by raising home country income—as well as diverting it. Perhaps not all those who cite the beggar-thy-neighbor thesis are aware that it had its origins in the Great Depression, when it was used as an argument against the very devaluations that ultimately proved crucial to world economic recovery. A yen trading at 100 to the dollar is in no one’s interest”
Chairman Bernanke is referring to the argument by Joan Robinson based on the experience of the Great Depression that: “in times of general unemployment a game of beggar-my-neighbour is played between the nations, each one endeavouring to throw a larger share of the burden upon the others” (Robinson 1947, 156). Devaluation is one of the tools used in these policies (Robinson 1947, 157). Banking crises dominated the experience of the United States, but countries that recovered were those devaluing early such that competitive devaluations rescued many countries from a recession as strong as that in the US (see references to Ehsan Choudhri, Levis Kochin and Barry Eichengreen in Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 205-9; for the case of Brazil that devalued early in the Great Depression recovering with an increasing trade balance see Pelaez, 1968, 1968b, 1972; Brazil devalued and abandoned the gold standard during crises in the historical period as shown by Pelaez 1976, Pelaez and Suzigan 1981). Beggar-my-neighbor policies did work for individual countries but the criticism of Joan Robinson was that it was not optimal for the world as a whole.
Is depreciation of the dollar the best available tool currently for achieving the dual mandate of higher inflation and lower unemployment? Bernanke (2002) finds dollar devaluation against gold to have been important in preventing further deflation in the 1930s (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm):
“Although a policy of intervening to affect the exchange value of the dollar is nowhere on the horizon today, it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934.17 The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.”
Should the US devalue following Roosevelt? Or has monetary policy intended devaluation? Fed policy is seeking, deliberately or as a side effect, what Irving Fisher proposed “that great depressions are curable and preventable through reflation and stabilization” (Fisher, 1933, 350). The Fed has created not only high volatility of assets but also what many countries are regarding as a competitive devaluation similar to those criticized by Nurkse (1944). Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment.
Friedman (1969) finds that the optimal rule for the quantity of money is deflation at a rate that results in a zero nominal interest rate (see Ireland 2003 and Cole and Kocherlakota 1998). Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) argue that central bankers are not inclined to implement policies that could result in deflation because of the interpretation of the Great Depression as closely related to deflation. They use panel data on inflation and growth of real output for 17 countries over more than 100 years. The time-series data for each individual country are broken into five-year events with deflation measured as average negative inflation and depression as average negative growth rate of real output. Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) find that the Great Depression from 1929 to 1934 is the only case of association between deflation and depression without any evidence whatsoever of such relation in any other period. Their conclusion is (Atkeson and Kehoe 2004, 99): “Our finding thus suggests that policymakers’ fear of anticipated policy-induced deflation that would result from following, say, the Friedman rule is greatly overblown.” Their conclusion on the experience of Japan is (Atkeson and Kehoe 2004, 99):
“Since 1960, Japan’s average growth rates have basically fallen monotonically, and since 1970, its average inflation rates have too. Attributing this 40-year slowdown to monetary forces is a stretch. More reasonable, we think, is that much of the slowdown is the natural pattern for a country that was far behind the world leaders and had begun to catch up.”
In the sample of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), there are only eight five-year periods besides the Great Depression with both inflation and depression. Deflation and depression is shown in 65 cases with 21 of depression without deflation. There is no depression in 65 of 73 five-year periods and there is no deflation in 29 episodes of depression. There is a remarkable result of no depression in 90 percent of deflation episodes. Excluding the Great Depression, there is virtually no relation of deflation and depression. Atkeson and Kehoe (2004, 102) find that the average growth rate of Japan of 1.41 percent in the 1990s is “dismal” when compared with 3.20 percent in the United States but is not “dismal” when compared with 1.61 percent for Italy and 1.84 percent for France, which are also catch-up countries in modern economic growth (see Atkeson and Kehoe 1998). The conclusion of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), without use of controls, is that there is no association of deflation and depression in their dataset.
Benhabib and Spiegel (2009) use a dataset similar to that of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) but allowing for nonlinearity and inflation volatility. They conclude that in cases of low and negative inflation an increase of average inflation of 1 percent is associated with an increase of 0.31 percent of average annual growth. The analysis of Benhabib and Spiegel (2009) leads to the significantly different conclusion that inflation and economic performance are strongly associated for low and negative inflation. There is no claim of causality by Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2009).
Delfim Netto (1959) partly reprinted in Pelaez (1973) conducted two classical nonparametric tests (Mann 1945, Wallis and Moore 1941; see Kendall and Stuart 1968) with coffee-price data in the period of free markets from 1857 to 1906 with the following conclusions (Pelaez, 1976a, 280):
“First, the null hypothesis of no trend was accepted with high confidence; secondly, the null hypothesis of no oscillation was rejected also with high confidence. Consequently, in the nineteenth century international prices of coffee fluctuated but without long-run trend. This statistical fact refutes the extreme argument of structural weakness of the coffee trade.”
In his classic work on the theory of international trade, Jacob Viner (1937, 563) analyzed the “index of total gains from trade,” or “amount of gain per unit of trade,” denoted as T:
T= (∆Pe/∆Pi)∆Q
Where ∆Pe is the change in export prices, ∆Pi is the change in import prices and ∆Q is the change in export volume. Dorrance (1948, 52) restates “Viner’s index of total gain from trade” as:
“What should be done is to calculate an index of the value (quantity multiplied by price) of exports and the price of imports for any country whose foreign accounts are to be analysed. Then the export value index should be divided by the import price index. The result would be an index which would reflect, for the country concerned, changes in the volume of imports obtainable from its export income (i.e. changes in its "real" export income, measured in import terms). The present writer would suggest that this index be referred to as the ‘income terms of trade’ index to differentiate it from the other indexes at present used by economists.”
What really matters for an export activity especially during modernization is the purchasing value of goods that it exports in terms of prices of imports. For a primary producing country, the purchasing power of exports in acquiring new technology from the country providing imports is the critical measurement. The barter terms of trade of Brazil improved from 1857 to 1906 because international coffee prices oscillated without trend (Delfim Netto 1959) while import prices from the United Kingdom declined at the rate of 0.5 percent per year (Imlah 1958). The accurate measurement of the opportunity afforded by the coffee exporting economy was incomparably greater when considering the purchasing power in British prices of the value of coffee exports, or Dorrance’s (1948) income terms of trade.
The conventional theory that the terms of trade of Brazil deteriorated over the long term is without reality (Pelaez 1976a, 280-281):
“Moreover, physical exports of coffee by Brazil increased at the high average rate of 3.5 per cent per year. Brazil's exchange receipts from coffee-exporting in sterling increased at the average rate of 3.5 per cent per year and receipts in domestic currency at 4.5 per cent per year. Great Britain supplied nearly all the imports of the coffee economy. In the period of the free coffee market, British export prices declined at the rate of 0.5 per cent per year. Thus, the income terms of trade of the coffee economy improved at the relatively satisfactory average rate of 4.0 per cent per year. This is only a lower bound of the rate of improvement of the terms of trade. While the quality of coffee remained relatively constant, the quality of manufactured products improved significantly during the fifty-year period considered. The trade data and the non-parametric tests refute conclusively the long-run hypothesis. The valid historical fact is that the tropical export economy of Brazil experienced an opportunity of absorbing rapidly increasing quantities of manufactures from the "workshop" countries. Therefore, the coffee trade constituted a golden opportunity for modernization in nineteenth-century Brazil.”
Imlah (1958) provides decline of British export prices at 0.5 percent in the nineteenth century and there were no lost decades, depressions or unconventional monetary policies in the highly dynamic economy of England that drove the world’s growth impulse. Inflation in the United Kingdom between 1857 and 1906 is measured by the composite price index of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) at minus 7.0 percent or average rate of decline of 0.2 percent per year.
Simon Kuznets (1971) analyzes modern economic growth in his Lecture in Memory of Alfred Nobel:
“The major breakthroughs in the advance of human knowledge, those that constituted dominant sources of sustained growth over long periods and spread to a substantial part of the world, may be termed epochal innovations. And the changing course of economic history can perhaps be subdivided into economic epochs, each identified by the epochal innovation with the distinctive characteristics of growth that it generated. Without considering the feasibility of identifying and dating such economic epochs, we may proceed on the working assumption that modern economic growth represents such a distinct epoch - growth dating back to the late eighteenth century and limited (except in significant partial effects) to economically developed countries. These countries, so classified because they have managed to take adequate advantage of the potential of modern technology, include most of Europe, the overseas offshoots of Western Europe, and Japan—barely one quarter of world population.”
Cameron (1961) analyzes the mechanism by which the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain spread throughout Europe and Cameron (1967) analyzes the financing by banks of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) provide consumer price inflation in England since 1750 and MacFarlane and Mortimer-Lee (1994) analyze inflation in England over 300 years. Lucas (2004) estimates world population and production since the year 1000 with sustained growth of per capita incomes beginning to accelerate for the first time in English-speaking countries and in particular in the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. The conventional theory is unequal distribution of the gains from trade and technical progress between the industrialized countries and developing economies (Singer 1950, 478):
“Dismissing, then, changes in productivity as a governing factor in changing terms of trade, the following explanation presents itself: the fruits of technical progress may be distributed either to producers (in the form of rising incomes) or to consumers (in the form of lower prices). In the case of manufactured commodities produced in more developed countries, the former method, i.e., distribution to producers through higher incomes, was much more important relatively to the second method, while the second method prevailed more in the case of food and raw material production in the underdeveloped countries. Generalizing, we may say -that technical progress in manufacturing industries showed in a rise in incomes while technical progress in the production of food and raw materials in underdeveloped countries showed in a fall in prices”
Temin (1997, 79) uses a Ricardian trade model to discriminate between two views on the Industrial Revolution with an older view arguing broad-based increases in productivity and a new view concentration of productivity gains in cotton manufactures and iron:
“Productivity advances in British manufacturing should have lowered their prices relative to imports. They did. Albert Imlah [1958] correctly recognized this ‘severe deterioration’ in the net barter terms of trade as a signal of British success, not distress. It is no surprise that the price of cotton manufactures fell rapidly in response to productivity growth. But even the price of woolen manufactures, which were declining as a share of British exports, fell almost as rapidly as the price of exports as a whole. It follows, therefore, that the traditional ‘old-hat’ view of the Industrial Revolution is more accurate than the new, restricted image. Other British manufactures were not inefficient and stagnant, or at least, they were not all so backward. The spirit that motivated cotton manufactures extended also to activities as varied as hardware and haberdashery, arms, and apparel.”
Phyllis Deane (1968, 96) estimates growth of United Kingdom gross national product (GNP) at around 2 percent per year for several decades in the nineteenth century. The facts that the terms of trade of Great Britain deteriorated during the period of epochal innovation and high rates of economic growth while the income terms of trade of the coffee economy of nineteenth-century Brazil improved at the average yearly rate of 4.0 percent from 1857 to 1906 disprove the hypothesis of weakness of trade as an explanation of relatively lower income and wealth. As Temin (1997) concludes, Britain did pass on lower prices and higher quality the benefits of technical innovation. Explanation of late modernization must focus on laborious historical research on institutions and economic regimes together with economic theory, data gathering and measurement instead of grand generalizations of weakness of trade and alleged neocolonial dependence (Stein and Stein 1970, 134-5):
“Great Britain, technologically and industrially advanced, became as important to the Latin American economy as to the cotton-exporting southern United States. [After Independence in the nineteenth century] Latin America fell back upon traditional export activities, utilizing the cheapest available factor of production, the land, and the dependent labor force.”
The experience of the United Kingdom with deflation and economic growth is relevant and rich. Table IE-1 uses yearly percentage changes of the composite index of prices of the United Kingdom of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004). There are 73 declines of inflation in the 145 years from 1751 to 1896. Prices declined in 50.3 percent of 145 years. Some price declines were quite sharp and many occurred over several years. Table IE-1 also provides yearly percentage changes of the UK composite price index of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) from 1929 to 1934. Deflation was much sharper in continuous years in earlier periods than during the Great Depression. The United Kingdom could not have led the world in modern economic growth if there were meaningful causality from deflation to depression.
Table IE-1, United Kingdom, Negative Percentage Changes of Composite Price Index, 1751-1896, 1929-1934, Yearly ∆%
Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% |
1751 | -2.7 | 1797 | -10.0 | 1834 | -7.8 | 1877 | -0.7 |
1753 | -2.7 | 1798 | -2.2 | 1841 | -2.3 | 1878 | -2.2 |
1755 | -6.0 | 1802 | -23.0 | 1842 | -7.6 | 1879 | -4.4 |
1758 | -0.3 | 1803 | -5.9 | 1843 | -11.3 | 1881 | -1.1 |
1759 | -7.9 | 1806 | -4.4 | 1844 | -0.1 | 1883 | -0.5 |
1760 | -4.5 | 1807 | -1.9 | 1848 | -12.1 | 1884 | -2.7 |
1761 | -4.5 | 1811 | -2.9 | 1849 | -6.3 | 1885 | -3.0 |
1768 | -1.1 | 1814 | -12.7 | 1850 | -6.4 | 1886 | -1.6 |
1769 | -8.2 | 1815 | -10.7 | 1851 | -3.0 | 1887 | -0.5 |
1770 | -0.4 | 1816 | -8.4 | 1857 | -5.6 | 1893 | -0.7 |
1773 | -0.3 | 1819 | -2.5 | 1858 | -8.4 | 1894 | -2.0 |
1775 | -5.6 | 1820 | -9.3 | 1859 | -1.8 | 1895 | -1.0 |
1776 | -2.2 | 1821 | -12.0 | 1862 | -2.6 | 1896 | -0.3 |
1777 | -0.4 | 1822 | -13.5 | 1863 | -3.6 | 1929 | -0.9 |
1779 | -8.5 | 1826 | -5.5 | 1864 | -0.9 | 1930 | -2.8 |
1780 | -3.4 | 1827 | -6.5 | 1868 | -1.7 | 1931 | -4.3 |
1785 | -4.0 | 1828 | -2.9 | 1869 | -5.0 | 1932 | -2.6 |
1787 | -0.6 | 1830 | -6.1 | 1874 | -3.3 | 1933 | -2.1 |
1789 | -1.3 | 1832 | -7.4 | 1875 | -1.9 | 1934 | 0.0 |
1791 | -0.1 | 1833 | -6.1 | 1876 | -0.3 |
Source:
O’Donoghue, Jim and Louise Goulding, 2004. Consumer Price Inflation since 1750. UK Office for National Statistics Economic Trends 604, Mar 2004, 38-46.
Lucas (2011May) estimates US economic growth in the long-term at 3 percent per year and about 2 percent per year in per capita terms. There are displacements from this trend caused by events such as wars and recessions but the economy then returns to trend. Historical US GDP data exhibit remarkable growth: Lucas (2011May) estimates an increase of US real income per person by a factor of 12 in the period from 1870 to 2010. The explanation by Lucas (2011May) of this remarkable growth experience is that government provided stability and education while elements of “free-market capitalism” were an important driver of long-term growth and prosperity. The analysis is sharpened by comparison with the long-term growth experience of G7 countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan) and Spain from 1870 to 2010. Countries benefitted from “common civilization” and “technology” to “catch up” with the early growth leaders of the US and UK, eventually growing at a faster rate. Significant part of this catch up occurred after World War II. If deflation causes depressions as embedded in the theory of unconventional monetary policy, the United Kingdom would not have been a growth leader in the nineteenth century while staying almost half of the time in deflation.
Nicholas Georgescu-Rogen (1960, 1) reprinted in Pelaez (1973) argues that “the agrarian economy has to this day remained a reality without theory.” The economic history of Latin America shares with the relation of deflation and unconventional monetary policy a more frustrating intellectual misfortune: theory without reality. MacFarlane and Mortimer-Lee (1994, 159) quote in a different context a phrase by Thomas Henry Huxley in the President’s Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science on Sep 14, 1870 that is appropriate to these issues: “The great tragedy of science—the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.”
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
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