Saturday, February 25, 2023

US GDP grew at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (SAAR) of 2.7 percent in IVQ2022, grew at 3.2 percent in IIIQ2022, contracted at SAAR of 0.6 percent in IIQ2022, and contracted at SAAR of 1.6 percent in IQ2022, The Consumer Price index of the United States increased 6.4 percent in Jan 2023 Relative to a Year Earlier, which is the Ninth Highest Since 8.9 percent in Dec 1981, Followed by the Highest of 9.1 percent in Jun 2022, the Second Highest of 8.6 percent in May 2022, 8.5 percent in both Jul 2022 and Mar 2022, 8.3 percent in both Apr and Aug 2022, 8.2 percent in Sep 2022, 7.7 percent in Oct 2022, 7.1 percent in Nov 2022 and 6.5 percent in Dec 2022, US Consumer Prices Increased at Annual Equivalent 3.2 Percent in Nov 2022-Jan 2023 and at 0.5 Percent in Jan 2023 or 6.2 Percent in Annual Equivalent, Consumer Prices Excluding Food and Energy Increased 5.6 Percent in 12 Months Ending in Jan 2023 and at Annual Equivalent 4.5 Percent in Nov 2022-Jan 2023 and Increased 0.4 Percent in Jan 2023 or 4.9 Percent Annual Equivalent, Energy Services Prices Increased 15.6 Percent in 12 Months Ending in Jan 2023, Increased at Annual Equivalent 14.4 Percent in Nov 2022-Jan 2023 and 2.1 Percent in Jan 2023 or at 28.3 Percent Annual Equivalent, Consumer Food Prices Increased 10.1 Percent in 12 Months Ending in Jan 2023 and Increased at Annual Equivalent 6.2 Percent in Nov 2022-Jan 2023 and Increased 0.5 Percent in Jan 2023 or 6.2 Percent Annual Equivalent, Cumulative Decrease of US Manufacturing of 1.1 Percent From Aug 2022 to Jan 2023 at Annual Equivalent minus 2.2 Percent and Increasing 1.0 Percent in Jan 2023, US Manufacturing 0.2 Percent Higher in Jan 2023 Than A Year Earlier in the Global Recession, with Output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the Lockdown of Economic activity in the COVID-19 Event and the Through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), US Manufacturing Underperforming Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Stagflation, Global Recession Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

 

US GDP grew at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (SAAR) of 2.7 percent in IVQ2022, grew at 3.2 percent in IIIQ2022, contracted at SAAR of 0.6 percent in IIQ2022, and contracted at SAAR of 1.6 percent in IQ2022, The Consumer Price index of the United States increased 6.4 percent in Jan 2023 Relative to a Year Earlier, which is the Ninth Highest Since 8.9 percent in Dec 1981, Followed by the Highest of 9.1 percent in Jun 2022, the Second Highest of 8.6 percent in May 2022, 8.5 percent in both Jul 2022 and Mar 2022, 8.3 percent in both Apr and Aug 2022, 8.2 percent in Sep 2022, 7.7 percent in Oct 2022, 7.1 percent in Nov 2022 and 6.5 percent in Dec 2022, US Consumer Prices Increased at Annual Equivalent 3.2 Percent in Nov 2022-Jan 2023 and at 0.5 Percent in Jan 2023 or 6.2 Percent in Annual Equivalent, Consumer Prices Excluding Food and Energy Increased 5.6 Percent in 12 Months Ending in Jan 2023 and at Annual Equivalent 4.5 Percent in Nov 2022-Jan 2023 and Increased 0.4 Percent in Jan 2023 or 4.9 Percent Annual Equivalent, Energy Services Prices Increased 15.6 Percent in 12 Months Ending in Jan 2023, Increased at Annual Equivalent 14.4 Percent in Nov 2022-Jan 2023 and 2.1 Percent in Jan 2023 or at 28.3 Percent Annual Equivalent, Consumer Food Prices Increased 10.1 Percent in 12 Months Ending in Jan 2023 and Increased at Annual Equivalent 6.2 Percent in Nov 2022-Jan 2023 and Increased 0.5 Percent in Jan 2023 or 6.2 Percent Annual Equivalent, Cumulative Decrease of US Manufacturing of 1.1 Percent From Aug 2022 to Jan 2023 at Annual Equivalent minus 2.2 Percent and Increasing 1.0 Percent in Jan 2023, US Manufacturing 0.2 Percent Higher in Jan 2023 Than A Year Earlier in the Global Recession, with Output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the Lockdown of Economic activity in the COVID-19 Event and the Through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), US Manufacturing Underperforming Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Stagflation, Global Recession Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

Note: This Blog will post only one indicator of the US economy while we concentrate efforts in completing a book-length manuscript in the critically important subject of INFLATION.

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023.

I United States Inflation

IB Long-term US Inflation

IC Current US Inflation

I United States Industrial Production

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

Preamble. United States total public debt outstanding is $31.5 trillion and debt held by the public $24.6 trillion (https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/datasets/debt-to-the-penny/debt-to-the-penny). The Net International Investment Position of the United States, or foreign debt, is $16.7 trillion at the end of IIIQ2022 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-12/intinv322.pdf). The United States current account deficit is 3.4 percent of GDP in IIIQ2022, decreasing from 3.8 percent in IIQ2022 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-12/trans322.pdf). The Treasury deficit of the United States reached $2.8 trillion in fiscal year 2021 (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/). Total assets of Federal Reserve Banks reached $8.4 trillion on Feb 22, 2023 and securities held outright reached $8.0 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). US GDP nominal NSA reached $26.1 trillion in IVQ2022 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). US GDP contracted at the real seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 1.6 percent in IQ2022 and contract at the SAAR of 0.6 percent in IIQ2022, growing at 2.9 percent in IIIQ2022 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Total Treasury interest-bearing, marketable debt held by private investors increased from $3635 billion in 2007 to $16,439 billion in Sep 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021) or increase by 352.2 percent (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/). John Hilsenrath, writing on “Economists Seek Recession Cues in the Yield Curve,” published in the Wall Street Journal on Apr 2, 2022, analyzes the inversion of the Treasury yield curve with the two-year yield at 2.430 on Apr 1, 2022, above the ten-year yield at 2.374. Hilsenrath argues that inversion appears to signal recession in market analysis but not in alternative Fed approach.

The Consumer Price index of the United States in Chart CPI-H increased 6.4 percent in Jan 2023 Relative to a Year Earlier, which is the Ninth Highest Since 8.9 percent in Dec 1981, Followed by the Highest of 9.1 percent in Jun 2022, the Second Highest of 8.6 percent in May 2022, 8.5 percent in both Jul 2022 and Mar 2022, 8.3 percent in both Apr and Aug 2022, 8.2 percent in Sep 2022, 7.7 percent in Oct 2022, 7.1 percent in Nov 2022 and 6.5 percent in Dec 2022.

clip_image001

Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Table CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-1982, 2019-2023

Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

1981

11.8

11.4

10.5

10.0

9.8

9.6

10.8

10.8

11.0

10.1

9.6

8.9

1982

8.4

7.6

6.8

6.5

6.7

7.1

6.4

5.9

5.0

5.1

4.6

3.8

2019

1.6

1.5

1.9

2.0

1.8

1.6

1.8

1.7

1.7

1.8

2.1

2.3

2020

2.5

2.3

1.5

0.3

0.1

0.6

1.0

1.3

1.4

1.2

1.2

1.4

2021

1.4

1.7

2.6

4.2

5.0

5.4

5.4

5.3

5.4

6.2

6.8

7.0

2022

7.5

7.9

8.5

8.3

8.6

9.1

8.5

8.3

8.2

7.7

7.1

6.5

2023

6.4

                      

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart VII-3 of the Energy Information Administration provides the US retail price of regular gasoline. The price moved to $3.379 per gallon on Feb 20, 2023 from $3.530 a year earlier or minus 4.3 percent.

clip_image002

Chart VII-3, US Retail Price of Regular Gasoline, Dollars Per Gallon

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/weekly/

Chart VII-3A provides the US retail price of regular gasoline, dollars per gallon, from $1.191 on Aug 20,1990 to $3.379 on Feb 20,2023 or 183.7 percent. The price of retail regular gasoline increased from $2.249/gallon on Jan 4,2021 to $3.379/gallon on Feb 20, 2023, or 50.2 percent. The price of retail regular gasoline decreased from $3.530/gallon on Feb 21, 2022, two days before the invasion of Ukraine, to $3.379/gallon on Feb 20,2023 or minus 4.3 percent and had increased 57.0 percent from $2.249/gallon on Jan 4,2021 to $3.530/gallon on Feb 21, 2022.

clip_image004

Chart VII-3A, US Retail Price of Regular Gasoline, Dollars Per Gallon

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=EMM_EPMR_PTE_NUS_DPG&f=W

Chart VII-4 of the Energy Information Administration provides the price of the Natural Gas Futures Contract increasing from $2.581 per million Btu on Jan 4, 2021 to $5.326 per million Btu on Dec 20, 2022 or 106.4 percent and closing at $2.174 on Feb 22, 2023 or decrease of 15.8 percent.

clip_image006

Chart VII-4, US, Natural Gas Futures Contract 1

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1d.htm

Chart VII-5 of the US Energy Administration provides US field production of oil decreasing from a peak of 13.000 thousand barrels per day in Nov 2019 to the final point of 12.375 thousand barrels per day in Nov 2022.

clip_image008

Chart VII-5, US, US, Field Production of Crude Oil, Thousand Barrels Per Day

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=M

Chart VII-6 of the US Energy Information Administration provides imports of crude oil. Imports increased from 245,473 thousand barrels per day in Jan 2021 to 252,916 thousand barrels in Jan 2022, moving to 249,629 thousand barrels in Nov 2022.

clip_image010

Chart VII-6, US, US, Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Thousand Barrels

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUS1&f=M

Chart VI-7 of the EIA provides US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2020. There was sharp increase in production in the final segment that reached consumption by 2020. There is reversal in 2021 with consumption exceeding production.

clip_image012

Chart VI-7, US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2021, Million Barrels Per Day

https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php

Chart VI-8 provides the US average retail price of electricity at 12.78 cents per kilowatthour in Dec 2020 increasing to 15.64 cents per kilowatthour in Nov 2022 or 22.24 per cent.

clip_image014

Chart VI-8, US Average Retail Price of Electricity, Monthly, Cents per Kilowatthour,

https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.M~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.M&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.M&freq=M&start=200101&end=202205&ctype=linechart&ltype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0

Chart VII-9 provides the fed funds rate and Three Months, Two-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields. Unconventional monetary policy of near zero interest rates is typically followed by financial and economic stress with sharp increases in interest rates.

clip_image015

Chart VII-9, US Fed Funds Rate and Three-Month, Two-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Jan 2, 1994 to Jan 2, 2014

Source: Federal Reserve Board of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

clip_image016

Chart VII-9A, US Fed Funds Rate and Three-Month, Two-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Jan 2, 2022 to Sep 2, 2022

Source: Federal Reserve Board of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Note: Chart is shortened of current dates in download.

Chart VI-14 provides the overnight fed funds rate, the yield of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, the yield of the 30-year constant maturity bond and the conventional mortgage rate from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. In Jan 1991, the fed funds rate was 6.91 percent, the 10-year Treasury yield 8.09 percent, the 30-year Treasury yield 8.27 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 9.64 percent. Before monetary policy tightening in Oct 1993, the rates and yields were 2.99 percent for the fed funds, 5.33 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 5.94 for the 30-year Treasury and 6.83 percent for the conventional mortgage rate. After tightening in Nov 1994, the rates and yields were 5.29 percent for the fed funds rate, 7.96 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 8.08 percent for the 30-year Treasury and 9.17 percent for the conventional mortgage rate.

clip_image018

Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Chart VI-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. There does not appear acceleration of consumer prices requiring aggressive tightening.

clip_image019

Chart VI-15, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. Inflation collapsed during the recession from Jul 1990 (III) and Mar 1991 (I) and the end of the Kuwait War on Feb 25, 1991 that stabilized world oil markets. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Policy tightening had adverse collateral effects in the form of emerging market crises in Mexico and Argentina and fixed income markets worldwide.

clip_image020

Chart VI-16, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Twelve-Month Percentage Change, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart USFX provides the exchange rate of US Dollars per EURO from 2007 to 2023. Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs, Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec 1985), argue that foreign exchange “depreciation was clearly beneficial for initiating countries” during the Great Depression of the 1930s and that it was no equivalent to “beggar my neighbor” policies such as tariffs.

clip_image021\

Chart USFX, Exchange Rate USD/EURO 2007-2023

Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/

Table USFX provides the rate of USD/EURO in selected months. The dollar appreciated sharply from USD 1.2254 on Jan 4, 2021 to 1.0678 on Feb 27, 2023.

Table USFX, USD/EURO Selected Months

Date

USD/EUR

1/4/2021

1.2254

1/5/2021

1.2295

1/6/2021

1.229

1/7/2021

1.2265

1/8/2021

1.2252

1/11/2021

1.2169

1/12/2021

1.2168

1/13/2021

1.2159

1/14/2021

1.2156

1/15/2021

1.2099

1/31/2023

1.0858

2/1/2023

1.0917

2/2/2023

1.0918

2/3/2023

1.0825

2/6/2023

1.0722

2/7/2023

1.0705

2/8/2023

1.0734

2/9/2023

1.0761

2/10/2023

1.067

2/13/2023

1.0718

2/14/2023

1.0722

2/15/2023

1.0683

2/16/2023

1.0684

2/17/2023

1.0678

Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/

Table B provides the exchange rate of Brazil and the trade balance from 1927 to 1939.

Table B, Brazil, Exchange Rate and Trade Balance, 1927-1939

Year

  

Exchange Rate

Mil-Réis per £

  

Trade Balance 1000 Contos

1927

  

40.6

  

370.9

1928

  

40.3

  

275.3

1929

  

40.6

  

332.7

1930

  

49.4

  

563.6

1931

  

62.4

  

1517.2

1932

  

48.1

  

1018.1

1933

  

52.6

  

655

1934

  

59.7

  

956.2

1935

  

57.9

  

248.1

1936

  

58.4

  

626.8

1937

  

56.9

  

-222.5

1938

  

57.6

  

-98.7

1939

  

71.1

  

631.9

Source: Carlos Manuel Peláez, Análise Econômica do Programa Brasileiro de Sustentação do Café 1906-1945: Teoria, Política e Medição, Revista Brasileira de Economia, Vol. 25, N 4, Out/Dez 1971, 5-213.

Christina D. Romer argues that growth of the money stock was critical in the recovery of the United States from the Great Depression (Christina D. Romer, What ended the Great Depression? The Journal of Economic History, Volume 52, Number 4, Dec 1992, pp 757-784).

Table C, Brazil, Yearly Percentage Changes of the Money Stock, M1 and M2, Terms of Trade, Industrial Production, Real Gross National Product and Real Gross Income Per Capita, 1930-1939

Period

M1

M2

Exchange Rate

Terms of Trade

Industrial Production

Real GNP

Real Gross Income Per Capita

1929/30

-9

-4

22

-34

-5

-1

-10

1930/31

4

1

26

-5

8

-3

-6

1931/32

15

7

-23

8

0

6

2

1932/33

10

4

10

-15

16

10

7

1933/34

5

6

13

5

13

7

5

1934/35

7

8

-3

-28

14

1

-4

1935/36

10

11

1

2

14

12

9

1936/37

10

9

-3

2

7

3

0

1937/38

19

13

1

-11

6

4

-1

1938/39

0

8

23

-12

14

4

2

Source: Carlos Manuel Peláez and Wilson Suzigan, História Monetária do Brasil. Segunda Edição Revisada e Ampliada. Coleção Temas Brasileiros, Universidade de Brasília, 1981.

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

Inflation and unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment. Chart VI-1B for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart VI-1B cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s. The loans were used in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on inflation and the economy.  This interpretation is consistent with the case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises frm the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a plausible interpretation of this pattern.”

The reading of the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the output gap and inflation expectations:

“So, inflation is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’ or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with ‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen in economies well below potential.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”

Chart VI-1B provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that period. Chart VI-1B used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of unemployment in large urban centers.

clip_image023

Chart VI1-B, Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987

Source: ©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.

I D Current US Inflation. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and large-scale purchases of long-term securities for the balance sheet of the central bank is proposed to prevent deflation. The data of CPI inflation of all goods and CPI inflation excluding food and energy for the past six decades does not show even one negative change, as shown in Table CPIEX. There is acceleration in 2021 and 2022.

Table CPIEX, Annual Percentage Changes of the CPI All Items Excluding Food and Energy

Year

Annual ∆%

1958

2.4

1959

2.0

1960

1.3

1961

1.3

1962

1.3

1963

1.3

1964

1.6

1965

1.2

1966

2.4

1967

3.6

1968

4.6

1969

5.8

1970

6.3

1971

4.7

1972

3.0

1973

3.6

1974

8.3

1975

9.1

1976

6.5

1977

6.3

1978

7.4

1979

9.8

1980

12.4

1981

10.4

1982

7.4

1983

4.0

1984

5.0

1985

4.3

1986

4.0

1987

4.1

1988

4.4

1989

4.5

1990

5.0

1991

4.9

1992

3.7

1993

3.3

1994

2.8

1995

3.0

1996

2.7

1997

2.4

1998

2.3

1999

2.1

2000

2.4

2001

2.6

2002

2.4

2003

1.4

2004

1.8

2005

2.2

2006

2.5

2007

2.3

2008

2.3

2009

1.7

2010

1.0

2011

1.7

2012

2.1

2013

1.8

2014

1.7

2015

1.8

2016

2.2

2017

1.8

2018

2.1

2019

2.2

2020

1.7

2021

3.6

2022

6.2

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-12 provides the consumer price index NSA from 1913 to 2022. The dominating characteristic is the increase in slope during the Great Inflation from the middle of the 1960s through the 1970s. There is long-term inflation in the US and no evidence of deflation risks. There is increasing inflation in 2021-2023.

clip_image024

Chart I-12, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 1913-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-13 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 1914 to 2023. The only episode of deflation after 1950 is in 2009, which is explained by the reversal of speculative commodity futures carry trades that were induced by interest rates driven to zero in a shock of monetary policy in 2008. The only persistent case of deflation is from 1930 to 1933, which has little if any relevance to the contemporary United States economy. There are actually three waves of inflation in the second half of the 1960s, in the mid-1970s and again in the late 1970s. Inflation rates then stabilized in a range with only two episodes above 5 percent. There are current higher rates of inflation.

clip_image025

Chart I-13, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, 12- Month Percentage Change 1914-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Table I-2 provides annual percentage changes of United States consumer price inflation from 1914 to 2022. There have been only cases of annual declines of the CPI after wars:

  • World War I minus 10.5 percent in 1921 and minus 6.1 percent in 1922 following cumulative increases of 83.5 percent in four years from 1917 to 1920 at the average of 16.4 percent per year
  • World War II: minus 1.2 percent in 1949 following cumulative 33.9 percent in three years from 1946 to 1948 at average 10.2 percent per year
  • Minus 0.4 percent in 1955 two years after the end of the Korean War
  • Minus 0.4 percent in 2009.
  • The decline of 0.4 percent in 2009 followed increase of 3.8 percent in 2008 and is explained by the reversal of speculative carry trades into commodity futures that were created in 2008 as monetary policy rates were driven to zero. The reversal occurred after misleading statement on toxic assets in banks in the proposal for TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009).

There were declines of 1.7 percent in both 1927 and 1928 during the episode of revival of rules of the gold standard. The only persistent deflationary period since 1914 was during the Great Depression in the years from 1930 to 1933 and again in 1938-1939. Consumer prices increased only 0.1 percent in 2015 because of the collapse of commodity prices from artificially high levels induced by zero interest rates. Consumer prices increased 1.3 percent in 2016, increasing at 2.1 percent in 2017. Consumer prices increased 2.4 percent in 2018, increasing at 1.8 percent in 2019. Consumer prices increased 1.2 percent in 2020. Consumer prices increased 4.7 percent in 2021 during fiscal, monetary, and external imbalances. Consumer prices increased 8.0 percent in 2022. Fear of deflation based on that experience does not justify unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates that has failed to stop deflation in Japan. Financial repression causes far more adverse effects on allocation of resources by distorting the calculus of risk/returns than alleged employment-creating effects or there would not be current recovery without jobs and hiring after zero interest rates since Dec 2008 and intended now forever in a self-imposed forecast growth and employment mandate of monetary policy. Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzed 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). Jon Hilsenrath demonstrates that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.

Table I-2, US, Annual CPI Inflation ∆% 1914-2022

Year

Annual ∆%

1914

1.0

1915

1.0

1916

7.9

1917

17.4

1918

18.0

1919

14.6

1920

15.6

1921

-10.5

1922

-6.1

1923

1.8

1924

0.0

1925

2.3

1926

1.1

1927

-1.7

1928

-1.7

1929

0.0

1930

-2.3

1931

-9.0

1932

-9.9

1933

-5.1

1934

3.1

1935

2.2

1936

1.5

1937

3.6

1938

-2.1

1939

-1.4

1940

0.7

1941

5.0

1942

10.9

1943

6.1

1944

1.7

1945

2.3

1946

8.3

1947

14.4

1948

8.1

1949

-1.2

1950

1.3

1951

7.9

1952

1.9

1953

0.8

1954

0.7

1955

-0.4

1956

1.5

1957

3.3

1958

2.8

1959

0.7

1960

1.7

1961

1.0

1962

1.0

1963

1.3

1964

1.3

1965

1.6

1966

2.9

1967

3.1

1968

4.2

1969

5.5

1970

5.7

1971

4.4

1972

3.2

1973

6.2

1974

11.0

1975

9.1

1976

5.8

1977

6.5

1978

7.6

1979

11.3

1980

13.5

1981

10.3

1982

6.2

1983

3.2

1984

4.3

1985

3.6

1986

1.9

1987

3.6

1988

4.1

1989

4.8

1990

5.4

1991

4.2

1992

3.0

1993

3.0

1994

2.6

1995

2.8

1996

3.0

1997

2.3

1998

1.6

1999

2.2

2000

3.4

2001

2.8

2002

1.6

2003

2.3

2004

2.7

2005

3.4

2006

3.2

2007

2.8

2008

3.8

2009

-0.4

2010

1.6

2011

3.2

2012

2.1

2013

1.5

2014

1.6

2015

0.1

2016

1.3

2017

2.1

2018

2.4

2019

1.8

2020

1.2

2021

4.7

2022

8.0

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-14 provides the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1957 to 2023. There is long-term inflation in the US without episodes of persistent deflation.

clip_image026

Chart I-14, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1957-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-15 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1958 to 2023. There are three waves of inflation in the 1970s during the Great Inflation. There is no episode of deflation. There is renewed inflation currently.

clip_image027

Chart I-15, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1958-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

The consumer price index of housing is in Chart I-16. There was also acceleration during the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The index flattens after the global recession in IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Housing prices collapsed under the weight of construction of several times more housing than needed. Surplus housing originated in subsidies and artificially low interest rates in the shock of unconventional monetary policy in 2003 to 2004 in fear of deflation.

clip_image028

Chart I-16, US, Consumer Price Index Housing, NSA, 1967-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-17 provides 12-month percentage changes of the housing CPI. The Great Inflation also had extremely high rates of housing inflation. Housing is considered as potential hedge of inflation. There is current higher inflation.

clip_image029

Chart I-17, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, 12- Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1968-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

ID Current US Inflation. Consumer price inflation has fluctuated in recent months. Table I-3 provides 12-month consumer price inflation in Jan 2023 and annual equivalent percentage changes for the months from Nov 2022 to Jan 2023 of the CPI, the core CPI and major segments. The final column provides inflation from Dec 2022 to Jan 2022. CPI inflation increased 6.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2023. The annual equivalent rate from Nov 2022 to Jan 2023 was 3.2 percent in the episode of shifting energy sources; and the monthly inflation rate of 0.5 percent annualizes at 6.2 percent. Prior inflation rates fluctuate in accordance with inducement of risk appetite or frustration by risk aversion of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. At the margin, the decline in commodity prices in sharp recent risk aversion in commodities markets caused lower inflation worldwide (with return in some countries in Dec 2012 and Jan-Feb 2013) that followed a jump in Aug-Sep 2012 because of the relaxed risk aversion resulting from the bond-buying program of the European Central Bank or Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). Carry trades moved away from commodities into stocks with resulting weaker commodity prices and stronger equity valuations. There is reversal of exposures in commodities but with preferences of equities by investors. Geopolitical events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East together with economic conditions worldwide are inducing risk concerns in commodities at the margin magnified by policies shifting energy sources. With zero or very low interest rates, commodity prices would increase again in an environment of risk appetite, as shown in past oscillating inflation. Excluding food and energy, core CPI inflation was 5.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2023, 4.5 percent in annual equivalent from Nov 2022 to Jan 2023 and 0.4 percent in Jan 2023, which annualizes at 4.9 percent. There is no deflation in the US economy that could justify further unconventional monetary policy open-ended or forever with very low interest rates and cessation of bond-buying by the central bank but with reinvestment of interest and principal, or QE→∞ even if the economy grows back to potential. The FOMC engaged in increases in the Fed balance sheet. Financial repression of very low interest rates constituted protracted distortion of resource allocation by clouding risk/return decisions, preventing the economy from expanding along its optimal growth path. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues. On Dec 14 , 2022, the FOMC increased interest rates with the following statement (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20230201a.htm): “The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 4-1/2 to 4-3/4 percent. The Committee anticipates that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate in order to attain a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent over time. In determining the extent of future increases in the target range, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, as described in its previously announced plans. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective.”

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

Table I-3, US, Consumer Price Index Percentage Changes 12 months NSA and Annual Equivalent ∆%

 

% RI

Dec 2022

∆% 12 Months Jan 2023/Jan
2022 NSA

∆% Annual Equivalent Nov 2022 to Jan 2023 SA

∆% Jan 2023/Dec 2022 SA

CPI All Items

100.000

6.4

3.2

0.5

CPI ex Food and Energy

79.548

5.6

4.5

0.4

Food

13.531

10.1

6.2

0.5

Energy

6.921

8.7

-9.8

2.0

Gasoline

3.172

1.5

-25.1

2.4

Energy Services

3.431

15.6

14.4

2.1

Electricity

2.541

11.9

9.6

0.5

Utility Gas

0.890

26.7

29.5

6.7

Shelter

34.413

7.9

8.7

0.7

Medical Care Services

6.653

3.0

-3.6

-0.7

Transportation Services

5.750

14.6

7.4

0.9

% RI: Percent Relative Importance

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Table I-4 provides relative important components of the consumer price index. The relative important weights for Dec 2022 are in Table I-3.

Table I-4, US, Relative Importance, 2009-2010 Weights, of Components in the Consumer Price Index, US City Average, Dec 2012

All Items

100.000

Food and Beverages

15.261

  Food

   14.312

  Food at home

     8.898

  Food away from home

     5.713

Housing

41.021

  Shelter

    31.681

  Rent of primary residence

      6.545

  Owners’ equivalent rent

    22.622

Apparel

  3.564

Transportation

16.846

  Private Transportation

    15.657

  New vehicles

      3.189

  Used cars and trucks

      1.844

  Motor fuel

      5.462

    Gasoline

      5.274

Medical Care

7.163

  Medical care commodities

      1.714

  Medical care services

      5.448

Recreation

5.990

Education and Communication

6.779

Other Goods and Services

3.376

Refers to all urban consumers, covering approximately 87 percent of the US population (see http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiovrvw.htm#item1). Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiri2011.pdf http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiriar.htm http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpiri2012.pdf

Chart I-18 provides the US consumer price index for housing from 2001 to 2023. Housing prices rose sharply during the decade until the bump of the global recession and increased again in 2011-2012 with some stabilization in 2013. There is renewed increase in 2014 followed by stabilization and renewed increase in 2015-2023. The CPI excluding housing would likely show much higher inflation. The commodity carry trades resulting from unconventional monetary policy have compressed income remaining after paying for indispensable shelter.

clip_image030

Chart I-18, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, NSA, 2001-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-19 provides 12-month percentage changes of the housing CPI. Percentage changes collapsed during the global recession but have been rising into positive territory in 2011 and 2012-2013 but with the rate declining and then increasing into 2014. There is decrease into 2015 followed by stability and marginal increase in 2016-2019 followed by initial decline in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) with sharp recovery.

clip_image031

Chart I-19, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

There have been waves of consumer price inflation in the US in 2011 and into 2023 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-70-percent-in.html) that are illustrated in Table I-5. The first wave occurred in Jan-Apr 2011 and was caused by the carry trade of commodity prices induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates. Cheap money at zero opportunity cost in environment of risk appetite was channeled into financial risk assets, causing increases in commodity prices. The annual equivalent rate of increase of the all-items CPI in Jan-Apr 2011 was 4.9 percent and the CPI excluding food and energy increased at annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent. The second wave occurred during the collapse of the carry trade from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity futures because of risk aversion in financial markets created by the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The annual equivalent rate of increase of the all-items CPI dropped to 1.8 percent in May-Jun 2011 while the annual equivalent rate of the CPI excluding food and energy increased at 2.4 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent CPI inflation rose to 3.2 percent while the core CPI increased at 2.4 percent. The fourth wave occurred in the form of increase of the CPI all-items annual equivalent rate to 1.8 percent in Oct-Nov 2011 with the annual equivalent rate of the CPI excluding food and energy remaining at 2.4 percent. The fifth wave occurred in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 with annual equivalent headline inflation of 1.8 percent and core inflation of 2.4 percent. In the sixth wave, headline CPI inflation increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Feb-Apr 2012 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The seventh wave in May-Jul occurred with annual equivalent inflation of minus 1.2 percent for the headline CPI in May-Jul 2012 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The eighth wave is with annual equivalent inflation of 6.8 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 but 5.7 percent including Oct. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Nov 2012 was minus 2.4 percent under the new shock of risk aversion and 0.0 percent in Dec 2012 with annual equivalent of 0.0 percent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent of the headline CPI was 6.2 percent in Feb 2013 and 1.2 percent for the core CPI. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent was minus 3.0 percent in Mar-Apr 2013 and 0.6 percent for the core index. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.4 percent in May-Sep 2013 and 2.2 percent for the core CPI. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent CPI inflation in Oct-Nov 2013 was 1.8 percent and 1.8 percent for the core CPI. Inflation returned in the fourteenth wave at 2.4 percent for the headline CPI index and 1.8 percent for the core CPI in annual equivalent for Dec 2013 to Mar 2014. In the fifteenth wave, inflation moved to annual equivalent 1.8 percent for the headline index in Apr-Jul 2014 and 2.1 percent for the core index. In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 0.0 percent in Aug 2014 and 1.2 percent for the core index. In the seventeenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 0.0 percent for the headline CPI and 2.4 percent for the core in Sep-Oct 2014. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.3 percent for the headline index in Nov 2014-Jan 2015 and 1.2 percent for the core. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.2 percent for the headline index and 2.2 percent for the core index in Feb-Jun 2015. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 2.4 percent in Jul 2015 for the headline and core indexes. In the twenty-first wave, headline consumer prices decreased at 1.2 percent in annual equivalent in Aug-Sep 2015 while core prices increased at annual equivalent 1.8 percent. In the twenty-second wave, consumer prices increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent for the central index and 2.4 percent for the core in Oct-Nov 2015. In the twenty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 0.6 percent for the headline CPI in Dec 2015 to Jan 2016 and 1.8 percent for the core. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent was minus 1.2 percent and 2.4 percent for the core in Feb 2016. In the twenty-fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 4.3 percent for the central index in Mar-Apr 2016 and at 3.0 percent for the core index. In the twenty-sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.0 percent for the central CPI in May-Jun 2016 and 2.4 percent for the core CPI. In the twenty-seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent for the central CPI and 1.2 percent for the core in Jul 2016. In the twenty-eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent for the headline CPI in Aug 2016 and 2.4 percent for the core. In the twenty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 3.0 percent in Sep-Oct 2016 while the core CPI increased at 1.8 percent. In the thirtieth wave, annual equivalent CPI prices increased at 2.4 percent in Nov-Dec 2016 while the core CPI increased at 1.8 percent. In the thirty-first wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Jan 2017 while the core index increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-second wave, CPI prices changed at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Feb 2017 while the core increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-third wave, CPI prices changed at annual equivalent 0.0 percent in Mar 2017 while the core index changed at 0.0 percent. In the thirty-fourth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Apr 2017 while the core index increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-fifth wave, CPI prices changed at 0.0 annual equivalent in May-Jun 2017 while core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-sixth wave, CPI prices changed at annual equivalent 0.0 percent in Jul 2017 while core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-seventh wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Aug-Sep 2017 while core prices increased at 1.8 percent. In the thirty-eighth wave, CPI prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Oct-Nov 2017 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2017-Feb 2018 while core prices increased at 2.8 percent. In the fortieth wave, CPI prices changed at 0.0 percent annual equivalent in Mar 2018 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-first wave, CPI prices increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent in Apr-May 2018 while core prices increased at 1.8 percent. In the forty-second wave, CPI prices increased at 1.8 percent in Jun-Sep 2018 while core prices increased at 1.5 percent. In the forty-third wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Oct 2018 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-fourth wave, CPI prices changed at 0.0 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2018-Jan 2019 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-fifth wave, CPI prices increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Apr 2019 while core prices increased at 2.0 percent. In the forty-sixth wave, CPI prices decreased at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in May-Jun 2019 while core prices increased at 1.8 percent. In the forty-seventh wave, CPI prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Jul 2019 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-eighth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent in Aug-Sep 2019 while core prices increased at 3.0 percent. In the forty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at 3.2 percent annual equivalent in Oct-Dec 2019 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the fiftieth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2020 and core prices at 3.0 percent. In the fifty-first wave, CPI prices decreased at annual equivalent 5.1 percent in Mar-May 2020 while core prices decreased at 2.8 percent. In the fifty-second wave, CPI prices increased at 5.5 percent annual equivalent in Jun-Jul 2020 and core prices increased at 3.7 percent. In the fifty-third wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent and core prices increased at 3.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2020. In the fifty-fourth wave, CPI prices increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and core prices at 1.2 percent in Oct 2020. In the fifty-fifth wave, CPI prices increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2020-Jan 2021 and core prices at 1.2 percent. In the fifty-sixth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Feb-Mar 2021 and core prices at 2.4 percent. In the fifty-seventh wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 9.2 percent in Apr-Jun 2021 and core prices at 9.2 percent. In the fifty-eighth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Jul-Sep 2021 and core prices at 3.2 percent. In the fifty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 10.7 percent in Oct-Nov 2021 while core prices increased at 8.1 percent. In the sixtieth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 8.7 percent and core prices increased at 7.4 percent in Dec 2021-Feb 2022. In the sixty-first wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 12.7 percent and core prices at 3.7 percent in Mar 2022. In the sixty-second wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Apr 2022 and core prices at 6.2 percent. In the sixty-third wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 13.4 percent in May-Jun 2022 and core prices at 7.4 percent. In the sixty-fourth wave, CPI prices changed at annual equivalent 0.0 percent in Jul 2022 and core prices increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent. In the sixty-fifth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Aug 2022 and core prices at 7.4 percent annual equivalent. In the sixty-sixth wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Sep-Oct 2022 and core prices at 5.5 percent. In the sixty-seventh wave, CPI prices increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Nov 2022 and core prices at 3.7 percent. In the sixty-eighth wave, CPI prices decreased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent while core prices increased at 4.9 percent in Dec 2022. In the sixty-ninth wave, CPI prices increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent in Jan 2023 and core prices at 4.9 percent. The conclusion is that inflation accelerates and decelerates in unpredictable fashion because of shocks or risk aversion and portfolio reallocations in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity derivatives. There are recent increases in shifting sources of energy.

Table I-5, US, Headline and Core CPI Inflation Monthly SA and 12 Months NSA ∆%

 

All Items 

SA Month

All Items NSA 12 month

Core SA
Month

Core NSA
12 months

Jan 2023

0.5

6.4

0.4

5.6

AE Jan

6.2

  

4.9

  

Dec 2022

0.1

6.5

0.4

5.7

AE Dec

1.2

  

4.9

  

Nov

0.2

7.1

0.3

6.0

AE Nov

2.4

  

3.7

  

Oct

0.5

7.7

0.3

6.3

Sep

0.4

8.2

0.6

6.6

AE Sep-Oct

5.5

  

5.5

  

Aug

0.2

8.3

0.6

6.3

AE Aug

2.4

  

7.4

  

Jul

0.0

8.5

0.3

5.9

AE Jul

0.0

  

3.7

  

Jun

1.2

9.1

0.6

5.9

May

0.9

8.6

0.6

6.0

AE May-Jun

13.4

  

7.4

  

Apr

0.4

8.3

0.5

6.2

AE Apr

4.9

  

6.2

  

Mar

1.0

8.5

0.3

6.5

AE Mar

12.7

  

3.7

  

Feb

0.7

7.9

0.5

6.4

Jan

0.6

7.5

0.6

6.0

Dec 2021

0.8

7.0

0.7

5.5

AE Dec-Feb

8.7

  

7.4

  

Nov

0.8

6.8

0.6

4.9

Oct

0.9

6.2

0.7

4.6

AE Oct-Nov

10.7

  

8.1

  

Sep

0.4

5.4

0.3

4.0

Aug

0.4

5.3

0.2

4.0

Jul

0.4

5.4

0.3

4.3

AE Jul-Sep

4.9

  

3.2

  

Jun

0.8

5.4

0.7

4.5

May

0.7

5.0

0.7

3.8

Apr

0.7

4.2

0.8

3.0

AE Apr-Jun

9.2

  

9.2

  

Mar

0.5

2.6

0.3

1.6

Feb

0.4

1.7

0.1

1.3

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

5.5

  

2.4

  

Jan

0.2

1.4

0.0

1.4

Dec 2020

0.5

1.4

0.1

1.6

Nov

0.2

1.2

0.2

1.6

AE ∆% Nov-Jan

3.7

  

1.2

  

Oct

0.1

1.2

0.1

1.6

AE ∆% Oct

1.2

  

1.2

  

Sep

0.2

1.4

0.2

1.7

Aug

0.4

1.3

0.4

1.7

AE ∆% Aug-Sep

3.7

  

3.7

  

Jul

0.5

1.0

0.5

1.6

Jun

0.4

0.6

0.1

1.2

AE ∆% Jun-Jul

5.5

  

3.7

  

May

-0.1

0.1

-0.1

1.2

Apr

-0.8

0.3

-0.5

1.4

Mar

-0.4

1.5

-0.1

2.1

AE ∆% Mar-May

-5.1

  

-2.8

  

Feb

0.1

2.3

0.2

2.4

Jan

0.2

2.5

0.3

2.3

AE ∆% Jan-Feb

1.8

  

3.0

  

Dec 2019

0.3

2.3

0.2

2.3

Nov

0.2

2.1

0.2

2.3

Oct

0.3

1.8

0.2

2.3

AE ∆% Oct-Dec

3.2

  

2.4

  

Sep

0.2

1.7

0.2

2.4

Aug

0.1

1.7

0.3

2.4

AE ∆% Aug-Sep

1.8

  

3.0

  

Jul

0.2

1.8

0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Jul

2.4

  

2.4

  

Jun

-0.1

1.6

0.2

2.1

May

0.0

1.8

0.1

2.0

AE ∆% May-Jun

-0.6

  

1.8

  

Apr

0.4

2.0

0.2

2.1

Mar

0.3

1.9

0.2

2.0

Feb

0.2

1.5

0.1

2.1

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

3.7

  

2.0

  

Jan

0.0

1.6

0.2

2.2

Dec 2018

0.1

1.9

0.2

2.2

Nov

-0.1

2.2

0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Nov-Jan

0.0

  

2.4

  

Oct

0.2

2.5

0.2

2.1

AE ∆% Oct

2.4

  

2.4

  

Sep

0.2

2.3

0.2

2.2

Aug

0.2

2.7

0.1

2.2

Jul

0.1

2.9

0.1

2.4

Jun

0.1

2.9

0.1

2.3

AE ∆% Jun-Sep

1.8

  

1.5

  

May

0.2

2.8

0.2

2.2

Apr

0.3

2.5

0.1

2.1

AE ∆% Apr-May

3.0

  

1.8

  

Mar

0.0

2.4

0.2

2.1

AE ∆% Mar

0.0

  

2.4

  

Feb

0.3

2.2

0.2

1.8

Jan

0.4

2.1

0.3

1.8

Dec 2017

0.2

2.1

0.2

1.8

AE ∆% Dec-Feb

3.7

  

2.8

  

Nov

0.3

2.2

0.1

1.7

Oct

0.1

2.0

0.3

1.8

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

2.4

  

2.4

  

Sep

0.5

2.2

0.1

1.7

Aug

0.4

1.9

0.2

1.7

AE ∆% Aug-Sep

5.5

  

1.8

  

Jul

0.0

1.7

0.1

1.7

AE ∆% Jul

0.0

  

1.2

  

Jun

0.1

1.6

0.1

1.7

May

-0.1

1.9

0.1

1.7

AE ∆% May-Jun

0.0

  

1.2

  

Apr

0.1

2.2

0.1

1.9

AE ∆% Apr

1.2

  

1.2

  

Mar

0.0

2.4

0.0

2.0

AE ∆% Mar

0.0

  

0.0

  

Feb

0.2

2.7

0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Feb

2.4

  

2.4

  

Jan

0.4

2.5

0.2

2.3

AE ∆% Jan

4.9

  

2.4

  

Dec 2016

0.3

2.1

0.2

2.2

Nov

0.1

1.7

0.1

2.1

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

2.4

  

1.8

  

Oct

0.2

1.6

0.1

2.1

Sep

0.3

1.5

0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Sep-Oct

3.0

  

1.8

  

Aug

0.2

1.1

0.2

2.3

AE ∆ Aug

2.4

  

2.4

  

Jul

-0.1

0.8

0.1

2.2

AE ∆% Jul

-1.2

  

1.2

  

Jun

0.3

1.0

0.2

2.2

May

0.2

1.0

0.2

2.2

AE ∆% May-Jun

3.0

  

2.4

  

Apr

0.4

1.1

0.3

2.1

Mar

0.3

0.9

0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Mar-Apr

4.3

  

3.0

  

Feb

-0.1

1.0

0.2

2.3

AE ∆% Feb

-1.2

  

2.4

  

Jan

0.0

1.4

0.2

2.2

Dec 2015

-0.1

0.7

0.1

2.1

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

-0.6

  

1.8

  

Nov

0.1

0.5

0.2

2.0

Oct

0.1

0.2

0.2

1.9

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

1.2

  

2.4

  

Sep

-0.2

0.0

0.2

1.9

Aug

0.0

0.2

0.1

1.8

AE ∆% Aug-Sep

-1.2

  

1.8

  

Jul

0.2

0.2

0.2

1.8

AE ∆% Jul

2.4

  

2.4

  

Jun

0.3

0.1

0.2

1.8

May

0.3

0.0

0.1

1.7

Apr

0.1

-0.2

0.2

1.8

Mar

0.3

-0.1

0.2

1.8

Feb

0.3

0.0

0.2

1.7

AE ∆% Feb-Jun

3.2

  

2.2

  

Jan

-0.6

-0.1

0.1

1.6

Dec 2014

-0.3

0.8

0.1

1.6

Nov

-0.2

1.3

0.1

1.7

AE ∆% Nov-Jan

-4.3

  

1.2

  

Oct

0.0

1.7

0.2

1.8

Sep

0.0

1.7

0.2

1.7

AE ∆% Sep-Oct

0.0

  

2.4

  

Aug

0.0

1.7

0.1

1.7

AE ∆% Aug

0.0

  

1.2

  

Jul

0.1

2.0

0.2

1.9

Jun

0.1

2.1

0.1

1.9

May

0.2

2.1

0.2

2.0

Apr

0.2

2.0

0.2

1.8

AE ∆% Apr-Jul

1.8

  

2.1

  

Mar

0.2

1.5

0.2

1.7

Feb

0.1

1.1

0.1

1.6

Jan

0.2

1.6

0.1

1.6

Dec 2013

0.3

1.5

0.2

1.7

AE ∆% Dec-Mar

2.4

  

1.8

  

Nov

0.2

1.2

0.2

1.7

Oct

0.1

1.0

0.1

1.7

AE ∆%

Oct-Nov

1.8

  

1.8

  

Sep

0.0

1.2

0.2

1.7

Aug

0.2

1.5

0.2

1.8

Jul

0.2

2.0

0.2

1.7

Jun

0.2

1.8

0.2

1.6

May

0.0

1.4

0.1

1.7

AE ∆%

May-Sep

1.4

  

2.2

  

Apr

-0.2

1.1

0.0

1.7

Mar

-0.3

1.5

0.1

1.9

AE ∆%

Mar-Apr

-3.0

  

0.6

  

Feb

0.5

2.0

0.1

2.0

AE ∆% Feb

6.2

  

1.2

  

Jan

0.2

1.6

0.2

1.9

Dec 2012

0.0

1.7

0.2

1.9

Nov

-0.2

1.8

0.1

1.9

AE ∆% Nov-Jan

0.0

  

2.0

  

Oct

0.3

2.2

0.2

2.0

Sep

0.5

2.0

0.2

2.0

Aug

0.6

1.7

0.1

1.9

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

5.7

  

2.0

  

Jul

0.0

1.4

0.2

2.1

Jun

-0.1

1.7

0.2

2.2

May

-0.2

1.7

0.1

2.3

AE ∆% May-Jul

-1.2

  

2.0

  

Apr

0.2

2.3

0.2

2.3

Mar

0.2

2.7

0.2

2.3

Feb

0.2

2.9

0.1

2.2

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

2.4

  

2.0

  

Jan

0.3

2.9

0.2

2.3

Dec 2011

0.0

3.0

0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

1.8

  

2.4

  

Nov

0.2

3.4

0.2

2.2

Oct

0.1

3.5

0.2

2.1

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

1.8

  

2.4

  

Sep

0.2

3.9

0.1

2.0

Aug

0.3

3.8

0.3

2.0

Jul

0.3

3.6

0.2

1.8

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

3.2

  

2.4

  

Jun

0.0

3.6

0.2

1.6

May

0.3

3.6

0.2

1.5

AE ∆%  May-Jun

1.8

  

2.4

  

Apr

0.5

3.2

0.1

1.3

Mar

0.5

2.7

0.1

1.2

Feb

0.3

2.1

0.2

1.1

Jan

0.3

1.6

0.2

1.0

AE ∆%  Jan-Apr

4.9

  

1.8

  

Dec 2010

0.4

1.5

0.1

0.8

Nov

0.3

1.1

0.1

0.8

Oct

0.3

1.2

0.1

0.6

Sep

0.2

1.1

0.1

0.8

Aug

0.1

1.1

0.1

0.9

Jul

0.2

1.2

0.1

0.9

Jun

0.0

1.1

0.1

0.9

May

-0.1

2.0

0.1

0.9

Apr

0.0

2.2

0.0

0.9

Mar

0.0

2.3

0.0

1.1

Feb

-0.1

2.1

0.0

1.3

Jan

0.1

2.6

-0.1

1.6

Note: Core: excluding food and energy; AE: annual equivalent

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/

The behavior of the US consumer price index NSA from 2001 to 2023 is in Chart I-20. Inflation in the US is very dynamic without deflation risks that would justify symmetric inflation targets. The hump in 2008 originated in the carry trade from interest rates dropping to zero into commodity futures. There is no other explanation for the increase of the Cushing OK Crude Oil Future Contract 1 from $55.64/barrel on Jan 9, 2007 to $145.29/barrel on July 3, 2008 during deep global recession, collapsing under a panic of flight into government obligations and the US dollar to $37.51/barrel on Feb 13, 2009 and then rising by carry trades to $113.93/barrel on Apr 29, 2012, collapsing again and then recovering again to $105.23/barrel, all during mediocre economic recovery with peaks and troughs influenced by bouts of risk appetite and risk aversion (data from the US Energy Information Administration EIA, https://www.eia.gov/). The unwinding of the carry trade with the TARP announcement of toxic assets in banks channeled cheap money into government obligations (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There is sharp increase in 2021 and into 2022-2023.

clip_image032

Chart I-20, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 2001-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-21 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 2001 to 2023. There was no deflation or threat of deflation from 2008 into 2009. Commodity prices collapsed during the panic of toxic assets in banks. When stress tests in 2009 revealed US bank balance sheets in much stronger position, cheap money at zero opportunity cost exited government obligations and flowed into carry trades of risk financial assets. Increases in commodity prices drove again the all-items CPI with interruptions during risk aversion originating in multiple fears but especially from the sovereign debt crisis of Europe. There are sharp increases in 2021-2023.

clip_image033

Chart I-21, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

The trend of increase of the consumer price index excluding food and energy in Chart I-22 does not reveal any threat of deflation that would justify symmetric inflation targets. There are mild oscillations in a neat upward trend.

clip_image034

Chart I-22, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 2001-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-23 provides 12-month percentage change of the consumer price index excluding food and energy. Past-year rates of inflation fell toward 1 percent from 2001 into 2003 because of the recession and the decline of commodity prices beginning before the recession with declines of real oil prices. Near zero interest rates with fed funds at 1 percent between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004 stimulated carry trades of all types, including in buying homes with subprime mortgages in expectation that low interest rates forever would increase home prices permanently, creating the equity that would permit the conversion of subprime mortgages into creditworthy mortgages (Gorton 2009EFM; see https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Inflation rose and then collapsed during the unwinding of carry trades and the housing debacle of the global recession. Carry trades into 2011 and 2012 gave a new impulse to CPI inflation, all items and core. Symmetric inflation targets destabilize the economy by encouraging hunts for yields that inflate and deflate financial assets, obscuring risk/return decisions on production, investment, consumption and hiring. There is sharp increase in 2021-2023.

clip_image035

Chart I-23, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

The Consumer Price index of the United States in Chart CPI-H increased 6.4 percent in Jan 2023 Relative to a Year Earlier, which is the Ninth Highest Since 8.9 percent in Dec 1981, Followed by the Highest of 9.1 percent in Jun 2022, the Second Highest of 8.6 percent in May 2022, 8.5 percent in both Jul 2022 and Mar 2022, 8.3 percent in both Apr and Aug 2022, 8.2 percent in Sep 2022, 7.7 percent in Oct 2022, 7.1 percent in Nov 2022 and 6.5 percent in Dec 2022.

clip_image001[1]

Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2023

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

I United States Industrial Production. There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)

Industrial production decreased 0.2 percent in Nov 2022 and decreased 0.1 percent in Oct 2022 after increasing 0.4 percent in Sep 2022, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on May 28, 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. The most prominent features of the revision are an update of the base year to 2017 for the indexes, a conversion of the industry-group indexes to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the incorporation of comprehensive annual production data for 2017 through 2019, and the incorporation of new survey utilization rate data for 2019 and 2020.[1]

On net, the revisions to total IP for recent years are negative. Notably, the updated rates of change are 1 to 1-1/2 percentage points lower per year from 2017 through 2019.[2] The cumulative effect of these revisions leaves the level of total IP in April 2021 about 3-1/2 percent below its late-2007 peak before the Great Recession; previously, total IP in April 2021 was slightly above its peak before the Great Recession. The incorporation of detailed data for manufacturing from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2017 Economic Census (EC) and the 2018 and 2019 Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASMs) accounts for the majority of the differences between the current and the previously published estimates. The revisions to the rates of change for 2020 are small, and the magnitude of the sharp drop (17 percent) in total IP at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 is very similar to the magnitude reported earlier.

Annual capacity growth is revised down about 1 percentage point, on average, from 2017 to 2019 and is little changed in 2020. After these revisions, capacity for total industry is estimated to have grown about 3 percent less between 2016 and the end of 2020 than previously estimated.

In the fourth quarter of 2020, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 73.4 percent, about 1/2 percentage point below its previous estimate and about 6-1/4 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average. The utilization rate for 2019 is also about 1/2 percentage point lower than the previous estimate, but revisions to utilization rates for 2017 and 2018 are very small.”

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted its annual revision of industrial production and capacity utilization on Jun 28, 2022 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Revisions/20220628/DefaultRev.htm):

“Manufacturing output is now estimated to have fallen about 2-1/2 percent in both 2019 and 2020 before moving up about 4-1/4 percent in 2021; these rates of change are identical to the estimates published previously. Manufacturing output is now estimated to have dropped about 18-1/2 percent between February 2020 and April 2020 because of the pandemic, only slightly less than was originally reported. Factory output has moved up robustly since then, and the index for May 2022 is currently reported to be 3-1/2 percent above its pre-pandemic level, about 1 percentage point less of a gain than the pre-revision estimate.

The revised contour for mining output shows a modest increase in 2019, a sharp drop in 2020, and a substantial rebound thereafter. The rates of change are broadly similar to those published previously, although the gains in 2019 and 2021 are now each about 1 percentage point stronger, and the decline in 2020 is about 1-1/2 percentage points steeper. The index for mining currently stands about 4 percent below its pre-pandemic level; before the revision, the index was 2 percent below its pre-pandemic level. The rates of change for utilities output are moderately higher in 2020 and little different in other recent years.”

The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm):

“Industrial production was unchanged in January after falling 0.6 percent and 1.0 percent in November and December, respectively. In January, manufacturing output moved up 1.0 percent and mining output rose 2.0 percent following two months with substantial decreases for each sector. The output of utilities fell 9.9 percent in January, as a swing from unseasonably cool weather in December to unseasonably warm weather in January depressed the demand for heating. At 103.0 percent of its 2017 average, total industrial production in January was 0.8 percent above its year-earlier level. Capacity utilization declined 0.1 percentage point in January to 78.3 percent, a rate that is 1.3 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2022) average.”

In the six months ending in Jan 2023, United States national industrial production accumulated change of minus 1.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent, which is lower than growth of 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2023. Industrial production decreased at annual equivalent minus 6.2 percent in the most recent quarter from Nov 2022 to Jan 2023 and increased at 0.4 percent annual equivalent in the prior quarter from Aug 2022 to Oct 2022. Business equipment accumulated change of minus 0.7 percent in the six months from Aug 2022 to Jan 2023, at the annual equivalent rate of minus 1.5 percent, which is lower than growth of 3.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2023. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm): “Capacity utilization declined 0.1 percentage point in January to 78.3 percent, a rate that is 1.3 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2022) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration, oscillating growth in past months and deep contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is renewed decline.

Table I-1, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, SA, ∆% 

 

Jan 23

Dec 22

Nov 22

Oct 22

Sep 22

Aug 22

Jan 23/

Jan 22

Total

0.0

-1.0

-0.6

0.0

0.2

-0.1

0.8

Market
Groups

              

Final Products

-0.1

-0.6

-0.7

0.7

-0.2

0.3

1.1

Consumer Goods

-0.7

-0.2

-0.6

0.8

-0.5

0.1

-0.9

Business Equipment

1.2

-2.0

-1.3

0.4

0.5

0.5

3.7

Non
Industrial Supplies

0.2

-1.5

-0.3

-0.2

0.1

-0.4

-1.1

Construction

0.8

-1.3

-0.4

0.0

0.1

-0.3

-0.4

Materials

0.1

-1.2

-0.6

-0.5

0.5

-0.3

1.1

Industry Groups

              

Manufacturing

1.0

-1.8

-0.8

0.4

0.1

0.0

0.3

Mining

2.0

-1.2

-1.4

0.0

1.9

0.0

8.6

Utilities

-9.9

5.1

2.7

-2.6

-2.1

-1.3

-8.9

Capacity

78.3

78.4

79.3

79.8

79.9

79.8

1.6

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Manufacturing increased 1.0 percent in Jan 2023 and decreased 1.8 percent in Dec 2022 after decreasing 0.8 percent in Nov 2022, seasonally adjusted, increasing 0.2 percent not seasonally adjusted in the 12 months ending in Jan 2023, as shown in Table I-2. Manufacturing decreased cumulatively 1.1 percent in the six months ending in Jan 2023 or at the annual equivalent rate of minus 2.2 percent. Table I-2 provides a longer perspective of manufacturing in the US. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 with recovery followed by renewed deterioration/improvement in more recent months as shown by 12 months’ rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession, but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily with some strength at the margin. There is renewed deterioration, improvement and current deterioration. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on May 28, 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. The most prominent features of the revision are an update of the base year to 2017 for the indexes, a conversion of the industry-group indexes to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the incorporation of comprehensive annual production data for 2017 through 2019, and the incorporation of new survey utilization rate data for 2019 and 2020.[1]

On net, the revisions to total IP for recent years are negative. Notably, the updated rates of change are 1 to 1-1/2 percentage points lower per year from 2017 through 2019.[2] The cumulative effect of these revisions leaves the level of total IP in April 2021 about 3-1/2 percent below its late-2007 peak before the Great Recession; previously, total IP in April 2021 was slightly above its peak before the Great Recession. The incorporation of detailed data for manufacturing from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2017 Economic Census (EC) and the 2018 and 2019 Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASMs) accounts for the majority of the differences between the current and the previously published estimates. The revisions to the rates of change for 2020 are small, and the magnitude of the sharp drop (17 percent) in total IP at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 is very similar to the magnitude reported earlier.

Annual capacity growth is revised down about 1 percentage point, on average, from 2017 to 2019 and is little changed in 2020. After these revisions, capacity for total industry is estimated to have grown about 3 percent less between 2016 and the end of 2020 than previously estimated.

In the fourth quarter of 2020, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 73.4 percent, about 1/2 percentage point below its previous estimate and about 6-1/4 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average. The utilization rate for 2019 is also about 1/2 percentage point lower than the previous estimate, but revisions to utilization rates for 2017 and 2018 are very small.”

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted its annual revision of industrial production and capacity utilization on Jun 28, 2022 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Revisions/20220628/DefaultRev.htm):

“Manufacturing output is now estimated to have fallen about 2-1/2 percent in both 2019 and 2020 before moving up about 4-1/4 percent in 2021; these rates of change are identical to the estimates published previously. Manufacturing output is now estimated to have dropped about 18-1/2 percent between February 2020 and April 2020 because of the pandemic, only slightly less than was originally reported. Factory output has moved up robustly since then, and the index for May 2022 is currently reported to be 3-1/2 percent above its pre-pandemic level, about 1 percentage point less of a gain than the pre-revision estimate.

The revised contour for mining output shows a modest increase in 2019, a sharp drop in 2020, and a substantial rebound thereafter. The rates of change are broadly similar to those published previously, although the gains in 2019 and 2021 are now each about 1 percentage point stronger, and the decline in 2020 is about 1-1/2 percentage points steeper. The index for mining currently stands about 4 percent below its pre-pandemic level; before the revision, the index was 2 percent below its pre-pandemic level. The rates of change for utilities output are moderately higher in 2020 and little different in other recent years.”

Manufacturing decreased 22.3 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009. Manufacturing increased 14.9 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jan 2023. Manufacturing in Jan 2023 is 10.7 percent below the peak in Apr 2009. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 54 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2022 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2022 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/gdp4q22_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%] or accumulating the quarter-on-quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/02/federal-open-market-committee-fomc-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/12/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IVQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IIQ1996 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/02/federal-open-market-committee-fomc-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/12/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2022 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 55.8 percent. GDP in IVQ2022 would be $24,564.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4366.5 billion than actual $20,198.1 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 23.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.2 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/02/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/01/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm). US GDP in IVQ2022 is 17.8 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $20,198.1 billion in IVQ2022 or 28.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jan 2023. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.7546 in Dec 2007 to 164.3052 in Jan 2023. The actual index NSA in Jan 2023 is 98.9295 which is 39.8 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing output grew at average 1.4 percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.4 percent per year, the index would increase to 131.6615 in Jan 2023. The output of manufacturing at 98.9295 in Jan 2023 is 24.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.4159 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7149 in Jun 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7149 in Apr 2009 to 99.5568 in Jan 2023 or 17.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6406 in Dec 2007 to 175.8126 in Jan 2023. The NAICS index at 99.5568 in Jan 2023 is 43.4 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6406 in Dec 2007 to 134.9349 in Jan 2023. The NAICS index at 99.5568 in Jan 2023 is 26.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-2, US, Monthly and 12-Month Rates of Growth of Manufacturing ∆%

 

Month SA ∆%

12-Month NSA ∆%

2023-01

1.0

0.2

2022-12

-1.8

-0.7

2022-11

-0.8

0.8

2022-10

0.4

2.3

2022-09

0.1

3.9

2022-08

0.0

2.5

2022-07

0.4

2.3

2022-06

-0.8

3.2

2022-05

-0.5

3.7

2022-04

0.4

4.1

2022-03

0.7

4.7

2022-02

1.2

7.0

2022-01

-0.3

2.2

2021-12

-0.1

3.8

2021-11

0.5

4.4

2021-10

1.7

3.9

2021-09

-0.7

3.6

2021-08

-0.2

4.2

2021-07

1.1

6.8

2021-06

-0.1

9.0

2021-05

0.9

17.2

2021-04

-0.1

22.3

2021-03

3.1

3.0

2021-02

-3.5

-4.5

2021-01

1.6

-0.5

2020-12

0.3

-2.5

2020-11

0.5

-2.9

2020-10

1.1

-2.5

2020-09

0.1

-5.1

2020-08

1.6

-5.1

2020-07

3.6

-6.1

2020-06

7.4

-9.8

2020-05

4.3

-15.5

2020-04

-15.3

-19.6

2020-03

-4.3

-5.0

2020-02

0.3

-0.4

2020-01

-0.1

-1.4

2019-12

-0.1

-2.1

2019-11

0.7

-2.0

2019-10

-0.8

-3.1

2019-09

-0.7

-3.0

2019-08

0.7

-2.2

2019-07

-0.6

-2.7

2019-06

0.3

-1.8

2019-05

0.1

-1.8

2019-04

-0.6

-2.8

2019-03

-0.1

-1.1

2019-02

-0.4

-1.0

2019-01

-0.8

0.4

2018-12

0.1

0.5

2018-11

-0.4

0.0

2018-10

-0.4

0.4

2018-09

0.0

2.2

2018-08

0.3

2.2

2018-07

0.1

1.7

2018-06

0.6

1.2

2018-05

-0.9

0.8

2018-04

0.7

2.7

2018-03

0.1

1.9

2018-02

1.0

1.7

2018-01

-0.4

0.7

2017-12

-0.3

1.6

2017-11

0.0

1.5

2017-10

1.1

1.1

2017-09

0.0

0.2

2017-08

-0.2

0.6

2017-07

-0.3

0.8

2017-06

0.0

0.7

2017-05

-0.2

0.9

2017-04

1.1

-0.4

2017-03

-0.3

0.4

2017-02

0.0

0.2

2017-01

0.2

-0.1

2016-12

0.0

0.1

2016-11

-0.1

-0.4

2016-10

0.2

-0.4

2016-09

0.2

-0.3

2016-08

-0.4

-1.5

2016-07

0.1

-1.3

2016-06

0.2

-0.6

2016-05

-0.1

-1.4

2016-04

-0.2

-0.6

2016-03

-0.1

-1.7

2016-02

-0.3

-0.5

2016-01

0.4

-0.8

2015-12

-0.3

-1.8

2015-11

-0.3

-1.7

2015-10

-0.1

-0.7

2015-09

-0.3

-1.7

2015-08

-0.4

-0.7

2015-07

0.8

-0.5

2015-06

-0.4

-1.2

2015-05

0.0

-0.3

2015-04

0.0

-0.1

2015-03

0.4

-0.1

2015-02

-0.7

0.5

2015-01

-0.6

1.9

2014-12

-0.2

1.6

2014-11

0.7

1.7

2014-10

-0.1

0.9

2014-09

0.0

1.1

2014-08

-0.6

1.2

2014-07

0.5

2.1

2014-06

0.3

1.4

2014-05

0.3

1.4

2014-04

0.0

0.9

2014-03

0.9

1.5

2014-02

0.9

0.2

2014-01

-1.1

-0.5

2013-12

-0.2

0.1

2013-11

0.0

1.2

2013-10

0.1

1.9

2013-09

0.1

1.3

2013-08

0.9

1.3

2013-07

-0.8

0.3

2013-06

0.1

0.8

2013-05

0.3

0.9

2013-04

-0.3

0.9

2013-03

-0.1

0.6

2013-02

0.4

0.6

2013-01

-0.3

0.7

2012-12

0.7

1.6

2012-11

0.6

1.6

2012-10

-0.2

0.6

2012-09

-0.2

1.7

2012-08

-0.1

2.2

2012-07

-0.2

2.5

2012-06

0.2

3.4

2012-05

-0.3

3.4

2012-04

0.5

3.7

2012-03

-0.5

2.8

2012-02

0.4

4.1

2012-01

0.9

3.5

2011-12

0.6

3.0

2011-11

-0.2

2.6

2011-10

0.5

2.7

2011-09

0.3

2.6

2011-08

0.5

2.0

2011-07

0.6

2.2

2011-06

0.1

1.7

2011-05

0.0

1.5

2011-04

-0.6

2.8

2011-03

0.6

4.5

2011-02

0.2

4.9

2011-01

0.1

4.9

2010-12

0.5

5.5

2010-11

0.1

4.7

2010-10

0.1

5.9

2010-09

0.1

6.2

2010-08

0.1

6.9

2010-07

0.5

7.5

2010-06

0.0

9.4

2010-05

1.3

9.1

2010-04

0.8

7.4

2010-03

1.3

5.2

2010-02

-0.1

1.9

2010-01

1.0

1.8

2009-12

-0.1

-2.8

2009-11

1.0

-5.7

2009-10

0.0

-8.9

2009-09

1.0

-10.4

2009-08

1.1

-13.5

2009-07

1.6

-15.3

2009-06

-0.2

-17.9

2009-05

-1.1

-17.9

2009-04

-0.7

-18.6

2009-03

-1.8

-17.7

2009-02

-0.1

-16.7

2009-01

-3.2

-17.1

2008-12

-3.3

-14.5

2008-11

-2.5

-11.7

2008-10

-0.7

-9.1

2008-09

-3.4

-8.7

2008-08

-1.3

-5.1

2008-07

-1.0

-3.6

2008-06

-0.7

-3.3

2008-05

-0.6

-2.4

2008-04

-1.0

-1.2

2008-03

-0.5

-0.7

2008-02

-0.7

1.0

2008-01

-0.2

2.5

2007-12

0.1

2.0

2007-11

0.5

3.4

2007-10

-0.2

2.8

2007-09

0.3

2.8

2007-08

-0.3

2.6

2007-07

0.0

3.6

2007-06

0.3

3.1

2007-05

0.0

3.3

2007-04

0.6

3.7

2007-03

0.8

2.7

2007-02

0.3

1.7

2007-01

-0.4

1.3

2006-12

1.5

2.8

2005-12

0.1

3.6

2004-12

0.8

4.1

2003-12

0.0

2.2

2002-12

-0.6

2.4

2001-12

0.2

-5.3

2000-12

-0.6

0.7

1999-12

0.7

5.2

∆% Peak 110.8038 in 06/2007 to 86.0771 in 04/2009

  

-22.3

∆% Trough 86.0771 in 04/2009 to 98.9295 in 01/2023

  

14.9

∆% Peak 110.8038 in 07/2007 to 98.9295 in 01/2023

  

-10.7

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides industrial production, manufacturing and capacity since the 1970s. There was acceleration of growth of industrial production, manufacturing and capacity in the 1990s because of rapid growth of productivity in the US (Cobet and Wilson (2002); see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). The slopes of the curves flatten in the 2000s. Production and capacity have not recovered sufficiently above levels before the global recession, remaining like GDP below historical trend. There is sharp contraction of output followed by continuing recovery in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jan 2023. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.7546 in Dec 2007 to 164.3052 in Jan 2023. The actual index NSA in Jan 2023 is 98.9295 which is 39.8 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing output grew at average 1.4 percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.4 percent per year, the index would increase to 131.6615 in Jan 2023. The output of manufacturing at 98.9295 in Jan 2023 is 24.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.4159 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7149 in Jun 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7149 in Apr 2009 to 99.5568 in Jan 2023 or 17.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6406 in Dec 2007 to 175.8126 in Jan 2023. The NAICS index at 99.5568 in Jan 2023 is 43.4 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6406 in Dec 2007 to 134.9349 in Jan 2023. The NAICS index at 99.5568 in Jan 2023 is 26.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

clip_image036

Chart I-1, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg1.svg

Additional detail on industrial production and capacity utilization is in Chart I-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Production of consumer durable goods fell sharply during the global recession by more than 30 percent and is oscillating above the level before the contraction. Output of nondurable consumer goods fell around 10 percent and is some 5 percent below the level before the contraction. Output of business equipment fell sharply during the contraction of 2001 but began rapid growth again after 2004. An important characteristic is rapid growth of output of business equipment in the cyclical expansion after sharp contraction in the global recession, stalling in the final segment followed by recovery. Output of defense and space only suffered reduction in the rate of growth during the global recession and surged ahead of the level before the contraction, declining in the final segment. Output of construction supplies collapsed during the global recession and is well below the level before the contraction. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but recovered sharply above the level before the contraction with alternating recent decline/improvement. There are deep contractions in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image037

Chart I-2, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg2.svg

The modern industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is captured in Chart I-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (for the literature on M&A and corporate control see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009a), 143-56, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 49-59, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 46-49). The slope of the curve of total industrial production accelerates in the 1990s to a much higher rate of growth than the curve excluding high-technology industries. Growth rates decelerate into the 2000s and output and capacity utilization have not recovered fully from the strong impact of the global recession. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but recovered sharply above the level before the contraction with alternating recent decline/improvement followed by stability and renewed contraction. Growth in the current cyclical expansion has been more subdued than in the prior comparably deep contractions in the 1970s and 1980s. Chart I-2 shows that the past recessions after World War II are the relevant ones for comparison with the recession after 2007 instead of common comparisons with the Great Depression (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/10/annual-update-of-us-product-and-income.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/09/us-gdp-contracting-at-saar-of-06.html). The lower part of Chart I-3 shows recent strong growth of energy compared with non-energy. There are deep contractions in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image038

Chart I-3, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, Selected Industries

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg3.svg

United States manufacturing output from 1919 to 2022 monthly is in Chart I-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The second industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is quite evident in the acceleration of the rate of growth of output given by the sharper slope in the 1980s and 1990s. Growth was robust after the shallow recession of 2001 but dropped sharply during the global recession after IVQ2007. Manufacturing output recovered sharply but has not reached earlier levels and is losing momentum at the margin. There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jan 2023. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.7546 in Dec 2007 to 164.3052 in Jan 2023. The actual index NSA in Jan 2023 is 98.9295 which is 39.8 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing output grew at average 1.4 percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.4 percent per year, the index would increase to 131.6615 in Jan 2023. The output of manufacturing at 98.9295 in Jan 2023 is 24.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.4159 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7149 in Jun 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7149 in Apr 2009 to 99.5568 in Jan 2023 or 17.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6406 in Dec 2007 to 175.8126 in Jan 2023. The NAICS index at 99.5568 in Jan 2023 is 43.4 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6406 in Dec 2007 to 134.9349 in Jan 2023. The NAICS index at 99.5568 in Jan 2023 is 26.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

clip_image039

Chart I-4, US, Manufacturing Output, 1919-2023

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shows that output of durable manufacturing accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s with slower growth in the 2000s perhaps because processes matured. Growth was robust after the major drop during the global recession but appears to vacillate in the final segment. There is sharp contraction in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is initial recovery in May 2020-Oct 2022 with deterioration in Nov 2022-Jan 2023.

clip_image040

Chart I-7, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 1972-2023

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Jan 2023. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade. There is sharp decline in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image041

Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Jan 2023

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023.

Posted by at No comments:
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)