Recovery without Jobs, Stagnating Real Disposable per Capita Income and World Economy Growth Standstill with Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012
Executive Summary
I Twenty Eight Million Unemployed and Underemployed and Stagnating Real Wages
IA Twenty Eight Million Unemployed or Underemployed
IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation
IA2 Number of People in Job Stress
IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment
IA4 Job Creation
IB Stagnating Real Wages
II Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures and Financial Repression
IIA Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures
IIB Financial Repression
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendix I The Great Inflation
Executive Summary
ESI Twenty Eight Million Unemployed or Underemployed. Table ESI-1 consists of data and additional calculations using the BLS household survey, illustrating the possibility that the actual rate of unemployment could be 11.0 percent and the number of people in job stress could be around 28.6 million, which is 17.8 percent of the labor force. The first column provides for 2006 the yearly average population (POP), labor force (LF), participation rate or labor force as percent of population (PART %), employment (EMP), employment population ratio (EMP/POP %), unemployment (UEM), the unemployment rate as percent of labor force (UEM/LF Rate %) and the number of people not in the labor force (NLF). All data are unadjusted or not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA). The numbers in column 2006 are averages in millions while the monthly numbers for Jun 2011, May 2012 and Jun 2012 are in thousands, not seasonally adjusted. The average yearly participation rate of the population in the labor force was in the range of 66.0 percent minimum to 67.1 percent maximum between 2000 and 2006 with the average of 66.4 percent (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2006/pdf/cpsaat1.pdf). Table ESI-2 provides the yearly labor force participation rate from 1979 to 2012. The objective of Table ESI-1 is to assess how many people could have left the labor force because they do not think they can find another job. Row “LF PART 66.2 %” applies the participation rate of 2006, almost equal to the rates for 2000 to 2006, to the population in May and Jun 2012 and Jun 2011 to obtain what would be the labor force of the US if the participation rate had not changed. In fact, the participation rate fell to 64.5 percent by Jun 2011 and was 63.8 percent in May 2012 and 64.3 percent in Jun 2012, suggesting that many people simply gave up on finding another job. Row “∆ NLF UEM” calculates the number of people not counted in the labor force because they could have given up on finding another job by subtracting from the labor force with participation rate of 66.2 percent (row “LF PART 66.2%”) the labor force estimated in the household survey (row “LF”). Total unemployed (row “Total UEM”) is obtained by adding unemployed in row “∆NLF UEM” to the unemployed of the household survey in row “UEM.” The row “Total UEM%” is the effective total unemployed “Total UEM” as percent of the effective labor force in row “LF PART 66.2%.” The results are that: (1) there are an estimated 4.584 million unemployed in Jun 2012 who are not counted because they left the labor force on their belief they could not find another job (∆NLF UEM); (2) the total number of unemployed is effectively 17.768 million (Total UEM) and not 13.184 million (UEM) of whom many have been unemployed long term; (3) the rate of unemployment is 11.0 percent (Total UEM%) and not 8.4 percent, not seasonally adjusted, or 8.2 percent seasonally adjusted; and (4) the number of people in job stress is close to 28.6 million by adding the 4.584 million leaving the labor force because they believe they could not find another job. The row “In Job Stress” in Table ESI-1 provides the number of people in job stress not seasonally adjusted at 28.6 million in Jun 2012, adding the total number of unemployed (“Total UEM”), plus those involuntarily in part-time jobs because they cannot find anything else (“Part Time Economic Reasons”) and the marginally attached to the labor force (“Marginally attached to LF”). The final row of Table ESI-1 shows that the number of people in job stress is equivalent to 17.8 percent of the labor force in Jun 2012. The employment population ratio “EMP/POP %” dropped from 62.9 percent on average in 2006 to 58.5 percent in Jun 2011, 58.7 percent in May 2012 and 58.9 percent in Jun 2012; the number employed (EMP) dropped from 144 million to 143.2 million. What really matters for labor input in production and wellbeing is the number of people with jobs or the employment/population ratio, which has declined and does not show signs of increasing. There are around four million fewer people working in 2012 than in 2006 and the number employed is not increasing. The number of hiring relative to the number unemployed measures the chances of becoming employed. The number of hiring in the US economy has declined by 17 million and does not show signs of increasing in an unusual recovery without hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of_24.html).
Table ESI-1, US, Population, Labor Force and Unemployment, NSA
| 2006 | Jun 2011 | May 2012 | Jun 2012 | |
| POP | 229 | 239,489 | 242,966 | 243,155 |
| LF | 151 | 154,538 | 154,998 | 156,385 |
| PART% | 66.2 | 64.5 | 63.8 | 64.3 |
| EMP | 144 | 140,129 | 142,727 | 143,202 |
| EMP/POP% | 62.9 | 58.5 | 58.7 | 58.9 |
| UEM | 7 | 14,409 | 12,271 | 13,184 |
| UEM/LF Rate% | 4.6 | 9.3 | 7.9 | 8.4 |
| NLF | 77 | 84,951 | 87,968 | 86,770 |
| LF PART 66.2% | 158,541 | 160,843 | 160,969 | |
| ∆NLF UEM | 4,003 | 5,845 | 4,584 | |
| Total UEM | 18,412 | 18,116 | 17,768 | |
| Total UEM% | 11.6 | 11.3 | 11.0 | |
| Part Time Economic Reasons | 8,738 | 7,837 | 8,394 | |
| Marginally Attached to LF | 2,680 | 2,423 | 2,483 | |
| In Job Stress | 29,830 | 28,376 | 28,645 | |
| People in Job Stress as % Labor Force | 18.8 | 17.6 | 17.8 |
Pop: population; LF: labor force; PART: participation; EMP: employed; UEM: unemployed; NLF: not in labor force; ∆NLF UEM: additional unemployed; Total UEM is UEM + ∆NLF UEM; Total UEM% is Total UEM as percent of LF PART 66.2%; In Job Stress = Total UEM + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached to LF
Note: the first column for 2006 is in average millions; the remaining columns are in thousands; NSA: not seasonally adjusted
The labor force participation rate of 66.2% in 2006 is applied to current population to obtain LF PART 66.2%; ∆NLF UEM is obtained by subtracting the labor force with participation of 66.2 percent from the household survey labor force LF; Total UEM is household data unemployment plus ∆NLF UEM; and total UEM% is total UEM divided by LF PART 66.2%
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table ESI-2 and Chart ESI-1 provide the US labor force participation rate or percentage of the labor force in population. It is not likely that simple demographic trends caused the sharp decline during the global recession and failure to recover earlier levels.
Table ESI-2, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2012
| Year | Apr | May | Jun | Annual |
| 1979 | 62.9 | 62.9 | 64.5 | 63.7 |
| 1980 | 63.2 | 63.5 | 64.6 | 63.8 |
| 1981 | 63.6 | 63.9 | 64.6 | 63.9 |
| 1982 | 63.3 | 63.9 | 64.8 | 64.0 |
| 1983 | 63.2 | 63.4 | 65.1 | 64.0 |
| 1984 | 63.7 | 64.3 | 65.5 | 64.4 |
| 1985 | 64.3 | 64.6 | 65.5 | 64.8 |
| 1986 | 64.6 | 65.0 | 66.3 | 65.3 |
| 1987 | 64.9 | 65.6 | 66.3 | 65.6 |
| 1988 | 65.3 | 65.5 | 66.7 | 65.9 |
| 1989 | 65.9 | 66.2 | 67.4 | 66.5 |
| 1990 | 66.1 | 66.5 | 67.4 | 66.5 |
| 1991 | 66.0 | 66.0 | 67.2 | 66.2 |
| 1992 | 66.0 | 66.4 | 67.6 | 66.4 |
| 1993 | 65.6 | 66.3 | 67.3 | 66.3 |
| 1994 | 66.0 | 66.5 | 67.2 | 66.6 |
| 1995 | 66.4 | 66.4 | 67.2 | 66.6 |
| 1996 | 66.2 | 66.7 | 67.4 | 66.8 |
| 1997 | 66.7 | 67.0 | 67.8 | 67.1 |
| 1998 | 66.6 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.1 |
| 1999 | 66.7 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.1 |
| 2000 | 67.0 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.1 |
| 2001 | 66.7 | 66.6 | 67.2 | 66.8 |
| 2002 | 66.4 | 66.5 | 67.1 | 66.6 |
| 2003 | 66.2 | 66.2 | 67.0 | 66.2 |
| 2004 | 65.7 | 65.8 | 66.5 | 66.0 |
| 2005 | 65.8 | 66.0 | 66.5 | 66.0 |
| 2006 | 65.8 | 66.0 | 66.7 | 66.2 |
| 2007 | 65.7 | 65.8 | 66.6 | 66.0 |
| 2008 | 65.7 | 66.0 | 66.6 | 66.0 |
| 2009 | 65.4 | 65.5 | 66.2 | 65.4 |
| 2010 | 64.9 | 64.8 | 65.1 | 64.7 |
| 2011 | 63.9 | 64.1 | 64.5 | 64.1 |
| 2012 | 63.4 | 63.8 | 64.3 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart ESI-1, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2011
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
ESII Recovery without Jobs. Total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 80,000 in Jun 2012 and private payroll employment rose 84,000. The number of nonfarm jobs and private jobs created has been declining in the first five months of 2012 from 275,000 in Jan to 80,000 in Jun for nonfarm jobs and from 277,000 in Jan to 84,000 in Jun for private jobs. Table ESII-1 provides the monthly change in jobs seasonally adjusted in the prior strong contraction of 1981-1982 and the recovery in 1983 into 1984 and in the contraction of 2008-2009 and in the recovery in 2009 to 2012. All revisions have been incorporated in Table ESII-1. The data in the recovery periods are in relief to facilitate comparison. There is significant bias in the comparison. The average yearly civilian noninstitutional population was 174.2 million in 1983 and the civilian labor force 111.6 million, growing by 2009 to an average yearly civilian noninstitutional population of 235.8 million and civilian labor force of 154.1 million, that is, increasing by 35.4 percent and 38.1 percent, respectively (http://www.bls.gov/data/). Total nonfarm payroll jobs in 1983 were 90.280 million, jumping to 94.530 million in 1984 while total nonfarm jobs in 2010 were 129.874 million declining from 130.807 million in 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/data/). What is striking about the data in Table ESII-1 is that the numbers of monthly increases in jobs in 1983 and 1984 are several times higher than in 2010 to 2011 even with population higher by 35.4 percent and labor force higher by 38.1 percent in 2009 relative to 1983 nearly three decades ago and total number of jobs in payrolls rose by 39.5 million in 2010 relative to 1983 or by 43.8 percent. Growth has been mediocre in the eleven quarters of expansion beginning in IIIQ2009 in comparison with earlier expansions (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/mediocre-economic-growth-united-states.html) and also in terms of what is required to reduce the job stress of at least 24 million persons but likely close to 30 million. Some of the job growth and contraction in 2010 in Table ESII-1 is caused by the hiring and subsequent layoff of temporary workers for the 2010 census.
Table ESII-1, US, Monthly Change in Jobs, Number SA
| Month | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | Private |
| Jan | 95 | -327 | 225 | 41 | -818 | -40 | -40 |
| Feb | 67 | -6 | -78 | -84 | -724 | -35 | -27 |
| Mar | 104 | -129 | 173 | -95 | -799 | 189 | 141 |
| Apr | 74 | -281 | 276 | -208 | -692 | 239 | 193 |
| May | 10 | -45 | 277 | -190 | -361 | 516 | 84 |
| Jun | 196 | -243 | 378 | -198 | -482 | -167 | 92 |
| Jul | 112 | -343 | 418 | -210 | -339 | -58 | 92 |
| Aug | -36 | -158 | -308 | -274 | -231 | -51 | 128 |
| Sep | -87 | -181 | 1114 | -432 | -199 | -27 | 115 |
| Oct | -100 | -277 | 271 | -489 | -202 | 220 | 196 |
| Nov | -209 | -124 | 352 | -803 | -42 | 121 | 134 |
| Dec | -278 | -14 | 356 | -661 | -171 | 120 | 140 |
| 1984 | 2011 | Private | |||||
| Jan | 447 | 110 | 119 | ||||
| Feb | 479 | 220 | 257 | ||||
| Mar | 275 | 246 | 261 | ||||
| Apr | 363 | 251 | 264 | ||||
| May | 308 | 54 | 108 | ||||
| Jun | 379 | 84 | 102 | ||||
| Jul | 312 | 96 | 175 | ||||
| Aug | 241 | 85 | 52 | ||||
| Sep | 311 | 202 | 216 | ||||
| Oct | 286 | 112 | 139 | ||||
| Nov | 349 | 157 | 178 | ||||
| Dec | 127 | 223 | 234 | ||||
| 1985 | 2012 | Private | |||||
| Jan | 266 | 275 | 277 | ||||
| Feb | 124 | 259 | 254 | ||||
| Mar | 346 | 143 | 147 | ||||
| Apr | 195 | 68 | 85 | ||||
| May | 274 | 77 | 105 | ||||
| Jun | 145 | 80 | 84 | ||||
| Jul | 189 | ||||||
| Aug | 193 | ||||||
| Sep | 204 | ||||||
| Oct | 187 | ||||||
| Nov | 209 | ||||||
| Dec | 168 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Charts numbered from ESII-1 to ESII-4 from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide a comparison of payroll survey data for the contractions and expansions in the 1980s and after 2007. Chart ESII-1 provides total nonfarm payroll jobs from 2001 to 2012. The sharp decline in total nonfarm jobs during the contraction after 2007 has been followed by initial stagnation and then tepid growth in the first five months of 2012.
Chart ESII-1, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Total nonfarm payroll jobs grew rapidly during the expansion in 1983 and 1984 as shown in Chart ESII-2. Nonfarm payroll jobs continued to grow at high rates during the remainder of the 1980s.
Chart ESII-2, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Most job creation in the US is by the private sector. Chart ESII-3 shows the sharp destruction of private payroll jobs during the contraction after 2007. There has been growth after 2010 but insufficient to recover higher levels of employment prevailing before the contraction. At current rates, recovery of employment may spread over several years in contrast with past expansions of the business cycle in the US.
Chart ESII-3, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
In contrast, growth of private payroll jobs in the US recovered vigorously during the expansion in 1983 through 1985, as shown in Chart ESII-4. Rapid growth of creation of private jobs continued throughout the 1980s.
Chart ESII-4, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
ESIII Declining Real Wages. Calculations using BLS data of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings are shown in Table ESIII-1. The final column of Table ESIII-1 (“12 Month Real ∆%”) provides inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of all employees in the US. Average hourly earnings rose above inflation throughout the first nine months of 2007 just before the global recession that began in the final quarter of 2007 when average hourly earnings lost to inflation. In contrast, average hourly earnings of all US workers have risen less than inflation in four months in 2010 and in all but the first month in 2011 and the loss accelerated at 1.8 percent in Sep 2011, declining to a real loss of 1.1 percent in Feb 2012 and 0.6 percent in Mar 2012. There was a gain of 0.5 percent in Apr 2012 in inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings but another fall of 0.6 percent in May 2012.
Table ESIII-1, US, Average Hourly Earnings Nominal and Inflation Adjusted, Dollars and % NSA
| AHE ALL | 12 Month | ∆% 12 Month CPI | 12 Month | |
| 2007 | ||||
| Jan* | $20.70* | 4.2* | 2.1 | 2.1* |
| Feb* | $20.79* | 4.1* | 2.4 | 1.7* |
| Mar | $20.82 | 3.7 | 2.8 | 0.9 |
| Apr | $21.05 | 3.3 | 2.6 | 0.7 |
| May | $20.83 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 1.0 |
| Jun | $20.82 | 3.8 | 2.7 | 1.1 |
| Jul | $20.99 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 1.0 |
| Aug | $20.85 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| Sep | $21.18 | 4.0 | 2.8 | 1.2 |
| Oct | $21.07 | 2.7 | 3.5 | -0.8 |
| Nov | $21.13 | 3.3 | 4.3 | -0.9 |
| Dec | $21.37 | 3.7 | 4.1 | -0.4 |
| 2010 | ||||
| Jan | $22.55 | 2.0 | 2.6 | -0.6 |
| Feb | $22.61 | 1.4 | 2.1 | -0.7 |
| Mar | $22.51 | 1.2 | 2.3 | -1.1 |
| Apr | $22.56 | 1.8 | 2.2 | -0.4 |
| May | $22.63 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 0.5 |
| Jun | $22.37 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| Jul | $22.44 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 0.6 |
| Aug | $22.58 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| Sep | $22.63 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
| Oct | $22.73 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
| Nov | $22.72 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Dec | $22.79 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 0.2 |
| 2011 | ||||
| Jan | $23.20 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 1.3 |
| Feb | $23.03 | 1.9 | 2.1 | -0.2 |
| Mar | $22.93 | 1.9 | 2.7 | -0.8 |
| Apr | $23.00 | 2.0 | 3.2 | -1.2 |
| May | $23.09 | 2.0 | 3.6 | -1.5 |
| Jun | $22.85 | 2.1 | 3.6 | -1.4 |
| Jul | $22.98 | 2.4 | 3.6 | -1.2 |
| Aug | $22.88 | 1.3 | 3.8 | -2.4 |
| Sep | $23.09 | 2.0 | 3.9 | -1.8 |
| Oct | $23.34 | 2.7 | 3.5 | -0.8 |
| Nov | $23.19 | 2.1 | 3.4 | -1.3 |
| Dec | $23.26 | 2.1 | 3.0 | -0.9 |
| 2012 | ||||
| Jan | $23.61 | 1.8 | 2.9 | -1.1 |
| Feb | $23.45 | 1.8 | 2.9 | -1.1 |
| Mar | $23.41 | 2.1 | 2.7 | -0.6 |
| Apr | $23.64 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 0.5 |
| May | $23.35 | 1.1 | 1.7 | -0.6 |
| Jun | $23.29 | 1.9 |
Note: AHE ALL: average hourly earnings of all employees; CPI: consumer price index; Real: adjusted by CPI inflation; NA: not available
*AHE of production and nonsupervisory employees because of unavailability of data for all employees
Source: http://www.bls.gov/data/
Average hourly earnings of all US employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984 from the dataset of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are provided in Table ESIII-2. Average hourly earnings fell 0.5 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Mar 2012 and gained 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2011 but then lost 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2012. Table ESIII-2 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average hourly earnings in 2011 and into 2012. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer goods than a year earlier and savings in bank deposits do not pay anything because of financial repression (Section ESIV).
Table ESIII-2, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984
| Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Dec |
| 2006 | 10.05 | 10.11 | 9.92 | 9.88 | 10.21 | ||
| 2007 | 10.23 | 10.22 | 10.14 | 10.18 | 10.02 | 9.99 | 10.17 |
| 2008 | 10.11 | 10.12 | 10.11 | 10.00 | 9.91 | 9.84 | 10.47 |
| 2009 | 10.47 | 10.50 | 10.46 | 10.39 | 10.32 | 10.20 | 10.38 |
| 2010 | 10.41 | 10.43 | 10.34 | 10.35 | 10.37 | 10.26 | 10.40 |
| 2011 | 10.53 | 10.41 | 10.26 | 10.23 | 10.22 | 10.12 | 10.31 |
| 2012 | 10.42 | 10.30 | 10.21 | 10.27 | 10.16 | ||
| ∆% | -1.0 | -1.1 | -0.5 | 0.4 | -0.6 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The deterioration of purchasing power of average hourly earnings of US workers is shown by Chart ESIII-1 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Chart ESIII-1 plots average hourly earnings of all US employees in constant 1982-1984 dollars with evident decline from 2010 to 2012.
Chart ESIII-1, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart ESIII-2 provides 12-month percentage changes of average hourly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984, that is, adjusted for inflation. There was sharp contraction of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of US employees during parts of 2007 and 2008. Rates of change in 12 months became positive in parts of 2009 and 2010 but then became negative again in 2011 and now into 2012 with temporary increase in Apr 2012 that was reversed in May.
Chart ESIII-2, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA 12-Month Percent Change, 1982-1984 Dollars, NSA 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Average weekly earnings of all US employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984 from the dataset of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are provided in Table ESIII-3. Average weekly earnings fell 0.9 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Sep 2011, increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct, fell 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov and 0.3 in the 12 months ending in Dec, declining 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 and 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars were flat in Mar 2012 relative to Mar 2011, increasing 0.04 percent. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 1.6 percent in Apr 2012 relative to Apr 2011 but fell 1.4 percent in May 2012 relative to May 2011. Table ESIII-3 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average weekly earnings in 2011 and into 2012. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer goods than a year earlier. The fractured US job market does not provide an opportunity for advancement as in past booms following recessions.
Table ESIII-3, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, NSA 2007-2012
| Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May |
| 2006 | 343.71 | 349.78 | 340.12 | ||
| 2007 | 348.72 | 349.40 | 347.76 | 353.41 | 344.58 |
| 2008 | 345.92 | 346.21 | 351.70 | 344.13 | 340.77 |
| 2009 | 353.94 | 359.26 | 355.65 | 349.17 | 347.79 |
| 2010 | 350.71 | 350.51 | 349.60 | 351.84 | 356.80 |
| 2011 | 360.29 | 353.81 | 349.90 | 350.77 | 353.56 |
| 2012 | 359.36 | 352.27 | 350.04 | 356.52 | 348.50 |
| ∆% | -0.3 | -0.4 | 0.04 | 1.6 | -1.4 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart ESIII-3 provides average weekly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984. The same pattern emerges of sharp decline during the contraction, followed by recovery in the expansion and continuing fall from 2010 to 2011 and into 2012.
Chart ESIII-3, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart ESIII-4 provides 12-month percentage changes of average weekly earnings of all employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984. There is the same pattern of contraction during the global recession in 2008 and then again trend of deterioration in the recovery without hiring and inflation waves in 2011 and 2012 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/fractured-labor-market-with-hiring.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html).
Chart ESIII-4, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984 12-Month Percent Change, NSA 2007-2011
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
ESIV Financial Repression. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1974) argue that legal restrictions on financial institutions can be detrimental to economic development. “Financial repression” is the term used in the economic literature for these restrictions (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 81-6). Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. Prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits were imposed by the Banking Act of 1933. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q.
Most regulatory actions trigger compensatory measures by the private sector that result in outcomes that are different from those intended by regulation (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Banks offered services to their customers and loans at rates lower than market rates to compensate for the prohibition to pay interest on demand deposits (Friedman 1970, 24). The prohibition of interest on demand deposits was eventually lifted in recent times. In the second half of the 1960s, already in the beginning of the Great Inflation (DeLong 1997), market rates rose above the ceilings of Regulation Q because of higher inflation. Nobody desires savings allocated to time or savings deposits that pay less than expected inflation. This is a fact currently with zero interest rates and consumer price inflation of 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). Funding problems motivated compensatory measures by banks. Money-center banks developed the large certificate of deposit (CD) to accommodate increasing volumes of loan demand by customers. As Friedman (1970, 25) finds:
“Large negotiable CD’s were particularly hard hit by the interest rate ceiling because they are deposits of financially sophisticated individuals and institutions who have many alternatives. As already noted, they declined from a peak of $24 billion in mid-December, 1968, to less than $12 billion in early October, 1969.”
Banks created different liabilities to compensate for the decline in CDs. As Friedman (1970, 25; 1969) explains:
“The most important single replacement was almost surely ‘liabilities of US banks to foreign branches.’ Prevented from paying a market interest rate on liabilities of home offices in the United States (except to foreign official institutions that are exempt from Regulation Q), the major US banks discovered that they could do so by using the Euro-dollar market. Their European branches could accept time deposits, either on book account or as negotiable CD’s at whatever rate was required to attract them and match them on the asset side of their balance sheet with ‘due from head office.’ The head office could substitute the liability ‘due to foreign branches’ for the liability ‘due on CDs.”
Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:
“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”
In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:
“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.”
Chart ESIV-1 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides quarterly savings as percent of disposable income or the US savings rate from 1980 to 2012. There was a long-term downward sloping trend from 12 percent in the early 1980s to less than 2 percent in 2005-2006. The savings rate then rose during the contraction and also in the expansion. In 2011 and into 2012 the savings rate declined as consumption is financed with savings in part because of the disincentive or frustration of receiving a few pennies for every $10,000 of deposits in a bank. The objective of monetary policy is to reduce borrowing rates to induce consumption but it has collateral disincentive of reducing savings. The zero interest rate of monetary policy is a tax on saving. This tax is highly regressive, meaning that it affects the most people with lower income or wealth and retirees. The long-term decline of savings rates in the US has created a dependence on foreign savings to finance the deficits in the federal budget and the balance of payments.
Chart ESIV-1, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Quarterly, 1980-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart ESIV-2 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides personal savings as percent of personal disposable income, or savings ratio, from Jan 2007 to May 2012. The uncertainties caused by the global recession resulted in sharp increase in the savings ratio that peaked at 8.3 percent in May 2008. The second highest ratio occurred at 7.1 percent in May 2009. There was another rising trend until 5.8 percent in Jun 2006 and then steady downward trend until 3.9 percent in May 2012. Permanent manipulation of the entire spectrum of interest rates with monetary policy measures distorts the compass of resource allocation with inferior outcomes of future growth, employment and prosperity and dubious redistribution of income and wealth affecting the most people without vast capital and relations to manage their savings.
Chart ESIV-2, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Income, Monthly 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
ESV Flight to Government Securities of the United States, Germany and Japan. Current financial risk is dominated by interest rate decisions of major central banks and the new program of rescue of banks and countries in the sovereign risk event in the euro zone. At the meeting of its Governing Council on Jul 5, 2010, the European Central Bank took the following policy measures (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120705.en.html):
“5 July 2012 - Monetary policy decisions
At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:
1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.75%, starting from the operation to be settled on 11 July 2012.
2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to 1.50%, with effect from 11 July 2012.
3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.00%, with effect from 11 July 2012.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 2.30 p.m. CET today.”
The President of the ECB Mario Draghi summarized the reasons for the policy measures as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120705.en.html):
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to cut the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Inflationary pressure over the policy-relevant horizon has been dampened further as some of the previously identified downside risks to the euro area growth outlook have materialised. Consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. Inflation expectations for the euro area economy continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. At the same time, economic growth in the euro area continues to remain weak, with heightened uncertainty weighing on confidence and sentiment.”
The Bank of England decided on Jul 5, 2012 to increase its policy of quantitative easing (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2012/066.aspx ):
“The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee today voted to maintain the official Bank Rate paid on commercial bank reserves at 0.5%. The Committee also voted to increase the size of its asset purchase programme, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, by £50 billion to a total of £375 billion.
UK output has barely grown for a year and a half and is estimated to have fallen in both of the past two quarters. The pace of expansion in most of the United Kingdom’s main export markets also appears to have slowed. Business indicators point to a continuation of that weakness in the near term, both at home and abroad. In spite of the progress made at the latest European Council, concerns remain about the indebtedness and competitiveness of several euro-area economies, and that is weighing on confidence here. The correspondingly weaker outlook for UK output growth means that the margin of economic slack is likely to be greater and more persistent.”
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) also cut interest rates simultaneously with the other major central banks (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2012/20120608171005950734495/20120608171005950734495_.html):
“The PBC has decided to cut RMB benchmark deposit and loan interest rates for financial institutions as of June 8, 2012. The one-year RMB benchmark deposit and loan interest rates will be lowered both by 0.25 percentage points. Adjustments are made correspondingly to benchmark interest rates on deposits and loans of other maturities and to deposit and loan interest rates on personal housing provident fund.”
Monetary authorities worldwide are assessing higher risks to the economy.
The key decisions of the summit of European Leaders with regards to resolving the sovereign debt issues are (http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/summit-impact-on-the-eurozone?lang=en):
“Euro area summit statement
Eurozone heads of state or government decided:
- to establish a single banking supervisory mechanism run the by the ECB, and, once this mechanism has been created,
- to provide the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with the possibility to inject funds into banks directly.
Spain's bank recapitalisation will begin under current rules, i.e. with assistance provided by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) until the ESM becomes available. The funds will then be transferred to the ESM without gaining seniority status.
It was also agreed that EFSF/ESM funds can be used flexibly to buy bonds for member states that comply with common rules, recommendations and timetables.
The Eurogroup has been asked to implement these decisions by 9 July 2012.”
Valuations of risk financial assets increased sharply after the announcement of these decisions. The details will be crafted at a meeting on finance ministries of the European Union on Jul 9, 2012.
The definition of “banking panic” by Calomiris and Gorton (1991, 112) during the Great Depression in the US is:
“A banking panic occurs when bank debt holders at all or many banks in the banking system suddenly demand that banks convert their debt claims into cash (at par) to such an extent that the banks suspend convertibility of their debt into cash, or in the case of the United States, act collectively to avoid suspension of convertibility by issuing clearing house loan certificates.”
The financial panic during the credit crisis and global recession consisted of a run on the sale and repurchase agreements (SRP) of structured investment products (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Cochrane and Zingales (2009) argue that the initial proposal for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) instead of the failure of Lehman Bros caused the flight into the dollar and Treasury securities. Washington Mutual experienced a silent run in the form of internet withdrawals. The current silent run in the euro area is from banks with challenged balance sheets in highly indebted member countries to banks and government securities in countries with stronger fiscal affairs. The analysis of the IMF 2012 Article IV Consultation focuses on this key policy priority of reversing the silent run on challenged euro area banks.
Jonathan House, writing on “Spanish banks need as much as €62 billion in new capital,” on Jun 21, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304765304577480062972372858.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), informs that two independent studies estimate the needs new capital of Spain’s banks at €62, billion, around $78.8 billion, which will be used by the government of Spain in the request for financial assistance from the European Union during the meeting with finance ministers.
The European Central Bank (ECB) announced changes in acceptable collateral for refinancing (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120622.en.html):
“On 20 June 2012 the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided on additional measures to improve the access of the banking sector to Eurosystem operations in order to further support the provision of credit to households and non-financial corporations.
The Governing Council has reduced the rating threshold and amended the eligibility requirements for certain asset-backed securities (ABSs). It has thus broadened the scope of the measures to increase collateral availability which were introduced on 8 December 2011 and which remain applicable.
In addition to the ABSs that are already eligible for use as collateral in Eurosystem operations, the Eurosystem will consider the following ABSs as eligible:
1. Auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs and ABSs backed by commercial mortgages (CMBSs) which have a second-best rating of at least “single A” in the Eurosystem’s harmonised credit scale, at issuance and at all times subsequently. These ABSs will be subject to a valuation haircut of 16%.
2. Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), securities backed by loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs and CMBSs which have a second-best rating of at least “triple B” in the Eurosystem’s harmonised credit scale, at issuance and at all times subsequently. RMBSs, securities backed by loans to SMEs, and auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs would be subject to a valuation haircut of 26%, while CMBSs would be subject to a valuation haircut of 32%.
The risk control framework with higher haircuts applicable to the newly eligible ABS aims at ensuring risk equalisation across asset classes and maintaining the risk profile of the Eurosystem.
The newly eligible ABSs must also satisfy additional requirements which will be specified in the legal act to be adopted Thursday, 28 June 2012. The measures will take effect as soon as the relevant legal act enters into force.”
There was significant improvement in ten-year yields of bonds of the government of Italy, declining to 5.796 percent on Fri Jun 29, 2012, from yields exceeding 6 percent, and of ten-year yields of bonds of the government of Spain, declining to 6.347 percent on Fri Jun 29 from earlier yields exceeding 7 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-govtbonds.html?mod=mdc_bnd_pglnk). Yields on sovereign debt backed up again with the yield of the ten-year bond of the government of Spain increasing to 6.872 percent on Jul 6, 2012, and of the ten-year bond of Italy rising to 6.020 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-govtbonds.html?mod=mdc_bnd_pglnk). Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Increasing aversion is captured by decrease of the yield of the ten-year Treasury and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table ESV-1 provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.548 percent on Jul 6, 2012 while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.33 percent. The yield of the two-year government bond of Germany fell from 0.65 percent on Aug 26, 2011, to minus 0.01 percent on Jul 1, 2012, probably influenced by the cut of interest rates by the ECB. As investors fled euro area risks to the safety of liabilities of the government of Germany, the two-year German government bond fell to 0.01 percent on Jun 1, 2012, and increased marginally to 0.07 percent on Jun 15, 2012, 0.14 percent on Jun 22 and 0.12 percent on Jun 29. The combination of multiple risks in the world economy and finance caused heightened risk aversion in the week of Jun 1, 2012, with the ten-year Treasury yield collapsing to 1.454 percent, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the two-year government bond of Germany fell to 0.01 percent and even negative and 0.00 percent and the ten-year government bond of Germany collapsing to 1.17 percent. There was relaxation of risk aversion in the week of Jun 8 with increase of the yield of the ten-year Treasury to 1.635 percent and of the two-year government bond of Germany to 0.04 percent and the ten-year to 1.33 percent, which are still at levels of extreme flight from risk. Fears on Greece, Spain and Italy resulted in renewed risk aversion with yields on Jun 15, 2012 at levels of flight to safety but more relaxed yields in the weeks of Jun 22 and Jun 29, 2012. The US dollar strengthened significantly from USD 1.450/EUR on Aug 26, 2011, to USD 1.2518/EUR on May 25, 2919, or by 13.7 percent, and further to USD 1.2435/EUR on Jun 1, 2012, or by 14.2 percent. The USD revalued by 0.7 percent to USD 1.2517 on Jun 8, 2012, depreciated 1 percent on Jun 15 to USD 1.2640/EUR but appreciated by 0.6 percent on Jun 22, depreciating 0.7 percent to USD 1.2661/EUR on Jun 29, 2012. The dollar peaked at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010, during the first round of the European sovereign risk crisis, but is now only 3.1 percent weaker at USD 1.2288/EUR on Jul 7, 2012. Under zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, carry trades ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield is still at a level well below consumer price inflation of 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May (see subsection IB United States Inflation http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html and ealier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury.
A similar risk aversion phenomenon occurred in Germany. Eurostat confirmed euro zone CPI inflation is at 2.4 percent for the 12 months ending in May 2012, jumping 1.3 percent in the month of Mar (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-14062012-BP/EN/2-14062012-BP-EN.PDF and Section IV http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html) but the yield of the two-year German government bond fell from 0.65 percent on Aug 19, 2011 to 0.05 percent on May 25, 2012, 0.01 percent on Jun 1, 2012, 0.04 percent on Jun 8, 0.07 percent on Jun 15 and 0.14 percent on Jun 22, 0.12 percent on Jun 29 and minus 0.01 percent on Jul 6, while the ten-year yield fell from 2.16 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.37 percent on May 25, 2012 and then to 1.17 percent on Jun 1, 2012, 1.33 percent on Jun 8, 1.44 percent on Jun 15 and 1.33 percent on Jul 6, as shown in Table ESV-1. The lower part of Table ESV-1 provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.
Table ESV-1, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate
| US 2Y | US 10Y | DE 2Y | DE 10Y | USD/ EUR | |
| 7/6/12 | 1.548 | 0.272 | -0.01 | 1.33 | 1.2288 |
| 6/29/12 | 1.648 | 0.305 | 0.12 | 1.58 | 1.2661 |
| 6/22/12 | 0.309 | 1.676 | 0.14 | 1.58 | 1.2570 |
| 6/15/12 | 0.272 | 1.584 | 0.07 | 1.44 | 1.2640 |
| 6/8/12 | 0.268 | 1.635 | 0.04 | 1.33 | 1.2517 |
| 6/1/12 | 0.248 | 1.454 | 0.01 | 1.17 | 1.2435 |
| 5/25/12 | 0.291 | 1.738 | 0.05 | 1.37 | 1.2518 |
| 5/18/12 | 0.292 | 1.714 | 0.05 | 1.43 | 1.2780 |
| 5/11/12 | 0.248 | 1.845 | 0.09 | 1.52 | 1.2917 |
| 5/4/12 | 0.256 | 1.876 | 0.08 | 1.58 | 1.3084 |
| 4/6/12 | 0.31 | 2.058 | 0.14 | 1.74 | 1.3096 |
| 3/30/12 | 0.335 | 2.214 | 0.21 | 1.79 | 1.3340 |
| 3/2/12 | 0.29 | 1.977 | 0.16 | 1.80 | 1.3190 |
| 2/24/12 | 0.307 | 1.977 | 0.24 | 1.88 | 1.3449 |
| 1/6/12 | 0.256 | 1.957 | 0.17 | 1.85 | 1.2720 |
| 12/30/11 | 0.239 | 1.871 | 0.14 | 1.83 | 1.2944 |
| 8/26/11 | 0.20 | 2.202 | 0.65 | 2.16 | 1.450 |
| 8/19/11 | 0.192 | 2.066 | 0.65 | 2.11 | 1.4390 |
| 6/7/10 | 0.74 | 3.17 | 0.49 | 2.56 | 1.192 |
| 3/5/09 | 0.89 | 2.83 | 1.19 | 3.01 | 1.254 |
| 12/17/08 | 0.73 | 2.20 | 1.94 | 3.00 | 1.442 |
| 10/27/08 | 1.57 | 3.79 | 2.61 | 3.76 | 1.246 |
| 7/14/08 | 2.47 | 3.88 | 4.38 | 4.40 | 1.5914 |
| 6/26/03 | 1.41 | 3.55 | NA | 3.62 | 1.1423 |
Note: DE: Germany
Source:
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html
ESVI Stagnating Real Disposable Income per Capita. Table ESVI-1 provides the data required for broader comparison of the cyclical expansions of IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and the current one from 2009 to 2012. First, in the 13 quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1985, GDP increased 19.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.7 percent; real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 14.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent; RDPI per capita increased 11.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.4 percent; and population increased 2.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. Second, in the 11 quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2012, GDP increased 6.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent; real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 2.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.9 percent; RDPI per capita increased 0.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.1 percent; and population increased 2.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. Third, since the beginning of the recession in IVQ2007 to IQ2012, GDP increased 1.2 percent, or barely above the level before the recession; real disposable personal income increased 2.7 percent; population increased 3.5 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita is 0.8 percent lower than the level before the recession. Real disposable personal income is the actual take home pay after inflation and taxes and real disposable income per capita is what is left per inhabitant. The current cyclical expansion is the worst in the period after World War II in terms of growth of economic activity and income. The United States grew during its history at high rates of per capita income that made its economy the largest in the world. That dynamism is disappearing.
Table ESVI-1, US, GDP, Real Disposable Personal Income, Real Disposable Income per Capita and Population in 1983-85 and 2007-2011, %
| # Quarters | ∆% | ∆% Annual Equivalent | |
| IQ1983 to IVQ1985 | 13 | ||
| GDP | 19.6 | 5.7 | |
| RDPI | 14.5 | 4.3 | |
| RDPI Per Capita | 11.5 | 3.4 | |
| Population | 2.7 | 0.8 | |
| IIIQ2009 to IQ2012 | 11 | ||
| GDP | 6.7 | 2.4 | |
| RDPI | 2.5 | 0.9 | |
| RDPI per Capita | 0.4 | 0.1 | |
| Population | 2.1 | 0.8 | |
| IVQ2007 to IQ2012 | 18 | ||
| GDP | 1.2 | ||
| RDPI | 2.7 | ||
| RDPI per Capita | -0.8 | ||
| Population | 3.5 |
RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
ESVII World Economy Growth Standstill with Global Recession Risk. Table ESVII-1 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog. Growth is weak throughout most of the world. Japan’s GDP increased 1.2 percent in IQ2012 and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier but part of the jump could be the low level a year earlier because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan is experiencing difficulties with the overvalued yen because of worldwide capital flight originating in zero interest rates with risk aversion in an environment of softer growth of world trade. China grew at 1.8 percent in IQ2012, which annualizes to 7.4 percent. Xinhuanet informs that Premier Wen Jiabao considers the need for macroeconomic stimulus, arguing that “we should continue to implement proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy, while giving more priority to maintaining growth” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/20/c_131599662.htm). Premier Wen elaborates that “the country should properly handle the relationship between maintaining growth, adjusting economic structures and managing inflationary expectations” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/20/c_131599662.htm). GDP was flat in the euro area in IQ2012 and fell 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2012 and 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2012 and 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier (Section I) but with substantial underemployment and underemployment (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/mediocre-recovery-without-jobs.html) and weak hiring (Section I http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of.html
Table ESVII-1, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%
| IQ2012/IVQ2011 | IQ2012/IQ2011 | |
| United States | 0.5 | 2.0 |
| Japan | 1.2 | 2.8 |
| China | 1.8 | 8.1 |
| Euro Area | 0.0 | -0.1 |
| Germany | 0.5 | 1.7 |
| France | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| Italy | -0.8 | -1.4 |
| United Kingdom | -0.3 | -0.1 |
Source: Country Statistical Agencies
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html http://www.insee.fr/en/ http://www.istat.it/en/ http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/naa2/second-estimate-of-gdp/q1-2012/index.html
The JP Morgan Global All-Industry Output Index of the JP Morgan Manufacturing and Services PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, with high association with world GDP, fell from 52.1 in May to 50.3 in Jun, indicating expansion at a lower rate but close to stagnation and to the contraction zone at 50.0 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=9795). This index has remained above the contraction territory of 50.0 during 34 months. Both global manufacturing and services have slowed down considerably. David Hensley, Director of Global Economic Coordination at JP Morgan, finds that the PMI data suggest world GDP growth in IIQ2012 could be the slowest in three years (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=9795). The JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, fell to 48.9 in Jun from 50.6 in May, for the lowest reading in three years and the first change of direction to contraction since Nov 2011 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=9762). David Hensley, Director of Global Economics Coordination at JPMorgan, finds that inventory adjustment is the driver of the only second change to contraction in the current expansion (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=9762). The HSBC Brazil Composite Output Index, compiled by Markit, rose from marginal contraction of 49.6 in May to moderate expansion at 51.5 in Jun (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=9775). Andre Loes, Chief Economist, Brazil, at HSBC, finds that PMI data for IIQ2012 could signal weaker activity in services, which can restrain growth of GDP in the year, although the HSBC Services PMI Business Activity Index increased from 49.7 in May to 53.0 in Jun (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=9775). The HSBC Brazil Purchasing Managers’ IndexTM (PMI™) fell to 48.5 in Jun from 49.3 in May, indicating modest business conditions in Brazilian manufacturing (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=9733). Andre Loes, Chief Economist, Brazil at HSBC, finds that the manufacturing index average of 49.0 in IIQ2012 is lower than the prior quarter’s average of 51.0 with Brazil experiencing competitive pressures (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=9733).
ESVIII Global Financial and Economic Risk. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task both for theory and measurement. The IMF provides surveillance of the world economy with its Global Economic Outlook (WEO) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/update/01/index.htm), of the world financial system with its Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fmu/eng/2012/01/index.htm) and of fiscal affairs with the Fiscal Monitor (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2012/update/01/fmindex.htm). There appears to be a moment of transition in global economic and financial variables that may prove of difficult analysis and measurement. It is useful to consider a summary of global economic and financial risks, which are analyzed in detail in the comments of this blog in Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets, Table VI-4.
Economic risks include the following:
1. China’s Economic Growth. China is lowering its growth target to 7.5 percent per year. The growth rate of GDP of China in the first quarter of 2012 of 1.8 percent is equivalent to 7.4 percent per year.
2. United States Economic Growth, Labor Markets and Budget/Debt Quagmire. The US is growing slowly with 28.4 million in job stress, fewer 10 million full-time jobs, high youth unemployment, historically-low hiring and declining real wages.
3. Economic Growth and Labor Markets in Advanced Economies. Advanced economies are growing slowly. There is still high unemployment in advanced economies.
4. World Inflation Waves. Inflation continues in repetitive waves globally (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html).
A list of financial uncertainties includes:
1. Euro Area Survival Risk. The resilience of the euro to fiscal and financial doubts on larger member countries is still an unknown risk.
2. Foreign Exchange Wars. Exchange rate struggles continue as zero interest rates in advanced economies induce devaluation of their currencies.
3. Valuation of Risk Financial Assets. Valuations of risk financial assets have reached extremely high levels in markets with lower volumes.
4. Duration Trap of the Zero Bound. The yield of the US 10-year Treasury rose from 2.031 percent on Mar 9, 2012, to 2.294 percent on Mar 16, 2012. Considering a 10-year Treasury with coupon of 2.625 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years, the price would fall from 105.3512 corresponding to yield of 2.031 percent to 102.9428 corresponding to yield of 2.294 percent, for loss in a week of 2.3 percent but far more in a position with leverage of 10:1. Min Zeng, writing on “Treasurys fall, ending brutal quarter,” published on Mar 30, 2012, in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577313400029412564.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_markets), informs that Treasury bonds maturing in more than 20 years lost 5.52 percent in the first quarter of 2012.
5. Credibility and Commitment of Central Bank Policy. There is a credibility issue of the commitment of monetary policy (Sargent and Silber 2012Mar20).
6. Carry Trades. Commodity prices driven by zero interest rates have resumed their increasing path with fluctuations caused by intermittent risk aversion.
It is in this context of economic and financial uncertainties that decisions on portfolio choices of risk financial assets must be made. There is a new carry trade that learned from the losses after the crisis of 2007 or learned from the crisis how to avoid losses. The sharp rise in valuations of risk financial assets shown in Table VI-1 in the text after the first policy round of near zero fed funds and quantitative easing by the equivalent of withdrawing supply with the suspension of the 30-year Treasury auction was on a smooth trend with relatively subdued fluctuations. The credit crisis and global recession have been followed by significant fluctuations originating in sovereign risk issues in Europe, doubts of continuing high growth and accelerating inflation in China now complicated by political developments, events such as in the Middle East and Japan and legislative restructuring, regulation, insufficient growth, falling real wages, depressed hiring and high job stress of unemployment and underemployment in the US now with realization of growth standstill. The “trend is your friend” motto of traders has been replaced with a “hit and realize profit” approach of managing positions to realize profits without sitting on positions. There is a trend of valuation of risk financial assets driven by the carry trade from zero interest rates with fluctuations provoked by events of risk aversion or the “sharp shifts in risk appetite” of Blanchard (2012WEOApr, XIII). Table ESVIII-1, which is updated for every comment of this blog, shows the deep contraction of valuations of risk financial assets after the Apr 2010 sovereign risk issues in the fourth column “∆% to Trough.” There was sharp recovery after around Jul 2010 in the last column “∆% Trough to 7/6/12,” which has been recently stalling or reversing amidst profound risk aversion. “Let’s twist again” monetary policy during the week of Sep 23 caused deep worldwide risk aversion and selloff of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/collapse-of-household-income-and-wealth.html). Monetary policy was designed to increase risk appetite but instead suffocated risk exposures. There has been rollercoaster fluctuation in risk aversion and financial risk asset valuations: surge in the week of Dec 2, mixed performance of markets in the week of Dec 9, renewed risk aversion in the week of Dec 16, end-of-the-year relaxed risk aversion in thin markets in the weeks of Dec 23 and Dec 30, mixed sentiment in the weeks of Jan 6 and Jan 13 2012 and strength in the weeks of Jan 20, Jan 27 and Feb 3 followed by weakness in the week of Feb 10 but strength in the weeks of Feb 17 and 24 followed by uncertainty on financial counterparty risk in the weeks of Mar 2 and Mar 9. All financial values have fluctuated with events such as the surge in the week of Mar 16 on favorable news of Greece’s bailout even with new risk issues arising in the week of Mar 23 but renewed risk appetite in the week of Mar 30 because of the end of the quarter and the increase in the firewall of support of sovereign debts in the euro area. New risks developed in the week of Apr 6 with increase of yields of sovereign bonds of Spain and Italy, doubts on Fed policy and weak employment report. Asia and financial entities are experiencing their own risk environments. Financial markets were under stress in the week of Apr 13 because of the large exposure of Spanish banks to lending by the European Central Bank and the annual equivalent growth rate of China’s GDP of 7.4 percent in IQ2012 [(1.018)4]. There was strength again in the week of Apr 20 because of the enhanced IMF firewall and Spain placement of debt, continuing into the week of Apr 27. Risk aversion returned in the week of May 4 because of the expectation of elections in Europe and the new trend of deterioration of job creation in the US. Europe’s sovereign debt crisis and the fractured US job market continued to influence risk aversion in the week of May 11. Politics in Greece and banking issues in Spain were important factors of sharper risk aversion in the week of May 18. Risk aversion continued during the week of May 25 and exploded in the week of Jun 1. Expectations of stimulus by central banks caused valuation of risk financial assets in the week of Jun 8 and in the week of Jun 15. Expectations of major stimulus were frustrated by minor continuance of maturity extension policy in the week of Jun 22 together with doubts on the silent bank run in highly indebted euro area member countries. There was a major rally of valuations of risk financial assets in the week of Jun 29 with the announcement of new measures by the European Council on bank resolutions. New doubts surfaced in the week of Jul 6, 2012 on the implementation of the bank resolution mechanism and on the outlook for the world economy because of interest rate reductions by the European Central, Bank of England and People’s Bank of China. The highest valuations in column “∆% Trough to 7/6/12” are by US equities indexes: DJIA 31.9 percent and S&P 500 32.5 percent, driven by stronger earnings and economy in the US than in other advanced economies but with doubts on the relation of business revenue to the weakening economy and fractured job market. The DJIA reached 13,331.77 in intraday trading on Mar 16, which is the highest level in 52 weeks (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 7/6/12” had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 but now most valuations of equity indexes show increase of less than 10 percent: China’s Shanghai Composite is 6.7 percent below the trough; STOXX 50 of Europe is 5.5 percent above the trough; Japan’s Nikkei Average is 2.2 percent above the trough; DJ Asia Pacific TSM is 5.8 percent above the trough; Dow Global is 6.5 percent above the trough; and NYSE Financial is 4.0 percent above the trough. DJ UBS Commodities is 10.4 percent above the trough. DAX is 13.0 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 2.2 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 20.8 percent below the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 9020.75 on Fri Jul 6, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 12.0 percent lower than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar depreciated by 3.1 percent relative to the euro and even higher before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 7/6/12” in Table ESVIII-1 shows that there were increases of valuations of risk financial assets in the week of Jul 7, 2012 such as 1.2 percent for DJ Asia Pacific, 0.2 percent for Nikkei Average and 1.8 percent for STOXX 50. DJ UBS Commodities increased 1.1 percent. Other valuations decreased such as 0.8 percent for NYSE Financial, 0.9 percent for Dow Global and 0.1 percent for DAX. The DJIA fell 0.8 percent and S&P 500 decreased 0.5 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table ESVIII-1 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 7/6/12” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to Jul 6, 2012. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 7/6/12” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 7/6/12.” There are now only three equity indexes above the peak in Table ESVIII-1: DJIA 14.0 percent, S&P 500 11.3 percent and DAX 1.2 percent. There are several indexes below the peak: NYSE Financial Index (http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/nykid.shtml) by 17.2 percent, Nikkei Average by 20.8 percent, Shanghai Composite by 29.7 percent, DJ Asia Pacific by 7.3 percent, STOXX 50 by 10.6 percent and Dow Global by 13.1 percent. DJ UBS Commodities Index is now 5.6 percent below the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010. An intriguing issue is the difference in performance of valuations of risk financial assets and economic growth and employment. Paul A. Samuelson (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1970/samuelson-bio.html) popularized the view of the elusive relation between stock markets and economic activity in an often-quoted phrase “the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions.” In the presence of zero interest rates forever, valuations of risk financial assets are likely to differ from the performance of the overall economy. The interrelations of financial and economic variables prove difficult to analyze and measure.
Table ESVIII-1, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and 10-Year Treasury
| Peak | Trough | ∆% to Trough | ∆% Peak to 7/6 /12 | ∆% Week 7/6/12 | ∆% Trough to 7/6 12 | |
| DJIA | 4/26/ | 7/2/10 | -13.6 | 14.0 | -0.8 | 31.9 |
| S&P 500 | 4/23/ | 7/20/ | -16.0 | 11.3 | -0.5 | 32.5 |
| NYSE Finance | 4/15/ | 7/2/10 | -20.3 | -17.2 | -0.8 | 4.0 |
| Dow Global | 4/15/ | 7/2/10 | -18.4 | -13.1 | -0.9 | 6.5 |
| Asia Pacific | 4/15/ | 7/2/10 | -12.5 | -7.3 | 1.2 | 5.8 |
| Japan Nikkei Aver. | 4/05/ | 8/31/ | -22.5 | -20.8 | 0.2 | 2.2 |
| China Shang. | 4/15/ | 7/02 | -24.7 | -29.7 | -0.1 | -6.7 |
| STOXX 50 | 4/15/10 | 7/2/10 | -15.3 | -10.6 | 1.8 | 5.5 |
| DAX | 4/26/ | 5/25/ | -10.5 | 1.2 | -0.1 | 13.0 |
| Dollar | 11/25 2009 | 6/7 | 21.2 | 18.8 | 2.9 | -3.1 |
| DJ UBS Comm. | 1/6/ | 7/2/10 | -14.5 | -5.6 | 1.1 | 10.4 |
| 10-Year T Note | 4/5/ | 4/6/10 | 3.986 | 1.548 |
T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)
Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
I Twenty Eight Million Unemployed or Underemployed. The employment situation report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the US Department of Labor released in the first Friday of every month is critical in the analysis of social and economic conditions in the US. The objective of this section is to analyze the report released on Jul 6, 2012, for Jun 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf). This section is divided into two subsections. IA Twenty Eight Million Unemployed or Underemployed provides the key data on employment and job creation contained in the BLS report. These data are complemented by the BLS report on hiring, job openings and separations to be released on Tue Jul 10 (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/), which will be analyzed in this blog’s comment of Jul 15 with the latest report analyzed in the blog comment for Jun 24 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of.html). IB Falling Real Wages analyzes wages and hours worked. IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation provides brief analysis of the employment situation. IA2 Number of People in Job Stress provides the calculation of people unemployed or underemployed in the US using the estimates of the BLS. IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment provides the comparison with long-term and relevant cyclical experience in the US. IA4 Creation of Jobs analyzes the establishment survey of the BLS that provides job creation in nonfarm payrolls. Hourly and weekly earnings and hours worked are analyzed in the following section IB Stagnating Real Wages.
IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the US Department of Labor provides both seasonally-adjusted (SA) and not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) or unadjusted data with important uses (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012Feb3; 2011Feb11):
“Most series published by the Current Employment Statistics program reflect a regularly recurring seasonal movement that can be measured from past experience. By eliminating that part of the change attributable to the normal seasonal variation, it is possible to observe the cyclical and other nonseasonal movements in these series. Seasonally adjusted series are published monthly for selected employment, hours, and earnings estimates.”
Table I-1 provides the summary statistics of the employment situation report of the BLS. The first four rows provide the data from the establishment report of creation of nonfarm payroll jobs and remuneration of workers (for analysis of the differences in employment between the establishment report and the household survey see Abraham, Haltiwanger, Sandusky and Spletzer 2009). The US economy created 80,000 nonfarm payroll jobs in Jun seasonally adjusted (SA), which is about the same as revised 77,000 created in May 2012 and 68,000 created in Apr 2012 but lower than 143,000 created in Mar, 259,000 created in Feb and 275,000 created in Jan 2012 in what could be an adverse downward trend. Subsection IA4 Job Creation analyzes the types of jobs created. Average hourly earnings in Jun 2012 were $23.29 not seasonally adjusted (NSA), increasing 1.9 percent relative to Jun 2011 and 0.3 percent higher relative to May 2012 seasonally adjusted. In May 2012, average hourly earnings not seasonally adjusted were $23.35, increasing 1.1 percent relative to Apr 2011 and increasing 0.2 percent seasonally adjusted relative to Mar 2012. These are nominal changes in worker wages. The following row “average hourly earnings in constant dollars” provides hourly wages in constant dollars calculated by the BLS or what is called “real wages” adjusted for inflation. Data are not available for Jun because the prices indexes of the BLS for May will only be released on Jul 17 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/), which will be covered in this blog’s comment on Jul 22. The second column provides changes in real wages for May. Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation or in constant dollars decreased 0.6 percent in May 2012 relative to May 2011 but have been decreasing during many consecutive months. The fractured labor market of the US is characterized by high levels of unemployment and underemployment together with falling real wages or wages adjusted for inflation. The following section IB Stagnating Real Wages provides more detailed analysis. Average weekly hours of US workers not seasonally adjusted fell to 34.3 in May 2012 relative to 34.7 in Apr but rebounded to 34.5 in Jun. Another headline number widely followed is the unemployment rate or number of people unemployed as percent of the labor force. The unemployment rate calculated in the household survey increased from 8.1 percent in Apr 2012 to 8.2 percent in May 2012 and remained at 8.2 percent in Jun 2012. This blog provides with every employment situation report the number of people in the US in job stress or unemployed plus underemployed calculated without seasonal adjustment (NSA) at 28.6 million in Jun 2012 and 28.4 million in May 2012. The final row in Table I-1 provides the number in job stress as percent of the actual labor force calculated at 17.8 percent in Jun and 17.6 percent in May 2012. The combination of high number of people in job stress, falling or stagnating real wages and high number of people in poverty constitutes a socio-economic disaster.
Table I-1, US, Summary of the Employment Situation Report SA
| Jun 2012 | May 2012 | |
| New Nonfarm Payroll Jobs | 80,000 | 77,000 |
| New Private Payroll Jobs | 84,000 | 105,000 |
| Average Hourly Earnings | $23.29 ∆% Jun 12/Jun 11 NSA: 1.9 ∆% Jun 12/May 12 SA: 0.3 | $23.35 ∆% May 12/May 11 NSA: 1.1 ∆% May 12/Apr 12 SA: 0.2 |
| Average Hourly Earnings in Constant Dollars | NA | $10.16 ∆% May 2012/May 2011: -0.6 |
| Average Weekly Hours | 34.3 | 34.5 |
| Unemployment Rate Household Survey % of Labor Force SA | 8.2 | 8.2 |
| Number in Job Stress Unemployed and Underemployed Blog Calculation | 28.6 million NSA | 28.4 million NSA |
| In Job Stress as % Labor Force | 17.8 | 17.6 |
Source: Tables I-2, I-3, I-4, I-8, IB-1, IB-3 and IB-4.
IA2 Number of People in Job Stress. There are two approaches to calculating the number of people in job stress. The first approach consists of calculating the number of people in job stress unemployed or underemployed with the raw data of the employment situation report as in Table I-2. The data are seasonally adjusted (SA). The first three rows provide the labor force and unemployed in millions and the unemployment rate of unemployed as percent of the labor force. There is increase in the number unemployed from 12.500 million in Apr 2012 to 12.720 million in May 2012 or increase of 220,000 and increase to 12.749 million in Jun 2012 for an increase of 249.000 from Apr to Jun 2012. Thus, the rate of unemployment increases from 8.1 percent in Apr 2012 to 8.2 percent in May and Jun 2012. The labor force SA increased from 154.365 million in Apr 2012 to 155.007 million in May 2012 or by 642,000 and increased to 155.163 in Jun 2012 for an increase of 798,000 relative to Apr 2012. An important aspect of unemployment is its persistence with 5.370 million in Jun who had been unemployed for 27 weeks or more, constituting 42.1 percent of the unemployed. The longer the period of unemployment the lower are the chances of finding another job. Another key characteristic of the current labor market is the high number of people trying to subsist with part-time jobs because they cannot find full-time employment or part-time for economic reasons. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals were working part time because their hours had been cut back or because they were unable to find a full-time job” (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number of part-time for economic reasons increased from 7.672 million in Mar 2012 to 8.210 million in Jun 2012 or by 538,000. Another category consists of people marginally attached to the labor force who have sought employment at some point but believe there may not be another job for them. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey” (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number in job stress unemployed or underemployed of 23.442 million in Jun is composed of 12.749 million unemployed (of whom 5.370 million, or 42.1 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more) compared with 12.720 million unemployed in May (of whom 5.411 million, or 42.5 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more), 8.210 million employed part-time for economic reasons in Jun (who suffered reductions in their work hours or could not find full-time employment) compared with 8.098 million in May and 2.483 million who were marginally attached to the labor force in Jun (who were not in the labor force but wanted and were available for work) compared with 2.423 million in May. The final row in Table I-2 provides the number in job stress as percent of the labor force: 15.1 percent in Jun, which is marginally higher than 14.9 percent in May and 14.7 percent in Apr.
Table I-2, US, People in Job Stress, Millions and % SA
| 2012 | Jun 2012 | May 2012 | Apr 2012 |
| Labor Force Millions | 155.163 | 155.007 | 154.365 |
| Unemployed | 12.749 | 12.720 | 12.500 |
| Unemployment Rate (unemployed as % labor force) | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.1 |
| Unemployed ≥27 weeks | 5.370 | 5.411 | 5.101 |
| Unemployed ≥27 weeks % | 42.1 | 42.5 | 40.8 |
| Part Time for Economic Reasons ∆ Jun 2012/Dec 2011: 112 thousand ∆ Jun 2012/Sep 2011: -1.060 million | 8.210 | 8.098 | 7.853 |
| Marginally ∆Jun 2012/Sep 2011: -28 thousand ∆Jun 2012/Dec 2011: -57 thousand | 2.483 | 2.423 | 2.363 |
| Job Stress ∆Mar 12/Dec 11: -948 thousand ∆Feb 12/Sep 11: -2.145 million | 23.442 | 23.241 | 22.716 |
| In Job Stress as % Labor Force | 15.1 | 14.9 | 14.7 |
Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-3 repeats the data in Table I-2 but including Mar and additional data. What really matters is the number of people with jobs or the total employed. The final row of Table I-3 provides people employed as percent of the population or employment to population ratio. The number has remained relatively constant around 58.6 percent.
Table I-3, US, Unemployment and Underemployment, SA, Millions and Percent
| Jun 2012 | May 2012 | Apr 2012 | Mar 2012 | |
| Labor Force | 155.163 | 155.007 | 154.365 | 154.707 |
| Unemployed | 12.749 | 12.720 | 12.500 | 12.673 |
| UNE Rate % | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.1 | 8.2 |
| Part Time Economic Reasons | 8.210 | 8.098 | 7.853 | 7.672 |
| Marginally Attached to Labor Force | 2.483 | 2.423 | 2.363 | 2.352 |
| In Job Stress | 23.442 | 23.241 | 22.716 | 22.697 |
| In Job Stress % Labor Force | 15.1 | 14.9 | 14.7 | 14.7 |
| Employed | 142.415 | 142.287 | 141.865 | 142.034 |
| Employment % Population | 58.6 | 58.6 | 58.4 | 58.5 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The second approach is considered in the balance of this subsection. Charts I-1 to I-12 explain the reasons for considering another approach to calculating job stress in the US. Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2012. There was a big drop of the number of people employed from 147.315 million at the peak in Jul 2007 (NSA) to 136.809 million at the trough in Jan 2010 (NSA) with 10.506 million fewer people employed. Recovery has been anemic compared with the shallow recession of 2001 that was followed by nearly vertical growth in jobs. The number employed in Jun 2012 was 140.129 million (NSA) or 7.186 million fewer people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007.
Chart I-1, US, Employed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-2 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the number of people employed in the US from 2001 to 2012. There was recovery in 2010 and 2011 but not sufficient to recover lost jobs. There are many people in the US who had jobs before the global recession who are not working now.
Chart I-2, US, Employed, 12-Month Percentage Change NSA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The foundation of the second approach derives from Chart I-3 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics providing the level of the civilian labor force in the US. The civilian labor force consists of people who are available and willing to work and who have searched for employment recently. The labor force of the US grew from 142.828 million in Jan 2001 to 156.255 million in Jul 2009 but has declined to 153,905 million in Apr 2012, 154,998 million in May 2012 and 156.385 million in Jun 2012, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. Chart 1-3 shows the flattening of the curve of expansion of the labor force and its decline in 2010 and 2011. The level of the labor force in the US has stagnated. The key issue is whether the decline in participation of the population in the labor force is the result of people giving up on finding another job.
Chart I-3, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, SA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-4 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of the labor force in the US. The rate of growth fell almost instantaneously with the global recession and became negative from 2009 to 2011. The labor force of the US collapsed and did not recover.
Chart I-4, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 12-month Percentage Change, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-5 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the labor force participation rate in the US or labor force as percent of the population. The labor force participation rate of the US fell from 66.8 percent in Jan 2001 to 64.3 percent NSA in Jun 2012, all number not seasonally adjusted. Chart I-5 shows an evident downward trend beginning with the global recession that has continued throughout the recovery beginning in IIIQ2009. The critical issue is whether people left the workforce of the US because they believe there is no longer a job for them.
Chart I-5, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Population in Labor Force SA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-6 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of unemployed in the US. The number unemployed rose from the trough of 6.272 million in Oct 2006 to the peak of 15.991 million in Feb 2010, declining to 13.184 million in Jun 2012, all numbers not seasonally adjusted.
Chart I-6, US, Unemployed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-7 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the rate of unemployment in the US or unemployed as percent of the labor force. The rate of unemployment of the US rose from 4.7 percent in Jan 2001 to 6.5 percent in Jun 2003, declining to 4.1 percent in Oct 2006. The rate of unemployment jumped to 10.6 percent in Jan 2010 and declined to 8.4 percent in Jun 2012, all numbers not seasonally adjusted.
Chart I-7, US, Unemployment Rate, SA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-8 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of unemployed. There was a jump above 7.5 percent early in 2009 with subsequent decline and negative rates since 2010.
Chart I-8, US, Unemployed, 12-month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-9 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the number of people in part-time occupations because of economic reasons, that is, because they cannot find full-time employment. The number underemployed in part-time occupations rose from 3.332 million in Jan 2001 to 4.820 million in Oct 2004, falling to 3.900 million in Apr 2006. The number underemployed seasonally adjusted jumped to 9.130 million in Nov 2009, falling to 8.098 million in Dec 2011 but increasing to 8.230 million in Jan 2012 and 8.119 million in Feb 2012 but then falling to 7.853 million in Apr 2012. Without seasonally adjustment the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 9,354 million in Dec 2009, declining to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 and 8.394 million in Jun 2012. The longer the period in part-time jobs the worst are the chances of finding another full-time job.
Chart I-9, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, SA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-10 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics repeats the behavior of unemployment. The 12-month rate of the level of people at work part-time for economic reasons jumped in 2009 and then declined subsequently. The declines have been insufficient to reduce significantly the number of people who cannot shift from part-time to full-time employment.
Chart I-10, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons NSA 12-Month Percentage Change, 2001-2011
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-11 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the same pattern of the number marginally attached to the labor force jumping to significantly higher levels during the global recession and remaining at historically high levels. The number marginally attached to the labor force increased from 1.295 million in Jan 2001 to 1.691 million in Feb 2004. The number of marginally attached to the labor force fell to 1.299 million in Sep 2006 and increased to 2.486 million in Dec 2009. The number marginally attached to the labor force was 2.540 million in Dec 2011, increasing to 2.809 million in Jan 2012, falling to 2.608 million in Feb 2012, 2.352 million in Mar 2012, 2.363 million in Apr 2012, 2.423 million in May 2012 and 2.483 million in Jun 2012.
Chart I-11, US, Marginally-Attached to the Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-12 provides 12-month percentage changes of the marginally-attached to the labor force from 2001 to 2012. There was a big percentage jump during the global recession followed by declines in percentage changes but insufficient negative changes.
Chart I-12, US, Marginally-Attached to the Labor Force 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-4 consists of data and additional calculations using the BLS household survey, illustrating the possibility that the actual rate of unemployment could be 11.0 percent and the number of people in job stress could be around 28.6 million, which is 17.8 percent of the labor force. The first column provides for 2006 the yearly average population (POP), labor force (LF), participation rate or labor force as percent of population (PART %), employment (EMP), employment population ratio (EMP/POP %), unemployment (UEM), the unemployment rate as percent of labor force (UEM/LF Rate %) and the number of people not in the labor force (NLF). All data are unadjusted or not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA). The numbers in column 2006 are averages in millions while the monthly numbers for Jun 2011, May 2012 and Jun 2012 are in thousands, not seasonally adjusted. The average yearly participation rate of the population in the labor force was in the range of 66.0 percent minimum to 67.1 percent maximum between 2000 and 2006 with the average of 66.4 percent (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2006/pdf/cpsaat1.pdf). Table I-4b provides the yearly labor force participation rate from 1979 to 2012. The objective of Table I-4 is to assess how many people could have left the labor force because they do not think they can find another job. Row “LF PART 66.2 %” applies the participation rate of 2006, almost equal to the rates for 2000 to 2006, to the population in May and Jun 2012 and Jun 2011 to obtain what would be the labor force of the US if the participation rate had not changed. In fact, the participation rate fell to 64.5 percent by Jun 2011 and was 63.8 percent in May 2012 and 64.3 percent in Jun 2012, suggesting that many people simply gave up on finding another job. Row “∆ NLF UEM” calculates the number of people not counted in the labor force because they could have given up on finding another job by subtracting from the labor force with participation rate of 66.2 percent (row “LF PART 66.2%”) the labor force estimated in the household survey (row “LF”). Total unemployed (row “Total UEM”) is obtained by adding unemployed in row “∆NLF UEM” to the unemployed of the household survey in row “UEM.” The row “Total UEM%” is the effective total unemployed “Total UEM” as percent of the effective labor force in row “LF PART 66.2%.” The results are that: (1) there are an estimated 4.584 million unemployed in Jun 2012 who are not counted because they left the labor force on their belief they could not find another job (∆NLF UEM); (2) the total number of unemployed is effectively 17.768 million (Total UEM) and not 13.184 million (UEM) of whom many have been unemployed long term; (3) the rate of unemployment is 11.0 percent (Total UEM%) and not 8.4 percent, not seasonally adjusted, or 8.2 percent seasonally adjusted; and (4) the number of people in job stress is close to 28.6 million by adding the 4.584 million leaving the labor force because they believe they could not find another job. The row “In Job Stress” in Table I-4 provides the number of people in job stress not seasonally adjusted at 28.6 million in Jun 2012, adding the total number of unemployed (“Total UEM”), plus those involuntarily in part-time jobs because they cannot find anything else (“Part Time Economic Reasons”) and the marginally attached to the labor force (“Marginally attached to LF”). The final row of Table I-4 shows that the number of people in job stress is equivalent to 17.8 percent of the labor force in Jun 2012. The employment population ratio “EMP/POP %” dropped from 62.9 percent on average in 2006 to 58.5 percent in Jun 2011, 58.7 percent in May 2012 and 58.9 percent in Jun 2012; the number employed (EMP) dropped from 144 million to 143.2 million. What really matters for labor input in production and wellbeing is the number of people with jobs or the employment/population ratio, which has declined and does not show signs of increasing. There are around four million fewer people working in 2012 than in 2006 and the number employed is not increasing. The number of hiring relative to the number unemployed measures the chances of becoming employed. The number of hiring in the US economy has declined by 17 million and does not show signs of increasing in an unusual recovery without hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of_24.html).
Table I-4, US, Population, Labor Force and Unemployment, NSA
| 2006 | Jun 2011 | May 2012 | Jun 2012 | |
| POP | 229 | 239,489 | 242,966 | 243,155 |
| LF | 151 | 154,538 | 154,998 | 156,385 |
| PART% | 66.2 | 64.5 | 63.8 | 64.3 |
| EMP | 144 | 140,129 | 142,727 | 143,202 |
| EMP/POP% | 62.9 | 58.5 | 58.7 | 58.9 |
| UEM | 7 | 14,409 | 12,271 | 13,184 |
| UEM/LF Rate% | 4.6 | 9.3 | 7.9 | 8.4 |
| NLF | 77 | 84,951 | 87,968 | 86,770 |
| LF PART 66.2% | 158,541 | 160,843 | 160,969 | |
| ∆NLF UEM | 4,003 | 5,845 | 4,584 | |
| Total UEM | 18,412 | 18,116 | 17,768 | |
| Total UEM% | 11.6 | 11.3 | 11.0 | |
| Part Time Economic Reasons | 8,738 | 7,837 | 8,394 | |
| Marginally Attached to LF | 2,680 | 2,423 | 2,483 | |
| In Job Stress | 29,830 | 28,376 | 28,645 | |
| People in Job Stress as % Labor Force | 18.8 | 17.6 | 17.8 |
Pop: population; LF: labor force; PART: participation; EMP: employed; UEM: unemployed; NLF: not in labor force; ∆NLF UEM: additional unemployed; Total UEM is UEM + ∆NLF UEM; Total UEM% is Total UEM as percent of LF PART 66.2%; In Job Stress = Total UEM + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached to LF
Note: the first column for 2006 is in average millions; the remaining columns are in thousands; NSA: not seasonally adjusted
The labor force participation rate of 66.2% in 2006 is applied to current population to obtain LF PART 66.2%; ∆NLF UEM is obtained by subtracting the labor force with participation of 66.2 percent from the household survey labor force LF; Total UEM is household data unemployment plus ∆NLF UEM; and total UEM% is total UEM divided by LF PART 66.2%
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table I-4b and Chart 12-b provide the US labor force participation rate or percentage of the labor force in population. It is not likely that simple demographic trends caused the sharp decline during the global recession and failure to recover earlier levels.
Table I-4b, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2012
| Year | Apr | May | Jun | Annual |
| 1979 | 62.9 | 62.9 | 64.5 | 63.7 |
| 1980 | 63.2 | 63.5 | 64.6 | 63.8 |
| 1981 | 63.6 | 63.9 | 64.6 | 63.9 |
| 1982 | 63.3 | 63.9 | 64.8 | 64.0 |
| 1983 | 63.2 | 63.4 | 65.1 | 64.0 |
| 1984 | 63.7 | 64.3 | 65.5 | 64.4 |
| 1985 | 64.3 | 64.6 | 65.5 | 64.8 |
| 1986 | 64.6 | 65.0 | 66.3 | 65.3 |
| 1987 | 64.9 | 65.6 | 66.3 | 65.6 |
| 1988 | 65.3 | 65.5 | 66.7 | 65.9 |
| 1989 | 65.9 | 66.2 | 67.4 | 66.5 |
| 1990 | 66.1 | 66.5 | 67.4 | 66.5 |
| 1991 | 66.0 | 66.0 | 67.2 | 66.2 |
| 1992 | 66.0 | 66.4 | 67.6 | 66.4 |
| 1993 | 65.6 | 66.3 | 67.3 | 66.3 |
| 1994 | 66.0 | 66.5 | 67.2 | 66.6 |
| 1995 | 66.4 | 66.4 | 67.2 | 66.6 |
| 1996 | 66.2 | 66.7 | 67.4 | 66.8 |
| 1997 | 66.7 | 67.0 | 67.8 | 67.1 |
| 1998 | 66.6 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.1 |
| 1999 | 66.7 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.1 |
| 2000 | 67.0 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.1 |
| 2001 | 66.7 | 66.6 | 67.2 | 66.8 |
| 2002 | 66.4 | 66.5 | 67.1 | 66.6 |
| 2003 | 66.2 | 66.2 | 67.0 | 66.2 |
| 2004 | 65.7 | 65.8 | 66.5 | 66.0 |
| 2005 | 65.8 | 66.0 | 66.5 | 66.0 |
| 2006 | 65.8 | 66.0 | 66.7 | 66.2 |
| 2007 | 65.7 | 65.8 | 66.6 | 66.0 |
| 2008 | 65.7 | 66.0 | 66.6 | 66.0 |
| 2009 | 65.4 | 65.5 | 66.2 | 65.4 |
| 2010 | 64.9 | 64.8 | 65.1 | 64.7 |
| 2011 | 63.9 | 64.1 | 64.5 | 64.1 |
| 2012 | 63.4 | 63.8 | 64.3 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart 12b, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2011
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment. There is initial discussion here of long-term employment trends followed by cyclical comparison. Growth and employment creation have been mediocre in the expansion beginning in Jul IIIQ2009 from the contraction between Dec IVQ2007 and Jun IIQ2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). A series of charts from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides significant insight. Chart I-13 provides the monthly employment level of the US from 1948 to 2012. The number of people employed has trebled. There are multiple contractions throughout the more than six decades but followed by resumption of the strong upward trend. The contraction after 2007 is deeper and followed by a flatter curve of job creation. Economic growth is much lower in the current expansion at 2.4 percent relative to average 6.2 percent in expansions following earlier contractions.
Chart I-13, US, Employment Level, Thousands, 1948-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The steep and consistent curve of growth of the US labor force is shown in Chart I-14. The contraction beginning in Dec 2007 flattened the path of the US civilian labor force and is now followed by a flatter curve during the current expansion.
Chart I-14, US, Civilian Labor Force, 1948-2012, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-15 for the period from 1948 to 2012. The labor force participation rate is influenced by numerous factors such as the age of the population. There is no comparable episode in the postwar economy to the sharp collapse of the labor force participation rate in Chart I-15 during the contraction and subsequent expansion after 2007. Aging can reduce the labor force participation rate as many people retire but many may have decided to work longer as their wealth and savings have been significantly reduced. There is an important effect of many people just exiting the labor force because they believe there is no job available for them.
Chart I-15, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, 1948-2012, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number of unemployed in the US jumped from 5.8 million in May 1979 to 12.1 million in Dec 1982, by 6.3 million, or 108.6 percent. The number of unemployed jumped from 6.7 million in Mar 2007 to 15.6 million in Oct 2009, by 8.9 million, or 132.8 percent. These are the two episodes with steepest increase in the level of unemployment in Chart I-16.
Chart I-16, US, Unemployed, 1948-2012, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-17 provides the rate of unemployment of the US from 1948 to 2012. The peak of the series is 10.8 percent in both Nov and Dec 1982. The second highest rates are 10.1 percent in Oct 2009 and 9.9 percent in both Nov and Dec 2009.
Chart I-17, US, Unemployment Rate, 1948-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-18 provides the number unemployed for 27 weeks and over from 1948 to 2012. The number unemployed for 27 weeks and over jumped from 510,000 in Dec 1978 to 2.9 million in Jun 1983, by 2.4 million, or 480 percent. The number of unemployed 27 weeks or over jumped from 1.1 million in May 2007 to 6.7 million in Jun 2010, by 5.6 million, or 509 percent.
Chart I-18, US, Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More, 1948-2012, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The employment-population ratio in Chart I-19 is an important indicator of wellbeing in labor markets, measuring the number of people with jobs. The US employment-population ratio fell from 63.4 in Dec 2006 to 58.2 in Jul 2011 and stands at 58.6 NSA in Jun 2012. There is no comparable decline during an expansion in Chart I-19.
Chart I-19, US, Employment-Population Ratio, 1948-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number of people at work part-time for economic reasons because they cannot find full-time employment is provided in Chart I-20. The number of people at work part-time for economic reasons jumped from 4.1 million in Sep 2006 to a high of 9.4 million in Sep 2010 and 9.3 million in Sep 2011, or by 5.2 million, or 127 percent. Earlier increases in the 1980s and after the tough recession of 1991 were followed by rapid decrease that is still absent in the current expansion. The drop by 1,172,000 of seasonally-adjusted data from Sep to Dec while actual data without seasonal adjustment show decrease by 113,000 is not very credible.
Chart I-20, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, 1955-2012, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-5 provides the change in real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.7 percent cumulatively and fell 45.6 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.8 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1981 to IVQ1982 and 5.1 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first two years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.5 percent in 1983 and 7.2 percent in 1984 while GDP grew at 3.0 percent in 2010, 1.7 percent in 2011 and 2.1 percent in IQ2012 relative to IQ2011. GDP grew at 4.1 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while the forecasts of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are 1.9 to 2.4 percent in 2012 and 2.2 to 2.8 percent in 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20120620.pdf).
Table I-5, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%
| Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% |
| 1930 | -8.6 | 1980 | -0.3 | 2000 | 4.1 |
| 1931 | -6.5 | 1981 | 2.5 | 2001 | 1.1 |
| 1932 | -13.1 | 1982 | -1.9 | 2002 | 1.8 |
| 1933 | -1.3 | 1983 | 4.5 | 2003 | 2.5 |
| 1934 | 10.9 | 1984 | 7.2 | 2004 | 3.5 |
| 1935 | 8.9 | 1985 | 4.1 | 2005 | 3.1 |
| 1936 | 13.1 | 1986 | 3.5 | 2006 | 2.7 |
| 1937 | 5.1 | 1987 | 3.2 | 2007 | 1.9 |
| 1938 | -3.4 | 1988 | 4.1 | 2008 | -0.3 |
| 1930 | 8.1 | 1989 | 3.6 | 2009 | -3.5 |
| 1940 | 8.8 | 1990 | 1.9 | 2010 | 3.0 |
| 1941 | 17.1 | 1991 | -0.2 | 2011 | 1.7 |
Source: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-6 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.8 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 5.1 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.7 percent cumulatively and fell 45.6 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.
Table I-6, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions
| Number of Quarters | Cumulative Percentage Contraction | Average Percentage Rate | |
| IIQ1953 to IIQ1954 | 4 | -2.5 | -0.63 |
| IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958 | 3 | -3.1 | -9.0 |
| IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 | 2 | -2.2 | -1.1 |
| IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | 4 | -2.7 | -0.67 |
| IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | 6 | -5.1 | -0.87 |
Source: Business Cycle Reference Dates: http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html
Data: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table I-7 shows the extraordinary contrast between the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.4 percent of the US economy in the eleven quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2012 and the average of 6.2 percent in the four earlier cyclical expansions. The BEA data for the four quarters of 2011 show the economy in standstill with annual growth of 1.6 percent {[(1.004x1.013x1.018x1.03) ¼ -1] =1.6%} with growth increasing to 2.0 percent from IQ2011 to IQ2012 {[(1.013x1.018x1.03x1.019)1/4 -1] = 2.0%}. The expansion of IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent.
Table I-7, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions
| Number | Cumulative Growth ∆% | Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate | |
| IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957 | 11 | 12.6 | 4.4 |
| IIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 5 | 10.2 | 8.1 |
| IIQ1975 to IVQ1976 | 8 | 9.5 | 4.6 |
| IQ1983 to IV1985 | 13 | 19.6 | 5.7 |
| Average Four Above Expansions | 6.2 | ||
| IIIQ2009 to IQ2012 | 11 | 6.7 | 2.4 |
Source: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
A group of charts from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics facilitate the comparison of employment in the 1980s and 2000s. The long-term charts and tables from I-5 to I-7 in the discussion above confirm the view that the comparison of the current expansion should be with that in the 1980s because of similar dimensions. Chart I-21 provides the level of employment in the US between 1979 and 1989. Employment surged after the contraction and grew rapidly during the decade.
Chart I-21, US, Employed, Thousands, 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number employed in the US fell from 147.315 million in Jul 2007 to 143,202 million in Jun 2012, by 4.113 million, or 2.8 percent, using not-seasonally-adjusted data. Chart I-22 shows tepid recovery early in 2010 followed by near stagnation and marginal expansion.
![clip_image024[1]](file:///C:\Users\cmpelaez\AppData\Local\Temp\WindowsLiveWriter1264636800\supfiles3689DE5\image112.png "clip_image024[1]")
Chart I-22, US, Employed, Thousands, 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
There was a steady upward trend in growth of the civilian labor force between 1979 and 1989 as shown in Chart I-23. There were fluctuations but strong long-term dynamism over an entire decade.
Chart I-23, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The civilian labor force in Chart I-24 grew steadily on an upward trend in the 2000s until it contracted together with the economy after 2007. There has not been recovery during the expansion but rather decline and marginal turn of the year into 2012 expansion.
![clip_image028[1]](file:///C:\Users\cmpelaez\AppData\Local\Temp\WindowsLiveWriter1264636800\supfiles3689DE5\image116.png "clip_image028[1]")
Chart I-24, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of participation of the labor force in population stagnated during the stagflation and conquest of inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as shown in Chart I-25. Recovery was vigorous during the expansion and lasted through the remainder of the decade.
Chart I-25, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, 1979-1989, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of participation in the labor force declined after the recession of 2001 and stagnated until 2007, as shown in Chart I-26. The rate of participation in the labor force continued to decline both during the contraction after 2007 and the expansion after 2009 with marginal expansion at the turn of the year into 2012, which is reversed and insufficiently recovered at the tail of the curve.
![clip_image032[1]](file:///C:\Users\cmpelaez\AppData\Local\Temp\WindowsLiveWriter1264636800\supfiles3689DE5\image120.png "clip_image032[1]")
Chart I-26, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, 2001-2012, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-27 provides the number unemployed during the 1980s. The number unemployed peaked at 12.051 million in Dec 1982 seasonally adjusted and 12.517 in Jan 1983 million not seasonally adjusted, declining to 8.358 million in Dec 1984 seasonally adjusted and 7.978 million not seasonally adjusted during the first two years of expansion from the contraction. The number unemployed then fell to 6.667 million in Dec 1989 seasonally adjusted and 6.300 million not seasonally adjusted.
Chart I-27, US, Unemployed Thousands 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-28 provides the number unemployed from 2001 to 2012. Using seasonally adjusted data, the number unemployed rose from 6.727 million in Oct 2006 to 15.421 million in Oct 2009, declining to 13.097 million in Dec 2011 and to 12.720 million in May 2012. Using data not seasonally adjusted, the number unemployed rose from 6.272 million in Oct 2006 to 16.147 million in Jan 2010, declining to 13.184 million in Jun 2012.
![clip_image034[1]](file:///C:\Users\cmpelaez\AppData\Local\Temp\WindowsLiveWriter1264636800\supfiles3689DE5\image124.png "clip_image034[1]")
Chart I-28, US, Unemployed Thousands 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of unemployment peaked at 10.8 percent in both Nov and Dec 1982 seasonally adjusted, as shown in Chart I-29. The rate of unemployment dropped sharply during the expansion after 1984 and continued to decline during the rest of the decade to 5.4 percent in Dec 1989. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the rate of unemployment peaked at 11.4 percent in Jan 1983, declining to 7.0 percent in Dec 1984 and 5.1 percent in Dec 1989.
Chart I-29, US, Unemployment Rate, 1979-1989, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of unemployment in the US seasonally adjusted jumped from 4.4 percent in May 2007 to 10.0 percent in Oct 2009 and 9.9 percent in both Nov and Dec 2009, as shown in Chart I-30. The rate of unemployment fluctuated at around 9.0 percent in 2011 with the somewhat less credible 8.7 percent in Nov 2011 because of the decrease of the labor force by 120,000 from 154.057 million Oct to 153.937 million in Nov and then declined to 8.5 percent in Dec 2011 with decline of 50,000 of the labor force from 153.937 million in Nov to 153.887 million Dec. The rate of unemployment then fell to 8.3 percent in Jan and Feb 2012 and fell to 8.2 percent in Mar 2012 and8.1 percent in Apr 2012 with another decline of the labor force. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the rate of unemployment rose from 4.3 percent in Apr and May 2007 to 10.6 percent in Jan 2010, declining to 8.4 percent in Jun 2012.
![clip_image036[1]](file:///C:\Users\cmpelaez\AppData\Local\Temp\WindowsLiveWriter1264636800\supfiles3689DE5\image128.png "clip_image036[1]")
Chart I-30, US, Unemployment Rate, 2001-2012, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The employment population ratio seasonally adjusted fell from around 60.1 in Dec 1979 to 57.1 in both Feb and Mar 1983, as shown in Chart I-31. The employment population ratio seasonally adjusted rose back to 59.9 in Dec 1984 and reached 63.0 later in the decade in Dec 1989. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the employment population ratio dropped from 60.4 percent in Oct 1979 to 56.1 percent in Jan 1983, increasing to 59.8 in Dec 1984 and to 62.9 percent in Dec 1989.
Chart I-31, US, Employment Population Ratio, 1979-1989, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The US employment-population ratio seasonally adjusted has fallen from 63.4 in Dec 2006 to 58.5 in Dec 2011 and Jan 2012, increasing to 58.6 percent in Feb 2012 and falling back to 58.5 percent in Mar 2012 and 58.4 percent in Apr 2012 but rising to 58.6 percent in May 2012, as shown in Chart I-32. The employment population-ratio has stagnated during the expansion. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the employment population ratio fell from 63.6 percent in Jul 2006 to 57.6 percent in Jan 2011 and 58.9 percent in Jun 2012.
Chart I-32, US, Employment Population Ratio, 2001-2012, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number unemployed for 27 weeks or over peaked at 2.885 million in Jun 1983 as shown in Chart I-33. The number unemployed for 27 weeks or over fell sharply during the expansion to 1.393 million in Dec 1984 and continued to decline throughout the 1980s to 0.635 million in Dec 1989.
Chart I-33, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More 1979-1989, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number unemployed for 27 weeks or over, seasonally adjusted, increased sharply during the contraction as shown in Chart I-34 from 1.131 million in Nov 2006 to 6.730 in Apr 2010. The number of unemployed for 27 weeks remained at around 6 million during the expansion compared with somewhat above 1 million before the contraction, falling to 5.370 million in Jun 2012 seasonally adjusted and 5.217 million not seasonally adjusted.
Chart I-34, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More, 2001-2012, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number of persons working part-time for economic reasons because they cannot find full-time work peaked during the contraction at 6.857 million in Oct 1982, as shown in Chart I-35. The number of persons at work part-time for economic reasons fell sharply during the expansion to 5.797 million in Dec 1984 and continued to fall throughout the decade to 4.817 million in Dec 1989.
Chart I-35, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, 1979-1989, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number of people working part-time because they cannot find full-time employment, not seasonally adjusted, increased sharply during the contraction from 3.972 million in Mar 2006, not seasonally adjusted, to 9.130 million in Nov 2009, as shown in Chart I-36. The number of people working part-time because of failure to find an alternative occupation stagnated at a very high level during the expansion, declining to 8.934 million not seasonally adjusted in Jun 2012.
![clip_image040[1]](file:///C:\Users\cmpelaez\AppData\Local\Temp\WindowsLiveWriter1264636800\supfiles3689DE5\image156.png "clip_image040[1]")
Chart I-36, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, 2001-2012, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number marginally attached to the labor force in Chart I-37 jumped from 1.252 million in Dec 2006 to 2.730 million in Feb 2011, remaining at a high level of 2.540 million in Dec 2011, 2.809 million in Jan 2012, 2.608 million in Feb 2012, 2.352 million in Mar 2012, 2.363 million in Apr 2012 and increase to 2.423 million in May 2012 and 2.843 million in Jun 2012.
![clip_image044[1]](file:///C:\Users\cmpelaez\AppData\Local\Temp\WindowsLiveWriter1264636800\supfiles3689DE5\image160.png "clip_image044[1]")
Chart I-37, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 80,000 in Jun 2012 and private payroll employment rose 84,000. The number of nonfarm jobs and private jobs created has been declining in the first five months of 2012 from 275,000 in Jan to 80,000 in Jun for nonfarm jobs and from 277,000 in Jan to 84,000 in Jun for private jobs. Table I-8 provides the monthly change in jobs seasonally adjusted in the prior strong contraction of 1981-1982 and the recovery in 1983 into 1984 and in the contraction of 2008-2009 and in the recovery in 2009 to 2012. All revisions have been incorporated in Table I-8. The data in the recovery periods are in relief to facilitate comparison. There is significant bias in the comparison. The average yearly civilian noninstitutional population was 174.2 million in 1983 and the civilian labor force 111.6 million, growing by 2009 to an average yearly civilian noninstitutional population of 235.8 million and civilian labor force of 154.1 million, that is, increasing by 35.4 percent and 38.1 percent, respectively (http://www.bls.gov/data/). Total nonfarm payroll jobs in 1983 were 90.280 million, jumping to 94.530 million in 1984 while total nonfarm jobs in 2010 were 129.874 million declining from 130.807 million in 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/data/). What is striking about the data in Table I-8 is that the numbers of monthly increases in jobs in 1983 and 1984 are several times higher than in 2010 to 2011 even with population higher by 35.4 percent and labor force higher by 38.1 percent in 2009 relative to 1983 nearly three decades ago and total number of jobs in payrolls rose by 39.5 million in 2010 relative to 1983 or by 43.8 percent. Growth has been mediocre in the eleven quarters of expansion beginning in IIIQ2009 in comparison with earlier expansions (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/mediocre-economic-growth-united-states.html) and also in terms of what is required to reduce the job stress of at least 24 million persons but likely close to 30 million. Some of the job growth and contraction in 2010 in Table I-8 is caused by the hiring and subsequent layoff of temporary workers for the 2010 census.
Table I-8, US, Monthly Change in Jobs, Number SA
| Month | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | Private |
| Jan | 95 | -327 | 225 | 41 | -818 | -40 | -40 |
| Feb | 67 | -6 | -78 | -84 | -724 | -35 | -27 |
| Mar | 104 | -129 | 173 | -95 | -799 | 189 | 141 |
| Apr | 74 | -281 | 276 | -208 | -692 | 239 | 193 |
| May | 10 | -45 | 277 | -190 | -361 | 516 | 84 |
| Jun | 196 | -243 | 378 | -198 | -482 | -167 | 92 |
| Jul | 112 | -343 | 418 | -210 | -339 | -58 | 92 |
| Aug | -36 | -158 | -308 | -274 | -231 | -51 | 128 |
| Sep | -87 | -181 | 1114 | -432 | -199 | -27 | 115 |
| Oct | -100 | -277 | 271 | -489 | -202 | 220 | 196 |
| Nov | -209 | -124 | 352 | -803 | -42 | 121 | 134 |
| Dec | -278 | -14 | 356 | -661 | -171 | 120 | 140 |
| 1984 | 2011 | Private | |||||
| Jan | 447 | 110 | 119 | ||||
| Feb | 479 | 220 | 257 | ||||
| Mar | 275 | 246 | 261 | ||||
| Apr | 363 | 251 | 264 | ||||
| May | 308 | 54 | 108 | ||||
| Jun | 379 | 84 | 102 | ||||
| Jul | 312 | 96 | 175 | ||||
| Aug | 241 | 85 | 52 | ||||
| Sep | 311 | 202 | 216 | ||||
| Oct | 286 | 112 | 139 | ||||
| Nov | 349 | 157 | 178 | ||||
| Dec | 127 | 223 | 234 | ||||
| 1985 | 2012 | Private | |||||
| Jan | 266 | 275 | 277 | ||||
| Feb | 124 | 259 | 254 | ||||
| Mar | 346 | 143 | 147 | ||||
| Apr | 195 | 68 | 85 | ||||
| May | 274 | 77 | 105 | ||||
| Jun | 145 | 80 | 84 | ||||
| Jul | 189 | ||||||
| Aug | 193 | ||||||
| Sep | 204 | ||||||
| Oct | 187 | ||||||
| Nov | 209 | ||||||
| Dec | 168 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Charts numbered from I-38 to I-41 from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide a comparison of payroll survey data for the contractions and expansions in the 1980s and after 2007. Chart I-38 provides total nonfarm payroll jobs from 2001 to 2012. The sharp decline in total nonfarm jobs during the contraction after 2007 has been followed by initial stagnation and then tepid growth in the first five months of 2012.
Chart I-38, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Total nonfarm payroll jobs grew rapidly during the expansion in 1983 and 1984 as shown in Chart I-39. Nonfarm payroll jobs continued to grow at high rates during the remainder of the 1980s.
Chart I-39, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Most job creation in the US is by the private sector. Chart I-40 shows the sharp destruction of private payroll jobs during the contraction after 2007. There has been growth after 2010 but insufficient to recover higher levels of employment prevailing before the contraction. At current rates, recovery of employment may spread over several years in contrast with past expansions of the business cycle in the US.
Chart I-40, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
In contrast, growth of private payroll jobs in the US recovered vigorously during the expansion in 1983 through 1985, as shown in Chart I-41. Rapid growth of creation of private jobs continued throughout the 1980s.
Chart I-41, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
IA4 Creation of Jobs. Types of jobs created, and not only the pace of job creation, may be important. Aspects of growth of payroll jobs from Jun 2011 to Jun 2012, not seasonally adjusted (NSA), are provided in Table I-9. Total nonfarm employment increased by 1,776,000 (row A, column Change), consisting of growth of total private employment by 1,949,000 (row B, column Change) and decline by 173,000 of government employment (row C, column Change). Monthly average growth of private payroll employment has been 162,417, which is mediocre relative to 24 to 30 million in job stress, while total nonfarm employment has grown on average by only 148,000 per month. These monthly rates of job creation are insufficient to meet the demands of new entrants in the labor force and thus perpetuate unemployment and underemployment. Manufacturing employment increased by 232,000, at the monthly rate of 19,333, while private service providing employment grew by 1,646,000, at the monthly rate of 137,167. The employment situation report states: “Professional and business services added 47,000 jobs in Jun, with temporary help services accounting for 25,000 of the increase. Employment in professional and business services has grown by 1.5 million since its most recent low points in Sep 2009” (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). An important feature in Table I-9 is that jobs in professional and business services increased by 594,000 with temporary help services increasing by 246,000. This episode of jobless recovery is characterized by part-time jobs and creation of jobs that are inferior to those that have been lost. Monetary and fiscal stimuli fail to increase consumption in a fractured job market. The segment leisure and hospitality added 14,198 jobs in Jun and 277,000 in 12 months. An important characteristic is that the losses of government jobs have been high in local government, 98,000 jobs lost in the past twelve months (row C3 Local), because of the higher number of employees in local government, 14.3 million relative to 4.8 million in state jobs and 2.8 million in federal jobs.
Table I-9, US, Employees in Nonfarm Payrolls Not Seasonally Adjusted, in Thousands
| Jun 2011 | Jun 2012 | Change | |
| A Total Nonfarm | 132,340 | 134,116 | 1,776 |
| B Total Private | 110,231 | 112,180 | 1,949 |
| B1 Goods Producing | 18,304 | 18,607 | 303 |
| B1a Manufacturing | 11,806 | 12,038 | 232 |
| B2 Private service providing | 91,927 | 93,573 | 1,646 |
| B2a Wholesale Trade | 5,568 | 5,669 | 101 |
| B2b Retail Trade | 14,656 | 14,756 | 100 |
| B2c Transportation & Warehousing | 4,316 | 4,392 | 76 |
| B2d Financial Activities | 7,725 | 7,785 | 60 |
| B2e Professional and Business Services | 17,437 | 18,031 | 594 |
| B2e1 Temporary help services | 2,303 | 2,549 | 246 |
| B2f Health Care & Social Assistance | 16,634 | 16,987 | 353 |
| B2g Leisure & Hospitality | 13,921 | 14,198 | 277 |
| C Government | 22,109 | 21,936 | -173 |
| C1 Federal | 2,874 | 2,820 | -54 |
| C2 State | 4,854 | 4,833 | -21 |
| C3 Local | 14,381 | 14,283 | -98 |
Note: A = B+C, B = B1 + B2, C=C1 + C2 + C3
Source: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf
Greater detail on the types of job created is provided in Table I-10 with data for Jun and May 2012. Strong seasonal effects are shown by the significant difference between seasonally-adjusted (SA) and not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA) data. The purpose of seasonality is to isolate nonseasonal effects. The 80,000 jobs SA total nonfarm jobs created in Jun relative to May actually correspond to job increase of 391,000 jobs NSA, as shown in row A. The 84,000 total private payroll jobs SA created in Jun relative to May actually correspond to increase of 815,000 jobs NSA in Jun. Adjustment for seasonality isolates nonseasonal effects that suggest improvement from Dec to Apr. The analysis of NSA job creation in the prior Table I-9 does show improvement over the 12 months ending in Jun 2012 that is not clouded by seasonal variations but significant reduction in number of jobs created. In fact, the 12-month rate of job creation without seasonal adjustment is stronger indication of marginal improvement in the US job market but that is insufficient to even make a dent in about 30 million people unemployed or underemployed.
Table I-10, US, Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls and Selected Industry Detail, Thousands, SA
| Jun 2012 SA | May 2012 SA | ∆ | Jun 2012 NSA | May 2012 NSA | ∆ | |
| A Total Nonfarm | 133,088 | 133,008 | 80 | 134,116 | 133,725 | 391 |
| B Total Private | 111,145 | 111,061 | 84 | 111,365 | 112,180 | 815 |
| B1 Goods Producing | 18,301 | 18,314 | 13 | 18,322 | 18,607 | 285 |
| B1a Constr. | 5,507 | 5,509 | 2 | 5,550 | 5,717 | 167 |
| B Mfg | 11,951 | 11,962 | 11 | 11,931 | 12,038 | 107 |
| B2 Private Service Providing | 92,760 | 92,831 | 71 | 93,043 | 93,573 | 530 |
| B2a Wholesale Trade | 5,623 | 5,632 | 9 | 5,633 | 5,687 | 54 |
| B2b Retail Trade | 14,753 | 14,747 | -6 | 14,701 | 14,756 | 55 |
| B2c Couriers & Mess. | 526 | 527 | 1 | 516 | 521 | 6 |
| B2d Health-care & Social Assistance | 16,968 | 16,979 | 11 | 16,988 | 16,987 | -1 |
| B2De Profess. & Business Services | 17,848 | 17,895 | 47 | 17,840 | 18,031 | 191 |
| B2De1 Temp Help Services | 2,508 | 2,534 | 26 | 2,509 | 2,549 | 40 |
| B2f Leisure & Hospit. | 13,580 | 13,593 | 13 | 13,824 | 14,198 | 374 |
Notes: ∆: Absolute Change; Constr.: Construction; Mess.: Messengers; Temp: Temporary; Hospit.: Hospitality. SA aggregate do not add because of seasonality.
Source: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf
Table I-11 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 86.7 percent in US national income. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Jun 2012, there were 134.116 million nonfarm jobs in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf Table B-1, 28). Total private jobs of 112.180 million NSA in Jun 2012 accounted for 83.6 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 134.116 million, of which 12.038 million, or 10.7 percent of total private jobs and 8.9 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-producing jobs were 93.573 million NSA in Apr 2012, or 69.8 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.4 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 10.4 in US national income, as shown in Table I-11. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.
Table I-11, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total
| SAAR IQ2012 | % Total | |
| National Income WCCA | 13,693.0 | 100.0 |
| Domestic Industries | 13,516.2 | 98.7 |
| Private Industries | 11,863.4 | 86.7 |
| Agriculture | 130.8 | 1.0 |
| Mining | 184.0 | 1.3 |
| Utilities | 190.9 | 1.4 |
| Construction | 560.1 | 4.1 |
| Manufacturing | 1419.9 | 10.4 |
| Durable Goods | 817.3 | 6.0 |
| Nondurable Goods | 602.5 | 4.4 |
| Wholesale Trade | 795.0 | 5.8 |
| Retail Trade | 932.0 | 6.8 |
| Transportation & WH | 385.2 | 2.8 |
| Information | 474.4 | 3.5 |
| Finance, insurance, RE | 2563.5 | 18.7 |
| Professional, BS | 1919.3 | 14.0 |
| Education, Health Care | 1382.3 | 10.1 |
| Arts, Entertainment | 519.9 | 3.8 |
| Other Services | 537.4 | 3.9 |
| Government | 1652.8 | 12.1 |
| Rest of the World | 176.8 | 1.3 |
Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
The NBER dates recessions in the US from peaks to troughs as: IQ80 to IIIQ80, IIIQ81 to IV82 and IVQ07 to IIQ09 (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Table I-12 provides total annual level nonfarm employment in the US for the 1980s and the 2000s, which is different from 12 months comparisons. Nonfarm jobs rose by 4.853 million in 1982 to 1984, or 5.4 percent, and continued rapid growth in the rest of the decade. In contrast, nonfarm jobs are down by 7.724 million in 2010 relative to 2007 and fell by 933,000 in 2010 relative to 2009 even after six quarters of GDP growth. Monetary and fiscal stimuli have failed in increasing growth to rates required for mitigating job stress. The initial growth impulse reflects a flatter growth curve in the current expansion.
Table I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Employment in Thousands
| Year | Total Nonfarm | Year | Total Nonfarm |
| 1980 | 90,528 | 2000 | 131,785 |
| 1981 | 91,289 | 2001 | 131,826 |
| 1982 | 89,677 | 2002 | 130,341 |
| 1983 | 90,280 | 2003 | 129,999 |
| 1984 | 94,530 | 2004 | 131,435 |
| 1985 | 97,511 | 2005 | 133,703 |
| 1986 | 99,474 | 2006 | 136,086 |
| 1987 | 102,088 | 2007 | 137,598 |
| 1988 | 105,345 | 2008 | 136,790 |
| 1989 | 108,014 | 2009 | 130,807 |
| 1990 | 109,487 | 2010 | 129,874 |
| 1991 | 108,374 | 2011 | 131,359 |
Source: http://www.bls.gov/data/
The highest average yearly percentage of unemployed to the labor force since 1940 was 14.6 percent in 1940 followed by 9.9 percent in 1941, 8.5 percent in 1975, 9.7 percent in 1982 and 9.6 percent in 1983 (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2006/pdf/cpsaat1.pdf). The rate of unemployment remained at high levels in the 1930s, rising from 3.2 percent in 1929 to 22.9 percent in 1932 in one estimate and 23.6 percent in another with real wages increasing by 16.4 percent (Margo 1993, 43; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 214-5). There are alternative estimates of 17.2 percent or 9.5 percent for 1940 with real wages increasing by 44 percent. Employment declined sharply during the 1930s. The number of hours worked remained in 1939 at 29 percent below the level of 1929 (Cole and Ohanian 1999). Private hours worked fell in 1939 to 25 percent of the level in 1929. The policy of encouraging collusion through the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), to maintain high prices, together with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), to maintain high wages, prevented the US economy from recovering employment levels until Roosevelt abandoned these policies toward the end of the 1930s (for review of the literature analyzing the Great Depression see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 198-217).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) makes yearly revisions of its establishment survey (Harris 2011BA):
“With the release of data for January 2011, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) introduced its annual revision of national estimates of employment, hours, and earnings from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) monthly survey of nonfarm establishments. Each year, the CES survey realigns its sample-based estimates to incorporate universe counts of employment—a process known as benchmarking. Comprehensive counts of employment, or benchmarks, are derived primarily from unemployment insurance (UI) tax reports that nearly all employers are required to file with State Workforce Agencies.”
The number of not seasonally adjusted total private jobs in the US in Dec 2010 is 108.464 million, declining to 106.079 million in Jan 2011, or by 2.385 million, because of the adjustment of a different benchmark and not actual job losses. The not seasonally adjusted number of total private jobs in Dec 1984 is 80.250 million, declining to 78.704 million in Jan 1985, or by 1.546 million for the similar adjustment. Table I-13 attempts to measure job losses and gains in the recessions and expansions of 1981-1985 and 2007-2011. The final ten rows provide job creation from May 1983 to May 1984 and from May 2010 to May 2011, that is, at equivalent stages of the recovery from two comparable strong recessions. The row “Change ∆%” for May 1983 to May 1984 shows an increase of total nonfarm jobs by 4.9 percent and of 5.9 percent for total private jobs. The row “Change ∆%” for May 2010 to May 2011 shows an increase of total nonfarm jobs by 0.7 percent and of 1.7 percent for total private jobs. The last two rows of Table 7 provide a calculation of the number of jobs that would have been created from May 2010 to May 2011 if the rate of job creation had been the same as from May 1983 to May 1984. If total nonfarm jobs had grown between May 2010 and May 2011 by 4.9 percent, as between May 1983 and May 1984, 6.409 million jobs would have been created in the past 12 months for a difference of 5.457 million more total nonfarm jobs relative to 0.952 million jobs actually created. If total private jobs had grown between May 2010 and May 2011 by 5.9 percent as between May 1983 and May 1984, 6.337 million private jobs would have been created for a difference of 4.539 million more total private jobs relative to 1.798 million jobs actually created.
Table I-13, US, Total Nonfarm and Total Private Jobs Destroyed and Subsequently Created in
Two Recessions IIIQ1981-IVQ1982 and IVQ2007-IIQ2009, Thousands and Percent
| Total Nonfarm Jobs | Total Private Jobs | |
| 06/1981 # | 92,288 | 75,969 |
| 11/1982 # | 89,482 | 73,260 |
| Change # | -2,806 | -2,709 |
| Change ∆% | -3.0 | -3.6 |
| 12/1982 # | 89,383 | 73,185 |
| 05/1984 # | 94,471 | 78,049 |
| Change # | 5,088 | 4,864 |
| Change ∆% | 5.7 | 6.6 |
| 11/2007 # | 139,090 | 116,291 |
| 05/2009 # | 131,626 | 108,601 |
| Change % | -7,464 | -7,690 |
| Change ∆% | -5.4 | -6.6 |
| 12/2009 # | 130,178 | 107,338 |
| 05/2011 # | 131,753 | 108,494 |
| Change # | 1,575 | 1,156 |
| Change ∆% | 1.2 | 1.1 |
| 05/1983 # | 90,005 | 73,667 |
| 05/1984 # | 94,471 | 78,049 |
| Change # | 4,466 | 4,382 |
| Change ∆% | 4.9 | 5.9 |
| 05/2010 # | 130,801 | 107,405 |
| 05/2011 # | 131,753 | 109,203 |
| Change # | 952 | 1,798 |
| Change ∆% | 0.7 | 1.7 |
| Change # by ∆% as in 05/1984 to 05/1985 | 6,409* | 6,337** |
| Difference in Jobs that Would Have Been Created | 5,457 = | 4,539 = |
*[(130,801x1.049)-130,801] = 6,409 thousand
**[(107,405)x1.059 – 107,405] = 6,337 thousand
Source: http://www.bls.gov/data/
IB Stagnating Real Wages. The wage bill is the product of average weekly hours times the earnings per hour. Table IB-1 provides the estimates by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of earnings per hour seasonally adjusted, increasing from $23.05/hour in Jun 2011 to $23.50/hour in Jun 2012, or by 1.9 percent. There has been disappointment about the pace of wage increases because of rising food and energy costs that inhibit consumption and thus sales and similar concern about growth of consumption that accounts for about 70 percent of GDP. Growth of consumption by decreasing savings by means of controlling interest rates in what is called financial repression may not be lasting and sound for personal finances (See Section IIB and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/mediocre-recovery-without-jobs.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/mediocre-growth-with-high-unemployment.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/mediocre-economic-growth-falling-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/mediocre-economic-growth-flattening.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/mediocre-economic-growth-financial.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/12/slow-growth-falling-real-disposable.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/us-growth-standstill-falling-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/slow-growth-driven-by-reducing-savings.html). Average hourly earnings seasonally adjusted were virtually flat from $23.44 in May 2012 to $23.50 in Jun 2012 or increasing by 0.3 percent. Average private weekly earnings increased $17.83 from $792.92 in Jun 2011 to $810.75 in Jun 2012 or 2.2 percent and increased from $806.34 in May 2012 to $810.75 in Jun 2012 or 0.5 percent. The inflation-adjusted wage bill can only be calculated for May, which is the most recent month for which there are estimates of the consumer price index. Earnings per hour (not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA)) rose from $23.09 in May 2011 to $23.35 in May 2012 or by 1.1 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/; see Table IB-3 below). Data NSA are more suitable for comparison over a year. Average weekly hours NSA were 34.6 in May 2011 and 34.3 in May 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/data/; see Table IB-2 below). The wage bill rose 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2012:
{[(wage bill in May 2012)/(wage bill in May 2011)]-1}100 =
{[($23.35x34.3)/($23.09x34.6)]-1]}100
= {[($800.9/$789.9)]-1}100 = 1.4%
CPI inflation was 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/) for an inflation-adjusted wage-bill change of -0.3 percent :{[(1.014/1.017)-1]100}. The wage bill for Jun 2012 before inflation adjustment increased 1.6 percent relative to the wage bill for Jun 2011:
{[(wage bill in Jun 2012)/(wage bill in Jun 2011)]-1}100 =
{[($23.29x34.4)/($22.85x34.5)]-1]}100
= {[($801.2/$788.3)]-1}100 = 1.6%
Average hourly earnings increased 1.9 percent from Jun 2011 to Jun 2012 {[($23.29/22.85) – 1]100 = 1.1%] while hours worked fell 0.3 percent {[(34.4/34.5) – 1}100 = -0.3%}. If inflation is around 2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun, the inflation-adjusted wage bill will decrease.
Energy and food price increases are similar to a “silent tax” that is highly regressive, harming the most those with lowest incomes. There are concerns that the wage bill would deteriorate in purchasing power because of renewed raw materials shock in the form of increases in prices of commodities such as the 31.1 percent steady increase in the DJ-UBS Commodity Index from Jul 2, 2010 to Sep 2, 2011. The charts of four commodity price indexes by Bloomberg show steady increase since Jul 2, 2010 that was interrupted briefly only in Nov 2010 with the sovereign issues in Europe triggered by Ireland, in Mar 2011 by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan and in the beginning of May 2011 by the decline in oil prices and sovereign risk difficulties in Europe (http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/commodities/futures/). Renewed risk aversion because of the sovereign risks in Europe has reduced the rate of increase of the DJ UBS commodity index to 10.4 percent on Jul 6, 2012, relative to Jul 2, 2010 (see Table VI-4). Inflation has been rising in waves with carry trades driven by zero interest rates to commodity futures during periods of risk appetite with interruptions during risk aversion (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/fractured-labor-market-with-hiring.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/12/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation_20.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/world-inflation-waves-and-monetary_21.html). Inflation-adjusted wages fall sharply during carry trades from zero interest rates to long positions in commodity futures during periods of risk appetite.
Table IB-1, US, Earnings per Hour and Average Weekly Hours SA
| Earnings per Hour | Jun 2011 | Apr 2012 | May 2012 | Jun 2012 |
| Total Private | $23.05 | $23.40 | $23.44 | $23.50 |
| Goods Producing | $24.39 | $24.68 | $24.65 | $24.71 |
| Service Providing | $22.73 | $23.10 | $23.15 | $23.21 |
| Average Weekly Earnings | ||||
| Total Private | $792.92 | $807.30 | $806.34 | $810.75 |
| Goods Producing | $973.16 | $994.60 | $988.47 | $993.34 |
| Service Providing | $756.91 | $769.23 | $770.90 | $772.89 |
| Average Weekly Hours | ||||
| Total Private | 34.4 | 34.5 | 34.4 | 34.5 |
| Goods Producing | 39.9 | 40.3 | 40.1 | 40.2 |
| Service Providing | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 |
Source: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf
Table IB-2 provides average weekly hours of all employees in the US from 2006 to 2012. Average weekly hours fell from 34.7 in Jun 2007 to 33.8 in Jun 2009, which was the last month of the contraction. Average weekly hours rose to 34.4 in Dec 2011 but fell with oscillations to 34.4 in May 2012 and higher at 34.5 in Jun 2012.
Table IB-2, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, NSA 2006-2012
| Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |
| 2006 | 34.2 | 34.6 | 34.3 | 34.6 | 34.9 | 34.6 | 34.5 | 34.9 | 34.4 | 34.6 | ||
| 2007 | 34.1 | 34.2 | 34.3 | 34.7 | 34.4 | 34.7 | 34.9 | 34.7 | 35.0 | 34.5 | 34.5 | 35.0 |
| 2008 | 34.2 | 34.2 | 34.8 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.9 | 34.5 | 34.6 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.6 | 34.1 |
| 2009 | 33.8 | 34.2 | 34.0 | 33.6 | 33.7 | 33.8 | 33.8 | 34.3 | 33.7 | 33.8 | 34.3 | 33.9 |
| 2010 | 33.7 | 33.6 | 33.8 | 34.0 | 34.4 | 34.1 | 34.2 | 34.7 | 34.1 | 34.3 | 34.2 | 34.2 |
| 2011 | 34.2 | 34.0 | 34.1 | 34.3 | 34.6 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.9 | 34.4 | 34.4 |
| 2012 | 34.5 | 34.2 | 34.3 | 34.7 | 34.3 | 34.5 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart IB-1 provides average weekly hours monthly from Mar 2006 to May 2012. Average weekly hours remained relatively stable in the period before the contraction and fell sharply during the contraction as business could not support lower production with the same labor input. Average weekly hours rose rapidly during the expansion but have stabilized at a level below that prevailing before the contraction.
Chart IB-1, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, SA 2006-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Calculations using BLS data of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings are shown in Table IB-3. The final column of Table IB-3 (“12 Month Real ∆%”) provides inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of all employees in the US. Average hourly earnings rose above inflation throughout the first nine months of 2007 just before the global recession that began in the final quarter of 2007 when average hourly earnings lost to inflation. In contrast, average hourly earnings of all US workers have risen less than inflation in four months in 2010 and in all but the first month in 2011 and the loss accelerated at 1.8 percent in Sep 2011, declining to a real loss of 1.1 percent in Feb 2012 and 0.6 percent in Mar 2012. There was a gain of 0.5 percent in Apr 2012 in inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings but another fall of 0.6 percent in May 2012.
Table IB-3, US, Average Hourly Earnings Nominal and Inflation Adjusted, Dollars and % NSA
| AHE ALL | 12 Month | ∆% 12 Month CPI | 12 Month | |
| 2007 | ||||
| Jan* | $20.70* | 4.2* | 2.1 | 2.1* |
| Feb* | $20.79* | 4.1* | 2.4 | 1.7* |
| Mar | $20.82 | 3.7 | 2.8 | 0.9 |
| Apr | $21.05 | 3.3 | 2.6 | 0.7 |
| May | $20.83 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 1.0 |
| Jun | $20.82 | 3.8 | 2.7 | 1.1 |
| Jul | $20.99 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 1.0 |
| Aug | $20.85 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 1.5 |
| Sep | $21.18 | 4.0 | 2.8 | 1.2 |
| Oct | $21.07 | 2.7 | 3.5 | -0.8 |
| Nov | $21.13 | 3.3 | 4.3 | -0.9 |
| Dec | $21.37 | 3.7 | 4.1 | -0.4 |
| 2010 | ||||
| Jan | $22.55 | 2.0 | 2.6 | -0.6 |
| Feb | $22.61 | 1.4 | 2.1 | -0.7 |
| Mar | $22.51 | 1.2 | 2.3 | -1.1 |
| Apr | $22.56 | 1.8 | 2.2 | -0.4 |
| May | $22.63 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 0.5 |
| Jun | $22.37 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| Jul | $22.44 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 0.6 |
| Aug | $22.58 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| Sep | $22.63 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
| Oct | $22.73 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
| Nov | $22.72 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
| Dec | $22.79 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 0.2 |
| 2011 | ||||
| Jan | $23.20 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 1.3 |
| Feb | $23.03 | 1.9 | 2.1 | -0.2 |
| Mar | $22.93 | 1.9 | 2.7 | -0.8 |
| Apr | $23.00 | 2.0 | 3.2 | -1.2 |
| May | $23.09 | 2.0 | 3.6 | -1.5 |
| Jun | $22.85 | 2.1 | 3.6 | -1.4 |
| Jul | $22.98 | 2.4 | 3.6 | -1.2 |
| Aug | $22.88 | 1.3 | 3.8 | -2.4 |
| Sep | $23.09 | 2.0 | 3.9 | -1.8 |
| Oct | $23.34 | 2.7 | 3.5 | -0.8 |
| Nov | $23.19 | 2.1 | 3.4 | -1.3 |
| Dec | $23.26 | 2.1 | 3.0 | -0.9 |
| 2012 | ||||
| Jan | $23.61 | 1.8 | 2.9 | -1.1 |
| Feb | $23.45 | 1.8 | 2.9 | -1.1 |
| Mar | $23.41 | 2.1 | 2.7 | -0.6 |
| Apr | $23.64 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 0.5 |
| May | $23.35 | 1.1 | 1.7 | -0.6 |
| Jun | $23.29 | 1.9 |
Note: AHE ALL: average hourly earnings of all employees; CPI: consumer price index; Real: adjusted by CPI inflation; NA: not available
*AHE of production and nonsupervisory employees because of unavailability of data for all employees
Source: http://www.bls.gov/data/
Average hourly earnings of all US employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984 from the dataset of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are provided in Table IB-4. Average hourly earnings fell 0.5 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Mar 2012 and gained 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2011 but then lost 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2012. Table IB-4 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average hourly earnings in 2011 and into 2012. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer goods than a year earlier and savings in bank deposits do not pay anything because of financial repression (Section IIB).
Table IB-4, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984
| Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Dec |
| 2006 | 10.05 | 10.11 | 9.92 | 9.88 | 10.21 | ||
| 2007 | 10.23 | 10.22 | 10.14 | 10.18 | 10.02 | 9.99 | 10.17 |
| 2008 | 10.11 | 10.12 | 10.11 | 10.00 | 9.91 | 9.84 | 10.47 |
| 2009 | 10.47 | 10.50 | 10.46 | 10.39 | 10.32 | 10.20 | 10.38 |
| 2010 | 10.41 | 10.43 | 10.34 | 10.35 | 10.37 | 10.26 | 10.40 |
| 2011 | 10.53 | 10.41 | 10.26 | 10.23 | 10.22 | 10.12 | 10.31 |
| 2012 | 10.42 | 10.30 | 10.21 | 10.27 | 10.16 | ||
| ∆% | -1.0 | -1.1 | -0.5 | 0.4 | -0.6 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The deterioration of purchasing power of average hourly earnings of US workers is shown by Chart IB-2 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Chart IB-2 plots average hourly earnings of all US employees in constant 1982-1984 dollars with evident decline from 2010 to 2012.
Chart IB-2, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart IB-3 provides 12-month percentage changes of average hourly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984, that is, adjusted for inflation. There was sharp contraction of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of US employees during parts of 2007 and 2008. Rates of change in 12 months became positive in parts of 2009 and 2010 but then became negative again in 2011 and now into 2012 with temporary increase in Apr 2012 that was reversed in May.
Chart IB-3, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA 12-Month Percent Change, 1982-1984 Dollars, NSA 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Average weekly earnings of all US employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984 from the dataset of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are provided in Table IB-5. Average weekly earnings fell 0.9 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Sep 2011, increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct, fell 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov and 0.3 in the 12 months ending in Dec, declining 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 and 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars were flat in Mar 2012 relative to Mar 2011, increasing 0.04 percent. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 1.6 percent in Apr 2012 relative to Apr 2011 but fell 1.4 percent in May 2012 relative to May 2011. Table IB-5 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average weekly earnings in 2011 and into 2012. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer goods than a year earlier. The fractured US job market does not provide an opportunity for advancement as in past booms following recessions.
Table IB-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, NSA 2007-2012
| Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May |
| 2006 | 343.71 | 349.78 | 340.12 | ||
| 2007 | 348.72 | 349.40 | 347.76 | 353.41 | 344.58 |
| 2008 | 345.92 | 346.21 | 351.70 | 344.13 | 340.77 |
| 2009 | 353.94 | 359.26 | 355.65 | 349.17 | 347.79 |
| 2010 | 350.71 | 350.51 | 349.60 | 351.84 | 356.80 |
| 2011 | 360.29 | 353.81 | 349.90 | 350.77 | 353.56 |
| 2012 | 359.36 | 352.27 | 350.04 | 356.52 | 348.50 |
| ∆% | -0.3 | -0.4 | 0.04 | 1.6 | -1.4 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart IB-4 provides average weekly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984. The same pattern emerges of sharp decline during the contraction, followed by recovery in the expansion and continuing fall from 2010 to 2011 and into 2012.
Chart IB-4, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart IB-5 provides 12-month percentage changes of average weekly earnings of all employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984. There is the same pattern of contraction during the global recession in 2008 and then again trend of deterioration in the recovery without hiring and inflation waves in 2011 and 2012 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/fractured-labor-market-with-hiring.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html).
Chart IB-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984 12-Month Percent Change, NSA 2007-2011
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
IIB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures and Financial Repression. Subsection IIB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures provides analysis of the personal income and consumption outlays of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for May 2012. Subsection IIB2 Repression of Savings analyzes financial repression and how it is affecting savings and wealth allocation in the US.
Subsection IIB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures. The data on personal income and consumption have been revised back to 2003 as it the case of the national accounts (GDP revisions are covered in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/growth-recession-debt-financial-risk.html). All revisions are incorporated in this subsection. Table IIB-1 provides monthly and annual equivalent percentage changes, seasonally adjusted, of current dollars or nominal personal income (NPI), current dollars or nominal disposable personal income (NDPI), real or constant chained (2005) dollars DPI (RDPI), current dollars nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) and constant or chained (2005) dollars PCE. There are waves of changes in personal income and expenditures in Table IIB-1 that correspond to inflation waves observed worldwide (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html). In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011 with relaxed risk aversion, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 7.1 percent, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 4.6 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 6.5. Real disposable income (RDPI) stagnated and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) rose at annual equivalent 1.5 percent. In the second wave in May-Aug under risk aversion, NPI rose at annual equivalent 2.4 percent, NPDI at 2.7 percent and NPCE at 2.7 percent. RDPI stagnated at 0.3 percent annual equivalent and RPCE crawled at 0.6 percent annual equivalent. With mixed shocks of risk aversion in the third wave from Sep to Dec, NPI rose at 1.8 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 1.8 percent and NPCE at 3.3 percent. Real values were more dynamic than in the earlier wave with RDPI increasing at 0.6 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 2.4 percent annual equivalent. In the fourth wave from Jan to Mar 2012, NPI increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent and NDPI at 4.5 percent but real disposable income (RDPI) stagnated in Feb and Jan, increasing in the first three months at annual equivalent of 0.8 percent. The policy of repressing savings with zero interest rates stimulated growth of nominal consumption (NPCE) at the annual equivalent rate of 6.2 percent and real consumption (RPCE) at 2.4 percent. In the fifth wave in Apr-May 2012, NPI, NDPI and RDPI grew at the same annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent while NPCE grew at 0.6 percent and RPCE at 1.2 percent. There has been sharp deterioration in the annual equivalent rates in the five waves in 2011 and 2012 shown in Table II-1 from the annual equivalent rates prevailing in the final quarter of 2010 with equivalent rate of real personal consumption expenditures of 3.2 percent but based on growth of real disposable income at 2.0 percent annual equivalent. The US economy began to decelerate in mid 2010 and has not recovered the pace of growth in the early expansion phase.
Table IIB-1, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month Seasonally Adjusted of Personal Income, Disposable Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures %
| NPI | NDPI | RDPI | NPCE | RPCE | |
| 2012 | |||||
| May | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Apr | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Apr-May | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 0.6 | 1.2 |
| Mar | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | -0.2 |
| Feb | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.6 |
| Jan | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Mar | 4.9 | 4.5 | 0.8 | 6.2 | 2.4 |
| 2011 | |||||
| ∆% Jan-Dec 2011* | 4.0 | 2.9 | 0.3 | 4.1 | 1.5 |
| Dec | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Nov | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Oct | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Sep | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Dec | 1.8 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 3.3 | 2.4 |
| Aug | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 |
| Jul | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
| Jun | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.2 | -0.1 |
| May | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% May-Aug | 2.4 | 2.7 | 0.3 | 2.7 | 0.6 |
| Apr | 0.2 | 0.2 | -0.2 | 0.3 | -0.1 |
| Mar | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| Feb | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
| Jan | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 7.1 | 4.6 | 0.0 | 6.5 | 1.5 |
| 2010 | |||||
| ∆% Jan-Dec 2010** | 5.1 | 4.6 | 3.2 | 4.2 | 2.8 |
| Dec | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| Nov | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Oct | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| IVQ2010∆% | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 0.8 |
| IVQ2010 AE ∆% | 4.5 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 5.7 | 3.2 |
Notes: NPI: current dollars personal income; NDPI: current dollars disposable personal income; RDPI: chained (2005) dollars DPI; NPCE: current dollars personal consumption expenditures; RPCE: chained (2005) dollars PCE; AE: annual equivalent; IVQ2010: fourth quarter 2010; A: annual equivalent
Percentage change month to month seasonally adjusted
*∆% Dec 2011/Dec 2010 **∆% Dec 2010/Dec 2009
Source: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Further information on income and consumption is provided by Table IIB-2. The 12-month rates of increase of RDPI and RPCE in 2011 show a sharp trend of deterioration of RDPI from over 3 percent in the final four months of 2010 to less than 3 percent in IQ2011 and then collapsing to a range of 0.9 to 0.5 percent in May-Aug 2011. The BEA has revised earlier data showing RDPI falling 0.1 percent in 2011 to growth of 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2011. In the 12 months ending in May 2012, RDPI grew 1.1 percent compared with growth of 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2010, confirming the deceleration of income recovery in the US. RPCE growth decelerated less sharply from close to 3 percent in IVQ 2010 to 2.3 percent in Jul 2011 and 1.9 percent in May 2012. Subdued growth of RPCE could affect revenues of business. Growth rates of personal income and consumption have weakened. Goods and especially durable goods have been driving growth of PCE as shown by the much higher 12-month rates of growth of real goods PCE (RPCEG) and durable goods real PCE (RPCEGD) than services real PCE (RPCES). The faster expansion of industry in the economy is derived from growth of consumption of goods and in particular of consumer durable goods while growth of consumption of services is much more moderate. The 12-month rates of growth of RPCEGD have fallen from more than 10 percent in Sep 2010 to Feb 2011 to the range of 6.3 to 7.9 percent in Jan-May 2012. RPCEG growth rates have fallen from over 5 percent late in 2010 and early Jan-Feb 2011 to the range of 2.5 to 3.4 percent in Jan-May 2012. There are limits to sustained growth on the basis of financial repression in an environment of weak labor markets and real labor remuneration.
Table IIB-2, Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Personal Consumption Expenditures Percentage Change from the Same Month a Year Earlier %
| RDPI | RPCE | RPCEG | RPCEGD | RPCES | |
| 2012 | |||||
| May | 1.1 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 7.7 | 1.2 |
| Apr | 0.7 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 6.8 | 1.3 |
| Mar | 0.3 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 6.3 | 1.1 |
| Feb | 0.2 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 7.9 | 1.5 |
| Jan | 0.3 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 7.5 | 1.1 |
| 2011 | |||||
| Dec | 0.3 | 1.5 | 2.4 | 7.0 | 1.1 |
| Nov | 0.3 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 6.7 | 1.2 |
| Oct | 0.6 | 1.9 | 2.7 | 6.6 | 1.5 |
| Sep | 0.8 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 7.8 | 1.5 |
| Aug | 0.5 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 6.1 | 1.4 |
| Jul | 0.9 | 2.3 | 3.9 | 7.1 | 1.5 |
| Jun | 0.8 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 6.3 | 1.4 |
| May | 0.9 | 2.2 | 4.0 | 7.8 | 1.4 |
| Apr | 1.6 | 2.5 | 4.7 | 9.2 | 1.4 |
| Mar | 2.4 | 2.6 | 4.5 | 9.3 | 1.7 |
| Feb | 2.7 | 2.9 | 5.9 | 12.8 | 1.4 |
| Jan | 2.8 | 2.9 | 5.8 | 12.0 | 1.5 |
| 2010 | |||||
| Dec | 3.2 | 2.8 | 5.4 | 10.2 | 1.6 |
| Nov | 3.6 | 3.2 | 5.9 | 10.2 | 1.9 |
| Oct | 3.8 | 2.9 | 6.1 | 12.2 | 1.3 |
| Sep | 3.1 | 2.7 | 5.6 | 10.5 | 1.4 |
Notes: RDPI: real disposable personal income; RPCE: real personal consumption expenditures (PCE); RPCEG: real PCE goods; RPCEGD: RPCEG durable goods; RPCES: RPCE services
Numbers are percentage changes from the same month a year earlier
Source: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIB-1 shows US real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) between 1995 and 2012. There is an evident drop in RPCE during the global recession in 2007 to 2009 but the slope is flatter during the current recovery than in the period before 2007.
Chart IIB-1, US, Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Percent changes from the prior period in seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent quarterly rates (SAAR) of real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) are provided in Chart IIB-2 from 1995 to 2012. The average rate could be visualized as a horizontal line. Although there are not yet sufficient observations, it appears from Chart IIB-2 that the average rate of growth of RPCE was higher before the recession than during the past eleven quarters of expansion that began in IIIQ2009.
Chart IIB-2, Percent Change from Prior Period in Real Personal Consumption Expenditure, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Personal income and its disposition are shown in Table IIB-3. An important adversity is shown in Table IIB-3 in the form of sharp deceleration in growth of personal income from $155.3 billion in Jan 2011 relative to Dec 2010 to nil growth in May and Jun. In the same period, growth of wages and salaries fell from $55.4 billion in Jan 2011/Dec 2010 to contraction by $4.5 billion in Jun/May. In Nov/Oct 2011 income fell 0.1 percent and wages and salaries declined 0.4 percent. The final column of Table IIB-3 shows the decline of the savings rate from 5.2 percent in Dec 2010 to 3.9 percent in May 2012. The mediocre recovery of the economy is significantly driven by consuming out of savings with stagnating real disposable personal income in both Jan and Feb 2012 and increasing at annual equivalent 0.8 percent in Jan-Mar 2012, as shown in Table IIB-1 above. The collapse of hiring and 10 million fewer full-time jobs prevents advancement to higher incomes and consumption (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of_24.html).
Table IIB-3, US, Personal Income and its Disposition, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates $ Billions
| Personal | Wages & | Personal | DPI | Savings | |
| May 2012 | 13,334.9 | 6,833.8 | 1,470.8 | 11,864.1 | 3.9 |
| Apr 2012 | 13,309.5 | 6,832.4 | 1,463.9 | 11,845.6 | 3.7 |
| Change May/Apr | 25.4 ∆% 0.2 | 1.4 ∆% 0.0 | 6.9 ∆% 0.5 | 18.5 ∆% 0.2 | |
| Mar | 13,280.1 | 6,826.7 | 1,454.0 | 11,826.1 | 3.7 |
| Change Apr/Mar | 29.4 ∆% 0.2 | 5.7 ∆% 0.1 | 9.9 ∆% 0.7 | 19.5 ∆% 0.2 | |
| Feb 2012 | 13,226.3 | 6,809.9 | 1,448.2 | 11,778.1 | 3.4 |
| Change Mar/Feb | 53.8 ∆% 0.4 | 16.8 ∆% 0.2 | 5.8 ∆% 0.4 | 48.0 ∆% 0.4 | |
| Jan | 13,176.9 | 6,784.1 | 1,440.0 | 11,736.9 | 4.0 |
| Change Feb/Jan | 49.4 ∆% 0.4 | 25.8 ∆% 0.4 | 8.2 ∆% 0.6 | 41.2 ∆% 0.4 | |
| Dec 2011 | 13,128.9 | 6,753.8 | 1,424.2 | 11,704.7 | 4.2 |
| Change Jan/Dec | 48.0 ∆% 0.4 | 30.3 ∆% 0.4 | 15.8 | 32.2 | |
| Nov | 13,085.8 | 6,739.9 | 1,416.9 | 11,668.9 | 4.0 |
| Change Dec/Nov | 43.1 ∆% 0.3 | 13.9 ∆% 0.2 | 7.3 ∆% 0.5 | 35.8 ∆% 0.3 | |
| Oct | 13,102.5 | 6,766.0 | 1,417.2 | 11,685.3 | 4.2 |
| Change Nov/Oct | -16.7 ∆% -0.1 | -26.1 ∆% -0.4 | -0.3 ∆% 0.0 | -16.4 ∆% -0.1 | |
| Sep | 13,088.8 | 6,763.3 | 1,413.4 | 11,675.4 | 4.3 |
| Change Oct/Sep | 39.7 | 2.7 ∆% 0.0 | 3.8 ∆% 0.3 | 9.9 ∆% 0.1 | |
| Aug | 13,049.1 | 6,715.3 | 1,406.0 | 11,643.1 | 4.7 |
| Change Sep/Aug | 39.7 | 48.0 | 7.4 | 32.3 | |
| Jul | 13,032.5 | 6,694.4 | 1,407.8 | 11,624.6 | 4.7 |
| Change Aug/Jul | 16.6 ∆% 0.1 | 20.9 ∆% 0.3 | -1.8 ∆% –0.1 | 18.5 ∆% 0.2 | |
| Jun | 12,970.1 | 6,615.1 | 1,403.2 | 11,566.9 | 5.0 |
| Change Jul/Jun | 62.4 ∆% 0.5 | 79.3 ∆% 1.2 | 4.6 ∆% 0.3 | 57.7 ∆% 0.5 | |
| May | 12,957.2 | 6,619.6 | 1,397.4 | 11,559.7 | 4.7 |
| Change | 12.9 ∆% 0.1 | -4.5 ∆% -0.1 | 5.8 ∆% 0.4 | 7.2 ∆% 0.1 | |
| Apr | 12,938.7 | 6,616.5 | 1,387.9 | 11,550.8 | 4.8 |
| Change | 18.5 ∆% 0.1 | 3.1 ∆% 0.0 | 9.5 ∆% 0.7 | 8.9 ∆% 0.1 | |
| Mar | 12,909.7 | 6,614.8 | 1,377.7 | 11,532.1 | 4.9 |
| Change | 29.0 ∆% 0.2 | 1.7 ∆% 0.0 | 10.2 ∆% 0.7 | 18.7 ∆% 0.2 | |
| Feb | 12,850.6 | 6,582.9 | 1,367.1 | 11,483.5 | 5.0 |
| Change | 59.1 ∆% 0.5 | 31.9 ∆% 0.5 | 10.6 0.8 | 48.6 ∆% 0.4 | |
| Jan | 12,780.3 | 6,536.8 | 1,352.8 | 11,427.5 | 5.2 |
| Change | 70.3 ∆% 0.6 | 46.1 ∆% 0.7 | 14.3 ∆% 1.1 | 56.0 ∆% 0.5 | |
| Dec | 12,625.0 | 6,481.4 | 1,247.6 | 11,377.3 | 5.2 |
| Change | 155.3 ∆% 1.2 | 55.4 ∆% 0.9 | 105.2 ∆% 8.4 | 50.2 ∆% 0.4 |
Source: http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIB-3 provides personal income in the US between 1980 and 1989. These data are not adjusted for inflation that was still high in the 1980s in the exit from the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s. Personal income grew steadily during the 1980s after recovery from two recessions from Jan IQ1980 to Jul IIIQ1980 and from Jul IIIQ1981 to Nov IVQ1982 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) with combined drop of GDP by 4.8 percent.
Chart IIB-3, US, Personal Income, Billion Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 1980-1989
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
A different evolution of personal income is shown in Chart IIB-4. Personal income also fell during the recession from Dec IVQ2007 to Jun IIQ2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). Growth of personal income has been anemic and stalled in 2011 and into 2012.
Chart IIB-4, US, Personal Income, Current Billions of Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2012
Source:
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Real or inflation-adjusted disposable personal income is provided in Chart IIB-5 from 1980 to 1989. Real disposable income after allowing for taxes and inflation grew steadily at high rates during the entire decade.
Chart IIB-5, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1980-1989
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
The stagnation of real disposable income is evident in Chart IIB-6. There was initial recovery in 2010 and then income after inflation and taxes stagnated into 2011. The 12-month percentage change of real disposable income in May 2012 was 1.1 percent compared with 2.8 percent in Jan 2011 and 3.2 percent in Dec 2010. Real disposable income was flat in Jan-Feb 2012 and grew at the annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent in Jan-May 2012.
Chart IIB-6, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIB-7 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally-adjusted annual rates from 1980 to 1989. Rates of change were high during the decade with few negative changes.
Chart IIB-7, US, Real Disposable Income Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Quarterly Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 1980-1989
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIB-8 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally-adjusted annual rates from 2007 to 2012. There has been a period of positive rates followed by decline of rates and then negative and low rates. There is marginal improvement in IVQ2011 but mediocre compared with the early phase of expansion. Real disposable income collapsed after IIQ2011 and has not recovered its earlier dynamism. Real personal disposable income in chained 2005 dollars was $10,210.1 billion in IQ2012 and $10,183.2 billion in IQ2011 for increase of 0.3 percent {[($10,210.1/$10,183.2)-1]100 = 0.3%}. Real disposable personal income in 2005 chained dollars was $10,160.0 billion in May 2011 and $10,271.9 billion in May 2012 for increase of 1.1 percent {[($10,271.9/$10,160.0) – 1]100 =1.1%}. Real disposable income per person increased from $32,594 in May 2011 to $32,716 in May 2012 or 0.4% {[($32,716/$32,594)-1]100 = 0.4%}. Growth of real disposable income is struggling in following population growth.
Chart, IIB-8, US, Real Disposable Income, Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
In the latest available report, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates US personal income in May 2012 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate of $13,334.9 billion, as shown in Table IIB-3 above (see page 5, Table 1 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2012/pdf/pi0512.pdf). The major portion of personal income is compensation of employees of $8475.3 billion, or 63.6 percent of the total. Wage and salary disbursements are $6,833.8 billion, of which $5,639.5 billion by private industries and supplements to wages and salaries of $1,6141.6 billion (employer contributions to pension and insurance funds are $1,129.7 billion and contributions to social insurance are $511.9 billion). Chart IIB-9 provides US wage and salary disbursement by private industries in the 1980s. Growth was robust after the interruption of the recessions.
Chart IIB-9, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates Billions of Dollars, 1980-1989
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIB-10 shows US wage and salary disbursement of private industries from 2007 to 2012. There is a drop during the contraction followed by initial recovery in 2010 and then the current stagnation in 2011 and 2012.
Chart IIB-10, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIB-11 provides finer detail with monthly wage and salary disbursement of private industries from 2007 to 2012. There is decline during the contraction and a period of mild recovery with current stagnation.
Chart IIB-11, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIB-12 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 1980 to 1989. This is the ultimate measure of well being in receiving income by obtaining the value per inhabitant. The measure cannot adjust for the distribution of income. Real disposable personal income per capital grew rapidly during the expansion after 1983 and continued growing during the rest of the decade.
Chart IIB-12, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 1980-1989
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart II-13 provides monthly real disposable personal per capita income from 2007 to 2012. There was initial recovery from the drop during the global recession followed by stagnation.
Chart IIB-13, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table IIB-14 provides the data required for broader comparison of the cyclical expansions of IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and the current one from 2009 to 2012. First, in the 13 quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1985, GDP increased 19.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.7 percent; real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 14.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent; RDPI per capita increased 11.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.4 percent; and population increased 2.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. Second, in the 11 quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2012, GDP increased 6.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent; real disposable personal income (RDPI) increased 2.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.9 percent; RDPI per capita increased 0.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.1 percent; and population increased 2.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. Third, since the beginning of the recession in IVQ2007 to IQ2012, GDP increased 1.2 percent, or barely above the level before the recession; real disposable personal income increased 2.7 percent; population increased 3.5 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita is 0.8 percent lower than the level before the recession. Real disposable personal income is the actual take home pay after inflation and taxes and real disposable income per capita is what is left per inhabitant. The current cyclical expansion is the worst in the period after World War II in terms of growth of economic activity and income. The United States grew during its history at high rates of per capita income that made its economy the largest in the world. That dynamism is disappearing.
Table IIB-4, US, GDP, Real Disposable Personal Income, Real Disposable Income per Capita and Population in 1983-85 and 2007-2011, %
| # Quarters | ∆% | ∆% Annual Equivalent | |
| IQ1983 to IVQ1985 | 13 | ||
| GDP | 19.6 | 5.7 | |
| RDPI | 14.5 | 4.3 | |
| RDPI Per Capita | 11.5 | 3.4 | |
| Population | 2.7 | 0.8 | |
| IIIQ2009 to IQ2012 | 11 | ||
| GDP | 6.7 | 2.4 | |
| RDPI | 2.5 | 0.9 | |
| RDPI per Capita | 0.4 | 0.1 | |
| Population | 2.1 | 0.8 | |
| IVQ2007 to IQ2012 | 18 | ||
| GDP | 1.2 | ||
| RDPI | 2.7 | ||
| RDPI per Capita | -0.8 | ||
| Population | 3.5 |
RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
IIB2 Financial Repression. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1974) argue that legal restrictions on financial institutions can be detrimental to economic development. “Financial repression” is the term used in the economic literature for these restrictions (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 81-6). Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. Prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits were imposed by the Banking Act of 1933. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q.
Most regulatory actions trigger compensatory measures by the private sector that result in outcomes that are different from those intended by regulation (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Banks offered services to their customers and loans at rates lower than market rates to compensate for the prohibition to pay interest on demand deposits (Friedman 1970, 24). The prohibition of interest on demand deposits was eventually lifted in recent times. In the second half of the 1960s, already in the beginning of the Great Inflation (DeLong 1997), market rates rose above the ceilings of Regulation Q because of higher inflation. Nobody desires savings allocated to time or savings deposits that pay less than expected inflation. This is a fact currently with zero interest rates and consumer price inflation of 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). Funding problems motivated compensatory measures by banks. Money-center banks developed the large certificate of deposit (CD) to accommodate increasing volumes of loan demand by customers. As Friedman (1970, 25) finds:
“Large negotiable CD’s were particularly hard hit by the interest rate ceiling because they are deposits of financially sophisticated individuals and institutions who have many alternatives. As already noted, they declined from a peak of $24 billion in mid-December, 1968, to less than $12 billion in early October, 1969.”
Banks created different liabilities to compensate for the decline in CDs. As Friedman (1970, 25; 1969) explains:
“The most important single replacement was almost surely ‘liabilities of US banks to foreign branches.’ Prevented from paying a market interest rate on liabilities of home offices in the United States (except to foreign official institutions that are exempt from Regulation Q), the major US banks discovered that they could do so by using the Euro-dollar market. Their European branches could accept time deposits, either on book account or as negotiable CD’s at whatever rate was required to attract them and match them on the asset side of their balance sheet with ‘due from head office.’ The head office could substitute the liability ‘due to foreign branches’ for the liability ‘due on CDs.”
Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:
“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”
In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:
“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.”
Chart IIB2-1 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides quarterly savings as percent of disposable income or the US savings rate from 1980 to 2012. There was a long-term downward sloping trend from 12 percent in the early 1980s to less than 2 percent in 2005-2006. The savings rate then rose during the contraction and also in the expansion. In 2011 and into 2012 the savings rate declined as consumption is financed with savings in part because of the disincentive or frustration of receiving a few pennies for every $10,000 of deposits in a bank. The objective of monetary policy is to reduce borrowing rates to induce consumption but it has collateral disincentive of reducing savings. The zero interest rate of monetary policy is a tax on saving. This tax is highly regressive, meaning that it affects the most people with lower income or wealth and retirees. The long-term decline of savings rates in the US has created a dependence on foreign savings to finance the deficits in the federal budget and the balance of payments.
Chart IIB2-1, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Quarterly, 1980-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIB2-2 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides personal savings as percent of personal disposable income, or savings ratio, from Jan 2007 to May 2012. The uncertainties caused by the global recession resulted in sharp increase in the savings ratio that peaked at 8.3 percent in May 2008. The second highest ratio occurred at 7.1 percent in May 2009. There was another rising trend until 5.8 percent in Jun 2006 and then steady downward trend until 3.9 percent in May 2012. Permanent manipulation of the entire spectrum of interest rates with monetary policy measures distorts the compass of resource allocation with inferior outcomes of future growth, employment and prosperity and dubious redistribution of income and wealth affecting the most people without vast capital and relations to manage their savings.
Chart IIB2-2, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Income, Monthly 2007-2012
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
III World Financial Turbulence. Financial markets are being shocked by multiple factors including (1) world economic slowdown; (2) slowing growth in China with political development, Japan and world trade; (3) slow growth propelled by savings reduction in the US with high unemployment/underemployment, falling wages and hiring collapse; and (3) the outcome of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This section provides current data and analysis. Subsection IIIA Financial Risks provides analysis of the evolution of valuations of risk assets during the week. There are various appendixes at the end of this section for convenience of reference of material related to the euro area debt crisis. Some of this material is updated in Subsection IIIA when new data are available and then maintained in the appendixes for future reference until updated again in Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies discusses arguments and measures of currency intervention. Subsection IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact provides analysis of the restructuring of the fiscal affairs of the European Union in the agreement of European leaders reached on Dec 9, 2011. Subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort considers the policies of the European Central Bank. Appendix IIIE Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the threats to survival of the European Monetary Union. Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation provides more technical analysis. Subsection IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis provides analysis of proposals to finance growth with budget deficits together with experience of the economic history of Brazil.
IIIA Financial Risks. The past half year has been characterized by financial turbulence, attaining unusual magnitude in recent months. Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Fr Jun 29 and daily values throughout the week ending on Fri Jul 6 of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at 5 PM. The first column provides the value on Fri Jun 29 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Jun 29, 2012”, first row “USD/EUR 1.2661 -0.7%,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) depreciated 0.7 percent to USD 1.2661/EUR in the week ending on Fri Jun 29 relative to the exchange rate on Fri Jun 22. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. The most important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf).
The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per one euro EUR, USD 1.2661/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Fri Jun 29, appreciating to USD 1.2583/EUR on Mon Jul 2, or by 0.6 percent. The dollar appreciated because fewer dollars, $1.2583, were required on Mon Jul 2 to buy one euro than $1.2661 on Jun 29. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the exchange rate at 5 PM New York time, such as USD 1.2583/EUR on Jul 2; the second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Fri Jun 29, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Fri Jul 6, such as appreciation by 2.9 percent to USD 1.2288/EUR by Jul 6; and the third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 2.9 percent from the rate of USD 1.2661/EUR on Fri Jun 29 to the rate of USD 1.2288/EUR on Fri Jul 6 {[(1.2288/1.2661) – 1]100 = -2.9%} and appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 0.8 percent from the rate of USD 1.2393 on Thu Jul 5 to USD 1.2288/EUR on Fri Jul 6 {[(1.2288/1.2393) -1]100 = -0.8%}. Other factors constant, appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro is caused by increasing risk aversion, with rising uncertainty on European sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. Funds move away from higher yielding risk financial assets to the safety of dollar investments. When risk aversion declines, funds have been moving away from safe assets in dollars to risk financial assets, depreciating the dollar.
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Assets Jun 2 to Jun 6, 2012
| Fri Jun 29, 2012 | M 2 | Tue 3 | W 4 | Thu 5 | Fr 6 |
| USD/EUR 1.2661 -0.7% | 1.2583 0.6% 0.6% | 1.2609 0.4% -0.2% | 1.2524 1.1% 0.7% | 1.2393 2.1% 1.0% | 1.2288 2.9% 0.8% |
| JPY/ USD 79.81 0.8% | 79.53 0.4% 0.4% | 79.82 0.0% 0.0% | 79.85 -0.1% 0.0% | 79.91 -0.1% -0.1% | 79.66 0.2% 0.3% |
| CHF/ USD 0.9487 0.7% | 0.9546 -0.6% -0.6% | 0.9526 -0.4% 0.2% | 0.9591 -1.1% -0.7% | 0.9695 -2.2% -1.1% | 0.9774 -3.0% -0.8% |
| CHF/ EUR 1.2013 0.0% | 1.2011 0.0% 0.0% | 1.2011 0.0% 0.0% | 1.2011 0.0% 0.0% | 1.2013 0.0% 0.0% | 1.2010 0.0% 0.0% |
| USD/ AUD 1.0245 0.9761 1.8% | 1.0249 0.9757 0.0% 0.0% | 1.0283 0.9725 0.4% 0.3% | 1.0274 0.9733 0.3% -0.1% | 1.0286 0.9722 0.4% 0.1% | 1.0211 0.9793 -0.3% -0.7% |
| 10 Year T Note 1.648 | 1.58 | 1.63 | 1.63 | 1.60 | 1.548 |
| 2 Year T Note 0.305 | 0.29 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.272 |
| German Bond 2Y 0.12 10Y 1.58 | 2Y 0.10 10Y 1.52 | 2Y 0.09 10Y 1.53 | 2Y 0.07 10Y 1.45 | 2Y 0.02 10Y 1.38 | 2Y -0.01 10Y 1.33 |
| DJIA 12880.09 1.9% | 12871.39 -0.1% -0.1% | 12943.82 0.5% 0.6% | 12943.82 0.5% 0.6% | 12896.67 0.1% -0.4% | 12772.47 -0.8% -0.9% |
| DJ Global 1831.63 2.2% | 1839.56 0.4% 0.4% | 1854.30 1.2% 0.8% | 1850.38 1.0% -0.2% | 1837.14 0.3% -0.7% | 1814.28 -0.9% -1.2% |
| DJ Asia Pacific 1196.87 2.6% | 1202.77 0.5% 0.5% | 1212.54 1.3% 0.8% | 1217.66 1.7% 0.4% | 1215.49 1.6% -0.2% | 1211.53 1.2% -0.3% |
| Nikkei 9006.78 2.4% | 9003.48 0.0% | 9066.59 0.7% 0.7% | 9104.17 1.1% 0.4% | 9079.80 0.8% -0.3% | 9020.75 0.2% -0.7% |
| Shanghai 2225.43 -1.6% | 2226.11 0.0% 0.0% | 2229.19 0.2% 0.1% | 2227.31 0.1% -0.1% | 2201.35 -1.1% -1.2% | 2223.58 -0.1% 1.0% |
| DAX 6416.28 2.4% | 6496.08 1.2% 1.2% | 6578.21 2.5% 1.3% | 6564.80 2.3% -0.2% | 6535.56 1.8% -0.5% | 6410.11 -0.1% -1.9% |
| DJ UBS Comm. 135.42 5.6% | 135.67 0.2% 0.2% | 139.31 2.9% 2.7% | 139.31 2.9% 2.7% | 140.09 3.4% 0.6% | 136.89 1.1% -2.3% |
| WTI $ B 84.96 6.0% | 83.66 -1.5% -1.5% | 87.57 3.1% 4.7% | 87.05 2.5% -0.6% | 86.76 2.1% -0.3% | 84.14 -0.9% -3.0% |
| Brent $/B 97.59 6.8% | 97.25 -0.3% -0.3% | 100.62 3.1% 3.5% | 99.77 2.2% -0.8% | 100.00 2.5% 0.2% | 97.94 0.4% -2.1% |
| Gold $/OZ 1598.2 1.6% | 1597.5 0.0% 0.0% | 1617.6 1.2% 1.3% | 1615.0 1.1% -0.2% | 1604.1 0.4% -0.7% | 1583.2 -0.9% -1.3% |
Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss
Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce
Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
Current financial risk is dominated by interest rate decisions of major central banks and the new program of rescue of banks and countries in the sovereign risk event in the euro zone. At the meeting of its Governing Council on Jul 5, 2010, the European Central Bank took the following policy measures (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120705.en.html):
“5 July 2012 - Monetary policy decisions
At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:
4. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.75%, starting from the operation to be settled on 11 July 2012.
5. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to 1.50%, with effect from 11 July 2012.
6. The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.00%, with effect from 11 July 2012.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 2.30 p.m. CET today.”
The President of the ECB Mario Draghi summarized the reasons for the policy measures as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120705.en.html):
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to cut the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Inflationary pressure over the policy-relevant horizon has been dampened further as some of the previously identified downside risks to the euro area growth outlook have materialised. Consistent with this picture, the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains subdued. Inflation expectations for the euro area economy continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. At the same time, economic growth in the euro area continues to remain weak, with heightened uncertainty weighing on confidence and sentiment.”
The Bank of England decided on Jul 5, 2012 to increase its policy of quantitative easing (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2012/066.aspx ):
“The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee today voted to maintain the official Bank Rate paid on commercial bank reserves at 0.5%. The Committee also voted to increase the size of its asset purchase programme, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, by £50 billion to a total of £375 billion.
UK output has barely grown for a year and a half and is estimated to have fallen in both of the past two quarters. The pace of expansion in most of the United Kingdom’s main export markets also appears to have slowed. Business indicators point to a continuation of that weakness in the near term, both at home and abroad. In spite of the progress made at the latest European Council, concerns remain about the indebtedness and competitiveness of several euro-area economies, and that is weighing on confidence here. The correspondingly weaker outlook for UK output growth means that the margin of economic slack is likely to be greater and more persistent.”
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) also cut interest rates simultaneously with the other major central banks (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2012/20120608171005950734495/20120608171005950734495_.html):
“The PBC has decided to cut RMB benchmark deposit and loan interest rates for financial institutions as of June 8, 2012. The one-year RMB benchmark deposit and loan interest rates will be lowered both by 0.25 percentage points. Adjustments are made correspondingly to benchmark interest rates on deposits and loans of other maturities and to deposit and loan interest rates on personal housing provident fund.”
Monetary authorities worldwide are assessing higher risks to the economy.
The key decisions of the summit of European Leaders with regards to resolving the sovereign debt issues are (http://www.european-council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/summit-impact-on-the-eurozone?lang=en):
“Euro area summit statement
Eurozone heads of state or government decided:
- to establish a single banking supervisory mechanism run the by the ECB, and, once this mechanism has been created,
- to provide the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with the possibility to inject funds into banks directly.
Spain's bank recapitalisation will begin under current rules, i.e. with assistance provided by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) until the ESM becomes available. The funds will then be transferred to the ESM without gaining seniority status.
It was also agreed that EFSF/ESM funds can be used flexibly to buy bonds for member states that comply with common rules, recommendations and timetables.
The Eurogroup has been asked to implement these decisions by 9 July 2012.”
Valuations of risk financial assets increased sharply after the announcement of these decisions. The details will be crafted at a meeting on finance ministries of the European Union on Jul 9, 2012.
The definition of “banking panic” by Calomiris and Gorton (1991, 112) during the Great Depression in the US is:
“A banking panic occurs when bank debt holders at all or many banks in the banking system suddenly demand that banks convert their debt claims into cash (at par) to such an extent that the banks suspend convertibility of their debt into cash, or in the case of the United States, act collectively to avoid suspension of convertibility by issuing clearing house loan certificates.”
The financial panic during the credit crisis and global recession consisted of a run on the sale and repurchase agreements (SRP) of structured investment products (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Cochrane and Zingales (2009) argue that the initial proposal for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) instead of the failure of Lehman Bros caused the flight into the dollar and Treasury securities. Washington Mutual experienced a silent run in the form of internet withdrawals. The current silent run in the euro area is from banks with challenged balance sheets in highly indebted member countries to banks and government securities in countries with stronger fiscal affairs. The analysis of the IMF 2012 Article IV Consultation focuses on this key policy priority of reversing the silent run on challenged euro area banks.
Jonathan House, writing on “Spanish banks need as much as €62 billion in new capital,” on Jun 21, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304765304577480062972372858.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), informs that two independent studies estimate the needs new capital of Spain’s banks at €62, billion, around $78.8 billion, which will be used by the government of Spain in the request for financial assistance from the European Union during the meeting with finance ministers.
The European Central Bank (ECB) announced changes in acceptable collateral for refinancing (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120622.en.html):
“On 20 June 2012 the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided on additional measures to improve the access of the banking sector to Eurosystem operations in order to further support the provision of credit to households and non-financial corporations.
The Governing Council has reduced the rating threshold and amended the eligibility requirements for certain asset-backed securities (ABSs). It has thus broadened the scope of the measures to increase collateral availability which were introduced on 8 December 2011 and which remain applicable.
In addition to the ABSs that are already eligible for use as collateral in Eurosystem operations, the Eurosystem will consider the following ABSs as eligible:
3. Auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs and ABSs backed by commercial mortgages (CMBSs) which have a second-best rating of at least “single A” in the Eurosystem’s harmonised credit scale, at issuance and at all times subsequently. These ABSs will be subject to a valuation haircut of 16%.
4. Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), securities backed by loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs and CMBSs which have a second-best rating of at least “triple B” in the Eurosystem’s harmonised credit scale, at issuance and at all times subsequently. RMBSs, securities backed by loans to SMEs, and auto loan, leasing and consumer finance ABSs would be subject to a valuation haircut of 26%, while CMBSs would be subject to a valuation haircut of 32%.
The risk control framework with higher haircuts applicable to the newly eligible ABS aims at ensuring risk equalisation across asset classes and maintaining the risk profile of the Eurosystem.
The newly eligible ABSs must also satisfy additional requirements which will be specified in the legal act to be adopted Thursday, 28 June 2012. The measures will take effect as soon as the relevant legal act enters into force.”
There was significant improvement in ten-year yields of bonds of the government of Italy, declining to 5.796 percent on Fri Jun 29, 2012, from yields exceeding 6 percent, and of ten-year yields of bonds of the government of Spain, declining to 6.347 percent on Fri Jun 29 from earlier yields exceeding 7 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-govtbonds.html?mod=mdc_bnd_pglnk). Yields on sovereign debt backed up again with the yield of the ten-year bond of the government of Spain increasing to 6.872 percent on Jul 6, 2012, and of the ten-year bond of Italy rising to 6.020 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-govtbonds.html?mod=mdc_bnd_pglnk). Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Increasing aversion is captured by decrease of the yield of the ten-year Treasury and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table III-1A provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.548 percent on Jul 6, 2012 while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.33 percent. The yield of the two-year government bond of Germany fell from 0.65 percent on Aug 26, 2011, to minus 0.01 percent on Jul 1, 2012, probably influenced by the cut of interest rates by the ECB. As investors fled euro area risks to the safety of liabilities of the government of Germany, the two-year German government bond fell to 0.01 percent on Jun 1, 2012, and increased marginally to 0.07 percent on Jun 15, 2012, 0.14 percent on Jun 22 and 0.12 percent on Jun 29. The combination of multiple risks in the world economy and finance caused heightened risk aversion in the week of Jun 1, 2012, with the ten-year Treasury yield collapsing to 1.454 percent, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the two-year government bond of Germany fell to 0.01 percent and even negative and 0.00 percent and the ten-year government bond of Germany collapsing to 1.17 percent. There was relaxation of risk aversion in the week of Jun 8 with increase of the yield of the ten-year Treasury to 1.635 percent and of the two-year government bond of Germany to 0.04 percent and the ten-year to 1.33 percent, which are still at levels of extreme flight from risk. Fears on Greece, Spain and Italy resulted in renewed risk aversion with yields on Jun 15, 2012 at levels of flight to safety but more relaxed yields in the weeks of Jun 22 and Jun 29, 2012. The US dollar strengthened significantly from USD 1.450/EUR on Aug 26, 2011, to USD 1.2518/EUR on May 25, 2919, or by 13.7 percent, and further to USD 1.2435/EUR on Jun 1, 2012, or by 14.2 percent. The USD revalued by 0.7 percent to USD 1.2517 on Jun 8, 2012, depreciated 1 percent on Jun 15 to USD 1.2640/EUR but appreciated by 0.6 percent on Jun 22, depreciating 0.7 percent to USD 1.2661/EUR on Jun 29, 2012. The dollar peaked at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010, during the first round of the European sovereign risk crisis, but is now only 3.1 percent weaker at USD 1.2288/EUR on Jul 7, 2012. Under zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, carry trades ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield is still at a level well below consumer price inflation of 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May (see subsection IB United States Inflation http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html and ealier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury.
A similar risk aversion phenomenon occurred in Germany. Eurostat confirmed euro zone CPI inflation is at 2.4 percent for the 12 months ending in May 2012, jumping 1.3 percent in the month of Mar (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-14062012-BP/EN/2-14062012-BP-EN.PDF and Section IV http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html) but the yield of the two-year German government bond fell from 0.65 percent on Aug 19, 2011 to 0.05 percent on May 25, 2012, 0.01 percent on Jun 1, 2012, 0.04 percent on Jun 8, 0.07 percent on Jun 15 and 0.14 percent on Jun 22, 0.12 percent on Jun 29 and minus 0.01 percent on Jul 6, while the ten-year yield fell from 2.16 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.37 percent on May 25, 2012 and then to 1.17 percent on Jun 1, 2012, 1.33 percent on Jun 8, 1.44 percent on Jun 15 and 1.33 percent on Jul 6, as shown in Table III-1A. The lower part of Table III-1A provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.
Table III-1A, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate
| US 2Y | US 10Y | DE 2Y | DE 10Y | USD/ EUR | |
| 7/6/12 | 1.548 | 0.272 | -0.01 | 1.33 | 1.2288 |
| 6/29/12 | 1.648 | 0.305 | 0.12 | 1.58 | 1.2661 |
| 6/22/12 | 0.309 | 1.676 | 0.14 | 1.58 | 1.2570 |
| 6/15/12 | 0.272 | 1.584 | 0.07 | 1.44 | 1.2640 |
| 6/8/12 | 0.268 | 1.635 | 0.04 | 1.33 | 1.2517 |
| 6/1/12 | 0.248 | 1.454 | 0.01 | 1.17 | 1.2435 |
| 5/25/12 | 0.291 | 1.738 | 0.05 | 1.37 | 1.2518 |
| 5/18/12 | 0.292 | 1.714 | 0.05 | 1.43 | 1.2780 |
| 5/11/12 | 0.248 | 1.845 | 0.09 | 1.52 | 1.2917 |
| 5/4/12 | 0.256 | 1.876 | 0.08 | 1.58 | 1.3084 |
| 4/6/12 | 0.31 | 2.058 | 0.14 | 1.74 | 1.3096 |
| 3/30/12 | 0.335 | 2.214 | 0.21 | 1.79 | 1.3340 |
| 3/2/12 | 0.29 | 1.977 | 0.16 | 1.80 | 1.3190 |
| 2/24/12 | 0.307 | 1.977 | 0.24 | 1.88 | 1.3449 |
| 1/6/12 | 0.256 | 1.957 | 0.17 | 1.85 | 1.2720 |
| 12/30/11 | 0.239 | 1.871 | 0.14 | 1.83 | 1.2944 |
| 8/26/11 | 0.20 | 2.202 | 0.65 | 2.16 | 1.450 |
| 8/19/11 | 0.192 | 2.066 | 0.65 | 2.11 | 1.4390 |
| 6/7/10 | 0.74 | 3.17 | 0.49 | 2.56 | 1.192 |
| 3/5/09 | 0.89 | 2.83 | 1.19 | 3.01 | 1.254 |
| 12/17/08 | 0.73 | 2.20 | 1.94 | 3.00 | 1.442 |
| 10/27/08 | 1.57 | 3.79 | 2.61 | 3.76 | 1.246 |
| 7/14/08 | 2.47 | 3.88 | 4.38 | 4.40 | 1.5914 |
| 6/26/03 | 1.41 | 3.55 | NA | 3.62 | 1.1423 |
Note: DE: Germany
Source:
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html
Equity indexes in Table III-1 mostly weakened in the week of Jul 6, with the exception of China, as a result of doubt on the agreement reached in the summit of European leaders and prospects on the economy implicit in the concerted reduction of interest rates by the European Central Bank and People’s Bank of China with increasing quantitative easing by the Bank of England. Germany’s Dax fell only 0.1 percent while DJIA decreased 0.8 percent in the week of Jul 6 and Dow Global fell 0.9 percent. Japan’s Nikkei Average increased 0.4 percent. Dow Asia Pacific TSM increased 1.2 percent in the week of Jul 6 while Shanghai Composite fell 0.1 percent.
Commodities were mixed during the week of Jul 6, 2012, as shown in Table III-1. The DJ UBS Commodities Index rose 1.1 percent. WTI fell 0.9 percent while Brent increased 0.4 percent. Gold increased 1.6 percent.
Risk aversion during the week of Mar 2, 2012, was dominated by the long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) of the European Central Bank. LTROs and related principles are analyzed in subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort. First, as analyzed by David Enrich, writing on “ECB allots €529.5 billion in long-term refinancing operations,” published on Feb 29, 2012 by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203986604577252803223310964.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), the ECB provided a second round of three-year loans at 1.0 percent to about 800 banks. The earlier round provided €489 billion to more than 500 banks. Second, the ECB sets the fixed-rate for main refinancing operations at 1.00 percent and the overnight deposit facility at 0.25 percent (http://www.ecb.int/home/html/index.en.html) for negative spread of 75 basis points. That is, if a bank borrows at 1.0 percent for three years through the LTRO and deposits overnight at the ECB, it incurs negative spread of 75 basis points. An alternative allocation could be to lend for a positive spread to other banks. Richard Milne, writing on “Banks deposit record cash with ECB,” on Mar 2, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9798fd36-644a-11e1-b30e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1nxeicB6H), provides important information and analysis that banks deposited a record €776.9 billion at the ECB on Fri Mar 2 at interest receipt of 0.25 percent, just two days after receiving €529.5 billion of LTRO loans at interest cost of 1.0 percent. The main issue here is whether there is ongoing perceptions of high risks in counterparties in financial transactions that froze credit markets in 2008 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009a), 57-60, 217-27, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009b), 155-67). Richard Milne and Mary Watkins, writing on “European finance: the leaning tower of perils,” on Mar 27, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/82205f6e-7735-11e1-baf3-00144feab49a.html#axzz1qOqWaqF2), raise concerns that the large volume of LTROs can create future problems for banks and the euro area. An important issue is if the cheap loans at 1 percent for three-year terms finance the carry trade into securities of the governments of banks. Balance sheets of banks may be stressed during future sovereign-credit events. Sam Jones, writing on “ECB liquidity fuels high stakes hedging,” on Apr 4, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cb74d63a-7e75-11e1-b009-00144feab49a.html#axzz1qyDYxLjS), analyzes unusually high spreads in government bond markets in Europe that could have been caused by LTROs. There has been active relative value arbitrage of these spreads similar to the strategies of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) of capturing high spreads in mortgage-backed securities jointly with hedges in Treasury securities (on LTCM see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 108-12, 87-9, The Global Recession Risk (2007) 12-3, 102, 176, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 59-64).
Table III-1B provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the LTROs. Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €870,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €1,260,858 million on Jun 29, 2012. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has increased to €1,863,180 million in the statement of Jun 29.
Table III-1B, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR
| Dec 31, 2010 | Dec 28, 2011 | Jun 29, 2012 | |
| 1 Gold and other Receivables | 367,402 | 419,822 | 433,779 |
| 2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 223,995 | 236,826 | 260,867 |
| 3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 26,941 | 95,355 | 51,856 |
| 4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 22,592 | 25,982 | 17,455 |
| 5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro | 546,747 | 879,130 | 1,260,858 |
| 6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro | 45,654 | 94,989 | 186,363 |
| 7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 457,427 | 610,629 | 602,322 |
| 8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro | 34,954 | 33,928 | 30,092 |
| 9 Other Assets | 278,719 | 336,574 | 258,637 |
| TOTAL ASSETS | 2,004, 432 | 2,733,235 | 3,102,227 |
| Memo Items | |||
| Sum of 5 and 7 | 1,004,174 | 1,489,759 | 1,863,180 |
| Capital and Reserves | 78,143 | 85,748 | 85,748 |
Source: European Central Bank
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2012/html/fs120704.en.html
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies. Safe-haven currencies, such as the Swiss franc (CHF) and the Japanese yen (JPY) have been under threat of appreciation but also remained relatively unchanged. A characteristic of the global recession would be struggle for maintaining competitiveness by policies of regulation, trade and devaluation (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation War (2008c)). Appreciation of the exchange rate causes two major effects on Japan.
1. Trade. Consider an example with actual data (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c), 70-72). The yen traded at JPY 117.69/USD on Apr 2, 2007 and at JPY 102.77/USD on Apr 2, 2008, or appreciation of 12.7 percent. This meant that an export of JPY 10,000 to the US sold at USD 84.97 on Apr 2, 2007 [(JPY 10,000)/(USD 117.69/USD)], rising to USD 97.30 on Apr 2, 2008 [(JPY 10,000)/(JPY 102.77)]. If the goods sold by Japan were invoiced worldwide in dollars, Japanese’s companies would suffer a reduction in profit margins of 12.7 percent required to maintain the same dollar price. An export at cost of JPY 10,000 would only bring JPY 8,732 when converted at JPY 102.77 to maintain the price of USD 84.97 (USD 84.97 x JPY 102.77/USD). If profit margins were already tight, Japan would be uncompetitive and lose revenue and market share. The pain of Japan from dollar devaluation is illustrated by Table 58 in the Nov 6 comment of this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/slow-growth-driven-by-reducing-savings.html): The yen traded at JPY 110.19/USD on Aug 18, 2008 and at JPY 75.812/USD on Oct 28, 2011, for cumulative appreciation of 31.2 percent. Cumulative appreciation from Sep 15, 2010 (JPY 83.07/USD) to Oct 28, 2011 (JPY 75.812) was 8.7 percent. The pain of Japan from dollar devaluation continues as illustrated by Table VI-6 in Section VII Valuation of Risk Financial Assets: The yen traded at JPY 110.19/USD on Aug 18, 2008 and at JPY 78.08/USD on Dec 23, 2011, for cumulative appreciation of 29.1 percent. Cumulative appreciation from Sep 15, 2010 (JPY 83.07/USD) to Dec 23, 2011 (JPY 78.08) was 6.0 percent.
2. Foreign Earnings and Investment. Consider the case of a Japanese company receiving earnings from investment overseas. Accounting the earnings and investment in the books in Japan would also result in a loss of 12.7 percent. Accounting would show fewer yen for investment and earnings overseas.
There is a point of explosion of patience with dollar devaluation and domestic currency appreciation. Andrew Monahan, writing on “Japan intervenes on yen to cap sharp rise,” on Oct 31, 2011, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204528204577009152325076454.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_MIDDLETopStories), analyzes the intervention of the Bank of Japan, at request of the Ministry of Finance, on Oct 31, 2011. Traders consulted by Monahan estimate that the Bank of Japan sold JPY 7 trillion, about $92.31 billion, against the dollar, exceeding the JPY 4.5 trillion on Aug 4, 2011. The intervention caused an increase of the yen rate to JPY 79.55/USD relative to earlier trading at a low of JPY 75.31/USD. The JPY appreciated to JPY76.88/USD by Fri Nov 18 for cumulative appreciation of 3.4 percent from JPY 79.55 just after the intervention. The JPY appreciated another 0.3 percent in the week of Nov 18 but depreciated 1.1 percent in the week of Nov 25. There was mild depreciation of 0.3 percent in the week of Dec 2 that was followed by appreciation of 0.4 percent in the week of Dec 9. The JPY was virtually unchanged in the week of Dec 16 with depreciation of 0.1 percent but depreciated by 0.5 percent in the week of Dec 23, appreciating by 1.5 percent in the week of Dec 30. Historically, interventions in yen currency markets have been unsuccessful (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 107-109). Interventions are even more difficult currently with daily trading of some $4 trillion in world currency markets. Risk aversion with zero interest rates in the US diverts hot capital movements toward safe-haven currencies such as Japan, causing appreciation of the yen. Mitsuru Obe, writing on Nov 25, on “Japanese government bonds tumble,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204452104577060231493070676.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the increase in yields of the Japanese government bond with 10 year maturity to a high for one month of 1.025 percent at the close of market on Nov 25. Thin markets in after-hours trading may have played an important role in this increase in yield but there may have been an effect of a dreaded reduction in positions of bonds by banks under pressure of reducing assets. The report on Japan sustainability by the IMF (2011JSRNov23, 2), analyzes how rising yields could threaten Japan:
· “As evident from recent developments, market sentiment toward sovereigns with unsustainably large fiscal imbalances can shift abruptly, with adverse effects on debt dynamics. Should JGB yields increase, they could initiate an adverse feedback loop from rising yields to deteriorating confidence, diminishing policy space, and a contracting real economy.
· Higher yields could result in a withdrawal of liquidity from global capital markets, disrupt external positions and, through contagion, put upward pressure on sovereign bond yields elsewhere.”
Exchange rate controls by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) fixing the rate at a minimum of CHF 1.20/EUR (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20110906/source/pre_20110906.en.pdf) has prevented flight of capital into the Swiss franc. The Swiss franc remained unchanged relative to the USD in the week of Dec 23 and appreciated 0.2 percent in the week of Dec 30 relative to the USD and 0.5 percent relative to the euro, as shown in Table II-1. Risk aversion is evident in the depreciation of the Australian dollar by cumulative 2.5 percent in the week of Fr Dec 16 after no change in the week of Dec 9. In the week of Dec 23, the Australian dollar appreciated 1.9 percent, appreciating another 0.5 percent in the week of Dec 30 as shown in Table II-1. Risk appetite would be revealed by carry trades from zero interest rates in the US and Japan into high yielding currencies such as in Australia with appreciation of the Australian dollar (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 202-4, Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 70-4).
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. There are three types of actions in Europe to steer the euro zone away from the threats of fiscal and banking crises: (1) fiscal compact; (2) enhancement of stabilization tools and resources; and (3) bank capital requirements. The first two consist of agreements by the Euro Area Heads of State and government while the third one consists of measurements and recommendations by the European Banking Authority.
1. Fiscal Compact. The “fiscal compact” consists of (1) conciliation of fiscal policies and budgets within a “fiscal rule”; and (2) establishment of mechanisms of governance, monitoring and enforcement of the fiscal rule.
i. Fiscal Rule. The essence of the fiscal rule is that “general government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus” by compliance of members countries that “the annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP” (European Council 2011Dec9, 3). Individual member states will create “an automatic correction mechanism that shall be triggered in the event of deviation” (European Council 2011Dec9, 3). Member states will define their automatic correction mechanisms following principles proposed by the European Commission. Those member states falling into an “excessive deficit procedure” will provide a detailed plan of structural reforms to correct excessive deficits. The European Council and European Commission will monitor yearly budget plans for consistency with adjustment of excessive deficits. Member states will report in anticipation their debt issuance plans. Deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP and/or debt in excess of 60 percent of GDP will trigger automatic consequences.
ii. Policy Coordination and Governance. The euro area is committed to following common economic policy. In accordance, “a procedure will be established to ensure that all major economic policy reforms planned by euro area member states will be discussed and coordinated at the level of the euro area, with a view to benchmarking best practices” (European Council 2011Dec9, 5). Governance of the euro area will be strengthened with regular euro summits at least twice yearly.
2. Stabilization Tools and Resources. There are several enhancements to the bailouts of member states.
i. Facilities. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) will use leverage and the European Central Bank as agent of its market operations. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or permanent bailout facility will be operational as soon as 90 percent of the capital commitments are ratified by member states. The ESM is planned to begin in Jul 2012.
ii. Financial Resources. The overall ceiling of the EFSF/ESM of €500 billion (USD 670 billion) will be reassessed in Mar 2012. Measures will be taken to maintain “the combined effective lending capacity of EUR 500 billion” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Member states will “consider, and confirm within 10 days, the provision of additional resources for the IMF of up to EUR 200 billion (USD 270 billion), in the form of bilateral loans, to ensure that the IMF has adequate resources to deal with the crisis. We are looking forward to parallel contributions from the international community” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Matthew Dalton and Matina Stevis, writing on Dec 20, 2011, on “Euro Zone Agrees to New IMF Loans,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204791104577107974167166272.html?mod=WSJPRO_hps_MIDDLESecondNews), inform that at a meeting on Dec 20, finance ministers of the euro-zone developed plans to contribute €150 billion in bilateral loans to the IMF as provided in the agreement of Dec 9. Bailouts “will strictly adhere to the well established IMF principles and practices.” There is a specific statement on private sector involvement and its relation to recent experience: “We clearly reaffirm that the decisions taken on 21 July and 26/27 October concerning Greek debt are unique and exceptional; standardized and identical Collective Action clauses will be included, in such a way as to preserve market liquidity, in the terms and conditions of all new euro government bonds” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6). Will there be again “unique and exceptional” conditions? The ESM is authorized to take emergency decisions with “a qualified majority of 85% in case the Commission and the ECB conclude that an urgent decision related to financial assistance is needed when the financial and economic sustainability of the euro area is threatened” (European Council 2011Dec9, 6).
3. Bank Capital. The European Banking Authority (EBA) finds that European banks have a capital shortfall of €114.7 billion (http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise/Press%20release%20FINAL.pdf). To avoid credit difficulties, the EBA recommends “that the credit institutions build a temporary capital buffer to reach a 9% Core Tier 1 ratio by 30 June 2012” (http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise/EBA%20BS%202011%20173%20Recommendation%20FINAL.pdf 6). Patrick Jenkins, Martin Stabe and Stanley Pignal, writing on Dec 9, 2011, on “EU banks slash sovereign holdings,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a6d2fd4e-228f-11e1-acdc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gAlaswcW), analyze the balance sheets of European banks released by the European Banking Authority. They conclude that European banks have reduced their holdings of riskier sovereign debt of countries in Europe by €65 billion from the end of 2010 to Sep 2011. Bankers informed that the European Central Bank and hedge funds acquired those exposures that represent 13 percent of their holdings of debt to Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, which are down to €513 billion by the end of IIIQ2011.
The members of the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), on May 9, 2010, to (http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm):
- “Provide loans to countries in financial difficulties
- Intervene in the debt primary and secondary markets. Intervention in the secondary market will be only on the basis of an ECB analysis recognising the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability
- Act on the basis of a precautionary programme
- Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions through loans to governments”
The EFSF will be replaced by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2013. On Mar 30, 2012, members of the euro area reached an agreement providing for sufficient funding required in rescue programs of members countries facing funding and fiscal difficulties and the transition from the EFSF to the ESM. The agreement of Mar 30, 2012 of the euro area members provides for the following (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1513204/eurogroup_statement_30_march_12.pdf):
· Acceleration of ESM paid-in capital. The acceleration of paid-in capital for the ESM provides for two tranches paid in 2012, in July and Oct; another two tranches in 2013; and a final tranche in the first half of 2014. There could be acceleration of paid-in capital is required to maintain a 15 percent relation of paid-in capital and the outstanding issue of the ESM
· ESM Operation and EFSF transition. ESM will assume all new rescue programs beginning in Jul 2012. EFSF will administer programs begun before initiation of ESM activities. There will be a transition period for the EFSF until mid 2013 in which it can engage in new programs if required to maintain the full lending limit of €500 billion.
· Increase of ESM/EFSF lending limit. The combined ceiling of the ESM and EFSF will be increased to €700 billion to facilitate operation of the transition of the EFSF to the ESM. The ESM lending ceiling will be €500 billion by mid 2013. The combined lending ceiling of the ESM and EFSF will continue to €700 billion
· Prior lending. The bilateral Greek loan facility of €53 billion and €49 billion of the EFSF have been paid-out in supporting programs of countries: “all together the euro area is mobilizing an overall firewall of approximately EUR 800 billion, more than USD 1 trillion” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1513204/eurogroup_statement_30_march_12.pdf)
· Bilateral IMF contributions. Members of the euro area have made commitments of bilateral contributions to the IMF of €150 billion
A key development in the bailout of Greece is the approval by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Mar 15, 2012, of a new four-year financing in the value of €28 billion to be disbursed in equal quarterly disbursements (http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2012/tr031512.htm). The sovereign debt crisis of Europe has moderated significantly with the elimination of immediate default of Greece. New economic and financial risk factors have developed, which are covered in VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets and V World Economic Slowdown.
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort. European Central Bank. The European Central Bank (ECB) has been pressured to assist in the bailouts by acquiring sovereign debts. The ECB has been providing liquidity lines to banks under pressure and has acquired sovereign debts but not in the scale desired by authorities. In an important statement to the European Parliament, the President of the ECB Mario Draghi (2011Dec1) opened the possibility of further ECB actions but after a decisive “fiscal compact:”
“What I believe our economic and monetary union needs is a new fiscal compact – a fundamental restatement of the fiscal rules together with the mutual fiscal commitments that euro area governments have made.
Just as we effectively have a compact that describes the essence of monetary policy – an independent central bank with a single objective of maintaining price stability – so a fiscal compact would enshrine the essence of fiscal rules and the government commitments taken so far, and ensure that the latter become fully credible, individually and collectively.
We might be asked whether a new fiscal compact would be enough to stabilise markets and how a credible longer-term vision can be helpful in the short term. Our answer is that it is definitely the most important element to start restoring credibility.
Other elements might follow, but the sequencing matters. And it is first and foremost important to get a commonly shared fiscal compact right. Confidence works backwards: if there is an anchor in the long term, it is easier to maintain trust in the short term. After all, investors are themselves often taking decisions with a long time horizon, especially with regard to government bonds.
A new fiscal compact would be the most important signal from euro area governments for embarking on a path of comprehensive deepening of economic integration. It would also present a clear trajectory for the future evolution of the euro area, thus framing expectations.”
An important statement of Draghi (2011Dec15) focuses on the role of central banking: “You all know that the statutes of the ECB inherited this important principle and that central bank independence and the credible pursuit of price stability go hand in hand.”
Draghi (2011Dec19) explains measures to ensure “access to funding markets” by euro zone banks:
§ “We have decided on three-year refinancing operations to support the supply of credit to the euro area economy. These measures address the risk that persistent financial markets tensions could affect the capacity of euro area banks to obtain refinancing over longer horizons.
§ Earlier, in October, the Governing Council had already decided to have two more refinancing operations with a maturity of around one year.
§ Also, it was announced then that in all refinancing operations until at least the first half of 2012 all liquidity demand by banks would be fully allotted at fixed rate.
§ Funding via the covered bonds market was also facilitated by the ECB deciding in October to introduce a new Covered Bond Purchase Programme of €40 billion.
§ Funding in US dollar is facilitated by lowering the pricing on the temporary US dollar liquidity swap arrangements.”
Lionel Barber and Ralph Atkins interviewed Mario Draghi on Dec 14 with the transcript published in the Financial Times on Dec 18 (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/25d553ec-2972-11e1-a066-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gzoHXOj6) as “FT interview transcript: Mario Draghi.” A critical question in the interview is if the new measures are a European version of quantitative easing. Draghi analyzes the difference between the measures of the European Central Bank (ECB) and quantitative easing such as in Japan, US and UK:
1. The measures are termed “non-standard” instead of “unconventional.” While quantitative easing attempts to lower the yield of targeted maturities, the three-year facility operates through the “bank channel.” Quantitative easing would not be feasible because the ECB is statutorily prohibited of funding central governments. The ECB would comply with its mandate of medium-term price stability.
2. There is a critical difference in the two programs. Quantitative easing has been used as a form of financial repression known as “directed lending.” For example, the purchase of mortgage-backed securities more recently or the suspension of the auctions of 30-year bonds in response to the contraction early in the 2000s has the clear objective of directing spending to housing. The ECB gives the banks entire discretion on how to use the funding within their risk/return decisions, which could include purchase of government bonds.
The question on the similarity of the ECB three-year lending facility and quantitative easing is quite valid. Tracy Alloway, writing on Oct 10, 2011, on “Investors worry over cheap ECB money side effects,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d2f87d16-f339-11e0-8383-00144feab49a.html#axzz1hAqMH1vn), analyzes the use of earlier long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) of the ECB. LTROs by the ECB in Jun, Sep and Dec 2009 lent €614 billion at 1 percent. Alloway quotes estimates of Deutsche Bank that banks used €442billion to acquire assets with higher yields. Carry trades developed from LTRO funds at 1 percent into liquid investments at a higher yield to earn highly profitable spreads. Alloway quotes estimates of Morgan Stanley that European debt of GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) in European bank balance sheets is €700 billion. Tracy Alloway, writing on Dec 21, 2011, on “Demand for ECB loans rises to €489bn,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d6ddd0ae-2bbd-11e1-98bc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1hAqMH1vn), informs that European banks borrowed the largest value of €489 billion in all LTROs of the ECB. Tom Fairless and David Cottle, writing on Dec 21, 2011, on “ECB sees record refinancing demand,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577111983838592746.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), inform that the first of three operations of the ECB lent €489.19 billion, or $639.96 billion, to 523 banks. Three such LTROs could add to $1.9 trillion, which is not far from the value of quantitative easing in the US of $2.5 trillion. Fairless and Cottle find that there could be renewed hopes that banks could use the LTROs to support euro zone bond markets. It is possible that there could be official moral suasion by governments on banks to increase their holdings of government bonds or at least not to sell existing holdings. Banks are not free to choose assets in evaluation of risk and returns. Floods of cheap money at 1 percent per year induce carry trades to high-risk assets and not necessarily financing of growth with borrowing and lending decisions constrained by shocks of confidence.
The LTROs of the ECB are not very different from the liquidity facilities of the Fed during the financial crisis. Kohn (2009Sep10) finds that the trillions of dollars in facilities provided by the Fed (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-64, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 224-7) could fall under normal principles of “lender of last resort” of central banks:
“The liquidity measures we took during the financial crisis, although unprecedented in their details, were generally consistent with Bagehot's principles and aimed at short-circuiting these feedback loops. The Federal Reserve lends only against collateral that meets specific quality requirements, and it applies haircuts where appropriate. Beyond the collateral, in many cases we also have recourse to the borrowing institution for repayment. In the case of the TALF, we are backstopped by the Treasury. In addition, the terms and conditions of most of our facilities are designed to be unattractive under normal market conditions, thus preserving borrowers' incentives to obtain funds in the market when markets are operating normally. Apart from a very small number of exceptions involving systemically important institutions, such features have limited the extent to which the Federal Reserve has taken on credit risk, and the overall credit risk involved in our lending during the crisis has been small.
In Ricardo's view, if the collateral had really been good, private institutions would have lent against it. However, as has been recognized since Bagehot, private lenders, acting to protect themselves, typically severely curtail lending during a financial crisis, irrespective of the quality of the available collateral. The central bank--because it is not liquidity constrained and has the infrastructure in place to make loans against a variety of collateral--is well positioned to make those loans in the interest of financial stability, and can make them without taking on significant credit risk, as long as its lending is secured by sound collateral. A key function of the central bank is to lend in such circumstances to contain the crisis and mitigate its effects on the economy.”
The Bagehot (1873) principle is that central banks should provide a safety net, lending to temporarily illiquid but solvent banks and not to insolvent banks (see Cline 2001, 2002; Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 175-8). Kohn (2009Apr18) characterizes “quantitative easing” as “large scale purchases of assets:”
“Another aspect of our efforts to affect financial conditions has been the extension of our open market operations to large-scale purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), agency debt, and longer-term Treasury debt. We initially announced our intention to undertake large-scale asset purchases last November, when the federal funds rate began to approach its zero lower bound and we needed to begin applying stimulus through other channels as the economic contraction deepened. These purchases are intended to reduce intermediate- and longer-term interest rates on mortgages and other credit to households and businesses; those rates influence decisions about investments in long-lived assets like houses, consumer durable goods, and business capital. In ordinary circumstances, the typically quite modest volume of central bank purchases and sales of such assets has only small and temporary effects on their yields. However, the extremely large volume of purchases now underway does appear to have substantially lowered yields. The decline in yields reflects "preferred habitat" behavior, meaning that there is not perfect arbitrage between the yields on longer-term assets and current and expected short-term interest rates. These preferences are likely to be especially strong in current circumstances, so that long-term asset prices rise and yields fall as the Federal Reserve acquires a significant portion of the outstanding stock of securities held by the public.”
Non-standard ECB policy and unconventional Fed policy have a common link in the scale of implementation or policy doses. Direct lending by the central bank to banks is the function “large scale lender of last resort.” If there is moral suasion by governments to coerce banks into increasing their holdings of government bonds, the correct term would be financial repression.
An important additional measure discussed by Draghi (2011Nov19) is relaxation on the collateral pledged by banks in LTROs:
“Some banks’ access to refinancing operations may be restricted by lack of eligible collateral. To overcome this, a temporary expansion of the list of collateral has been decided. Furthermore, the ECB intends to enhance the use of bank loans as collateral in Eurosystem operations. These measures should support bank lending, by increasing the amount of assets on euro area banks’ balance sheets that can be used to obtain central bank refinancing.”
There are collateral concerns about European banks. David Enrich and Sara Schaefer Muñoz, writing on Dec 28, on “European bank worry: collateral,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203899504577126430202451796.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyze the strain on bank funding from a squeeze in the availability of high-quality collateral as guarantee in funding. High-quality collateral includes government bonds and investment-grade non-government debt. There could be difficulties in funding for a bank without sufficient available high-quality collateral to offer in guarantee of loans. It is difficult to assess from bank balance sheets the availability of sufficient collateral to support bank funding requirements. There has been erosion in the quality of collateral as a result of the debt crisis and further erosion could occur. Perceptions of counterparty risk among financial institutions worsened the credit/dollar crisis of 2007 to 2009. The banking theory of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b) and the model of Diamond Dybvig (1983, 1986) provide the analysis of bank functions that explains the credit crisis of 2007 to 2008 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 155-7, 48-52, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 52-66, 217-24). In fact, Rajan (2005, 339-41) anticipated the role of low interest rates in causing a hunt for yields in multiple financial markets from hedge funds to emerging markets and that low interest rates foster illiquidity. Rajan (2005, 341) argued:
“The point, therefore, is that common factors such as low interest rates—potentially caused by accommodative monetary policy—can engender excessive tolerance for risk on both sides of financial transactions.”
A critical function of banks consists of providing transformation services that convert illiquid risky loans and investment that the bank monitors into immediate liquidity such as unmonitored demand deposits. Credit in financial markets consists of the transformation of asset-backed securities (SRP) constructed with monitoring by financial institutions into unmonitored immediate liquidity by sale and repurchase agreements (SRP). In the financial crisis financial institutions distrusted the quality of their own balance sheets and those of their counterparties in SRPs. The financing counterparty distrusted that the financed counterparty would not repurchase the assets pledged in the SRP that could collapse in value below the financing provided. A critical problem was the unwillingness of banks to lend to each other in unsecured short-term loans. Emse Bartha, writing on Dec 28, on “Deposits at ECB hit high,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204720204577125913779446088.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), informs that banks deposited €453.034 billion, or $589.72 billion, at the ECB on Dec 28, which is a record high in two consecutive days. The deposit facility is typically used by banks when they do prefer not to extend unsecured loans to other banks. In addition, banks borrowed €6.225 billion from the overnight facility on Dec 28, when in normal times only a few hundred million euro are borrowed. The collateral issues and the possible increase in counterparty risk occurred a week after large-scale lender of last resort by the ECB in the value of €489 billion in the prior week. The ECB may need to extend its lender of last resort operations.
The financial reform of the United States around the proposal of a national bank by Alexander Hamilton (1780) to develop the money economy with specialization away from the barter economy is credited with creating the financial system that brought prosperity over a long period (see Pelaez 2008). Continuing growth and prosperity together with sound financial management earned the US dollar the role as reserve currency and the AAA rating of its Treasury securities. McKinnon (2011Dec18) analyzes the resolution of the European debt crisis by comparison with the reform of Alexander Hamilton. Northern states of the US had financed the revolutionary war with the issue of paper notes that were at risk of default by 1890. Alexander Hamilton proposed the purchase of the states’ paper notes by the Federal government without haircuts. McKinnon (2011Dec18) describes the conflicts before passing the assumption bill in 1790 for federal absorption of the debts of states. Other elements in the Hamilton reform consisted of creation of a market for US Treasury bonds by their use as paid-in capital in the First Bank of the United States. McKinnon (2011Dec18) finds growth of intermediation in the US by the branching of the First Bank of the United States throughout several states, accepting deposits to provide commercial short-term credit. The reform consolidated the union of states, fiscal credibility for the union and financial intermediation required for growth. The reform also introduced low tariffs and an excise tax on whisky to service the interest on the federal debt. Trade relations among members of the euro zone are highly important to economic activity. There are two lessons drawn by McKinnon (2011Dec18) from the experience of Hamilton for the euro zone currently. (1) The reform of Hamilton included new taxes for the assumption of debts of states with concrete provisions for their credibility. (2) Commercial lending was consolidated with a trusted bank both for accepting private deposits and for commercial lending, creating the structure of financial intermediation required for growth.
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk. Markets have been dominated by rating actions of Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (S&PRS) (2012Jan13) on 16 members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or eurozone. The actions by S&PRS (2012Jan13) are of several types:
1. Downgrades by two notches of long-term credit ratings of Cyprus (from BBB/Watch/NegA-3+ to BB+/Neg/B), Italy (from A/Watch Neg/A-1 to BBB+/Neg/A-2), Portugal (from BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3 to BB/Neg/B) and Spain (from AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+ to A/Neg/A-1).
2. Downgrades by one notch of long-term credit ratings of Austria (from AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+ to AA+/Neg/A-1+), France (from AAA/Watch Neg/A-1+ to AA+/Neg A-1+), Malta (from A/Watch, Neg/A-1 to A-/Neg/A-2), Slovakia (from A+/Watch Neg/A-1 to A/Stable/A-1) and Slovenia (AA-/Watch Neg/A-1+ to A+/Neg/A-1).
3. Affirmation of long-term ratings of Belgium (AA/Neg/A-1+), Estonia (AA-/Neg/A-1+), Finland (AAA/Neg/A-1+), Germany (AAA/Stable/A-1+), Ireland (BBB+/Neg/A-2), Luxembourg (AAA/Neg/A-1+) and the Netherlands (AAA/Neg/A-1+) with removal from CreditWatch.
4. Negative outlook on the long-term credit ratings of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, meaning that S&PRS (2012Jan13) finds that the ratings of these sovereigns have a chance of at least 1-to-3 of downgrades in 2012 or 2013.
S&PRS (2012Jan13) finds that measures by European policymakers may not be sufficient to contain sovereign risks in the eurozone. The sources of stress according to S&PRS (2012Jan13) are:
1. Worsening credit environment
2. Increases in risk premiums for many eurozone borrowers
3. Simultaneous attempts at reducing debts by both eurozone governments and households
4. More limited perspectives of economic growth
5. Deepening and protracted division among Europe’s policymakers in agreeing to approaches to resolve the European debt crisis
There is now only one major country in the eurozone with AAA rating of its long-term debt by S&PRS (2012Jan13): Germany. IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the hurdle of financial bailouts of euro area members by the strength of the credit of Germany alone. The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is abouy $3531.6 billion. There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic.” Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is about $7385.1 billion, which would be equivalent to 126.3 percent of their combined GDP in 2010. Under this arrangement the entire debt of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. Debt as percent of Germany’s GDP would exceed 224 percent if including debt of France and 165 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Charles Forelle, writing on Jan 14, 2012, on “Downgrade hurts euro rescue fund,” published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409004577159210191567778.html), analyzes the impact of the downgrades on the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The EFSF is a special purpose vehicle that has not capital but can raise funds to be used in bailouts by issuing AAA-rated debt. S&P may cut the rating of the EFSF to the new lowest rating of the six countries with AAA rating, which are now down to four with the downgrades of France and Austria. The other rating agencies Moody’s and Fitch have not taken similar action. On Jan, S&PRS (2012Jan16) did cut the long-term credit rating of the EFSF to AA+ and affirmed the short-term credit rating at A-+. The decision is derived from the reduction in credit rating of the countries guaranteeing the EFSF. In the view of S&PRS (2012Jan16), there are not sufficient credit enhancements after the reduction in the creditworthiness of the countries guaranteeing the EFSF. The decision could be reversed if credit enhancements were provided.
The flow of cash from safe havens to risk financial assets is processed by carry trades from zero interest rates that are frustrated by episodes of risk aversion or encouraged with return of risk appetite. European sovereign risk crises are closely linked to the exposures of regional banks to government debt. An important form of financial repression consists of changing the proportions of debt held by financial institutions toward higher shares in government debt. The financial history of Latin America, for example, is rich in such policies. Bailouts in the euro zone have sanctioned “bailing in” the private sector, which means that creditors such as banks will participate by “voluntary” reduction of the principal in government debt (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 163-202). David Enrich, Sara Schaeffer Muñoz and Patricia Knowsmann, writing on “European nations pressure own banks for loans,” on Nov 29, 2011, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066431341281676.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_MIDDLETopStories), provide important data and analysis on the role of banks in the European sovereign risk crisis. They assemble data from various sources showing that domestic banks hold 16.2 percent of Italy’s total government securities outstanding of €1,617.4 billion, 22.9 percent of Portugal’s total government securities of €103.9 billion and 12.3 percent of Spain’s total government securities of €535.3 billion. Capital requirements force banks to hold government securities to reduce overall risk exposure in balance sheets. Enrich, Schaeffer Muñoz and Knowsmann find information that governments are setting pressures on banks to acquire more government debt or at least to stop selling their holdings of government debt.
Bond auctions are also critical in episodes of risk aversion. David Oakley, writing on Jan 3, 2012, on “Sovereign issues draw euro to crunch point,” published by the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/63b9d7ca-2bfa-11e1-98bc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1iLNRyEbs), estimates total euro area sovereign issues in 2012 at €794 billion, much higher than the long-term average of €670 billion. Oakley finds that the sovereign issues are: Italy €220 billion, France €197 billion, Germany €178 billion and Spain €81 billion. Bond auctions will test the resilience of the euro. Victor Mallet and Robin Wigglesworth, writing on Jan 12, 2012, on “Spain and Italy raise €22bn in debt sales,” published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e22c4e28-3d05-11e1-ae07-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1j4euflAi), analyze debt auctions during the week. Spain placed €10 billion of new bonds with maturities in 2015 and 2016, which was twice the maximum planned for the auction. Italy placed €8.5 billion of one-year bills at average yield of 2.735 percent, which was less than one-half of the yield of 5.95 percent a month before. Italy also placed €3.5 billion of 136-day bills at 1.64 percent. There may be some hope in the sovereign debt market. The yield of Italy’s 10-year bond dropped from around 7.20 percent on Jan 9 to about 6.70 percent on Jan 13 and then to around 6.30 percent on Jan 20. The yield of Spain’s 10-year bond fell from about 6.60 percent on Jan 9 to around 5.20 percent on Jan 13 and then to 5.50 percent on Jan 20.
A combination of strong economic data in China analyzed in subsection VC and the realization of the widely expected downgrade could explain the strength of the European sovereign debt market. Emese Bartha, Art Patnaude and Nick Cawley, writing on January 17, 2012, on “European T-bills see solid demand,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204555904577166363369792848.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyze successful auctions treasury bills by Spain and Greece. A day after the downgrade, the EFSF found strong demand on Jan 17 for its six-month debt auction at the yield of 0.2664 percent, which is about the same as sovereign bills of France with the same maturity.
There may be some hope in the sovereign debt market. The yield of Italy’s 10-year bond dropped from around 7.20 percent on Jan 9 to about 6.70 percent on Jan 13 and then to around 6.30 percent on Jan 20. The yield of Spain’s 10-year bond fell from about 6.60 percent on Jan 9 to around 5.20 percent on Jan 13 and then to 5.50 percent on Jan 20. Paul Dobson, Emma Charlton and Lucy Meakin, writing on Jan 20, 2012, on “Bonds show return of crisis once ECB loans expire,” published in Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-20/bonds-show-return-of-crisis-once-ecb-loans-expire-euro-credit.html), analyze sovereign debt and analysis of market participants. Large-scale lending of last resort by the European Central Bank, considered in VD Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort, provided ample liquidity in the euro zone for banks to borrow at 1 percent and lend at higher rates, including to government. Dobson, Charlton and Meakin trace the faster decline of yields of short-term sovereign debt relative to decline of yields of long-term sovereign debt. The significant fall of the spread of short relative to long yields could signal concern about the resolution of the sovereign debt while expanding lender of last resort operations have moderated relative short-term sovereign yields. Normal conditions would be attained if there is definitive resolution of long-term sovereign debt that would require fiscal consolidation in an environment of economic growth.
Charles Forelle and Stephen Fidler, writing on Dec 10, 2011, on “Questions place EU pact,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203413304577087562993283958.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories#project%3DEUSUMMIT121011%26articleTabs%3Darticle), provide data, information and analysis of the agreement of Dec 9. There are multiple issues centering on whether investors will be reassured that the measures have reduced the risks of European sovereign obligations. While the European Central Bank has welcomed the measures, it is not yet clear of its future role in preventing erosion of sovereign debt values.
Another complicating factor is whether there will be further actions on sovereign debt ratings. On Dec 5, 2011, four days before the conclusion of the meeting of European leaders, Standard & Poor’s (2011Dec5) placed the sovereign ratings of 15 members of the euro zone on “CreditWatch with negative implications.” S&P finds five conditions that trigger the action: (1) worsening credit conditions in the euro area; (2) differences among member states on how to manage the debt crisis in the short run and on measures to move toward enhanced fiscal convergence; (3) household and government debt at high levels throughout large parts of the euro area; (4) increasing risk spreads on euro area sovereigns, including those with AAA ratings; and (5) increasing risks of recession in the euro zone. S&P also placed the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in CreditWatch with negative implications (http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245325307963). On Dec 9, 2011, Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the ratings of the three largest French banks (http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-BNP-Paribass-long-term-ratings-to-Aa3-concluding--PR_232989 http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Credit-Agricole-SAs-long-term-ratings-to-Aa3--PR_233004 http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Socit-Gnrales-long-term-ratings-to-A1--PR_232986 ).
Improving equity markets and strength of the euro appear related to developments in sovereign debt negotiations and markets. Alkman Granitsas and Costas Paris, writing on Jan 29, 2012, on “Greek debt deal, new loan agreement to finish next week,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204573704577189021923288392.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), inform that Greece and its private creditors were near finishing a deal of writing off €100 billion, about $132 billion, of Greece’s debt depending on the conversations between Greece, the euro area and the IMF on the new bailout. An agreement had been reached in Oct 2011 for a new package of fresh money in the amount of €130 billion to fill needs through 2015 but was contingent on haircuts reducing Greece’s debt from 160 percent of GDP to 120 percent of GDP. The new bailout would be required to prevent default by Greece of €14.4 billion maturing on Mar 20, 2012. There has been increasing improvement of sovereign bond yields. Italy’s ten-year bond yield fell from over 6.30 percent on Jan 20, 2012 to slightly above 5.90 percent on Jan 27. Spain’s ten-year bond yield fell from slightly above 5.50 percent on Jan 20 to just below 5 percent on Jan 27.
An important difference, according to Beim (2011Oct9), between large-scale buying of bonds by the central bank between the Federal Reserve of the US and the European Central Bank (ECB) is that the Fed and most banks do not buy local and state government obligations with lower creditworthiness. The European Monetary Union (EMU) that created the euro and the ECB did not include common fiscal policy and affairs. Thus, EMU cannot issue its own treasury obligations. The line “Reserve bank credit” in the Fed balance sheet for Jan 25, 2012, is $2902 billion of which $2570 billion consisting of $1565 billion US Treasury notes and bonds, $68 billion inflation-indexed bonds and notes, $101 billion Federal agency debt securities and $836 billion mortgage-backed securities (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). The Fed has been careful in avoiding credit risk in its portfolio of securities. The 11 exceptional liquidity facilities of several trillion dollars created during the financial crisis (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-62) have not resulted in any losses. The Fed has used unconventional monetary policy without credit risk as in classical central banking.
Beim (2011Oct9, 6) argues:
“In short, the ECB system holds more than €1 trillion of debt of the banks and governments of the 17 member states. The state-by-state composition of this debt is not disclosed, but the events of the past year suggest that a disproportionate fraction of these assets are likely obligations of stressed countries. If a significant fraction of the €1 trillion were to be restructured at 40-60% discounts, the ECB would have a massive problem: who would bail out the ECB?
This is surely why the ECB has been so shrill in its antagonism to the slightest mention of default and restructuring. They need to maintain the illusion of risk-free sovereign debt because confidence in the euro itself is built upon it.”
Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the LTROs. Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €870,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €1,260,858 million on Jun 29, 2012. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has increased to €1,863,180 million in the statement of Jun 29.
This sum is roughly what concerns Beim (2012Oct9) because of the probable exposure relative to capital to institutions and sovereigns with higher default risk. To be sure, there is no precise knowledge of the composition of the ECB portfolio of loans and securities with weights and analysis of the risks of components. Javier E. David, writing on Jan 16, 2012, on “The risks in ECB’s crisis moves,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577158753459542024.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), informs that the estimated debt of weakest euro zone sovereigns held by the ECB is €211 billion, with Greek debt in highest immediate default risk being only 17 percent of the total. Another unknown is whether there is high risk collateral in the €489 billion three-year loans to credit institutions at 1 percent interest rates. The potential risk is the need for recapitalization of the ECB that could find similar political hurdles as the bailout fund EFSF. There is a recurring issue of whether the ECB should accept a haircut on its portfolio of Greek bonds of €40 billion acquired at discounts from face value. An article on “Haircut for the ECB? Not so fast,” published by the Wall Street Journal on Jan 28, 2012 (http://blogs.wsj.com/davos/2012/01/28/haircut-for-the-ecb-not-so-fast/), informs of the remarks by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada and President of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm), expressing what appears to be correct doctrine that there could conceivably be haircuts for official debt but that such a decision should be taken by governments and not by central banks.
Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR
| Dec 31, 2010 | Dec 28, 2011 | Jun 29, 2012 | |
| 1 Gold and other Receivables | 367,402 | 419,822 | 433,779 |
| 2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 223,995 | 236,826 | 260,867 |
| 3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 26,941 | 95,355 | 51,856 |
| 4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 22,592 | 25,982 | 17,455 |
| 5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro | 546,747 | 879,130 | 1,260,858 |
| 6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro | 45,654 | 94,989 | 186,363 |
| 7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 457,427 | 610,629 | 602,322 |
| 8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro | 34,954 | 33,928 | 30,092 |
| 9 Other Assets | 278,719 | 336,574 | 258,637 |
| TOTAL ASSETS | 2,004, 432 | 2,733,235 | 3,102,227 |
| Memo Items | |||
| Sum of 5 and 7 | 1,004,174 | 1,489,759 | 1,863,180 |
| Capital and Reserves | 78,143 | 85,748 | 85,748 |
Source: European Central Bank
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2012/html/fs120704.en.html
Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. That success would be assured with growth of the Italian economy. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surplus that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15) argue that 55 percent of the exports of Italy are to countries outside the euro area such that devaluation of 15 percent would be effective in increasing export revenue. Newly available data in Table III-3 providing Italy’s trade with regions and countries supports the argument of Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15). Italy’s exports to the European Monetary Union (EMU) are only 42.7 percent of the total. Exports to the non-European Union area are growing at 8.0 percent in Apr 2012 relative to Apr 2011 while those to EMU are falling at 0.5 percent.
Table III-3, Italy, Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, % Share and 12-Month ∆%
| Apr 2012 | Exports | ∆% Jan-Apr 2012/ Jan-Apr 2011 | Imports | Imports |
| EU | 56.0 | 0.5 | 53.3 | -7.6 |
| EMU 17 | 42.7 | -0.5 | 43.2 | -7.1 |
| France | 11.6 | 0.6 | 8.3 | -4.7 |
| Germany | 13.1 | 3.3 | 15.6 | -10.3 |
| Spain | 5.3 | -9.3 | 4.5 | -9.9 |
| UK | 4.7 | 8.9 | 2.7 | -16.4 |
| Non EU | 44.0 | 8.0 | 46.7 | -3.7 |
| Europe non EU | 13.3 | 12.4 | 11.1 | -4.7 |
| USA | 6.1 | 7.9 | 3.3 | 5.4 |
| China | 2.7 | -10.7 | 7.3 | -22.3 |
| OPEC | 4.7 | 18.2 | 8.6 | 20.1 |
| Total | 100.0 | 3.7 | 100.0 | -5.7 |
Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/64824
Table III-4 provides Italy’s trade balance by regions and countries. Italy had trade deficit of €325 million with the 17 countries of the euro zone (EMU 17) in Apr and deficit of €667 million in Jan-Apr. Depreciation to parity could permit greater competitiveness in improving the trade surpluses of €2469 million in Jan-Apr with Europe non European Union and of €3415 million with the US. There is significant rigidity in the trade deficits in Jan-Apr of €5187 million with China and €8039 million with members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Table III-4, Italy, Trade Balance by Regions and Countries, Millions of Euro
| Regions and Countries | Trade Balance Apr 2012 Millions of Euro | Trade Balance Cumulative Jan-Apr 2012 Millions of Euro |
| EU | 702 | 3,434 |
| EMU 17 | -325 | -667 |
| France | 848 | 3,820 |
| Germany | -521 | -1,882 |
| Spain | 93 | 834 |
| UK | 715 | 2,855 |
| Non EU | -904 | -7,052 |
| Europe non EU | 605 | 2,469 |
| USA | 1,279 | 3,415 |
| China | -1,076 | -5,187 |
| OPEC | -1,877 | -8,039 |
| Total | -202 | -3,617 |
Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/64824
Growth rates of Italy’s trade and major products are provided in Table III-5 for the period Mar 2012 relative to Mar 2011. Growth rates of imports are negative with the exception of energy. The higher rate of growth of exports of 3.7 percent relative to imports of minus 5.7 percent may reflect weak demand in Italy with GDP declining during three consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 through IQ2012.
Table III-5, Italy, Exports and Imports % Share of Products in Total and ∆%
| Exports | Exports | Imports | Imports | |
| Consumer | 28.9 | 4.7 | 25.0 | -2.8 |
| Durable | 5.9 | 0.8 | 3.0 | -9.8 |
| Non | 23.0 | 5.7 | 22.0 | -1.8 |
| Capital Goods | 32.2 | 1.9 | 20.8 | -13.9 |
| Inter- | 34.3 | 2.6 | 34.5 | -13.0 |
| Energy | 4.7 | 17.3 | 19.7 | 13.0 |
| Total ex Energy | 95.3 | 3.0 | 80.3 | -10.2 |
| Total | 100.0 | 3.7 | 100.0 | -5.7 |
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/64824
Table III-6 provides Italy’s trade balance by product categories in Apr 2012 and cumulative Jan-Apr 2012. Italy’s trade balance excluding energy generated surplus of €5351 million in Apr 2012 and €19,377 million in Jan-Apr 2012 but the energy trade balance created deficit of €5553 million in Apr 2012 and €22,994 million in Jan-Apr 2012. The overall deficit in Apr 2012 was €202 million but there was an overall deficit of €3617 million in Jan-Apr 2012. Italy has significant competitiveness in various economic activities in contrast with some other countries with debt difficulties.
Table III-6, Italy, Trade Balance by Product Categories, € Millions
| Mar 2012 | Cumulative Jan-Mar 2012 | |
| Consumer Goods | 788 | 4,286 |
| Durable | 867 | 3,510 |
| Nondurable | -80 | 776 |
| Capital Goods | 4,452 | 14,072 |
| Intermediate Goods | 112 | 1,019 |
| Energy | -5,553 | -22,994 |
| Total ex Energy | 5,351 | 19,377 |
| Total | -202 | -3,617 |
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/64824
Brazil’s terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated 47 percent and 36 percent excluding oil (Pelaez 1987, 176-79; Pelaez 1986, 37-66; see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 178-87). Brazil had accumulated unsustainable foreign debt by borrowing to finance balance of payments deficits during the 1970s. Foreign lending virtually stopped. The German mark devalued strongly relative to the dollar such that Brazil’s products lost competitiveness in Germany and in multiple markets in competition with Germany. The resolution of the crisis was devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent relative to the dollar and subsequent maintenance of parity by monthly devaluation equal to inflation and indexing that resulted in financial stability by parity in external and internal interest rates avoiding capital flight. With a combination of declining imports, domestic import substitution and export growth, Brazil followed rapid growth in the US and grew out of the crisis with surprising GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 1984.
The euro zone faces a critical survival risk because several of its members may default on their sovereign obligations if not bailed out by the other members. The valuation equation of bonds is essential to understanding the stability of the euro area. An explanation is provided in this paragraph and readers interested in technical details are referred to the following Subsection IIID Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. Contrary to the Wriston doctrine, investing in sovereign obligations is a credit decision. The value of a bond today is equal to the discounted value of future obligations of interest and principal until maturity. On Dec 30 the yield of the 2-year bond of the government of Greece was quoted around 100 percent. In contrast, the 2-year US Treasury note traded at 0.239 percent and the 10-year at 2.871 percent while the comparable 2-year government bond of Germany traded at 0.14 percent and the 10-year government bond of Germany traded at 1.83 percent. There is no need for sovereign ratings: the perceptions of investors are of relatively higher probability of default by Greece, defying Wriston (1982), and nil probability of default of the US Treasury and the German government. The essence of the sovereign credit decision is whether the sovereign will be able to finance new debt and refinance existing debt without interrupting service of interest and principal. Prices of sovereign bonds incorporate multiple anticipations such as inflation and liquidity premiums of long-term relative to short-term debt but also risk premiums on whether the sovereign’s debt can be managed as it increases without bound. The austerity measures of Italy are designed to increase the primary surplus, or government revenues less expenditures excluding interest, to ensure investors that Italy will have the fiscal strength to manage its debt of 120 percent of GDP, which is the third largest in the world after the US and Japan. Appendix IIIE links the expectations on the primary surplus to the real current value of government monetary and fiscal obligations. As Blanchard (2011SepWEO) analyzes, fiscal consolidation to increase the primary surplus is facilitated by growth of the economy. Italy and the other indebted sovereigns in Europe face the dual challenge of increasing primary surpluses while maintaining growth of the economy (for the experience of Brazil in the debt crisis of 1982 see Pelaez 1986, 1987).
Much of the analysis and concern over the euro zone centers on the lack of credibility of the debt of a few countries while there is credibility of the debt of the euro zone as a whole. In practice, there is convergence in valuations and concerns toward the fact that there may not be credibility of the euro zone as a whole. The fluctuations of financial risk assets of members of the euro zone move together with risk aversion toward the countries with lack of debt credibility. This movement raises the need to consider analytically sovereign debt valuation of the euro zone as a whole in the essential analysis of whether the single-currency will survive without major changes.
Welfare economics considers the desirability of alternative states, which in this case would be evaluating the “value” of Germany (1) within and (2) outside the euro zone. Is the sum of the wealth of euro zone countries outside of the euro zone higher than the wealth of these countries maintaining the euro zone? On the choice of indicator of welfare, Hicks (1975, 324) argues:
“Partly as a result of the Keynesian revolution, but more (perhaps) because of statistical labours that were initially quite independent of it, the Social Product has now come right back into its old place. Modern economics—especially modern applied economics—is centered upon the Social Product, the Wealth of Nations, as it was in the days of Smith and Ricardo, but as it was not in the time that came between. So if modern theory is to be effective, if it is to deal with the questions which we in our time want to have answered, the size and growth of the Social Product are among the chief things with which it must concern itself. It is of course the objective Social Product on which attention must be fixed. We have indexes of production; we do not have—it is clear we cannot have—an Index of Welfare.”
If the burden of the debt of the euro zone falls on Germany and France or only on Germany, is the wealth of Germany and France or only Germany higher after breakup of the euro zone or if maintaining the euro zone? In practice, political realities will determine the decision through elections.
The prospects of survival of the euro zone are dire. Table III-7 is constructed with IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx) for GDP in USD billions, primary net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP and general government debt as percent of GDP for selected regions and countries in 2010.
Table III-7, World and Selected Regional and Country GDP and Fiscal Situation
| GDP 2012 | Primary Net Lending Borrowing | General Government Net Debt | |
| World | 69,660 | ||
| Euro Zone | 12,586 | -0.5 | 70.3 |
| Portugal | 221 | 0.1 | 110.9 |
| Ireland | 210 | -4.4 | 102.9 |
| Greece | 271 | -1.0 | 153.2 |
| Spain | 1,398 | -3.6 | 67.0 |
| Major Advanced Economies G7 | 34,106 | -4.8 | 88.3 |
| United States | 15,610 | -6.1 | 83.7 |
| UK | 2,453 | -5.3 | 84.2 |
| Germany | 3,479 | 1.0 | 54.1 |
| France | 2,712.0 | -2.2 | 83.2 |
| Japan | 5,981 | -8.9 | 135.2 |
| Canada | 1,805 | -3.1 | 35.4 |
| Italy | 2,067 | 2.9 | 102.3 |
| China | 7992 | -1.3* | 22.0** |
*Net Lending/borrowing**Gross Debt
Source: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx
The data in Table III-7 are used for some very simple calculations in Table III-8. The column “Net Debt USD Billions” in Table III-8 is generated by applying the percentage in Table III-7 column “General Government Net Debt % GDP 2010” to the column “GDP USD Billions.” The total debt of France and Germany in 2012 is $4138.5 billion, as shown in row “B+C” in column “Net Debt USD Billions” The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is $3927.8 billion, adding rows D+E+F+G+H in column “Net Debt USD billions.” There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic” in the two final columns of Table III-8. Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is shown in column “Debt as % of Germany plus France GDP” to reach $8066.3 billion, which would be equivalent to 130.3 percent of their combined GDP in 2012. Under this arrangement the entire debt of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. The final column provides “Debt as % of Germany GDP” that would exceed 231.9 percent if including debt of France and 167.0 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Wriston (1982) would prove to be wrong again that countries do not bankrupt but would have a consolation prize that similar to LBOs the sum of the individual values of euro zone members outside the current agreement exceeds the value of the whole euro zone. Internal rescues of French and German banks may be less costly than bailing out other euro zone countries so that they do not default on French and German banks.
Table III-8, Guarantees of Debt of Sovereigns in Euro Area as Percent of GDP of Germany and France, USD Billions and %
| Net Debt USD Billions | Debt as % of Germany Plus France GDP | Debt as % of Germany GDP | |
| A Euro Area | 8,847.9 | ||
| B Germany | 1,882.1 | $8066.3 as % of $3479 =231.9% $5809.9 as % of $3479 =167.0% | |
| C France | 2,256.4 | ||
| B+C | 4,138.5 | GDP $6,191.0 Total Debt $8066.3 Debt/GDP: 130.3% | |
| D Italy | 2,114.5 | ||
| E Spain | 936.7 | ||
| F Portugal | 245.3 | ||
| G Greece | 415.2 | ||
| H Ireland | 216.1 | ||
| Subtotal D+E+F+G+H | 3,927.8 |
Source: calculation with IMF data http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx
There is extremely important information in Table III-1C for the current sovereign risk crisis in the euro zone. Table III-9 provides the structure of regional and country relations of Germany’s exports and imports with newly available data for Apr 2012. German exports to other European Union (EU) members are 57.9 percent of total exports in Apr 2012 and 58.3 percent in Jan-Apr 2012. Exports to the euro area are 38.0 percent in Apr and 38.8 percent in Jan-Apr. Exports to third countries are 42.1 percent of the total in Apr and 41.7 percent in Jan-Mar. There is similar distribution for imports. Economic performance in Germany is closely related to its high competitiveness in world markets. Weakness in the euro zone and the European Union in general could affect the German economy. This may be the major reason for choosing the “fiscal abuse” of the European Central Bank considered by Buiter (2011Oct31) over the breakdown of the euro zone. There is a tough analytical, empirical and forecasting doubt of growth and trade in the euro zone and the world with or without maintenance of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro zone. Germany could benefit from depreciation of the euro because of its high share in exports to countries not in the euro zone but breakdown of the euro zone raises doubts on the region’s economic growth that could affect German exports to other member states.
Table III-9, Germany, Structure of Exports and Imports by Region, € Billions and ∆%
| Apr 2012 | Apr 12-Month | Jan–Apr 2012 € Billions | Jan-Apr 2012/ | |
| Total | 87.1 | 3.4 | 363.1 | 5.2 |
| A. EU | 50.5 % 57.9 | -1.1 | 211.6 % 58.3 | 1.4 |
| Euro Area | 33.1 % 38.0 | -3.6 | 140.7 % 38.8 | -0.1 |
| Non-euro Area | 17.3 % 19.9 | 4.1 | 70.9 % 19.5 | 4.6 |
| B. Third Countries | 36.7 % 42.1 | 10.3 | 151.4 % 41.7 | 11.0 |
| Total Imports | 72.7 | -1.0 | 303.2 | 3.3 |
| C. EU Members | 46.3 % 63.7 | -1.1 | 192.0 % 63.3 | 3.4 |
| Euro Area | 32.8 % 45.1 | -0.6 | 135.1 % 44.6 | 3.3 |
| Non-euro Area | 13.5 % 18.6 | -2.3 | 56.9 % 18.8 | 3.7 |
| D. Third Countries | 26.5 % 36.5 | -0.7 | 113.3 % 37.4 | 3.1 |
Notes: Total Exports = A+B; Total Imports = C+D
Source:
Statistiche Bundesamt Deutschland https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2012/06/PE12_195_51.html;jsessionid=9AA93AFFD978CD2C25BE7CA368BD0690.cae1
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. There are two approaches to government finance and their implications: (1) simple unpleasant monetarist arithmetic; and (2) simple unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Both approaches illustrate how sovereign debt can be perceived riskier under profligacy.
First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:
D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)
Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,
{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:
N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)
The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:
B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)
On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.
Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:
(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+τ)st+τdτ (4)
Equation (4) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+τ, of the future primary surpluses st+τ, which are equal to Tt+τ – Gt+τ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+τ. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:
MtV(it, ·) = PtYt (5)
Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):
“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”
An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.
There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:
(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress
(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality
(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis. This section is divided into two subsections. Subsection IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth analyzes proposals to promote economic growth with government deficits financed by monetary policy. Subsection IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s provides the routes of adjustment of Brazil during the debt crisis after 1983.
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth. The advice of Bernanke (2000, 159-161, 165) to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to reignite growth and employment in the economy consisted of zero interest rates and commitment to a high inflation target as proposed by Krugman (1999):
“I agree that this approach would be helpful, in that it would give private decision makers more information about the objectives of monetary policy. In particular, a target in the 3-4 percent range for inflation to be maintained for a number of years, would confirm not only that the BOJ is intent on moving safely away from a deflationary regime but also that it intends to make up some of the ‘price-level gap’ created by 8 years of zero or negative inflation. In stating an inflation target of, say, 3-4 percent, the BOJ would be giving the direction in which it will attempt to move the economy. The important question, of course, is whether a determined Bank of Japan would be able to depreciate the yen. I am not aware of any previous historical episode, including the period of very low interest rates in the 1930s, in which a central bank has been unable to devaluate its currency. There is strong presumption that vigorous intervention by the BOJ, together with appropriate announcements to influence market expectations, could drive down the value of the yen significantly. Further, there seems little reason not to try this strategy. The ‘worst’ that could happen would be that the BOJ would greatly increase its holdings of reserve assets. Perhaps not all of those who cite the beggar-thy-neighbor thesis are aware that it had its origins in the Great Depression, when it was used as an argument against the very devaluations that ultimately proved crucial to world economic recovery. Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected president of the United States in 1932 with the mandate to get the country out of the Depression. In the end, his most effective actions were the same ones that Japan needs to take—namely, rehabilitation of the banking system and devaluation of the currency.”
Bernanke (2002) also finds devaluation to be a powerful policy instrument to move the economy away from deflation and weak economic and financial conditions:
“Although a policy of intervening to affect the exchange value of the dollar is nowhere on the horizon today, it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934. The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.”
Krugman (2012Apr24) finds that this advice of then Professor Bernanke (2000) is relevant to current monetary policy in the US. The relevance would be in a target of inflation in the US of 4 percent, which was the rate prevailing in the late years of the Reagan Administration. The liquidity trap is defined by Krugman (1998, 141) “as a situation in which conventional monetary policies have become impotent, because nominal interest rates are at or near zero: injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect, because base and bonds are viewed by the private sector as perfect substitutes.” The adversity of the liquidity trap in terms of weakness in output and employment can be viewed as an economy experiencing deflation that cannot be contained by increases in the monetary base, or currency held by the public plus reserves held by banks at the central bank. The argument of monetary neutrality is that an increase in money throughout all future periods will increase prices by the same proportion. According to Krugman (1998, 142), the liquidity trap occurs because the public does not expect that the central bank will continue the monetary expansion once inflation returns to a certain level. Expectations are critical in explaining the liquidity trap and have been shaped by the continued fight against inflation by central banks during several decades with the possible exception of Japan beginning with the lost decade when deflation became the relevant policy concern. In this framework, monetary policy is ineffectual if perceived by the public as temporary. Credible monetary policy is perceived by the public as permanent deliberate increase in prices or output: “if the central bank can credibly promise to be irresponsible—that is, convince the market that it will in fact allow prices to rise sufficiently—it can bootstrap the economy out of the trap” (Krugman 1998, 161).
Fed Chairman Bernanke (2012Apr25, 7-8) argues that there is no conflict between his advice to the Bank of Japan as Princeton Professor Bernanke (2000) and current monetary policy by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC):
“So there’s this view circulating [Princeton Professor Paul Krugman at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/chairman-bernanke-should-listen-to-professor-bernanke.html?pagewanted=all] that the views I expressed about 15 years ago on the Bank of Japan are somehow inconsistent with our current policies. That is absolutely incorrect. Our—my views and our policies today are completely consistent with the views that I held at that time. I made two points at that time to the Bank of Japan. The first was that I believe that a determined central bank could and should work to eliminate deflation—that is, falling prices. The second point that I made was that when short-term interest rates hit zero, the tools of a central bank are no longer—are not exhausted, there are still other things that the central bank can do to create additional accommodation. Now, looking at the current situation in United States, we are not in deflation. When deflation became a significant risk in late 2010, or at least a modest risk in late 2010, we used additional balance sheet tools to help return inflation close to the 2 percent target. Likewise, we have been aggressive and creative in using non-federal-funds-rate-centered tools to achieve additional accommodation for the U.S. economy. So the very critical difference between the Japanese situation 15 years ago and the U.S. situation today is that Japan was in deflation, and, clearly, when you’re in deflation and in recession, then both sides of your mandates, so to speak, are demanding additional accommodation. In this case, it’s—we are not in deflation, we have an inflation rate that’s close to our objective. Now, why don’t we do more? Well, first I would again reiterate that we are doing a great deal; policy is extraordinarily accommodative. We—and I won’t go through the list again, but you know all the things that we have done to try to provide support to the economy. I guess the question is, does it make sense to actively seek a higher inflation rate in order to achieve a slightly increased reduction—a slightly increased pace of reduction in the unemployment rate? The view of the Committee is that that would be very reckless. We have—we, the Federal Reserve, have spent 30 years building up credibility for low and stable inflation, which has proved extremely valuable in that we’ve been be able to take strong accommodative actions in the last four or five years to support the economy without leading to an unanchoring of inflation expectations or a destabilization of inflation. To risk that asset for what I think would be quite tentative and perhaps doubtful gains on the real side would be, I think, an unwise thing to do.”
Chairman Bernanke (2012Apr 25, 10-11) explains current FOMC policy:
“So it’s not a ceiling, it’s a symmetric objective, and we attempt to bring inflation close to 2 percent. And in particular, if inflation were to jump for whatever reason—and we don’t have, obviously don’t have perfect control of inflation—we’ll try to return inflation to 2 percent at a pace which takes into account the situation with respect to unemployment. The risk of higher inflation—you say 2½ percent; well, 2½ percent expected change might involve a distribution of outcomes, some of which might be much higher than 2½ percent. And the concern we have is that if inflation were to run well above 2 percent for a protracted period, that the credibility and the well-anchored inflation expectations, which are such a valuable asset of the Federal Reserve, might become eroded, in which case we would in fact have less rather than more flexibility to use accommodative monetary policy to achieve our employment goals. I would cite to you, just as an example, if you look at Vice Chair Yellen’s paper, which she gave—or speech, which she gave a couple of weeks ago, where she described a number of ways of looking at the late 2014 guidance. She showed there some so-called optimal policy rules that come from trying to get the best possible outcomes from our quantitative econometric models, and what you see, if you look at that, is that the best possible outcomes, assuming perfect certainty, assuming perfect foresight—very unrealistic assumptions—still involve inflation staying quite close to 2 percent. So there is no presumption even in our econometric models that you need inflation well above target in order to make progress on unemployment.”
In perceptive analysis of growth and macroeconomics in the past six decades, Rajan (2012FA) argues that “the West can’t borrow and spend its way to recovery.” The Keynesian paradigm is not applicable in current conditions. Advanced economies in the West could be divided into those that reformed regulatory structures to encourage productivity and others that retained older structures. In the period from 1950 to 2000, Cobet and Wilson (2002) find that US productivity, measured as output/hour, grew at the average yearly rate of 2.9 percent while Japan grew at 6.3 percent and Germany at 4.7 percent (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). In the period from 1995 to 2000, output/hour grew at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US but at lower rates of 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in the US. Rajan (2012FA) argues that the differential in productivity growth was accomplished by deregulation in the US at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. In contrast, Europe did not engage in reform with the exception of Germany in the early 2000s that empowered the German economy with significant productivity advantage. At the same time, technology and globalization increased relative remunerations in highly-skilled, educated workers relative to those without skills for the new economy. It was then politically appealing to improve the fortunes of those left behind by the technological revolution by means of increasing cheap credit. As Rajan (2012FA) argues:
“In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, partly to gain more control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant private mortgage agencies, and partly to promote affordable homeownership for low-income groups. Such policies helped money flow to lower-middle-class households and raised their spending—so much so that consumption inequality rose much less than income inequality in the years before the crisis. These policies were also politically popular. Unlike when it came to an expansion in government welfare transfers, few groups opposed expanding credit to the lower-middle class—not the politicians who wanted more growth and happy constituents, not the bankers and brokers who profited from the mortgage fees, not the borrowers who could now buy their dream houses with virtually no money down, and not the laissez-faire bank regulators who thought they could pick up the pieces if the housing market collapsed. The Federal Reserve abetted these shortsighted policies. In 2001, in response to the dot-com bust, the Fed cut short-term interest rates to the bone. Even though the overstretched corporations that were meant to be stimulated were not interested in investing, artificially low interest rates acted as a tremendous subsidy to the parts of the economy that relied on debt, such as housing and finance. This led to an expansion in housing construction (and related services, such as real estate brokerage and mortgage lending), which created jobs, especially for the unskilled. Progressive economists applauded this process, arguing that the housing boom would lift the economy out of the doldrums. But the Fed-supported bubble proved unsustainable. Many construction workers have lost their jobs and are now in deeper trouble than before, having also borrowed to buy unaffordable houses. Bankers obviously deserve a large share of the blame for the crisis. Some of the financial sector’s activities were clearly predatory, if not outright criminal. But the role that the politically induced expansion of credit played cannot be ignored; it is the main reason the usual checks and balances on financial risk taking broke down.”
In fact, Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) anticipated low liquidity in financial markets resulting from low interest rates before the financial crisis that caused distortions of risk/return decisions provoking the credit/dollar crisis and global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Near zero interest rates of unconventional monetary policy induced excessive risks and low liquidity in financial decisions that were critical as a cause of the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. Rajan (2012FA) argues that it is not feasible to return to the employment and income levels before the credit/dollar crisis because of the bloated construction sector, financial system and government budgets.
Proposals for higher inflation target of 4 percent for FOMC monetary policy are based on the view that interest rates are too high in real terms because the nominal rate is already at zero and cannot be lowered further. Rajan (2012May8) argues that higher inflation targets by the FOMC need not increase aggregate demand as proposed in those policies because of various factors:
· Pension Crisis. Baby boomers close to retirement calculate that their savings are not enough at current interest rates and may simply save more. Many potential retirees are delaying retirement in order to save what is required to provide for comfortable retirement.
· Regional Income and Debt Disparities. Unemployment, indebtedness and income growth differ by regions in the US. It is not feasible to relocate demand around the country such that decreases in real interest rates may not have aggregate demand effects.
· Inflation Expectations. Rajan (2012May) argues that there is not much knowledge about how people form expectations. Increasing the FOMC target to 4 percent could erode control of monetary policy by the central bank. More technical analysis of this issue, which could be merely repetition of inflation surprise in the US Great Inflation of the 1970s, is presented in Appendix IIA.
· Frictions. Keynesian economics is based on rigidities of wages and benefits in economic activities but there may be even more important current inflexibilities such as moving when it is not possible to sell and buy a house.
Thomas J. Sargent and William L. Silber, writing on “The challenges of the Fed’s bid for transparency,” on Mar 20, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/778eb1ce-7288-11e1-9c23-00144feab49a.html#axzz1pexRlsiQ), analyze the costs and benefits of transparency by the Fed. In the analysis of Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20), benefits of transparency by the Fed will exceed costs if the Fed is successful in conveying to the public what policies would be implemented and how forcibly in the presence of unforeseen economic events. History has been unkind to policy commitments. The risk in this case is if the Fed would postpone adjustment because of political pressures as has occurred in the past or because of errors of evaluation and forecasting of economic and financial conditions. Both political pressures and errors abounded in the unhappy stagflation of the 1970s also known as the US Great Inflation (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB). The challenge of the Fed, in the view of Sargent and Silber 2012Mar20), is to convey to the public the need to deviate from the commitment to interest rates of zero to ¼ percent because conditions have changed instead of unwarranted inaction or policy changes. Errors have abounded such as a critical cause of the global recession pointed by Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20): “While no president is known to have explicitly pressurized Mr. Bernanke’s predecessor, Alan Greenspan, he found it easy to maintain low interest rates for too long, fuelling the credit boom and housing bubble that led to the financial crisis in 2008.” Sargent and Silber (2012Mar20) also find need of commitment of fiscal authorities to consolidation needed to attain sustainable path of debt. Further analysis is provided in Appendix IIA Inflation Surprise and Appendix IIB Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html.
According to an influential school of thought, the interrelation of growth and inflation in Latin America is complex, preventing analysis of whether inflation promotes or restricts economic growth (Seers 1962, 191). In this view, there are multiple structural factors of inflation. Successful economic policy requires a development program that ameliorates structural weaknesses. Policy measures in developed countries are not transferable to developing economies.
In extensive research and analysis, Kahil (1973) finds no evidence of the role of structural factors in Brazilian inflation from 1947 to 1963. In fact, Kahil (1973, 329) concludes:
“The immediate causes of the persistent and often violent rise in prices, with which Brazil was plagued from the last month of 1948 to the early months of 1964, are pretty obvious: large and generally growing public deficits, together with too rapid an expansion of bank credit in the first years and, later, exaggerated and more and more frequent increases in the legal minimum wages.”
Kahil (1973, 334) analyzes the impact of inflation on the economy and society of Brazil:
“The real incomes of the various social classes alternately suffered increasingly frequent and sharp fluctuations: no sooner had a group succeeded in its struggle to restore its real income to some previous peak than it witnessed its erosion with accelerated speed; and it soon became apparent to all that the success of any important group in raising its real income, through government actions or by other means, was achieved only by reducing theirs. Social harmony, the general climate of euphoria, and also enthusiasm for government policies, which had tended to prevail until the last months of 1958, gave way in the following years of galloping inflation to intense political and social conflict and to profound disillusionment with public policies. By 1963 when inflation reached its runaway stage, the economy had ceased to grow, industry and transport were convulsed by innumerable strikes, and peasants were invading land in the countryside; and the situation further worsened in the first months of 1964.”
Professor Nathiel H. Leff (1975) at Columbia University identified another important contribution of Kahil (1975, Chapter IV“The supply of capital,” 127-185) of key current relevance to current proposals to promote economic growth and employment by raising inflation targets:
“Contrary to the assertions of some earlier writers on this topic, Kahil concludes that inflation did not lead to accelerated capital formation in Brazil.”
In econometric analysis of Brazil’s inflation from 1947 to 1980, Barbosa (1987) concludes:
“The most important result, based on the empirical evidence presented here, is that in the long run inflation is a monetary phenomenon. It follows that the most challenging task for Brazilian society in the near future is to shape a monetary-fiscal constitution that precludes financing much of the budget deficits through the inflation tax.”
Experience with continuing fiscal deficits and money creation tend to show accelerating inflation. Table III-10 provides average yearly rates of growth of two definitions of the money stock, M1, and M2 that adds also interest-paying deposits. The data were part of a research project on the monetary history of Brazil using the NBER framework of Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 1970) and Cagan (1965) as well as the institutional framework of Rondo E. Cameron (1967, 1972) who inspired the research (Pelaez 1974, 1975, 1976a,b, 1977, 1979, Pelaez and Suzigan 1978, 1981). The data were also used to test the correct specification of money and income following Sims (1972; see also Williams et al. 1976) as well as another test of orthogonality of money demand and supply using covariance analysis. The average yearly rates of inflation are high for almost any period in 1861-1970, even when prices were declining at 1 percent in 19th century England, and accelerated to 27.1 percent in 1945-1970. There may be concern in an uncontrolled deficit monetized by sharp increases in base money. The Fed may have desired to control inflation at 2 percent after lowering the fed funds rate to 1 percent in 2003 but inflation rose to 4.1 percent in 2007. There is not “one hundred percent” confidence in controlling inflation because of the lags in effects of monetary policy impulses and the equally important lags in realization of the need for action and taking of action and also the inability to forecast any economic variable. Romer and Romer (2004) find that a one percentage point tightening of monetary policy is associated with a 4.3 percent decline in industrial production. There is no change in inflation in the first 22 months after monetary policy tightening when it begins to decline steadily, with decrease by 6 percent after 48 months (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 102). Even if there were one hundred percent confidence in reducing inflation by monetary policy, it could take a prolonged period with adverse effects on economic activity. Certainty does not occur in economic policy, which is characterized by costs that cannot be anticipated.
Table III-10, Brazil, Yearly Growth Rates of M1, M2, Nominal Income (Y), Real Income (y), Real Income per Capita (y/n) and Prices (P)
| M1 | M2 | Y | y | y/N | P | |
| 1861-1970 | 9.3 | 6.2 | 10.2 | 4.6 | 2.4 | 5.8 |
| 1861-1900 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 2.6 | 1.6 |
| 1861-1913 | 4.7 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 0.1 |
| 1861-1929 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 4.3 | 2.3 | 2.1 |
| 1900-1970 | 13.9 | 13.9 | 15.2 | 4.9 | 2.6 | 10.3 |
| 1900-1929 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 10.8 | 4.2 | 2.1 | 6.6 |
| 1900-1945 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 9.2 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 4.9 |
| 1920-1970 | 17.8 | 17.3 | 19.4 | 5.3 | 2.8 | 14.1 |
| 1920-1945 | 8.3 | 8.7 | 7.5 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 3.2 |
| 1920-1929 | 5.4 | 6.9 | 11.1 | 5.3 | 3.3 | 5.8 |
| 1929-1939 | 8.9 | 8.1 | 11.7 | 6.3 | 4.1 | 5.4 |
| 1945-1970 | 30.3 | 29.2 | 33.2 | 6.1 | 3.1 | 27.1 |
Note: growth rates are obtained by regressions of the natural logarithms on time. M1 and M2 definitions of the money stock; Y nominal GDP; y real GDP; y/N real GDP per capita; P prices.
Source: See Pelaez and Suzigan (1978), 143; M1 and M2 from Pelaez and Suzigan (1981); money income and real income from Contador and Haddad (1975) and Haddad (1974); prices by the exchange rate adjusted by British wholesale prices until 1906 and then from Villela and Suzigan (1973); national accounts after 1947 from Fundação Getúlio Vargas.
Chart III-1 shows in semi-logarithmic scale from 1861 to 1970 in descending order two definitions of income velocity, money income, M1, M2, an indicator of prices and real income.
Chart III-1, Brazil, Money, Income and Prices 1861-1970.
Source: © Carlos Manuel Pelaez and Wilson Suzigan. 1981. História Monetária do Brasil Segunda Edição. Coleção Temas Brasileiros. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 21.
Table III-11 provides yearly percentage changes of GDP, GDP per capita, base money, prices and the current account in millions of dollars during the acceleration of inflation after 1947. There was an explosion of base money or the issue of money and three waves of inflation identified by Kahil (1973). Inflation accelerated together with issue of money and political instability from 1960 to 1964. There must be a role for expectations in inflation but there is not much sound knowledge and measurement as Rajan (2012May8) argues. There have been inflation waves documented in periodic comments in this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/mediocre-recovery-without-jobs.html) . The risk is ignition of adverse expectations at the crest of one of worldwide inflation waves. Lack of credibility of the commitment by the FOMC to contain inflation could ignite such perverse expectations. Deficit financing of economic growth can lead to inflation and financial instability.
Table III-11, Brazil, GDP, GDP per Capita, Base Money, Prices and Current Account of the Balance of Payments, ∆% and USD Millions, 1947-1971
| GDP ∆% | GDP per Capita ∆% | Base Money ∆% | Prices ∆% | Current USD Millions | |
| 1947 | 2.4 | 0.1 | -1.4 | 14.0 | 162 |
| 1948 | 7.4 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 7.6 | -24 |
| 1949 | 6.6 | 4.2 | 14.5 | 4.0 | -74 |
| 1950 | 6.5 | 4.0 | 23.0 | 10.0 | 52 |
| 1951 | 5.9 | 2.9 | 15.3 | 21.9 | -291 |
| 1952 | 8.7 | 5.6 | 17.7 | 10.2 | -615 |
| 1953 | 2.5 | -0.5 | 15.5 | 12.1 | 16 |
| 1954 | 10.1 | 6.9 | 23.4 | 31.0 | -203 |
| 1955 | 6.9 | 3.8 | 18.0 | 14.0 | 17 |
| 1956 | 3.2 | 0.2 | 16.9 | 21.6 | 194 |
| 1957 | 8.1 | 4.9 | 30.5 | 13.9 | -180 |
| 1958 | 7.7 | 4.6 | 26.1 | 10.4 | -253 |
| 1959 | 5.6 | 2.5 | 32.3 | 37.7 | -154 |
| 1960 | 9.7 | 6.5 | 42.4 | 27.6 | -410 |
| 1961 | 10.3 | 7.1 | 54.4 | 36.1 | 115 |
| 1962 | 5.3 | 2.2 | 66.4 | 54.1 | -346 |
| 1963 | 1.6 | -1.4 | 78.4 | 75.2 | -244 |
| 1964 | 2.9 | -0.1 | 82.5 | 89.7 | 40 |
| 1965 | 2.7 | -0.6 | 67.6 | 62.0 | 331 |
| 1966 | 4.4 | 1.5 | 25.8 | 37.9 | 153 |
| 1967 | 4.9 | 2.0 | 33.9 | 28.7 | -245 |
| 1968 | 11.2 | 8.1 | 31.4 | 25.2 | 32 |
| 1969 | 9.9 | 6.9 | 22.4 | 18.2 | 549 |
| 1970 | 8.9 | 5.8 | 20.2 | 20.7 | 545 |
| 1971 | 13.3 | 10.2 | 29.8 | 22.0 | 530 |
Sources: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Banco Central do Brasil and Pelaez and Suzigan (1981). Carlos Manuel Pelaez, História Econômica do Brasil: Um Elo entre a Teoria e a Realidade Econômica. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1979, 94.
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s. Economic and financial risks in the euro area are increasingly being dominated by analytical and political disagreement on conflicts of fiscal adjustment, financial stability, economic growth and employment. Political development is beginning to push for alternative paths of policy. Blanchard (2012WEOApr) and Draghi (2012May3) provide analysis of appropriate directions of policy.
Blanchard (2012WEOApr) finds that interest rates close to zero in advanced economies have not induced higher economic growth because of two main factors—fiscal consolidation and deleveraging—that restrict economic growth in the short-term. First, Blanchard (2012WEOApr, XIII) finds that assuming a multiplier of unity of the fiscal deficit on GDP, decrease of the cyclically-adjusted deficit of advanced economies by 1 percent would reduce economic growth by one percentage point. Second, deleveraging by banks, occurring mainly in Europe, tightens credit supply with similar reduction of euro area economic growth by one percentage point in 2012. The baseline of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the IMF (2012WEOApr) for Apr 2012 incorporates both effects, which results in weak economic growth, in particular in Europe, and prolonged unemployment. An important analysis by Blanchard (2012WEOApr, XIII) is that “financial uncertainty, together with sharp shifts in risk appetite, has led to volatile capital flows.” Blanchard (2012WEOApr) still finds that the greatest vulnerability is another profound crisis in Europe (ECB). Crisis prevention should buttress the resilience of affected countries during those shifts in risk appetite. The role of the enhanced firewall of the IMF, European Union (EU) and European Central Bank is gaining time during which countries could engage in fiscal consolidation and structural reforms that would diminish the shifts in risk appetite, preventing devastating effects of financial crises. Volatility in capital flows is equivalent to volatility of valuations of risk financial assets. The challenge to the policy mix consists in balancing the adverse short-term effects of fiscal consolidation and deleveraging with the beneficial long-term effects of eliminating the vulnerability to shocks of risk aversion. Blanchard (2012WEOApr) finds that policy should seek short-term credibility while implementing measures that restrict the path of expenditures together with simultaneous development of institutions and rules that constrain deficits and spending in the future. There is similar policy challenge in deleveraging banks, which is required for sound lending institutions, but without causing an adverse credit crunch. Advanced economies face a tough policy challenge of increasing demand and potential growth.
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi (2012May3) also outlines the appropriate policy mix for successful adjustment:
“It is of utmost importance to ensure fiscal sustainability and sustainable growth in the euro area. Most euro area countries made good progress in terms of fiscal consolidation in 2011. While the necessary comprehensive fiscal adjustment is weighing on near-term economic growth, its successful implementation will contribute to the sustainability of public finances and thereby to the lowering of sovereign risk premia. In an environment of enhanced confidence in fiscal balances, private sector activity should also be fostered, supporting private investment and medium-term growth.
At the same time, together with fiscal consolidation, growth and growth potential in the euro area need to be enhanced by decisive structural reforms. In this context, facilitating entrepreneurial activities, the start-up of new firms and job creation is crucial. Policies aimed at enhancing competition in product markets and increasing the wage and employment adjustment capacity of firms will foster innovation, promote job creation and boost longer-term growth prospects. Reforms in these areas are particularly important for countries which have suffered significant losses in cost competitiveness and need to stimulate productivity and improve trade performance.
In this context, let me make a few remarks on the adjustment process within the euro area. As we know from the experience of other large currency areas, regional divergences in economic developments are a normal feature. However, considerable imbalances have accumulated in the last decade in several euro area countries and they are now in the process of being corrected.
As concerns the monetary policy stance of the ECB, it has to be focused on the euro area. Our primary objective remains to maintain price stability over the medium term. This is the best contribution of monetary policy to fostering growth and job creation in the euro area.
Addressing divergences among individual euro area countries is the task of national governments. They must undertake determined policy actions to address major imbalances and vulnerabilities in the fiscal, financial and structural domains. We note that progress is being made in many countries, but several governments need to be more ambitious. Ensuring sound fiscal balances, financial stability and competitiveness in all euro area countries is in our common interest.”
Economic policy during the debt crisis of 1983 may be useful in analyzing the options of the euro area. Brazil successfully combined fiscal consolidation, structural reforms to eliminate subsidies and devaluation to parity. Brazil’s terms of trade, or export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated by 47 percent from 1977 to 1983 (Pelaez 1986, 46). Table III-12 provides selected economic indicators of the economy of Brazil from 1970 to 1985. In 1983, Brazil’s inflation was 164.9 percent, GDP fell 3.2 percent, idle capacity in manufacturing reached 24.0 percent and Brazil had an unsustainable foreign debt. US money center banks would have had negative capital if loans to emerging countries could have been marked according to loss given default and probability of default (for credit risk models see Pelaez and Pelaez (2005), International Financial Architecture, 134-54). Brazil’s current account of the balance of payments shrank from $16,310 million in 1982 to $6,837 million in 1983 because of the abrupt cessation of foreign capital inflows with resulting contraction of Brazil’s GDP by 3.2 percent. An important part of adjustment consisted of agile coordination of domestic production to cushion the impact of drastic reduction in imports. In 1984, Brazil had a surplus of $45 million in current account, the economy grew at 4.5 percent and inflation was stabilized at 232.9 percent.
Table III-12, Brazil, Selected Economic Indicators 1970-1985
| Inflation ∆% | GDP Growth ∆% | Idle Capacity in MFG % | BOP Current Account USD MM | |
| 1985 | 223.4 | 7.4 | 19.8 | -630 |
| 1984 | 232.9 | 4.5 | 22.6 | 45 |
| 1983 | 164.9 | -3.2 | 24.0 | -6,837 |
| 1982 | 94.0 | 0.9 | 15.2 | -16,310 |
| 1981 | 113.0 | -1.6 | 12.3 | -11,374 |
| 1980 | 109.2 | 7.2 | 3.5 | -12,886 |
| 1979 | 55.4 | 6.4 | 4.1 | -10,742 |
| 1978 | 38.9 | 5.0 | 3.3 | -6,990 |
| 1977 | 40.6 | 5.7 | 3.2 | -4,037 |
| 1976 | 40.4 | 9.7 | 0.0 | -6,013 |
| 1975 | 27.8 | 5.4 | 3.0 | -6,711 |
| 1974 | 29.1 | 9.7 | 0.1 | -7,122 |
| 1973 | 15.4 | 13.6 | 0.3 | -1,688 |
| 1972 | 17.7 | 11.1 | 6.5 | -1,489 |
| 1971 | 21.5 | 12.0 | 9.8 | -1,307 |
| 1970 | 19.3 | 8.8 | 12.2 | -562 |
Source: Carlos 21.5Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 1986, 86.
Chart III-2 provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that period. Chart III-2 used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of unemployment in large urban centers.
Chart III-2, Brazil, Phillips Circuit 1963-1987
Source:
©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.
A key to success in stabilizing an economy with significant risk aversion is finding parity of internal and external interest rates. Brazil implemented fiscal consolidation and reforms that are advisable in explosive foreign debt environments. In addition, Brazil had the capacity to find parity in external and internal interest rates to prevent capital flight and disruption of balance sheets (for analysis of balance sheets, interest rates, indexing, devaluation, financial instruments and asset/liability management in that period see Pelaez and Pelaez (2007), The Global Recession Risk: Dollar Devaluation and the World Economy, 178-87). Table III-13 provides monthly percentage changes of inflation, devaluation and indexing and the monthly percent overnight interest rate. Parity was attained by means of a simple inequality:
Cost of Domestic Loan ≥ Cost of Foreign Loan
This ordering was attained in practice by setting the domestic interest rate of the overnight interest rate plus spread higher than indexing of government securities with lower spread than loans in turn higher than devaluation plus spread of foreign loans. Interest parity required equality of inflation, devaluation and indexing. Brazil devalued the cruzeiro by 30 percent in 1983 because the depreciation of the German mark DM relative to the USD had eroded the competitiveness of Brazil’s products in Germany and in competition with German goods worldwide. The database of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System quotes DM 1.7829/USD on Mar 3 1980 and DM 2.4425/USD on Mar 15, 1983 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat89_ge.htm) for devaluation of 37.0 percent. Parity of costs and rates of domestic and foreign loans and assets required ensuring that there would not be appreciation of the exchange rate, inducing capital flight in expectation of future devaluation that would have reversed stabilization. One of the main problems of adjustment of members of the euro area with high debts is that they cannot adjust the exchange rate because of the common euro currency. This is not an argument in favor of breaking the euro area because there would be also major problems of adjustment such as exiting the euro in favor of a new Drachma in the case of Greece. Another hurdle of adjustment in the euro area is that Brazil could have moved swiftly to adjust its economy in 1983 but the euro area has major sovereignty and distribution of taxation hurdles in moving rapidly.
Table III-13, Brazil, Inflation, Devaluation, Overnight Interest Rate and Indexing, Percent per Month, 1984
| 1984 | Inflation IGP ∆% | Devaluation ∆% | Overnight Interest Rate % | Indexing ∆% |
| Jan | 9.8 | 9.8 | 10.0 | 9.8 |
| Feb | 12.3 | 12.3 | 12.2 | 12.3 |
| Mar | 10.0 | 10.1 | 11.3 | 10.0 |
| Apr | 8.9 | 8.8 | 10.1 | 8.9 |
| May | 8.9 | 8.9 | 9.8 | 8.9 |
| Jun | 9.2 | 9.2 | 10.2 | 9.2 |
| Jul | 10.3 | 10.2 | 11.9 | 10.3 |
| Aug | 10.6 | 10.6 | 11.0 | 10.6 |
| Sep | 10.5 | 10.5 | 11.9 | 10.5 |
| Oct | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.9 | 12.6 |
| Nov | 9.9 | 9.9 | 10.9 | 9.9 |
| Dec | 10.5 | 10.5 | 11.5 | 10.5 |
Source: Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 1986, 86.
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012
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