United States Producer Prices of Finished Goods Increase 12.2 Percent and Final Demand Prices Increase 9.7 Percent in 12 Months Ending in Dec 2021, Cumulative Growth of US Manufacturing of 2.0 Percent From Jul 2021 to Dec 2021 at Annual Equivalent 4.0 Percent and Decreasing 0.3 Percent in Dec 2021, US Manufacturing 3.8 Percent Higher in Dec 2021 Than A Year Earlier in the Global Recession, with Output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the Lockdown of Economic activity in the COVID-19 Event and the Through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), US Manufacturing Underperforming Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, High United States Inflation, Stagflation Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022.
I United States Industrial Production
II Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates
IC United States Inflation
IC Long-term US Inflation
ID Current US Inflation
IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation
III World Financial Turbulence
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
Preamble. The current federal debt of the United States is $29.04 trillion subject to debt limit of $31.4 trillion (https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/FINAL-Daily-Debt-Subject-Limit-Activity-2021_12_15.pdf). The Net International Investment Position of the United States, or foreign debt, is $16.1 trillion (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/intinv321.pdf https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). The United States current account deficit is 3.7 percent of GDP in IIIQ2021 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). The Treasury deficit of the United States reached $2.8 trillion in fiscal year 2021 (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/). Total assets of Federal Reserve Banks reached $8.9 trillion on Jan 19, 2022 and securities held outright reached $8.4 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). US GDP nominal NSA reached $23.2 trillion in IIIQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/gdp3q21_3rd.pdf). Total Treasury interest-bearing, marketable debt held by private investors increased from $3635 billion in 2007 to $16,439 billion in Sep 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021) or increase by 352.2 percent (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/).
Chart VII-4 of the Energy Information Administration provides the price of the Natural Gas Futures Contract increasing from $2.581 on Jan 4, 2021 to $4.283 per million Btu on Jan 17, 2022 or 65.9 percent.
Chart VII-4, US, Natural Gas Futures Contract 1
Source: US Energy Information Administration
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1d.htm
Chart CPI-H provides 12 months percentage changes of the US Consumer Price Index from 1981 to 2021. The increase of 7.0 percent of the US CPI in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021 is the highest since 7.1 percent in Jun 1982 in the beginning adjustment from the Great Inflation.
Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2021
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
I United States Industrial Production. This Section I provides data and analysis showing the underperformance in manufacturing in the lost cycle of the global recession without output underperforming below trend worldwide and in the global recession with output in the US reaching in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).
There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:
- Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP three trillion dollars below trend). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.1 percent per year from 1929 to 2020 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html), with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2020 and 1.3 percent from 2007 to 2020. GDP in IIIQ2021 is 17.7 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent.
- Private fixed investment stagnating initially followed by cumulative increase of 36.3 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2021 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html).
- Twenty four million or 13.6 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with cyclically stagnating or declining real wages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/increase-in-sep-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/increase-in-aug-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/decrease-in-dec-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-fed-will-be-patient-adjusting.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-on00000000e-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
- Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/real-disposable-income-decreasing-02.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/increase-in-sep-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/increase-in-aug-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)
- Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/united-states-consumer-prices-increase.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/accelerating-inflation-with-deepening.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/total-nonfarm-hires-jump-from-5864.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/new-nonfarm-hires-of-6.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/nonfarm-hires-jump-64.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/global-recession-with-output-in-us.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/united-states-imbalances-of-internal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contracting-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-rising.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/impact-of-monetary-policy-on-exchange.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
- Productivity growth fell from 2.1 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2019 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.4 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2019, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/united-states-high-inflation-theory-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/world-inflation-waves-high-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-66-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/united-states-inflation-rules.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/financial-markets-stress-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/ii-rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)
- Output of manufacturing (SIC) in Dec 2021 at 38.7 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 26.8 percent below trend since 1986. Output of manufacturing (NAICS) at 41.1 percent below trend measured from 1986 to 2006 and 24.7 percent below trend measured from 1999 to 2006 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/federal-open-market-committee-leaves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/us-industrial-production-increased-3.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/growth-of-industrial-production-of-54.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)
- Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Worldwide waves of inflation (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/real-disposable-income-decreasing-02.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/world-inflation-waves-high-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in_29.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/rising-inflation-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-41-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-40-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-334-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-331-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/weekly-rise-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/sharp-worldwide-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
- Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/federal-open-market-committee-leaves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/us-industrial-production-increased-3.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/growth-of-industrial-production-of-54.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier) (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
- Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/real-disposable-income-decreasing-02.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/increase-in-sep-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/increase-in-aug-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
- 43 million in poverty and 29 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1999 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 58.1 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2021 when it would have grown over 56.3 percent at trend of 3.3 percent per year in real terms from IVQ1945 to IIIQ2021. Financial assets increased $60.0 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $18.0 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation increased 21.2 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/us-gdp-growing-at-67-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/rising-inflation-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/destruction-of-household-nonfinancial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html).
Industrial production decreased 0.1 percent in Dec 2021 and increased 0.7 percent in Nov 2021 after increasing 1.2 percent in Oct 2021, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on May 28, 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. The most prominent features of the revision are an update of the base year to 2017 for the indexes, a conversion of the industry-group indexes to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the incorporation of comprehensive annual production data for 2017 through 2019, and the incorporation of new survey utilization rate data for 2019 and 2020.[1]
On net, the revisions to total IP for recent years are negative. Notably, the updated rates of change are 1 to 1-1/2 percentage points lower per year from 2017 through 2019.[2] The cumulative effect of these revisions leaves the level of total IP in April 2021 about 3-1/2 percent below its late-2007 peak before the Great Recession; previously, total IP in April 2021 was slightly above its peak before the Great Recession. The incorporation of detailed data for manufacturing from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2017 Economic Census (EC) and the 2018 and 2019 Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASMs) accounts for the majority of the differences between the current and the previously published estimates. The revisions to the rates of change for 2020 are small, and the magnitude of the sharp drop (17 percent) in total IP at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 is very similar to the magnitude reported earlier.
Annual capacity growth is revised down about 1 percentage point, on average, from 2017 to 2019 and is little changed in 2020. After these revisions, capacity for total industry is estimated to have grown about 3 percent less between 2016 and the end of 2020 than previously estimated.
In the fourth quarter of 2020, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 73.4 percent, about 1/2 percentage point below its previous estimate and about 6-1/4 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average. The utilization rate for 2019 is also about 1/2 percentage point lower than the previous estimate, but revisions to utilization rates for 2017 and 2018 are very small.”
The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm):
“Industrial production declined 0.1 percent in December. Losses of 0.3 percent for manufacturing and 1.5 percent for utilities were mostly offset by a gain of 2.0 percent for mining. For the fourth quarter as a whole, total industrial production rose at an annual rate of 4.0 percent. At 101.9 percent of its 2017 average, total industrial production in December was 3.7 percent higher than it was at the end of 2020 and 0.6 percent above its pre-pandemic (February 2020) reading. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector edged down 0.1 percentage point in December to 76.5 percent, a rate that is 3.1 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.”
In the six months ending in Dec 2021, United States national industrial production accumulated change of 1.3 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.6 percent, which is lower than growth of 3.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021. Excluding increase of 0.7 percent in Jul 2021, growth in the remaining five months from Jul 2021 to Dec 2021 accumulated to 0.6 percent or 1.4 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production increased 1.2 percent in one of the past six months, 0.7 percent in two months, minus 1.0 percent in one month, minus 0.2 percent in one month and minus 0.1 percent in one month. Industrial production increased at annual equivalent 7.4 percent in the most recent quarter from Oct 2021 to Dec 2021 and decreased at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the prior quarter from Jul 2021 to Sep 2021. Business equipment accumulated change of 1.8 percent in the six months from Jul 2021 to Dec 2021, at the annual equivalent rate of 4.2 percent, which is higher than growth of 3.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “Capacity utilization for the industrial sector edged down 0.1 percentage point in December to 76.5 percent, a rate that is 3.1 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration, oscillating growth in past months and deep contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).
Table I-1, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, SA, ∆%
| Dec 21 | Nov 21 | Oct 21 | Sep 21 | Aug 21 | Jul 21 | Dec 21/ Dec 20 | |
| Total | -0.1 | 0.7 | 1.2 | -1.0 | -0.2 | 0.7 | 3.7 |
| Market | |||||||
| Final Products | -0.7 | 0.9 | 0.4 | -0.5 | -0.6 | 1.6 | 2.4 |
| Consumer Goods | -0.9 | 1.3 | 0.0 | -0.5 | -0.5 | 0.9 | -0.2 |
| Business Equipment | -0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | -0.3 | -0.9 | 3.0 | 3.7 |
| Non | -0.3 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 3.4 |
| Construction | 0.3 | 2.1 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 4.4 |
| Materials | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.3 | -1.9 | 0.0 | -0.2 | 4.9 |
| Industry Groups | |||||||
| Manufacturing | -0.3 | 0.6 | 1.4 | -0.5 | -0.6 | 1.4 | 3.5 |
| Mining | 2.0 | 0.5 | 4.3 | -2.1 | -0.4 | 0.1 | 11.0 |
| Utilities | -1.5 | 1.9 | -3.4 | -2.8 | 2.8 | -3.0 | -3.4 |
| Capacity | 76.5 | 76.6 | 76.1 | 75.2 | 76.0 | 76.2 | 0.4 |
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Manufacturing decreased 0.3 percent in Dec 2021 and increased 0.6 percent in Nov 2021 after increasing 1.4 percent in Oct 2021, seasonally adjusted, increasing 3.8 percent not seasonally adjusted in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021, as shown in Table I-2. Manufacturing increased cumulatively 2.0 percent in the six months ending in Dec 2021 or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.0 percent. Excluding the decrease of 0.6 percent in Aug 2021, manufacturing increased 2.6 percent from Jul 2020 to Dec 2021 or at the annual equivalent rate of 6.4 percent. Table I-2 provides a longer perspective of manufacturing in the US. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 with recovery followed by renewed deterioration/improvement in more recent months as shown by 12 months’ rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession, but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily with some strength at the margin. There is renewed deterioration and improvement. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on May 28, 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. The most prominent features of the revision are an update of the base year to 2017 for the indexes, a conversion of the industry-group indexes to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the incorporation of comprehensive annual production data for 2017 through 2019, and the incorporation of new survey utilization rate data for 2019 and 2020.[1]
On net, the revisions to total IP for recent years are negative. Notably, the updated rates of change are 1 to 1-1/2 percentage points lower per year from 2017 through 2019.[2] The cumulative effect of these revisions leaves the level of total IP in April 2021 about 3-1/2 percent below its late-2007 peak before the Great Recession; previously, total IP in April 2021 was slightly above its peak before the Great Recession. The incorporation of detailed data for manufacturing from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2017 Economic Census (EC) and the 2018 and 2019 Annual Surveys of Manufactures (ASMs) accounts for the majority of the differences between the current and the previously published estimates. The revisions to the rates of change for 2020 are small, and the magnitude of the sharp drop (17 percent) in total IP at the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 is very similar to the magnitude reported earlier.
Annual capacity growth is revised down about 1 percentage point, on average, from 2017 to 2019 and is little changed in 2020. After these revisions, capacity for total industry is estimated to have grown about 3 percent less between 2016 and the end of 2020 than previously estimated.
In the fourth quarter of 2020, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 73.4 percent, about 1/2 percentage point below its previous estimate and about 6-1/4 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2020) average. The utilization rate for 2019 is also about 1/2 percentage point lower than the previous estimate, but revisions to utilization rates for 2017 and 2018 are very small.”
Manufacturing decreased 22.4 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 13.5 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2019. Manufacturing increased 10.9 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2020. Manufacturing in Dec 2020 is lower by 13.9 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. Manufacturing increased 15.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2021. Manufacturing in Dec 2021 is 10.7 percent below the peak in Jun 2007.
US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 49 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIIQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/gdp3q21_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 50.1 percent. GDP in IIIQ2021 would be $23,673.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4194.7 billion than actual $19,478.9 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 23.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.6 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm). US GDP in IIIQ2021 is 17.7 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,478.9 billion in IIIQ2021 or 23.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-2, US, Monthly and 12-Month Rates of Growth of Manufacturing ∆%
| Month SA ∆% | 12-Month NSA ∆% | |
| 2021-12 | -0.3 | 3.8 |
| 2021-11 | 0.6 | 4.8 |
| 2021-10 | 1.4 | 4.3 |
| 2021-09 | -0.5 | 4.5 |
| 2021-08 | -0.6 | 5.1 |
| 2021-07 | 1.4 | 7.8 |
| 2021-06 | -0.2 | 10.2 |
| 2021-05 | 0.8 | 18.5 |
| 2021-04 | -0.2 | 24.2 |
| 2021-03 | 3.4 | 3.8 |
| 2021-02 | -3.7 | -4.1 |
| 2021-01 | 1.5 | -0.4 |
| 2020-12 | 0.6 | -2.3 |
| 2020-11 | 0.6 | -2.9 |
| 2020-10 | 1.5 | -2.5 |
| 2020-09 | 0.1 | -5.3 |
| 2020-08 | 1.6 | -5.2 |
| 2020-07 | 4.0 | -6.4 |
| 2020-06 | 7.3 | -10.3 |
| 2020-05 | 4.6 | -16.0 |
| 2020-04 | -15.8 | -20.4 |
| 2020-03 | -4.4 | -5.5 |
| 2020-02 | 0.0 | -0.9 |
| 2020-01 | -0.2 | -1.7 |
| 2019-12 | 0.0 | -2.0 |
| 2019-11 | 0.7 | -1.9 |
| 2019-10 | -0.7 | -3.1 |
| 2019-09 | -0.6 | -3.1 |
| 2019-08 | 0.5 | -2.4 |
| 2019-07 | -0.4 | -2.9 |
| 2019-06 | 0.2 | -2.0 |
| 2019-05 | 0.1 | -1.9 |
| 2019-04 | -0.8 | -2.9 |
| 2019-03 | -0.1 | -1.1 |
| 2019-02 | -0.5 | -1.0 |
| 2019-01 | -0.7 | 0.5 |
| 2018-12 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| 2018-11 | -0.4 | 0.1 |
| 2018-10 | -0.5 | 0.5 |
| 2018-09 | 0.0 | 2.3 |
| 2018-08 | 0.2 | 2.3 |
| 2018-07 | 0.2 | 1.7 |
| 2018-06 | 0.5 | 1.2 |
| 2018-05 | -0.8 | 0.8 |
| 2018-04 | 0.6 | 2.7 |
| 2018-03 | 0.1 | 1.8 |
| 2018-02 | 0.9 | 1.6 |
| 2018-01 | -0.4 | 0.6 |
| 2017-12 | -0.2 | 1.3 |
| 2017-11 | 0.0 | 1.5 |
| 2017-10 | 1.0 | 1.3 |
| 2017-09 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| 2017-08 | -0.3 | 0.7 |
| 2017-07 | -0.2 | 0.6 |
| 2017-06 | 0.0 | 0.8 |
| 2017-05 | -0.1 | 0.9 |
| 2017-04 | 1.1 | -0.3 |
| 2017-03 | -0.3 | 0.4 |
| 2017-02 | -0.1 | 0.2 |
| 2017-01 | 0.3 | -0.2 |
| 2016-12 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| 2016-11 | -0.1 | -0.4 |
| 2016-10 | 0.1 | -0.4 |
| 2016-09 | 0.2 | -0.3 |
| 2016-08 | -0.5 | -1.5 |
| 2016-07 | 0.2 | -1.3 |
| 2016-06 | 0.2 | -0.6 |
| 2016-05 | 0.0 | -1.3 |
| 2016-04 | -0.2 | -0.6 |
| 2016-03 | -0.1 | -1.7 |
| 2016-02 | -0.3 | -0.5 |
| 2016-01 | 0.5 | -0.8 |
| 2015-12 | -0.3 | -1.9 |
| 2015-11 | -0.3 | -1.7 |
| 2015-10 | -0.1 | -0.7 |
| 2015-09 | -0.3 | -1.7 |
| 2015-08 | -0.5 | -0.7 |
| 2015-07 | 0.8 | -0.4 |
| 2015-06 | -0.4 | -1.2 |
| 2015-05 | 0.0 | -0.3 |
| 2015-04 | 0.0 | -0.1 |
| 2015-03 | 0.3 | -0.1 |
| 2015-02 | -0.7 | 0.5 |
| 2015-01 | -0.5 | 1.9 |
| 2014-12 | -0.2 | 1.6 |
| 2014-11 | 0.7 | 1.7 |
| 2014-10 | -0.1 | 0.9 |
| 2014-09 | 0.0 | 1.1 |
| 2014-08 | -0.6 | 1.2 |
| 2014-07 | 0.5 | 2.0 |
| 2014-06 | 0.3 | 1.4 |
| 2014-05 | 0.3 | 1.4 |
| 2014-04 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| 2014-03 | 0.8 | 1.5 |
| 2014-02 | 0.9 | 0.3 |
| 2014-01 | -1.0 | -0.5 |
| 2013-12 | -0.2 | 0.1 |
| 2013-11 | 0.0 | 1.2 |
| 2013-10 | 0.1 | 1.9 |
| 2013-09 | 0.1 | 1.2 |
| 2013-08 | 0.9 | 1.4 |
| 2013-07 | -0.8 | 0.3 |
| 2013-06 | 0.1 | 0.7 |
| 2013-05 | 0.3 | 0.9 |
| 2013-04 | -0.3 | 0.9 |
| 2013-03 | -0.1 | 0.5 |
| 2013-02 | 0.4 | 0.7 |
| 2013-01 | -0.3 | 0.7 |
| 2012-12 | 0.7 | 1.6 |
| 2012-11 | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| 2012-10 | -0.2 | 0.7 |
| 2012-09 | -0.2 | 1.6 |
| 2012-08 | -0.1 | 2.2 |
| 2012-07 | -0.2 | 2.5 |
| 2012-06 | 0.3 | 3.4 |
| 2012-05 | -0.4 | 3.4 |
| 2012-04 | 0.5 | 3.8 |
| 2012-03 | -0.5 | 2.8 |
| 2012-02 | 0.3 | 4.1 |
| 2012-01 | 0.8 | 3.5 |
| 2011-12 | 0.7 | 3.0 |
| 2011-11 | -0.2 | 2.6 |
| 2011-10 | 0.5 | 2.7 |
| 2011-09 | 0.3 | 2.6 |
| 2011-08 | 0.5 | 2.0 |
| 2011-07 | 0.6 | 2.2 |
| 2011-06 | 0.1 | 1.7 |
| 2011-05 | 0.0 | 1.5 |
| 2011-04 | -0.5 | 2.8 |
| 2011-03 | 0.6 | 4.5 |
| 2011-02 | 0.2 | 4.9 |
| 2011-01 | 0.1 | 4.9 |
| 2010-12 | 0.5 | 5.5 |
| 2010-11 | 0.1 | 4.6 |
| 2010-10 | 0.1 | 5.9 |
| 2010-09 | 0.0 | 6.1 |
| 2010-08 | 0.1 | 6.8 |
| 2010-07 | 0.6 | 7.5 |
| 2010-06 | 0.0 | 9.4 |
| 2010-05 | 1.3 | 9.0 |
| 2010-04 | 0.8 | 7.4 |
| 2010-03 | 1.3 | 5.2 |
| 2010-02 | -0.1 | 1.8 |
| 2010-01 | 1.1 | 1.8 |
| 2009-12 | -0.2 | -2.8 |
| 2009-11 | 1.0 | -5.8 |
| 2009-10 | 0.1 | -8.9 |
| 2009-09 | 1.0 | -10.4 |
| 2009-08 | 1.1 | -13.5 |
| 2009-07 | 1.6 | -15.3 |
| 2009-06 | -0.2 | -17.9 |
| 2009-05 | -1.1 | -18.0 |
| 2009-04 | -0.7 | -18.6 |
| 2009-03 | -1.9 | -17.7 |
| 2009-02 | -0.1 | -16.7 |
| 2009-01 | -3.2 | -17.1 |
| 2008-12 | -3.3 | -14.4 |
| 2008-11 | -2.5 | -11.7 |
| 2008-10 | -0.7 | -9.1 |
| 2008-09 | -3.4 | -8.6 |
| 2008-08 | -1.2 | -5.1 |
| 2008-07 | -1.1 | -3.6 |
| 2008-06 | -0.7 | -3.3 |
| 2008-05 | -0.6 | -2.5 |
| 2008-04 | -1.0 | -1.2 |
| 2008-03 | -0.4 | -0.6 |
| 2008-02 | -0.7 | 1.0 |
| 2008-01 | -0.2 | 2.4 |
| 2007-12 | 0.1 | 2.0 |
| 2007-11 | 0.5 | 3.4 |
| 2007-10 | -0.2 | 2.8 |
| 2007-09 | 0.3 | 2.8 |
| 2007-08 | -0.3 | 2.6 |
| 2007-07 | 0.0 | 3.6 |
| 2007-06 | 0.3 | 3.1 |
| 2007-05 | -0.1 | 3.3 |
| 2007-04 | 0.7 | 3.8 |
| 2007-03 | 0.9 | 2.7 |
| 2007-02 | 0.3 | 1.7 |
| 2007-01 | -0.4 | 1.3 |
| 2006-12 | 1.5 | 2.8 |
| 2005-12 | 0.1 | 3.5 |
| 2004-12 | 0.7 | 4.1 |
| 2003-12 | 0.0 | 2.2 |
| 2002-12 | -0.6 | 2.4 |
| 2001-12 | 0.2 | -5.4 |
| 2000-12 | -0.6 | 0.7 |
| 1999-12 | 0.7 | 5.2 |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2020 | 1.6 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2019 | 1.8 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2018 | 1.9 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2017 | 1.9 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2016 | 1.9 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2015 | 2.0 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2014 | 2.1 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2013 | 2.2 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 1999 | 4.3 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2006 | 1.4 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2006 | 3.3 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2017 | 0.3 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2018 | 0.3 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2019 | 0.2 | |
| ∆% Peak 110.8954 in 06/2007 to 97.7118 in 12/2019 | -11.9 | |
| ∆% Trough 86.0957 in 04/2009 to 97.7118 in 12/2019 | 13.5 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2020 | 0.03 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2021 | 0.2 | |
| ∆% Peak 110.8954 in 06/2007 to 95.4579 in 12/2020 | -13.9 | |
| ∆% Peak 110.8954 in 06/2007 to Trough 86.0957 in 4/2009 | -22.4 | |
| ∆% Trough 86.0957 in 04/2009 to 95.4579 in 12/2020 | 10.9 | |
| ∆% Trough 86.0957 in 04/2009 to 99.0648 in 12/2021 | 15.1 | |
| ∆% Peak 110.8954 in 06/2007 to 99.0648 in 12/2021 | -10.7 |
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides industrial production, manufacturing and capacity since the 1970s. There was acceleration of growth of industrial production, manufacturing and capacity in the 1990s because of rapid growth of productivity in the US (Cobet and Wilson (2002); see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). The slopes of the curves flatten in the 2000s. Production and capacity have not recovered sufficiently above levels before the global recession, remaining like GDP below historical trend. The final data point is for Dec 2021. There is sharp contraction of output followed by continuing recovery in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart I-1, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg1.gif
Additional detail on industrial production and capacity utilization is in Chart I-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Production of consumer durable goods fell sharply during the global recession by more than 30 percent and is oscillating above the level before the contraction. Output of nondurable consumer goods fell around 10 percent and is some 5 percent below the level before the contraction. Output of business equipment fell sharply during the contraction of 2001 but began rapid growth again after 2004. An important characteristic is rapid growth of output of business equipment in the cyclical expansion after sharp contraction in the global recession, stalling in the final segment followed by recovery. Output of defense and space only suffered reduction in the rate of growth during the global recession and surged ahead of the level before the contraction, declining in the final segment. Output of construction supplies collapsed during the global recession and is well below the level before the contraction. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but recovered sharply above the level before the contraction with alternating recent decline/improvement. There are deep contractions in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).
Chart I-2, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg3.gif
The modern industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is captured in Chart I-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (for the literature on M&A and corporate control see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009a), 143-56, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 49-59, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 46-49). The slope of the curve of total industrial production accelerates in the 1990s to a much higher rate of growth than the curve excluding high-technology industries. Growth rates decelerate into the 2000s and output and capacity utilization have not recovered fully from the strong impact of the global recession. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but recovered sharply above the level before the contraction with alternating recent decline/improvement followed by stability. Growth in the current cyclical expansion has been more subdued than in the prior comparably deep contractions in the 1970s and 1980s. Chart I-2 shows that the past recessions after World War II are the relevant ones for comparison with the recession after 2007 instead of common comparisons with the Great Depression (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/us-gdp-growing-at-20-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The lower part of Chart I-3 shows recent strong growth of energy compared with non-energy. There are deep contractions in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).
Chart I-3, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, Selected Industries
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg2.gif
United States manufacturing output from 1919 to 2021 monthly is in Chart I-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The second industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is quite evident in the acceleration of the rate of growth of output given by the sharper slope in the 1980s and 1990s. Growth was robust after the shallow recession of 2001 but dropped sharply during the global recession after IVQ2007. Manufacturing output recovered sharply but has not reached earlier levels and is losing momentum at the margin. There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart I-4, US, Manufacturing Output, 1919-2021
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Industrial production decreased 0.1 percent in Dec 2021 and increased 0.7 percent in Nov 2021 after increasing 1.2 percent in Oct 2021, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. Manufacturing decreased 22.4 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 13.5 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2019. Manufacturing increased 10.9 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2020. Manufacturing in Dec 2020 is lower by 13.9 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. Manufacturing increased 15.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2021. Manufacturing in Dec 2021 is 10.7 percent below the peak in Jun 2007. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 49 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIIQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/gdp3q21_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 50.1 percent. GDP in IIIQ2021 would be $23,673.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4194.7 billion than actual $19,478.9 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 23.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.6 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm). US GDP in IIIQ2021 is 17.7 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,478.9 billion in IIIQ2021 or 23.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 87.8 percent in IIIQ2021. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Dec 2021, there were 150.170 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 127.963 million NSA in Dec 2021 accounted for 85.2 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 150.170 million, of which 12.610 million, or 9.9 percent of total private jobs and 8.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 107.233 million NSA in Dec 2021, or 71.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.8 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 9.8 percent in US national income in IIIQ2021 and durable goods 5.6 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.
Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total
| IIQ2021 | % Total | IIIQ2021 | % Total | |
| National Income WCCA | 19,157.3 | 100.0 | 19,795.6 | 100.0 |
| Domestic Industries | 18,926.9 | 98.8 | 19,528.0 | 98.6 |
| Private Industries | 16,822.0 | 87.8 | 17,373.5 | 87.8 |
| Agriculture | 189.2 | 1.0 | 195.8 | 1.0 |
| Mining | 155.5 | 0.8 | 191.4 | 1.0 |
| Utilities | 199.1 | 1.0 | 207.3 | 1.0 |
| Construction | 999.5 | 5.2 | 1041.5 | 5.3 |
| Manufacturing | 1842.8 | 9.6 | 1930.3 | 9.8 |
| Durable Goods | 1091.0 | 5.7 | 1114.5 | 5.6 |
| Nondurable Goods | 751.8 | 3.9 | 815.8 | 4.1 |
| Wholesale Trade | 1064.3 | 5.6 | 1103.3 | 5.6 |
| Retail Trade | 1437.2 | 7.5 | 1415.8 | 7.2 |
| Transportation & WH | 571.4 | 3.0 | 623.5 | 3.1 |
| Information | 802.7 | 4.2 | 816.3 | 4.1 |
| Finance, Insurance, RE | 3407.2 | 17.8 | 3464.9 | 17.5 |
| Professional & Business Services | 2972.9 | 15.5 | 3079.8 | 15.6 |
| Education, Health Care | 1975.3 | 10.3 | 2032.3 | 10.3 |
| Arts, Entertainment | 685.5 | 3.6 | 730.3 | 3.7 |
| Other Services | 519.5 | 2.7 | 541.0 | 2.7 |
| Government | 2104.9 | 11.0 | 2,154.5 | 10.9 |
| Rest of the World | 230.4 | 1.2 | 267.7 | 1.4 |
Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; Percentages Calculates from Unrounded Data; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Motor vehicle sales and production in the US have been in long-term structural change. Table VA-1A provides the data on new motor vehicle sales and domestic car production in the US from 1990 to 2010. New motor vehicle sales grew from 14,137 thousand in 1990 to the peak of 17,806 thousand in 2000 or 29.5 percent. In that same period, domestic car production fell from 6,231 thousand in 1990 to 5,542 thousand in 2000 or -11.1 percent. New motor vehicle sales fell from 17,445 thousand in 2005 to 11,772 in 2010 or 32.5 percent while domestic car production fell from 4,321 thousand in 2005 to 2,840 thousand in 2010 or 34.3 percent. In IIQ2018, light vehicle sales accumulated to 4,500,220, which is higher by 1.8 percent relative to 4,419,349 a year earlier in IIQ2017 (http://www.motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html). Total not seasonally adjusted light vehicle sales reached 1194.3 thousand in Dec 2021, decreasing 25.6 percent from 1605.5 thousand in Dec 2020 (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86). The seasonally adjusted annual rate of light vehicle sales in the US reached 12.4 million in Dec 2021, lower than 12.9 million in Nov 2021 and lower than 16.3 million in Dec 2020 (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86).
Table VA-1A, US, New Motor Vehicle Sales and Car Production, Thousand Units 7
| New Motor Vehicle Sales | New Car Sales and Leases | New Truck Sales and Leases | Domestic Car Production | |
| 1990 | 14,137 | 9,300 | 4,837 | 6,231 |
| 1991 | 12,725 | 8,589 | 4,136 | 5,454 |
| 1992 | 13,093 | 8,215 | 4,878 | 5,979 |
| 1993 | 14,172 | 8,518 | 5,654 | 5,979 |
| 1994 | 15,397 | 8,990 | 6,407 | 6,614 |
| 1995 | 15,106 | 8,536 | 6,470 | 6,340 |
| 1996 | 15,449 | 8,527 | 6,922 | 6,081 |
| 1997 | 15,490 | 8,273 | 7,218 | 5,934 |
| 1998 | 15,958 | 8,142 | 7,816 | 5,554 |
| 1999 | 17,401 | 8,697 | 8,704 | 5,638 |
| 2000 | 17,806 | 8,852 | 8,954 | 5,542 |
| 2001 | 17,468 | 8,422 | 9,046 | 4,878 |
| 2002 | 17,144 | 8,109 | 9,036 | 5,019 |
| 2003 | 16,968 | 7,611 | 9,357 | 4,510 |
| 2004 | 17,298 | 7,545 | 9,753 | 4,230 |
| 2005 | 17,445 | 7,720 | 9,725 | 4,321 |
| 2006 | 17,049 | 7,821 | 9,228 | 4,367 |
| 2007 | 16,460 | 7,618 | 8,683 | 3,924 |
| 2008 | 13,494 | 6,814 | 6.680 | 3,777 |
| 2009 | 10,601 | 5,456 | 5,154 | 2,247 |
| 2010 | 11,772 | 5,729 | 6,044 | 2,840 |
Source: US Census Bureau
https://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gap_hist.xlsx
Table VA-1B provides the seasonally adjusted annual rate of total vehicle sales in the United States in millions. The rate decreased from 17.832 in Jun 2019 and 17.337 in Feb 2020 to 8.961 in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The rate recovered to 12.438 in May 2020 and 13.447 in Jun 2020, 15.089 in Jul 2020, 15.677 in Aug 2020 and 16.703 in Sep 2020 in gradual return to economic activity. The rate for Nov 2020 decreased to 16.339 and increased to 16.761 in Dec 2020 and 17.287 in Jan 2021, decreasing to 16.390 in Feb 2021 and increasing to 18.154 in Mar 2021. The rate increased to 18.782 in Apr 2021, decreasing to 17.391 in May 2021, 15.949 in Jun 2021, 15.107 in Jul 2021 13.505 in Aug 2021, 12.689 in Sep 2021, 13.489 in Oct 2021, 13.335 in Nov 2021 and 12.799 in Dec 2021. (https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86).
Table VA-1B, United States, Annual Rate, Total Vehicle Sales, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (Millions)
| January | 2019 | 17.265 | |||
| February | 2019 | 17.185 | |||
| March | 2019 | 17.656 | |||
| April | 2019 | 16.997 | |||
| May | 2019 | 17.840 | |||
| June | 2019 | 17.832 | |||
| July | 2019 | 17.597 | |||
| August | 2019 | 17.645 | |||
| September | 2019 | 17.714 | |||
| October | 2019 | 17.230 | |||
| November | 2019 | 17.557 | |||
| December | 2019 | 17.339 | |||
| January | 2020 | 17.306 | |||
| February | 2020 | 17.337 | |||
| March | 2020 | 11.635 | |||
| April | 2020 | 8.961 | |||
| May | 2020 | 12.438 | |||
| June | 2020 | 13.447 | |||
| July | 2020 | 15.089 | |||
| August | 2020 | 15.677 | |||
| September | 2020 | 16.703 | |||
| October | 2020 | 16.852 | |||
| November | 2020 | 16.339 | |||
| December | 2020 | 16.761 | |||
| January | 2021 | 17.287 | |||
| February | 2021 | 16.390 | |||
| March | 2021 | 18.154 | |||
| April | 2021 | 18.782 | |||
| May | 2021 | 17.391 | |||
| June | 2021 | 15.949 | |||
| July | 2021 | 15.107 | |||
| August | 2021 | 13.505 | |||
| September | 2021 | 12.689 | |||
| October | 2021 | 13.489 | |||
| November | 2021 | 13.335 | |||
| December | 2021 | 12.799 |
Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA
Data for Dec 2021 and updates: https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86
https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product#collapse86
Chart I-4 of the Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, provides the complete data set of SAAR of total car sales in the US. The SAAR of 8.961 in Apr 2020 is lower than the lowest rate in the global recession at 9.223 in Feb 2009.
Chart I-4, SA Annual Rate of Total Car Sales in the United States, Jan 1976 to Nov 2021
Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA
Chart I-4, SA Annual Rate of Total Car Sales in the United States, Jan 1976 to Nov 2021
Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA
Chart I-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve provides output of motor vehicles and parts in the United States from 1972 to 2021. Output virtually stagnated since the late 1990s with recent increase followed by the highest decrease in the data history in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and sharp recovery after easing of lockdown followed by current weakness.
Chart 1-5, US, Motor Vehicles and Parts Output, 1972-2021
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides output of computers and electronic products in the United States from 1972 to 2021. Output accelerated sharply in the 1990s and 2000s and surpassed the level before the global recession beginning in IVQ2007. There is sharp contraction in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is initial recovery in May 2020-Dec 2021.
Chart I-6, US, Output of Computers and Electronic Products, 1972-2021
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shows that output of durable manufacturing accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s with slower growth in the 2000s perhaps because processes matured. Growth was robust after the major drop during the global recession but appears to vacillate in the final segment. There is sharp contraction in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is initial recovery in May 2020-Dec 2021.
Chart I-7, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 1972-2021
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-8 provides output of aerospace and miscellaneous transportation from 1972 to 2021. The drop in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) is much sharper than the drop in the global recession after 2007. There is sharp recovery from May 2020 to Dec 2021 but without return to trend.
Chart I-8, US, Output of Aerospace and Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment, 1972-2021
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Manufacturing is underperforming in the lost cycle of the global recession. Manufacturing (NAICS) in Dec 2021 is lower by 8.0 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007, as shown in Chart V-3A. Manufacturing (SIC) in Dec 2021 at 99.0648 is lower by 10.7 percent relative to the peak at 110.8954 in Jun 2007. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Dec 2007 to Dec 2021
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jun 2007 to Dec 2021
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart V-3B provides the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States, or those available for work. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 231.713 million in Jun 2007 to 262.136 million in Dec 2021 or 30.423 million.
Chart V-3B, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 2007 to Dec 2021
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3C provides nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 2007 to Dec 2021. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs fell from 13.987 million in Jun 2007 to 12.610 million in Dec 2021, or 1.377 million.
Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 2007 to Dec 2021, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Dec 2021. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade. There is sharp decline in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).
Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Dec 2021
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart V-3E provides the US noninstitutional civilian population, or those in condition of working, from Jan 1948, when first available, to Dec 2021. The noninstitutional civilian population increased from 170.042 million in Jun 1981 to 262.136 million in Dec 2021 or 92.094 million.
Chart V-3E, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 1948 to Dec 2021
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3F provides manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 1939 to Dec 2021. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs decreased from a peak of 18.890 million in Jun 1981 and 18.927 million in Sep 2021 to 12.610 million in Dec 2021.
Chart V-3F, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 1939 to Dec 2021, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The Empire State Manufacturing Survey Index in Table VA-1 provides continuing deterioration that started in Jun 2012 well before Hurricane Sandy in Oct 2012. The current general index has been in negative contraction territory from minus 2.7 in Aug 2012 to minus 7.5 in Jan 2013 and minus 1.1 in May 2013. The current general index changed to minus 0.7 in Jan 2022. The index of current orders has also been in negative contraction territory from minus 3.0 in Aug 2012 to minus 10.9 in Jan 2013 and minus 7.8 in Jun 2013. The index of current new orders changed to minus 5.0 in Jan 2022. There is strength in the general index for the next six months at 35.1 in Jan 2022 and strength in new orders at 32.9.
Table VA-1, US, New York Federal Reserve Bank Empire State Manufacturing Survey Index SA Current General Index
| Current General Index | Current New Orders | Future General Index | Future New Orders | |
| 10/31/2011 | -5.7 | 1.7 | 14.5 | 19.4 |
| 11/30/2011 | 4.9 | 1.6 | 35.4 | 30.3 |
| 12/31/2011 | 11.7 | 10.1 | 45.4 | 43.2 |
| 1/31/2012 | 11.5 | 8.7 | 50.7 | 44.4 |
| 2/29/2012 | 17.5 | 7.1 | 46.3 | 37.6 |
| 3/31/2012 | 15.5 | 4.4 | 43.8 | 37.8 |
| 4/30/2012 | 7.8 | 4.1 | 40.5 | 38.4 |
| 5/31/2012 | 14.2 | 7.1 | 32.5 | 32 |
| 6/30/2012 | 1.6 | 3 | 27.9 | 28.4 |
| 7/31/2012 | 3.2 | -3.3 | 24.4 | 21.8 |
| 8/31/2012 | -2.7 | -3 | 18.6 | 14.6 |
| 9/30/2012 | -6.9 | -10.3 | 27 | 28 |
| 10/31/2012 | -4.6 | -6.6 | 20.1 | 22.3 |
| 11/30/2012 | -0.8 | 6.1 | 18.1 | 15.1 |
| 12/31/2012 | -5.8 | 0.3 | 18.9 | 18.8 |
| 1/31/2013 | -7.5 | -10.9 | 21.7 | 23.7 |
| 2/28/2013 | 9.2 | 12.4 | 32 | 26.8 |
| 3/31/2013 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 34.7 | 33 |
| 4/30/2013 | 4.5 | 2.8 | 30.7 | 35.8 |
| 5/31/2013 | -1.1 | -3.1 | 26.6 | 30.3 |
| 6/30/2013 | 4.5 | -7.8 | 27.8 | 22.4 |
| 7/31/2013 | 5.2 | 2.3 | 34.1 | 33.3 |
| 8/31/2013 | 9.7 | 2.8 | 35.7 | 30.8 |
| 9/30/2013 | 7.7 | 2.9 | 40.3 | 38.2 |
| 10/31/2013 | 3.6 | 9.5 | 41.3 | 36.9 |
| 11/30/2013 | 2.2 | -2.5 | 38.1 | 39.4 |
| 12/31/2013 | 3.2 | 1.1 | 36.4 | 27.5 |
| 1/31/2014 | 12.8 | 8.1 | 35.8 | 37.5 |
| 2/28/2014 | 6.8 | 1.9 | 39.8 | 43.5 |
| 3/31/2014 | 2.8 | 0.8 | 34.6 | 36.4 |
| 4/30/2014 | 4.1 | -0.4 | 39.1 | 35.2 |
| 5/31/2014 | 17.5 | 8.6 | 43.6 | 38.6 |
| 6/30/2014 | 15.8 | 13.1 | 41.2 | 44.3 |
| 7/31/2014 | 21 | 16.5 | 30.7 | 27.4 |
| 8/31/2014 | 16.1 | 15.6 | 45.5 | 50.2 |
| 9/30/2014 | 29.4 | 17.3 | 47 | 46.1 |
| 10/31/2014 | 6.2 | 1.8 | 42.3 | 42.2 |
| 11/30/2014 | 12 | 10.3 | 47.7 | 47.6 |
| 12/31/2014 | -2.5 | 0.4 | 35.3 | 35.2 |
| 1/31/2015 | 12.5 | 6.9 | 46.6 | 41 |
| 2/28/2015 | 10.6 | 3.1 | 26.9 | 28.7 |
| 3/31/2015 | 3.7 | -6.3 | 30.1 | 26.1 |
| 4/30/2015 | 0.1 | -4.7 | 38.4 | 35.2 |
| 5/31/2015 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 31.2 | 35 |
| 6/30/2015 | -4.8 | -6.9 | 25.9 | 27 |
| 7/31/2015 | 1.7 | -5 | 29.4 | 33.3 |
| 8/31/2015 | -13.9 | -14.6 | 32.4 | 30.5 |
| 9/30/2015 | -12.7 | -11.9 | 24.3 | 24.8 |
| 10/31/2015 | -13.7 | -15.3 | 22.8 | 22.9 |
| 11/30/2015 | -9.7 | -11.4 | 22.3 | 19.4 |
| 12/31/2015 | -5.9 | -6.1 | 33.1 | 23.7 |
| 1/31/2016 | -16.6 | -20.6 | 12.1 | 15.3 |
| 2/29/2016 | -12.9 | -10 | 13.6 | 19.5 |
| 3/31/2016 | -2.5 | 3 | 24.2 | 36.8 |
| 4/30/2016 | 8.9 | 10.7 | 32 | 39.1 |
| 5/31/2016 | -7.4 | -2.8 | 29.2 | 24 |
| 6/30/2016 | 3.1 | 6.6 | 33.1 | 37.6 |
| 7/31/2016 | 1.4 | -1.5 | 31 | 30.9 |
| 8/31/2016 | -5.6 | 0.7 | 24.5 | 28.4 |
| 9/30/2016 | -1.6 | -6.4 | 35.8 | 33.5 |
| 10/31/2016 | -9.5 | -2.8 | 36.1 | 38.1 |
| 11/30/2016 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 29.9 | 26.8 |
| 12/31/2016 | 9.6 | 9.3 | 47.2 | 45 |
| 1/31/2017 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 49.5 | 40.3 |
| 2/28/2017 | 20.1 | 13.5 | 39.2 | 39.6 |
| 3/31/2017 | 15.6 | 17 | 36.4 | 33.9 |
| 4/30/2017 | 6.2 | 9.9 | 43.2 | 36.1 |
| 5/31/2017 | 0.7 | -2.2 | 40.8 | 35.6 |
| 6/30/2017 | 18.8 | 16.1 | 41.3 | 42 |
| 7/31/2017 | 11.8 | 13.8 | 36.6 | 34.9 |
| 8/31/2017 | 22.7 | 20 | 43.3 | 40.9 |
| 9/30/2017 | 23.6 | 23.7 | 42.5 | 44.9 |
| 10/31/2017 | 26.6 | 19.4 | 45.8 | 45 |
| 11/30/2017 | 19.1 | 18.2 | 48.9 | 50.5 |
| 12/31/2017 | 20.1 | 17 | 43.7 | 39.4 |
| 1/31/2018 | 19.4 | 16.6 | 49.1 | 48.5 |
| 2/28/2018 | 17.5 | 14.9 | 48.4 | 45.4 |
| 3/31/2018 | 23.5 | 16.1 | 43.1 | 42.8 |
| 4/30/2018 | 17.4 | 11.7 | 23.5 | 22.8 |
| 5/31/2018 | 17 | 15.9 | 32.2 | 34.9 |
| 6/30/2018 | 25.8 | 21.5 | 38.5 | 35.5 |
| 7/31/2018 | 21.6 | 19.2 | 31 | 36.1 |
| 8/31/2018 | 24.1 | 15.8 | 33.8 | 35.6 |
| 9/30/2018 | 19 | 16.1 | 32.6 | 35.5 |
| 10/31/2018 | 19.4 | 20.5 | 30.3 | 35.6 |
| 11/30/2018 | 21.1 | 16.6 | 32.7 | 37 |
| 12/31/2018 | 11.1 | 12.4 | 27.1 | 30.3 |
| 1/31/2019 | 4.8 | 6.3 | 21.2 | 21.7 |
| 2/28/2019 | 10.3 | 8.1 | 30.9 | 34.4 |
| 3/31/2019 | 5.1 | 3.6 | 27.9 | 29 |
| 4/30/2019 | 9.4 | 7.4 | 17.4 | 24.3 |
| 5/31/2019 | 14.4 | 8.2 | 29.7 | 33 |
| 6/30/2019 | -6.4 | -9.7 | 25.5 | 28.4 |
| 7/31/2019 | 4.2 | -0.4 | 29.3 | 34.2 |
| 8/31/2019 | 4.2 | 5.6 | 25.1 | 31.1 |
| 9/30/2019 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 15.5 | 23.4 |
| 10/31/2019 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 17.8 | 24 |
| 11/30/2019 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 19.8 | 25.2 |
| 12/31/2019 | 3.3 | 1.7 | 26.1 | 30.8 |
| 1/31/2020 | 4.8 | 6.6 | 23.6 | 31.4 |
| 2/29/2020 | 12.9 | 22.1 | 22.9 | 27.5 |
| 3/31/2020 | -21.5 | -9.3 | 1.2 | 17.6 |
| 4/30/2020 | -78.2 | -66.3 | 7 | 11.7 |
| 5/31/2020 | -48.5 | -42.4 | 29.1 | 35 |
| 6/30/2020 | -0.2 | -0.6 | 56.5 | 52.9 |
| 7/31/2020 | 17.2 | 13.9 | 38.4 | 41.9 |
| 8/31/2020 | 3.7 | -1.7 | 34.3 | 37.2 |
| 9/30/2020 | 17 | 7.1 | 40.3 | 39.1 |
| 10/31/2020 | 10.5 | 12.3 | 32.8 | 37.7 |
| 11/30/2020 | 6.3 | 3.7 | 33.9 | 32.9 |
| 12/31/2020 | 4.9 | 3.4 | 36.3 | 32.3 |
| 1/31/2021 | 3.5 | 6.6 | 31.9 | 34.8 |
| 2/28/2021 | 12.1 | 10.8 | 34.9 | 35.6 |
| 3/31/2021 | 17.4 | 9.1 | 36.4 | 37.9 |
| 4/30/2021 | 26.3 | 26.9 | 39.8 | 41.1 |
| 5/31/2021 | 24.3 | 28.9 | 36.6 | 35.3 |
| 6/30/2021 | 17.4 | 16.3 | 47.7 | 44.5 |
| 7/31/2021 | 43 | 33.2 | 39.5 | 34.2 |
| 8/31/2021 | 18.3 | 14.8 | 46.5 | 42.7 |
| 9/30/2021 | 34.3 | 33.7 | 48.4 | 48.4 |
| 10/31/2021 | 19.8 | 24.3 | 52 | 51 |
| 11/30/2021 | 30.9 | 28.8 | 36.9 | 34.4 |
| 12/31/2021 | 31.9 | 27.1 | 36.4 | 30 |
| 1/31/2022 | -0.7 | -5 | 35.1 | 32.9 |
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html
Chart VA-1 of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides indexes of current and expected economic activity. There were multiple contractions in current activity after the global recession shown in shade. Current activity is weakening relative to strong recovery in the initial expansion in 2010 and 2011 with recent oscillating recovery and weakness. There is sharp improvement in the current index by strong positive reading with strong improvement in the future index in positive reading. There is deterioration in Dec 2020-Jan 2021 with improvement in Feb-Apr 2021 followed by mild deterioration in May 2021. The future index deteriorates in Jul 2021 while the current index improves. The future index improves in Aug 2021 while the current index deteriorates. The future index improves in Sep 2021 while the current index improves. The current index deteriorates in Oct 2021 while the future index improves. The current index improves in Nov 2021 while the future index deteriorates. The current index improves in Dec 2021 while the future index deteriorates. The current index deteriorates in Jan 2022 while the future index deteriorates.
Chart update: https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html
Chart VA-1, US, US, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Diffusion Index of Current and Expected Activity, Seasonally Adjusted
Update: https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview#tabs-1
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html
Table VA-2 shows improvement after prior deterioration followed by current soft improvement of the Business Outlook Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. There is sharp deterioration in Mar-May 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The general index moved out of contraction of 5.3 in Feb 2013 to expansion at 23.2 in Jan 2022. New orders moved from 0.6 in Feb 2021 to expansion at 17.9 in Jan 2022. There is expansion in the future index at 28.7 in Jan 2022 and in future new orders at 29.4 in Jan 2022.
Table VA-2, US, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, SA
| Current General Index | Current New Orders | Future General Index | Future New Orders | |
| Jan-11 | 16.5 | 20.1 | 43.8 | 35.9 |
| Feb-11 | 28.9 | 19.8 | 41.9 | 38.7 |
| Mar-11 | 36.4 | 34.1 | 57.0 | 55.5 |
| Apr-11 | 13.0 | 13.7 | 35.7 | 30.9 |
| May-11 | 6.2 | 8.3 | 26.2 | 25.3 |
| Jun-11 | -0.5 | -5.2 | 8.5 | 8.6 |
| Jul-11 | 7.1 | 4.1 | 28.6 | 32.2 |
| Aug-11 | -19.5 | -17.5 | 12.6 | 26.6 |
| Sep-11 | -10.7 | -5.6 | 18.1 | 19.6 |
| Oct-11 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 26.1 | 28.6 |
| Nov-11 | 4.0 | 1.5 | 36.4 | 36.2 |
| Dec-11 | 2.4 | 4.4 | 33.7 | 38.6 |
| Jan-12 | 7.5 | 10.7 | 43.4 | 43.5 |
| Feb-12 | 10.4 | 11.6 | 30.3 | 32.2 |
| Mar-12 | 8.8 | -0.1 | 30.4 | 37.1 |
| Apr-12 | 5.7 | 0.6 | 39.9 | 42.4 |
| May-12 | -0.8 | 2.3 | 24.9 | 35.5 |
| Jun-12 | -12.6 | -17.8 | 25.4 | 34.3 |
| Jul-12 | -12.7 | -3.6 | 21.5 | 25.6 |
| Aug-12 | -2.6 | 1.6 | 20 | 25.5 |
| Sep-12 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 31.6 | 42.8 |
| Oct-12 | -1.1 | -4.7 | 17.1 | 20.7 |
| Nov-12 | -10.6 | -7.4 | 16.6 | 22.6 |
| Dec-12 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 22.4 | 29 |
| Jan-13 | -1.4 | -2 | 28.8 | 31.9 |
| Feb-13 | -5.3 | 0.6 | 32 | 39 |
| Mar-13 | 2 | 0.1 | 35.5 | 38.1 |
| Apr-13 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 30.6 | 34.4 |
| May-13 | 0.2 | -4 | 39.5 | 42.2 |
| Jun-13 | 12.7 | 11.7 | 37.2 | 40 |
| Jul-13 | 15.9 | 7.4 | 41.6 | 52.4 |
| Aug-13 | 8.2 | 8.9 | 38.5 | 38.8 |
| Sep-13 | 20.6 | 19.3 | 48.8 | 51.5 |
| Oct-13 | 13.5 | 23.1 | 55.4 | 61.2 |
| Nov-13 | 4.6 | 8.8 | 42 | 46 |
| Dec-13 | 3.8 | 12 | 41.1 | 44.6 |
| Jan-14 | 15.2 | 7.9 | 38 | 40.8 |
| Feb-14 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 43.9 | 39.5 |
| Mar-14 | 12.5 | 6.5 | 42.4 | 38.7 |
| Apr-14 | 17 | 17.3 | 39.3 | 38.6 |
| May-14 | 18.5 | 14.8 | 43.8 | 42.5 |
| Jun-14 | 14.1 | 10.4 | 53.3 | 55.3 |
| Jul-14 | 21.4 | 28.7 | 53.6 | 48.8 |
| Aug-14 | 22.9 | 15.4 | 61.9 | 51.3 |
| Sep-14 | 21.7 | 13.8 | 46.1 | 44.8 |
| Oct-14 | 18.1 | 16.8 | 50.8 | 49 |
| Nov-14 | 35.5 | 29.7 | 50.1 | 44.3 |
| Dec-14 | 21.6 | 14.5 | 47.2 | 43.9 |
| Jan-15 | 13.2 | 10.1 | 54 | 47 |
| Feb-15 | 10.5 | 8.4 | 35 | 46.1 |
| Mar-15 | 7.3 | 0.8 | 37.7 | 37.8 |
| Apr-15 | 9.9 | 4.5 | 39.7 | 33.6 |
| May-15 | 6.1 | 5.4 | 38.1 | 35.1 |
| Jun-15 | 8.2 | 11.2 | 43.4 | 47.5 |
| Jul-15 | 4.4 | 2.3 | 40.2 | 45.4 |
| Aug-15 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 34.9 | 39.2 |
| Sep-15 | -3.8 | 10.5 | 36.8 | 41.7 |
| Oct-15 | -4.9 | -6.4 | 34.8 | 36.4 |
| Nov-15 | -3.8 | -7.6 | 37.5 | 44.3 |
| Dec-15 | -9 | -8.9 | 18.6 | 29.7 |
| Jan-16 | -4 | -3 | 18.3 | 21.3 |
| Feb-16 | -6.8 | -6 | 15.8 | 20 |
| Mar-16 | 9 | 5.5 | 26.9 | 35.6 |
| Apr-16 | -1 | -0.5 | 39.9 | 43.6 |
| May-16 | -4.8 | -1.7 | 39.7 | 40.3 |
| Jun-16 | 4.4 | -0.9 | 36.6 | 37.6 |
| Jul-16 | 0.9 | 10.1 | 36 | 35.2 |
| Aug-16 | 5.4 | -1.5 | 41.9 | 42.8 |
| Sep-16 | 12.1 | 2.8 | 37 | 38.3 |
| Oct-16 | 10.5 | 19.4 | 36.2 | 40.2 |
| Nov-16 | 9.4 | 19.4 | 29.8 | 35.1 |
| Dec-16 | 22.6 | 15.5 | 45.5 | 44.8 |
| Jan-17 | 24.8 | 24.9 | 54.7 | 52.3 |
| Feb-17 | 39.7 | 35.1 | 50.3 | 49.2 |
| Mar-17 | 32 | 31.4 | 56.4 | 59.1 |
| Apr-17 | 23.7 | 28.5 | 46.2 | 55.5 |
| May-17 | 34.3 | 25.2 | 40.2 | 49.5 |
| Jun-17 | 28.2 | 27.3 | 38.3 | 39.6 |
| Jul-17 | 20.4 | 5.3 | 38.5 | 44.6 |
| Aug-17 | 20.7 | 22.9 | 42.4 | 50.2 |
| Sep-17 | 24 | 26.7 | 54.1 | 58.6 |
| Oct-17 | 27.2 | 21 | 46.4 | 43.6 |
| Nov-17 | 23.1 | 26.5 | 47.9 | 49.1 |
| Dec-17 | 29.3 | 29.3 | 50 | 54.6 |
| Jan-18 | 23 | 9.6 | 45.4 | 48.2 |
| Feb-18 | 30.7 | 29.5 | 40.1 | 49.7 |
| Mar-18 | 23.8 | 30.3 | 46.8 | 50.2 |
| Apr-18 | 25.3 | 22.2 | 43 | 41.1 |
| May-18 | 32.2 | 41.3 | 41.5 | 43.7 |
| Jun-18 | 21.7 | 21.2 | 38.3 | 41.2 |
| Jul-18 | 20.8 | 24.9 | 26.8 | 29.8 |
| Aug-18 | 10.1 | 12.1 | 36.8 | 36.8 |
| Sep-18 | 21.3 | 18.5 | 36 | 35.9 |
| Oct-18 | 20.5 | 15.5 | 31.9 | 39 |
| Nov-18 | 10.6 | 12.2 | 26.4 | 39.1 |
| Dec-18 | 10.9 | 14.8 | 29.1 | 36.3 |
| Jan-19 | 14.8 | 16.7 | 29.7 | 31.8 |
| Feb-19 | -0.7 | 1.5 | 29 | 30.5 |
| Mar-19 | 14.9 | 6.4 | 23.1 | 24.2 |
| Apr-19 | 11 | 16 | 22.2 | 27 |
| May-19 | 17.5 | 14.2 | 22.3 | 24.8 |
| Jun-19 | 1.5 | 8 | 24.2 | 33.7 |
| Jul-19 | 16.6 | 18.4 | 33.6 | 41.6 |
| Aug-19 | 13.1 | 21.6 | 31.8 | 42 |
| Sep-19 | 12.2 | 22.5 | 23.1 | 34.4 |
| Oct-19 | 6.8 | 22.5 | 32.6 | 37.3 |
| Nov-19 | 8.4 | 10.1 | 34.4 | 37.3 |
| Dec-19 | 2.4 | 11.1 | 34.8 | 33.6 |
| Jan-20 | 17 | 18.2 | 38.4 | 41.9 |
| Feb-20 | 36.7 | 33.6 | 45.4 | 54 |
| Mar-20 | -12.7 | -15.5 | 35.2 | 36.7 |
| Apr-20 | -56.6 | -70.9 | 43 | 36.5 |
| May-20 | -43.1 | -25.7 | 49.7 | 54.7 |
| Jun-20 | 27.5 | 16.7 | 66.3 | 67.9 |
| Jul-20 | 24.1 | 23 | 36 | 55.6 |
| Aug-20 | 17.2 | 19 | 38.8 | 55.1 |
| Sep-20 | 15 | 25.5 | 56.6 | 56.9 |
| Oct-20 | 32.3 | 42.6 | 62.7 | 51.6 |
| Nov-20 | 26.3 | 37.9 | 44.3 | 48.1 |
| Dec-20 | 11.1 | 2.3 | 39.2 | 41.5 |
| Jan-21 | 30.1 | 24.2 | 51.3 | 44.6 |
| Feb-21 | 28.7 | 25.7 | 40 | 38.1 |
| Mar-21 | 44.5 | 38.2 | 59.1 | 48.2 |
| Apr-21 | 50.2 | 36 | 66.6 | 59.5 |
| May-21 | 31.5 | 32.5 | 52.7 | 50.3 |
| Jun-21 | 30.7 | 22.2 | 69.2 | 68.4 |
| Jul-21 | 21.9 | 17 | 48.6 | 45.3 |
| Aug-21 | 19.4 | 22.8 | 33.7 | 38 |
| Sep-21 | 30.7 | 15.9 | 20 | 32.1 |
| Oct-21 | 23.8 | 30.8 | 24.2 | 26.2 |
| Nov-21 | 39 | 47.4 | 28.5 | 28 |
| Dec-21 | 15.4 | 13.7 | 19 | 24.2 |
| Jan-22 | 23.2 | 17.9 | 28.7 | 29.4 |
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
https://www.philadelphiafed.org
Chart VA-2 of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia provides current and future general activity indexes from Jan 2008 to Jan 2022. There are multiple contractions of current activity There are major drops in 2008 and 2009 in the Global Recession. The index shows weakness from 2011 to 2015. There is a major drop in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Recovery was rapid and sharp but there is following weakness in both future and current activity.
Chart VA-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, Current and Future Activity Indexes
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/
The index of current new orders of the Business Outlook Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in Chart VA-3 illustrates the weakness of the cyclical expansion. The index weakened in 2006 and 2007 and then fell sharply into contraction during the global recession. There have been twelve readings into contraction from Jan 2012 to May 2013 and generally weak readings with some exceptions. The index of new orders moved into expansion in Jun-Oct 2013 with moderation in Nov-Dec 2013 and into Jan 2014. The index fell into contraction in Feb 2014, recovering in Mar-Apr 2014 but weaker reading in May 2014. There is marked improvement in Jun-Jul 2014 with slowing in Aug-Oct 2014 followed by acceleration in Nov 2014. New orders deteriorated in Jan-Apr 2015, improving in May-Jun 2015. New orders deteriorated in Jul-Aug 2015 and improved in Sep 2015. New orders deteriorated in Oct-2015 to Dec 2015, contracting at slower pace in Jan 2016. There is sharper contraction in Feb 2016 and an upward jump in Mar 2016 followed by deterioration in Apr-Jun 2016. New orders improved in Jul 2016, deteriorating in Aug 2016 and improving in Sep 2016. Improvement continued in Oct-Nov 2016 with mild deterioration in Dec 2016 followed by improvement in Jan-Feb 2017, softening in Mar-Jul 2017, recovering in Aug-Sep 2017. There is deterioration in Oct 2017 followed by improvement in Nov-Dec 2017. There is deterioration in Jan 2018 followed by improvement in Feb 2018 and improvement in Mar 2018. The index deteriorates in Apr 2018, improving in May 2018. The index deteriorates in Jun 2018, improving in Jul 2018 and deteriorating in Aug 2018. The index improves in Sep 2018, deteriorating in Oct 2018. The index weakens in Nov 2018, improving in Dec 2018. The index improves in Jan 2019, deteriorating in Feb 2019. The index improves in Mar 2019, improving in Apr 2019. The index deteriorates in May-Jun 2019, improving in Jul 2019. The index improves in Aug 2019, improving in Sep 2019. The index stabilizes in Oct 2019, deteriorating in Nov 2019. The index improves in Dec 2019 and Jan 2020. The index improves in Feb 2020. The index contracts in Mar-Apr 2020. There is improvement in the index to softer negative level in May 2020. The index improves to positive in Jun 2020-Apr 2021. The index deteriorates in May-Sep 2021, improving in Oct-Nov 2021. There is deterioration in Dec 2021 followed by improvement in Jan 2022.
Chart VA-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, Current New Orders Diffusion Index SA
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022.
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