CMP Associates Regulation Blog

Table I-2, US, People in Job Stress, Millions and % SA

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the US Department of Labor provides both seasonally adjusted (SA) and not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) or unadjusted data with important uses (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012Feb3; 2011Feb11):

“Most series published by the Current Employment Statistics program reflect a regularly recurring seasonal movement that can be measured from past experience. By eliminating that part of the change attributable to the normal seasonal variation, it is possible to observe the cyclical and other nonseasonal movements in these series. Seasonally adjusted series are published monthly for selected employment, hours, and earnings estimates.”

Requirements of using best available information and updating seasonality factors affect the comparability over time of United States employment data. In the first month of the year, the BLS revises data for several years by adjusting benchmarks and seasonal factors (page 4 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015), which is the case of the data for Jan 2015 released on Feb 6, 2015:

“In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2014. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which enumerates jobs covered by the unemployment insurance tax system. The benchmark process results in revisions to not seasonally adjusted data from April 2013 forward.

Seasonally adjusted data from January 2010 forward are subject to revision. In addition, data for some series prior to 2010, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted, incorporate revisions. The total nonfarm employment level for March 2014 was revised upward by 91,000 (+67,000 on a not seasonally adjusted basis, or less than 0.05 percent). The average benchmark revision over the past 10 years was plus or minus 0.3 percent. Table A presents revised total nonfarm employment data on a seasonally adjusted basis for January through

December 2014.

An article that discusses the benchmark and post-benchmark revisions and other technical issues can be accessed through the BLS website at www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesbmart.pdf.

Information on the data released today also may be obtained by calling (202) 691-6555.”

There are also adjustments of population that affect comparability of labor statistics over time (page 5 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015):

“Effective with data for January 2015, updated population estimates have been used in the household survey. Population estimates for the household survey are developed by the U.S. Census Bureau. Each year, the Census Bureau updates the estimates to reflect new information and assumptions about the growth of the population since the previous decennial census. The change in population reflected in the new estimates results from adjustments for net international migration, updated vital statistics and other information, and some methodological changes in the estimation process. In accordance with usual practice, BLS will not revise the official household survey estimates for December 2014 and earlier months. To show the impact of the population adjustments, however, differences in selected December 2014 labor force series based on the old and new population estimates are shown in table B.”

There are also adjustments of benchmarks and seasonality factors for establishment data that affect comparability over time (page 4 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015):

“In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today [Feb 6, 2015] have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2014. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which enumerates jobs covered by the unemployment insurance tax system. The benchmark process results in revisions to not seasonally adjusted data from April 2013 forward. Seasonally adjusted data from January 2010 forward are subject to revision. In addition, data for some series prior to 2010, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted, incorporate revisions.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal factors in the release for Dec 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf):

“Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2011 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2015 through November 2015 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal factors in the release for Dec 2016 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf):

“Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2012 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2016 through November 2016 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised establishment data for seasonal and benchmarks in the release for Jan 2016 (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2016 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 4 for more information about these changes.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised establishment data for seasonal and benchmarks in the release for Jan 2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors using an improved methodology to select models. Also, household survey data for January 2017 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 4 for more information about these changes.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal adjustment in the release for Dec 2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2013 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2017 through November 2017 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 6, along with additional information about the revisions.”

All comparisons over time are affected by yearly adjustments of benchmarks and seasonality factors. All data in this blog comment use revised data released by the BLS (http://www.bls.gov/).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal adjustment in the release for Dec 2018 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Revision of Seasonally Adjusted Household Survey Data. Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2014 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2018 through November 2018 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised payroll establishment data with the release of the estimates for Jan 2019 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_02012019.htm): “ Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2019 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning at the end of this news release for more information about these changes.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised the Establishment Survey Data with the release of estimates for Jan 2018 on Feb 20, 2018 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2017. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which counts jobs covered by the Unemployment Insurance (UI) tax system. In addition, the data were updated to the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) from the 2012 NAICS. This update resulted in minor changes to several detailed industries. The normal benchmark process revises not seasonally adjusted data from April 2016 forward and seasonally adjusted data from January 2013 forward. However, some data were also revised further back in their history than normal due to the implementation of 2017 NAICS and other minor technical changes related to rounding and re-aggregation of some series. The total nonfarm employment level for March 2017 was revised upward by 146,000 (+138,000 on a not seasonally adjusted basis, or +0.1 percent). On a not seasonally adjusted basis, the average absolute benchmark revision over the past 10 years is 0.2 percent. The effect of these revisions on the underlying trend in nonfarm payroll employment was minor. For example, the over-the-year change in total nonfarm employment for 2017 was revised from +2,055,000 to +2,173,000 (seasonally adjusted). Table A presents revised total nonfarm employment data on a seasonally adjusted basis from January to December 2017. All revised historical establishment survey data are available on the BLS website at www.bls.gov/ces/data.htm. In addition, an article that discusses the benchmark and post-benchmark revisions and other technical issues is available at www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesbmart.htm.”

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) informs that “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2019 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 6 for more information about these changes” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) informs that “Revision of Seasonally Adjusted Household Survey Data. Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2015 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2019 through November 2019 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics informs that “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. In addition, several changes have been made to household survey data, including the annual update of population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 4 for more information” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf).

IA2 Number of People in Job Stress. There are two approaches to calculating the number of people in job stress. The first approach consists of calculating the number of people in job stress unemployed or underemployed with the raw data of the employment situation report as in Table I-2. The data are seasonally adjusted (SA). The first three rows provide the labor force and unemployed in millions and the unemployment rate of unemployed as percent of the labor force. There is decrease in the number unemployed from 16.338 million in Jul 2020 to 13.550 million in Aug 2020 and decrease to 12.580 million in Sep 2020. The rate of unemployment decreased from 10.2 percent in Jul 2020 to 8.4 percent in Aug 2020, decreasing to 7.9 percent in Sep 2020. An important aspect of unemployment is its persistence for more than 27 weeks with 2.405 million in Sep 2020 corresponding to 19.1 percent of the unemployed. The longer the period of unemployment the lower are the chances of finding another job with many long-term unemployed ceasing to search for a job. Another key characteristic of the current labor market is the high number of people trying to subsist with part-time jobs because they cannot find full-time employment or part-time for economic reasons. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals, who would have preferred full-time employment, were working part time because their hours had been reduced or because they were unable to find full-time jobs” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number of part-time for economic reasons decreased from 8.443 million in Jul 2020 to 7.572 million in Aug 2020 and 6.300 million in Sep 2020. Another important fact is the marginally attached to the labor force. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey” (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number in job stress unemployed or underemployed of 20.801 million in Sep 2020 consists of:

· 12.580 million unemployed (of whom 2.405 million, or 19.1 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more) compared with 13.550 million unemployed in Aug 2020 (of whom 1.624 million, or 12.0 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more).

· 6.330 million employed part-time for economic reasons in Sep 2020 (who suffered reductions in their work hours or could not find full-time employment) compared with 7.572 million in Aug 2020

· 1.921 million who were marginally attached to the labor force in Sep 2020 (who were not in the labor force but wanted and were available for work) compared with 2.083 million in Aug 2020

	Sep 2020	Aug 2020	Jul 2020
Labor Force Millions	160.143	160.838	159.870
Unemployed Millions	12.580	13.550	16.338
Unemployment Rate (unemployed as % labor force)	7.9	8.4	10.2
Unemployed ≥27 weeks Millions	2.405	1.624	1.501
Unemployed ≥27 weeks %	19.1	12.0	9.2
Part Time for Economic Reasons Millions	6.300	7.572	8.443
Marginally Attached to Labor Force Millions	1.921	2.083	2.027
Job Stress Millions	20.801	23.205	27.108
In Job Stress as % Labor Force	13.0	14.4	17.0

Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table I-3 repeats the data in Table I-2 but including Jun and additional data. What really matters is the number of people with jobs or the total employed, representing the opportunity for exit from unemployment. The final row of Table I-3 provides people employed as percent of the population or employment to population ratio. The number has remained relatively constant around 59 percent, reaching 60.1 in Nov 2017, 60.1 in Dec 2017, 60.5 in Jul 2018, 60.3 in Aug 2018, 60.4 for Sep 2018, 60.5 in Oct 2018, 60.5 in Nov 2018, 60.6 in Dec 2018, 60.7 in Jan 2019, 60.7 in Feb 2019, 60.6 in Mar 2019, 60.6 in Apr 2019, 60.6 in May 2019, 60.7 in Jun 2019, 60.7 in Jul 2019 and 60.9 in Aug 2019. The employment to population ratio fell from an annual level of 63.1 percent in 2006 to 58.6 percent in 2012, 58.6 percent in 2013 and 59.0 in 2014 with the lowest level at 58.4 percent in 2011. The employment population ratio NSA reached 59.4 in Dec 2015, 59.6 in Dec 2016, 60.0 in Dec 2017, 60.4 in Dec 2018, 60.9 in Dec 2019 and 56.7 in Sep 2020.

Table I-3, US, Unemployment and Underemployment, SA, Millions and Percent

	Sep 2020	Aug 2020	Jul 2020	Jun 2020
Labor Force	160.143	160.838	159.870	159.932
Participation Rate	61.4	61.7	61.4	61.5
Unemployed	12.580	13.550	16.338	17.750
UNE Rate %	7.9	8.4	10.2	11.1
Part Time Economic Reasons	6.300	7.572	8.443	9.062
Marginally Attached to Labor Force	1.921	2.083	2.027	2.486
In Job Stress	20.801	23.205	27.108	29.298
In Job Stress % Labor Force	13.0	14.4	17.0	18.3
Employed	147.563	147.288	143.532	142.182
Employment % Population	56.6	56.5	55.1	54.6

Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The balance of this section considers the second approach. Charts I-1 to I-12 explain the reasons for considering another approach to calculating job stress in the US. Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2020. There was a big drop of the number of people employed from 147.315 million at the peak in Jul 2007 (NSA) to 136.809 million at the trough in Jan 2010 (NSA) with 10.506 million fewer people employed. Recovery has been anemic compared with the shallow recession of 2001 that was followed by nearly vertical growth in jobs. The number employed in Sep 2020 was 147.796 million (NSA) or 0.481 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 260.742 million in Sep 2020 or by 28.784 million. The number employed increased 0.3 percent from Jul 2007 to Sep 2020 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 12.4 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Sep 2020 would result in 165.571 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 260.742 million). There are effectively 17.775 million fewer jobs in Sep 2020 than in Jul 2007, or 165.571 million minus 147.796 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Chart I-1, US, Employed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2020

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-2 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the number of people employed in the US from 2001 to 2020. There was recovery since 2010 but not sufficient to recover lost jobs. Many people in the US who had jobs before the global recession are not working now and many who entered the labor force cannot find employment. There is sharp contraction of employment in Mar and Apr 2020 with recovery in May-Sep 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-2, US, Employed, 12-Month Percentage Change NSA, 2001-2020

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The foundation of the second approach derives from Chart I-3 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics providing the level of the civilian labor force in the US. The civilian labor force consists of people who are available and willing to work and who have searched for employment recently. The labor force of the US NSA grew 9.4 percent from 142.828 million in Jan 2001 to 156.255 million in Jul 2009. The civilian labor force is 2.4 percent higher at 160.073 million in Sep 2020 than in Jul 2009, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. Chart I-3 shows the flattening of the curve of expansion of the labor force and its decline in 2010 and 2011. The ratio of the labor force of 154.871 million in Jul 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.958 million in Jul 2007 was 66.8 percent while the ratio of the labor force of 160.073 million in Sep 2020 to the noninstitutional population of 260.742 million in Sep 2020 was 61.4 percent. The labor force of the US in Sep 2020 corresponding to 66.8 percent of participation in the population would be 174.176 million (0.668 x 260.742) The difference between the measured labor force in Sep 2020 of 160.073 million and the labor force in Sep 2020 with participation rate of 66.8 percent (as in Jul 2007) of 174.176 million is 14.103 million. The level of the labor force in the US has stagnated and is 14.103 million lower than what it would have been had the same participation rate been maintained. Millions of people have abandoned their search for employment because they believe there are no jobs available for them. Millions lost their employment in the lockdown of economic activity of the COVID-19 event. The key issue is whether the decline in participation of the population in the labor force is the result of people giving up on finding another job in addition to job contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-3, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, SA, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-4 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of the labor force in the US. The rate of growth fell almost instantaneously with the global recession and became negative from 2009 to 2011. The labor force of the US collapsed and did not recover. Growth in the beginning of the summer originates in younger people looking for jobs in the summer after graduation or during school recess.

Chart I-4, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 12-month Percentage Change, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-5 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the labor force participation rate in the US or labor force as percent of the population. The labor force participation rate of the US fell from 66.8 percent in Jan 2001 to 61.4 percent NSA in Sep 2020, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. The annual labor force participation rate for 1979 was 63.7 percent and also 63.7 percent in Nov 1980 during sharp economic contraction. This comparison is further elaborated below. Chart I-5 shows an evident downward trend beginning with the global recession that has continued throughout the recovery beginning in IIIQ2009. The critical issue is whether people left the workforce of the US because they believe there is no longer a job for them and if that number will increase in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-5, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Population in Labor Force SA, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-6 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of unemployed in the US. The number unemployed rose from the trough of 6.272 million NSA in Oct 2006 to the peak of 16.147 million in Jan 2010, declining to 13.400 million in Jul 2012, 12.696 million in Aug 2012 and 11.741 million in Sep 2012. The level unemployed fell to 11.741 million in Oct 2012, 11.404 million in Nov 2012, 11.844 million in Dec 2012, 13.181 million in Jan 2013, 12.500 million in Feb 2013 and 9.984 million in Dec 2013. The level of unemployment reached 12.277 million in Sep 2020, all numbers not seasonally adjusted, in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-6, US, Unemployed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-7 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the rate of unemployment in the US or unemployed as percent of the labor force. The rate of unemployment of the US rose from 4.7 percent in Jan 2001 to 6.5 percent in Jun 2003, declining to 4.1 percent in Oct 2006. The rate of unemployment jumped to 10.6 percent in Jan 2010 and declined to 7.6 percent in Dec 2012 but increased to 8.5 percent in Jan 2013 and 8.1 percent in Feb 2013, falling back to 7.3 percent in May 2013 and 7.8 percent in Jun 2013, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. The rate of unemployment not seasonally adjusted stabilized at 7.7 percent in Jul 2013 and fell to 6.5 percent in Dec 2013 and 5.4 percent in Dec 2014. The rate of unemployment NSA decreased to 4.8 percent in Dec 2015 and 4.5 percent in Dec 2016, reaching 3.9 percent in Dec 2017. The NSA rate of unemployment was at 3.7 percent in Dec 2018 and 3.4 percent in Dec 2019. The NSA unemployment rate was 7.7 percent in Sep 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-7, US, Unemployment Rate, SA, 2001-2020

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-8 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of unemployed. There was a jump of 81.8 percent in Apr 2009 with subsequent decline and negative rates since 2010. On an annual basis, the level of unemployed rose 59.8 percent in 2009 and 26.1 percent in 2008 with increase of 3.9 percent in 2010, decline of 7.3 percent in 2011 and decrease of 9.0 percent in 2012. The annual level of unemployment decreased 8.4 percent in 2013 and fell 16.1 percent in 2014. The annual level of unemployment fell 13.7 percent in 2015 and fell 6.6 percent in 2016, decreasing 9.9 percent in 2017. The level of unemployment decreased 12.4 percent in Dec 2017 relative to a year earlier and decreased 4.0 percent in Dec 2018 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment decreased 8.7 percent in Dec 2019 relative to a year earlier. The level of unemployment increased 124.6 percent in Dec 2020 relative to a year earlier in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-8, US, Unemployed, 12-month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-9 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the number of people in part-time occupations because of economic reasons, that is, because they cannot find full-time employment. The number underemployed in part-time occupations not seasonally adjusted rose from 3.732 million in Jan 2001 to 5.270 million in Jan 2004, falling to 3.787 million in Apr 2006. The number underemployed seasonally adjusted jumped to 9.114 million in Nov 2009, falling to 8.171 million in Dec 2011 but increasing to 8.305 million in Jan 2012 and 8.238 million in Feb 2012 but then falling to 7.943 million in Dec 2012 and increasing to 8.099 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons seasonally adjusted reached 4.655 million in Dec 2018 and 4.288 million in Nov 2019. Without seasonal adjustment, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 9.354 million in Dec 2009, declining to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 and 8.166 million in Dec 2012 but increasing to 8.324 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA stood at 7.990 million in Dec 2013, 6.970 million in Dec 2014 and 6.179 million in Dec 2015. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA stood at 5.707 million in Dec 2016. The number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 5.060 million in Dec 2017. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons stood at 4.740 million in Dec 2018 and 4.247 million in Dec 2019. The longer the period in part-time jobs the lower are the chances of finding another full-time job. The number of part-time for economic reasons NSA jumped to 10.684 million in Mar 2020 and 5.955 million in Sep 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-9, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, SA, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-10 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics repeats the behavior of unemployment. The 12-month percentage change of the level of people at work part-time for economic reasons jumped 84.7 percent in Mar 2009 and declined subsequently. The declines have been insufficient to reduce significantly the number of people who cannot shift from part-time to full-time employment. On an annual basis, the number of part-time for economic reasons increased 33.5 percent in 2008 and 51.7 percent in 2009, declining 0.4 percent in 2010, 3.5 percent in 2011 and 5.1 percent in 2012. The annual number of part-time for economic reasons decreased 2.3 percent in 2013 and fell 9.1 percent in 2014. The annual number of part-time for economic reasons fell 11.7 percent in 2015 and fell 6.7 percent in 2016. The number of part-time for economic reasons decreased 7.6 percent in Dec 2016 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reason fell 11.3 percent in Dec 2017 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell 6.3 percent in Dec 2018 relative to a year earlier and decreased 10.4 percent in Dec 2019 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons jumped 138.3 percent in Apr 2020 relative to a year earlier and 49.2 percent in Sep 2020 relative to a year earlier in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-10, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons NSA 12-Month Percentage Change, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-11 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the same pattern of the number marginally attached to the labor force jumping to significantly higher levels during the global recession and remaining at historically high levels. The number marginally attached to the labor force not seasonally adjusted increased from 1.295 million in Jan 2001 to 1.691 million in Feb 2004. The number of marginally attached to the labor force fell to 1.299 million in Sep 2006 and increased to 2.609 million in Dec 2010 and 2.800 million in Jan 2011. The number marginally attached to the labor force was 2.540 million in Dec 2011, increasing to 2.809 million in Jan 2012, falling to 2.608 million in Feb 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell to 2.352 million in Mar 2012, 2.363 million in Apr 2012, 2.423 million in May 2012, 2.483 million in Jun 2012, 2.529 million in Jul 2012 and 2.561 million in Aug 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell to 2.517 million in Sep 2012, 2.433 million in Oct 2012, 2.505 million in Nov 2012 and 2.427 million in in Dec 2013. The number marginally attached to the labor force reached 2.260 million in Dec 2014 and 1.833 million in Dec 2015. The number marginally attached to the labor force stood at 1.684 million in Dec 2016. The level marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.623 million in Dec 2017. The level of marginally attached to the labor force stood at 1.556 million in Dec 2018 and 1.246 million in Dec 2019. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.921 million in Sep 2020.

Chart I-11, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-12 provides 12-month percentage changes of the marginally attached to the labor force from 2001 to 2020. There was a jump of 56.1 percent in May 2009 during the global recession followed by declines in percentage changes but insufficient negative changes. On an annual basis, the number of marginally attached to the labor force increased in four consecutive years: 15.7 percent in 2008, 37.9 percent in 2009, 11.7 percent in 2010 and 3.5 percent in 2011. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 2.2 percent on annual basis in 2012 but increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012, fell 13.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013, falling 10.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. The number marginally attached to the labor force increased 4.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 and fell 4.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and 8.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013. The annual number of marginally attached to the labor force fell 6.2 percent in 2013 and fell 6.5 percent in 2014. The annual number of marginally attached to the labor force fell 11.4 percent in 2015. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 7.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 and fell 6.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 18.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015 and decreased 8.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016. The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017. The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 4.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2018 and decreased 19.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019. The level of marginally attached to the labor force increased 64.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2020 and increased 47.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2020 relative to a year earlier in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-12, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Table I-4 consists of data and additional calculations using the BLS household survey, illustrating the possibility that the actual rate of unemployment could be 14.4 percent and the number of people in job stress could be around 32.7 million, which is 18.9 percent of the effective labor force. Unemployment increased sharply while employment declined rapidly in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). There is increasing employment and reduction of unemployment in the gradual return of economic activity in May-Sep 2020. The first column provides for 2006 the yearly average population (POP), labor force (LF), participation rate or labor force as percent of population (PART %), employment (EMP), employment population ratio (EMP/POP %), unemployment (UEM), the unemployment rate as percent of labor force (UEM/LF Rate %) and the number of people not in the labor force (NLF). All data are unadjusted or not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA). The numbers in column 2006 are averages in millions while the monthly numbers for Sep 2019, Aug 2020 and Sep 2020 are in thousands, not seasonally adjusted. The average yearly participation rate of the population in the labor force was in the range of 66.0 percent minimum to 67.1 percent maximum between 2000 and 2006 with the average of 66.4 percent (https://www.bls.gov/data/). Table I-4b provides the yearly labor force participation rate from 1979 to 2020. The objective of Table I-4 is to assess how many people could have left the labor force because they do not think they can find another job. Abraham, Hatiwanger, Sandusky and Spletzer (2016) find that “unemployment duration has a strongly negative effect on the likelihood of subsequent employment.” Row “LF PART 66.2 %” applies the participation rate of 2006, almost equal to the rates for 2000 to 2006, to the noninstitutional civilian population in Sep 2019, Aug 2020 and Sep 2020 to obtain what would be the labor force of the US if the participation rate had not changed. In fact, the participation rate fell to 63.1 percent by Sep 2019 and was 61.8 percent in Aug 2020 and 61.4 percent in Sep 2020, suggesting that many people simply gave up on finding another job. There is also abrupt decrease in employment and increase in unemployment in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Row “∆ NLF UEM” calculates the number of people not counted in the labor force because they could have given up on finding another job by subtracting from the labor force with participation rate of 66.2 percent (row “LF PART 66.2%”) the labor force estimated in the household survey (row “LF”). Total unemployed (row “Total UEM”) is obtained by adding unemployed in row “∆NLF UEM” to the unemployed of the household survey in row “UEM.” The row “Total UEM%” is the effective total unemployed “Total UEM” as percent of the effective labor force in row “LF PART 66.2%.” The results are that:

there are an estimated 12.538 million unemployed in Sep 2020 who are not counted because they left the labor force on their belief they could not find another job (∆NLF UEM), that is, they dropped out of their job searches
the total number of unemployed is effectively 24.815 million (Total UEM) and not 12.277 million (UEM) of whom many have been unemployed long term
the rate of unemployment is 14.4 percent (Total UEM%) and not 7.7 percent, not seasonally adjusted, or 7.9 percent seasonally adjusted
the number of people in job stress is close to 32.691 million by adding the 12.538 million leaving the labor force because they believe they could not find another job, corresponding to 18.9 percent of the effective labor force.

The row “In Job Stress” in Table I-4 provides the number of people in job stress not seasonally adjusted at 32.691 million in Sep 2020, adding the total number of unemployed (“Total UEM”), plus those involuntarily in part-time jobs because they cannot find anything else (“Part Time Economic Reasons”) and the marginally attached to the labor force (“Marginally attached to LF”). The final row of Table I-4 shows that the number of people in job stress is equivalent to 18.9 percent of the labor force in Sep 2020. The number employed in Sep 2020 was 147.796 million (NSA) or 0.481 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 260.742 million in Sep 2020 or by 28.784 million. The number employed increased 0.3 percent from Jul 2007 to Sep 2020 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 12.4 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Sep 2020 would result in 165.571 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 260.742 million). There are effectively 17.775 million fewer jobs in Sep 2020 than in Jul 2007, or 165.571 million minus 147.796 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/new-nonfarm-hires-of-6.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/nonfarm-hires-jump-64.html). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. The number of hiring relative to the number unemployed measures the chances of becoming employed. The number of hiring in the US economy has declined by 10 million and does not show signs of increasing in an unusual recovery without hiring. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 1.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 44 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIQ2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/gdp2q20_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ2019, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event would have accumulated to 44.7 percent. GDP in IIQ2020 would be $22,807.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $5505.1 billion than actual $17,302.5 billion. There are more than five trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 32.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 18.9 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). US GDP in IIQ2020 is 24.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,302.5 billion in IIQ2020 or 9.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Aug 1919 to Aug 2020. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 155.5554 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841 which is 36.2 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 163.3909 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841, which is 39.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Aug 2020. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.0774 in Aug 2020. The output of manufacturing at 99.2841 in Aug 2020 is 26.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 100.4257 in Aug 2020 or 16.3 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 164.9372 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 39.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 132.0705 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 24.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-4, US, Population, Labor Force and Unemployment, NSA

	2006	Sep 2019	Aug 2020	Sep 2020
POP	229	259.638	260.558	260.742
LF	151	163.943	160.966	160.073
PART%	66.2	63.1	61.8	61.4
EMP	144	158.478	147.224	147.796
EMP/POP%	62.9	61.0	56.5	56.7
UEM	7	5,465	13.742	12.277
UEM/LF Rate%	4.6	3.3	8.5	7.7
NLF	77	95.694	99.592	100.670
LF PART 66.2%		171.880	172.489	172.611
∆NLF UEM		7.937	11.523	12.538
Total UEM		13.402	25.265	24.815
Total UEM%		7.8	14.6	14.4
Part Time Economic Reasons		3.992	7.488	5.955
Marginally Attached to LF		1.299	2.083	1.921
In Job Stress		18.693	34.836	32.691
People in Job Stress as % Labor Force		10.9	20.2	18.9

Pop: population; LF: labor force; PART: participation; EMP: employed; UEM: unemployed; NLF: not in labor force; ∆NLF UEM: additional unemployed; Total UEM is UEM + ∆NLF UEM; Total UEM% is Total UEM as percent of LF PART 66.2%; In Job Stress = Total UEM + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached to LF

Note: the first column for 2006 is in average millions; the remaining columns are in thousands; NSA: not seasonally adjusted

The labor force participation rate of 66.2% in 2006 is applied to current population to obtain LF PART 66.2%; ∆NLF UEM is obtained by subtracting the labor force with participation of 66.2 percent from the household survey labor force LF; Total UEM is household data unemployment plus ∆NLF UEM; and total UEM% is total UEM divided by LF PART 66.2%

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 3) of secular stagnation, economic progress consists of growth of real income per person driven by growth of productivity. The “constituent elements” of economic progress are “(a) inventions, (b) the discovery and development of new territory and new resources, and (c) the growth of population” (Hansen 1939, 3). Secular stagnation originates in decline of population growth and discouragement of inventions. According to Hansen (1939, 2), US population grew by 16 million in the 1920s but grew by one half or about 8 million in the 1930s with forecasts at the time of Hansen’s writing in 1938 of growth of around 5.3 million in the 1940s. Hansen (1939, 2) characterized demography in the US as “a drastic decline in the rate of population growth. Hansen’s plea was to adapt economic policy to stagnation of population in ensuring full employment. In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 8), population caused half of the growth of US GDP per year. Growth of output per person in the US and Europe was caused by “changes in techniques and to the exploitation of new natural resources.” In this analysis, population caused 60 percent of the growth of capital formation in the US. Declining population growth would reduce growth of capital formation. Residential construction provided an important share of growth of capital formation. Hansen (1939, 12) argues that market power of imperfect competition discourages innovation with prolonged use of obsolete capital equipment. Trade unions would oppose labor-savings innovations. The combination of stagnating and aging population with reduced innovation caused secular stagnation. Hansen (1939, 12) concludes that there is role for public investments to compensate for lack of dynamism of private investment but with tough tax/debt issues.

The current application of Hansen’s (1938, 1939, 1941) proposition argues that secular stagnation occurs because full employment equilibrium can be attained only with negative real interest rates between minus 2 and minus 3 percent. Professor Lawrence H. Summers (2013Nov8) finds that “a set of older ideas that went under the phrase secular stagnation are not profoundly important in understanding Japan’s experience in the 1990s and may not be without relevance to America’s experience today” (emphasis added). Summers (2013Nov8) argues there could be an explanation in “that the short-term real interest rate that was consistent with full employment had fallen to -2% or -3% sometime in the middle of the last decade. Then, even with artificial stimulus to demand coming from all this financial imprudence, you wouldn’t see any excess demand. And even with a relative resumption of normal credit conditions, you’d have a lot of difficulty getting back to full employment.” The US economy could be in a situation where negative real rates of interest with fed funds rates close to zero as determined by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) do not move the economy to full employment or full utilization of productive resources. Summers (2013Oct8) finds need of new thinking on “how we manage an economy in which the zero nominal interest rates is a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economy activity holding our economies back to their potential.”

Former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (2014Jan8) finds three major risks in prolonged unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing: (1) incentive of delaying action by political leaders; (2) “financial moral hazard” in inducing excessive exposures pursuing higher yields of risker credit classes; and (3) major risks in exiting unconventional policy. Rubin (2014Jan8) proposes reduction of deficits by structural reforms that could promote recovery by improving confidence of business attained with sound fiscal discipline.

Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) provides clear thought on the lack of relevance of Hansen’s contention of secular stagnation to current economic conditions. The application of secular stagnation argues that the economy of the US has attained full-employment equilibrium since around 2000 only with negative real rates of interest of minus 2 to minus 3 percent. At low levels of inflation, the so-called full-employment equilibrium of negative interest rates of minus 2 to minus 3 percent cannot be attained and the economy stagnates. Taylor (2014Jan01) analyzes multiple contradictions with current reality in this application of the theory of secular stagnation:

Secular stagnation would predict idle capacity, in particular in residential investment when fed fund rates were fixed at 1 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. Taylor (2014Jan01) finds unemployment at 4.4 percent with house prices jumping 7 percent from 2002 to 2003 and 14 percent from 2004 to 2005 before dropping from 2006 to 2007. GDP prices doubled from 1.7 percent to 3.4 percent when interest rates were low from 2003 to 2005.
Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the application of secular stagnation based on low interest rates because of savings glut and lack of investment opportunities. Taylor (2009) shows that there was no savings glut. The savings rate of the US in the past decade is significantly lower than in the 1980s.
Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the low ratio of investment to GDP currently and reduced investment and hiring by US business firms.
Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the financial crisis and global recession were caused by weak implementation of existing regulation and departure from rules-based policies.
Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the recovery from the global recession was constrained by a change in the regime of regulation and fiscal/monetary policies.

In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (https://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share s_i of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate y_i of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):

Y = ∑_is_iy_i (1)

This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):

∆Y = ∑_i∆s_iy*_i+ ∑_i∆y_is*_i (2)

The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆s_i multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*_i, or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆y_i, multiplied by the average share of the group s*_i,or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:

“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”

Table I-4b and Chart I-12-b provide the US labor force participation rate or percentage of the labor force in population. It is not likely that simple demographic trends caused the sharp decline during the global recession and failure to recover earlier levels. The civilian labor force participation rate dropped from the peak of 66.9 percent in Jul 2006 to 62.6 percent in Dec 2013, 62.5 percent in Dec 2014, 62.4 percent in Dec 2015 and 62.4 in Dec 2016. The civilian labor force participation rate reached 62.4 in Dec 2017, and 63.1 percent in 2019. The civilian labor force participation rate was at 62.9 percent in Nov 2018 and 62.8 percent in Dec 2018. The civilian labor force participation was 63.0 in Dec 2019. The civilian labor force participation rate was 61.4 in Sep 2020. The civilian labor force participation rate was 63.7 percent on an annual basis in 1979 and 63.4 percent in Dec 1980 and Dec 1981, reaching even 62.9 percent in both Apr and May 1979. The civilian labor force participation rate jumped with the recovery to 64.8 percent on an annual basis in 1985 and 65.9 percent in Jul 1985. Structural factors cannot explain these sudden changes vividly shown visually in the final segment of Chart I-12b. Seniors would like delay their retiring especially because of the adversities of financial repression on their savings. Labor force statistics are capturing the disillusion of potential workers with their chances in finding a job in what Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) characterize as accentuated cyclical factors. The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/new-nonfarm-hires-of-6.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/nonfarm-hires-jump-64.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html). “Secular stagnation” would be a process over many years and not from one year to another. This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals.

Table I-4b, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2020

Year	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Dec	Annual
1979	62.9	64.5	64.9	64.5	63.8	63.8	63.7
1980	63.5	64.6	65.1	64.5	63.6	63.4	63.8
1981	63.9	64.6	65.0	64.6	63.5	63.4	63.9
1982	63.9	64.8	65.3	64.9	64.0	63.8	64.0
1983	63.4	65.1	65.4	65.1	64.3	63.8	64.0
1984	64.3	65.5	65.9	65.2	64.4	64.3	64.4
1985	64.6	65.5	65.9	65.4	64.9	64.6	64.8
1986	65.0	66.3	66.6	66.1	65.3	65.0	65.3
1987	65.6	66.3	66.8	66.5	65.5	65.5	65.6
1988	65.5	66.7	67.1	66.8	65.9	65.9	65.9
1989	66.2	67.4	67.7	67.2	66.3	66.3	66.5
1990	66.5	67.4	67.7	67.1	66.4	66.1	66.5
1991	66.0	67.2	67.3	66.6	66.1	65.8	66.2
1992	66.4	67.6	67.9	67.2	66.3	66.1	66.4
1993	66.3	67.3	67.5	67.0	66.1	66.2	66.3
1994	66.5	67.2	67.5	67.2	66.5	66.5	66.6
1995	66.4	67.2	67.7	67.1	66.5	66.2	66.6
1996	66.7	67.4	67.9	67.2	66.8	66.7	66.8
1997	67.0	67.8	68.1	67.6	67.0	67.0	67.1
1998	67.0	67.7	67.9	67.3	67.0	67.0	67.1
1999	67.0	67.7	67.9	67.3	66.8	67.0	67.1
2000	67.0	67.7	67.6	67.2	66.7	67.0	67.1
2001	66.6	67.2	67.4	66.8	66.6	66.6	66.8
2002	66.5	67.1	67.2	66.8	66.6	66.2	66.6
2003	66.2	67.0	66.8	66.3	65.9	65.8	66.2
2004	65.8	66.5	66.8	66.2	65.7	65.8	66.0
2005	66.0	66.5	66.8	66.5	66.1	65.9	66.0
2006	66.0	66.7	66.9	66.5	66.1	66.3	66.2
2007	65.8	66.6	66.8	66.1	66.0	65.9	66.0
2008	66.0	66.6	66.8	66.4	65.9	65.7	66.0
2009	65.5	66.2	66.2	65.6	65.0	64.4	65.4
2010	64.8	65.1	65.3	65.0	64.6	64.1	64.7
2011	64.1	64.5	64.6	64.3	64.2	63.8	64.1
2012	63.8	64.3	64.3	63.7	63.6	63.4	63.7
2013	63.5	64.0	64.0	63.4	63.2	62.6	63.2
2014	62.9	63.4	63.5	63.0	62.8	62.5	62.9
2015	63.0	63.1	63.2	62.7	62.3	62.4	62.7
2016	62.7	63.2	63.4	62.9	62.8	62.4	62.8
2017	62.8	63.3	63.5	63.0	63.0	62.4	62.9
2018	62.8	63.4	63.5	62.7	62.7	62.8	62.9
2019	62.8	63.4	63.6	63.2	63.1	63.0	63.1
2020	60.7	61.8	62.0	61.8	61.4

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-12b, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2020

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Broader perspective is in Chart I-12c of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The United States civilian noninstitutional population has increased along a consistent trend since 1948 that continued through earlier recessions and the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 and the cyclical expansion after IIIQ2009.

Chart I-12c, US, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Thousands, NSA, 1948-2020

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The labor force of the United States in Chart I-12d has increased along a trend similar to that of the civilian noninstitutional population in Chart I-12c. There is an evident stagnation of the civilian labor force in the final segment of Chart I-12d during the current economic cycle, with growth below historical trend. This stagnation is explained by cyclical factors similar to those analyzed by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) that motivated an increasing population to drop out of the labor force instead of structural factors. Large segments of the potential labor force are not observed, constituting unobserved unemployment and of more permanent nature because those afflicted have been seriously discouraged from working by the lack of opportunities.

Chart I-12d, US, Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 1948-2020

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The rate of labor force participation in the US is in Chart I-12E from 1948 to 2020. There is sudden decline during the global recession after 2007 without recovery explained by cyclical factors (Lazear and Spletzer2012JHJul22) as many potential workers stopped their searches disillusioned that there could be an opportunity for them in sharply contracted markets.

Chart I-12E, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1948-2020

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment. There is initial discussion here of long-term employment trends followed by cyclical comparison. Growth and employment creation have been mediocre in the expansion beginning in Jul IIIQ2009 from the contraction between Dec IVQ2007 and Jun IIQ2009 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). A series of charts from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides significant insight. Chart I-13 provides the monthly employment level of the US from 1948 to 2020. The number of people employed has trebled. Unemployment is increasing sharply while employment is declining rapidly because of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). There is increasing employment and decreasing unemployment in May-Aug 2020 in the gradual return to economic activity. There are multiple contractions throughout the more than six decades but followed by resumption of the strong upward trend. The contraction of employment after 2007 is sharp and followed by a flatter curve of job creation. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery that historically eliminated unemployment and underemployment created during the contraction. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 1.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 44 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIQ2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/gdp2q20_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ2019, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event would have accumulated to 44.7 percent. GDP in IIQ2020 would be $22,807.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $5505.1 billion than actual $17,302.5 billion. There are more than five trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 32.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 18.9 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). US GDP in IIQ2020 is 24.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,302.5 billion in IIQ2020 or 9.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Aug 1919 to Aug 2020. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 155.5554 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841 which is 36.2 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 163.3909 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841, which is 39.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Aug 2020. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.0774 in Aug 2020. The output of manufacturing at 99.2841 in Aug 2020 is 26.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 100.4257 in Aug 2020 or 16.3 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 164.9372 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 39.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 132.0705 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 24.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-13, US, Employment Level, Thousands, SA, 1948-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The steep and consistent curve of growth of the US labor force is in Chart I-14. The contraction beginning in Dec 2007 flattened the path of the US civilian labor force and with flatter curve during the current expansion, growing below historical trend. There is contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-14, US, Civilian Labor Force, SA, 1948-2020, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-15 provides the labor force participation rate for the period from 1948 to 2020. The labor force participation rate is influenced by numerous factors such as the age of the population. There is no comparable episode in the postwar economy to the sharp collapse of the labor force participation rate in Chart I-15 during the contraction and subsequent expansion after 2007. Aging can reduce the labor force participation rate as many people retire but many may have decided to work longer because their wealth and savings have been significantly reduced. There is an important effect of many people just exiting the labor force because they believe there is no job available for them. There is contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-15, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, SA, 1948-2020, %

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The number of unemployed in the US jumped seasonally adjusted from 5.8 million in May 1979 to 12.1 million in Dec 1982, by 6.3 million, or 108.6 percent. The jump not seasonally adjusted was from 5.4 million in May 1979 to 12.5 million in Jan 1983, by 7.1 million or 131.5 percent. The number of unemployed seasonally adjusted jumped from 6.7 million in Mar 2007 to 15.4 million in Oct 2009, by 8.7 million, or 129.9 percent. The number of unemployed not seasonally adjusted jumped from 6.5 million in Apr 2007 to 16.1 million in Jan 2010, by 9.6 million or 147.7 percent. These are the two episodes with steepest increase in the level of unemployment in Chart I-16. There is sharp increase in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-16, US, Unemployed, SA, 1948-2020, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-17 provides the rate of unemployment of the US from 1948 to 2020. The peak of the series is 10.8 percent in both Nov and Dec 1982. The second highest rates are 10.0 percent in Oct 2009 and 9.9 percent in both Nov and Dec 2009 SA. The unadjusted rate of unemployment NSA reached 7.7 percent in Sep 2020.

Chart I-17, US, Unemployment Rate, SA, 1948-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The number unemployed 27 weeks or more in Chart I-18 jumped to peak levels in the current cycle. There is insufficient decline to return to earlier levels.

Chart I-18, US, Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More, SA, 1948-2020, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The employment-population ratio in Chart I-19 is an important indicator of wellbeing in labor markets, measuring the number of people with jobs. The US employment-population ratio fell from 63.5 in Dec 2006 to 58.6 in Jul 2011 and stands at 60.4 NSA in Dec 2018. The employment population ration reached 60.0 NSA in Dec 2017. The NSA employment/population ratio stood at 60.4 in Dec 2018 and 60.9 in Dec 2019. There is no comparable decline followed by stabilization during a cyclical expansion in Chart I-19. The employment-population rate contracted sharply to 56.7 NSA in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-19, US, Employment-Population Ratio, 1948-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The number employed part-time for economic reasons in Chart I-20 increased in the recessions and declined during the expansions. In the current cycle, the number employed part-time for economic reasons increased sharply and has not returned to normal levels. Lower growth of economic activity in the expansion after IIIQ2009 failed to reduce the number desiring to work full time but finding only part-time occupations. The lack of full-time jobs is evidently cyclical and not secular. There is sharp increase in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-20, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, NSA, 1955-2020, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table I-5 provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.8 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.0 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.2 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. In contrast, GDP grew 2.6 percent in 2010, 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.5 percent in 2014 and 3.1 percent in 2015. GDP grew 1.7 percent in 2016 and 2.3 percent in 2017. GDP grew 3.0 percent in 2018 and 2.2 percent in 2019. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the thirty-four quarters from IQ2012 to IIQ2020 is 1.2 percent and minus 9.5 percent in the four quarters ending in IIQ2020. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. The forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of minus 4.0 to minus 3.0 percent in 2020 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20200916.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 3.6 to 4.7 percent in 2021 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20200916.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020 has been at average 1.2 percent in annual equivalent with sharp contraction at 31.4 percent SAAR in IIQ2020 in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Table I-5, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%

Year	GDP ∆%	Year	GDP ∆%	Year	GDP ∆%
1930	-8.5	1980	-0.3	2000	4.1
1931	-6.4	1981	2.5	2001	1.0
1932	-12.9	1982	-1.8	2002	1.7
1933	-1.2	1983	4.6	2003	2.9
1934	10.8	1984	7.2	2004	3.8
1935	8.9	1985	4.2	2005	3.5
1936	12.9	1986	3.5	2006	2.9
1937	5.1	1987	3.5	2007	1.9
1938	-3.3	1988	4.2	2008	-0.1
1939	8.0	1989	3.7	2009	-2.5
1940	8.8	1990	1.9	2010	2.6
1941	17.7	1991	-0.1	2011	1.6
1942	18.9	1992	3.5	2012	2.2
1943	17.0	1993	2.8	2013	1.8
1944	8.0	1994	4.0	2014	2.5
1945	-1.0	1995	2.7	2015	3.1
1946	-11.6	1996	3.8	2016	1.7
1947	-1.1	1997	4.4	2017	2.3
1948	4.1	1998	4.5	2018	3.0
1949	-0.6	1999	4.8	2019	2.2

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are in Table I-6 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.8 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.0 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-6, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Percentage Contraction	Average Percentage Rate
IIQ1953 to IIQ1954	3	-2.4	-0.8
IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958	3	-3.0	-1.0
IVQ1973 to IQ1975	5	-3.1	-0.6
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980	2	-2.2	-1.1
IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982	4	-2.6	-0.65
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009	6	-4.0	-0.7

Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-7 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 1.2 percent of the US economy in the forty-four quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020. There is sharp contraction in IIQ2020 at SAAR of minus 31.4 percent in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:

5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
5.3 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
5.1 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987
5.0 percent in the first twenty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1987
4.9 percent in the first twenty-first quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1988
4.9 percent in the first twenty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1989
4.7 percent in the first twenty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1989
4.6 percent in the first twenty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989
4.5 percent in the first twenty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1989
4.5 percent in the first twenty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1990
4.4 percent in the first thirty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1990
4.3 percent in the first thirty-one quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990
4.0 percent in the first thirty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1990
3.8 percent in the first thirty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1991
3.8 percent in the first thirty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1991
3.8 percent in the first thirty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991
3.7 percent in the thirty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1991
3.7 percent in the thirty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1992
3.7 percent in the thirty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1992
3.7 percent in the thirty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992
3.8 percent in the forty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1992
3.7 percent in the forty-one quarters from IQ1983 to IQ1993
3.6 percent in the forty-two quarters from IQ1983 to IIQ1993
3.6 percent in the forty-three quarters from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993
3.7 percent in the forty-four quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1993

The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill relative to historical experience with annual growth of 2.6 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.6 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.5 percent in 2014, 3.1 percent in 2015, 1.7 percent in 2016, 2.3 percent in 2017, 3.0 percent in 2018 and 2.2 percent in 2019 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988. 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990. 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990. 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991. 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993. 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993. 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). GDP grew 2.8 percent in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010. GDP growth in the thirty-four quarters from IQ2012 to IIQ2020 accumulated to 8.1 percent. This growth is equivalent to 0.9 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IIQ2020 of $17,302.5 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $16,004.1 billion and compounding by 4/34: {[($17,302.5/$16,004.1)^4/34 -1]100 = 0.9 percent}.

Table I-7, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Growth ∆%	Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate
IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957	11	12.8	4.5
First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955	4	7.8
IIQ1958 to IIQ1959	5	10.0	7.9
First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959	4	9.2
IIQ1975 to IVQ1976	8	8.3	4.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976	4	6.1
IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983 to IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 IQ1983 to IQ1989 IQ1983 to IIQ1989 IQ1983 to IIIQ1989 IQ1983 to IVQ1989 IQ1983 to IQ1990 IQ1983 to IIQ1990 IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 IQ1983 to IVQ1990 IQ1983 to IQ1991 IQ1983 to IIQ1991 IQ1983 to IIIQ1991 IQ1983 to IVQ1991 IQ1983 to IQ1992 IQ1983 to IIQ1992 IQ1983 to IIIQ1992 IQ1983 to IVQ1992 IQ1983 to IQ1993 IQ1983 to IIQ1993 IQ1983 to IIIQ1993 IQ1983 to IVQ1993	13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44	19.8 21.5 22.1 23.0 24.4 25.4 27.6 28.3 29.9 30.7 32.5 33.8 34.8 35.8 36.1 37.6 38.1 38.2 36.9 36.3 37.3 38.0 38.5 40.2 41.7 43.1 44.6 44.8 45.7 46.4 48.3	5.7 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983	4	7.9
Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*		7.7
IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020	44	14.3	1.2
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010		2.8

*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-21 provides the level of employment in the US from 1979 to 1993. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the flattening of the curve in 1990.

Chart I-21, US, Employed, Thousands, 1979-1993

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-22 provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2020. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs. Recovery has been anemic compared with the shallow recession of 2001 that was followed by nearly vertical growth in jobs. The number employed in Sep 2020 was 147.796 million (NSA) or 0.481 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 260.742 million in Sep 2020 or by 28.784 million. The number employed increased 0.3 percent from Jul 2007 to Sep 2020 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 12.4 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Sep 2020 would result in 165.571 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 260.742 million). There are effectively 17.775 million fewer jobs in Sep 2020 than in Jul 2007, or 165.571 million minus 147.796 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Chart I-22, US, Employed, Thousands, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The US civilian labor force in Chart I-23 grew with few interruptions from 1979 to 1993. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the flattening of the curve in 1990.

Chart I-23, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, 1979-1993

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-24 provides the civilian labor force of the US from 2001 to 2020. The civilian labor force contracted together with the economy after 2007. There has not been recovery during the expansion but rather decline and marginal turn of the year 2011 into expansion in 2012 followed by stability and oscillation into 2013-2018. There is substantial underperformance relative to trend before the global recession. The foundation of the second approach derives from Chart I-3 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics providing the level of the civilian labor force in the US. The civilian labor force consists of people who are available and willing to work and who have searched for employment recently. The labor force of the US NSA grew 9.4 percent from 142.828 million in Jan 2001 to 156.255 million in Jul 2009. The civilian labor force is 2.4 percent higher at 160.073 million in Sep 2020 than in Jul 2009, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. Chart I-3 shows the flattening of the curve of expansion of the labor force and its decline in 2010 and 2011. The ratio of the labor force of 154.871 million in Jul 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.958 million in Jul 2007 was 66.8 percent while the ratio of the labor force of 160.073 million in Sep 2020 to the noninstitutional population of 260.742 million in Sep 2020 was 61.4 percent. The labor force of the US in Sep 2020 corresponding to 66.8 percent of participation in the population would be 174.176 million (0.668 x 260.742) The difference between the measured labor force in Sep 2020 of 160.073 million and the labor force in Sep 2020 with participation rate of 66.8 percent (as in Jul 2007) of 174.176 million is 14.103 million. The level of the labor force in the US has stagnated and is 14.103 million lower than what it would have been had the same participation rate been maintained. Millions of people have abandoned their search for employment because they believe there are no jobs available for them. Millions lost their employment in the lockdown of economic activity of the COVID-19 event. The key issue is whether the decline in participation of the population in the labor force is the result of people giving up on finding another job in addition to job contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-24, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The rate of participation of the labor force in population stagnated during the stagflation and conquest of inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as shown in Chart I-25. Recovery was vigorous during the expansion and lasted through the remainder of the decade. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the flattening/decline of the curve in 1990 followed by incipient recovery.

Chart I-25, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, 1979-1993, %

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The rate of participation in the labor force declined after the recession of 2001 followed by stability until 2007, as shown in Chart I-26. The rate of participation in the labor force continued to decline both during the contraction after 2007 and during the expansion after 2009 with marginal expansion at the turn of the year into 2012 followed by trend of decline and stability. Sharp decline occurred during the cycle and not secularly. There is contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-26, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, 2001-2020, %

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-27 provides the number unemployed during the 1980s. The number unemployed peaked at 12.051 million in Dec 1982 seasonally adjusted and 12.517 in Jan 1983 million not seasonally adjusted, declining to 8.358 million in Dec 1984 seasonally adjusted and 7.978 million in Dec 1984 not seasonally adjusted during the first two years of expansion from the contraction. The number unemployed then fell to 6.667 million in Dec 1989 seasonally adjusted and 6.300 million not seasonally adjusted. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the increase of the curve in 1990 with 7.525 million unemployed NSA and 7.901 million SA.

Chart I-27, US, Unemployed Thousands 1979-1993

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-28 provides the number unemployed from 2001 to 2020. Using seasonally adjusted data, the number unemployed rose from 6.727 million in Oct 2006 to 15.352 million in Oct 2009, declining to 13.093 million in Dec 2011, 8.717 million in Dec 2014 and 7.907 million in Dec 2015. The number unemployed SA stood at 7.495 million in Dec 2016. The level of unemployment SA was 6.561 million in Dec 2017. The level of unemployment SA was 6.286 million in Dec 2018. The level of unemployment SA was 5.753 million in Dec 2019. Using data not seasonally adjusted, the number unemployed rose from 6.272 million in Oct 2006 to 16.147 million in Jan 2010, declining to 11.844 million in Dec 2012, increasing to 13.181 million in Jan 2013 and declining to 9.984 million in Dec 2013. The level of unemployment fell from 10.855 million in Jan 2014 to 8.331 million in Dec 2014. The level of unemployment was 7.542 million in Dec 2015 and 7.170 million in Dec 2016. The level of unemployment was 6.278 million in Dec 2017. The level of unemployment NSA was 6.029 million in Dec 2018. The level of unemployment NSA was 5.503 million in Dec 2019, increasing to 12.777 million in Sep 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-28, US, Unemployed Thousands 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The rate of unemployment peaked at 10.8 percent in both Nov and Dec 1982 seasonally adjusted, as shown in Chart I-29. The rate of unemployment dropped sharply during the expansion after 1984 and continued to decline during the rest of the decade to 5.4 percent in Dec 1989. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the rate of unemployment peaked at 11.4 percent in Jan 1983, declining to 7.0 percent in Dec 1984 and 5.1 percent in Dec 1989. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the increase of the curve in Dec 1990 with 6.0 percent unemployed NSA and 6.2 percent SA. The rate of unemployment continued to increase in 1991-92, decreasing in 1993.

Chart I-29, US, Unemployment Rate, 1979-1993, %

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The rate of unemployment in the US seasonally adjusted jumped from 4.4 percent in May 2007 to 10.0 percent in Oct 2009 and 9.9 percent in both Nov and Dec 2009, as shown in Chart I-30. The rate of unemployment fluctuated at around 9.0 percent in 2011, declining to 7.9 percent in Dec 2012 and 6.7 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of unemployed eased to 5.6 percent in Dec 2014 and 5.0 percent in Dec 2015. The rate of unemployment SA stood at 4.7 percent in Dec 2016. The rate of unemployment SA reached 4.1 percent in Dec 2017. The rate of unemployment SA was 3.9 percent in Dec 2018. The rate of unemployment SA was 3.5 percent in Dec 2019, decreasing to 7.9 percent in Sep 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-30, US, Unemployment Rate, 2001-2020, %

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The employment population ratio seasonally adjusted fell from around 60.1 in Dec 1979 to 57.1 in both Feb and Mar 1983, as shown in Chart I-31. The employment population ratio seasonally adjusted rose back to 59.9 in Dec 1984 and reached 63.0 later in the decade in Dec 1989. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the employment population ratio dropped from 60.4 percent in Oct 1979 to 56.1 percent in Jan 1983, increasing to 59.8 in Dec 1984 and to 62.9 percent in Dec 1989. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the increase of the curve in Dec 1990 with 62.2 NSA and 62.2 percent SA.

Chart I-31, US, Employment Population Ratio, 1979-1993, %

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The US employment-population ratio seasonally adjusted has fallen from 63.4 in Dec 2006 to 58.6 in Dec 2011, 58.7 in Dec 2012, 58.7 in Dec 2013, 59.3 in Dec 2014 and 59.6 in Dec 2015, as shown in Chart I-32. The employment-population ratio reached 59.8 in Dec 2016. The employment population ratio stood at 60.1 in Dec

2017. The SA employment population ratio was at 60.6 in Dec 2018. The employment population ratio was 61.0 in Dec 2019, decreasing to 56.5 in Aug 2020 during the COVID-19 event. The employment population-ratio has stagnated during the expansion. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the employment population ratio fell from 63.6 percent in Jul 2006 to 57.6 percent in Jan 2011, 58.5 percent in Dec 2012, 58.5 percent in Dec 2013 and 59.1 in Dec 2014. The employment population ratio reached 59.4 percent in Dec 2015 and 59.6 percent in Dec 2016. The employment population ratio stood at 60.0 in Dec 2017. The employment population ratio was 60.4 in Dec 2018. The employment population ratio NSA was 60.9 in Dec 2019, decreasing to 56.7 in Sep 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-32, US, Employment Population Ratio, 2001-2020, %

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The number unemployed 27 weeks or more rose in Chart I-33 rose from 492,000 NSA in Oct 1979 to 2.978 million in Mar 1983. The level unemployed 27 weeks or more NSA fell to 566,000 in Aug 1989. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the increase of the curve in Dec 1990 with 774,000 NSA and 831,000 SA. The number unemployed 27 weeks or more rose to 1.924 million NSA in Dec 1992 and 2.056 million SA. The number unemployed 27 weeks or more was 1.651 million NSA in Dec 1993 and 1.782 million SA.

Chart I-33, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More 1979-1993, SA, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The number unemployed for 27 weeks or over, seasonally adjusted, increased sharply during the contraction as shown in Chart I-34 from 1.131 million in Nov 2006 to 6.800 million in Apr 2010 seasonally adjusted. The number of unemployed for 27 weeks or over remained at around 6 million during the expansion compared with somewhat above 1 million before the contraction, falling to 1.869 million in Dec 2016 seasonally adjusted and 1.769 million not seasonally adjusted. The level unemployed for 27 weeks or over reached 1.515 million SA in Dec 2017 and 1.420 million NSA. The level unemployed for 27 weeks and over was 1.311 million SA in Dec 2018 and 1.219 million NSA in Dec 2018. The level of unemployed for 27 weeks and over was 1.186 million SA in Dec 2019 moving to 2.405 million in Sep 2020 and 1.097 million NSA in Dec 2019, increasing to 2.435 million in Sep 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-34, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More, 2001-2020, SA, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The number of persons working part-time for economic reasons because they cannot find full-time work peaked during the contraction at 6.857 million SA in Oct 1982, as shown in Chart I-35. The number of persons at work part-time for economic reasons fell sharply during the expansion to 5.797 million in Dec 1984 and continued to fall throughout the decade to 4.817 million in Dec 1989 SA and 4.709 million NSA. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the increase of the curve in Dec 1990 with 5.615 million NSA and 5.699 million SA. The level employed part-time for economic reasons rose to 6.347 million NSA in Dec 1992 and 6.458 million NSA. The level employed part-time for economic reasons decreased to 6.213 million NSA in Dec 1993 and 6.291 million SA.

Chart I-35, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, 1979-1993, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The number of people working part-time because they cannot find full-time employment, not seasonally adjusted, increased sharply during the contraction from 3.787 million in Apr 2006, not seasonally adjusted, to 9.354 million in Dec 2009, as shown in Chart I-36. The number of people working part-time because of failure to find an alternative occupation stagnated at a very high level during the expansion, declining to 5.060 million not seasonally adjusted in Dec 2017. The level of part-time for economic reason was at 4.740 million NSA in Dec 2018 and 4.247 million NSA in Dec 2019, increasing to 5.955 million in Sep 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-36, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, 2001-2020, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-37 provides the level of marginally attached to the labor force from 2001 to 2020. There was sharp increase during the global recession and stability at a higher level until 2013. There is continuing decline through 2019 toward levels before the contraction of the economy. There is sharp increase in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart I-37, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

IA4 Job Creation. What is striking about the data in Table I-8 is that the numbers of monthly increases in jobs in 1983 and 1984 are several times higher than in 2010 to 2019. The civilian noninstitutional population grew by 48.8 percent from 174.215 million in 1983 to 259.175 million in 2019 and labor force higher by 46.6 percent, growing from 111.550 million in 1983 to 163.539 million in 2019.

Total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 0.661 million in Sep 2020 and private payroll employment increased 0.877 million. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm): “Our analysis suggests that the net effect of these hurricanes [Harvey and Irma] was to reduce the estimate of total nonfarm payroll employment for September. There was no discernible effect on the national unemployment rate. No changes were made to either the establishment or household survey estimation procedures for the September figures.” A hurdle in analyzing the labor market is the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). The average monthly number of nonfarm jobs created from Sep 2018 to Sep 2019 was 168,333 using seasonally adjusted data, while the average number of nonfarm jobs reduced from Sep 2019 to Sep 2020 was minus 804 or decrease by 100.5 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US from Sep 2018 to Sep 2019 was 154,917, using seasonally adjusted data, while the average from Sep 2019 to Sep 2020 was minus 733 or decrease by 100.5 percent. This blog calculates the effective labor force of the US at 172.611 million in Sep 2020 and 171.880 million in Sep 2019 (Table I-4), for growth of 0.731 million at average 60,917 per month. This situation will continue to challenge measurement (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm) and the return to fuller employment is unpredictable.

There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:

“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/new-nonfarm-hires-of-6.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/nonfarm-hires-jump-64.html). The proper explanation is not in secular stagnation but in cyclically slow growth. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 1.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 44 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIQ2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/gdp2q20_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ2019, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event would have accumulated to 44.7 percent. GDP in IIQ2020 would be $22,807.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $5505.1 billion than actual $17,302.5 billion. There are more than five trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 32.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 18.9 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). US GDP in IIQ2020 is 24.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,302.5 billion in IIQ2020 or 9.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Aug 1919 to Aug 2020. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 155.5554 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841 which is 36.2 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 163.3909 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841, which is 39.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Aug 2020. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.0774 in Aug 2020. The output of manufacturing at 99.2841 in Aug 2020 is 26.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 100.4257 in Aug 2020 or 16.3 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 164.9372 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 39.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 132.0705 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 24.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-8, US, Monthly Change in Jobs, Number SA

Month	1981	1982	1983	2008	2009	2010	Private
Jan	90	-330	219	11	-784	2	-7
Feb	72	-2	-73	-79	-743	-92	-77
Mar	105	-129	173	-49	-800	181	139
Apr	73	-284	274	-240	-695	231	180
May	13	-43	280	-177	-342	540	113
Jun	194	-242	377	-171	-467	-139	117
Jul	111	-344	416	-196	-340	-84	87
Aug	-36	-158	-308	-278	-183	-5	144
Sep	-88	-180	1118	-460	-241	-65	108
Oct	-97	-276	273	-481	-199	268	218
Nov	-209	-121	355	-727	12	125	135
Dec	-276	-15	355	-706	-269	72	93
			1984			2011	Private
Jan			443			19	27
Feb			484			212	255
Mar			272			235	258
Apr			363			314	322
May			306			101	156
Jun			381			236	201
Jul			310			60	175
Aug			243			126	158
Sep			312			233	267
Oct			285			204	189
Nov			353			132	159
Dec			125			202	219
			1985			2012	Private
Jan			265			354	362
Feb			131			262	261
Mar			339			240	244
Apr			196			82	94
May			274			100	120
Jun			147			73	54
Jul			189			152	169
Aug			192			172	169
Sep			205			187	178
Oct			188			159	181
Nov			210			156	176
Dec			166			239	235
			1986			2013	Private
Jan			123			191	209
Feb			115			278	266
Mar			87			139	150
Apr			187			191	192
May			127			222	227
Jun			-93			181	205
Jul			318			112	137
Aug			115			242	226
Sep			346			187	183
Oct			187			225	230
Nov			187			264	251
Dec			201			69	92
			1987			2014	Private
Jan			169			175	181
Feb			241			166	155
Mar			245			254	246
Apr			335			325	305
May			229			218	239
Jun			172			326	263
Jul			347			232	226
Aug			173			188	234
Sep			227			309	267
Oct			491			252	232
Nov			234			291	276
Dec			289			268	253
			1988			2015	Private
Jan			92			191	178
Feb			461			271	253
Mar			275			71	79
Apr			243			284	249
May			230			331	324
Jun			364			174	171
Jul			224			302	267
Aug			124			125	115
Sep			339			155	175
Oct			263			306	290
Nov			341			237	212
Dec			281			273	257
			1989			2016	Private
Jan			263			73	52
Feb			266			263	237
Mar			194			229	193
Apr			170			187	181
May			122			42	31
Jun			114			267	280
Jul			42			354	253
Aug			51			135	152
Sep			249			269	234
Oct			107			145	156
Nov			276			151	153
Dec			84			230	212
			1990			2017	Private
Jan			363			185	191
Feb			236			188	171
Mar			209			129	123
Apr			42			197	192
May			153			155	153
Jun			17			216	202
Jul			-32			215	202
Aug			-208			184	186
Sep			-98			18	9
Oct			-151			267	264
Nov			-153			225	201
Dec			-48			130	142
			1991			2018	Private
Jan			-111			121	147
Feb			-321			406	355
Mar			-160			176	178
Apr			-210			137	127
May			-115			278	261
Jun			85			219	191
Jul			-42			136	133
Aug			18			244	216
Sep			26			80	81
Oct			21			201	205
Nov			-61			134	133
Dec			32			182	173
			1992			2019	Private
Jan			41			269	258
Feb			-58			1	-6
Mar			54			147	132
Apr			154			210	185
May			130			85	87
Jun			66			182	180
Jul			78			194	160
Aug			132			207	157
Sep			34			208	195
Oct			180			185	190
Nov			133			261	247
Dec			223			184	164
			1993			2020
Jan			299			214	179
Feb			250			251	220
Mar			-50			-1373	-1356
Apr			302			-20787	-19835
May			272			2725	3236
Jun			181			4781	4729
Jul			306			1761	1526
Aug			151			1489	1022
Sep			242			661	877
Oct			285
Nov			251
Dec			330

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Charts numbered from I-38 to I-41 from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide a comparison of payroll survey data for the contractions and expansions in the 1980s and after 2007. Chart I-38 provides total nonfarm payroll jobs from 2001 to 2020. The sharp decline in total nonfarm jobs during the contraction after 2007 has been followed by initial stagnation and then inadequate growth in 2012 and 2013-2020 while population growth continued. There is sharp contraction in the final data point in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event, with recovery in May-Sep 2020 in partial return to economic activity.

Chart I-38, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-39 provides total nonfarm jobs SA from 1979 to 1993. Recovery is strong throughout the decade with the economy growing at trend over the entire economic cycle. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the decline of the curve in 1990 followed by incipient recovery.

Chart I-39, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1993

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Most job creation in the US is by the private sector. Chart I-40 shows the sharp destruction of private payroll jobs during the contraction after 2007. There has been growth after 2010 but insufficient to recover higher levels of employment prevailing before the contraction. At current rates, recovery of employment may spread over several years in contrast with past expansions of the business cycle in the US. There is sharp contraction in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event, with recovery in May-Aug 2020 in partial return to economic activity.

Chart I-40, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

In contrast, growth of private payroll jobs in the US recovered vigorously during the expansion in 1983 through 1985, as shown in Chart I-41. Rapid growth of creation of private jobs continued throughout the 1980s. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The third recession explains the decline of the curve in 1990 followed by recovery.

Chart I-41, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1993

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Types of jobs created, and not only the pace of job creation, may be important. Unemployment decreased sharply while employment declined rapidly in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). Aspects of growth of payroll jobs from Sep 2019 to Sep 2020, not seasonally adjusted (NSA), are in Table I-9. Data are in thousands. Total nonfarm employment decreased by 9,701,000 (row A, column Change), consisting of decrease of total private employment by 8,858,000 (row B, column Change) and decrease by 843,000 of government employment (row C, column Change). Manufacturing employment decreased 656,000 while private service providing employment decreased by 7,798,000. An aspect in Table I-9 is that jobs in professional and business services decreased 1,240,000 with temporary help services decreasing 474,000. This episode of jobless recovery was characterized during significant part of the lost cycle of the global recession by part-time jobs and creation of jobs that are inferior to those that have been lost. Monetary and fiscal stimuli fail to increase consumption and investment in a fractured job market. The segment leisure and hospitality decreased 3,635,000 jobs in 12 months. An important characteristic is that the loss of government jobs has stabilized in federal government with increase of 274,000 jobs while states decreased 245,000 jobs and local government reduced 872,000 jobs. Local government provides the bulk of government jobs, 13.670 million, while federal government provides 3.133 million and states’ government 4.993 million.

Table I-9, US, Employees in Nonfarm Payrolls Not Seasonally Adjusted, in Thousands

	Sep 2019	Sep 2020	Change
A Total Nonfarm	151,556	141,855	-9,701
B Total Private	128,917	120,059	-8,858
B1 Goods Producing	21,318	20,258	-1,060
B1a Manufacturing	12,880	12,224	-656
B2 Private service providing	107,599	99,801	-7,798
B2a Wholesale Trade	5,911	5,620	-291
B2b Retail Trade	15,487	15,061	-426
B2c Transportation & Warehousing	5,631	5,370	-261
B2d Financial Activities	8,775	8,682	-93
B2e Professional and Business Services	21,479	20,239	-1240
B2e1 Temporary help services	3017	2543	-474
B2f Health Care & Social Assistance	20,493	19,679	-814
B2g Leisure & Hospitality	16,759	13,124	-3,635
C Government	22,639	21,796	-843
C1 Federal	2,859	3,133	274
C2 State	5,238	4,993	-245
C3 Local	14,542	13,670	-872

Note: A = B+C, B = B1 + B2, C=C1 + C2 + C3

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Greater detail on the types of jobs created is provided in Table I-10 with data for Aug 2020 and

Sep 2020. Strong seasonal effects are shown by the significant difference between seasonally adjusted (SA) and not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA) data. The purpose of adjusting for seasonality is to isolate nonseasonal effects. Unemployment decreased sharply while employment declined rapidly in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). There is improvement in May-Sep 2020 in the return to economic activity. The 0.661 million SA total nonfarm jobs increased in Sep 2020 relative to Aug 2020 actually correspond to increase of 1137 thousand jobs NSA, as shown in row A. Most of this difference in Jan 2020 is due to the necessary benchmark and seasonal adjustments in the beginning of every year. The 0.877 thousand total private payroll jobs SA increased in Sep 2020 relative to Jul 2020 actually correspond to increase of 328 thousand jobs NSA. The analysis of NSA job creation in the prior Table I-9 does show improvement over the 12 months ending in Sep 2020 that is not clouded by seasonal variations but is inadequate number of jobs created. In fact, the 12-month rate of job creation without seasonal adjustment is stronger indication of marginal improvement in the US job market but that is still insufficient in reducing about 33 million people unemployed or underemployed. Benchmark and seasonal adjustments affect comparability of data over time. A hurdle in analyzing the labor market is the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm).

Table I-10, US, Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls and Selected Industry Detail, Thousands, SA and NSA

	Aug 2020	Sep 2020	∆	Aug 2020	Sep 2020	∆
A Total Nonfarm	141,059	141,720	661	140,718	141,855	1137
B Total Private	119,040	119,917	877	119,731	120,059	328
B1 Goods Producing	19,970	20,063	93	20,293	20,258	-35
B1a Constr.	7219	7245	26	7461	7415	-46
B Mfg	12,139	12,205	66	12,212	12,224	12
B2 Private Service Providing	99,070	99,854	784	99,438	99,801	363
B2a Wholesale Trade	5604	5623	19	5624	5620	-4
B2b Retail Trade	15,047	15,189	142	15,023	15,061	38
B2c Couriers & Mess.	926	937	11	883	904	21
B2f Leisure & Hospit.	12,709	13,027	318	13,231	13,124	-107

Notes: ∆: Absolute Change; Constr.: Construction; Mess.: Messengers; Temp: Temporary; Hospit.: Hospitality. SA aggregates do not add because of seasonal adjustment.

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Industrial production increased 0.4 percent in Aug 2020 and increased 3.5 percent in Jul 2020 after increasing 6.1 percent in Jun 2020, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 27, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to the growth rates for total IP for recent years were small and positive, with the estimates for 2016 and 2017 a bit higher and the estimates for 2015 and 2018 slightly lower.[2] Total IP is still reported to have increased from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014 before declining in 2015 and rebounding in mid-2016. Subsequently, the index advanced around 7 1/2 percent over 2017 and 2018.

Capacity for total industry expanded modestly in each year from 2015 to 2017 before advancing 1 1/2 percent in 2018; it is expected to advance about 2 percent in 2019. Revisions for recent years were very small and showed slightly less expansion in most years relative to earlier reports.

In the fourth quarter of 2018, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 79.4 percent, about 3/4 percentage point above its previous estimate and about 1/2 percentage point below its long-run (1972–2018) average. The utilization rate in 2017 is also higher than its previous estimate.”

The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm):

“Industrial production rose 0.4 percent in August for its fourth consecutive monthly increase. However, even after the recent gains, the index in August was 7.3 percent below its pre-pandemic February level. Manufacturing output continued to improve in August, rising 1.0 percent, but the gains for most manufacturing industries have gradually slowed since June. Mining production fell 2.5 percent in August, as Tropical Storm Marco and Hurricane Laura caused sharp but temporary drops in oil and gas extraction and well drilling. The output of utilities moved down 0.4 percent. At 101.4 percent of its 2012 average, the level of total industrial production was 7.7 percent lower in August than it was a year earlier. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector increased 0.3 percentage point in August to 71.4 percent, a rate that is 8.4 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2019) average but 7.3 percentage points above its low in April.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration, weakening growth in past months and deep contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Manufacturing decreased 22.3 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 18.3 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2019. Manufacturing increased 13.7 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Aug 2020. Manufacturing in Aug 2020 is lower by 11.6 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 1.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 44 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIQ2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/gdp2q20_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ2019, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event would have accumulated to 44.7 percent. GDP in IIQ2020 would be $22,807.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $5505.1 billion than actual $17,302.5 billion. There are more than five trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 32.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 18.9 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). US GDP in IIQ2020 is 24.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,302.5 billion in IIQ2020 or 9.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Aug 1919 to Aug 2020. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 155.5554 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841 which is 36.2 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 163.3909 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841, which is 39.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Aug 2020. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.0774 in Aug 2020. The output of manufacturing at 99.2841 in Aug 2020 is 26.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 100.4257 in Aug 2020 or 16.3 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 164.9372 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 39.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 132.0705 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 24.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 86.4 percent in IIQ2020. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Sep 2020, there were 141.855 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 120.059 million NSA in Sep 2020 accounted for 84.6 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 141.855 million, of which 12.224 million, or 10.2 percent of total private jobs and 8.6 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 99.801 million NSA in Sep 2020, or 70.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.1 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 8.7 percent in US national income in IIQ2020 and durable goods 5.1 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

	SAAR IQ2020	% Total	SAAR IIQ2020	% Total
National Income WCCA	18,092.3	100.0	15,768.7	100.0
Domestic Industries	17,849.1	98.7	15,616.8	99.0
Private Industries	15,767.2	87.1	13,626.3	86.4
Agriculture	147.5	0.8	94.2	0.6
Mining	155.5	0.9	62.9	0.4
Utilities	204.1	1.1	209.2	1.3
Construction	954.2	5.3	827.5	5.2
Manufacturing	1671.5	9.2	1374.2	8.7
Durable Goods	995.5	5.5	798.1	5.1
Nondurable Goods	676.0	3.7	576.1	3.7
Wholesale Trade	1010.9	5.6	876.7	5.6
Retail Trade	1204.8	6.7	1074.4	6.8
Transportation & WH	589.2	3.3	415.7	2.6
Information	692.0	3.8	634.6	4.0
Finance, Insurance, RE	3192.4	17.6	3218.9	20.4
Professional & Business Services	2737.7	15.1	2471.3	15.7
Education, Health Care	1873.3	10.4	1525.7	9.7
Arts, Entertainment	795.8	4.4	404.3	2.6
Other Services	538.4	3.0	436.7	2.8
Government	2081.9	11.5	1990.5	12.6
Rest of the World	243.2	1.3	151.9	1.0

Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; Percentages Calculates from Unrounded Data; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

Chart I-42 provides output of durable manufacturing from 1972 to 2020. Output fell sharply during the global recession, recovering at relatively high pace. Output is lower than extrapolation of trend. Output contracted in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. There is recovery in May-Aug 2020.

Chart I-42, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 1972-2020

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

The NBER dates recessions in the US from peaks to troughs as: IQ80 to IIIQ80, IIIQ81 to IV82 and IVQ07 to IIQ09 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). Table I-12 provides total annual level nonfarm employment in the US for the 1980s and the 2000s, which is different from 12-month comparisons. Nonfarm jobs rose by 4.859 million from 1982 to 1984, or 5.4 percent, and continued rapid growth in the rest of the decade. In contrast, nonfarm jobs are down by 7.636 million in 2010 relative to 2007 and fell by 951,000 in 2010 relative to 2009 even after six quarters of GDP growth. Monetary and fiscal stimuli have failed in increasing growth to rates required for mitigating job stress. The initial growth impulse reflects a flatter growth curve in the current expansion. Nonfarm jobs declined from 137.981 million in 2007 to 136.364 million in 2013, by 1.617 million or 1.2 percent. Nonfarm jobs increased from 137.981 million in 2007 to 150.939 million in 2019, by 12.958 million or 9.4 percent. The US noninstitutional population or in condition to work increased from 231.867 million in 2007 to 259.175 million in 2019, by 27.308 million or 11.8 percent. The ratio of nonfarm jobs of 137.981 million in 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.867 was 59.5. Nonfarm jobs in 2019 corresponding to the ratio of 59.5 of nonfarm jobs/noninstitutional population would be 154.209 million (0.595x259.175). The difference between actual nonfarm jobs of 150.939 million in 2019 and nonfarm jobs of 154.209 million that are equivalent to 59.5 percent of the noninstitutional population as in 2007 is 3.270 million fewer jobs. The proper explanation for this loss of work opportunities is not in secular stagnation but in cyclically slow growth. The NBER dates recessions in the US from peaks to troughs as: IQ80 to IIIQ80, IIIQ81 to IV82 and IVQ07 to IIQ09 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). US economic growth has been at only 1.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 44 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIQ2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/gdp2q20_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ2019, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2020 and in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event would have accumulated to 44.7 percent. GDP in IIQ2020 would be $22,807.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $5505.1 billion than actual $17,302.5 billion. There are more than five trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 32.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 18.9 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm). US GDP in IIQ2020 is 24.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,302.5 billion in IIQ2020 or 9.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Aug 1919 to Aug 2020. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 155.5554 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841 which is 36.2 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Aug 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the current global recession with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 163.3909 in Aug 2020. The actual index NSA in Aug 2020 is 99.2841, which is 39.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Aug 2020. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.0774 in Aug 2020. The output of manufacturing at 99.2841 in Aug 2020 is 26.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 100.4257 in Aug 2020 or 16.3 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 164.9372 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 39.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 132.0705 in Aug 2020. The NAICS index at 100.4257 in Aug 2020 is 24.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Employment in Thousands

Year	Total Nonfarm	Year	Total Nonfarm
1980	90,533	2000	132,011
1981	91,297	2001	132,073
1982	89,689	2002	130,634
1983	90,295	2003	130,331
1984	94,548	2004	131,769
1985	97,532	2005	134,034
1986	99,500	2006	136,435
1987	102,116	2007	137,981
1988	105,378	2008	137,224
1989	108,051	2009	131,296
1990	109,526	2010	130,345
1991	108,425	2011	131,914
1992	108,799	2012	134,157
1993	110,931	2013	136,364
1994	114,393	2014	138,940
1995	117,400	2015	141,825
1996	119,828	2016	144,336
1997	122,941	2017	146,608
1998	126,146	2018	148,908
1999	129,228	2019	150,939

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

Chart I-43 provides annual nonfarm jobs from 2000 to 2019. Cyclically slow growth in the expansion since IIIQ2009 has not been sufficient to recover nonfarm jobs. Because of population growth, there are 3.270 million fewer nonfarm jobs in the US in 2019 than in 2007.

Chart I-43, US, Annual Nonfarm Jobs, NSA, Thousands, 2000-2019

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

Chart I-44 provides annual nonfarm jobs in the US from 1980 to 1999. Much more rapid cyclical growth as in other expansions historically allowed steady and rapid growth of nonfarm job opportunities even with similarly dynamic population growth.

Chart I-44, US, Annual Nonfarm Jobs, NSA, Thousands, 1980-1999

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

The highest average yearly percentage of unemployed to the labor force since 1940 was 14.6 percent in 1940 followed by 9.9 percent in 1941, 8.5 percent in 1975, 9.7 percent in 1982 and 9.6 percent in 1983 (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2006/pdf/cpsaat1.pdf). The rate of unemployment remained at high levels in the 1930s, rising from 3.2 percent in 1929 to 22.9 percent in 1932 in one estimate and 23.6 percent in another with real wages increasing by 16.4 percent (Margo 1993, 43; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 214-5). There are alternative estimates of 17.2 percent or 9.5 percent for 1940 with real wages increasing by 44 percent. Employment declined sharply during the 1930s. The number of hours worked remained in 1939 at 29 percent below the level of 1929 (Cole and Ohanian 1999). Private hours worked fell in 1939 to 25 percent of the level in 1929. The policy of encouraging collusion through the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), to maintain high prices, together with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), to maintain high wages, prevented the US economy from recovering employment levels until Roosevelt abandoned these policies toward the end of the 1930s (for review of the literature analyzing the Great Depression see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 198-217).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) makes yearly revisions of its establishment survey (Harris 2011BA):

“With the release of data for January 2011, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) introduced its annual revision of national estimates of employment, hours, and earnings from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) monthly survey of nonfarm establishments. Each year, the CES survey realigns its sample-based estimates to incorporate universe counts of employment—a process known as benchmarking. Comprehensive counts of employment, or benchmarks, are derived primarily from unemployment insurance (UI) tax reports that nearly all employers are required to file with State Workforce Agencies.”

The number of not seasonally adjusted total private jobs in the US in Dec 2010 is 108.464 million, declining to 106.079 million in Jan 2011, or by 2.385 million, because of the adjustment of a different benchmark and not actual job losses. The not seasonally adjusted number of total private jobs in Dec 1984 is 80.250 million, declining to 78.704 million in Jan 1985, or by 1.546 million for the similar adjustment. Table I-13 attempts to measure job losses and gains in the recessions and expansions of 1981-1985 and 2007-2011. The final ten rows provide job creation from May 1983 to May 1984 and from May 2010 to May 2011, that is, at equivalent stages of the recovery from two comparable strong recessions. The row “Change ∆%” for May 1983 to May 1984 shows an increase of total nonfarm jobs by 4.9 percent and of 5.9 percent for total private jobs. The row “Change ∆%” for May 2010 to May 2011 shows an increase of total nonfarm jobs by 0.7 percent and of 1.7 percent for total private jobs. The last two rows of Table 7 provide a calculation of the number of jobs that would have been created from May 2010 to May 2011 if the rate of job creation had been the same as from May 1983 to May 1984. If total nonfarm jobs had grown between May 2010 and May 2011 by 4.9 percent, as between May 1983 and May 1984, 6.409 million jobs would have been created in the past 12 months for a difference of 5.457 million more total nonfarm jobs relative to 0.952 million jobs actually created. If total private jobs had grown between May 2010 and May 2011 by 5.9 percent as between May 1983 and May 1984, 6.337 million private jobs would have been created for a difference of 4.539 million more total private jobs relative to 1.798 million jobs actually created.

Table I-13, US, Total Nonfarm and Total Private Jobs Destroyed and Subsequently Created in Two Recessions IIIQ1981-IVQ1982 and IVQ2007-IIQ2009, Thousands and Percent

	Total Nonfarm Jobs	Total Private Jobs
06/1981 #	92,288	75,969
11/1982 #	89,482	73,260
Change #	-2,806	-2,709
Change ∆%	-3.0	-3.6
12/1982 #	89,383	73,185
05/1984 #	94,471	78,049
Change #	5,088	4,864
Change ∆%	5.7	6.6
11/2007 #	139,090	116,291
05/2009 #	131,626	108,601
Change %	-7,464	-7,690
Change ∆%	-5.4	-6.6
12/2009 #	130,178	107,338
05/2011 #	131,753	108,494
Change #	1,575	1,156
Change ∆%	1.2	1.1
05/1983 #	90,005	73,667
05/1984 #	94,471	78,049
Change #	4,466	4,382
Change ∆%	4.9	5.9
05/2010 #	130,801	107,405
05/2011 #	131,753	109,203
Change #	952	1,798
Change ∆%	0.7	1.7
Change # by ∆% as in 05/1984 to 05/1985	6,409*	6,337**
Difference in Jobs that Would Have Been Created	5,457 = 6,409-952	4,539 = 6,337-1,798

*[(130,801x1.049)-130,801] = 6,409 thousand

**[(107,405)x1.059 – 107,405] = 6,337 thousand

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/global-financial-risk-mediocre-united.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/historically-sharper-recoveries-from.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/mediocre-recovery-without-jobs.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/mediocre-growth-with-high-unemployment.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/mediocre-economic-growth-falling-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/mediocre-economic-growth-flattening.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/mediocre-economic-growth-financial.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/12/slow-growth-falling-real-disposable.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/us-growth-standstill-falling-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/slow-growth-driven-by-reducing-savings.html). Average hourly earnings seasonally adjusted increased 0.1 percent from $29.45 in Aug 2020 to $29.47 in Sep 2020. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm): “Similarly, changes in average hourly earnings in recent months must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 35 cents in June to $29.37, following a decrease of 31 cents in May and a gain of $1.34 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May and June, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of employment changes in the past 2 months.” Average private weekly earnings increased $53.91 from $968.70 in Sep 2019 to $1,022.61 in Sep 2020 or 5.6 percent and increased $3.64 from $1,018.97 in Aug 2020 to $1,022.61 in Sep 2020 or 0.4 percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics analyzes the increase in earnings (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm): “Similarly, changes in average hourly earnings in recent months must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 35 cents in June to $29.37, following a decrease of 31 cents in May and a gain of $1.34 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May and June, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of employment changes in the past 2 months.” The inflation-adjusted wage bill can only be calculated for Aug, which is the most recent month for which there are estimates of the consumer price index. Earnings per hour (not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA) rose from $27.94 in Aug 2019 to $29.47 in Aug 2020 or by 5.5 percent (https://www.bls.gov/data/); see Table IB-3 below). Data NSA are more suitable for comparison over a year. Average weekly hours NSA were 34.5 in

Aug 2019 and 34.2 in Aug 2020 (https://www.bls.gov/data/; see Table IB-2 below). The wage bill increased 7.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020:

{[(wage bill in Aug 2020)/(wage bill in Aug 2019)]-1}100 =

{[($29.47x35.2)/($27.94x34.5)]-1]}100

= {[($1037.34)/($963.93]-1}100 = 7.6%

CPI inflation was 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020 (https://www.bls.gov/cpi/) for an inflation-adjusted wage-bill change of percent: {[(1.076/1.013)-1]100 = 6.2%} (see Table IB-5 below for Aug 2020 with minor rounding difference). The wage bill for Sep 2020 before inflation adjustment increased 3.1 percent relative to the wage bill for Sep 2019:

{[(wage bill in Sep 2020)/(wage bill in Sep 2019)]-1}100 =

{[($29.43x34.5)/($28.30x34.8)]-1]}100

= {[($1015.34)/($984.84)]-1}100 = 3.1%

Average hourly earnings increased 4.0 percent from Sep 2019 to Sep 2020 {[($29.43/$28.30) – 1]100 = 4.0%} while hours worked decreased 0.9 percent {[(34.5/34.8) – 1]100 = -0.9%}. The increase of the wage bill is the product of the increase of hourly earnings of 4.0 percent and decrease of hours worked of 0.9 percent {[(1.04x0.99)-1]100 = 3.1%} with small rounding error. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm): “Similarly, changes in average hourly earnings in recent months must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 35 cents in June to $29.37, following a decrease of 31 cents in May and a gain of $1.34 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May and June, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of employment changes in the past 2 months.” Energy and food price increases are similar to a “silent tax” that is highly regressive, harming the most those with lowest incomes. There are concerns that the wage bill would deteriorate in purchasing power because of renewed raw materials shocks in the form of increases in prices of commodities such as the 31.1 percent steady increase in the DJ-UBS Commodity Index from Jul 2, 2010 to Sep 2, 2011. The charts of four commodity price indexes by Bloomberg show steady increase since Jul 2, 2010 that was interrupted briefly only in Nov 2010 with the sovereign issues in Europe triggered by Ireland; in Mar 2011 by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and in the beginning of May 2011 by the decline in oil prices and sovereign risk difficulties in Europe (http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/commodities/futures/). Renewed risk aversion because of the sovereign risks in Europe had reduced the rate of increase of the DJ UBS commodity index to 10.2 percent on May 2, 2014, relative to Jul 2, 2010 (see Table VI-4) but there has been a shift in investor preferences into equities. Inflation has been rising in waves with carry trades driven by zero interest rates to commodity futures during periods of risk appetite with interruptions during risk aversion (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html). Inflation-adjusted wages fall sharply during carry trades from zero interest rates to long positions in commodity futures during periods of risk appetite.

Table IB-1, US, Earnings per Hour and Average Weekly Hours SA

Earnings per Hour	Sep 2019	Jul 2020	Aug 2020	Sep 2020
Total Private	$28.16	$29.35	$29.45	$29.47
Goods Producing	$29.18	$30.05	$30.16	$30.11
Service Providing	$27.92	$29.19	$29.28	$29.32
Average Weekly Earnings
Total Private	$968.70	$1,051.51	$1,018.97	$1,022.61
Goods Producing	$1,178.87	$1,186.98	$1,197.35	$1,198.38
Service Providing	$926.94	$977.87	$983.81	$988.08
Average Weekly Hours
Total Private	34.4	34.6	34.6	34.7
Goods Producing	40.4	39.5	39.7	39.8
Service Providing	33.2	33.5	33.6	33.7

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Average weekly hours in Table IB-2 fell from 34.8 in Dec 2007 at the beginning of the contraction to 33.7 in Jun 2009, which was the last month of the contraction. Average weekly hours rose to 34.4 in Dec 2011 and oscillated to 34.8 in Dec 2012 and 34.7 in Dec 2013. Average weekly hours of all employees decreased to 34.6 in Dec 2014 and 34.5 in Dec 2015. Average weekly hours stood at 34.3 in Dec 2016. Average weekly hours reached 34.5 in Dec 2017, increasing to 34.9 in Dec 2018. Average weekly hours moved to 34.7 in Dec 2019 and 34.5 in Sep 2020. The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (https://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent months.

Table IB-2, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, NSA 2006-2020

Year	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Dec	Annual
2006	34.1	34.4	34.7	34.5	34.3	34.4
2007	34.3	34.5	34.8	34.5	34.8	34.8	34.4
2008	34.2	34.8	34.3	34.5	34.2	33.9	34.3
2009	33.6	33.7	33.8	34.3	33.7	33.8	33.8
2010	34.4	34.1	34.2	34.7	34.1	34.2	34.1
2011	34.6	34.3	34.4	34.4	34.3	34.4	34.3
2012	34.2	34.4	34.7	34.5	34.8	34.8	34.5
2013	34.3	34.9	34.3	34.5	34.9	34.7	34.4
2014	34.4	34.9	34.5	34.6	34.5	34.6	34.5
2015	34.4	34.5	34.5	35.1	34.3	34.5	34.5
2016	34.6	34.4	34.4	34.4	34.4	34.3	34.4
2017	34.3	34.4	34.8	34.4	34.3	34.5	34.4
2018	34.4	34.6	34.9	34.6	34.8	34.9	34.5
2019	34.3	34.9	34.3	34.5	34.8	34.7	34.4
2020	34.6	34.6	34.5	35.2	34.5

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart IB-1 provides average weekly hours of all employees seasonally adjusted. There was sharp contraction during the global recession. Hours returned to levels before the contraction.

Chart IB-1, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, SA 2006-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Calculations of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings using BLS data are in Table IB-3. The final column of Table IB-3 (“12-Month Real ∆%”) provides inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of all employees in the US. Average hourly earnings rose above inflation throughout the first nine months of 2007 just before the global recession that began in the final quarter of 2007 when average hourly earnings began to lose to inflation. In contrast, average hourly earnings of all US workers have risen less than inflation in four months in 2010 and in all but the first month in 2011 and the loss accelerated at 1.8 percent in Sep 2011, declining to a real loss of 1.1 percent in Feb 2012 and 0.6 percent in Mar 2012. There was a gain of 0.5 percent in Apr 2012 in inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings but another fall of 0.6 percent in May 2012 followed by increases of 0.3 percent in Jun and 1.0 percent in Jul 2012. Real hourly earnings stagnated in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 with increase of only 0.1 percent and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 1.3 percent in Oct 2012 and gained 1.1 percent in Dec 2012 but declined 0.2 percent in Jan 2013 and stagnated at change of 0.2 percent in Feb 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013 and 0.2 percent in Apr 2013, increasing 0.6 percent in May 2013. In Jun 2013, real hourly earnings increased 1.0 percent relative to Jun 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013 and 1.0 percent in Nov 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014. Real hourly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Real hourly earnings stagnated at 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014. Real hourly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Real hourly earnings fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014 and increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015 and 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015 and increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015 and increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015 and increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2016 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016 and increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016 and increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016 and increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016 and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017. Real hourly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2017 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2017 and decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2017 and increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2017 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2017 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017. Real hourly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2018 and increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2018 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2018, changing 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2018. Real hourly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018. Real hourly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 7.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 6.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 3.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 4.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020. The Bureau of Labor Statistics advises on hourly earnings in Apr 2020 (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm): “Similarly, estimates of average hourly earnings for April also must be interpreted with extra caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls rose by $1.34 in April to $30.01, following a gain of 15 cents in March. While some workers experienced an increase in pay in April, the increase in average hourly earnings reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls; their removal put upward pressure on the average hourly earnings estimate.” The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-may-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm): “Similarly, estimates of average hourly earnings for May must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 29 cents in May to $29.75, following a gain of $1.35 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of the employment change. The large changes in employment in recent months make it difficult to discern longer-term trends in the hours and earnings measures.” The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm): “Similarly, changes in average hourly earnings in recent months must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 35 cents in June to $29.37, following a decrease of 31 cents in May and a gain of $1.34 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May and June, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of employment changes in the past 2 months.” Real hourly earnings are oscillating in part because of world inflation waves caused by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html) and also by weak economic growth (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.

Table IB-3, US, Average Hourly Earnings Nominal and Inflation Adjusted, Dollars and % NSA

	AHE ALL	12 Month- Nominal ∆%	∆% 12 Month CPI	12-Month Real ∆%
2007
Jan*	$20.69*	4.2*	2.1	2.1*
Feb*	$20.77*	4.1*	2.4	1.7*
Mar	$20.75	3.4	2.8	0.6
Apr	$20.99	3.1	2.6	0.5
May	$20.77	3.5	2.7	0.8
Jun	$20.77	3.6	2.7	0.9
Jul	$20.94	3.3	2.4	0.9
Aug	$20.79	3.3	2.0	1.3
Sep	$21.12	3.8	2.8	1.0
Oct	$21.01	2.4	3.5	-1.1
Nov	$21.07	3.1	4.3	-1.2
Dec	$21.30	3.4	4.1	-0.7
2010
Jan	$22.51	2.1	2.6	-0.5
Feb	$22.57	1.6	2.1	-0.5
Mar	$22.48	1.2	2.3	-1.1
Apr	$22.53	1.8	2.2	-0.4
May	$22.60	2.5	2.0	0.5
Jun	$22.34	1.8	1.1	0.6
Jul	$22.41	1.9	1.2	0.7
Aug	$22.54	1.7	1.1	0.7
Sep	$22.60	1.8	1.1	0.7
Oct	$22.69	1.9	1.2	0.7
Nov	$22.69	1.1	1.1	0.0
Dec	$22.76	1.7	1.5	0.2
2011
Jan	$23.16	2.9	1.6	1.3
Feb	$22.99	1.9	2.1	-0.2
Mar	$22.90	1.9	2.7	-0.8
Apr	$22.96	1.9	3.2	-1.3
May	$23.06	2.0	3.6	-1.5
Jun	$22.81	2.1	3.6	-1.4
Jul	$22.94	2.4	3.6	-1.2
Aug	$22.84	1.3	3.8	-2.4
Sep	$23.05	2.0	3.9	-1.8
Oct	$23.29	2.6	3.5	-0.9
Nov	$23.14	2.0	3.4	-1.4
Dec	$23.21	2.0	3.0	-1.0
2012
Jan	$23.55	1.7	2.9	-1.2
Feb	$23.40	1.8	2.9	-1.1
Mar	$23.38	2.1	2.7	-0.6
Apr	$23.61	2.8	2.3	0.5
May	$23.32	1.1	1.7	-0.6
Jun	$23.26	2.0	1.7	0.3
Jul	$23.48	2.4	1.4	1.0
Aug	$23.26	1.8	1.7	0.1
Sep	$23.67	2.7	2.0	0.7
Oct	$23.51	0.9	2.2	-1.3
Nov	$23.58	1.9	1.8	0.1
Dec	$23.85	2.8	1.7	1.1
2013
Jan	$23.87	1.4	1.6	-0.2
Feb	$23.90	2.1	2.0	0.2
Mar	$23.84	2.0	1.5	0.5
Apr	$23.92	1.3	1.1	0.2
May	$23.79	2.0	1.4	0.6-
Jun	$23.92	2.8	1.8	1.0
Jul	$23.80	1.4	2.0	-0.6
Aug	$23.79	2.3	1.5	0.8
Sep	$24.16	2.1	1.2	0.9
Oct	$24.04	2.3	1.0	1.3
Nov	$24.11	2.2	1.2	1.0
Dec	$24.30	1.9	1.5	0.4
2014
Jan	$24.34	2.0	1.6	0.4
Feb	$24.58	2.8	1.1	1.7
Mar	$24.49	2.7	1.5	1.2
Apr	$24.40	2.0	2.0	0.0
May	$24.30	2.1	2.1	0.0
Jun	$24.42	2.1	2.1	0.0
Jul	$24.30	2.1	2.0	0.1
Aug	$24.32	2.2	1.7	0.5
Sep	$24.50	1.4	1.7	-0.3
Oct	$24.52	2.0	1.7	0.3
Nov	$24.78	2.8	1.3	1.5
Dec	$24.58	1.2	0.8	0.4
2015
Jan	$24.87	2.2	-0.1	2.3
Feb	$25.05	1.9	0.0	1.9
Mar	$25.04	2.2	-0.1	2.3
Apr	$24.94	2.2	-0.2	2.4
May	$24.88	2.4	0.0	2.4
Jun	$24.76	1.4	0.1	1.3
Jul	$24.83	2.2	0.2	2.0
Aug	$25.03	2.9	0.2	2.7
Sep	$25.05	2.2	0.0	2.2
Oct	$25.14	2.5	0.2	2.3
Nov	$25.37	2.4	0.5	1.9
Dec	$25.20	2.5	0.7	1.8
2016
Jan	$25.50	2.5	1.4	1.1
Feb	$25.48	1.7	1.0	0.7
Mar	$25.49	1.8	0.9	0.9
Apr	$25.59	2.6	1.1	1.5
May	$25.67	3.2	1.0	2.2
Jun	$25.41	2.6	1.0	1.6
Jul	$25.52	2.8	0.8	2.0
Aug	$25.50	1.9	1.1	0.8
Sep	$25.73	2.7	1.5	1.2
Oct	$26.02	3.5	1.6	1.9
Nov	$25.84	1.9	1.7	0.2
Dec	$25.87	2.7	2.1	0.6
2017
Jan	$26.31	3.2	2.5	0.7
Feb	$26.17	2.7	2.7	0.0
Mar	$26.14	2.6	2.4	0.2
Apr	$26.42	3.2	2.2	1.0
May	$26.13	1.8	1.9	-0.1
Jun	$26.03	2.4	1.6	0.8
Jul	$26.35	3.3	1.7	1.6
Aug	$26.17	2.6	1.9	0.7
Sep	$26.46	2.8	2.2	0.6
Oct	$26.62	2.3	2.0	0.3
Nov	$26.47	2.4	2.2	0.2
Dec	$26.58	2.7	2.1	0.6
2018
Jan	$26.86	2.1	2.1	0.0
Feb	$26.84	2.6	2.2	0.4
Mar	$26.87	2.8	2.4	0.4
Apr	$27.16	2.8	2.5	0.3
May	$26.90	2.9	2.8	0.1
Jun	$26.79	2.9	2.9	0.0
Jul	$27.10	2.8	2.9	-0.1
Aug	$27.00	3.2	2.7	0.5
Sep	$27.45	3.7	2.3	1.4
Oct	$27.31	2.6	2.5	0.1
Nov	$27.35	3.3	2.2	1.1
Dec	$27.69	4.2	1.9	2.3
2019
Jan	$27.72	3.2	1.6	1.6
Feb	$27.79	3.5	1.5	2.0
Mar	$27.79	3.4	1.9	1.5
Apr	$27.86	2.6	2.0	0.6
May	$27.78	3.3	1.8	1.5
Jun	$27.90	4.1	1.6	2.5
Jul	$27.87	2.8	1.8	1.0
Aug	$27.94	3.5	1.7	1.8
Sep	$28.30	3.1	1.7	1.4
Oct	$28.19	3.2	1.8	1.4
Nov	$28.26	3.3	2.1	1.2
Dec	$28.51	3.0	2.3	0.7
2020
Jan	$28.56	3.0	2.5	0.5
Feb	$28.82	3.7	2.3	1.4
Mar	$28.88	3.9	1.5	2.4
Apr	$30.08	8.0	0.3	7.7
May	$29.61	6.6	0.1	6.5
Jun	$29.08	4.2	0.6	3.6
Jul	$29.19	4.7	1.0	3.7
Aug	$29.47	5.5	1.3	4.1
Sep	$29.43	4.0

Note: AHE ALL: average hourly earnings of all employees; CPI: consumer price index; Real: adjusted by CPI inflation; NA: not available

*AHE of production and nonsupervisory employees because of unavailability of data for all employees for Jan-Feb 2006

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Calculations of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings by the BLS are in Table IB-4. Average hourly earnings rose above inflation throughout the first nine months of 2007 just before the global recession that began in the final quarter of 2007 when average hourly earnings began to lose to inflation. In contrast, average hourly earnings of all US workers have risen less than inflation in four months in 2010 and in all but the first month in 2011 and the loss accelerated at 1.8 percent in Sep 2011, declining to a real loss of 1.1 percent in Feb 2012 and 0.6 percent in Mar 2012. There was a gain of 0.5 percent in Apr 2012 in inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings but another fall of 0.6 percent in May 2012 followed by increases of 0.3 percent in Jun and 1.0 percent in Jul 2012. Real hourly earnings stagnated in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 with increase of only 0.2 percent and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 1.3 percent in Oct 2012 and gained 1.1 percent in Dec 2012 but declined 0.2 percent in Jan 2013 and stagnated at change of 0.1 percent in Feb 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013 and 0.3 percent in Apr 2013, increasing 0.6 percent in May 2013. In Jun 2013, real hourly earnings increased 1.0 percent relative to Jun 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013 and 1.0 percent in Nov 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014. Real hourly changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Real hourly changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Real hourly earnings fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014 and 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015 and 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015 and increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015. Average hourly earnings increased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015 and increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2016 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016 and increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016 and increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016 and increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016 and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017.

Real hourly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2017 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2017 and decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2017 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2017 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2017 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017. Real hourly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2018 and increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2018 and increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2018 and changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2018. Real hourly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2018 and increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018 and changed 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2018 and increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2018. Real hourly earnings increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2019 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2019 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2019 and increased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019. Real hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 7.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 6.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 3.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2020. Real hourly earnings increased 4.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm): “Similarly, estimates of average hourly earnings for May must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 29 cents in May to $29.75, following a gain of $1.35 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of the employment change. The large changes in employment in recent months make it difficult to discern longer-term trends in the hours and earnings measures.” The economic welfare or wellbeing of United States workers deteriorated in a recovery without hiring (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/new-nonfarm-hires-of-6.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/nonfarm-hires-jump-64.html), stagnating/declining real wages and 32.7 million unemployed or underemployed (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html) because of mediocre economic growth (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (https://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.

Table IB-4, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984

Year	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Dec
2006	9.91	9.88	9.97	9.87	10.21
2007	9.99	9.97	10.05	10.00	10.14
2008	9.88	9.82	9.75	9.81	10.45
2009	10.31	10.18	10.22	10.27	10.36
2010	10.36	10.25	10.28	10.32	10.38
2011	10.21	10.11	10.15	10.08	10.28
2012	10.15	10.14	10.25	10.10	10.39
∆%12M	-0.6	0.3	1.0	0.2	1.1
2013	10.21	10.24	10.19	10.17	10.43
∆%12M	0.6	1.0	-0.6	0.7	0.4
2014	10.21	10.25	10.20	10.22	10.47
∆%12M	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.4
2015	10.46	10.38	10.40	10.50	10.65
∆%12M	2.4	1.3	2.0	2.7	1.7
2016	10.69	10.54	10.61	10.59	10.72
∆%12M	2.2	1.5	2.0	0.9	0.7
2017	10.68	10.63	10.76	10.66	10.78
∆%12M	-0.1	0.9	1.4	0.7	0.6
2018	10.69	10.63	10.75	10.71	11.02
∆%12M	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.5	2.2
2019	10.85	10.89	10.86	10.89	11.09
∆%12M	1.5	2.4	1.0	1.7	0.6
2020	11.55	11.28	11.27	11.34
∆%12M	6.5	3.6	3.8	4.1

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart IB-2 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics plots average hourly earnings of all US employees in constant 1982-1984 dollars with evident decline from annual earnings of $10.33 in 2009 and $10.35 in 2010 to $10.24 in 2011 and $10.23 in 2012 or loss of 1.0 percent (data in https://www.bls.gov/data/). Annual real hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in 2013 relative to 2012 and increased 0.5 percent in 2014 relative to 2013. Annual real hourly earnings increased 2.1 percent in 2015 relative to 2014. Annual real hourly earnings increased 1.2 percent in 2016 relative to 2015. Annual real hourly earnings increased 0.6 percent in 2017. Annual hourly earnings increased 0.6 percent in 2018. Annual hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in 2019. Annual real hourly earnings increased 8.5 percent from 2007 to 2019 at the rate of 0.7 percent per year. Annual real hourly earnings increased 6.0 percent from 2009 to 2019 at the rate of 0.6 percent per year and increased 9.4 percent from 2008 to 2019 at the rate of 0.8 percent per year. Real hourly earnings of US workers are crawling in a fractured labor market. The economic welfare or wellbeing of United States workers deteriorated in a recovery without hiring (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/new-nonfarm-hires-of-6.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/nonfarm-hires-jump-64.html), stagnating/declining real wages and 32.7 million unemployed or underemployed (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html) because of mediocre economic growth (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.

Chart IB-2, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

Chart IB-3 provides 12-month percentage changes of average hourly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984, that is, adjusted for inflation. There was sharp contraction of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of US employees during parts of 2007 and 2008. Rates of change in 12 months became positive in parts of 2009 and 2010 but then became negative again in 2011 and into 2012 with temporary increase in Apr 2012 that was reversed in May with another gain in Jun and Jul 2012 followed by stagnation in Aug 2012. There was marginal gain in Sep 2012 with sharp decline in Oct 2012, stagnation in Nov 2012, increase in Dec 2012 and renewed decrease in Jan 2013 with near stagnation in Feb 2013 followed by mild increase in Mar-Apr 2013. Hourly earnings adjusted for inflation increased in Jun 2013 and fell in Jul 2013, increasing in Aug-Dec 2013 and Jan-Mar 2014. Average hourly earnings stagnated in Apr-May 2014 and rebounded mildly in Jul 2014, increasing in Aug 2014 and Sep 2014. Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation increased in Oct-Dec 2014, Jan-Dec 2015, Jan-Dec 2016 and Jan-Apr 2017, stabilizing in May 2017 and increasing/decreasing in oscillations in Jun-Dec 2017. Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation increased in Jan-Apr 2018. Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation stagnated in May-Jun 2018 and decreased in Jul 2018. Average hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in Aug 2018. Average hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in Sep 2018 and changed 0.1 percent in Oct 2018, increasing 1.1 percent in Nov 2018. Average hourly earnings increased 2.2 percent in Dec 2018 and increased 1.6 percent in Jan 2019. Average hourly earnings increased 1.9 percent in Feb 2019 and increased 1.5 percent in Mar 2019. Average hourly earnings increased 0.6 percent in Apr 2019 and increased 1.5 percent in May 2019. Average hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in Jun 2019 and increased 1.0 percent in Jul 2019. Average hourly earnings increased 1.7 percent in Aug 2019 and increased 1.4 percent in Sep 2019. Average hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in Oct 2019 and increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019. Average hourly earnings increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019 and increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2020. Average hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2020. Average hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2020. Average hourly earnings increased 7.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2020. Average hourly earnings increased 6.5 percent in the 12 months ending May 2020. Average hourly earnings increased 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2020. Average hourly earnings increased 3.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2020. Average hourly earnings increased 4.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020. The Bureau of Labor Statistics advises on hourly earnings in Apr 2020 (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm): “Similarly, estimates of average hourly earnings for April also must be interpreted with extra caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls rose by $1.34 in April to $30.01, following a gain of 15 cents in March. While some workers experienced an increase in pay in April, the increase in average hourly earnings reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls; their removal put upward pressure on the average hourly earnings estimate.” The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (): “Similarly, estimates of average hourly earnings for May must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 29 cents in May to $29.75, following a gain of $1.35 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of the employment change. The large changes in employment in recent months make it difficult to discern longer-term trends in the hours and earnings measures.” The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm): “Similarly, changes in average hourly earnings in recent months must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 35 cents in June to $29.37, following a decrease of 31 cents in May and a gain of $1.34 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May and June, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of employment changes in the past 2 months.”

Chart IB-3, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA 12-Month Percent Change, 1982-1984 Dollars, NSA 2007-2020

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

Average weekly earnings of the dataset of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are in Table IB-5. Average weekly earnings fell 3.2 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Aug 2011, decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2011 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2011. Average weekly earnings fell 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2011 and fell 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2011. Average weekly earnings declined 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 and fell 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars were virtually flat in Mar 2012 relative to Mar 2011, decreasing 0.2 percent. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 1.7 percent in Apr 2012 relative to Apr 2011 but fell 1.7 percent in May 2012 relative to May 2011, increasing 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2012 and 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2012. Real weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 and 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 2.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2012 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2012 and 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 and virtually stagnated with gain of 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013, increasing 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013. Real weekly earnings fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 and fell 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013. Real weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013, 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013 and 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014 and 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014 and changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Real average weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Real weekly earnings decreased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015 and increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015. Average weekly earnings increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015 and 4.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015 and increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016. Average weekly earnings contracted 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015 and contracted 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016 and increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016 and increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016 and increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016 and decreased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016. Average weekly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016 and increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017. Average weekly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2017 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2017 and increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2017 and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2017 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2018 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2018 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2018 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018 and decreased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 3.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2019 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2019 and increased 3.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2019 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 7.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 7.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 4.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 6.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020. Table I-5 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average weekly earnings in 2011 and into 2013 with oscillations according to carry trades causing world inflation waves (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html). On an annual basis, average weekly earnings in constant 1982-1984 dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $354.10 in 2013, by 2.0 percent or at the average rate of 0.3 percent per year (data in http://www.bls.gov/data/). Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars of $352.92 in 2010 fell 0.4 percent to $351.54 in 2011. Annual average weekly earnings increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $356.85 in 2014 or by 2.8 at the average rate of 0.4 percent. Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $364.56 in 2015 by 5.0 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollar increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $367.11 in 2016 by 5.8 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $369.69 in 2017 by 6.5 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $372.90 in 2018 by 7.4 percent at the average rate of 0.7 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $376.71 in 2019 by 8.5 percent at the average rate of 0.7 percent per year. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer high-quality goods than a year earlier. The fractured US job market does not provide an opportunity for advancement as in past booms following recessions because of poor job creation with 32.7 million unemployed or underemployed (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html) because of mediocre economic growth (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/dollar-carry-trades-induced-from-zero.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html).The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.

Table IB-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, NSA 2006-2020

Year	Jun	Jul	Aug	Dec
2006	339.76	345.81	340.43	351.16
2007	343.92	349.84	344.97	352.91
2008	341.61	334.32	338.41	354.11
2009	342.95	345.30	352.16	350.29
2010	349.50	351.55	358.27	355.14
2011	346.61	349.30	346.82	353.80
2012	348.68	355.63	348.33	361.49
∆%12M	0.6	1.8	0.4	2.2
2013	357.51	349.47	350.94	361.82
∆%12M	2.5	-1.7	0.7	0.1
2014	357.58	351.88	353.78	362.19
∆%12M	0.0	0.7	0.8	0.1
2015	357.96	358.95	368.65	367.57
∆%12M	0.1	2.0	4.2	1.5
2016	362.67	364.83	364.21	367.53
∆%12M	1.3	1.6	-1.2	0.0
2017	365.55	374.60	366.67	371.98
∆%12M	0.8	2.7	0.7	1.2
2018	367.85	375.30	370.50	384.65
∆%12M	0.6	0.2	1.0	3.4
2019	380.14	372.58	375.72	384.98
∆%12M	3.3	-0.7	1.4	0.1
2020	390.30	388.67	399.10
∆%12M	2.7	4.3	6.2

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics