Sunday, January 30, 2022

FOMC states “With inflation well above 2 percent and a strong labor market, the Committee expects it will soon be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate.” FOMC to end purchases of assets in Mar 2022, Revaluation of the US Dollar, US GDP Growing at SAAR of 6.9 Percent in IVQ2021 and Growing 5.5 Percent Relative to a Year Earlier in Continuing Recovery In the Global Recession, with Output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the Lockdown of Economic activity in the COVID-19 Event and the Through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Real Private Fixed Investment, US Terms of International Trade, United States House Sales and House Prices, World Inflation Waves, Increasing Inflation in the US and Worldwide, Stagflation Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part I

 

FOMC states “With inflation well above 2 percent and a strong labor market, the Committee expects it will soon be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate.” FOMC to end purchases of assets in Mar 2022, Revaluation of the US Dollar, US GDP Growing at SAAR of 6.9 Percent in IVQ2021 and Growing 5.5 Percent Relative to a Year Earlier in Continuing Recovery In the Global Recession, with Output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the Lockdown of Economic activity in the COVID-19 Event and the Through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Real Private Fixed Investment, US Terms of International Trade, United States House Sales and House Prices, World Inflation Waves, Increasing Inflation in the US and Worldwide, Stagflation Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022.

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment

IID United States Terms of International Trade

IIA United States Housing Collapse

IIA1 Sales of New Houses

IIA2 United States House Prices

I World Inflation Waves

IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IC United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

Preamble. The current federal debt of the United States is $29.04 trillion subject to debt limit of $31.4 trillion (https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/FINAL-Daily-Debt-Subject-Limit-Activity-2021_12_15.pdf). The Net International Investment Position of the United States, or foreign debt, is $16.1 trillion (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/intinv321.pdf https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). The United States current account deficit is 3.7 percent of GDP in IIIQ2021 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). The Treasury deficit of the United States reached $2.8 trillion in fiscal year 2021 (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/). Total assets of Federal Reserve Banks reached $8.9 trillion on Jan 26, 2022 and securities held outright reached $8.4 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). US GDP nominal NSA reached $24.0 trillion in IVQ2021 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Total Treasury interest-bearing, marketable debt held by private investors increased from $3635 billion in 2007 to $16,439 billion in Sep 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021) or increase by 352.2 percent (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/).

Chart VII-4 of the Energy Information Administration provides the price of the Natural Gas Futures Contract increasing from $2.581 on Jan 4, 2021 to $4.053 per million Btu on Jan 25, 2022 or 57.0 percent.

clip_image002

Chart VII-4, US, Natural Gas Futures Contract 1

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1d.htm

Chart CPI-H provides 12 months percentage changes of the US Consumer Price Index from 1981 to 2021. The increase of 7.0 percent of the US CPI in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021 is the highest since 7.1 percent in Jun 1982 in the beginning adjustment from the Great Inflation.

clip_image003

Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2021

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

I Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Four Trillion Dollars below Trend. IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth provides the analysis of long-term and cyclical growth of GDP in the US with GDP Four Trillion Dollars or 17.0 percent below trend. Section IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment analyzes weakness in investment in the initial part of the cycle followed by stronger performance and recent weakness/recovery in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Section IID United States International Terms of Trade provides data and analysis of relative prices in US international trade.

There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:

  • Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP three trillion dollars below trend). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.1 percent per year from 1929 to 2021 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html), with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2020 and 1.3 percent from 2007 to 2020. GDP in IIIQ2021 is 17.7 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent.

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)

The Bureau of Economic Analysis revised the national accounts of the United States since 1929 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/gdp2q18_adv.pdf):

“Comprehensive Update of the National Income and Product Accounts The estimates released today also reflect the results of the 15th comprehensive update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The updated estimates reflect previously announced improvements, and include the introduction of new not seasonally adjusted estimates for GDP, GDI, and their major components. For more information, see the Technical Note. Revised NIPA table stubs, initial results, and background materials are available on the BEA Web site.” The Bureau of Economic Analysis provided the annual revision of the national product accounts in the release of the first estimate or advanced estimate of IIQ2019 GDP (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-07/gdp2q19_adv.pdf): “The estimates released today also reflect the results of the Annual Update of the National Income and

Product Accounts (NIPAs). The update covers the first quarter of 2014 through the first quarter of 2019.” The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the annual revision of the national product accounts in the release of the first estimate or advanced estimate of IIQ2020 GDP (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/gdp2q20_adv.pdf): “The estimates released today also reflect the results of the Annual Update of the National Income and

Product Accounts (NIPAs). The timespan of the update is the first quarter of 2015 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of real GDP and its major components, and the first quarter of 1999 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of income and saving. The reference year remains 2012. More information on the 2020 Annual Update is included in the May Survey of Current Business article, “GDP and the Economy.” The BEA provided the annual update of the national accounts in the first or advanced estimate of IIQ2021 GDP (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/gdp2q21_adv.pdf): “Today’s release also reflects the Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts; the updated Industry Economic Accounts will be released on September 30, 2021, along with the third estimate of GDP for the second quarter of 2021. The timespan of the update is the first quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2021 and resulted in revisions to GDP, GDI, and their major components. The reference year remains 2012. More information on the 2021 Annual Update is included in the May Survey of Current Business article, GDP and the Economy. For the period of economic expansion from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019, real GDP increased at an annual rate of 2.3 percent, the same as previously published. For the period of economic contraction from the fourth quarter of 2019 through the second quarter of 2020, real GDP decreased at an annual rate of 19.2 percent, also the same as previously published. For the period of economic expansion from the second quarter of 2020 through the first quarter of 2021, real GDP increased at an annual rate of 14.1 percent, an upward revision of 0.1 percentage point from the previously published estimate. With today's release, most NIPA tables are available through BEA’s Interactive Data application on the BEA website (www.bea.gov). See Information on Updates to the National Economic Accounts for the complete table release schedule and a summary of results through 2020, which includes a discussion of methodology changes. A table showing the major current-dollar revisions and their sources for each component of GDP, national income, and personal income is also provided. The August 2021 Survey of Current Business will contain an article describing the update in more detail. Previously published estimates, which are superseded by today's release, are found in BEA’s archives.”

Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions.

The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as fluctuating from mediocre growth of 2.7 percent on an annual basis in 2010 to 1.5 percent in 2011, 2.3 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.3 percent in 2014 and 2.7 percent in 2015. GDP growth was 1.7 percent in 2016 and 2.3 percent in 2017. GDP growth was 2.9 percent in 2018 and 2.3 percent in 2019. GDP contracted 3.4 percent in 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). GDP grew 5.7 percent in 2021. The following calculations show that actual growth is around 2.2 percent per year during the expansion phase. The rate of growth of 1.6 percent in the entire cycle from 2006 to 2021 and 1.6 percent from 2007 to 2021 is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which the economy of the US always attained for entire cycles in expansions after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provides valuable information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.

Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita

 

GDP

 

Long-Term

   

1929-2021

3.2

 

1947-2021

3.1

 

Whole Cycles

   

1980-1989

3.5

 

2006-2021

1.6

 

2007-2021

1.6

 

Cyclical Contractions ∆%

   

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

-4.6

 

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

-3.8

 

Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆%

   

IQ1983 to IVQ1985

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

IQ1983-IIIQ1987

IQ1983 to IVQ1987

IQ1983 to IQ1988

IQ1983 to IIQ1988

IQ1983 to IIIQ1988

IQ1983 to IVQ1988

IQ1983 to IQ1989

IQ1983 to IIQ1989

IQ1983 to IIIQ1989

IQ1983 to IVQ1989

IQ1983 to IQ1990

IQ1983 to IIQ1990

IQ1983 to IIIQ1990

IQ1983 to IVQ1990

5.9

5.7

5.3

5.1

5.0

5.0

4.9

5.0

4.9

4.9

4.8

4.8

4.8

4.7

4.6

4.5

4.5

4.4

4.3

4.0

 

IQ1983 to IQ1991

IQ1983 to IIQ1991

IQ1983 to IIIQ1991

IQ1983 to IVQ1991

IQ1983 to IQ1992

IQ1983 to IIQ1992

IQ1983 to IIIQ1992

IQ1983 to IVQ1992

IQ1983 to IQ1993

IQ1983 to IIQ1993

IQ1983 to IIIQ1993

IQ1983 to IV1993

IQ1983 to IQ1994

IQ1983 to IIQ1994

IQ1983 to IIIQ1994

IQ1983 to IVQ1994

IQ1983 to IQ1995

IQ1983 to IQ1995

IIQ1983 to IIQ1995

3.8

3.8

3.8

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.8

3.7

3.6

3.6

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.6

3.6

3.6

 

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

7.9

 

IIIQ2009 to IVQ2021

2.2

 

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

2.9

 
 

Real Disposable Income

Real Disposable Income per Capita

Long-Term

   

1929-2020

3.2

2.1

1947-1999

3.7

2.3

Whole Cycles

   

1980-1989

3.5

2.6

2006-2020

2.4

1.7

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace around 2.1 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.

  1. Average Annual Growth in the Past Forty Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013, the four quarters of 2014, the four quarters of 2015, the four quarters of 2016, the four quarters of 2017, the four quarters of 2018, the four quarters of 2019, the four quarters of 2020 and the four quarters of 2021 accumulated to 23.4 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.1 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2021 of $19,806.0 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $16,048.7 billion and compounding by 4/40: {[($19,806.0/$16,048.7)4/40 -1]100 = 2.1 percent.
  2. Average Annual Growth in the Past Four Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters from IVQ2020 to IVQ2021 accumulated to 5.5 percent. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2021 of $19,806.0 billion by GDP in IVQ2020 of $18,767.8 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($19,806.0/$18,767.8)4/4 -1]100 = 5.5%}. The US economy increased 5.5 percent in IVQ2021 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IVQ2020 (See Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/gdp4q21_adv.pdf and the complete data at https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Growth was at annual equivalent 5.2 percent in IIQ2014 and 4.7 percent IIIQ2014 and only at 1.8 percent in IVQ2014. GDP grew at annual equivalent 3.3 percent in IQ2015, 2.3 percent in IIQ2015, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2015 and 0.6 percent in IVQ2015. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in IQ2016 and at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in IIQ2016. GDP increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in IIIQ2016 and at 2.0 percent in IVQ2016. GDP grew at annual equivalent 1.9 percent in IQ2017 and at annual equivalent 2.3 percent in IIQ2017. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.9 percent in IIIQ2017. GDP grew at annual equivalent 3.8 percent in IVQ2017. GDP grew at annual equivalent 3.1 percent in IQ2018, increasing at 3.4 percent annual equivalent in IIQ2018. GDP grew at annual equivalent 1.9 percent in IIIQ2018 and at 0.9 percent in IVQ2018. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in IQ2019 and at annual equivalent 3.2 percent in IIQ2019. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.8 percent in IIIQ2019 and at 1.9 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2019. Growth was at annual equivalent minus 5.1 percent in IQ2020. Growth was at annual equivalent minus 31.2 percent in IIQ2020. GDP grew at annual equivalent 33.8 percent in IIIQ2020. Growth was at annual equivalent 4.5 percent in IVQ2020. GDP grew at annual equivalent 6.3 percent in IQ2021. GDP grew at annual equivalent 6.7 percent in IIQ2021. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.3 percent in IIIQ2021. GDP grew at annual equivalent 6.9 percent in IVQ2021. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat at 0.1 in IVQ2012, which is in the borderline of contraction, and negative in IQ2014. US GDP fell 0.4 percent in IQ2014. The rate of growth of GDP in the revision of IIIQ2013 is 3.2 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR).

Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2012 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real GDP, Billions Chained 2012 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

15,767.1

NA

0.6

2.2

IVQ2011

16,048.7

1.8

1.1

1.5

IQ2012

16,180.0

2.6

0.8

2.6

IIQ2012

16,253.7

3.1

0.5

2.4

IIIQ2012

16,282.2

3.3

0.2

2.6

IVQ2012

16,300.0

3.4

0.1

1.6

IQ2013

16,441.5

4.3

0.9

1.6

IIQ2013

16,464.4

4.4

0.1

1.3

IIIQ2013

16,594.7

5.2

0.8

1.9

IVQ2013

16,712.8

6.0

0.7

2.5

IQ2014

16,654.2

5.6

-0.4

1.3

IIQ2014

16,868.1

7.0

1.3

2.5

IIIQ2014

17,064.6

8.2

1.2

2.8

IVQ2014

17,141.2

8.7

0.4

2.6

IQ2015

17,280.6

9.6

0.8

3.8

IIQ2015

17,380.9

10.2

0.6

3.0

IIIQ2015

17,437.1

10.6

0.3

2.2

IVQ2015

17,462.6

10.8

0.1

1.9

IQ2016

17,565.5

11.4

0.6

1.6

IIQ2016

17,618.6

11.7

0.3

1.4

IIIQ2016

17,724.5

12.4

0.6

1.6

IVQ2016

17,812.6

13.0

0.5

2.0

IQ2017

17,896.6

13.5

0.5

1.9

IIQ2017

17,996.8

14.1

0.6

2.1

IIIQ2017

18,126.2

15.0

0.7

2.3

IVQ2017

18,296.7

16.0

0.9

2.7

IQ2018

18,436.3

16.9

0.8

3.0

IIQ2018

18,590.0

17.9

0.8

3.3

IIIQ2018

18,679.6

18.5

0.5

3.1

IVQ2018

18,721.3

18.7

0.2

2.3

IQ2019

18,833.2

19.4

0.6

2.2

IIQ2019

18,982.5

20.4

0.8

2.1

IIIQ2019

19,112.7

21.2

0.7

2.3

IVQ2019

19,202.3

21.8

0.5

2.6

IQ2020

18,952.0

20.2

-1.3

0.6

IIQ2020

17,258.2

9.5

-8.9

-9.1

IIIQ2020

18,560.8

17.7

7.5

-2.9

IVQ2020

18,767.8

19.0

1.1

-2.3

IQ2021

19,055.7

20.9

1.5

0.5

IIQ2021

19,368.3

22.8

1.6

12.2

IIIQ2021

19,478.9

23.5

0.6

4.9

IVQ2021

19,806.0

25.6

1.7

5.5

Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IIIQ2021

23.4

     

Annual Equivalent ∆%

2.1

     

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart GDP of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the rates of growth of GDP at SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the 16 quarters from IQ2018 to IVQ2021. Growth has been fluctuating. The final data point is 6.9 percent in IVQ2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image005

Chart GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Rates of Growth of United States GDP, ∆%

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product

Historical parallels are instructive but have all the limitations of empirical research in economics. The more instructive comparisons are not with the Great Depression of the 1930s but rather with the recessions in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s. The growth rates and job creation in the expansion of the economy away from recession are subpar in the current expansion compared to others in the past. Four recessions are initially considered, following the reference dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html): IIQ1953-IIQ1954, IIIQ1957-IIQ1958, IIIQ1973-IQ1975 and IQ1980-IIIQ1980. The data for the earlier contractions illustrate that the growth rate and job creation in the current expansion are inferior. The sharp contractions of the 1950s and 1970s are considered in Table I-1, showing the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) quarter-to-quarter, seasonally adjusted (SA), yearly-equivalent growth rates of GDP. The recovery from the recession of 1953 consisted of four consecutive quarters of high percentage growth rates from IIQ1954 to IIIQ1955: 4.6, 8.1, 11.9 and 6.7. The recession of 1957 was followed by four consecutive high percentage growth rates from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959: 9.6, 9.7, 7.9 and 9.3. The recession of 1973-1975 was followed by high percentage growth rates from IIQ1975 to IQ1976: 2.9, 7.0, 5.5 and 9.3. The disaster of the Great Inflation and Unemployment of the 1970s, which made stagflation notorious, is even better in growth rates during the expansion phase in comparison with the current cycle slow-growth recession.

Table I-1, US, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Percentage Growth Rates in Annual Equivalent of GDP in Cyclical Recessions and Following Four Quarter Expansions ∆%

 

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IV

R IIQ1953-IIQ1954

       

1953

   

-2.2

-5.9

1954

-1.9

     

E IIIQ1954-IIQ1955

       

1954

   

4.6

8.1

1955

11.9

6.7

   

R IIIQ1957-IIQ1958

       

1957

     

-4.1

1958

-10.0

     

E IIIQ1958-IIQ1959

       

1958

   

9.6

9.7

1959

7.9

9.3

   

R IVQ1969-IV1970

       

1969

     

-1.9

1970

-0.6

     

E IIQ1970-IQ1971

       

1970

 

0.6

3.7

-4.2

1971

11.3

     

R IVQ1973-IQ1975

       

1973

     

3.8

1974

-3.4

1.0

-3.7

-1.5

1975

-4.8

     

E IIQ1975-IQ1976

       

1975

 

2.9

7.0

5.5

1976

9.3

     

R IQ1980-IIIQ1980

       

1980

1.3

-8.0

-0.5

 

R IQ1981-IVQ1982

       

1981

8.1

-2.9

4.9

-4.3

1982

-6.1

1.8

-1.5

0.2

E IQ1983-IVQ1983

       

1983

5.4

9.4

8.2

8.6

R IVQ2007-IIQ2009

       

2008

-2.3

2.1

-2.1

-8.4

2009

-4.4

-0.6

   

E IIIQ2009-IIQ2010

       

2009

   

1.5

4.5

2010

1.5

3.7

   

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The NBER dates another recession in 1980 that lasted about half a year. If the two recessions from IQ1980s to IIIQ1980 and IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 are combined, the impact of lost GDP of 4.6 percent is more comparable to the latest revised 3.8 percent drop of the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table I-2 provides the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) quarterly growth rates of GDP in SA yearly equivalents for the recessions of 1981 to 1982 and 2007 to 2009, using the latest major revision published on Jul 27, 2016, subsequent revisions, the revision since 1929 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/gdp2q18_adv.pdf), revising data since 1929 (“Comprehensive Update of the National Income and Product Accounts The estimates released today also reflect the results of the 15th comprehensive update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The updated estimates reflect previously announced improvements and include the introduction of new not seasonally adjusted estimates for GDP, GDI, and their major components. For more information, see the Technical Note. Revised NIPA table stubs, initial results, and background materials are available on the BEA Web site.”) and the third estimate for IIQ2019 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-09/gdp2q19_3rd.pdf) revising estimates from IQ2014 through IQ2019, which are available in the dataset of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The first estimate for IIQ2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/gdp2q20_adv.pdf) provides the annual update: “The estimates released today also reflect the results of the Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The timespan of the update is the first quarter of 2015 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of real GDP and its major components, and the first quarter of 1999 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of income and saving. The reference year remains 2012. More information on the 2020 Annual Update is included in the May Survey of Current Business article, “GDP and the Economy https://apps.bea.gov/scb/2020/05-may/0520-gdp-economy.htm#annual-update.” There is a third estimate of GDP for IQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/gdp1q21_3rd_1.pdf). There is an annual update and revisions of historical data in the advanced estimate for GDP of IIQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/gdp2q21_adv.pdf). There is a first estimate for IVQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/gdp4q21_adv.pdf). There were four quarters of contraction in 1981-1982 ranging in rate from -1.5 percent to -6.1 percent and five quarters of contraction in 2007-2009 ranging in rate from -0.7 percent to -8.5 percent. The striking difference is that in the first forty eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, shown in Table I-2 in relief, GDP grew at the high quarterly percentage growth rates of 5.4, 9.4, 8.2, 8.6, 8.1, 7.1, 3.9, 3.3, 3.9, 3.6, 6.2, 3.0, 3.8, 1.8, 3.9, 2.2, 3.0, 4.4, 3.5, 7.0, 2.1, 5.4, 2.4, 5.4, 4.1, 3.1, 3.0, 0.8, 4.4, 1.5, 0.3, minus 3.6, minus 1.9, 3.2, 2.0, 1.4 , 4.9, 4.4, 4.0, 4.2, 0.7, 2.3, 1.9, 5.5, 3.9, 5.5, 2.4, 4.7, 1.4 and 1.2 in IIQ1995. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table III-1 shows weaker performance in IIQ1990 and IIIQ1990 and contractions at 3.6 percent in IVQ1990 and 1.9 percent in IQ1991. In contrast, the percentage growth rates in the first fifty quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2021 shown in relief in Table I-2 were mediocre: 1.5, 4.3, 2.0, 3.9, 3.1, 2.1, -1.0, 2.7, -0.2, 4.6, 3.3, 1.8, 0.7, 0.4, 3.5, 0.6, 3.2, 2.9, minus 1.4, 5.2, 4.7, 1.8, 3.3, 2.3, 1.3, 0.6, 2.4, 1.2, 2.4, 2.0, 1.9, 2.3, 2.9, 3.8, 3.1, 3.4, 1.9, 0.9, 2.4, 3.2, 2.8, 1.9, minus 5.1, minus 31.2, 33.8 in IIIQ2020, 4.5, 6.3, 6.7, 2.3 and 6.9 percent in IVQ2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Economic growth and employment creation continued at slow rhythm during 2012 and in 2013-2019 while much stronger growth would be required in movement to full employment. The cycle is now long by historical standards and growth rates are typically weaker in the final periods of cyclical expansions.

Table I-2, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of GDP, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q

1981

1982

1983

1984

2008

2009

2010

I

8.1

-6.1

5.4

8.1

-1.6

-4.6

2.0

II

-2.9

1.8

9.4

7.1

2.3

-0.7

3.9

III

4.9

-1.5

8.2

3.9

-2.1

1.5

3.1

IV

-4.3

0.2

8.6

3.3

-8.5

4.3

2.1

       

1985

   

2011

I

     

3.9

   

-1.0

II

     

3.6

   

2.7

III

     

6.2

   

-0.2

IV

     

3.0

   

4.6

       

1986

   

2012

I

     

3.8

   

3.3

II

     

1.8

   

1.8

III

     

3.9

   

0.7

IV

     

2.2

   

0.4

       

1987

   

2013

I

     

3.0

   

3.5

II

     

4.4

   

0.6

III

     

3.5

   

3.2

IV

     

7.0

   

2.9

       

1988

   

2014

I

     

2.1

   

-1.4

II

     

5.4

   

5.2

III

     

2.4

   

4.7

IV

     

5.4

   

1.8

       

1989

   

2015

I

     

4.1

   

3.3

II

     

3.1

   

2.3

III

     

3.0

   

1.3

IV

     

0.8

   

0.6

       

1990

   

2016

I

     

4.4

   

2.4

II

     

1.5

   

1.2

III

     

0.3

   

2.4

IV

     

-3.6

   

2.0

       

1991

   

2017

I

     

-1.9

   

1.9

II

     

3.2

   

2.3

III

     

2.0

   

2.9

IV

     

1.4

   

3.8

       

1992

   

2018

I

     

4.9

   

3.1

II

     

4.4

   

3.4

III

     

4.0

   

1.9

IV

     

4.2

   

0.9

       

1993

   

2019

I

     

0.7

   

2.4

II

     

2.3

   

3.2

III

     

1.9

   

2.8

IV

     

5.5

   

1.9

       

1994

   

2020

I

     

3.9

   

-5.1

II

     

5.5

   

-31.2

III

     

2.4

   

33.8

IV

     

4.7

   

4.5

       

1995

   

2021

       

1.4

   

6.3

       

1.2

   

6.7

       

3.4

   

2.3

       

2.7

   

6.9

       

1996

   

       

3.0

   

       

6.8

   

       

3.6

   

       

4.2

   

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-1 provides the real GDP of the US between 1929 and 1999. US GDP grew at the yearly average rate of 3.5 percent between 1929 and 1999. There is an evident acceleration of the rate of GDP growth in the 1990s as shown by a much sharper slope of the growth curve. Cobet and Wilson (2002) define labor productivity as the value of manufacturing output produced per unit of labor input used (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). Between 1950 and 2000, labor productivity in the US grew less rapidly than in Germany and Japan. The major part of the increase in productivity in Germany and Japan occurred between 1950 and 1973 while the rate of productivity growth in the US was relatively subdued in several periods. While Germany and Japan reached their highest growth rates of productivity before 1973, the US accelerated its rate of productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s. Between 1950 and 2000, the rate of productivity growth in the US of 2.9 percent per year was much lower than 6.3 percent in Japan and 4.7 percent in Germany. Between 1995 and 2000, the rate of productivity growth of the US of 4.6 percent exceeded that of Japan of 3.9 percent and the rate of Germany of 2.6 percent.

clip_image007

Chart I-1, US, Real GDP 1929-1999

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-1A provides real GDP annually from 1929 to 2021. Growth after the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has not been sufficiently high to compensate for the contraction as it had in past economic cycles. The drop of output in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has been followed by anemic recovery compared with return to trend at 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May) and a standstill that can lead to growth recession, or low rates of economic growth. The expansion is relatively long compared to earlier expansion and there could be even another contraction or conventional recession in the future. This could be a fact in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The average rate of growth from 1947 to 2021 is 3.1 percent. The average growth rate from IV2007 to IVQ2021 is only 1.6 percent in contrast with 2.9 percent annual equivalent from the end of the recession in IVQ2001 to the end of the expansion in IVQ2007. US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 50 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/gdp4q21_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 51.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2021 would be $23,849.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4043.2 billion than actual $19,806.0 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 23.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.6 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm). US GDP in IVQ2021 is 17.0 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,806.0 billion in IVQ2021 or 25.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

clip_image009

Chart I-1A, US, Real GDP 1929-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-2 provides the growth of real quarterly GDP in the US between 1947 and 2021. The drop of output in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has been followed by anemic recovery compared with return to trend at 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May) and a standstill that can lead to growth recession, or low rates of economic growth. The expansion is relatively long compared to earlier expansions and there could be another contraction or conventional recession in the future. The average rate of growth from 1947 to 2020 is 3.1 percent. The annual equivalent growth rate from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2021 is only 1.5 percent with 2.9 percent from the end of the recession in IVQ2001 to the end of the expansion in IVQ2007. There is sharp contraction in IQ2020 and IIQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) followed by sharp recovery in IIIQ2020, IVQ2020, IQ2021, IIQ2021, IIIQ2021 and IVQ2021.

clip_image011

Chart I-2, US, Real GDP, Quarterly, 1947-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-3 provides real GDP percentage change on the quarter a year earlier for 1983-1995. The objective is simply to compare expansion in two recoveries from sharp contractions as shown in Table I-5. Growth rates in the early phase of the recovery in 1983 and 1984 were very high, which is the opportunity to reduce unemployment that has characterized cyclical expansion in the postwar US economy. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image013

Chart I-3, Real GDP Percentage Change on Quarter a Year Earlier 1983-1995

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In contrast, growth rates in the comparable forty-eight quarters of expansion from 2009 to 2021 in Chart I-4 have been mediocre. As a result, growth has not provided the exit from unemployment and underemployment as in other cyclical expansions in the postwar period. Growth rates did not rise in V shape as in earlier expansions and then declined close to the standstill of growth recessions. There is sharp decrease in the rate of growth in IQ2020 relative to IQ2019 at 0.6 percent and contraction of 9.1 percent in IIQ2020 relative to IIQ2019. GDP contracted 2.9 percent in IIIQ2020 relative to IIIQ2019 and contracted 2.3 percent in IVQ2020 relative to IVQ019. GDP expanded at 0.5 percent in IQ2021 relative to IQ2020. GDP grew 12.2 percent in IIQ2021 relative to IIQ2020. GDP grew 4.9 percent in IIIQ2021 relative to IIIQ2020. GDP grew 5.5 percent from IVQ2020 to IVQ2021.

clip_image015

Chart I-4, US, Real GDP Percentage Change on Quarter a Year Earlier 2009-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-3 provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.6 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1982 and 3.8 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.2 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. In contrast, GDP grew 2.7 percent in 2010, 1.5 percent in 2011, 2.3 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.3 percent in 2014 and 2.7 percent in 2015. GDP grew 1.7 percent in 2016 and 2.3 percent in 2017. GDP grew 2.9 percent in 2018 and 2.3 percent in 2019. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the forty quarters from IQ2012 to IVQ2021 is 2.1 percent. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. The forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 3.6 to 4.5 percent in 2022 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20211215.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 2.0 to 2.5 percent in 2023 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20211215.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2021 has been at average 2.1 percent in annual equivalent with sharp contraction at 31.2 percent SAAR in IIQ2020 followed by sharp recovery at 33.8 percent in IIIQ2020, 4.5 percent in IVQ2020, 6.3 percent in IQ2021, 6.7 percent in IIQ2021 and 2.3 percent in IIIQ2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Table I-3, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

1930

-8.5

1980

-0.3

2000

4.1

1931

-6.4

1981

2.5

2001

1.0

1932

-12.9

1982

-1.8

2002

1.7

1933

-1.2

1983

4.6

2003

2.8

1934

10.8

1984

7.2

2004

3.9

1935

8.9

1985

4.2

2005

3.5

1936

12.9

1986

3.5

2006

2.8

1937

5.1

1987

3.5

2007

2.0

1938

-3.3

1988

4.2

2008

0.1

1939

8.0

1989

3.7

2009

-2.6

1940

8.8

1990

1.9

2010

2.7

1941

17.7

1991

-0.1

2011

1.5

1942

18.9

1992

3.5

2012

2.3

1943

17.0

1993

2.8

2013

1.8

1944

8.0

1994

4.0

2014

2.3

1945

-1.0

1995

2.7

2015

2.7

1946

-11.6

1996

3.8

2016

1.7

1947

-1.1

1997

4.4

2017

2.3

1948

4.1

1998

4.5

2018

2.9

1949

-0.6

1999

4.8

2019

2.3

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-5 provides percentage change of GDP in the US during the 1930s. There is vast literature analyzing the Great Depression (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009), 198-217). Cole and Ohanian (1999) find that US real per capita output was lower by 11 percent in 1939 than in 1929 while the typical expansion of real per capita output in the US during a decade is 31 percent. Private hours worked in the US were 25 percent lower in 1939 relative to 1929.

clip_image017

Chart I-5, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Accelerated growth in the initial quarters of expansion eliminated the unemployment and underemployment created during the contraction in the 1980s as shown in Chart I-6. The economy then returned to grow at the trend of expansion, interrupted by another contraction in 1991. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image019

Chart I-6, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1980s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-7 provides the rates of growth during the 2000s. Growth rates in the initial forty-nine quarters of expansion have been relatively lower than during recessions after World War II. As a result, unemployment and underemployment continue at the rate of 13.5 percent of the effective US labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). There is sharp contraction at SAAR of 31.2 percent in IIQ2020 followed by sharp recovery at 33.8 percent in IIIQ2020, 4.5 percent in IVQ2020, 6.3 percent in IQ2021, 6.7 percent in IIQ2021, 2.3 percent in IIIQ2021 and 6.9 percent in IVQ2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image021

Chart I-7, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 2000s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are in Table I-4 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.6 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 3.8 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-4, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions   

 

Number of Quarters

Cumulative Percentage Contraction

Average Percentage Rate

IIQ1953 to IIQ1954

3

-2.4

-0.8

IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958

3

-3.0

-1.0

IVQ1973 to IQ1975

5

-3.1

-0.6

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980

2

-2.2

-1.1

IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

4

-2.5

-0.64

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

6

-3.8

-0.7

Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-5 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.2 percent of the US economy in the fifty quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2021. There is sharp contraction in IIQ2020 at SAAR of minus 31.2 percent followed by sharp growth at 33.8 percent in IIIQ2020, 4.5 percent in IVQ2020, 6.3 percent in IQ2021, 6.7 percent in IIQ2021, 2.3 percent in IIIQ2021 and 6.9 percent in IVQ2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:

  • 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
  • 5.3 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
  • 5.1 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
  • 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
  • 5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
  • 4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987
  • 5.0 percent in the first twenty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1987
  • 4.9 percent in the first twenty-first quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1988
  • 4.9 percent in the first twenty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1988
  • 4.8 percent in the first twenty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988
  • 4.8 percent in the first twenty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1988
  • 4.8 percent in the first twenty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1989
  • 4.7 percent in the first twenty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1989
  • 4.6 percent in the first twenty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989
  • 4.5 percent in the first twenty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1989
  • 4.5 percent in the first twenty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1990
  • 4.4 percent in the first thirty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1990
  • 4.3 percent in the first thirty-one quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990
  • 4.0 percent in the first thirty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1990
  • 3.8 percent in the first thirty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1991
  • 3.8 percent in the first thirty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1991
  • 3.8 percent in the first thirty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991
  • 3.7 percent in the thirty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1991
  • 3.7 percent in the thirty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1992
  • 3.7 percent in the thirty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1992
  • 3.7 percent in the thirty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992
  • 3.8 percent in the forty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1992
  • 3.7 percent in the forty-one quarters from IQ1983 to IQ1993
  • 3.6 percent in the forty-two quarters from IQ1983 to IIQ1993
  • 3.6 percent in the forty-three quarters from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993
  • 3.7 percent in the forty-four quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1993
  • 3.7 percent in the forty-five quarters from IQ1983 to IQ1994
  • 3.7 percent in the forty-six quarters from IQ1983 to IIQ1994
  • 3.7 percent in the forty-seven quarters from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994
  • 3.7 percent in the forty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1994
  • 3.6 percent in the forty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1995
  • 3.6 percent in the fifty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1995

The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery.  BEA data show the US economy in standstill relative to historical experience with annual growth of 2.7 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.5 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.3 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.3 percent in 2014, 2.7 percent in 2015, 1.7 percent in 2016, 2.3 percent in 2017, 2.9 percent in 2018 and 2.3 percent in 2019 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) with contraction of 3.4 percent in 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Followed by growth of 5.7 percent in 2021. The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988. 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990. 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991. 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993. 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). GDP grew 2.9 percent in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010. GDP growth in the thirty-nine quarters from IQ2012 to IVQ2021 accumulated to 23.4 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.1 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2021 of $19,806.0 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $16,048.7 billion and compounding by 4/40: {[($19,806.0/$16,048.7)4/40 -1]100 = 2.1 percent}.

Table I-5, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

 

Number
of
Quarters

Cumulative Growth

∆%

Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate

IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957

11

12.8

4.5

First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955

4

7.8

 

IIQ1958 to IIQ1959

5

10.0

7.9

First Four Quarters

IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959

4

9.2

 

IIQ1975 to IVQ1976

8

8.3

4.1

First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976

4

6.1

 

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

IQ1983 to IIIQ1987

IQ1983 to IVQ1987

IQ1983 to IQ1988

IQ1983 to IIQ1988

IQ1983 to IIIQ1988

IQ1983 to IVQ1988

IQ1983 to IQ1989

IQ1983 to IIQ1989

IQ1983 to IIIQ1989

IQ1983 to IVQ1989

IQ1983 to IQ1990

IQ1983 to IIQ1990

IQ1983 to IIIQ1990

IQ1983 to IVQ1990

IQ1983 to IQ1991

IQ1983 to IIQ1991

IQ1983 to IIIQ1991

IQ1983 to IVQ1991

IQ1983 to IQ1992

IQ1983 to IIQ1992

IQ1983 to IIIQ1992

IQ1983 to IVQ1992

IQ1983 to IQ1993

IQ1983 to IIQ1993

IQ1983 to IIIQ1993

IQ1983 to IVQ1993

IQ1983 to IQ1994

IQ1983 to IIQ1994

IQ1983 to IIIQ1994

IQ1983 to IVQ1994

IQ1983 to IQ1995

IQ1983 to IIQ1995

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

19.8

21.5

22.1

23.0

24.4

25.4

27.6

28.3

29.9

30.7

32.4

33.8

34.8

35.8

36.1

37.6

38.1

38.2

36.9

36.3

37.3

38.0

38.5

40.2

41.7

43.1

44.6

44.8

45.7

46.4

48.3

49.8

51.8

52.7

54.4

55.0

55.5

5.7

5.3

5.1

5.0

5.0

4.9

5.0

4.9

4.9

4.8

4.8

4.8

4.7

4.6

4.5

4.5

4.4

4.3

4.0

3.8

3.8

3.8

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.8

3.7

3.6

3.6

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.6

3.6

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

4

7.9

 

Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*

 

7.7

 

IIIQ2009 to IVQ2021

50

30.6

2.2

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

 

2.9

 

*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-8 shows US real quarterly GDP growth from 1980 to 1995. The economy contracted during the recession and then expanded vigorously throughout the 1980s, rapidly eliminating the unemployment caused by the contraction. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image023

Chart I-8, US, Real GDP, 1980-1995

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-9 shows the entirely different situation of real quarterly GDP in the US between 2007 and 2021. The economy has underperformed during the first fifty quarters of expansion for the first time in the comparable contractions since the 1950s. The US economy was in a perilous cyclical slow growth now in 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), shown by sharp contractions in the final data points in IQ2020 and IIQ2020 followed by sharp growth in IIIQ2020, IVQ2020, IQ2021, IIQ2021, IIIQ2021 and IVQ2021.

clip_image025

Chart I-9, US, Real GDP, 2007-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

As shown in Tables I-4 and I-5 above the loss of real GDP in the US during the contraction was 3.8 percent but the gain in the cyclical expansion has been only 30.6 percent (first to the last row in Table I-5), using all latest revisions. As a result, the level of real GDP in IVQ2021 with the first estimate and revisions is higher by only 25.6 percent than the level of real GDP in IVQ2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 51.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2021 would be $23,849.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4043.2 billion than actual $19,806.0 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 23.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.6 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm). US GDP in IVQ2021 is 17.0 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,806.0 billion in IVQ2021 or 25.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-6 shows that the contraction concentrated in two quarters: decline of 2.2 percent in IVQ2008 relative to the prior quarter and decline of 1.2 percent in IQ2009 relative to IVQ2008. The combined fall of GDP in IVQ2008 and IQ2009 was 3.3 percent {[(1-0.022) x (1-0.012) -1]100 = -3.4%}, or {[(IQ2009 $15,187.5)/(IIIQ2008 $15,709.6) – 1]100 = -3.3%} except for rounding. Those two quarters coincided with the worst effects of the financial crisis (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). GDP fell 0.2 percent in IIQ2009 but grew 0.4 percent in IIIQ2009, which is the beginning of recovery in the cyclical dates of the NBER. Most of the recovery occurred in five successive quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2010 of growth of 1.1 percent in IVQ2009, 0.5 percent in IQ2010, 1.0 percent in IIQ2010 and nearly equal growth at 0.8 percent in IIIQ2010 and 0.5 percent in IVQ2010 for cumulative growth in those five quarters of 3.8 percent, obtained by accumulating the quarterly rates {[(1.011 x 1.005 x 1.01 x 1.008 x 1.005) – 1]100 = 4.0%} or {[(IVQ2010 $15,808.0)/(IIIQ2009 $15,216.6) – 1]100 = 3.9%} with minor rounding difference. The economy then stalled during the first half of 2011 with decline of 0.2 percent in IQ2011 and growth of 0.7 percent in IIQ2011 for combined annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent {(0.998 x 1.007)2}. Growth picked up in IVQ2011 with 1.1 percent relative to IIIQ2011. Growth in a quarter relative to a year earlier in Table I-6 slows from over 2.6 percent during three consecutive quarters from IIQ2010 to IVQ2010 to 2.0 percent in IQ2011, 1.7 percent in IIQ2011, 0.9 percent in IIIQ2011 and 1.5 percent in IVQ2011. As shown below, growth of 1.5 percent in IVQ2011 was partly driven by inventory accumulation. In IQ2012, GDP grew 0.8 percent relative to IVQ2011 and 2.6 percent relative to IQ2011, decelerating to 0.5 percent in IIQ2012 and 2.4 percent relative to IIQ2011 and 0.2 percent in IIIQ2012 and 2.6 percent relative to IIIQ2011. Growth was 0.1 percent in IVQ2012 with 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier but mostly because of deduction of 1.70 percentage points of inventory divestment and 0.62 percentage points of reduction of one-time national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.9 percent in IQ2013 and 1.6 percent relative to IQ2012 in large part because of burning savings to consume caused by financial repression of zero interest rates. There is similar growth of 0.1 percent in IIQ2013 and 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2013, GDP grew 0.8 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.9 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier with inventory accumulation contributing 1.48 percentage points to growth at 3.2 percent SAAR in IIIQ2013. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2013 and 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP fell 0.4 percent in IQ2014 and grew 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Inventory divestment deducted 1.40 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. GDP grew 1.3 percent in IIQ2014, 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier and at 5.2 SAAR with inventory change contributing 1.05 percentage points. GDP grew 1.2 percent in IIIQ2014 and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.4 percent in IVQ2014 and 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2015 and increased 3.8 percent relative to a year earlier partly because of low level during contraction of 0.4 percent in IQ2014. GDP grew 0.6 percent in IIQ2015 and 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.3 percent in IIIQ2015 and 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.6 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.3 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.6 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.5 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.5 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.6 percent in IIQ2017 and 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.9 percent in IVQ2017 and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2018 and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.8 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 3.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.2 percent in IVQ2018 and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.6 percent in IQ2019 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.8 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.7 percent in IIIQ2019 and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.5 percent in IVQ2019 and increased 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 1.3 percent in IQ2020 and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 8.9 percent in IIQ2020 and decreased 9.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 7.5 percent in IIIQ2020 and decreased 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.1 percent in IVQ2020 and decreased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.5 percent in IQ2021 and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IIQ2021 and increased 12.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2021 and increased 4.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.7 percent in IVQ2021 and increased 5.5 percent relative to a year earlier (See Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/gdp4q21_adv.pdf and entire data in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Rates of a quarter relative to the prior quarter capture better deceleration of the economy than rates on a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. The critical question for which there is not yet definitive solution is whether what lies ahead is continuing growth recession with the economy crawling and unemployment/underemployment at extremely high levels or another contraction or conventional recession. Forecasts of various sources continued to maintain high growth in 2011 without taking into consideration the continuous slowing of the economy in late 2010 and the first half of 2011. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and growth in China have been common sources of doubts on the rate and direction of economic growth in the US. There is weak internal demand in the US with almost recent higher growth of investment and spikes of consumption driven by burning saving because of financial repression in the form of low interest rates and bloated balance sheet of the Fed.

Table I-6, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007, Prior Quarter and Quarter Year Earlier, Billions Chained 2012 Dollars and ∆%

 

GDP $Billion

∆% 2007Q4

∆% Prior Quarter

∆% Quarter Year Earlier

2007Q4

15767.1

NA

0.6

2.2

2008Q1

15702.9

-0.4

-0.4

1.4

2008Q2

15792.8

0.2

0.6

1.4

2008Q3

15709.6

-0.4

-0.5

0.2

2008Q4

15366.6

-2.5

-2.2

-2.5

2009Q1

15187.5

-3.7

-1.2

-3.3

2009Q2

15161.8

-3.8

-0.2

-4.0

2009Q3

15216.6

-3.5

0.4

-3.1

2009Q4

15379.2

-2.5

1.1

0.1

2010Q1

15456.1

-2.0

0.5

1.8

2010Q2

15605.6

-1.0

1.0

2.9

2010Q3

15726.3

-0.3

0.8

3.3

2010Q4

15808.0

0.3

0.5

2.8

2011Q1

15769.9

0.0

-0.2

2.0

2011Q2

15876.8

0.7

0.7

1.7

2011Q3

15870.7

0.7

0.0

0.9

2011Q4

16048.7

1.8

1.1

1.5

2012Q1

16180.0

2.6

0.8

2.6

2012Q2

16253.7

3.1

0.5

2.4

2012Q3

16282.2

3.3

0.2

2.6

2012Q4

16300.0

3.4

0.1

1.6

2013Q1

16441.5

4.3

0.9

1.6

2013Q2

16464.4

4.4

0.1

1.3

2013Q3

16594.7

5.2

0.8

1.9

2013Q4

16712.8

6.0

0.7

2.5

2014Q1

16654.2

5.6

-0.4

1.3

2014Q2

16868.1

7.0

1.3

2.5

2014Q3

17064.6

8.2

1.2

2.8

2014Q4

17141.2

8.7

0.4

2.6

2015Q1

17280.6

9.6

0.8

3.8

2015Q2

17380.9

10.2

0.6

3.0

2015Q3

17437.1

10.6

0.3

2.2

2015Q4

17462.6

10.8

0.1

1.9

2016Q1

17565.5

11.4

0.6

1.6

2016Q2

17618.6

11.7

0.3

1.4

2016Q3

17724.5

12.4

0.6

1.6

2016Q4

17812.6

13.0

0.5

2.0

2017Q1

17896.6

13.5

0.5

1.9

2017Q2

17996.8

14.1

0.6

2.1

2017Q3

18126.2

15.0

0.7

2.3

2017Q4

18296.7

16.0

0.9

2.7

2018Q1

18436.3

16.9

0.8

3.0

2018Q2

18590.0

17.9

0.8

3.3

2018Q3

18679.6

18.5

0.5

3.1

2018Q4

18721.3

18.7

0.2

2.3

2019Q1

18833.2

19.4

0.6

2.2

2019Q2

18982.5

20.4

0.8

2.1

2019Q3

19112.7

21.2

0.7

2.3

2019Q4

19202.3

21.8

0.5

2.6

2020Q1

18952.0

20.2

-1.3

0.6

2020Q2

17258.2

9.5

-8.9

-9.1

2020Q3

18560.8

17.7

7.5

-2.9

2020Q4

18767.8

19.0

1.1

-2.3

2021Q1

19055.7

20.9

1.5

0.5

2021Q2

19368.3

22.8

1.6

12.2

2021Q3

19478.9

23.5

0.6

4.9

2021Q4

19806.0

25.6

1.7

5.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-10 provides the percentage change of real GDP from the same quarter a year earlier from 1980 to 1995. There were two contractions almost in succession in 1980 and from 1981 to 1983. The expansion was marked by initial high rates of growth as in other recession in the postwar US period during which employment lost in the contraction was recovered. Growth rates continued to be high after the initial phase of expansion. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image027

Chart I-10, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Quarter a Year Earlier 1980-1995

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The experience of recovery after 2009 is not as complete as during the 1980s. Chart I-11 shows the much lower rates of growth in the early phase of the current expansion and sharp decline from an early peak. The US missed the initial high growth rates in cyclical expansions that eliminate unemployment and underemployment. There is sharp decrease of the rate of growth of GDP to 0.6 percent in IQ2020 and minus 9.1 percent in IIQ2020 relative to a year earlier, decreasing 2.9 percent in IIIQ2020 relative to a year earlier, and 2.3 percent in IVQ2020 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.5 percent in IQ2021 relative to a year earlier, 12.2 percent in IIQ2021 relative to a year earlier and 4.9 percent in IIIQ2021 relative to a year earlier and 5.5 percent in IVQ2021 relative to a year earlier (See Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/gdp4q21_adv.pdf and entire data in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image029

Chart I-11, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Quarter a Year Earlier 2007-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-12 provides growth rates from a quarter relative to the prior quarter during the 1980s. There is the same strong initial growth followed by a long period of sustained growth. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image031

Chart I-12, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Prior Quarter 1980-1995

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-13 provides growth rates in a quarter relative to the prior quarter from 2007 to 2021. Growth in the current expansion after IIIQ2009 has not been as strong as in other postwar cyclical expansions. There is sharp contraction at SAAR of minus 5.1 percent in IQ2020 and minus 31.2 percent IIQ2020, increasing sharply at 33.8 percent in IIIQ2020 and at 4.5 percent in IVQ2020, 6.3 percent in IQ2021, 6.7 percent in IIQ2021, 2.3 percent in IIIQ2021 and 6.9 percent in IVQ2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image033

Chart I-13, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Prior Quarter 2007-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revised estimates and earlier estimates from IQ2008 to IQ2016 in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rates are shown in Table I-7. The strongest revision is for IVQ2008 for which the contraction of GDP is revised from minus 6.8 percent to minus 8.9 percent and minus 8.2 percent. IQ2009 is also revised from contraction of minus 4.9 percent to minus 6.7 percent but then lowered to contraction of 5.3 percent and 5.4 percent. There is only minor revision in IIIQ2008 of the contraction of minus 4.0 percent to minus 3.7 percent and much lower to minus 1.9 percent. Growth of 5.0 percent in IV2009 is revised to 3.8 percent and then increased to 4.0 percent but lowered to 3.9 percent. Growth in IQ2010 is lowered from 3.9 percent to 2.3 percent and 1.7 percent. Growth in IIQ2010 is upwardly revised to 3.8 percent but then lowered to 2.2 percent. The final revision increased growth in IIQ2010 to 3.9 percent. Revisions lowered growth of 1.9 percent in IQ2011 to minus 1.5 percent. The revisions increased growth of 1.8 percent in IQ2013 to 2.7 percent and increased growth of 2.0 percent in IQ2012 to 2.3 percent. The revision reduced the decline of GDP from 2.9 percent in IQ2014 to 2.1 percent. The revision of Jul 20, 2015 reduced significantly the rate of growth in 2013. The revision of Jul 27, 2016 increased the growth rate in 2013 and 2014. The revisions do not alter the conclusion that the current expansion is much weaker than historical sharp contractions since the 1950s and is now changing into slow growth recession with higher risks of contraction and continuing underperformance.

Table I-7, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of GDP, % Annual Equivalent SA, Revised and Earlier Estimates

Quarters

Rev Jul 29, 2016

Rev Jul 30, 2015

Rev Jul 30, 2014

Rev

Jul 31, 2013

Rev

Jul 27, 2012

Rev

Jul 29, 2011

Earlier Estimate

2008

             

I

   

-2.7

-2.7

 

-1.8

-0.7

II

   

2.0

2.0

 

1.3

0.6

III

   

-1.9

-2.0

 

-3.7

-4.0

IV

   

-8.2

-8.3

 

-8.9

-6.8

2009

             

I

   

-5.4

-5.4

-5.3

-6.7

-4.9

II

   

-0.5

-0.4

-0.3

-0.7

-0.7

III

   

1.3

1.3

1.4

1.7

1.6

IV

   

3.9

3.9

4.0

3.8

5.0

2010

             

I

   

1.7

1.6

2.3

3.9

3.7

II

   

3.9

3.9

2.2

3.8

1.7

III

   

2.7

2.8

2.6

2.5

2.6

IV

   

2.5

2.8

2.4

2.3

3.1

2011

             

I

   

-1.5

-1.3

0.1

0.4

1.9

II

   

2.9

3.2

2.5

   

III

   

0.8

1.4

1.3

   

IV

   

4.6

4.9

4.1

   

2012

             

I

 

2.7

2.3

3.7

2.0

   

II

 

1.9

1.6

1.2

1.3

   

III

 

0.5

2.5

2.8

3.1

   

IV

 

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.4

   

2013

             

I

2.8

1.9

2.7

1.1

1.8

   

II

0.8

1.1

1.8

2.5

     

III

3.1

3.0

4.5

4.1

     

IV

4.0

3.8

3.5

2.6

     

2014

             

I

-1.2

-0.9

-2.1

-2.9

     

II

4.0

4.6

         

III

5.0

4.3

         

IV

2.3

2.1

         

2015

             

I

2.0

0.6

         

II

2.6

           

III

2.0

           

IV

0.9

           

2016

             

I

0.8

           

Note: Rev: Revision

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-8 provides contributions to the rate of growth of GDP by major sectors in percentage points. GDP contracted at the SAAR rate of 5.1 percent in IQ2020 and 31.2 percent in IIQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) subtracted 24.10 percentage points in IIQ2020 and subtracted 4.79 percentage points in IQ2020. Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) subtracted 9.64 percentage points in IIQ2020 and 0.92 percentage points in IQ2020. GDP grew at 6.3 percent in IQ2021, at 6.7 percent in IIQ2021, at 2.3 percent in IIIQ2021 and at 6.9 percent in IVQ2021. The highest contributions were 7.44 percentage points by PCE in IQ2021 and 7.92 percentage points in IIQ2021. PCE contributed 2.25 percentage points in IIIQ2021, GDI contributed 5.15 percentage points and net trade contributed 0.00 percentage points.

Table I-8, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of GDP in Percentage Points

 

GDP

PCE

GDI

∆ PI

Trade

GOV

2021

           

I

6.3

7.44

-0.37

-2.62

-1.56

0.77

II

6.7

7.92

-0.65

-1.26

-0.18

-0.36

III

2.3

1.35

2.05

2.20

-1.26

0.17

IV

6.9

2.25

5.15

4.90

0.00

-0.51

2020

           

I

-5.1

-4.79

-0.92

-0.51

-0.05

0.63

II

-31.2

-24.10

-9.64

-4.01

1.53

0.97

III

33.8

25.51

11.71

6.84

-3.25

-0.19

IV

4.5

2.26

4.01

1.10

-1.65

-0.09

2019

           

I

2.4

0.43

1.13

0.49

0.39

0.47

II

3.2

2.37

0.48

-0.57

-0.50

0.86

III

2.8

2.12

0.22

-0.32

0.07

0.36

IV

1.9

1.13

-1.18

-0.99

1.43

0.52

Note: PCE: personal consumption expenditures; GDI: gross private domestic investment; ∆ PI: change in private inventories; Trade: net exports of goods and services; GOV: government consumption expenditures and gross investment; – is negative and no sign positive

GDP: percent change at annual rate; percentage points at annual rates

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

“Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 6.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021 (table 1), according to the "advance" estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the third quarter, real GDP increased2.3 percent. The GDP estimate released today is based on source data that are incomplete or subject to further revision by the source agency (refer to “Source Data for the Advance Estimate” on page 4). The "second" estimate for the fourth quarter, based on more complete data, will be released on February 24, 2022. The increase in real GDP primarily reflected increases in private inventory investment, exports, personal consumption expenditures (PCE), and nonresidential fixed investment that were partly offset by decreases in both federal and state and local government spending. Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, increased (table 2). The increase in fourth quarter GDP reflected the continued economic impact of the COVID19 pandemic. In the fourth quarter, COVID-19 cases resulted in continued restrictions and disruptions in the operations of establishments in some parts of the country. Government assistance payments in the form of forgivable loans to businesses, grants to state and local governments, and social benefits to households all decreased as provisions of several federal programs expired or tapered off. The full economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be quantified in the GDP estimate for the fourth quarter because the impacts are generally embedded in source data and cannot be separately identified. For more information, refer to the Technical Note and Federal Recovery Programs and BEA Statistics. Real GDP accelerated in the fourth quarter, increasing 6.9 percent after increasing 2.3 percent in the third quarter. The acceleration in real GDP in the fourth quarter primarily reflected an upturn in exports, accelerations in private inventory investment and PCE, and smaller decreases in residential fixed investment and federal government spending that were partly offset by a downturn in state and local government spending. Imports accelerated. “

There are positive contributions to growth in IVQ2021 shown in Table I-9:

  • Personal consumption expenditures growing at 3.3 percent.
  • Durable goods growing at 1.6 percent.
  • Nonresidential fixed investment growing at 2.0 percent.
  • Exports growing at 24.5 percent.
  • Inventory investment contributing 4.90 percentage points

There were negative contributions in IVQ2021:

· Imports, which are a deduction from growth, growing at 17.7 percent.

· Residential fixed investment contracting at 0.8 percent.

· Government expenditures contracting at 2.9 percent

· Federal government expenditures contracting at 4.0 percent.

· National defense expenditures contracting at 5.7 percent.

· State and local government expenditures contracting at 2.2 percent.

The BEA finds accelerating factors:

  • Personal consumption expenditures growing at 3.3 percent after growing at 2.0 percent in IIIQ2021.
  • Durable goods growing at 1.6 percent after contracting at 24.6 percent in IIIQ2021.
  • Nonresidential fixed investment growing at 2.0 percent after growing at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2021.
  • Exports growing at 24.5 percent after contracting at 5.3 percent in IIIQ2021.
  • Inventory investment contributing 4.90 percentage after contributing 2.20 percentage points in IIIQ2021.
  • Federal government expenditures contracting at 4.0 percent after contracting at 5.1 percent in IIIQ2021.

The BEA finds offsetting decelerating factors:

· Imports, which are a deduction from growth, growing at 17.7 percent after growing at 4.7 percent in IIIQ2021.

· Government expenditures contracting at 2.9 percent after growing at 0.9 percent in IIIQ2021.

· National defense expenditures contracting at 5.7 percent after contracting at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2021.

· State and local government expenditures contracting at 2.2 percent after growing at 4.9 percent in IIIQ2021.

An important aspect of growth in the US is the decline in growth of real disposable personal income, or what is left after taxes and inflation, which decreased at the rate of 0.2 percent in IIIQ2013 compared with a year earlier. Contraction of real disposable income of 2.5 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier is largely due to comparison with an artificially higher level in anticipations of income in Nov and Dec 2012 to avoid increases in taxes in 2013, an episode known as “fiscal cliff.” Real disposable personal income increased 3.1 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 3.6 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable personal income increased 4.3 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 5.2 percent in IVQ2014 compared with a year earlier. Real disposable personal income grew 4.9 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier partly because of contraction of energy prices and increased at 4.4 percent in IIQ2015. Real disposable personal income grew at 4.0 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and at 3.0 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 2.5 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and at 1.6 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 1.8 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and at 1.8 percent in IVQ2016 compared with a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 2.1 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and grew at 3.3 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 3.5 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and grew 3.1 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 3.3 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and grew at 3.2 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable personal income grew at 3.4 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to a year earlier and at 3.7 percent in IVQ2018 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 3.3 percent in IQ2019 relative to a year earlier and grew at 2.1 percent in IIQ2019 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 1.9 percent in IIIQ2019 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 1.7 percent in IVQ2019 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 1.6 percent in IQ2020 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable personal income grew at 12.5 percent in IIQ2020 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew 6.9 percent in IIIQ2020 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 4.0 percent in IVQ2020 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income grew at 15.1 percent in IQ2021. Real disposable income contracted at 4.3 percent in IIQ2021 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income contracted at 0.9 percent in IIIQ2021 relative to a year earlier. Real disposable income contracted at 0.3 percent in IVQ2021 relative to a year earlier. The effects of financial repression, or zero interest, are vividly shown in the decline of the savings rate, or personal saving as percent of disposable income from 10.2 percent in IVQ2012 to 6.6 percent in IIIQ2013 and 6.3 percent in IVQ2013. The savings rate eased to 7.3 percent in IQ2014, increasing to 7.4 percent in IIQ2014 and stabilizing to 7.4 percent in IIIQ2014. The savings rate moved to 7.4 percent in IVQ2014, increasing to 7.7 percent in IQ2015. The savings rate moved to 7.6 percent in IIQ2015, 7.7 percent in IIIQ2015 and 7.4 percent in IVQ2015. The savings ratio moved to 7.5 percent in IQ2016 and 6.6 percent in IIQ2016. The savings ratio eased at 6.3 percent in IIIQ2016 and at 6.4 percent in IVQ2016. The savings ratio reached 7.0 percent in IQ2017 and 6.7 percent in IIQ2017. The savings ratio eased to 6.7 percent in IIIQ2017 and 6.3 percent in IVQ2017. The savings ratio increased to 7.2 percent in IQ2018 and 7.6 percent in IIQ2018. The savings ratio eased to 7.5 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased to 7.8 percent in IVQ2018. The savings ratio increased to 8.5 percent in IQ2019, easing to 7.3 percent in IIQ2019. The savings ratio eased to 7.2 percent in IIIQ2019, stabilizing to 7.3 percent in IVQ2019. The savings ratio increased to 9.6 percent in IQ2020. The savings ratio increased to 26.1 percent in IIQ2020. The savings ratio eased to 16.0 percent in IIIQ2020. The savings ratio eased to 13.6 percent in IVQ2020. The savings ratio moved to 20.5 percent in IQ2021. The savings ratio eased to 10.9 percent in IIQ2021. The savings ratio eased to 9.6 percent in IIIQ2021. The savings rate eased to 7.4 percent in IVQ2021. Anticipation of income in IVQ2012 to avoid higher taxes in 2013 caused increases in income and savings while higher payroll taxes in 2013 restricted income growth and savings in IQ2013. Zero interest rates induce risky investments with high leverage and can contract balance sheets of families, business and financial institutions when interest rates inevitably increase in the future. There is a tradeoff of weaker economy in the future when interest rates increase by meager growth in the present with forced consumption by zero interest rates. Microeconomics consists of the analysis of allocation of scarce resources to alternative and competing ends. Zero interest rates cloud he calculus of risk and returns in consumption and investment, disrupting decisions that maintain the economy in its long-term growth path.

Table I-9, US, Percentage Seasonally Adjusted Annual Equivalent Quarterly Rates of Increase, %

 

IV Q2020

I

Q2021

II

Q2021

III

Q2021

IV Q2021

GDP

4.5

6.3

6.7

2.3

6.9

PCE

3.4

11.4

12.0

2.0

3.3

Durable Goods

1.1

50.0

11.6

-24.6

1.6

NRFI

12.5

12.9

9.2

1.7

2.0

RFI

34.4

13.3

-11.7

-7.7

-0.8

Net Exports GS % Points

-1.65

-1.56

-0.18

-1.26

0.00

Exports

22.5

-2.9

7.6

-5.3

24.5

Imports

31.3

9.3

7.1

4.7

17.7

GOV

-0.5

4.2

-2.0

0.9

-2.9

Federal GOV

-3.1

11.3

-5.3

-5.1

-4.0

National Defense

5.3

-5.8

-1.1

-1.7

-5.7

GDP Growth % Points

0.22

-0.25

-0.04

-0.07

-0.22

State/Local GOV

1.2

-0.1

0.2

4.9

-2.2

∆ PI % Points

1.10

-2.62

-1.26

2.20

4.90

Final Sales of Domestic Product

3.4

9.1

8.1

0.1

1.9

Gross Domestic Purchases

6.1

7.7

6.7

3.5

6.7

Prices Gross
Domestic Purchases

1.8

3.9

5.8

5.6

6.9

Prices of GDP

2.2

4.3

6.1

6.0

6.9

Prices of GDP Excluding Food and Energy

1.9

3.4

5.8

5.3

6.1

Prices of PCE

1.5

3.8

6.5

5.3

6.5

Prices of PCE Excluding Food and Energy

1.2

2.7

6.1

4.6

4.9

Prices of Market Based PCE

1.3

3.9

5.8

5.3

6.2

Prices of Market Based PCE Excluding Food and Energy

1.0

2.5

5.3

4.3

4.3

Real Disposable Personal Income*

4.0

15.1

-4.3

-0.9

-0.3

Personal Saving As % Disposable Income

13.6

20.5

10.9

9.5

7.4

Note: PCE: personal consumption expenditures; NRFI: nonresidential fixed investment; RFI: residential fixed investment; GOV: government consumption expenditures and gross investment; ∆ PI: change in

private inventories; GDP - ∆ PI: final sales of domestic product; PP: percentage points; Personal savings rate: savings as percent of disposable income

*Percent change from quarter one year ago

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percentage shares of GDP are in Table I-10. PCE (personal consumption expenditures) is equivalent to 68.1 percent of GDP and is under pressure with stagnant real disposable income per person, elevated levels of unemployment and underemployment and higher savings rates than before the global recession, temporarily interrupted by financial repression in the form of zero interest rates. There is even stronger pressure in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Gross private domestic investment is also growing slowly even with about two trillion dollars in cash holdings by companies. In a slowing world economy, it may prove more difficult to grow exports faster than imports to generate higher growth. Bouts of risk aversion revalue the dollar relative to most currencies in the world as investors increase their holdings of dollar-denominated assets.

Table I-10, US, Percentage Shares of GDP, %

 

IVQ2021

GDP

100.0

PCE

68.1

   Goods

23.5

            Durable

8.6

            Nondurable

15.0

   Services

44.6

Gross Private Domestic Investment

18.7

    Fixed Investment

17.7

        NRFI

13.1

            Structures

2.5

            Equipment & Software

5.4

            Intellectual Property

5.2

        RFI

4.6

     Change in Private
      Inventories

0.9

Net Exports of Goods and Services

-4.0

       Exports

11.1

                    Goods

7.8

                    Services

3.3

       Imports

15.1

                     Goods

12.6

                     Services

2.5

Government

17.2

        Federal

6.5

           National Defense

3.8

           Nondefense

2.7

        State and Local

10.7

PCE: personal consumption expenditures; NRFI: nonresidential fixed investment; RFI: residential fixed investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-11 shows percentage point (PP) contributions to the annual levels of GDP growth in the earlier recessions 1958-1959, 1975-1976, 1982-1993 and 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. The data incorporate the new revisions released by the BEA. The most striking contrast is in the rates of growth of annual GDP in the expansion phases of 6.9 percent in 1959, 5.4 percent in 1976, and 4.6 percent in 1983 followed by 7.2 percent in 1984 and 4.2 percent in 1985. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). In contrast, GDP grew 2.7 percent in 2010 after six consecutive quarters of growth, 1.5 percent in 2011 after ten consecutive quarters of expansion, 2.3 percent in 2012 after 14 quarters of expansion, 1.8 percent in 2013 after 18 consecutive quarters of expansion, 2.3 percent in 2014 after 22 consecutive quarters of expansion and 2.7 percent in 2015 after twenty-six consecutive quarters of expansion. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in 2016 after thirty consecutive quarters of expansion. GDP grew at 2.3 percent in 2017 after 34 quarters of expansion. GDP grew at 2.9 percent in 2018 after 38 quarters of expansion. GDP grew at 2.3 percent in 2019 after 42 quarters of expansion. GDP contracted at 3.4 percent in 2020 after 46 quarters of expansion interrupted in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). GDP grew at 5.7 percent in 2021 after 50 quarters of expansion. Annual levels also show much stronger growth of PCEs in the expansions after the earlier contractions than in the expansion after the global recession of 2007. Gross domestic investment was much stronger in the earlier expansions than in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

Table I-11, US, Percentage Point Contributions to the Annual Growth Rate of GDP

 

GDP

PCE

GDI

∆ PI

Trade

GOV

1958

-0.7

0.52

-1.16

-0.17

-0.87

0.76

1959

6.9

3.51

2.83

0.83

0.00

0.60

1975

-0.2

1.36

-2.91

-1.24

0.86

0.49

1976

5.4

3.41

2.91

1.37

-1.05

0.12

1982

-1.8

0.88

-2.46

-1.31

-0.59

0.37

1983

4.6

3.51

1.60

0.28

-1.32

0.79

1984

7.2

3.30

4.73

1.90

-1.54

0.74

1985

4.2

3.20

-0.01

-1.03

-0.39

1.37

1986

3.5

2.58

0.03

-0.31

-0.29

1.14

1987

3.5

2.15

0.53

0.41

0.17

0.62

1988

4.2

2.65

0.45

-0.13

0.81

0.26

1989

3.7

1.86

0.72

0.17

0.51

0.58

1990

1.9

1.28

-0.45

-0.21

0.40

0.65

1991

-0.1

0.12

-1.09

-0.26

0.62

0.25

1992

3.5

2.36

1.11

0.28

-0.04

0.10

1993

2.8

2.24

1.24

0.07

-0.56

-0.17

2009

-2.6

-0.88

-3.51

-0.82

1.07

0.72

2010

2.7

1.31

1.85

1.42

-0.43

-0.02

2011

1.5

1.16

0.94

-0.05

0.12

-0.67

2012

2.3

0.94

1.64

0.17

0.12

-0.42

2013

1.8

1.01

1.10

0.23

0.20

-0.47

2014

2.3

1.82

0.95

-0.12

-0.31

-0.17

2015

2.7

2.20

0.95

0.31

-0.78

0.33

2016

1.7

1.67

-0.18

-0.53

-0.17

0.35

2017

2.3

1.65

0.68

-0.01

-0.16

0.09

2018

2.9

1.96

0.98

0.16

-0.27

0.24

2019

2.3

1.48

0.60

0.05

-0.18

0.38

2020

-3.4

-2.55

-0.99

-0.52

-0.29

0.43

2021

5.7

5.30

1.67

0.32

-1.39

0.08

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-12. GDP contracted at 3.4 percent in 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The highest impact in 2020 were subtractions of 2.55 percentage points from GDP growth by PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures) and 0.99 percentage points by GDI (Gross Domestic Investment). Net exports of goods and services subtracted percentage points from GDP growth in all years: 0.16 in 2017, 0.27 in 2018, 0.18 in 2010, 0.29 in 2020 and 1.39 in 2021. GDP grew at 5.7 percent in 2021 with the highest contributions of 5.30 percentage points by PCE and 1.67 percentage points by GPDI.

Table I-12, US, Contributions to Growth of Gross Domestic Product in Percentage Points

 

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

 

GDP Growth ∆%

2.3

2.9

2.3

-3.4

5.7

 

Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE)

1.65

1.96

1.48

-2.55

5.30

 

  Goods

0.82

0.84

0.71

0.96

2.68

 

     Durable

0.44

0.49

0.30

0.54

1.38

 

Nondurable

0.38

0.35

0.40

0.42

1.30

 

Services

0.83

1.13

0.78

-3.52

2.62

 

Gross Private Domestic Investment (GPDI)

0.68

0.98

0.60

-0.99

1.67

 

Fixed Investment

0.69

0.82

0.55

-0.47

1.35

 

Nonresidential

0.53

0.85

0.59

-0.73

0.97

 

Structures

0.13

0.12

0.06

-0.39

-0.24

 

Equipment, software

0.16

0.36

0.19

-0.48

0.68

 

Intellectual Property

0.25

0.36

0.33

0.14

0.52

 

Residential

0.15

-0.02

-0.04

0.26

0.38

 

Change Private Inventories

-0.01

0.16

0.05

-0.52

0.32

 

Net Exports of Goods and Services

-0.16

-0.27

-0.18

-0.29

-1.39

 

Exports

0.49

0.35

-0.01

-1.57

0.48

 

Goods

0.32

0.34

0.00

-0.76

0.52

 

Services

0.17

0.01

0.00

-0.81

-0.04

 

Imports

-0.65

-0.62

-0.17

1.28

-1.87

 

Goods

-0.53

-0.62

-0.07

0.65

-1.61

 

Services

-0.12

0.00

-0.11

0.63

-0.26

 

Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment

0.09

0.24

0.38

0.43

0.08

 

Federal

0.02

0.20

0.25

0.33

0.05

 

National Defense

0.04

0.13

0.20

0.11

-0.04

 

Nondefense

-0.01

0.07

0.04

0.21

0.08

 

State and Local

0.07

0.04

0.14

0.10

0.04

 

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Industrial production decreased 0.1 percent in Dec 2021 and increased 0.7 percent in Nov 2021 after increasing 1.2 percent in Oct 2021, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. Manufacturing decreased 22.4 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 13.5 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2019. Manufacturing increased 10.9 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2020. Manufacturing in Dec 2020 is lower by 13.9 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. Manufacturing increased 15.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2021. Manufacturing in Dec 2021 is 10.7 percent below the peak in Jun 2007. US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 50 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/gdp4q21_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 51.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2021 would be $23,849.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4043.2 billion than actual $19,806.0 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 23.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.6 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm). US GDP in IVQ2021 is 17.0 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,806.0 billion in IVQ2021 or 25.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 87.8 percent in IIIQ2021. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Dec 2021, there were 150.170 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 127.963 million NSA in Dec 2021 accounted for 85.2 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 150.170 million, of which 12.610 million, or 9.9 percent of total private jobs and 8.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 107.233 million NSA in Dec 2021, or 71.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.8 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 9.8 percent in US national income in IIIQ2021 and durable goods 5.6 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

 

IIQ2021

% Total

IIIQ2021

% Total

National Income WCCA

19,157.3

100.0

19,795.6

100.0

Domestic Industries

18,926.9

98.8

19,528.0

98.6

Private Industries

16,822.0

87.8

17,373.5

87.8

Agriculture

189.2

1.0

195.8

1.0

Mining

155.5

0.8

191.4

1.0

Utilities

199.1

1.0

207.3

1.0

Construction

999.5

5.2

1041.5

5.3

Manufacturing

1842.8

9.6

1930.3

9.8

Durable Goods

1091.0

5.7

1114.5

5.6

Nondurable Goods

751.8

3.9

815.8

4.1

Wholesale Trade

1064.3

5.6

1103.3

5.6

Retail Trade

1437.2

7.5

1415.8

7.2

Transportation & WH

571.4

3.0

623.5

3.1

Information

802.7

4.2

816.3

4.1

Finance, Insurance, RE

3407.2

17.8

3464.9

17.5

Professional & Business Services

2972.9

15.5

3079.8

15.6

Education, Health Care

1975.3

10.3

2032.3

10.3

Arts, Entertainment

685.5

3.6

730.3

3.7

Other Services

519.5

2.7

541.0

2.7

Government

2104.9

11.0

2,154.5

10.9

Rest of the World

230.4

1.2

267.7

1.4

Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; Percentages Calculates from Unrounded Data; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment. Table IA1-1 provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of growth of private fixed investment for the recessions of the 1980s and the current economic cycle. In the cyclical expansion beginning in IQ1983 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), real private fixed investment in the United States grew at the average annual rate of 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. Growth rates fell to an average of 2.2 percent in the following eight quarters from IQ1985 to IVQ1986 and to an average of 1.9 percent in the 12 quarters of 1985, 1986 and 1987. The average rate of growth in the four quarters of 1988 was 3.7 percent. There were only four quarters of contraction of private fixed investment from IQ1983 to IVQ1987. The National Bureau of Economic Research dates another cycle from Jul 1990 (IIIQ1981) to Mar 1991 (IQ1991) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), showing in Table III-1 with contractions of fixed investment in the final three quarters of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991. There is quite different behavior of private fixed investment in the thirty-six quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2018. The average annual growth rate in the first eight quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2011 was 4.6 percent, which is significantly lower than 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. There is only robust growth of private fixed investment in the four quarters of expansion from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 at the average annual rate of 12.8 percent. Growth has fallen from the SAAR of 17.9 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.6 percent in IIIQ2012, recovering to 7.4 percent in IVQ2012 and increasing at 7.0 percent in IQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment fell to 7.1 percent in IIIQ2013 and to 5.5 percent in IVQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment decreased to 4.1 percent in IQ2014. Fixed investment grew at the SAAR of 11.6 percent in IIQ2014 and at 7.9 percent in IIIQ2014. Fixed investment grew at 4.7 percent in IVQ2014, 1.1 percent in IQ2015 and 3.5 percent in IIQ2015. Fixed investment grew at 3.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and fell at 1.1 percent in IVQ2015. Fixed investment increased at 2.4 percent in IQ2016 and increased at 2.2 percent in IIQ2016. Fixed investment increased at 3.7 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased at 3.1 percent in IVQ2016. Fixed investment increased at 6.4 percent in IQ2017 and increased at 3.8 percent in IIQ2017. Fixed investment grew at 0.5 percent in IIIQ2017. Fixed investment grew at 8.1 percent in IVQ2017 and increased at 6.7 percent in IQ2018. Fixed investment grew at 6.0 percent in IIQ2018. Fixed investment increased at 0.8 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased at 1.8 percent in IVQ2018. Fixed investment increased at 3.7 percent in IQ2019 and increased at 6.1 percent in IIQ2019. Fixed investment increased at 3.1 percent in IIIQ2019. Fixed investment decreased at 1.1 percent in IVQ2019. Fixed investment decreased at 2.3 percent in IQ2020 and decreased at 30.4 percent in IIQ2020, increasing at 27.5 percent in IIIQ2020 and at 17.7 percent in IVQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Fixed investment grew at 13.0 percent in IQ2021 and increased at 3.3 percent in IIQ2021. Fixed investment decreased at 0.9 percent in IIIQ2021. Fixed investment increased at 1.3 percent in IVQ2021. Sudeep Reddy and Scott Thurm, writing on “Investment falls off a cliff,” on Nov 18, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123593211825394.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories) analyze the decline of private investment in the US and inform that a review by the Wall Street Journal of filing and conference calls finds that 40 of the largest publicly traded corporations in the US have announced intentions to reduce capital expenditures in 2012.

Table IA1-1, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of Real Private Fixed Investment, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q

1981

1982

1983

1984

2008

2009

2010

I

3.8

-10.6

9.3

13.2

-6.1

-28.2

-0.2

II

3.2

-12.0

15.9

16.6

-3.2

-13.7

15.4

III

0.2

-9.2

24.4

8.2

-9.7

1.5

2.2

IV

-1.3

0.2

24.3

7.4

-23.9

2.0

7.8

       

1985

   

2011

I

     

3.7

   

-0.7

II

     

5.2

   

9.7

III

     

-1.6

   

17.9

IV

     

7.8

   

10.6

       

1986

   

2012

I

     

1.1

   

13.1

II

     

0.1

   

8.3

III

     

-1.8

   

0.6

IV

     

3.1

   

7.4

       

1987

   

2013

I

     

-6.7

   

7.0

II

     

6.3

   

3.3

III

     

7.1

   

7.1

IV

     

-0.2

   

5.5

       

1988

   

2014

I

     

0.2

   

4.1

II

     

8.1

   

11.6

III

     

1.9

   

7.9

IV

     

4.8

   

4.7

       

1989

   

2015

IQ

     

3.6

   

1.1

IIQ

     

0.5

   

3.5

IIIQ

     

7.2

   

3.4

IVQ

     

-5.1

   

-1.1

       

1990

   

2016

IQ

     

4.8

   

2.4

IIQ

     

-7.7

   

2.2

IIIQ

     

-3.2

   

3.7

IVQ

     

-9.9

   

3.1

       

1991

   

2017

I

     

-10.6

   

6.4

II

     

1.2

   

3.8

III

     

0.5

   

0.5

IV

     

1.7

   

8.1

       

1992

   

2018

I

     

4.5

   

6.7

II

     

13.8

   

6.0

III

     

4.7

   

0.8

IV

     

12.2

   

1.8

       

1993

   

2019

I

     

3.0

   

3.7

II

     

7.4

   

6.1

III

     

6.4

   

3.1

IV

     

17.1

   

-1.1

       

1994

   

2020

I

     

4.8

   

-2.3

II

     

8.3

   

-30.4

III

     

3.3

   

27.5

IV

     

10.0

   

17.7

       

1995

   

2021

I

     

8.7

   

13.0

II

     

-0.3

   

3.3

III

     

5.7

   

-0.9

IV

     

8.0

   

1.3

       

1996

     
       

10.6

     
       

13.0

     
       

9.4

     
       

6.5

     

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-1 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth of real private fixed investment from 1980 to 1995. Growth rates recovered sharply during the first eight quarters, which was essential in returning the economy to trend growth and eliminating unemployment and most underemployment accumulated during the contractions. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image035

Chart IA1-1, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 1980-1995

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Weak behavior of real private fixed investment from 2007 to 2021 is in Chart IA1-2. Growth rates of real private fixed investment were much lower during the initial phase of the current economic cycle, entered sharp trend of decline and recovered recently, with another decline followed by increase and renewed decline. Fixed investment contracted sharply, at 2.3 percent in IQ2020 and at 30.4 percent in IIQ2020, increasing at 27.5 percent in IIIQ2020 and at 17.7 percent in IVQ2020. Fixed investment grew at 13.0 percent in IQ2021, growing at 3.3 percent in IIQ2021. Fixed investment decreased at 0.9 percent in IIIQ2021. Fixed investment increased at 1.3 percent in IVQ2021. There is a downward effect in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image037

Chart IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 2007-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-2 provides real private fixed investment at seasonally adjusted annual rates from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2021 or for the complete economic cycle. The first column provides the quarter, the second column percentage change relative to IVQ2007, the third column the quarter percentage change in the quarter relative to the prior quarter and the final column percentage change in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IQ1980, real gross private domestic investment in the US was $933.1 billion of chained 2012 dollars, growing to $1,514.4 billion in IIQ1995 or 62.3 percent. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 45.8 percent from $2,653.1 billion in IVQ2007 to $3,868.9 billion in IVQ2021. Real private fixed investment increased 36.7 percent from $2,630.0 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IVQ2007 to $3,596.5 billion in IVQ2021. Real gross private domestic investment fell at SAAR 48.8 percent in IIQ2020, increasing at 82.1 percent in IIIQ2020 and at 24.7 percent in IVQ2020, falling at 2.3 percent in IQ2021 and decreasing at 3.9 percent in IIQ2021. Real gross domestic investment increased at 12.4 percent in IIIQ2021. Real gross domestic investment increased at 32.0 percent in IVQ2021. Private fixed investment fell at SAAR 30.4 percent in IIQ2020, increasing at 27.5 percent in IIIQ2020, at 17.7 percent in IVQ2020, 13.0 percent in IQ2021, 3.3 percent in IIQ2021, decreasing at 0.9 percent in IIIQ2021 and increasing at 1.3 percent in IVQ2021, in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Private fixed investment fell relative to IVQ2007 in all quarters preceding IVQ2012 and increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2016, increasing 0.5 percent in IIQ2016 and increasing 0.6 percent in IQ2016. Private fixed investment increased 0.8 percent in IVQ2016. Private fixed investment increased 1.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 0.9 percent in IIQ2017. Private fixed investment increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 2.0 percent in IVQ2017. Private fixed investment increased 1.6 percent in IQ2018, increasing 1.5 percent in IIQ2018. Private fixed investment increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2018, increasing 0.4 percent in IVQ2018. Private fixed investment increased 0.9 percent in IQ2019, increasing 1.5 percent in IIQ2019. Private fixed investment increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2019. Private fixed investment decreased 0.3 percent in IVQ2019. Private fixed investment decreased 0.6 percent in IQ2020. Private fixed investment decreased 8.7 percent in IIQ2020. Private fixed investment increased 6.3 percent in IIIQ2020. Private fixed investment increased 4.2 percent in IVQ2020. Private fixed investment increased at 3.1 percent in IQ2021. Private fixed investment increased at 0.8 percent in IIQ2021. Private fixed investment decreased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2021. Private fixed investment increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2021. Growth of real private investment in Table IA1-2 is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012. There is recent robust growth followed by sharp contraction and fast recovery in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The investment decision of United States corporations is fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash.

Table IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions of Chained 2012 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real PFI, Billions Chained

2012

Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆% over
Year Earlier

2007Q4

2,629.9

NA

-1.0

-1.1

2008Q1

2,589.1

-1.6

-1.6

-2.6

2008Q2

2,567.9

-2.4

-0.8

-3.8

2008Q3

2,503.0

-4.8

-2.5

-5.7

2008Q4

2,337.8

-11.1

-6.6

-11.1

2009Q1

2,151.9

-18.2

-8.0

-16.9

2009Q2

2,073.9

-21.1

-3.6

-19.2

2009Q3

2,081.6

-20.9

0.4

-16.8

2009Q4

2,092.0

-20.5

0.5

-10.5

2010Q1

2,091.0

-20.5

0.0

-2.8

2010Q2

2,167.1

-17.6

3.6

4.5

2010Q3

2,178.7

-17.2

0.5

4.7

2010Q4

2,220.0

-15.6

1.9

6.1

2011Q1

2,216.2

-15.7

-0.2

6.0

2011Q2

2,268.0

-13.8

2.3

4.7

2011Q3

2,363.3

-10.1

4.2

8.5

2011Q4

2,423.7

-7.8

2.6

9.2

2012Q1

2,499.4

-5.0

3.1

12.8

2012Q2

2,549.8

-3.0

2.0

12.4

2012Q3

2,553.6

-2.9

0.1

8.1

2012Q4

2,599.4

-1.2

1.8

7.2

2013Q1

2,643.9

0.5

1.7

5.8

2013Q2

2,665.3

1.3

0.8

4.5

2013Q3

2,711.3

3.1

1.7

6.2

2013Q4

2,748.0

4.5

1.4

5.7

2014Q1

2,775.6

5.5

1.0

5.0

2014Q2

2,852.8

8.5

2.8

7.0

2014Q3

2,907.3

10.5

1.9

7.2

2014Q4

2,941.2

11.8

1.2

7.0

2015Q1

2,949.5

12.2

0.3

6.3

2015Q2

2,974.9

13.1

0.9

4.3

2015Q3

2,999.8

14.1

0.8

3.2

2015Q4

2,991.8

13.8

-0.3

1.7

2016Q1

3,009.2

14.4

0.6

2.0

2016Q2

3,025.5

15.0

0.5

1.7

2016Q3

3,052.8

16.1

0.9

1.8

2016Q4

3,076.5

17.0

0.8

2.8

2017Q1

3,124.7

18.8

1.6

3.8

2017Q2

3,154.2

19.9

0.9

4.3

2017Q3

3,158.1

20.1

0.1

3.5

2017Q4

3,220.3

22.4

2.0

4.7

2018Q1

3,273.2

24.5

1.6

4.8

2018Q2

3,321.2

26.3

1.5

5.3

2018Q3

3,327.9

26.5

0.2

5.4

2018Q4

3,342.6

27.1

0.4

3.8

2019Q1

3,372.8

28.2

0.9

3.0

2019Q2

3,423.2

30.2

1.5

3.1

2019Q3

3,449.3

31.2

0.8

3.6

2019Q4

3,439.9

30.8

-0.3

2.9

2020Q1

3,419.6

30.0

-0.6

1.4

2020Q2

3,123.0

18.7

-8.7

-8.8

2020Q3

3,318.5

26.2

6.3

-3.8

2020Q4

3,456.6

31.4

4.2

0.5

2021Q1

3,564.1

35.5

3.1

4.2

2021Q2

3,593.0

36.6

0.8

15.0

2021Q3

3,585.0

36.3

-0.2

8.0

2021Q4

3,596.5

36.8

0.3

4.0

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-3 provides real private fixed investment in chained dollars of 2009 from 2007 to 2021. Real private fixed investment increased 36.7 percent from $2,630.0 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IVQ2007 to $3,596.5 billion in IVQ2021. Private fixed investment fell at SAAR 30.4 percent in IIQ2020, increasing at 27.5 percent in IIIQ2020, at 17.7 percent in IVQ2020, 13.0 percent in IQ2021, 3.3 percent in IIQ2021, decreasing at 0.9 percent in IIIQ2021 and increasing at 1.3 percent in IVQ2021.

clip_image039

Chart IA1-3, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, 2007 to 2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-4 provides real gross private domestic investment in chained dollars of 2012 from 1980 to 1995. Real gross private domestic investment climbed 62.3 percent to $1,514.4 billion of 2012 dollars in IIQ1995 above the level of $933.1 billion in IQ1980. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image041

Chart IA1-4, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 1980-1995

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-5 provides real gross private domestic investment in the United States in billions of chained dollars of 2012 from 2007 to 2021. Real gross private domestic investment reached a level of $3,868.9 billion in IVQ2021, which was 45.8 percent higher than the level of $2,653.1 billion in IVQ2007 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image043

Chart IA1-5, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2012 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 2007-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-3 shows that the share of gross private domestic investment in GDP has decreased from 19.8 percent in IVQ2000 and 19.1 percent in IVQ2006 to 18.7 percent in IVQ2021. There are declines in percentage shares in GDP of all components with sharp reduction of residential investment from 4.7 percent in IVQ2000 and 5.6 percent in IVQ2006 to 4.6 percent in IVQ2021. The share of fixed investment in GDP fell from 19.3 percent in IVQ2000 and 18.7 percent in IVQ2006 to 17.7 percent in IVQ2021.

Table IA1-3, Percentage Shares of Gross Private Domestic Investment and Components in Gross Domestic Product, % of GDP

 

IVQ2021

IVQ2006

IVQ2000

Gross Private Domestic Investment

18.7

19.1

19.8

  Fixed Investment

17.7

18.7

19.3

     Nonresidential

13.1

13.2

14.6

          Structures

2.5

3.2

3.2

          Equipment

          and Software

5.4

6.2

7.3

          Intellectual
           Property

5.2

3.8

4.0

     Residential

4.6

5.6

4.7

   Change in Private Inventories

0.9

0.3

0.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Broader perspective is in Chart IA1-6 with the percentage share of gross private domestic investment in GDP in annual data from 1929 to 2021. There was sharp drop during the current economic cycle with incomplete recovery in contrast with sharp recovery after the recessions of the 1980s.

clip_image045

Chart IA1-6, US, Percentage Share of Gross Private Domestic Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-7 provides percentage shares of private fixed investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2021. The sharp contraction after the recessions of the 1980s was followed by sustained recovery while the sharp drop in the current economic cycle has not been recovered.

clip_image047

Chart IA1-7, US, Percentage Share of Private Fixed Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-8 provides percentage shares in GDP of nonresidential investment from 1929 to 2021. There is again recovery from sharp contraction in the 1980s but inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

clip_image049

Chart IA1-8, US, Percentage Share of Nonresidential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-9 provides percentage shares of business equipment and software in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2021. There is again inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

clip_image051

Chart IA1-9, US, Percentage Share of Business Equipment and Software in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-10 provides percentage shares of residential investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2021. The salient characteristic of Chart IA1-10 is the vertical increase of the share of residential investment in GDP up to 2006 and subsequent collapse.

clip_image053

Chart IA1-10, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Finer detail is provided by the quarterly share of residential investment in GDP from 1979 to 2021 in Chart IA1-11. There was protracted growth of that share, accelerating sharply into 2006 followed with nearly vertical drop. The explanation of the sharp contraction of United States housing can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the

interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ingersoll 1987, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

clip_image055

Chart IA1-11, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-12 provides the share of intellectual property products investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2021. This is an important addition in the revision and enhancement of GDP provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The share rose sharply over time.

clip_image057

Chart IA1-12, US, Percentage Share of Intellectual Property Products Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-13 provides the percentage share of intellectual property investment in GDP on a quarterly basis from 1979 to 2021.

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Chart IA1-13, US, Percentage Share of Intellectual Property Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percentage shares of net trade (exports less imports), exports and imports in US Gross Domestic Product are in Chart IA1-13 from 1929 to 2021. There is sharp trend of decline of exports and imports after the global recession beginning in IVQ2007. Net trade has been subtracting from growth since the stagflation of the 1970s.

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Chart IA1-14, US, Percentage Shares of Net Trade, Exports and Imports in Gross Domestic Product, Yearly, 1979-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Contributions to the rate of growth of real GDP in percentage points by investment segments are in Table IA1-4. There are multiple subtractions in IQ2020 and IIQ2020 in investment segments in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is recovery in the return to economic activity from IIIQ2020 to IVQ2021. Private Fixed Investment (PFI) and Equipment (EQP) contributed to the recovery as also Non-Residential (NRES) and Residential (RES).

Table IA1-4, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of Real GDP in Percentage Points

 

GDP

GDI

PFI

NRES

EQP

IPP

RES

∆INV

2021

               

I

6.3

-0.37

2.25

1.65

0.75

0.76

0.60

-2.62

II

6.7

-0.65

0.61

1.21

0.66

0.62

-0.60

-1.26

III

2.3

2.05

-0.16

0.22

-0.13

0.46

-0.38

2.20

IV

6.9

5.15

0.25

0.28

0.05

0.53

-0.03

4.90

2020

               

I

-5.1

-0.92

-0.41

-1.14

-1.30

0.18

0.73

-0.51

II

-31.2

-9.64

-5.63

-4.28

-1.99

-0.51

-1.36

-4.01

III

33.8

11.71

4.88

2.72

2.73

0.45

2.16

6.84

IV

4.5

4.01

2.92

1.57

1.29

0.50

1.34

1.10

2019

               

I

2.4

1.13

0.64

0.63

0.25

0.25

0.00

0.49

II

3.2

0.48

1.06

0.90

0.15

0.34

0.15

-0.57

III

2.8

0.22

0.54

0.40

-0.31

0.29

0.14

-0.32

IV

1.9

-1.18

-0.19

-0.23

-0.29

0.32

0.04

-0.99

GDP: Gross Domestic Product; GDI: Gross Domestic Investment; PFI: Private Fixed Investment; NRES: Nonresidential; EQP: Business Equipment and Software; IPP: Intellectual Property Products; RES: Residential; ∆INV: Change in Private Inventories.

GDI = PFI + ∆INV, may not add exactly because of errors of rounding.

GDP: Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate of growth in a quarter; components: percentage points at annual rate.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IID. United States International Terms of Trade. Delfim Netto (1959) partly reprinted in Pelaez (1973) conducted two classical nonparametric tests (Mann 1945, Wallis and Moore 1941; see Kendall and Stuart 1968) with coffee-price data in the period of free markets from 1857 to 1906 with the following conclusions (Pelaez, 1976a, 280):

“First, the null hypothesis of no trend was accepted with high confidence; secondly, the null hypothesis of no oscillation was rejected also with high confidence. Consequently, in the nineteenth century international prices of coffee fluctuated but without long-run trend. This statistical fact refutes the extreme argument of structural weakness of the coffee trade.”

In his classic work on the theory of international trade, Jacob Viner (1937, 563) analyzed the “index of total gains from trade,” or “amount of gain per unit of trade,” denoted as T:

T= (∆Pe/∆Pi)∆Q

Where ∆Pe is the change in export prices, ∆Pi is the change in import prices and ∆Q is the change in export volume. Dorrance (1948, 52) restates “Viner’s index of total gain from trade” as:

“What should be done is to calculate an index of the value (quantity multiplied by price) of exports and the price of imports for any country whose foreign accounts are to be analysed. Then the export value index should be divided by the import price index. The result would be an index which would reflect, for the country concerned, changes in the volume of imports obtainable from its export income (i.e. changes in its "real" export income, measured in import terms). The present writer would suggest that this index be referred to as the ‘income terms of trade’ index to differentiate it from the other indexes at present used by economists.”

What really matters for an export activity especially during modernization is the purchasing value of goods that it exports in terms of prices of imports. For a primary producing country, the purchasing power of exports in acquiring new technology from the country providing imports is the critical measurement. The barter terms of trade of Brazil improved from 1857 to 1906 because international coffee prices oscillated without trend (Delfim Netto 1959) while import prices from the United Kingdom declined at the rate of 0.5 percent per year (Imlah 1958). The accurate measurement of the opportunity afforded by the coffee exporting economy was incomparably greater when considering the purchasing power in British prices of the value of coffee exports, or Dorrance’s (1948) income terms of trade.

The conventional theory that the terms of trade of Brazil deteriorated over the long term is without reality (Pelaez 1976a, 280-281):

“Moreover, physical exports of coffee by Brazil increased at the high average rate of 3.5 per cent per year. Brazil's exchange receipts from coffee-exporting in sterling increased at the average rate of 3.5 per cent per year and receipts in domestic currency at 4.5 per cent per year. Great Britain supplied nearly all the imports of the coffee economy. In the period of the free coffee market, British export prices declined at the rate of 0.5 per cent per year. Thus, the income terms of trade of the coffee economy improved at the relatively satisfactory average rate of 4.0 per cent per year. This is only a lower bound of the rate of improvement of the terms of trade. While the quality of coffee remained relatively constant, the quality of manufactured products improved significantly during the fifty-year period considered. The trade data and the non-parametric tests refute conclusively the long-run hypothesis. The valid historical fact is that the tropical export economy of Brazil experienced an opportunity of absorbing rapidly increasing quantities of manufactures from the "workshop" countries. Therefore, the coffee trade constituted a golden opportunity for modernization in nineteenth-century Brazil.”

Imlah (1958) provides decline of British export prices at 0.5 percent in the nineteenth century and there were no lost decades, depressions or unconventional monetary policies in the highly dynamic economy of England that drove the world’s growth impulse. Inflation in the United Kingdom between 1857 and 1906 is measured by the composite price index of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) at minus 7.0 percent or average rate of decline of 0.2 percent per year.

Simon Kuznets (1971) analyzes modern economic growth in his Lecture in Memory of Alfred Nobel:

“The major breakthroughs in the advance of human knowledge, those that constituted dominant sources of sustained growth over long periods and spread to a substantial part of the world, may be termed epochal innovations. And the changing course of economic history can perhaps be subdivided into economic epochs, each identified by the epochal innovation with the distinctive characteristics of growth that it generated. Without considering the feasibility of identifying and dating such economic epochs, we may proceed on the working assumption that modern economic growth represents such a distinct epoch - growth dating back to the late eighteenth century and limited (except in significant partial effects) to economically developed countries. These countries, so classified because they have managed to take adequate advantage of the potential of modern technology, include most of Europe, the overseas offshoots of Western Europe, and Japan—barely one quarter of world population.”

Cameron (1961) analyzes the mechanism by which the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain spread throughout Europe and Cameron (1967) analyzes the financing by banks of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) provide consumer price inflation in England since 1750 and MacFarlane and Mortimer-Lee (1994) analyze inflation in England over 300 years. Lucas (2004) estimates world population and production since the year 1000 with sustained growth of per capita incomes beginning to accelerate for the first time in English-speaking countries and in particular in the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. The conventional theory is unequal distribution of the gains from trade and technical progress between the industrialized countries and developing economies (Singer 1950, 478):

“Dismissing, then, changes in productivity as a governing factor in changing terms of trade, the following explanation presents itself: the fruits of technical progress may be distributed either to producers (in the form of rising incomes) or to consumers (in the form of lower prices). In the case of manufactured commodities produced in more developed countries, the former method, i.e., distribution to producers through higher incomes, was much more important relatively to the second method, while the second method prevailed more in the case of food and raw material production in the underdeveloped countries. Generalizing, we may say -that technical progress in manufacturing industries showed in a rise in incomes while technical progress in the production of food and raw materials in underdeveloped countries showed in a fall in prices”

Temin (1997, 79) uses a Ricardian trade model to discriminate between two views on the Industrial Revolution with an older view arguing broad-based increases in productivity and a new view concentration of productivity gains in cotton manufactures and iron:

“Productivity advances in British manufacturing should have lowered their prices relative to imports. They did. Albert Imlah [1958] correctly recognized this ‘severe deterioration’ in the net barter terms of trade as a signal of British success, not distress. It is no surprise that the price of cotton manufactures fell rapidly in response to productivity growth. But even the price of woolen manufactures, which were declining as a share of British exports, fell almost as rapidly as the price of exports as a whole. It follows, therefore, that the traditional ‘old-hat’ view of the Industrial Revolution is more accurate than the new, restricted image. Other British manufactures were not inefficient and stagnant, or at least, they were not all so backward. The spirit that motivated cotton manufactures extended also to activities as varied as hardware and haberdashery, arms, and apparel.”

Phyllis Deane (1968, 96) estimates growth of United Kingdom gross national product (GNP) at around 2 percent per year for several decades in the nineteenth century. The facts that the terms of trade of Great Britain deteriorated during the period of epochal innovation and high rates of economic growth while the income terms of trade of the coffee economy of nineteenth-century Brazil improved at the average yearly rate of 4.0 percent from 1857 to 1906 disprove the hypothesis of weakness of trade as an explanation of relatively lower income and wealth. As Temin (1997) concludes, Britain did pass on lower prices and higher quality the benefits of technical innovation. Explanation of late modernization must focus on laborious historical research on institutions and economic regimes together with economic theory, data gathering and measurement instead of grand generalizations of weakness of trade and alleged neocolonial dependence (Stein and Stein 1970, 134-5):

“Great Britain, technologically and industrially advanced, became as important to the Latin American economy as to the cotton-exporting southern United States. [After Independence in the nineteenth century] Latin America fell back upon traditional export activities, utilizing the cheapest available factor of production, the land, and the dependent labor force.”

Summerhill (2015) contributes momentous solid facts and analysis with an ideal method combining economic theory, econometrics, international comparisons, data reconstruction and exhaustive archival research. Summerhill (2015) finds that Brazil committed to service of sovereign foreign and internal debt. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Brazil generated primary fiscal surpluses during most of the Empire until 1889 (Summerhill 2015, 37-8, Figure 2.1). Econometric tests by Summerhill (2015, 19-44) show that Brazil’s sovereign debt was sustainable. Sovereign credibility in the North-Weingast (1989) sense spread to financial development that provided the capital for modernization in England and parts of Europe (see Cameron 1961, 1967). Summerhill (2015, 3, 194-6, Figure 7.1) finds that “Brazil’s annual cost of capital in London fell from a peak of 13.9 percent in 1829 to only 5.12 percent in 1889. Average rates on secured loans in the private sector in Rio, however, remained well above 12 percent through 1850.” Financial development would have financed diversification of economic activities, increasing productivity and wages and ensuring economic growth. Brazil restricted creation of limited liability enterprises (Summerhill 2015, 151-82) that prevented raising capital with issue of stocks and corporate bonds. Cameron (1961) analyzed how the industrial revolution in England spread to France and then to the rest of Europe. The Société Générale de Crédit Mobilier of Émile and Isaac Péreire provided the “mobilization of credit” for the new economic activities (Cameron 1961). Summerhill (2015, 151-9) provides facts and analysis demonstrating that regulation prevented the creation of a similar vehicle for financing modernization by Irineu Evangelista de Souza, the legendary Visconde de Mauá. Regulation also prevented the use of negotiable bearing notes of the Caisse Générale of Jacques Lafitte (Cameron 1961, 118-9). The government also restricted establishment and independent operation of banks (Summerhill 2015, 183-214). Summerhill (2015, 198-9) measures concentration in banking that provided economic rents or a social loss. The facts and analysis of Summerhill (2015) provide convincing evidence in support of the economic theory of regulation, which postulates that regulated entities capture the process of regulation to promote their self-interest. There appears to be a case that excessively centralized government can result in regulation favoring private instead of public interests with adverse effects on economic activity. The contribution of Summerhill (2015) explains why Brazil did not benefit from trade as an engine of growth—as did regions of recent settlement in the vision of nineteenth-century trade and development of Ragnar Nurkse (1959)—partly because of restrictions on financing and incorporation. Professor Rondo E. Cameron, in his memorable A Concise Economic History of the World (Cameron 1989, 307-8), finds that “from a broad spectrum of possible forms of interaction between the financial sector and other sectors of the economy that requires its services, one can isolate three type-cases: (1) that in which the financial sector plays a positive, growth-inducing role; (2) that in which the financial sector is essentially neutral or merely permissive; and (3) that in which inadequate finance restricts or hinders industrial and commercial development.” Summerhill (2015) proves exhaustively that Brazil failed to modernize earlier because of the restrictions of an inadequate institutional financial arrangement plagued by regulatory capture for self-interest.

There is analysis of the origins of current tensions in the world economy (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), International Financial Architecture (2005), The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. I (2008a), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c)).

The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) measures the terms of trade index of the United States quarterly since 1947 and annually since 1929. Chart IID-1 provides the terms of trade of the US quarterly since 1947 with significant long-term deterioration from 150.983 in IQ1947 to 110.202 in IVQ2020, increasing from 109.891 in IVQ2019 and increasing from 107.819 in IIQ2020 and 109.156 in IIIQ2020. The index increased to 112.034 in IQ2021, increasing to 113.485 in IIQ2021. The index increased to 114.437 in IIIQ2021. The index increased to 114.472 in IVQ2021. Significant part of the deterioration occurred from the 1960s to the 1980s followed by some recovery and then stability.

clip_image063

Chart IID-1, United States Terms of Trade Quarterly Index 1947-2021

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=46#reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=46

Chart IID-1A provides the annual US terms of trade from 1929 to 2020. The index fell from 143.072 in 1929 to 113.628 in 2021. There is decline from 1971 to a much lower plateau.

clip_image065

Chart IID-1A, United States Terms of Trade Annual Index 1929-2021, Annual

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=46#reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=46

Chart IID-1B provides the US terms of trade index, index of terms of trade of nonpetroleum goods and index of terms of trade of goods. The terms of trade of nonpetroleum goods dropped sharply from the mid-1980s to 1995, recovering significantly until 2014, dropping and then recovering again into 2021. There is relative stability in the terms of trade of nonpetroleum goods from 1967 to 2021 but sharp deterioration in the overall index and the index of goods.

clip_image067

Chart IID-1B, United States Terms of Trade Indexes 1967-2021, Quarterly

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=46#reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&1921=survey&1903=46

The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides measurements of US international terms of trade. The measurement by the BLS is as follows (https://www.bls.gov/mxp/terms-of-trade.htm):

“BLS terms of trade indexes measure the change in the U.S. terms of trade with a specific country, region, or grouping over time. BLS terms of trade indexes cover the goods sector only.

To calculate the U.S. terms of trade index, take the U.S. all-export price index for a country, region, or grouping, divide by the corresponding all-import price index and then multiply the quotient by 100. Both locality indexes are based in U.S. dollars and are rounded to the tenth decimal place for calculation. The locality indexes are normalized to 100.0 at the same starting point.
TTt=(LODt/LOOt)*100,
where
TTt=Terms of Trade Index at time t
LODt=Locality of Destination Price Index at time t
LOOt=Locality of Origin Price Index at time t
The terms of trade index measures whether the U.S. terms of trade are improving or deteriorating over time compared to the country whose price indexes are the basis of the comparison. When the index rises, the terms of trade are said to improve; when the index falls, the terms of trade are said to deteriorate. The level of the index at any point in time provides a long-term comparison; when the index is above 100, the terms of trade have improved compared to the base period, and when the index is below 100, the terms of trade have deteriorated compared to the base period.”

Chart IID-3 provides the BLS terms of trade of the US with Canada. The index increases from 100.0 in Dec 2017 to 117.8 in Dec 2018 and decreases to 104.0 in Feb 2020. The index increases to 121.5 in Apr 2020. The index decreases to 89.3 in Dec 2021.

clip_image068

Chart IID-3, US Terms of Trade, Monthly, All Goods, Canada, NSA, Dec 2017=100

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/mxp/data.htm

Chart IID-4 provides the BLS terms of trade of the US with the European Union. There is improvement from 100.0 in Dec 2017 to 102.8 in Jan 2020 followed by move to 103.7 in Dec 2021.

clip_image069

Chart IID-4, US Terms of Trade, Monthly, All Goods, European Union, NSA, Dec 2017=100

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/mxp/data.htm

Chart IID-4 provides the BLS terms of trade of the US with Mexico. There is improvement from 100.0 in Dec 2017 to 115.0 in Dec 2021.

clip_image070

Chart IID-5, US Terms of Trade, Monthly, All Goods, Mexico, NSA, Dec 2017=100

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/mxp/data.htm

Chart IID-4 provides the BLS terms of trade of the US with China. There is deterioration from 100.0 in Dec 2017 to 98.0 in Sep 2018, improvement to 102.1 in Dec 2020 and 106.8 in Dec 2021.

clip_image071

Chart IID-6, US Terms of Trade, Monthly, All Goods, China, NSA, Dec 2017=100

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/mxp/data.htm

Chart IID-4 provides the BLS terms of trade of the US with Japan. There is deterioration from 100.0 in Dec 2017 to 99.2 in Dec 2019 and improvement to 108.9 in Dec 2021.

clip_image072

Chart IID-7, US Terms of Trade, Monthly, All Goods, Japan, NSA, Dec 2017=100

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/mxp/data.htm

Manufacturing is underperforming in the lost cycle of the global recession. Manufacturing (NAICS) in Dec 2021 is lower by 8.0 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007, as shown in Chart V-3A. Manufacturing (SIC) in Dec 2021 at 99.0648 is lower by 10.7 percent relative to the peak at 110.8954 in Jun 2007. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2021. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 161.5689 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648 which is 38.7 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 168.2834 in Dec 2021. The actual index NSA in Dec 2021 is 99.0648, which is 41.1 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.7 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2021. Using trend growth of 1.7 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.2478 in Dec 2021. The output of manufacturing at 99.0648 in Dec 2021 is 26.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 99.8182 in Dec 2021 or 17.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 169.4560 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 41.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.5517 in Dec 2021. The NAICS index at 99.8182 in Dec 2021 is 24.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

clip_image073

Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Dec 2007 to Dec 2021

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

clip_image074

Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jun 2007 to Dec 2021

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3B provides the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States, or those available for work. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 231.713 million in Jun 2007 to 262.136 million in Dec 2021 or 30.423 million.

clip_image075

Chart V-3B, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 2007 to Dec 2021

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3C provides nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 2007 to Dec 2021. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs fell from 13.987 million in Jun 2007 to 12.610 million in Dec 2021, or 1.377 million.

clip_image076

Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 2007 to Dec 2021, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Dec 2021. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade. There is sharp decline in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image077

Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Dec 2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3E provides the US noninstitutional civilian population, or those in condition of working, from Jan 1948, when first available, to Dec 2021. The noninstitutional civilian population increased from 170.042 million in Jun 1981 to 262.136 million in Dec 2021 or 92.094 million.

clip_image078

Chart V-3E, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 1948 to Dec 2021

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3F provides manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 1939 to Dec 2021. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs decreased from a peak of 18.890 million in Jun 1981 and 18.927 million in Sep 2021 to 12.610 million in Dec 2021.

clip_image079

Chart V-3F, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 1939 to Dec 2021, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Table I-13A provides national income without capital consumption by industry with estimates based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). The share of agriculture declines from 8.7 percent in 1948 to 1.7 percent in 1987 while the share of manufacturing declines from 30.2 percent in 1948 to 19.4 percent in 1987. Colin Clark (1957) pioneered the analysis of these trends over long periods.

Table I-13A, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

 

1948

% Total

1987

% Total

National Income WCCA

249.1

100.0

4,029.9

100.0

Domestic Industries

247.7

99.4

4,012.4

99.6

Private Industries

225.3

90.4

3,478.8

86.3

Agriculture

21.7

8.7

66.5

1.7

Mining

5.8

2.3

42.5

1.1

Construction

11.1

4.5

201.0

5.0

Manufacturing

75.2

30.2

780.2

19.4

Durable Goods

37.5

15.1

458.4

11.4

Nondurable Goods

37.7

15.1

321.8

8.0

Transportation PUT

21.3

8.5

317.7

7.9

Transportation

13.8

5.5

127.2

3.2

Communications

3.8

1.5

96.7

2.4

Electric, Gas, SAN

3.7

1.5

93.8

2.3

Wholesale Trade

17.1

6.9

283.1

7.0

Retail Trade

28.8

11.6

400.4

9.9

Finance, INS, RE

22.9

9.2

651.7

16.2

Services

21.4

8.6

735.7

18.3

Government

22.4

9.0

533.6

13.2

Rest of World

1.5

0.6

17.5

0.4

 

2003.9

11.6

2016.3

11.5

 

252.6

1.5

257.9

1.5

Notes: Using 1972 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Percentages Calculates from Unrounded Data; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; RE: Real Estate; PUT: Public Utilities; SAN: Sanitation

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-13B provides national income without capital consumption estimated based on the 2012 North American Industry Classification (NAICS). The share of manufacturing fell from 14.9 percent in 1998 to 9.5 percent in 2018.

Table I-13B, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

 

1998

% Total

2018

% Total

National Income WCCA

7,744.4

100.0

17,136.5

100.0

Domestic Industries

7,727.0

99.8

16,868.6

98.4

Private Industries

6,793.3

87.7

14,889.6

86.9

Agriculture

72.7

0.9

119.7

0.7

Mining

74.2

1.0

202.7

1.2

Utilities

134.4

1.7

157.7

0.9

Construction

379.2

4.9

902.5

5.3

Manufacturing

1156.4

14.9

1635.3

9.5

Durable Goods

714.9

9.2

964.9

5.6

Nondurable Goods

441.5

5.7

670.4

3.9

Wholesale Trade

512.8

6.6

958.2

5.6

Retail Trade

610.0

7.9

1124.1

6.6

Transportation & WH

246.1

3.2

554.4

3.2

Information

294.3

3.8

629.7

3.7

Finance, Insurance, RE

1280.9

16.5

3058.8

17.8

Professional & Business Services

889.8

11.5

2522.6

14.7

Education, Health Care

607.1

7.8

1764.8

10.3

Arts, Entertainment

290.5

3.8

756.6

4.4

Other Services

244.9

3.3

502.5

2.9

Government

933.7

12.1

1979.0

11.5

Rest of the World

17.4

0.2

267.9

1.6

Notes: Estimates based on 2012 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Percentages Calculates from Unrounded Data; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

II I United States Housing Collapse. Data and other information continue to provide depressed conditions in the US housing market in a longer perspective, with recent improvement at the margin. Table IIB-1 shows sales of new houses in the US at seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate (SAAR). The US Census Bureau revised all seasonally adjusted new house sales from 2014 to 2019 with the report for Apr 2019 on May 23, 2019 (https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/newressales.pdf). The US Census Bureau revised all seasonally adjusted new house sales from 2015 to 2020 with the report of Apr 2020 on May 26, 2020 (https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/newressales.pdf). The US Census Bureau revised all seasonally adjusted new house sales from 2016 to 2021 with the report for Apr 2021 on May 25, 2021 (https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/pdf/newressales.pdf). There is significant oscillation of monthly house sales. Recovery from the global recession after 2007 was inadequate. New house sales dropped 14.7 percent in Mar 2020 and decreased 6.6 percent in Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Recovery was quite sharp with SAARs jumping to 993 thousand in Jan 2021. Sales eased to 811 thousand in Dec 2021.

Table IIB-1, US, Sales of New Houses Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (SAAR), Thousands and %

 

SAAR Thousands

 

∆%

Dec-2010

326

 

13.6

Jan-2011

307

 

-5.8

Feb-2011

270

 

-12.1

Mar-2011

300

 

11.1

Apr-2011

310

 

3.3

May-2011

305

 

-1.6

Jun-2011

301

 

-1.3

Jul-2011

296

 

-1.7

Aug-2011

299

 

1.0

Sep-2011

304

 

1.7

Oct-2011

316

 

3.9

Nov-2011

328

 

3.8

Dec-2011

341

 

4.0

Jan-2012

335

 

-1.8

Feb-2012

366

 

9.3

Mar-2012

354

 

-3.3

Apr-2012

354

 

0.0

May-2012

370

 

4.5

Jun-2012

360

 

-2.7

Jul-2012

369

 

2.5

Aug-2012

375

 

1.6

Sep-2012

385

 

2.7

Oct-2012

358

 

-7.0

Nov-2012

392

 

9.5

Dec-2012

399

 

1.8

Jan-2013

446

 

11.8

Feb-2013

447

 

0.2

Mar-2013

444

 

-0.7

Apr-2013

441

 

-0.7

May-2013

428

 

-2.9

Jun-2013

470

 

9.8

Jul-2013

375

 

-20.2

Aug-2013

381

 

1.6

Sep-2013

403

 

5.8

Oct-2013

444

 

10.2

Nov-2013

446

 

0.5

Dec-2013

433

 

-2.9

Jan-2014

443

 

2.3

Feb-2014

420

 

-5.2

Mar-2014

405

 

-3.6

Apr-2014

403

 

-0.5

May-2014

451

 

11.9

Jun-2014

418

 

-7.3

Jul-2014

402

 

-3.8

Aug-2014

456

 

13.4

Sep-2014

470

 

3.1

Oct-2014

476

 

1.3

Nov-2014

442

 

-7.1

Dec-2014

497

 

12.4

Jan-2015

515

 

3.6

Feb-2015

540

 

4.9

Mar-2015

480

 

-11.1

Apr-2015

502

 

4.6

May-2015

502

 

0.0

Jun-2015

480

 

-4.4

Jul-2015

506

 

5.4

Aug-2015

518

 

2.4

Sep-2015

456

 

-12.0

Oct-2015

482

 

5.7

Nov-2015

504

 

4.6

Dec-2015

546

 

8.3

Jan-2016

505

 

-7.5

Feb-2016

517

 

2.4

Mar-2016

532

 

2.9

Apr-2016

576

 

8.3

May-2016

571

 

-0.9

Jun-2016

557

 

-2.5

Jul-2016

628

 

12.7

Aug-2016

575

 

-8.4

Sep-2016

558

 

-3.0

Oct-2016

575

 

3.0

Nov-2016

571

 

-0.7

Dec-2016

561

 

-1.8

Jan-2017

578

 

3.0

Feb-2017

601

 

4.0

Mar-2017

643

 

7.0

Apr-2017

604

 

-6.1

May-2017

627

 

3.8

Jun-2017

612

 

-2.4

Jul-2017

553

 

-9.6

Aug-2017

550

 

-0.5

Sep-2017

622

 

13.1

Oct-2017

625

 

0.5

Nov-2017

718

 

14.9

Dec-2017

658

 

-8.4

Jan-2018

610

 

-7.3

Feb-2018

644

 

5.6

Mar-2018

680

 

5.6

Apr-2018

658

 

-3.2

May-2018

680

 

3.3

Jun-2018

598

 

-12.1

Jul-2018

600

 

0.3

Aug-2018

582

 

-3.0

Sep-2018

584

 

0.3

Oct-2018

546

 

-6.5

Nov-2018

618

 

13.2

Dec-2018

566

 

-8.4

Jan-2019

628

 

11.0

Feb-2019

675

 

7.5

Mar-2019

721

 

6.8

Apr-2019

689

 

-4.4

May-2019

619

 

-10.2

Jun-2019

711

 

14.9

Jul-2019

636

 

-10.5

Aug-2019

677

 

6.4

Sep-2019

706

 

4.3

Oct-2019

703

 

-0.4

Nov-2019

700

 

-0.4

Dec-2019

733

 

4.7

Jan-2020

756

 

3.1

Feb-2020

730

 

-3.4

Mar-2020

623

 

-14.7

Apr-2020

582

 

-6.6

May-2020

704

 

21.0

Jun-2020

839

 

19.2

Jul-2020

972

 

15.9

Aug-2020

977

 

0.5

Sep-2020

971

 

-0.6

Oct-2020

969

 

-0.2

Nov-2020

865

 

-10.7

Dec-2020

943

 

9.0

Jan-2021

993

 

5.3

Feb-2021

823

 

-17.1

Mar-2021

873

 

6.1

Apr-2021

796

 

-8.8

May-2021

733

 

-7.9

Jun-2021

683

 

-6.8

Jul-2021

704

 

3.1

Aug-2021

668

 

-5.1

Sep-2021

725

 

8.5

Oct-2021

649

 

-10.5

Nov-2021

725

 

11.7

Dec-2021

811

 

11.9

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

There is additional information of the report of new house sales in Table IIB-2. The stock of unsold houses fell from rates of 6 to 8 percent of sales in 2011 to 4 to 5 percent in 2013 and 6.0 percent in Dec 2021. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), find that inventories of houses have declined as investors acquire distressed houses of higher quality. Median and average house prices oscillate. In Dec 2021, median prices of new houses sold not seasonally adjusted (NSA) decreased 9.2 percent after decreasing 1.3 percent in

Nov 2021. Average prices decreased 4.6 percent in Dec 2021 and decreased 1.5 percent in Nov 2021. Between Dec 2010 and Dec 2021, median prices increased 56.6 percent, with increases of 6.0 percent in Feb 2016, 4.9 percent in Nov 2015, 2.2 percent in Sep 2015, 13.6 percent in Oct 2014, 4.0 percent in Aug 2014, 4.0 percent in May 2014 and 5.2 percent in Mar 2014. Average prices increased 56.8 percent between Dec 2010 and Dec 2021, with increases of 5.1 percent in Mar 2016, 4.0 percent in Sep 2015, 4.4 percent in Jul 2015 and 18.3 percent in Oct 2014. Between Dec 2010 and Dec 2012, median prices increased 7.1 percent and average prices increased 2.6 percent. Price increases concentrated in 2012 with increase of median prices of 18.2 percent from Dec 2011 to Dec 2012 and of average prices of 13.8 percent. Median prices increased 16.7 percent from Dec 2012 to Dec 2014, with increase of 13.6 percent in Oct 2014, while average prices increased 24.7 percent, with increase of 18.3 percent in Oct 2014. Median prices decreased 1.5 percent from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 while average prices fell 5.5 percent. Median prices increased 10.1 percent from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 while average prices increased 8.5 percent. Median prices increased 5.0 percent from Dec 2016 to Dec 2017 while average prices increased 5.3 percent. Median prices decreased 4.0 percent from Dec 2017 to Dec 2018 while average prices decreased 5.2 percent. Median prices decreased 0.1 percent from Dec 2018 to Dec 2019 while average prices decreased 1.1 percent. Median prices increased 10.9 percent from Dec 2019 to Dec 2020 while average prices increased 6.4 percent. Median prices increased 3.4 percent from Dec 2020 to Dec 2021 while average prices increased 13.8 percent. Robbie Whelan, writing on “New homes hit record as builders cap supply,” on May 24, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323475304578500973445311276.html?mod=WSJ_economy_LeftTopHighlights), finds that homebuilders are continuing to restrict the number of new homes for sale. Restriction of available new homes for sale increases prices paid by buyers.

Table IIB-2, US, New House Stocks and Median and Average New Homes Sales Price

 

Stocks in Equiv.
Months
of Sales
SA %

Median
New House Sales Price USD
NSA

Month
∆%

Average New House Sales Price USD
NSA

Month
∆%

Dec-2010

7

241,200

9.8

291,700

3.5

Jan-2011

7.3

240,100

-0.5

275,700

-5.5

Feb-2011

8.1

220,100

-8.3

262,800

-4.7

Mar-2011

7.2

220,500

0.2

260,800

-0.8

Apr-2011

6.7

224,700

1.9

268,900

3.1

May-2011

6.6

222,000

-1.2

262,700

-2.3

Jun-2011

6.6

240,200

8.2

273,100

4.0

Jul-2011

6.7

229,900

-4.3

270,300

-1.0

Aug-2011

6.5

219,600

-4.5

259,300

-4.1

Sep-2011

6.3

217,000

-1.2

255,400

-1.5

Oct-2011

6

224,800

3.6

258,300

1.1

Nov-2011

5.7

214,300

-4.7

250,000

-3.2

Dec-2011

5.3

218,600

2.0

262,900

5.2

Jan-2012

5.3

221,700

1.4

265,700

1.1

Feb-2012

4.8

239,900

8.2

274,000

3.1

Mar-2012

4.9

239,800

0.0

283,600

3.5

Apr-2012

4.9

236,400

-1.4

287,900

1.5

May-2012

4.7

239,200

1.2

280,900

-2.4

Jun-2012

4.8

232,600

-2.8

271,800

-3.2

Jul-2012

4.6

237,400

2.1

282,300

3.9

Aug-2012

4.6

253,200

6.7

305,500

8.2

Sep-2012

4.5

254,600

0.6

297,700

-2.6

Oct-2012

4.9

247,200

-2.9

285,400

-4.1

Nov-2012

4.6

245,000

-0.9

290,700

1.9

Dec-2012

4.5

258,300

5.4

299,200

2.9

Jan-2013

4

251,500

-2.6

306,900

2.6

Feb-2013

4.1

265,100

5.4

312,500

1.8

Mar-2013

4.2

257,500

-2.9

300,200

-3.9

Apr-2013

4.4

279,300

8.5

337,000

12.3

May-2013

4.6

263,700

-5.6

314,000

-6.8

Jun-2013

4.1

259,800

-1.5

306,100

-2.5

Jul-2013

5.5

262,200

0.9

329,900

7.8

Aug-2013

5.5

255,300

-2.6

310,800

-5.8

Sep-2013

5.4

269,800

5.7

321,400

3.4

Oct-2013

4.9

264,300

-2.0

335,700

4.4

Nov-2013

5

277,100

4.8

335,600

0.0

Dec-2013

5.2

275,500

-0.6

321,200

-4.3

Jan-2014

5.1

269,800

-2.1

337,300

5.0

Feb-2014

5.3

268,400

-0.5

325,900

-3.4

Mar-2014

5.6

282,300

5.2

331,500

1.7

Apr-2014

5.7

274,500

-2.8

325,100

-1.9

May-2014

5.2

285,600

4.0

323,500

-0.5

Jun-2014

5.7

287,000

0.5

338,100

4.5

Jul-2014

6.2

280,400

-2.3

345,200

2.1

Aug-2014

5.4

291,700

4.0

356,200

3.2

Sep-2014

5.4

261,500

-10.4

319,100

-10.4

Oct-2014

5.3

297,000

13.6

377,500

18.3

Nov-2014

5.7

298,300

0.4

348,900

-7.6

Dec-2014

5.1

301,500

1.1

373,200

7.0

Jan-2015

4.8

292,000

-3.2

348,300

-6.7

Feb-2015

4.5

286,600

-1.8

346,300

-0.6

Mar-2015

5.1

286,600

0.0

349,300

0.9

Apr-2015

4.9

294,500

2.8

340,400

-2.5

May-2015

5

287,500

-2.4

336,200

-1.2

Jun-2015

5.4

285,100

-0.8

326,900

-2.8

Jul-2015

5.2

292,300

2.5

341,200

4.4

Aug-2015

5

293,000

0.2

343,300

0.6

Sep-2015

5.9

299,500

2.2

357,200

4.0

Oct-2015

5.6

298,000

-0.5

368,900

3.3

Nov-2015

5.5

312,600

4.9

373,200

1.2

Dec-2015

5.1

297,100

-5.0

352,500

-5.5

Jan-2016

5.6

288,400

-2.9

361,200

2.5

Feb-2016

5.5

305,800

6.0

341,700

-5.4

Mar-2016

5.5

303,200

-0.9

359,000

5.1

Apr-2016

5

318,300

5.0

369,300

2.9

May-2016

5.1

295,200

-7.3

349,700

-5.3

Jun-2016

5.3

311,200

5.4

357,800

2.3

Jul-2016

4.5

297,400

-4.4

353,000

-1.3

Aug-2016

5

298,900

0.5

355,100

0.6

Sep-2016

5.2

314,800

5.3

366,100

3.1

Oct-2016

5.2

302,800

-3.8

352,200

-3.8

Nov-2016

5.2

315,000

4.0

363,400

3.2

Dec-2016

5.4

327,000

3.8

382,500

5.3

Jan-2017

5.3

315,200

-3.6

357,700

-6.5

Feb-2017

5.2

298,000

-5.5

370,500

3.6

Mar-2017

4.9

321,700

8.0

384,400

3.8

Apr-2017

5.3

311,100

-3.3

365,800

-4.8

May-2017

5.2

323,600

4.0

378,400

3.4

Jun-2017

5.4

315,200

-2.6

370,600

-2.1

Jul-2017

6

322,900

2.4

372,400

0.5

Aug-2017

6.2

314,200

-2.7

369,200

-0.9

Sep-2017

5.5

331,500

5.5

379,300

2.7

Oct-2017

5.5

319,500

-3.6

394,000

3.9

Nov-2017

4.8

343,400

7.5

388,500

-1.4

Dec-2017

5.3

343,300

0.0

402,900

3.7

Jan-2018

5.7

329,600

-4.0

377,800

-6.2

Feb-2018

5.5

327,200

-0.7

373,600

-1.1

Mar-2018

5.2

335,400

2.5

369,200

-1.2

Apr-2018

5.5

314,400

-6.3

385,100

4.3

May-2018

5.3

316,700

0.7

372,600

-3.2

Jun-2018

6.2

310,500

-2.0

370,100

-0.7

Jul-2018

6.3

327,500

5.5

392,300

6.0

Aug-2018

6.6

321,400

-1.9

380,900

-2.9

Sep-2018

6.7

328,300

2.1

386,400

1.4

Oct-2018

7.3

328,300

0.0

394,900

2.2

Nov-2018

6.5

308,500

-6.0

367,100

-7.0

Dec-2018

7.3

329,700

6.9

381,800

4.0

Jan-2019

6.6

305,400

-7.4

361,100

-5.4

Feb-2019

6

320,800

5.0

383,600

6.2

Mar-2019

5.6

310,600

-3.2

372,700

-2.8

Apr-2019

5.8

339,000

9.1

385,400

3.4

May-2019

6.5

312,700

-7.8

379,100

-1.6

Jun-2019

5.6

311,800

-0.3

361,900

-4.5

Jul-2019

6.2

308,300

-1.1

373,500

3.2

Aug-2019

5.8

327,000

6.1

392,700

5.1

Sep-2019

5.5

315,700

-3.5

372,100

-5.2

Oct-2019

5.5

322,400

2.1

380,300

2.2

Nov-2019

5.5

328,000

1.7

384,400

1.1

Dec-2019

5.3

329,500

0.5

377,700

-1.7

Jan-2020

5.1

328,900

-0.2

384,000

1.7

Feb-2020

5.3

331,800

0.9

386,200

0.6

Mar-2020

6.3

328,200

-1.1

375,400

-2.8

Apr-2020

6.6

310,100

-5.5

360,300

-4.0

May-2020

5.3

317,100

2.3

368,700

2.3

Jun-2020

4.3

341,100

7.6

382,200

3.7

Jul-2020

3.6

329,800

-3.3

379,100

-0.8

Aug-2020

3.5

325,500

-1.3

386,300

1.9

Sep-2020

3.5

344,400

5.8

405,100

4.9

Oct-2020

3.5

346,900

0.7

394,600

-2.6

Nov-2020

4

350,800

1.1

396,100

0.4

Dec-2020

3.8

365,300

4.1

401,700

1.4

Jan-2021

3.6

373,200

2.2

418,600

4.2

Feb-2021

4.5

362,000

-3.0

407,500

-2.7

Mar-2021

4.2

359,600

-0.7

414,700

1.8

Apr-2021

4.8

376,600

4.7

434,800

4.8

May-2021

5.4

390,400

3.7

445,300

2.4

Jun-2021

6.1

374,700

-4.0

431,900

-3.0

Jul-2021

6.2

406,000

8.4

462,100

7.0

Aug-2021

6.8

404,300

-0.4

470,000

1.7

Sep-2021

6.3

413,200

2.2

470,600

0.1

Oct-2021

7.2

421,500

2.0

486,600

3.4

Nov-2021

6.6

416,100

-1.3

479,300

-1.5

Dec-2021

6

377,700

-9.2

457,300

-4.6

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

The depressed level of residential construction and new house sales in the US is evident in Table IIB-3 providing new house sales not seasonally adjusted in Jan-Dec of various years. New house sales decreased 7.1 percent from Jan-Dec 2020 to Jan-Dec 2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is an ongoing boom in real estate acquisitions. Comparisons are strong relative to current house sales in contrast with weakness in earlier periods after the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. New house sales increased 11.9 percent from Jan-Dec 2019 to Jan-Dec 2021. New house sales increased 23.7 percent from Jan-Dec 2018 to Jan-Dec 2021. New house sales increased 24.5 percent from Jan-Dec 2017 to Jan-Dec 2021. Sales of new houses are higher in Jan-Dec 2020 relative to Jan-Dec 2016 with increase of 36.0 percent. Sales of new houses are higher in Jan-Dec 2020 relative to Jan-Dec 2015 with increase of 52.3 percent. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2021 were substantially lower than in many years between 1996 and 2019 except for the years from 2008 to 2019. There are several other increases of 73.8 percent relative to 2014, 77.9 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2013, 106.8 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2012, 150.2 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2011, 137.0 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2010, and 104.0 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2009. New house sales in Jan-Dec 2021 are 57.3 percent higher than in Jan-Dec 2008. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2021 are lower by 1.7 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2007. Sales of new houses are lower by 27.5 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2006, 40.5 percent relative to 2005 and 36.6 percent relative to 2004. The housing boom peaked in 2005 and 2006 when increases in fed funds rates to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 from 1.0 percent in Jun 2004 affected subprime mortgages that were programmed for refinancing in two or three years on the expectation that price increases forever would raise home equity. Higher home equity would permit refinancing under feasible mortgages incorporating full payment of principal and interest (Gorton 2009EFM; see other references in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Sales of new houses in Jan-Jul 2021 relative to the same period in 2003 fell 29.9 percent and decreased 21.5 percent relative to the same period in 2002. Similar percentage declines are also for 2021 relative to years from 2000 to 2004. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2021 decreased 13.8 per cent relative to the same period in 1998. The population of the US was 179.3 million in 1960 and 281.4 million in 2000 (Hobbs and Stoops 2002, 16). Detailed historical census reports are available from the US Census Bureau at (http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscendata.html). The estimate of the US population is 418.8 million in 2015. The US population increased by 133.6 percent from 1960 to 2015. The final row of Table IIB-3 reveals catastrophic data: sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2021 of 763 thousand units are lower by 7.0 percent relative to 820 thousand units of houses sold in Jan-Dec 1977, which is fifteenth year when data become available in 1963. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 122.416 million in 1963 to 259.175 million in 2019, or 111.7 percent (https://www.bls.gov/data/), to 260.329 million in 2020 or 112.7 percent and to 261.445 million in 2021 or 113.6 percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.” Note: there are two equal total new houses sold in 2015 of 84 (39 in Jan and 45 in Feb) and 84 in 2016 (39 in Jan and 45 in Feb). There are two other equal total new houses sold of 68 in 2013 (32 in Jan and 36 in Feb) and 68 in 2014 (33 in Jan and 35 in 2014).

Table IIB-3, US, Sales of New Houses Not Seasonally Adjusted, Thousands and %

Jan-Dec 2021

763

Jan-Dec 2020

821

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2020

-7.1

Jan-Dec 2019

682

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2019

11.9

Jan-Dec 2018

617

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2018

23.7

Jan-Dec 2017

613

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2017

24.5

Jan-Dec 2016

561

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2016

36.0

Jan-Dec 2015

501

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2015

52.3

Jan-Dec 2014

439

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2014

73.8

Jan-Dec 2013

429

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2013

77.9

Jan-Dec 2012

369

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/ 
Jan-Dec 2012

106.8

Jan-Dec 2011

305

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/ 
Jan-Dec 2011

150.2

Jan-Dec 2010

322

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/ 
Jan-Dec 2010

137.0

Jan-Dec 2009

374

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/
Jan-Dec 2009

104.0

Jan-Dec 2008

485

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2008

57.3

Jan-Dec 2007

776

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2007

-1.7

Jan-Dec 2006

1052

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2006

-27.5

Jan-Dec 2005

1283

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/
Jan-Dec 2005

-40.5

Jan-Dec 2004

1203

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/
Jan-Dec 2004

-36.6

Jan-Dec 2003

1088

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/
Jan-Dec 2003

-29.9

Jan-Dec 2002

972

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2002

-21.5

Jan-Dec 2001

909

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2001

-16.1

Jan-Dec 2000

877

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 2000

-13.0

Jan-Dec 1998

885

∆% Jan-Dec 2020/Jan-Dec 1998

-13.8

Jan-Dec 1977

820

∆% Jan-Dec 2021/Jan-Dec 1977

-7.0

*Computed using unrounded data

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

Table IIB-4 provides annual sales of new houses. The revised level of 306 thousand new houses sold in 2011 is the lowest since 560 thousand in 1963 in the 56 years of available data while the level of 368 thousand in 2012 is only higher than 323 thousand in 2010. The level of sales of new houses of 437 thousand in 2014 is the lowest from 1963 to 2009 with exception of 412 thousand in 1982 and 436 thousand in 1981. The population of the US increased 129.4 million from 179.3 million in 1960 to 308.7 million in 2010, or 72.2 percent. The estimate of the US population is 418.8 million in 2015. The US population increased 133.6 percent from 1960 to 2015. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 122.416 million in 1963 to 259.175 million in 2019, or 111.7 percent (https://www.bls.gov/data/), to 260.329 million in 2020 or 112.7 percent and 261.445 million in 2021 or 113.6 percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (https://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”

Table IIB-4, US, New Houses Sold, NSA Thousands

Period

Sold During Period

1963

560

1964

565

1965

575

1966

461

1967

487

1968

490

1969

448

1970

485

1971

656

1972

718

1973

634

1974

519

1975

549

1976

646

1977

819

1978

817

1979

709

1980

545

1981

436

1982

412

1983

623

1984

639

1985

688

1986

750

1987

671

1988

676

1989

650

1990

534

1991

509

1992

610

1993

666

1994

670

1995

667

1996

757

1997

804

1998

886

1999

880

2000

877

2001

908

2002

973

2003

1,086

2004

1,203

2005

1,283

2006

1,051

2007

776

2008

485

2009

375

2010

323

2011

306

2012

368

2013

429

2014

437

2015

501

2016

561

2017

613

2018

617

2019

683

2020

822

2021

762

Source: US Census Bureau https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

Chart IIB-1 of the US Bureau of the Census shows the sharp decline of sales of new houses in the US. Sales rose temporarily until about mid 2010 but then declined to a lower plateau followed by increase, stability and new oscillating increase. There is decrease in the final segment followed by marginal increase. There is renewed decline and stabilization with recovery in oscillations in May-2020-Dec 2021.

clip_image081

Chart IIB-1, US, New One-Family Houses Sold in the US, SAAR (Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate) 

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/img/c25_curr.gif

Between 1991 and 2001, sales of new houses rose 78.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 6.0 percent, as shown in Table IB-5. Between 1995 and 2005 sales of new houses increased 92.4 percent at the yearly rate of 6.8 percent. There are similar rates in all years from 2000 to 2005. The boom in housing construction and sales began in the 1980s and 1990s. The collapse of real estate culminated several decades of housing subsidies and policies to lower mortgage rates and borrowing terms (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009b), 42-8). Sales of new houses sold in 2019 fell 9.8 percent relative to the same period in 1996 and fell 46.8 percent relative to 2005. Sales of new houses increased 20.4 percent from 2019 to 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Sales of new houses increased 11.6 percent from 2019 to 2021 and fell 7.3 percent in 2021 relative to 2020.

Table IIB-5, US, Percentage Change and Average Yearly Rate of Growth of Sales of New One-Family Houses

 

∆%

Average Yearly % Rate

1963-2019

22.0

0.4

1991-2001

78.4

6.0

1995-2005

92.4

6.8

2000-2005

46.3

7.9

1996-2019

-9.8

NA

2000-2019

-22.1

NA

2005-2019

-46.8

NA

2019-2020

20.4

NA

2019-2021

11.6

NA

2020-2021

-7.3

NA

NA: Not Applicable

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

IMPORTANT NOTE: Charts IIB-2 through IIB-2A cannot be updated because of the discontinuance of support of the Adobe Flash Player (https://www.adobe.com/products/flashplayer/end-of-life.html). There are updates with Fusion charts.

clip_image083

Chart IIB-2, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 1963-2020

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image085

Chart IIB-2F, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 1963-2021

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image087

Chart IIB-2A, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 2019-2020

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image089

Chart IIB-2AF, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 2019-2021

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image091

Chart IIB-2A1, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, SA, 2019-2020

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image093

Chart IIB-2A1F, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, SAAR, 2019-2021

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

The available historical annual data of median and average prices of new houses sold in the US between 1963 and 2020 is in Table IIB-6. On a yearly basis, median and average prices reached a peak in 2007 and then fell substantially. There is recovery in 2012-2018 followed by decline in 2019. Prices recovered in 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Table IIB-6, US, Median and Average Prices of New Houses Sold, Annual Data

Period

Median

Average

1963

$18,000

$19,300

1964

$18,900

$20,500

1965

$20,000

$21,500

1966

$21,400

$23,300

1967

$22,700

$24,600

1968

$24,700

$26,600

1969

$25,600

$27,900

1970

$23,400

$26,600

1971

$25,200

$28,300

1972

$27,600

$30,500

1973

$32,500

$35,500

1974

$35,900

$38,900

1975

$39,300

$42,600

1976

$44,200

$48,000

1977

$48,800

$54,200

1978

$55,700

$62,500

1979

$62,900

$71,800

1980

$64,600

$76,400

1981

$68,900

$83,000

1982

$69,300

$83,900

1983

$75,300

$89,800

1984

$79,900

$97,600

1985

$84,300

$100,800

1986

$92,000

$111,900

1987

$104,500

$127,200

1988

$112,500

$138,300

1989

$120,000

$148,800

1990

$122,900

$149,800

1991

$120,000

$147,200

1992

$121,500

$144,100

1993

$126,500

$147,700

1994

$130,000

$154,500

1995

$133,900

$158,700

1996

$140,000

$166,400

1997

$146,000

$176,200

1998

$152,500

$181,900

1999

$161,000

$195,600

2000

$169,000

$207,000

2001

$175,200

$213,200

2002

$187,600

$228,700

2003

$195,000

$246,300

2004

$221,000

$274,500

2005

$240,900

$297,000

2006

$246,500

$305,900

2007

$247,900

$313,600

2008

$232,100

$292,600

2009

$216,700

$270,900

2010

$221,800

$272,900

2011

$227,200

$267,900

2012

$245,200

$292,200

2013

$268,900

$324,500

2014

$288,500

$347,700

2015

$294,200

$352,700

2016

$307,800

$360,900

2017

$323,100

$384,900

2018

$326,400

$385,000

2019

$321,500

$383,900

2020

$336,900

$391,900

2021

$392,900

$453,700

Source: US Census Bureau https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

Prices rose sharply between 2000 and 2005 as shown in Table IIB-7. In fact, prices in 2019 are higher than in 2000. Between 2006 and 2019, median prices of new houses sold increased 30.4 percent and average prices increased 25.5 percent. Between 2018 and 2019, median prices decreased 1.5 percent and average prices decreased 0.3 percent. Median prices increased 36.7 percent from 2006 to 2020 while average prices increased 28.1 percent. Median prices increased 4.8 percent from 2019 to 2020 while average prices increased 2.1 percent in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Median prices increased 59.4 percent from 2006 to 2021 while average prices increased 48.3 percent. Median prices increased 16.6 percent from 2020 to 2021 while average prices increased 15.8 percent.

Table IIB-7, US, Percentage Change of New Houses Median and Average Prices, NSA, ∆%

 

Median New 
Home Sales Prices ∆%

Average New Home Sales Prices ∆%

∆% 2000 to 2003

15.4

19.0

∆% 2000 to 2005

42.5

43.5

∆% 2000 to 2019

90.2

85.5

∆% 2005 to 2019

33.5

29.3

∆% 2000 to 2006

45.9

47.8

∆% 2006 to 2019

30.4

25.5

∆% 2009 to 2019

48.4

41.7

∆% 2010 to 2019

45.0

40.7

∆% 2011 to 2019

41.5

43.3

∆% 2012 to 2019

31.1

31.4

∆% 2013 to 2019

19.6

18.3

∆% 2014 to 2019

11.4

10.4

∆% 2015 to 2019

9.3

8.8

∆% 2016 to 2019

4.5

6.4

∆% 2017 to 2019

-0.5

-0.3

∆% 2018 to 2019

-1.5

-0.3

∆% 2006 to 2020

36.7

28.1

∆% 2019 to 2020

4.8

2.1

∆% 2006 to 2021

59.4

48.3

∆% 2019 to 2021

22.2

18.2

∆% 2020 to 2021

16.6

15.8

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

IMPORTANT NOTE: Charts IIB-3 through IIB-4A cannot be updated because of the discontinuance of support of the Adobe Flash Player (https://www.adobe.com/products/flashplayer/end-of-life.html). There are updates with Fusion charts.

Chart IIB-3 of the US Census Bureau provides the entire series of new single-family sales median prices from Jan 1963 to Nov 2020. There is long-term sharp upward trend with few declines until the current collapse. Median prices increased sharply during the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s and paused during the savings and loans crisis of the late 1980s and the recession of 1991. Housing subsidies throughout the 1990s caused sharp upward trend of median new house prices that accelerated after the fed funds rate of 1 percent from 2003 to 2004. There was sharp reduction of prices after 2006 with recovery recently above earlier prices.

clip_image095

Chart IIB-3, US, Median Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 1963-2020

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image097

Chart IIB-3F, US, Median Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 1963-2021

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

Chart IIB-3A of the US Census Bureau provides the entire series of new single-family sales median prices from Jan 2019 to Nov 2020. There is sharp decline of prices in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event followed by vigorous recovery in May-Jun 2020 with decline in Jul-Aug 2020, recovery in Sep 2020 and decline in Oct-Nov 2020.

clip_image099

Chart IIB-3A, US, Median Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 2019-2020

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image101

Chart IIB-3AF, US, Median Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 2019-2021

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

Chart IIB-4 of the US Census Bureau provides average prices of new houses sold from the mid-1970s to Nov 2020. There is similar behavior as with median prices of new houses sold in Chart IIB-3. The only stress occurred in price pauses during the savings and loans crisis of the late 1980s and the collapse after 2006 with recent recovery, interrupted in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

clip_image103

Chart IIB-4F, US, Average Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 1975-2020

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image105

Chart IIB-4F, US, Average Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 1975-2021

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

Chart IIB-4A of the US Census Bureau provides average prices of new houses sold from Jan 2019 to Nov 2020. Prices declined in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event with vigorous recovery in May-Jun 2020 followed by decline in Jul 2020. There is sharp recovery in Sep-Aug 2020 followed by decline in Oct 2020 and mild increase in Nov 2020.

clip_image107

Chart IIB-4A, US, Average Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 2019-2020

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image109

Chart IIB-4AF, US, Average Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 2019-2021

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image110

Chart IIB-4A, US, Average Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 2019-2020

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

clip_image112

Chart IIB-4AF, US, Average Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 2019-2021

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

Chart IIB-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate for the 30-year conventional mortgage, the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond and the rate of the overnight federal funds rate, monthly, from 1954 to 2016. All rates decline throughout the period from the Great Inflation of the 1970s through the following Great Moderation and until currently. In Apr 1971, the fed funds rate was 4.15 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 7.31 percent. In November 2012, the fed funds rate was 0.16 percent, the yield of the 30-year Treasury 2.80 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 3.35. The final segment shows an increase in the yield of the 30-year Treasury to 3.61 percent in July 2013 with the fed funds rate at 0.09 percent and the conventional mortgage at 4.37 percent. The final data point shows marginal decrease of the conventional mortgage rate to 3.60 percent in May 2016 with the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond at 2.63 percent and overnight rate on fed funds at 0.37 percent. The recent increase in interest rates if sustained could affect the US real estate market. Shayndi Raice and Nick Timiraos, writing on “Banks cut as mortgage boom ends,” on Jan 9, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303754404579310940019239208), analyze the drop in mortgage applications to a 13-year low, as measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Demand for home loans plunges,” on Apr 24, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579522051733228402?mg=reno64-wsj), analyzes data in Inside Mortgage Finance that mortgage lending of $235 billion in IQ2014 is 58 percent lower than a year earlier and 23 percent below IVQ2013. Mortgage lending collapsed to the lowest level in 14 years. In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm): “One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.”

clip_image113

Chart IIB-5, US, Thirty-year Conventional Mortgage, Thirty-year Treasury Bond and Overnight Federal Funds Rate, Monthly, 1954-2016

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm

Chart IIB-5A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond and the rate of the overnight federal funds rate, monthly, from 1977 to 2021. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System discontinued the conventional mortgage rate in its data bank. The final data point is 0.08 percent for the fed funds rate in Dec 2021 and 1.85 percent for the thirty-year Treasury bond resulting from the massive unconventional monetary policy in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The conventional mortgage rate stood at 3.10 percent in Dec 2021.

clip_image114

Chart IIB-5A, US, Thirty-year Treasury Bond and Overnight Federal Funds Rate, Monthly, 1977-2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm

Table IIB-8, US, Fed Funds Rate, Thirty Year Treasury Bond and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Percent per Year, Dec 2012 to Dec 2021

 

Fed Funds Rate

Yield of Thirty-Year Constant Maturity

Conventional Mortgage Rate

2012-12

0.16

2.88

3.35

2013-01

0.14

3.08

3.41

2013-02

0.15

3.17

3.53

2013-03

0.14

3.16

3.57

2013-04

0.15

2.93

3.45

2013-05

0.11

3.11

3.54

2013-06

0.09

3.4

4.07

2013-07

0.09

3.61

4.37

2013-08

0.08

3.76

4.46

2013-09

0.08

3.79

4.49

2013-10

0.09

3.68

4.19

2013-11

0.08

3.8

4.26

2013-12

0.09

3.89

4.46

2014-01

0.07

3.77

4.43

2014-02

0.07

3.66

4.3

2014-03

0.08

3.62

4.34

2014-04

0.09

3.52

4.34

2014-05

0.09

3.39

4.19

2014-06

0.1

3.42

4.16

2014-07

0.09

3.33

4.13

2014-08

0.09

3.2

4.12

2014-09

0.09

3.26

4.16

2014-10

0.09

3.04

4.04

2014-11

0.09

3.04

4

2014-12

0.12

2.83

3.86

2015-01

0.11

2.46

3.67

2015-02

0.11

2.57

3.71

2015-03

0.11

2.63

3.77

2015-04

0.12

2.59

3.67

2015-05

0.12

2.96

3.84

2015-06

0.13

3.11

3.98

2015-07

0.13

3.07

4.05

2015-08

0.14

2.86

3.91

2015-09

0.14

2.95

3.89

2015-10

0.12

2.89

3.8

2015-11

0.12

3.03

3.94

2015-12

0.24

2.97

3.96

2016-01

0.34

2.86

3.87

2016-02

0.38

2.62

3.66

2016-03

0.36

2.68

3.69

2016-04

0.37

2.62

3.61

2016-05

0.37

2.63

3.6

2016-06

0.38

2.45

3.57

2016-07

0.39

2.23

3.44

2016-08

0.4

2.26

3.44

2016-09

0.4

2.35

3.46

2016-10

0.4

2.5

3.47

2016-11

0.41

2.86

3.77

2016-12

0.54

3.11

4.2

2017-01

0.65

3.02

4.15

2017-02

0.66

3.03

4.17

2017-03

0.79

3.08

4.2

2017-04

0.9

2.94

4.05

2017-05

0.91

2.96

4.01

2017-06

1.04

2.8

3.9

2017-07

1.15

2.88

3.97

2017-08

1.16

2.8

3.88

2017-09

1.15

2.78

3.81

2017-10

1.15

2.88

3.9

2017-11

1.16

2.8

3.92

2017-12

1.3

2.77

3.95

2018-01

1.41

2.88

4.03

2018-02

1.42

3.13

4.33

2018-03

1.51

3.09

4.44

2018-04

1.69

3.07

4.47

2018-05

1.7

3.13

4.59

2018-06

1.82

3.05

4.57

2018-07

1.91

3.01

4.53

2018-08

1.91

3.04

4.55

2018-09

1.95

3.15

4.63

2018-10

2.19

3.34

4.83

2018-11

2.2

3.36

4.87

2018-12

2.27

3.10

4.64

2019-01

2.40

3.04

4.46

2019-02

2.40

3.02

4.37

2019-03

2.41

2.98

4.27

2019-04

2.42

2.94

4.14

2019-05

2.39

2.82

4.07

2019-06

2.38

2.57

3.80

2019-07

2.40

2.57

3.77

2019-08

2.13

2.12

3.62

2019-09

2.04

2.16

3.61

2019-10

1.83

2.19

3.69

2019-11

1.55

2.28

3.70

2019-12

1.55

2.30

3.72

2020-01

1.55

2.22

3.62

2020-02

1.58

1.97

3.47

2020-03

0.65

1.46

3.45

2020-04

0.05

1.27

3.31

2020-05

0.05

1.38

3.23

2020-06

0.08

1.49

3.16

2020-07

0.09

1.31

3.02

2020-08

0.10

1.36

2.94

2020-09

0.09

1.42

2.89

2020-10

0.09

1.57

2.83

2020-11

0.09

1.62

2.77

2020-12

0.09

1.67

2.68

2021-01

0.09

1.82

2.74

2021-02

0.08

2.04

2.81

2021-03

0.07

2.34

3.08

2021-04

0.07

2.30

3.06

2021-05

0.06

2.32

2.96

2021-06

0.08

2.16

2.98

2021-7

0.10

1.94

2.87

2021-8

0.09

1.92

2.84

2021-9

0.08

1.94

2.90

2021-10

0.08

2.06

3.07

2021-11

0.08

1.94

3.07

2021-12

0.08

1.85

3.10

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm

http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.html

IIB2 United States House Prices. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, provides the FHFA House Price Index (HPI) that “is calculated using home sales price information from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-acquired mortgages” (http://fhfa.gov/webfiles/24216/q22012hpi.pdf 1). The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, provides the FHFA House Price Index (HPI) that “is calculated using home sales price information from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-acquired mortgages” (http://fhfa.gov/webfiles/24216/q22012hpi.pdf 1). Table IIA2-1 provides the FHFA HPI for purchases only, which shows behavior similar to that of the Case-Shiller index but with lower magnitudes. House prices catapulted from 2000 to 2003, 2005 and 2006. From IVQ2000 to IVQ2006, the index for the US as a whole rose 55.0 percent, with 62.1 percent for New England, 72.0 percent for Middle Atlantic, 71.2 percent for South Atlantic but only by 33.1 percent for East South Central. Prices fell relative to 2014 for the US and all regions from 2006 with exception of increase of 2.6 percent for East South Central. Prices for the US increased 4.9 percent in IVQ2014 relative to IVQ2013 and 12.9 percent from IVQ2012 to IVQ2014. From IVQ2000 to IVQ2014, prices rose for the US and the four regions in Table IIA2-1.

Table IIA2-1, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only NSA ∆%

 

United States

New England

Middle Atlantic

South Atlantic

East South Central

IVQ2000
to
IVQ2003

24.0

40.6

35.8

25.9

11.0

IVQ2000
to
IVQ2005

50.5

65.0

67.6

62.9

25.4

IVQ2000 to
IVQ2006

55.0

62.1

72.0

71.2

33.1

IVQ2005 to
IVQ2014

-1.5

-8.7

-2.3

-7.4

8.9

IVQ2006
to
IVQ2014

-4.4

-7.1

-4.8

-11.9

2.6

IVQ2007 to
IVQ2014

-1.9

-5.1

-5.0

-8.6

0.7

IVQ2011 to
IVQ2014

18.9

7.3

6.9

19.9

11.8

IVQ2012 to
IVQ2014

12.9

6.8

5.7

13.8

8.6

IVQ2013 to IVQ2014

4.9

2.5

2.2

5.1

4.2

IVQ2000 to
IVQ2014

48.3

144.27

50.6

138.40

63.7

127.30

50.9

140.28

36.6

146.07

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

http://www.fhfa.gov/KeyTopics/Pages/House-Price-Index.aspx

Data of the FHFA HPI for the remaining US regions are in Table IIA2-2. Behavior is not very different from that in Table IIA2-1 with the exception of East North Central. House prices in the Pacific region doubled between 2000 and 2006. Although prices of houses declined sharply from 2005 and 2006 to 2014 with exception of West South Central and West North Central, there was still appreciation relative to 2000.

Table IIA2-2, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only NSA ∆%

 

West South Central

West North Central

East North Central

Mountain

Pacific

IVQ2000
to
IVQ2003

11.1

18.3

14.7

18.9

44.6

IVQ2000
to
IVQ2005

23.9

31.0

23.8

58.0

107.7

IVQ2000 to IVQ2006

31.6

33.7

23.7

68.6

108.7

IVQ2005 to
IVQ2014

26.6

4.7

-5.4

-2.6

-14.7

IVQ2006
to
IVQ2014

19.1

2.6

-5.4

-8.7

-15.1

IVQ2007 to
IVQ2014

15.2

3.2

-2.1

-5.6

-6.0

IVQ2011 to
IVQ2014

18.1

13.5

14.2

32.9

37.6

IVQ2012 to
IVQ2014

12.1

8.9

11.1

17.9

24.4

IVQ2013 to IVQ2014

5.9

4.0

4.6

5.5

7.3

IVQ2000 to IVQ2014

56.8

145.53

37.1

158.59

17.1

155.13

53.9

172.46

77.1

132.21

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

http://www.fhfa.gov/KeyTopics/Pages/House-Price-Index.aspx

Monthly and 12-month percentage changes of the FHFA House Price Index are in Table IIA2-3. Percentage monthly increases of the FHFA index were positive from Apr to Jul 2011 with exception of declines in May and Aug 2011 while 12-month percentage changes improved steadily from around minus 6.0 percent in Mar to May 2011 to minus 4.6 percent in Jun 2011. The house price index increased 0.6 percent in Jan 2019 and increased 5.4 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 0.4 percent in Feb 2019 and increased 5.0 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.3 percent in Mar 2019 and increased 4.9 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 0.6 percent in Apr 2019 and increased 5.2 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.5 percent in May 2019 and increased 5.1 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 0.3 percent in Jun 2019 and increased 4.9 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.4 percent in Jul 2019 and increased 4.9 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 0.3 percent in Aug 2019 and increased 4.8 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.6 percent in Sep 2019 and increased 5.3 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 0.4 percent in Oct 2019 and increased 5.4 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.4 percent in Nov 2019 and increased 5.3 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 0.9 percent in Dec 2019 and increased 5.9 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.7 percent in Jan 2020 and increased 6.0 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 0.8 percent in Feb 2020 and increased 6.5 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.2 percent in Mar 2020 and increased 6.3 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 0.3 percent in Apr 2020 and increased 6.0 percent in 12 months. The house price index decreased 0.2 percent in May 2020 and increased 5.2 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.1 percent in Jun 2020 and increased 6.0 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 1.2 percent in Jul 2020 and increased 6.9 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.6 percent in Aug 2020 and increased 8.4 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 1.5 percent in Sep 2020 and increased 9.5 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.5 percent in Oct 2020 and increased 10.7 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 1.0 percent in Nov 2020 and increased 11.3 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.4 percent in Dec 2020 and increased 11.8 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 1.2 percent in Jan 2021 and increased 12.4 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.2 percent in Feb 2021 and increased 12.7 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 1.6 percent in Mar 2021 and increased 14.3 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.9 percent in Apr 2021 and increased 16.0 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 1.8 percent in May 2021 and increased 18.3 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.7 percent in Jun 2021 and increased 19.0 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 1.4 percent in Jul 2021 and increased 19.3 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.0 percent in Aug 2021 and increased 18.6 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.9 percent in Sep 2021 and increased 17.9 percent in 12 months. House prices increased 1.1 percent in Oct 2021 and increased 17.5 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 1.1 percent in Nov 2021 and increased 17.6 percent in 12 months.

Table IIA2-3, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only SA. Month and NSA 12-Month ∆%

   

Month ∆% SA

   

12-Month ∆% NSA

11/1/2021

 

1.1

   

17.6

10/1/2021

 

1.1

   

17.5

9/1/2021

 

0.9

   

17.9

8/1/2021

 

1.0

   

18.6

7/1/2021

 

1.4

   

19.3

6/1/2021

 

1.7

   

19.0

5/1/2021

 

1.8

   

18.3

4/1/2021

 

1.9

   

16.0

3/1/2021

 

1.6

   

14.3

2/1/2021

 

1.2

   

12.7

1/1/2021

 

1.2

   

12.4

12/1/2020

 

1.4

   

11.8

11/1/2020

 

1.0

   

11.3

10/1/2020

 

1.5

   

10.7

9/1/2020

 

1.5

   

9.5

8/1/2020

 

1.6

   

8.4

7/1/2020

 

1.2

   

6.9

6/1/2020

 

1.1

   

6.0

5/1/2020

 

-0.2

   

5.2

4/1/2020

 

0.3

   

6.0

3/1/2020

 

0.2

   

6.3

2/1/2020

 

0.8

   

6.5

1/1/2020

 

0.7

   

6.0

12/1/2019

 

0.9

   

5.9

11/1/2019

 

0.4

   

5.3

10/1/2019

 

0.4

   

5.4

9/1/2019

 

0.6

   

5.3

8/1/2019

 

0.3

   

4.8

7/1/2019

 

0.4

   

4.9

6/1/2019

 

0.3

   

4.9

5/1/2019

 

0.5

   

5.1

4/1/2019

 

0.6

   

5.2

3/1/2019

 

0.3

   

4.9

2/1/2019

 

0.4

   

5.0

1/1/2019

 

0.6

   

5.4

12/1/2018

 

0.3

   

5.5

11/1/2018

 

0.5

   

5.7

10/1/2018

 

0.4

   

5.8

9/1/2018

 

0.1

   

5.9

8/1/2018

 

0.5

   

6.0

7/1/2018

 

0.4

   

6.2

6/1/2018

 

0.4

   

6.3

5/1/2018

 

0.6

   

6.4

4/1/2018

 

0.3

   

6.4

3/1/2018

 

0.3

   

6.9

2/1/2018

 

0.8

   

7.3

1/1/2018

 

0.8

   

7.1

12/1/2017

 

0.5

   

6.2

11/1/2017

 

0.6

   

6.4

10/1/2017

 

0.4

   

6.2

9/1/2017

 

0.4

   

6.3

8/1/2017

 

0.7

   

6.4

7/1/2017

 

0.6

   

6.1

6/1/2017

 

0.4

   

6.1

5/1/2017

 

0.5

   

6.4

4/1/2017

 

0.8

   

6.4

3/1/2017

 

0.6

   

6.2

2/1/2017

 

0.7

   

6.4

1/1/2017

 

0.0

   

5.8

12/1/2016

 

0.6

   

6.2

11/1/2016

 

0.5

   

5.9

10/1/2016

 

0.5

   

6.0

9/1/2016

 

0.6

   

5.9

8/1/2016

 

0.4

   

5.9

7/1/2016

 

0.5

   

5.6

6/1/2016

 

0.6

   

5.5

5/1/2016

 

0.5

   

5.5

4/1/2016

 

0.5

   

5.7

3/1/2016

 

0.8

   

5.6

2/1/2016

 

0.1

   

5.2

1/1/2016

 

0.4

   

5.8

12/1/2015

 

0.4

   

5.4

11/1/2015

 

0.5

   

5.6

10/1/2015

 

0.5

   

5.5

9/1/2015

 

0.5

   

5.5

8/1/2015

 

0.2

   

5.1

7/1/2015

 

0.5

   

5.2

6/1/2015

 

0.4

   

5.2

5/1/2015

 

0.6

   

5.4

4/1/2015

 

0.3

   

5.1

3/1/2015

 

0.3

   

5.1

2/1/2015

 

0.8

   

5.1

1/1/2015

 

0.0

   

4.6

12/1/2014

 

0.7

   

4.9

11/1/2014

 

0.5

   

4.8

10/1/2014

 

0.6

   

4.3

9/1/2014

 

0.1

   

4.0

8/1/2014

 

0.4

   

4.4

7/1/2014

 

0.4

   

4.4

6/1/2014

 

0.5

   

4.6

5/1/2014

 

0.2

   

4.7

4/1/2014

 

0.3

   

5.4

3/1/2014

 

0.4

   

5.7

2/1/2014

 

0.4

   

6.3

1/1/2014

 

0.4

   

6.5

12/1/2013

 

0.6

   

6.8

11/1/2013

 

0.0

   

6.6

10/1/2013

 

0.2

   

7.0

9/1/2013

 

0.5

   

7.4

8/1/2013

 

0.3

   

7.3

7/1/2013

 

0.6

   

7.7

6/1/2013

 

0.6

   

7.4

5/1/2013

 

0.8

   

7.1

4/1/2013

 

0.5

   

6.9

3/1/2013

 

1.0

   

6.9

2/1/2013

 

0.6

   

6.6

1/1/2013

 

0.7

   

6.2

12/1/2012

 

0.5

   

5.0

11/1/2012

 

0.4

   

4.8

10/1/2012

 

0.5

   

4.8

9/1/2012

 

0.4

   

3.8

8/1/2012

 

0.7

   

4.0

7/1/2012

 

0.2

   

3.1

6/1/2012

 

0.4

   

3.1

5/1/2012

 

0.6

   

3.0

4/1/2012

 

0.5

   

2.1

3/1/2012

 

0.8

   

1.8

2/1/2012

 

0.3

   

-0.3

1/1/2012

 

-0.4

   

-1.4

12/1/2011

 

0.3

   

-1.6

11/1/2011

 

0.4

   

-2.6

10/1/2011

 

-0.6

   

-3.3

9/1/2011

 

0.6

   

-2.6

8/1/2011

 

-0.3

   

-4.1

7/1/2011

 

0.2

   

-3.9

6/1/2011

 

0.3

   

-4.6

5/1/2011

 

-0.2

   

-5.9

4/1/2011

 

0.3

   

-5.8

3/1/2011

 

-1.1

   

-5.9

2/1/2011

 

-0.9

   

-5.1

1/1/2011

 

-0.6

   

-4.5

12/1/2010

 

-0.7

   

-3.9

12/1/2009

 

-1.0

   

-2.0

12/1/2008

 

-0.3

   

-10.4

12/1/2007

 

-0.5

   

-3.4

12/1/2006

 

0.0

   

2.3

12/1/2005

 

0.6

   

9.8

12/1/2004

 

0.9

   

10.2

12/1/2003

 

0.8

   

8.0

12/1/2002

 

0.7

   

7.8

12/1/2001

 

0.7

   

6.7

12/1/2000

 

0.6

   

7.1

12/1/1999

 

0.5

   

6.1

12/1/1998

 

0.5

   

5.9

12/1/1997

 

0.3

   

3.3

12/1/1996

 

0.3

   

2.7

12/1/1995

 

0.4

   

3.0

12/1/1994

 

0.0

   

2.5

12/1/1993

 

0.5

   

3.1

12/1/1992

 

-0.1

   

2.3

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools

The bottom part of Table IIA2-3 provides 12-month percentage changes of the FHFA house price index since 1992 when data become available for 1991. Table IIA2-4 provides percentage changes and average rates of percent change per year for various periods. Between 1992 and 2019, the FHFA house price index increased 167.4 percent at the yearly average rate of 3.7 percent. In the period 1992-2000, the FHFA house price index increased 39.0 percent at the average yearly rate of 4.2 percent. The average yearly rate of price increase accelerated to 7.5 percent in the period 2000-2003, 8.5 percent in 2000-2005 and 7.4 percent in 2000-2006. At the margin, the average rate jumped to 10.0 percent in 2003-2005 and 7.4 percent in 2003-2006. House prices measured by the FHFA house price index increased 25.2 percent at the average yearly rate of 1.7 percent between 2006 and 2019 and 28.0 percent between 2005 and 2019 at the average yearly rate of 1.8 percent. The FHFA house price index increased 11.8 percent from 2019 to 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Table IIA2-4, US, FHFA House Price Index, Percentage Change and Average Rate of Percentage Change per Year, Selected Dates 1992-2020

Dec

∆%

Average ∆% per Year

1992-2019

167.2

3.7

1992-2020

198.7

4.0

1992-2000

39.0

4.2

2000-2003

24.1

7.5

2000-2005

50.2

8.5

2003-2005

21.0

10.0

2005-2019

28.0

1.8

2005-2020

43.1

2.4

2000-2006

53.5

7.4

2003-2006

23.7

7.4

2006-2019

25.2

1.7

2006-2020

40.0

2.4

2019-2020

11.8

11.8

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools

The explanation of the sharp contraction of household wealth can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ibid, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

There are significant elements of the theory of bank financial fragility of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b) that help to explain the financial fragility of banks during the credit/dollar crisis (see also Diamond 2007). The theory of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) as exposed by Diamond (2007) is that banks funding with demand deposits have a mismatch of liquidity (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 58-66). A run occurs when too many depositors attempt to withdraw cash at the same time. All that is needed is an expectation of failure of the bank. Three important functions of banks are providing evaluation, monitoring and liquidity transformation. Banks invest in human capital to evaluate projects of borrowers in deciding if they merit credit. The evaluation function reduces adverse selection or financing projects with low present value. Banks also provide important monitoring services of following the implementation of projects, avoiding moral hazard that funds be used for, say, real estate speculation instead of the original project of factory construction. The transformation function of banks involves both assets and liabilities of bank balance sheets. Banks convert an illiquid asset or loan for a project with cash flows in the distant future into a liquid liability in the form of demand deposits that can be withdrawn immediately.

In the theory of banking of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b), the bank creates liquidity by tying human assets to capital. The collection skills of the relationship banker convert an illiquid project of an entrepreneur into liquid demand deposits that are immediately available for withdrawal. The deposit/capital structure is fragile because of the threat of bank runs. In these days of online banking, the run on Washington Mutual was through withdrawals online. A bank run can be triggered by the decline of the value of bank assets below the value of demand deposits.

Pelaez and Pelaez (Regulation of Banks and Finance 2009b, 60, 64-5) find immediate application of the theories of banking of Diamond, Dybvig and Rajan to the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. It is a credit crisis because the main issue was the deterioration of the credit portfolios of securitized banks as a result of default of subprime mortgages. It is a dollar crisis because of the weakening dollar resulting from relatively low interest rate policies of the US. It caused systemic effects that converted into a global recession not only because of the huge weight of the US economy in the world economy but also because the credit crisis transferred to the UK and Europe. Management skills or human capital of banks are illustrated by the financial engineering of complex products. The increasing importance of human relative to inanimate capital (Rajan and Zingales 2000) is revolutionizing the theory of the firm (Zingales 2000) and corporate governance (Rajan and Zingales 2001). Finance is one of the most important examples of this transformation. Profits were derived from the charter in the original banking institution. Pricing and structuring financial instruments was revolutionized with option pricing formulas developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973, 1974, 1998) that permitted the development of complex products with fair pricing. The successful financial company must attract and retain finance professionals who have invested in human capital, which is a sunk cost to them and not of the institution where they work.

The complex financial products created for securitized banking with high investments in human capital are based on houses, which are as illiquid as the projects of entrepreneurs in the theory of banking. The liquidity fragility of the securitized bank is equivalent to that of the commercial bank in the theory of banking (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 65). Banks created off-balance sheet structured investment vehicles (SIV) that issued commercial paper receiving AAA rating because of letters of liquidity guarantee by the banks. The commercial paper was converted into liquidity by its use as collateral in SRPs at the lowest rates and minimal haircuts because of the AAA rating of the guarantor bank. In the theory of banking, default can be triggered when the value of assets is perceived as lower than the value of the deposits. Commercial paper issued by SIVs, securitized mortgages and derivatives all obtained SRP liquidity on the basis of illiquid home mortgage loans at the bottom of the pyramid. The run on the securitized bank had a clear origin (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 65):

“The increasing default of mortgages resulted in an increase in counterparty risk. Banks were hit by the liquidity demands of their counterparties. The liquidity shock extended to many segments of the financial markets—interbank loans, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), high-yield bonds and many others—when counterparties preferred lower returns of highly liquid safe havens, such as Treasury securities, than the risk of having to sell the collateral in SRPs at deep discounts or holding an illiquid asset. The price of an illiquid asset is near zero.”

Gorton and Metrick (2010H, 507) provide a revealing quote to the work in 1908 of Edwin R. A. Seligman, professor of political economy at Columbia University, founding member of the American Economic Association and one of its presidents and successful advocate of progressive income taxation. The intention of the quote is to bring forth the important argument that financial crises are explained in terms of “confidence” but as Professor Seligman states in reference to historical banking crises in the US, the important task is to explain what caused the lack of confidence. It is instructive to repeat the more extended quote of Seligman (1908, xi) on the explanations of banking crises:

“The current explanations may be divided into two categories. Of these the first includes what might be termed the superficial theories. Thus it is commonly stated that the outbreak of a crisis is due to lack of confidence,--as if the lack of confidence was not in itself the very thing which needs to be explained. Of still slighter value is the attempt to associate a crisis with some particular governmental policy, or with some action of a country’s executive. Such puerile interpretations have commonly been confined to countries like the United States, where the political passions of democracy have had the fullest way. Thus the crisis of 1893 was ascribed by the Republicans to the impending Democratic tariff of 1894; and the crisis of 1907 has by some been termed the ‘[Theodore] Roosevelt panic,” utterly oblivious of the fact that from the time of President Jackson, who was held responsible for the troubles of 1837, every successive crisis had had its presidential scapegoat, and has been followed by a political revulsion. Opposed to these popular, but wholly unfounded interpretations, is the second class of explanations, which seek to burrow beneath the surface and to discover the more occult and fundamental causes of the periodicity of crises.”

Scholars ignore superficial explanations in the effort to seek good and truth. The problem of economic analysis of the credit/dollar crisis is the lack of a structural model with which to attempt empirical determination of causes (Gorton and Metrick 2010SB). There would still be doubts even with a well-specified structural model because samples of economic events do not typically permit separating causes and effects. There is also confusion is separating the why of the crisis and how it started and propagated, all of which are extremely important.

In true heritage of the principles of Seligman (1908), Gorton (2009EFM) discovers a prime causal driver of the credit/dollar crisis. The objective of subprime and Alt-A mortgages was to facilitate loans to populations with modest means so that they could acquire a home. These borrowers would not receive credit because of (1) lack of funds for down payments; (2) low credit rating and information; (3) lack of information on income; and (4) errors or lack of other information. Subprime mortgage “engineering” was based on the belief that both lender and borrower could benefit from increases in house prices over the short run. The initial mortgage would be refinanced in two or three years depending on the increase of the price of the house. According to Gorton (2009EFM, 13, 16):

“The outstanding amounts of Subprime and Alt-A [mortgages] combined amounted to about one quarter of the $6 trillion mortgage market in 2004-2007Q1. Over the period 2000-2007, the outstanding amount of agency mortgages doubled, but subprime grew 800%! Issuance in 2005 and 2006 of Subprime and Alt-A mortgages was almost 30% of the mortgage market. Since 2000 the Subprime and Alt-A segments of the market grew at the expense of the Agency (i.e., the government sponsored entities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) share, which fell from almost 80% (by outstanding or issuance) to about half by issuance and 67% by outstanding amount. The lender’s option to rollover the mortgage after an initial period is implicit in the subprime mortgage. The key design features of a subprime mortgage are: (1) it is short term, making refinancing important; (2) there is a step-up mortgage rate that applies at the end of the first period, creating a strong incentive to refinance; and (3) there is a prepayment penalty, creating an incentive not to refinance early.”

The prime objective of successive administrations in the US during the past 20 years and actually since the times of Roosevelt in the 1930s has been to provide “affordable” financing for the “American dream” of home ownership. The US housing finance system is mixed with public, public/private and purely private entities. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system was established by Congress in 1932 that also created the Federal Housing Administration in 1934 with the objective of insuring homes against default. In 1938, the government created the Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae, to foster a market for FHA-insured mortgages. Government-insured mortgages were transferred from Fannie Mae to the Government National Mortgage Association, or Ginnie Mae, to permit Fannie Mae to become a publicly-owned company. Securitization of mortgages began in 1970 with the government charter to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac, with the objective of bundling mortgages created by thrift institutions that would be marketed as bonds with guarantees by Freddie Mac (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 42-8). In the third quarter of 2008, total mortgages in the US were $12,057 billion of which 43.5 percent, or $5423 billion, were retained or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 45). In 1990, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had a share of only 25.4 percent of total mortgages in the US. Mortgages in the US increased from $6922 billion in 2002 to $12,088 billion in 2007, or by 74.6 percent, while the retained or guaranteed portfolio of Fannie and Freddie rose from $3180 billion in 2002 to $4934 billion in 2007, or by 55.2 percent.

According to Pinto (2008) in testimony to Congress:

“There are approximately 25 million subprime and Alt-A loans outstanding, with an unpaid principal amount of over $4.5 trillion, about half of them held or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie. Their high risk activities were allowed to operate at 75:1 leverage ratio. While they may deny it, there can be no doubt that Fannie and Freddie now own or guarantee $1.6 trillion in subprime, Alt-A and other default prone loans and securities. This comprises over 1/3 of their risk portfolios and amounts to 34% of all the subprime loans and 60% of all Alt-A loans outstanding. These 10.5 million unsustainable, nonprime loans are experiencing a default rate 8 times the level of the GSEs’ 20 million traditional quality loans. The GSEs will be responsible for a large percentage of an estimated 8.8 million foreclosures expected over the next 4 years, accounting for the failure of about 1 in 6 home mortgages. Fannie and Freddie have subprimed America.”

In perceptive analysis of growth and macroeconomics in the past six decades, Rajan (2012FA) argues that “the West can’t borrow and spend its way to recovery.” The Keynesian paradigm is not applicable in current conditions. Advanced economies in the West could be divided into those that reformed regulatory structures to encourage productivity and others that retained older structures. In the period from 1950 to 2000, Cobet and Wilson (2002) find that US productivity, measured as output/hour, grew at the average yearly rate of 2.9 percent while Japan grew at 6.3 percent and Germany at 4.7 percent (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). In the period from 1995 to 2000, output/hour grew at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US but at lower rates of 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in the US. Rajan (2012FA) argues that the differential in productivity growth was accomplished by deregulation in the US at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. In contrast, Europe did not engage in reform with the exception of Germany in the early 2000s that empowered the German economy with significant productivity advantage. At the same time, technology and globalization increased relative remunerations in highly-skilled, educated workers relative to those without skills for the new economy. It was then politically appealing to improve the fortunes of those left behind by the technological revolution by means of increasing cheap credit. As Rajan (2012FA) argues:

“In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, partly to gain more control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant private mortgage agencies, and partly to promote affordable homeownership for low-income groups. Such policies helped money flow to lower-middle-class households and raised their spending—so much so that consumption inequality rose much less than income inequality in the years before the crisis. These policies were also politically popular. Unlike when it came to an expansion in government welfare transfers, few groups opposed expanding credit to the lower-middle class—not the politicians who wanted more growth and happy constituents, not the bankers and brokers who profited from the mortgage fees, not the borrowers who could now buy their dream houses with virtually no money down, and not the laissez-faire bank regulators who thought they could pick up the pieces if the housing market collapsed. The Federal Reserve abetted these shortsighted policies. In 2001, in response to the dot-com bust, the Fed cut short-term interest rates to the bone. Even though the overstretched corporations that were meant to be stimulated were not interested in investing, artificially low interest rates acted as a tremendous subsidy to the parts of the economy that relied on debt, such as housing and finance. This led to an expansion in housing construction (and related services, such as real estate brokerage and mortgage lending), which created jobs, especially for the unskilled. Progressive economists applauded this process, arguing that the housing boom would lift the economy out of the doldrums. But the Fed-supported bubble proved unsustainable. Many construction workers have lost their jobs and are now in deeper trouble than before, having also borrowed to buy unaffordable houses. Bankers obviously deserve a large share of the blame for the crisis. Some of the financial sector’s activities were clearly predatory, if not outright criminal. But the role that the politically induced expansion of credit played cannot be ignored; it is the main reason the usual checks and balances on financial risk taking broke down.”

In fact, Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) anticipated low liquidity in financial markets resulting from low interest rates before the financial crisis that caused distortions of risk/return decisions provoking the credit/dollar crisis and global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Near zero interest rates of unconventional monetary policy induced excessive risks and low liquidity in financial decisions that were critical as a cause of the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. Rajan (2012FA) argues that it is not feasible to return to the employment and income levels before the credit/dollar crisis because of the bloated construction sector, financial system and government budgets.

Table IIA-1 shows the euphoria of prices during the housing boom and the subsequent decline. House prices rose 65.9 percent in the US national home price index between Nov 2000 and Nov 2005. Prices rose 69.6 percent in the US national index from Nov 2000 to Nov 2006. House prices rose 29.5 percent between Nov 2003 and Nov 2005 for the US national propelled by low fed funds rates of 1.0 percent between Nov 2003 and Nov 2004. Fed funds rates increased by 0.25 basis points at every meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from Jun 2004 until Jun 2006, reaching 5.25 percent. Simultaneously, the suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury bond caused decrease of yields of mortgage-backed securities with intended increase in mortgage rates. Similarly, between Nov 2003 and Nov 2006 the US national increased 32.3 percent. House prices have increased from Nov 2006 to Nov 2021 by 50.4 percent for the US national. Measuring house prices is quite difficult because of the lack of homogeneity that is typical of standardized commodities. In the 12 months ending in Nov 2021, house prices increased 18.8 percent in the US national. Table IIA-1 also shows that house prices increased 155.0 percent between Nov 2000 and Nov 2021 for the US national. House prices had been close to the lowest level since peaks during the boom before the financial crisis and global recession. The US national increased 49.6 percent in Nov 2021 from the peak in Jun 2006 and increased 49.6 percent from the peak in Jul 2006. The final part of Table II-2 provides average annual percentage rates of growth of the house price indexes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller. The average rate for the US national was 3.8 percent from Dec 1987 to Dec 2020 and 3.6 percent from Dec 1987 to Dec 2000. Although the global recession affecting the US between IVQ2007 (Dec) and IIQ2009 (Jun) caused decline of house prices of slightly above 30 percent, the average annual growth rate between Dec 2000 and Dec 2020 was 3.9 percent for the US national.

Table IIA-1, US, Percentage Changes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller National Home Price Indices, Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%

 

US National

∆% Nov 2000 to Nov 2003

28.1

∆% Nov 2000 to Nov 2005

65.9

∆% Nov 2003 to Nov 2005

29.5

∆% Nov 2000 to Nov 2006

69.6

∆% Nov 2003 to Nov 2006

32.3

∆% Nov 2005 to Nov 2021

53.7

∆% Nov 2006 to Nov 2021

50.4

∆% Nov 2009 to Nov 2021

86.6

∆% Nov 2010 to Nov 2021

94.7

∆% Nov 2011 to Nov 2021

102.0

∆% Nov 2012 to Nov 2021

91.8

∆% Nov 2013 to Nov 2021

73.3

∆% Nov 2014 to Nov 2021

65.7

∆% Nov 2015 to Nov 2021

57.6

∆% Nov 2016 to Nov 2021

49.9

∆% Nov 2017 to Nov 2021

41.2

∆% Nov 2018 to Nov 2021

34.6

∆% Nov 2019 to Nov 2021

30.1

∆% Nov 2020 to Nov 2021

18.8

∆% Nov 2000 to Nov 2021

155.0

∆% Peak Jun 2006 to Nov 2021

49.6

∆% Peak Jul 2006 to Nov 2021

49.6

Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2020

3.8

Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2000

3.6

Average ∆% Dec 1992-Dec 2000

4.5

Average ∆% Dec 2000-Dec 2020

3.9

Source: https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/indicators/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-us-national-home-price-nsa-index/#overview

Monthly house prices increased sharply from Feb 2013 to Jan 2014 for both the SA and NSA national house price, as shown in Table IIA-3. In Jan 2013, the seasonally adjusted national house price index increased 0.9 percent and the NSA increased 0.3. House prices increased at high monthly percentage rates from Feb to Nov 2013. The most important seasonal factor in house prices is school changes for wealthier homeowners with more expensive houses. With seasonal adjustment, house prices fell from Dec 2010 throughout Mar 2011 and fell in every month from Aug 2011 to Feb 2012. The not seasonally adjusted index registers increase in Mar 2012 of 1.4 percent. Not seasonally adjusted house prices increased 1.9 percent in Apr 2012 and at high monthly percentage rates through Aug 2012. House prices not seasonally adjusted stalled from Oct 2012 to Dec 2012 and surged from Feb to Sep 2013, decelerating in Oct 2013-Jan 2014. House prices grew at fast rates in Mar-Jul 2014. The SA national house price index increased 1.1 percent in Nov 2021 and the NSA index increased 0.9 percent. Declining house prices cause multiple adverse effects of which two are quite evident. (1) There is a disincentive to buy houses in continuing price declines. (2) More mortgages could be losing fair market value relative to mortgage debt. Another possibility is a wealth effect that consumers restrain purchases because of the decline of their net worth in houses.

Table IIA-2, US, Monthly Percentage Change of S&P Corelogic Case-Shiller National Home Price Indices, Seasonally Adjusted and Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%

 

∆% SA

   

∆% NSA

November 2021

1.1

   

0.9

October 2021

1.0

   

0.8

September 2021

1.1

   

0.9

August 2021

1.4

   

1.2

July 2021

1.6

   

1.7

June 2021

1.9

   

2.2

May 2021

1.8

   

2.3

April 2021

1.7

   

2.3

March 2021

1.7

   

2.1

February 2021

1.3

   

1.2

January 2021

1.3

   

0.8

December 2020

1.3

   

0.9

November 2020

1.3

   

1.1

October 2020

1.6

   

1.3

September 2020

1.4

   

1.2

August 2020

1.3

   

1.1

July 2020

0.7

   

0.8

June 2020

0.2

   

0.6

May 2020

0.1

   

0.6

April 2020

0.4

   

1.0

March 2020

0.5

   

0.9

February 2020

0.5

   

0.4

January 2020

0.5

   

0.1

December 2019

0.5

   

0.1

November 2019

0.3

   

0.1

October 2019

0.3

   

0.0

September 2019

0.3

   

0.1

August 2019

0.3

   

0.2

July 2019

0.2

   

0.4

June 2019

0.2

   

0.6

May 2019

0.3

   

0.8

April 2019

0.3

   

0.9

March 2019

0.3

   

0.7

February 2019

0.2

   

0.1

January 2019

0.2

   

-0.2

December 2018

0.2

   

-0.2

November 2018

0.2

   

-0.1

October 2018

0.3

   

0.0

September 2018

0.3

   

0.0

August 2018

0.4

   

0.2

July 2018

0.3

   

0.4

June 2018

0.4

   

0.8

May 2018

0.4

   

0.9

April 2018

0.4

   

1.0

March 2018

0.4

   

0.8

February 2018

0.5

   

0.4

January 2018

0.6

   

0.1

December 2017

0.6

   

0.2

November 2017

0.5

   

0.2

October 2017

0.5

   

0.1

September 2017

0.5

   

0.2

August 2017

0.6

   

0.4

July 2017

0.5

   

0.7

June 2017

0.5

   

0.9

May 2017

0.5

   

1.1

April 2017

0.4

   

1.1

March 2017

0.4

   

0.8

February 2017

0.3

   

0.2

January 2017

0.6

   

0.1

December 2016

0.5

   

0.1

November 2016

0.5

   

0.1

October 2016

0.5

   

0.0

September 2016

0.5

   

0.2

August 2016

0.6

   

0.3

July 2016

0.4

   

0.6

June 2016

0.4

   

0.9

May 2016

0.4

   

1.0

April 2016

0.3

   

1.1

March 2016

0.3

   

0.8

February 2016

0.2

   

0.1

January 2016

0.4

   

0.0

December 2015

0.5

   

0.0

November 2015

0.5

   

0.1

October 2015

0.6

   

0.0

September 2015

0.5

   

0.1

August 2015

0.5

   

0.3

July 2015

0.4

   

0.6

June 2015

0.3

   

0.9

May 2015

0.3

   

1.1

April 2015

0.3

   

1.1

March 2015

0.4

   

0.9

February 2015

0.3

   

0.2

January 2015

0.4

   

-0.1

December 2014

0.4

   

-0.1

November 2014

0.4

   

-0.2

October 2014

0.4

   

-0.2

September 2014

0.4

   

-0.1

August 2014

0.4

   

0.2

July 2014

0.3

   

0.6

June 2014

0.2

   

0.9

May 2014

0.2

   

1.1

April 2014

0.2

   

1.1

March 2014

0.3

   

0.8

February 2014

0.4

   

0.3

January 2014

0.6

   

0.1

December 2013

0.6

   

-0.1

November 2013

0.5

   

-0.1

October 2013

0.6

   

-0.1

September 2013

0.8

   

0.2

August 2013

0.9

   

0.7

July 2013

0.9

   

1.2

June 2013

0.9

   

1.7

May 2013

0.9

   

1.9

April 2013

1.0

   

2.0

March 2013

1.5

   

1.9

February 2013

0.6

   

0.6

January 2013

0.9

   

0.3

December 2012

0.6

   

-0.1

November 2012

0.7

   

0.0

October 2012

0.5

   

-0.3

September 2012

0.4

   

-0.2

August 2012

0.4

   

0.3

July 2012

0.5

   

0.8

June 2012

0.6

   

1.5

May 2012

0.7

   

1.9

April 2012

0.9

   

1.9

March 2012

1.0

   

1.4

February 2012

-0.1

   

-0.1

January 2012

0.0

   

-0.7

December 2011

-0.3

   

-1.1

November 2011

-0.6

   

-1.3

October 2011

-0.5

   

-1.3

September 2011

-0.5

   

-1.1

August 2011

-0.3

   

-0.4

July 2011

-0.1

   

0.3

June 2011

0.0

   

0.9

May 2011

-0.1

   

1.1

April 2011

0.0

   

1.0

March 2011

-0.3

   

0.0

February 2011

-0.8

   

-0.9

January 2011

-0.4

   

-1.1

December 2010

-0.1

   

-0.8

Source: https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/indicators/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-us-national-home-price-nsa-index/#overview

Table IIA-4 summarizes the brutal drops in assets and net worth of US households and nonprofit organizations from 2007 to 2008 and 2009. Total assets fell $8.9 trillion or 10.5 percent from 2007 to 2008 and $8.6 trillion or 10.2 percent to 2009. Net worth fell $8.8 trillion from 2007 to 2008 or 12.6 percent and $8.4 trillion to 2009 or 12.0 percent. Subsidies to housing prolonged over decades together with interest rates at 1.0 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 inflated valuations of real estate and risk financial assets such as equities. The increase of fed funds rates by 25 basis points until 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 reversed carry trades through exotic vehicles such as subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) and world financial markets. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9).

Table IIA-4 summarizes the brutal drops in assets and net worth of US households and nonprofit organizations from 2007 to 2008 and 2009. Total assets fell $8.9 trillion or 10.5 percent from 2007 to 2008 and $8.6 trillion or 10.2 percent to 2009. Net worth fell $8.8 trillion from 2007 to 2008 or 12.6 percent and $8.4 trillion to 2009 or 11.9 percent. Subsidies to housing prolonged over decades together with interest rates at 1.0 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 inflated valuations of real estate and risk financial assets such as equities. The increase of fed funds rates by 25 basis points until 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 reversed carry trades through exotic vehicles such as subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) and world financial markets. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9).

Table IIA-4, Difference of Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations, Billions of Dollars from 2007 to 2008 and 2009

 

2007

2008

Change to 2008

2009

Change to 2009

A

84,697.8

75,772.0

-8,925.8

76,096.3

-8,601.5

Non
FIN

30,637.4

28,164.1

-2,473.3

26,139.6

-4,497.8

RE

25,845.9

23,249.9

-2,596.0

21,209.1

-4,636.8

FIN

54,060.4

47,607.8

-6,452.6

49,956.7

-4,103.7

LIAB

14,613.2

14,508.7

-104.5

14,383.6

-229.6

NW

70,084.6

61,263.3

-8,821.3

61,712.7

-8,371.9

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2021. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: third quarter 2021. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Nov 9. https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/default.htm

The apparent improvement in Table IIA-4A is mostly because of increases in valuations of risk financial assets by the carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged exposures in risk financial assets such as stocks, high-yield bonds, emerging markets, commodities and so on. Zero interest rates also act to increase net worth by reducing debt or liabilities. The net worth of households has become an instrument of unconventional monetary policy by zero interest rates in the theory that increases in net worth increase consumption that accounts for 68.8 percent of GDP in IIIQ2021 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/us-gdp-growing-at-20-saar-in-iiiq2021.html), generating demand to increase aggregate economic activity and employment. There are neglected and counterproductive risks in unconventional monetary policy. Between 2007 and IIIQ2021, real estate increased in value by $15,079.0 billion. Financial assets increased $59,996.6 billion, explaining most of the increase in net worth of $74,624.8 billion obtained by deducting the increase in liabilities of $3355.4 billion from the increase of assets of $77,980.2 billion (with minor rounding error). Net worth increased from $70,084.6 billion in IVQ2007 to $144,709.4 billion in IIIQ2021 by $74,624.8 billion or 106.5 percent. The US consumer price index for all items increased from 210.036 in Dec 2007 to 274.310 in Sep 2021 (https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm) or 30.6 percent. Net worth adjusted by CPI inflation increased 58.1 percent from 2007 to IIIQ2021. Real estate assets adjusted for CPI inflation increased 21.2 percent from 2007 to IIIQ2021. There are multiple complaints that unconventional monetary policy concentrates income on wealthier individuals because of their holdings of financial assets while the middle class has gained less because of fewer holdings of financial assets and higher share of real estate in family wealth. There is nothing new in these arguments. Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. The Banking Act of 1933 imposed prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q. Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:

“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”

In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:

“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.” Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 49 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIIQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/gdp3q21_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/us-gdp-growing-at-23-saar-in-iiiq2021.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2021 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 50.1 percent. GDP in IIIQ2021 would be $23,673.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4194.7 billion than actual $19,478.9 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 23.4 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.5 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2021.htm). US GDP in IIIQ2021 is 17.7 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,478.9 billion in IIIQ2021 or 23.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.9 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2021. Growth at 2.9 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 159.0076 in Nov 2021. The actual index NSA in Nov 2021 is 100.8699 which is 36.6 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 167.8289 in Nov 2021. The actual index NSA in Nov 2021 is 100.8699, which is 39.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.8 percent between Dec 1986 and Nov 2021. Using trend growth of 1.8 percent per year, the index would increase to 136.9179 in Nov 2021. The output of manufacturing at 100.8699 in Nov 2021 is 26.3 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 101.5378 in Nov 2021 or 19.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 168.9711 in Nov 2021. The NAICS index at 101.5378 in Nov 2021 is 39.9 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 132.3657 in Nov 2021. The NAICS index at 101.5378 in Nov 2021 is 23.3 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table IIA-4A, US, Difference of Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations Billions of Dollars from 2007 to 2019 2020 and IIIQ2021

 

Value 2007

Change to 2019

Change to 2020

Change to IIIQ2021

Assets

84,697.8

48,621.3

63,341.6

77,980.2

Nonfinancial

30,637.4

9,295.0

12,884.9

17,983.6

Real Estate

25,845.9

7,702.5

10,903.6

15,079.0

Financial

54,060.4

39,326.3

50,456.7

59,996.6

Liabilities

14,613.2

1,891.9

2,510.1

3,355.4

Net Worth

70,084.6

46,729.3

60,831.5

74,624.8

Notes: Deposits: Total Time and Savings Deposits FL15303005; Net Worth = Assets – Liabilities

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2021. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: third quarter 2021. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Nov 9. https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/default.htm

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022.

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