Consumer Prices of the
United States Increased 8.6 percent in May 2022, Which Is the Highest Since 8.9
percent in Dec 1981, Followed by the Third Highest of 8.4 percent in Jan 1982
and the Second highest of 8.5 percent in Mar 2022, Real Disposable Income or Personal
Income After Tax and Inflation Changing 0.0 Percent in Apr 2022 and Decreasing
6.2 Percent in 12 Months, Prices of Personal Consumption Expenditures
Increasing 6.3 Percent in 12 Months Ending in Apr 2022, Prices of Personal
Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy Increasing 10.0 Percent in
12 Months Ending in Apr 2022, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income and
Consumption Expenditures, Financial Repression, Stagflation
Risks, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth,
and Government Intervention in Globalization
Note: This Blog will post only one indicator of the US
economy while we concentrate efforts in completing a book-length manuscript in
the critically important subject of INFLATION.
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M.
Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020,
2021, 2022.
I IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures
II Prices of
Personal Consumption Expenditures
III World Financial Turbulence
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last
Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
Preamble. United States total public debt outstanding is $30.4
trillion and debt held by the public $23.8 trillion (https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/datasets/debt-to-the-penny/debt-to-the-penny). The Net International
Investment Position of the United States, or foreign debt, is $18.1 trillion (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/intinv421.pdf https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/us-consumer-price-index-increased-85.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). The United States
current account deficit is 3.6 percent of GDP in IVQ2021 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/trans421.pdf). The Treasury deficit of
the United States reached $2.8 trillion in fiscal year 2021 (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/). Total assets of
Federal Reserve Banks reached $8.9 trillion on Jun 8, 2022 and securities held
outright reached $8.5 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). US GDP nominal NSA
reached $24.4 trillion in IQ2022 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Total Treasury
interest-bearing, marketable debt held by private investors increased from
$3635 billion in 2007 to $16,439 billion in Sep 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021) or
increase by 352.2 percent (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/). John Hilsenrath, writing
on “Economists Seek Recession Cues in the Yield Curve,” published in the Wall
Street Journal on Apr 2, 2022, analyzes the inversion of the Treasury yield
curve with the two-year yield at 2.430 on Apr 1, 2022, above the ten-year yield
at 2.374. Hilsenrath argues that inversion appears to signal recession in
market analysis but not in alternative Fed approach.
Chart CPI-H provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index of the United States with 8.6 percent in May 2022, which is the highest since 8.9 percent in Dec 1981, followed by the second highest of 8.5 percent in Mar 2022 and the third highest of 8.4 percent in Jan 1982
Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer
Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2022
Source: US Bureau of Labor
Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer
Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2022
Source: US Bureau of Labor
Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart VII-4 of the Energy Information
Administration provides the price of the Natural Gas Futures Contract
increasing from $2.581 on Jan 4, 2021 to $9.293 per million Btu on Jun 7, 2022
or 260.1 percent.
Chart VII-4, US, Natural Gas
Futures Contract 1
Source: US Energy Information
Administration
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1d.htm
Chart VII-5 of the US Energy Administration provides US field production
of oil decreasing from a peak of 12,966 thousand barrels per day in Nov 2019 to
the final point of 11.655 thousand barrels per day in Mar 2022.
Chart VII-5, US, US, Field
Production of Crude Oil, Thousand Barrels Per Day
Source: US Energy Information
Administration
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=M
Chart VI-6 of the US Energy Information
Administration provides imports of crude oil. Imports increased from 245,369
thousand barrels per day in Jan 2021 to 252,916 thousand in Jan 2022, inreasing
to 262.282 in Mar 2022.
Chart VII-6, US, US, Imports
of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Thousand Barrels
Source: US Energy Information
Administration
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUS1&f=M
Chart VI-7 of
the EIA provides US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net
Imports 1950-2020. There was sharp increase in production in the final segment
that reached consumption in 2020.
Chart VI-7, US
Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2020,
Million Barrels Per Day
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php
Chart VI-8 provides the US
average retail price of electricity at 12.78 cents per kilowatthour in Dec 2020
increasing to 14.47 cents per kilowatthour in Mar 2022 or 13.2 per cent.
Chart VI-8, US
Average Retail Price of Electricity, Monthly, Cents per Kilowatthour,
In his classic
restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference
as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies
the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958,
86):
“The assumption
that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been
adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for
reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in
interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the
purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the
theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The
formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected
capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest
rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate
of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In
addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself,
there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying
change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates
expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative
quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At
the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would
increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no
cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the
investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to
changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”
Tobin (1969)
provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general
equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting
of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital
gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the
expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of
the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus,
g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of
Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of
interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there
is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move
into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk
financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades
with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank
created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global
recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory,
“income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or
believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957,
10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return,
r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman
1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that
individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint
for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W.
This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby
1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and
wealth can be restated as:
W = Y/r
(1)
Equation (1)
shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞.
Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present
value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of
long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary
policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite
perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r
→0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing
interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on
production, investment and employment.
Inflation and
unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23)
by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment.
Chart VI-1B for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist
in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan,
23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve
correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in
inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart VI-1B
cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds
rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the
Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing
balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s. The loans were used
in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long
gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt
higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with
declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on
inflation and the economy. This interpretation is consistent with the
case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with
significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation
more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises
frm the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a
plausible interpretation of this pattern.”
The reading of
the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about
the output gap and inflation expectations:
“So, inflation
is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not
just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because
given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other
sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These
statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the
Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look
at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’
or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long
period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the
stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with
‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They
ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen
in economies well below potential.”
Yellen
(2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small
portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the
current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening
labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”
Chart VI-1B
provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were
no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that
period. Chart VI-1B used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the
wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of
unemployment in large urban centers.
Chart VI1-B,
Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987
Source: ©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado
e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina.
São
Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy,
The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.
I IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and
Consumption Expenditures. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides
important revisions and enhancements of data on personal income and outlays
since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). There are
waves of changes in personal income and expenditures in Table IB-1 that
correspond somewhat to inflation waves observed worldwide (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/inflation-accelerating-worldwide.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html) because of
the influence through price indexes. There are wide fluctuations in Nov and Dec
2012 by the rush to realize income of all forms in anticipation of tax increases
beginning in Jan 2013. There is major distortion in Jan 2013 because of higher
contributions in payrolls to government social insurance that caused sharp
reduction in personal income and disposable personal income. The Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) explains as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):
“The February
and January [2013] changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected
the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the
“payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to
November and to December [2012] in anticipation of changes in individual tax
rates.”
The BEA provides the annual update of the
national income and product account (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html): “Annual Update of the
National Income and Product Accounts
The estimates released today reflect the results of the
annual update of the national income and
product accounts (NIPAs) in conjunction with preliminary
estimates for June 2017. The update covers the most recent 3 years and the
first 5 months of 2017. For more information, see information on the “2017 Annual Update” on BEA’s website.
Additionally, the August Survey of Current Business will contain an article that describes the results in
detail.”
The BEA provides “Comprehensive Update of the
National Income and Product Accounts” on Jul 31, 2018 with revisions since 1929
(https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html): “The
estimates released today also reflect the results of the 15th comprehensive
update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The updated
estimates reflect previously announced improvements (https://www.bea.gov/scb/2018/04-april/0418-preview-2018-comprehensive-nipa-update.htm), and include
the introduction of new not seasonally adjusted estimates for GDP, GDI and
their major components. For more information, see the Technical Note. Revised
NIPA table stubs, initial results, and background materials are available on
the BEA website (https://www.bea.gov/index.htm).” The BEA provides the
“Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts” on Jul 26, 2019 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-07/NIPA-AU19-Briefing.pdf).
The BEA
provides the annual update of the National Income and Product Accounts on Jul
31, 2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/pi0620.pdf): “The estimates released today also reflect the results of
the Annual Update of the National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPAs). The
timespan of the update is the first quarter of 2015 through the fourth quarter
of 2019 for estimates of real GDP and its major components, and the first
quarter of 1999 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of income and
saving. The reference year remains 2012. More information on the 2020 Annual
Update is included in the May Survey of Current Business article, “GDP and the Economy.”
The BEA provides the annual update
of the National Income and Product Accounts on Jul 30, 2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/pi0621.pdf): “Today’s release
also reflects the Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts.
The timespan of the update is the first quarter of 1999 through the first quarter
of 2021 and resulted in revisions to GDP, GDI, and their major components. The
reference year remains 2012. With today's release, most NIPA tables are
available through BEA’s Interactive Data application on the
BEA website (www.bea.gov). See Information on
Updates to the National Economic Accounts for the
complete table release schedule and a summary of results through 2020, which
includes a discussion of methodology changes. A table showing the major current
dollar revisions and their sources for each component of GDP, national income,
and personal income is also provided. The August 2021 Survey of
Current Business will contain an article describing the
update in more detail. Previously published estimates, which are superseded by
today's release, are found in BEA’s archives.”
The
emphasis is now shifting to the
global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). In
the first wave, nominal personal income increased at 2.4 percent in Jan
2019 while nominal disposable personal income decreased at 1.2 percent. Nominal
personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real disposable
income changed at 0.0 percent and real personal consumption expenditures
increased at 4.9 percent. In the second wave, nominal personal income
increased at 4.3 percent in Feb-Mar 2019 while nominal disposable personal
income increased at 3.0 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures
increased at 6.2 percent. Real disposable income increased at 0.6 percent and
real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. In the third
wave, nominal personal income increased at 1.6 percent in Apr-Jun 2019
while nominal disposable income increased at 0.8 percent. Nominal personal
consumption expenditures increased at 5.3 percent. Real disposable income
decreased at 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased
at 2.8 percent. In the fourth wave, nominal personal income increased at
1.2 percent annual equivalent in Jul 2019 while nominal disposable income
increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption increased at 4.9
percent. Real disposable income increased at 1.2 percent and real personal
consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. In the fifth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.3 percent annual equivalent
in Aug-Sep 2019 while nominal disposable income increased at 5.5 percent.
Nominal personal consumption increased at 3.0 percent. Real disposable income
increased at 4.3 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased
at 2.4 percent. In the sixth wave, nominal personal income increased
at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Oct-Dec 2019 while nominal disposable
income increased at 2.8 percent. Nominal personal consumption increased at 3.2
percent. Real disposable income increased at 0.8 percent and real personal
consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. In the seventh wave,
nominal personal income increased at 11.3 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb
2020 while nominal disposable income increased at 11.3 percent. Nominal
personal consumption increased at 4.3 percent. Real disposable income increased
at 9.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.4
percent. In the eighth wave, in the global recession, with output
in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021),
nominal personal income increased at 80.7 percent annual equivalent in Mar-Apr
2020 while nominal disposable income increased at 109.8 percent. Nominal
personal consumption decreased at 71.0 percent. Real disposable income
increased at 119.1 percent and real personal consumption expenditures decreased
at 69.8 percent. The BEA explains (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/pi0420_0.pdf): “The increase in personal
income in April primarily reflected an increase in government social benefits
to persons as payments were made to individuals from federal economic recovery
programs in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (table 3). For more information,
see “How are
the economic impact payments for
individuals authorized by the CARES Act of 2020 recorded in the NIPAs?” “Other government social
benefits to persons” are $3,122.1 billion in Apr 2020 compared with $528.3
billion in Mar 2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/pi0420_0.pdf). In the ninth wave, in the global recession, with
output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021),
nominal personal income decreased at 25.9 percent annual equivalent in May-Jun
2020 while nominal disposable income decreased at 30.3 percent. Nominal
personal consumption increased at 138.0 percent. Real disposable income
decreased at 33.3 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased
at 130.1 percent. The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/pi0520_0.pdf): “The May estimate for personal income and outlays was
impacted by the response to the spread
of COVID-19. Federal economic
recovery payments continued but were at a lower level than in
April, and government
“stay-at-home” orders were partially lifted in May. The full economic
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
cannot be quantified in the personal income and outlays
estimate for May because the
impacts are generally embedded in source data and cannot be
separately identified. For more
information, see the “highlights” file and the Effects
of Selected
Federal Pandemic Response
Programs on Personal Income table.” The BEA
explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/pi0620.pdf): “The decrease in personal income in June was more
than accounted for by a decrease in government social benefits to persons as
payments made to individuals from federal economic recovery programs in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic continued, but at a lower level than in May
(table 3). For more
information, see “How are the economic impact payments for individuals
authorized by the CARES Act of 2020 recorded in the NIPAs? Partially offsetting the decrease in other government
social benefits were increases in compensation of employees and proprietors’ income as
portions of the economy continued to reopen in June.
Unemployment insurance benefits,
based primarily on unemployment claims data from the Department of Labor’s
Employment and Training Administration, also increased in June. For more
information, see “How will the expansion of
unemployment benefits in response to the COVID-19 pandemic be recorded
in the NIPAs?”.” In the ninth wave, in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a
high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021),
nominal personal income increased at 11.4 percent annual equivalent in Jul 2020
while nominal disposable income increased at 11.4 percent. Nominal personal
consumption increased at 22.4 percent. Real disposable income increased at 7.4
percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 18.2 percent.
The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/pi0720.pdf): “The July estimate for personal income and outlays was
impacted by the response to the spread of COVID-19. Federal economic recovery
payments continued but were at a lower level than in June,
and government “stay-at-home”
orders lifted in some areas of the country. The full economic
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
cannot be quantified in the personal income and outlays
estimate because the impacts are
generally embedded in source data and cannot be separately
identified. For more
information, see Effects of Selected Federal
Pandemic Response Programs on Personal Income.
The increase in personal income in July was
more than accounted for by compensation of employees as portions of the economy
continued to reopen (table 3). Proprietors’ income and rental income of persons
also contributed to the increase. Partially
offsetting these increases were decreases in government social benefits and
income on assets.
Unemployment insurance benefits,
based primarily on unemployment claims data from the Department of Labor’s
Employment and Training Administration, decreased in July. For more
information, see “How will federal government
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic affect unemployment insurance benefits?”.” In the tenth wave, in
the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions),
in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr
2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), nominal personal income decreased at 29.8 percent
annual equivalent in Aug 2020 while nominal disposable income decreased at 34.0
percent. Nominal personal consumption increased at 12.7 percent. Real
disposable income decreased at 36.4 percent and real personal consumption
expenditures increased at 8.7 percent. The BEA
explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/pi0820.pdf): “The decrease in personal income in August was more than
accounted for by a decrease in
unemployment insurance benefits,
based primarily on unemployment claims data from the Department of Labor’s
Employment and Training Administration (table 3). In particular, the Federal
Pandemic Unemployment Compensation program which provided a temporary weekly supplemental
payment of $600 for those receiving unemployment benefits expired on July 31.
For more information, see “How
will federal government
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic affect unemployment insurance
benefits?”. Partially offsetting the decrease in unemployment
insurance benefits was an increase in compensation in August. Government wage
and salary disbursements increased $17.5 billion in August, following an
increase of $14.5 billion in July. Temporary and intermittent Census decennial
workers boosted government wages and salaries by $10.8 billion in August.” In the eleventh wave, in the global
recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and
the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), nominal personal income increased at 8.7 percent annual
equivalent in Sep 2020 while nominal disposable income increased at 8.7
percent. Nominal personal consumption increased at 19.6 percent. Real
disposable income increased at 7.4 percent and real personal consumption
expenditures increased at 16.8 percent. The BEA explains the process (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/pi0920.pdf). In the eleventh wave, in the global
recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and
the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), nominal personal income decreased at 7.0 percent annual
equivalent in Oct-Nov 2020 while nominal disposable income decreased at 9.7 percent.
Nominal personal consumption decreased at 0.6 percent. Real disposable income
decreased at 10.3 percent and real personal consumption expenditures decreased
at 1.2 percent. The BEA explains the process (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/pi1020.pdf and https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/pi1120.pdf). In the twelfth wave, in the global
recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and
the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), nominal personal income increased at 83.7 percent annual
equivalent in Dec 2020-Jan 2021 while nominal disposable income increased at
90.8 percent. Nominal personal consumption increased at 17.9 percent. Real
disposable income increased at 83.2 percent and real personal consumption
expenditures increased at 12.4 percent. The BEA explains the process (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/pi0121.pdf). In the thirteenth wave, in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in
Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event, nominal
personal income decreased at 59.2 percent annual equivalent in Feb 2021 while
nominal disposable income decreased at 64.2 percent. Nominal personal
consumption decreased at 12.4 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 65.6
percent and real personal consumption expenditures decreased at 14.5 percent.
The BEA explains the process (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/pi0221.pdf). In the fourteenth wave, in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in
Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and
the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), nominal personal income increased at 885.0 percent annual
equivalent in Mar 2021 while nominal disposable income increased at 1183.6
percent. Nominal personal consumption increased at 83.7 percent. Real
disposable income increased at 1099.1 percent and real personal consumption
expenditures increased at 71.5 percent. The BEA explains the process (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/pi0321.pdf): “The increase in personal income in March largely
reflected an increase in government social benefits (table 3). Within
government social benefits, “other” social benefits increased. The American
Rescue Plan Act established an additional round of direct economic impact
payments to households.” In the fifteenth wave, in the global
recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and
the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), nominal personal income decreased at 62.4 percent annual
equivalent in Apr-May 2021 while nominal disposable income decreased at 67.6
percent. Nominal personal consumption increased at 6.2 percent. Real disposable
income decreased at 69.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures
changed at 0.0 percent. The BEA explains the process (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/pi0421.pdf): “The decrease in personal
income in April primarily reflected a decrease in government social benefits
(table 3). Within government social benefits, "other" social benefits
decreased as economic impact payments made to individuals from the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021 continued, but at a lower level than in March.
Unemployment insurance also decreased, led by decreases in payments from the
Pandemic Unemployment Compensation program.” The BEA explains further (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/pi0521.pdf): “The decrease in personal income in May primarily reflected
a decrease in government social benefits (table 3). Within government social
benefits, "other" social benefits decreased as economic impact
payments made to individuals from the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
continued, but at a lower level than in April. Unemployment insurance also
decreased, led by decreases in payments from the Pandemic Unemployment
Compensation program.” In the sixteenth wave, in the global
recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and
the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), nominal personal income increased at 3.7 percent annual
equivalent in Jun 2021 while nominal disposable income increased at 1.2
percent. Nominal personal consumption increased at 14.0 percent. Real
disposable income decreased at 4.7 percent and real personal consumption
expenditures increased at 7.4 percent. The BEA explains the process (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/pi0621.pdf): “The estimate for June of personal income
and outlays reflected the continued economic recovery, reopening of
establishments, and continued government response related to the COVID-19
pandemic. Government social benefits associated with pandemic-related
assistance programs declined in June. The full economic effects of the COVID-19
pandemic cannot be quantified in the personal income and outlays estimate
because the impacts are generally embedded in source data and cannot be
separately identified. For more information, see Effects of Selected Federal Pandemic
Response Programs on Personal Income. The increase in personal income in June primarily reflected an
increase in compensation of employees. Government social benefits decreased in
June (table 3). Within compensation, the increase was primarily in private
wages and salaries, reflecting Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment
Statistics. Within government social benefits, "other" social
benefits decreased as economic impact payments declined. Unemployment insurance
also decreased, led by decreases in payments from the Pandemic Unemployment
Compensation program.
The $155.4
billion increase in current dollar PCE in June reflected an increase of $29.3
billion in spending for goods and a $126.1 billion increase in spending for
services (table 3). Within goods, an increase in nondurable goods was partly
offset by a decrease in durable goods. Within nondurable goods, the increase
was primarily accounted for by increases in “other” nondurable goods (mainly
pharmaceuticals) as well as gasoline and other energy goods. Within durable
goods, the decrease was primarily in motor vehicles and parts. Within services,
increases were widespread across all spending categories, led by food services
and accommodations. Detailed information on monthly PCE spending can be found
on Table 2.3.5U.” In the seventeenth
wave, nominal personal income increased at annual equivalent 16.8 percent
in Jul 2021 while nominal disposable income increased at 15.4 percent. Nominal
personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. Real disposable
income increased at 10.0 percent while real personal consumption expenditures
decreased at 3.5 percent. The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-08/pi0721.pdf): “The increase in personal income in July primarily
reflected increases in government social benefits and compensation of employees
(table 3). Within government social benefits, an increase in "other"
social benefits (more than accounted for by advance Child Tax Credit payments
as authorized by the American Rescue Plan) was partly offset by a decrease in
unemployment insurance, reflecting a decrease in payments from the Pandemic
Unemployment Compensation program. Within compensation, the increase was
primarily in private wages and salaries, reflecting Bureau of Labor Statistics
Current Employment Statistics.” In the eighteenth wave, nominal personal income
increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Aug 2021 while nominal disposable
income increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures
increased at 14.0 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 1.2 percent
while real personal consumption expenditures increased at 8.7 percent. The BEA
explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/pi0821.pdf): “The increase in personal income in August primarily
reflected increases in compensation of employees and government social benefits
(table 3). Within compensation, the increase primarily reflected an increase in
private wages and salaries. Within government social benefits, an increase in
"other" social benefits, reflecting advance Child Tax Credit payments
authorized by the American Rescue Plan, was partly offset by a decrease in
unemployment insurance, reflecting decreases in payments from the Pandemic
Unemployment Compensation program.” In the nineteenth wave, nominal
personal income decreased at annual equivalent 10.3 percent in Sep 2021 while
nominal disposable income decreased at 14.5 percent. Nominal personal
consumption expenditures increased at 7.4 percent. Real disposable income
decreased at 17.6 percent while real personal consumption expenditures
increased at 3.7 percent. The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/pi0921.pdf): “The decrease in personal income in September primarily
reflected a decrease in government social benefits, both in unemployment
benefits and “other” benefits (table 3). Unemployment insurance decreased
reflecting decreases in payments from the Pandemic Unemployment Compensation
program, the Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation program, and the
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program. “Other” social benefits decreased
primarily reflecting decreases in the Provider Relief Fund, economic impact
payments, and Paycheck Protection Program loans to nonprofit institutions.” In the twentieth
wave, nominal personal income increased at annual equivalent 9.4 percent in
Oct-Nov 2021 while nominal disposable income increased at 8.1 percent. Nominal
personal consumption expenditures increased at 12.0 percent. Real disposable
income changed at 0.0 percent while real personal consumption expenditures
increased at 3.7 percent. The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/pi1021.pdf): “The increase in personal income in
October primarily reflected increases in compensation of employees and personal
income receipts on assets that were partly offset by a decrease in government social
benefits (table 3). Within compensation, the increase primarily reflected an
increase in private wages and salaries. Within personal income receipts on
assets, both dividend income and interest income increased. Within government
social benefits, unemployment insurance decreased, reflecting decreases in
payments from three pandemic-related unemployment programs: Pandemic
Unemployment Compensation Payments, Pandemic Emergency Unemployment
Compensation, and Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (table 3).” The BEA explains further (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/pi1121.pdf): “The estimate for November personal
income and outlays reflected the continued economic recovery and government
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Government social benefits increased in
November, reflecting an increase in the Provider Relief Fund (extended by the
American Rescue Plan) that was partly offset by declines in many other
pandemic-assistance programs. The full economic effects of the COVID-19
pandemic cannot be quantified in the personal income and outlays estimate
because the impacts are generally embedded in source data and cannot be
separately identified. For more information, see Effects of Selected Federal
Pandemic Response Programs on Personal Income.” In the twenty-first wave, nominal
personal income increased at annual equivalent 6.2 percent in Dec 2021 while
nominal disposable income increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption
expenditures decreased at 10.3 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 2.4
percent while real personal consumption expenditures decreased at 15.6 percent.
The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/pi1221.pdf): “The increase in personal income in
December primarily reflected an increase in compensation that was partly offset
by a decrease in proprietors' income. Within compensation, the increase
reflected increases in both private and government wages and salaries. Within
proprietors' income, both nonfarm and farm income decreased (table 3).
Government social benefits decreased slightly, reflecting the winding down of
pandemic-related assistance programs. The estimate for December personal income
and outlays reflected the continued economic recovery and government response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. In December, COVID-19 cases resulted in continued
restrictions and disruptions in the operations of establishments in some parts
of the country. Government social benefits decreased, primarily reflecting the
winding down of pandemic-related assistance programs. The full economic effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be quantified in the personal income and
outlays estimate because the impacts are generally embedded in source data and
cannot be separately identified. For more information, see Effects of Selected
Federal Pandemic Response Programs on Personal Income.” In the twenty-second
wave, nominal personal income increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent in
Jan 2022 while nominal disposable income increased at 10.3 percent. Nominal
personal consumption expenditures increased at 28.3 percent. Real disposable
income decreased at 15.6 percent while real personal consumption expenditures
increased at 19.6 percent. The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/pi0122.pdf):” The increase in personal income
in January primarily reflected an increase in compensation that was partly
offset by a decrease in government social benefits (table 3). Within
compensation, the increase reflected increases in both private and government
wages and salaries. Within government social benefits, a decrease in
"other" social benefits (reflecting the end of advance Child Tax
Credit payments as authorized by the American Rescue Plan) was partly offset by
an increase in Social Security benefits (reflecting a 5.9 percent
cost-of-living adjustment). The $337.2 billion increase in current-dollar PCE
in January reflected an increase of $285.4 billion in spending for goods and a
$51.8 billion increase in spending for services (table 3). Within goods,
increases were widespread, led by motor vehicles and parts, "other"
nondurable goods, and recreational goods and vehicles. Within services, the
largest contributor to the increase was spending for housing and utilities.
Detailed information on monthly PCE spending can be found on Table 2.3.5U.” In the twenty-third
wave, nominal personal income increased at annual equivalent 6.2 percent in
Feb-Apr 2022 while nominal disposable income increased at 4.9 percent. Nominal
personal consumption expenditures increased at 12.2 percent. Real disposable
income decreased at 2.0 percent while real personal consumption expenditures increased
at 5.3 percent. The BEA provides detailed explanations (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/pi0222.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/pi0322.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf).
The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate
of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to
2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the
economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of
expansion after recessions. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets
is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic
performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent
per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to
2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after
adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of
adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion
periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment
losses that occurred during the contractions. Over
the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with
higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of
GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average
over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for
contractions. US
economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical
expansion in the 51 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2022 and in the global
recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures
that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5
percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of
1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the
first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor
Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall
Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations
using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of
GDP for IQ2022 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/gdp1q22_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent
in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the
rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to
IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in
IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 =
2.9%] or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/06/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-65-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/sharp-revaluation-of-us-dollar-with.html). The expansion from IQ1983
to IQ1986 was at the average annual
growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1
percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent
from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from
IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983
to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to
IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989,
4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5
percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent
from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from
IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983
to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to
IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to
IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to
IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to
IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to
IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to
IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to
IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1995
and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/06/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-65-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/sharp-revaluation-of-us-dollar-with.html). The National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to
IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until
another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent
from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in
IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).
The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles
with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend
in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2022 and in the global recession, with
output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to
52.4 percent. GDP in IQ2022 would be $24,026.0 billion (in constant dollars of
2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4294.9 billion than
actual $19,731.1 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less
than at trend, explaining the 21.9 million unemployed or underemployed
equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.5 percent of the
effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global
recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/05/us-consumer-prices-increase-83-percent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/increase-in-mar-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in
initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession
resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm). US
GDP in IQ2022 is 17.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1
billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,731.1 billion in
IQ2022 or 25.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent.
Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent
below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5
percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000
to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane
(2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to
private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher
rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates
in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the
opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first
four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and
quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical
expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0
percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the
US instead of allegations of secular
stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic
research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example
Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term
trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Apr 1919
to Apr 2022. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of
manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in
Dec 2007 to 163.1686 in Apr 2022. The actual index NSA in Apr 2022 is 102.3449
which is 37.3 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in
Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the
global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing output grew at average 1.4
percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.4 percent per
year, the index would increase to 130.3709 in Apr 2022. The output of
manufacturing at 102.3449 in Apr 2022 is 21.5 percent below trend under this
alternative calculation. Using
the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output
fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or
21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009
to 103.3242 in Apr 2022 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased
at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth
at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from
104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 171.4101 in Apr 2022. The NAICS index at 103.3242 in
Apr 2022 is 39.7 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew
at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7
percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec
2007 to 133.2985 in Apr 2022. The NAICS index at 103.3242 in Apr 2022 is 22.5
percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table IB-1, US,
Percentage Change from Prior Month Seasonally Adjusted of Personal Income,
Disposable Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures %
|
NPI |
NDPI |
RDPI |
NPCE |
RPCE |
Apr 2022 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.0 |
0.9 |
0.7 |
Mar |
0.5 |
0.4 |
-0.5 |
1.4 |
0.5 |
Feb |
0.6 |
0.5 |
0.0 |
0.6 |
0.1 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr |
6.2 |
4.9 |
-2.0 |
12.2 |
5.3 |
Jan |
0.1 |
-0.9 |
-1.4 |
2.1 |
1.5 |
AE ∆% Jan |
1.2 |
-10.3 |
-15.6 |
28.3 |
19.6 |
Dec 2021 |
0.5 |
0.3 |
-0.2 |
-0.9 |
-1.4 |
AE ∆% Dec |
6.2 |
3.7 |
-2.4 |
-10.3 |
-15.6 |
Nov |
0.7 |
0.6 |
0.0 |
0.5 |
-0.1 |
Oct |
0.8 |
0.7 |
0.0 |
1.4 |
0.7 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov |
9.4 |
8.1 |
0.0 |
12.0 |
3.7 |
Sep |
-0.9 |
-1.3 |
-1.6 |
0.6 |
0.3 |
AE ∆% Sep |
-10.3 |
-14.5 |
-17.6 |
7.4 |
3.7 |
Aug |
0.4 |
0.3 |
-0.1 |
1.1 |
0.7 |
AE ∆% Aug |
4.9 |
3.7 |
-1.2 |
14.0 |
8.7 |
Jul |
1.3 |
1.2 |
0.8 |
0.1 |
-0.3 |
AE ∆% Jul |
16.8 |
15.4 |
10.0 |
1.2 |
-3.5 |
Jun |
0.3 |
0.1 |
-0.4 |
1.1 |
0.6 |
AE ∆% Jun |
3.7 |
1.2 |
-4.7 |
14.0 |
7.4 |
May |
-2.0 |
-2.4 |
-3.0 |
0.0 |
-0.5 |
Apr |
-13.3 |
-15.1 |
-15.5 |
1.0 |
0.5 |
AE ∆% Apr-May |
-62.4 |
-67.6 |
-69.7 |
6.2 |
0.0 |
Mar |
21.0 |
23.7 |
23.0 |
5.2 |
4.6 |
AE ∆% Mar |
885.0 |
1183.6 |
1099.1 |
83.7 |
71.5 |
Feb |
-7.2 |
-8.2 |
-8.5 |
-1.1 |
-1.3 |
AE ∆% Feb |
-59.2 |
-64.2 |
-65.6 |
-12.4 |
-14.5 |
Jan |
9.9 |
10.7 |
10.4 |
3.3 |
2.9 |
Dec 2020 |
0.7 |
0.6 |
0.2 |
-0.5 |
-0.9 |
AE ∆% Dec-Jan |
83.7 |
90.8 |
83.2 |
17.9 |
12.4 |
Nov |
-1.0 |
-1.3 |
-1.3 |
-0.5 |
-0.6 |
Oct |
-0.2 |
-0.4 |
-0.5 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov |
-7.0 |
-9.7 |
-10.3 |
-0.6 |
-1.2 |
Sep |
0.7 |
0.7 |
0.6 |
1.5 |
1.3 |
AE ∆% Sep |
8.7 |
8.7 |
7.4 |
19.6 |
16.8 |
Aug |
-2.9 |
-3.4 |
-3.7 |
1.0 |
0.7 |
AE ∆% Aug |
-29.8 |
-34.0 |
-36.4 |
12.7 |
8.7 |
Jul |
0.9 |
0.9 |
0.6 |
1.7 |
1.4 |
AE ∆% Jul |
11.4 |
11.4 |
7.4 |
22.4 |
18.2 |
Jun |
-0.9 |
-1.2 |
-1.7 |
6.4 |
5.9 |
May |
-4.0 |
-4.7 |
-4.9 |
8.6 |
8.5 |
AE ∆% May-Jun |
-25.9 |
-30.3 |
-33.3 |
138.0 |
130.1 |
Apr |
12.5 |
15.1 |
15.7 |
-12.6 |
-12.2 |
Mar |
-1.9 |
-1.7 |
-1.5 |
-6.9 |
-6.7 |
AE ∆% Mar-Apr |
80.7 |
109.8 |
119.1 |
-71.0 |
-69.8 |
Feb |
0.7 |
0.7 |
0.6 |
0.1 |
0.0 |
Jan |
1.1 |
1.1 |
0.9 |
0.6 |
0.4 |
AE ∆% Jan-Feb |
11.3 |
11.3 |
9.4 |
4.3 |
2.4 |
Dec 2019 |
0.0 |
-0.1 |
-0.3 |
0.1 |
-0.1 |
Nov |
0.5 |
0.5 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
Oct |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.1 |
0.3 |
0.1 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec |
3.7 |
2.8 |
0.8 |
3.2 |
1.2 |
Sep |
0.2 |
0.3 |
0.2 |
0.2 |
0.1 |
Aug |
0.5 |
0.6 |
0.5 |
0.3 |
0.3 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep |
4.3 |
5.5 |
4.3 |
3.0 |
2.4 |
Jul |
0.1 |
0.3 |
0.1 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
AE ∆% Jul |
1.2 |
3.7 |
1.2 |
4.9 |
3.7 |
Jun |
0.2 |
0.2 |
0.1 |
0.4 |
0.3 |
May |
0.1 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.3 |
0.2 |
Apr |
0.1 |
0.0 |
-0.4 |
0.6 |
0.2 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun |
1.6 |
0.8 |
-1.2 |
5.3 |
2.8 |
Mar |
0.3 |
0.2 |
-0.1 |
0.9 |
0.6 |
Feb |
0.4 |
0.3 |
0.2 |
0.1 |
0.0 |
AE ∆% Feb-Mar |
4.3 |
3.0 |
0.6 |
6.2 |
3.7 |
Jan |
0.2 |
-0.1 |
0.0 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
AE ∆% Jan |
2.4 |
-1.2 |
0.0 |
4.9 |
4.9 |
Notes:
*Excluding exceptional income gains in Nov and Dec 2012 because of anticipated
tax increases in Jan 2013 ((page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). a Excluding
employee contributions for government social insurance (pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf ) Excluding
NPI: current dollars personal income; NDPI: current dollars disposable personal
income; RDPI: chained (2005) dollars DPI; NPCE: current dollars personal
consumption expenditures; RPCE: chained (2005) dollars PCE; AE: annual
equivalent; IVQ2010: fourth quarter 2010; A: annual equivalent
Percentage
change month to month seasonally adjusted
*∆% Dec
2011/Dec 2010 **∆% Dec 2010/Dec 2009 *** ∆% Dec 2012/Dec 2011
Source: US Bureau of Economic http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table
IB-12 provides year on year growth of real disposable income and real personal
consumption expenditures and segments. Real disposable income decreased 6.2
percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2022 in the global recession, with
output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The BEA explains as
follows (
https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf): “The increase in
personal income in April primarily reflected an increase in compensation and
personal income receipts on assets that were partly offset by a decrease in
proprietors' income (table 3). Within compensation, the increase reflected
increases in both private and government wages and salaries. The increase in
personal income receipts on assets was led by personal dividend income. The
decrease in proprietors' income was led by nonfarm income. The $152.3 billion
increase in current-dollar PCE in April reflected an increase of $48.6 billion
in spending for goods and a $103.7 billion increase in spending for services
(table 3). Within goods, increases were widespread across all components except
for gasoline and other energy goods; spending for motor vehicles and parts was
the leading contributor to the increase. Within services, increases were also
widespread across all components, led by food services and accommodations as
well as housing and utilities. Detailed information on monthly PCE spending can
be found on Table 2.3.5U. Personal outlays increased $155.3 billion in April
(table 3). Personal saving was $815.3 billion in April and the personal saving
rate—personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income—was 4.4
percent (table 1). The PCE price index for April increased 6.3 percent from one
year ago, reflecting increases in both goods and services (table 11). Energy
prices increased 30.4 percent while food prices increased 10.0 percent.
Excluding food and energy, the PCE price index for April increased 4.9 percent
from one year ago.”
RPCE growth decelerated sharply to minus 2.2 percent in Feb 2021, increasing 2.8
percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2022. Subdued growth of RPCE could
affect revenues of business. Growth rates of personal consumption have weakened
in oscillations. Goods and especially durable goods have been driving growth of
PCE as shown by the much higher 12-month rates of growth of real goods PCE
(RPCEG) and real durable goods PCE (RPCEGD) than services real PCE (RPCES).
Growth of consumption of goods and, in particular, of consumer durable goods
drives the faster expansion of the economy while growth of consumption of
services is much more moderate. In Apr 2022, RPCEG decreased 2.9 percent in 12
months and RPCEGD decreased 6.5 percent while RPCES increased 5.9 percent.
Government transfers through the stimulus program to compensate for the
lockdown of economic activity caused sharp increases in Mar 2021. There are
limits to sustained growth based on financial repression in an environment of
weak labor markets and real labor remuneration.
Table IB-2,
Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
Percentage
Change from the Same Month a Year Earlier %
|
RDPI |
RPCE |
RPCEG |
RPCEGD |
RPCES |
2022 |
|
|
|
|
|
Apr |
-6.2 |
2.8 |
-2.9 |
-6.5 |
5.9 |
Mar |
-20.8 |
2.6 |
-4.2 |
-9.1 |
6.4 |
Feb |
-2.1 |
6.8 |
5.1 |
3.8 |
7.7 |
Jan |
-10.4 |
5.3 |
2.7 |
0.2 |
6.6 |
2021 |
|
|
|
|
|
Dec |
0.3 |
6.7 |
6.3 |
4.3 |
7.0 |
Nov |
0.7 |
7.2 |
8.4 |
8.3 |
6.7 |
Oct |
-0.6 |
6.7 |
7.4 |
7.4 |
6.4 |
Sep |
-1.1 |
6.4 |
6.1 |
5.4 |
6.5 |
Aug |
1.1 |
7.5 |
8.1 |
6.5 |
7.2 |
Jul |
-2.6 |
7.5 |
6.7 |
7.0 |
7.9 |
Jun |
-2.8 |
9.3 |
11.2 |
14.4 |
8.4 |
May |
-4.1 |
15.1 |
17.1 |
25.9 |
14.0 |
Apr |
-6.0 |
25.4 |
37.3 |
70.5 |
19.7 |
Mar |
28.8 |
9.6 |
21.1 |
53.2 |
4.1 |
Feb |
3.2 |
-2.2 |
9.1 |
16.9 |
-7.2 |
Jan |
13.4 |
-0.8 |
12.8 |
21.7 |
-6.8 |
2020 |
|
|
|
|
|
Dec |
3.7 |
-3.3 |
5.5 |
10.2 |
-7.2 |
Nov |
3.2 |
-2.4 |
7.9 |
13.4 |
-7.1 |
Oct |
5.0 |
-1.6 |
9.6 |
16.8 |
-6.6 |
Sep |
5.6 |
-1.9 |
9.5 |
14.7 |
-7.0 |
Aug |
5.3 |
-3.1 |
7.3 |
14.4 |
-7.7 |
Jul |
9.8 |
-3.5 |
8.0 |
14.5 |
-8.5 |
Jun |
9.3 |
-4.6 |
6.7 |
12.6 |
-9.5 |
May |
11.3 |
-9.6 |
1.3 |
4.0 |
-14.4 |
Apr |
17.0 |
-16.4 |
-10.8 |
-17.7 |
-18.9 |
Mar |
0.8 |
-4.7 |
2.0 |
-7.8 |
-7.6 |
Feb |
2.2 |
2.8 |
4.2 |
7.7 |
2.1 |
Jan |
1.8 |
2.8 |
4.1 |
8.2 |
2.2 |
2019 |
|
|
|
|
|
Dec |
0.8 |
2.8 |
5.2 |
8.6 |
1.8 |
Nov |
2.3 |
1.9 |
2.5 |
4.3 |
1.7 |
Oct |
2.0 |
2.0 |
3.4 |
4.5 |
1.4 |
Sep |
2.1 |
2.4 |
3.9 |
5.6 |
1.7 |
Aug |
1.8 |
2.2 |
3.8 |
4.3 |
1.5 |
Jul |
1.6 |
2.2 |
3.7 |
4.4 |
1.5 |
Jun |
1.9 |
2.2 |
3.8 |
3.8 |
1.5 |
May |
2.1 |
2.1 |
2.8 |
3.6 |
1.8 |
Apr |
2.4 |
2.1 |
3.3 |
3.6 |
1.6 |
Mar |
3.0 |
2.3 |
3.3 |
4.1 |
1.8 |
Feb |
3.5 |
2.0 |
2.0 |
1.6 |
2.0 |
Jan |
3.5 |
2.1 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
1.8 |
Notes: RDPI:
real disposable personal income; RPCE: real personal consumption expenditures
(PCE); RPCEG: real PCE goods; RPCEGD: RPCEG durable goods; RPCES: RPCE services
Numbers are
percentage changes from the same month a year earlier
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IB-1 shows US real personal
consumption expenditures (RPCE) from 2002 to 2022. There is an evident drop in
RPCE during the global recession in 2007 to 2009 but the slope is flatter
during the current recovery than in the period before 2007 with recent
recovery. The final data points in IIQ2020 shows sharp drop in the global recession, with
output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) with sharp recovery in
IIIQ2020 and milder recovery in IVQ2020. Recovery gained strength in
IQ2021-IIQ2021, slowing in IIIQ2021 and IVQ2021. There is further slowing in
IQ2022.
Chart IB-1, US,
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual
Rates 2002-2022
Source: US
Bureau of Economic Analysis
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Percent changes from the prior
period in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent quarterly rates (SAAR) of real
personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) are in Chart IB-2 from 1995 to 2021.
The average rate could be visualized as a horizontal line. Although there are
not yet sufficient observations, it appears from Chart IB-2 that the average
rate of growth of RPCE was higher before the recession than during the fifty
quarters of expansion that began in IIIQ2009. The data point in IIQ2020 shows
sharp contraction in
the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) followed by sharp recovery
in IIIQ2020, milder recovery in IVQ2020 and stronger recovery in
IQ2021-IIQ2021, slowing in IIIQ2021, IVQ2021 and IQ2022.
Chart IB-2,
Percent Change from Prior Period in Real Personal Consumption Expenditures,
Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2022
Source: US
Bureau of Economic Analysis
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Personal income and its disposition are in Table IB-3. The latest
estimates and revisions have changed movements. (1) Increase in Apr 2022 of
personal income by $89.4 billion or 0.4 percent and increase of disposable
income of $48.3 billion or 0.3 percent with increase of wages and salaries of
0.6 percent in
the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The BEA explains as
follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf): “The increase in
personal income in April primarily reflected an increase in compensation and
personal income receipts on assets that were partly offset by a decrease in
proprietors' income (table 3). Within compensation, the increase reflected
increases in both private and government wages and salaries. The increase in
personal income receipts on assets was led by personal dividend income. The
decrease in proprietors' income was led by nonfarm income. The $152.3 billion
increase in current-dollar PCE in April reflected an increase of $48.6 billion
in spending for goods and a $103.7 billion increase in spending for services
(table 3). Within goods, increases were widespread across all components except
for gasoline and other energy goods; spending for motor vehicles and parts was
the leading contributor to the increase. Within services, increases were also
widespread across all components, led by food services and accommodations as
well as housing and utilities. Detailed information on monthly PCE spending can
be found on Table 2.3.5U. Personal outlays increased $155.3 billion in April
(table 3). Personal saving was $815.3 billion in April and the personal saving
rate—personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income—was 4.4
percent (table 1).” (2) Increase of personal income of $1557.9 billion or 8.0
percent from Dec 2020 to Dec 2021 and increase of disposable income of $1057.3
billion or 6.1 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 11.2 percent. (3)
Increase of personal
income of $887.1 billion from Dec 2019 to Dec 2020 or 4.8 percent and increase
of disposable income of $827.9 billion or 5.0 percent with increase of wages
and salaries of 3.9 percent. (4)
Increase of personal income of $538.0 billion from Dec 2018 to Dec 2019 or 3.0
percent and increase of disposable income of $402.1 billion or 2.5 percent with
increase of wages and salaries of 4.7 percent.
Table IB-3, US,
Personal Income and its Disposition, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates USD
Billions
|
Personal |
Wages & |
Personal |
DPI |
Savings |
Apr 2022 |
21,469.8 |
11,243.5 |
3,089.0 |
18,380.7 |
4.4 |
Mar 2022 |
21,380.4 |
11,176.7 |
3,048.0 |
18,332.4 |
5.0 |
Change Apr
2022/ Mar 2022 |
89.4 ∆% 0.4 |
66.8 ∆% 0.6 |
41.0 ∆% 0.1 |
48.3 ∆% 0.3 |
|
Dec 2021 |
21,120.1 |
10,982.5 |
2,790.6 |
18,329.5 |
8.7 |
Change Dec
2021/ Dec 2020 |
1557.9 ∆% 8.0 |
1109.9 ∆% 11.2 |
500.6 ∆% 21.9 |
1057.3 ∆% 6.1 |
|
Dec 2020 |
19,562.2 |
9,872.6 |
2,290.0 |
17,272.2 |
14.0 |
Change Dec
2020/Dec 2019 |
1557.9 ∆% 4.8 |
368.8 ∆% 3.9 |
59.2 ∆% 2.7 |
827.9 ∆% 5.0 |
|
Dec 2019 |
18,675.1 |
9,503.8 |
2,230.8 |
16,444.3 |
7.3 |
Change Dec
2019/Dec 2018 |
538.0 ∆% 3.0 |
426.8 ∆% 4.7 |
135.9 ∆% 6.5 |
402.1 ∆% 2.5 |
|
Dec 2018 |
18,137.1 |
9,077.0 |
2,094.9 |
16,042.2 |
9.0 |
Source: US
Bureau of Economic Analysis
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table IB-4 provides growth rates
of real disposable income and real disposable income per capita in the
long-term and selected periods. Real disposable income consists of after-tax
income adjusted for inflation. Real disposable income per capita is income per
person after taxes and inflation. There is remarkable long-term trend of growth
of real disposable income of 3.2 percent per year on average from 1929 to 2019
and 2.0 percent in real disposable income per capita. Real disposable income
increased at the average yearly rate of 3.7 percent from 1947 to 1999 and real
disposable income per capita at 2.3 percent. These rates of increase broadly
accompany rates of growth of GDP. Institutional arrangements in the United
States provided the environment for growth of output and income after taxes,
inflation and population growth. There is significant break of growth by much
lower 2.5 percent for real disposable income on average from 1999 to 2019 and
1.6 percent in real disposable per capita income. Real disposable income grew
at 3.5 percent from 1980 to 1989 and real disposable per capita income at 2.6
percent. In contrast, real disposable income grew at only 2.1 percent on
average from 2006 to 2019 and real disposable income per capita at 1.3 percent.
Real disposable income grew at 2.1 percent from 2007 to 2019 and real
disposable income per capita at 1.3 percent. The United States has interrupted
its long-term and cyclical dynamism of output, income and employment growth.
Recovery of this dynamism could prove to be a major challenge. Cyclical uncommonly slow growth
explains weakness in the global recession whole cycle instead of the allegation
of secular stagnation. Real disposable income increased 6.2 percent
from 2019 to 2020 and 2.2 percent from 2020 to 2021 while real disposable
income per capita increased 5.8 percent from 2019 to 2020 and 2.1 percent from
2020 to 2021 in
the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).
Table IB-4,
Average Annual Growth Rates of Real Disposable Income (RDPI) and Real
Disposable Income per Capita (RDPIPC), Percent per Year
RDPI Average
∆% |
|
1929-2019 |
3.2 |
1929-2021 |
3.2 |
1947-1999 |
3.7 |
1999-2019 |
2.5 |
1999-2021 |
2.6 |
1999-2006 |
3.1 |
1980-1989 |
3.5 |
2006-2019 |
2.1 |
2006-2021 |
2.4 |
2007-2019 |
2.1 |
2007-2021 |
2.4 |
2019-2020* |
6.2 |
2020-2021 |
2.2 |
RDPIPC
Average ∆% |
|
1929-2019 |
2.0 |
1929-2021 |
2.1 |
1947-1999 |
2.3 |
1999-2019 |
1.6 |
1999-2021 |
1.8 |
1999-2006 |
2.1 |
1980-1989 |
2.6 |
2006-2019 |
1.3 |
2006-2021 |
1.7 |
2007-2019 |
1.3 |
2007-2021 |
1.7 |
2019-2020* |
5.8 |
2020-2021* |
2.1 |
Note: *Absolute
percentage change
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
IA2 Financial Repression. McKinnon (1973)
and Shaw (1974) argue that legal restrictions on financial institutions can be
detrimental to economic development. “Financial repression” is the term used in
the economic literature for these restrictions (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization
and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 81-6; for historical analysis see the
landmark exhaustive research by Summerhill (2015) and earlier research by
Pelaez (1975)). Theory and evidence support the role of financial institutions
in efficiency and growth (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 22-6,
Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks
and Finance (2009b), 37-44). Excessive official regulation frustrates
financial development required for growth (Haber 2011). Emphasis on disclosure
can reduce bank fragility and corruption, empowering investors to enforce sound
governance (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2006). Banking was important in
facilitating economic growth in historical periods (Cameron 1961, 1967, 1972;
Cameron et al. 1992). Banking is also important currently because small- and
medium-size business may have no other form of financing than banks in contrast
with many options for larger and more mature companies that have access to
capital markets. Calomiris and Haber (2014) find that broad voting rights and
institutions restricting coalitions of bankers and populists ensure stable
banking systems and access to credit. Summerhill (2015) contributes
momentous solid facts and analysis with an ideal method combining economic theory,
econometrics, international comparisons, data reconstruction and exhaustive
archival research. Summerhill (2015) finds that Brazil committed to service of
sovereign foreign and internal debt. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Brazil
generated primary fiscal surpluses during most of the Empire until 1889
(Summerhill 2015, 37-8, Figure 2.1). Econometric tests by Summerhill (2015,
19-44) show that Brazil’s sovereign debt was sustainable. Sovereign credibility
in the North-Weingast (1989) sense spread to financial development that
provided the capital for modernization in England and parts of Europe (see
Cameron 1961, 1967). Summerhill (2015, 3,194-6, Figure 7.1) finds that
“Brazil’s annual cost of capital in London fell from a peak of 13.9 percent in
1829 to only 5.12 percent in 1889. Average rates on secured loans in the
private sector in Rio, however, remained well above 12 percent through 1850.”
Financial development would have financed diversification of economic
activities, increasing productivity and wages and ensuring economic growth.
Brazil restricted creation of limited liability enterprises (Summerhill 2015,
151-82) that prevented raising capital with issue of stocks and corporate
bonds. Cameron (1961) analyzed how the industrial revolution in England spread
to France and then to the rest of Europe. The Société Générale de Crédit Mobilier of Émile and Isaac Péreire
provided the “mobilization of credit” for the new economic activities (Cameron
1961). Summerhill (2015, 151-9) provides facts and analysis demonstrating that
regulation prevented the creation of a similar vehicle for financing
modernization by Irineu Evangelista de
Souza, the legendary Visconde de Mauá.
Regulation also prevented the use of negotiable bearing notes of the Caisse Générale of Jacques Lafitte
(Cameron 1961, 118-9). The government also restricted establishment and
independent operation of banks (Summerhill 2015, 183-214). Summerhill (2015,
198-9) measures concentration in banking that provided economic rents or a
social loss. The facts and analysis of Summerhill (2015) provide convincing
evidence in support of the economic theory of regulation, which postulates that
regulated entities capture the process of regulation to promote their
self-interest. There appears to be a case that excessively centralized
government can result in regulation favoring private instead of public
interests with adverse effects on economic activity. The contribution of
Summerhill (2015) explains why Brazil did not benefit from trade as an engine
of growth—as did regions of recent
settlement in the vision of nineteenth-century trade and development of
Ragnar Nurkse (1959)—partly because of restrictions on financing and
incorporation. Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly
used. Professor Rondo E. Cameron, in his memorable A Concise Economic History of the World
(Cameron 1989, 307-8), finds that “from a broad spectrum of possible forms of
interaction between the financial sector and other sectors of the economy that
requires its services, one can isolate three type-cases: (1) that in which the
financial sector plays a positive, growth-inducing role; (2) that in which the
financial sector is essentially neutral or merely permissive; and (3) that in
which inadequate finance restricts or hinders industrial and commercial
development.” Summerhill (1985) proves exhaustively that Brazil failed to
modernize earlier because of the restrictions of an inadequate institutional
financial arrangement plagued by regulatory capture for self-interest. The Banking Act
of 1933 imposed prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and
ceilings on interest rates on time deposits. These measures were justified by
arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates
on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970,
18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b),
74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings
and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks
that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward
residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive
during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when
Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time
deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the
relevance of Regulation Q.
Most regulatory
actions trigger compensatory measures by the private sector that result in
outcomes that are different from those intended by regulation (Kydland and
Prescott 1977). Banks offered services to their customers and loans at rates
lower than market rates to compensate for the prohibition to pay interest on
demand deposits (Friedman 1970, 24). The prohibition of interest on demand
deposits was eventually lifted in recent times. In the second half of the
1960s, already in the beginning of the Great Inflation (DeLong 1997), market
rates rose above the ceilings of Regulation Q because of higher inflation.
Nobody desires savings allocated to time or savings deposits that pay less than
expected inflation. This is a fact currently with still low nominal interest
rates, 0.75 to 1.0 percent, and consumer price inflation of 8.3 percent in the
12 months ending in Apr 2022 (https://www.bls.gov/cpi/) but rising
during waves of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures
exposures (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/inflation-accelerating-worldwide.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html). Funding
problems motivated compensatory measures by banks. Money-center banks developed
the large certificate of deposit (CD) to accommodate increasing volumes of loan
demand by customers. As Friedman (1970, 25) finds:
“Large
negotiable CD’s were particularly hard hit by the interest rate ceiling because
they are deposits of financially sophisticated individuals and institutions who
have many alternatives. As already noted, they declined from a peak of $24
billion in mid-December, 1968, to less than $12 billion in early October,
1969.”
Banks created
different liabilities to compensate for the decline in CDs. As Friedman (1970,
25; 1969) explains:
“The most
important single replacement was almost surely ‘liabilities of US banks to
foreign branches.’ Prevented from paying a market interest rate on liabilities
of home offices in the United States (except to foreign official institutions
that are exempt from Regulation Q), the major US banks discovered that they
could do so by using the Euro-dollar market. Their European branches could
accept time deposits, either on book account or as negotiable CD’s at whatever
rate was required to attract them and match them on the asset side of their
balance sheet with ‘due from head office.’ The head office could substitute the
liability ‘due to foreign branches’ for the liability ‘due on CDs.”
Friedman (1970,
26-7) predicted the future:
“The banks have
been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system
has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been
artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”
In short,
Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore
centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the
argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with
lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on
their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer
markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:
“These are the
people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and
are least sophisticated about the alternatives.”
Chart IB-14 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides
quarterly savings as percent of disposable income or the US savings rate from
1980 to 2022. There was a long-term downward sloping trend from 12 percent in
the early 1980s to 2.2 percent in Jul 2005. The savings rate then rose during
the contraction and in the expansion. In 2011 and into 2012 the savings rate
declined as consumption is financed with savings in part because of the
disincentive or frustration of receiving a few pennies for every $10,000 of
deposits in a bank. The savings rate increased in the final segment of Chart
IB-14 in 2012 because of the “fiscal cliff” episode followed by another decline
because of the pain of the opportunity cost of zero remuneration for
hard-earned savings. There are multiple recent oscillations during expectations
of increase or “liftoff” of the fed funds rate in the United States followed by
“shallow” or uncertain monetary policy with increase in policy interest rates
and reduction of the balance sheet of the Fed. The savings rate increased in
the final segment with the annual revisions of 2019 and 2020. The savings rate
jumped followed by decline in the lockdown of economic activity of the COVID-19
event. The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf): “The
increase in personal income in April primarily reflected an increase in
compensation and personal income receipts on assets that were partly offset by
a decrease in proprietors' income (table 3). Within compensation, the increase
reflected increases in both private and government wages and salaries. The
increase in personal income receipts on assets was led by personal dividend
income. The decrease in proprietors' income was led by nonfarm income. The
$152.3 billion increase in current-dollar PCE in April reflected an increase of
$48.6 billion in spending for goods and a $103.7 billion increase in spending
for services (table 3). Within goods, increases were widespread across all
components except for gasoline and other energy goods; spending for motor
vehicles and parts was the leading contributor to the increase. Within
services, increases were also widespread across all components, led by food
services and accommodations as well as housing and utilities. Detailed
information on monthly PCE spending can be found on Table 2.3.5U. Personal
outlays increased $155.3 billion in April (table 3). Personal saving was $815.3
billion in April and the personal saving rate—personal saving as a percentage
of disposable personal income—was 4.4 percent (table 1).”
There is further explanation (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/pi1120.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-01/pi1220.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/pi0121.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/pi0221.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/pi0321.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/pi0321.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/pi0421.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/pi0521.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/pi0621.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-08/pi0721.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/pi0821.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/pi0921.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/pi1021.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/pi1121.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/pi1221.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/pi0122.pdf
https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/pi0222.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/pi0322.pdf
https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf)
Chart IB-14,
US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Quarterly,
1980-2022
Source: US
Bureau of Economic Analysis
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IB-14A provides the US
personal savings rate, or personal savings as percent of disposable personal
income, on an annual basis from 1929 to 2021. The US savings rate shows decline
from around 10 percent in the 1960s to around 8 percent currently. There is
sharp increase in the
global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event.
Chart IB-14A,
US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Annual,
1929-2021
Source: US
Bureau of Economic Analysis
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table IB-7 provides personal
savings as percent of disposable income and annual change of real disposable
personal income in selected years since 1930. Savings fell from 4.5 percent of
disposable personal income in 1930 to minus 0.7 percent in 1933 while real
disposable income contracted 6.3 percent in 1930 and 2.9 percent in 1933.
Savings as percent of disposable personal income swelled during World War II to
27.9 percent in 1944 with increase of real disposable income of 3.1 percent.
Savings as percent of personal disposable income fell steadily over decades
from 12.0 percent in 1982 to 2.9 percent in 2005. Savings as percent of
disposable personal income was 6.1 percent in 2013 while real disposable income
fell 1.2 percent. The savings rate was 7.1 percent of GDP in 2014 with growth
of real disposable income of 3.8 percent. The savings rate was 7.5 percent in
2015 with growth of real disposable income at 4.0 percent. The savings rate
stood at 7.0 percent in 2016 with growth of real disposable income at 1.8
percent. The savings rate reached 7.3 percent in 2017 with growth of real
disposable income at 2.8 percent. The savings rate stood at 7.6 percent in 2018
with growth of real disposable income at 3.4 percent. The savings rate stood at
7.6 percent in 2019 with growth of real disposable income at 2.3 percent. The
savings rate jumped to 16.6 percent in 2020 with growth of real disposable
income of 6.2 percent in
the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event. The savings rate decreased to 12.3
percent in 2021 with growth of real disposable income of 2.2 percent.
Table IB-7, US,
Personal Savings as Percent of Disposable Personal Income, Annual, Selected
Years 1929-2021
Personal
Savings as Percent of Disposable Personal Income |
Annual Change
of Real Disposable Personal Income |
|
1930 |
4.5 |
-6.3 |
1933 |
-0.7 |
-2.9 |
1944 |
27.9 |
3.1 |
1947 |
6.3 |
-4.1 |
1954 |
10.3 |
1.4 |
1958 |
11.4 |
1.0 |
1960 |
10.1 |
2.6 |
1970 |
12.8 |
4.6 |
1975 |
13.4 |
2.5 |
1982 |
12.0 |
2.2 |
1989 |
8.4 |
2.9 |
1993 |
7.9 |
1.7 |
2002 |
5.7 |
3.0 |
2003 |
5.4 |
2.6 |
2004 |
5.0 |
3.3 |
2005 |
2.9 |
1.5 |
2006 |
3.6 |
3.8 |
2007 |
3.3 |
2.4 |
2008 |
4.6 |
1.2 |
2009 |
5.9 |
-0.1 |
2010 |
6.2 |
2.1 |
2011 |
6.8 |
2.1 |
2012 |
8.6 |
3.3 |
2013 |
6.1 |
-1.2 |
2014 |
7.1 |
3.8 |
2015 |
7.5 |
4.0 |
2016 |
7.0 |
1.8 |
2017 |
7.3 |
2.8 |
2018 |
7.6 |
3.4 |
2019 |
7.6 |
2.3 |
2020 |
16.6 |
6.2 |
2021 |
12.3 |
2.2 |
Average
Savings Ratio |
||
1980-1989 |
9.9 |
|
2007-2019 |
6.6 |
|
Average
Yearly ∆% Real Disposable Income |
||
1980-1989 |
3.1 |
|
2007-2019 |
2.1 |
Source: US
Bureau of Economic Analysis
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IB-15 of the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis provides personal savings as percent of personal disposable income, or
savings ratio, from Jan 2007 to Mar 2022. The savings rate jumped to 13.1
percent in Mar 2020 and 33.8 percent in Apr 2020, decreasing to 24.8 percent in
May 2020, 19.3 percent in Jun 2020, 18.7 percent in Jul 2020, 15.0 percent in
Aug 2020, 14.3 percent in Sep 2020, 13.6 percent in Oct 2020, 13.0 percent in
Nov 2020, 14.0 in Dec 2020, 19.9 in Jan 2021, 13.5 percent in Feb 2021, 26.6
percent in Mar 2021, 12.6 percent in Apr 2021, 10.4 percent in May 2021, 9.5
percent in Jun 2021, 10.5 percent in Jul 2021, 9.8 percent in Aug 2021, 8.1 in
Sep 2021, 7.5 percent in Oct 2021, 7.6 percent in Nov 2021, 8.7 percent in Dec
2021, 6.0 percent in Jan 2022, 5.9 percent in Feb 2022, 5.0 percent in Mar 2022
and 4.4 percent in Apr 2022 during government social transfers in the global recession, with
output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), in the lockdown of
economic activity in the COVID-19 event. The BEA
explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf): “The
increase in personal income in April primarily reflected an increase in
compensation and personal income receipts on assets that were partly offset by
a decrease in proprietors' income (table 3). Within compensation, the increase
reflected increases in both private and government wages and salaries. The
increase in personal income receipts on assets was led by personal dividend
income. The decrease in proprietors' income was led by nonfarm income.” There is
further explanation (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/pi1120.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-01/pi1220.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/pi0121.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/pi0221.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/pi0321.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/pi0421.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/pi0521.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/pi0621.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-08/pi0721.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/pi0821.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/pi0921.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/pi1021.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/pi1121.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/pi1221.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/pi0122.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/pi0222.pdf https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/pi0422.pdf )
Chart IB-15, US, Personal
Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Income, Monthly 2007-2021
Source: US Bureau of
Economic Analysis
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Percentage changes of prices of
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) in a month relative to the same month a
year earlier at in Table IV-6. Prices of PCE increased from 1.5 percent
relative to a year earlier in Jan 2019 to 1.9 percent in Jan 2020, increasing
to 6.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2022. The price indicator of
monetary policy is the 12-month change of prices of personal consumption
excluding food and energy (PCE). The goal of monetary policy was to maintain
the 12-month change of PCEX at or below 2.0 percent. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market
Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including
the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term
inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price
stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's
ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic
disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this
level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over
time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been
running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim
to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The Federal
Open Market Committee provided new guidance in its statement of Mar 16, 2022 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20220316a.htm): “The Committee seeks to achieve
maximum employment and inflation at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run.
With appropriate firming in the stance of monetary policy, the Committee
expects inflation to return to its 2 percent objective and the labor market to
remain strong. In support of these goals, the Committee decided to raise the
target range for the federal funds rate to 1/4 to 1/2 percent and anticipates
that ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate. In addition,
the Committee expects to begin reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and
agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities at a coming meeting.” The new
policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates
and country risk issues. The change of PCEX in 12 months increased from 1.9
percent in Feb 2020 to 4.9 percent in Apr 2022, higher than the policy target
of 2.0 percent.
Table IV-6, US,
Percentage Change in 12 Months of Prices of Personal Consumption
Expenditures ∆%
|
PCE |
PCEG |
PCEG |
PCES |
PCEX |
PCEF |
PCEE |
2022 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Apr |
6.3 |
9.5 |
8.4 |
4.6 |
4.9 |
10.0 |
30.4 |
Mar |
6.6 |
10.6 |
10.2 |
4.5 |
5.2 |
9.2 |
33.9 |
Feb |
6.3 |
9.5 |
11.0 |
4.6 |
5.3 |
8.0 |
25.7 |
Jan |
6.0 |
8.8 |
11.5 |
4.5 |
5.1 |
6.6 |
26.0 |
2021 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dec |
5.8 |
8.6 |
10.6 |
4.3 |
4.9 |
5.7 |
29.0 |
Nov |
5.6 |
8.3 |
9.8 |
4.3 |
4.7 |
5.5 |
31.4 |
Oct |
5.1 |
7.5 |
9.0 |
3.8 |
4.2 |
4.7 |
29.0 |
Sep |
4.4 |
6.1 |
7.4 |
3.5 |
3.7 |
4.1 |
24.9 |
Aug |
4.2 |
5.5 |
6.9 |
3.6 |
3.6 |
2.8 |
24.8 |
Jul |
4.2 |
5.3 |
6.9 |
3.5 |
3.6 |
2.4 |
23.6 |
Jun |
4.0 |
5.3 |
7.3 |
3.4 |
3.6 |
0.9 |
24.2 |
May |
4.0 |
5.4 |
7.0 |
3.2 |
3.5 |
0.7 |
27.3 |
Apr |
3.6 |
4.5 |
5.4 |
3.1 |
3.1 |
1.1 |
24.3 |
Mar |
2.5 |
2.5 |
2.4 |
2.4 |
2.0 |
3.0 |
13.3 |
Feb |
1.6 |
0.9 |
1.4 |
2.0 |
1.5 |
3.3 |
1.9 |
Jan |
1.4 |
0.3 |
1.4 |
1.9 |
1.5 |
3.5 |
-4.5 |
2020 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dec |
1.3 |
-0.2 |
1.4 |
2.0 |
1.5 |
3.9 |
-7.7 |
Nov |
1.1 |
-0.6 |
0.6 |
1.9 |
1.4 |
3.7 |
-10.0 |
Oct |
1.2 |
-0.6 |
0.4 |
2.0 |
1.4 |
3.9 |
-9.6 |
Sep |
1.4 |
-0.2 |
0.4 |
2.1 |
1.6 |
3.9 |
-7.9 |
Aug |
1.3 |
-0.1 |
0.4 |
2.0 |
1.5 |
4.3 |
-9.1 |
Jul |
1.0 |
-0.8 |
-0.7 |
1.9 |
1.3 |
4.3 |
-11.1 |
Jun |
0.9 |
-1.2 |
-1.9 |
1.9 |
1.1 |
5.1 |
-12.6 |
May |
0.5 |
-2.3 |
-2.3 |
1.9 |
1.0 |
4.6 |
-18.3 |
Apr |
0.4 |
-2.4 |
-2.8 |
1.7 |
0.9 |
4.0 |
-17.5 |
Mar |
1.3 |
-1.0 |
-1.7 |
2.4 |
1.7 |
1.2 |
-6.1 |
Feb |
1.9 |
0.3 |
-1.5 |
2.6 |
1.9 |
0.9 |
3.0 |
Jan |
1.9 |
0.5 |
-2.0 |
2.5 |
1.8 |
0.9 |
6.8 |
2019 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dec |
1.7 |
0.3 |
-2.0 |
2.3 |
1.6 |
0.8 |
3.7 |
Nov |
1.4 |
-0.3 |
-1.5 |
2.2 |
1.6 |
1.0 |
-0.8 |
Oct |
1.4 |
-0.7 |
-1.1 |
2.4 |
1.7 |
1.1 |
-4.3 |
Sep |
1.4 |
-0.7 |
-1.0 |
2.3 |
1.7 |
0.8 |
-4.7 |
Aug |
1.5 |
-0.5 |
-1.2 |
2.4 |
1.9 |
0.8 |
-4.4 |
Jul |
1.5 |
-0.5 |
-1.3 |
2.4 |
1.7 |
0.9 |
-2.0 |
Jun |
1.5 |
-0.6 |
-0.5 |
2.4 |
1.7 |
1.0 |
-3.4 |
May |
1.5 |
-0.4 |
-1.2 |
2.4 |
1.6 |
1.2 |
-0.4 |
Apr |
1.6 |
-0.3 |
-1.5 |
2.5 |
1.7 |
0.8 |
1.6 |
Mar |
1.5 |
-0.3 |
-1.3 |
2.3 |
1.6 |
1.4 |
-0.4 |
Feb |
1.4 |
-0.8 |
-1.0 |
2.4 |
1.7 |
1.4 |
-5.2 |
Jan |
1.5 |
-0.8 |
-1.1 |
2.5 |
1.8 |
0.8 |
-5.1 |
Notes:
percentage changes in price index relative to the same month a year earlier of
PCE: personal consumption expenditures; PCEG: PCE goods; PCEG-D: PCE durable
goods; PCES: PCE services; PCEX: PCE excluding food and energy; PCEF: PCE food;
PCEE: PCE energy goods and services
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IV-1AP provides the monthly
price indexes of PCE and PCE core, excluding food and energy, from 2019 to 2022.
There is recent sharp upward trend.
Chart IV-1AP, Indexes of Prices of Personal Consumption, PCE, and PCE
Core, Excluding Food and Energy, 2019-2022
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IV-2AP1 provides the
indexes of PCE and PCE core, excluding food and energy, monthly from 1959 to
2022. There is similar sharp upward trend in both indexes.
Chart IV-2AP1, Indexes of Prices of Personal Consumption, PCE, and PCE
Core, Excluding Food and Energy, 1959-2022
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IV-2AP2 provides the
monthly price indexes from 1965 to 1982, a period commonly referred as The
Great Inflation. Both the US and Japan experienced high rates of
inflation during the US Great Inflation of the 1970s (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see
Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, http://www.johnbtaylor.com/ http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html
and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
It is difficult to justify unconventional monetary policy because of risks of
deflation similar to that experienced in Japan. Fear of deflation as had
occurred during the Great Depression and in Japan was used as an argument for
the first round of unconventional monetary policy with 1 percent interest rates
from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. The 1 percent interest rate combined with
quantitative easing in the form of withdrawal of supply of 30-year securities
by suspension of the auction of 30-year Treasury bonds with the intention of
reducing mortgage rates. For fear of deflation, see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture
(2005), 18-28, and Pelaez and Pelaez, The
Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95. The financial crisis and global
recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability
policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound
credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession
(2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International
Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk
(2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government
Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of
this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.htm
Chart IV-2AP2, Indexes of Prices of Personal Consumption, PCE, and PCE
Core, Excluding Food and Energy, 1965-1982
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IV-2AP3 provides
monthly percentage changes of PCE and PCE core, excluding food and energy from
1965 to 1982. Mickey D. Levy and Michael D. Bordo, both members of the Shadow
Open Market Committee (https://www.shadowfed.org/), in an opinion article in
the Wall Street Journal, “The Fed in the sand as inflation threatens,”
on Apr 26, 2021, argue that monetary policy in the 1970s caused increases in
financial asset prices initially with subsequent impact on the economy and
inflation. There is also major fiscal incentive. Monetary policy may have been
underestimating inflation risks, as Levy and Bordo argue.
Chart IV-2AP3, Monthly Percent Change of Indexes of Prices of Personal
Consumption, PCE, and PCE Core, Excluding Food and Energy, 1965-1982
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Inflation and
unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23)
by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment.
Chart VI-1B for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist
in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan,
23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve
correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in
inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart VI-1B
cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds
rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the
Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing
balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s. The loans were used
in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long
gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt
higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with
declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on
inflation and the economy. This interpretation is consistent with the
case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with
significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation
more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises
frm the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a
plausible interpretation of this pattern.”
The reading of the
Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the
output gap and inflation expectations:
“So, inflation
is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not
just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because
given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other
sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These
statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the
Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look
at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’
or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long
period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the
stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with
‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They
ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen
in economies well below potential.”
Yellen
(2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small
portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the
current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a
tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”
Chart VI-1B
provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were
no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that
period. Chart VI-1B used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the
wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of
unemployment in large urban centers.
Chart VI1-B,
Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987
Source: ©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das
Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo:
Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The
Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.
In his classic
restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference
as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies
the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958,
86):
“The assumption
that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been
adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for
reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in
interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the
purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the
theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The
formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected
capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest
rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the
rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In
addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself,
there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying
change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates
expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative
quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At
the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would
increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no
cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the
investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to
changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”
Tobin (1969)
provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general
equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting
of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital
gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the
expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of
the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus,
g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of
Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of
interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there
is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move
into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk
financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades
with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank
created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global
recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory,
“income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or
believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957,
10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return,
r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman
1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that
individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint
for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W.
This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby
1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and
wealth can be restated as:
W = Y/r
(1)
Equation (1) shows that as r goes to
zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional
monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash
flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term
increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy
necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite
perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r
→0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing
interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on
production, investment and employment.
Chart
IV-2AP4 provides the percentage change of PCE and PCE core price indexes from
2019 to 2022. There is significant fluctuation. The final segment reaches
higher levels of monthly inflation.
Chart IV-2AP4, Percent Change from Preceding Period in Indexes of Prices
of Personal Consumption, PCE, and PCE Core, Excluding Food and Energy,
2019-2022
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022.
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