Monetary Policy and Fluctuations of Risk Financial Assets, Destruction of Household Nonfinancial Wealth with Stagnating Total Real Wealth, United States International Trade, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016
I Destruction of Household Nonfinancial Wealth with Stagnating Total Real Wealth
II IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation
II United States International Trade
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
IIA Destruction of Household Nonfinancial Wealth with Stagnating Total Real Wealth. The valuable report on Financial Accounts of the United States formerly Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/ http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/) is rich in important information and analysis. Table IIA-1, updated in this blog for every new quarterly release, shows the balance sheet of US households combined with nonprofit organizations in 2007, 2011, 2014 and IVQ2015. The data show the strong shock to US wealth during the contraction. Assets fell from $80.9 trillion in 2007 to $77.0 trillion in 2011 even after nine consecutive quarters of growth beginning in IIIQ2009 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html), for decline of $3.9 trillion or 4.9 percent. Assets stood at $98.4 trillion in 2014 for gain of $17.4 trillion relative to $80.9 trillion in 2007 or increase by 21.5 percent. Assets increased to $101.3 trillion in IVQ2015 by $20.4 trillion relative to 2007 or 25.2 percent. Liabilities declined from $14.4 trillion in 2007 to $13.6 trillion in 2011 or by $818.2 billion equivalent to decline by 5.7 percent. Liabilities declined $232.4 billion or 1.6 percent from 2007 to 2014. Liabilities increased from $14.4 trillion in 2007 to $14.5 trillion in IVQ2015, by $114.8 billion or increase of 0.8 percent. Net worth shrank from $66.5 trillion in 2007 to $63.4 trillion in 2011, that is, $3.1 trillion equivalent to decline of 4.7 percent. Net worth increased from $66,536.0 billion in 2007 to $86,796.0 billion in IVQ2015 by $20,260.0 billion or 30.4 percent. The US consumer price index for all items increased from 210.036 in Dec 2007 to 236.525 in Dec 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm) or 12.6 percent. Net worth adjusted by CPI inflation increased 15.8 percent from 2007 to IVQ2015. Nonfinancial assets increased $2790.9 billion from $28,188.2 billion in 2007 to $30,979.1 billion in IVQ2015 or 9.9 percent. There was increase from 2007 to IVQ2015 of $1897.1 billion in real estate assets or by 8.1 percent. Real estate assets adjusted for CPI inflation fell 4.0 percent between 2007 and IVQ2015. The National Association of Realtors estimated that the gains in net worth in homes by Americans were about $4 trillion between 2000 and 2005 (quoted in Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 224-5).
Table IIA-1, US, Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations, Billions of Dollars Outstanding End of Period, NSA
| 2007 | 2011 | 2014 | IVQ2015 | |
| Assets | 80,931.0 | 76,999.6 | 98,353.2 | 101,305.8 |
| Nonfinancial | 28,188.2 | 23,451.7 | 29,197.1 | 30,979.1 |
| Real Estate | 23,378.7 | 18,326.0 | 23,713.4 | 25,275.8 |
| Durable Goods | 4,476.0 | 4,723.3 | 5,037.8 | 5,240.3 |
| Financial | 52,742.8 | 53,547.9 | 69,156.0 | 70,326.7 |
| Deposits | 7,562.3 | 8,711.3 | 10,201.9 | 10,693.1 |
| Debt Secs. | 3,915.8 | 4,305.7 | 3,244.4 | 3,230.6 |
| Mutual Fund Shares | 4,599.7 | 4,629.3 | 7,803.6 | 8,119.0 |
| Equities Corporate | 9,726.1 | 8,069.9 | 13,883.1 | 13,310.9 |
| Equity Noncorporate | 8,934.9 | 7,524.2 | 10,168.8 | 10,739.3 |
| Pension | 15,081.9 | 17,313.8 | 20,620.6 | 20,971.9 |
| Liabilities | 14,395.0 | 13,576.8 | 14,164.3 | 14,509.8 |
| Home Mortgages | 10,613.0 | 9,702.0 | 9,400.6 | 9,490.6 |
| Consumer Credit | 2,615.2 | 2,755.4 | 3,317.2 | 3,533.1 |
| Net Worth | 66,536.0 | 63,422.8 | 84,188.9 | 86,796.0 |
Net Worth = Assets – Liabilities
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
The explanation of the sharp contraction of household wealth can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:
“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”
Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:
“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”
There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ibid, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.
The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:
W = Y/r (1)
Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.
Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).
The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).
There are significant elements of the theory of bank financial fragility of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b) that help to explain the financial fragility of banks during the credit/dollar crisis (see also Diamond 2007). The theory of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) as exposed by Diamond (2007) is that banks funding with demand deposits have a mismatch of liquidity (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 58-66). A run occurs when too many depositors attempt to withdraw cash at the same time. All that is needed is an expectation of failure of the bank. Three important functions of banks are providing evaluation, monitoring and liquidity transformation. Banks invest in human capital to evaluate projects of borrowers in deciding if they merit credit. The evaluation function reduces adverse selection or financing projects with low present value. Banks also provide important monitoring services of following the implementation of projects, avoiding moral hazard that funds be used for, say, real estate speculation instead of the original project of factory construction. The transformation function of banks involves both assets and liabilities of bank balance sheets. Banks convert an illiquid asset or loan for a project with cash flows in the distant future into a liquid liability in the form of demand deposits that can be withdrawn immediately.
In the theory of banking of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b), the bank creates liquidity by tying human assets to capital. The collection skills of the relationship banker convert an illiquid project of an entrepreneur into liquid demand deposits that are immediately available for withdrawal. The deposit/capital structure is fragile because of the threat of bank runs. In these days of online banking, the run on Washington Mutual was through withdrawals online. A bank run can be triggered by the decline of the value of bank assets below the value of demand deposits.
Pelaez and Pelaez (Regulation of Banks and Finance 2009b, 60, 64-5) find immediate application of the theories of banking of Diamond, Dybvig and Rajan to the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. It is a credit crisis because the main issue was the deterioration of the credit portfolios of securitized banks as a result of default of subprime mortgages. It is a dollar crisis because of the weakening dollar resulting from relatively low interest rate policies of the US. It caused systemic effects that converted into a global recession not only because of the huge weight of the US economy in the world economy but also because the credit crisis transferred to the UK and Europe. Management skills or human capital of banks are illustrated by the financial engineering of complex products. The increasing importance of human relative to inanimate capital (Rajan and Zingales 2000) is revolutionizing the theory of the firm (Zingales 2000) and corporate governance (Rajan and Zingales 2001). Finance is one of the most important examples of this transformation. Profits were derived from the charter in the original banking institution. Pricing and structuring financial instruments was revolutionized with option pricing formulas developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973, 1974, 1998) that permitted the development of complex products with fair pricing. The successful financial company must attract and retain finance professionals who have invested in human capital, which is a sunk cost to them and not of the institution where they work.
The complex financial products created for securitized banking with high investments in human capital are based on houses, which are as illiquid as the projects of entrepreneurs in the theory of banking. The liquidity fragility of the securitized bank is equivalent to that of the commercial bank in the theory of banking (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 65). Banks created off-balance sheet structured investment vehicles (SIV) that issued commercial paper receiving AAA rating because of letters of liquidity guarantee by the banks. The commercial paper was converted into liquidity by its use as collateral in SRPs at the lowest rates and minimal haircuts because of the AAA rating of the guarantor bank. In the theory of banking, default can be triggered when the value of assets is perceived as lower than the value of the deposits. Commercial paper issued by SIVs, securitized mortgages and derivatives all obtained SRP liquidity on the basis of illiquid home mortgage loans at the bottom of the pyramid. The run on the securitized bank had a clear origin (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 65):
“The increasing default of mortgages resulted in an increase in counterparty risk. Banks were hit by the liquidity demands of their counterparties. The liquidity shock extended to many segments of the financial markets—interbank loans, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), high-yield bonds and many others—when counterparties preferred lower returns of highly liquid safe havens, such as Treasury securities, than the risk of having to sell the collateral in SRPs at deep discounts or holding an illiquid asset. The price of an illiquid asset is near zero.”
Gorton and Metrick (2010H, 507) provide a revealing quote to the work in 1908 of Edwin R. A. Seligman, professor of political economy at Columbia University, founding member of the American Economic Association and one of its presidents and successful advocate of progressive income taxation. The intention of the quote is to bring forth the important argument that financial crises are explained in terms of “confidence” but as Professor Seligman states in reference to historical banking crises in the US the important task is to explain what caused the lack of confidence. It is instructive to repeat the more extended quote of Seligman (1908, xi) on the explanations of banking crises:
“The current explanations may be divided into two categories. Of these the first includes what might be termed the superficial theories. Thus it is commonly stated that the outbreak of a crisis is due to lack of confidence,--as if the lack of confidence was not in itself the very thing which needs to be explained. Of still slighter value is the attempt to associate a crisis with some particular governmental policy, or with some action of a country’s executive. Such puerile interpretations have commonly been confined to countries like the United States, where the political passions of democracy have had the fullest way. Thus the crisis of 1893 was ascribed by the Republicans to the impending Democratic tariff of 1894; and the crisis of 1907 has by some been termed the ‘[Theodore] Roosevelt panic,” utterly oblivious of the fact that from the time of President Jackson, who was held responsible for the troubles of 1837, every successive crisis had had its presidential scapegoat, and has been followed by a political revulsion. Opposed to these popular, but wholly unfounded interpretations, is the second class of explanations, which seek to burrow beneath the surface and to discover the more occult and fundamental causes of the periodicity of crises.”
Scholars ignore superficial explanations in the effort to seek good and truth. The problem of economic analysis of the credit/dollar crisis is the lack of a structural model with which to attempt empirical determination of causes (Gorton and Metrick 2010SB). There would still be doubts even with a well-specified structural model because samples of economic events do not typically permit separating causes and effects. There is also confusion is separating the why of the crisis and how it started and propagated, all of which are extremely important.
In true heritage of the principles of Seligman (1908), Gorton (2009EFM) discovers a prime causal driver of the credit/dollar crisis. The objective of subprime and Alt-A mortgages was to facilitate loans to populations with modest means so that they could acquire a home. These borrowers would not receive credit because of (1) lack of funds for down payments; (2) low credit rating and information; (3) lack of information on income; and (4) errors or lack of other information. Subprime mortgage “engineering” was based on the belief that both lender and borrower could benefit from increases in house prices over the short run. The initial mortgage would be refinanced in two or three years depending on the increase of the price of the house. According to Gorton (2009EFM, 13, 16):
“The outstanding amounts of Subprime and Alt-A [mortgages] combined amounted to about one quarter of the $6 trillion mortgage market in 2004-2007Q1. Over the period 2000-2007, the outstanding amount of agency mortgages doubled, but subprime grew 800%! Issuance in 2005 and 2006 of Subprime and Alt-A mortgages was almost 30% of the mortgage market. Since 2000 the Subprime and Alt-A segments of the market grew at the expense of the Agency (i.e., the government sponsored entities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) share, which fell from almost 80% (by outstanding or issuance) to about half by issuance and 67% by outstanding amount. The lender’s option to rollover the mortgage after an initial period is implicit in the subprime mortgage. The key design features of a subprime mortgage are: (1) it is short term, making refinancing important; (2) there is a step-up mortgage rate that applies at the end of the first period, creating a strong incentive to refinance; and (3) there is a prepayment penalty, creating an incentive not to refinance early.”
The prime objective of successive administrations in the US during the past 20 years and actually since the times of Roosevelt in the 1930s has been to provide “affordable” financing for the “American dream” of home ownership. The US housing finance system is mixed with public, public/private and purely private entities. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system was established by Congress in 1932 that also created the Federal Housing Administration in 1934 with the objective of insuring homes against default. In 1938, the government created the Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae, to foster a market for FHA-insured mortgages. Government-insured mortgages were transferred from Fannie Mae to the Government National Mortgage Association, or Ginnie Mae, to permit Fannie Mae to become a publicly-owned company. Securitization of mortgages began in 1970 with the government charter to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac, with the objective of bundling mortgages created by thrift institutions that would be marketed as bonds with guarantees by Freddie Mac (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 42-8). In the third quarter of 2008, total mortgages in the US were $12,057 billion of which 43.5 percent, or $5423 billion, were retained or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 45). In 1990, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had a share of only 25.4 percent of total mortgages in the US. Mortgages in the US increased from $6922 billion in 2002 to $12,088 billion in 2007, or by 74.6 percent, while the retained or guaranteed portfolio of Fannie and Freddie rose from $3180 billion in 2002 to $4934 billion in 2007, or by 55.2 percent.
According to Pinto (2008) in testimony to Congress:
“There are approximately 25 million subprime and Alt-A loans outstanding, with an unpaid principal amount of over $4.5 trillion, about half of them held or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie. Their high risk activities were allowed to operate at 75:1 leverage ratio. While they may deny it, there can be no doubt that Fannie and Freddie now own or guarantee $1.6 trillion in subprime, Alt-A and other default prone loans and securities. This comprises over 1/3 of their risk portfolios and amounts to 34% of all the subprime loans and 60% of all Alt-A loans outstanding. These 10.5 million unsustainable, nonprime loans are experiencing a default rate 8 times the level of the GSEs’ 20 million traditional quality loans. The GSEs will be responsible for a large percentage of an estimated 8.8 million foreclosures expected over the next 4 years, accounting for the failure of about 1 in 6 home mortgages. Fannie and Freddie have subprimed America.”
In perceptive analysis of growth and macroeconomics in the past six decades, Rajan (2012FA) argues that “the West can’t borrow and spend its way to recovery.” The Keynesian paradigm is not applicable in current conditions. Advanced economies in the West could be divided into those that reformed regulatory structures to encourage productivity and others that retained older structures. In the period from 1950 to 2000, Cobet and Wilson (2002) find that US productivity, measured as output/hour, grew at the average yearly rate of 2.9 percent while Japan grew at 6.3 percent and Germany at 4.7 percent (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). In the period from 1995 to 2000, output/hour grew at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US but at lower rates of 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in the US. Rajan (2012FA) argues that the differential in productivity growth was accomplished by deregulation in the US at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. In contrast, Europe did not engage in reform with the exception of Germany in the early 2000s that empowered the German economy with significant productivity advantage. At the same time, technology and globalization increased relative remunerations in highly-skilled, educated workers relative to those without skills for the new economy. It was then politically appealing to improve the fortunes of those left behind by the technological revolution by means of increasing cheap credit. As Rajan (2012FA) argues:
“In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, partly to gain more control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant private mortgage agencies, and partly to promote affordable homeownership for low-income groups. Such policies helped money flow to lower-middle-class households and raised their spending—so much so that consumption inequality rose much less than income inequality in the years before the crisis. These policies were also politically popular. Unlike when it came to an expansion in government welfare transfers, few groups opposed expanding credit to the lower-middle class—not the politicians who wanted more growth and happy constituents, not the bankers and brokers who profited from the mortgage fees, not the borrowers who could now buy their dream houses with virtually no money down, and not the laissez-faire bank regulators who thought they could pick up the pieces if the housing market collapsed. The Federal Reserve abetted these shortsighted policies. In 2001, in response to the dot-com bust, the Fed cut short-term interest rates to the bone. Even though the overstretched corporations that were meant to be stimulated were not interested in investing, artificially low interest rates acted as a tremendous subsidy to the parts of the economy that relied on debt, such as housing and finance. This led to an expansion in housing construction (and related services, such as real estate brokerage and mortgage lending), which created jobs, especially for the unskilled. Progressive economists applauded this process, arguing that the housing boom would lift the economy out of the doldrums. But the Fed-supported bubble proved unsustainable. Many construction workers have lost their jobs and are now in deeper trouble than before, having also borrowed to buy unaffordable houses. Bankers obviously deserve a large share of the blame for the crisis. Some of the financial sector’s activities were clearly predatory, if not outright criminal. But the role that the politically induced expansion of credit played cannot be ignored; it is the main reason the usual checks and balances on financial risk taking broke down.”
In fact, Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) anticipated low liquidity in financial markets resulting from low interest rates before the financial crisis that caused distortions of risk/return decisions provoking the credit/dollar crisis and global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Near zero interest rates of unconventional monetary policy induced excessive risks and low liquidity in financial decisions that were critical as a cause of the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. Rajan (2012FA) argues that it is not feasible to return to the employment and income levels before the credit/dollar crisis because of the bloated construction sector, financial system and government budgets.
Table IIA-1 shows the euphoria of prices during the housing boom and the subsequent decline. House prices rose 95.4 percent in the 10-city composite of the Case-Shiller home price index, 81.0 percent in the 20-city composite and 65.6 percent in the US national home price index between Dec 2000 and Dec 2005. Prices rose around 100 percent from Dec 2000 to Dec 2006, increasing 95.8 percent for the 10-city composite, 82.2 percent for the 20-city composite and 68.4 percent in the US national index. House prices rose 37.6 percent between Dec 2003 and Dec 2005 for the 10-city composite, 34.2 percent for the 20-city composite and 29.0 percent for the US national propelled by low fed funds rates of 1.0 percent between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004. Fed funds rates increased by 0.25 basis points at every meeting of the Federal Open Aprket Committee (FOMC) from Jun 2004 until Jun 2006, reaching 5.25 percent. Simultaneously, the suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury bond caused decline of yields of mortgage-backed securities with intended decrease in mortgage rates. Similarly, between Dec 2003 and Dec 2006, the 10-city index gained 37.9 percent, the 20-city index increased 35.1 percent and the US national 31.2 percent. House prices have fallen from Dec 2006 to Dec 2015 by 11.3 percent for the 10-city composite, 10.1 percent for the 20-city composite and 4.1 percent for the US national. Measuring house prices is quite difficult because of the lack of homogeneity that is typical of standardized commodities. In the 12 months ending in Dec 2015, house prices increased 5.1 percent in the 10-city composite, increasing 5.7 percent in the 20-city composite and 5.4 percent in the US national. Table IIA-6 also shows that house prices increased 73.7 percent between Dec 2000 and Dec 2015 for the 10-city composite, increasing 63.8 percent for the 20-city composite and 61.5 percent for the US national. House prices are close to the lowest level since peaks during the boom before the financial crisis and global recession. The 10-city composite fell 12.9 percent from the peak in Jun 2006 to Dec 2015 and the 20-city composite fell 11.5 percent from the peak in Jul 2006 to Dec 2015. The US national fell 4.8 percent from the peak of the 10-city composite to Dec 2015 and 4.9 percent from the peak of the 20-city composite to Dec 2015. The final part of Table II-2 provides average annual percentage rates of growth of the house price indexes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller. The average annual growth rate between Dec 1987 and Dec 2015 for the 10-city composite was 3.8 percent and 3.6 percent for the US national. Data for the 20-city composite are available only beginning in Jan 2000. House prices accelerated in the 1990s with the average rate of the 10-city composite of 5.0 percent between Dec 1992 and Dec 2000 while the average rate for the period Dec 1987 to Dec 2000 was 3.8 percent. The average rate for the US national was 3.4 percent from Dec 1987 to Dec 2014 and 3.6 percent from Dec 1987 to Dec 2000. Although the global recession affecting the US between IVQ2007 (Dec) and IIQ2009 (Jun) caused decline of house prices of slightly above 30 percent, the average annual growth rate of the 10-city composite between Dec 2000 and Dec 2015 was 3.7 percent while the rate of the 20-city composite was 3.3 percent and 3.2 percent for the US national.
Table IIA-1, US, Percentage Changes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%
| 10-City Composite | 20-City Composite | US National | |
| ∆% Dec 2000 to Dec 2003 | 42.0 | 34.9 | 28.3 |
| ∆% Dec 2000 to Dec 2005 | 95.4 | 81.0 | 65.6 |
| ∆% Dec 2003 to Dec 2005 | 37.6 | 34.2 | 29.0 |
| ∆% Dec 2000 to Dec 2006 | 95.8 | 82.2 | 68.4 |
| ∆% Dec 2003 to Dec 2006 | 37.9 | 35.1 | 31.2 |
| ∆% Dec 2005 to Dec 2015 | -11.1 | -9.5 | -2.5 |
| ∆% Dec 2006 to Dec 2015 | -11.3 | -10.1 | -4.1 |
| ∆% Dec 2009 to Dec 2015 | 24.7 | 25.3 | 19.7 |
| ∆% Dec 2010 to Dec 2015 | 26.4 | 28.3 | 24.9 |
| ∆% Dec 2011 to Dec 2015 | 31.8 | 33.8 | 30.0 |
| ∆% Dec 2012 to Dec 2015 | 24.3 | 25.1 | 22.0 |
| ∆% Dec 2013 to Dec 2015 | 9.5 | 10.3 | 10.2 |
| ∆% Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 5.4 |
| ∆% Dec 2000 to Dec 2015 | 73.7 | 63.8 | 61.5 |
| ∆% Peak Jun 2006 Dec 2015 | -12.9 | -4.8 | |
| ∆% Peak Jul 2006 Dec 2015 | -11.5 | -4.9 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2015 | 3.8 | NA | 3.4 |
| Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2000 | 3.8 | NA | 3.6 |
| Average ∆% Dec 1992-Dec 2000 | 5.0 | NA | 4.5 |
| Average ∆% Dec 2000-Dec 2015 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 3.2 |
Source: http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller
Price increases measured by the Case-Shiller house price indices show in data for Dec 2015 that “home prices continued their rise across the country over the last 12 months” (https://www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/308145_cshomeprice-release-0223.pdf?force_download=true). Monthly house prices increased sharply from Feb 2013 to Jan 2014 for both the 10- and 20-city composites, as shown in Table IIA-2. In Jan 2013, the seasonally adjusted 10-city composite increased 0.8 percent and the 20-city increased 0.9 percent while the 10-city not seasonally adjusted changed 0.0 percent and the 20-city changed 0.0 percent. House prices increased at high monthly percentage rates from Feb to Nov 2013. With the exception of Mar through Apr 2012, house prices seasonally adjusted declined in most months for both the 10-city and 20-city Case-Shiller composites from Dec 2010 to Jan 2012, as shown in Table IIA-2. The most important seasonal factor in house prices is school changes for wealthier homeowners with more expensive houses. Without seasonal adjustment, house prices fell from Dec 2010 throughout Mar 2011 and then increased in every month from Apr to Aug 2011 but fell in every month from Sep 2011 to Feb 2012. The not seasonally adjusted index registers decline in Mar 2012 of 0.1 percent for the 10-city composite and is flat for the 20-city composite. Not seasonally adjusted house prices increased 1.4 percent in Apr 2012 and at high monthly percentage rates until Sep 2012. House prices not seasonally adjusted stalled from Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 and surged from Feb to Sep 2013, decelerating in Oct 2013-Feb 2014. House prices grew at fast rates in Mar 2014. The 10-city NSA index decreased 0.1 percent in Dec 2015 and the 20-city changed 0.0 percent. The 10-city SA increased 0.7 percent in Dec 2015 and the 20-city composite SA increased 0.8 percent. Declining house prices cause multiple adverse effects of which two are quite evident. (1) There is a disincentive to buy houses in continuing price declines. (2) More mortgages could be losing fair market value relative to mortgage debt. Another possibility is a wealth effect that consumers restrain purchases because of the decline of their net worth in houses.
Table IIA-2, US, Monthly Percentage Change of S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, Seasonally Adjusted and Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%
| 10-City Composite SA | 10-City Composite NSA | 20-City Composite SA | 20-City Composite NSA | |
| Dec 2015 | 0.7 | -0.1 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| Nov | 0.9 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.1 |
| Oct | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| Sep | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| Aug | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Jul | -0.1 | 0.6 | -0.1 | 0.6 |
| Jun | -0.1 | 0.9 | -0.1 | 1.0 |
| May | -0.1 | 1.0 | -0.1 | 1.1 |
| Apr | -0.2 | 1.1 | -0.1 | 1.2 |
| Mar | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| Feb | 1.1 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 0.5 |
| Jan | 0.6 | -0.1 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Dec 2014 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| Nov | 0.6 | -0.3 | 0.7 | -0.3 |
| Oct | 0.6 | -0.1 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Sep | 0.2 | -0.1 | 0.3 | -0.1 |
| Aug | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| Jul | -0.2 | 0.6 | -0.2 | 0.6 |
| Jun | 0.0 | 1.0 | -0.1 | 1.0 |
| May | -0.1 | 1.1 | -0.1 | 1.1 |
| Apr | -0.2 | 1.1 | -0.1 | 1.2 |
| Mar | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| Feb | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Jan | 0.7 | -0.1 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Dec 2013 | 0.7 | -0.1 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Nov | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.9 | -0.1 |
| Oct | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.2 |
| Sep | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
| Aug | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| Jul | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 1.8 |
| Jun | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 2.2 |
| May | 1.2 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 2.5 |
| Apr | 1.5 | 2.6 | 1.4 | 2.6 |
| Mar | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
| Feb | 1.0 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.2 |
| Jan | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 |
| Dec 2012 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.2 |
| Nov | 0.7 | -0.3 | 0.8 | -0.2 |
| Oct | 0.7 | -0.2 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Sep | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| Aug | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| Jul | 0.5 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| Jun | 1.0 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 2.3 |
| May | 0.9 | 2.2 | 1.0 | 2.4 |
| Apr | 0.4 | 1.4 | 0.5 | 1.4 |
| Mar | 0.2 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Feb | -0.1 | -0.9 | 0.0 | -0.8 |
| Jan | -0.2 | -1.1 | -0.2 | -1.0 |
| Dec 2011 | -0.5 | -1.2 | -0.4 | -1.1 |
| Nov | -0.5 | -1.4 | -0.5 | -1.3 |
| Oct | -0.5 | -1.3 | -0.5 | -1.4 |
| Sep | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.7 |
| Aug | -0.2 | 0.1 | -0.2 | 0.1 |
| Jul | -0.1 | 0.9 | -0.1 | 1.0 |
| Jun | -0.1 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 |
| May | -0.2 | 1.0 | -0.3 | 1.0 |
| Apr | -0.3 | 0.6 | -0.2 | 0.6 |
| Mar | -0.5 | -1.0 | -0.7 | -1.0 |
| Feb | -0.4 | -1.3 | -0.3 | -1.2 |
| Jan | -0.3 | -1.1 | -0.3 | -1.1 |
| Dec 2010 | -0.2 | -0.9 | -0.2 | -1.0 |
Source: http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller
Table IIA-4 summarizes the brutal drops in assets and net worth of US households and nonprofit organizations from 2007 to 2008 and 2009. Total assets fell $10.5 trillion or 13.0 percent from 2007 to 2008 and $8.8 trillion or 10.9 percent to 2009. Net worth fell $10.4 trillion from 2007 to 2008 or 15.6 percent and $8.5 trillion to 2009 or 12.7 percent. Subsidies to housing prolonged over decades together with interest rates at 1.0 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 inflated valuations of real estate and risk financial assets such as equities. The increase of fed funds rates by 25 basis points until 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 reversed carry trades through exotic vehicles such as subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) and world financial markets. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9).
Table IIA-4, Difference of Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations, Billions of Dollars from 2007 to 2008 and 2009
| 2007 | 2008 | Change to 2008 | 2009 | Change to 2009 | |
| A | 80,931.0 | 70,438.0 | -10,493 | 72,128.2 | -8,802.8 |
| Non | 28,188.2 | 24,842.8 | -3,345.4 | 23,738.9 | -4,449.3 |
| RE | 23,378.7 | 19,908.6 | -3,470.1 | 18,782.5 | -4,596.2 |
| FIN | 52,742.8 | 45,595.2 | -7,147.6 | 48,389.2 | -4,353.6 |
| LIAB | 14,395.0 | 14,278.7 | -116.3 | 14,062.6 | -332.4 |
| NW | 66,536.0 | 56,159.2 | -10,376.8 | 58,065.6 | -8,470.4 |
A: Assets; Non FIN: Nonfinancial Assets; RE: Real Estate; FIN: Financial Assets; LIAB: Liabilities; NW: Net Worth
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
The apparent improvement in Table IIA-4A is mostly because of increases in valuations of risk financial assets by the carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged exposures in risk financial assets such as stocks, high-yield bonds, emerging markets, commodities and so on. Zero interest rates also act to increase net worth by reducing debt or liabilities. The net worth of households has become an instrument of unconventional monetary policy by zero interest rates in the theory that increases in net worth increase consumption that accounts for 68.5 percent of GDP in IVQ2015 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html), generating demand to increase aggregate economic activity and employment. There are neglected and counterproductive risks in unconventional monetary policy. Between 2007 and IVQ2015, real estate increased in value by $1897.1 billion and financial assets increased $17,583.9 billion for net gain of real estate and financial assets of $15,686.8 billion, explaining most of the increase in net worth of $20,260.0 billion obtained by adding the decrease in liabilities of $114.8 billion to the increase of assets of $20,374.8 billion. Net worth increased from $66,536.0 billion in 2007 to $86,796.0 billion in IVQ2015 by $20,260.0 billion or 30.4 percent. The US consumer price index for all items increased from 210.036 in Dec 2007 to 236.525 in Dec 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm) or 12.6 percent. Net worth adjusted by CPI inflation increased 15.8 percent from 2007 to IVQ2015. Real estate assets adjusted for CPI inflation fell 4.0 percent from 2007 to IVQ2015. There are multiple complaints that unconventional monetary policy concentrates income on wealthier individuals because of their holdings of financial assets while the middle class has gained less because of fewer holdings of financial assets and higher share of real estate in family wealth. There is nothing new in these arguments. Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. The Banking Act of 1933 imposed prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q. Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:
“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”
In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:
“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.” Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 26 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2015. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2016/pdf/gdp4q15_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 would have accumulated to 26.7 percent. GDP in IVQ2015 would be $18,994.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2539.5 billion than actual $16,455.1 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 25.1 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 15.0 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html). US GDP in IVQ2015 is 13.4 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,445.1 billion in IVQ2015 or 9.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jan 2016. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 138.8098 in Jan 2016. The actual index NSA in Jan 2016 is 103.8436, which is 25.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 128.3031 in Jan 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.8436 in Jan 2016 is 19.1 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table IIA-4A, US, Difference of Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations Billions of Dollars from 2007 to 2011, 2014 and IVQ2015
| Value 2007 | Change to 2011 | Change to 2014 | Change to IVQ2015 | |
| Assets | 80,931.0 | -3,391.4 | 17,422.2 | 20,374.8 |
| Nonfinancial | 28,188.2 | -4,736.5 | 1,008.9 | 2,790.0 |
| Real Estate | 23,378.7 | -5,052.7 | 334.7 | 1,897.1 |
| Financial | 52,742.8 | 805.1 | 16,413.2 | 17,583.9 |
| Liabilities | 14,395.0 | -818.2 | -230.7 | -114.8 |
| Net Worth | 66,536.0 | -3,113.2 | 17,652.9 | 20,260.0 |
Net Worth = Assets – Liabilities
Source: Net Worth = Assets – Liabilities
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
The comparison of net worth of households and nonprofit organizations in the entire economic cycle from IQ1980 (and from IVQ1979) to IIQ1989 and from IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 is in Table IIA-5. The data reveal the following facts for the cycles in the 1980s:
- IVQ1979 to IIQ1989. Net worth increased 126.9 percent from IVQ1979 to IIQ1989, the all items CPI index increased 61.8 percent from 76.7 in Dec 1979 to 124.1 in Jun 1989 and real net worth increased 40.2 percent.
- IQ1980 to IVQ1985. Net worth increased 65.4 percent, the all items CPI index increased 36.5 percent from 80.1 in Mar 1980 to 109.3 in Dec 1985 and real net worth increased 21.2 percent.
- IVQ1979 to IVQ1985. Net worth increased 68.9 percent, the all items CPI index increased 42.5 percent from 76.7 in Dec 1979 to 109.3 in Dec 1985 and real net worth increased 18.5 percent.
- IQ1980 to IQ1989. Net worth increased 118.0 percent, the all items CPI index increased 52.7 percent from 80.1 in Mar 1980 to 122.3 in Mar 1989 and real net worth increased 42.8 percent.
- IQ1980 to IIQ1989. Net worth increased 122.2 percent, the all items CPI index increased 54.9 percent from 80.1 in Mar 1980 to 124.1 in Jun 1989 and real net worth increased 43.4 percent.
There is disastrous performance in the current economic cycle:
- IVQ2007 to IVQ2015. Net worth increased 30.4 percent, the all items CPI increased 12.6 percent from 210.036 in Dec 2007 to 236.525 in Dec 2015 and real or inflation adjusted net worth increased 15.8 percent. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation fell 4.0 percent.
The explanation is partly in the sharp decline of wealth of households and nonprofit organizations and partly in the mediocre growth rates of the cyclical expansion beginning in IIIQ2009. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 26 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2015. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2016/pdf/gdp4q15_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 would have accumulated to 26.7 percent. GDP in IVQ2015 would be $18,994.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2539.5 billion than actual $16,455.1 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 25.1 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 15.0 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html). US GDP in IVQ2015 is 13.4 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,445.1 billion in IVQ2015 or 9.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jan 2016. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 138.8098 in Jan 2016. The actual index NSA in Jan 2016 is 103.8436, which is 25.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 128.3031 in Jan 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.8436 in Jan 2016 is 19.1 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table IIA-5, Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations in Billions of Dollars, IVQ1979 to IQ1989 and IVQ2007 to IVQ2015
| Period IQ1980 to IIQ1988 | |
| Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations USD Millions | |
| IVQ1979 IQ1980 | 9,047.8 9,238.6 |
| IVQ1985 IIIQ1986 IVQ1986 IQ1987 IIQ1987 IIIQ1987 IVQ1987 IQ1988 IIQ1988 IIIQ1988 IVQ1988 IQ1989 IIQ1989 | 15,277.3 16,290.8 16,840.3 17,494.7 17,784.1 18,195.3 18,022.0 18,495.3 18,900.3 19,209.4 19,691.2 20,138.2 20,530.4 |
| ∆ USD Billions IVQ1985 IVQ1979 to IIQ1989 IQ1980-IVQ1985 IQ1980-IIIQ1986 IQ1980-IVQ1986 IQ1980-IQ1987 IQ1980-IIQ1987 IQ1980-IIIQ1987 IQ1980-IVQ1987 IQ1980-IQ1988 IQ1980-IIQ1988 IQ1980-IIIQ1988 IQ1980-IVQ1988 IQ1980-IQ1989 IQ1980-IIQ1989 | +6,229.5 ∆%68.9 R∆%18.5 +11482.6 ∆%126.9 R∆%40.2 +6,038.7 ∆%65.4 R∆%21.2 +7,052.2 ∆%76.3 R∆%28.2 +7,601.8 ∆%82.3 R∆%32.1 +8,256.1 ∆%89.4 R∆%35.3 +8,545.5 ∆%92.5 R∆%35.9 +8,956.8 ∆%96.9 R∆%37.2 +8783.4 ∆%95.1 R∆%35.4 +9256.7 ∆%100.2 R∆%37.6 +9661.7 ∆%104.6 R∆%38.9 +9970.7 ∆%107.9 R∆%39.0 +10452.6 ∆%113.1 R∆%41.7 +10899.6 ∆%118.0 R∆%42.8 +11,291.8 ∆%122.2 R∆% 43.4 |
| Period IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 | |
| Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations USD Millions | |
| IVQ2007 | 66,536.0 |
| IVQ2015 | 86,796.0 |
| ∆ USD Billions | +20,260 ∆%30.4 R∆%15.8 |
Net Worth = Assets – Liabilities. R∆% real percentage change or adjusted for CPI percentage change.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
Chart IIA-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides US wealth of households and nonprofit organizations from IVQ2007 to IVQ2015. There is remarkable stop and go behavior in this series with two sharp declines and two standstills in the 26 quarters of expansion of the economy beginning in IIIQ2009. The increase in net worth of households and nonprofit organizations is the result of increases in valuations of risk financial assets and compressed liabilities resulting from zero interest rates. Wealth of households and nonprofits organization increased 15.8 percent from IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 when adjusting for consumer price inflation.
Chart IIA-1, Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations in Millions of Dollars, IVQ2007 to IVQ2015
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
Chart IIA-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides US wealth of households and nonprofit organizations from IVQ1979 to IIQ1989. There are changes in the rates of growth of wealth suggested by the changing slopes but there is smooth upward trend. There was significant financial turmoil during the 1980s. Benston and Kaufman (1997, 139) find that there was failure of 1150 US commercial and savings banks between 1983 and 1990, or about 8 percent of the industry in 1980, which is nearly twice more than between the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1934 through 1983. More than 900 savings and loans associations, representing 25 percent of the industry, were closed, merged or placed in conservatorships (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 74-7). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) that received $150 billion of taxpayer funds to resolve insolvent savings and loans. The GDP of the US in 1989 was $5657.7 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the partial cost to taxpayers of that bailout was around 2.65 percent of GDP in a year. US GDP in 2015 is estimated at $17,942.9 billion, such that the bailout would be equivalent to cost to taxpayers of about $475.5 billion in current GDP terms. A major difference with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for private-sector banks is that most of the costs were recovered with interest gains whereas in the case of savings and loans there was no recovery. Money center banks were under extraordinary pressure from the default of sovereign debt by various emerging nations that represented a large share of their net worth (see Pelaez 1986). Net worth of households and nonprofit organizations increased 126.9 percent from IVQ1979 to IIQ1989 and 40.2 percent when adjusting for consumer price inflation. Net worth of households and nonprofit organizations increased 122.2 percent from IQ1980 to IIQ1989 and 43.4 percent when adjusting for consumer price inflation.
Chart IIA-2, Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations in Millions of Dollars, IVQ1979 to IIQ1989
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
Chart IIA-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides US wealth of households and nonprofit organizations from IVQ1945 at $767.3 billion to IVQ2015 at $86,796.0 billion or increase of 11,211.9 percent. The consumer price index not seasonally adjusted was 18.2 in Dec 1945 jumping to 236.525 in Dec 2015 or increase of 1,199.6 percent. There was a gigantic increase of US net worth of households and nonprofit organizations over 70 years with inflation-adjusted increase from $42.159 in dollars of 1945 to $366.963 in IVQ2015 or 770.4 percent. In a simple formula: {[($86,796/$767.3)/(236.525/18.2)-1]100 = 770.4%}. Wealth of households and nonprofit organizations increased from $767.3 billion at year-end 1945 to $86,796 billion at the end of IVQ2015 or 11,211.9 percent. The consumer price index increased from 18.2 in Dec 1945 to 236.525 in Dec 2015 or 1,199.6 percent. Net wealth of households and nonprofit organizations in dollars of 1945 increased from $42.159 in 1945 to $366.963 in IVQ2015 or 770.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 3.1 percent. US real GDP grew at the average rate of 2.9 percent from 1945 to 2015 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The combination of collapse of values of real estate and financial assets during the global recession of IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 caused sharp contraction of net worth of US households and nonprofit organizations. Recovery has been in stop-and-go fashion during the worst cyclical expansion in the 70 years when US GDP grew at 2.1 percent on average in the twenty-six quarters between IIIQ2009 and IVQ2015 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). US GDP was $228.2 billion in 1945 and net worth of households and nonprofit organizations $767.3 billion for ratio of wealth to GDP of 3.36. The ratio of net worth of households and nonprofits of $66,536.0 billion in 2007 to GDP of $14,477.6 billion was 4.59. The ratio of net worth of households and nonprofits of $86,796.0 billion in 2015 to GDP of 17,942.9 billion was 4.84. The final data point in Chart IIA-3 is net worth of household and nonprofit institutions at $86,796.0 billion in IVQ2015 for increase of 11,211.9 percent relative to $767.3 billion in IVQ1945. CPI adjusted net worth of household and nonprofit institutions increased from $42.159 in IVQ1945 to $366.963 in IVQ2015 or 770.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.1 percent.
Chart IIA-3, Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations in Millions of Dollars, IVQ1945 to IVQ2015
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/
Table IIA-6 provides percentage changes of nonfinancial domestic sector debt. Households increased debt by 10.5 percent in 2006 but reduced debt from 2010 to 2011. Households have increased debt moderately since 2012. Financial repression by zero fed funds rates or negative interest rates intends to increase debt and reduce savings. Business had not been as exuberant in acquiring debt and has been increasing debt benefitting from historically low costs while increasing cash holdings to around $2 trillion by swelling undistributed profits because of the uncertainty of capital budgeting. The key to growth and hiring consists in creating the incentives for business to invest and hire. States and local government were forced into increasing debt by the decline in revenues but began to contract in IQ2011, decreasing again from IQ2011 to IVQ2011, increasing at 2.1 percent in IIQ2012 and decreasing at 0.2 percent in IIIQ2012 and 2.6 percent in IVQ2012. State and local government increased debt at 1.9 percent in IQ2013 and decreased at 1.1 percent in IIQ2013. State and local government decreased debt at 3.0 percent in IIIQ2013 and at 2.8 percent in IVQ2013. State and local government reduced debt at 1.7 percent in IQ2014 and increased at 0.1 percent in IIQ2014. State and local government reduced debt at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased at 1.5 percent in IVQ2014. State and local government increased debt at 4.3 percent in IQ2015 and increased at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2015. State and local government did not increase debt in IVQ2015. Opposite behavior is for the federal government that has been rapidly accumulating debt but without success in the self-assigned goal of promoting economic growth. Financial repression constitutes seigniorage of government debt (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/global-inflation-seigniorage-financial.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/global-inflation-seigniorage-monetary.html).
Table IIA-6, US, Percentage Change of Nonfinancial Domestic Sector Debt
| Total | Households | Business | State & | Federal | |
| IVQ2015 | 8.6 | 3.4 | 5.0 | 0.0 | 18.5 |
| IIIQ2015 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 4.9 | 1.7 | 0.2 |
| IIQ2015 | 4.6 | 4.3 | 8.4 | 1.0 | 2.4 |
| IQ2015 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 7.5 | 4.3 | -1.1 |
| IVQ2014 | 4.7 | 2.2 | 7.0 | 1.5 | 5.9 |
| IIIQ2014 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 5.9 | -1.7 | 6.0 |
| IIQ2014 | 4.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 0.1 | 3.5 |
| IQ2014 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 6.3 | -1.7 | 5.7 |
| IVQ2013 | 6.0 | 1.5 | 3.9 | -2.8 | 14.4 |
| 2015 | 4.5 | 2.8 | 6.6 | 1.8 | 5.0 |
| 2014 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 6.3 | -0.5 | 5.4 |
| 2013 | 4.0 | 1.7 | 4.9 | -1.3 | 6.7 |
| 2012 | 5.0 | 1.9 | 4.7 | -0.2 | 10.1 |
| 2011 | 3.5 | -0.5 | 2.8 | -1.7 | 10.8 |
| 2010 | 4.4 | -0.5 | -0.7 | 2.3 | 18.5 |
| 2009 | 3.5 | 0.3 | -4.1 | 4.0 | 20.4 |
| 2008 | 5.8 | -0.1 | 6.0 | 0.6 | 21.4 |
| 2007 | 8.1 | 7.2 | 12.4 | 5.5 | 4.7 |
| 2006 | 8.4 | 10.5 | 9.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| 2005 | 8.6 | 10.6 | 8.1 | 5.8 | 6.6 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
Table IIA-7 provides wealth of US households and nonprofit organizations since 2005 in billions of current dollars at the end of period, NSA. Wealth fell from $66,536 billion in 2007 to $58,066 billion in 2009 or 12.7 percent and to $63,423 billion in 2011 or 4.7 percent. Wealth increased 30.4 percent from 2007 to IVQ2015, increasing 15.8 percent after adjustment for inflation, primarily because of bloating financial assets while nonfinancial assets declined in real terms.
Table IIA-7, US, Net Worth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations, Billions of Dollars, Amounts Outstanding at End of Period, NSA
| Quarter | Net Worth |
| IVQ2015 | 86,797 |
| IIIQ2015 | 85,160 |
| IIQ2015 | 86,481 |
| IQ2015 | 85,996 |
| IVQ2014 | 84,189 |
| IIIQ2014 | 82,520 |
| IIQ2014 | 82,242 |
| IQ2014 | 80,626 |
| IVQ2013 | 79,390 |
| IIIQ2013 | 76,673 |
| IIQ2013 | 74,217 |
| IQ2013 | 72,617 |
| IVQ2012 | 69,579 |
| 2015 | 86,797 |
| 2014 | 84,189 |
| 2013 | 79,390 |
| 2012 | 69,579 |
| 2011 | 63,423 |
| 2010 | 62,275 |
| 2009 | 58,066 |
| 2008 | 56,159 |
| 2007 | 66,536 |
| 2006 | 66,073 |
| 2005 | 61,748 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2016. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: fourth quarter 2015. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Mar 10. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/.
IIA United States International Trade. Table IIA-1 provides the trade balance of the US and monthly growth of exports and imports seasonally adjusted with the latest release and revisions (http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/). Because of heavy dependence on imported oil, fluctuations in the US trade account originate largely in fluctuations of commodity futures prices caused by carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures exposures in a process similar to world inflation waves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html). The Census Bureau revised data for 2015, 2014, 2013 and 2012. Exports decreased 2.1 percent in Jan 2016 while imports decreased 1.3 percent. The trade deficit increased from $44,698 million in Dec 2015 to $45,677 million in Jan 2016. The trade deficit increased to $39,462 million in Jan 2014 and deficit of $42,835 million in Feb 2014. The trade deficit increased to $43,121 million in Mar 2014 and $44,271 million in Apr 2014. The deficit improved to $42,070 million in May 2014 and $41,411 million in Jul 2014. The trade deficit moved to $41,275 million in Aug 2014, deteriorating to $43,186 million in Sep 2014 and $42,753 million in Oct 2014. The trade deficit improved to $40,021 million in Nov 2014, deteriorating to $45,549 million in Dec 2014 and improving to $43,601 million in Jan 2015 and $38,550 million in Feb 2015. The trade deficit deteriorated to $52,176 million in Mar 2015. The trade deficit improved to $43,379 million in Apr 2015 and $43,457 million in May 2015. The trade deficit deteriorated to $46,271 million in Jun 2015 and improved to $43,710 million in Jul 2015, deteriorating to $50,544 million in Aug 2015. The trade deficit improved to $44,321 million in Sep 2015, deteriorating to $45,476 million in Oct 2015 and improving to $43,571 million in Nov 2015. The trade deficit deteriorated to $4,698 million in Dec 2015, deteriorating to $45,677 million in Jan 2016.
Table IIA-1, US, Trade Balance of Goods and Services Seasonally Adjusted Millions of Dollars and ∆%
| Trade Balance | Exports | Month ∆% | Imports | Month ∆% | |
| Jan 2016 | -45,677 | 176,456 | -2.1 | 222,133 | -1.3 |
| Dec 2015 | -44,698 | 180,284 | -0.3 | 224,983 | 0.2 |
| Nov | -43,571 | 180,903 | -1.2 | 224,474 | -1.8 |
| Oct | -45,476 | 183,149 | -1.2 | 228,625 | -0.4 |
| Sep | -44,321 | 185,289 | 1.4 | 229,611 | -1.6 |
| Aug | -50,544 | 182,810 | -2.3 | 233,353 | 1.1 |
| Jul | -43,710 | 187,199 | 0.2 | 230,909 | -1.0 |
| Jun | -46,271 | 186,905 | -0.1 | 233,177 | 1.2 |
| May | -43,457 | 187,065 | -0.7 | 230,522 | -0.5 |
| Apr | -43,379 | 188,407 | 0.9 | 231,786 | -3.0 |
| Mar | -52,176 | 186,741 | 0.5 | 238,917 | 6.5 |
| Feb | -38,550 | 185,865 | -1.7 | 224,415 | -3.5 |
| Jan | -43,601 | 189,000 | -3.1 | 232,602 | -3.3 |
| Dec 2014 | -45,549 | 194,975 | -0.6 | 240,524 | 1.8 |
| Nov | -40,021 | 196,201 | -0.8 | 236,222 | -1.8 |
| Oct | -42,753 | 197,759 | 1.4 | 240,513 | 1.0 |
| Sep | -43,186 | 195,053 | -1.1 | 238,239 | -0.1 |
| Aug | -41,275 | 197,303 | 0.2 | 238,578 | 0.1 |
| Jul | -41,411 | 196,907 | 0.7 | 238,317 | 0.2 |
| Jun | -42,371 | 195,579 | -0.9 | 237,950 | -0.6 |
| May | -42,070 | 197,269 | 1.2 | 239,340 | 0.0 |
| Apr | -44,271 | 195,024 | 0.1 | 239,295 | 0.6 |
| Mar | -43,121 | 194,759 | 2.8 | 237,881 | 2.4 |
| Feb | -42,835 | 189,495 | -1.8 | 232,330 | 0.0 |
| Jan | -39,462 | 192,879 | 0.1 | 232,341 | 0.8 |
| Jan-Dec 2014 | -508,324 | 2,343,205 | 2.9 | 2,851,529 | 3.4 |
Note: Trade Balance of Goods = Exports of Goods less Imports of Goods. Trade balance may not add exactly because of errors of rounding and seasonality. Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
Table IIA-1B provides US exports, imports and the trade balance of goods. The US has not shown a trade surplus in trade of goods since 1976. The deficit of trade in goods deteriorated sharply during the boom years from 2000 to 2007. The deficit improved during the contraction in 2009 but deteriorated in the expansion after 2009. The deficit could deteriorate sharply with growth at full employment.
Table IIA-1B, US, International Trade Balance of Goods, Exports and Imports of Goods, Millions of Dollars, Census Basis
| Balance | ∆% | Exports | ∆% | Imports | ∆% | |
| 1960 | 4,608 | (X) | 19,626 | (X) | 15,018 | (X) |
| 1961 | 5,476 | 18.8 | 20,190 | 2.9 | 14,714 | -2.0 |
| 1962 | 4,583 | -16.3 | 20,973 | 3.9 | 16,390 | 11.4 |
| 1963 | 5,289 | 15.4 | 22,427 | 6.9 | 17,138 | 4.6 |
| 1964 | 7,006 | 32.5 | 25,690 | 14.5 | 18,684 | 9.0 |
| 1965 | 5,333 | -23.9 | 26,699 | 3.9 | 21,366 | 14.4 |
| 1966 | 3,837 | -28.1 | 29,379 | 10.0 | 25,542 | 19.5 |
| 1967 | 4,122 | 7.4 | 30,934 | 5.3 | 26,812 | 5.0 |
| 1968 | 837 | -79.7 | 34,063 | 10.1 | 33,226 | 23.9 |
| 1969 | 1,289 | 54.0 | 37,332 | 9.6 | 36,043 | 8.5 |
| 1970 | 3,224 | 150.1 | 43,176 | 15.7 | 39,952 | 10.8 |
| 1971 | -1,476 | -145.8 | 44,087 | 2.1 | 45,563 | 14.0 |
| 1972 | -5,729 | 288.1 | 49,854 | 13.1 | 55,583 | 22.0 |
| 1973 | 2,389 | -141.7 | 71,865 | 44.2 | 69,476 | 25.0 |
| 1974 | -3,884 | -262.6 | 99,437 | 38.4 | 103,321 | 48.7 |
| 1975 | 9,551 | -345.9 | 108,856 | 9.5 | 99,305 | -3.9 |
| 1976 | -7,820 | -181.9 | 116,794 | 7.3 | 124,614 | 25.5 |
| 1977 | -28,352 | 262.6 | 123,182 | 5.5 | 151,534 | 21.6 |
| 1978 | -30,205 | 6.5 | 145,847 | 18.4 | 176,052 | 16.2 |
| 1979 | -23,922 | -20.8 | 186,363 | 27.8 | 210,285 | 19.4 |
| 1980 | -19,696 | -17.7 | 225,566 | 21.0 | 245,262 | 16.6 |
| 1981 | -22,267 | 13.1 | 238,715 | 5.8 | 260,982 | 6.4 |
| 1982 | -27,510 | 23.5 | 216,442 | -9.3 | 243,952 | -6.5 |
| 1983 | -52,409 | 90.5 | 205,639 | -5.0 | 258,048 | 5.8 |
| 1984 | -106,702 | 103.6 | 223,976 | 8.9 | 330,678 | 28.1 |
| 1985 | -117,711 | 10.3 | 218,815 | -2.3 | 336,526 | 1.8 |
| 1986 | -138,279 | 17.5 | 227,159 | 3.8 | 365,438 | 8.6 |
| 1987 | -152,119 | 10.0 | 254,122 | 11.9 | 406,241 | 11.2 |
| 1988 | -118,526 | -22.1 | 322,426 | 26.9 | 440,952 | 8.5 |
| 1989 | -109,399 | -7.7 | 363,812 | 12.8 | 473,211 | 7.3 |
| 1990 | -101,719 | -7.0 | 393,592 | 8.2 | 495,311 | 4.7 |
| 1991 | -66,723 | -34.4 | 421,730 | 7.1 | 488,453 | -1.4 |
| 1992 | -84,501 | 26.6 | 448,164 | 6.3 | 532,665 | 9.1 |
| 1993 | -115,568 | 36.8 | 465,091 | 3.8 | 580,659 | 9.0 |
| 1994 | -150,630 | 30.3 | 512,626 | 10.2 | 663,256 | 14.2 |
| 1995 | -158,801 | 5.4 | 584,742 | 14.1 | 743,543 | 12.1 |
| 1996 | -170,214 | 7.2 | 625,075 | 6.9 | 795,289 | 7.0 |
| 1997 | -180,522 | 6.1 | 689,182 | 10.3 | 869,704 | 9.4 |
| 1998 | -229,758 | 27.3 | 682,138 | -1.0 | 911,896 | 4.9 |
| 1999 | -328,821 | 43.1 | 695,797 | 2.0 | 1,024,618 | 12.4 |
| 2000 | -436,104 | 32.6 | 781,918 | 12.4 | 1,218,022 | 18.9 |
| 2001 | -411,899 | -5.6 | 729,100 | -6.8 | 1,140,999 | -6.3 |
| 2002 | -468,263 | 13.7 | 693,103 | -4.9 | 1,161,366 | 1.8 |
| 2003 | -532,350 | 13.7 | 724,771 | 4.6 | 1,257,121 | 8.2 |
| 2004 | -654,830 | 23.0 | 814,875 | 12.4 | 1,469,704 | 16.9 |
| 2005 | -772,373 | 18.0 | 901,082 | 10.6 | 1,673,455 | 13.9 |
| 2006 | -827,971 | 7.2 | 1,025,967 | 13.9 | 1,853,938 | 10.8 |
| 2007 | -808,763 | -2.3 | 1,148,199 | 11.9 | 1,956,962 | 5.6 |
| 2008 | -816,199 | 0.9 | 1,287,442 | 12.1 | 2,103,641 | 7.5 |
| 2009 | -503,582 | -38.3 | 1,056,043 | -18.0 | 1,559,625 | -25.9 |
| 2010 | -635,362 | 26.2 | 1,278,495 | 21.1 | 1,913,857 | 22.7 |
| 2011 | -725,447 | 14.2 | 1,482,508 | 16.0 | 2,207,954 | 15.4 |
| 2012 | -730,446 | 0.7 | 1,545,821 | 4.3 | 2,276,267 | 3.1 |
| 2013 | -689,931 | -5.5 | 1,578,439 | 2.1 | 2,268,370 | -0.3 |
| 2014 | -727,153 | 5.4 | 1,620,532 | 2.7 | 2,347,685 | 3.5 |
| 2015 | -736,019 | 1.2 | 1,504,914 | -7.1 | 2,240,933 | -4.5 |
Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
Chart IIA-1 of the US Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce shows that the trade deficit (gap between exports and imports) fell during the economic contraction after 2007 but has grown again during the expansion. The low average rate of growth of GDP of 2.1 percent during the expansion beginning since IIIQ2009 does not deteriorate further the trade balance. Higher rates of growth may cause sharper deterioration.
Chart IIA-1, US, International Trade Balance, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services USD Billions
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/briefrm/esbr/www/esbr042.html
Table IIA-2B provides the US international trade balance, exports and imports of goods and services on an annual basis from 1992 to 2014. The trade balance deteriorated sharply over the long term. The US has a large deficit in goods or exports less imports of goods but it has a surplus in services that helps to reduce the trade account deficit or exports less imports of goods and services. The current account deficit of the US not seasonally adjusted increased from $115.3 billion in IIIQ2014 to $138.5 billion in IIIQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm). The current account deficit seasonally adjusted at annual rate increased from 2.2 percent of GDP in IIIQ2014 to 2.5 percent of GDP in IIQ2015, increasing to 2.7 percent of GDP in IIIQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP has stabilized around 3 percent of GDP compared with much higher percentages before the recession (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). The last row of Table IIA-2B shows marginal improvement of the trade deficit from $548,625 million in 2011 to lower $536,773 million in 2012 with exports growing 4.3 percent and imports 3.0 percent. The trade balance improved further to deficit of $478,394 million in 2013 with growth of exports of 2.7 percent while imports virtually stagnated. The trade deficit deteriorated in 2014 to $508,324 million with growth of exports of 2.8 percent and of imports of 3.4 percent. The trade deficit deteriorated in 2015 to $539,735 million with decrease of exports of 5.1 percent and decrease of imports of 3.1 percent. Growth and commodity shocks under alternating inflation waves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html) have deteriorated the trade deficit from the low of $383,774 million in 2009.
Table IIA-2B, US, International Trade Balance of Goods and Services, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, SA, Millions of Dollars, Balance of Payments Basis
| Balance | Exports | ∆% | Imports | ∆% | |
| 1960 | 3,508 | 25,940 | NA | 22,432 | NA |
| 1961 | 4,195 | 26,403 | 1.8 | 22,208 | -1.0 |
| 1962 | 3,370 | 27,722 | 5.0 | 24,352 | 9.7 |
| 1963 | 4,210 | 29,620 | 6.8 | 25,410 | 4.3 |
| 1964 | 6,022 | 33,341 | 12.6 | 27,319 | 7.5 |
| 1965 | 4,664 | 35,285 | 5.8 | 30,621 | 12.1 |
| 1966 | 2,939 | 38,926 | 10.3 | 35,987 | 17.5 |
| 1967 | 2,604 | 41,333 | 6.2 | 38,729 | 7.6 |
| 1968 | 250 | 45,543 | 10.2 | 45,293 | 16.9 |
| 1969 | 91 | 49,220 | 8.1 | 49,129 | 8.5 |
| 1970 | 2,254 | 56,640 | 15.1 | 54,386 | 10.7 |
| 1971 | -1,302 | 59,677 | 5.4 | 60,979 | 12.1 |
| 1972 | -5,443 | 67,222 | 12.6 | 72,665 | 19.2 |
| 1973 | 1,900 | 91,242 | 35.7 | 89,342 | 23.0 |
| 1974 | -4,293 | 120,897 | 32.5 | 125,190 | 40.1 |
| 1975 | 12,404 | 132,585 | 9.7 | 120,181 | -4.0 |
| 1976 | -6,082 | 142,716 | 7.6 | 148,798 | 23.8 |
| 1977 | -27,246 | 152,301 | 6.7 | 179,547 | 20.7 |
| 1978 | -29,763 | 178,428 | 17.2 | 208,191 | 16.0 |
| 1979 | -24,565 | 224,131 | 25.6 | 248,696 | 19.5 |
| 1980 | -19,407 | 271,834 | 21.3 | 291,241 | 17.1 |
| 1981 | -16,172 | 294,398 | 8.3 | 310,570 | 6.6 |
| 1982 | -24,156 | 275,236 | -6.5 | 299,391 | -3.6 |
| 1983 | -57,767 | 266,106 | -3.3 | 323,874 | 8.2 |
| 1984 | -109,072 | 291,094 | 9.4 | 400,166 | 23.6 |
| 1985 | -121,880 | 289,070 | -0.7 | 410,950 | 2.7 |
| 1986 | -138,538 | 310,033 | 7.3 | 448,572 | 9.2 |
| 1987 | -151,684 | 348,869 | 12.5 | 500,552 | 11.6 |
| 1988 | -114,566 | 431,149 | 23.6 | 545,715 | 9.0 |
| 1989 | -93,141 | 487,003 | 13.0 | 580,144 | 6.3 |
| 1990 | -80,864 | 535,233 | 9.9 | 616,097 | 6.2 |
| 1991 | -31,135 | 578,344 | 8.1 | 609,479 | -1.1 |
| 1992 | -39,212 | 616,882 | 6.7 | 656,094 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | -70,311 | 642,863 | 4.2 | 713,174 | 8.7 |
| 1994 | -98,493 | 703,254 | 9.4 | 801,747 | 12.4 |
| 1995 | -96,384 | 794,387 | 13.0 | 890,771 | 11.1 |
| 1996 | -104,065 | 851,602 | 7.2 | 955,667 | 7.3 |
| 1997 | -108,273 | 934,453 | 9.7 | 1,042,726 | 9.1 |
| 1998 | -166,140 | 933,174 | -0.1 | 1,099,314 | 5.4 |
| 1999 | -258,617 | 969,867 | 3.9 | 1,228,485 | 11.8 |
| 2000 | -372,517 | 1,075,321 | 10.9 | 1,447,837 | 17.9 |
| 2001 | -361,511 | 1,005,654 | -6.5 | 1,367,165 | -5.6 |
| 2002 | -418,955 | 978,706 | -2.7 | 1,397,660 | 2.2 |
| 2003 | -493,890 | 1,020,418 | 4.3 | 1,514,308 | 8.3 |
| 2004 | -609,883 | 1,161,549 | 13.8 | 1,771,433 | 17.0 |
| 2005 | -714,245 | 1,286,022 | 10.7 | 2,000,267 | 12.9 |
| 2006 | -761,716 | 1,457,642 | 13.3 | 2,219,358 | 11.0 |
| 2007 | -705,375 | 1,653,548 | 13.4 | 2,358,922 | 6.3 |
| 2008 | -708,726 | 1,841,612 | 11.4 | 2,550,339 | 8.1 |
| 2009 | -383,774 | 1,583,053 | -14.0 | 1,966,827 | -22.9 |
| 2010 | -494,658 | 1,853,606 | 17.1 | 2,348,263 | 19.4 |
| 2011 | -548,625 | 2,127,021 | 14.8 | 2,675,646 | 13.9 |
| 2012 | -536,773 | 2,218,989 | 4.3 | 2,755,762 | 3.0 |
| 2013 | -478,394 | 2,279,937 | 2.7 | 2,758,331 | 0.1 |
| 2014 | -508,324 | 2,343,205 | 2.8 | 2,851,529 | 3.4 |
| 2015 | -539,755 | 2,223,618 | -5.1 | 2,763,374 | -3.1 |
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
Chart IIA-2 of the US Census Bureau provides the US trade account in goods and services SA from Jan 1992 to Jan 2016. There is long-term trend of deterioration of the US trade deficit shown vividly by Chart IIA-2. The global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 reversed the trend of deterioration. Deterioration resumed together with incomplete recovery and was influenced significantly by the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures (these arguments are elaborated in Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html). Earlier research focused on the long-term external imbalance of the US in the form of trade and current account deficits (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b) 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). US external imbalances have not been fully resolved and tend to widen together with improving world economic activity and commodity price shocks.
Chart IIA-2, US, Balance of Trade SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Jan 2016
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
Chart IIA-3 of the US Census Bureau provides US exports SA from Jan 1992 to Dec 2015. There was sharp acceleration from 2003 to 2007 during worldwide economic boom and increasing inflation. Exports fell sharply during the financial crisis and global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Growth picked up again together with world trade and inflation but stalled in the final segment with less rapid global growth and inflation.
Chart IIA-3, US, Exports SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars Jan 1992-Jan 2016
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
Chart IIA-4 of the US Census Bureau provides US imports SA from Jan 1992 to Jan 2016. Growth was stronger between 2003 and 2007 with worldwide economic boom and inflation. There was sharp drop during the financial crisis and global recession. There is stalling import levels in the final segment resulting from weaker world economic growth and diminishing inflation because of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations from commodity exposures to equities.
Chart IIA-4, US, Imports SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars Jan 1992-Jan 2016
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
There is deterioration of the US trade balance in goods in Table IIA-3 from deficit of $62,978 million in Jan 2015 to deficit of $63,718 million in Jan 2016. The nonpetroleum deficit increased by $6,977 million while the petroleum deficit shrank by $5,677 million. Total exports of goods decreased 9.6 percent in Jan 2016 relative to a year earlier while total imports decreased 6.1 percent. Nonpetroleum exports decreased 8.1 percent from Jan 2015 to Jan 2016 while nonpetroleum imports decreased 1.6 percent. Petroleum imports fell 41.8 percent.
Table IIA-3, US, International Trade in Goods Balance, Exports and Imports $ Millions and ∆% SA
| Jan 2016 | Jan 2015 | ∆% | |
| Total Balance | -63,718 | -62,978 | |
| Petroleum | -4,638 | -10,315 | |
| Non Petroleum | -57,760 | -50,783 | |
| Total Exports | 116,890 | 129,266 | -9.6 |
| Petroleum | 6,548 | 8,909 | -26.5 |
| Non Petroleum | 109,838 | 119,552 | -8.1 |
| Total Imports | 180,609 | 192,244 | -6.1 |
| Petroleum | 11,186 | 19,225 | -41.8 |
| Non Petroleum | 167,598 | 170,335 | -1.6 |
Details may not add because of rounding and seasonal adjustment
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
US exports and imports of goods not seasonally adjusted in Jan 2016 and Jan 2015 are in Table IIA-4. The rate of growth of exports was minus 10.7 percent and minus 7.9 percent for imports. The US has partial hedge of commodity price increases in exports of agricultural commodities that decreased 17.8 percent and of mineral fuels that decreased 30.2 percent both because prices of raw materials and commodities increase and fall recurrently as a result of shocks of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations. The US exports an insignificant but growing amount of crude oil, decreasing 30.6 percent in cumulative Jan 2016 relative to a year earlier. US exports and imports consist mostly of manufactured products, with less rapidly increasing prices. US manufactured exports decreased 10.7 percent while manufactured imports increased 4.6 percent. Significant part of the US trade imbalance originates in imports of mineral fuels decreasing 42.3 percent and petroleum decreasing 43.2 percent with wide oscillations in oil prices. The limited hedge in exports of agricultural commodities and mineral fuels compared with substantial imports of mineral fuels and crude oil results in waves of deterioration of the terms of trade of the US, or export prices relative to import prices, originating in commodity price increases caused by carry trades from zero interest rates. These waves are similar to those in worldwide inflation.
Table IIA-4, US, Exports and Imports of Goods, Not Seasonally Adjusted Millions of Dollars and %, Census Basis
| Jan 2016 $ Millions | Jan 2015 $ Millions | ∆% | |
| Exports | 108,453 | 121,398 | -10.7 |
| Manufactured | 79,230 | 88,752 | -10.7 |
| Agricultural | 10,099 | 12,290 | -17.8 |
| Mineral Fuels | 6,719 | 9,622 | -30.2 |
| Petroleum | 5,513 | 7,939 | -30.6 |
| Imports | 165,848 | 180,113 | -7.9 |
| Manufactured | 144,666 | 151,581 | -4.6 |
| Agricultural | 9,435 | 9,511 | -0.8 |
| Mineral Fuels | 11,312 | 19,614 | -42.3 |
| Petroleum | 10,281 | 18,094 | -43.2 |
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
The current account of the US balance of payments is provided in Table IIA2-1 for IIIQ2014 and IIIQ2015. The Bureau of Economic Analysis analyzes as follows (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2015/pdf/trans315.pdf):
“The U.S. current-account deficit—a net measure of transactions between the United States and the rest of the world in goods, services, primary income (investment income and compensation), and secondary income (current transfers)— increased to $124.1 billion (preliminary) in the third quarter of 2015 from $111.1 billion (revised) in the second quarter. The deficit increased to 2.7 percent of current dollar gross domestic product (GDP) from 2.5 percent in the second quarter. The increase in the current-account deficit was largely accounted for by a decrease in the surplus on primary income and an increase in the deficit on secondary income.”
The US has a large deficit in goods or exports less imports of goods but it has a surplus in services that helps to reduce the trade account deficit or exports less imports of goods and services. The current account deficit of the US not seasonally adjusted increased from $115.3 billion in IIIQ2014 to $138.5 billion in IIIQ2015. The current account deficit seasonally adjusted at annual rate increased from 2.2 percent of GDP in IIIQ2014 to 2.5 percent of GDP in IIQ2015, increasing to 2.7 percent of GDP in IIIQ2015. The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP has stabilized below 3 percent of GDP compared with much higher percentages before the recession but is combined now with much higher imbalance in the Treasury budget (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71).
Table IIA2-1, US, Balance of Payments, Millions of Dollars NSA
| IIIQ2014 | IIIQ2015 | Difference | |
| Goods Balance | -203,498 | -206,713 | 3,215 |
| X Goods | 406,854 | 374,732 | -7.9 ∆% |
| M Goods | -610,351 | -581,446 | -4.7 ∆% |
| Services Balance | 60,646 | 59,789 | -857 |
| X Services | 183,664 | 185,973 | 1.3 ∆% |
| M Services | -123,018 | -126,184 | 2.6 ∆% |
| Balance Goods and Services | -142,852 | -146,924 | 4,072 |
| Exports of Goods and Services and Income Receipts | 833,618 | 791,395 | |
| Imports of Goods and Services and Income Payments | -948,951 | -929,875 | |
| Current Account Balance | -115,332 | -138,480 | 23,148 |
| % GDP | IIIQ2014 | IIIQ2015 | IIQ2015 |
| 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.5 |
X: exports; M: imports
Balance on Current Account = Exports of Goods and Services – Imports of Goods and Services and Income Payments
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop
In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):
“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”
The alternative fiscal scenario of the CBO (2012NovCDR, 2013Sep17) resembles an economic world in which eventually the placement of debt reaches a limit of what is proportionately desired of US debt in investment portfolios. This unpleasant environment is occurring in various European countries.
The current real value of government debt plus monetary liabilities depends on the expected discounted values of future primary surpluses or difference between tax revenue and government expenditure excluding interest payments (Cochrane 2011Jan, 27, equation (16)). There is a point when adverse expectations about the capacity of the government to generate primary surpluses to honor its obligations can result in increases in interest rates on government debt.
First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:
D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)
Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,
{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:
N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)
The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:
B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)
On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.
Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:
(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+τ)st+τdτ (4)
Equation (4) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+τ, of the future primary surpluses st+τ, which are equal to Tt+τ – Gt+τ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+τ. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:
MtV(it, ·) = PtYt (5)
Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):
“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”
An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.
There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:
(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress
(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality
(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.
This analysis suggests that there may be a point of saturation of demand for United States financial liabilities without an increase in interest rates on Treasury securities. A risk premium may develop on US debt. Such premium is not apparent currently because of distressed conditions in the world economy and international financial system. Risk premiums are observed in the spread of bonds of highly indebted countries in Europe relative to bonds of the government of Germany.
The issue of global imbalances centered on the possibility of a disorderly correction (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b) 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). Such a correction has not occurred historically but there is no argument proving that it could not occur. The need for a correction would originate in unsustainable large and growing United States current account deficits (CAD) and net international investment position (NIIP) or excess of financial liabilities of the US held by foreigners net relative to financial liabilities of foreigners held by US residents. The IMF estimated that the US could maintain a CAD of two to three percent of GDP without major problems (Rajan 2004). The threat of disorderly correction is summarized by Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 15):
“It is possible that foreigners may be unwilling to increase their positions in US financial assets at prevailing interest rates. An exit out of the dollar could cause major devaluation of the dollar. The depreciation of the dollar would cause inflation in the US, leading to increases in American interest rates. There would be an increase in mortgage rates followed by deterioration of real estate values. The IMF has simulated that such an adjustment would cause a decline in the rate of growth of US GDP to 0.5 percent over several years. The decline of demand in the US by four percentage points over several years would result in a world recession because the weakness in Europe and Japan could not compensate for the collapse of American demand. The probability of occurrence of an abrupt adjustment is unknown. However, the adverse effects are quite high, at least hypothetically, to warrant concern.”
The United States could be moving toward a situation typical of heavily indebted countries, requiring fiscal adjustment and increases in productivity to become more competitive internationally. The CAD and NIIP of the United States are not observed in full deterioration because the economy is well below trend. There are two complications in the current environment relative to the concern with disorderly correction in the first half of the past decade. In the release of Jun 14, 2013, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2013/pdf/trans113.pdf) informs of revisions of US data on US international transactions since 1999:
“The statistics of the U.S. international transactions accounts released today have been revised for the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2012 to incorporate newly available and revised source data, updated seasonal adjustments, changes in definitions and classifications, and improved estimating methodologies.”
The BEA introduced new concepts and methods (http://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm) in comprehensive restructuring on Jun 18, 2014 (http://www.bea.gov/international/modern.htm):
“BEA introduced a new presentation of the International Transactions Accounts on June 18, 2014 and will introduce a new presentation of the International Investment Position on June 30, 2014. These new presentations reflect a comprehensive restructuring of the international accounts that enhances the quality and usefulness of the accounts for customers and bring the accounts into closer alignment with international guidelines.”
Table IIA2-3 provides data on the US fiscal and balance of payments imbalances incorporating all revisions and methods. In 2007, the federal deficit of the US was $161 billion corresponding to 1.1 percent of GDP while the Congressional Budget Office estimates the federal deficit in 2012 at $1087 billion or 6.8 percent of GDP. The estimate of the deficit for 2013 is $680 billion or 4.1 percent of GDP. The combined record federal deficits of the US from 2009 to 2012 are $5090 billion or 31.6 percent of the estimate of GDP for fiscal year 2012 implicit in the CBO (CBO 2013Sep11) estimate of debt/GDP. The deficits from 2009 to 2012 exceed one trillion dollars per year, adding to $5.094 trillion in four years, using the fiscal year deficit of $1087 billion for fiscal year 2012, which is the worst fiscal performance since World War II. Federal debt in 2007 was $5035 billion, slightly less than the combined deficits from 2009 to 2012 of $5094 billion. Federal debt in 2012 was 70.1 percent of GDP (CBO 2015Jan26) and 72.0 percent of GDP in 2013 (http://www.cbo.gov/). This situation may worsen in the future (CBO 2013Sep17):
“Between 2009 and 2012, the federal government recorded the largest budget deficits relative to the size of the economy since 1946, causing federal debt to soar. Federal debt held by the public is now about 73 percent of the economy’s annual output, or gross domestic product (GDP). That percentage is higher than at any point in U.S. history except a brief period around World War II, and it is twice the percentage at the end of 2007. If current laws generally remained in place, federal debt held by the public would decline slightly relative to GDP over the next several years, CBO projects. After that, however, growing deficits would ultimately push debt back above its current high level. CBO projects that federal debt held by the public would reach 100 percent of GDP in 2038, 25 years from now, even without accounting for the harmful effects that growing debt would have on the economy. Moreover, debt would be on an upward path relative to the size of the economy, a trend that could not be sustained indefinitely.
The gap between federal spending and revenues would widen steadily after 2015 under the assumptions of the extended baseline, CBO projects. By 2038, the deficit would be 6½ percent of GDP, larger than in any year between 1947 and 2008, and federal debt held by the public would reach 100 percent of GDP, more than in any year except 1945 and 1946. With such large deficits, federal debt would be growing faster than GDP, a path that would ultimately be unsustainable.
Incorporating the economic effects of the federal policies that underlie the extended baseline worsens the long-term budget outlook. The increase in debt relative to the size of the economy, combined with an increase in marginal tax rates (the rates that would apply to an additional dollar of income), would reduce output and raise interest rates relative to the benchmark economic projections that CBO used in producing the extended baseline. Those economic differences would lead to lower federal revenues and higher interest payments. With those effects included, debt under the extended baseline would rise to 108 percent of GDP in 2038.”
The most recent CBO long-term budget on Jun 16, 2015, projects US federal debt at 103 percent of GDP in 2040 (CBO (2015Jun15). The 2015 long-term budget outlook. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Jun 16).
Table VI-3B, US, Current Account, NIIP, Fiscal Balance, Nominal GDP, Federal Debt and Direct Investment, Dollar Billions and %
| 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | |
| Goods & | -705 | -709 | -384 | -495 | -549 | -538 | -478 | -508 |
| Primary Income | 101 | 146 | 124 | 178 | 221 | 212 | 225 | 238 |
| Secondary Income | -114 | -128 | -124 | -125 | -133 | -125 | -123 | -119 |
| Current Account | -719 | -691 | -384 | -442 | -460 | -450 | -377 | -390 |
| NGDP | 14478 | 14719 | 14419 | 14964 | 15518 | 16155 | 16663 | 17348 |
| Current Account % GDP | -5.0 | -4.7 | -2.7 | -3.0 | -3.0 | -2.8 | -2.3 | -2.2 |
| NIIP | -1279 | -3995 | -2628 | -2512 | -4455 | -4518 | -5327 | -7020 |
| US Owned Assets Abroad | 20705 | 19423 | 19426 | 21768 | 22209 | 22562 | 24159 | 24595 |
| Foreign Owned Assets in US | 21984 | 23418 | 22054 | 24279 | 26664 | 27080 | 29487 | 31615 |
| NIIP % GDP | -8.8 | -27.1 | -18.2 | -16.8 | -28.7 | -28.0 | -32.0 | -40.5 |
| Exports | 2569 | 2751 | 2286 | 2631 | 2988 | 3098 | 3201 | 3307 |
| NIIP % | -50 | -145 | -115 | -95 | -149 | -146 | -166 | -212 |
| DIA MV | 5858 | 3707 | 4945 | 5486 | 5215 | 5968 | 7117 | 7124 |
| DIUS MV | 4134 | 3091 | 3619 | 4099 | 4199 | 4661 | 5781 | 6229 |
| Fiscal Balance | -161 | -459 | -1413 | -1294 | -1300 | -1087 | -680 | -483 |
| Fiscal Balance % GDP | -1.1 | -3.1 | -9.8 | -8.7 | -8.5 | -6.8 | -4.1 | -2.8 |
| Federal Debt | 5035 | 5803 | 7545 | 9019 | 10128 | 11281 | 11983 | 12779 |
| Federal Debt % GDP | 35.1 | 39.3 | 52.3 | 61.0 | 65.8 | 70.1 | 72.0 | 74.1 |
| Federal Outlays | 2729 | 2983 | 3518 | 3457 | 3603 | 3537 | 3455 | 3504 |
| ∆% | 2.8 | 9.3 | 17.9 | -1.7 | 4.2 | -1.8 | -2.3 | 1.4 |
| % GDP | 19.1 | 20.2 | 24.4 | 23.4 | 23.4 | 22.1 | 20.8 | 20.3 |
| Federal Revenue | 2568 | 2524 | 2105 | 2163 | 2304 | 2450 | 2775 | 3021 |
| ∆% | 6.7 | -1.7 | -16.6 | 2.7 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 13.3 | 8.9 |
| % GDP | 17.9 | 17.1 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 15.0 | 15.3 | 16.7 | 17.5 |
Sources:
Notes: NGDP: nominal GDP or in current dollars; NIIP: Net International Investment Position; DIA MV: US Direct Investment Abroad at Market Value; DIUS MV: Direct Investment in the US at Market Value. There are minor discrepancies in the decimal point of percentages of GDP between the balance of payments data and federal debt, outlays, revenue and deficits in which the original number of the CBO source is maintained. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, US International Economic Accounts: Concepts and Methods. 2014. Washington, DC: BEA, Department of Commerce, Jun 2014 http://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm These discrepancies do not alter conclusions. Budget http://www.cbo.gov/ Balance of Payments and NIIP http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop Gross Domestic Product, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table VI-3C provides quarterly estimates NSA of the external imbalance of the United States. The current account deficit seasonally adjusted increases from 2.2 percent of GDP in IIIQ2014 to 2.3 percent in IVQ2014. The current account deficit increases to 2.7 percent of GDP in IQ2015 and decreases to 2.5 percent of GDP in IIQ2015. The deficit increases to 2.7 percent of GDP in IIIQ2015. The net international investment position decreases from minus $6.2 trillion in IIIQ2014 to minus $7.0 trillion in IVQ2014, increasing at minus $6.8 trillion in IQ2015. The net international investment position increases to minus 6.7 trillion in IIQ2015 and increases to minus $7.3 trillion in IIIQ2015. The BEA explains as follows (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/2015/pdf/intinv315.pdf):
“The U.S. net international investment position at the end of the third quarter of 2015 was -$7,269.8 billion (preliminary) as the value of U.S. liabilities exceeded the value of U.S. assets. At the end of the second quarter, the net investment position was -$6,743.1 billion (revised). The decrease in the net investment position reflected equity price decreases for U.S. assets and liabilities and the depreciation of foreign currencies against the U.S. dollar. The net investment position decreased 7.8 percent in the third quarter, compared with an increase of 0.9 percent in the second quarter and an average quarterly decrease of 6.7 percent from the first quarter of 2011 through the first quarter of 2015. The net investment position was equal to 3.5 percent of the value of all U.S. financial assets at the end of the third quarter, up from 3.2 percent at the end of the second quarter.”
The BEA explains further (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/2015/pdf/intinv315.pdf): “Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), Financial Accounts of the United States, Third Quarter 2015, Z.1. Statistical Release (Washington, DC: FRS, December 10, 2015). According to the December release, the value of all U.S. financial assets was $205,068.1 billion at the end of the third quarter. The value of U.S. assets abroad was $23,311.9 billion, or 11.4 percent of all U.S. financial assets, down from 11.8 percent at the end of the second quarter” (see Section II).
Table VI-3C, US, Current Account, NIIP, Fiscal Balance, Nominal GDP, Federal Debt and Direct Investment, Dollar Billions and % NSA
| IIIQ2014 | IVQ2014 | IQ2015 | IIQ2015 | IIIQ2015 | |
| Goods & | -143 | -126 | -109 | -142 | -147 |
| Primary Income | 63 | 59 | 50 | 53 | 47 |
| Secondary Income | -35 | -34 | -34 | -29 | -38 |
| Current Account | -115 | -102 | -93 | -118 | -138 |
| Current Account % GDP | -2.2 | -2.3 | -2.7 | -2.5 | -2.7 |
| NIIP | -6205 | -7020 | -6801 | -6743 | -7270 |
| US Owned Assets Abroad | 24597 | 24595 | 25317 | 24545 | 23312 |
| Foreign Owned Assets in US | -30802 | -31615 | -32118 | -31288 | -30582 |
| DIA MV | 7232 | 7124 | 7251 | 7305 | 6695 |
| DIA MV Equity | 6156 | 6052 | 6178 | 6191 | 5609 |
| DIUS MV | 6023 | 6229 | 6392 | 6533 | 6196 |
| DIUS MV Equity | 4639 | 4839 | 4977 | 4977 | 4637 |
Notes: NIIP: Net International Investment Position; DIA MV: US Direct Investment Abroad at Market Value; DIUS MV: Direct Investment in the US at Market Value. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, US International Economic Accounts: Concepts and Methods. 2014. Washington, DC: BEA, Department of Commerce, Jun 2014 http://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm
Chart VI-10 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the overnight Fed funds rate on business days from Jul 1, 1954 at 1.13 percent through Jan 10, 1979, at 9.91 percent per year, to Mar 10, 2016, at 0.36 percent per year. US recessions are in shaded areas according to the reference dates of the NBER (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). In the Fed effort to control the “Great Inflation” of the 1930s (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html), the fed funds rate increased from 8.34 percent on Jan 3, 1979 to a high in Chart VI-10 of 22.36 percent per year on Jul 22, 1981 with collateral adverse effects in the form of impaired savings and loans associations in the United States, emerging market debt and money-center banks (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 72-7; Pelaez 1986, 1987). Another episode in Chart VI-10 is the increase in the fed funds rate from 3.15 percent on Jan 3, 1994, to 6.56 percent on Dec 21, 1994, which also had collateral effects in impairing emerging market debt in Mexico and Argentina and bank balance sheets in a world bust of fixed income markets during pursuit by central banks of non-existing inflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 113-5). Another interesting policy impulse is the reduction of the fed funds rate from 7.03 percent on Jul 3, 2000, to 1.00 percent on Jun 22, 2004, in pursuit of equally non-existing deflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-85), followed by increments of 25 basis points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006, raising the fed funds rate to 5.25 percent on Jul 3, 2006 in Chart VI-10. Central bank commitment to maintain the fed funds rate at 1.00 percent induced adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS) linked to the fed funds rate. Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at interest rates close to zero, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).
The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper with the objective of purchasing default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever-increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4). A final episode in Chart VI-10 is the reduction of the fed funds rate from 5.41 percent on Aug 9, 2007, to 2.97 percent on October 7, 2008, to 0.12 percent on Dec 5, 2008 and close to zero throughout a long period with the final point at 0.36 percent on Mar 10, 2016. Evidently, this behavior of policy would not have occurred had there been theory, measurements and forecasts to avoid these violent oscillations that are clearly detrimental to economic growth and prosperity without inflation. The Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet L. Yellen, stated on Jul 10, 2015 that (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150710a.htm):
“Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or accelerate this first step. I currently anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.”
There is essentially the same view in the Testimony of Chair Yellen in delivering the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jul 15, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150715a.htm). The FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) raised the fed funds rate to ¼ to ½ percent at its meeting on Dec 16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm).
It is a forecast mandate because of the lags in effect of monetary policy impulses on income and prices (Romer and Romer 2004). The intention is to reduce unemployment close to the “natural rate” (Friedman 1968, Phelps 1968) of around 5 percent and inflation at or below 2.0 percent. If forecasts were reasonably accurate, there would not be policy errors. A commonly analyzed risk of zero interest rates is the occurrence of unintended inflation that could precipitate an increase in interest rates similar to the Himalayan rise of the fed funds rate from 9.91 percent on Jan 10, 1979, at the beginning in Chart VI-10, to 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981. There is a less commonly analyzed risk of the development of a risk premium on Treasury securities because of the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html
and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). There is not a fiscal cliff or debt limit issue ahead but rather free fall into a fiscal abyss. The combination of the fiscal abyss with zero interest rates could trigger the risk premium on Treasury debt or Himalayan hike in interest rates.
Chart VI-10, US, Fed Funds Rate, Business Days, Jul 1, 1954 to Mar 10, 2016, Percent per Year
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/
There is a false impression of the existence of a monetary policy “science,” measurements and forecasting with which to steer the economy into “prosperity without inflation.” Market participants are remembering the Great Bond Crash of 1994 shown in Table VI-7G when monetary policy pursued nonexistent inflation, causing trillions of dollars of losses in fixed income worldwide while increasing the fed funds rate from 3 percent in Jan 1994 to 6 percent in Dec. The exercise in Table VI-7G shows a drop of the price of the 30-year bond by 18.1 percent and of the 10-year bond by 14.1 percent. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). The pursuit of nonexistent deflation during the past ten years has resulted in the largest monetary policy accommodation in history that created the 2007 financial market crash and global recession and is currently preventing smoother recovery while creating another financial crash in the future. The issue is not whether there should be a central bank and monetary policy but rather whether policy accommodation in doses from zero interest rates to trillions of dollars in the fed balance sheet endangers economic stability.
Table VI-7G, Fed Funds Rates, Thirty and Ten Year Treasury Yields and Prices, 30-Year Mortgage Rates and 12-month CPI Inflation 1994
| 1994 | FF | 30Y | 30P | 10Y | 10P | MOR | CPI |
| Jan | 3.00 | 6.29 | 100 | 5.75 | 100 | 7.06 | 2.52 |
| Feb | 3.25 | 6.49 | 97.37 | 5.97 | 98.36 | 7.15 | 2.51 |
| Mar | 3.50 | 6.91 | 92.19 | 6.48 | 94.69 | 7.68 | 2.51 |
| Apr | 3.75 | 7.27 | 88.10 | 6.97 | 91.32 | 8.32 | 2.36 |
| May | 4.25 | 7.41 | 86.59 | 7.18 | 88.93 | 8.60 | 2.29 |
| Jun | 4.25 | 7.40 | 86.69 | 7.10 | 90.45 | 8.40 | 2.49 |
| Jul | 4.25 | 7.58 | 84.81 | 7.30 | 89.14 | 8.61 | 2.77 |
| Aug | 4.75 | 7.49 | 85.74 | 7.24 | 89.53 | 8.51 | 2.69 |
| Sep | 4.75 | 7.71 | 83.49 | 7.46 | 88.10 | 8.64 | 2.96 |
| Oct | 4.75 | 7.94 | 81.23 | 7.74 | 86.33 | 8.93 | 2.61 |
| Nov | 5.50 | 8.08 | 79.90 | 7.96 | 84.96 | 9.17 | 2.67 |
| Dec | 6.00 | 7.87 | 81.91 | 7.81 | 85.89 | 9.20 | 2.67 |
Notes: FF: fed funds rate; 30Y: yield of 30-year Treasury; 30P: price of 30-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 6.29 percent and maturity in exactly 30 years; 10Y: yield of 10-year Treasury; 10P: price of 10-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 5.75 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years; MOR: 30-year mortgage; CPI: percent change of CPI in 12 months
Sources: yields and mortgage rates http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm CPI ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.t
Chart VI-14 provides the overnight fed funds rate, the yield of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, the yield of the 30-year constant maturity bond and the conventional mortgage rate from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. In Jan 1991, the fed funds rate was 6.91 percent, the 10-year Treasury yield 8.09 percent, the 30-year Treasury yield 8.27 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 9.64 percent. Before monetary policy tightening in Oct 1993, the rates and yields were 2.99 percent for the fed funds, 5.33 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 5.94 for the 30-year Treasury and 6.83 percent for the conventional mortgage rate. After tightening in Nov 1994, the rates and yields were 5.29 percent for the fed funds rate, 7.96 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 8.08 percent for the 30-year Treasury and 9.17 percent for the conventional mortgage rate.
Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/
Chart VI-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. There does not appear acceleration of consumer prices requiring aggressive tightening.
Chart VI-15, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart IV-16 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. Inflation collapsed during the recession from Jul 1990 (III) and Mar 1991 (I) and the end of the Kuwait War on Feb 25, 1991 that stabilized world oil markets. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Policy tightening had adverse collateral effects in the form of emerging market crises in Mexico and Argentina and fixed income markets worldwide.
Chart VI-16, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Twelve-Month Percentage Change, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2014BEOFeb4) estimates potential GDP, potential labor force and potential labor productivity provided in Table IB-3. The CBO estimates average rate of growth of potential GDP from 1950 to 2014 at 3.3 percent per year. The projected path is significantly lower at 2.1 percent per year from 2015 to 2025. The legacy of the economic cycle expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2015 at 2.1 percent on average is in contrast with 4.8 percent on average in the expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1989 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). Subpar economic growth may perpetuate unemployment and underemployment estimated at 25.1 million or 15.0 percent of the effective labor force in Dec 2015 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html) with much lower hiring than in the period before the current cycle (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html).
Table IB-3, US, Congressional Budget Office History and Projections of Potential GDP of US Overall Economy, ∆%
| Potential GDP | Potential Labor Force | Potential Labor Productivity* | |
| Average Annual ∆% | |||
| 1950-1973 | 4.0 | 1.6 | 2.4 |
| 1974-1981 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 0.8 |
| 1982-1990 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
| 1991-2001 | 3.2 | 1.3 | 1.9 |
| 2002-2007 | 2.8 | 0.9 | 1.9 |
| 2008-2014 | 1.4 | 0.5 | 0.9 |
| Total 1950-2014 | 3.3 | 1.5 | 1.8 |
| Projected Average Annual ∆% | |||
| 2015-2019 | 2.1 | 0.5 | 1.6 |
| 2019-2025 | 2.2 | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| 2015-2025 | 2.1 | 0.5 | 1.6 |
*Ratio of potential GDP to potential labor force
Source: CBO (2014BEOFeb4), CBO, Key assumptions in projecting potential GDP—February 2014 baseline. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 4, 2014. CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2015 to 2025. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Jan 26, 2015.
Chart IB-1A of the Congressional Budget Office provides historical and projected potential and actual US GDP. The gap between actual and potential output closes by 2017. Potential output expands at a lower rate than historically. Growth is even weaker relative to trend.
Chart IB-1A, Congressional Budget Office, Estimate of Potential GDP and Gap
Source: Congressional Budget Office
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49890
Chart IB-1 of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2013BEOFeb5) provides actual and potential GDP of the United States from 2000 to 2011 and projected to 2024. Lucas (2011May) estimates trend of United States real GDP of 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 and 2.2 percent for per capita GDP. The United States successfully returned to trend growth of GDP by higher rates of growth during cyclical expansion as analyzed by Bordo (2012Sep27, 2012Oct21) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR). Growth in expansions following deeper contractions and financial crises was much higher in agreement with the plucking model of Friedman (1964, 1988). The unusual weakness of growth at 2.1 percent on average from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2015 during the current economic expansion in contrast with 4.7 percent on average in the cyclical expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1989 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html) cannot be explained by the contraction of 4.2 percent of GDP from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 and the financial crisis. Weakness of growth in the expansion is perpetuating unemployment and underemployment of 25.1 million or 15.0 percent of the labor force as estimated for Feb 2016 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html). There is no exit from unemployment/underemployment and stagnating real wages because of the collapse of hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html). The US economy and labor markets collapsed without recovery. Abrupt collapse of economic conditions can be explained only with cyclic factors (Lazear and Spletzer 2012Jul22) and not by secular stagnation (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941 with early dissent by Simons 1942).
Chart IB-1, US, Congressional Budget Office, Actual and Projections of Potential GDP, 2000-2024, Trillions of Dollars
Source: Congressional Budget Office, CBO (2013BEOFeb5). The last year in common in both projections is 2017. The revision lowers potential output in 2017 by 7.3 percent relative to the projection in 2007.
Chart IB-2 provides differences in the projections of potential output by the CBO in 2007 and more recently on Feb 4, 2014, which the CBO explains in CBO (2014Feb28).
Chart IB-2, Congressional Budget Office, Revisions of Potential GDP
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2014Feb 28. Revisions to CBO’s Projection of Potential Output since 2007. Washington, DC, CBO, Feb 28, 2014.
Chart IB-3 provides actual and projected potential GDP from 2000 to 2024. The gap between actual and potential GDP disappears at the end of 2017 (CBO2014Feb4). GDP increases in the projection at 2.5 percent per year.
Chart IB-3, Congressional Budget Office, GDP and Potential GDP
Source: CBO (2013BEOFeb5), CBO, Key assumptions in projecting potential GDP—February 2014 baseline. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 4, 2014.
Chart IIA2-3 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce shows on the lower negative panel the sharp increase in the deficit in goods and the deficits in goods and services from 1960 to 2012. The upper panel shows the increase in the surplus in services that was insufficient to contain the increase of the deficit in goods and services. The adjustment during the global recession has been in the form of contraction of economic activity that reduced demand for goods.
Chart IIA2-3, US, Balance of Goods, Balance on Services and Balance on Goods and Services, 1960-2013, Millions of Dollars
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm
Chart IIA2-4 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows exports and imports of goods and services from 1960 to 2012. Exports of goods and services in the upper positive panel have been quite dynamic but have not compensated for the sharp increase in imports of goods. The US economy apparently has become less competitive in goods than in services.
Chart IIA2-4, US, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services, 1960-2013, Millions of Dollars
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm
Chart IIA2-5 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows the US balance on current account from 1960 to 2012. The sharp devaluation of the dollar resulting from unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and elimination of auctions of 30-year Treasury bonds did not adjust the US balance of payments. Adjustment only occurred after the contraction of economic activity during the global recession.
Chart IIA2-5, US, Balance on Current Account, 1960-2013, Millions of Dollars
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm
Chart IIA2-6 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis provides real GDP in the US from 1960 to 2014. The contraction of economic activity during the global recession was a major factor in the reduction of the current account deficit as percent of GDP.
Chart IIA2-6, US, Real GDP, 1960-2015, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIA-7 provides the US current account deficit on a quarterly basis from 1980 to IQ1983. The deficit is at a lower level because of growth below potential not only in the US but worldwide. The combination of high government debt and deficit with external imbalance restricts potential prosperity in the US.
Chart IIA-7, US, Balance on Current Account, Quarterly, 1980-2013
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Risk aversion channels funds toward US long-term and short-term securities that finance the US balance of payments and fiscal deficits benefitting from risk flight to US dollar denominated assets. There are now temporary interruptions because of fear of rising interest rates that erode prices of US government securities because of mixed signals on monetary policy and exit from the Fed balance sheet of four trillion dollars of securities held outright. Net foreign purchases of US long-term securities (row C in Table VA-1) weakened from $18.2 billion in Nov 2015 to minus $43.4 billion in Dec 2015. Foreign (residents) purchases minus sales of US long-term securities (row A in Table VA-1) in Nov 2015 of minus $41.0 billion weakened to minus $43.4 billion in Dec 2015. Net US (residents) purchases of long-term foreign securities (row B in Table VA-1) improved from minus $9.6 billion in Nov 2015 to $14.0 billion in Dec 2015. Other transactions (row C2 in Table VA-1) changed from minus $13.2 billion in Nov 2015 to minus $14.0 billion in Dec 2015. In Dec 2015,
C = A + B + C2 = -$43.4 billion + $14.0 billion -$14.0 billion = -$43.4 billion
There are minor rounding errors. There is weakening demand in Table VA-1 in Dec in A1 private purchases by residents overseas of US long-term securities of $8.0 billion of which weakening in A11 Treasury securities of $12.2 billion, weakening in A12 of $0.7 billion in agency securities, weakening of $4.5 billion of corporate bonds and improvement of minus $9.5 billion in equities. Worldwide risk aversion causes flight into US Treasury obligations with significant oscillations. Official purchases of securities in row A2 decreased $51.3 billion with decrease of Treasury securities of $48.1 billion in Dec 2015. Official purchases of agency securities increased $1.0 billion in Dec 2015. Row D shows increase in Dec 2015 of $56.5 billion in purchases of short-term dollar denominated obligations. Foreign private holdings of US Treasury bills increased $43.8 billion (row D11) with foreign official holdings increasing $10.3 billion while the category “other” increased $2.4 billion. Foreign private holdings of US Treasury bills increased $43.8 billion in what could be arbitrage of duration exposures. Risk aversion of default losses in foreign securities dominates decisions to accept zero interest rates in Treasury securities with no perception of principal losses. In the case of long-term securities, investors prefer to sacrifice inflation and possible duration risk to avoid principal losses with significant oscillations in risk perceptions.
Table VA-1, Net Cross-Borders Flows of US Long-Term Securities, Billion Dollars, NSA
| Nov 2014 12 Months | Nov 2015 12 Months | Nov 2015 | Dec 2015 | |
| A Foreign Purchases less Sales of | 249.3 | 144.4 | 41.0 | -43.4 |
| A1 Private | 171.0 | 356.8 | 41.2 | 8.0 |
| A11 Treasury | 120.6 | 205.5 | 37.5 | 12.2 |
| A12 Agency | 43.2 | 123.2 | 10.2 | 0.7 |
| A13 Corporate Bonds | 18.4 | 137.6 | 6.9 | 4.5 |
| A14 Equities | -11.2 | -109.5 | -13.4 | -9.5 |
| A2 Official | 78.3 | -212.4 | -0.2 | -51.3 |
| A21 Treasury | 44.9 | -225.9 | 0.9 | -48.1 |
| A22 Agency | 31.4 | 33.5 | 3.7 | 1.0 |
| A23 Corporate Bonds | 7.0 | -3.8 | -1.8 | 0.1 |
| A24 Equities | -4.9 | -16.2 | -2.9 | -4.3 |
| B Net US Purchases of LT Foreign Securities | 25.9 | 175.9 | -9.6 | 14.0 |
| B1 Foreign Bonds | 131.7 | 288.4 | -11.3 | 19.1 |
| B2 Foreign Equities | -105.7 | -112.5 | 1.7 | -5.1 |
| C1 Net Transactions | 275.3 | 320.2 | 31.4 | -29.4 |
| C2 Other | -84.0 | -286.0 | -13.2 | -14.0 |
| C Net Foreign Purchases of US LT Securities | 191.2 | 34.3 | 18.2 | -43.4 |
| D Increase in Foreign Holdings of Dollar Denominated Short-term | 26.7 | 60.6 | 52.8 | 56.5 |
| D1 US Treasury Bills | -13.9 | 53.0 | 51.8 | 54.0 |
| D11 Private | 49.2 | 51.6 | 32.6 | 43.8 |
| D12 Official | -63.1 | 1.4 | 19.1 | 10.3 |
| D2 Other | 40.6 | 7.6 | 1.0 | 2.4 |
C1 = A + B; C = C1+C2
A = A1 + A2
A1 = A11 + A12 + A13 + A14
A2 = A21 + A22 + A23 + A24
B = B1 + B2
D = D1 + D2
Sources: United States Treasury
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticpress.aspx
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2609.aspx
Table VA-3 provides major foreign holders of US Treasury securities. China is the largest holder with $1246.1 billion in Dec 2015, decreasing 1.5 percent from $1264.5 billion in Nov 2015 while increasing $1.8 billion from Dec 2014 or 0.1 percent. The United States Treasury estimates US government debt held by private investors at $10,379 billion in Sep 2015. China’s holding of US Treasury securities represent 12.0 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors (http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html). Min Zeng, writing on “China plays a big role as US Treasury yields fall,” on Jul 16, 2004, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-plays-a-big-role-as-u-s-treasury-yields-fall-1405545034?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj), finds that acceleration in purchases of US Treasury securities by China has been an important factor in the decline of Treasury yields in 2014. Japan decreased its holdings from $1230.9 billion in Dec 2014 to $1122.5 billion in Dec 2015 or 8.8 percent. The combined holdings of China and Japan in Dec 2015 add to $2368.6 billion, which is equivalent to 22.8 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing securities held by investors of $10,379 billion in Sep 2015 (http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html). Total foreign holdings of Treasury securities increased from $6156.0 billion in Dec 2014 to $6165.8 billion in Dec 2015, or 0.2 percent. The US continues to finance its fiscal and balance of payments deficits with foreign savings (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). A point of saturation of holdings of US Treasury debt may be reached as foreign holders evaluate the threat of reduction of principal by dollar devaluation and reduction of prices by increases in yield, including possibly risk premium. Shultz et al (2012) find that the Fed financed three-quarters of the US deficit in fiscal year 2011, with foreign governments financing significant part of the remainder of the US deficit while the Fed owns one in six dollars of US national debt. Concentrations of debt in few holders are perilous because of sudden exodus in fear of devaluation and yield increases and the limit of refinancing old debt and placing new debt. In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):
“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”
Table VA-2, US, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities $ Billions at End of Period
| Dec 2015 | Nov 2015 | Dec 2014 | |
| Total | 6165.8 | 6125.7 | 6156.0 |
| China | 1246.1 | 1264.5 | 1244.3 |
| Japan | 1122.5 | 1144.9 | 1230.9 |
| Caribbean Banking Centers | 351.6 | 336.6 | 272.4 |
| Oil Exporters | 292.5 | 289.0 | 285.9 |
| Ireland | 264.2 | 246.4 | 202.0 |
| Brazil | 254.8 | 255.0 | 255.8 |
| Switzerland | 231.9 | 227.1 | 190.1 |
| United Kingdom | 218.3 | 215.4 | 188.9 |
| Luxembourg | 200.5 | 193.0 | 171.8 |
| Hong Kong | 200.2 | 196.6 | 172.6 |
| Taiwan | 178.7 | 177.5 | 174.4 |
| Belgium | 121.7 | 143.6 | 335.4 |
| India | 116.8 | 115.4 | 83.0 |
| Foreign Official Holdings | 4095.4 | 4117.2 | 4122.6 |
| A. Treasury Bills | 336.7 | 326.4 | 335.3 |
| B. Treasury Bonds and Notes | 3758.7 | 3790.8 | 3787.3 |
Source: United States Treasury
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticpress.aspx
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/index.aspx
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016.
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