Sunday, July 27, 2014

World Inflation Waves, United States Housing Collapse, Financial “Irrational Exuberance,” “Stretched Valuations,” “Brisk Issuance” and Monetary Policy Rules Instead of Discretionary Authorities, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part I

 

World Inflation Waves, United States Housing Collapse, Financial “Irrational Exuberance,” “Stretched Valuations,” “Brisk Issuance” and Monetary Policy Rules Instead of Discretionary Authorities, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

I World Inflation Waves

IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IB United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

II Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

IIA United States Housing Collapse

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

Executive Summary

Contents of Executive Summary

ESI Increasing Interest Rate Risk, Tapering Quantitative Easing, Duration Dumping, Steepening

Yield Curve and Global Financial and Economic Risk

ESII World Inflation Waves

ESIII United States Inflation

ESIV United States Housing Collapse

ESV Financial “Irrational Exuberance,” “Stretched Valuations,” “Brisk Issuance” and Monetary Policy Rules Instead of Discretionary Authorities

ESI Increasing Interest Rate Risk, Tapering Quantitative Easing, Duration Dumping, Steepening Yield Curve and Global Financial and Economic Risk. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task for both theory and measurement. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task for both theory and measurement. The IMF provides surveillance of the world economy with its Global Economic Outlook (WEO) (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=29), of the world financial system with its Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/index.htm) and of fiscal affairs with the Fiscal Monitor (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=262). There appears to be a moment of transition in global economic and financial variables that may prove of difficult analysis and measurement. It is useful to consider a summary of global economic and financial risks, which are analyzed in detail in the comments of this blog in Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets, Table VI-4.

Economic risks include the following:

  1. China’s Economic Growth. China is lowering its growth target to 7.5 percent per year. Growth of China’s GDP in IIQ2014 relative to the same period in 2013 was 7.5 percent. Secondary industry accounts for 46.0 percent of GDP of which industry alone for 39.7 percent in cumulative IIQ2014 and construction with the remaining 6.3 percent. Tertiary industry accounts for 46.6 percent of GDP in cumulative IIQ2014 and primary industry for 7.4 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is changing to lower growth rates while improving living standards. GDP growth decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 and 11.2 percent in IIQ2010 to 7.7 percent in IQ2013, 7.5 percent in IIQ2013 and 7.8 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP grew 7.7 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 1.7 percent relative to IIIQ2013, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent per year. GDP grew 7.4 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.5 percent in IQ2014 that is equivalent to 6.1 percent per year. GP grew 7.5 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 2.0 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is equivalent 8.2 percent (Section VC an earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/imf-view-world-inflation-waves-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and_7005.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/world-inflation-waves-stagnating-united_21.html). There is also concern about indebtedness, move to devaluation and deep policy reforms.
  2. United States Economic Growth, Labor Markets and Budget/Debt Quagmire. The US is growing slowly with 26.6 million in job stress, fewer 10 million full-time jobs, high youth unemployment, historically low hiring and declining/stagnating real wages. Actual GDP is about two trillion dollars lower than trend GDP.
  3. Economic Growth and Labor Markets in Advanced Economies. Advanced economies are growing slowly. There is still high unemployment in advanced economies.
  4. World Inflation Waves. Inflation continues in repetitive waves globally (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). There is growing concern on capital outflows and currency depreciation of emerging markets.

A list of financial uncertainties includes:

  1. Euro Area Survival Risk. The resilience of the euro to fiscal and financial doubts on larger member countries is still an unknown risk.
  2. Foreign Exchange Wars. Exchange rate struggles continue as zero interest rates in advanced economies induce devaluation of their currencies with alternating episodes of revaluation.
  3. Valuation of Risk Financial Assets. Valuations of risk financial assets have reached extremely high levels in markets with lower volumes.
  4. Duration Trap of the Zero Bound. The yield of the US 10-year Treasury rose from 2.031 percent on Mar 9, 2012, to 2.294 percent on Mar 16, 2012. Considering a 10-year Treasury with coupon of 2.625 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years, the price would fall from 105.3512 corresponding to yield of 2.031 percent to 102.9428 corresponding to yield of 2.294 percent, for loss in a week of 2.3 percent but far more in a position with leverage of 10:1. Min Zeng, writing on “Treasurys fall, ending brutal quarter,” published on Mar 30, 2012, in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577313400029412564.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_markets), informs that Treasury bonds maturing in more than 20 years lost 5.52 percent in the first quarter of 2012.
  5. Credibility and Commitment of Central Bank Policy. There is a credibility issue of the commitment of monetary policy (Sargent and Silber 2012Mar20).
  6. Carry Trades. Commodity prices driven by zero interest rates have resumed their increasing path with fluctuations caused by intermittent risk aversion

Chart VIII-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate on the overnight fed funds rate and the yields of the 10-year constant maturity Treasury and the Baa seasoned corporate bond. Table VIII-3 provides the data for selected points in Chart VIII-1. There are two important economic and financial events, illustrating the ease of inducing carry trade with extremely low interest rates and the resulting financial crash and recession of abandoning extremely low interest rates.

  • The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target of the fed funds rate from 7.03 percent on Jul 3, 2000, to 1.00 percent on Jun 22, 2004, in pursuit of non-existing deflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-85). Central bank commitment to maintain the fed funds rate at 1.00 percent induced adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS) linked to the fed funds rate. Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment. The exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at interest rates close to zero, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV). The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper with the objective of purchasing default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever-increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity by the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions. The put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4). The FOMC implemented increments of 25 basis points of the fed funds target from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006, raising the fed funds rate to 5.25 percent on Jul 3, 2006, as shown in Chart VIII-1. The gradual exit from the first round of unconventional monetary policy from 1.00 percent in Jun 2004 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/20040630/default.htm) to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20060629a.htm) caused the financial crisis and global recession.
  • On Dec 16, 2008, the policy determining committee of the Fed decided (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm): “The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent.” Policymakers emphasize frequently that there are tools to exit unconventional monetary policy at the right time. At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states that: “The Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.” Perception of withdrawal of $2671 billion, or $2.7 trillion, of bank reserves (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1), would cause Himalayan increase in interest rates that would provoke another recession. There is no painless gradual or sudden exit from zero interest rates because reversal of exposures created on the commitment of zero interest rates forever.

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

clip_image001

Chart VIII-1, Fed Funds Rate and Yields of Ten-year Treasury Constant Maturity and Baa Seasoned Corporate Bond, Jan 2, 2001 to Jul 24, 2014 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Table VIII-3, Selected Data Points in Chart VIII-1, % per Year

 

Fed Funds Overnight Rate

10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity

Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond

1/2/2001

6.67

4.92

7.91

10/1/2002

1.85

3.72

7.46

7/3/2003

0.96

3.67

6.39

6/22/2004

1.00

4.72

6.77

6/28/2006

5.06

5.25

6.94

9/17/2008

2.80

3.41

7.25

10/26/2008

0.09

2.16

8.00

10/31/2008

0.22

4.01

9.54

4/6/2009

0.14

2.95

8.63

4/5/2010

0.20

4.01

6.44

2/4/2011

0.17

3.68

6.25

7/25/2012

0.15

1.43

4.73

5/1/13

0.14

1.66

4.48

9/5/13

0.08

2.98

5.53

11/21/2013

0.09

2.79

5.44

11/26/13

0.09

2.74

5.34 (11/26/13)

12/5/13

0.09

2.88

5.47

12/11/13

0.09

2.89

5.42

12/18/13

0.09

2.94

5.36

12/26/13

0.08

3.00

5.37

1/1/2014

0.08

3.00

5.34

1/8/2014

0.07

2.97

5.28

1/15/2014

0.07

2.86

5.18

1/22/2014

0.07

2.79

5.11

1/30/2014

0.07

2.72

5.08

2/6/2014

0.07

2.73

5.13

2/13/2014

0.06

2.73

5.12

2/20/14

0.07

2.76

5.15

2/27/14

0.07

2.65

5.01

3/6/14

0.08

2.74

5.11

3/13/14

0.08

2.66

5.05

3/20/14

0.08

2.79

5.13

3/27/14

0.08

2.69

4.95

4/3/14

0.08

2.80

5.04

4/10/14

0.08

2.65

4.89

4/17/14

0.09

2.73

4.89

4/24/14

0.10

2.70

4.84

5/1/14

0.09

2.63

4.77

5/8/14

0.08

2.61

4.79

5/15/14

0.09

2.50

4.72

5/22/14

0.09

2.56

4.81

5/29/14

0.09

2.45

4.69

6/05/14

0.09

2.59

4.83

6/12/14

0.09

2.58

4.79

6/19/14

0.10

2.64

4.83

6/26/14

0.10

2.53

4.71

7/2/14

0.10

2.64

4.84

7/10/14

0.09

2.55

4.75

7/17/14

0.09

2.47

4.69

7/24/14

0.09

2.52

4.72

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jun 18, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140618a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate. In determining how long to maintain the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess progress--both realized and expected--toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored” (emphasis added).

Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):

So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).

Chart S provides the yield of the two-year Treasury constant maturity from Mar 17, 2014, two days before the guidance of Chair Yellen on Mar 19, 2014, to Jul 24, 2014. Chart SA provides the yields of the seven-, ten- and thirty-year Treasury constant maturity in the same dates. Yields increased right after the guidance of Chair Yellen. The two-year yield remain at a higher level than before while the ten-year yield fell and increased again. There could be more immediate impact on two-year yields of an increase in the fed funds rates but the effects would spread throughout the term structure of interest rates (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1981, 1985, Ingersoll 1987). Yields converged toward slightly lower earlier levels in the week of Apr 24, 2014 with reallocation of portfolios of risk financial assets away from equities and into bonds and commodities.

clip_image002

Chart S, US, Yield of Two-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, Mar 17 to Jul 24, 2014 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

clip_image003

Chart SA, US, Yield of Seven-Year, Ten-Year and Thirty-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, Mar 17 to Jul 24, 2014 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):

“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.

Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.

Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”

Inflation and unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment. Chart VI-1B for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart VI-1B cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s. The loans were used in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on inflation and the economy.  This interpretation is consistent with the case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises from the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a plausible interpretation of this pattern.”

The reading of the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the output gap and inflation expectations:

“So, inflation is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’ or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with ‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen in economies well below potential.”

Chart VI-1B provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that period. Chart VI-1B used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of unemployment in large urban centers.

BrazilPhillipsCircuit

ChVI1-B, Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987

Source:

©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25

It is quite difficult to measure inflationary expectations because they tend to break abruptly from past inflation. There could still be an influence of past and current inflation in the calculation of future inflation by economic agents. Table VIII-1 provides inflation of the CPI. In the three months Apr 2014 to Jun 2014, CPI inflation for all items seasonally adjusted was 4.1 percent in annual equivalent, obtained by calculating accumulated inflation from Apr 2014 to Jun 2014 and compounding for a full year. In the 12 months ending in Jun 2014, CPI inflation of all items not seasonally adjusted was 2.1 percent. Inflation in Jun 2014 seasonally adjusted was 0.3 percent relative to May 2014, or 3.7 percent annual equivalent (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The second row provides the same measurements for the CPI of all items excluding food and energy: 1.9 percent in 12 months and 2.4 percent in annual equivalent Apr 2014-Jun 2014. The Wall Street Journal provides the yield curve of US Treasury securities (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_bonds.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000). The shortest term is 0.033 percent for one month, 0.033 percent for three months, 0.061 percent for six months, 0.114 percent for one year, 0.492 percent for two years, 0.971 percent for three years, 1.678 percent for five years, 2.130 percent for seven years, 2.468 percent for ten years and 3.240 percent for 30 years. The Irving Fisher (1930) definition of real interest rates is approximately the difference between nominal interest rates, which are those estimated by the Wall Street Journal, and the rate of inflation expected in the term of the security, which could behave as in Table VIII-1. Inflation in Apr 2014 is low in 12 months because of the unwinding of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures prices but could ignite again with subdued risk aversion. Real interest rates in the US have been negative during substantial periods in the past decade while monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

Negative real rates of interest distort calculations of risk and returns from capital budgeting by firms, through lending by financial intermediaries to decisions on savings, housing and purchases of households. Inflation on near zero interest rates misallocates resources away from their most productive uses and creates uncertainty of the future path of adjustment to higher interest rates that inhibit sound decisions.

Table VIII-1, US, Consumer Price Index Percentage Change 12 Months NSA and Annual Equivalent

 

∆% 12 Months Jun 2014/Jun
2013 NSA

∆% Annual Equivalent Apr 2014 to Jun 2014 SA

CPI All Items

2.1

4.1

CPI ex Food and Energy

1.9

2.4

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Professionals use a variety of techniques in measuring interest rate risk (Fabozzi, Buestow and Johnson, 2006, Chapter Nine, 183-226):

  • Full valuation approach in which securities and portfolios are shocked by 50, 100, 200 and 300 basis points to measure their impact on asset values
  • Stress tests requiring more complex analysis and translation of possible events with high impact even if with low probability of occurrence into effects on actual positions and capital
  • Value at Risk (VaR) analysis of maximum losses that are likely in a time horizon
  • Duration and convexity that are short-hand convenient measurement of changes in prices resulting from changes in yield captured by duration and convexity
  • Yield volatility

Analysis of these methods is in Pelaez and Pelaez (International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-162) and Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. (I) (2008a), 78-100). Frederick R. Macaulay (1938) introduced the concept of duration in contrast with maturity for analyzing bonds. Duration is the sensitivity of bond prices to changes in yields. In economic jargon, duration is the yield elasticity of bond price to changes in yield, or the percentage change in price after a percentage change in yield, typically expressed as the change in price resulting from change of 100 basis points in yield. The mathematical formula is the negative of the yield elasticity of the bond price or –[dB/d(1+y)]((1+y)/B), where d is the derivative operator of calculus, B the bond price, y the yield and the elasticity does not have dimension (Hallerbach 2001). The duration trap of unconventional monetary policy is that duration is higher the lower the coupon and higher the lower the yield, other things being constant. Coupons and yields are historically low because of unconventional monetary policy. Duration dumping during a rate increase may trigger the same crossfire selling of high duration positions that magnified the credit crisis. Traders reduced positions because capital losses in one segment, such as mortgage-backed securities, triggered haircuts and margin increases that reduced capital available for positioning in all segments, causing fire sales in multiple segments (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 217-24). Financial markets are currently experiencing fear of duration and riskier asset classes resulting from the debate within and outside the Fed on tapering quantitative easing. Table VIII-2 provides the yield curve of Treasury securities on Jul 25, 2014, Dec 31, 2013, May 1, 2013, Jul 25, 2013 and Jul 25, 2006. There is oscillating steepening of the yield curve for longer maturities, which are also the ones with highest duration. The 10-year yield increased from 1.45 percent on Jul 26, 2012 to 3.04 percent on Dec 31, 2013 and 2.48 percent on Jul 25, 2014, as measured by the United States Treasury. Assume that a bond with maturity in 10 years were issued on Dec 31, 2013, at par or price of 100 with coupon of 1.45 percent. The price of that bond would be 86.3778 with instantaneous increase of the yield to 3.04 percent for loss of 13.6 percent and far more with leverage. Assume that the yield of a bond with exactly ten years to maturity and coupon of 2.50 percent would jump instantaneously from yield of 2.48 percent on Jul 25, 2014 to 5.07 percent as occurred on Jul 25, 2006 when the economy was closer to full employment. The price of the hypothetical bond issued with coupon of 2.50 percent would drop from 100 to 79.8786 after an instantaneous increase of the yield to 5.07 percent. The price loss would be 20.1 percent. Losses absorb capital available for positioning, triggering crossfire sales in multiple asset classes (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). What is the path of adjustment of zero interest rates on fed funds and artificially low bond yields? There is no painless exit from unconventional monetary policy. Chris Dieterich, writing on “Bond investors turn to cash,” on Jul 25, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323971204578625900935618178.html), uses data of the Investment Company Institute (http://www.ici.org/) in showing withdrawals of $43 billion in taxable mutual funds in Jun, which is the largest in history, with flows into cash investments such as $8.5 billion in the week of Jul 17 into money-market funds.

Table VIII-2, United States, Treasury Yields

 

7/25/14

12/31/13

5/01/13

7/25/13

7/25/06

1 M

0.03

0.01

0.03

0.02

5.01

3 M

0.03

0.07

0.06

0.02

5.13

6 M

0.06

0.10

0.08

0.06

5.25

1 Y

0.11

0.13

0.11

0.12

5.21

2 Y

0.53

0.38

0.20

0.32

5.11

3 Y

0.98

0.78

0.30

0.62

5.05

5 Y

1.69

1.75

0.65

1.38

5.02

7 Y

2.14

2.45

1.07

2.00

5.03

10 Y

2.48

3.04

1.66

2.61

5.07

20 Y

2.99

3.72

2.44

3.34

5.24

30 Y

3.24

3.96

2.83

3.65

5.13

M: Months; Y: Years

Source: United States Treasury

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield

Interest rate risk is increasing in the US with amplifying fluctuations. Chart VI-13 of the Board of Governors provides the conventional mortgage rate for a fixed-rate 30-year mortgage. The rate stood at 5.87 percent on Jan 8, 2004, increasing to 6.79 percent on Jul 6, 2006. The rate bottomed at 3.35 percent on May 2, 2013. Fear of duration risk in longer maturities such as mortgage-backed securities caused continuing increases in the conventional mortgage rate that rose to 4.51 percent on Jul 11, 2013, 4.58 percent on Aug 22, 2013 and 4.13 percent on Jul 25, 2014, which is the last data point in Chart VI-13. Shayndi Raice and Nick Timiraos, writing on “Banks cut as mortgage boom ends,” on Jan 9, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303754404579310940019239208), analyze the drop in mortgage applications to a 13-year low, as measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Demand for home loans plunges,” on Apr 24, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579522051733228402?mg=reno64-wsj), analyzes data in Inside Mortgage Finance that mortgage lending of $235 billion in IQ2014 is 58 percent lower than a year earlier and 23 percent below IVQ2013. Mortgage lending collapsed to the lowest level in 14 years. In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm): “One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.”

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Chart VI-13, US, Conventional Mortgage Rate, Jan 8, 2004 to Jul 24, 2014

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update

There is a false impression of the existence of a monetary policy “science,” measurements and forecasting with which to steer the economy into “prosperity without inflation.” Market participants are remembering the Great Bond Crash of 1994 shown in Table VI-7G when monetary policy pursued nonexistent inflation, causing trillions of dollars of losses in fixed income worldwide while increasing the fed funds rate from 3 percent in Jan 1994 to 6 percent in Dec. The exercise in Table VI-7G shows a drop of the price of the 30-year bond by 18.1 percent and of the 10-year bond by 14.1 percent. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). The pursuit of nonexistent deflation during the past ten years has resulted in the largest monetary policy accommodation in history that created the 2007 financial market crash and global recession and is currently preventing smoother recovery while creating another financial crash in the future. The issue is not whether there should be a central bank and monetary policy but rather whether policy accommodation in doses from zero interest rates to trillions of dollars in the fed balance sheet endangers economic stability.

Table VI-7G, Fed Funds Rates, Thirty and Ten Year Treasury Yields and Prices, 30-Year Mortgage Rates and 12-month CPI Inflation 1994

1994

FF

30Y

30P

10Y

10P

MOR

CPI

Jan

3.00

6.29

100

5.75

100

7.06

2.52

Feb

3.25

6.49

97.37

5.97

98.36

7.15

2.51

Mar

3.50

6.91

92.19

6.48

94.69

7.68

2.51

Apr

3.75

7.27

88.10

6.97

91.32

8.32

2.36

May

4.25

7.41

86.59

7.18

88.93

8.60

2.29

Jun

4.25

7.40

86.69

7.10

90.45

8.40

2.49

Jul

4.25

7.58

84.81

7.30

89.14

8.61

2.77

Aug

4.75

7.49

85.74

7.24

89.53

8.51

2.69

Sep

4.75

7.71

83.49

7.46

88.10

8.64

2.96

Oct

4.75

7.94

81.23

7.74

86.33

8.93

2.61

Nov

5.50

8.08

79.90

7.96

84.96

9.17

2.67

Dec

6.00

7.87

81.91

7.81

85.89

9.20

2.67

Notes: FF: fed funds rate; 30Y: yield of 30-year Treasury; 30P: price of 30-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 6.29 percent and maturity in exactly 30 years; 10Y: yield of 10-year Treasury; 10P: price of 10-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 5.75 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years; MOR: 30-year mortgage; CPI: percent change of CPI in 12 months

Sources: yields and mortgage rates http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm CPI ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.t

Chart VI-14 provides the overnight fed funds rate, the yield of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, the yield of the 30-year constant maturity bond and the conventional mortgage rate from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. In Jan 1991, the fed funds rate was 6.91 percent, the 10-year Treasury yield 8.09 percent, the 30-year Treasury yield 8.27 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 9.64 percent. Before monetary policy tightening in Oct 1993, the rates and yields were 2.99 percent for the fed funds, 5.33 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 5.94 for the 30-year Treasury and 6.83 percent for the conventional mortgage rate. After tightening in Nov 1994, the rates and yields were 5.29 percent for the fed funds rate, 7.96 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 8.08 percent for the 30-year Treasury and 9.17 percent for the conventional mortgage rate.

ChVI-14DDPChart

Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Chart VI-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. There does not appear acceleration of consumer prices requiring aggressive tightening.

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Chart VI-15, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. Inflation collapsed during the recession from Jul 1990 (III) and Mar 1991 (I) and the end of the Kuwait War on Feb 25, 1991 that stabilized world oil markets. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Policy tightening had adverse collateral effects in the form of emerging market crises in Mexico and Argentina and fixed income markets worldwide.

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Chart VI-16, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Twelve-Month Percentage Change, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Table VI-2 extracts four rows of Table VI-1 with the Dollar/EUR (USD/EUR) exchange rate and Chinese Yuan/Dollar (CNY/USD) exchange rate that reveal pursuit of exchange rate policies resulting from monetary policy in the US and capital control/exchange rate policy in China. The ultimate intentions are the same: promoting internal economic activity at the expense of the rest of the world. The easy money policy of the US was deliberately or not but effectively to devalue the dollar from USD 1.1423/EUR on Jun 26, 2003 to USD 1.5914/EUR on Jul 14, 2008, or by 39.3 percent. The flight into dollar assets after the global recession caused revaluation to USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010, or by 25.1 percent. After the temporary interruption of the sovereign risk issues in Europe from Apr to Jul, 2010, shown in Table VI-4 below, the dollar has devalued again to USD 1.3431/EUR on Jul 25, 2014 or by 12.7 percent {[(1.3431/1.192)-1]100 = 12.7%}. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar. China fixed the CNY to the dollar for a long period at a highly undervalued level of around CNY 8.2765/USD subsequently revaluing to CNY 6.8211/USD until Jun 7, 2010, or by 17.6 percent. After fixing again the CNY to the dollar, China revalued to CNY 6.1923/USD on Fri Jul 25, 2014, or by an additional 9.2 percent, for cumulative revaluation of 25.2 percent. The final row of Table VI-2 shows: revaluation of 0.2 percent in the week of Jul 4, 2014; change of 0.0 percent in the week of Jul 11, 2014; devaluation of 0.1 percent the week of Jul 18, 2014; and revaluation of 0.2 percent in the week of Jul 25, 2014. There could be reversal of revaluation to devalue the Yuan.

Table VI-2, Dollar/Euro (USD/EUR) Exchange Rate and Chinese Yuan/Dollar (CNY/USD) Exchange Rate

USD/EUR

12/26/03

7/14/08

6/07/10

7/25/14

Rate

1.1423

1.5914

1.192

1.3431

CNY/USD

01/03
2000

07/21
2005

7/15
2008

7/25/

2014

Rate

8.2798

8.2765

6.8211

6.1923

Weekly Rates

7/4/2014

7/11/2014

7/18/2014

7/25/

2014

CNY/USD

6.2036

6.2040

6.2074

6.1923

∆% from Earlier Week*

0.2

0.0

-0.1

0.2

*Negative sign is depreciation; positive sign is appreciation

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_currencies.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000

Professor Edward P Lazear (2013Jan7), writing on “Chinese ‘currency manipulation’ is not the problem,” on Jan 7, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578213203581231448.html), provides clear thought on the role of the yuan in trade between China and the United States and trade between China and Europe. There is conventional wisdom that Chinese exchange rate policy causes the loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States, which is shown by Lazear (2013Jan7) to be erroneous. The fact is that manipulation of the CNY/USD rate by China has only minor effects on US employment. Lazear (2013Jan7) shows that the movement of monthly exports of China to its major trading partners, United States and Europe, since 1995 cannot be explained by the fixing of the CNY/USD rate by China. The period is quite useful because it includes rapid growth before 2007, contraction until 2009 and weak subsequent expansion. Chart VI-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the CNY/USD exchange rate from Jan 3, 1995 to Jul 18, 2014 together with US recession dates in shaded areas. China fixed the CNY/USD rate for a long period as shown in the horizontal segment from 1995 to 2005. There was systematic revaluation of 17.6 percent from CNY 8.2765 on Jul 21, 2005 to CNY 6.8211 on Jul 15, 2008. China fixed the CNY/USD rate until Jun 7, 2010, to avoid adverse effects on its economy from the global recession, which is shown as a horizontal segment from 2009 until mid 2010. China then continued the policy of appreciation of the CNY relative to the USD with oscillations until the beginning of 2012 when the rate began to move sideways followed by a final upward slope of devaluation that is measured in Table VI-2A but virtually disappeared in the rate of CNY 6.3589/USD on Aug 17, 2012 and was nearly unchanged at CNY 6.3558/USD on Aug 24, 2012. China then appreciated 0.2 percent in the week of Dec 21, 2012, to CNY 6.2352/USD for cumulative 1.9 percent revaluation from Oct 28, 2011 and left the rate virtually unchanged at CNY 6.2316/USD on Jan 11, 2013, appreciating to CNY 6.2075/USD on Jul 18, 2014, which is the last data point in Chart VI-1. Revaluation of the CNY relative to the USD by 25.2 percent by Jul 25, 2014 has not reduced the trade surplus of China but reversal of the policy of revaluation could result in international confrontation. The interruption with upward slope in the final segment on the right of Chart VI-I is measured as virtually stability in Table VI-2A followed with decrease or revaluation and subsequent increase or devaluation. Linglin Wei, writing on “China intervenes to lower yuan,” on Feb 26, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304071004579406810684766716?KEYWORDS=china+yuan&mg=reno64-wsj), finds from informed sources that the central bank of China conducted the ongoing devaluation of the yuan with the objective of driving out arbitrageurs to widen the band of fluctuation. There is concern if the policy of revaluation is changing to devaluation.

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Chart VI-1, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (USD), Business Days, Jan 3, 1995-Jul 18, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-1A provides the daily CNY/USD rate from Jan 5, 1981 to Jul 18, 2014. The exchange rate was CNY 1.5418/USD on Jan 5, 1981. There is sharp cumulative depreciation of 107.8 percent to CNY 3.2031 by Jul 2, 1986, continuing to CNY 5.8145/USD on Dec 29, 1993 for cumulative 277.1 percent since Jan 5, 1981. China then devalued sharply to CNY 8.7117/USD on Jan 7, 1994 for 49.8 percent relative to Dec 29, 1993 and cumulative 465.0 percent relative to Jan 5, 1981. China then fixed the rate at CNY 8.2765/USD until Jul 21, 2005 and revalued as analyzed in Chart VI-1. The final data point in Chart VI-1A is CNY 6.2075/USD on Jul 18, 2014. To be sure, China fixed the exchange rate after substantial prior devaluation. It is unlikely that the devaluation could have been effective after many years of fixing the exchange rate with high inflation and multiple changes in the world economy. The argument of Lazear (2013Jan7) is still valid in view of the lack of association between monthly exports of China to the US and Europe since 1995 and the exchange rate of China.

clip_image010

Chart VI-1A, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (USD), Business Days, Jan 5, 1981-Jul 18, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-1B provides finer details with the rate of Chinese Yuan (CNY) to the US Dollar (USD) from Oct 28, 2011 to Jul 18, 2014. There have been alternations of revaluation and devaluation. The initial data point is CNY 6.3570 on Oct 28, 2011. There is an episode of devaluation from CNY 6.2790 on Apr 30, 2012 to CNY 6.3879 on Jul 25, 2012, or devaluation of 1.7 percent. Another devaluation is from CNY 6.0402/USD on Jan 4, 2014 to CNY 6.2075 on Jul 18, 2014, or devaluation of 2.8 percent. China is the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities with $1270.9 billion in May 2014, decreasing 2.0 percent from $1297.3 billion in May 2013 while increasing $7.7 billion from Apr 2014 or 0.6 percent. The United States Treasury estimates US government debt held by private investors at $9800 billion in Mar 2014. China’s holding of US Treasury securities represent 13.0 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors (http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html). Min Zeng, writing on “China plays a big role as US Treasury yields fall,” on Jul 16, 2004, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-plays-a-big-role-as-u-s-treasury-yields-fall-1405545034?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj), finds that acceleration in purchases of US Treasury securities by China has been an important factor in the decline of Treasury yields in 2014. Japan increased its holdings from $1103.7 billion in May 2013 to $1220.1 billion in May 2014 or 10.5 percent. The combined holdings of China and Japan in May 2014 add to $2491 billion, which is equivalent to 25 .4 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing securities held by investors of $9800 billion in Mar 2014 (http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html). Total foreign holdings of Treasury securities rose from $5658.1 billion in May 2013 to $5976.0 billion in May 2014, or 5.6 percent. The US continues to finance its fiscal and balance of payments deficits with foreign savings (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). A point of saturation of holdings of US Treasury debt may be reached as foreign holders evaluate the threat of reduction of principal by dollar devaluation and reduction of prices by increases in yield, including possibly risk premium. Shultz et al (2012) find that the Fed financed three-quarters of the US deficit in fiscal year 2011, with foreign governments financing significant part of the remainder of the US deficit while the Fed owns one in six dollars of US national debt. Concentrations of debt in few holders are perilous because of sudden exodus in fear of devaluation and yield increases and the limit of refinancing old debt and placing new debt. In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

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Chart VI-1B, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (US), Business Days, Oct 28, 2011-Jul 18, 2014

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-3 provides three indexes of the US Dollars (USD) from Jan 4, 1995 to Jul 18, 2014

Chart VI-3A provides the overnight fed funds rate and yields of the three-month constant maturity Treasury bill, the ten-year constant maturity Treasury note and Moody’s Baa bond from Jan 4, 1995 to Jul 24, 2014. The first phase from 1995 to 2001 shows sharp trend of appreciation of the USD while interest rates remained at relatively high levels. The dollar revalued partly because of the emerging market crises that provoked inflows of financial investment into the US and partly because of a deliberate strong dollar policy. DeLong and Eichengreen (2001, 4-5) argue:

“That context was an economic and political strategy that emphasized private investment as the engine for U.S. economic growth. Both components of this term, "private" and "investment," had implications for the administration’s international economic strategy. From the point of view of investment, it was important that international events not pressure on the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, since this would have curtailed capital formation and vitiated the effects of the administration’s signature achievement: deficit reduction. A strong dollar -- or rather a dollar that was not expected to weaken -- was a key component of a policy which aimed at keeping the Fed comfortable with low interest rates. In addition, it was important to create a demand for the goods and services generated by this additional productive capacity. To the extent that this demand resided abroad, administration officials saw it as important that the process of increasing international integration, of both trade and finance, move forward for the interest of economic development in emerging markets and therefore in support of U.S. economic growth.”

The process of integration consisted of restructuring “international financial architecture” (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture: G7, IMF, BIS, Debtors and Creditors (2005)). Policy concerns subsequently shifted to the external imbalances, or current account deficits, and internal imbalances, or government deficits (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk: Dollar Devaluation and the World Economy (2007)). Fed policy consisted of lowering the policy rate or fed funds rate, which is close to the marginal cost of funding of banks, toward zero during the past decade. Near zero interest rates induce carry trades of selling dollar debt (borrowing), shorting the USD and investing in risk financial assets. Without risk aversion, near zero interest rates cause devaluation of the dollar. Chart VI-3 shows the weakening USD between the recession of 2001 and the contraction after IVQ2007. There was a flight to dollar assets and especially obligations of the US government after Sep 2008. Cochrane and Zingales (2009) show that flight was coincident with proposals of TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) to withdraw “toxic assets” in US banks (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a) and Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b)). There are shocks to globalization in the form of regulation, trade and devaluation wars and breakdown of international cooperation (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State: Vol. I (2008a), Globalization and the State: Vol. II (2008b) and Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c)). As evident in Chart VI-3A, there is no exit from near zero interest rates without a financial crisis and economic contraction, verified by the increase of interest rates from 1 percent in Jun 2004 to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target of the fed funds rate from 7.03 percent on Jul 3, 2000, to 1.00 percent on Jun 22, 2004, in pursuit of non-existing deflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-85). The FOMC implemented increments of 25 basis points of the fed funds target from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006, raising the fed funds rate to 5.25 percent on Jul 3, 2006, as shown in Chart VI-3A. The gradual exit from the first round of unconventional monetary policy from 1.00 percent in Jun 2004 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/20040630/default.htm) to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20060629a.htm) caused the financial crisis and global recession. There are conflicts on exchange rate movements among central banks. There is concern of declining inflation in the euro area and appreciation of the euro. On Jun 5, 2014, the European Central Bank introduced cuts in interest rates and a negative rate paid on deposits of banks (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605.en.html):

5 June 2014 - Monetary policy decisions

At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:

  1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 10 basis points to 0.15%, starting from the operation to be settled on 11 June 2014.
  2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 35 basis points to 0.40%, with effect from 11 June 2014.
  3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 10 basis points to -0.10%, with effect from 11 June 2014. A separate press release to be published at 3.30 p.m. CET today will provide details on the implementation of the negative deposit facility rate.”

The ECB also introduced new measures of monetary policy on Jun 5, 2014 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605_2.en.html):

5 June 2014 - ECB announces monetary policy measures to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism

In pursuing its price stability mandate, the Governing Council of the ECB has today announced measures to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism by supporting lending to the real economy. In particular, the Governing Council has decided:

  1. To conduct a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) aimed at improving bank lending to the euro area non-financial private sector [1], excluding loans to households for house purchase, over a window of two years.
  2. To intensify preparatory work related to outright purchases of asset-backed securities (ABS).”

The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi analyzed the measures at a press conference (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140605.en.html). At the press conference following the meeting of the ECB on Jul 3, 2014, Mario Draghi stated (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140703.en.html): “In fact, as I said, interest rates will stay low for an extended period of time, and the Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment to use also nonstandard, unconventional measures to cope with the risk of a too-prolonged period of time of low inflation.”

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Chart VI-3, US Dollar Currency Indexes, Jan 4, 1995-Jul 18, 2014

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

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Chart VI-3A, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, Yield of Three-Month Treasury Constant Maturity, Yield of Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Yield of Moody’s Baa Bond, Jan 4, 1995 to Jul 24, 2014

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Carry trades induced by zero interest rates increase capital flows into emerging markets that appreciate exchange rates. Portfolio reallocations away from emerging markets depreciate their exchange rates in reversals of capital flows. Chart VI-4A provides the exchange rate of the Mexican peso (MXN) per US dollar from Nov 8, 1993 to Jul 18, 2014. The first data point in Chart VI-4A is MXN 3.1520 on Nov 8, 1993. The rate devalued to 11.9760 on Nov 14, 1995 during emerging market crises in the 1990s and the increase of interest rates in the US in 1994 that stressed world financial markets (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture 2005, The Global Recession Risk 2007, 147-77). The MXN depreciated sharply to MXN 15.4060/USD on Mar 2, 2009, during the global recession. The rate moved to MXN 11.5050/USD on May 2, 2011, during the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The rate depreciated to 11.9760 on May 9, 2013. The final data point in the current flight from emerging markets is MXN 12.9610/USD on Jul 18, 2014.

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Chart VI-4A, Mexican Peso (MXN) per US Dollar (USD), Nov 8, 1993 to Jul 18, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

There are collateral effects worldwide from unconventional monetary policy. In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Professor Willem Buiter (2014Feb4), a distinguished economist currently Global Chief Economist at Citigroup (http://www.willembuiter.com/resume.pdf), writing on “The Fed’s bad manners risk offending foreigners,” on Feb 4, 2014, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fbb09572-8d8d-11e3-9dbb-00144feab7de.html#axzz2suwrwkFs), concurs with Raghuram Rajan. Buiter (2014Feb4) argues that international policy cooperation in monetary policy is both in the interest of the world and the United States. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows. In a speech at the Brookings Institution on Apr 10, 2014, Raghuram G. Rajan (2014Apr10, 1, 10) argues:

“As the world seems to be struggling back to its feet after the great financial crisis, I want to draw attention to an area we need to be concerned about: the conduct of monetary policy in this integrated world. A good way to describe the current environment is one of extreme monetary easing through unconventional policies. In a world where debt overhangs and the need for structural change constrain domestic demand, a sizeable portion of the effects of such policies spillover across borders, sometimes through a weaker exchange rate. More worryingly, it prompts a reaction. Such competitive easing occurs both simultaneously and sequentially, as I will argue, and both advanced economies and emerging economies engage in it. Aggregate world demand may be weaker and more distorted than it should be, and financial risks higher. To ensure stable and sustainable growth, the international rules of the game need to be revisited. Both advanced economies and emerging economies need to adapt, else I fear we are about to embark on the next leg of a wearisome cycle. A first step to prescribing the right medicine is to recognize the cause of the sickness. Extreme monetary easing, in my view, is more cause than medicine. The sooner we recognize that, the more sustainable world growth we will have.”

Chart VI-4B provides the rate of the Indian rupee (INR) per US dollar (USD) from Jan 2, 1973 to Jul 18, 2014. The first data point is INR 8.0200 on Jan 2, 1973. The rate depreciated sharply to INR 51.9600 on Mar 3, 2009, during the global recession. The rate appreciated to INR 44.0300/USD on Jul 28, 2011 in the midst of the sovereign debt event in the euro area. The rate overshot to INR 68.8000 on Aug 28, 2013. The final data point is INR 60.3300/USD on Jul 18, 2014.

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Chart VI-4B, Indian Rupee (INR) per US Dollar (USD), Jan 2, 1973 to Jul 18, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-5 provides the exchange rate of JPY (Japan yen) per USD (US dollars). The first data point on the extreme left is JPY 357.7300/USD for Jan 4, 1971. The JPY has appreciated over the long term relative to the USD with fluctuations along an evident long-term appreciation. Before the global recession, the JPY stood at JPY 124.0900/USD on Jun 22, 2007. The use of the JPY as safe haven is evident by sharp appreciation during the global recession to JPY 110.48/USD on Aug 15, 2008, and to JPY 87.8000/USD on Jan 21, 2009. The final data point in Chart VI-5 is JPY 101.3700/USD on Jul 18, 2014 for appreciation of 18.3 percent relative to JPY 124.0900/USD on Jun 22, 2007 before the global recession and expansion characterized by recurring bouts of risk aversion. Takashi Nakamichi and Eleanor Warnock, writing on “Japan lashes out over dollar, euro,” on Dec 29, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323530404578207440474874604.html?mod=WSJ_markets_liveupdate&mg=reno64-wsj), analyze the “war of words” launched by Japan’s new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his finance minister Taro Aso, arguing of deliberate devaluations of the USD and EUR relative to the JPY, which are hurting Japan’s economic activity. Gerard Baker and Jacob M. Shlesinger, writing on “Bank of Japan’s Kuroda signals impatience with Abe government,” on May 23, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303480304579579311491068756?KEYWORDS=bank+of+japan+kuroda&mg=reno64-wsj), analyze concerns of the Governor of the Bank of Japan Haruhiko Kuroda that the JPY has strengthened relative to the USD, partly eroding earlier depreciation. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).

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Chart VI-5, Japanese Yen JPY per US Dollars USD, Monthly, Jan 4, 1971-Jul 18, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html

Zero interest rates in the United States forever tend to depreciate the dollar against every other currency if there is no risk aversion preventing portfolio rebalancing toward risk financial assets, which include the capital markets and exchange rates of emerging-market economies. The objective of unconventional monetary policy as argued by Yellen 2011AS) is to devalue the dollar to increase net exports that increase US economic growth. Increasing net exports and internal economic activity in the US is equivalent to decreasing net exports and internal economic activity in other countries.

Continental territory, rich endowment of natural resources, investment in human capital, teaching and research universities, motivated labor force and entrepreneurial initiative provide Brazil with comparative advantages in multiple economic opportunities. Exchange rate parity is critical in achieving Brazil’s potential but is difficult in a world of zero interest rates. Chart IV-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate of Brazilian real (BRL) per US dollar (USD) from BRL 1.2074/USD on Jan 4, 1999 to BRL 2.2326/USD on Jul 18, 2014. The rate reached BRL 3.9450/USD on Oct 10, 2002 appreciating 60.5 percent to BRL 1.5580/USD on Aug 1, 2008. The rate depreciated 68.1 percent to BRL 2.6187/USD on Dec 5, 2008 during worldwide flight from risk. The rate appreciated again by 41.3 percent to BRL 1.5375/USD on Jul 26, 2011. The final data point in Chart VI-6 is BRL 2.2326/USD on Jul 18, 2014 for depreciation of 45.2 percent. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).

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Chart VI-6, Brazilian Real (BRL) per US Dollar (USD) Jan 4, 1999 to Jul 18, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the history of the BRL beginning with the first data point of BRL 0.8440/USD on Jan 2, 1995. The rate jumped to BRL 2.0700/USD on Jan 29, 1999 after changes in exchange rate policy and then to BRL 2.2000/USD on Mar 3, 1999. The rate depreciated 26.7 percent to BRL 2.7880/USD on Sep 21, 2001 relative to Mar 3, 1999.

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Chart VI-7, Brazilian Real (BRL) per US Dollar (USD), Jan 2, 1995 to Jul 18, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

The major reason and channel of transmission of unconventional monetary policy is through expectations of inflation. Fisher (1930) provided theoretical and historical relation of interest rates and inflation. Let in be the nominal interest rate, ir the real or inflation-adjusted interest rate and πe the expectation of inflation in the time term of the interest rate, which are all expressed as proportions. The following expression provides the relation of real and nominal interest rates and the expectation of inflation:

(1 + ir) = (1 + in)/(1 + πe) (1)

That is, the real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate discounted by the expectation of inflation in time term of the interest rate. Fisher (1933) analyzed the devastating effect of deflation on debts. Nominal debt contracts remained at original principal interest but net worth and income of debtors contracted during deflation. Real interest rates increase during declining inflation. For example, if the interest rate is 3 percent and prices decline 0.2 percent, equation (1) calculates the real interest rate as:

(1 +0.03)/(1 – 0.02) = 1.03/(0.998) = 1.032

That is, the real rate of interest is (1.032 – 1) 100 or 3.2 percent. If inflation were 2 percent, the real rate of interest would be 0.98 percent, or about 1.0 percent {[(1.03/1.02) -1]100 = 0.98%}.

The yield of the one-year Treasury security was quoted in the Wall Street Journal at 0.114 percent on Fri May 17, 2013 (http://online.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_topnav_marketdata_main). The expected rate of inflation πe in the next twelve months is not observed. Assume that it would be equal to the rate of inflation in the past twelve months estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BLS) at 1.1 percent (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The real rate of interest would be obtained as follows:

(1 + 0.00114)/(1 + 0.011) = (1 + rr) = 0.9902

That is, ir is equal to 1 – 0.9902 or minus 0.98 percent. Investing in a one-year Treasury security results in a loss of 0.98 percent relative to inflation. The objective of unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates is to induce consumption and investment because of the loss to inflation of riskless financial assets. Policy would be truly irresponsible if it intended to increase inflationary expectations or πe. The result could be the same rate of unemployment with higher inflation (Kydland and Prescott 1977).

Current focus is on tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases of $35 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed

(http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140618a.htm):

““The Committee currently judges that there is sufficient underlying strength in the broader economy to support ongoing improvement in labor market conditions. In light of the cumulative progress toward maximum employment and the improvement in the outlook for labor market conditions since the inception of the current asset purchase program, the Committee decided to make a further measured reduction in the pace of its asset purchases. Beginning in July, the Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $15 billion per month rather than $20 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $20 billion per month rather than $25 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee's sizable and still-increasing holdings of longer-term securities should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative, which in turn should promote a stronger economic recovery and help to ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with the Committee's dual mandate.”

What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jun 18, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140618a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate. In determining how long to maintain the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess progress--both realized and expected--toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored” (emphasis added).

How long is “considerable time”? At the press conference following the meeting on Mar 19, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question of Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal explaining “In particular, the Committee has endorsed the view that it anticipates that will be a considerable period after the asset purchase program ends before it will be appropriate to begin to raise rates. And of course on our present path, well, that's not utterly preset. We would be looking at next, next fall. So, I think that's important guidance” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140319.pdf). Many focused on “next fall,” ignoring that the path of increasing rates is not “utterly preset.”

At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):

“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.

Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.

Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”

Chair Yellen analyzes the view of inflation (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140416a.htm):

“Inflation, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, has slowed from an annual rate of about 2-1/2 percent in early 2012 to less than 1 percent in February of this year. This rate is well below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective. Many advanced economies are observing a similar softness in inflation.

To some extent, the low rate of inflation seems due to influences that are likely to be temporary, including a deceleration in consumer energy prices and outright declines in core import prices in recent quarters. Longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably steady, however. We anticipate that, as the effects of transitory factors subside and as labor market gains continue, inflation will gradually move back toward 2 percent.”

There is a critical phrase in the statement of Sep 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm): “but mortgage rates have risen further.” Did the increase of mortgage rates influence the decision of the FOMC not to taper? Is FOMC “communication” and “guidance” successful? Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?

At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:

“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.

For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”

In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):

“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability.  If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.  In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that it does not run persistently above or below that level (emphasis added).”

In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm):

“The economy has continued to recover from the steep recession of 2008 and 2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth stepped up to an average annual rate of about 3-1/4 percent over the second half of last year, a faster pace than in the first half and during the preceding two years. Although real GDP growth is currently estimated to have paused in the first quarter of this year, I see that pause as mostly reflecting transitory factors, including the effects of the unusually cold and snowy winter weather. With the harsh winter behind us, many recent indicators suggest that a rebound in spending and production is already under way, putting the overall economy on track for solid growth in the current quarter. One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.

Conditions in the labor market have continued to improve. The unemployment rate was 6.3 percent in April, about 1-1/4 percentage points below where it was a year ago. Moreover, gains in payroll employment averaged nearly 200,000 jobs per month over the past year. During the economic recovery so far, payroll employment has increased by about 8-1/2 million jobs since its low point, and the unemployment rate has declined about 3-3/4 percentage points since its peak.

While conditions in the labor market have improved appreciably, they are still far from satisfactory. Even with recent declines in the unemployment rate, it continues to be elevated. Moreover, both the share of the labor force that has been unemployed for more than six months and the number of individuals who work part time but would prefer a full-time job are at historically high levels. In addition, most measures of labor compensation have been rising slowly--another signal that a substantial amount of slack remains in the labor market.

Inflation has been quite low even as the economy has continued to expand. Some of the factors contributing to the softness in inflation over the past year, such as the declines seen in non-oil import prices, will probably be transitory. Importantly, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained stable. That said, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recognizes that inflation persistently below 2 percent--the rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its dual mandate--could pose risks to economic performance, and we are monitoring inflation developments closely.

Looking ahead, I expect that economic activity will expand at a somewhat faster pace this year than it did last year, that the unemployment rate will continue to decline gradually, and that inflation will begin to move up toward 2 percent. A faster rate of economic growth this year should be supported by reduced restraint from changes in fiscal policy, gains in household net worth from increases in home prices and equity values, a firming in foreign economic growth, and further improvements in household and business confidence as the economy continues to strengthen. Moreover, U.S. financial conditions remain supportive of growth in economic activity and employment.”

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (10

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/global-financial-instability-recovery.html). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. The current reality is cyclical slow growth.

In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:

“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.

The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”

Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) is that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This is a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.

A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html).

Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 17,100.18 on Fr Jul 18, 2014, which is higher by 20.7 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 20.4 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs. Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):

So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).

In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):

“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”

Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:

“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).

Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:

“Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).

Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor (1993, 1998LB, 1999, 1998LB, 1999, 2007JH, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012JMCB, 2014Jan3) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html).

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. The DJIA has increased 75.1 percent since the trough of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe on Jul 2, 2010 to Jul 25, 2014; S&P 500 has gained 93.5 percent and DAX 70.1 percent. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 7/25/14” had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 followed by negative performance but now some valuations of equity indexes show varying behavior. China’s Shanghai Composite is 10.8 percent below the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 75.2 percent above the trough. DJ Asia Pacific TSM is 34.4 percent above the trough. Dow Global is 54.5 percent above the trough. STOXX 50 of 50 blue-chip European equities (http://www.stoxx.com/indices/index_information.html?symbol=sx5E) is 31.8 percent above the trough. NYSE Financial Index is 54.2 percent above the trough. DAX index of German equities (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DAX:IND) is 70.1 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 75.2 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 35.7 percent above the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 15,457.87 on Fri Jul 25, 2014 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 50.7 percent higher than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar depreciated by 12.7 percent relative to the euro and even higher before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 7/25/14” in Table VI-4 shows increase of 3.3 percent in the week for China’s Shanghai Composite. DJ Asia Pacific increased 1.4 percent. NYSE Financial increased 0.2 percent in the week. Dow Global increased 0.4 percent in the week of Jul 25, 2014. The DJIA decreased 0.8 percent and S&P 500 changed 0.0 percent. DAX of Germany decreased 0.8 percent. STOXX 50 increased 0.6 percent. The USD appreciated 0.7 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table VI-4 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 7/25/14” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to Jul 25, 2014. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 7/25/14” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 7/25/14.” There are now several equity indexes above the peak in Table VI-4: DJIA 51.4 percent, S&P 500 62.5 percent, DAX 52.3 percent, Dow Global 26.1 percent, DJ Asia Pacific 17.6 percent, NYSE Financial Index (http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/nykid.shtml) 22.8 percent, Nikkei Average 35.7 percent and STOXX 50 11.6 percent. There is only one equity index below the peak: Shanghai Composite by 32.8 percent. The US dollar strengthened 11.2 percent relative to the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010. Tom Lauricella, writing on Mar 31, 2014, on “Stock investors see hints of a stronger quarter,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304157204579473513864900656?mod=WSJ_smq0314_LeadStory&mg=reno64-wsj), finds views of stronger earnings among many money managers with positive factors for equity markets in continuing low interest rates and US economic growth. There is important information in the Quarterly Markets review of the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/public/page/quarterly-markets-review-03312014.html) foir IQ2014. Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. Future company cash flows derive from investment projects. In IQ1980, gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of chained 2009 dollars, growing to $1,174.6 billion in IIIQ1987 or 23.4 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US decreased 1.7 percent from $2,605.2 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,562.1 billion in IQ2014. As shown in Table IAI-2, real private fixed investment fell 3.3 percent from $2,586.3 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,499.9 billion in IQ2014. Growth of real private investment in Table IA1-2 is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012

(Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-instability-mediocre-cyclical.html). The investment decision of United States corporations has been fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash. Undistributed corporate profits swelled 294.4 percent from $107.7 billion in IQ2007 to $424.8 billion in IQ2014 and changed signs from minus $55.9 billion in current dollars in IVQ2007. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell $26.6 billion in IQ2013 after increasing $34.9 billion in IVQ2012 and $13.9 billion in IIIQ2012. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA rebounded with $66.8 billion in IIQ2013 and $39.2 billion in IIIQ2013. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $47.1 billion in IVQ2013. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell $198.3 billion in IQ2014. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA fell $1.7 billion in IQ2013 after increasing $40.8 billion in IVQ2012 and $4.5 billion in IIIQ2012. In IIQ2013, profits after tax with IVA and CCA increased $56.9 billion and $39.5 billion in IIIQ2013. In IVQ2013, profits after tax with IVA and CCA increased $33.8 billion. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA fell at $226.0 billion in IQ2014. Anticipation of higher taxes in the “fiscal cliff” episode caused increase of $120.9 billion in net dividends in IVQ2012 followed with adjustment in the form of decrease of net dividends by $103.8 billion in IQ2013, rebounding with $273.5 billion in IIQ2013. Net dividends fell at $179.0 billion in IIIQ2013 and increased at $90.5 billion in IVQ2013. Net dividends fell at $87.1 billion in IQ2014. There is similar decrease of $80.1 billion in undistributed profits with IVA and CCA in IVQ2012 followed by increase of $102.1 billion in IQ2013 and decline of $216.6 billion in IIQ2013. Undistributed profits with IVA and CCA rose at $218.6 billion in IIIQ2013 and fell at $56.7 billion in IVQ2013. Undistributed corporate profits swelled 294.4 percent from $107.7 billion in IQ2007 to $424.8 billion in IQ2014 and changed signs from minus $55.9 billion in current dollars in IVQ2007 (Section IA2). In IQ2013, corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment fell $26.6 billion relative to IVQ2012, from $2047.2 billion to $2020.6 billion at the quarterly rate of minus 1.3 percent. In IIQ2013, corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $66.8 billion from $2020.6 billion in IQ2013 to $2087.4 billion at the SAAR of 3.3 percent. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $39.2 billion from $2087.4 billion in IIQ2013 to $2126.6 billion in IIIQ2013 at the SAAR of 1.9 percent. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased at $47.1 billion in IVQ2013 from $2126.6 billion in IIIQ2013 to $2173.7 billion in IVQ2013 at the SAAR of 2.2 percent. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell at $198.3 billion from $2173.7 billion in IVQ2013 to $1975.4 billion in IQ2014 at the SAAR of minus 9.1 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp1q14_2nd.pdf). The investment decision of US business is fractured. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

clip_image020

Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

clip_image021

declines. Equally, decline in expected revenue from the stock or project, Rτ, causes decline in valuation.

An intriguing issue is the difference in performance of valuations of risk financial assets and economic growth and employment. Paul A. Samuelson (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1970/samuelson-bio.html) popularized the view of the elusive relation between stock markets and economic activity in an often-quoted phrase “the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions.” In the presence of zero interest rates forever, valuations of risk financial assets are likely to differ from the performance of the overall economy. The interrelations of financial and economic variables prove difficult to analyze and measure.

Table VI-4, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and 10-Year Treasury  

 

Peak

Trough

∆% to Trough

∆% Peak to 7/25/

/14

∆% Week 7/25/14

∆% Trough to 7/25/

14

DJIA

4/26/
10

7/2/10

-13.6

51.4

-0.8

75.1

S&P 500

4/23/
10

7/20/
10

-16.0

62.5

0.0

93.5

NYSE Finance

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-20.3

22.8

0.2

54.2

Dow Global

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-18.4

26.1

0.4

54.5

Asia Pacific

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-12.5

17.6

1.4

34.4

Japan Nikkei Aver.

4/05/
10

8/31/
10

-22.5

35.7

1.6

75.2

China Shang.

4/15/
10

7/02
/10

-24.7

-32.8

3.3

-10.8

STOXX 50

4/15/10

7/2/10

-15.3

11.6

0.6

31.8

DAX

4/26/
10

5/25/
10

-10.5

52.3

-0.8

70.1

Dollar
Euro

11/25 2009

6/7
2010

21.2

11.2

0.7

-12.7

DJ UBS Comm.

1/6/
10

7/2/10

-14.5

NA

NA

NA

10-Year T Note

4/5/
10

4/6/10

3.986

2.784

2.464

 

T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

ESII World Inflation Waves. Table IA-1 provides annual equivalent rates of inflation for producer price indexes followed in this blog of countries and regions that account for close to three quarters of world output. The behavior of the US producer price index in 2011 and into 2012-2014 shows neatly multiple waves. (1) In Jan-Apr 2011, without risk aversion, US producer prices rose at the annual equivalent rate of 10.4 percent. (2) After risk aversion, producer prices increased in the US at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2011. (3) From Jul to Sep 2011, under alternating episodes of risk aversion, producer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 4.1 percent. (4) Under the pressure of risk aversion because of the European debt crisis, US producer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of minus 0.4 percent in Oct-Dec 2011. (5) Inflation of producer prices returned with 2.8 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Mar 2012. (6) With return of risk aversion from the European debt crisis, producer prices fell at the annual equivalent rate of 4.1 percent in Apr-May 2012. (7) New positions in commodity futures even with continuing risk aversion caused annual equivalent inflation of 0.6 percent in Jun-Jul 2012. (8) Relaxed risk aversion because of announcement of sovereign bond buying by the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html) induced carry trades that resulted in annual equivalent producer price inflation in the US of 12.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2012. (9) Renewed risk aversion caused unwinding of carry trades of zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures with annual equivalent inflation of minus 2.8 percent in Oct-Dec 2012. (10) In Jan-Feb 2013, producer prices rose at the annual equivalent rate of 6.2 percent with more relaxed risk aversion at the margin. (11) Return of risk aversion resulted in annual equivalent inflation of minus 6.4 percent in Mar-Apr 2013 with worldwide portfolio reallocation toward equities and high-yield bonds and away from commodity exposures. (12) Inflation of producer prices returned at 4.0 percent in annual equivalent in May-Aug 2013. (13) Continuing reallocation of investment portfolios away from commodities into equities is causing downward pressure on prices. In Sep-Nov 2013, the US producer price index changed at the annual equivalent rate of 0.0 percent. (14) Renewed carry trades caused annual equivalent inflation of 4.9 percent in US producer prices in Dec 2013-Feb 2014. (15) Annual equivalent inflation of producer prices was minus 0.0 percent in Mar 2014. (16) Annual equivalent inflation of producer prices jumped at 5.7 percent in Apr-Jun 2014. Resolution of the European debt crisis if there is not an unfavorable growth event with political development in China would result in jumps of valuations of risk financial assets. Increases in commodity prices would cause the same high producer price inflation experienced in Jan-Apr 2011 and Aug-Sep 2012. An episode of exploding commodity prices could ignite inflationary expectations that would result in an inflation phenomenon of costly resolution. There are ten producer-price indexes in Table IA-1 for seven countries (two for the US and two for the UK) and one region (euro area) showing very similar behavior. Zero interest rates without risk aversion cause increases in commodity prices that in turn increase input prices at a faster pace than output prices. Producer price inflation rose at very high rates during the first part of 2011 for the US, Japan, China, Euro Area, Germany, France, Italy and the UK when risk aversion was contained. With the increase in risk aversion in May and Jun 2011, inflation moderated because carry trades were unwound. Producer price inflation returned after Jul 2011, with alternating bouts of risk aversion. In the final months of the year producer price inflation collapsed because of the disincentive to exposures in commodity futures resulting from fears of resolution of the European debt crisis. There is renewed worldwide inflation in the early part of 2012 with subsequent collapse because of another round of sharp risk aversion and relative portfolio reallocation away from commodities and into equities and high-yield bonds. Sharp worldwide jump in producer prices occurred recently because of zero interest rates forever or QE with temporarily relaxed risk aversion. Producer prices were moderating or falling in the final months of 2012 because of renewed risk aversion that causes unwinding of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures. In the first months of 2013, new carry trades caused higher worldwide inflation. Inflation of producer prices returned in the US and Japan in Dec 2013-Jan 2014. Lower inflation recently originates in portfolio reallocations away from commodity exposures into equities. Unconventional monetary policy fails in stimulating the overall real economy, merely introducing undesirable instability because monetary authorities cannot control allocation of floods of money at zero interest rates to carry trades into risk financial assets. The economy is constrained in a suboptimal allocation of resources that monetary policy perpetuates along a continuum of short-term periods. The result is long-term or dynamic inefficiency in the form of a trajectory of economic activity that is lower than what would be attained with rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html) Inflation of producer prices returned in the US and Japan in Dec 2013-Jan 2014 and fell in Mar 2014 as part of the general instability of economic and financial variables. Inflation returned in

Apr-Jun 2014 with reallocations of portfolios toward commodities during various geopolitical events.

Table IA-1, Annual Equivalent Rates of Producer Price Indexes

INDEX 2011-2014

AE ∆%

US Producer Finished Goods Price Index

 

AE  ∆% Apr-Jun 2014

5.7

AE  ∆% Mar 2014

0.0

AE  ∆% Dec 2013-Feb 2014

4.9

AE  ∆% Sep-Nov 2013

0.0

AE  ∆% May-Aug 2013

4.0

AE  ∆% Mar-Apr 2013

-6.4

AE  ∆% Jan-Feb 2013

6.2

AE  ∆% Oct-Dec 2012

-2.8

AE  ∆% Aug-Sep 2012

12.7

AE  ∆% Jun-Jul 2012

0.6

AE  ∆% Apr-May 2012

-4.1

AE  ∆% Jan-Mar 2012

2.8

AE  ∆% Oct-Dec 2011

-0.4

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011

4.1

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

1.2

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

10.4

US Final Demand Producer Price Index

 

AE  ∆% Mar-Jun 2014

2.7

AE  ∆% Dec 2013-Feb 2014

2.0

AE  ∆% Sep-Nov 2013

1.6

AE  ∆% May-Aug 2013

1.8

AE  ∆% Mar-Apr 2013

-0.6

AE  ∆% Jan-Feb 2013

1.8

AE  ∆% Oct-Dec 2012

1.2

AE  ∆% Aug-Sep 2012

5.5

AE  ∆% Jun-Jul 2012

-1.2

AE  ∆% Apr-May 2012

0.6

AE  ∆% Jan-Mar 2012

3.7

AE  ∆% Oct-Dec 2011

-0.8

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011

3.2

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

2.4

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

7.1

Japan Corporate Goods Price Index

 

AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2014

14.4

AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2014

-0.6

AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014

2.4

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013

-0.6

AE ∆% Dec 2012-Sep 2013

3.3

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2012

-3.0

AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012

2.4

AE ∆%  May-Jul 2012

-5.5

AE ∆%  Feb-Apr 2012

2.0

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012

-0.6

AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011

-2.1

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

-1.2

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

5.8

China Producer Price Index

 

AE ∆% Oct 2013-Jun 2014

-1.5

AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2013

1.8

AE ∆% Mar-Jul 2013

-4.9

AE ∆% Jan-Feb  2013

2.4

AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012

-1.2

AE ∆% Oct 2012

2.4

AE ∆% May-Sep 2012

-5.8

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

2.4

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012

-2.4

AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011

-3.1

AE ∆% Jan-Jun 2011

6.4

Euro Zone Industrial Producer Prices

 

AE ∆% Jan-May 2014

-2.1

AE ∆% Dec 2013

2.4

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013

-3.0

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2013

1.6

AE ∆% Mar-Jun 2013

-3.5

AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2013

2.4

AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012

-2.4

AE ∆% Sep-Oct 2012

0.6

AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012

6.8

AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012

-2.4

AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012

7.9

AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011

0.4

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011

2.4

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

-0.6

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

11.3

Germany Producer Price Index

 

AE ∆% Jan-Jun 2014

-1.4 NSA -1.2 SA

AE ∆% Dec 2013

1.2 NSA 2.4 SA

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013

-1.8 NSA –1.8 SA

AE ∆% Sep 2013

3.7 NSA 0.0 SA

AE ∆% May-Aug 2013

-1.8 NSA –0.6 SA

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2013

-2.4 NSA –2.4 SA

AE ∆% Jan 2013

7.4 NSA 2.4 SA

AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2012

-0.8 NSA 0.8 SA

AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012

4.3 NSA 2.4 SA

AE ∆% May-Jul 2012

-2.8 NSA 0.0 SA

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

4.9 NSA 2.4 SA

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012

0.0 NSA –0.6 SA

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011

0.6 NSA 1.8 SA

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011

2.4 NSA 3.2 SA

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

0.6 NSA 3.7 SA

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

10.4 NSA 6.2 SA

France Producer Price Index for the French Market

 

AE ∆% Jan-May 2014

-4.5

AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2013

4.9

AE ∆% Oct 2013

-2.4

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2013

4.5

AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2013

-10.7

AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2013

4.9

AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012

-4.1

AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2012

7.4

AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012

-4.3

AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012

6.2

AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011

2.8

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011

3.7

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

-1.8

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

10.4

Italy Producer Price Index

 

AE ∆% Oct 2013-May 2014

-2.7

AE ∆% Jun-Sep 2013

0.3

AE ∆% Apr-May 2013

-3.5

AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2013

1.2

AE ∆% Sep 2012-Jan 2013

-5.2

AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012

9.4

AE ∆% May-Jun 2012

-0.6

AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2012

6.8

AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2012

8.1

AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011

2.0

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011

4.9

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

1.8

AE ∆% Jan-April 2011

10.7

UK Output Prices

 

AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2014

-0.8

AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2014

2.0

AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2013

-1.5

AE ∆% Jun-Aug 2013

2.0

AE ∆% Apr-May 2013

-0.6

AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2013

4.9

AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012

-2.4

AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2012

3.0

AE ∆% May-Jun 2012

-3.5

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

5.3

AE ∆% Nov 2011-Jan-2012

1.2

AE ∆% May-Oct 2011

1.6

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

10.0

UK Input Prices

 

AE ∆% Jan-Jun 2014

-6.2

AE ∆% Dec 2013

3.7

AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2013

-8.4

AE ∆% Jul 2013

18.2

AE ∆% Mar-Jun 2013

-9.5

AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2013

24.6

AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2012

3.0

AE ∆% Aug 2012

23.9

AE ∆% Apr-Jul 2012

-16.1

AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012

14.9

AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2011

0.0

AE ∆% May-Oct 2011

-1.3

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

30.6

AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2010

31.8

AE: Annual Equivalent

Sources: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ http://www.boj.or.jp/en/

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html

http://www.insee.fr/en/default.asp

http://www.istat.it/en/

http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html

Similar world inflation waves are in the behavior of consumer price indexes of six countries and the euro zone in Table IA-2. US consumer price inflation shows similar waves. (1) Under risk appetite in Jan-Apr 2011, consumer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. (2) Risk aversion caused the collapse of inflation to annual equivalent 2.4 percent in May-Jun 2011. (3) Risk appetite drove the rate of consumer price inflation in the US to 3.2 percent in Jul-Sep 2011. (4) Gloomier views of carry trades caused the collapse of inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 to annual equivalent 1.2 percent. (5) Consumer price inflation resuscitated with increased risk appetite at annual equivalent of 1.8 percent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. (6) Consumer price inflation returned at 2.8 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Apr 2012. (7) Under renewed risk aversion, annual equivalent consumer price inflation in the US was minus 0.4 percent in May-Jul 2012. (8) Inflation jumped to annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. (9) Unwinding of carry trades caused negative annual equivalent inflation of minus 0.4 percent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 but some countries experienced higher inflation in Dec 2012 and Jan 2013. (10) Inflation jumped again with annual equivalent inflation of 7.4 percent in Feb 2013 in a mood of relaxed risk aversion. (11) Inflation fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Mar-Apr 2013. (12) Inflation rose at 2.2 percent in annual equivalent in May-Sep 2013. (13) Inflation moderated at the annual equivalent rate of 0.6 percent in Oct-Nov 2013. (14) Inflation stood at annual equivalent 1.8 percent in Dec 2013-Mae 2014. (5) Inflation returned at annual equivalent 4.1 percent in Apr-Jun 2014. Inflationary expectations can be triggered in one of these episodes of accelerating inflation because of commodity carry trades induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates in perpetuity or QEin almost continuous time. Alternating episodes of increase and decrease of inflation introduce uncertainty in household planning that frustrates consumption and home buying. Announcement of purchases of impaired sovereign bonds by the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html) relaxed risk aversion that induced carry trades into commodity exposures, increasing prices of food, raw materials and energy. There is similar behavior in the other consumer price indexes in Table IA-2. China’s CPI increased at annual equivalent 8.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2011, 2.0 percent in Apr-Jun, 2.9 percent in Jul-Nov and resuscitated at 5.8 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Mar 2012, declining to minus 3.9 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but resuscitating at 4.1 percent in Jul-Sep 2012, declining to minus 1.2 percent in Oct 2012 and 0.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2012. High inflation in China at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Nov-Dec 2012 is attributed to inclement winter weather that caused increases in food prices. Continuing pressure of food prices caused annual equivalent inflation of 12.2 percent in China in Dec 2012 to Feb 2013. Inflation in China fell at annual equivalent 10.3 percent in Mar 2013 and increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Apr 2013. Adjustment to lower food prices caused annual equivalent inflation of minus 7.0 percent in May 2013 and minus 3.5 percent in annual equivalent in May-Jun 2013. Inflation in China returned at annual equivalent 4.6 percent in Jul-Oct 2013, falling at 1.2 percent in annual equivalent in Nov 2013. As in many countries, inflation in China surged at 7.4 percent annual equivalent in Dec 201-Feb 2014 with significant effects of local increases in food prices. Annual equivalent inflation in China fell at 4.7 percent in Mar-Apr 2014 and increased at 1.2 percent in May 2014. China’s inflation fell at annual equivalent 1.2 percent in Jun 2014. The euro zone harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) increased at annual equivalent 5.2 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, minus 2.4 percent in May-Jul 2011, 4.3 percent in Aug-Dec 2011, minus 3.0 percent in Dec 2011-Jan 2012 and then 9.6 percent in Feb-Apr 2012, falling to minus 2.8 percent annual equivalent in May-Jul 2012 but resuscitating at 5.3 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. The shock of risk aversion forced minus 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2012. As in several European countries, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 4.9 percent in the euro area in Dec 2012. The HICP price index fell at annual equivalent 11.4 percent in Jan 2013 and increased at 10.0 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. As in most countries and regions, euro zone inflation fell at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent in Apr 2013. Prices in the euro zone rose at 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2013. Inflation in the euro zone fell at annual equivalent 5.8 percent in Jul 2013. Inflation returned in the euro zone at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2013. Euro zone inflation fell at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent in Oct-Nov 2013. Euro zone inflation jumped at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2013 as in many countries worldwide. Inflation in the euro zone fell at annual equivalent 12.4 percent in Dec 2013 and increased at annual equivalent 5.7 percent in Feb-Apr 2014. Inflation in the euro zone fell at 1.2 percent in May 2014 and increased at 1.2 percent in Jun 2014. The price indexes of the largest members of the euro zone, Germany, France and Italy, and the euro zone as a whole, exhibit the same inflation waves. The United Kingdom CPI increased at annual equivalent 6.5 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, falling to only 0.4 percent in May-Jul 2011 and then increasing at 4.6 percent in Aug-Nov 2011. UK consumer prices fell at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 but increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent from Feb to Apr 2012. In May-Jun 2012, with renewed risk aversion, UK consumer prices fell at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the UK at average annual equivalent of 4.5 percent in Jul-Dec 2012 with inflation in Oct 2012 caused mostly by increases of university tuition fees. Inflation returned at 4.5 percent annual equivalent in Jul-Dec 2012 and was higher in annual equivalent inflation of producer prices in the UK in Jul-Oct 2012 at 3.0 percent for output prices and 23.9 percent for input prices in Aug 2012 (see Table IA-1). Consumer prices in the UK fell at annual equivalent 5.8 percent in Jan 2013. Inflation returned in the UK with annual equivalent 4.3 percent in Feb-May 2013 and fell at 1.2 percent in Jun-Jul 2013. UK annual equivalent inflation returned at 3.4 percent in Aug-Dec 2013. CPI inflation fell at annual equivalent 7.0 percent in Jan 2014. Consumer price inflation in the UK returned at annual equivalent 4.5 percent in Feb-Apr 2014. UK consumer prices fell at annual equivalent 1.2 percent in May 2014 and increased at 2.4 percent in Jun 2014.

Table IA-2, Annual Equivalent Rates of Consumer Price Indexes

Index 2011-2014

AE ∆%

US Consumer Price Index 

 

AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2014

4.1

AE ∆% Dec 2013-Mar 2014

1.8

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013

0.6

AE ∆% May-Sep 2013

2.2

AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2013

-2.4

AE ∆% Feb 2013

7.4

AE ∆% Nov 2012-Jan 2013

-0.4

AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012

4.9

AE ∆% May-Jul 2012

-0.4

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

2.8

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan  2012

1.8

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011

1.2

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011

3.2

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

2.4

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

4.9

China Consumer Price Index

 

AE ∆% Jun 2014

-1.2

AE ∆% May 2014

1.2

AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2014

-4.7

AE ∆% Dec 2013-Feb 2014

7.4

AE ∆% Nov 2013

-1.2

AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2013

4.6

AE ∆% May-Jun 2013

-3.5

AE ∆% Apr 2013

2.4

AE ∆% Mar 2013

-10.3

AE ∆% Dec 2012-Feb 2013

12.2

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2012

0.0

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2012

4.1

AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012

-3.9

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Mar 2012

5.8

AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011

2.9

AE ∆% Apr-Jun

2.0

AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2011

8.3

Euro Zone Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices

 

AE ∆% Jun 2014

1.2

AE ∆% May 2014

-1.2

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2014

5.7

AE ∆% Jan 2014

-12.4

AE ∆% Dec 2013

4.9

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013

-2.4

AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2013

3.7

AE ∆% Jul 2013

-5.8

AE ∆% May-Jun 2013

1.2

AE ∆% Apr 2013

-1.2

AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2013

10.0

AE ∆% Jan 2013

-11.4

AE ∆% Dec 2012

4.9

AE ∆% Nov 2012

-2.4

AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012

5.3

AE ∆% May-Jul 2012

-2.8

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

9.6

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012

-3.0

AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011

4.3

AE ∆% May-Jul 2011

-2.4

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

5.2

Germany Consumer Price Index

 

AE ∆% Jun 2014

3.7 NSA 2.4 SA

AE ∆% Apr-May 2014

-1.8 NSA 0.6 SA

AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2014

4.9 NSA 0.0 SA

AE ∆% Jan 2014

-7.0 NSA 0.0 SA

AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2013

3.7 NSA 2.4 SA

AE ∆% Oct 2013

-2.4 NSA 0.0 SA

AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2013

0.0 NSA 0.0 SA

AE ∆% May-Jul 2013

4.1 NSA 3.2 SA

AE ∆% Apr 2013

-5.8 NSA 0.0 SA

AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2013

6.8 NSA 1.2 SA

AE ∆% Jan 2013

-5.8 NSA 0.0 SA

AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2012

1.5 NSA 1.5 SA

AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012

4.9 NSA 3.0 SA

AE ∆% May-Jun 2012

-1.2 NSA  0.6 SA

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

4.5 NSA 2.4 SA

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012

0.6 NSA 1.8 SA

AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011

1.7 NSA 1.9 SA

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

0.6 NSA 3.0 SA

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2011

3.0 NSA 2.4 SA

France Consumer Price Index

 

AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2014

0.0

AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2014

6.8

AE ∆% Jan 2014

-7.0

AE ∆% Dec 2013

3.7

AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2013

-1.6

AE ∆% Aug 2013

6.2

AE ∆% Jul 2013

-3.5

AE ∆% May-Jun 2013

1.8

AE ∆% Apr 2013

-1.2

AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2013

6.8

AE ∆% Nov 2012-Jan 2013

-1.6

AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012

2.8

AE ∆% May-Jul 2012

-2.4

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

5.3

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012

0.0

AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011

3.0

AE ∆% May-Jul 2011

-1.2

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

4.3

Italy Consumer Price Index

 

AE ∆% Jun 2014

1.2

AE ∆% May 2014

-1.2

AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2014

1.8

AE ∆% Feb 2014

-1.2

AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014

2.4

AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2013

-3.2

AE ∆% Dec 2012-Aug 2013

2.0

AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2012

-0.8

AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012

3.0

AE ∆% May-Jun 2012

1.2

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

5.7

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012

4.3

AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011

3.0

AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011

2.4

AE ∆% May-Jun 2011

1.2

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

4.9

UK Consumer Price Index

 

AE ∆% Jun 2014

2.4

AE ∆% May 2014

-1.2

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

4.5

AE ∆% Jan 2014

-7.0

AE ∆% Aug-Dec 2013

3.4

AE ∆% Jun-Jul 2013

-1.2

AE ∆% Feb-May 2013

4.3

AE ∆% Jan 2013

-5.8

AE ∆% Jul-Dec 2012

4.5

AE ∆% May-Jun 2012

-3.0

AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012

6.2

AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012

-0.6

AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011

4.6

AE ∆% May-Jul 2011

0.4

AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011

6.5

AE: Annual Equivalent

Sources: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ http://www.boj.or.jp/en/

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html

http://www.insee.fr/en/default.asp

http://www.istat.it/en/

http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html

ESIII United States Inflation. Chart I-12 provides the consumer price index NSA from 1915 to 2014. The dominating characteristic is the increase in slope during the Great Inflation from the middle of the 1960s through the 1970s. There is long-term inflation in the US and no evidence of deflation risks.

clip_image022

Chart I-12, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 1915-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-13 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 1915 to 2014. The only episode of deflation after 1950 is in 2009, which is explained by the reversal of speculative commodity futures carry trades that were induced by interest rates driven to zero in a shock of monetary policy in 2008. The only persistent case of deflation is from 1930 to 1933, which has little if any relevance to the contemporary United States economy. There are actually three waves of inflation in the second half of the 1960s, in the mid-1970s and again in the late 1970s. Inflation rates then stabilized in a range with only two episodes above 5 percent.

clip_image023

Chart I-13, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, 12- Month Percentage Change 1915-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Table I-2 provides annual percentage changes of United States consumer price inflation from 1914 to 2013. There have been only cases of annual declines of the CPI after wars: (1)

  • World War I minus 10.5 percent in 1921 and minus 6.1 percent in 1922 following cumulative increases of 83.5 percent in four years from 1917 to 1920 at the average of 16.4 percent per year
  • World War II: minus 1.2 percent in 1949 following cumulative 33.9 percent in three years from 1946 to 1948 at average 10.2 percent per year
  • Minus 0.4 percent in 1955 two years after the end of the Korean War
  • Minus 0.4 percent in 2009.
  • The decline of 0.4 percent in 2009 followed increase of 3.8 percent in 2008 and is explained by the reversal of speculative carry trades into commodity futures that were created in 2008 as monetary policy rates were driven to zero. The reversal occurred after misleading statement on toxic assets in banks in the proposal for TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009).

There were declines of 1.7 percent in both 1927 and 1928 during the episode of revival of rules of the gold standard. The only persistent deflationary period since 1914 was during the Great Depression in the years from 1930 to 1933 and again in 1938-1939. Fear of deflation on the basis of that experience does not justify unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates that has failed to stop deflation in Japan. Financial repression causes far more adverse effects on allocation of resources by distorting the calculus of risk/returns than alleged employment-creating effects or there would not be current recovery without jobs and hiring after zero interest rates since Dec 2008 and intended now forever in a self-imposed forecast growth and employment mandate of monetary policy. Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.

Table I-2, US, Annual CPI Inflation ∆% 1914-2013

Year

Annual ∆%

1914

1.0

1915

1.0

1916

7.9

1917

17.4

1918

18.0

1919

14.6

1920

15.6

1921

-10.5

1922

-6.1

1923

1.8

1924

0.0

1925

2.3

1926

1.1

1927

-1.7

1928

-1.7

1929

0.0

1930

-2.3

1931

-9.0

1932

-9.9

1933

-5.1

1934

3.1

1935

2.2

1936

1.5

1937

3.6

1938

-2.1

1939

-1.4

1940

0.7

1941

5.0

1942

10.9

1943

6.1

1944

1.7

1945

2.3

1946

8.3

1947

14.4

1948

8.1

1949

-1.2

1950

1.3

1951

7.9

1952

1.9

1953

0.8

1954

0.7

1955

-0.4

1956

1.5

1957

3.3

1958

2.8

1959

0.7

1960

1.7

1961

1.0

1962

1.0

1963

1.3

1964

1.3

1965

1.6

1966

2.9

1967

3.1

1968

4.2

1969

5.5

1970

5.7

1971

4.4

1972

3.2

1973

6.2

1974

11.0

1975

9.1

1976

5.8

1977

6.5

1978

7.6

1979

11.3

1980

13.5

1981

10.3

1982

6.2

1983

3.2

1984

4.3

1985

3.6

1986

1.9

1987

3.6

1988

4.1

1989

4.8

1990

5.4

1991

4.2

1992

3.0

1993

3.0

1994

2.6

1995

2.8

1996

3.0

1997

2.3

1998

1.6

1999

2.2

2000

3.4

2001

2.8

2002

1.6

2003

2.3

2004

2.7

2005

3.4

2006

3.2

2007

2.8

2008

3.8

2009

-0.4

2010

1.6

2011

3.2

2012

2.1

2013

1.5

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-14 provides the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1957 to 2014. There is long-term inflation in the US without episodes of persistent deflation.

clip_image024

Chart I-14, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1957-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-15 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1958 to 2014. There are three waves of inflation in the 1970s during the Great Inflation. There is no episode of deflation.

clip_image025

Chart I-15, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1958-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

The consumer price index of housing is provided in Chart I-16. There was also acceleration during the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The index flattens after the global recession in IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Housing prices collapsed under the weight of construction of several times more housing than needed. Surplus housing originated in subsidies and artificially low interest rates in the shock of unconventional monetary policy in 2003 to 2004 in fear of deflation.

clip_image026

Chart I-16, US, Consumer Price Index Housing, NSA, 1967-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-17 provides 12-month percentage changes of the housing CPI. The Great Inflation also had extremely high rates of housing inflation. Housing is considered as potential hedge of inflation.

clip_image027

Chart I-17, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, 12- Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1968-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Consumer price inflation has fluctuated in recent months. Table I-3 provides 12-month consumer price inflation in Jun 2014 and annual equivalent percentage changes for the months of Apr 2014 to Jun 2014 of the CPI and major segments. The final column provides inflation from May 2014 to Jun 2014. CPI inflation in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014 reached 2.1 percent, the annual equivalent rate from Apr 2014 to Jun 2014 was 4.1 percent in the new episode of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodities exposures and the monthly inflation rate of 0.3 percent annualizes at 3.7 percent with oscillating carry trades at the margin. These inflation rates fluctuate in accordance with inducement of risk appetite or frustration by risk aversion of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. At the margin, the decline in commodity prices in sharp recent risk aversion in commodities markets caused lower inflation worldwide (with return in some countries in Dec 2012 and Jan-Feb 2013) that followed a jump in Aug-Sep 2012 because of the relaxed risk aversion resulting from the bond-buying program of the European Central Bank or Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). Carry trades moved away from commodities into stocks with resulting weaker commodity prices and stronger equity valuations. There is reversal of exposures in commodities but with preferences of equities by investors. Geopolitical events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East are inducing risk appetite in commodities at the margin. With zero interest rates, commodity prices would increase again in an environment of risk appetite, as shown in inflation in Apr 2014-Jun 2014. Excluding food and energy, CPI inflation was 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014 and 2.4 percent in annual equivalent in Apr 2014 to Jun 2014. There is no deflation in the US economy that could justify further unconventional monetary policy, which is now open-ended or forever with zero interest rates and potential tapering bond-buying by the central bank, or QE, even if the economy grows back to potential. Financial repression of zero interest rates is now intended as a permanent distortion of resource allocation by clouding risk/return decisions, preventing the economy from expanding along its optimal growth path. Consumer food prices in the US have risen 2.3 percent in 12 months ending in Jun 2014 and at 4.1 percent in annual equivalent in Apr 2014 to Jun 2014. Monetary policies stimulating carry trades of commodities futures that increase prices of food constitute a highly regressive tax on lower income families for whom food is a major portion of the consumption basket especially with wage increases below inflation in a recovery without hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-risk-recovery-without-hiring.html). Energy consumer prices increased 3.2 percent in 12 months, increased at 11.8 percent in annual equivalent in Apr 2014 to Jun 2014 and increased 1.6 percent in Jun 2014 or at 21.0 percent in annual equivalent. Waves of inflation are induced by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures, which are unwound and repositioned during alternating risk aversion and risk appetite originating in the European debt crisis and increasingly in growth, soaring debt and politics in China. For lower income families, food and energy are a major part of the family budget. Inflation is not persistently low or threatening deflation in annual equivalent in Apr 2014 to Jun 2014 in any of the categories in Table I-2 but simply reflecting waves of inflation originating in carry trades. Zero interest rates induce carry trades into commodity futures positions with episodes of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations causing fluctuations that determine an upward trend of prices.

Table I-3, US, Consumer Price Index Percentage Changes 12 months NSA and Annual Equivalent ∆%

 

% RI

∆% 12 Months Jun 2014/Jun
2013 NSA

∆% Annual Equivalent Apr 2014 to Jun 2014 SA

∆% Jun 2014/May 2014 SA

CPI All Items

100.000

2.1

4.1

0.3

CPI ex Food and Energy

76.465

1.9

2.4

0.1

Food

13.864

2.3

4.1

0.1

Food at Home

8.216

2.4

4.5

0.0

Food Away from Home

5.648

2.2

2.8

0.2

Energy

9.671

3.2

11.8

1.6

Gasoline

5.475

2.0

28.2

3.3

Electricity

2.936

4.2

-0.6

0.2

Commodities less Food and Energy

19.463

-0.2

1.2

0.1

New Vehicles

3.509

0.0

0.8

-0.3

Used Cars and Trucks

1.675

0.1

0.0

-0.4

Medical Care Commodities

1.708

2.8

6.2

0.7

Apparel

3.434

0.9

3.2

0.5

Services Less Energy Services

57.001

2.7

2.8

0.1

Shelter

31.835

2.8

2.8

0.2

Rent of Primary Residence

6.911

3.2

3.7

0.3

Owner’s Equivalent Rent of Residences

23.635

2.6

2.4

0.2

Transportation Services

5.592

3.2

7.4

0.1

Medical Care Services

5.824

2.6

2.4

0.0

% RI: Percent Relative Importance

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Chart I-18 provides the US consumer price index for housing from 2001 to 2014. Housing prices rose sharply during the decade until the bump of the global recession and increased again in 2011-2012 with some stabilization in 2013. There is renewed increase in 2014. The CPI excluding housing would likely show much higher inflation. The commodity carry trades resulting from unconventional monetary policy have compressed income remaining after paying for indispensable shelter.

clip_image028

Chart I-18, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart I-19 provides 12-month percentage changes of the housing CPI. Percentage changes collapsed during the global recession but have been rising into positive territory in 2011 and 2012-2013 but with the rate declining and then increasing into 2014.

clip_image029

Chart I-19, US, Consumer Price Index, Housing, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

There have been waves of consumer price inflation in the US in 2011 and into 2014 (Section IA and earlier athttp://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html ) that are illustrated in Table I-5. The first wave occurred in Jan-Apr 2011 and was caused by the carry trade of commodity prices induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates. Cheap money at zero opportunity cost in environment of risk appetite was channeled into financial risk assets, causing increases in commodity prices. The annual equivalent rate of increase of the all-items CPI in Jan-Apr 2011 was 4.9 percent and the CPI excluding food and energy increased at annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent. The second wave occurred during the collapse of the carry trade from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity futures because of risk aversion in financial markets created by the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The annual equivalent rate of increase of the all-items CPI dropped to 2.4 percent in May-Jun 2011 while the annual equivalent rate of the CPI excluding food and energy increased at 3.0 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent CPI inflation rose to 3.2 percent while the core CPI increased at 2.4 percent. The fourth wave occurred in the form of increase of the CPI all-items annual equivalent rate to 1.2 percent in Oct-Nov 2011 with the annual equivalent rate of the CPI excluding food and energy remaining at 2.4 percent. The fifth wave occurred in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 with annual equivalent headline inflation of 1.8 percent and core inflation of 2.4 percent. In the sixth wave, headline CPI inflation increased at annual equivalent 2.8 percent in Feb-Apr 2012 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The seventh wave in May-Jul occurred with annual equivalent inflation of minus 0.4 percent for the headline CPI in May-Jul 2012 and 2.0 percent for the core CPI. The eighth wave is with annual equivalent inflation of 6.2 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 but 4.9 percent including Oct. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Nov 2012 was minus 2.4 percent under the new shock of risk aversion and 0.0 percent in Dec 2012 with annual equivalent of minus 0.4 percent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 and 1.6 percent for the core CPI. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent of the headline CPI was 7.4 percent in Feb 2013 and 2.4 percent for the core CPI. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent was minus 2.4 percent in Mar-Apr 2013 and 1.2 percent for the core index. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.2 percent in May-Sep 2013 and 1.7 percent for the core CPI. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent CPI inflation in Oct-Nov 2013 was 0.6 percent and 1.8 percent for the core CPI. Inflation returned in the fourteenth wave at 1.8 percent for the headline CPI index and 2.0 percent for the core CPI in annual equivalent for Dec 2013 to Mar 2014. In the sixteenth wave, inflation accelerated to annual equivalent 4.1 percent for the headline index in Apr-Jun 2014 and 2.4 percent for the core index. The conclusion is that inflation accelerates and decelerates in unpredictable fashion because of shocks or risk aversion and portfolio reallocations in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity derivatives.

Table I-5, US, Headline and Core CPI Inflation Monthly SA and 12 Months NSA ∆%

 

All Items 

SA Month

All Items NSA 12 month

Core SA
Month

Core NSA
12 months

Jun 2014

0.3

2.1

0.1

1.9

May

0.4

2.1

0.3

2.0

Apr

0.3

2.0

0.2

1.8

AE ∆% Apr-Jun

4.1

 

2.4

 

Mar

0.2

1.5

0.2

1.7

Feb

0.1

1.1

0.1

1.6

Jan

0.1

1.6

0.1

1.6

Dec 2013

0.2

1.5

0.1

1.7

AE ∆% Dec-Mar

1.8

 

2.0

 

Nov

0.1

1.2

0.2

1.7

Oct

0.0

1.0

0.1

1.7

AE ∆%

Oct-Nov

0.6

 

1.8

 

Sep

0.1

1.2

0.1

1.7

Aug

0.1

1.5

0.1

1.8

Jul

0.2

2.0

0.2

1.7

Jun

0.3

1.8

0.2

1.6

May

0.2

1.4

0.1

1.7

AE ∆%

May-Sep

2.2

 

1.7

 

Apr

-0.2

1.1

0.1

1.7

Mar

-0.2

1.5

0.1

1.9

AE ∆%

Mar-Apr

-2.4

 

1.2

 

Feb

0.6

2.0

0.2

2.0

AE ∆% Feb

7.4

 

2.4

 

Jan

0.1

1.6

0.2

1.9

Dec 2012

0.0

1.7

0.1

1.9

Nov

-0.2

1.8

0.1

1.9

AE ∆% Nov-Jan

-0.4

 

1.6

 

Oct

0.2

2.2

0.2

2.0

Sep

0.5

2.0

0.2

2.0

Aug

0.5

1.7

0.1

1.9

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

4.9

 

2.0

 

Jul

0.0

1.4

0.1

2.1

Jun

0.0

1.7

0.2

2.2

May

-0.1

1.7

0.2

2.3

AE ∆% May-Jul

-0.4

 

2.0

 

Apr

0.2

2.3

0.2

2.3

Mar

0.3

2.7

0.2

2.3

Feb

0.2

2.9

0.1

2.2

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

2.8

 

2.0

 

Jan

0.3

2.9

0.2

2.3

Dec 2011

0.0

3.0

0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

1.8

 

2.4

 

Nov

0.2

3.4

0.2

2.2

Oct

0.0

3.5

0.2

2.1

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

1.2

 

2.4

 

Sep

0.2

3.9

0.1

2.0

Aug

0.3

3.8

0.3

2.0

Jul

0.3

3.6

0.2

1.8

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

3.2

 

2.4

 

Jun

0.0

3.6

0.2

1.6

May

0.4

3.6

0.3

1.5

AE ∆%  May-Jun

2.4

 

3.0

 

Apr

0.5

3.2

0.2

1.3

Mar

0.5

2.7

0.1

1.2

Feb

0.3

2.1

0.2

1.1

Jan

0.3

1.6

0.2

1.0

AE ∆%  Jan-Apr

4.9

 

2.1

 

Dec 2010

0.4

1.5

0.1

0.8

Nov

0.2

1.1

0.1

0.8

Oct

0.3

1.2

0.0

0.6

Sep

0.1

1.1

0.0

0.8

Aug

0.2

1.1

0.1

0.9

Jul

0.2

1.2

0.1

0.9

Jun

0.0

1.1

0.1

0.9

May

0.0

2.0

0.1

0.9

Apr

0.0

2.2

0.0

0.9

Mar

0.0

2.3

0.0

1.1

Feb

-0.1

2.1

0.1

1.3

Jan

0.1

2.6

-0.2

1.6

Note: Core: excluding food and energy; AE: annual equivalent

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

The behavior of the US consumer price index NSA from 2001 to 2014 is provided in Chart I-20. Inflation in the US is very dynamic without deflation risks that would justify symmetric inflation targets. The hump in 2008 originated in the carry trade from interest rates dropping to zero into commodity futures. There is no other explanation for the increase of the Cushing OK Crude Oil Future Contract 1 from $55.64/barrel on Jan 9, 2007 to $145.29/barrel on July 3, 2008 during deep global recession, collapsing under a panic of flight into government obligations and the US dollar to $37.51/barrel on Feb 13, 2009 and then rising by carry trades to $113.93/barrel on Apr 29, 2012, collapsing again and then recovering again to $105.23/barrel, all during mediocre economic recovery with peaks and troughs influenced by bouts of risk appetite and risk aversion (data from the US Energy Information Administration EIA, http://www.eia.gov/). The unwinding of the carry trade with the TARP announcement of toxic assets in banks channeled cheap money into government obligations (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009).

clip_image030

Chart I-20, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Chart I-21 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 2001 to 2014. There was no deflation or threat of deflation from 2008 into 2009. Commodity prices collapsed during the panic of toxic assets in banks. When stress tests in 2009 revealed US bank balance sheets in much stronger position, cheap money at zero opportunity cost exited government obligations and flowed into carry trades of risk financial assets. Increases in commodity prices drove again the all items CPI with interruptions during risk aversion originating in multiple fears but especially from the sovereign debt crisis of Europe.

clip_image031

Chart I-21, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

The trend of increase of the consumer price index excluding food and energy in Chart I-22 does not reveal any threat of deflation that would justify symmetric inflation targets. There are mild oscillations in a neat upward trend.

clip_image032

Chart I-22, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Chart I-23 provides 12-month percentage change of the consumer price index excluding food and energy. Past-year rates of inflation fell toward 1 percent from 2001 into 2003 because of the recession and the decline of commodity prices beginning before the recession with declines of real oil prices. Near zero interest rates with fed funds at 1 percent between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004 stimulated carry trades of all types, including in buying homes with subprime mortgages in expectation that low interest rates forever would increase home prices permanently, creating the equity that would permit the conversion of subprime mortgages into creditworthy mortgages (Gorton 2009EFM; see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Inflation rose and then collapsed during the unwinding of carry trades and the housing debacle of the global recession. Carry trades into 2011 and 2012 gave a new impulse to CPI inflation, all items and core. Symmetric inflation targets destabilize the economy by encouraging hunts for yields that inflate and deflate financial assets, obscuring risk/return decisions on production, investment, consumption and hiring.

clip_image033

Chart I-23, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

ESIV United States Housing Collapse. Data and other information continue to provide depressed conditions in the US housing market in a longer perspective, with recent improvement at the margin. Table IIB-1 shows sales of new houses in the US at seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate (SAAR). House sales fell in eighteen of forty-two months from Jan 2011 to Jun 2014 with concentration in monthly declines of five in 2011 and seven in 2013. In Jan-Apr 2012, house sales increased at the annual equivalent rate of 11.8 percent and at 22.3 percent in May-Sep 2012. There was significant strength in Sep-Dec 2011 with annual equivalent rate of 48.4 percent. Sales of new houses fell 7.0 percent in Oct 2012 with increase of 9.5 percent in Nov 2012. Sales of new houses rebounded 13.5 percent in Jan 2013 with annual equivalent rate of 62.9 percent from Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 because of the increase of 13.5 percent in Jan 2013. New house sales fell at annual equivalent 16.1 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. New house sales weakened, increasing at 0.8 percent in annual equivalent from Apr to Dec 2013 with significant volatility illustrated by decline of 20.0 percent in Jul 2013 and increase of 12.8 percent in Oct 2013. New house sales fell 0.7 percent in Dec 2013. New house sales increased 3.4 percent in Jan 2014 and fell 5.5 percent in Feb 2014 and 6.7 percent in Mar 201. New house sales increased 1.2 percent in Apr 2014 and 8.3 percent in May 2014. New house sales fell 8.1 percent in Jun 2014 for annual equivalent rate of minus 15.7 percent in Jan-Jun 2014. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), analyze how builders have provided financial assistance to home buyers, including those short of cash and with weaker credit background, explaining the rise in new home sales and the highest gap between prices of new and existing houses. The 30-year conventional mortgage rate increased from 3.40 on Apr 25, 2013 to 4.58 percent on Aug 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm), which could also be a factor in recent weakness with improvement after the rate fell to 4.26 in Nov 2013. The conventional mortgage rate rose to 4.48 percent on Dec 26, 2013 and fell to 4.32 percent on Jan 30, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate increased to 4.37 percent on Feb 26, 2014 and 4.40 percent on Mar 27, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate fell to 4.14 percent on Apr 22, 2014, stabilizing at 4.14 on Jun 26, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate stood at 4.13 percent on Jul 17, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate measured in a survey by Freddie Mac (http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/release.html) is the “contract interest rate on commitments for fixed-rate first mortgages” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm).

Table IIB-1, US, Sales of New Houses at Seasonally-Adjusted (SA) Annual Equivalent Rate, Thousands and % 

 

SA Annual Rate
Thousands

∆%

Jun 2014

406

-8.1

May

442

8.3

Apr

408

1.2

Mar

403

-6.7

Feb

432

-5.5

Jan

457

3.4

AE ∆% Jan-Jun

 

-15.7

Dec 2013

442

-0.7

Nov

445

-1.1

Oct

450

12.8

Sep

399

5.3

Aug

379

3.3

Jul

367

-20.0

Jun

459

6.5

May

431

-4.6

Apr

452

2.7

AE ∆% Apr-Dec

 

0.8

Mar

440

-1.8

Feb

448

-1.1

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

 

-16.1

Jan

453

13.5

Dec 2012

399

1.8

Nov

392

9.5

Oct

358

-7.0

AE ∆% Oct-Jan

 

62.9

Sep

385

2.7

Aug

375

1.6

Jul

369

2.5

Jun

360

-2.7

May

370

4.5

AE ∆% May-Sep

 

22.3

Apr

354

0.0

Mar

354

-3.3

Feb

366

9.3

Jan

335

-1.8

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

 

11.8

Dec 2011

341

4.0

Nov

328

3.8

Oct

316

3.9

Sep

304

1.7

AE ∆% Sep-Dec

 

48.4

Aug

299

1.0

Jul

296

-1.7

Jun

301

-1.3

May

305

-1.6

AE ∆% May-Aug

 

-10.3

Apr

310

3.3

Mar

300

11.1

Feb

270

-12.1

Jan

307

-5.8

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

 

-14.2

Dec 2010

326

13.6

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

There is additional information of the report of new house sales in Table IIB-2. The stock of unsold houses fell from rates of 6 to 7 percent of sales in 2011 to 4 to 5 percent in 2013 and 5.8 percent in Jun 2014. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), find that inventories of houses have declined as investors acquire distressed houses of higher quality. Median and average house prices oscillate. In Jun 2014, median prices of new houses sold not seasonally adjusted (NSA) decreased 3.2 percent after increasing 3.7 percent in May 2014. Average prices increased 3.5 percent in Jun 2014 and decreased 0.3 percent in May 2014. Between Dec 2010 and Jun 2014, median prices increased 13.4 percent, partly concentrated in increases of 3.7 percent in May 2014 and 5.2 percent in Mar 2014. Average prices increased 13.6 percent between Dec 2010 and Jun 2014, with increase of 3.5 percent in Jun 2014. Between Dec 2010 and Dec 2012, median prices increased 7.1 percent and average prices increased 2.6 percent. Price increases concentrated in 2012 with increase of median prices of 18.2 percent from Dec 2011 to Dec 2012 and of average prices of 13.8 percent. Median prices increased 5.9 percent from Dec 2012 to Jun 2014, with decrease of 3.2 percent in Jun 2014, while average prices increased 10.8 percent, with increase of 3.5 percent in Jun 2014. Robbie Williams, writing on “New homes hit record as builders cap supply,” on May 24, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323475304578500973445311276.html?mod=WSJ_economy_LeftTopHighlights), finds that homebuilders are continuing to restrict the number of new homes for sale. Restriction of available new homes for sale increases prices paid by buyers.

Table IIB-2, US, New House Stocks and Median and Average New Homes Sales Price

 

Unsold*
Stocks in Equiv.
Months
of Sales
SA %

Median
New House Sales Price USD
NSA

Month
∆%

Average New House Sales Price USD
NSA

Month
∆%

Jun 2014

5.8

273,500

-3.2

331,400

3.5

May

5.2

282,600

3.7

320,100

-0.3

Apr

5.6

272,600

-3.4

321,000

-3.2

Mar

5.7

282,300

5.2

331,500

1.7

Feb

5.2

268,400

-0.5

325,900

-3.4

Jan

5.0

269,800

-2.1

337,300

5.0

Dec 2013

5.1

275,500

-0.6

321,200

-4.3

Nov

5.0

277,100

4.8

335,600

0.0

Oct

4.9

264,300

-2.0

335,700

4.4

Sep

5.5

269,800

5.7

321,400

3.4

Aug

5.5

255,300

-2.6

310,800

-5.8

Jul

5.6

262,200

0.9

329,900

7.8

Jun

4.2

259,800

-1.5

306,100

-2.5

May

4.5

263,700

-5.6

314,000

-6.8

Apr

4.3

279,300

8.5

337,000

12.3

Mar

4.2

257,500

-2.9

300,200

-3.9

Feb

4.1

265,100

5.4

312,500

1.8

Jan

3.9

251,500

-2.6

306,900

2.6

Dec 2012

4.5

258,300

5.4

299,200

2.9

Nov

4.6

245,000

-0.9

290,700

1.9

Oct

4.9

247,200

-2.9

285,400

-4.1

Sep

4.5

254,600

0.6

297,700

-2.6

Aug

4.6

253,200

6.7

305,500

8.2

Jul

4.6

237,400

2.1

282,300

3.9

Jun

4.8

232,600

-2.8

271,800

-3.2

May

4.7

239,200

1.2

280,900

-2.4

Apr

4.9

236,400

-1.4

287,900

1.5

Mar

4.9

239,800

0.0

283,600

3.5

Feb

4.8

239,900

8.2

274,000

3.1

Jan

5.3

221,700

1.4

265,700

1.1

Dec 2011

5.3

218,600

2.0

262,900

5.2

Nov

5.7

214,300

-4.7

250,000

-3.2

Oct

6.0

224,800

3.6

258,300

1.1

Sep

6.3

217,000

-1.2

255,400

-1.5

Aug

6.5

219,600

-4.5

259,300

-4.1

Jul

6.7

229,900

-4.3

270,300

-1.0

Jun

6.6

240,200

8.2

273,100

3.9

May

6.6

222,000

-1.2

262,700

-2.3

Apr

6.7

224,700

1.9

268,900

3.1

Mar

7.2

220,500

0.2

260,800

-0.8

Feb

8.1

220,100

-8.3

262,800

-4.7

Jan

7.3

240,100

-0.5

275,700

-5.5

Dec 2010

7.0

241,200

9.8

291,700

3.5

*Percent of new houses for sale relative to houses sold

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

The depressed level of residential construction and new house sales in the US is evident in Table IIB-3 providing new house sales not seasonally adjusted in Jan-Jun of various years. Sales of new houses are virtually the same in Jan-Jun 2014 relative to Jan-Jun 2013 with decrease of 4.9 percent. Sales of new houses in Jan-Jun 2014 are substantially lower than in any year between 1963 and 2014 with the exception of the years from 2009 to 2012. There are only four increases of 18.4 percent relative to Jan-Jun 2012, 43.3 percent relative to Jan-Jun 2011, 23.6 percent relative to Jan-Jun 2010 and 20.3 percent relative to Jan-Jun 2009. Sales of new houses in Jan-May 2014 are lower by 20.8 percent relative to Jan-Jun 2008, 49.9 percent relative to 2007, 61.5 percent relative to 2006 and 66.9 percent relative to 2005. The housing boom peaked in 2005 and 2006 when increases in fed funds rates to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 from 1.0 percent in Jun 2004 affected subprime mortgages that were programmed for refinancing in two or three years on the expectation that price increases forever would raise home equity. Higher home equity would permit refinancing under feasible mortgages incorporating full payment of principal and interest (Gorton 2009EFM; see other references in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Sales of new houses in Jan-Jun 2014 relative to the same period in 2004 fell 65.0 percent and 59.5 percent relative to the same period in 2003. Similar percentage declines are also observed for 2014 relative to years from 2000 to 2004. Sales of new houses in Jan-Jun 2014 fell 33.6 per cent relative to the same period in 1995. The population of the US was 179.3 million in 1960 and 281.4 million in 2000 (Hobbs and Stoops 2002, 16). Detailed historical census reports are available from the US Census Bureau at (http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscendata.html). The US population reached 308.7 million in 2010 (http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/). The US population increased by 129.4 million from 1960 to 2010 or 72.2 percent. The final row of Table IIB-3 reveals catastrophic data: sales of new houses in Jan-Jun 2014 of 225 thousand units are lower by 19.4 percent relative to 279 thousand units of houses sold in Jan-Jun 1963, the first year when data become available. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 123.360 million in Dec 1963 to 246.745 million in Dec 2013, or 100.0 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”

Table IIB-3, US, Sales of New Houses Not Seasonally Adjusted, Thousands and %

 

Not Seasonally Adjusted Thousands

Jan-Jun 2014

225

Jan-Jun 2013

236

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/Jan-Jun 2013

-4.9*

Jan-Jun 2012

190

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/Jan-Jun 2012

18.4

Jan-Jun 2011

157

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/Jan-Jun 2011

43.3

Jan-Jun 2010

182

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/ 
Jan-Jun 2010

23.6

Jan-Jun 2009

187

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/ 
Jan-Jun 2009

20.3

Jan-Jun 2008

284

∆% Jan-May 2014/ 
Jan-Jun 2008

-20.8

Jan-Jun 2007

449

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/
Jan-Jun 2007

-49.9

Jan-Jun 2006

585

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/Jan-Jun 2006

-61.5

Jan-Jun 2005

679

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/Jan-Jun 2005

-66.9

Jan-Jun 2004

643

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/Jan-Jun 2004

-65.0

Jan-Jun 2003

555

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/
Jan-Jun  2003

-59.5

Jan-Jun 2002

498

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/
Jan-Jun 2002

-54.8

Jan-Jun 2001

494

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/
Jan-Jun 2001

-54.5

Jan-Jun 2000

459

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/
Jan-Jun 2000

-51.0

Jan-Jun 1995

339

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/
Jan-Jun 1995

-33.6

Jan-Jun 1963

279

∆% Jan-Jun 2014/
Jan-Jun 1963

-19.4

*Computed using unrounded data

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Table IIB-4 provides the entire available annual series of new house sales from 1963 to 2013. The revised level of 306 thousand new houses sold in 2011 is the lowest since 560 thousand in 1963 in the 48 years of available data while the level of 368 thousand in 2012 is only higher than 323 thousand in 2010. The level of sales of new houses of 429 thousand in 2013 is the lowest from 1963 to 2009 with exception of 412 thousand in 1982. The population of the US increased 129.4 million from 179.3 million in 1960 to 308.7 million in 2010, or 72.2 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US increased from 122.416 million in 1963 to 245.679 million in 2013 or 100.7 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”

The civilian noninstitutional population is the universe of the labor force. In fact, there is no year from 1963 to 2013 in Table IIA-4 with sales of new houses below 400 thousand with the exception of the immediately preceding years of 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

Table IIB-4, US, New Houses Sold, NSA Thousands

1963

560

1964

565

1965

575

1966

461

1967

487

1968

490

1969

448

1970

485

1971

656

1972

718

1973

634

1974

519

1975

549

1976

646

1977

819

1978

817

1979

709

1980

545

1981

436

1982

412

1983

623

1984

639

1985

688

1986

750

1987

671

1988

676

1989

650

1990

534

1991

509

1992

610

1993

666

1994

670

1995

667

1996

757

1997

804

1998

886

1999

880

2000

877

2001

908

2002

973

2003

1,086

2004

1,203

2005

1,283

2006

1,051

2007

776

2008

485

2009

375

2010

323

2011

306

2012

368

2013

429

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs

Chart IIB-1 of the US Bureau of the Census shows the sharp decline of sales of new houses in the US. Sales rose temporarily until about mid 2010 but then declined to a lower plateau followed by increase and stability.

clip_image035

Chart IIB-1, US, New One-Family Houses Sold in the US, SAAR (Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate) 

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/briefrm/esbr/www/esbr051.html

Percentage changes and average rates of growth of new house sales for selected periods are shown in Table IIB-5. The percentage change of new house sales from 1963 to 2013 is minus 23.4 percent. Between 1991 and 2001, sales of new houses rose 78.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 6.0 percent. Between 1995 and 2005 sales of new houses increased 92.4 percent at the yearly rate of 6.8 percent. There are similar rates in all years from 2000 to 2005. The boom in housing construction and sales began in the 1980s and 1990s. The collapse of real estate culminated several decades of housing subsidies and policies to lower mortgage rates and borrowing terms (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009b), 42-8). Sales of new houses sold in 2013 fell 35.7 percent relative to the same period in 1995 and 66.6 percent relative to 2005.

Table IIB-5, US, Percentage Change and Average Yearly Rate of Growth of Sales of New One-Family Houses

 

∆%

Average Yearly % Rate

1963-2013

-23.4

NA

1991-2001

78.4

6.0

1995-2005

92.4

6.8

2000-2005

46.3

7.9

1995-2013

-35.7

NA

2000-2013

-51.1

NA

2005-2013

-66.6

NA

NA: Not Applicable

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-2 of the US Bureau of the Census provides the entire monthly sample of new houses sold in the US between Jan 1963 and Jun 2014 without seasonal adjustment. The series is almost stationary until the 1990s. There is sharp upward trend from the early 1990s to 2005-2006 after which new single-family houses sold collapse to levels below those in the beginning of the series in the 1960s.

clip_image036

Chart IIB-2, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 1963-2014

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate for the 30-year conventional mortgage, the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond and the rate of the overnight federal funds rate, monthly, from 1971 to 2014. All rates decline throughout the period from the Great Inflation of the 1970s through the following Great Moderation and until currently. In Apr 1971, the fed funds rate was 4.15 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 7.31 percent. In November 2012, the fed funds rate was 0.16 percent, the yield of the 30-year Treasury 2.80 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 3.35. The final segment shows an increase in the yield of the 30-year Treasury to 3.61 percent in July 2013 with the fed funds rate at 0.09 percent and the conventional mortgage at 4.37 percent. The final data point shows marginal decrease of the conventional mortgage rate to 4.16 percent in Jun 2014 with the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond at 3.42 percent and overnight rate on fed funds at 0.10 percent. The recent increase in interest rates if sustained could affect the US real estate market. Shayndi Raice and Nick Timiraos, writing on “Banks cut as mortgage boom ends,” on Jan 9, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303754404579310940019239208), analyze the drop in mortgage applications to a 13-year low, as measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Demand for home loans plunges,” on Apr 24, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579522051733228402?mg=reno64-wsj), analyzes data in Inside Mortgage Finance that mortgage lending of $235 billion in IQ2014 is 58 percent lower than a year earlier and 23 percent below IVQ2013. Mortgage lending collapsed to the lowest level in 14 years. In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm): “One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.”

clip_image037

Chart IIB-5, US, Thirty-year Conventional Mortgage, Thirty-year Treasury Bond and Overnight Federal Funds Rate, Monthly, 1954-2014

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm

Table IIB-8 provides the monthly data in Chart IIB-5 from Dec 2012 to Jun 2014. While the fed funds rate fell from 0.16 percent in Dec 2012 to 0.07 percent in Jan 2014, the yield of the constant maturity 30-year Treasury bond rose from 2.88 percent in Dec 2012 to 3.77 percent in Jan 2014 and the conventional mortgage rate increased from 3.35 percent in Dec 2012 to 4.43 percent in Jan 2014. In Jun 2014, the fed funds rate stabilized at 0.10 percent with decline to 3.42 percent of the 30-year yield and decline at 4.16 percent of the conventional mortgage rate.

Table IIB-8, US, Fed Funds Rate, Thirty Year Treasury Bond and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Percent Per Year, Dec 2012 to Jun 2014

 

Fed Funds Rate

Yield of Thirty-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Bond

Rate of Thirty-Year Conventional Mortgage

2012-12

0.16

2.88

3.35

2013-01

0.14

3.08

3.41

2013-02

0.15

3.17

3.53

2013-03

0.14

3.16

3.57

2013-04

0.15

2.93

3.45

2013-05

0.11

3.11

3.54

2013-06

0.09

3.40

4.07

2013-07

0.09

3.61

4.37

2013-08

0.08

3.76

4.46

2013-09

0.08

3.79

4.49

2013-10

0.09

3.68

4.19

2013-11

0.08

3.80

4.26

2013-12

0.09

3.89

4.46

2014-01

0.07

3.77

4.43

2014-02

0.07

3.66

4.30

2014-03

0.08

3.62

4.34

2014-04

0.09

3.52

4.34

2014-05

0.09

3.39

4.19

2014-06

0.10

3.42

4.16

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm

ESV Financial “Irrational Exuberance,” “Stretched Valuations,” “Brisk Issuance” and Monetary Policy Rules Instead of Discretionary Authorities. A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html).

Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 17,100.18 on Fr Jul 18, 2014, which is higher by 20.7 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 20.4 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs. Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):

So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).

In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):

“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”

Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:

“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).

Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:

Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).

Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor (1993, 1998LB, 1999, 1998LB, 1999, 2007JH, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012JMCB, 2014Jan3) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities).

The objective of this section is to place the alternatives of monetary policy into two perspectives of (1) emphasis on long-term policy in contrast with (2) current emphasis on short-term impulses of unusual magnitude to respond immediately to deviations perceived with significant lags and measurement errors because of the deficiencies of the state of the art. IA Monetary Policy Rules considers the use of long-term rules or guidance for optimization of policy over many periods in contrast with discretion or immediate optimization of every perceived deviation from desired paths by policymakers. Section IB Unconventional Monetary Policy raises the issue if excessive short-term impulses cause instability instead of the prime objective of monetary policy of fostering stability together with adverse effects on resource allocation that prevent an efficient dynamic path of the economy at the time when real disposable income per capita, or what is left per person after taxes and inflation, has stagnated.

IA Monetary Policy Rules. The discussion of monetary policy rules is divided into three subsections: IA1 Origins of Rules versus Discretion, IA2 Monetary Policy Rules and IA3 The Taylor Rule.

IA1 Origins of Rules versus Discretion. A classic proposal for rules instead of “authorities” in monetary policy is by Simons (1936, 29-30):

“A democratic, free-enterprise system implies, and requires for its effective functioning and survival, a stable framework of definite rules, laid down in legislation and subject to change only gradually and with careful regard for the vested interests of participants in the economic game. It is peculiarly essential economically that there should be a minimum of uncertainty for enterprisers and investors as to monetary conditions in the future and, politically, that the plausible expedient of setting up "authorities" instead of rules, with respect to matters of such fundamental importance, be avoided, or accepted only as a very temporary arrangement. The most important objective of a sound liberal policy, apart from the establishment of highly competitive conditions in industry and the narrow limitation of political control over relative prices, should be that of securing a monetary system governed by definite rule. The responsibility for carrying out the monetary rules should be lodged in a federal authority, endowed with large administrative powers but closely controlled in their exercise by a sharply defined policy. The powers of the monetary authority should have to do primarily or exclusively with fiscal arrangements with the issue and retirement of paper money (open-market operations in government securities) and perhaps with the relation between government revenues and expenditures; in other words, the monetary rules should be implemented entirely by, and in turn should largely determine, fiscal policy. A monetary rule of maintaining the constancy of some price-index, preferably an index of prices of competitively produced commodities, appears to afford the only promising escape from present monetary chaos and uncertainties.”

The working system of Simons (1936, 1948) consisted of 100 percent reserve requirements on banks (see Allen 1993, Fisher 1936, Graham 1936) to avoid fluctuations from bank runs and fixed quantity of money. Friedman (1967) finds that the monetary reforms proposed by Simons (1948) were not required and moving against desired directions by restricting financial intermediation that would raise costs of capital, inhibiting capital formation. The value in the proposals of Simons (1948) as viewed by Friedman (1967) would be in providing more flexibility for banks that were restricted in the 1960s by regulation inherited from the Great Depression. There are contemporary proposals that resemble the 100 percent reserve requirement in what is known as “narrow banking” (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 71-72).

Historical evolution of monetary policy rules is analyzed by Asso, Khan and Leeson (2007, 2010). In the United States, Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman proposed price and monetary rules (see Bordo and Rockoff 2011). An important departure for considering rules is the existence of three lags of macroeconomic policy (Friedman 1953):

1. The lag between the need for action and the recognition of the need

2. The lag between recognition of the need and taking action

3. The lag between taking action and effects on prices and income

There is not “one hundred percent” confidence in controlling inflation because of the lags in effects of monetary policy impulses and the equally important lags in realization of the need for action and taking of action and also the inability to forecast any economic variable. Romer and Romer (2004) find that a one percentage point tightening of monetary policy is associated with a 4.3 percent decline in industrial production. There is no change in inflation in the first 22 months after monetary policy tightening when it begins to decline steadily, with decrease by 6 percent after 48 months (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 102). Even if there were one hundred percent confidence in reducing inflation by monetary policy, it could take a prolonged period with adverse effects on economic activity. Certainty does not occur in economic policy, which is characterized by costs that cannot be anticipated.

Friedman (1968) restated his proposal for fixed setting of monetary policy in terms of a fixed rate of increase of the money stock:

“My own prescription is still that the monetary authority go all the way in avoiding such swings by adopting publicly the policy of achieving a steady rate of growth in a specified monetary total. The precise rate of growth, like the precise monetary total, is less important than the adoption of some stated and known rate. I myself have argued for a rate that would on the average achieve rough stability in the level of prices of final products, which I have estimated would call for something like a 3 to 5 per cent per year rate of growth in currency plus all commercial bank deposits or a slightly lower rate of growth in currency plus demand deposits only. But it would be better to have a fixed rate that would on the average produce moderate inflation or moderate deflation, provided it was steady, than to suffer the wide and erratic perturbations we have experienced. Short of the adoption of such a publicly stated policy of a steady rate of monetary growth, it would constitute a major improvement if the monetary authority followed the self-denying ordinance of avoiding wide swings. It is a matter of record that periods of relative stability in the rate of monetary growth have also been periods of relative stability in economic activity, both in the United States and other countries. Periods of wide swings in the rate of monetary growth have also been periods of wide swings in economic activity.”

This was Friedman’s presidential address to the American Economic Association at the onset of wide swings in monetary policy, output and employment in the period of United States economic history known as “the Great Inflation.”

There are three “tactics” in monetary policy identified by Friedman (1982, 100-1):

  1. Interest rates as both targets and instruments
  2. Monetary targets as instruments and interest rates as targets
  3. Base money as instrument and monetary aggregates as targets

The specific policy proposal of Friedman (1982, 101) consists of five ingredients:

“A monetarist policy has five points: first, the target should be growth in some monetary aggregate just which monetary aggregate is a separate question; second, monetary authorities should adopt long-run targets for monetary growth that are consistent with no inflation; third, present rates of growth of monetary aggregates should be modified to achieve the long-run target in a gradual, systematic, and preannounced fashion; fourth, monetary authorities should avoid fine-tuning; fifth, monetary authorities should avoid trying to manipulate either interest rates or exchange rates. Internationally, those countries that have broadly followed the five-point monetarist policy have succeeded in controlling inflation and have done so while achieving relatively satisfactory economic growth.”

The fourth of eight specific proposals for Fed monetary policy at the time states (Friedman, 1982, 117): “set a target path for several years ahead for a single aggregate—for example, M2 or the base. It is less important which aggregate is chosen than that a single aggregate be designated as the target.”

IA2 Monetary Policy Rules. The essence of rules versus discretion monetary policy is posed by McCallum (1999) as follows:

  1. Rules attempt to optimize by using a policy-contingent rule or formula that is implemented every period and is designed such as to apply indefinitely
  2. Discretion consist of re-optimization in every period in accordance with existing conditions assessed by monetary authorities

A rules-based policy optimizes over a long-term period while discretionary policy optimizes individually in every period in accordance with short-term information. A practical definition of monetary policy rule by McCallum (1999) is systematic policy that does not use expectations to cause temporary gains in output.

McCallum (1999) finds that Barro and Gordon (1983b) opened the inclusion of activist policy within a monetary policy rule. The rule provides a reaction function of the central bank that depends on available information. Barro and Gordon (1983b, 606) differentiate as follows: “the presence or absence of precomitment is the most important distinction between rules and discretion.” The reaction function of the central bank h(It-1) depends on information available in the past period, It-1, that would be more restrictive under rules-based policy than under discretion, would include many more variables in the argument. As McCallum (1999) argues a rule could specify the conditions for activism instead of fixed settings for policy. For example, constant rate of growth of the money stock would be a fixed setting that the central bank would implement indefinitely. A policy in which the interest rate depends on inflation and the divergence of actual and potential output would be activist but under certain guidance.

Current distinction between rules and discretion is provided by Taylor (2012JMCB, 2). There are characteristics of both rules and discretion.

  1. Characteristics of rules

· More predictable and systematic decisions by the central bank on policy instruments

· Dynamic analysis of effects of current decisions on future outcomes

· Decisions based or guided by formulas and equations

· Use of stable relation of policy instruments to outcomes such as inflation and growth

  1. Characteristics of discretion
  • Decisions on monetary policy instruments are “less predictable,” focusing on short-term events such as “fine tuning” or policy actions in response to ad hoc movements in economic and financial variables
  • Little or no interest by policymakers in agreeing on alternative strategies for fixing magnitudes of instruments of policy
  • Evolution of policy instruments over time cannot be captured by equations

IA3 The Taylor Rule. The definition of policy rule by Taylor (1993, 199) is: “Technically, a policy rule is a contingency plan that lasts forever unless there is an explicit cancellation clause.” “Forever” means here “a reasonably long period of time” (Taylor 1993, 1999). The departing theory of Taylor (1993, 1999) is the quantity theory of money equation:

MV = PY (1)

Where M is the money stock V is income velocity of money, P the price level and Y real output. Velocity depends on the interest rate r and real output or income Y with functional form V(r, Y). The substitution of V(r, Y) in equation (1) yields a relation between the interest rate, r, the price level, P, and real output Y. Taylor (1999) assumes a linear relation of interest rates and the logarithms of the price level P and real output Y. Assuming no lags, deviation of output from stochastic trend and the inflation rate as the first difference of the logarithms of the price level, Taylor (1999) obtains:

r = π + gy + h(π – π*) + rr = (rfhπ*) + (1 + h)π + gy (2)

Where r is the short-term interest rate, π the inflation rate or percent change in the price level P, y the percentage difference of real output Y from trend and g, h, π* and rf are constants. The settings of monetary policy are the response coefficients g of the deviation of actual output from potential output and (1+h), the response to inflation.

Taylor (1993, 202) provides the simple formula, known as the Taylor Rule, as follows:

r = p + .5y + .5(p-2) + 2 (3)

Where r is the federal funds rate or policy rate of the Fed, p is the rate of inflation in the past four quarters and y is the percentage deviation of actual output from potential output. The fed funds rate increases if the gap between actual and potential output y increases to prevent lower growth below potential and resulting unemployment; and increases if inflation p increases above maximum tolerable inflation of 2 percent. Thus, the policy is guidance on fixing the fed funds rate in response to growth and inflation. Taylor (1993, 202) states: “if both the inflation rate and real GDP are on target, then the federal funds rate would equal 4 percent, or 2 percent in real terms.” If real economic growth is around trend, y is zero, and inflation is around the maximum desired of 2 percent, (p-2) is zero, such that the fed funds rate r is equal to 4 or 2 percent by deducting inflation of 2 percent.

IB Unconventional Monetary Policy. Taylor (1998LB, 1999, 2012JMCB) argues that economic performance has been enhanced during periods of long-term focus of monetary policy in the form of guidance under monetary policy rules. Periods of discretion such as the Great Inflation from the second half of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s and the past decade since 2003 have been characterized by instability and mediocre economic performance.

The objective of Levin and Taylor (2009) is to reveal the primary cause of the persistence of inflation drift during the Great Inflation by focusing on the path of inflationary expectations to model monetary policy from 1965 to 1980. They derive three stylized facts by use of measurements of inflation expectations. (1) Inflation began in the mid 1960 while it had been contained since the late 1950s at around 1 percent but inflation expectations accelerate beginning in 1965. (2) Long-term inflation expectations stabilized at a high level in the first half of the 1970s but catapulted toward the end of the decade. (3) Long-run inflation expectations only began to decline at the end of 1980. The central bank reaction function analyzed by Taylor (1993, 202, equation (1)) on the basis of prior research is:

r = p +0.5y + 0.5(p-2) + 2 (4)

In equation (4), the federal funds rate, r, is expressed in terms of the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters, the percentage output gap, y, defined as 100(Y-Y*)/Y*, where Y is actual GDP, Y* is trend real GDP (2.2 percent from IQ1984 to IIIQ1992), and the deviation of inflation from the target of 2 percent, 0.5(p-2). The Taylor policy rule in equation (3) triggers an increase in the fed funds rate when inflation exceeds 2 percent or when GDP exceeds trend GDP. If GDP is equal to target, y = 0, and inflation is also equal to target, p = 2, then the real rate of interest as measured by prior inflation, r-p, equal 2 percent. The fed funds rate calculated with this simple policy rule fits remarkably well the actual fed funds rate in 1987-1992 (Taylor 1993, 204, Figure 1).

The simple rule is restated by Levin and Taylor (2010, 16, equation (1)) to account for discrete shifts in the intercept:

rt = ­r’ + γπt – π*) + γy(yty*t) (5)

Equation (5) expresses the short-term real interest rate, rt, in terms of an effect, γπt – π*), of the difference between actual inflation, πt, and the central’s bank objective for inflation, π*, and an effect, γy(yty*t), of the deviation of actual output, yt, from trend or steady-state output, y*t, and r’ stands for the steady-state value of the real rate of interest.

Equation (5) is shown by Levy and Taylor (2009) to provide a good fit of experience during the Great Inflation by allowing for shifts in the central bank’s inflation objective π*. Monetary policy during the Great Inflation can be interpreted by three stop-start events occurring in 1968-70, 1974-76 and 1979-80. Levy and Taylor (2009) conclude that in all three “stop and go” episodes monetary policy “fell behind the curve,” permitting rising inflation before belated tightening and abandoning tightening because of the contraction before inflation was reduced to the level before the event. Lags in effect of monetary policy have been amply discussed in the literature and may have proved important in falling behind the curve (see Culbertson 1960, Friedman 1961, Culbertson 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002 and Romer and Romer 2004).

Detailed discussion of the analysis of the Great Inflation is provided in past comments of this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html). Unconventional monetary policy played a major role in the financial crisis and global recession as discussed in the balance of this section.

Weakness in the housing sector is being considered as an important factor of the financial crisis, global recession and slow growth recession. Chairman Bernanke (2011Oct4JEC, 2-3) states:

“Other sectors of the economy are also contributing to the slower-than-expected rate of expansion. The housing sector has been a significant driver of recovery from most recessions in the United States since World War II. This time, however, a number of factors—including the overhang of distressed and foreclosed properties, tight credit conditions for builders and potential homebuyers, and the large number of “underwater” mortgages (on which homeowners owe more than their homes are worth)—have left the rate of new home construction at only about one-third of its average level in recent decades.”

The answer to these arguments can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ibid, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

There are significant elements of the theory of bank financial fragility of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b) that help to explain the financial fragility of banks during the credit/dollar crisis (see also Diamond 2007). The theory of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) as exposed by Diamond (2007) is that banks funding with demand deposits have a mismatch of liquidity (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 58-66). A run occurs when too many depositors attempt to withdraw cash at the same time. All that is needed is an expectation of failure of the bank. Three important functions of banks are providing evaluation, monitoring and liquidity transformation. Banks invest in human capital to evaluate projects of borrowers in deciding if they merit credit. The evaluation function reduces adverse selection or financing projects with low present value. Banks also provide important monitoring services of following the implementation of projects, avoiding moral hazard that funds be used for, say, real estate speculation instead of the original project of factory construction. The transformation function of banks involves both assets and liabilities of bank balance sheets. Banks convert an illiquid asset or loan for a project with cash flows in the distant future into a liquid liability in the form of demand deposits that can be withdrawn immediately.

In the theory of banking of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b), the bank creates liquidity by tying human assets to capital. The collection skills of the relationship banker convert an illiquid project of an entrepreneur into liquid demand deposits that are immediately available for withdrawal. The deposit/capital structure is fragile because of the threat of bank runs. In these days of online banking, the run on Washington Mutual was through withdrawals online. A bank run can be triggered by the decline of the value of bank assets below the value of demand deposits.

Pelaez and Pelaez (Regulation of Banks and Finance 2009b, 60, 64-5) find immediate application of the theories of banking of Diamond, Dybvig and Rajan to the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. It is a credit crisis because the main issue was the deterioration of the credit portfolios of securitized banks as a result of default of subprime mortgages. It is a dollar crisis because of the weakening dollar resulting from relatively low interest rate policies of the US. It caused systemic effects that converted into a global recession not only because of the huge weight of the US economy in the world economy but also because the credit crisis transferred to the UK and Europe. Management skills or human capital of banks are illustrated by the financial engineering of complex products. The increasing importance of human relative to inanimate capital (Rajan and Zingales 2000) is revolutionizing the theory of the firm (Zingales 2000) and corporate governance (Rajan and Zingales 2001). Finance is one of the most important examples of this transformation. Profits were derived from the charter in the original banking institution. Pricing and structuring financial instruments was revolutionized with option pricing formulas developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973, 1974, 1998) that permitted the development of complex products with fair pricing. The successful financial company must attract and retain finance professionals who have invested in human capital, which is a sunk cost to them and not of the institution where they work.

The complex financial products created for securitized banking with high investments in human capital are based on houses, which are as illiquid as the projects of entrepreneurs in the theory of banking. The liquidity fragility of the securitized bank is equivalent to that of the commercial bank in the theory of banking (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 65). Banks created off-balance sheet structured investment vehicles (SIV) that issued commercial paper receiving AAA rating because of letters of liquidity guarantee by the banks. The commercial paper was converted into liquidity by its use as collateral in SRPs at the lowest rates and minimal haircuts because of the AAA rating of the guarantor bank. In the theory of banking, default can be triggered when the value of assets is perceived as lower than the value of the deposits. Commercial paper issued by SIVs, securitized mortgages and derivatives all obtained SRP liquidity on the basis of illiquid home mortgage loans at the bottom of the pyramid. The run on the securitized bank had a clear origin (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 65):

“The increasing default of mortgages resulted in an increase in counterparty risk. Banks were hit by the liquidity demands of their counterparties. The liquidity shock extended to many segments of the financial markets—interbank loans, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), high-yield bonds and many others—when counterparties preferred lower returns of highly liquid safe havens, such as Treasury securities, than the risk of having to sell the collateral in SRPs at deep discounts or holding an illiquid asset. The price of an illiquid asset is near zero.”

Table I-3 provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.7 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.3 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first three years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.3 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while GDP grew, 2.5 percent in 2010, 1.8 percent in 2011, 2.8 percent in 2012 and 1.9 percent in 2013. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, and five quarters from IQ2013 to IQ2014 is 1.7 percent and 1.5 percent in the four quarters ending in IQ2014 but only 2.2 percent in the four quarters of 2013 by discounting contribution of 1.67 percentage points of inventory accumulation to growth in IIIQ2013. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while the forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 2.1 to 2.3 percent in 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20140618.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 3.0 to 3.2 percent in 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20140618.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2014 has been at average 2.1 percent in annual equivalent.

Table I-3, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

1930

-8.5

1980

-0.2

2000

4.1

1931

-6.4

1981

2.6

2001

1.0

1932

-12.9

1982

-1.9

2002

1.8

1933

-1.3

1983

4.6

2003

2.8

1934

10.8

1984

7.3

2004

3.8

1935

8.9

1985

4.2

2005

3.4

1936

12.9

1986

3.5

2006

2.7

1937

5.1

1987

3.5

2007

1.8

1938

-3.3

1988

4.2

2008

-0.3

1930

8.0

1989

3.7

2009

-2.8

1940

8.8

1990

1.9

2010

2.5

1941

17.7

1991

-0.1

2011

1.8

1942

18.9

1992

3.6

2012

2.8

1943

17.0

1993

2.7

2013

1.9

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-4 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.7 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.3 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-4, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions   

 

Number of Quarters

Cumulative Percentage Contraction

Average Percentage Rate

IIQ1953 to IIQ1954

3

-2.4

-0.8

IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958

3

-3.0

-1.0

IVQ1973 to IQ1975

5

-3.1

-0.6

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980

2

-2.2

-1.1

IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

4

-2.5

-0.64

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

6

-4.3

-0.72

Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-5 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.2 percent of the US economy in the nineteen quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2014. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:

  • 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
  • 5.4 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
  • 5.2 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
  • 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
  • 5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
  • 4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987.

The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.4 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.8 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.8 percent in 2012 and 1.9 percent in 2013 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013 and the first quarter of 2014 accumulated to 3.8 percent. This growth is equivalent to 1.7 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IQ2014 of $15,924.2 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,242.1 billion and compounding by 4/9: {[($15,824.2/$15,242.1)4/9 -1]100 = 1.7 percent. The rate of growth of GDP in the third estimate of IIIQ2013 is 4.1 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR). Inventory accumulation contributed 1.67 percentage points to this rate of growth. The actual rate without this impulse of unsold inventories would have been 2.43 percent, or 0.6 percent in IIIQ2013, such that annual equivalent growth in 2013 is closer to 2.2 percent {[(1.003)(1.006)(1.006)(1.007)4/4-1]100 = 2.2%}, compounding the quarterly rates and converting into annual equivalent. Inventory divestment deducted 1.70 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Without this deduction of inventory divestment, GDP growth would have been minus 1.23 percent in IQ2014, such that the actual growth rates in the four quarters ending in IQ2014 is closer to 2.0 percent {[(1.006)(1.01)(1.007)(0.9969)]4/4 -1]100 = 2.0%}.

Table I-5, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

 

Number
of
Quarters

Cumulative Growth

∆%

Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate

IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957

11

12.8

4.5

First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955

4

7.8

 

IIQ1958 to IIQ1959

5

10.0

7.9

First Four Quarters

IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959

4

9.2

 

IIQ1975 to IVQ1976

8

8.3

4.1

First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976

4

6.1

 

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

IQ1983 to IIIQ1987

13

15

16

17

18

19

19.9

21.6

22.3

23.1

24.5

25.6

5.7

5.4

5.2

5.0

5.0

4.9

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

4

7.8

 

Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*

 

7.7

 

IIIQ2009 to IQ2014

19

10.2

2.1

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

 

2.7

 

*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IIQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

There are around 26.8 million people in the US unemployed or underemployed, which is 16.3 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-valuations-twenty-seven.html). Real wages are stagnating. There is no exit from unemployment, underemployment and falling real wages because of the collapse of hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-risk-recovery-without-hiring.html). Zero interest rates induce carry trades that squeeze economic activity with deterioration of the margin of revenue from sale of production net of input costs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html). Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and large-scale purchases of assets using the central bank’s balance sheet intends to increase aggregate demand by stimulating consumption and investment. In practice, there is no control of how cheap money will be used. An alternative allocation of cheap money is through the carry trade from zero interest rates and short dollar positions to exposures in risk financial assets such as equities, commodities and so on. Normal monetary policy would encourage financial intermediation required for financing sound long-term projects that can stimulate economic growth and full utilization of resources. An exit from zero interest rates may provoke another financial panic with with possible global recession. There is no painless escape from the duration trap of zero interest rates.

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014.

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