CMP Associates Regulation Blog: Sharp Revaluation of the US Dollar with Increasing Interest Rates, Net Foreign Trade, Exports Less Imports, Subtracts 3.20 Percentage Points from US GDP Growth in IQ2022, US GDP Contracts at 1.4 Percent Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate in IQ2022, US GDP 17.9 Percent Below Historical Trend, US Public Debt Held by the Public $23.8 Trillion with US Nominal GDP $24.4 Trillion in IQ2022, Cyclically Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment, Long-term Deterioration of United States International Terms of Trade, Decline of United States Competitive Advantage, Increasing Stagflation Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part I

Sharp Revaluation of the US Dollar with Increasing Interest Rates, Net Foreign Trade, Exports Less Imports, Subtracts 3.20 Percentage Points from US GDP Growth in IQ2022, US GDP Contracts at 1.4 Percent Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate in IQ2022, US GDP 17.9 Percent Below Historical Trend, US Public Debt Held by the Public $23.8 Trillion with US Nominal GDP $24.4 Trillion in IQ2022, Cyclically Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment, Long-term Deterioration of United States International Terms of Trade, Decline of United States Competitive Advantage, Increasing Stagflation Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

Carlos M. Pelaez

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment

IID United States Terms of International Trade

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

Preamble. United States total public debt outstanding is $30.4 trillion and debt held by the public $23.8 trillion (https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/datasets/debt-to-the-penny/debt-to-the-penny). The Net International Investment Position of the United States, or foreign debt, is $18.1 trillion (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/intinv421.pdf https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/us-consumer-price-index-increased-85.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). The United States current account deficit is 3.6 percent of GDP in IVQ2021 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/trans421.pdf). The Treasury deficit of the United States reached $2.8 trillion in fiscal year 2021 (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/). Total assets of Federal Reserve Banks reached $8.9 trillion on Apr 27,2022 and securities held outright reached $8.5 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). US GDP nominal NSA reached $24.4 trillion in IQ2022 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Total Treasury interest-bearing, marketable debt held by private investors increased from $3635 billion in 2007 to $16,439 billion in Sep 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021) or increase by 352.2 percent (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/). John Hilsenrath, writing on “Economists Seek Recession Cues in the Yield Curve,” published in the Wall Street Journal on Apr 2, 2022, analyzes the inversion of the Treasury yield curve with the two-year yield at 2.430 on Apr 1, 2022, above the ten-year yield at 2.374. Hilsenrath argues that inversion appears to signal recession in market analysis but not in alternative Fed approach.

Chart CPI-H provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index of the United States with 8.5 percent in Mar 2022, which is the highest since 8.9 percent in Dec 1981.

Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2022

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart VII-4 of the Energy Information Administration provides the price of the Natural Gas Futures Contract increasing from $2.581 on Jan 4, 2021 to $6.850 per million Btu on Apr 26, 2022 or 165.4 percent.

Chart VII-4, US, Natural Gas Futures Contract 1

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1d.htm

Chart VII-5 of the US Energy Administration provides US field production of oil decreasing from a peak of 12,966 thousand barrels per day in Nov 2019 to the final point of 11.371 thousand barrels per day in Jan 2022.

Chart VII-5, US, US, Field Production of Crude Oil, Thousand Barrels Per Day

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=M

Chart VI-6 of the US Energy Information Administration provides imports of crude oil. Imports increased from 245,369 thousand barrels per day in Jan 2021 to 252,916 thousand in Jan 2022.

Chart VII-6, US, US, Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Thousand Barrels

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUS1&f=M

Chart VI-7 of the EIA provides US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2020. There was sharp increase in production in the final segment that reached consumption in 2020.

Chart VI-7, US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2020, Million Barrels Per Day

https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and r^e the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+r^e). Thus, g = [(r/r^e) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dr^e>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

I Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Four Trillion Dollars below Trend. IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth provides the analysis of long-term and cyclical growth of GDP in the US with GDP Four Trillion Dollars or 17.9 percent below trend. Section IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment analyzes weakness in investment in the initial part of the cycle followed by stronger performance and recent weakness/recovery in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Section IA2 Swelling Undistributed Profits analyzes corporate profits. Section IID United States International Terms of Trade provides data and analysis of relative prices in US international trade.

There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:

Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP three trillion dollars below trend. US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.1 percent per year from 1929 to 2021 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-69-percent-in.html), with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2020 and 1.6 percent from 2007 to 2021. GDP in IVQ2021 is 17.9 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent.
Private fixed investment stagnating initially followed by increase of 7.3 percent SAAR in IQ2022 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-69-percent-in.html).
Twenty two million or 12.5 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with cyclically stagnating or declining real wages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/increase-in-mar-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/increase-in-feb-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/increase-in-jan-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/increase-in-dec-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/increase-in-sep-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/increase-in-aug-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/decrease-in-dec-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-fed-will-be-patient-adjusting.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-on00000000e-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/increase-in-mar-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/increase-in-feb-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/increase-in-jan-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/real-disposable-income-decreasing-02.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/increase-in-nov-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/increase-in-sep-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/increase-in-aug-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier 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Output of manufacturing (SIC) in Mar 2022 at 37.3 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 20.5 percent below trend measured from 1999 to 2006. Output of manufacturing (NAICS) at 38.8 percent below trend measured from 1986 to 2006 and 21.4 percent below trend measured from 1999 to 2006 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/inflation-accelerating-worldwide.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/the-fomc-decided-to-raise-target-range.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/united-states-producer-prices-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/united-states-producer-prices-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/total-nonfarm-hires-move-from-4986.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/unchanged-fomc-target-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/federal-open-market-committee-leaves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/us-industrial-production-increased-3.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/growth-of-industrial-production-of-54.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/recovery-without-hiring-twenty-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/contraction-of-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/sharp-contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/declining-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

The Bureau of Economic Analysis revised the national accounts of the United States since 1929 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/gdp2q18_adv.pdf):

“Comprehensive Update of the National Income and Product Accounts The estimates released today also reflect the results of the 15th comprehensive update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The updated estimates reflect previously announced improvements, and include the introduction of new not seasonally adjusted estimates for GDP, GDI, and their major components. For more information, see the Technical Note. Revised NIPA table stubs, initial results, and background materials are available on the BEA Web site.” The Bureau of Economic Analysis provided the annual revision of the national product accounts in the release of the first estimate or advanced estimate of IIQ2019 GDP (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-07/gdp2q19_adv.pdf): “The estimates released today also reflect the results of the Annual Update of the National Income and

Product Accounts (NIPAs). The update covers the first quarter of 2014 through the first quarter of 2019.” The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the annual revision of the national product accounts in the release of the first estimate or advanced estimate of IIQ2020 GDP (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/gdp2q20_adv.pdf): “The estimates released today also reflect the results of the Annual Update of the National Income and

Product Accounts (NIPAs). The timespan of the update is the first quarter of 2015 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of real GDP and its major components, and the first quarter of 1999 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of income and saving. The reference year remains 2012. More information on the 2020 Annual Update is included in the May Survey of Current Business article, “GDP and the Economy.” The BEA provided the annual update of the national accounts in the first or advanced estimate of IIQ2021 GDP (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/gdp2q21_adv.pdf): “Today’s release also reflects the Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts; the updated Industry Economic Accounts will be released on September 30, 2021, along with the third estimate of GDP for the second quarter of 2021. The timespan of the update is the first quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2021 and resulted in revisions to GDP, GDI, and their major components. The reference year remains 2012. More information on the 2021 Annual Update is included in the May Survey of Current Business article, GDP and the Economy. For the period of economic expansion from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019, real GDP increased at an annual rate of 2.3 percent, the same as previously published. For the period of economic contraction from the fourth quarter of 2019 through the second quarter of 2020, real GDP decreased at an annual rate of 19.2 percent, also the same as previously published. For the period of economic expansion from the second quarter of 2020 through the first quarter of 2021, real GDP increased at an annual rate of 14.1 percent, an upward revision of 0.1 percentage point from the previously published estimate. With today's release, most NIPA tables are available through BEA’s Interactive Data application on the BEA website (www.bea.gov). See Information on Updates to the National Economic Accounts for the complete table release schedule and a summary of results through 2020, which includes a discussion of methodology changes. A table showing the major current-dollar revisions and their sources for each component of GDP, national income, and personal income is also provided. The August 2021 Survey of Current Business will contain an article describing the update in more detail. Previously published estimates, which are superseded by today's release, are found in BEA’s archives.”

Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions.

The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as fluctuating from mediocre growth of 2.7 percent on an annual basis in 2010 to 1.5 percent in 2011, 2.3 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.3 percent in 2014 and 2.7 percent in 2015. GDP growth was 1.7 percent in 2016 and 2.3 percent in 2017. GDP growth was 2.9 percent in 2018 and 2.3 percent in 2019. GDP contracted 3.4 percent in 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). GDP grew 5.7 percent in 2021. The following calculations show that actual growth is around 2.2 percent per year during the expansion phase. The rate of growth of 1.6 percent in the entire cycle from 2006 to 2021 and 1.6 percent from 2007 to 2021 is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which the economy of the US always attained for entire cycles in expansions after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provides valuable information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.

Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita

	GDP
Long-Term
1929-2021	3.2
1947-2021	3.1
Whole Cycles
1980-1989	3.5
2006-2021	1.6
2007-2021	1.6
Cyclical Contractions ∆%
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982	-4.6
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009	-3.8
Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆%
IQ1983 to IVQ1985 IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983-IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 IQ1983 to IQ1989 IQ1983 to IIQ1989 IQ1983 to IIIQ1989 IQ1983 to IVQ1989 IQ1983 to IQ1990 IQ1983 to IIQ1990 IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 IQ1983 to IVQ1990	5.9 5.7 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.0
IQ1983 to IQ1991 IQ1983 to IIQ1991 IQ1983 to IIIQ1991 IQ1983 to IVQ1991 IQ1983 to IQ1992 IQ1983 to IIQ1992 IQ1983 to IIIQ1992 IQ1983 to IVQ1992 IQ1983 to IQ1993 IQ1983 to IIQ1993 IQ1983 to IIIQ1993 IQ1983 to IV1993 IQ1983 to IQ1994 IQ1983 to IIQ1994 IQ1983 to IIIQ1994 IQ1983 to IVQ1994 IQ1983 to IQ1995 IQ1983 to IQ1995 IQ1983 to IQ1995 IQ1983 to IIQ1995 IQ1983 to IIIQ1995	3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 33.6.6
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983	7.9
IIIQ2009 to IQ2022	2.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010	2.9
	Real Disposable Income	Real Disposable Income per Capita
Long-Term
1929-2021	3.2	2.1
1947-1999	3.7	2.3
Whole Cycles
1980-1989	3.5	2.6
2006-2021	2.4	1.7

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace around 2.1 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.

Average Annual Growth in the Past Forty-One Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013, the four quarters of 2014, the four quarters of 2015, the four quarters of 2016, the four quarters of 2017, the four quarters of 2018, the four quarters of 2019, the four quarters of 2020, the four quarters of 2021 and the first quarter of 2022 accumulated to 23.0 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.0 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2021 of $19,735.9 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $16,048.7 billion and compounding by 4/41: {[($19,735.9/$16,048.7)^4/41 -1]100 = 2.0 percent.
Average Annual Growth in the Past Four Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters from IQ2020 to IQ2022 accumulated to 3.6 percent. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IQ2022 of $19,9735.9 billion by GDP in IQ2021 of $19,055.7 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($19,735.9/$19,055.7)^4/4 -1]100 = 3.6%}. The US economy increased 3.6 percent in IQ2022 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IQ2021 (See Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/gdp1q22_adv.pdf and the complete data at https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2012 Dollars and ∆%

	Real GDP, Billions Chained 2012 Dollars	∆% Relative to IVQ2007	∆% Relative to Prior Quarter	∆% over Year Earlier
IVQ2007	15,767.1	NA	0.6	2.2
IVQ2011	16,048.7	1.8	1.1	1.5
IQ2012	16,180.0	2.6	0.8	2.6
IIQ2012	16,253.7	3.1	0.5	2.4
IIIQ2012	16,282.2	3.3	0.2	2.6
IVQ2012	16,300.0	3.4	0.1	1.6
IQ2013	16,441.5	4.3	0.9	1.6
IIQ2013	16,464.4	4.4	0.1	1.3
IIIQ2013	16,594.7	5.2	0.8	1.9
IVQ2013	16,712.8	6.0	0.7	2.5
IQ2014	16,654.2	5.6	-0.4	1.3
IIQ2014	16,868.1	7.0	1.3	2.5
IIIQ2014	17,064.6	8.2	1.2	2.8
IVQ2014	17,141.2	8.7	0.4	2.6
IQ2015	17,280.6	9.6	0.8	3.8
IIQ2015	17,380.9	10.2	0.6	3.0
IIIQ2015	17,437.1	10.6	0.3	2.2
IVQ2015	17,462.6	10.8	0.1	1.9
IQ2016	17,565.5	11.4	0.6	1.6
IIQ2016	17,618.6	11.7	0.3	1.4
IIIQ2016	17,724.5	12.4	0.6	1.6
IVQ2016	17,812.6	13.0	0.5	2.0
IQ2017	17,896.6	13.5	0.5	1.9
IIQ2017	17,996.8	14.1	0.6	2.1
IIIQ2017	18,126.2	15.0	0.7	2.3
IVQ2017	18,296.7	16.0	0.9	2.7
IQ2018	18,436.3	16.9	0.8	3.0
IIQ2018	18,590.0	17.9	0.8	3.3
IIIQ2018	18,679.6	18.5	0.5	3.1
IVQ2018	18,721.3	18.7	0.2	2.3
IQ2019	18,833.2	19.4	0.6	2.2
IIQ2019	18,982.5	20.4	0.8	2.1
IIIQ2019	19,112.7	21.2	0.7	2.3
IVQ2019	19,202.3	21.8	0.5	2.6
IQ2020	18,952.0	20.2	-1.3	0.6
IIQ2020	17,258.2	9.5	-8.9	-9.1
IIIQ2020	18,560.8	17.7	7.5	-2.9
IVQ2020	18,767.8	19.0	1.1	-2.3
IQ2021	19,055.7	20.9	1.5	0.5
IIQ2021	19,368.3	22.8	1.6	12.2
IIIQ2021	19,478.9	23.5	0.6	4.9
IVQ2021	19,806.3	25.6	1.7	5.5
IQ2022	19,735.9	25.2	-0.4	3.6
Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IVQ2021	23.0
Annual Equivalent ∆%	2.0

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart GDP of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the rates of growth of GDP at SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the 16 quarters from IIQ2018 to IQ2022. Growth has been fluctuating. The final data point is minus 1.4 percent in IQ2022 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Rates of Growth of United States GDP, ∆%

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product

Historical parallels are instructive but have all the limitations of empirical research in economics. The more instructive comparisons are not with the Great Depression of the 1930s but rather with the recessions in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s. The growth rates and job creation in the expansion of the economy away from recession are subpar in the current expansion compared to others in the past. Four recessions are initially considered, following the reference dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html): IIQ1953-IIQ1954, IIIQ1957-IIQ1958, IIIQ1973-IQ1975 and IQ1980-IIIQ1980. The data for the earlier contractions illustrate that the growth rate and job creation in the current expansion are inferior. The sharp contractions of the 1950s and 1970s are considered in Table I-1, showing the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) quarter-to-quarter, seasonally adjusted (SA), yearly-equivalent growth rates of GDP. The recovery from the recession of 1953 consisted of four consecutive quarters of high percentage growth rates from IIQ1954 to IIIQ1955: 4.6, 8.1, 11.9 and 6.7. The recession of 1957 was followed by four consecutive high percentage growth rates from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959: 9.6, 9.7, 7.9 and 9.3. The recession of 1973-1975 was followed by high percentage growth rates from IIQ1975 to IQ1976: 2.9, 7.0, 5.5 and 9.3. The disaster of the Great Inflation and Unemployment of the 1970s, which made stagflation notorious, is even better in growth rates during the expansion phase in comparison with the current cycle slow-growth recession.

Table I-1, US, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Percentage Growth Rates in Annual Equivalent of GDP in Cyclical Recessions and Following Four Quarter Expansions ∆%

	IQ	IIQ	IIIQ	IV
R IIQ1953-IIQ1954
1953			-2.2	-5.9
1954	-1.9
E IIIQ1954-IIQ1955
1954			4.6	8.1
1955	11.9	6.7
R IIIQ1957-IIQ1958
1957				-4.1
1958	-10.0
E IIIQ1958-IIQ1959
1958			9.6	9.7
1959	7.9	9.3
R IVQ1969-IV1970
1969				-1.9
1970	-0.6
E IIQ1970-IQ1971
1970		0.6	3.7	-4.2
1971	11.3
R IVQ1973-IQ1975
1973				3.8
1974	-3.4	1.0	-3.7	-1.5
1975	-4.8
E IIQ1975-IQ1976
1975		2.9	7.0	5.5
1976	9.3
R IQ1980-IIIQ1980
1980	1.3	-8.0	-0.5
R IQ1981-IVQ1982
1981	8.1	-2.9	4.9	-4.3
1982	-6.1	1.8	-1.5	0.2
E IQ1983-IVQ1983
1983	5.4	9.4	8.2	8.6
R IVQ2007-IIQ2009
2008	-2.3	2.1	-2.1	-8.4
2009	-4.4	-0.6
E IIIQ2009-IIQ2010
2009			1.5	4.5
2010	1.5	3.7

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The NBER dates another recession in 1980 that lasted about half a year. If the two recessions from IQ1980s to IIIQ1980 and IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 are combined, the impact of lost GDP of 4.6 percent is more comparable to the latest revised 3.8 percent drop of the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table I-2 provides the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) quarterly growth rates of GDP in SA yearly equivalents for the recessions of 1981 to 1982 and 2007 to 2009, using the latest major revision published on Jul 27, 2016, subsequent revisions, the revision since 1929 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/gdp2q18_adv.pdf), revising data since 1929 (“Comprehensive Update of the National Income and Product Accounts The estimates released today also reflect the results of the 15th comprehensive update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The updated estimates reflect previously announced improvements and include the introduction of new not seasonally adjusted estimates for GDP, GDI, and their major components. For more information, see the Technical Note. Revised NIPA table stubs, initial results, and background materials are available on the BEA Web site.”) and the third estimate for IIQ2019 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-09/gdp2q19_3rd.pdf) revising estimates from IQ2014 through IQ2019, which are available in the dataset of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The first estimate for IIQ2020 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/gdp2q20_adv.pdf) provides the annual update: “The estimates released today also reflect the results of the Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The timespan of the update is the first quarter of 2015 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of real GDP and its major components, and the first quarter of 1999 through the fourth quarter of 2019 for estimates of income and saving. The reference year remains 2012. More information on the 2020 Annual Update is included in the May Survey of Current Business article, “GDP and the Economy https://apps.bea.gov/scb/2020/05-may/0520-gdp-economy.htm#annual-update.” There is a third estimate of GDP for IQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/gdp1q21_3rd_1.pdf). There is an annual update and revisions of historical data in the advanced estimate for GDP of IIQ2021 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/gdp2q21_adv.pdf). There is a first estimate for IQ2022 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/gdp1q22_adv.pdf). There were four quarters of contraction in 1981-1982 ranging in rate from -1.5 percent to -6.1 percent and five quarters of contraction in 2007-2009 ranging in rate from -0.7 percent to -8.5 percent. The striking difference is that in the first forty fifty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, shown in Table I-2 in relief, GDP grew at the high quarterly percentage growth rates of 5.4, 9.4, 8.2, 8.6, 8.1, 7.1, 3.9, 3.3, 3.9, 3.6, 6.2, 3.0, 3.8, 1.8, 3.9, 2.2, 3.0, 4.4, 3.5, 7.0, 2.1, 5.4, 2.4, 5.4, 4.1, 3.1, 3.0, 0.8, 4.4, 1.5, 0.3, minus 3.6, minus 1.9, 3.2, 2.0, 1.4 , 4.9, 4.4, 4.0, 4.2, 0.7, 2.3, 1.9, 5.5, 3.9, 5.5, 2.4, 4.7, 1.4, 1.2 in and 3.4 IIIQ1995. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table III-1 shows weaker performance in IIQ1990 and IIIQ1990 and contractions at 3.6 percent in IVQ1990 and 1.9 percent in IQ1991. In contrast, the percentage growth rates in the first fifty quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2021 shown in relief in Table I-2 were mediocre: 1.5, 4.3, 2.0, 3.9, 3.1, 2.1, -1.0, 2.7, -0.2, 4.6, 3.3, 1.8, 0.7, 0.4, 3.5, 0.6, 3.2, 2.9, minus 1.4, 5.2, 4.7, 1.8, 3.3, 2.3, 1.3, 0.6, 2.4, 1.2, 2.4, 2.0, 1.9, 2.3, 2.9, 3.8, 3.1, 3.4, 1.9, 0.9, 2.4, 3.2, 2.8, 1.9, minus 5.1, minus 31.2, 33.8 in IIIQ2020, 4.5, 6.3, 6.7, 2.3, 6.9, and minus 1.4 in IIQ2022 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Economic growth and employment creation continued at slow rhythm during 2012 and in 2013-2019 while much stronger growth would be required in movement to full employment. The cycle is now long by historical standards and growth rates are typically weaker in the final periods of cyclical expansions.

Table I-2, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of GDP, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q	1981	1982	1983	1984	2008	2009	2010
I	8.1	-6.1	5.4	8.1	-1.6	-4.6	2.0
II	-2.9	1.8	9.4	7.1	2.3	-0.7	3.9
III	4.9	-1.5	8.2	3.9	-2.1	1.5	3.1
IV	-4.3	0.2	8.6	3.3	-8.5	4.3	2.1
				1985			2011
I				3.9			-1.0
II				3.6			2.7
III				6.2			-0.2
IV				3.0			4.6
				1986			2012
I				3.8			3.3
II				1.8			1.8
III				3.9			0.7
IV				2.2			0.4
				1987			2013
I				3.0			3.5
II				4.4			0.6
III				3.5			3.2
IV				7.0			2.9
				1988			2014
I				2.1			-1.4
II				5.4			5.2
III				2.4			4.7
IV				5.4			1.8
				1989			2015
I				4.1			3.3
II				3.1			2.3
III				3.0			1.3
IV				0.8			0.6
				1990			2016
I				4.4			2.4
II				1.5			1.2
III				0.3			2.4
IV				-3.6			2.0
				1991			2017
I				-1.9			1.9
II				3.2			2.3
III				2.0			2.9
IV				1.4			3.8
				1992			2018
I				4.9			3.1
II				4.4			3.4
III				4.0			1.9
IV				4.2			0.9
				1993			2019
I				0.7			2.4
II				2.3			3.2
III				1.9			2.8
IV				5.5			1.9
				1994			2020
I				3.9			-5.1
II				5.5			-31.2
III				2.4			33.8
IV				4.7			4.5
				1995			2021
				1.4			6.3
				1.2			6.7
				3.4			2.3
				2.7			6.9
				1996			2022
				3.0			-1.4
				6.8
				3.6
				4.2

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-1 provides the real GDP of the US between 1929 and 1999. US GDP grew at the yearly average rate of 3.5 percent between 1929 and 1999. There is an evident acceleration of the rate of GDP growth in the 1990s as shown by a much sharper slope of the growth curve. Cobet and Wilson (2002) define labor productivity as the value of manufacturing output produced per unit of labor input used (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). Between 1950 and 2000, labor productivity in the US grew less rapidly than in Germany and Japan. The major part of the increase in productivity in Germany and Japan occurred between 1950 and 1973 while the rate of productivity growth in the US was relatively subdued in several periods. While Germany and Japan reached their highest growth rates of productivity before 1973, the US accelerated its rate of productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s. Between 1950 and 2000, the rate of productivity growth in the US of 2.9 percent per year was much lower than 6.3 percent in Japan and 4.7 percent in Germany. Between 1995 and 2000, the rate of productivity growth of the US of 4.6 percent exceeded that of Japan of 3.9 percent and the rate of Germany of 2.6 percent.

Chart I-1, US, Real GDP 1929-1999

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-1A provides real GDP annually from 1929 to 2021. Growth after the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has not been sufficiently high to compensate for the contraction as it had in past economic cycles. The drop of output in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has been followed by anemic recovery compared with return to trend at 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May) and a standstill that can lead to growth recession, or low rates of economic growth. The expansion is relatively long compared to earlier expansion and there could be even another contraction or conventional recession in the future. This could be a fact in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The average rate of growth from 1947 to 2021 is 3.1 percent. The average growth rate from IV2007 to IVQ2021 is only 1.6 percent in contrast with 2.9 percent annual equivalent from the end of the recession in IVQ2001 to the end of the expansion in IVQ2007. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 51 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2022 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 201 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IQ2022 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/gdp1q22_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,605.6 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,161.8 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,605.6/$15,161.8) -1]100 = 2.9%] or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-69-percent-in.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1995 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-69-percent-in.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2022 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 52.4 percent. GDP in IQ2022 would be $24,026.0 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4290.1 billion than actual $19,735.9 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 21.8 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.5 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/increase-in-mar-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/increase-in-feb-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm). US GDP in IQ202 is 17.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,767.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,735.9 billion in IQ2022 or 25.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Mar 1919 to Mar 2022. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 106.8161 in Dec 2007 to 165.0337 in Mar 2022. The actual index NSA in Mar 2022 is 103.4865 which is 37.3 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Manufacturing output grew at average 1.4 percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.4 percent per year, the index would increase to 130.2200 in Mar 2022. The output of manufacturing at 103.4865 in Mar 2022 is 20.5 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 108.5167 in Jul 2007 to the low of 84.7321 in May 2009 or 21.9 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 84.7321 in Apr 2009 to 104.6594 in Mar 2022 or 23.5 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 170.9196 in Mar 2022. The NAICS index at 104.6594 in Mar 2022 is 38.8 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 104.6868 in Dec 2007 to 133.1115 in Mar 2022. The NAICS index at 104.6594 in Mar 2022 is 21.4 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-1A, US, Real GDP 1929-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-2 provides the growth of real quarterly GDP in the US between 1947 and 2022. The drop of output in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has been followed by anemic recovery compared with return to trend at 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May) and a standstill that can lead to growth recession, or low rates of economic growth. The expansion is relatively long compared to earlier expansions and there could be another contraction or conventional recession in the future. The average rate of growth from 1947 to 2021 is 3.1 percent. The annual equivalent growth rate from IVQ2007 to IVQ2021 is only 1.6 percent with 2.9 percent from the end of the recession in IVQ2001 to the end of the expansion in IVQ2007. There is sharp contraction in IQ2020 and IIQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) followed by sharp recovery in IIIQ2020, IVQ2020, IQ2021, IIQ2021, IIIQ2021 and IVQ2021. There is contraction in IQ2022.

Chart I-2, US, Real GDP, Quarterly, 1947-2022

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-3 provides real GDP percentage change on the quarter a year earlier for 1983-1995. The objective is simply to compare expansion in two recoveries from sharp contractions as shown in Table I-5. Growth rates in the early phase of the recovery in 1983 and 1984 were very high, which is the opportunity to reduce unemployment that has characterized cyclical expansion in the postwar US economy. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart I-3, Real GDP Percentage Change on Quarter a Year Earlier 1983-1995

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In contrast, growth rates in the comparable fifty quarters of expansion from 2009 to 2022 in Chart I-4 have been mediocre. As a result, growth has not provided the exit from unemployment and underemployment as in other cyclical expansions in the postwar period. Growth rates did not rise in V shape as in earlier expansions and then declined close to the standstill of growth recessions. There is sharp decrease in the rate of growth in IQ2020 relative to IQ2019 at 0.6 percent and contraction of 9.1 percent in IIQ2020 relative to IIQ2019. GDP contracted 2.9 percent in IIIQ2020 relative to IIIQ2019 and contracted 2.3 percent in IVQ2020 relative to IVQ019. GDP expanded at 0.5 percent in IQ2021 relative to IQ2020. GDP grew 12.2 percent in IIQ2021 relative to IIQ2020. GDP grew 4.9 percent in IIIQ2021 relative to IIIQ2020. GDP grew 5.5 percent from IVQ2020 to IVQ2021. GDP grew 3.6 percent from IQ2021 to IQ2022.

Chart I-4, US, Real GDP Percentage Change on Quarter a Year Earlier 2009-2022

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are in Table I-4 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.6 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 3.8 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-4, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Percentage Contraction	Average Percentage Rate
IIQ1953 to IIQ1954	3	-2.4	-0.8
IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958	3	-3.0	-1.0
IVQ1973 to IQ1975	5	-3.1	-0.6
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980	2	-2.2	-1.1
IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982	4	-2.5	-0.64
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009	6	-3.8	-0.7

Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-5 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.1 percent of the US economy in the fifty-one quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2022. There is sharp contraction in IIQ2020 at SAAR of minus 31.2 percent followed by sharp growth at 33.8 percent in IIIQ2020, 4.5 percent in IVQ2020, 6.3 percent in IQ2021, 6.7 percent in IIQ2021, 2.3 percent in IIIQ2021, 6.9 percent in IVQ2021 and contraction at 1.4 percent in IQ2022 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:

5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
5.3 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
5.1 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987
5.0 percent in the first twenty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1987
4.9 percent in the first twenty-first quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1988
4.9 percent in the first twenty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1989
4.7 percent in the first twenty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1989
4.6 percent in the first twenty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989
4.5 percent in the first twenty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1989
4.5 percent in the first twenty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1990
4.4 percent in the first thirty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1990
4.3 percent in the first thirty-one quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990
4.0 percent in the first thirty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1990
3.8 percent in the first thirty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1991
3.8 percent in the first thirty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1991
3.8 percent in the first thirty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991
3.7 percent in the thirty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1991
3.7 percent in the thirty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1992
3.7 percent in the thirty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1992
3.7 percent in the thirty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992
3.8 percent in the forty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1992
3.7 percent in the forty-one quarters from IQ1983 to IQ1993
3.6 percent in the forty-two quarters from IQ1983 to IIQ1993
3.6 percent in the forty-three quarters from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993
3.7 percent in the forty-four quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1993
3.7 percent in the forty-five quarters from IQ1983 to IQ1994
3.7 percent in the forty-six quarters from IQ1983 to IIQ1994
3.7 percent in the forty-seven quarters from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994
3.7 percent in the forty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1994
3.6 percent in the forty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1995
3.6 percent in the fifty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1995
3.6 percent in the fifty-one quarters from IQ1983 to IIIQ1995

The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill relative to historical experience with annual growth of 2.7 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.5 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.3 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.3 percent in 2014, 2.7 percent in 2015, 1.7 percent in 2016, 2.3 percent in 2017, 2.9 percent in 2018 and 2.3 percent in 2019 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) with contraction of 3.4 percent in 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Followed by growth of 5.7 percent in 2021. The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988. 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990. 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991. 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993. 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1995 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). GDP grew 2.9 percent in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010. GDP growth in the forty quarters from IQ2012 to IVQ2021 accumulated to 23.0 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.0 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IQ2022 of $19,735.9 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $16,048.7 billion and compounding by 4/41: {[($19,735.9/$16,048.7)^4/41 -1]100 = 2.0 percent}.

Table I-5, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Growth ∆%	Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate
IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957	11	12.8	4.5
First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955	4	7.8
IIQ1958 to IIQ1959	5	10.0	7.9
First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959	4	9.2
IIQ1975 to IVQ1976	8	8.3	4.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976	4	6.1
IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983 to IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 IQ1983 to IQ1989 IQ1983 to IIQ1989 IQ1983 to IIIQ1989 IQ1983 to IVQ1989 IQ1983 to IQ1990 IQ1983 to IIQ1990 IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 IQ1983 to IVQ1990 IQ1983 to IQ1991 IQ1983 to IIQ1991 IQ1983 to IIIQ1991 IQ1983 to IVQ1991 IQ1983 to IQ1992 IQ1983 to IIQ1992 IQ1983 to IIIQ1992 IQ1983 to IVQ1992 IQ1983 to IQ1993 IQ1983 to IIQ1993 IQ1983 to IIIQ1993 IQ1983 to IVQ1993 IQ1983 to IQ1994 IQ1983 to IIQ1994 IQ1983 to IIIQ1994 IQ1983 to IVQ1994 IQ1983 to IQ1995 IQ1983 to IIQ1995 IQ1983 to IIIQ1995	13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51	19.8 21.5 22.1 23.0 24.4 25.4 27.6 28.3 29.9 30.7 32.4 33.8 34.8 35.8 36.1 37.6 38.1 38.2 36.9 36.3 37.3 38.0 38.5 40.2 41.7 43.1 44.6 44.8 45.7 46.4 48.3 49.8 51.8 52.7 54.4 55.0 55.5 56.8	5.7 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983	4	7.9
Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*		7.7
IIIQ2009 to IQ2022	51	30.2	2.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010		2.9

*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-8 shows US real quarterly GDP growth from 1980 to 1995. The economy contracted during the recession and then expanded vigorously throughout the 1980s, rapidly eliminating the unemployment caused by the contraction. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $9404.5 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9275.3 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart I-8, US, Real GDP, 1980-1995

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-9 shows the entirely different situation of real quarterly GDP in the US between 2007 and 2022. The economy has underperformed during the first fifty quarters of expansion for the first time in the comparable contractions since the 1950s. The US economy was in a perilous cyclical slow growth now in 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), shown by sharp contractions in the final data points in IQ2020 and IIQ2020 followed by sharp growth in IIIQ2020, IVQ2020, IQ2021, IIQ2021, IIIQ2021 and IVQ2021 interrupted by contraction IQ2022.

Chart I-9, US, Real GDP, 2007-2022

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-8 provides contributions to the rate of growth of GDP by major sectors in percentage points. GDP contracted at the SAAR rate of 5.1 percent in IQ2020 and 31.2 percent in IIQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) subtracted 24.10 percentage points in IIQ2020 and subtracted 4.79 percentage points in IQ2020. Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) subtracted 9.64 percentage points in IIQ2020 and 0.92 percentage points in IQ2020. GDP grew at 6.3 percent in IQ2021, at 6.7 percent in IIQ2021, at 2.3 percent in IIIQ2021 and at 6.9 percent in IVQ2021. The highest contributions were 7.44 percentage points by PCE in IQ2021 and 7.92 percentage points in IIQ2021. PCE contributed 1.76 percentage points in IVQ2021, GDI contributed 5.82 percentage points and net trade subtracted 0.23 percentage points. GDP contracted at 1.4 percent in IQ2022. PCE contributed 1.83 percentage points and GDI added 0.43 percentage points. Trade deducted 3.20 percentage points , government deducted 0.48 percentage points and inventory divestment deducted 0.84 percentage points.

Table I-8, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of GDP in Percentage Points

	GDP	PCE	GDI	∆ PI	Trade	GOV
2022
I	-1.4	1.83	0.43	-0.84	-3.20	-0.48
2021
I	6.3	7.44	-0.37	-2.62	-1.56	0.77
II	6.7	7.92	-0.65	-1.26	-0.18	-0.36
III	2.3	1.35	2.05	2.20	-1.26	0.17
IV	6.9	1.76	5.82	5.32	-0.23	-0.46
2020
I	-5.1	-4.79	-0.92	-0.51	-0.05	0.63
II	-31.2	-24.10	-9.64	-4.01	1.53	0.97
III	33.8	25.51	11.71	6.84	-3.25	-0.19
IV	4.5	2.26	4.01	1.10	-1.65	-0.09
2019
I	2.4	0.43	1.13	0.49	0.39	0.47
II	3.2	2.37	0.48	-0.57	-0.50	0.86
III	2.8	2.12	0.22	-0.32	0.07	0.36
IV	1.9	1.13	-1.18	-0.99	1.43	0.52

Note: PCE: personal consumption expenditures; GDI: gross private domestic investment; ∆ PI: change in private inventories; Trade: net exports of goods and services; GOV: government consumption expenditures and gross investment; – is negative and no sign positive

GDP: percent change at annual rate; percentage points at annual rates

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment. Table IA1-1 provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of growth of private fixed investment for the recessions of the 1980s and the current economic cycle. Fixed investment increased at 3.7 percent in IQ2019 and increased at 6.1 percent in IIQ2019. Fixed investment increased at 3.1 percent in IIIQ2019. Fixed investment decreased at 1.1 percent in IVQ2019. Fixed investment decreased at 2.3 percent in IQ2020 and decreased at 30.4 percent in IIQ2020, increasing at 27.5 percent in IIIQ2020 and at 17.7 percent in IVQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Fixed investment grew at 13.0 percent in IQ2021 and increased at 3.3 percent in IIQ2021. Fixed investment decreased at 0.9 percent in IIIQ2021. Fixed investment increased at 2.7 percent in IVQ2021. Fixed investment increased at 7.3 percent in IQ2022. Sudeep Reddy and Scott Thurm, writing on “Investment falls off a cliff,” on Nov 18, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123593211825394.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories) analyze the decline of private investment in the US and inform that a review by the Wall Street Journal of filing and conference calls finds that 40 of the largest publicly traded corporations in the US have announced intentions to reduce capital expenditures in 2012.

Table IA1-1, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of Real Private Fixed Investment, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q	1981	1982	1983	1984	2008	2009	2010
I	3.8	-10.6	9.3	13.2	-6.1	-28.2	-0.2
II	3.2	-12.0	15.9	16.6	-3.2	-13.7	15.4
III	0.2	-9.2	24.4	8.2	-9.7	1.5	2.2
IV	-1.3	0.2	24.3	7.4	-23.9	2.0	7.8
				1985			2011
I				3.7			-0.7
II				5.2			9.7
III				-1.6			17.9
IV				7.8			10.6
				1986			2012
I				1.1			13.1
II				0.1			8.3
III				-1.8			0.6
IV				3.1			7.4
				1987			2013
I				-6.7			7.0
II				6.3			3.3
III				7.1			7.1
IV				-0.2			5.5
				1988			2014
I				0.2			4.1
II				8.1			11.6
III				1.9			7.9
IV				4.8			4.7
				1989			2015
IQ				3.6			1.1
IIQ				0.5			3.5
IIIQ				7.2			3.4
IVQ				-5.1			-1.1
				1990			2016
IQ				4.8			2.4
IIQ				-7.7			2.2
IIIQ				-3.2			3.7
IVQ				-9.9			3.1
				1991			2017
I				-10.6			6.4
II				1.2			3.8
III				0.5			0.5
IV				1.7			8.1
				1992			2018
I				4.5			6.7
II				13.8			6.0
III				4.7			0.8
IV				12.2			1.8
				1993			2019
I				3.0			3.7
II				7.4			6.1
III				6.4			3.1
IV				17.1			-1.1
				1994			2020
I				4.8			-2.3
II				8.3			-30.4
III				3.3			27.5
IV				10.0			17.7
				1995			2021
I				8.7			13.0
II				-0.3			3.3
III				5.7			-0.9
IV				8.0			2.7
				1996			2022
I				10.6			7.3
II				13.0
III				9.4
IV				6.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Weak behavior of real private fixed investment from 2007 to 2022 is in Chart IA1-2. Growth rates of real private fixed investment were much lower during the initial phase of the current economic cycle, entered sharp trend of decline and recovered recently, with another decline followed by increase and renewed decline. Fixed investment contracted sharply, at 2.3 percent in IQ2020 and at 30.4 percent in IIQ2020, increasing at 27.5 percent in IIIQ2020 and at 17.7 percent in IVQ2020. Fixed investment grew at 13.0 percent in IQ2021, growing at 3.3 percent in IIQ2021. Fixed investment decreased at 0.9 percent in IIIQ2021. Fixed investment increased at 2.7 percent in IVQ2021. Fixed investment increased at 7.3 percent in IQ2022. There is a downward effect in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 2007-2022

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percentage shares of net trade (exports less imports), exports and imports in US Gross Domestic Product are in Chart IA1-14 from 1929 to 2021. There is sharp trend of decline of exports and imports after the global recession beginning in IVQ2007. Net trade has been subtracting from growth since the stagflation of the 1970s.

Chart IA1-14, US, Percentage Shares of Net Trade, Exports and Imports in Gross Domestic Product, Yearly, 1979-2021

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Contributions to the rate of growth of real GDP in percentage points by investment segments are in Table IA1-4. There are multiple subtractions in IQ2020 and IIQ2020 in investment segments in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the through in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is recovery in the return to economic activity from IIIQ2020 to IVQ2021. Private Fixed Investment (PFI) and Equipment (EQP) contributed to the recovery as also Non-Residential (NRES) and Residential (RES).

Table IA1-4, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of Real GDP in Percentage Points

	GDP	GDI	PFI	NRES	EQP	IPP	RES	∆INV
2022
I	-1.4	0.43	1.27	1.17	0.79	0.40	0.10	-0.84
2021
I	6.3	-0.37	2.25	1.65	0.75	0.76	0.60	-2.62
II	6.7	-0.65	0.61	1.21	0.66	0.62	-0.60	-1.26
III	2.3	2.05	-0.16	0.22	-0.13	0.46	-0.38	2.20
IV	6.9	5.82	0.50	0.40	0.17	0.45	0.10	5.32
2020
I	-5.1	-0.92	-0.41	-1.14	-1.30	0.18	0.73	-0.51
II	-31.2	-9.64	-5.63	-4.28	-1.99	-0.51	-1.36	-4.01
III	33.8	11.71	4.88	2.72	2.73	0.45	2.16	6.84
IV	4.5	4.01	2.92	1.57	1.29	0.50	1.34	1.10
2019
I	2.4	1.13	0.64	0.63	0.25	0.25	0.00	0.49
II	3.2	0.48	1.06	0.90	0.15	0.34	0.15	-0.57
III	2.8	0.22	0.54	0.40	-0.31	0.29	0.14	-0.32
IV	1.9	-1.18	-0.19	-0.23	-0.29	0.32	0.04	-0.99

GDP: Gross Domestic Product; GDI: Gross Domestic Investment; PFI: Private Fixed Investment; NRES: Nonresidential; EQP: Business Equipment and Software; IPP: Intellectual Property Products; RES: Residential; ∆INV: Change in Private Inventories.

GDI = PFI + ∆INV, may not add exactly because of errors of rounding.

GDP: Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate of growth in a quarter; components: percentage points at annual rate.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

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