Increase in Dec 2025 of Nonfarm Payroll Jobs by 52 Thousand and Increase of Private Payroll Jobs by 37 Thousand In the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021), Twenty-Five Million Unemployed or Underemployed in the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Decrease of Inflation Adjusted 12-Month Weekly Earnings by 0.7 Percent in Dec 2025, Stagflation, Financial Repression, Recession Risk, Worldwide Fiscal, Monetary and External Imbalances, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

 

I United States Employment Situation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

 

Note: This Blog will post only one indicator of the US economy while we concentrate efforts in completing a book-length manuscript in the critically important subject of INFLATION.

 

Preamble. United States total public debt outstanding is $38.4 trillion and debt held by the public $30.8 trillion (https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/datasets/debt-to-the-penny/debt-to-the-penny) [Date last updated Jan 14, 2026.] The Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis estimates Federal Total Public Debt as percent of GDP at 118.8 in IIQ2025 and Federal Total Public Debt Held by the Public at 95.0 Percent of GDP (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEGDQ188S). [Shutdown affects data: https://news.research.stlouisfed.org/2025/09/a-u-s-government-shutdown-could-delay-some-fred-data-2/] The Net International Investment Position of the United States, or foreign debt, is $26.14 trillion at the end of IIQ2025 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/intinv225.pdf) [Shutdown affects data]. The United States current account deficit is 3.3 percent of nominal GDP in IIQ2025, “down from 5.9 percent in the first quarter” (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/trans225.pdf) (Next release Jan 14, 2026) [Shutdown affects data]. The Treasury deficit of the United States reached $1.8 trillion in fiscal year 2024 (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/). Total assets of Federal Reserve Banks reached $6.6 trillion on Jan 14, 2026 and securities held outright reached $6.3 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). US GDP nominal NSA reached $31.1 trillion in IIIQ2025 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). US GDP contracted at the real seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 1.0 percent in IQ2022 and grew at the SAAR of 0.6 percent in IIQ2022, growing at 2.9 percent in IIIQ2022, growing at 2.8 percent in IVQ2022, growing at 2.9 percent in IQ2023, growing at 2.5 percent in IIQ2023 growing at 4.7 percent in IIIQ2023, growing at 3.4 percent in IVQ2023, growing at 0.8 percent in IQ2024, growing at 3.6 percent in IIQ2024, growing at 3.3 percent in IIIQ2024, growing at 1.9 percent in IVQ2024, contracting at 0.6 percent in IQ2025, growing at 3.8 percent in IIQ2025 and growing at 4.3 percent in IIIQ2025 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). [Shutdown affects data] Total Treasury interest-bearing, marketable debt held by private investors increased from $3635 billion in 2007 to $16,439 billion in Sep 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021) or increase by 352.2 percent (https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/). John Hilsenrath, writing on “Economists Seek Recession Cues in the Yield Curve,” published in the Wall Street Journal on Apr 2, 2022, analyzes the inversion of the Treasury yield curve with the two-year yield at 2.430 on Apr 1, 2022, above the ten-year yield at 2.374. Hilsenrath argues that inversion appears to signal recession in market analysis but not in alternative Fed approach.

The Consumer Price index of the United States in Chart CPI-H increased 2.7 percent in Dec 2025 Relative to a Year Earlier, The Tenth Highest Since 8.9 percent in Dec 1981 was Followed by the Highest of 9.1 percent in Jun 2022, the Second Highest of 8.6 percent in May 2022, 8.5 percent in both Jul 2022 and Mar 2022, 8.3 percent in both Apr and Aug 2022, 8.2 percent in Sep 2022, 7.9 percent in February 2022, 7.5 percent in Jan 2022, 7.7 percent in Oct 2022, 7.1 percent in Nov 2022, 6.5 percent in Dec 2022, 6.4 percent in Jan 2023, 6.0 percent in Feb 2023, 5.0 percent in Mar 2023, 4.9 percent in Apr 2023, 4.0 percent in May 2023, 3.0 percent in Jun 2023, 3.2 percent in Jul 2023, 3.7 percent in Aug 2023, 3.7 percent in Sep 2023, 3.2 percent in Oct 2023, 3.1 percent in Nov 2023, 3.4 percent in Dec 2023, 3.1 percent in Jan 2024, 3.2 percent in Feb 2024, 3.5 percent in Mar 2024, 3.4 percent in Apr 2024, 3.3 percent in May 2024, 3.0 in Jun 2024, 2.9 percent in Jul 2024, 2.5 percent in Aug 2024, 2.4 percent in Sep 2024, 2.6 percent in Oct 2024, 2.7 percent in Nov 2024, 2.9 percent in Dec 2024, 3.0 percent in Jan 2025, 2.8 percent in Feb 2025, 2.4 percent in Mar 2025, 2.3 percent in Apr 2025, 2.4 percent in May 2025, 2.7 percent in Jun 2025, 2.7 percent in Jul 2025, 2.9 percent in Aug 2025, 3.0 percent in Sep 2025, no observations available (NA) for Oct 2025 during the shutdown, 2.7 percent in Nov 2025 and 2.7 percent in Dec 2025.

 

Chart CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1981-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

 

Table CPI-H, US, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA,

 1981-1983, 2019-2025

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
1981	11.8	11.4	10.5	10.0	9.8	9.6
1982	8.4	7.6	6.8	6.5	6.7	7.1
1983	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.5	2.6
2019	1.6	1.5	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.6
2020	2.5	2.3	1.5	0.3	0.1	0.6
2021	1.4	1.7	2.6	4.2	5.0	5.4
2022	7.5	7.9	8.5	8.3	8.6	9.1
2023	6.4	6.0	5.0	4.9	4.0	3.0
2024	3.1	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.0
2025	3.0	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.7
Year	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
1981	10.8	10.8	11.0	10.1	9.6	8.9
1982	6.4	5.9	5.0	5.1	4.6	3.8
1983	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.9	3.3	3.8
2019	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.3
2020	1.0	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.4
2021	5.4	5.3	5.4	6.2	6.8	7.0
2022	8.5	8.3	8.2	7.7	7.1	6.5
2023	3.2	3.7	3.7	3.2	3.1	3.4
2024	2.9	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.9
2025	2.7	2.9	3.0		2.7	2.7

Note: NA because of interruption of appropriations.

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

 

 

Chart VII-3 of the Energy Information Administration provides the US retail price of regular gasoline. The price moved to $2.779 per gallon on Jan 12, 2026, from $3.043 a year earlier or minus 8.7 percent.

https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/weekly/ [Chart discontinued See Weekly Petroleum Status Report.]

Chart VII-3A provides the US retail price of regular gasoline, dollars per gallon, from $1.191 on Aug 20,1990 to $2.779 on Jan 12, 2026 or 133.3 percent. The price of retail regular gasoline increased from $2.249/gallon on Jan 4,2021 to $2.779/gallon on Jan 12, 2026, or 23.6 percent. The price of retail regular gasoline decreased from $3.530/gallon on Feb 21, 2022, two days before the invasion of Ukraine, to $2.779/gallon on Jan 12, 2026 or minus 21.3 percent and had increased 57.0 percent from $2.249/gallon on Jan 4,2021 to $3.530/gallon on Feb 28, 2022.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chart VII-3A, US Retail Price of Regular Gasoline, Dollars Per Gallon

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=EMM_EPMR_PTE_NUS_DPG&f=W 

Chart VII-4 of the Energy Information Administration provides the price of the Natural Gas Futures Contract increasing from $2.581 per million Btu on Jan 4, 2021 to $5.326 per million Btu on Dec 20, 2022 or 106.4 percent and closing at $1.785 on Apr 5, 2024 or change of minus 66.5 percent.

Chart VII-4, US, Natural Gas Futures Contract 1

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1d.htm

Chart VII-5 of the US Energy Administration provides US field production of oil moving from a high of 12.983 thousand barrels per day in Dec 2019 to 11.760 thousand barrels per day in Dec 2021 and the final point of 13.870 thousand barrels per day in Oct 2025.

Chart VII-5 United States Field Production of Crude Oil, Thousand Barrels Per Day

Sources: US Energy Information Administration https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/leafhandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=m

Chart VII-6 of the US Energy Information Administration provides net imports of crude oil and petroleum products. Net imports changed from 1967 thousand barrels per day in the first week of Dec 2020 to minus -3216 thousand barrels in the fourth week of Oct 25, 2024, minus 3310 thousand barrels in the second week of Dec 13, 2024 and minus 2.374 thousand barrels in the second week of Jan 9, 2026.

Chart VII-6, US, Net Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Thousand Barrels Per Day

Source: US Energy Information Administration

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WTTNTUS2&f=W

Chart VI-7 of the EIA provides US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2022. There was sharp increase in production in the final segment that reached consumption by 2020. There is reversal in 2021 with consumption exceeding production. 

Chart VI-7, US Petroleum Consumption, Production, Imports, Exports and Net Imports 1950-2022, Million Barrels Per Day

https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php

Chart VI-8 provides the US average retail price of electricity at 12.78 cents per kilowatthour in Dec 2020 increasing to 17.98 cents per kilowatthour in Oct 2025 or 40.7 per cent.

Chart VI-8, US Average Retail Price of Electricity, Monthly, Cents per Kilowatthour

https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.M~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.M~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.M&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.M&freq=M&start=200101&end=202205&ctype=linechart&ltype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&ma

United States manufacturing output from 1919 to 2025 monthly is in Chart I-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The second industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is quite evident in the acceleration of the rate of growth of output given by the sharper slope in the 1980s and 1990s. Growth was robust after the shallow recession of 2001 but dropped sharply during the global recession after IVQ2007. Manufacturing output recovered sharply but has not reached earlier levels and is losing momentum at the margin.  There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.8 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2025. Growth at 2.8 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.5636 in Dec 2007 to 178.0579 in Nov 2025. The actual index NSA in Nov 2025 is 96.9756 which is 45.5 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).  Manufacturing output grew at average 1.5 percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.5 percent per year, the index would increase to 141.7537 in Nov 2025. The output of manufacturing at 96.9756 in Nov 2025 is 31.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 105.8434 in Jun 2007 to the low of 85.6368 in Apr 2009 or 19.1 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 85.6368 in Apr 2009 to 97.7127 in Nov 2025 or 14.1 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.4 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.4 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6125 in Dec 2007 to 194.0744 in Nov 2025. The NAICS index at 97.7127 in Nov 2025 is 49.7 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 105.8434 in Dec 2007 to 144.2034 in Nov 2025. The NAICS index at 97.7127 in Nov 2025 is 32.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-4, US, Manufacturing Output, 1919-2025

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

 

Chart I-4B provides the data for the period 2007-2025 SIC US Manufacturing. There has not been recovery from the higher levels before the recession from Dec 2007 to Aug 2009 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions).

Chart I-4B, US, Manufacturing Output, 2007-2025

htps://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shows that output of durable manufacturing accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s with slower growth in the 2000s perhaps because processes matured. Growth was robust after the major drop during the global recession but appears to vacillate in the final segment. There is sharp contraction in Mar-Apr 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). There is initial recovery in May 2020-Oct 2022 with deterioration/weakness and renewed oscillating growth in Nov 2022-Nov 2025.

Chart I-7, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 2007-2025

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

htps://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart I-7B provides NAICS Durable Manufacturing from 2007 to 2025. There has not been recovery from the higher levels before the recession from Dec 2007 to Aug 2009 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions).

Chart I-7B, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 2007-2025

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

htps://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Nov 2025. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade. There is sharp decline in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Nov 2025

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htmh

Chart V-3DB provides NAICS Manufacturing from 2007 to 2025. There has not been recovery from the higher levels before the recession from Dec 2007 to Nov 2009 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions).

Chart V-3DB, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 2007 to Nov 2025

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart VII-9 provides the fed funds rate and Three Months, Two-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields. Unconventional monetary policy of near zero interest rates is typically followed by financial and economic stress with sharp increases in interest rates.

Chart VII-9, US Fed Funds Rate and Three-Month, Two-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Jan 2, 1994 to 2022-2023

Source: Federal Reserve Board of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

            Note: program does not download the entire right-side of the chart.

Chart VII-9A, US Fed Funds Rate and Three-Month, Two-Year and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Jan 2, 2022 to May 30, 2023

Source: Federal Reserve Board of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Note: Chart is shortened of current dates in download.

Chart VI-14 provides the overnight fed funds rate, the yield of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, the yield of the 30-year constant maturity bond and the conventional mortgage rate from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. In Jan 1991, the fed funds rate was 6.91 percent, the 10-year Treasury yield 8.09 percent, the 30-year Treasury yield 8.27 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 9.64 percent. Before monetary policy tightening in Oct 1993, the rates and yields were 2.99 percent for the fed funds, 5.33 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 5.94 for the 30-year Treasury and 6.83 percent for the conventional mortgage rate. After tightening in Nov 1994, the rates and yields were 5.29 percent for the fed funds rate, 7.96 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 8.08 percent for the 30-year Treasury and 9.17 percent for the conventional mortgage rate.

Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Chart VI-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. There does not appear acceleration of consumer prices requiring aggressive tightening.

Chart VI-15, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. Inflation collapsed during the recession from Jul 1990 (III) and Mar 1991 (I) and the end of the Kuwait War on Feb 25, 1991 that stabilized world oil markets. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Policy tightening had adverse collateral effects in the form of emerging market crises in Mexico and Argentina and fixed income markets worldwide.

Chart VI-16, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Twelve-Month Percentage Change, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

 

Chart USFX provides the exchange rate of US Dollars per EURO from 2007 to 2023. Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs, Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the 1930s, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec 1985), argue that foreign exchange “depreciation was clearly beneficial for initiating countries” during the Great Depression of the 1930s and that it was no equivalent to “beggar my neighbor” policies such as tariffs.

\

Chart USFX, Exchange Rate USD/EURO 2007-2023

Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/

Chart USFX, Exchange Rate USD/EURO 2000-2023

Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fred.stlouisfed.org/

Chart USFX, Exchange Rate USD/EURO 2018-2023

Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://fred.stlouisfed.org/

Table USFX provides the rate of USD/EURO in selected months. The dollar appreciated sharply from USD 1.2254 on Jan 4, 2021 to 1.0787 on Aug 25, 2023 and 1.1634 on Jan 9, 2026.

Table USFX, USD/EURO Selected Months

Date	USD/EUR
1/4/2021	1.2254
1/5/2021	1.2295
1/6/2021	1.229
1/7/2021	1.2265
1/8/2021	1.2252
1/11/2021	1.2169
1/12/2021	1.2168
1/13/2021	1.2159
1/14/2021	1.2156
1/15/2021	1.2099
1/31/2023	1.0858
2/1/2023	1.0917
2/2/2023	1.0918
2/3/2023	1.0825
2/6/2023	1.0722
2/7/2023	1.0705
2/8/2023	1.0734
2/9/2023	1.0761
2/10/2023	1.0670
2/13/2023	1.0718
2/14/2023	1.0722
2/15/2023	1.0683
2/16/2023	1.0684
2/17/2023	1.0678
2/24/2023	1.0545
3/03/2023	1.0616
3/10/2023	1.0659
3/17/2023	1.0647
3/24/2023	1.0762
3/31/2023	1.0872
4/7/2023	1.0913
4/14/2023	1.0980
4/21/2023	1.0973
4/28/2023	1.1040
5/5/2023	1.1026
5/26/2023	1.0713
6/2/2023	1.0724
6/9/2023	1.0749
6/16/2023	1.0925
6/23/2023	1.0887
6/30/2023	1.0920
7/7/2023	1.0964
7/14/2023	1.1237
7/21/2023	1.1120
7/28/2023	1.1039
8/4/2023	1.1036
8/11/2023	1.0957
8/18/2023	1.0875
8/25/2023	1.0787
9/1/223	1.0787
9/8/2023	1.0709
9/15/2023	1.0673
9/22/2023	1.0660
9/29/2023	1.0584
10/6/2023	1.0596
10/13/2023	1.0502
10/20/2023	1.0592
10/27/2023	1.0592
11/3/2023	1.0733
11/10/2023	1.0710
11/17/2023	1.0879
11/24/2023	1.0934
12/1/2023	1.0878
12/8/2023	1.0746
12/15/2023	1.0906
6/21/2024	1.0694
2/7/2025	1.0329
1/9/2026	1.1634

Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/

U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, October 2025

October 2025	-$29.4 B
September 2025	-$48.1 B

The U.S. goods and services trade deficit decreased in October 2025 according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Census Bureau. The deficit decreased from $48.1 billion in September (revised) to $29.4 billion in October, as exports increased and imports decreased. The goods deficit decreased $19.2 billion in October to $59.1 billion. The services surplus decreased $0.4 billion in October to $29.8 billion.

• Current release: January 8, 2026
• Next release: January 29, 2026

• Current release: December 11, 2025
• Next release: January 8, 2026

 

 

Source: https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/international-trade-goods-and-services   [Data are not being updated during shutdown.]

A comprehensive analysis of the Mill-Bickerdike theorem and the Lerner theorem on tariffs and international terms of trade with application to the Brazilian coffee support program, the recovery of Brazil from the Great Depression and Brazil’s industrialization is in Carlos Manuel Pelaez, História da Industrialização Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro, APEC Editora, 1972.

Chart IID-1B provides the US terms of trade index, index of terms of trade of nonpetroleum goods and index of terms of trade of goods with the new base of 2017. The terms of trade of nonpetroleum goods dropped sharply from the mid-1980s to 1995, recovering significantly until 2014, dropping and then recovering again into 2021. There is relative stability in the terms of trade of nonpetroleum goods from 1967 to 2025 but sharp deterioration in the overall index and the index of goods.

Chart IID-1B, United States Terms of Trade Indexes 1967-2025, Quarterly

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm [Data are not being updated during shutdown.]

Percentage shares of net trade (exports less imports), exports and imports in US Gross Domestic Product are in Chart IA1-14 from 1979 to 2025. There is sharp trend of decline of exports and imports after the global recession beginning in IVQ2007. Net trade has been subtracting from growth since the stagflation of the 1970s.

 

Chart IA1-14, US, Percentage Shares of Net Trade, Exports and Imports in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2025

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm  [Data are not being updated during shutdown.]

Table B provides the exchange rate of Brazil and the trade balance from 1927 to 1939. “Currency depreciation in the 1930s…benefitted the initiating countries…There can be no presumption that depreciation was beggar-thy-neighbor…competitive devaluation taken by a group of countries had they been even more widely adopted and coordinated internationally would have hasted recovery from the Great Depression,” Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs, “Exchange Rates and Economic Recovery in the1930s,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp.925-946.

Table B, Brazil, Exchange Rate and Trade Balance, 1927-1939

Year		Exchange Rate Mil-Réis per £		Trade Balance 1000 Contos
1927		40.6		370.9
1928		40.3		275.3
1929		40.6		332.7
1930		49.4		563.6
1931		62.4		1517.2
1932		48.1		1018.1
1933		52.6		655
1934		59.7		956.2
1935		57.9		248.1
1936		58.4		626.8
1937		56.9		-222.5
1938		57.6		-98.7
1939		71.1		631.9

Source: Carlos Manuel Peláez, Análise Econômica do Programa Brasileiro de Sustentação do Café 1906-1945: Teoria, Política e Medição, Revista Brasileira de Economia, Vol. 25, N 4, Out/Dez 1971, 5-213.

Christina D. Romer argues that growth of the money stock was critical in the recovery of the United States from the Great Depression (Christina D. Romer, What ended the Great Depression? The Journal of Economic History, Volume 52, Number 4, Dec 1992, pp 757-784).

Table C, Brazil, Yearly Percentage Changes of the Money Stock, M1 and M2, Exchange Rate, Terms of Trade, Industrial Production, Real Gross National Product and Real Gross Income Per Capita, 1930-1939

Period	M1	M2	Exchange Rate	Terms of Trade	Industrial Production	Real GNP	Real Gross Income Per Capita
1929/30	-9	-4	22	-34	-5	-1	-10
1930/31	4	1	26	-5	8	-3	-6
1931/32	15	7	-23	8	0	6	2
1932/33	10	4	10	-15	16	10	7
1933/34	5	6	13	5	13	7	5
1934/35	7	8	-3	-28	14	1	-4
1935/36	10	11	1	2	14	12	9
1936/37	10	9	-3	2	7	3	0
1937/38	19	13	1	-11	6	4	-1
1938/39	0	8	23	-12	14	4	2

Source: Carlos Manuel Peláez and Wilson Suzigan, História Monetária do Brasil. Segunda Edição Revisada e Ampliada. Coleção Temas Brasileiros, Universidade de Brasília, 1981.

“In the period of the free coffee market 1857-1906, international coffee prices fluctuated in cycles of increasing amplitude. British export prices decreased at a low average rate, and physical exports of coffee by Brazil increased at the average rate of 2.9 percent per year. The income terms of trade of the coffee economy of Brazil improved at the average compound rate of 4.0 percent per year. But the actual rate must have been much higher because of drastic improvements in the quality of manufactures while the quality of coffee remained relatively constant,” Carlos Manuel Peláez, “The Theory and Reality of Imperialism in the Coffee Economy of Nineteenth-Century Brazil,” The Economic History Review, Second Series, Volume XXIX, No. 2, May 1976. 276-290. See Carlos Manuel Peláez, “A Comparison of Long-Term Monetary Behavior and Institutions in Brazil, Europe and the United States,” The Journal of European Economic History, Volume 5, Number 2, Fall 1976, 439-450, Presented at the Sixth International Congress of Economic History, Section on Monetary Inflation in Historical Perspective, Copenhagen, 22 Aug 1974.

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and r^e the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+r^e). Thus, g = [(r/r^e) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dr^e>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

Inflation and unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment. Chart VI-1B for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart VI-1B cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s. The loans were used in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on inflation and the economy.  This interpretation is consistent with the case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises frm the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a plausible interpretation of this pattern.”

The reading of the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the output gap and inflation expectations:

“So, inflation is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’ or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with ‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen in economies well below potential.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”

Chart VI-1B provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that period. Chart VI-1B used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of unemployment in large urban centers.

 

Chart VI1-B, Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987

Source: ©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.

 

I Summary of the Employment Report. Table I-1 provides succinct summary of the Employment Situation Report. The first three rows provide the number of nonfarm jobs and private jobs created in Dec 2025, Aug 2025 and Jul 2025. The number of nonfarm jobs decreased from 79 thousand in Jul 2025 to 22 thousand in Aug 2025, increasing to 50 thousand in Dec 2025. The number of private jobs decreased from 77 thousand in Jul 2025 to 38 thousand in Aug 2025 and 37 thousand in Dec 2025. Average hourly earnings seasonally adjusted increased 0.3 percent in Dec 25 relative to Nov 25, increasing 0.4 percent in Aug 25 relative to Jul 25 and 0.3 percent in Jul 2025 relative to Jun 2025. Not-seasonally adjusted hourly earnings increased 3.8 percent from Dec 2024 to Dec 2025, 3.9 percent from Jul 2025 to Aug 2025 and 3.8 percent from Jun 2025 to Jul 2025. Average weekly hours were 34.2 seasonally adjusted in Dec 2025 and 34.2 not seasonally adjusted. Average weekly hours were 34.2 seasonally adjusted in Aug 2025 and 34.3 not seasonally adjusted. Average weekly hours were 34.3 seasonally adjusted in Jul 2025 and 34.2 not seasonally adjusted. The unemployment rate seasonally adjusted was 4.4 percent in Dec 2025, 4.3 percent in Aug 2025 and 4.3 percent in Jul 2025. The number employed in Dec 2025 was 163.720 million (NSA) or 16.405 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 274.816 million in Dec 2025 or by 42.858 million. The number employed increased 11.1 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2025 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 18.5 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2025 would result in 174.508 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 274.816 million). There are effectively 10.788 million fewer jobs in Dec 2025 than in Dec 2007, or 174.508 million minus 163.720 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs. The number employed in Dec 2025 was 163.720 million (NSA) or 16.405 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 274.816 million in Dec 2025 or by 42.858 million. The number employed increased 11.1 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2025 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 18.5 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2025 would result in 174.508 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 274.816 million). There are effectively 10.788 million fewer jobs in Dec 2025 than in Dec 2007, or 174.508 million minus 163.720 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Table I-1, US, Summary of the Employment Situation Report

Dec 2025	Aug 2025	Jul 2025
50	22	79
37	38	77
37.02 ∆% Dec 25/Dec 24 NSA: 3.8 ∆% Dec 25 Nov 25 SA:     0.3	36.58 ∆% Aug 25/Aug 24 NSA: 3.9 ∆% Aug 25 Jul 25 SA: 0.4	36.43 ∆% Jul 25/Jul 24 NSA: 3.8 ∆% Jul 25 Jun 25 SA: 0.3
∆% Dec 25 Nov 24 NSA: 1.3	∆% Aug 25 Aug 24 NSA: 0.7	∆% Jul 25 Jul 24 NSA: 1.3
34.2 NSA 34.2	34.2 NSA 34.3	34.3 NSA 34.2
4.4	4.3	4.3

Note: data were not collected for October 2025 during the lapse of appropriations.

Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons

+ Marginally Attached Labor Force

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cps/

There are two approaches to calculating the number of people in job stress. The first approach consists of calculating the number of people in job stress unemployed or underemployed with the raw data of the employment situation report as in Table I-2.  The data are seasonally adjusted (SA). The first three rows provide the labor force and unemployed in millions and the unemployment rate of unemployed as percent of the labor force. There is increase in the number unemployed from 7.380 million in Aug 2025 to 7.605 million in Sep 2025. The number unemployed increased to 7.781 million in Nov 2025. The number of unemployed decreased to 7.503 million in Dec 2025. The rate of unemployment increased from 4.3 percent in Aug 2024 to 4.4 percent in Sep 2025, increasing to 4.5 percent in Nov 2025. The rate of unemployment decreased to 4.4 percent in Dec 2025.  An important aspect of unemployment is its persistence for more than 27 weeks with 1.948 million in Dec 2025 corresponding to 26.0 percent of the unemployed. The longer the period of unemployment the lower the chances of finding another job with many long-term unemployed ceasing to search for a job.  Another key characteristic of the current labor market is the high number of people trying to subsist with part-time jobs because they cannot find full-time employment or part-time for economic reasons. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals, who would have preferred full-time employment, were working part time because their hours had been reduced or because they were unable to find full-time jobs” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf  2). The number of part-time for economic reasons decreased from 4.755 million in Aug 2025 to 4.594 million in Sep 2025, decreasing to 5.487 million in Nov 2025 and decreasing to 5.341 million in Dec 2025. Another important fact is the marginally attached to the labor force. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not looked for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey” (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number in job stress unemployed or underemployed of 14.594 million in Dec 2025 consists of:

• 7.503 million unemployed (of whom 1.948 million, or 26.0 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more) compared with 7.781 million unemployed in Nov 2025 (of whom 1.910 million, or 24.4 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more).

·         5.341 million employed part-time for economic reasons in Dec 2025 (who suffered reductions in their work hours or could not find full-time employment) compared with 5.487 million in Nov 2025.

·         1.750 million who were marginally attached to the labor force in Dec 2025 (who were not in the labor force but wanted and were available for work) compared with 1.873 million in Nov 2025.

Table I-2, US, People in Job Stress, Millions and % SA

	Dec 2025	Nov 2025	Sep 2025	Aug 2025
Labor Force Millions	171.495	171.541	171.261	170.750
Unemployed Millions	7.503	7.781	7.605	7.380
Unemployment Rate (unemployed as % labor force)	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.3
Unemployed ≥27 weeks Millions	1.948	1.910	1.815	1.924
Unemployed ≥27 weeks %	26.0	24.4	23.6	25.6
Part Time for Economic Reasons Millions	5.341	5.487	4.594	4.755
Marginally Attached to Labor Force Millions	1.750	1.873	1.807	1.791
Job Stress Millions	14.594	15.141	14.006	13.926
In Job Stress as % Labor Force	8.5	8.8	8.2	8.2

Note: data were not collected for October 2025 during the lapse of appropriations.

Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cps/

Table I-3 repeats the data in Table I-2 but including Jul and additional data. What really matters is the number of people with jobs or the total employed, representing the opportunity for exit from unemployment. The final row of Table I-3 provides people employed as percent of the population or employment to population ratio. The number has remained relatively constant around 59 percent, reaching 60.1 in Nov 2017, 60.1 in Dec 2017, 60.6 in Jul 2018, 60.3 in Aug 2018, 60.4 for Sep 2018, 60.5 in Oct 2018, 60.6 in Nov 2018, 60.6 in Dec 2018, 60.6 in Jan 2019, 60.7 in Feb 2019, 60.6 in Mar 2019, 60.5 in Apr 2019, 60.6 in May 2019, 60.7 in Jun 2019, 60.8 in Jul 2019 and 60.8 in Aug 2019. The employment to population ratio fell from an annual level of 63.1 percent in 2006 to 58.6 percent in 2012, 58.6 percent in 2013 and 59.0 in 2014 with the lowest level at 58.4 percent in 2011. The employment population ratio NSA reached 59.4 in Dec 2015, 59.6 in Dec 2016, 60.0 in Dec 2017, 60.4 in Dec 2018, 60.9 in Dec 2019, 57.3 in Dec 2020, 59.4 in Dec 2021, 60.0 in Dec 2022, 60.0 in Dec 2023 and 59.5 in Jan 2025 and 59.6 in Dec 2025. The SA level in Table I-3 is 59.7 in Dec 2025.

Table I-3, US, Unemployment and Underemployment, SA, Millions and Percent

	Dec 2025	Nov 2025	Sep 2025	Aug 2025	Jul 2025
Labor Force	171.495	171.541	171.261	170.750	170.412
Participation Rate	62.4	62.5	62.5	62.3	62.2
Unemployed	7.503	7.781	7.605	7.380	7.272
UNE Rate %	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.3
Part Time Economic Reasons	4.749	4.684	4.465	4.624	4.690
Marginally Attached to Labor Force	1.791	1.751	1.862	1.500	1.571
In Job Stress	14.043	14.216	13.932	13.504	13.533
In Job Stress % Labor Force	8.2	8.3	8.1	7.9	7.9
Employed	163.394	163.106	163.366	163.273	163.969
Employment % Population	59.7	59.6	59.7	59.7	59.6

Note: data were not collected for October 2025 during the lapse of appropriations.

Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cps/

Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2025. There was a big drop of the number of people employed from 147.315 million at the peak in Jul 2007 (NSA) to 136.809 million at the trough in Jan 2010 (NSA) with 10.506 million fewer people employed. Recovery has been anemic compared with the shallow recession of 2001 that was followed by nearly vertical growth in jobs. Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2025. The number employed in Dec 2025 was 163.720 million (NSA) or 16.405 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 274.816 million in Dec 2025 or by 42.858 million. The number employed increased 11.1 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2025 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 18.5 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2025 would result in 174.508 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 274.816 million). There are effectively 10.788 million fewer jobs in Dec 2025 than in Dec 2007, or 174.508 million minus 163.720 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Chart I-1, US, Employed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2025

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-2 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the number of people employed in the US from 2001 to 2025. There was recovery since 2010 but not sufficient to recover lost jobs. Many people in the US who had jobs before the global recession are not working now and many who entered the labor force cannot find employment. There is sharp contraction of employment in Mar and Apr 2020 with recovery in May 2020-Dec 2025 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-2, US, Employed, 12-Month Percentage Change

 NSA, 2001-2025

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/data/

The foundation of the second approach derives from Chart I-3 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics providing the level of the civilian labor force in the US. The civilian labor force consists of people who are available and willing to work and who have searched for employment recently. The labor force of the US NSA grew 9.4 percent from 142.828 million in Jan 2001 to 156.255 million in Jul 2009. The civilian labor force is 9.3 percent higher at 170.723 million in Dec 2025 than in Jul 2009, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. Chart I-3 shows the flattening of the curve of expansion of the labor force and its decline in 2010 and 2011. The ratio of the labor force of 154.871 million in Jul 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.958 million in Jul 2007 was 66.8 percent while the ratio of the labor force of 170.723 million in Dec 2025 to the noninstitutional population of 274.816 million in Dec 2025 was 62.1 percent. The labor force of the US in Dec 2025 corresponding to 66.8 percent of participation in the population would be 183.577 million (0.668 x 274.816). The difference between the measured labor force in Dec 2025 of 170.723 million and the labor force in Dec 2025 with participation rate of 66.8 percent (as in Jul 2007) of 183.577 million is 12.854 million. The level of the labor force in the US has stagnated and is 12.854 million lower than what it would have been had the same participation rate been maintained. Millions of people have abandoned their search for employment because they believe there are no jobs available for them. Millions lost their employment in the lockdown of economic activity of the COVID-19 event. The key issue is whether the decline in participation of the population in the labor force is the result of people giving up on finding another job in addition to job contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-3, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, SA, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-4 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of the labor force in the US. The rate of growth fell almost instantaneously with the global recession and became negative from 2009 to 2011. The labor force of the US collapsed and did not recover cyclically. Growth in the beginning of the summer originates in younger people looking for jobs in the summer after graduation or during school recess. There is sharp contraction in 2020 followed by oscillating growth.

Chart I-4, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, NSA,

12-month Percentage Change, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-5 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the labor force participation rate in the US or labor force as percent of the population. The labor force participation rate of the US fell from 66.8 percent in Jan 2001 to 62.1 percent NSA in Dec 2025, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. The annual labor force participation rate for 1979 was 63.7 percent and also 63.7 percent in Nov 1980 during sharp economic contraction. This comparison is further elaborated below in prior blog posts. Chart I-5 shows an evident downward trend beginning with the global recession that has continued throughout the recovery beginning in IIIQ2009. The critical issue is whether people left the workforce of the US because they believe there is no longer a job for them and if that number will increase in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-5, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate,

Percent of Population in Labor Force SA, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

Chart I-6 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of unemployed in the US. The number unemployed rose from the trough of 6.272 million NSA in Oct 2006 to the peak of 16.147 million in Jan 2010, declining to 13.400 million in Jul 2012, 12.696 million in Aug 2012 and 11.741 million in Sep 2012. The level unemployed fell to 11.741 million in Oct 2012, 11.404 million in Nov 2012, 11.844 million in Dec 2012, 13.181 million in Jan 2013, 12.500 million in Feb 2013 and 9.984 million in Dec 2013. The level of unemployment reached 7.003 million in Dec 2025, all numbers not seasonally adjusted, in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-6, US, Unemployed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-7 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the rate of unemployment in the US or unemployed as percent of the labor force. The rate of unemployment of the US rose from 4.7 percent in Jan 2001 to 6.5 percent in Jun 2003, declining to 4.1 percent in Oct 2006. The rate of unemployment jumped to 10.6 percent in Jan 2010 and declined to 7.6 percent in Dec 2012 but increased to 8.5 percent in Jan 2013 and 8.1 percent in Feb 2013, falling back to 7.3 percent in May 2013 and 7.8 percent in Jun 2013, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. The rate of unemployment not seasonally adjusted stabilized at 7.7 percent in Jul 2013 and fell to 6.5 percent in Dec 2013 and 5.4 percent in Dec 2014. The rate of unemployment NSA decreased to 4.8 percent in Dec 2015 and 4.5 percent in Dec 2016, reaching 3.9 percent in Dec 2017. The NSA rate of unemployment was at 3.7 percent in Dec 2018, 3.4 percent in Dec 2019 and 6.5 percent in Dec 2020. The NSA unemployment rate was 3.7 percent in Dec 2021, 3.3 percent in Dec 2022 3.5 percent in Dec 2023, 3.8 percent in Dec 2024 and 4.1 percent in Dec 2025 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).

Chart I-7, US, Unemployment Rate, SA, 2001-2025

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-8 provides 12-month percentage changes of the unemployed. There was a jump of 81.8 percent in 2009 percent with decrease of 5.0 percent in Dec 2010. The number of unemployed increased 317.7 percent in Apr 2021 with recovery beginning in Apr 2021 with decrease of 59.0 percent. Unemployment increased 8.5 percent in Dec 2025.

Chart I-8, US, Unemployed, 12-month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-9 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the number of people in part-time occupations because of economic reasons, that is, because they cannot find full-time employment. The number underemployed in part-time occupations not seasonally adjusted rose from 3.732 million in Jan 2001 to 5.270 million in Jan 2004, falling to 3.787 million in Apr 2006. The number underemployed seasonally adjusted jumped to 9.114 million in Nov 2009, falling to 8.171 million in Dec 2011 but increasing to 8.305 million in Jan 2012 and 8.238 million in Feb 2012 but then falling to 7.943 million in Dec 2012 and increasing to 8.099 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons seasonally adjusted reached 4.627 million in Dec 2018 and 4.665 million in Nov 2018. Without seasonal adjustment, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 9.354 million in Dec 2009, declining to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 and 8.166 million in Dec 2012 but increasing to 8.324 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA stood at 7.990 million in Dec 2013, 6.970 million in Dec 2014 and 6.179 million in Dec 2015. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA stood at 5.707 million in Dec 2016. The number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 5.060 million in Dec 2017. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons stood at 4.740 million in Dec 2018 and 4.247 million in Dec 2019. The longer the period in part-time jobs the lower are the chances of finding another full-time job. The number of part-time for economic reasons NSA jumped to 10.684 million in Apr 2020 and 6.245 million in Dec 2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The level of part-time for economic reasons reached 4.049 million in Dec 2021, 3.991 million in Dec 2022 and 4.324 million in Dec 2023. The level of part-time for economic reasons stood at 4.461 million in Dec 2024 and 5.441 million in Dec 2025.

Chart I-9, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons,

Thousands, SA, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-10 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics repeats the behavior of unemployment. The 12-month percentage change of the level of people at work part-time for economic reasons jumped 84.7 percent in Mar 2009 and declined subsequently. The declines have been insufficient to reduce significantly the number of people who cannot shift from part-time to full-time employment. On an annual basis, the number of part-time for economic reasons increased 33.5 percent in 2008 and 51.7 percent in 2009, declining 0.4 percent in 2010, 3.5 percent in 2011 and 5.1 percent in 2012. The annual number of part-time for economic reasons decreased 2.3 percent in 2013 and fell 9.1 percent in 2014. The annual number of part-time for economic reasons fell 11.7 percent in 2015 and fell 6.7 percent in 2016. The number of part-time for economic reasons decreased 7.6 percent in Dec 2016 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reason fell 11.3 percent in Dec 2017 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell 6.3 percent in Dec 2018 relative to a year earlier and decreased 10.4 percent in Dec 2019 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons jumped 138.3 percent in Apr 2020 relative to a year earlier and 37.2 percent in Feb 2021 relative to a year earlier in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The level of part-time for economic reasons increased 0.6 percent in Mar 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreased 52.9 percent in Apr 2021 relative to a year earlier, decreasing 51.6 percent in May 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased 48.0 percent in Jun 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreased 46.3 percent in Jul 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased 41.4 percent in Aug 2021 relative to a year earlier, decreasing 30.6 percent in Sep 2021 relative to a year earlier, decreasing 35.4 percent in Oct 2021 relative to a year earlier and decreasing 35.9 percent in Nov 2021 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased 35.2 percent in Dec 2021 and decreased 32.0 percent in 2021 relative to 2020. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased 1.4 percent in Dec 2022 relative to a year earlier and decreased 20.0 percent relative to 2021. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased 8.3 percent in Dec 2023 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased 3.2 percent in Dec 2024 relative to a year earlier. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased 22.0 percent in Dec 2025 relative to a year earlier.

Chart I-10, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons NSA

12-Month Percentage Change, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-11 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the same pattern of the number marginally attached to the labor force jumping to significantly higher levels during the global recession and remaining at historically high levels. The number marginally attached to the labor force not seasonally adjusted increased from 1.295 million in Jan 2001 to 1.691 million in Feb 2004. The number of marginally attached to the labor force fell to 1.299 million in Sep 2006 and increased to 2.609 million in Dec 2010 and 2.800 million in Jan 2011. The number marginally attached to the labor force was 2.540 million in Dec 2011, increasing to 2.809 million in Jan 2012, falling to 2.608 million in Feb 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell to 2.352 million in Mar 2012, 2.363 million in Apr 2012, 2.423 million in May 2012, 2.483 million in Jun 2012, 2.529 million in Jul 2012 and 2.561 million in Aug 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell to 2.517 million in Sep 2012, 2.433 million in Oct 2012, 2.505 million in Nov 2012 and 2.427 million in Dec 2013. The number marginally attached to the labor force reached 2.260 million in Dec 2014 and 1.833 million in Dec 2015. The number marginally attached to the labor force stood at 1.684 million in Dec 2016. The level marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.623 million in Dec 2017. The level of marginally attached to the labor force stood at 1.556 million in Dec 2018 and 1.246 million in Dec 2019. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 2.197 million in Dec 2020. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.671 million in Dec 2021. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.260 million in Dec 2022. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.567 million in Dec 2023. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.565 million in Dec 2024. The level of the marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.750 million in Dec 2025.

Chart I-11, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force,

Thousands, NSA, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-12 provides 12-month percentage changes of the marginally attached to the labor force from 2001 to 2025. There was a jump of 56.1 percent in May 2009 during the global recession followed by declines in percentage changes but insufficient negative changes. On an annual basis, the number of marginally attached to the labor force increased in four consecutive years: 15.7 percent in 2008, 37.9 percent in 2009, 11.7 percent in 2010 and 3.5 percent in 2011. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 2.2 percent on an annual basis in 2012 but increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012, fell 13.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013, falling 10.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. The number marginally attached to the labor force increased 4.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 and fell 4.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and 8.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013. The annual number of marginally attached to the labor force fell 6.2 percent in 2013 and fell 6.5 percent in 2014. The annual number of marginally attached to the labor force fell 11.4 percent in 2015. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 7.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 and fell 6.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 18.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015 and decreased 8.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016. The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017. The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 4.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2018 and decreased 19.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019. The level of marginally attached to the labor force increased 64.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2020 and increased 29.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2021 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 23.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021 and decreased 24.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2022. The level of marginally attached to the labor force increased 24.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2023. The level of marginally attached to the labor force decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2024. The level of marginally attached to the labor force increased 20.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2025. The level of marginally attached to the labor force increased 11.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2025.

Chart I-12, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force

12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data/

The number employed in Dec 2025 was 163.720 million (NSA) or 16.405 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 274.816 million in Dec 2025 or by 42.858 million. The number employed increased 11.1 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2025 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 18.5 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2025 would result in 174.508 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 274.816 million). There are effectively 10.788 million fewer jobs in Dec 2025 than in Dec 2007, or 174.508 million minus 163.720 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs. The number employed in Dec 2025 was 163.720 million (NSA) or 16.405 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 274.816 million in Dec 2025 or by 42.858 million. The number employed increased 11.1 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2025 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 18.5 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2025 would result in 174.508 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 274.816 million). There are effectively 10.788 million fewer jobs in Dec 2025 than in Dec 2007, or 174.508 million minus 163.720 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 65 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2025 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010  http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIIQ2025 (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/gdp2q25-3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.9 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $16,743.2 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $16,269.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($16,743.2/$16,269.1) -1]100 = 2.9%] or accumulating the quarter-on-quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2026/01/mediocre-economic-growth-below.html  and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/10/us-gdp-grew-at-38-percent-saar-in.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual  growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1992, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1993, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1993, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1994, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1994, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IVQ1995, 3.6 percent from IQ1982 to IQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1996, 3.6 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1997, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1998, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1998, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1998, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1998 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2026/01/mediocre-economic-growth-below.html  and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/10/us-gdp-grew-at-38-percent-saar-in.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.4 percent from the pre-recession peak of $10,090.6 billion of chained 2017 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $9951.9 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2025 and in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021) would have accumulated to 69.0 percent. GDP in IIIQ2025 would be $28,585.0 billion (in constant dollars of 2017) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $4560.0 billion than actual $24,025.0 billion. There are more than four trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.6 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.5 percent of the effective labor force with the largest part originating in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021). Unemployment is decreasing while employment is increasing in initial adjustment of the lockdown of economic activity in the global recession resulting from the COVID-19 event (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/12/ia1-hr5371-continuing-appropriations.html). US GDP in IIIQ2025 is 19.4 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $16,915.2 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $24,025.0 billion in IIIQ2025 or 42.0 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 2.2 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 2.8 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2025. Growth at 2.8 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.5636 in Dec 2007 to 178.0579 in Nov 2025. The actual index NSA in Nov 2025 is 96.9756 which is 45.5 percent below trend. The underperformance of manufacturing in Mar-Nov 2020 originates partly in the earlier global recession augmented by the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).  Manufacturing output grew at average 1.5 percent between Dec 1999 and Dec 2006. Using trend growth of 1.5 percent per year, the index would increase to 141.7537 in Nov 2025. The output of manufacturing at 96.9756 in Nov 2025 is 31.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 105.8434 in Jun 2007 to the low of 85.6368 in Apr 2009 or 19.1 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 85.6368 in Apr 2009 to 97.7127 in Nov 2025 or 14.1 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.4 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.4 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6125 in Dec 2007 to 194.0744 in Nov 2025. The NAICS index at 97.7127 in Nov 2025 is 49.7 percent below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 105.8434 in Dec 2007 to 144.2034 in Nov 2025. The NAICS index at 97.7127 in Nov 2025 is 32.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-4, US, Population, Labor Force and Unemployment, NSA

	2006	Dec 2024	Nov 2025	Dec 2025
POP	229	269.638	274.633	274.816
LF	151	167.746	171.467	170.723
PART%	66.2	62.2	62.4	62.1
EMP	144	161.294	164.066	163.720
EMP/POP%	63.1	59.8	59.7	59.6
UEM	7	6.452	7.401	7.003
UEM/LF Rate%	4.6	3.8	4.3	4.1
NLF	77	101.892	103.165	104.094
LF PART 66.2%		178.500	181.807	181.928
∆NLF UEM		10.754	10.340	11.205
Total UEM		17.206	17.447	18.101
Total UEM%		10.2	10.2	10.6
Part Time Economic Reasons		4.461	5.350	5.442
Marginally Attached to LF		1.565	1.873	1.750
In Job Stress		23.232	24.670	25.293
People in Job Stress as % Labor Force		13.0	13.6	13.9

Pop: population; LF: labor force; PART: participation; EMP: employed; UEM: unemployed; NLF: not in labor force; ∆NLF UEM: additional unemployed; Total UEM is UEM + ∆NLF UEM; Total UEM% is Total UEM as percent of LF PART 66.2%; In Job Stress = Total UEM + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached to LF

Note: the first column for 2006 is in average millions; the remaining columns are in thousands; NSA: not seasonally adjusted.

The monthly increase in nonfarm jobs seasonally adjusted decreased from 56 thousand in Nov 2025 to 50 thousand in Dec 2023 while private jobs decreased from 50 thousand to 37 thousand in Dec 2025, as shown in Table I-8. There is sharp contrast with growth of 232 thousand in Nov 1998 and 337 thousand in Dec 1998. This situation will continue to challenge measurement (https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm) and the return to fuller employment is unpredictable.

Closing the economy to mitigate the infection of COVID-19 could deepen the global recession. Gradual reopening in Jun-2020 to Jul 2025 is recovering jobs. The number employed in Dec 2025 was 163.720 million (NSA) or 16.405 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 274.816 million in Dec 2025 or by 42.858 million. The number employed increased 11.1 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2025 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 18.5 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2025 would result in 174.508 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 274.816 million). There are effectively 10.788 million fewer jobs in Dec 2025 than in Dec 2007, or 174.508 million minus 163.720 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Table I-8, US, Monthly Change in Jobs, Number SA

Month	1998 Total	2025 Total	2025 Private
Jan	253	111	79
Feb	195	102	107
Mar	142	120	114
Apr	257	158	133
May	341	19	69
Jun	226	-13	-27
Jul	84	72	56
Aug	306	-26	10
Sep	172	108	104
Oct	188	-173	1
Nov	232	56	50
Dec	337	50	37

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/data

IB Stagnating Real Wages. The wage bill is the product of average weekly hours times the earnings per hour. Table IB-1 provides the estimates by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of earnings per hour seasonally adjusted, increasing from $30.67/hour in Dec 2024 to $31.76/hour in Dec 2025, or by 3.6 percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-october-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2020.htm  https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-january-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-february-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-march-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-may-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-october-2021.htm   https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm) “In December, average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls rose by 12

cents, or 0.3 percent, to $37.02. Over the past 12 months, average hourly earnings have

increased by 3.8 percent. In December, average hourly earnings of private-sector production

and nonsupervisory employees, at $31.76, changed little (+3 cents). (See tables B-3 and B-8.).” There has been disappointment about the pace of wage increases because of rising food and energy costs that inhibit consumption and thus sales and similar concern about growth of consumption that accounts for about 68.1 percent of GDP (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Growth of consumption by decreasing savings by means of controlling interest rates in what is called financial repression  may not be lasting and sound for personal finances (See Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008c), 81-6, Pelaez (1975), See https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/08/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/07/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html  and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/06/although-swings-in-net-exports-have.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/05/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/03/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/01/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/01/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/12/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/11/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/10/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/09/in-light-of-progress-on-inflation-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/08/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html  and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/07/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/06/in-support-of-its-goals-committee.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/05/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/04/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/03/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/02/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/01/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/12/the-fomc-maintains-fed-funds-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/11/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/10/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/09/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/08/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/07/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/07/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/06/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/05/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/03/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/02/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2023/01/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/12/us-gdp-grew-at-seasonally-adjusted_24.html https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/11/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/10/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/09/federal-open-market-committee-fomc-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/08/real-disposable-income-or-personal.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/07/consumer-prices-of-theunited-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/06/consumer-prices-of-theunited-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/04/increase-in-mar-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/increase-in-feb-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/increase-in-jan-2022-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/real-disposable-income-decreasing-02.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/increase-in-oct-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/increase-in-sep-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/increase-in-aug-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html  and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/increase-in-jul-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/increase-in-jun-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/increase-in-may-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/increase-in-apr-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/increase-in-feb-2021-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/increasing-valuations-of-risks.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html  and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/recovering-gdp-of-major-world-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/increase-in-oct-2020-of-nonfarm-payroll.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/increasingvaluations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/fifty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/lockdown-of-economic-activity-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/stress-of-world-financial-markets-fomc.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/01/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html  and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitical-and-financial-risks.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-instability-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/global-financial-risk-mediocre-united.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/historically-sharper-recoveries-from.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/mediocre-recovery-without-jobs.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/mediocre-growth-with-high-unemployment.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/mediocre-economic-growth-falling-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/mediocre-economic-growth-flattening.html  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/mediocre-economic-growth-financial.html  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/12/slow-growth-falling-real-disposable.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/us-growth-standstill-falling-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/slow-growth-driven-by-reducing-savings.html https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2024/11/the-consumer-price-index-of-united.html). Average hourly earnings seasonally adjusted increased 0.1 percent from $31.73 in Nov 2025 to $31.76 in Dec 2025. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-october-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-january-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-february-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-march-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-may-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-october-2021.htm  https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm): “ Revision of Seasonally Adjusted Household Survey Data Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal| adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted

estimates back to January 2021 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January

|2025 through November 2025 (as originally published and as revised), along with additional

|information about the revisions, appear in table A at the end of this news release.”

Average private weekly earnings increased $36.73 from $1,033.58 in Dec 2024 to $1,070.31 in Dec 2025 or 3.6 percent and increased $1.01 from $1,069.30 in Dec 2024 to $1,070.31 in Dec 2025 or 0.1 percent. The Bureau of Labor Statistics analyzes the increase in earnings (https://www.bls.gov/cps/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2020.pdf https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-october-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2020.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-january-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-february-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-march-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-april-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-may-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-june-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-july-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-august-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-september-2021.htm  https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-november-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/employment-situation-covid19-faq-december-2021.htm https://www.bls.gov/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the-employment-situation-news-release.htm): “Similarly, changes in average hourly earnings in recent months must be interpreted with caution. Average hourly earnings of all employees on private nonfarm payrolls declined by 35 cents in June to $29.37, following a decrease of 31 cents in May and a gain of $1.34 in April. The increase in average hourly earnings in April largely reflects the disproportionate number of lower-paid workers who went off payrolls, which put upward pressure on the total private average hourly earnings estimate. Some of these workers returned to payrolls in May and June, and job gains among lower-paid workers put downward pressure on average hourly earnings, though the effect is more muted given the smaller magnitude of employment changes in the past 2 months.”

Table IB-1, US, Earnings per Hour and Average Weekly Hours SA

Earnings per Hour	Dec 2024	Oct 2025	Nov 2025	Dec 2025
Total Private	$30.67	$31.62	$31.73	$31.76
Goods Producing	$31.72	$32.81	$32.98	$33.07
Service Providing	$30.46	$31.39	$31.47	$31.50
Average Weekly Earnings
Total Private	$1,033.58	$1,065.59	$1,069.30	$1,070.31
Goods Producing	$1,284.66	$1,335.37	$1,348.88	$1,349.26
Service Providing	$933.00	$1,023.31	$1,025.92	$1,026.90
Average Weekly Hours
Total Private	33.7	33.7	33.7	33.7
Goods Producing	40.5	40.7	40.9	40.8
Service Providing	32.6	32.6	32.6	32.6

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart IB-1 provides average weekly hours of all employees seasonally adjusted. There was sharp contraction during the global recession. Hours returned to levels before and above the contraction. There is recent decrease.

Chart IB-1, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, SA 2006-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/data

Average weekly hours in Table IB-2 fell from 34.8 in Dec 2007 at the beginning of the contraction to 33.7 in Jun 2009, which was the last month of the contraction. Average weekly hours rose to 34.4 in Dec 2011 and oscillated to 34.8 in Dec 2012 and 34.7 in Dec 2013. Average weekly hours of all employees decreased to 34.6 in Dec 2014 and 34.5 in Dec 2015. Average weekly hours stood at 34.3 in Dec 2016. Average weekly hours reached 34.5 in Dec 2017, increasing to 34.9 in Dec 2018.  Average weekly hours moved to 34.7 in Dec 2019, 34.8 in Dec 2020, 34.8 in Dec 2021 and 34.4 in Dec 2022. Average weekly hours moved to 34.4 in Dec 2023. Average weekly hours were 34.6 in Dec 2024. Average weekly hours were 34.2 in Dec 2025. The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (https://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent months.

Table IB-2, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees,

NSA 2006-2025

Year	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
2006	34.5	34.3	34.7	34.3	34.4
2007	34.5	34.8	34.3	34.3	34.8	34.4
2008	34.5	34.2	34.2	34.4	33.9	34.3
2009	34.3	33.7	33.8	34.2	33.8	33.8
2010	34.7	34.1	34.3	34.2	34.2	34.1
2011	34.4	34.3	34.8	34.3	34.4	34.3
2012	34.5	34.8	34.3	34.3	34.8	34.5
2013	34.5	34.9	34.4	34.4	34.7	34.4
2014	34.6	34.5	34.5	34.9	34.6	34.5
2015	35.1	34.3	34.5	34.8	34.5	34.5
2016	34.4	34.4	34.8	34.3	34.3	34.4
2017	34.4	34.3	34.8	34.4	34.5	34.4
2018	34.6	34.8	34.4	34.4	34.9	34.5
2019	34.5	34.8	34.3	34.2	34.7	34.4
2020	35.1	34.5	34.8	35.1	34.8	34.6
2021	35.1	34.5	34.7	34.7	34.8	34.7
2022	34.5	34.5	34.9	34.4	34.4	34.5
2023	34.4	34.3	34.7	34.3	34.4	34.4
2024	34.3	34.6	34.2	34.2	34.6	34.3
2025	34.3	34.2	34.2	34.6	34.2	34.3

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cps/

 

I Average Weekly Earnings in Constant Dollars

Calculations of inflation adjusted real weekly earnings by the BLS are in Table IB-5. Average weekly earnings fell 3.2 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Aug 2011, decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2011 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2011. Average weekly earnings fell 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2011 and fell 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2011. Average weekly earnings declined 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 and fell 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars were virtually flat in Mar 2012 relative to Mar 2011, decreasing 0.2 percent. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 1.7 percent in Apr 2012 relative to Apr 2011 but fell 1.7 percent in May 2012 relative to May 2011, increasing 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2012 and 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2012. Real weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 and 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2012 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2012 and 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 and virtually stagnated with gain of 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013, increasing 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013. Real weekly earnings fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 and fell 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013. Real weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013, 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013 and 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014 and 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014 and changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Real average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Real weekly earnings decreased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015 and increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015. Average weekly earnings increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015 and 4.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015 and increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016. Average weekly earnings contracted 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015 and contracted 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016 and increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016 and increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016 and increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016 and decreased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016. Average weekly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016 and increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017. Average weekly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2017 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2017 and increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2017.  Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2017 and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2017 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2017. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2018 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2018 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2018 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018 and decreased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 3.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2018. Average weekly earnings increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2019 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2019 and increased 3.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2019 and increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019. Average weekly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2019. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 7.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 7.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2020.  Average weekly earnings increased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 4.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 6.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 4.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2020.  Average weekly earnings increased 6.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2020. Average weekly earnings increased 5.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2021. Average weekly earnings increased 2.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2021. Average weekly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2021.  Average weekly earnings decreased 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2021. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2022. Average weekly earnings fell 3.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 5.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 2.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2022. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2023. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2023. Average hourly earnings decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2023. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars decreased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2023. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2023. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2023. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2023. Average weekly earnings increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2023. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2024. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2024. Real average weekly earnings decreased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2024. Real average weekly earnings decreased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2024. Real average weekly earnings decreased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2024. Real average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2024. Real Average weekly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2024. Average weekly earnings increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2025. Average weekly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2025. Real average weekly earnings increased 3.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2025. Real average weekly earnings increased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2025. Real average weekly earnings increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2025.   Real average weekly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2025.  Real average weekly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2025, Real average weekly earnings increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2025. Real average weekly earnings decreased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2025. There are no observations for Oct 2025 because of the government shutdown. Average hourly earnings increased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2025. Real average hourly earnings decreased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2025. Table I-5 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average weekly earnings in 2011 and into 2013 with oscillations according to carry trades causing world inflation waves (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-70-percent-in.html). On an annual basis, average weekly earnings in constant 1982-1984 dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $354.18 in 2013, by 2.0 percent or at the average rate of 0.3 percent per year (data in https://www.bls.gov/data/). Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars of $352.92 in 2010 fell 0.4 percent to $351.56 in 2011. Annual average weekly earnings increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $356.86 in 2014 or by 2.8 at the average rate of 0.4 percent. Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $364.57 in 2015 by 5.0 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $367.11 in 2016 by 5.8 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $369.69 in 2017 by 6.5 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $372.90 in 2018 by 7.4 percent at the average rate of 0.7 percent per year. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased from $347.13 in 2007 to $376.70 in 2019 by 8.5 percent at the average rate of 0.7 percent per year. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer high-quality goods than a year earlier. Average weekly earnings increased from $376.70 in 2019 to $391.95 in 2020 by 4.0 percent and increased 0.1 percent from $391.95 in 2020 to $392.33 in 2021, decreasing 2.9 percent from $392.33 in 2021 to $380.77, changed 0.0 percent from $380.77 in 2022 to $380.86 in  in 2023 and increased 0.5 percent from $380.86 in 2023 to $382.87 in 2024 and increased 1.1 percent from $382.87 in 2024 to $387.19 in 2025, in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event and the trough in Apr 2020 (https://www.nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-july-19-2021).  The fractured US job market does not provide an opportunity for advancement as in past booms following recessions because of poor job creation with 24.6 million unemployed or underemployed (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2025/11/nonfarm-payroll-jobs-grew-119-thousand.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases. 

Table IB-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, NSA 2006-2025

Year	Oct	Nov	Dec
2006	352.68	347.94	351.16
2007	344.91	343.85	352.91
2008	342.83	355.78	354.11
2009	348.04	354.76	350.29
2010	355.84	354.66	355.14
2011	358.11	350.99	353.80
2012	348.61	351.31	361.34
∆%12M	-2.7	0.1	2.1
2013	354.10	355.85	361.82
∆%12M	1.6	1.3	0.1
2014	356.29	366.21	362.19
∆%12M	0.6	2.9	0.1
2015	364.67	372.00	367.57
∆%12M	2.4	1.6	1.5
2016	374.59	367.23	367.53
∆%12M	2.7	-1.3	0.0
2017	375.57	369.15	371.98
∆%12M	0.3	0.5	1.2
2018	371.50	373.29	384.65
∆%12M	-1.1	1.1	3.4
2019	375.73	375.76	384.98
∆%12M	1.1	0.7	0.1
2020	393.86	401.41	398.67
∆%12M	4.8	6.8	3.6
2021	389.92	388.64	390.94
∆%12M	-1.0	-3.2	-1.9
2022	384.94	377.96	380.86
∆%12M	-1.3	-2.7	-2.6
2023	386.17	380.37	383.87
∆%12M	0.3	0.6	0.8
2024	383.64	384.50	392.70
∆%12M	-0.7	1.1	2.3
2025	NA	395.40	389.86
∆%12M	NA	2.8	-0.7

Note: NA because of appropriations shutdown

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart IB-4 provides average hourly earnings in constant dollars of 1982-1984 from 2006 to 2025. The same pattern emerges of sharp decline during the contraction, followed by recovery in the expansion and continuing fall with oscillation caused by carry trade from zero interest rates into commodity futures from 2010 to 2011 and into 2012-2020. The increase in the final segment is mostly because of carry trade exposures followed by reversal of carry trades and new decrease/stability. The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases. There is risk of continuing high inflation.

Chart IB-4, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees

in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/data

Chart IB-5 provides 12-month percentage changes of average weekly earnings of all employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984. The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (https://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases. There is the same pattern of contraction during the global recession in 2008 and then again weakness in the recovery without hiring and inflation waves https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/03/accelerating-inflation-throughout-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-of-70-percent-in.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/fomc-states-with-inflation-well-above-2.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2022/01/real-disposable-income-decreasing-02.html https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/us-gdp-growing-at-21-saar-in-iiiq2021.html  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/10/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/09/world-inflation-waves-high-inflation.html  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/08/us-gdp-growing-at-66-saar-in-iiq2021-in.html https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/07/cumulative-growth-of-us-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/06/us-gdp-growing-continuing-recovery-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/05/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-64-percent-in_29.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/04/rising-inflation-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/03/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-43-percent-in.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/02/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-41-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2021/01/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-40-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-334-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/12/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-334-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/dollar-devaluation-increasing.html and earlier  lhttps://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/11/us-gdp-growing-at-saar-331-percent-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/wealth-of-households-and-nonprofit.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/recovery-in-jun-2020-of-manufacturing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/04/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/03/weekly-rise-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/sharp-worldwide-contraction-of.html and earlier   https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/02/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier 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https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier 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http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/imf-view-world-inflation-waves-squeeze.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/world-inflation-waves-interest-rate.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/world-inflation-waves-regional-economic.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/recovery-without-hiring-forecast-growth.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012_09_01_archive.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/world-inflation-waves-financial.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/fractured-labor-market-with-hiring.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012_09_01_archive.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/world-inflation-waves-financial.html  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/fractured-labor-market-with-hiring.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html).

Chart IB-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees NSA

 in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984 12-Month Percent Change, NSA 2007-2025

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/data

 

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026.