Saturday, April 20, 2019

Increasing Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Inflation Waves, United States Industrial Production, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, IMF View of World Economy and Finance, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk: Part VII

CANNOT UPLOAD CHARTS AND IMAGES: ERROR 400

Increasing Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Inflation Waves, United States Industrial Production, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, IMF View of World Economy and Finance, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019

CANNOT UPLOAD CHARTS AND IMAGES: ERROR 400

I World Inflation Waves

IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IC United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

II United States Industrial Production

IIB Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates

IIC IMF View of World Economy and Finance

II 1B Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

V World Economic Slowdown. Table V-1 is constructed with the database of the IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=29) to show GDP in dollars in 2017 and the growth rate of real GDP of the world and selected regional countries from 2017 to 2020. The data illustrate the concept often repeated of “two-speed recovery” of the world economy from the recession of 2007 to 2009. The IMF has changed its measurement of the world economy to 3.8 percent in 2017 and reducing the forecast rate of growth to 3.6 percent in 2018, 3.3 percent in 2019 and 3.6 percent in 2020. Slow-speed recovery occurs in the “major advanced economies” of the G7 that account for $36,871 billion of world output of $80,145 billion, or 46.0 percent, but are projected to grow at much lower rates than world output, 1.9 percent on average from 2017 to 2020, in contrast with 3.6 percent for the world as a whole. While the world would grow 15.1 percent in the four years from 2017 to 2020, the G7 as a whole would grow 7.6 percent. The difference in dollars of 2017 is high: growing by 15.1 percent would add around $12.1 trillion of output to the world economy, or roughly, over two times the output of the economy of Japan of $4,860 billion but growing by 7.6 percent would add $6.1 trillion of output to the world, or somewhat higher than the output of Japan in 2017. The “two speed” concept is in reference to the growth of the 150 countries labeled as emerging and developing economies (EMDE) with joint output in 2017 of $31,792 billion, or 39.7 percent of world output. The EMDEs would grow cumulatively 19.8 percent or at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent, contributing $6.3 trillion from 2017 to 2020 or the equivalent of somewhat more than one half the GDP of $12,062 billion of China in 2017. The final four countries in Table V-1 often referred as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), are large, rapidly growing emerging economies. Their combined output in 2017 adds to $18,345 billion, or 22.9 percent of world output, which is equivalent to 49.8 percent of the combined output of the major advanced economies of the G7.

Table V-1, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Real GDP Growth

GDP USD Billions 2017

Real GDP ∆%
2017

Real GDP ∆%
2018

Real GDP ∆%
2019

Real GDP ∆%
2020

World

80,145

3.8

3.6

3.3

3.6

G7

36,871

2.2

2.1

1.6

1.5

Canada

1,650

3.0

1.8

1.5

1.9

France

2,588

2.2

1.5

1.3

1.4

DE

3,701

2.5

1.5

0.8

1.4

Italy

1,947

1.6

0.9

0.1

0.9

Japan

4,860

1.9

0.8

1.0

0.5

UK

2,640

1.8

1.4

1.2

1.4

US

19,485

2.2

2.9

2.3

1.9

Euro Area

12,652

2.4

1.8

1.3

1.5

DE

3,701

2.5

1.5

0.8

1.4

France

2,588

2.2

1.5

1.3

1.4

Italy

1,947

1.6

0.9

0.1

0.9

POT

220

2.8

2.1

1.7

1.5

Ireland

332

7.2

6.8

4.2

3.4

Greece

204

1.5

2.1

2.4

2.2

Spain

1,317

3.0

2.5

2.1

1.9

EMDE

31,792

4.8

4.5

4.4

4.8

Brazil

2,053

1.1

1.1

2.1

2.5

Russia

1,578

1.6

2.3

1.6

1.7

India

2,652

7.2

7.1

7.3

7.5

China

12,062

6.8

6.6

6.3

6.1

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries); POT: Portugal

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx

Continuing high rates of unemployment in advanced economies constitute another characteristic of the database of the WEO (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx). Table V-2 is constructed with the WEO database to provide rates of unemployment from 2016 to 2020 for major countries and regions. In fact, unemployment rates for 2016 in Table V-2 are high for all countries: unusually high for countries with high rates most of the time and unusually high for countries with low rates most of the time. The rates of unemployment are particularly high in 2016 for the countries with sovereign debt difficulties in Europe: 11.1 percent for Portugal (POT), 8.4 percent for Ireland, 23.6 percent for Greece, 19.6 percent for Spain and 11.7 percent for Italy, which is lower but still high. The G7 rate of unemployment is 5.4 percent. Unemployment rates are not likely to decrease substantially if relative slow cyclical growth persists in advanced economies.

Table V-2, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Unemployment Rate as Percent of Labor Force

% Labor Force 2016

% Labor Force 2017

% Labor Force 2018

% Labor Force 2019

% Labor Force 2020

World

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

G7

5.4

5.0

4.5

4.5

4.4

Canada

7.0

6.3

5.8

5.9

6.0

France

10.1

9.4

9.1

8.8

8.4

DE

4.2

3.8

3.4

3.4

3.3

Italy

11.7

11.3

10.6

10.7

10.5

Japan

3.1

2.8

2.4

2.4

2.4

UK

4.9

4.4

4.1

4.2

4.4

US

4.9

4.4

3.9

3.8

3.7

Euro Area

10.0

9.1

8.2

8.0

7.7

DE

4.2

3.8

3.4

3.4

3.3

France

10.1

9.4

9.1

8.8

8.4

Italy

11.7

11.3

10.6

10.7

10.5

POT

11.1

8.9

7.1

6.8

6.3

Ireland

8.4

6.7

5.7

5.3

5.0

Greece

23.6

21.5

19.6

18.5

17.5

Spain

19.6

17.2

15.3

14.2

14.1

EMDE

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Brazil

11.3

12.8

12.3

11.4

10.2

Russia

5.5

5.2

4.8

4.8

4.7

India

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

China

4.0

3.9

3.8

3.8

3.8

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries)

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx

There are references to adverse periods as “lost decades.” There is a more prolonged and adverse period in Table V-3A: the lost economic cycle of the Global Recession with economic growth underperforming below trend worldwide. Economic contractions were relatively high but not comparable to the decline of GDP during the Great Depression. In fact, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, US GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. The contraction of GDP in the current cycle of the Global Recession was much lower, 4.0 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). Contractions were deeper in Japan, 8.7 percent, the euro area (19 members), 5.7 percent, Germany, 6.9 percent and the UK 6.3 percent. The contraction in France was 3.9 percent. There is adversity in low rates of growth during the expansion that did not compensate for the contraction such that for the whole cycle performance is disappointingly low. As a result, GDP is substantially below what it would have been in trend growth in all countries and regions in the world. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 38 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IVQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/gdp4q18_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 would have accumulated to 38.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2018 would be $21,814.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3049.3 billion than actual $18,765.3 billion. There are more than two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.1 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html). US GDP in IVQ2018 is 14.0 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,765.3 billion in IVQ2018 or 19.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Mar 1919 to Mar 2019. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 154.3581 in Mar 2019. The actual index NSA in Mar 2019 is 105.8503, which is 31.4 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Mar 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.3241 in Mar 2019. The output of manufacturing at 105.8503 in Mar 2019 is 21.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table V-3A, Cycle 2007-2018, Percentage Contraction, Average Growth Rate in Expansion, Average Growth Rate in Whole Cycle and GDP Percent Below Trend

Contraction ∆%

Expansion AV ∆%

Whole Cycle AV ∆%

Below Trend Percent

USA

4.0

2.3

1.6

14.0

Japan

8.7

1.5

0.5

NA

Euro Area (19)

5.7

1.4

0.7

16.0

France

3.9

1.3

0.8

9.9

Germany

6.9

1.9

1.1

NA

UK

6.3

1.9

1.1

16.8

Note: AV: Average. Expansion and Whole Cycle AV ∆% calculated with quarterly growth, seasonally adjusted and quarterly adjusted when applicable, rates and converted into annual equivalent.

Data reported periodically in this blog.

Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table V-3 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog from IQ2012 to IVQ2016 available now for all countries. There are estimates for all countries for IQ2017, IIQ2017 and IIIQ2017. There are estimates for IVQ2017, IQ2018, IIQ2018, IIIQ2018 and preliminary estimates for IVQ2018. Growth is weak throughout most of the world.

Table V-3, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%

IQ2012/IVQ2011

IQ2012/IQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.8       

SAAR: 3.2

2.7

Japan

QOQ: 1.2

SAAR: 5.0

3.1

China

1.9 AE 7.8

8.1

Euro Area

-0.2

-0.4

Germany

0.3

1.6

France

0.1

0.6

Italy

-0.9

-2.2

United Kingdom

0.6

1.2

IIQ2012/IQ2012

IIQ2012/IIQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.4        

SAAR: 1.7

2.4

Japan

QOQ: -0.8
SAAR: -3.1

2.9

China

2.1 AE 8.7

7.6

Euro Area

-0.3

-0.8

Germany

0.1

0.4 0.9 CA

France

-0.1

0.5

Italy

-0.9

-3.2

United Kingdom

-0.1

1.0

IIIQ2012/ IIQ2012

IIIQ2012/ IIIQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.1 
SAAR: 0.5

2.5

Japan

QOQ: –0.4
SAAR: –1.5

-0.1

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.5

Euro Area

-0.1

-0.9

Germany

0.3

0.2

France

0.1

0.4

Italy

-0.5

-3.1

United Kingdom

1.2

2.0

IVQ2012/IIIQ2012

IVQ2012/IVQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.1
SAAR: 0.5

1.5

Japan

QOQ: 0.3

SAAR: 1.2

0.3

China

2.0 AE 8.2

8.1

Euro Area

-0.4

-1.1

Germany

-0.5

-0.1

France

0.0

0.1

Italy

-0.5

-2.8

United Kingdom

-0.2

1.6

IQ2013/IVQ2012

IQ2013/IQ2012

United States

QOQ: 0.9
SAAR: 3.6

1.6

Japan

QOQ: 1.1

SAAR: 4.6

0.4

China

1.9 AE 7.8

7.9

Euro Area

-0.4

-1.2

Germany

-0.3

-1.5

France

0.0

0.0

Italy

-1.0

-2.9

UK

0.6

1.6

IIQ2013/IQ2013

IIQ2013/IIQ2012

United States

QOQ: 0.1

SAAR: 0.5

1.3

Japan

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.4

1.9

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.6

Euro Area

0.5

-0.4

Germany

0.9

0.9

France

0.7

0.7

Italy

0.0

-2.0

UK

0.5

2.2

IIIQ2013/IIQ2013

III/Q2013/IIIQ2012

USA

QOQ: 0.8
SAAR: 3.2

1.9

Japan

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.4

3.0

China

2.1 AE 8.7

7.9

Euro Area

0.4

0.1

Germany

0.6

1.2

France

0.0

0.6

Italy

0.4

-1.2

UK

0.9

1.9

IVQ2013/IIIQ2013

IVQ2013/IVQ2012

USA

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.2

2.6

Japan

QOQ: 0.0

SAAR: -0.1

2.7

China

1.6 AE 6.6

7.7

Euro Area

0.2

0.7

Germany

0.4

1.4

France

0.4

1.1

Italy

-0.2

-0.8

UK

0.5

2.6

IQ2014/IVQ2013

IQ2014/IQ2013

USA

QOQ -0.3

SAAR -1.0

1.5

Japan

QOQ: 0.9

SAAR: 3.7

3.0

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.4

Euro Area

0.5

1.6

Germany

1.0

3.2

France

0.1

1.2

Italy

0.1

0.3

UK

0.8

2.8

IIQ2014/IQ2014

IIQ2014/IIQ2013

USA

QOQ 1.3

SAAR 5.1

2.6

Japan

QOQ: -1.8

SAAR: -7.2

-0.1

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.5

Euro Area

0.2

1.3

Germany

-0.1

1.5

France

0.2

0.7

Italy

-0.1

0.2

UK

0.8

3.1

IIIQ2014/IIQ2014

IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013

USA

QOQ: 1.2

SAAR: 4.9

3.0

Japan

QOQ: 0.1

SAAR: 0.4

-0.9

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.1

Euro Area

0.4

1.3

Germany

0.3

1.7

France

0.4

1.2

Italy

0.2

0.1

UK

0.7

2.9

IVQ2014/IIIQ2014

IVQ2014/IVQ2013

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 1.9

2.7

Japan

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 1.9

-0.5

China

1.7 AE 7.0

7.2

Euro Area

0.5

1.6

Germany

1.0

2.4

France

0.1

0.9

Italy

0.0

0.2

UK

0.7

3.1

IQ2015/IVQ2014

IQ2015/IQ2014

USA

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.3

3.8

Japan

QOQ: 1.3

SAAR: 5.4

0.0

China

1.7 AE 7.0

7.0

Euro Area

0.7

1.8

Germany

-0.1

1.3

France

0.5

1.2

Italy

0.2

0.3

UK

0.4

2.7

IIQ2015/IQ2015

IIQ2015/IIQ2014

USA

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.3

3.4

Japan

QOQ: 0.2

SAAR: 0.7

2.2

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.0

Euro Area

0.4

2.1

Germany

0.6

1.8

France

0.0

1.0

Italy

0.4

0.8

UK

0.6

2.4

IIIQ2015/IIQ2015

IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014

USA

QOQ: 0.2

SAAR: 1.0

2.4

Japan

QOQ: -0.1

SAAR: -0.2

1.9

China

1.7 AE 7.0

6.9

Euro Area

0.4

2.0

Germany

0.3

1.8

France

0.4

0.9

Italy

0.3

0.8

UK

0.4

2.1

IVQ2015/IIIQ2015

IVQ2015/IVQ2014

USA

QOQ: 0.1

SAAR: 0.4

2.0

Japan

QOQ: -0.4

SAAR: -1.6

0.9

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.8

Euro Area

0.5

2.0

Germany

0.5

2.1

France

0.3

1.0

Italy

0.4

1.3

UK

0.7

2.2

IQ2016/IVQ2015

IQ2016/IQ2015

USA

QOQ: 0.4

SAAR: 1.5

1.6

Japan

QOQ: 0.7

SAAR: 2.9

0.4

China

1.4 AE 5.7

6.7

Euro Area

0.7

2.0

Germany

0.9

2.0

France

0.7

1.3

Italy

0.2

1.3

UK

0.3

2.1

IIQ2016/IQ2016

IIQ2016/IIQ2015

USA

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.3

1.3

Japan

QOQ: 0.0

SAAR: 0.1

0.3

China

1.9 AE 7.8

6.7

Euro Area

0.3

1.8

Germany

0.4

3.7

France

-0.2

1.1

Italy

0.2

1.2

UK

0.2

1.7

IIIQ2016/IIQ2016

IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015

United States

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 1.9

1.5

Japan

QOQ: 0.2

SAAR: 0.9

0.5

China

1.7 AE 7.0

6.7

Euro Area

0.3

1.8

Germany

0.2

1.9

France

0.2

0.9

Italy

0.3

1.2

UK

0.5

1.7

IVQ2016/IIIQ2016

IVQ2016/IVQ2015

United States

QOQ: 0.4

SAAR: 1.8

1.9

Japan

QOQ: 0.2

SAAR: 0.9

1.2

China

1.6 AE 6.6

6.8

Euro Area

0.8

2.1

Germany

0.4

1.4

France

0.6

1.2

Italy

0.5

1.3

UK

0.7

1.7

IQ2017/IVQ2016

IQ2017/IQ2016

United States

QOQ: 0.4

SAAR: 1.8

1.9

Japan

QOQ: 0.9

SAAR: 3.6

1.4

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.8

Euro Area

0.7

2.1

Germany

1.1

3.4

France

0.8

1.4

Italy

0.5

1.6

UK

0.4

1.8

IIQ2017/IQ2017

IIQ2017/IIQ2016

USA

QOQ: 0.7

SAAR: 3.0

2.1

Japan

QOQ: 0.4

SAAR: 1.8

1.8

China

1.8 AE 7.4

6.8

Euro Area

0.7

2.5

Germany

0.5

0.9 CA 2.2

France

0.7

2.3

Italy

0.3

1.7

UK

0.3

1.9

IIIQ2017/IIQ2017

IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016

USA

QOQ: 0.7

SAAR: 2.8

2.3

Japan

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.5

2.1

China

1.7 AE 7.0

6.7

Euro Area

0.7

2.8

Germany

0.6

2.2 CA 2.6

France

0.6

2.7

Italy

0.4

1.7

UK

0.5

2.0

IVQ2017/IIIQ2017

IVQ2017/IVQ2016

USA

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.3

2.5

Japan

QOQ: 0.4

SAAR: 1.6

2.4

China

1.6 AE 6.6

6.7

Euro Area

0.7

2.7

Germany

0.5

2.2 CA 2.8

France

0.7

2.8

Italy

0.4

1.7

UK

0.4

1.6

IQ2018/IVQ2017

IQ2018/IQ2017

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.2

2.6

Japan

QOQ: -0.1

SAAR: -0.4

1.3

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.8

Euro Area

0.4

2.4

Germany

0.4

1.4 CA 2.1

France

0.2

2.2

Italy

0.2

1.4

UK

0.1

1.2

IIQ2018/IQ2018

IIQ2018/IIQ2017

USA

QOQ: 1.0

SAAR: 4.2

2.9

Japan

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 1.9

1.5

China

1.7 AE 7.0

6.7

Euro Area

0.4

2.1

Germany

0.5

2.3 CA 2.0

France

0.2

1.7

Italy

0.1

1.1

UK

0.4

1.4

IIIQ2018/IIQ2018

IIIQ2018/IIIQ2017

USA

QOQ: 0.9

SAAR: 3.4

3.0

Japan

QOQ -0.6

SAAR: -2.4

0.1

China

1.6 AE 6.6

6.5

Euro Area

0.1

1.6

Germany

-0.2

1.1 CA 1.1

France

0.3

1.4

Italy

-0.1

0.6

UK

0.7

1.6

IVQ2018IIIQ2018

IVQ2018/IVQ2017

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.2

3.0

Japan

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 1.9

0.3

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.4

Euro Area

0.2

1.1

Germany

0.0

0.9 CA 0.6

France

0.3

1.0

Italy

-0.1

0.0

UK

0.2

1.4

QOQ: Quarter relative to prior quarter; SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate

Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table V-4 provides two types of data: growth of exports and imports in the latest available months and in the past 12 months; and contributions of net trade (exports less imports) to growth of real GDP.

  • China. In Mar 2019, China exports increased 14.2 percent relative to a year earlier and imports decreased 7.6 percent.
  • Germany. Germany’s exports decreased 1.3 percent in the month of Feb 2019 and increased 3.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019. Germany’s imports decreased 1.6 percent in the month of Feb 2019 and increased 5.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to growth of GDP in IQ2012, contributed 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2012, contributed 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2012, deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2012, deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2013 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded deducted 0.0 percentage points from Germany’s GDP growth in IIIQ2013 and added 0.9 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2014 and added 0.8 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.5 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.8 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018 and deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.9 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2018.
  • United Kingdom. Net trade contributed 0.7 percentage points in IIQ2013. In IIIQ2013, net trade deducted 1.7 percentage points from UK growth. Net trade contributed 0.1 percentage points to UK value added in IVQ2013. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to UK value added in IQ2014 and 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2014 and added 0.0 percentage points in IVQ2014. Net traded deducted 0.4 percentage points from growth in IQ2015. Net trade added 1.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.1-percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.8 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade added 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2017 and contributed 0.1 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2018.
  • France. France’s exports increased 0.9 percent in Feb 2019 while imports increased 0.4 percent. France’s exports increased 7.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019 and imports increased 5.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Net traded added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IIIQ2012 and 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IQ2013 and added 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 1.7 percentage points in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IVQ2013 and deducted 0.1 percentage points in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IIQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to France’s GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.6 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IIIQ2016 and added 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IQ2017 and added 0.9 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.6 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade added 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP in IVQ2018.
  • United States. US exports increased 0.9 percent in Jan 2019 and goods exports increased 3.5 percent in Jan 2019 relative to a year earlier. Imports decreased 2.6 percent in Jan 2019 and goods imports increased 0.5 percent in Jan 2019 relative to a year earlier. Net trade added 0.27 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2012 and deducted 0.08 percentage points in IIIQ2012, adding 0.57 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade added 0.40 percentage points to US GDP growth in IQ2013 and deducted 0.33 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded subtracted 0.14 percentage points from US GDP growth in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 1.23 percentage points to US GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 1.08 percentage points from US GDP growth in IQ2014 and deducted 0.51 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade added 0.12 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2014. Net trade deducted 1.08 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 1.58 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.01 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 1.05 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.21 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.36 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.29 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade added 0.03 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.32 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2016.  Net trade deducted 0.10 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2017.  Net trade added 0.08 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.01 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.89 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.02 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade added 1.22 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 1.99 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018, deducting 0.08 percentage points in IVQ2018.

Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted increased 210,000 from Mar 2018 to
Mar 2019 or at the average monthly rate of 17,500. Industrial production decreased 0.1 percent in Mar 2019 and increased 0.1 percent in Feb 2019 after decreasing 0.3 percent in Jan 2019, with all data seasonally adjusted. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 27, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to the growth rates for total IP for recent years were small and positive, with the estimates for 2016 and 2017 a bit higher and the estimates for 2015 and 2018 slightly lower.[2] Total IP is still reported to have increased from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014 before declining in 2015 and rebounding in mid-2016. Subsequently, the index advanced around 7 1/2 percent over 2017 and 2018.

Capacity for total industry expanded modestly in each year from 2015 to 2017 before advancing 1 1/2 percent in 2018; it is expected to advance about 2 percent in 2019. Revisions for recent years were very small and showed slightly less expansion in most years relative to earlier reports.

In the fourth quarter of 2018, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 79.4 percent, about 3/4 percentage point above its previous estimate and about 1/2 percentage point below its long-run (1972–2018) average. The utilization rate in 2017 is also higher than its previous estimate.”

Manufacturing decreased 22.3 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 19.7 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2018. Manufacturing grew 21.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Mar 2019. Manufacturing in Mar 2019 is lower by 5.8 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007.

The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 would have accumulated to 38.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2018 would be $21,814.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3049.3 billion than actual $18,765.3 billion. There are more than two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.1 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html). US GDP in IVQ2018 is 14.0 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,765.3 billion in IVQ2018 or 19.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Mar 1919 to Mar 2019. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 154.3581 in Mar 2019. The actual index NSA in Mar 2019 is 105.8503, which is 31.4 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Mar 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.3241 in Mar 2019. The output of manufacturing at 105.8503 in Mar 2019 is 21.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 87.2 percent in IVQ2018. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Mar 2019, there were 149.867 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 126.989 million NSA in Mar 2019 accounted for 84.7 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 149.867 million, of which 12.768 million, or 10.1 percent of total private jobs and 8.5 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 106.303 million NSA in Mar 2019, or 70.9 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.7 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 9.7 percent in US national income in IVQ2018 and durable goods 5.7 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table V-4, Growth of Trade and Contributions of Net Trade to GDP Growth, ∆% and % Points

Exports
M ∆%

Exports 12 M ∆%

Imports
M ∆%

Imports 12 M ∆%

USA

0.9 Jan

3.5

Jan

-2.6 Jan

0.5

Jan

Japan

Mar 2019

-2.4

Feb 2019

-1.2

Jan 2019

-8.4

Dec 2018

-3.8

Nov 2018

0.1

Oct 2018

8.2

Sep 2018

-1.2

Aug 2018

6.6

Jul 2018

3.9

Jun 2018

6.7

May 2018

8.1

Apr 2018

7.8

Mar 2018

2.1

Feb 2018

1.8

Jan 2018

12.2

Dec 2017

9.3

Nov 2017

16.2

Oct 2017

14.0

Sep 2017

14.1

Aug 2017

18.1

Jul 2017

13.4

Jun 2017

9.7

May 2017

14.9

Apr 2017

7.5

Mar 2017

12.0

Feb 2017

11.3

Jan 2017

1.3

Dec 2016

5.4

Nov 2016 -0.4

Oct 2016

-10.3

Sep 2016

-6.9

Aug 2016

9.6

Jul 2016

-14.0

Jun 2016

-7.8

May 2016

-11.3

Apr 2016

-10.1

Mar 2016

-6.8

Feb 2016

-4.0

Jan 2016

-12.9

Dec 2015

-8.0

Nov 2015

-3.3

Oct 2015

-2.1

Sep 2015

0.6

Aug

3.1

Jul 2015

7.6

Jun 2015

9.5

May 2015

2.4

Apr

8.0

Mar

8.5

Feb

2.4

Jan

17.0

Dec

12.9

Nov

4.9

Oct

9.6

Sep

6.9

Aug

-1.3

Jul

3.9

Jun

-2.0

May 2014

-2.7

Apr 2014

5.1

Mar 2014

1.8

Feb 2014

9.5

Jan 2014

9.5

Dec 2013

15.3

Nov 2013

18.4

Oct 2013

18.6

Sep 2013

11.5

Aug 2013

14.7

Jul 2013

12.2

Jun 2013 7.4

May 2013

10.1

Apr 2013

3.8

Mar 2013

1.1

Feb 2013

-2.9

Jan 2013 6.4

Dec -5.8

Nov -4.1

Oct -6.5

Sep -10.3

Aug -5.8

Jul -8.1

Mar 2019

1.1

Feb 2019

-6.7

Jan 2019

-0.6

Dec 2018

1.9

Nov 2018

12.5

Oct 2018

19.9

Sep 2018

7.0

Aug 2018

15.4

Jul 2018

14.6

Jun 2018

2.5

May 2018

14.0

Apr 2018

5.9

Mar 2018

-0.6

Feb 2018

16.6

Jan 2018

7.9

Dec 2017

14.9

Nov 2017

17.2

Oct 2017

18.9

Sep 2017

12.0

Aug 2017

15.2

Jul 2017

16.3

Jun 2017

15.5

May 2017

17.8

Apr 2017

15.1

Mar 2017

15.8

Feb 2017

1.2

Jan 2017

8.5

Dec 2016

-2.6

Nov 2016

-8.8

Oct 2016

-16.5

Sep 2016

-16.3

Aug 2016

-17.3

Jul 2016

-24.7

Jun 2016

-18.8

May 2016

-13.8

Apr 2016

-23.3

Mar 2016

-14.9

Feb 2016

-14.2

Jan 2016

-18.0

Dec 2015

-18.0

Nov 2015

-10.2

Oct 2015

-13.4

Sep 2015

-11.1

Aug

-3.1

Jul 2015

-3.2

Jun 2015

-2.9

May 2015

-8.7

Apr

-4.2

Mar

-14.5

Feb

-3.6

Jan

-9.0

Dec

1.9

Nov

-1.7

Oct

2.7

Sep

6.2

Aug

-1.5

Jul

2.3

Jun

8.4

May 2014

-3.6

Apr 2013

3.4

Mar 2014

18.1

Feb 2014

9.0

Jan 2014

25.0

Dec 2013 24.7

Nov 2013

21.1

Oct 2013

26.1

Sep 2013

16.5

Aug 2013

16.0

Jul 2013

19.6

Jun 2013

11.8

May 2013

10.0

Apr 2013

9.4

Mar 2013

5.5

Feb 2013

7.3

Jan 2013 7.3

Dec 1.9

Nov 0.8

Oct -1.6

Sep 4.1

Aug -5.4

Jul 2.1

China

Jan-Dec

9.9

Jan-Dec

2017 7.9

Jan-Dec 2016 -7.7

Jan-Dec

2015 -2.8

2019

Mar

14.2

Feb

-20.7

Jan

9.3

2018

Dec

-4.4

Nov

5.4

Oct

15.6

Sep

14.5

Aug

9.8

Jul

12.2

Jun

11.3

May

12.6

Apr

12.9

Mar

-2.7

Feb

44.5

Jan

11.1

2017

Dec

10.9

Nov

12.3

Oct

6.9

Sep

8.1

Aug

5.5

Jul

7.2

Jun

11.3

May

8.7

Apr

8.0

Mar

16.4

Feb

-1.3

Jan

7.9

2016

Dec

3.1

Nov

0.1

Oct

-7.3

Sep

-10.0

Aug

-2.8

Jul

-4.4

Jun

-4.8

May

-4.1

Apr

-1.8

Mar

11.5

Feb

-25.4

Jan

-11.2

2015

-1.4 Dec

-6.8 Nov

-6.9 Oct

-3.7 Sep

-5.5 Aug

-8.3 Jul

2.8 Jun

-2.5 May

-6.4 Apr

-15.0 Mar

48.3 Feb

-3.3 Jan

2014

9.7 Dec

4.7 Nov

11.6 Oct

15.3 Sep

9.4 Aug

14.5 Jul

7.2 Jun

7.0 May

0.9 Apr

-6.6 Mar

-18.1 Feb

10.6 Jan

2013

4.3 Dec

12.7 Nov

5.6 Oct

-0.3 Sep

7.2 Aug

5.1 Jul

-3.1 Jun

1.0 May

14.7 Apr

10.0 Mar

21.8 Feb

25.0 Jan

Jan-Dec

15.8

Jan-Dec 2017 15.9

Jan-Dec 2016 -5.5

Jan-Dec 2015 -14.1

2019

Mar

-7.6

Feb

-5.2

Jan

-1.5

2018

Dec

-7.6

Nov

3.0

Oct

21.4

Sep

14.3

Aug

20.0

Jul

27.3

Jun

14.1

May

26.0

Apr

21.5

Mar

14.4

Feb

6.3

Jan

36.9

2017

Dec

4.5

Nov

17.7

Oct

17.2

Sep

18.7

Aug

13.3

Jul

11.0

Jun

17.2

May

14.8

Apr

11.9

Mar

20.3

Feb

38.1

Jan

16.7

2016

Dec

-7.7

Nov

6.7

Oct

-1.4

Sep

-1.9

Aug

1.5

Jul

-12.5

Jun

-2.8

May

-0.4

Apr

-10.6

Mar

-7.6

Feb

-13.8

Jan

-18.8

2015

-7.6 Dec

-8.7 Nov

-18.8 Oct

-20.4 Sep

-13.8 Aug

-8.1 Jul

-6.1 Jun

-17.6 May

-12.7 Mar

-20.5 Feb

-19.9 Jan

2014

-2.4 Dec

-6.7 Nov

4.6 Oct

7.0 Sep

-2.4 Aug

-1.6 Jul

5.5 Jun

-1.6 May

-0.8 Apr

-11.3 Mar

10.1 Feb

10.0 Jan

2013

8.3 Dec

5.3 Nov

7.6 Oct

7.4 Sep

7.0 Aug

10.9 Jul

-0.7 Jun

-0.3 May

16.8 Apr

14.1 Mar

-15.2 Feb

28.8 Jan

Euro Area

4.4 12-Feb 19

3.4 Jan-Feb 19

4.0 12-Feb 19

3.6 Jan-Feb 19

Germany

-1.3 Feb CSA

3.9 Feb

-1.6 Feb CSA

5.1 Feb

France

Feb

0.9

7.3

0.4

5.3

Italy Feb

-1.1

3.4

0.0

3.3

UK

0.1 Feb

3.1

-0.7 Feb

5.5

Net Trade % Points GDP Growth

Points

USA

IVQ 2018

-0.08

IIIQ 2018

-1.99

IIQ2018

1.22

IQ2018

-0.02

IVQ2017

-0.89

IIIQ2017

0.01

IIQ2017

0.08

IQ2017

-0.10

IVQ2016

-1.32

IIIQ2016

0.03

IIQ2016

0.29

IQ2016

-0.36

IVQ2015

-0.21

IIIQ2015

-1.05

IIQ2015

-0.01

IQ2015

-1.58

IVQ2014

-1.08

IIIQ2014

0.12

IIQ2014

-0.51

IQ2014

-1.08

IVQ2013

1.23

IIIQ2013

-0.14

IIQ2013

-0.33

IQ2013

0.40

IVQ2012 +0.57

IIIQ2012

-0.08

IIQ2012 0.27

IQ2012 0.00

Japan

0.6

IQ2012

-1.9 IIQ2012

-2.0

IIIQ2012

-0.3

IVQ2012

1.3

IQ2013

-0.1

IIQ2013

-1.4

IIIQ2013

-2.1

IVQ2013

-0.9

IQ2014

4.0

IIQ2014

-0.2

IIIQ2014

1.6

IVQ2014

0.0

IQ2015

-0.6

IIQ2015

-0.5

IIIQ2015

0.2

IVQ2015

1.3

IQ2016

0.3

IIQ2016

1.4

IIIQ2016

1.7

IVQ2016

0.3

IQ2017

-1.2

IIQ2017

2.1

IIIQ2017

0.1

IVQ2017

0.2

IQ2018

-0.6

IIQ2018

-0.6

IIIQ2018

-1.2

IVQ2018

Germany

IQ2012

0.8 IIQ2012 0.3 IIIQ2012 0.4 IVQ2012

-0.5

IQ2013

-0.3 IIQ2013

-0.3

IIIQ2013

0.0

IVQ2013

0.9

IQ2014

-0.2

IIQ2014

-0.2

IIIQ2014

0.8

IVQ2014

0.1

IQ2015

-0.5

IIQ2015

0.8

IIIQ2015

-0.3

IVQ2015

-0.7

IQ2016

-0.3

IIQ2016

0.7

IIIQ2016

-0.3

IVQ2016

-0.5

IQ2017

0.7

IIQ2017

-0.2

IIIQ2017

0.4

IVQ2017

0.2

IQ2018

0.0

IIQ2018

-0.2

IIIQ2018

-0.9

IVQ2018

0.0

France

0.1 IIIQ2012

0.1 IVQ2012

-0.1 IQ2013

0.3

IIQ2013 -1.7

IIIQ2013

0.1

IVQ2013

-0.1

IQ2014

-0.2

IIQ2014

-0.2

IIIQ2014

0.2

IVQ2014

-0.2

IQ2015

0.4

IIQ2015

-0.6

IIIQ2015

-0.7

IVQ2015

-0.1

IQ2016

0.3

IIQ2016

-0.6

IIIQ2016

0.1

IVQ2016

-0.6

IQ2017

0.9

IIQ2017

-0.3

IIIQ2017

0.6

IVQ2017

0.0

IQ2018

-0.1

IIQ2018

0.3

IIIQ2018

0.3

IVQ2018

UK

0.7

IIQ2013

-1.7

IIIQ2013

0.1

IVQ2013

0.8

IQ2014

0.3

IIQ2014

-0.7

IIIQ2014

0.0

IVQ2014

-0.4

IQ2015

1.1

IIQ2015

-0.4

IIIQ2015

-0.2

IVQ2015

-0.1

IQ2016

0.1

IIQ2016

-1.8

IIIQ2016

1.7

IVQ2016

-0.2

IQ2017

0.1

IIQ2017

0.4

IIIQ2017

0.2

IVQ2017

-0.2

IQ2018

-0.4

IIQ2018

0.0

IIIQ2018

-0.2

IVQ2018

Sources: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

The geographical breakdown of exports and imports of Japan with selected regions and countries is in Table V-5 for Mar 2019. The share of Asia in Japan’s trade is close to one-half for 52.9 percent of exports and 47.2 percent of imports. Within Asia, exports to China are 18.1 percent of total exports and imports from China 22.4 percent of total imports. While exports of Japan to China decreased 9.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019, imports from China increased 10.9 percent. The largest export market for Japan in Mar 2019 is the US with share of 19.7 percent of total exports, which is close to that of China, and share of imports from the US of 11.0 percent in total imports. Japan’s exports to the US increased 4.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019 and imports from the US decreased 0.2 percent. Western Europe has share of 12.1 percent in Japan’s exports and of 13.3 percent in imports. Rates of growth of exports of Japan in Mar 2019 are 4.4 percent for exports to the US, 1.5 percent for exports to Brazil and 1.6 percent for exports to Germany. Comparisons relative to 2011 may have some bias because of the effects of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Deceleration of growth in China and the US and threat of recession in Europe can reduce world trade and economic activity. Growth rates of imports in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019 are mixed. Imports from Asia increased 3.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2019 while imports from China increased 10.9 percent. Data are in millions of yen, which may have effects of recent depreciation of the yen relative to the United States dollar (USD) and revaluation of the dollar relative to the euro.

Table V-5, Japan, Value and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, ∆% and Millions of Yen

Mar 2019

Exports
Millions of Yen

12 months ∆%

Imports Millions of Yen

12 months ∆%

Total

7,201,317

-2.4

6,672,816

1.1

Asia

3,809,852

% Total 52.9

-5.5

3,152,174 % Total 47.2

3.9

China

1,304,610

% Total 18.1

-9.4

1,497,279 % Total 22.4

10.9

USA

1,415,747

% Total 19.7

4.4

732,188 % Total

11.0

-0.2

Canada

88,980

-12.4

96,433

-2.9

Brazil

40,052

1.5

57,586

3.2

Mexico

99,726

-9.3

54,796

-0.7

Western Europe

867,897 % Total 12.1

1.8

890,267 % Total 13.3

0.5

Germany

210,017

1.6

243,874

-7.5

France

68,867

-2.9

134,671

48.1

UK

149,526

21.6

77,818

3.6

Middle East

231,470

-14.6

771,792

-9.9

Australia

131,963

-24.1

475,712

22.3

Source: Japan, Ministry of Finance http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm

World trade projections of the IMF are in Table V-6. There is decreasing growth of the volume of world trade of goods and services from 3.8 percent in 2018 to 3.4 percent in 2019, stabilizing to 3.9 percent in 2020. Growth stabilizes at 3.8 percent on average from 2018 to 2024. World trade would be slower for advanced economies while emerging and developing economies (EMDE) experience faster growth. World economic slowdown would be more challenging with lower growth of world trade.

Table V-6, IMF, Projections of World Trade, USD Billions, USD/Barrel and Annual ∆%

2018

2019

2020

Average ∆% 2018-2024

World Trade Volume (Goods and Services)

3.8

3.4

3.9

3.8

Exports Goods & Services

3.5

3.2

3.7

3.6

Imports Goods & Services

4.1

3.6

4.0

3.9

Exports Goods & Services

G7

2.8

2.8

2.9

3.0

EMDE

4.3

4.0

4.8

4.5

Imports Goods & Services

G7

3.2

3.1

2.9

3.1

EMDE

5.6

4.6

5.3

5.1

Terms of Trade Goods & Services

G7

-0.6

-0.4

0.2

0.0

EMDE

1.3

-0.9

0.0

0.8

World Crude Oil Price $/Barrel

68.3

59.2

59.0

59.5

Crude Oil: Simple Average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate and the Dubai Fateh

Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook databank

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx

The JP Morgan Global Composite Output Index of the JP Morgan Manufacturing and Services PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and HIS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, with high association with world GDP, increased to 52.8 in Mar from 52.6 in Feb, indicating expansion at faster rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ad3d6919f4ea4a04a78c5147e4ea1319). This index has remained above the contraction territory of 50.0 during 78 consecutive months. The employment index decreased from 52.5 in Feb to 51.8 in Mar with input prices rising at faster rate, new orders increasing at faster rate and output increasing at faster rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ad3d6919f4ea4a04a78c5147e4ea1319). David Hensley, Director of Global Economic Coordination at JP Morgan, finds growth at solid pace with strength in services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ad3d6919f4ea4a04a78c5147e4ea1319). The JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and IHS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, did not change to 50.6 in Mar from 50.6 in Feb (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e5b8f6c5e26445ff8ed7a50fa4b62b10). New export orders decreased. David Hensley, Director of Global Economic Coordination at JP Morgan, finds weaker growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e5b8f6c5e26445ff8ed7a50fa4b62b10). The Markit Brazil Composite Output Index increased from 52.6 in Feb to 53.1 in Mar, indicating expansion in activity of Brazil’s private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/432bc375261e4e40ae45af3f9d4af83c). The Markit Brazil Services Business Activity index, compiled by Markit, increased from 52.2 in Feb to 52.7 in Mar indicating expanding services activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/432bc375261e4e40ae45af3f9d4af83c). Pollyanna De Lima, Principal Economist at Markit, finds improving activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/432bc375261e4e40ae45af3f9d4af83c). The HIS Markit Brazil Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ IndexTM (PMI™) decreased from 53.4 in Feb to 52.8 in Mar, indicating manufacturing above neutral 50.0 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/884e022309e64980bc98a77707afbbab). Pollyanna De Lima, Principal Economist at Markit, finds growing manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/884e022309e64980bc98a77707afbbab).

VA United States. The HIS Markit Flash US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) seasonally adjusted did not change to 52.4 in Apr from 52.4 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9fee4681de4c48fea91590204289b20d). New export orders grew. The HIS Markit Flash US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index decreased from 55.3 in Mar to 52.9 in Apr (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9fee4681de4c48fea91590204289b20d). The IHS Markit Flash US Composite PMI™ Output Index decreased from 54.6 in Mar to 52.8 in Apr (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9fee4681de4c48fea91590204289b20d). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the surveys are consistent with quarterly GDP growth at annualized around 2.0 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9fee4681de4c48fea91590204289b20d). The HIS Markit US Composite PMI™ Output Index of Manufacturing and Services decreased to 54.6 in Mar from 55.5 in Feb (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9acab8b430ff4c1c980bc0d6c54d8a53). The HIS Markit US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index decreased from 56.0 in Feb to 55.3 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9acab8b430ff4c1c980bc0d6c54d8a53). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds the indexes suggesting growth close to annualized 2.5 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9acab8b430ff4c1c980bc0d6c54d8a53). The HIS Markit US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) increased to 52.4 in Mar from 53.0 in Feb (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e29bbf8926ec4431bcf1019bfaf5fb69). New foreign orders increased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at HIS Markit, finds weaker growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e29bbf8926ec4431bcf1019bfaf5fb69). The purchasing managers’ index (PMI) of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Report on Business® increased 1.1-percentage points from 54.2 in Feb to 55.3 in Feb, Mar indicates faster growth (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/MfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=31128). The index of new export orders increased 1.0 percentage points from 51.8 in Jan to 52.8 in Feb. The Non-Manufacturing ISM Report on Business® PMI decreased 3.6 percentage points from 59.7 in Feb to 56.1 in Mar, indicating growth of business activity/production during 110 consecutive months, while the index of new orders decreased 6.2 percentage points from 65.2 in Feb to 59.0 in Mar (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/NonMfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=31129). Table USA provides the country economic indicators for the US.

Table USA, US Economic Indicators

Consumer Price Index

Mar 12 months NSA ∆%: 1.9; Ex food and energy ∆%: 2.0 Mar month SA ∆%: 0.4; Ex food and energy ∆%: 0.1
Blog 4/14/19

WIW 4/21/19

Producer Price Index

Finished Goods

Mar 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.4; ex food and energy ∆% 2.6
Mar month SA ∆% 1.4; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.1

Final Demand

Mar 12-month NSA ∆%: 2.2; ex food and energy ∆% 2.4 Mar month SA ∆% 0.6; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.3
Blog 4/14/19

WIW 4/21/19

PCE Inflation

Jan 12-month NSA ∆%: headline 1.4 ex food and energy ∆% 1.8
Blog 4/7/19

Employment Situation

Household Survey: Mar Unemployment Rate SA 3.8%
Blog calculation People in Job Stress Mar: 20.7 million NSA, 12.1% of Labor Force
Establishment Survey:
Mar Nonfarm Jobs 196,000; Private 182,000 jobs created 
Mar 12-month Average Hourly Earnings Inflation Adjusted ∆%: 1.9
Blog 4/7/19

Nonfarm Hiring

Nonfarm Hiring fell from 64.9 million in 2006 to 59.0 million in 2014 or by 5.9 million and to 63.7 million in 2016 or by 1.2 million. Nonfarm hiring increased to 68.9 million in 2018 or 4.0 million relative to 2006.
Private-Sector Hiring Feb 2019 4.436 million higher by 6.8 percent than 4.086 million in Feb 2006 while population grew 30.629 million or 13.4 percent
Blog 4/14/19

GDP Growth

BEA Revised National Income Accounts
IQ2012/IQ2011 ∆%: 2.7

IIQ2012/IIQ2011 2.4

IIIQ2012/IIIQ2011 2.5

IVQ2012/IVQ2011 1.5

IQ2013/IQ2012 1.6

IIQ2013/IIQ2012 1.3

IIIQ2013/IIIQ2012 1.9

IVQ2013/IVQ2012 2.6

IQ2014/IQ2013 1.5

IIQ2014/IIQ2013 2.6

IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013 3.0

IVQ2014/IVQ2013 2.7

IQ2015/IQ2014 3.8

IIQ2015/IIQ2014 3.4

IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014 2.4

IVQ2015/IVQ2014 2.0

IQ2016/IQ2015 1.6

IIQ2016/IIQ2015 1.3

IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015 1.5

IVQ2016/IVQ2015 1.9

IQ2017/IQ2016 1.9

IIQ2017/IIQ2016 2.1

IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016 2.3

IVQ2017/IVQ2016 2.5

IQ2018/IQ2017 2.6

IIQ2018/IIQ2017 2.9

IIIQ2018/IIIQ2017: 3.0

IVQ2018/IVQ2017 3.0

IQ2012 SAAR 3.2

IIQ2012 SAAR 1.7

IIIQ2012 SAAR 0.5

IVQ2012 SAAR 0.5

IQ2013 SAAR 3.6

IIQ2013 SAAR 0.5

IIIQ2013 SAAR 3.2

IVQ2013 SAAR 3.2

IQ2014 SAAR -1.0

IIQ2014 SAAR 5.1

IIIQ2014 SAAR 4.9

IVQ2014 SAAR 1.9

IQ2015 SAAR 3.3

IIQ2015 SAAR: 3.3

IIIQ2015 SAAR: 1.0

IVQ2015 SAAR: 0.4

IQ2016 SAAR: 1.5

IIQ2016 SAAR: 2.3

IIIQ2016 SAAR: 1.9

IVQ2016 SAAR 1.8

IQ2017 SAAR 1.8

IIQ2017 SAAR 3.0

IIIQ2017 SAAR 2.8

IVQ2017 SAAR 2.3

IQ2018 SAAR 2.2

IIQ2018 SAAR 4.2

IIIQ2018 SAAR 3.4

IVQ2018 SAAR 2.2
Blog 3/31/19

Real Private Fixed Investment

SAAR IVQ2018 ∆% 3.1 IVQ2018 to IVQ2017: 27.7% Blog 3/31/19

Corporate Profits

IVQ2018 SAAR: Corporate Profits -0.4; Undistributed Profits -3.6 Blog 3/31/19

Personal Income and Consumption

Jan month ∆% SA Real Disposable Personal Income (RDPI) SA ∆% -0.2
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (RPCE): 0.1
12-month Jan NSA ∆%:
RDPI: 3.0; RPCE ∆%: 2.3
Blog 4/7/19

Quarterly Services Report

IVQ18/IVQ17 NSA ∆%:
Information 7.3

Financial & Insurance 7.6

Earlier Data:
Blog 3/22/15

Employment Cost Index

Compensation Private IVQ2018 SA ∆%: 0.4 Dec 12 months ∆%: 3.0

Earlier Data:
Blog 2/1/15

Industrial Production

Mar month SA ∆%: -0.1
12 months SA ∆%: 2.8

Manufacturing Mar SA 0.0 ∆% Mar 12 months SA ∆% 1.0, NSA 1.1
Capacity Utilization: 78.8
Blog 4/21/19

Productivity and Costs

Nonfarm Business Productivity IVQ2018∆% SAAE 1.9; IVQ2018/IVQ2017 ∆% 1.8; Unit Labor Costs SAAE IV2018 ∆% 2.0; IVQ2018/IVQ2017 ∆%: 1.0

Blog 3/17/19

New York Fed Manufacturing Index

General Business Conditions from Mar 3.7 to Apr 10.1
New Orders: From Mar 3.0 to Apr 7.5
Blog 4/21/19

Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Index

General Index from Mar 13.7 to Apr 8.5
New Orders from Mar 1.9 to Apr 15.7
Blog 4/21/19

Manufacturing Shipments and Orders

Feb Orders SA ∆% -0.5 Ex Transport 0.3

Jan-Feb 19/Jan-Feb 17 NSA New Orders ∆% 2.4 Ex transport 1.5

Earlier data:
Blog 4/5/15

Durable Goods

Feb New Orders SA ∆%: -1.6; ex transport ∆%: 0.1
Jan-Feb 19/Jan-Feb 18 New Orders NSA ∆%: 4.4 ex transport ∆% 3.2

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/26/15

Sales of New Motor Vehicles

IIQ2018 4,500,220; IIQ2017 4,419,349. Mar 19 Total Light Vehicles NSA 1611.4 thousand decreasing 2.2% from 1647.1 thousand in Mar 2018. Mar 19 SAAR 17.5 million, Feb 19 SAAR 16.5 million, Mar 18 SAAR 17.2 million

Blog 9/9/18 12/9/18 4/7/2019

Sales of Merchant Wholesalers

Jan-Feb 2019/Jan-Feb 2018 NSA ∆%: Total 2.4; Durable Goods: 4.1; Nondurable
Goods: 0.9

EARLIER DATA:
Blog 4/12/15

Sales and Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers

Feb 19 12-M NSA ∆%: Sales Total Business 2.3; Manufacturers 3.1
Retailers 1.8; Merchant Wholesalers 1.9
Blog 4/21/19

Sales for Retail and Food Services

Jan-Mar 2019/Jan-Mar 2018 ∆%: Retail and Food Services 2.2; Retail ∆% 1.9
Blog 4/21/19

Value of Construction Put in Place

SAAR month SA Feb ∆%: 1.0 Jan-Feb 19/Jan-Feb 18 NSA: 1.4

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/5/15

Case-Shiller Home Prices

Jan 2019/Jan 2018 ∆% NSA: 10 Cities 3.2; 20 Cities: 3.6; National: 4.3
∆% Jan SA: 10 Cities 0.0; 20 Cities: 0.1
Blog 4/7/19

FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only

Jan SA ∆% 0.6;
12-month NSA ∆%: 5.6
Blog 4/7/19

New House Sales

Feb month SAAR ∆%: 4.9
Jan-Feb 2019/Jan-Feb 2018 NSA ∆%: 2.9
Blog 4/7/19

Housing Starts and Permits

Feb Starts month SA ∆% -8.7; Permits ∆%: -1.6
Jan-Feb 2019/Jan-Feb 2018 NSA ∆% Starts -8.2; Permits ∆% -1.9

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Rate of Homeownership

IVQ2018 64.8

IIIQ2018: 64.4

Blog 3/10/19

Trade Balance

Balance Jan SA -$51,149 million versus Dec -$59,900 million
Exports Jan SA ∆%: 0.9 Imports Jan SA ∆%: -2.6
Goods Exports Jan 2019/Jan 2018 NSA ∆%: 3.5
Goods Imports Jan 2019/Jan 2018 NSA ∆%: 0.5
Blog 3/31/19

Export and Import Prices

Mar 12-month NSA ∆%: Imports 0.0; Exports 0.6

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

International Terms of Trade

IVQ2018 109.130 IVQ1947 150.474

2018 108.590 1929 142.590

Blog 3/31/2019

Consumer Credit

Jan ∆% annual rate: Total 5.1; Revolving 2.9; Nonrevolving 5.9

Earlier Data:
Blog 5/10/15

Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities

Feb Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term US Securities: minus $33.1 billion
Major Holders of Treasury Securities: China $1130.9 billion; Japan $1072.4 billion; Total Foreign US Treasury Holdings Dec $6385.1 billion
Blog 4/21/19

Treasury Budget

Fiscal Year 2019/2018 ∆% Mar: Receipts 0.7; Outlays 4.9 Individual Income Taxes minus 1.7
Deficit Fiscal Year 2011 $1,300 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2012 $1,087 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2013 $680 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2014 $485 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2015 $439 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2016 $585 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2017 $665 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2018 $779 billion

Blog 3/24/19

CBO Budget and Economic Outlook

2012 Deficit $1087 B 6.8% GDP Debt $11,281 B 70.4% GDP

2013 Deficit $680 B, 4.1% GDP Debt $11,983 B 72.6% GDP

2014 Deficit $485 B 2.8% GDP Debt $12,780 B 74.1% GDP

2015 Deficit $438 B 2.4% GDP Debt $13,117 B 72.9% GDP

2016 Deficit $585 3.2% GDP Debt $14,168.4 B 76.7% GDP

2017 Deficit $665 3.5% GDP

Debt $14,665 76.5% GDP

2028 Deficit $1,526 B, 5.1 % GDP Debt $28,671 B 96.2% GDP

2048: Long-term Debt/GDP 152.0%

Blog 8/26/12 11/18/12 2/10/13 9/22/13 2/16/14 8/24/14 9/14/14 3/1/15 6/21/15 1/3/16 4/10/16 7/24/16 1/8/17 4/2/17 10/14/18

Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities

Feb 2019 SAAR ∆%: Securities 0.4 Loans 5.2 Cash Assets -27.1 Deposits 3.4

Blog 3/31/19

Flow of Funds Net Worth of Families and Nonprofits

IVQ2018 ∆ since 2007

Assets +$37,730.1 BN

Nonfinancial +$7,360.2 BN

Real estate +$5,978.2 BN

Financial +$30,369.9 BN

Net Worth +$36,173.3 BN

Net Worth IVQ2018/IIIQ2018 ∆% -3.5 Corporate Equity ∆% -14.5

Blog 3/31/19

Current Account Balance of Payments and Net International Investment Position

Current Account IVQ2018 NSA minus $138,400 MM

% GDP 2.6 SA
NIIP IVQ2018:

Minus $9,717 B

Blog 9/23/2018 2/10/2018 3/31/2019 4/7/2019

Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

Blog 4/14/19

Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades

Blog 4/21/19

IMF View

World Real Economic Growth 2019 ∆% 3.3 Blog 4/21/19

Income, Poverty and Health Insurance in the United States

43.123 Million Below Poverty in 2015, 13.5% of Population

Median Family Income CPI-2015 Adjusted $56,516 in 2015 back to 1999 Levels

Uncovered by Health Insurance 28.966 Million in 2015

Blog 9/25/16

Monetary Policy and Cyclical Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

Blog 1/7/2018

Rules versus Discretionary Authorities in Monetary Policy

Blog 1/1/2017

Links to blog comments in Table USA: 4/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

4/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html

3/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html

3/3/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html

2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html

2/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/delayed-updates-of-united-states.html

2/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html

1/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

1/13/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

1/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-fed-will-be-patient-adjusting.html

12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

12/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html

12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html

12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

12/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/monetary-policy-rates-near-normal.html

11/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html

11/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html

10/28/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html

9/30/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html

9/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

7/15/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

1/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

12/24/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html

10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html

4/2/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html

1/15/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

12/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

10/16/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html

9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html

7/24/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html

4/10/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html

1/17/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html

1/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html

10/11/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html

6/21/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html

5/10/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html

9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html

8/24/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

9/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

2/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

Table VA-1 provides the value of total sales of US business (manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers) and monthly and 12-month percentage changes. Sales of manufacturers increased 0.4 percent in Feb and decreased 0.3 percent in Jan, increasing 3.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019. Sales of retailers decreased 0.3 percent in Feb and increased 0.8 percent in Jan, increasing 1.8 percent in 12 months. Sales of merchant wholesalers increased 0.3 percent in Feb, increasing 0.5 percent in Jan and increasing 1.9 percent in 12 months. Total business sales increased 0.1 percent in Feb and increased 0.3 percent in Jan, increasing 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019.

Table VA-1, US, Percentage Changes for Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers

Feb 19/Jan 19
∆% SA

Feb 2019
Millions of Dollars NSA

Jan 19/Dec 18 ∆% SA

Feb 19/ Feb

18
∆% NSA

Total Business

0.1

1,299,943

0.3

2.3

Manufacturers

0.4

469,381

-0.3

3.1

Retailers

-0.3

391,116

0.8

1.8

Merchant Wholesalers

0.3

439,446

0.5

1.9

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-1 of the US Census Bureau provides total US sales of manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers seasonally adjusted (SA) in millions of dollars. The series with adjustment evens fluctuations following seasonal patterns. There is sharp recovery from the global recession in a robust trend, which is mixture of price and quantity effects because data are not adjusted for price changes. There is stability in the final segment with subdued prices with data not adjusted for price changes. There is recovery in the recent segment with occasional vacillation.

Chart VA-1, US, Total Business Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, SA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Feb 2019

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-2 of the US Census Bureau provides total US sales of manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers not seasonally adjusted (NSA) in millions of dollars. The series without seasonal adjustment shows sharp jagged behavior because of monthly fluctuations following seasonal patterns. There is sharp recovery from the global recession in a robust trend, which is mixture of price and quantity effects because data are not adjusted for price changes. There is stability in the final segment with monthly marginal weakness in data without adjustment for price changes with following recovery.

Chart VA-2, US, Total Business Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, NSA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Feb 2019

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Businesses added cautiously to inventories to replenish stocks. Retailers’ inventories increased 0.3 percent in Feb 2019 and increased 0.8 percent in

Jan with growth of 4.5 percent in 12 months, as shown in Table VA-2. Total business increased inventories 0.3 percent in Feb, changing 0.9 percent in Jan and increasing 5.0 percent in 12 months. Inventories sales/ratios of total business continued at a level close to 1.30 under careful management to avoid costs and risks, changing to 1.39 in Feb 2019. Inventory/sales ratios of manufacturers and retailers are higher than for merchant wholesalers. There is stability in inventory/sales ratios in individual months and relative to a year earlier with increase at the margin.

Table VA-2, US, Percentage Changes for Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers and Inventory/Sales Ratios

Inventory Change

Feb 19
Millions of Dollars NSA

Feb 19/Jan 19 ∆% SA

Jan 19/Dec 18 ∆% SA

Feb 19/Feb 18 ∆% NSA

Total Business

2,025,349

0.3

0.9

5.0

Manufacturers

691,838

0.3

0.5

3.6

Retailers

658,105

0.3

0.8

4.5

Merchant
Wholesalers

675,406

0.2

1.2

7.0

Inventory/
Sales Ratio

Feb 19
Millions of Dollars NSA

Feb 2019 SA

Jan 2018 SA

Feb 2018 SA

Total Business

2,025,349

1.39

1.39

1.36

Manufacturers

691,838

1.36

1.36

1.36

Retailers

658,105

1.48

1.47

1.45

Merchant Wholesalers

675,406

1.35

1.35

1.29

US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-3 of the US Census Bureau provides total business inventories of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers seasonally adjusted (SA) in millions of dollars from Jan 1992 to Feb 2019. The impact of the two recessions of 2001 and IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 is evident in the form of sharp reductions in inventories. Inventories have surpassed the peak before the global recession. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

Chart VA-3, US, Total Business Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, SA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Feb 2019

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-4 provides total business inventories of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers not seasonally adjusted (NSA) from Jan 1992 to Feb 2019 in millions of dollars. The recessions of 2001 and IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 are evident in the form of sharp reductions of inventories. There is sharp upward trend of inventory accumulation after both recessions. Total business inventories are higher than in the peak before the global recession.

Chart VA-4, US, Total Business Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, NSA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Feb 2019

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Inventories follow business cycles. When recession hits sales inventories pile up, declining with expansion of the economy. In a fascinating classic opus, Lloyd Meltzer (1941, 129) concludes:

“The dynamic sequences (i) through (6) were intended to show what types of behavior are possible for a system containing a sales output lag. The following conclusions seem to be the most important:

(i) An economy in which business men attempt to recoup inventory losses will always undergo cyclical fluctuations when equilibrium is disturbed, provided the economy is stable.

This is the pure inventory cycle.

(2) The assumption of stability imposes severe limitations upon the possible size of the marginal propensity to consume, particularly if the coefficient of expectation is positive.

(3) The inventory accelerator is a more powerful de-stabilizer than the ordinary acceleration principle. The difference in stability conditions is due to the fact that the former allows for replacement demand whereas the usual analytical formulation of the latter does not. Thus, for inventories, replacement demand acts as a de-stabilizer. Whether it does so for all types of capital goods is a moot question, but I believe cases may occur in which it does not.

(4) Investment for inventory purposes cannot alter the equilibrium of income, which depends only upon the propensity to consume and the amount of non-induced investment.

(5) The apparent instability of a system containing both an accelerator and a coefficient of expectation makes further investigation of possible stabilizers highly desirable.”

Chart VA-5 shows the increase in the inventory/sales ratios during the recession of 2007-2009. The inventory/sales ratio fell during the expansions. The inventory/sales ratio declined to a trough in 2011, climbed and then stabilized at current levels in 2012, 2013 and 2015 with increase into 2015-2016 and then decreasing at the margin from 2016 into 2017-2018.

Chart VA-5, Total Business Inventories/Sales Ratios 2008 to 2019

https://www.census.gov/mtis/img/mtisbrf.gif

Sales of retail and food services increased 1.6 percent in Mar 2019 after decreasing 0.2 percent in Feb 2019 seasonally adjusted (SA), growing 2.2 percent in Jan-Mar 2019 relative to Jan-Mar 2018 not seasonally adjusted (NSA), as shown in Table VA-3. Excluding motor vehicles and parts, retail sales increased 1.2 percent in Mar 2019, decreasing 0.2 percent in Feb 2019 SA and increasing 2.6 percent NSA in Jan-Mar 2019 relative to a year earlier. Sales of motor vehicles and parts increased 3.1 percent in Mar 2019 after decreasing 0.1 percent in Feb 2019 SA and increasing 1.1 percent NSA in Jan-Mar 2019 relative to a year earlier. Gasoline station sales increased 3.5 percent SA in Mar 2019 after increasing 3.5 percent in Feb 2019 in oscillating prices of gasoline that are moderating, decreasing 0.7 percent in Jan-Mar 2019 relative to a year earlier.

Table VA-3, US, Percentage Change in Monthly Sales for Retail and Food Services, ∆%

Mar ∆% SA

Feb ∆% SA

Jan-Mar 2019 Million Dollars NSA

Jan-Mar 2019 from Jan-Mar 2018 ∆% NSA

Retail and Food Services

1.6

-0.2

1,425,206

2.2

Excluding Motor Vehicles and Parts

1.2

-0.2

1,130,310

2.6

Motor Vehicles & Parts Dealers

3.1

-0.1

294,896

1.1

Retail

1.7

-0.3

1,249,152

1.9

Building Materials

0.3

-4.4

85,793

3.7

Food and Beverage

1.0

-1.9

181,035

1.4

Grocery

1.2

-2.0

163,076

1.7

Health & Personal Care Stores

0.2

0.6

86,021

3.5

Clothing & Clothing Accessories Stores

2.0

-1.8

57,053

-1.2

Gasoline Stations

3.5

3.5

114,281

-0.7

General Merchandise Stores

0.7

-0.3

163,487

1.0

Food Services & Drinking Places

0.8

0.3

176,054

4.5

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Chart VA-6 provides monthly percentage changes of sales of retail and food services. There is significant monthly volatility that prevents identification of clear trends.

Chart VA-6, US, Monthly Percentage Change of Retail and Food Services Sales, Jan 1992-Mar 2019

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Chart VA-7 of the US Census Bureau provides total sales of retail trade and food services seasonally adjusted (SA) from Jan 1992 to Mar 2019 in millions of dollars. The impact on sales of the shallow recession of 2001 was much milder than the sharp contraction in the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. There is flattening in the final segment of the series followed by another increase/decrease. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

Chart VA-7, US, Total Sales of Retail Trade and Food Services, SA, Jan 1992-Mar 2019, Millions of Dollars

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Chart VA-8 of the US Census Bureau provides total sales of retail trade and food services seasonally adjusted (NSA) from Jan 1992 to Mar 2019 in millions of dollars. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

Chart VA-8, US, Total Sales of Retail Trade and Food Services, NSA, Jan 1992-Mar 2019, Millions of Dollars

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Risk aversion channels funds toward US long-term and short-term securities that finance the US balance of payments and fiscal deficits benefitting from risk flight to US dollar denominated assets. There are now temporary interruptions because of fear of rising interest rates that erode prices of US government securities because of mixed signals on monetary policy and exit from the Fed balance sheet of four trillion dollars of securities held outright. Net foreign purchases of US long-term securities (row C in Table VA-4) strengthened from minus $19.5 billion in Jan 2019 to $33.1 billion in Feb

2019. Foreign residents’ purchases minus sales of US long-term securities (row A in Table VA-4) in Jan 2019 of minus $19.6 billion strengthened to $42.4 billion in Feb 2019. Net US (residents) purchases of long-term foreign securities (row B in Table VA-4) weakened from $12.3 billion in Jan 2019 to $9.5 billion in Feb 2019. Other transactions (row C2 in Table VA-4) changed from minus $12.3 billion in Jan 2018 to minus $18.8 billion in Feb 2019. In Feb 2019,

C = A + B + C2 = -$42.4 billion + $9.5 billion - $18.8 billion = $33.1 billion

There are minor rounding errors. There is strengthening demand in Table VA-4 in Feb 2019 in A1 private purchases by residents overseas of US long-term securities of $52.8 billion of which strengthening in A11 Treasury securities of $36.4 billion, strengthening in A12 of $13.1 billion in agency securities, strengthening of $12.2 billion of corporate bonds and strengthening of minus $9.0 billion in equities. Worldwide risk aversion causes flight into US Treasury obligations with significant oscillations. Official purchases of securities in row A2 decreased $10.4 billion with decrease of Treasury securities of $16.5 billion in Feb 2019. Official purchases of agency securities increased $9.4 billion in Feb 2019. Row D shows decrease in Feb 2019 of $11.0 billion in purchases of short-term dollar denominated obligations. Foreign holdings of US Treasury bills increased $6.6 billion (row D1) with foreign official holdings increasing $10.2 billion while the category “other” decreased $17.7 billion. Foreign private holdings of US Treasury bills decreased $3.6 billion in what could be arbitrage of duration exposures and international risks. Risk aversion of default losses in foreign securities dominates decisions to accept zero interest rates in Treasury securities with no perception of principal losses. In the case of long-term securities, investors prefer to sacrifice inflation and possible duration risk to avoid principal losses with significant oscillations

in risk perceptions.

Table VA-4, Net Cross-Borders Flows of US Long-Term Securities, Billion Dollars, NSA

Feb 2018 12 Months

Feb 2019 12 Months

Jan 2019

Feb 2019

A Foreign Purchases less Sales of
US LT Securities

470.0

56.7

-19.6

42.4

A1 Private

498.3

208.1

-6.4

52.8

A11 Treasury

172.2

192.2

12.3

36.4

A12 Agency

97.5

140.7

10.1

13.1

A13 Corporate Bonds

116.2

71.9

3.1

12.2

A14 Equities

112.5

-196.8

-31.9

-9.0

A2 Official

-28.4

-151.3

-13.1

-10.4

A21 Treasury

-80.0

-234.1

-24.3

-16.5

A22 Agency

46.6

100.5

12.9

9.4

A23 Corporate Bonds

4.3

-9.3

-2.4

-1.6

A24 Equities

0.7

-8.4

0.7

-1.7

B Net US Purchases of LT Foreign Securities

103.3

400.1

12.3

9.5

B1 Foreign Bonds

211.3

341.8

20.7

1.1

B2 Foreign Equities

-107.9

58.3

-8.4

8.3

C1 Net Transactions

573.3

456.8

-7.2

51.9

C2 Other

-196.9

-115.2

-12.3

-18.8

C Net Foreign Purchases of US LT Securities

376.3

341.6

-19.5

33.1

D Increase in Foreign Holdings of Dollar Denominated Short-term 

US Securities & Other Liab

263.1

329.1

-12.2

-11.0

D1 US Treasury Bills

71.0

12.4

-12.5

6.6

D11 Private

38.7

31.0

-7.2

-3.6

D12 Official

32.3

-18.6

-5.3

10.2

D2 Other

192.1

316.7

0.2

-17.7

C1 = A + B; C = C1+C2

A = A1 + A2

A1 = A11 + A12 + A13 + A14

A2 = A21 + A22 + A23 + A24

B = B1 + B2

D = D1 + D2

Sources: United States Treasury

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticpress.aspx

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2609.aspx

Table VA-5 provides major foreign holders of US Treasury securities. China is the largest holder with $1130.9 billion in Feb 2019, increasing 0.4 percent from $1126.7 billion in Jan 2019 while decreasing $45.8 billion from Feb 2018 or 3.9 percent. The United States Treasury estimates US government debt held by private investors at $12,881 billion in Sep 2018 (Fiscal Year 2018). China’s holding of US Treasury securities represents 8.8 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors (https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/treasBulletin/treasBulletin_home.htm). Min Zeng, writing on “China plays a big role as US Treasury yields fall,” on Jul 16, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-plays-a-big-role-as-u-s-treasury-yields-fall-1405545034?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj), finds that acceleration in purchases of US Treasury securities by China has been an important factor in the decline of Treasury yields in 2014. Japan increased its holdings from $1060.1 billion in Feb 2018 to $1072.4 billion in Feb 2019 or 1.2 percent. The combined holdings of China and Japan in Feb 2019 add to $2203.3 billion, which is equivalent to 17.1 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing securities held by investors of $12,881 billion in Sep 2018 (Fiscal Year 2018) (https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/treasBulletin/treasBulletin_home.htm). Total foreign holdings of Treasury securities increased from $6221.5 billion in Feb 2018 to $6385.1 billion in Feb 2019, or 2.6 percent. The US continues to finance its fiscal and balance of payments deficits with foreign savings (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). Professor Martin Feldstein, at Harvard University, writing on “The Debt Crisis Is Coming Soon,” published in the Wall Street Journal on Mar 20, 2019 (https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-debt-crisis-is-coming-soon-11553122139?mod=hp_opin_pos3), foresees a US debt crisis with deficits moving above $1 trillion and debt above 100 percent of GDP. A point of saturation of holdings of US Treasury debt may be reached as foreign holders evaluate the threat of reduction of principal by dollar devaluation and reduction of prices by increases in yield, including possibly risk premium. Shultz et al (2012) find that the Fed financed three-quarters of the US deficit in fiscal year 2011, with foreign governments financing significant part of the remainder of the US deficit while the Fed owns one in six dollars of US national debt. Concentrations of debt in few holders are perilous because of sudden exodus in fear of devaluation and yield increases and the limit of refinancing old debt and placing new debt. In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

Table VA-5, US, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities $ Billions at End of Period

Feb 2019

Jan 2019

Feb 2018

Total

6385.1

6334.4

6221.5

China

1130.9

1126.7

1176.7

Japan

1072.4

1070.2

1060.1

Brazil

307.7

305.1

272.9

United Kingdom

283.8

273.5

250.6

Ireland

274.1

270.2

314.2

Luxembourg

226.8

224.9

218.6

Switzerland

225.9

230.9

248.0

Cayman Islands

210.1

208.7

177.3

Hong Kong

202.4

200.8

196.6

Belgium

182.0

192.1

126.8

Saudi Arabia

167.0

162.6

150.9

Taiwan

164.9

168.3

170.7

India

144.3

144.9

152.9

Singapore

130.6

128.0

118.0

Foreign Official Holdings

4024.6

3980.0

4031.0

A. Treasury Bills

315.3

305.1

333.9

B. Treasury Bonds and Notes

3709.2

3674.9

3697.0

Source: United States Treasury

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticpress.aspx

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/index.aspx

http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt

VB Japan. The GDP of Japan grew at 1.0 percent per year on average from 1991 to 2002, with the GDP implicit deflator falling at 0.8 percent per year on average. The average growth rate of Japan’s GDP was 4 percent per year on average from the middle of the 1970s to 1992 (Ito 2004). Low growth in Japan in the 1990s is commonly labeled as “the lost decade” (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 81-115). Table VB-GDP provides yearly growth rates of Japan’s GDP from 1995 to 2018. Growth weakened from 2.7 per cent in 1995 and 3.1 percent in 1996 to contractions of 1.1 percent in 1998 and 0.3 percent in 1999. Growth rates were below 2 percent with exception of 2.8 percent in 2000 and 2.2 percent in 2004. Japan’s GDP contracted sharply by 1.1 percent in 2008 and 5.4 percent in 2009. As in most advanced economies, growth was robust at 4.2 percent in 2010 but mediocre at minus 0.1 percent in 2011 because of the tsunami and 1.5 percent in 2012. Japan’s GDP grew 2.0 percent in 2013 and nearly stagnated in 2014 at 0.4 percent. The GDP of Japan increased 1.2 percent in 2015 and 0.6 percent in 2016. Japan’s GDP increased at 1.9 percent in 2017. The GDP of Japan increased 0.8 percent in 2018. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). Japan’s real GDP in calendar year 2018 is 5.8 percent higher than in calendar year 2007 for growth at the average yearly rate of 0.5 percent. Japan’s real GDP grew 13.1 percent from the trough of 2009 to 2018 at the average yearly rate of 1.4 percent (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html).

Table VB-GDP, Japan, Yearly Percentage Change of GDP ∆%

Calendar Year

∆%

1995

2.7

1996

3.1

1997

1.1

1998

-1.1

1999

-0.3

2000

2.8

2001

0.4

2002

0.1

2003

1.5

2004

2.2

2005

1.7

2006

1.4

2007

1.7

2008

-1.1

2009

-5.4

2010

4.2

2011

-0.1

2012

1.5

2013

2.0

2014

0.4

2015

1.2

2016

0.6

2017

1.9

2018

0.8

Source: Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf) with changes on Jul 21, 2015 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 1.5 to 2.1 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food 0.2 to 1.2 to 3.3 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.2 to 1.2 percent in 2015 and 1.2 to 2.2 percent in 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was minus 0.4 percent in Mar 2014 and 2.2 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm), significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:

“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.

The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.

Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”

The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

  1. Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  2. Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
  3. Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  4. Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
  5. Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).

Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf) with changes on Feb 1, 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). On Jun 19, 2015, the Bank of Japan announced a “New Framework for Monetary Policy Meetings,” which provides for quarterly release of the forecasts of the economy and prices beginning in Jan 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/rel150619a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 0.7 to 0.7 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food of 0.0 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.0 to 0.2 percent in 2016 and 1.8 to 3.0 percent in 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was 0.1 percent in Mar 2016 and minus 0.3 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm). The CPI increased significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:

“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.

The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.

Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”

The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

  1. Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  2. Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
  3. Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  4. Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
  5. Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).
  6. Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) with Negative Nominal Interest Rate. On January 29, 2016, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan introduced a new policy to attain the “price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf). The new framework consists of three dimensions: quantity, quality and interest rate. The interest rate dimension consists of rates paid to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank of Japan of three tiers zero, positive and minus 0.1 percent. The quantitative dimension consists of increasing the monetary base at the annual rate of 80 trillion yen. The qualitative dimension consists of purchases by the Bank of Japan of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITS).
  7. Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control. The Bank of Japan introduced a new approach, QQE with Yield Curve Control (“Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control”) at its policy meeting on Sep 21, 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160921a.pdf). The policy consists of two measures. First “yield curve control” consists of controlling the long-term and short-term interest rates. The bank will fix the interest rates of policy balances held by financial institutions at the BOJ at minus 0.1 percent and will purchase Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) in the amount required to maintain the yield of the 10-year JGB at around zero percent. Second, “the inflation-overshooting commitment” consists of increasing base money to maintain the CPI price stability target above 2 percent.

Table VB-BOJF, Bank of Japan, Forecasts of the Majority of Members of the Policy Board, % Year on Year

Fiscal Year
Date of Forecast

Real GDP

CPI All Items Less Fresh Food

Excluding Effects of Consumption Tax Hikes

2013

Apr 2014

+2.2 to +2.3
[+2.2]

+0.8

Jan 2014

+2.5 to +2.9

[+2.7]

+0.7 to +0.9

[+0.7]

Oct 2013

+2.6 to +3.0

[+2.7]

+0.6 to +1.0

[+0.7]

Jul 2013

+2.5 to +3.0

[+2.8]

+0.5 to +0.8

[+0.6]

2014

Apr 2015

-1.0 to -0.8

[-0.9]

+2.8

+0.8

Jan 2015

-0.6 to -0.4

[-0.5]

+2.9 to +3.2

[+2.9]

+0.9 to +1.2

[+0.9]

Oct 2014

+0.2 to +0.7

[+0.5]

+3.1 to +3.4

[+3.2]

+1.1 to +1.4

[+1.2]

Jul 2014

+0.6 to +1.3

[+1.0]

+3.2 to +3.5

[+3.3]

+1.2 to +1.5

[+1.3]

Apr 2014

+0.8 to +1.3
[+1.1]

+3.0 to +3.5
[+3.3]

+1.0 to +1.5
[+1.3]

Jan 2014

+0.9 to 1.5

[+1.4]

+2.9 to +3.6

[+3.3]

+0.9 to +1.6

[+1.3]

Oct 2013

+0.9 to +1.5

[+1.5]

+2.8 to +3.6

[+3.3]

+0.8 to +1.6

[+1.3]

Jul 2013

+0.8 to +1.5

[+1.3]

+2.7 to +3.6

[+3.3]

+0.7 to +1.6

[+1.3]

2015

Feb 2016

+0.7 to +0.7

[+0.7]

0.0

Jan 2016

+1.0 to +1.3

[+1.1]

0.0 to 0.2

[+0.1]

Oct 2015

+0.8 to +1.4

[+1.2]

0.0 to +0.4

[+0.1

Jul 2015

+1.5 to +1.9

[+1.7]

+0.3 to +1.0

[+0.7]

Apr 2015

+1.5 to +2.1

[+2.0]

+0.2 to 1.2

[+0.8]

+0.2 to 1.2

[+0.8]

Jan 2015

+1.8 to +2.3

[+2.1]

+0.4 to +1.3

[+1.0]

+0.4 to +1.3

[+1.0]

Oct 2014

+1.2 to +1.7

[+1.5]

+1.8 to 2.6

[+2.4]

+1.1 to +1.9

[+1.7]

Jul 2014

+1.2 to +1.6

[+1.5]

+1.9 to +2.8

[+2.6]

+1.2 to +2.1

[+1.9]

Apr 2014

+1.2 to +1.5
[+1.5]

+1.9 to +2.8
[+2.6]

+1.2 to +2.1
[+1.9]

Jan 2014

+1.2 to +1.8

[+1.5]

+1.7 to +2.9

[+2.6]

+1.0 to +2.2

[+1.9]

Oct 2013

+1.3 to +1.8

[+1.5]

+1.6 to +2.9

[+2.6]

+0.9 to +2.2

[+1.9]

Jul 2013

+1.3 to +1.9 [+1.5]

+1.6 to +2.9 [+2.6]

+0.9 to +2.2 [+1.9]

2016

Apr 2017

+1.4 to +1.4

[+1.4]

-0.3

Feb 2017

+1.2 to +1.5

[+1.4]

-0.2 to -0.1

[-0.2]

Jul 2016

+0.8 to +1.0

[+1.0]

0.0 to +0.3

[0.5]

0.0 to +0.3

[0.5]

Apr 2016

+0.8 to +1.4

[+1.2]

0.0 to +0.8

[+0.5]

0.0 to +0.8

[+0.5]

Jan 2016

+1.0 to +1.7

[+1.5]

0.2 to +1.2

[+0.8]

Oct 2015

+1.2 to +1.6

[+1.4]

+0.8 to +1.5

[+1.4]

Jul 2015

+1.5 to 1.7

[+1.5]

+1.2 to +2.1

[+1.9]

Apr 2015

+1.4 to +1.8

[+1.5]

+1.2 to +2.2

[+2.0]

+1.2 to +2.2

[+2.0]

Jan 2015

+1.5 to +1.7

[+1.6]

+1.5 to +2.3

[+2.2]

+1.5 to +2.3

[+2.2]

Oct 2014

+1.0 to +1.4

[+1.2]

+1.9 to 3.0

[+2.8]

+1.2 to 2.3

[+2.1]

Jul 2014

+1.0 to +1.5

[+1.3]

+2.0 to +3.0

[+2.8]

+1.3 to +2.3

[+2.1]

Apr 2014

+1.0 to +1.5
[+1.3]

+2.0 to +3.0
[+2.8]

+1.3 to +2.3
[+2.1]

2017

Apr 2017

+1.4 to +1.6

[+1.6]

+0.6 to +1.6

[+1.4]

Feb 2017

+1.3 to +1.6

[+1.5]

+0.8 to +1.6

[+1.5]

Jul 2016

1.0 to +1.5
[+1.3]

+0.8 to +1.8
[+1.7]

+0.8 to +1.8
[+1.7]

Apr 2016

0.0 to + +0.3

[+0.1]

1.8 to +3.0

[+2.7]

0.8 to +2.0

[+1.7

Jan 2016

+0.1 to + 0.5

[+0.3]

+2.0 to +3.1

[+2.8]

+ 1.0 to +2.1

[+1.8]

Oct 2015

+0.1 to +0.5

[+0.3]

+2.5 to +3.4

[+3.1]

+1.2 to 2.1

[+1.8]

Jul 2015

+0.1 to +0.5

[+0.2]

+2.7 to +3.4

[+3.1]

+1.4 to +2.1

[+1.8]

Apr 2015

+0.1 to +0.5

[+0.2]

+2.7 to +3.4

[+3.2]

+1.4 to +2.1

[+1.9]

2018

Apr 2017

+1.1 to +1.3

[+1.3]

+0.8 to +1.9

[+1.7]

Feb 2017

+1.0 to +1.2

[+1.1]

+0.9 to +1.9

[+1.7]

Jul 2016

+0.8 to +1.0
[+0.9]

+1.0 to +2.0
[+1.9]

+1.0 to +2.0
[+1.9]

Apr 2016

+0.6 to +1.2

[+1.0]

+1.0 to +2.1

[+1.9]

+1.0 to +2.1

[+1.9]

2019

Apr 2017

+0.6 to +0.7

[+0.7]

+1.4 to +2.5

[+2.4]

+0.9 to +2.0

[+1.9]

Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members

Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan

Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members

Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140715a.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1510b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1601b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1607b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1704b.pdf

The Nikkei Flash Japan Manufacturing PMI Index™ with the Flash Japan

Manufacturing PMI™ changed from 48.9 in Mar to 49.5 in Apr

(https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/eda4895906e04f9388e00c706897537b). New export orders decreased. Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS

Markit, finds weakening conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/eda4895906e04f9388e00c706897537b).The Nikkei Composite Output PMI Index decreased from 50.7 in Feb to 50.4 in Mar, indicating slower business activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/d38c0009ceea42819aa038858338ea72). The Nikkei Business Activity Index of Services decreased to 52.0 in Mar from 52.3 in Feb (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/d38c0009ceea42819aa038858338ea72)). Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS Markit, finds continuing business activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/d38c0009ceea42819aa038858338ea72)). The Nikkei Japan Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™), seasonally adjusted, increased from 48.9 in Feb to 49.2 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/18dfc259790d4665b423e997f07c3175). New orders decreased while new foreign orders decreased. Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS Markit, finds weaker conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/18dfc259790d4665b423e997f07c3175). Table JPY provides the country data table for Japan.

Table JPY, Japan, Economic Indicators

Historical GDP and CPI

1981-2010 Real GDP Growth and CPI Inflation 1981-2010
Blog 8/9/11 Table 26

Corporate Goods Prices

Mar ∆% 0.3
12 months ∆% 1.3
Blog 4/14/19

Consumer Price Index

Feb NSA ∆% 0.0;Feb 12 months NSA ∆% 0.2
Blog 3/24/19

Real GDP Growth

IVQQ2018 ∆%: 0.5 on IIIQ2018; IVQ2018 SAAR 1.9;
∆% from quarter a year earlier: 0.3
Blog 6/16/13 8/18/13 9/15/13 11/17/13 12/15/13 2/23/14 3/16/14 5/18/14 6/15/14 8/17/14 9/14/14 11/23/14 12/14/14 2/22/15 3/15/15 5/24/15 6/14/15 8/23/15 9/13/15 11/22/15 12/13/15 2/21/16 3/13/16 5/22/16 6/12/16 8/21/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/11/16 2/19/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/11/17 8/20/17 9/10/17 11/26/17 12/17/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/17/18 8/19/18 9/16/18 11/18/18 2/17/19 3/17/19

Employment Report

Feb Unemployed 1.56 million

Change in unemployed since last year: -100 thousand
Unemployment rate: 2.3%
Blog 3/31/19

All Industry Indices

Jan month SA ∆% -0.2
12-month NSA ∆% 0.6

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/26/15

Industrial Production

Feb SA month ∆%:1.4
Feb 12-month NSA ∆% -1.0

Earlier Data:
Blog 3/29/15

Machine Orders

Total Feb ∆% 5.4

Private ∆%: -1.1 Excluding Volatile Orders minus 1.8

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Tertiary Index

Feb month SA ∆% -0.6
Feb 12 months NSA ∆% 0.9

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/26/15

Wholesale and Retail Sales

Feb 12 months:
Total ∆%: -0.8
Wholesale ∆%: -1.3
Retail ∆%: 0.4

Earlier Data:
Blog 3/29/15

Family Income and Expenditure Survey

Jan 12-month ∆% total nominal consumption 2.2, real 2.0

Earlier Data:

Blog 3/29/15

Trade Balance

Exports Mar 12 months ∆%: -2.4 Imports Mar 12 months ∆% 1.1

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/26/15

Links to blog comments in Table JPY: 4/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html

3/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html

3/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html

2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html

2/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/delayed-updates-of-united-states.html

1/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

12/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html

11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

8/26/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

8/12/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

8/5/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html

6/17/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/17/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html

9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/21/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html

6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html

5/22/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html

3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html

12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html

11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html

9/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html

08/23/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html

6/14/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html

5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

2/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html

12/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html

11/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.htm

9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html

2/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html

12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

VC China. China estimates an index of nonmanufacturing purchasing managers based on a sample of 1200 nonmanufacturing enterprises across the country (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Table CIPMNM provides this index and components. The total index increased from 55.7 in Jan 2011 to 58.0 in Mar 2012, decreasing to 53.9 in Aug 2013. The index decreased from 56.0 in Nov 2013 to 54.6 in Dec 2013, easing to 53.4 in Jan 2014. The index moved to 54.8 in Mar 2019. The index of new orders increased from 52.2 in Jan 2012 to 54.3 in Dec 2012 but fell to 50.1 in May 2013, barely above the neutral frontier of 50.0. The index of new orders stabilized at 51.0 in Nov-Dec 2013, easing to 50.9 in Jan 2014. The index of new orders moved to 52.5 in Mar 2019.

Table CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

Total Index

New Orders

Interm.
Input Prices

Subs Prices

Exp

Mar 2019

54.8

52.5

52.5

51.0

61.1

Feb

54.3

50.7

52.7

50.1

61.5

Jan

54.7

51.0

52.0

49.8

59.6

Dec 2018

53.8

50.4

50.1

47.6

60.8

Nov

53.4

50.1

50.8

49.4

60.9

Oct

53.9

50.1

54.9

51.2

60.6

Sep

54.9

51.0

55.6

51.5

60.1

Aug

54.2

50.6

54.3

50.9

61.4

Jul

54.0

51.0

53.9

52.0

60.2

Jun

55.0

50.6

53.5

51.1

60.8

May

54.9

51.0

54.2

50.6

61.0

Apr

54.8

51.1

52.7

50.6

61.5

Mar

54.6

50.1

49.9

49.3

61.1

Feb

54.4

50.5

53.2

49.9

61.2

Jan

55.3

51.9

53.9

52.6

61.7

Dec 2017

55.0

52.0

54.8

52.6

60.9

Nov

54.8

51.8

56.2

52.8

61.6

Oct

54.3

51.1

54.3

51.6

60.6

Sep

55.4

52.3

56.1

51.7

61.7

Aug

53.4

50.9

54.4

51.5

61.0

Jul

54.5

51.1

53.1

50.9

61.1

Jun

54.9

51.4

51.2

49.3

61.1

May

54.5

50.9

51.1

48.8

60.2

Apr

54.0

50.5

51.7

50.2

59.7

Mar

55.1

51.9

52.3

49.7

61.3

Feb

54.2

51.2

53.7

51.4

62.4

Jan

54.6

51.3

55.1

51.0

58.9

Dec 2016

54.5

52.1

56.2

51.9

59.5

Nov

54.7

51.8

53.5

51.4

60.7

Oct

54.0

50.9

53.7

51.5

60.6

Sep

53.7

51.4

51.7

50.1

61.1

Aug

53.5

49.8

52.6

50.4

59.4

Jul

53.9

49.9

51.4

49.5

59.5

Jun

53.7

50.8

51.6

50.6

58.6

May

53.1

49.2

51.6

49.8

57.8

Apr

53.5

48.7

52.1

49.1

59.1

Mar

53.8

50.8

51.4

49.5

59.0

Feb

52.7

48.7

50.5

48.3

59.5

Jan

53.5

49.6

49.9

47.7

58.4

Dec2015

54.4

51.7

49.0

48.2

58.3

Nov

53.6

50.2

49.3

47.7

60.0

Oct

53.1

51.2

51.2

48.8

61.1

Sep

53.4

50.2

50.8

47.9

60.0

Aug

53.4

49.6

49.6

47.8

59.7

Jul

53.9

50.1

48.9

47.4

60.0

Jun

53.8

51.3

50.6

48.7

59.7

May

53.2

49.5

52.8

50.4

60.1

Apr

53.4

49.1

50.8

48.9

60.0

Mar

53.7

50.3

50.0

48.4

58.8

Feb

53.9

51.2

52.5

51.2

58.7

Jan

53.7

50.2

47.6

46.9

59.6

Dec 2014

54.1

50.5

50.1

47.3

59.5

Nov

53.9

50.1

50.6

47.7

59.7

Oct

53.8

51.0

52.0

48.8

59.9

Sep

54.0

49.5

49.8

47.3

60.9

Aug

54.4

50.0

52.2

48.3

61.2

Jul

54.2

50.7

53.4

49.5

61.5

Jun

55.0

50.7

56.0

50.8

60.4

May

55.5

52.7

54.5

49.0

60.7

Apr

54.8

50.8

52.4

49.4

61.5

Mar

54.5

50.8

52.8

49.5

61.5

Feb

55.0

51.4

52.1

49.0

59.9

Jan

53.4

50.9

54.5

50.1

58.1

Dec 2013

54.6

51.0

56.9

52.0

58.7

Nov

56.0

51.0

54.8

49.5

61.3

Oct

56.3

51.6

56.1

51.4

60.5

Sep

55.4

53.4

56.7

50.6

60.1

Aug

53.9

50.9

57.1

51.2

62.9

Jul

54.1

50.3

58.2

52.4

63.9

Jun

53.9

50.3

55.0

50.6

61.8

May

54.3

50.1

54.4

50.7

62.9

Apr

54.5

50.9

51.1

47.6

62.5

Mar

55.6

52.0

55.3

50.0

62.4

Feb

54.5

51.8

56.2

51.1

62.7

Jan

56.2

53.7

58.2

50.9

61.4

Dec 2012

56.1

54.3

53.8

50.0

64.6

Nov

55.6

53.2

52.5

48.4

64.6

Oct

55.5

51.6

58.1

50.5

63.4

Sep

53.7

51.8

57.5

51.3

60.9

Aug

56.3

52.7

57.6

51.2

63.2

Jul

55.6

53.2

49.7

48.7

63.9

Jun

56.7

53.7

52.1

48.6

65.5

May

55.2

52.5

53.6

48.5

65.4

Apr

56.1

52.7

57.9

50.3

66.1

Mar

58.0

53.5

60.2

52.0

66.6

Feb

57.3

52.7

59.0

51.2

63.8

Jan

55.7

52.2

58.2

51.1

65.3

Notes: Interm.: Intermediate; Subs: Subscription; Exp: Business Expectations

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart CIPMNM provides China’s nonmanufacturing purchasing managers’ index. The index fell from 56.0 in Oct 2013 to 54.8 in Mar 2019.

Chart CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Table CIPMMFG provides the index of purchasing managers of manufacturing seasonally adjusted of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The general index (IPM) rose from 50.5 in Jan 2012 to 53.3 in Apr 2012, falling to 49.2 in Aug 2012, rebounding to 50.6 in Dec 2012. The index fell to 50.3 in Jul 2013, barely above the neutral frontier at 50.0, recovering to 51.4 in Nov 2013 but falling to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.5 in Jan 2014, 50.1 in Dec 2014 and 50.5 in Mar 2019. The index of new orders fell from 54.5 in Apr 2012 to 51.2 in Dec 2012. The index of new orders fell from 52.3 in Nov 2013 to 52.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.9 in Jan 2014 and moved to 50.4 in Dec 2014. The index moved to 51.6 in Mar 2019.

Table CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

IPM

PI

NOI

INV

EMP

SDEL

2019

Mar

50.5

52.7

51.6

48.4

47.6

50.2

Feb

49.2

49.5

50.6

46.3

47.5

49.8

Jan

49.5

50.9

49.6

48.1

47.8

50.1

2018

Dec

49.4

50.8

49.7

47.1

48.0

50.4

Nov

50.0

51.9

50.4

47.4

48.3

50.3

Oct

50.2

52.0

50.8

47.2

48.1

49.5

Sep

50.8

53.0

52.0

47.8

48.3

49.7

Aug

51.3

53.3

52.2

48.7

49.4

49.6

Jul

51.2

53.0

52.3

48.9

49.2

50.0

Jun

51.5

53.6

53.2

48.8

49.0

50.2

May

51.9

54.1

53.8

49.6

49.1

50.1

Apr

51.4

53.1

52.9

49.5

49.0

50.2

Mar

51.5

53.1

53.3

49.6

49.1

50.1

Feb

50.3

50.7

51.0

49.3

48.1

48.4

Jan

51.3

53.5

52.6

48.8

48.3

49.2

2017

Dec

51.6

54.0

53.4

48.0

48.5

49.3

Nov

51.8

54.3

53.6

48.4

48.8

49.5

Oct

51.6

53.4

52.9

48.6

49.0

48.7

Sep

52.4

54.7

54.8

48.9

49.0

49.3

Aug

51.7

54.1

53.1

48.3

49.1

49.3

Jul

51.4

53.5

52.8

48.5

49.2

50.1

Jun

51.7

54.4

53.1

48.6

49.0

49.9

May

51.2

53.4

52.3

48.5

49.4

50.2

Apr

51.2

53.8

52.3

48.3

49.2

50.5

Mar

51.8

54.2

53.3

48.3

50.0

50.3

Feb

51.6

53.7

53.0

48.6

49.7

50.5

Jan

51.3

53.1

52.8

48.0

49.2

49.8

2016

Dec

51.4

53.3

53.2

48.0

48.9

50.0

Nov

51.7

53.9

53.2

48.4

49.2

49.7

Oct

51.2

53.3

52.8

48.1

48.8

50.2

Sep

50.4

52.8

50.9

47.4

48.6

49.9

Aug

50.4

52.6

51.3

47.6

48.4

50.6

Jul

49.9

52.1

50.4

47.3

48.2

50.5

Jun

50.0

52.5

50.5

47.0

47.9

50.7

May

50.1

52.3

50.7

47.6

48.2

50.4

Apr

50.1

52.2

51.0

47.4

47.8

50.1

Mar

50.2

52.3

51.4

48.2

48.1

51.3

Feb

49.0

50.2

48.6

48.0

47.6

49.8

Jan

49.4

51.4

49.5

46.8

47.8

50.5

2015

Dec

49.7

52.2

50.2

47.6

47.4

50.7

Nov

49.6

51.9

49.8

47.1

47.6

50.6

Oct

49.8

52.2

50.3

47.2

47.8

50.6

Sep

49.8

52.3

50.2

47.5

47.9

50.8

Aug

49.7

51.7

49.7

48.3

47.9

50.6

Jul

50.0

52.4

49.9

48.4

48.0

50.4

Jun

50.2

52.9

50.1

48.7

48.1

50.3

May

50.2

52.9

50.6

48.2

48.2

50.9

Apr

50.1

52.6

50.2

48.2

48.0

50.4

Mar

50.1

52.1

50.2

48.0

48.4

50.1

Feb

49.9

51.4

50.4

48.2

47.8

49.9

Jan

49.8

51.7

50.2

47.3

47.9

50.2

2014

Dec

50.1

52.2

50.4

47.5

48.1

49.9

Nov

50.3

52.5

50.9

47.7

48.2

50.3

Oct

50.8

53.1

51.6

48.4

48.4

50.1

Sep

51.1

53.6

52.2

48.8

48.2

50.1

Aug

51.1

53.2

52.5

48.6

48.2

50.0

Jul

51.7

54.2

53.6

49.0

48.3

50.2

Jun

51.0

53.0

52.8

48.0

48.6

50.5

May

50.8

52.8

52.3

48.0

48.2

50.3

Apr

50.4

52.5

51.2

48.1

48.3

50.1

Mar

50.3

52.7

50.6

47.8

48.3

49.8

Feb

50.2

52.6

50.5

47.4

48.0

49.9

Jan

50.5

53.0

50.9

47.8

48.2

49.8

Dec 2013

51.0

53.9

52.0

47.6

48.7

50.5

Nov

51.4

54.5

52.3

47.8

49.6

50.6

Oct

51.4

54.4

52.5

48.6

49.2

50.8

Sep

51.1

52.9

52.8

48.5

49.1

50.8

Aug

51.0

52.6

52.4

48.0

49.3

50.4

Jul

50.3

52.4

50.6

47.6

49.1

50.1

Jun

50.1

52.0

50.4

47.4

48.7

50.3

May

50.8

53.3

51.8

47.6

48.8

50.8

Apr

50.6

52.6

51.7

47.5

49.0

50.8

Mar

50.9

52.7

52.3

47.5

49.8

51.1

Feb

50.1

51.2

50.1

49.5

47.6

48.3

Jan

50.4

51.3

51.6

50.1

47.8

50.0

Dec 2012

50.6

52.0

51.2

47.3

49.0

48.8

Nov

50.6

52.5

51.2

47.9

48.7

49.9

Oct

50.2

52.1

50.4

47.3

49.2

50.1

Sep

49.8

51.3

49.8

47.0

48.9

49.5

Aug

49.2

50.9

48.7

45.1

49.1

50.0

Jul

50.1

51.8

49.0

48.5

49.5

49.0

Jun

50.2

52.0

49.2

48.2

49.7

49.1

May

50.4

52.9

49.8

45.1

50.5

49.0

Apr

53.3

57.2

54.5

48.5

51.0

49.6

Mar

53.1

55.2

55.1

49.5

51.0

48.9

Feb

51.0

53.8

51.0

48.8

49.5

50.3

Jan

50.5

53.6

50.4

49.7

47.1

49.7

IPM: Index of Purchasing Managers; PI: Production Index; NOI: New Orders Index; EMP: Employed Person Index; SDEL: Supplier Delivery Time Index

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

China estimates the manufacturing index of purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 820 enterprises (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Chart CIPMMFG provides the manufacturing index of purchasing managers. The index fell to 50.1 in Jun 2013. The index decreased from 51.4 in Nov 2013 to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index moved to 50.5 in Mar 2019.

Chart CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Chart CIPCOMP provides China’s composite, manufacturing and nonmanufacturing, index. The index remains above the neutral 50.0, moving to 54.0 in Mar 2019.

Chart CIPCOMP, China, Composite Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Growth of China’s GDP in IVQ2018 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.4 percent and cumulative growth to IVQ2018 was 6.6 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 40.7 percent of cumulative GDP in IVQ2018. Tertiary industry accounts for 52.2 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2018 and primary industry for 7.2 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. The bottom block of Table VC-GDP provides quarter-on-quarter growth rates of GDP and their annual equivalent. China’s GDP growth decelerated significantly from annual equivalent 10.0 percent in IQ2011 to 6.1 percent in IVQ2011 and 7.8 percent in IQ2012, rebounding to 8.7 percent in IIQ2012, 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012 and 8.2 percent in IVQ2012. Annual equivalent growth in IQ2013 eased to 7.8 percent and to 7.4 percent in IIQ2013, rebounding to 8.7 percent in IIIQ2013. Annual equivalent growth was 6.6 percent in IVQ2013, stabilizing to 7.4 percent in IQ2014 and to 7.4 percent in IIQ2014. Annual equivalent growth stabilized at 7.4 percent in IIIQ2014 and 7.0 percent in IVQ2014. Growth moved to annual equivalent 7.0 percent in IQ2015, 7.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2015. Growth slowed to 6.1 percent in annual equivalent in IVQ2015 and 5.7 percent in IQ2016. Growth increased to annual equivalent 7.8 percent in IIQ2016 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2016, decreasing to 6.6 percent in IVQ2016. Growth decelerated to annual equivalent 6.1 percent in IQ2017, accelerating to 7.4 percent in IIQ2017 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2017. Growth decelerated to 6.6 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2017. Growth decelerated to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IQ2018, accelerating to 7.0 percent in IIQ2018. Growth decelerated to annual equivalent 6.6 percent in IIIQ2018, decelerating to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2018.

Table VC-GDP China, Quarterly Growth of GDP, Current CNY 100 Million and Inflation Adjusted ∆%

Cumulative GDP IIIQ2018

Value Current CNY Billion IVQ2018

Value Current CNY Billion IQ2018 to IVQ2018

IIIQ2018 Year-on-Year Constant Prices ∆%

Cumulative to IVQ2018

∆%

GDP

25,359.9

90,030.9

6.4

6.6

Primary Industry

2,493.4

6,473.4

3.5

3.5

Secondary Industry

10,417.8

36,600.1

5.8

5.8

Tertiary Industry

12,448.6

46,957.5

7.4

7.6

Growth in Quarter Relative to Prior Quarter

∆% on Prior Quarter

∆% Annual Equivalent

∆% Year-on-Year

2018

IVQ2018

1.5

6.1

6.4

IIIQ2018

1.6

6.6

6.5

IIQ2018

1.7

7.0

6.7

IQ2018

1.5

6.1

6.8

2017

IVQ2017

1.6

6.6

6.7

IIIQ2017

1.7

7.0

6.7

IIQ2017

1.8

7.4

6.8

IQ2017

1.5

6.1

6.8

2016

IVQ2016

1.6

6.6

6.8

IIIQ2016

1.7

7.0

6.7

IIQ2016

1.9

7.8

6.7

IQ2016

1.4

5.7

6.7

2015

IVQ2015

1.5

6.1

6.8

IIIQ2015

1.7

7.0

6.9

IIQ2015

1.8

7.4

7.0

IQ2015

1.7

7.0

7.0

2014

IVQ2014

1.7

7.0

7.2

IIIQ2014

1.8

7.4

7.1

IIQ2014

1.8

7.4

7.5

IQ2014

1.8

7.4

7.4

2013

IVQ2013

1.6

6.6

7.7

IIIQ2013

2.1

8.7

7.9

IIQ2013

1.8

7.4

7.6

IQ2013

1.9

7.8

7.9

2012

IVQ2012

2.0

8.2

8.1

IIIQ2012

1.8

7.4

7.5

IIQ2012

2.1

8.7

7.6

IQ2012

1.9

7.8

8.1

2011

IVQ2011

1.5

6.1

8.8

IIIQ2011

1.9

7.8

9.4

IIQ2011

2.4

10.0

10.0

IQ2011

2.4

10.0

10.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Growth of China’s GDP in IVQ2018 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.4 percent and cumulative growth to IVQ2018 was 6.6 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 40.7 percent of cumulative GDP in IVQ2018. Tertiary industry accounts for 52.2 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2018 and primary industry for 7.2 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. Table VC-GDPA shows that growth decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 and 11.2 percent in IIQ2010 to 7.9 percent in IQ2013, 7.6 percent in IIQ2013 and 7.9 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP grew 7.7 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 1.6 percent relative to IIIQ2013, which is equivalent to 6.6 percent per year. GDP grew 7.4 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent in IQ2014 that is equivalent to 7.4 percent per year. GDP grew 7.5 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is annual equivalent 7.4 percent. In IIIQ2014, GDP grew 7.1 percent relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is 7.4 percent in annual equivalent. GDP grew 1.7 percent in IVQ2014, which is 7.0 percent in annual equivalent and 7.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2015, GDP grew 1.7 percent, which is equivalent to 7.0 in a year and 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent in a year, and grew 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year, and grew 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IVQ2015, which is equivalent to 6.1 percent in a year and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, GDP grew at 1.4 percent, which is equivalent to 5.7 percent in a year, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.9 percent in IIQ2016, which is annual equivalent to 7.8 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, GDP grew at 1.6 percent, equivalent to 6.6 percent in a year, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 6.8 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased at 1.5 percent, which is 6.1 percent in annual equivalent. In IIQ2017, GDP grew at 1.8 percent, which is annual equivalent at 7.4 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017, which is annual equivalent at 7.0 percent, and increased at 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, GDP grew 1.6 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.6 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is annual equivalent to 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.6 percent in IIIQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, GDP grew at 1.5 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier.

Table VC-GDPA China, Growth Rate of GDP, ∆% Relative to a Year Earlier and ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

IQ2018

IIQ2018

IIIQ2018

IVQ2018

GDP

6.8

6.7

6.5

6.4

Primary Industry

3.2

3.2

3.6

3.5

Secondary Industry

6.3

6.0

5.3

5.8

Tertiary Industry

7.5

7.8

7.9

7.4

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.5

(6.1)

1.7

(7.0)

1.6

(6.6)

1.5

(6.1)

IQ2017

IIQ2017

IIIQ2017

IVQ2017

GDP

6.8

6.8

6.7

6.8

Primary Industry

3.0

3.8

3.9

4.4

Secondary Industry

6.4

6.4

6.0

5.7

Tertiary Industry

7.7

7.6

8.0

8.3

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.5

(6.1)

1.8

(7.4)

1.7

(7.0)

1.6

(6.6)

IQ2015

IIQ2015

IIIQ2015

IVQ2015

IQ2016

IIQ2016

IIIQ2016

IVQ2016

GDP

7.0

7.0

6.9

6.8

6.7

6.7

6.7

6.8

Primary Industry

3.2

3.5

3.8

4.1

2.9

3.1

3.5

2.9

Secondary Industry

6.4

6.1

6.0

6.1

5.8

6.3

6.1

6.1

Tertiary Industry

7.9

8.4

8.4

8.2

7.6

7.5

7.6

8.3

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.7

(7.0)

1.8

(7.4)

1.7

(7.0)

1.5

(6.1)

1.4

(5.7)

1.9

(7.8)

1.7

(7.0)

1.6

(6.6)

IQ 2013

IIQ 2013

IIIQ 2013

IVQ 2013

IQ

2014

IIQ 2014

IIIQ 2014

IVQ

2014

GDP

7.9

7.6

7.9

7.7

7.4

7.5

7.1

7.2

Primary Industry

3.4

3.0

3.4

4.0

3.5

3.9

4.2

4.1

Secondary Industry

7.8

7.6

7.8

7.8

7.3

7.4

7.4

7.3

Tertiary Industry

8.3

8.3

8.4

8.3

7.1

8.0

7.9

8.1

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.9

(7.8)

1.8

(7.4)

2.1

(8.7)

1.6

(6.6)

1.8

(7.4)

1.8

(7.4)

1.8

(7.4)

1.7

(7.0)

IQ 2011

IIQ 2011

IIIQ 2011

IVQ 2011

IQ 

2012

IIQ 2012

IIIQ 2012

IVQ 2012

GDP

10.2

10.0

9.4

8.8

8.1

7.6

7.5

8.1

Primary Industry

3.5

3.2

3.8

4.5

3.8

4.3

4.2

4.5

Secondary Industry

11.1

11.0

10.8

10.6

9.1

8.3

8.1

8.1

Tertiary Industry

9.1

9.2

9.0

8.9

7.5

7.7

7.9

8.1

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

2.4

(10.0)

2.4

(10.0)

1.9

(7.8)

1.5

(6.1)

1.9

(7.8)

2.1

(8.7)

1.8

(7.4)

2.0

(8.2)

IQ 2010

IIQ 2010

IIIQ 2010

IVQ 2010

GDP

12.1

11.2

10.7

12.1

Primary Industry

3.8

3.6

4.0

3.8

Secondary Industry

14.5

13.3

12.6

14.5

Tertiary Industry

10.5

9.9

9.7

10.5

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Growth of China’s GDP in IVQ2016 relative to the same period in 2016 was 6.8 percent and

Chart VC-GDP of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides annual value and growth rates of GDP. China’s GDP growth in 2016 is still high at 6.7 percent but at the lowest rhythm in five years.

Chart VC-GDP, China, Gross Domestic Product, Million Yuan and ∆%

Source: National bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart VC-FXR provides China’s foreign exchange reserves. FX reserves grew from $2399.2 billion in 2009 to $38430 billion in 2013 driven by high growth of China’s trade surplus, decreasing to $30105 billion in 2016.

Chart VC-FXR, China, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2012-2016

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Chart VC-Trade provides China’s imports and exports. Exports exceeded imports with resulting large trade balance surpluses that increased foreign exchange reserves.

Chart VC-Trade, China, Imports and Exports of Goods, 2012-2016, $100 Million US Dollars

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Chart VC-PCDI provides the level and growth rates of per capita disposable income in China.

Chart VC-PCDI, China, Level and Growth Rates of Per Capita Disposable Income

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

The Caixin Flash China General Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) compiled by Markit (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727) is mixed. The overall Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing PMI™ decreased from 47.3 in Aug to 47.0 in Sep, while the Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing Output Index decreased from 46.4 in Aug to 45.7 in Sep, indicating weaker conditions. He Fan, Chief Economist at Caixin Insight Group finds need of fiscal and monetary policy (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727). The Caixin China General Services PMI™, compiled by Markit, shows that the Caixin Composite Output, combining manufacturing and services, increased from 50.7 in Feb to 52.9 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/081f0e16fa8142de82d5e0a32849de17). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds faster services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/081f0e16fa8142de82d5e0a32849de17). The Caixin General Manufacturing PMI™ increased to 50.8 in Mar from 49.9 in Feb, indicating improving conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e84d001aabf0487a8c0649852c821bc8). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds improving conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e84d001aabf0487a8c0649852c821bc8). Table CNY provides the country data table for China.

Table CNY, China, Economic Indicators

Price Indexes for Industry

Mar 12-month ∆%: 0.4

Mar month ∆%: 0.1
Blog 4/14/19

Consumer Price Index

Mar 12-month ∆%: 2.3 Mar month ∆%: -0.4
Blog 4/14/19

Value Added of Industry

Mar month ∆%: 1.00

Jan-Mar 2019/Jan-Mar 2018 ∆%: 6.5

Earlier Data
Blog 4/19/15

GDP Growth Rate

Year-on-Year IVQ2018 ∆%: 6.4

IV Quarter 2018 ∆%: 1.5
Quarter IVQ2018 AE ∆%: 6.1
Blog 2/17/19

Investment in Fixed Assets

Total Jan-Mar 2019 ∆%: 6.3

Real estate development: 11.8

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Retail Sales

Mar month ∆%: 0.91
Jan-Mar 2019 ∆%: 8.3

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Trade Balance

Mar 2019 Balance 32.64 billion

Mar 2018 -$5.77 billion

Exports 12M ∆% 14.2

Imports 12M ∆% -7.6

Dec 2018 balance 57.06 billion
Exports 12M ∆% -4.4
Imports 12M ∆% -7.6

Dec 2017 balance $53.85 billion

2018 Exports ∆% 9.9

2018 Imports ∆% 15.8

2017 Exports ∆% 7.9

2017 Imports ∆% 15.9

2016 Exports ∆% 11.3

2016 Imports ∆% 17.3

Cumulative Dec 2018: $351.76

Cumulative Dec 2017: $422.50 billion

Cumulative Dec 2016: $486.0

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table CNY: 4/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

2/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html

2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html

11/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

VD Euro Area. Using calendar and seasonally adjusted chain-linked volumes (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of the euro area (19 countries) fell 5.7 percent from IQ2008 to IIQ2009. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) increased 13.8 percent from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) is higher by 7.2 percent in IVQ2018 relative to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008, growing at annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. The GDP of the euro area (18) countries increased at the average yearly rate of 2.3 percent from IQ1999 to IQ2008 while that of the euro area (19 countries) increased at 2.3 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) grew at 2.3 percent annual equivalent from IQ1999 to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008. Table VD-EUR provides yearly growth rates of the combined GDP of the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro area since 1999. Growth was very strong at 3.2 percent in 2006 and 3.0 percent in 2007. The global recession had strong impact with growth of only 0.4 percent in 2008 and decline of 4.5 percent in 2009. Recovery was at lower growth rates of 2.1 percent in 2010 and 1.5 percent in 2011. EUROSTAT estimates growth of GDP of the euro area of minus 0.9 percent in 2012 and minus 0.3 percent in 2013. Euro Area GDP grew 1.2 percent in 2014 and grew 2.0 percent in 2015. The GDP of the euro area grew 1.7 percent in 2016.

Table VD-EUR, Euro Area, Yearly Percentage Change of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, Unemployment and GDP ∆%

Year

HICP ∆%

Unemployment
%

GDP ∆%

1999

1.2

9.7

3.0

2000

2.2

8.9

3.8

2001

2.4

8.3

2.1

2002

2.3

8.6

1.0

2003

2.1

9.1

0.7

2004

2.2

9.3

2.3

2005

2.2

9.1

1.7

2006

2.2

8.4

3.2

2007

2.2

7.5

3.0

2008

3.3

7.6

0.4

2009

0.3

9.6

-4.5

2010

1.6

10.2

2.1

2011

2.7

10.2

1.5

2012

2.5

11.4

-0.9

2013

1.3

12.0

-0.3

2014

0.4

11.6

1.2

2015

0.0

10.9

2.0

2016

0.2

10.0

1.7

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

The GDP of the euro area in 2015 in current US dollars in the dataset of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is $11,990.9 billion or 16.3 percent of world GDP of $73,598.8 billion (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx). The sum of the GDP of France $2420.2 billion with the GDP of Germany of $3365.3 billion, Italy of $1815.8 billion and Spain $1199.7 billion is $8,801.0 billion or 73.4 percent of total euro area GDP and 13.1 percent of World GDP. The four largest economies account for slightly more than three quarters of economic activity of the euro area. Table VD-EUR1 is constructed with the dataset of EUROSTAT, providing growth rates of the euro area as a whole and of the largest four economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain annually from 1996 to 2016. The impact of the global recession on the overall euro area economy and on the four largest economies was quite strong. There was sharp contraction in 2009 and growth rates have not rebounded to earlier growth with exception of Germany in 2010 and 2011.

Table VD-EUR1, Euro Area, Real GDP Growth Rate, ∆%

Euro Area

Germany

France

Italy

Spain

2016

1.7

1.9

1.2

0.9

3.2

2015

2.0

1.7

1.3

0.8

3.2

2014

1.2

1.6

0.6

0.1

1.4

2013

-0.3

0.5

0.6

-1.7

-1.7

2012

-0.9

0.5

0.2

-2.8

-2.9

2011

1.5

3.7

2.1

0.6

-1.0

2010

2.1

4.1

2.0

1.7

0.0

2009

-4.5

-5.6

-2.9

-5.5

-3.6

2008

0.4

1.1

0.2

-1.1

1.1

2007

3.0

3.3

2.4

1.5

3.8

2006

3.2

3.7

2.4

2.0

4.2

2005

1.7

0.7

1.6

0.9

3.7

2004

2.3

1.2

2.8

1.6

3.2

2003

0.7

-0.7

0.8

0.2

3.2

2002

1.0

0.0

1.1

0.2

2.9

2001

2.1

1.7

2.0

1.8

4.0

2000

3.8

3.0

3.9

3.7

5.3

1999

3.0

2.0

3.4

1.6

4.5

1998

2.9

2.0

3.6

1.6

4.3

Average 1999-2016

1.2

1.3

1.3

0.3

1.7

Average 1999-2007

2.2

1.6

2.1

1.5

3.8

Average 2016-2007

0.3

1.0

0.6

-7.0*

-0.5*

1997

2.6

1.8

2.3

1.8

3.7

1996

1.6

0.8

1.4

1.3

2.7

Note: Absolute percentage change

Source: EUROSTAT

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

The Flash Eurozone PMI Composite Output Index of the HIS Markit Flash Eurozone PMI®, combining activity in manufacturing and services, decreased from 51.6 in Mar to 51.3 in Apr (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5e809b959ac94d7d90cbdb6569dae3e2). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the Markit Flash Eurozone PMI index suggests GDP growth about 0.2 percent quarterly with decline of manufacturing and weak growth of services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5e809b959ac94d7d90cbdb6569dae3e2). The IHS Markit Eurozone PMI® Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing activity with close association with GDP decreased from 51.9 in Feb to 51.6 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b738d4f7246a47388e3f837285b8cbba). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds slower potential for growth at 0.2 percent in GDP in Feb after at 0.1 percent in Jan (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b738d4f7246a47388e3f837285b8cbba). The IHS Markit Eurozone Services Business Activity Index increased from 52.8 in Feb to 53.3 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b738d4f7246a47388e3f837285b8cbba). The IHS Markit Eurozone Manufacturing PMI® decreased from 49.3 in Feb to 47.5 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/feec34453d624bf6888a8841055e6954). New export orders decreased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds manufacturing declining at 1 percent quarterly (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/feec34453d624bf6888a8841055e6954). Table EUR provides the data table for the euro area.

Table EUR, Euro Area Economic Indicators

GDP

IVQ2018 ∆% 0.2; IVQ2018/IVQ2017 ∆% 1.1 Blog 9/13/15 11/22/15 12/13/15 2/14/16 3/13/16 5/1/16 5/15/16 6/12/16 8/7/16 8/14/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/11/16 02/26/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/11/17 8/20/17 9/10/17 11/26/17 12/10/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/10/18 8/19/18 9/16/18 11/18/18 12/16/18 3/10/19

Unemployment 

Feb 2019: 7.8 % unemployment rate; Feb 2019: 12.730 million unemployed

Blog 4/7/19

HICP

Mar month ∆%: 1.0

12 months Mar ∆%: 1.4
Blog 3/24/19

Producer Prices

Euro Zone industrial producer prices Feb ∆%: 0.1
Feb 12-month ∆%: 3.0
Blog 4/7/19

Industrial Production

Feb Month ∆%: -0.2; 12 months ∆%: --0.3

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Retail Sales

Feb month ∆%: 0.4
Feb 12 months ∆%: 2.8

Earlier Data:
Blog 3/15/15

Confidence and Economic Sentiment Indicator

Sentiment 105.5 Mar 2019

Consumer -7.2 Mar 2019

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/5/15

Trade

Jan-Feb 2019/Jan-Feb 2018 Exports ∆%: 3.4
Imports ∆%: 3.6

Feb 2019 12-month Exports ∆% 4.4 Imports ∆% 4.0

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table EUR: 4/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

3/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html

2/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/delayed-updates-of-united-states.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

1/13/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

12/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html

12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html

12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

8/12/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

8/5/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html

6/10/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

5/20/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/11/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html

11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html

6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html

3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

VE Germany. The Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis) is updating GDP calculations (https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_299_811.html): “As every year in August, new statistical information was incorporated in the calculations of results for the last four years (from 2014) and for the first quarter of 2018 (see table "Comparison between previous and new figures: gross domestic product, price-adjusted, chain-linked") in the context of the first calculation of data for the second quarter of 2018. As is usual for seasonally and calendar-adjusted series, modified results may also appear in the whole time series from 1991 onwards.” Table VE-DE provides yearly growth rates of the German economy from 1971 to 2018, price adjusted chain-linked and price and calendar-adjusted chain-linked. Germany’s GDP fell 5.6 percent in 2009 after growing below trend at 1.1 percent in 2008. Recovery has been robust in contrast with other advanced economies. The German economy grew at 4.1 percent in 2010, 3.7 percent in 2011 and 0.5 percent in 2012. Growth stabilized to 0.5 percent in 2013, increasing to 2.2 percent in 2014. The German economy grew at 1.7 percent in 2015 and grew at 2.2 percent in 2016. Germany’s GDP increased 2.2 percent in 2017 and increased 1.5 percent in 2018.

The Federal Statistical Agency of Germany analyzes the fall and recovery of the German economy (http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/Inlandsprodukt/Aktuell,templateId=renderPrint.psml):

“The German economy again grew strongly in 2011. The price-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 3.0% compared with the previous year. Accordingly, the catching-up process of the German economy continued during the second year after the economic crisis. In the course of 2011, the price-adjusted GDP again exceeded its pre-crisis level. The economic recovery occurred mainly in the first half of 2011. In 2009, Germany experienced the most serious post-war recession, when GDP suffered a historic decline of 5.1%. The year 2010 was characterised by a rapid economic recovery (+3.7%).”

Table VE-DE, Germany, GDP ∆% on Prior Year

Price Adjusted Chain-Linked

Price- and Calendar-Adjusted Chain Linked

Average ∆% 1991-2017

1.4

Average ∆% 1991-1999

1.5

Average ∆% 2000-2007

1.4

Average ∆% 2003-2007

2.2

Average ∆% 2007-2017

1.2

Average ∆% 2009-2017

2.1

2018

1.4

1.5

2017

2.2

2.5

2016

2.2

2.2

2015

1.7

1.5

2014

2.2

2.2

2013

0.5

0.6

2012

0.5

0.7

2011

3.7

3.7

2010

4.1

3.9

2009

-5.6

-5.6

2008

1.1

0.8

2007

3.3

3.4

2006

3.7

3.9

2005

0.7

0.9

2004

1.2

0.7

2003

-0.7

-0.7

2002

0.0

0.0

2001

1.7

1.8

2000

3.0

3.2

1999

2.0

1.8

1998

2.0

1.8

1997

1.8

1.9

1996

0.8

0.9

1995

1.7

1.8

1994

2.5

2.5

1993

-1.0

-1.0

1992

1.9

1.5

1991

5.1

5.2

1990

5.3

5.5

1989

3.9

4.0

1988

3.7

3.4

1987

1.4

1.3

1986

2.3

2.3

1985

2.3

2.6

1984

2.8

2.9

1983

1.6

1.5

1982

-0.4

-0.5

1981

0.5

0.6

1980

1.4

1.3

1979

4.2

4.3

1978

3.0

3.1

1977

3.3

3.5

1976

4.9

4.5

1975

-0.9

-0.9

1974

0.9

1.0

1973

4.8

5.0

1972

4.3

4.3

1971

3.1

3.0

1970

NA

NA

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Destatis)

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economy/Nationalaccounts-domesticproduct/nationalaccountsdomesticproduct_node.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/NationalAccounts.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/DomesticProduct/CurrentRevision.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Methods/NationalAccountRevision/Revision2014_BackgroundPaper.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/02/PE14_048_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/08/PE13_278_811.html https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/11/PE13_381_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/01/PE14_016_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressekonferenzen/2014/BIP2013/Pressebroschuere_BIP2013.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/05/PE14_167_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/09/PE14_306_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/11/PE14_401_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/02/PE15_048_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/02/PE15_61_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/05/PE15_173_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/05/PE15_187_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/08/PE15_293_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/08/PE15_305_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/11/PE15_419_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/11/PE15_430_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/DomesticProduct/DomesticProduct.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/02/PE16_056_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/02/PE16_044_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/05/PE16_162_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/05/PE16_171_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_279_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_291_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/11/PE16_403_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/11/PE16_413_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_050_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_062_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/05/PE17_155_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/05/PE17_169_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/08/PE17_277_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/08/PE17_294_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/11/PE17_422_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/02/PE18_044_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/05/PE18_168_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/02/PE18_058_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/05/PE18_182_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_299_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_316_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/11/PE18_440_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/11/PE18_454_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/NationalAccounts.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economy/Nationalaccounts-domesticproduct/nationalaccountsdomesticproduct_node.html

The Flash Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Flash Germany PMI®, combining manufacturing and services, increased from 51.4 in Mar to 52.1 in Apr. The index of manufacturing output reached 45.6 in Apr, increasing from 43.9 in Mar, while the index of services increased to 55.6 in Apr from 55.4 in Mar. The overall Flash Germany Manufacturing PMI® increased from 44.1 in Mar to 44.5 in Apr (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c19579a15da64b6989f9d558bd4e9744). New orders decreased and new export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weakening manufacturing of Germany with strength in services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c19579a15da64b6989f9d558bd4e9744). The IHS Markit Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Germany Services PMI®, combining manufacturing and services with close association with Germany’s GDP, decreased from 52.8 in Feb to 51.4 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/39fe540909004e65b2fe056a6ea2f176). Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds growth of Germany (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/39fe540909004e65b2fe056a6ea2f176). The Germany Services Business Activity Index increased from 55.3 in Feb to 55.4 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/39fe540909004e65b2fe056a6ea2f176). The IHS Markit/BME Germany Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), showing close association with Germany’s manufacturing conditions, decreased from 47.6 in Feb to 44.1 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6fe0fb6d2c07407cbd35e8632cf1e0da). New export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6fe0fb6d2c07407cbd35e8632cf1e0da). Table DE provides the country data table for Germany.

Table DE, Germany, Economic Indicators

GDP

IVQ2018 0.0 ∆%; IVQ2018/IVQ2017 NCSA ∆% 0.9 CA 0.6

2016/2015: 2.2 CA 2.2

2017/2016: 2.2 CA 2.5

GDP ∆% 1970-2017

Blog 8/26/12 5/27/12 11/25/12 2/24/13 5/19/13 5/26/13 8/18/13 8/25/13 11/17/13 11/24/13 1/26/14 2/16/14 3/2/14 5/18/14 5/25/14 8/17/14 9/7/14 11/16/14 11/30/14 2/15/15 3/1/15 5/17/15 5/24/15 8/16/15 8/30/15 11/22/15 11/29/15 2/14/16 2/28/16 5/15/16 5/29/16 8/14/16 8/28/16 11/20/16 11/27/16 2/19/17 02/26/17 05/14/17 5/28/17 8/20/17 8/27/17 11/26/17 2/18/18 2/25/18 5/20/18 5/27/18 8/19/18 9/2/18 11/18/18 11/25/18 4/14/19

Consumer Price Index

Mar month NSA ∆%: 0.4
Mar 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.3
Blog 1/20/19 4/14/19

Producer Price Index

Feb month ∆%: -0.1 NSA, minus 0.2 CSA
12-month NSA ∆%: 2.6
Blog 3/17/19

Industrial Production

MFG Feb month CSA ∆%: minus -1.1
12-month NSA: NA

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

Machine Orders

MF Feb month ∆%: -4.2
Feb 12-month ∆%: -8.4

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

Retail Sales

Dec Month ∆% 4.3 Nov 1.6

12-Month Dec ∆% -2.1 Nov 1.9

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/5/15

Employment Report

Unemployment Rate SA Jan 3.1%
Blog 3/31/19

Trade Balance

Exports Feb 12-month NSA ∆%: 3.9
Imports Feb 12 months NSA ∆%: 5.1
Exports Feb month CSA ∆%: -1.3; Imports Feb month CSA -1.6

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/12/15

Links to blog comments in Table DE: 4/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html

3/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

2/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html

2/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/delayed-updates-of-united-states.html

1/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

1/13/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

12/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html

12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html

12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

11/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html

11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html

9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html

5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

5/14/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

02/19/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html

11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html

8/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/and-as-ever-economic-outlook-is.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html

11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html

08/30/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuations-of-global-financial.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

9/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/competitive-monetary-policy-and.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

1/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html

11/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html

8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

VF France. Table VF-FR provides growth rates of GDP of France with the estimates of Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE). The long-term rate of GDP growth of France from IVQ1949 to IBQ2018 is quite high at 3.1 percent. France’s growth rates were quite high in the four decades of the 1950s, 1960, 1970s and 1980s with an average growth rate of 4.0 percent compounding the average rates in the decades and discounting to one decade. The growth impulse diminished with 2.0 percent in the 1990s and 1.8 percent from 2000 to 2007. The average growth rate from 2000 to 2018, using fourth quarter data, is 1.2 percent because of the sharp impact of the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in US fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in the G7 in Japan and France in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Lucas (2011May) compares growth of the G7 economies (US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada) and Spain, finding that catch-up growth with earlier rates for the US and UK stalled in the 1970s.

Table VF-FR, France, Average Growth Rates of GDP Fourth Quarter, 1949-2016

Period

Average ∆%

1949-2018

3.1

2007-2018****

0.8

2007-2017***

0.8

2007-2016**

0.6

2007-2015*

0.5

2007-2014

0.4

2000-2018

1.2

2000-2017

1.2

2000-2016

1.1

2000-2015

1.1

2000-2014

1.1

2000-2007

1.8

1990-1999

2.0

1980-1989

2.6

1970-1979

3.7

1960-1969

5.7

1950-1959

4.2

*IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 **IVQ2007 to IVQ2016 ***IVQ2007 to IVQ2017 ****IVQ2007 to IVQ2018

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3735081

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3704845

http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312

The IHS Markit Flash France Composite Output Index increased from 48.9 in Mar to 50.0 in Apr (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/05de0e64420c4a9dbdea2e9c7c66ab30). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit, finds stabilizing activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/05de0e64420c4a9dbdea2e9c7c66ab30). The IHS Markit France Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing with close association with French GDP, decreased from 50.4 in Feb to 48.9 in Mar, indicating contracting activity of the private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/07c9a95fd80e4e239705bbac576002b9). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit that compiles the France Services PMI®, finds deteriorating activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/07c9a95fd80e4e239705bbac576002b9). The IHS Markit France Services Activity index decreased from 50.2 in Feb to 49.1 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/07c9a95fd80e4e239705bbac576002b9). The IHS Markit France Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index® decreased to 49.7 in Mar from 51.5 in Feb (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/691ab3056c3a41bda938266e593f12f0). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit, finds deteriorating manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/691ab3056c3a41bda938266e593f12f0). Table FR provides the country data table for France.

Table FR, France, Economic Indicators

CPI

Mar month ∆% 0.8
12 months ∆%: 1.1
4/14/19

PPI

Feb month ∆%: 041 Feb 12 months ∆%: 2.1

Blog 3/31/19

GDP Growth

IVQ2018/IIIQ2018 ∆%: 0.3
IVQ2018/IVQ2017 ∆%: 1.0
Blog 3/31/13 5/19/12 6/30/13 9/29/13 11/17/13 12/29/13 2/16/14 4/6/14 5/18/14 6/29/14 8/17/14 9/28/14 11/16/14 12/28/14 2/15/15 3/29/15 5/17/15 6/28/15 8/16/15 9/27/15 11/15/15 12/27/15 1/31/16 2/28/16 3/27/16 5/1/16 6/5/16 06/26/16 8/7/16 9/4/16 9/25/16 10/30/16 12/4/16 1/1/17 2/12/17 3/5/17 3/26/17 5/7/17 6/4/17 6/25/17 8/20/17 9/3/17 11/12/17 12/10/17 12/31/17 2/11/18 3/4/18 4/1/18 5/6/18 6/3/18 6/24/18 9/2/18 11/11/18 12/9/18 12/30/18 3/10/19 3/31/19

Industrial Production

Feb ∆%:
Manufacturing 1.1 Quarter ∆%: 1.0 YOY 0.5

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

Consumer Spending

Manufactured Goods
Feb ∆%: 0.2 12-Month Manufactured Goods
∆%: -0.1

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/5/15

Employment

Unemployment Rate: IVQ2018 8.5%
Blog 2/24/19

Trade Balance

Feb Exports ∆%: month 0.9 12 months 7.3

Imports ∆%: month 0.4 12 months 5.3

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/12/15

Confidence Indicators

Historical average 100

Mar Mfg Business Climate 102

Earlier Data:

Blog 3/29/15

Links to blog comments in Table FR: 4/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html

3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html

3/3/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html

2/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

12/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html

12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html

12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

11/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html

11/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

7/29/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html

6/24/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

6/3/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

04/01/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html

3/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

11/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/25/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html

6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

5/7/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

3/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

2/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html

10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html

9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html

9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html

8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html

6/26/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html

6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

3/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html

12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html

11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html

9/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

6/28/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

9/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

12/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

6/30/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

5/19/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

VG Italy. Table VG-IT provides revised percentage changes of GDP in Italy of quarter on prior quarter and quarter on same quarter a year earlier. In IVQ2018, the GDP of Italy decreased 0.1 percent and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of Italy increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 1.0 percent in IQ2013 and declined 2.9 percent relative to IQ2012. GDP had been growing during six consecutive quarters but at very low rates from IQ2010 to IIQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell in seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at increasingly higher rates of contraction from 0.6 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IVQ2011, 0.9 percent in IQ2012, 0.9 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012. The pace of decline accelerated to minus 0.5 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 1.0 percent in IQ2013. GDP contracted cumulatively 5.2 percent in seven consecutive quarterly contractions from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent. The year-on-year rate has fallen from 2.3 percent in IVQ2010 to minus 2.8 percent in IVQ2012, minus 2.9 percent in IQ2013, minus 2.0 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 1.2 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP fell 0.8 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.3 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.2 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.7 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.7 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.1 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to a year earlier and changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2018 relative to a year earlier. Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy in IVQ2018 of €402,822.5 million (https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/228142) is lower by 5.3 percent relative to €425,552.0 million in IQ2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy increased from €368,036.0 million in IQ1998 to €425,552.0 million in IQ2008 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. The fiscal adjustment of Italy is significantly more difficult with the economy not growing especially on the prospects of increasing government revenue. The strategy is for reforms to improve productivity, facilitating future fiscal consolidation.

Table VG-IT, Italy, GDP ∆%

Quarter ∆% Relative to Preceding Quarter

Quarter ∆% Relative to Same Quarter Year Earlier

IVQ2018

-0.1

0.0

IIIQ2018

-0.1

0.6

IIQ2018

0.1

1.1

IQ2018

0.2

1.4

IVQ2017

0.4

1.7

IIIQ2017

0.4

1.7

IIQ2017

0.3

1.7

IQ2017

0.5

1.6

IVQ2016

0.5

1.3

IIIQ2016

0.3

1.2

IIQ2016

0.2

1.2

IQ2016

0.2

1.3

IVQ2015

0.4

1.3

IIIQ2015

0.3

0.8

IIQ2015

0.4

0.8

IQ2015

0.2

0.3

IVQ2014

0.0

0.2

IIIQ2014

0.2

0.1

IIQ2014

-0.1

0.2

IQ2014

0.1

0.3

IVQ2013

-0.2

-0.8

IIIQ2013

0.4

-1.2

IIQ2013

0.0

-2.0

IQ2013

-1.0

-2.9

IVQ2012

-0.5

-2.8

IIIQ2012

-0.5

-3.1

IIQ2012

-0.9

-3.2

IQ2012

-0.9

-2.2

IVQ2011

-0.9

-1.1

IIIQ2011

-0.6

0.4

IIQ2011

0.1

1.6

IQ2011

0.2

2.0

IVQ2010

0.7

2.3

IIIQ2010

0.5

1.9

IIQ2010

0.6

1.9

IQ2010

0.4

0.5

IVQ2009

0.4

-2.6

IIIQ2009

0.5

-5.2

IIQ2009

-0.8

-7.0

IQ2009

-2.7

-7.2

IVQ2008

-2.3

-3.6

IIIQ2008

-1.4

-1.4

IIQ2008

-0.9

-0.1

IQ2008

1.0

0.8

IV2007

-0.1

-0.1

IIIQ2007

0.0

1.3

IIQ2007

-0.1

1.7

IQ2007

0.2

2.4

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/228142

The IHS Markit Italy Business Activity Index increased from 50.4 in Feb to 53.1 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/3f164749323c4495b58e2da5169e9ca7). Amritpal Virdee, Economist at IHS Markit that compiles the Italy Services PMI®, finds improving condition (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/3f164749323c4495b58e2da5169e9ca7). The IHS Markit Italy Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), decreased from 47.8 in Jan to 47.7 in Feb (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c07811b7638543cdb0eb64a567b0b2e8). New export orders increased. Andrew Harker, Associate Director at HIS Markit that compiles the Italian Manufacturing PMI®, finds deteriorating manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c07811b7638543cdb0eb64a567b0b2e8). Table IT provides the country data table for Italy.

Table IT, Italy, Economic Indicators

Consumer Price Index

Mar month ∆% 0.3

12 months ∆% 1.0
Blog 4/21/19

Producer Price Index

Feb month ∆%: -0.2 Feb 12-month ∆%: 3.9

Blog 3/31/19

GDP Growth

IVQ2018/IIIQ2018 SA ∆%: minus 0.1
IVQ2018/IVQ2017 NSA ∆%: 0.0
Blog 3/17/13 6/16/13 8/11/13 9/15/13 11/17/13 12/15/13 2/16/14 3/16/14 5/18/14 6/15/14 8/10/14 8/31/14 10/19/14 11/16/14 12/7/14 2/15/15 3/15/15 5/17/15 5/31/15 8/16/15 9/6/15 11/15/15 12/6/15 2/14/16 3/6/16 5/15/16 6/5/16 8/14/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/4/16 02/26/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/4/17 8/20/17 9/3/17 11/26/17 12/10/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/10/18 9/9/18 12/16/18 3/10/19

Labor Report

Feb 2019

Participation rate 65.7%

Employment ratio 58.6%

Unemployment rate 10.7%

Youth Unemployment 32.8%

Blog 4/7/19

Industrial Production

Feb month ∆%: 0.8
12 months CA ∆%: 0.9

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Retail Sales

Feb month ∆%: 0.1

Feb 12-month ∆%: 0.9

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/26/15

Business Confidence

Mfg Apr 100.6, Dec 103.3

Construction Apr 141.2 Dec 130.3

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/5/15

Trade Balance

Balance Feb SA €4,012 million
Exports Feb month SA ∆%: -1.1; Imports month ∆%: 0.0
Exports 12 months Feb NSA ∆%: 3.4 Imports 12 months NSA ∆%: 3.3

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table IT: 4/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html

3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html

3/3/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/delayed-updates-of-united-states.html

2/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

1/13/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

12/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html

12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html

12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

12/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html

11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html

9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

12/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

10/19/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html

8/31/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopo7litical-and-financial-risks.html

8/10/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk_10.html

6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

8/11/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/recovery-without-hiring-loss-of-full.html

6/16/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html

3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

VH United Kingdom. Annual data in Table VH-UK show the strong impact of the global recession in the UK with decline of GDP of 4.2 percent in 2009 after dropping 0.3 percent in 2008. Recovery of 1.7 percent in 2010 is relatively low in comparison with annual growth rates in 2007 and earlier years. Growth was only 1.6 percent in 2011 and 1.4 percent in 2012. Growth increased to 2.0 percent in 2013 and 2.9 percent in 2014. Growth fell to 2.3 percent in 2015, and 1.8 percent in 2016.  GDP grew 1.8 percent in 2017. GDP grew 1.4 percent in 2018. The bottom part of Table VH-UK provides average growth rates of UK GDP since 1948. The UK economy grew at 2.5 percent per year on average between 1948 and 2018, which is relatively high for an advanced economy. The growth rate of GDP between 2000 and 2007 is higher at 2.8 percent. Growth in the current cyclical expansion from 2010 to 2018 has been only at 1.9 percent as advanced economies struggle with weak internal demand and world trade. GDP in 2018 is higher by 13.1 percent relative to 2007 while it would have been 35.5 higher at trend of 2.8 percent as from 2000 to 2007.

Table VH-UK, UK, Gross Domestic Product, ∆%

∆% on Prior Year

1998

3.3

1999

3.2

2000

3.5

2001

2.8

2002

2.5

2003

3.3

2004

2.3

2005

3.1

2006

2.5

2007

2.5

2008

-0.3

2009

-4.2

2010

1.7

2011

1.6

2012

1.4

2013

2.0

2014

2.9

2015

2.3

2016

1.8

2017

1.8

2018

1.4

Average Growth Rates ∆% per Year

1948-2018

2.5

1950-1959

3.1

1960-1969

3.1

1970-1979

2.6

1980-1989

3.2

1990-1999

2.4

2000-2007

2.8

2007-2013*

2.1

2007-2014*

5.1

2007-2015

0.9

2007-2016

1.0

2007-2017

1.1

2007-2018

1.1

2000-2018

1.8

*Absolute change from 2007 to 2013 and 2007 to 2014

Source: UK Office for National Statistics

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/octobertodecember2018

The HIS Markit Flash UK PMI® Composite Output Index fell from 52.4 in Jun to 47.7 in Jul, which is the lowest in 87 months (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds the index suggests pace of contraction of GDP at 0.4 percent in IIIQ2016 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). The Business Activity Index of the IHS Markit/CIPS UK Services PMI® decreased from 51.3 in Feb to 48.9 in Mar (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9a6bda42a1514dff866eb32623b7231e). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds nearly stagnating GDP at 0.8 percent in 2019 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9a6bda42a1514dff866eb32623b7231e). The IHS Markit/CIPS UK Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®) decreased to 52.6 in Feb from 52.8 in Jan (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/8467d1324cdc4d80a8901d90b2e62352). New export orders decreased. Rob Dobson, Director at IHS Markit that compiles the Markit/CIPS Manufacturing PMI®, finds challenges in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/8467d1324cdc4d80a8901d90b2e62352). Table UK provides the economic indicators for the United Kingdom.

Table UK, UK Economic Indicators

CPI

Mar month ∆%: 0.2
Mar 12-month ∆%: 1.9
Blog 4/21/19

Output/Input Prices

Output Prices: Mar 12-month NSA ∆%: 2.4; excluding food, petroleum ∆%: 2.2
Input Prices: Mar 12-month NSA
∆%: 3.7
Excluding ∆%: 3.5
Blog 4/21/19

GDP Growth

IVQ2018 prior quarter ∆% 0.2; year earlier same quarter ∆%: 1.4
Blog 3/31/13 4/28/13 5/26/13 7/28/13 8/25/13 9/29/13 10/27/13 12/1/13 12/22/13 2/2/14 3/2/14 4/6/14 5/4/14 5/25/14 6/29/14 7/27/14 8/17/14 10/5/14 10/26/14 11/30/14 12/28/14 2/1/15 3/1/15 4/5/15 5/3/15 5/31/15 7/5/15 8/2/15 9/6/15 10/4/15 11/1/15 11/29/15 12/27/15 1/31/16 2/28/16 4/3/16 5/1/16 5/29/16 7/3/16 7/31/16 9/4/16 10/9/16 10/30/16 11/27/16 1/1/17 2/5/17 2/26/17 4/9/17 5/7/2017 5/28/17 7/9/17 7/30/17 8/19/17 10/8/17 10/29/17 11/26/17 12/31/17 2/4/18 2/25/18 4/8/18 5/6/18 5/2718 7/8/18 8/19/18 10/7/18 11/18/18 12/30/18 2/17/19 4/7/19

Industrial Production

Feb 2019/Feb 2018 ∆%: Production Industries 0.1; Manufacturing 0.6

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

Retail Sales

Feb month ∆%: 0.4
Feb 12-month ∆%: 4.0

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/26/15

Labor Market

Dec-Feb 2019 Unemployment Rate: 3.9%
Blog 4/21/19 LMGDP 5/17/15

GDP and the Labor Market

IQ2015 Employment 104.8

IQ2008 =100

GDP IQ15=104.0 IQ2008=100

Blog 5/17/14

Trade Balance UK Trade in Goods and Services

Balance SA Feb minus £4860million
Exports Feb ∆%: 0.1; Feb 12 M ∆%: 3.1
Imports Feb ∆%: -0.7 Feb 12M ∆%: 5.5

EARLIER DATA:
Blog 4/12/15

Links to blog comments in Table UK: 4/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

3/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

12/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html

11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html

10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

7/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html

5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

4/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

2/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html

10/8/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html

7/30/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html

7/9/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html

5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

2/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html

10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html

10/9/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html

9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html

7/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/business-fixed-investment-has-been-soft.html

7/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html

5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

4/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html

12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html

11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html

11/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-increase-considered.html

10/4/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html

9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html

08/02/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html

7/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html

5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

5/3/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html

12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

10/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html

10/5/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

7/27/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

5/4/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html

4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html

3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html

2/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

12/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html

12/1/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/exit-risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html

10/27/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html

9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html

7/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html

5/26/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

4/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html

03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

Table VH-L3, UK, Labor Force Survey Indicators, Thousands, SA

LFHP

EMP

PART

UNE

RATE

Dec-Feb 2017

41,115

31,860

74.6

1,550

4.6

Dec-Feb 2018

41,212

32,264

75.4

1,419

4.2

Mar-May 2018

41,236

32,395

75.6

1,408

4.2

Jun-Aug 2018

41,258

32,410

75.6

1,363

4.0

Sep-Nov 2018

41,277

32,542

75.8

1,370

4.0

Dec-Feb 2019

41,297

32,721

76.1

1,343

3.9

∆ on Quarter

20

179

0.4

-27

-0.1

∆%

0.0

0.5

-2.0

∆ on Year

85

457

0.8

-76

-0.3

∆%

0.2

1.4

-5.4

Notes: LFHP: Labor Force Household Population Ages 16 to 64 in thousands; EMP: Employed Ages 16 and over in thousands; PART: Employment as % of Population Ages 16 to 64; UNE: Unemployed Ages 16 and over in thousands; Rate: Number Unemployed Ages 16 and over as % of Employed plus Unemployed

Source: UK Office for National Statistics

https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/latest

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.

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