Monday, February 2, 2015

Financial and International Developments Influencing Monetary Policy, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend, Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment, United States Housing Collapse, Decline of United States Homeownership, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part I

 

Financial and International Developments Influencing Monetary Policy, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend, Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment, United States Housing Collapse, Decline of United States Homeownership, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

I Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment

II United States Housing Collapse

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

Executive Summary

Contents of Executive Summary

ESI Financial “Irrational Exuberance,” Increasing Interest Rate Risk, Tapering Quantitative Easing, Duration Dumping, Competitive Devaluations, Steepening Yield Curve and Global Financial and Economic Risk

ESII Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend

ESIII Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment

ESIV United States Housing Collapse

ESV Decline of United States Homeownership

ESI “Financial “Irrational Exuberance,” Increasing Interest Rate Risk, Tapering Quantitative Easing, Duration Dumping, Steepening Yield Curve and Global Financial and Economic Risk. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task for both theory and measurement. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task for both theory and measurement. The IMF provides surveillance of the world economy with its Global Economic Outlook (WEO) (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=29), of the world financial system with its Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/index.htm) and of fiscal affairs with the Fiscal Monitor (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=262). There appears to be a moment of transition in global economic and financial variables that may prove of difficult analysis and measurement. It is useful to consider a summary of global economic and financial risks, which are analyzed in detail in the comments of this blog in Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets, Table VI-4.

Economic risks include the following:

  1. China’s Economic Growth. Cumulative growth of China’s GDP in IVQ2014 relative to the same period in 2013 was 7.4 percent, as shown in Table VC-A. Secondary industry accounts for 42.6 percent of cumulative GDP in IVQ2014. In cumulative IVQ2014, industry accounts for 35.8 percent of GDP and construction for 7.0 percent. Tertiary industry accounts for 48.2 percent of cumulative GDP in IVQ2014 and primary industry for 9.2 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards. GDP growth decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 and 11.2 percent in IIQ2010 to 7.8 percent in IQ2013, 7.5 percent in IIQ2013 and 7.9 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP grew 7.6 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to IIIQ2013, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent per year. GDP grew 7.4 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.6 percent in IQ2014 that is equivalent to 6.6 percent per year. GP grew 7.5 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.9 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is equivalent 7.8 percent. In IIIQ2014, GDP grew 7.3 percent relative to a year earlier and 1.9 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is 7.8 percent in annual equivalent. GDP grew 1.5 percent in IVQ2014, which is 6.1 percent in annual equivalent and 7.3 percent relative to a year earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/imf-view-world-inflation-waves-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html).There is also concern about indebtedness, move to devaluation and deep policy reforms.
  2. United States Economic Growth, Labor Markets and Budget/Debt Quagmire. The US is growing slowly with 26.0 million in job stress, fewer 10 million full-time jobs, high youth unemployment, historically low hiring and declining/stagnating real wages. Actual GDP is about two trillion dollars lower than trend GDP.
  3. Economic Growth and Labor Markets in Advanced Economies. Advanced economies are growing slowly. There is still high unemployment in advanced economies.
  4. World Inflation Waves. Inflation continues in repetitive waves globally (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html). There is growing concern on capital outflows and currency depreciation of emerging markets.

A list of financial uncertainties includes:

  1. Euro Area Survival Risk. The resilience of the euro to fiscal and financial doubts on larger member countries is still an unknown risk.
  2. Foreign Exchange Wars. Exchange rate struggles continue as zero interest rates in advanced economies induce devaluation of their currencies with alternating episodes of revaluation.
  3. Valuation of Risk Financial Assets. Valuations of risk financial assets have reached extremely high levels in markets with lower volumes.
  4. Duration Trap of the Zero Bound. The yield of the US 10-year Treasury rose from 2.031 percent on Mar 9, 2012, to 2.294 percent on Mar 16, 2012. Considering a 10-year Treasury with coupon of 2.625 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years, the price would fall from 105.3512 corresponding to yield of 2.031 percent to 102.9428 corresponding to yield of 2.294 percent, for loss in a week of 2.3 percent but far more in a position with leverage of 10:1. Min Zeng, writing on “Treasurys fall, ending brutal quarter,” published on Mar 30, 2012, in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577313400029412564.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_markets), informs that Treasury bonds maturing in more than 20 years lost 5.52 percent in the first quarter of 2012.
  5. Credibility and Commitment of Central Bank Policy. There is a credibility issue of the commitment of monetary policy (Sargent and Silber 2012Mar20).
  6. Carry Trades. Commodity prices driven by zero interest rates have resumed their increasing path with fluctuations caused by intermittent risk aversion mixed with reallocations of portfolios of risk financial assets

Chart VIII-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate on the overnight fed funds rate and the yields of the 10-year constant maturity Treasury and the Baa seasoned corporate bond. Table VIII-3 provides the data for selected points in Chart VIII-1. There are two important economic and financial events, illustrating the ease of inducing carry trade with extremely low interest rates and the resulting financial crash and recession of abandoning extremely low interest rates.

  • The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target of the fed funds rate from 7.03 percent on Jul 3, 2000, to 1.00 percent on Jun 22, 2004, in pursuit of non-existing deflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-85). Central bank commitment to maintain the fed funds rate at 1.00 percent induced adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS) linked to the fed funds rate. Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment. The exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at interest rates close to zero, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV). The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper with the objective of purchasing default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever-increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity by the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions. The put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4). The FOMC implemented increments of 25 basis points of the fed funds target from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006, raising the fed funds rate to 5.25 percent on Jul 3, 2006, as shown in Chart VIII-1. The gradual exit from the first round of unconventional monetary policy from 1.00 percent in Jun 2004 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/20040630/default.htm) to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20060629a.htm) caused the financial crisis and global recession.
  • On Dec 16, 2008, the policy determining committee of the Fed decided (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm): “The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent.” Policymakers emphasize frequently that there are tools to exit unconventional monetary policy at the right time. At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states that: “The Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.” Perception of withdrawal of $2671 billion, or $2.7 trillion, of bank reserves (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1), would cause Himalayan increase in interest rates that would provoke another recession. There is no painless gradual or sudden exit from zero interest rates because reversal of exposures created on the commitment of zero interest rates forever.

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment

Chart VIII-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate on the overnight fed funds rate and the yields of the 10-year constant maturity Treasury and the Baa seasoned corporate bond. Table VIII-3 provides the data for selected points in Chart VIII-1. There are two important economic and financial events, illustrating the ease of inducing carry trade with extremely low interest rates and the resulting financial crash and recession of abandoning extremely low interest rates.

clip_image001

Chart VIII-1, Fed Funds Rate and Yields of Ten-year Treasury Constant Maturity and Baa Seasoned Corporate Bond, Jan 2, 2001 to Jan 29, 2015 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Table VIII-3, Selected Data Points in Chart VIII-1, % per Year

 

Fed Funds Overnight Rate

10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity

Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond

1/2/2001

6.67

4.92

7.91

10/1/2002

1.85

3.72

7.46

7/3/2003

0.96

3.67

6.39

6/22/2004

1.00

4.72

6.77

6/28/2006

5.06

5.25

6.94

9/17/2008

2.80

3.41

7.25

10/26/2008

0.09

2.16

8.00

10/31/2008

0.22

4.01

9.54

4/6/2009

0.14

2.95

8.63

4/5/2010

0.20

4.01

6.44

2/4/2011

0.17

3.68

6.25

7/25/2012

0.15

1.43

4.73

5/1/13

0.14

1.66

4.48

9/5/13

0.08

2.98

5.53

11/21/2013

0.09

2.79

5.44

11/26/13

0.09

2.74

5.34 (11/26/13)

12/5/13

0.09

2.88

5.47

12/11/13

0.09

2.89

5.42

12/18/13

0.09

2.94

5.36

12/26/13

0.08

3.00

5.37

1/1/2014

0.08

3.00

5.34

1/8/2014

0.07

2.97

5.28

1/15/2014

0.07

2.86

5.18

1/22/2014

0.07

2.79

5.11

1/30/2014

0.07

2.72

5.08

2/6/2014

0.07

2.73

5.13

2/13/2014

0.06

2.73

5.12

2/20/14

0.07

2.76

5.15

2/27/14

0.07

2.65

5.01

3/6/14

0.08

2.74

5.11

3/13/14

0.08

2.66

5.05

3/20/14

0.08

2.79

5.13

3/27/14

0.08

2.69

4.95

4/3/14

0.08

2.80

5.04

4/10/14

0.08

2.65

4.89

4/17/14

0.09

2.73

4.89

4/24/14

0.10

2.70

4.84

5/1/14

0.09

2.63

4.77

5/8/14

0.08

2.61

4.79

5/15/14

0.09

2.50

4.72

5/22/14

0.09

2.56

4.81

5/29/14

0.09

2.45

4.69

6/05/14

0.09

2.59

4.83

6/12/14

0.09

2.58

4.79

6/19/14

0.10

2.64

4.83

6/26/14

0.10

2.53

4.71

7/2/14

0.10

2.64

4.84

7/10/14

0.09

2.55

4.75

7/17/14

0.09

2.47

4.69

7/24/14

0.09

2.52

4.72

7/31/14

0.08

2.58

4.75

8/7/14

0.09

2.43

4.71

8/14/14

0.09

2.40

4.69

8/21/14

0.09

2.41

4.69

8/28/14

0.09

2.34

4.57

9/04/14

0.09

2.45

4.70

9/11/14

0.09

2.54

4.79

9/18/14

0.09

2.63

4.91

9/25/14

0.09

2.52

4.79

10/02/14

0.09

2.44

4.76

10/09/14

0.08

2.34

4.68

10/16/14

0.09

2.17

4.64

10/23/14

0.09

2.29

4.71

11/13/14

0.09

2.35

4.82

11/20/14

0.10

2.34

4.86

11/26/14

0.10

2.24

4.73

12/04/14

0.12

2.25

4.78

12/11/14

0.12

2.19

4.72

12/18/14

0.13

2.22

4.78

12/23/14

0.13

2.26

4.79

12/30/14

0.06

2.20

4.69

1/8/15

0.12

2.03

4.57

1/15/15

0.12

1.77

4.42

1/22/15

0.12

1.90

4.49

1/29/15

0.11

1.77

4.35

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jan 28, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20150128a.htm):

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate remains appropriate.  In determining how long to maintain this target range, the Committee will assess progress--both realized and expected--toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.  This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.  Based on its current assessment, the Committee judges that it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of monetary policy.  However, if incoming information indicates faster progress toward the Committee’s employment and inflation objectives than the Committee now expects, then increases in the target range for the federal funds rate are likely to occur sooner than currently anticipated.  Conversely, if progress proves slower than expected, then increases in the target range are likely to occur later than currently anticipated.” (emphasis added). The FOMC added “readings” of “international developments.”

How long is “considerable time”? At the press conference following the meeting on Mar 19, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question of Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal explaining “In particular, the Committee has endorsed the view that it anticipates that will be a considerable period after the asset purchase program ends before it will be appropriate to begin to raise rates. And of course on our present path, well, that's not utterly preset. We would be looking at next, next fall. So, I think that's important guidance” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140319.pdf). Many focused on “next fall,” ignoring that the path of increasing rates is not “utterly preset.”

At the press conference following the meeting on Dec 17, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question by Jon Hilseranth of the Wall Street Journal explaining “patience” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20141217.pdf):

“So I did say that this statement that the committee can be patient

should be interpreted as meaning that it is unlikely to begin the normalization process, for at least

the next couple of meetings. Now that doesn't point to any preset or predetermined time at which

normalization is -- will begin. There are a range of views on the committee, and it will be

dependent on how incoming data bears on the progress, the economy is making. First of all, I

want to emphasize that no meeting is completely off the table in the sense that if we do see faster

progress toward our objectives than we currently expect, then it is possible that the process of

normalization would occur sooner than we now anticipated. And of course the converse is also

true. So at this point, we think it unlikely that it will be appropriate, that we will see conditions

for at least the next couple of meetings that will make it appropriate for us to decide to begin

normalization. A number of committee participants have indicated that in their view, conditions

could be appropriate by the middle of next year. But there is no preset time.”

The Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced on Jan 15, 2015, the termination of its peg of the exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the euro (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):

“The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has decided to discontinue the minimum exchange rate of

CHF 1.20 per euro with immediate effect and to cease foreign currency purchases associated

with enforcing it.”

The SNB also lowered interest rates to nominal negative percentages (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):

“At the same time as discontinuing the minimum exchange rate, the SNB will be lowering the

interest rate for balances held on sight deposit accounts to –0.75% from 22 January. The

exemption thresholds remain unchanged. Further lowering the interest rate makes Swiss-franc

investments considerably less attractive and will mitigate the effects of the decision to

discontinue the minimum exchange rate. The target range for the three-month Libor is being

lowered by 0.5 percentage points to between –1.25% and –0.25%.”

The Swiss franc rate relative to the euro (CHF/EUR) appreciated 18.7 percent on Jan 15, 2015. The Swiss franc rate relative to the dollar (CHF/USD) appreciated 17.7 percent. Central banks are taking measures in anticipation of the quantitative easing by the European Central Bank.

On Jan 22, 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to implement an “expanded asset purchase program” with combined asset purchases of €60 billion per month “until at least Sep 2016 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html). The objective of the program is that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html):

“Asset purchases provide monetary stimulus to the economy in a context where key ECB interest rates are at their lower bound. They further ease monetary and financial conditions, making access to finance cheaper for firms and households. This tends to support investment and consumption, and ultimately contributes to a return of inflation rates towards 2%.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, explains the coordination of asset purchases with NCBs (National Central Banks) of the euro area and risk sharing (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“In March 2015 the Eurosystem will start to purchase euro-denominated investment-grade securities issued by euro area governments and agencies and European institutions in the secondary market. The purchases of securities issued by euro area governments and agencies will be based on the Eurosystem NCBs’ shares in the ECB’s capital key. Some additional eligibility criteria will be applied in the case of countries under an EU/IMF adjustment programme. As regards the additional asset purchases, the Governing Council retains control over all the design features of the programme and the ECB will coordinate the purchases, thereby safeguarding the singleness of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Eurosystem will make use of decentralised implementation to mobilise its resources. With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, rejected the possibility of seigniorage in the new asset purchase program, or central bank financing of fiscal expansion (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“As I just said, it would be a big mistake if countries were to consider that the presence of this programme might be an incentive to fiscal expansion. They would undermine the confidence, so it’s not directed to monetary financing at all. Actually, it’s been designed as to avoid any monetary financing.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, does not find effects of monetary policy in inflating asset prices (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“On the first question, we monitor closely any potential instance of risk to financial stability. So we're very alert to that risk. So far we don't see bubbles. There may be some local episodes of certain specific markets where prices are going up fast. But to have a bubble, besides having that, one should also identify, detect an increase, dramatic increase in leverage or in bank credit, and we don't see that now. However, we, as I said, we are alert. If bubbles are of a local nature, they should be addressed by local instruments, namely macro-prudential instruments rather than by monetary policy.”

The DAX index of German equities increased 1.3 percent on Jan 22, 2015 and 2.1 percent on Jan 23, 2015. The euro depreciated from EUR 1.1611/USD (EUR 0.8613/USD) on Wed Jan 21, 2015, to EUR 1.1206/USD (EUR 0.8924/USD) on Fri Jan 23, 2015, or 3.6 percent. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar.

Chart S provides the yield of the two-year Treasury constant maturity from Mar 17, 2014, two days before the guidance of Chair Yellen on Mar 19, 2014, to Jan 29, 2015. Chart SA provides the yields of the seven-, ten- and thirty-year Treasury constant maturity in the same dates. Yields increased right after the guidance of Chair Yellen. The two-year yield remain at a higher level than before while the ten-year yield fell and increased again. There could be more immediate impact on two-year yields of an increase in the fed funds rates but the effects would spread throughout the term structure of interest rates (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1981, 1985, Ingersoll 1987). Yields converged toward slightly lower earlier levels in the week of Apr 24, 2014 with reallocation of portfolios of risk financial assets away from equities and into bonds and commodities. There is ongoing reshuffling of portfolios to hedge against geopolitical events and world/regional economic performance.

clip_image002

Chart S, US, Yield of Two-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, Mar 17, 2014 to Jan 29, 2015 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

clip_image003

Chart SA, US, Yield of Seven-Year, Ten-Year and Thirty-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, Mar 17, 2014 to Jan 29, 2015 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):

“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.

Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.

Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”

Inflation and unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment. Chart VI-1B for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart VI-1B cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s. The loans were used in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on inflation and the economy.  This interpretation is consistent with the case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises from the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a plausible interpretation of this pattern.”

The reading of the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the output gap and inflation expectations:

“So, inflation is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’ or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with ‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen in economies well below potential.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”

Chart VI-1B provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that period. Chart VI-1B used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of unemployment in large urban centers.

BrazilPhillipsCircuit

ChVI1-B, Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987

Source:

©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.

The minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 16-17, 2014, reveal concern with global economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20140917.htm):

“Most viewed the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as broadly balanced. However, a number of participants noted that economic growth over the medium term might be slower than they expected if foreign economic growth came in weaker than anticipated, structural productivity continued to increase only slowly, or the recovery in residential construction continued to lag.”

There is similar concern in the minutes of the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16-17, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20141217.htm):

“In their discussion of the foreign economic outlook, participants noted that the implications of the drop in crude oil prices would differ across regions, especially if the price declines affected inflation expectations and financial markets; a few participants said that the effect on overseas employment and output as a whole was likely to be positive. While some participants had lowered their assessments of the prospects for global economic growth, several noted that the likelihood of further responses by policymakers abroad had increased. Several participants indicated that they expected slower economic growth abroad to negatively affect the U.S. economy, principally through lower net exports, but the net effect of lower oil prices on U.S. economic activity was anticipated to be positive.”

It is quite difficult to measure inflationary expectations because they tend to break abruptly from past inflation. There could still be an influence of past and current inflation in the calculation of future inflation by economic agents. Table VIII-1 provides inflation of the CPI. In the three months from Oct 2014 to Dec 2014, CPI inflation for all items seasonally adjusted was minus 2.8 percent in annual equivalent, obtained by calculating accumulated inflation from Oct 2014 to Dec 2014 and compounding for a full year. In the 12 months ending in Dec 2014, CPI inflation of all items not seasonally adjusted was 0.8 percent. Inflation in Dec 2014 seasonally adjusted was minus 0.4 percent relative to Nov 2014, or minus 4.7 percent annual equivalent (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The second row provides the same measurements for the CPI of all items excluding food and energy: 1.6 percent in 12 months and 1.2 percent in annual equivalent Oct 2014-Dec 2014. The Wall Street Journal provides the yield curve of US Treasury securities (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_bonds.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000). The shortest term is 0.010 percent for one month, 0.015 percent for three months, 0.063 percent for six months, 0.157 percent for one year, 0.453 percent for two years, 0.736 percent for three years, 1.155 percent for five years, 1.459 percent for seven years, 1.644 percent for ten years and 2.226 percent for 30 years. The Irving Fisher (1930) definition of real interest rates is approximately the difference between nominal interest rates, which are those estimated by the Wall Street Journal, and the rate of inflation expected in the term of the security, which could behave as in Table VIII-1. Inflation in Nov 2014 is low in 12 months because of the unwinding of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures prices but could ignite again with subdued risk aversion. Real interest rates in the US have been negative during substantial periods in the past decade while monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

Negative real rates of interest distort calculations of risk and returns from capital budgeting by firms, through lending by financial intermediaries to decisions on savings, housing and purchases of households. Inflation on near zero interest rates misallocates resources away from their most productive uses and creates uncertainty of the future path of adjustment to higher interest rates that inhibit sound decisions.

Table VIII-1, US, Consumer Price Index Percentage Change 12 Months NSA and Annual Equivalent

 

∆% 12 Months Dec 2014/Dec
2013 NSA

∆% Annual Equivalent Oct 2014 to Dec 2014 SA

CPI All Items

0.8

-2.8

CPI ex Food and Energy

1.6

1.2

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Professionals use a variety of techniques in measuring interest rate risk (Fabozzi, Buestow and Johnson, 2006, Chapter Nine, 183-226):

  • Full valuation approach in which securities and portfolios are shocked by 50, 100, 200 and 300 basis points to measure their impact on asset values
  • Stress tests requiring more complex analysis and translation of possible events with high impact even if with low probability of occurrence into effects on actual positions and capital
  • Value at Risk (VaR) analysis of maximum losses that are likely in a time horizon
  • Duration and convexity that are short-hand convenient measurement of changes in prices resulting from changes in yield captured by duration and convexity
  • Yield volatility

Analysis of these methods is in Pelaez and Pelaez (International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-162) and Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. (I) (2008a), 78-100). Frederick R. Macaulay (1938) introduced the concept of duration in contrast with maturity for analyzing bonds. Duration is the sensitivity of bond prices to changes in yields. In economic jargon, duration is the yield elasticity of bond price to changes in yield, or the percentage change in price after a percentage change in yield, typically expressed as the change in price resulting from change of 100 basis points in yield. The mathematical formula is the negative of the yield elasticity of the bond price or –[dB/d(1+y)]((1+y)/B), where d is the derivative operator of calculus, B the bond price, y the yield and the elasticity does not have dimension (Hallerbach 2001). The duration trap of unconventional monetary policy is that duration is higher the lower the coupon and higher the lower the yield, other things being constant. Coupons and yields are historically low because of unconventional monetary policy. Duration dumping during a rate increase may trigger the same crossfire selling of high duration positions that magnified the credit crisis. Traders reduced positions because capital losses in one segment, such as mortgage-backed securities, triggered haircuts and margin increases that reduced capital available for positioning in all segments, causing fire sales in multiple segments (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 217-24). Financial markets are currently experiencing fear of duration and riskier asset classes resulting from the debate within and outside the Fed on tapering quantitative easing. Table VIII-2 provides the yield curve of Treasury securities on Jan 30, 2015, Dec 31, 2013, May 1, 2013, Jan 30, 2014 and Jan 30, 2006. There is oscillating steepening of the yield curve for longer maturities, which are also the ones with highest duration. The 10-year yield increased from 1.45 percent on Jul 26, 2012 to 3.04 percent on Dec 31, 2013 and 1.81 percent on Jan 23, 2015, as measured by the United States Treasury. Assume that a bond with maturity in 10 years were issued on Dec 31, 2013, at par or price of 100 with coupon of 1.45 percent. The price of that bond would be 86.3778 with instantaneous increase of the yield to 3.04 percent for loss of 13.6 percent and far more with leverage. Assume that the yield of a bond with exactly ten years to maturity and coupon of 1.68 percent would jump instantaneously from yield of 1.68 percent on Jan 30, 2015 to 4.54 percent as occurred on Jan 30, 2006 when the economy was closer to full employment. The price of the hypothetical bond issued with coupon of 1.68 percent would drop from 100 to 77.2154 after an instantaneous increase of the yield to 4.54 percent. The price loss would be 22.8 percent. Losses absorb capital available for positioning, triggering crossfire sales in multiple asset classes (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). What is the path of adjustment of zero interest rates on fed funds and artificially low bond yields? There is no painless exit from unconventional monetary policy. Chris Dieterich, writing on “Bond investors turn to cash,” on Jul 25, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323971204578625900935618178.html), uses data of the Investment Company Institute (http://www.ici.org/) in showing withdrawals of $43 billion in taxable mutual funds in Jun, which is the largest in history, with flows into cash investments such as $8.5 billion in the week of Jul 17 into money-market funds.

Table VIII-2, United States, Treasury Yields

 

1/30/15

12/31/13

5/01/13

1/30/14

1/30/06

1 M

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.04

4.18

3 M

0.02

0.07

0.06

0.02

4.48

6 M

0.07

0.10

0.08

0.06

4.62

1 Y

0.18

0.13

0.11

0.10

4.59

2 Y

0.47

0.38

0.20

0.36

4.52

3 Y

0.77

0.78

0.30

0.72

4.47

5 Y

1.18

1.75

0.65

1.55

4.46

7 Y

1.49

2.45

1.07

2.19

4.49

10 Y

1.68

3.04

1.66

2.72

4.54

20 Y

2.04

3.72

2.44

3.40

4.77

30 Y

2.25

3.96

2.83

3.65

NA

M: Months; Y: Years

Source: United States Treasury

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield

Interest rate risk is increasing in the US with amplifying fluctuations. Chart VI-13 of the Board of Governors provides the conventional mortgage rate for a fixed-rate 30-year mortgage. The rate stood at 5.87 percent on Jan 8, 2004, increasing to 6.79 percent on Jul 6, 2006. The rate bottomed at 3.35 percent on May 2, 2013. Fear of duration risk in longer maturities such as mortgage-backed securities caused continuing increases in the conventional mortgage rate that rose to 4.51 percent on Jul 11, 2013, 4.58 percent on Aug 22, 2013 and 3.66 percent on Jan 29, 2015, which is the last data point in Chart VI-13. The current decline of yields is encouraging a surge in mortgage applications that could be reversed in a new increase. Shayndi Raice and Nick Timiraos, writing on “Banks cut as mortgage boom ends,” on Jan 9, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303754404579310940019239208), analyze the drop in mortgage applications to a 13-year low, as measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Demand for home loans plunges,” on Apr 24, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579522051733228402?mg=reno64-wsj), analyzes data in Inside Mortgage Finance that mortgage lending of $235 billion in IQ2014 is 58 percent lower than a year earlier and 23 percent below IVQ2013. Mortgage lending collapsed to the lowest level in 14 years. In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm): “One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.”

clip_image005

Chart VI-13, US, Conventional Mortgage Rate, Jan 8, 2004 Jan 29, 2015

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update

There is a false impression of the existence of a monetary policy “science,” measurements and forecasting with which to steer the economy into “prosperity without inflation.” Market participants are remembering the Great Bond Crash of 1994 shown in Table VI-7G when monetary policy pursued nonexistent inflation, causing trillions of dollars of losses in fixed income worldwide while increasing the fed funds rate from 3 percent in Jan 1994 to 6 percent in Dec. The exercise in Table VI-7G shows a drop of the price of the 30-year bond by 18.1 percent and of the 10-year bond by 14.1 percent. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). The pursuit of nonexistent deflation during the past ten years has resulted in the largest monetary policy accommodation in history that created the 2007 financial market crash and global recession and is currently preventing smoother recovery while creating another financial crash in the future. The issue is not whether there should be a central bank and monetary policy but rather whether policy accommodation in doses from zero interest rates to trillions of dollars in the fed balance sheet endangers economic stability.

Table VI-7G, Fed Funds Rates, Thirty and Ten Year Treasury Yields and Prices, 30-Year Mortgage Rates and 12-month CPI Inflation 1994

1994

FF

30Y

30P

10Y

10P

MOR

CPI

Jan

3.00

6.29

100

5.75

100

7.06

2.52

Feb

3.25

6.49

97.37

5.97

98.36

7.15

2.51

Mar

3.50

6.91

92.19

6.48

94.69

7.68

2.51

Apr

3.75

7.27

88.10

6.97

91.32

8.32

2.36

May

4.25

7.41

86.59

7.18

88.93

8.60

2.29

Jun

4.25

7.40

86.69

7.10

90.45

8.40

2.49

Jul

4.25

7.58

84.81

7.30

89.14

8.61

2.77

Aug

4.75

7.49

85.74

7.24

89.53

8.51

2.69

Sep

4.75

7.71

83.49

7.46

88.10

8.64

2.96

Oct

4.75

7.94

81.23

7.74

86.33

8.93

2.61

Nov

5.50

8.08

79.90

7.96

84.96

9.17

2.67

Dec

6.00

7.87

81.91

7.81

85.89

9.20

2.67

Notes: FF: fed funds rate; 30Y: yield of 30-year Treasury; 30P: price of 30-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 6.29 percent and maturity in exactly 30 years; 10Y: yield of 10-year Treasury; 10P: price of 10-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 5.75 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years; MOR: 30-year mortgage; CPI: percent change of CPI in 12 months

Sources: yields and mortgage rates http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm CPI ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.t

Chart VI-14 provides the overnight fed funds rate, the yield of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, the yield of the 30-year constant maturity bond and the conventional mortgage rate from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. In Jan 1991, the fed funds rate was 6.91 percent, the 10-year Treasury yield 8.09 percent, the 30-year Treasury yield 8.27 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 9.64 percent. Before monetary policy tightening in Oct 1993, the rates and yields were 2.99 percent for the fed funds, 5.33 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 5.94 for the 30-year Treasury and 6.83 percent for the conventional mortgage rate. After tightening in Nov 1994, the rates and yields were 5.29 percent for the fed funds rate, 7.96 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 8.08 percent for the 30-year Treasury and 9.17 percent for the conventional mortgage rate.

clip_image006

Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Chart VI-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. There does not appear acceleration of consumer prices requiring aggressive tightening.

clip_image007

Chart VI-15, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. Inflation collapsed during the recession from Jul 1990 (III) and Mar 1991 (I) and the end of the Kuwait War on Feb 25, 1991 that stabilized world oil markets. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Policy tightening had adverse collateral effects in the form of emerging market crises in Mexico and Argentina and fixed income markets worldwide.

clip_image008

Chart VI-16, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Twelve-Month Percentage Change, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Table VI-2 extracts four rows of Table VI-1 with the Dollar/EUR (USD/EUR) exchange rate and Chinese Yuan/Dollar (CNY/USD) exchange rate that reveal pursuit of exchange rate policies resulting from monetary policy in the US and capital control/exchange rate policy in China. The ultimate intentions are the same: promoting internal economic activity at the expense of the rest of the world. The easy money policy of the US was deliberately or not but effectively to devalue the dollar from USD 1.1423/EUR on Jun 26, 2003 to USD 1.5914/EUR on Jul 14, 2008, or by 39.3 percent. The flight into dollar assets after the global recession caused revaluation to USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010, or by 25.1 percent. After the temporary interruption of the sovereign risk issues in Europe from Apr to Jul, 2010, shown in Table VI-4 below, the dollar has revalued to USD 1.1291 EUR on Jan 30, 2015 or by 5.3 percent {[(1.1291/1.192)-1]100 = -5.3%}. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar. China fixed the CNY to the dollar for a long period at a highly undervalued level of around CNY 8.2765/USD subsequently revaluing to CNY 6.8211/USD until Jun 7, 2010, or by 17.6 percent. After fixing again the CNY to the dollar, China revalued to CNY 6.2543/USD on Fri Jan 30, 2015, or by an additional 8.3 percent, for cumulative revaluation of 24.4 percent. The final row of Table VI-2 shows: revaluation of 0.3 percent in the week of Jan 9, 2015; change of 0.0 percent in the week of Jan 16, 2015; devaluation of 0.4 percent in the week of Jan 23, 2015; and devaluation of 0.4 percent in the week of Jan 30, 2015. There could be reversal of revaluation to devalue the Yuan.

Table VI-2, Dollar/Euro (USD/EUR) Exchange Rate and Chinese Yuan/Dollar (CNY/USD) Exchange Rate

USD/EUR

12/26/03

7/14/08

6/07/10

1/30/15

Rate

1.1423

1.5914

1.192

1.1291

CNY/USD

01/03
2000

07/21
2005

7/15
2008

1/30/

2015

Rate

8.2765

8.2765

6.8211

6.2543

Weekly Rates

1/09/2015

1/16/2015

1/23/2015

1/30/

2015

CNY/USD

6.2045

6.2063

6.2309

6.2543

∆% from Earlier Week*

0.3

0.0

-0.4

-0.4

*Negative sign is depreciation; positive sign is appreciation

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_currencies.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000

Professor Edward P Lazear (2013Jan7), writing on “Chinese ‘currency manipulation’ is not the problem,” on Jan 7, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578213203581231448.html), provides clear thought on the role of the yuan in trade between China and the United States and trade between China and Europe. There is conventional wisdom that Chinese exchange rate policy causes the loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States, which is shown by Lazear (2013Jan7) to be erroneous. The fact is that manipulation of the CNY/USD rate by China has only minor effects on US employment. Lazear (2013Jan7) shows that the movement of monthly exports of China to its major trading partners, United States and Europe, since 1995 cannot be explained by the fixing of the CNY/USD rate by China. The period is quite useful because it includes rapid growth before 2007, contraction until 2009 and weak subsequent expansion. Chart VI-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the CNY/USD exchange rate from Jan 3, 1995 to Jan 23, 2015 together with US recession dates in shaded areas. China fixed the CNY/USD rate for a long period as shown in the horizontal segment from 1995 to 2005. There was systematic revaluation of 17.6 percent from CNY 8.2765 on Jul 21, 2005 to CNY 6.8211 on Jul 15, 2008. China fixed the CNY/USD rate until Jun 7, 2010, to avoid adverse effects on its economy from the global recession, which is shown as a horizontal segment from 2009 until mid 2010. China then continued the policy of appreciation of the CNY relative to the USD with oscillations until the beginning of 2012 when the rate began to move sideways followed by a final upward slope of devaluation that is measured in Table VI-2A but virtually disappeared in the rate of CNY 6.3589/USD on Aug 17, 2012 and was nearly unchanged at CNY 6.3558/USD on Aug 24, 2012. China then appreciated 0.2 percent in the week of Dec 21, 2012, to CNY 6.2352/USD for cumulative 1.9 percent revaluation from Oct 28, 2011 and left the rate virtually unchanged at CNY 6.2316/USD on Jan 11, 2013, appreciating to CNY 6.2279/USD on Jan 23, 2014, which is the last data point in Chart VI-1. Revaluation of the CNY relative to the USD by 24.4 percent by Jan 30, 2015 has not reduced the trade surplus of China but reversal of the policy of revaluation could result in international confrontation. The interruption with upward slope in the final segment on the right of Chart VI-I is measured as virtually stability in Table VI-2A followed with decrease or revaluation and subsequent increase or devaluation. The final segment shows decline or revaluation with another upward move or devaluation. Linglin Wei, writing on “China intervenes to lower yuan,” on Feb 26, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304071004579406810684766716?KEYWORDS=china+yuan&mg=reno64-wsj), finds from informed sources that the central bank of China conducted the ongoing devaluation of the yuan with the objective of driving out arbitrageurs to widen the band of fluctuation. There is concern if the policy of revaluation is changing to devaluation.

clip_image009

Chart VI-1, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (USD), Business Days, Jan 3, 1995-Jan 23, 2015

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-1A provides the daily CNY/USD rate from Jan 5, 1981 to Jan 23, 2015. The exchange rate was CNY 1.5418/USD on Jan 5, 1981. There is sharp cumulative depreciation of 107.8 percent to CNY 3.2031 by Jul 2, 1986, continuing to CNY 5.8145/USD on Dec 29, 1993 for cumulative 277.1 percent since Jan 5, 1981. China then devalued sharply to CNY 8.7117/USD on Jan 7, 1994 for 49.8 percent relative to Dec 29, 1993 and cumulative 465.0 percent relative to Jan 5, 1981. China then fixed the rate at CNY 8.2765/USD until Jul 21, 2005 and revalued as analyzed in Chart VI-1. The final data point in Chart VI-1A is CNY 6.2279/USD on Jan 23, 2015. To be sure, China fixed the exchange rate after substantial prior devaluation. It is unlikely that the devaluation could have been effective after many years of fixing the exchange rate with high inflation and multiple changes in the world economy. The argument of Lazear (2013Jan7) is still valid in view of the lack of association between monthly exports of China to the US and Europe since 1995 and the exchange rate of China.

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Chart VI-1A, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (USD), Business Days, Jan 5, 1981-Jan 23, 2015

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-1B provides finer details with the rate of Chinese Yuan (CNY) to the US Dollar (USD) from Oct 28, 2011 to Jan 23, 2015. There have been alternations of revaluation and devaluation. The initial data point is CNY 6.5370 on Oct 28, 2011. There is an episode of devaluation from CNY 6.2790 on Apr 30, 2012 to CNY 6.3879 on Jul 25, 2012, or devaluation of 1.4 percent. Another devaluation is from CNY 6.0402/USD on Jan 14, 2014 to CNY 6.2279 on Jan 23, 2015, or devaluation of 3.1 percent. The United States Treasury estimates US government debt held by private investors at $9829 billion in Sep 2014. China’s holding of US Treasury securities represent 12.7 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors (http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html). Min Zeng, writing on “China plays a big role as US Treasury yields fall,” on Jul 16, 2004, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-plays-a-big-role-as-u-s-treasury-yields-fall-1405545034?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj), finds that acceleration in purchases of US Treasury securities by China has been an important factor in the decline of Treasury yields in 2014. Japan increased its holdings from $1186.4 billion in Nov 2013 to $1241.5 billion in Nov 2014 or 4.6 percent. The combined holdings of China and Japan in Nov 2014 add to $2492 billion, which is equivalent to 25.4 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing securities held by investors of $9829 billion in Sep 2014 (http://www.fms.treas.gov/bulletin/index.html). Total foreign holdings of Treasury securities rose from $5716.8 billion in Nov 2013 to $6112.4 billion in Nov 2014, or 6.9 percent. The US continues to finance its fiscal and balance of payments deficits with foreign savings (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). A point of saturation of holdings of US Treasury debt may be reached as foreign holders evaluate the threat of reduction of principal by dollar devaluation and reduction of prices by increases in yield, including possibly risk premium. Shultz et al (2012) find that the Fed financed three-quarters of the US deficit in fiscal year 2011, with foreign governments financing significant part of the remainder of the US deficit while the Fed owns one in six dollars of US national debt. Concentrations of debt in few holders are perilous because of sudden exodus in fear of devaluation and yield increases and the limit of refinancing old debt and placing new debt. In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

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Chart VI-1B, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (US), Business Days, Oct 28, 2011-Jan 23, 2015

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

There are major ongoing and unresolved realignments of exchange rates in the international financial system as countries and regions seek parities that can optimize their productive structures. Seeking exchange rate parity or exchange rate optimizing internal economic activities is complex in a world of unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and even negative nominal interest rates of government obligations such as negative yields for the two-year government bond of Germany. Regulation, trade and devaluation conflicts should have been expected from a global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez (2007), The Global Recession Risk, Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008a)): “There are significant grounds for concern on the basis of this experience. International economic cooperation and the international financial framework can collapse during extreme events. It is unlikely that there will be a repetition of the disaster of the Great Depression. However, a milder contraction can trigger regulatory, trade and exchange wars” (Pelaez and Pelaez, Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c), 181). Chart VI-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the key exchange rate of US dollars (USD) per euro (EUR) from Jan 4, 1999 to Jan 23, 2015. US recession dates are in shaded areas. The rate on Jan 4, 1999 was USD 1.1812/EUR, declining to USD 0.8279/EUR on Oct 25, 2000, or appreciation of the USD by 29.9 percent. The rate depreciated 21.9 percent to USD 1.0098/EUR on Jul 22, 2002. There was sharp devaluation of the USD of 34.9 percent to USD 1.3625/EUR on Dec 27, 2004 largely because of the 1 percent interest rate between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004 together with a form of quantitative easing by suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury, which was equivalent to withdrawing supply from markets. Another depreciation of 17.5 percent took the rate to USD 1.6010/EUR on Apr 22, 2008, already inside the shaded area of the global recession. The flight to the USD and obligations of the US Treasury appreciated the dollar by 22.3 percent to USD 1.2446/EUR on Oct 27, 2008. In the return of the carry trade after stress tests showed sound US bank balance sheets, the rate depreciated 21.2 percent to USD 1.5085/EUR on Nov 25, 2009. The sovereign debt crisis of Europe in the spring of 2010 caused sharp appreciation of 20.7 percent to USD 1.1959/EUR on Jun 6, 2010. Renewed risk appetite depreciated the rate 24.4 percent to USD 1.4875/EUR on May 3, 2011. The rate appreciated 5.7 percent to USD 1.1279/EUR on Jan 23, 2015, which is the last point in Chart VI-2. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).

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Chart VI-2, US Dollars (USD) per Euro (EUR), Jan 4, 1999 to Jan 23, 2015

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-3 provides three indexes of the US Dollars (USD) from Jan 4, 1995 to Jan 23, 2015.

Chart VI-3A provides the overnight fed funds rate and yields of the three-month constant maturity Treasury bill, the ten-year constant maturity Treasury note and Moody’s Baa bond from Jan 4, 1995 to Jan 29, 2015. The first phase from 1995 to 2001 shows sharp trend of appreciation of the USD while interest rates remained at relatively high levels. The dollar revalued partly because of the emerging market crises that provoked inflows of financial investment into the US and partly because of a deliberate strong dollar policy. DeLong and Eichengreen (2001, 4-5) argue:

“That context was an economic and political strategy that emphasized private investment as the engine for U.S. economic growth. Both components of this term, "private" and "investment," had implications for the administration’s international economic strategy. From the point of view of investment, it was important that international events not pressure on the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates, since this would have curtailed capital formation and vitiated the effects of the administration’s signature achievement: deficit reduction. A strong dollar -- or rather a dollar that was not expected to weaken -- was a key component of a policy which aimed at keeping the Fed comfortable with low interest rates. In addition, it was important to create a demand for the goods and services generated by this additional productive capacity. To the extent that this demand resided abroad, administration officials saw it as important that the process of increasing international integration, of both trade and finance, move forward for the interest of economic development in emerging markets and therefore in support of U.S. economic growth.”

The process of integration consisted of restructuring “international financial architecture” (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture: G7, IMF, BIS, Debtors and Creditors (2005)). Policy concerns subsequently shifted to the external imbalances, or current account deficits, and internal imbalances, or government deficits (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk: Dollar Devaluation and the World Economy (2007)). Fed policy consisted of lowering the policy rate or fed funds rate, which is close to the marginal cost of funding of banks, toward zero during the past decade. Near zero interest rates induce carry trades of selling dollar debt (borrowing), shorting the USD and investing in risk financial assets. Without risk aversion, near zero interest rates cause devaluation of the dollar. Chart VI-3 shows the weakening USD between the recession of 2001 and the contraction after IVQ2007. There was a flight to dollar assets and especially obligations of the US government after Sep 2008. Cochrane and Zingales (2009) show that flight was coincident with proposals of TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) to withdraw “toxic assets” in US banks (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a) and Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b)). There are shocks to globalization in the form of regulation, trade and devaluation wars and breakdown of international cooperation (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State: Vol. I (2008a), Globalization and the State: Vol. II (2008b) and Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c)). As evident in Chart VI-3A, there is no exit from near zero interest rates without a financial crisis and economic contraction, verified by the increase of interest rates from 1 percent in Jun 2004 to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target of the fed funds rate from 7.03 percent on Jul 3, 2000, to 1.00 percent on Jun 22, 2004, in pursuit of non-existing deflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-85). The FOMC implemented increments of 25 basis points of the fed funds target from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006, raising the fed funds rate to 5.25 percent on Jul 3, 2006, as shown in Chart VI-3A. The gradual exit from the first round of unconventional monetary policy from 1.00 percent in Jun 2004 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/20040630/default.htm) to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20060629a.htm) caused the financial crisis and global recession. There are conflicts on exchange rate movements among central banks. There is concern of declining inflation in the euro area and appreciation of the euro. On Jun 5, 2014, the European Central Bank introduced cuts in interest rates and a negative rate paid on deposits of banks (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605.en.html):

“5 June 2014 - Monetary policy decisions

At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:

  1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 10 basis points to 0.15%, starting from the operation to be settled on 11 June 2014.
  2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 35 basis points to 0.40%, with effect from 11 June 2014.
  3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 10 basis points to -0.10%, with effect from 11 June 2014. A separate press release to be published at 3.30 p.m. CET today will provide details on the implementation of the negative deposit facility rate.”

The ECB also introduced new measures of monetary policy on Jun 5, 2014 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605_2.en.html):

“5 June 2014 - ECB announces monetary policy measures to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism

In pursuing its price stability mandate, the Governing Council of the ECB has today announced measures to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism by supporting lending to the real economy. In particular, the Governing Council has decided:

  1. To conduct a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) aimed at improving bank lending to the euro area non-financial private sector [1], excluding loans to households for house purchase, over a window of two years.
  2. To intensify preparatory work related to outright purchases of asset-backed securities (ABS).”

The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi analyzed the measures at a press conference (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140605.en.html). At the press conference following the meeting of the ECB on Jul 3, 2014, Mario Draghi stated (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140703.en.html): “In fact, as I said, interest rates will stay low for an extended period of time, and the Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment to use also nonstandard, unconventional measures to cope with the risk of a too-prolonged period of time of low inflation.”

The President of the ECB Mario Draghi analyzed unemployment in the euro area and the policy response policy in a speech at the Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers on Aug 22, 2014 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140822.en.html):

“We have already seen exchange rate movements that should support both aggregate demand and inflation, which we expect to be sustained by the diverging expected paths of policy in the US and the euro area (Figure 7). We will launch our first Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operation in September, which has so far garnered significant interest from banks. And our preparation for outright purchases in asset-backed security (ABS) markets is fast moving forward and we expect that it should contribute to further credit easing. Indeed, such outright purchases would meaningfully contribute to diversifying the channels for us to generate liquidity.”

On Sep 4, 2014, the European Central Bank lowered policy rates (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140904.en.html):

“4 September 2014 - Monetary policy decisions

At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:

  1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 10 basis points to 0.05%, starting from the operation to be settled on 10 September 2014.
  2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 10 basis points to 0.30%, with effect from 10 September 2014.
  3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 10 basis points to -0.20%, with effect from 10 September 2014.”

The President of the European Central Bank announced on Sep 4, 2014, the decision to expand the balance sheet by purchases of asset-backed securities (ABS) in a new ABS Purchase Program (ABSPP) and covered bonds (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140904.en.html):

“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, the Governing Council decided today to lower the interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem by 10 basis points to 0.05% and the rate on the marginal lending facility by 10 basis points to 0.30%. The rate on the deposit facility was lowered by 10 basis points to -0.20%. In addition, the Governing Council decided to start purchasing non-financial private sector assets. The Eurosystem will purchase a broad portfolio of simple and transparent asset-backed securities (ABSs) with underlying assets consisting of claims against the euro area non-financial private sector under an ABS purchase programme (ABSPP). This reflects the role of the ABS market in facilitating new credit flows to the economy and follows the intensification of preparatory work on this matter, as decided by the Governing Council in June. In parallel, the Eurosystem will also purchase a broad portfolio of euro-denominated covered bonds issued by MFIs domiciled in the euro area under a new covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3). Interventions under these programmes will start in October 2014. The detailed modalities of these programmes will be announced after the Governing Council meeting of 2 October 2014. The newly decided measures, together with the targeted longer-term refinancing operations which will be conducted in two weeks, will have a sizeable impact on our balance sheet.”

At the Thirtieth Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the IMF (IMFC), the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi stated (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp141010.en.html):

“Our monetary policy continues to aim at firmly anchoring medium to long-term inflation expectations, in line with our objective of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. In this context, we have taken both conventional and unconventional measures that will contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels closer to our aim. Our unconventional measures, more specifically our TLTROs (Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations) and our new purchase programmes for ABSs and covered bonds, will further enhance the functioning of our monetary policy transmission mechanism and facilitate credit provision to the real economy. Should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, the ECB’s Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate.”

In a speech on “Monetary Policy in the Euro Area,” on Nov 21, 2014, the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, advised of the determination to bring inflation back to normal levels by aggressive holding of securities in the balance sheet (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp141121.en.html):

“In short, there is a combination of policies that will work to bring growth and inflation back on a sound path, and we all have to meet our responsibilities in achieving that. For our part, we will continue to meet our responsibility – we will do what we must to raise inflation and inflation expectations as fast as possible, as our price stability mandate requires of us.

If on its current trajectory our policy is not effective enough to achieve this, or further risks to the inflation outlook materialise, we would step up the pressure and broaden even more the channels through which we intervene, by altering accordingly the size, pace and composition of our purchases.”

In the Introductory Statement to the press conference on Dec 4, 2014, the President of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi advised that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is141204.en.html):

“In this context, early next year the Governing Council will reassess the monetary stimulus achieved, the expansion of the balance sheet and the outlook for price developments. We will also evaluate the broader impact of recent oil price developments on medium-term inflation trends in the euro area. Should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, the Governing Council remains unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate. This would imply altering early next year the size, pace and composition of our measures.”

The Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced on Jan 15, 2015, the termination of its peg of the exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the euro (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):

“The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has decided to discontinue the minimum exchange rate of

CHF 1.20 per euro with immediate effect and to cease foreign currency purchases associated

with enforcing it.”

The SNB also lowered interest rates to nominal negative percentages (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):

“At the same time as discontinuing the minimum exchange rate, the SNB will be lowering the

interest rate for balances held on sight deposit accounts to –0.75% from 22 January. The

exemption thresholds remain unchanged. Further lowering the interest rate makes Swiss-franc

investments considerably less attractive and will mitigate the effects of the decision to

discontinue the minimum exchange rate. The target range for the three-month Libor is being

lowered by 0.5 percentage points to between –1.25% and –0.25%.”

The Swiss franc rate relative to the euro (CHF/EUR) appreciated 18.7 percent on Jan 15, 2015. The Swiss franc rate relative to the dollar (CHF/USD) appreciated 17.7 percent. Central banks are taking measures in anticipation of the quantitative easing by the European Central Bank.

On Jan 22, 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to implement an “expanded asset purchase program” with combined asset purchases of €60 billion per month “until at least Sep 2016 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html). The objective of the program is that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html):

“Asset purchases provide monetary stimulus to the economy in a context where key ECB interest rates are at their lower bound. They further ease monetary and financial conditions, making access to finance cheaper for firms and households. This tends to support investment and consumption, and ultimately contributes to a return of inflation rates towards 2%.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, explains the coordination of asset purchases with NCBs (National Central Banks) of the euro area and risk sharing (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“In March 2015 the Eurosystem will start to purchase euro-denominated investment-grade securities issued by euro area governments and agencies and European institutions in the secondary market. The purchases of securities issued by euro area governments and agencies will be based on the Eurosystem NCBs’ shares in the ECB’s capital key. Some additional eligibility criteria will be applied in the case of countries under an EU/IMF adjustment programme. As regards the additional asset purchases, the Governing Council retains control over all the design features of the programme and the ECB will coordinate the purchases, thereby safeguarding the singleness of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Eurosystem will make use of decentralised implementation to mobilise its resources. With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, rejected the possibility of seigniorage in the new asset purchase program, or central bank financing of fiscal expansion (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“As I just said, it would be a big mistake if countries were to consider that the presence of this programme might be an incentive to fiscal expansion. They would undermine the confidence, so it’s not directed to monetary financing at all. Actually, it’s been designed as to avoid any monetary financing.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, does not find effects of monetary policy in inflating asset prices (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“On the first question, we monitor closely any potential instance of risk to financial stability. So we're very alert to that risk. So far we don't see bubbles. There may be some local episodes of certain specific markets where prices are going up fast. But to have a bubble, besides having that, one should also identify, detect an increase, dramatic increase in leverage or in bank credit, and we don't see that now. However, we, as I said, we are alert. If bubbles are of a local nature, they should be addressed by local instruments, namely macro-prudential instruments rather than by monetary policy.”

The DAX index of German equities increased 1.3 percent on Jan 22, 2015 and 2.1 percent on Jan 23, 2015. The euro depreciated from EUR 1.1611/USD (EUR 0.8613/USD) on Wed Jan 21, 2015, to EUR 1.1206/USD (EUR 0.8924/USD) on Fri Jan 23, 2015, or 3.6 percent. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar.

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Chart VI-3, US Dollar Currency Indexes, Jan 4, 1995-Jan 23, 2015

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

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Chart VI-3A, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, Yield of Three-Month Treasury Constant Maturity, Yield of Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Yield of Moody’s Baa Bond, Jan 4, 1995 to Jan 29, 2015

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15

Carry trades induced by zero interest rates increase capital flows into emerging markets that appreciate exchange rates. Portfolio reallocations away from emerging markets depreciate their exchange rates in reversals of capital flows. Chart VI-4A provides the exchange rate of the Mexican peso (MXN) per US dollar from Nov 8, 1993 to Jan 23, 2015. The first data point in Chart VI-4A is MXN 3.1520 on Nov 8, 1993. The rate devalued to 11.9760 on Nov 14, 1995 during emerging market crises in the 1990s and the increase of interest rates in the US in 1994 that stressed world financial markets (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture 2005, The Global Recession Risk 2007, 147-77). The MXN depreciated sharply to MXN 15.4060/USD on Mar 2, 2009, during the global recession. The rate moved to MXN 11.5050/USD on May 2, 2011, during the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The rate depreciated to 11.9760 on May 9, 2013. The final data point is MXN 14.6400/USD on Jan 23, 2015.

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Chart VI-4A, Mexican Peso (MXN) per US Dollar (USD), Nov 8, 1993 to Jan 23, 2015

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

There are collateral effects worldwide from unconventional monetary policy. In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Professor Willem Buiter (2014Feb4), a distinguished economist currently Global Chief Economist at Citigroup (http://www.willembuiter.com/resume.pdf), writing on “The Fed’s bad manners risk offending foreigners,” on Feb 4, 2014, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fbb09572-8d8d-11e3-9dbb-00144feab7de.html#axzz2suwrwkFs), concurs with Raghuram Rajan. Buiter (2014Feb4) argues that international policy cooperation in monetary policy is both in the interest of the world and the United States. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows. In a speech at the Brookings Institution on Apr 10, 2014, Raghuram G. Rajan (2014Apr10, 1, 10) argues:

“As the world seems to be struggling back to its feet after the great financial crisis, I want to draw attention to an area we need to be concerned about: the conduct of monetary policy in this integrated world. A good way to describe the current environment is one of extreme monetary easing through unconventional policies. In a world where debt overhangs and the need for structural change constrain domestic demand, a sizeable portion of the effects of such policies spillover across borders, sometimes through a weaker exchange rate. More worryingly, it prompts a reaction. Such competitive easing occurs both simultaneously and sequentially, as I will argue, and both advanced economies and emerging economies engage in it. Aggregate world demand may be weaker and more distorted than it should be, and financial risks higher. To ensure stable and sustainable growth, the international rules of the game need to be revisited. Both advanced economies and emerging economies need to adapt, else I fear we are about to embark on the next leg of a wearisome cycle. A first step to prescribing the right medicine is to recognize the cause of the sickness. Extreme monetary easing, in my view, is more cause than medicine. The sooner we recognize that, the more sustainable world growth we will have.”

Professor Raguram G Rajan, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation.

Chart VI-4B provides the rate of the Indian rupee (INR) per US dollar (USD) from Jan 2, 1973 to Jan 23, 2015. The first data point is INR 8.0200 on Jan 2, 1973. The rate depreciated sharply to INR 51.9600 on Mar 3, 2009, during the global recession. The rate appreciated to INR 44.0300/USD on Jul 28, 2011 in the midst of the sovereign debt event in the euro area. The rate overshot to INR 68.8000 on Aug 28, 2013. The final data point is INR 61.4600/USD on Jan 23, 2015.

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Chart VI-4B, Indian Rupee (INR) per US Dollar (USD), Jan 2, 1973 to Jan 23, 2015

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-5 provides the exchange rate of JPY (Japan yen) per USD (US dollars). The first data point on the extreme left is JPY 357.7300/USD for Jan 4, 1971. The JPY has appreciated over the long term relative to the USD with fluctuations along an evident long-term appreciation. Before the global recession, the JPY stood at JPY 124.0900/USD on Jun 22, 2007. The use of the JPY as safe haven is evident by sharp appreciation during the global recession to JPY 110.48/USD on Aug 15, 2008, and to JPY 87.8000/USD on Jan 21, 2009. The final data point in Chart VI-5 is JPY 117.8000/USD on Jan 23, 2015 for appreciation of 5.1 percent relative to JPY 124.0900/USD on Jun 22, 2007 before the global recession and expansion characterized by recurring bouts of risk aversion. Takashi Nakamichi and Eleanor Warnock, writing on “Japan lashes out over dollar, euro,” on Dec 29, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323530404578207440474874604.html?mod=WSJ_markets_liveupdate&mg=reno64-wsj), analyze the “war of words” launched by Japan’s new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his finance minister Taro Aso, arguing of deliberate devaluations of the USD and EUR relative to the JPY, which are hurting Japan’s economic activity. Gerard Baker and Jacob M. Shlesinger, writing on “Bank of Japan’s Kuroda signals impatience with Abe government,” on May 23, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303480304579579311491068756?KEYWORDS=bank+of+japan+kuroda&mg=reno64-wsj), analyze concerns of the Governor of the Bank of Japan Haruhiko Kuroda that the JPY has strengthened relative to the USD, partly eroding earlier depreciation. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).

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Chart VI-5, Japanese Yen JPY per US Dollars USD, Monthly, Jan 4, 1971-Jan 23, 2015

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html

Zero interest rates in the United States forever tend to depreciate the dollar against every other currency if there is no risk aversion preventing portfolio rebalancing toward risk financial assets, which include the capital markets and exchange rates of emerging-market economies. The objective of unconventional monetary policy as argued by Yellen 2011AS) is to devalue the dollar to increase net exports that increase US economic growth. Increasing net exports and internal economic activity in the US is equivalent to decreasing net exports and internal economic activity in other countries.

Continental territory, rich endowment of natural resources, investment in human capital, teaching and research universities, motivated labor force and entrepreneurial initiative provide Brazil with comparative advantages in multiple economic opportunities. Exchange rate parity is critical in achieving Brazil’s potential but is difficult in a world of zero interest rates. Chart IV-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate of Brazilian real (BRL) per US dollar (USD) from BRL 1.2074/USD on Jan 4, 1999 to BRL 2.5805/USD on Jan 23, 2015. The rate reached BRL 3.9450/USD on Oct 10, 2002 appreciating 60.5 percent to BRL 1.5580/USD on Aug 1, 2008. The rate depreciated 68.1 percent to BRL 2.6187/USD on Dec 5, 2008 during worldwide flight from risk. The rate appreciated again by 41.3 percent to BRL 1.5375/USD on Jul 26, 2011. The final data point in Chart VI-6 is BRL 2.5805/USD on Jan 23, 2015 for depreciation of 67.8 percent. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).

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Chart VI-6, Brazilian Real (BRL) per US Dollar (USD) Jan 4, 1999 to Jan 23, 2015

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the history of the BRL beginning with the first data point of BRL 0.8440/USD on Jan 2, 1995. The rate jumped to BRL 2.0700/USD on Jan 29, 1999 after changes in exchange rate policy and then to BRL 2.2000/USD on Mar 3, 1999. The rate depreciated 26.7 percent to BRL 2.7880/USD on Sep 21, 2001 relative to Mar 3, 1999.

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Chart VI-7, Brazilian Real (BRL) per US Dollar (USD), Jan 2, 1995 to Jan 23, 2015

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas 

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

The major reason and channel of transmission of unconventional monetary policy is through expectations of inflation. Fisher (1930) provided theoretical and historical relation of interest rates and inflation. Let in be the nominal interest rate, ir the real or inflation-adjusted interest rate and πe the expectation of inflation in the time term of the interest rate, which are all expressed as proportions. The following expression provides the relation of real and nominal interest rates and the expectation of inflation:

(1 + ir) = (1 + in)/(1 + πe) (1)

That is, the real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate discounted by the expectation of inflation in time term of the interest rate. Fisher (1933) analyzed the devastating effect of deflation on debts. Nominal debt contracts remained at original principal interest but net worth and income of debtors contracted during deflation. Real interest rates increase during declining inflation. For example, if the interest rate is 3 percent and prices decline 0.2 percent, equation (1) calculates the real interest rate as:

(1 +0.03)/(1 – 0.02) = 1.03/(0.998) = 1.032

That is, the real rate of interest is (1.032 – 1) 100 or 3.2 percent. If inflation were 2 percent, the real rate of interest would be 0.98 percent, or about 1.0 percent {[(1.03/1.02) -1]100 = 0.98%}.

The yield of the one-year Treasury security was quoted in the Wall Street Journal at 0.114 percent on Fri May 17, 2013 (http://online.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_topnav_marketdata_main). The expected rate of inflation πe in the next twelve months is not observed. Assume that it would be equal to the rate of inflation in the past twelve months estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BLS) at 1.1 percent (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The real rate of interest would be obtained as follows:

(1 + 0.00114)/(1 + 0.011) = (1 + rr) = 0.9902

That is, ir is equal to 1 – 0.9902 or minus 0.98 percent. Investing in a one-year Treasury security results in a loss of 0.98 percent relative to inflation. The objective of unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates is to induce consumption and investment because of the loss to inflation of riskless financial assets. Policy would be truly irresponsible if it intended to increase inflationary expectations or πe. The result could be the same rate of unemployment with higher inflation (Kydland and Prescott 1977).

Focus is shifting from tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Markets overreacted to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases to $15 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed.

What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jan 28, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20150128a.htm):

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate remains appropriate.  In determining how long to maintain this target range, the Committee will assess progress--both realized and expected--toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.  This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.  Based on its current assessment, the Committee judges that it can be patient in beginning to normalize the stance of monetary policy.  However, if incoming information indicates faster progress toward the Committee’s employment and inflation objectives than the Committee now expects, then increases in the target range for the federal funds rate are likely to occur sooner than currently anticipated.  Conversely, if progress proves slower than expected, then increases in the target range are likely to occur later than currently anticipated.” (emphasis added). The FOMC added “readings” of “international developments.

How long is “considerable time”? At the press conference following the meeting on Mar 19, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question of Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal explaining “In particular, the Committee has endorsed the view that it anticipates that will be a considerable period after the asset purchase program ends before it will be appropriate to begin to raise rates. And of course on our present path, well, that's not utterly preset. We would be looking at next, next fall. So, I think that's important guidance” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140319.pdf). Many focused on “next fall,” ignoring that the path of increasing rates is not “utterly preset.”

At the press conference following the meeting on Dec 17, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question by Jon Hilseranth of the Wall Street Journal explaining “patience” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20141217.pdf):

“So I did say that this statement that the committee can be patient

should be interpreted as meaning that it is unlikely to begin the normalization process, for at least

the next couple of meetings. Now that doesn't point to any preset or predetermined time at which

normalization is -- will begin. There are a range of views on the committee, and it will be

dependent on how incoming data bears on the progress, the economy is making. First of all, I

want to emphasize that no meeting is completely off the table in the sense that if we do see faster

progress toward our objectives than we currently expect, then it is possible that the process of

normalization would occur sooner than we now anticipated. And of course the converse is also

true. So at this point, we think it unlikely that it will be appropriate, that we will see conditions

for at least the next couple of meetings that will make it appropriate for us to decide to begin

normalization. A number of committee participants have indicated that in their view, conditions

could be appropriate by the middle of next year. But there is no preset time.”

At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):

“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.

Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.

Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) provides comprehensive review of the theory and measurement of labor markets. Monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

Yellen (2014Aug22) finds that the unemployment rate is not sufficient in determining slack:

“One convenient way to summarize the information contained in a large number of indicators is through the use of so-called factor models. Following this methodology, Federal Reserve Board staff developed a labor market conditions index from 19 labor market indicators, including four I just discussed. This broadly based metric supports the conclusion that the labor market has improved significantly over the past year, but it also suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) restates that the FOMC determines monetary policy on newly available information and interpretation of labor markets and inflation and does not follow a preset path:

“But if progress in the labor market continues to be more rapid than anticipated by the Committee or if inflation moves up more rapidly than anticipated, resulting in faster convergence toward our dual objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target could come sooner than the Committee currently expects and could be more rapid thereafter. Of course, if economic performance turns out to be disappointing and progress toward our goals proceeds more slowly than we expect, then the future path of interest rates likely would be more accommodative than we currently anticipate. As I have noted many times, monetary policy is not on a preset path. The Committee will be closely monitoring incoming information on the labor market and inflation in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”

The minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 16-17, 2014, reveal concern with global economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20140917.htm):

“Most viewed the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as broadly balanced. However, a number of participants noted that economic growth over the medium term might be slower than they expected if foreign economic growth came in weaker than anticipated, structural productivity continued to increase only slowly, or the recovery in residential construction continued to lag.”

There is similar concern in the minutes of the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16-17, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20141217.htm):

“In their discussion of the foreign economic outlook, participants noted that the implications of the drop in crude oil prices would differ across regions, especially if the price declines affected inflation expectations and financial markets; a few participants said that the effect on overseas employment and output as a whole was likely to be positive. While some participants had lowered their assessments of the prospects for global economic growth, several noted that the likelihood of further responses by policymakers abroad had increased. Several participants indicated that they expected slower economic growth abroad to negatively affect the U.S. economy, principally through lower net exports, but the net effect of lower oil prices on U.S. economic activity was anticipated to be positive.”

Chair Yellen analyzes the view of inflation (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140416a.htm):

“Inflation, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, has slowed from an annual rate of about 2-1/2 percent in early 2012 to less than 1 percent in February of this year. This rate is well below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective. Many advanced economies are observing a similar softness in inflation.

To some extent, the low rate of inflation seems due to influences that are likely to be temporary, including a deceleration in consumer energy prices and outright declines in core import prices in recent quarters. Longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably steady, however. We anticipate that, as the effects of transitory factors subside and as labor market gains continue, inflation will gradually move back toward 2 percent.”

There is a critical phrase in the statement of Sep 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm): “but mortgage rates have risen further.” Did the increase of mortgage rates influence the decision of the FOMC not to taper? Is FOMC “communication” and “guidance” successful? Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?

At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:

“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.

For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”

In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):

“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability.  If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.  In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that it does not run persistently above or below that level (emphasis added).”

In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm):

“The economy has continued to recover from the steep recession of 2008 and 2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth stepped up to an average annual rate of about 3-1/4 percent over the second half of last year, a faster pace than in the first half and during the preceding two years. Although real GDP growth is currently estimated to have paused in the first quarter of this year, I see that pause as mostly reflecting transitory factors, including the effects of the unusually cold and snowy winter weather. With the harsh winter behind us, many recent indicators suggest that a rebound in spending and production is already under way, putting the overall economy on track for solid growth in the current quarter. One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.

Conditions in the labor market have continued to improve. The unemployment rate was 6.3 percent in April, about 1-1/4 percentage points below where it was a year ago. Moreover, gains in payroll employment averaged nearly 200,000 jobs per month over the past year. During the economic recovery so far, payroll employment has increased by about 8-1/2 million jobs since its low point, and the unemployment rate has declined about 3-3/4 percentage points since its peak.

While conditions in the labor market have improved appreciably, they are still far from satisfactory. Even with recent declines in the unemployment rate, it continues to be elevated. Moreover, both the share of the labor force that has been unemployed for more than six months and the number of individuals who work part time but would prefer a full-time job are at historically high levels. In addition, most measures of labor compensation have been rising slowly--another signal that a substantial amount of slack remains in the labor market.

Inflation has been quite low even as the economy has continued to expand. Some of the factors contributing to the softness in inflation over the past year, such as the declines seen in non-oil import prices, will probably be transitory. Importantly, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained stable. That said, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recognizes that inflation persistently below 2 percent--the rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its dual mandate--could pose risks to economic performance, and we are monitoring inflation developments closely.

Looking ahead, I expect that economic activity will expand at a somewhat faster pace this year than it did last year, that the unemployment rate will continue to decline gradually, and that inflation will begin to move up toward 2 percent. A faster rate of economic growth this year should be supported by reduced restraint from changes in fiscal policy, gains in household net worth from increases in home prices and equity values, a firming in foreign economic growth, and further improvements in household and business confidence as the economy continues to strengthen. Moreover, U.S. financial conditions remain supportive of growth in economic activity and employment.”

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (10

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. The current reality is cyclical slow growth.

In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:

“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.

The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”

Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) is that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This is a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets. A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/peaking-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html).

Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 17164.95 on Fri Jan 30, 2015, which is higher by 21.2 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 20.9 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs. Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):

So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).

In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):

“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”

Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:

“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).

Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:

“Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).

Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Professor Raguram G Rajan, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation. Rajan (2005) anticipated the risks of the world financial crisis. Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor (1993, 1998LB, 1999, 1998LB, 1999, 2007JH, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012JMCB, 2014Jan3) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html).

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. The DJIA has increased 77.2 percent since the trough of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe on Jul 16, 2010 to Jan 30, 2015; S&P 500 has gained 95.1 percent and DAX 88.6 percent. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 1/30/15” had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 followed by negative performance but now some valuations of equity indexes show varying behavior. China’s Shanghai Composite is 34.7 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 100.3 percent above the trough. DJ Asia Pacific TSM is 27.0 percent above the trough. Dow Global is 43.3 percent above the trough. STOXX 50 of 50 blue-chip European equities (http://www.stoxx.com/indices/index_information.html?symbol=sx5E) is 39.2 percent above the trough. NYSE Financial Index is 43.3 percent above the trough. DAX index of German equities (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DAX:IND) is 88.6 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 100.3 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 55.1 percent above the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 17,674.39 on Fri Jan 30, 2015 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 72.4 percent higher than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar appreciated by 5.3 percent relative to the euro. The dollar devalued before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 1/30/15” in Table VI-4 shows decrease of 4.2 percent in the week for China’s Shanghai Composite. DJ Asia Pacific decreased 0.3 percent. NYSE Financial decreased 3.0 percent in the week. Dow Global decreased 2.5 percent in the week of Jan 30, 2015. The DJIA decreased 2.9 percent and S&P 500 decreased 2.8 percent. DAX of Germany increased 0.4 percent. STOXX 50 decreased 1.6 percent. The USD depreciated 0.8 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table VI-4 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 1/30/15” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to Jan 30, 2015. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 1/30/15” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 1/30/15.” There are now several equity indexes above the peak in Table VI-4: DJIA 53.2 percent, S&P 500 63.9 percent, DAX 68.9 percent, Dow Global 16.9 percent, DJ Asia Pacific 11.2 percent, NYSE Financial Index (http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/nykid.shtml) 18.1 percent, Nikkei Average 55.1 percent, STOXX 50 17.9 percent. Shanghai Composite is 1.4 percent above the peak. The US dollar strengthened 25.4 percent relative to the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010. Sharp and continuing strengthening of the dollar is affecting balance sheets of US corporations with foreign operations (http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Pronouncement_C/SummaryPage&cid=900000010318). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is following “financial and international developments’ as part of the process of framing interest rate policy (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20150128a.htm). Inyoung Hwang, writing on “Fed optimism spurs record bets against stock volatility,” on Aug 21, 2014, published in Bloomberg.com (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-21/fed-optimism-spurs-record-bets-against-stock-voalitlity.html), informs that the S&P 500 is trading at 16.6 times estimated earnings, which is higher than the five-year average of 14.3 Tom Lauricella, writing on Mar 31, 2014, on “Stock investors see hints of a stronger quarter,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304157204579473513864900656?mod=WSJ_smq0314_LeadStory&mg=reno64-wsj), finds views of stronger earnings among many money managers with positive factors for equity markets in continuing low interest rates and US economic growth. There is important information in the Quarterly Markets review of the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/public/page/quarterly-markets-review-03312014.html) for IQ2014. Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. Future company cash flows derive from investment projects. In IQ1980, real gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of chained 2009 dollars, growing to $1,222.9 billion in IIQ1988 or 28.5 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 7.5 percent from $2605.2 billion in IVQ2007 to $2,800.2 billion in IVQ2014. Real private fixed investment increased 2.8 percent from $2,586.3 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,658.5 billion in IVQ2014. Private fixed investment fell relative to IVQ2007 in all quarters preceding IIQ2014. Growth of real private investment is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012. The investment decision of United States corporations has been fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash.

Corporate profits with IVA and CCA rebounded with $3.1 billion in IVQ2013. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell $201.7 billion in IQ2014 and increased $164.1 billion in IIQ2014. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $64.5 billion in IIIQ2014. In IVQ2013, profits after tax with IVA and CCA decreased $24.7 billion. In IQ2014, profits after tax with IVA and CCA decreased $268.6 billion. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA increased at $118.4 billion in IIQ2014 and at $70.1 billion in IIIQ2014. Net dividends fell at $187.0 billion in IIIQ2013 and increased at $80.6 billion in IVQ2013. Net dividends fell at $89.5 billion in IQ2014 and fell at $0.5 billion in IIQ2014. Net dividends fell at $3.9 billion in IIIQ2014. Undistributed profits with IVA and CCA fell at $105.5 billion in IVQ2013. Undistributed profits with IVA and CCA fell $178.9 percent in IQ2014 and increased at $118.8 billion in IIQ2014 and at $73.9 billion in IIIQ2014. Undistributed corporate profits swelled 315.9 percent from $107.7 billion in IQ2007 to $447.9 billion in IIIQ2014 and changed signs from minus $55.9 billion in current dollars in IVQ2007. Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment.

The investment decision of US business is fractured. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

clip_image021

Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

clip_image022

declines. Equally, decline in expected revenue from the stock or project, Rτ, causes decline in valuation.

An intriguing issue is the difference in performance of valuations of risk financial assets and economic growth and employment. Paul A. Samuelson (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1970/samuelson-bio.html) popularized the view of the elusive relation between stock markets and economic activity in an often-quoted phrase “the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions.” In the presence of zero interest rates forever, valuations of risk financial assets are likely to differ from the performance of the overall economy. The interrelations of financial and economic variables prove difficult to analyze and measure.

Table VI-4, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and 10-Year Treasury  

 

Peak

Trough

∆% to Trough

∆% Peak to 1/30/

/15

∆% Week 1/30/15

∆% Trough to 1/30/

15

DJIA

4/26/
10

7/2/10

-13.6

53.2

-2.9

77.2

S&P 500

4/23/
10

7/20/
10

-16.0

63.9

-2.8

95.1

NYSE Finance

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-20.3

18.1

-3.0

48.3

Dow Global

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-18.4

16.9

-2.5

43.3

Asia Pacific

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-12.5

11.2

-0.3

27.0

Japan Nikkei Aver.

4/05/
10

8/31/
10

-22.5

55.1

0.9

100.3

China Shang.

4/15/
10

7/02
/10

-24.7

1.4

-4.2

34.7

STOXX 50

4/15/10

7/2/10

-15.3

17.9

-1.6

39.2

DAX

4/26/
10

5/25/
10

-10.5

68.9

0.4

88.6

Dollar
Euro

11/25 2009

6/7
2010

21.2

25.4

-0.8

5.3

DJ UBS Comm.

1/6/
10

7/2/10

-14.5

NA

NA

NA

10-Year T Note

4/5/
10

4/6/10

3.986

2.784

1.683

 

T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

ESII Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 22 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2014. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2014 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2015/pdf/gdp4q14_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2014 would have accumulated to 23.0 percent. GDP in IVQ2014 would be $18,438.0 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,126.4 billion than actual $16,311.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 25.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 15.7 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html). US GDP in IVQ2014 is 11.5 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,311.6 billion in IVQ2014 or 8.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. The long-term trend is growth at average 3.3 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Dec 2014. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 99.2392 in Dec 2007 to 124.5620 in Dec 2014. The actual index NSA in Dec 2014 is 101.2840, which is 18.7 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.4 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014, raising the index at trend to 117.1610 in Dec 2014. The output of manufacturing at 101.2840 in Dec 2014 is 13.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as fluctuating from mediocre growth of 2.5 percent on an annual basis in 2010 to 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.3 percent in 2012, 2.2 percent in 2013 and 2.4 percent in 2014. The following calculations show that actual growth is around 2.4 to 2.5 percent per year. The rate of growth of 1.1 percent in the entire cycle from 2007 to 2014 is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which the economy of the US always attained for entire cycles in expansions after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.

Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita

 

GDP

 

Long-Term

   

1929-2014

3.3

 

1947-2014

3.2

 

Whole Cycles

   

1980-1989

3.5

 

2006-2014

1.2

 

2007-2014

1.1

 

Cyclical Contractions ∆%

   

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

-4.7

 

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

-4.2

 

Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆%

   

IQ1983 to IVQ1985

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

IQ1983-IIIQ1987

IQ1983 to IVQ1987

IQ1983 to IQ1988

1Q1983 to IIQ1988

5.9

5.7

5.4

5.2

5.0

5.0

4.9

5.0

4.9

4.9

 

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

7.8

 

IIIQ2009 to IVQ2014

2.4

 

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

2.7

 
 

Real Disposable Income

Real Disposable Income per Capita

Long-Term

   

1929-2013

3.2

2.0

1947-1999

3.7

2.3

Whole Cycles

   

1980-1989

3.5

2.6

2006-2013

1.3

0.5

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace from 2.2 to 2.4 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.

1. Average Annual Growth in the Past Twelve Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013 and the four quarters of 2014 accumulated to 7.4 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.4 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2014 of $16,311.6 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,190.3 billion and compounding by 4/11: {[($16,311.6/$15,190.3)4/12 -1]100 = 2.4 percent.

2. Average Annual Growth in the Past Four Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of IVQ2013 to IVQ2014 accumulated to 2.5 percent that is equivalent to 2.5 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2014 of $16,311.6 billion by GDP in IVQ2013 of $15,016.2 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($16,311.6/$15,916.2)4/4 -1]100 = 2.5 %}. The US economy grew 2.5 percent in IVQ2014 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IVQ2013. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is in the borderline of contraction, and negative in IQ2014. US GDP fell 0.5 percent in IQ2014. The rate of growth of GDP in the revision of IIIQ2013 is 4.5 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR). Inventory accumulation contributed 1.49 percentage points to this rate of growth. The actual rate without this impulse of unsold inventories would have been 3.0 percent, or 0.74 percent in IIIQ2013, such that annual equivalent growth in 2013 is closer to 2.9 percent {[(1.007)(1.004)(1.0074)(1.010)4/4-1]100 = 2.9%}, compounding the quarterly rates and converting into annual equivalent. Inventory divestment deducted 1.16 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Without this deduction of inventory divestment, GDP growth would have been minus 0.9 percent in IQ2014, such that the actual growth rates in the four quarters ending in IQ2014 is closer to 2.2 percent {[(1.004)(1.011)(1.009)(0.9977)]4/4 -1]100 = 2.2%}.

Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real GDP, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

14,991.8

NA

NA

1.9

IVQ2011

15,190.3

1.3

1.1

1.7

IQ2012

15,275.0

1.9

0.6

2.6

IIQ2012

15,336.7

2.3

0.4

2.3

IIIQ2012

15,431.3

2.9

0.6

2.7

IVQ2012

15,433.7

2.9

0.0

1.6

IQ2013

15,538.4

3.6

0.7

1.7

IIQ2013

15,606.6

4.1

0.4

1.8

IIIQ2013

15,779.9

5.3

1.1

2.3

IVQ2013

15,916.2

6.2

0.9

3.1

IQ2014

15,831.7

5.6

-0.5

1.9

IIQ2014

16,010.4

6.8

1.1

2.6

IIIQ2014

16,205.6

8.1

1.2

2.7

IVQ2014

16,311.6

8.8

0.7

2.5

Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IVQ2014

7.4

 

7.4

 

Annual Equivalent ∆%

2.4

 

2.4

 

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-4 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.7 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.2 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-4, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions   

 

Number of Quarters

Cumulative Percentage Contraction

Average Percentage Rate

IIQ1953 to IIQ1954

3

-2.4

-0.8

IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958

3

-3.0

-1.0

IVQ1973 to IQ1975

5

-3.1

-0.6

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980

2

-2.2

-1.1

IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

4

-2.5

-0.64

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

6

-4.2

-0.72

Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-5 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.4 percent of the US economy in the twenty-two quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2014. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:

  • 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
  • 5.4 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
  • 5.2 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
  • 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
  • 5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
  • 4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987
  • 5.0 percent in the first twenty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1987
  • 4.9 percent in the first twenty-first quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1988
  • 4.9 percent in the first twenty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1988

3. The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.5 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.6 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.3 percent in 2012, 2.2 percent in 2013 and 2.4 percent in 2014 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. GDP growth in the four quarters of IVQ2013 to IVQ2014 accumulated to 2.5 percent that is equivalent to 2.5 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2014 of $16,311.6 billion by GDP in IVQ2013 of $15,016.2 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($16,311.6/$15,916.2)4/4 -1]100 = 2.5 %}. The US economy grew 2.5 percent in IVQ2014 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IVQ2013. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is in the borderline of contraction, and negative in IQ2014. US GDP fell 0.5 percent in IQ2014. The rate of growth of GDP in the revision of IIIQ2013 is 4.5 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR). Inventory accumulation contributed 1.49 percentage points to this rate of growth. The actual rate without this impulse of unsold inventories would have been 3.0 percent, or 0.74 percent in IIIQ2013, such that annual equivalent growth in 2013 is closer to 2.9 percent {[(1.007)(1.004)(1.0074)(1.010)4/4-1]100 = 2.9%}, compounding the quarterly rates and converting into annual equivalent. Inventory divestment deducted 1.16 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Without this deduction of inventory divestment, GDP growth would have been minus 0.9 percent in IQ2014, such that the actual growth rates in the four quarters ending in IQ2014 is closer to 2.2 percent {[(1.004)(1.011)(1.009)(0.9977)]4/4 -1]100 = 2.2%}.

Table I-5, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

 

Number
of
Quarters

Cumulative Growth

∆%

Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate

IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957

11

12.8

4.5

First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955

4

7.8

 

IIQ1958 to IIQ1959

5

10.0

7.9

First Four Quarters

IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959

4

9.2

 

IIQ1975 to IVQ1976

8

8.3

4.1

First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976

4

6.1

 

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

IQ1983 to IIIQ1987

IQ1983 to IVQ1987

IQ1983 to IQ1988

IQ1983 to IIQ1988

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

19.9

21.6

22.3

23.1

24.5

25.6

27.7

28.4

30.1

5.7

5.4

5.2

5.0

5.0

4.9

5.0

4.9

4.9

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

4

7.8

 

Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*

 

7.7

 

IIIQ2009 to IVQ2014

22

13.6

2.4

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

 

2.7

 

*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-8 shows US real quarterly GDP growth from 1980 to 1989. The economy contracted during the recession and then expanded vigorously throughout the 1980s, rapidly eliminating the unemployment caused by the contraction.

clip_image023

Chart I-8, US, Real GDP, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-9 shows the entirely different situation of real quarterly GDP in the US between 2007 and 2013. The economy has underperformed during the first twenty quarters of expansion for the first time in the comparable contractions since the 1950s. The US economy is now in a perilous standstill.

clip_image024

Chart I-9, US, Real GDP, 2007-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

As shown in Tables I-4 and I-5 above the loss of real GDP in the US during the contraction was 4.2 percent but the gain in the cyclical expansion has been only 13.6 percent (first to the last row in Table I-5), using all latest revisions. As a result, the level of real GDP in IVQ2014 with the first estimate and revisions is only higher by 8.8 percent than the level of real GDP in IVQ2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2014 would have accumulated to 23.0 percent. GDP in IVQ2014 would be $18,438.0 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,126.4 billion than actual $16,311.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 25.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 15.7 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html). US GDP in IVQ2014 is 11.5 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,311.6 billion in IVQ2014 or 8.8 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. The long-term trend is growth at average 3.3 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Dec 2014. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 99.2392 in Dec 2007 to 124.5620 in Dec 2014. The actual index NSA in Dec 2014 is 101.2840, which is 18.7 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.4 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014, raising the index at trend to 117.1610 in Dec 2014. The output of manufacturing at 101.2840 in Dec 2014 is 13.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-6 shows that the contraction actually concentrated in two quarters: decline of 2.1 percent in IVQ2008 relative to the prior quarter and decline of 1.4 percent in IQ2009 relative to IVQ2008. The combined fall of GDP in IVQ2008 and IQ2009 was 3.5 percent {[(1-0.021) x (1-0.014) -1]100 = -3.5%}, or {[(IQ2009 $14,375.0)/(IIIQ2008 $14,891.6) – 1]100 = -3.5%} except for rounding. Those two quarters coincided with the worst effects of the financial crisis (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). GDP fell 0.1 percent in IIQ2009 but grew 0.3 percent in IIIQ2009, which is the beginning of recovery in the cyclical dates of the NBER. Most of the recovery occurred in five successive quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2010 of growth of 1.0 percent in IVQ2009, 0.4 percent in IQ2010, 1.0 percent in IIQ2010 and nearly equal growth at 0.7 percent in IIIQ2010 and 0.6 percent in IVQ2010 for cumulative growth in those five quarters of 3.8 percent, obtained by accumulating the quarterly rates {[(1.01 x 1.004 x 1.01 x 1.007 x 1.006) – 1]100 = 3.8%} or {[(IVQ2010 $14,939.0)/(IIIQ2009 $14,402.5) – 1]100 = 3.7%} with minor rounding difference. The economy then stalled during the first half of 2011 with decline of 0.4 percent in IQ2011 and growth of 0.7 percent in IIQ2011 for combined annual equivalent rate of 0.6 percent {(0.996 x 1.007)2}. The economy grew 0.2 percent in IIIQ2011 for annual equivalent growth of 0.7 percent in the first three quarters {[(0.996 x 1.007 x 1.002)4/3 -1]100 = 0.7%}. Growth picked up in IVQ2011 with 1.1 percent relative to IIIQ2011. Growth in a quarter relative to a year earlier in Table I-6 slows from over 2.7 percent during three consecutive quarters from IIQ2010 to IVQ2010 to 1.9 percent in IQ2011, 1.7 percent in IIQ2011, 1.2 percent in IIIQ2011 and 1.7 percent in IVQ2011. As shown below, growth of 1.1 percent in IVQ2011 was partly driven by inventory accumulation. In IQ2012, GDP grew 0.6 percent relative to IVQ2011 and 2.6 percent relative to IQ2011, decelerating to 0.4 percent in IIQ2012 and 2.3 percent relative to IIQ2011 and 0.6 percent in IIIQ2012 and 2.7 percent relative to IIIQ2011 largely because of inventory accumulation and national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.0 percent in IVQ2012 with 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier but mostly because of deduction of 1.80 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.12 percentage points of reduction of one-time national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.7 percent in IQ2013 and 1.7 percent relative to IQ2012 in large part because of burning savings to consume caused by financial repression of zero interest rates. There is similar growth of 0.4 percent in IIQ2013 and 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2013, GDP grew 1.1 percent relative to the prior quarter and 2.3 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier with inventory accumulation contributing 1.49 percentage points to growth at 4.5 percent SAAR in IIIQ2013. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IVQ2013 and 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP fell 0.5 percent in IQ2014 and grew 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Inventory divestment deducted 1.16 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. GDP grew 1.1 percent in IIQ2014, 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier and at 4.6 SAAR with inventory change contributing 1.42 percentage points. GDP grew 1.2 percent in IIIQ2014 and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 0.7 percent in IVQ2014 and 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Rates of a quarter relative to the prior quarter capture better deceleration of the economy than rates on a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. The critical question for which there is not yet definitive solution is whether what lies ahead is continuing growth recession with the economy crawling and unemployment/underemployment at extremely high levels or another contraction or conventional recession. Forecasts of various sources continued to maintain high growth in 2011 without taking into consideration the continuous slowing of the economy in late 2010 and the first half of 2011. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and growth in China are common sources of doubts on the rate and direction of economic growth in the US. There is weak internal demand in the US with almost no investment and spikes of consumption driven by burning saving because of financial repression forever in the form of zero interest rates.

Table I-6, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real GDP, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

14,991.8

NA

0.4

1.9

IQ2008

14,889.5

-0.7

-0.7

1.1

IIQ2008

14,963.4

-0.2

0.5

0.8

IIIQ2008

14,891.6

-0.7

-0.5

-0.3

IVQ2008

14,577.0

-2.8

-2.1

-2.8

IQ2009

14,375.0

-4.1

-1.4

-3.5

IIQ2009

14,355.6

-4.2

-0.1

-4.1

IIIQ2009

14,402.5

-3.9

0.3

-3.3

IV2009

14,541.9

-3.0

1.0

-0.2

IQ2010

14,604.8

-2.6

0.4

1.6

IIQ2010

14,745.9

-1.6

1.0

2.7

IIIQ2010

14,845.5

-1.0

0.7

3.1

IVQ2010

14,939.0

-0.4

0.6

2.7

IQ2011

14,881.3

-0.7

-0.4

1.9

IIQ2011

14,989.6

0.0

0.7

1.7

IIIQ2011

15,021.1

0.2

0.2

1.2

IVQ2011

15,190.3

1.3

1.1

1.7

IQ2012

15,275.0

1.9

0.6

2.6

IIQ2012

15,336.7

2.3

0.4

2.3

IIIQ2012

15,431.3

2.9

0.6

2.7

IVQ2012

15,433.7

2.9

0.0

1.6

IQ2013

15,538.4

3.6

0.7

1.7

IIQ2013

15,606.6

4.1

0.4

1.8

IIIQ2013

15,779.9

5.3

1.1

2.3

IVQ2013

15,916.2

6.2

0.9

3.1

IQ2014

15,831.7

5.6

-0.5

1.9

IIQ2014

16,010.4

6.8

1.1

2.6

IIIQ2014

16,205.6

8.1

1.2

2.7

IVQ2014

16,311.6

8.8

0.7

2.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-10 provides the percentage change of real GDP from the same quarter a year earlier from 1980 to 1989. There were two contractions almost in succession in 1980 and from 1981 to 1983. The expansion was marked by initial high rates of growth as in other recession in the postwar US period during which employment lost in the contraction was recovered. Growth rates continued to be high after the initial phase of expansion.

clip_image025

Chart I-10, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Quarter a Year Earlier 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The experience of recovery after 2009 is not as complete as during the 1980s. Chart I-11 shows the much lower rates of growth in the early phase of the current expansion and sharp decline from an early peak. The US missed the initial high growth rates in cyclical expansions that eliminate unemployment and underemployment.

clip_image026

Chart I-11, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Quarter a Year Earlier 2007-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-12 provides growth rates from a quarter relative to the prior quarter during the 1980s. There is the same strong initial growth followed by a long period of sustained growth.

clip_image027

Chart I-12, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Prior Quarter 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-13 provides growth rates in a quarter relative to the prior quarter from 2007 to 2014. Growth in the current expansion after IIIQ2009 has not been as strong as in other postwar cyclical expansions.

clip_image028

Chart I-13, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Prior Quarter 2007-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

ESIII Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. Table IA1-1 provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of growth of private fixed investment for the recessions of the 1980s and the current economic cycle. In the cyclical expansion beginning in IQ1983 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html), real private fixed investment in the United States grew at the average annual rate of 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. Growth rates fell to an average of 2.2 percent in the following eight quarters from IQ1985 to IVQ1986 and to an average of 1.9 percent in the 12 quarters of 1985, 1986 and 1987. The average rate of growth in the four quarters of 1988 was 3.7 percent. There were only four quarters of contraction of private fixed investment from IQ1983 to IVQ1987. There is quite different behavior of private fixed investment in the twenty quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2014. The average annual growth rate in the first eight quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2011 was 3.2 percent, which is significantly lower than 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. There is only strong growth of private fixed investment in the four quarters of expansion from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 at the average annual rate of 11.1 percent. Growth has fallen from the SAAR of 17.3 percent in IIIQ2011 to 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012, recovering to 6.6 percent in IVQ2012 and falling to 2.7 percent in IQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment rose to 6.6 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell to 6.3 percent in IVQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment fell to 0.2 percent in IQ2014. Fixed investment grew at the SAAR of 9.5 percent in IIQ2014 and at 7.7 percent in IIIQ2014. Fixed investment grew at 2.3 percent in IVQ2014. Sudeep Reddy and Scott Thurm, writing on “Investment falls off a cliff,” on Nov 18, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123593211825394.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories) analyze the decline of private investment in the US and inform that a review by the Wall Street Journal of filing and conference calls finds that 40 of the largest publicly traded corporations in the US have announced intentions to reduce capital expenditures in 2012.

Table IA1-1, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of Real Private Fixed Investment, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q

1981

1982

1983

1984

2008

2009

2010

I

3.8

-12.2

9.4

13.1

-7.1

-27.4

0.8

II

3.2

-12.1

16.0

16.6

-5.5

-14.2

13.6

III

0.1

-9.3

24.4

8.2

-12.1

-0.5

-0.4

IV

-1.5

0.2

24.3

7.3

-23.9

-2.8

8.5

       

1985

   

2011

I

     

3.7

   

-0.9

II

     

5.2

   

8.2

III

     

-1.6

   

17.3

IV

     

7.8

   

9.9

       

1986

   

2012

I

     

1.1

   

9.1

II

     

0.1

   

4.4

III

     

-1.8

   

3.1

IV

     

3.1

   

6.6

       

1987

   

2013

I

     

-6.7

   

2.7

II

     

6.3

   

4.9

III

     

7.1

   

6.6

IV

     

-0.2

   

6.3

       

1988

 

2014

 

I

     

0.2

   

0.2

II

     

8.1

   

9.5

III

     

1.9

   

7.7

IV

     

4.8

   

2.3

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-1 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth of real private fixed investment from 1981 to 1987. Growth rates recovered sharply during the first eight quarters, which was essential in returning the economy to trend growth and eliminating unemployment and most underemployment accumulated during the contractions.

clip_image029

Chart IA1-1, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 1981-1988

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Weak behavior of real private fixed investment from 2007 to 2014 is shown in Chart IA1-2. Growth rates of real private fixed investment were much lower during the initial phase of expansion in the current economic cycle and have entered sharp trend of decline.

clip_image030

Chart IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 2007-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-2 provides real private fixed investment at seasonally adjusted annual rates from IVQ2007 to IVQ2014 or for the complete economic cycle. The first column provides the quarter, the second column percentage change relative to IVQ2007, the third column the quarter percentage change in the quarter relative to the prior quarter and the final column percentage change in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IQ1980, real gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of chained 2009 dollars, growing to $1,222.9 billion in IIQ1988 or 28.5 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 7.5 percent from $2605.2 billion in IVQ2007 to $2,800.2 billion in IVQ2014. As shown in Table IAI-2, real private fixed investment increased 2.8 percent from $2,586.3 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,658.5 billion in IVQ2014. Private fixed investment fell relative to IVQ2007 in all quarters preceding IIQ2014. Growth of real private investment in Table IA1-2 is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012. The investment decision of United States corporations has been fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash.

Table IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real PFI, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

2586.3

NA

-0.9

-1.4

IQ2008

2539.1

-1.8

-1.8

-3.0

IIQ2008

2503.4

-3.2

-1.4

-4.6

IIIQ2008

2424.1

-6.3

-3.2

-7.1

IV2008

2263.8

-12.5

-6.6

-12.5

IQ2009

2089.3

-19.2

-7.7

-17.7

IIQ2009

2011.0

-22.2

-3.7

-19.7

IIIQ2009

2008.4

-22.3

-0.1

-17.1

IVQ2009

1994.1

-22.9

-0.7

-11.9

IQ2010

1997.9

-22.8

0.2

-4.4

IIQ2010

2062.8

-20.2

3.2

2.6

IIIQ2010

2060.8

-20.3

-0.1

2.6

IVQ2010

2103.1

-18.7

2.1

5.5

IQ2011

2098.4

-18.9

-0.2

5.0

IIQ2011

2140.2

-17.2

2.0

3.8

IIIQ2011

2227.5

-13.9

4.1

8.1

IVQ2011

2280.6

-11.8

2.4

8.4

IQ2012

2330.7

-9.9

2.2

11.1

IIQ2012

2355.6

-8.9

1.1

10.1

IIIQ2012

2373.7

-8.2

0.8

6.6

IVQ2012

2412.0

-6.7

1.6

5.8

IQ2013

2428.0

-6.1

0.7

4.2

IIQ2013

2457.0

-5.0

1.2

4.3

IIIQ2013

2496.8

-3.5

1.6

5.2

IVQ2013

2535.0

-2.0

1.5

5.1

IQ2014

2536.1

-1.9

0.0

4.5

IIQ2014

2594.5

0.3

2.3

5.6

IIIQ2014

2643.3

2.2

1.9

5.9

IVQ2014

2658.5

2.8

0.6

4.9

PFI: Private Fixed Investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-3 provides real private fixed investment in billions of chained 2009 dollars from IQ2007 to IIQ2014. Real private fixed investment has not recovered, stabilizing at a level in IVQ2014 that is barely higher relative to that in IVQ2007.

clip_image031

Chart IA1-3, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, IQ2007 to IVQ2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-4 provides real gross private domestic investment in chained dollars of 2009 from 1980 to 1987. Real gross private domestic investment climbed 28.5 percent to $$1,222.9 billion of 2009 dollars in IIQ1988 above the level of $951.6 billion in IQ1980.

clip_image032

Chart IA1-4, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 1980-1988

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-5 provides real gross private domestic investment in the United States in billions of chained dollars of 2009 from 2006 to 2014. Real gross private domestic investment reached a level of $2,800.2 billion in IVQ2014, which was only 7.5 percent higher than the level of $2605.2 billion in IVQ2007 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image033

Chart IA1-5, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 2007-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-3 provides percentage shares in GDP of gross private domestic investment and its components in IVQ2014, IVQ2006 and IVQ2000. The share of gross private domestic investment in GDP has fallen from 19.7 percent in IVQ2000 and 18.8 percent in IVQ2006 to 16.7 percent in IVQ2014. There are declines in percentage shares in GDP of all components with sharp reduction of residential investment from 4.7 percent in IVQ2000 and 5.6 percent in IVQ2006 to 3.3 percent in IVQ2014. The share of fixed investment in GDP fell from 19.2 percent in IVQ2000 and 18.5 percent in IVQ2006 to 16.0 percent in IVQ2014.

Table IA1-3, Percentage Shares of Gross Private Domestic Investment and Components in Gross Domestic Product, % of GDP, IQ2013

 

IVQ2014

IVQ2006

IVQ2000

Gross Private Domestic Investment

16.7

18.8

19.7

  Fixed Investment

16.0

18.5

19.2

     Nonresidential

12.7

12.9

14.5

          Structures

2.9

3.1

3.2

          Equipment

          and Software

5.8

6.1

7.3

          Intellectual
           Property

4.0

3.7

4.0

     Residential

3.3

5.6

4.7

   Change in Private Inventories

0.7

0.3

0.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-10 provides percentage shares of residential investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2014. The salient characteristic of Chart IA1-10 is the vertical increase of the share of residential investment in GDP up to 2006 and subsequent collapse.

clip_image034

Chart IA1-10, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Finer detail is provided by the quarterly share of residential investment in GDP from 1979 to 2014 in Chart IA1-11. There was protracted growth of that share, accelerating sharply into 2006 followed with nearly vertical drop. The explanation of the sharp contraction of United States housing can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ingersoll 1987, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

clip_image035

Chart IA1-11, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

ESIV United States Housing Collapse. Data and other information continue to provide depressed conditions in the US housing market in a longer perspective, with recent improvement at the margin. Table IIB-1 shows sales of new houses in the US at seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate (SAAR). House sales fell in 21 of forty-eight months from Jan 2011 to Dec 2014 with monthly declines of 5 in 2011, four in 2012, six in 2013 and five in 2014. In Jan-Apr 2012, house sales increased at the annual equivalent rate of 11.8 percent and at 22.3 percent in May-Sep 2012. There was significant strength in Sep-Dec 2011 with annual equivalent rate of 48.4 percent. Sales of new houses fell 7.0 percent in Oct 2012 with increase of 9.5 percent in Nov 2012. Sales of new houses rebounded 13.5 percent in Jan 2013 with annual equivalent rate of 62.9 percent from Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 because of the increase of 13.5 percent in Jan 2013. New house sales fell at annual equivalent 16.1 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. New house sales weakened, increasing at 0.8 percent in annual equivalent from Apr to Dec 2013 with significant volatility illustrated by decline of 20.0 percent in Jul 2013 and increase of 12.8 percent in Oct 2013. New house sales fell 0.7 percent in Dec 2013. New house sales increased 3.4 percent in Jan 2014 and fell 5.5 percent in Feb 2014 and 6.7 percent in Mar 201. New house sales increased 2.5 percent in Apr 2014 and 10.9 percent in May 2014. New house sales fell 10.7 percent in Jun 2014 and decreased 2.4 percent in Jul 2014. New house sales jumped 12.3 percent in Aug 2014 and increased 1.8 percent in Sep 2014. New House sales increased 1.3 percent in Oct 2014 and fell 6.7 percent in Nov 2014. New house sales increased 11.6 percent in Dec 2014. The annual equivalent rate in Jan-Aug 2014 was 2.1 percent and minus 23.8 percent in Sep-Dec 2014 with wide monthly oscillations. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), analyze how builders have provided financial assistance to home buyers, including those short of cash and with weaker credit background, explaining the rise in new home sales and the highest gap between prices of new and existing houses. The 30-year conventional mortgage rate increased from 3.40 on Apr 25, 2013 to 4.58 percent on Aug 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm), which could also be a factor in recent weakness with improvement after the rate fell to 4.26 in Nov 2013. The conventional mortgage rate rose to 4.48 percent on Dec 26, 2013 and fell to 4.32 percent on Jan 30, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate increased to 4.37 percent on Feb 26, 2014 and 4.40 percent on Mar 27, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate fell to 4.14 percent on Apr 22, 2014, stabilizing at 4.14 on Jun 26, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate stood at 3.66 percent on Jan 16, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate measured in a survey by Freddie Mac (http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/release.html) is the “contract interest rate on commitments for fixed-rate first mortgages” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm).

Table IIB-1, US, Sales of New Houses at Seasonally-Adjusted (SA) Annual Equivalent Rate, Thousands and % 

 

SA Annual Rate
Thousands

∆%

Dec

481

11.6

Nov

431

-6.7

Oct

462

1.3

Sep

456

1.8

AE ∆% Sep-Dec

 

23.8

Aug

448

12.3

Jul

399

-2.4

Jun

409

-10.7

May

458

10.9

Apr

413

2.5

Mar

403

-6.7

Feb

432

-5.5

Jan

457

3.4

AE ∆% Jan-Aug

 

2.1

Dec 2013

442

-0.7

Nov

445

-1.1

Oct

450

12.8

Sep

399

5.3

Aug

379

3.3

Jul

367

-20.0

Jun

459

6.5

May

431

-4.6

Apr

452

2.7

AE ∆% Apr-Dec

 

0.8

Mar

440

-1.8

Feb

448

-1.1

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

 

-16.1

Jan

453

13.5

Dec 2012

399

1.8

Nov

392

9.5

Oct

358

-7.0

AE ∆% Oct-Jan

 

62.9

Sep

385

2.7

Aug

375

1.6

Jul

369

2.5

Jun

360

-2.7

May

370

4.5

AE ∆% May-Sep

 

22.3

Apr

354

0.0

Mar

354

-3.3

Feb

366

9.3

Jan

335

-1.8

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

 

11.8

Dec 2011

341

4.0

Nov

328

3.8

Oct

316

3.9

Sep

304

1.7

AE ∆% Sep-Dec

 

48.4

Aug

299

1.0

Jul

296

-1.7

Jun

301

-1.3

May

305

-1.6

AE ∆% May-Aug

 

-10.3

Apr

310

3.3

Mar

300

11.1

Feb

270

-12.1

Jan

307

-5.8

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

 

-14.2

Dec 2010

326

13.6

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

There is additional information of the report of new house sales in Table IIB-2. The stock of unsold houses fell from rates of 6 to 7 percent of sales in 2011 to 4 to 5 percent in 2013 and 5.5 percent in Dec 2014. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), find that inventories of houses have declined as investors acquire distressed houses of higher quality. Median and average house prices oscillate. In Dec 2014, median prices of new houses sold not seasonally adjusted (NSA) increased 2.2 percent after decreasing 1.7 percent in Nov 2014. Average prices increased 9.6 percent in Dec 2014 and decreased 9.5 percent in Nov 2014. Between Dec 2010 and Dec 2014, median prices increased 23.6 percent, partly concentrated in increases of 13.5 percent in Oct 2014, 4.0 percent in May 2014 and 5.2 percent in Mar 2014. Average prices increased 29.5 percent between Dec 2010 and Dec 2014, with increase of 19.3 percent in Oct 2014. Between Dec 2010 and Dec 2012, median prices increased 23.6 percent and average prices increased 29.5 percent. Price increases concentrated in 2012 with increase of median prices of 18.2 percent from Dec 2011 to Dec 2012 and of average prices of 13.8 percent. Median prices increased 15.4 percent from Dec 2012 to Dec 2014, with increase of 13.5 percent in Oct 2014, while average prices increased 26.3 percent, with increase of 19.3 percent in Oct 2014. Robbie Whelan, writing on “New homes hit record as builders cap supply,” on May 24, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323475304578500973445311276.html?mod=WSJ_economy_LeftTopHighlights), finds that homebuilders are continuing to restrict the number of new homes for sale. Restriction of available new homes for sale increases prices paid by buyers.

Table IIB-2, US, New House Stocks and Median and Average New Homes Sales Price

 

Unsold*
Stocks in Equiv.
Months
of Sales
SA %

Median
New House Sales Price USD
NSA

Month
∆%

Average New House Sales Price USD
NSA

Month
∆%

Dec 2014

5.5

298,100

2.2

377,800

9.6

Nov

6.0

291,600

-1.7

344,600

-9.5

Oct

5.5

296,700

13.5

380,800

19.3

Sep

5.5

261,500

-10.4

319,100

-10.4

Aug

5.5

291,700

4.0

356,200

3.2

Jul

6.2

280,400

-2.3

345,200

2.1

Jun

5.8

287,000

0.5

338,100

4.5

May

5.0

285,600

4.0

323,500

-0.5

Apr

5.5

274,500

-2.8

325,100

-1.9

Mar

5.7

282,300

5.2

331,500

1.7

Feb

5.2

268,400

-0.5

325,900

-3.4

Jan

5.0

269,800

-2.1

337,300

5.0

Dec 2013

5.1

275,500

-0.6

321,200

-4.3

Nov

5.0

277,100

4.8

335,600

0.0

Oct

4.9

264,300

-2.0

335,700

4.4

Sep

5.5

269,800

5.7

321,400

3.4

Aug

5.5

255,300

-2.6

310,800

-5.8

Jul

5.6

262,200

0.9

329,900

7.8

Jun

4.2

259,800

-1.5

306,100

-2.5

May

4.5

263,700

-5.6

314,000

-6.8

Apr

4.3

279,300

8.5

337,000

12.3

Mar

4.2

257,500

-2.9

300,200

-3.9

Feb

4.1

265,100

5.4

312,500

1.8

Jan

3.9

251,500

-2.6

306,900

2.6

Dec 2012

4.5

258,300

5.4

299,200

2.9

Nov

4.6

245,000

-0.9

290,700

1.9

Oct

4.9

247,200

-2.9

285,400

-4.1

Sep

4.5

254,600

0.6

297,700

-2.6

Aug

4.6

253,200

6.7

305,500

8.2

Jul

4.6

237,400

2.1

282,300

3.9

Jun

4.8

232,600

-2.8

271,800

-3.2

May

4.7

239,200

1.2

280,900

-2.4

Apr

4.9

236,400

-1.4

287,900

1.5

Mar

4.9

239,800

0.0

283,600

3.5

Feb

4.8

239,900

8.2

274,000

3.1

Jan

5.3

221,700

1.4

265,700

1.1

Dec 2011

5.3

218,600

2.0

262,900

5.2

Nov

5.7

214,300

-4.7

250,000

-3.2

Oct

6.0

224,800

3.6

258,300

1.1

Sep

6.3

217,000

-1.2

255,400

-1.5

Aug

6.5

219,600

-4.5

259,300

-4.1

Jul

6.7

229,900

-4.3

270,300

-1.0

Jun

6.6

240,200

8.2

273,100

4.0

May

6.6

222,000

-1.2

262,700

-2.3

Apr

6.7

224,700

1.9

268,900

3.1

Mar

7.2

220,500

0.2

260,800

-0.8

Feb

8.1

220,100

-8.3

262,800

-4.7

Jan

7.3

240,100

-0.5

275,700

-5.5

Dec 2010

7.0

241,200

9.8

291,700

3.5

*Percent of new houses for sale relative to houses sold

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

The depressed level of residential construction and new house sales in the US is evident in Table IIB-3 providing new house sales not seasonally adjusted in Jan-Dec of various years. Sales of new houses are virtually the same in Jan-Dec 2014 relative to Jan-Dec 2013 with increase of 1.4 percent. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2014 are substantially lower than in any year between 1963 and 2014 with the exception of the years from 2009 to 2012. There are only four increases of 18.2 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2012, 42.2 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2011, 34.7 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2010 and 16/ percent relative to Jan-Dec 2009. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2014 are lower by 10.3 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2008, 43.9 percent relative to 2007, 58.6 percent relative to 2006 and 66.1 percent relative to 2005. The housing boom peaked in 2005 and 2006 when increases in fed funds rates to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 from 1.0 percent in Jun 2004 affected subprime mortgages that were programmed for refinancing in two or three years on the expectation that price increases forever would raise home equity. Higher home equity would permit refinancing under feasible mortgages incorporating full payment of principal and interest (Gorton 2009EFM; see other references in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2014 relative to the same period in 2004 fell 63.8 percent and 59.9 percent relative to the same period in 2003. Similar percentage declines are also observed for 2014 relative to years from 2000 to 2004. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2014 fell 34.8 per cent relative to the same period in 1995. The population of the US was 179.3 million in 1960 and 281.4 million in 2000 (Hobbs and Stoops 2002, 16). Detailed historical census reports are available from the US Census Bureau at (http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscendata.html). The US population reached 308.7 million in 2010 (http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/). The US population increased by 129.4 million from 1960 to 2010 or 72.2 percent. The final row of Table IIB-3 reveals catastrophic data: sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2014 of 435 thousand units are lower by 22.3 percent relative to 560 thousand units of houses sold in Jan-Dec 1963, the first year when data become available. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 122.416 million in 1963 to 247.947 million in 2014, or 102.5 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”

Table IIB-3, US, Sales of New Houses Not Seasonally Adjusted, Thousands and %

 

Not Seasonally Adjusted Thousands

Jan-Dec 2014

435

Jan-Dec 2013

429

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/Jan-Dec 2013

1.4

Jan-Dec 2012

368

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/Jan-Dec 2012

18.2

Jan-Dec 2011

306

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/Jan-Dec 2011

42.2

Jan-Dec 2010

323

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/ 
Jan-Dec 2010

34.7

Jan-Dec 2009

375

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/ 
Jan-Dec 2009

16.0

Jan-Dec 2008

485

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/ 
Jan-Dec 2008

-10.3

Jan-Dec 2007

776

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/
Jan-Dec 2007

-43.9

Jan-Dec 2006

1,051

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/Jan-Dec 2006

-58.6

Jan-Dec 2005

1,283

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/Jan-Dec 2005

-66.1

Jan-Dec 2004

1,203

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/Jan-Dec 2004

-63.8

Jan-Dec 2003

1,086

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/
Jan-Dec  2003

-59.9

Jan-Dec 2002

973

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/
Jan-Dec 2002

-55.3

Jan-Dec 2001

908

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/
Jan-Dec 2001

-52.1

Jan-Dec 2000

877

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/
Jan-Dec 2000

-50.4

Jan-Dec 1995

667

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/
Jan-Dec 1995

-34.8

Jan-Dec 1963

560

∆% Jan-Dec 2014/
Jan-Dec 1963

-22.3

*Computed using unrounded data

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Table IIB-4 provides the entire available annual series of new house sales from 1963 to 2014. The revised level of 306 thousand new houses sold in 2011 is the lowest since 560 thousand in 1963 in the 48 years of available data while the level of 368 thousand in 2012 is only higher than 323 thousand in 2010. The level of sales of new houses of 435 thousand in 2014 is the lowest from 1963 to 2009 with exception of 412 thousand in 1982. The population of the US increased 129.4 million from 179.3 million in 1960 to 308.7 million in 2010, or 72.2 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US increased from 122.416 million in 1963 to 247.947 million in 2014 or 102.5 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”

The civilian noninstitutional population is the universe of the labor force. In fact, there is no year from 1963 to 2013 in Table IIA-4 with sales of new houses below 400 thousand with the exception of the immediately preceding years of 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

Table IIB-4, US, New Houses Sold, NSA Thousands

Year

New Houses Sold Thousands

1963

560

1964

565

1965

575

1966

461

1967

487

1968

490

1969

448

1970

485

1971

656

1972

718

1973

634

1974

519

1975

549

1976

646

1977

819

1978

817

1979

709

1980

545

1981

436

1982

412

1983

623

1984

639

1985

688

1986

750

1987

671

1988

676

1989

650

1990

534

1991

509

1992

610

1993

666

1994

670

1995

667

1996

757

1997

804

1998

886

1999

880

2000

877

2001

908

2002

973

2003

1,086

2004

1,203

2005

1,283

2006

1,051

2007

776

2008

485

2009

375

2010

323

2011

306

2012

368

2013

429

2014

435

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-1 of the US Bureau of the Census shows the sharp decline of sales of new houses in the US. Sales rose temporarily until about mid 2010 but then declined to a lower plateau followed by increase and stability.

clip_image037

Chart IIB-1, US, New One-Family Houses Sold in the US, SAAR (Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate) 

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/briefrm/esbr/www/esbr051.html

Percentage changes and average rates of growth of new house sales for selected periods are shown in Table IIB-5. The percentage change of new house sales from 1963 to 2014 is minus 22.3 percent. Between 1991 and 2001, sales of new houses rose 78.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 6.0 percent. Between 1995 and 2005 sales of new houses increased 92.4 percent at the yearly rate of 6.8 percent. There are similar rates in all years from 2000 to 2005. The boom in housing construction and sales began in the 1980s and 1990s. The collapse of real estate culminated several decades of housing subsidies and policies to lower mortgage rates and borrowing terms (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009b), 42-8). Sales of new houses sold in 2014 fell 34.8 percent relative to the same period in 1995 and 66.1 percent relative to 2005.

Table IIB-5, US, Percentage Change and Average Yearly Rate of Growth of Sales of New One-Family Houses

 

∆%

Average Yearly % Rate

1963-2014

-22.3

NA

1991-2001

78.4

6.0

1995-2005

92.4

6.8

2000-2005

46.3

7.9

1995-2014

-34.8

NA

2000-2014

-50.4

NA

2005-2014

-66.1

NA

NA: Not Applicable

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-2 of the US Bureau of the Census provides the entire monthly sample of new houses sold in the US between Jan 1963 and Dec 2014 without seasonal adjustment. The series is almost stationary until the 1990s. There is sharp upward trend from the early 1990s to 2005-2006 after which new single-family houses sold collapse to levels below those in the beginning of the series in the 1960s.

clip_image038

Chart IIB-2, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 1963-2014

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

ESV Decline of United States Homeownership. The percentage of owned households in the United States as percent of total occupied households, or homeownership rate, increased from 62.9 percent in the first three quarters of 1965 in Table HO to 69.0 in IIIQ2006. The rate of homeownership in the US fell to 64.0 in IVQ2014.

Table HO, United States, Homeownership Rate, NSA  %

Year

1st Quarter

2nd Quarter

3rd Quarter

4th Quarter

1965

62.9

62.9

62.9

63.4

1966

63.5

63.2

63.3

63.8

1967

63.3

63.9

63.8

63.5

1968

63.6

64.1

64.1

63.6

1969

64.1

64.4

64.4

64.4

1970

64.3

64.0

64.4

64.0

1971

64.0

64.1

64.4

64.5

1972

64.3

64.5

64.3

64.4

1973

64.9

64.4

64.4

64.4

1974

64.8

64.8

64.6

64.4

1975

64.4

64.9

64.6

64.5

1976

64.6

64.6

64.9

64.8

1977

64.8

64.5

65.0

64.9

1978

64.8

64.4

65.2

65.4

1979

64.8

64.9

65.8

65.4

1980

65.5

65.5

65.8

65.5

1981

65.6

65.3

65.6

65.2

1982

64.8

64.9

64.9

64.5

1983

64.7

64.7

64.8

64.4

1984

64.6

64.6

64.6

64.1

1985

64.1

64.1

63.9

63.5

1986

63.6

63.8

63.8

63.9

1987

63.8

63.8

64.2

64.1

1988

63.7

63.7

64.0

63.8

1989

63.9

63.8

64.1

63.8

1990

64.0

63.7

64.0

64.1

1991

63.9

63.9

64.2

64.2

1992

64.0

63.9

64.3

64.4

1993

64.2

64.4

64.7

64.6

1994

63.8

63.8

64.1

64.2

1995

64.2

64.7

65.0

65.1

1996

65.1

65.4

65.6

65.4

1997

65.4

65.7

66.0

65.7

1998

65.9

66.0

66.8

66.4

1999

66.7

66.6

67.0

66.9

2000

67.1

67.2

67.7

67.5

2001

67.5

67.7

68.1

68.0

2002

67.8

67.6

68.0

68.3

2003

68.0

68.0

68.4

68.6

2004

68.6

69.2

69.0

69.2

2005

69.1

68.6

68.8

69.0

2006

68.5

68.7

69.0

68.9

2007

68.4

68.2

68.2

67.8

2008

67.8

68.1

67.9

67.5

2009

67.3

67.4

67.6

67.2

2010

67.1

66.9

66.9

66.5

2011

66.4

65.9

66.3

66.0

2012

65.4

65.5

65.5

65.4

2013

65.0

65.0

65.3

65.2

2014

64.8

64.7

64.4

64.0

Note: Homeownership rate is the percentage of owner occupied households relative to total occupied households.

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/

Chart HO of the US Census Bureau provides the rate of homeownership in the US NSA from IQ1965 to IVQ2014. The rate rose sharply during the housing boom from the 1990s to 2007. The rate of homeownership collapsed to the level before the housing boom of the 1990s.

clip_image039

Chart HO, United States, United States, Homeownership Rate, NSA  %

Note: Homeownership rate is the percentage of owner occupied households relative to total occupied households.

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015.

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