Flattening Yield Curve of Treasury Securities with Three-Month Yield Below Ten-Year Yield, Recovery of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, Twenty-One Million Unemployed or Underemployed in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Job Creation, Cyclically Stagnating Real Wages, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income per Capita, Financial Repression, United States Housing, United States House Prices, United States Current Account and Net International Investment Position, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk: Part II

CANNOT UPLOAD CHARTS AND IMAGES: ERROR 400

Flattening Yield Curve of Treasury Securities with Three-Month Yield Below Ten-Year Yield, Recovery of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, Twenty-One Million Unemployed or Underemployed in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Job Creation, Cyclically Stagnating Real Wages, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income per Capita, Financial Repression, United States Housing, United States House Prices, United States Current Account and Net International Investment Position, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk

CANNOT UPLOAD CHARTS AND IMAGES: ERROR 400

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019

I Twenty-One Million Unemployed or Underemployed

IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation

IA2 Number of People in Job Stress

IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment

IA4 Job Creation

IB Stagnating Real Wages

II Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IIB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB2 Financial Repression

IIA United States Housing Collapse

IIA1 Sales of New Houses

IIA2 United States House Prices

IID United States Current Account and Net International Investment Position

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

I IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides important revisions and enhancements of data on personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). There are waves of changes in personal income and expenditures in Table IB-1 that correspond somewhat to inflation waves observed worldwide (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html) because of the influence through price indexes. There are wide fluctuations in Nov and Dec 2012 by the rush to realize income of all forms in anticipation of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. There is major distortion in Jan 2013 because of higher contributions in payrolls to government social insurance that caused sharp reduction in personal income and disposable personal income. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) explains as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January [2013] changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December [2012] in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

The BEA provides the annual update of the national income and product account (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html): “Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts

The estimates released today reflect the results of the annual update of the national income and

product accounts (NIPAs) in conjunction with preliminary estimates for June 2017. The update covers the most recent 3 years and the first 5 months of 2017. For more information, see information on the “2017 Annual Update” on BEA’s website. Additionally, the August Survey of Current Business will contain an article that describes the results in detail.”

The BEA provides “Comprehensive Update of the National Income and Product Accounts” on Jul 31, 2018 with revisions since 1929 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html): “The estimates released today also reflect the results of the 15th comprehensive update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The updated estimates reflect previously announced improvements (https://www.bea.gov/scb/2018/04-april/0418-preview-2018-comprehensive-nipa-update.htm), and include the introduction of new not seasonally adjusted estimates for GDP, GDI and their major components. For more information, see the Technical Note. Revised NIPA table stubs, initial results, and background materials are available on the BEA Web site (https://www.bea.gov/index.htm).”

In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011 with relaxed risk aversion, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 7.4 percent, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 4.6 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 5.8 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 0.3 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) rose at annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the second wave in May-Aug 2011 under risk aversion, NPI rose at annual equivalent 4.0 percent, NPDI at 4.0 percent and NPCE at 3.0 percent. RDPI increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 1.2 percent annual equivalent. With mixed shocks of risk aversion in the third wave from Sep to Dec 2011, NPI rose at 3.6 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 4.3 percent and NPCE at 2.1 percent. RDPI increased at 2.7 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 0.9 percent annual equivalent. In the fourth wave from Jan to Mar 2012, NPI increased at 9.2 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 10.0 percent and NPCE at 6.6 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) is more dynamic in the revisions, growing at 7.0 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 3.7 percent. The policy of repressing savings with zero interest rates stimulated growth of nominal consumption (NPCE) at the annual equivalent rate of 6.6 percent and real consumption (RPCE) at 3.7 percent. In the fifth wave in Apr-Jul 2012, NPI increased at annual equivalent 0.0 percent, NDPI at minus 0.6 percent and RDPI at minus 0.3 percent. Financial repression failed to stimulate consumption with NPCE growing at 0.9 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 0.6 percent. In the sixth wave in Aug-Oct 2012, in another wave of carry trades into commodity futures, NPI increased at 7.9 percent annual equivalent and NDPI increased at 7.4 percent while real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 3.6 percent annual equivalent. NPCE increased at 4.1 percent and RPCE changed at 0.8 percent. Data for Nov-Dec 2012 have illusory increases: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). In the seventh wave, anticipations of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused exceptional income gains that increased personal income to annual equivalent 26.8 percent in Nov-Dec 2012, nominal disposable income at 25.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 26.1 percent with likely effects on nominal personal consumption that increased at 1.8 percent and real personal consumption at 2.4 percent with subdued prices. The numbers in parentheses show that without the exceptional effects NDPI (nominal disposable personal income) increased at 5.5 percent and RDPI (real disposable personal income) at 8.7 percent. In the eighth wave, nominal personal income fell 4.7 percent in Jan 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 43.9 percent; nominal disposable personal income fell 5.6 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 49.9 percent; real disposable income fell 5.8 percent or at the annual rate of decline of 51.2 percent; nominal personal consumption expenditures increased 0.6 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 7.4 percent; and real personal consumption expenditures increased 0.4 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. The savings rate fell significantly from 12.0 percent in Dec 2012 to 6.3 percent in Jan 2013. The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as follows (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf 3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income -- increased $126.7 billion in January, compared with an increase of $6.3 billion in December. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.8 billion to January. As noted above, employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, so the total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.8 billion”

Further explanation is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion. The January change in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates. Excluding these special factors and others, which are discussed more fully below, DPI increased $46.8 billion in February, or 0.4 percent, after increasing $15.8 billion, or 0.1 percent, in January.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). In the ninth wave in Feb-Mar 2013, nominal personal income changed at 0.0 percent and nominal disposable income fell at 0.6 percent annual equivalent, while real disposable income decreased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 0.0 percent annual equivalent. The savings rate collapsed from 8.8 percent in Oct 2012, 9.7 percent in Nov 2012 and 12.0 percent in Dec 2012 to 6.3 percent in Jan 2013, 5.8 percent in Feb 2013 and 5.9 percent in Mar 2013. In the tenth wave from Apr to Sep 2013, personal income grew at 3.9 percent annual equivalent, nominal disposable income increased at annual equivalent 4.1 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. Real disposable income grew at 3.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 1.4 percent. In the eleventh wave, nominal personal income fell at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Oct 2013, nominal disposable income fell at 1.2 percent and real disposable income fell at 3.5 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.7 percent. In the twelfth wave, nominal personal income increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2013, nominal disposable income at 6.2 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 7.4 percent. Real disposable income increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 4.9 percent. In the thirteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 7.4 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2013 and nominal disposable income at 6.2 percent while real disposable income increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent and 1.2 percent for real personal consumption expenditures. In the fourteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 9.6 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Mar 2014, nominal disposable income at 9.2 percent and nominal consumption expenditures at 4.9 percent. Real disposable personal income increased at 7.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 2.8 percent. In the fifteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.7 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014 and nominal disposable income at 5.9 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.4 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014. Nominal personal consumption increased at 6.4 percent annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014 and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.7 percent. In the sixteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.6 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Dec 2014, nominal disposable income at 4.9 percent and nominal personal consumption at 2.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at 5.2 percent in Sep-Dec 2014 and real personal consumption expenditure at 4.0 percent. In the seventeenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2015 and nominal disposable income increased at 3.0 percent while nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.9 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.0 percent. In the eighteenth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 5.3 percent and nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) increased at 4.5 percent annual equivalent in Mar-Jun 2015. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 2.4 percent. Nominal consumption expenditures (NPCE) increased at 6.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) increased at 4.1 percent. In the nineteenth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 4.1 percent in Jun-Aug 2015 and nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 4.9 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 3.2 percent, nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 4.1 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) at 2.8 percent. In the twentieth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Dec 2015, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 0.3 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 2.1 percent. Real disposable personal income grew at 0.9 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 2.1 percent. In the twenty-first wave, nominal personal income increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2016. Nominal disposable personal income increased at 3.0 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. Real disposable personal income increased at 3.0 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. In the twenty-second wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.0 percent in Mar-Apr 2016. Nominal disposable income increased at 2.4 percent and real disposable income fell at 0.6 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 4.9 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-third wave, nominal personal income increased at 2.8 percent in May-Jul 2016 and nominal disposable income at 2.8 percent while nominal consumption expenditures increased at 4.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 0.8 percent and real consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. In the twenty-fourth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.1 percent in Aug-Oct 2016 and nominal disposable income at 4.9 percent while nominal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real disposable income increased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.8 percent. In the twenty-fifth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.3 percent and nominal disposable income increased at 4.3 percent in Nov-Dec 2016. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real personal disposable income increased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.0 percent. In the twenty-sixth wave, nominal personal income increased at annual equivalent 7.4 percent in Jan-Feb 2017, nominal disposable income at 8.1 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 1.8 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.9 percent and real personal consumption expenditures fell at 0.6 percent. In the twenty-seventh wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.2 percent in Mar-May 2017 and nominal disposable income at 3.2 percent while nominal personal consumption increased at 4.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 2.8 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.1 percent. In the twenty-eighth wave, nominal personal income increased at 1.2 percent in Jun 2017 and nominal disposable income changed at 0.0 percent while nominal personal consumption increased at 3.7 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 1.2 percent and real consumption expenditures increased at 2.4 percent. In the twenty-ninth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.9 percent in Jul-Aug 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 4.9 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.0 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirtieth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent in Sep-Oct 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 5.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.0 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 7.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. In the thirty-first wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.7 percent in Nov 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 8.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 6.2 percent. In the thirty-second wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent in Dec 2017-Jan 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 8.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.0 percent. Real disposable income increased at 5.5 percent and real personal consumption expenditures changed at 0.0 percent. In the thirty-third wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.7 percent in Feb-Apr 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.1 percent. Real disposable income increased at 2.0 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-fourth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.5 percent in May-Jul 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 4.5 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 5.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. In the thirty-fifth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.5 percent in Aug-Oct 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 4.9 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.2 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.8 percent. In the thirty-sixth wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 6.2 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. In the thirty-eighth wave, nominal personal income increased at 12.7 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 14.0 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures decreased at 7.0 percent. Real disposable income increased at 12.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures decreased at 7.0 percent. In the thirty-ninth wave, nominal personal income decreased at 1.2 percent in Jan 2019 while nominal disposable personal income decreased at 2.4 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent.

There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:

• Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP two trillion dollars below trend (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.2 percent per year from 1929 to 2018, with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.6 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2018. GDP in IVQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent
• Private fixed investment stagnating initially followed by cumulative increase of 27.7 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html).
• Twenty-one million or 12.1 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with stagnating or declining real wages (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-fed-will-be-patient-adjusting.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
• Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)

• Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-rising.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/impact-of-monetary-policy-on-exchange.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
• Productivity growth fell from 2.1 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2018 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2018, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/ii-rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)

• Output of manufacturing in Jan 2019 at 31.9 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 23.2 percent below trend since 1986 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html Section and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)

• Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
• Worldwide waves of inflation (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
• Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier) (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
• Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (Section II and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
• 43 million in poverty and 29 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1999 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
• Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 28.0 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 when it would have grown over 39.9 percent at trend of 3.1 percent per year in real terms from IVQ1945 to IVQ2018 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/destruction-of-household-nonfinancial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html). Financial assets increased $30.4 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $7.4 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation increased 5.1 percent.

The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 38 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IVQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/gdp4q18_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 would have accumulated to 38.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2018 would be $21,814.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3049.3 billion than actual $18,765.3 billion. There are more than two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.1 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html). US GDP in IVQ2018 is 14.0 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,765.3 billion in IVQ2018 or 19.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Feb 1919 to Feb 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 152.3255 in Feb 2019. The actual index NSA in Feb 2019 is 103.7365, which is 31.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Feb 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.1303 in Feb 2019. The output of manufacturing at 103.7365 in Feb 2019 is 23.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table IB-1, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month Seasonally Adjusted of Personal Income, Disposable Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures %

	NPI	NDPI	RDPI	NPCE	RPCE
Feb 2019	0.2	0.2
Jan	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	0.1	0.1
AE ∆% Jan	-1.2	-2.4	-2.4	1.2	1.2
Dec 2018	1.0	1.1	1.0	-0.6	-0.6
AE ∆% Dec	12.7	14.0	12.7	-7.0	-7.0
Nov	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4
AE ∆% Nov	3.7	3.7	3.7	6.2	4.9
Oct	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.4
Sep	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
Aug	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
AE ∆% Aug-Oct	4.5	4.9	3.2	4.5	2.8
Jul	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.3
Jun	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
May	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.3
AE ∆% May-Jul	4.5	4.5	2.4	5.7	3.7
Apr	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.3
Mar	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.6
Feb	0.3	0.3	0.2	-0.1	-0.3
AE ∆% Feb-Apr	3.7	3.7	2.0	4.1	2.4
Jan	0.5	1.0	0.7	0.2	-0.1
Dec 2017	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.1
AE ∆% Dec-Jan	5.5	8.7	5.5	3.0	0.0
Nov	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.5
AE ∆% Nov	3.7	3.7	1.2	8.7	6.2
Oct	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
Sep	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.8	0.5
AE ∆% Sep-Oct	5.5	5.5	3.0	7.4	4.9
Aug	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.1
Jul	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1
AE ∆% Jul-Aug	4.9	4.9	3.0	3.7	1.2
Jun	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.3	0.2
AE ∆% Jun	1.2	0.0	-1.2	3.7	2.4
May	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2
Apr	0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.3	0.1
Mar	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7
AE ∆% Mar-May	3.2	3.2	2.8	4.5	4.1
Feb	0.5	0.5	0.4	-0.1	-0.1
Jan	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.0
AE ∆% Jan-Feb	7.4	8.1	4.9	1.8	-0.6
Dec 2016	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.3
Nov	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
AE ∆% Nov-Dec	4.3	4.3	2.4	4.9	3.0
Oct	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.1
Sep	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.4
Aug	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.2
AE ∆% Aug-Oct	4.1	4.9	2.4	4.9	2.8
Jul	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.0
Jun	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.4
May	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.4	0.2
AE ∆% May-Jul	2.8	2.8	0.8	4.5	2.4
Apr	0.2	0.1	-0.2	0.8	0.4
Mar	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.0	-0.2
AE ∆% Mar-Apr	3.0	2.4	-0.6	4.9	1.2
Feb	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.6
Jan	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.0
AE ∆% Jan-Feb	1.2	3.0	3.0	3.7	3.7
2015
Dec	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2
Nov	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	0.3	0.2
Oct	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
Sep	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1
AE ∆% Sep-Dec	0.6	0.3	0.9	2.1	2.1
Aug	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Jul	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
Jun	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.1
AE ∆% Jun-Aug	4.1	4.9	3.2	4.1	2.8
May	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.4
Apr	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.2
Mar	0.1	0.0	-0.2	0.6	0.4
AE ∆% Mar-Jun	5.3	4.5	2.4	6.2	4.1
Feb	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2
Jan	0.3	0.0	0.5	-0.1	0.3
AE ∆% Jan-Feb	4.9	3.0	4.9	1.2	3.0
2014
Dec	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.3
Nov	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3
Oct	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6
Sep	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1
AE ∆% Sep-Dec	4.6	4.9	5.2	2.7	4.0
Aug	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7
Jul	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.2
Jun	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.5
May	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2
Apr	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.3
AE ∆% Apr-Aug	5.7	5.9	4.4	6.4	4.7
Mar	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.5
Feb	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.4
Jan	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.0	-0.2
AE ∆% Jan-Mar	9.6	9.2	7.4	4.9	2.8
2013
Dec	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.1
AE ∆% Dec	7.4	6.2	3.7	3.7	1.2
Nov	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.4
AE ∆% Nov	6.2	6.2	3.7	7.4	4.9
Oct	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	0.5	0.3
AE ∆% Oct	-1.2	-1.2	-3.5	6.2	3.7
Sep	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
Aug	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.1
Jul	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.2	0.1
Jun	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.0
May	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3
Apr	0.4	0.3	0.4	-0.2	-0.1
AE ∆% Apr-Sep	3.9	4.1	3.2	2.4	1.4
Mar	0.1	0.0	0.2	-0.1	0.0
Feb	-0.1	-0.1	-0.5	0.3	0.0
AE ∆% Feb-Mar	0.0	-0.6	-1.8	1.2	0.0
Jan	-4.7	-5.6 (0.1)a	-5.8	0.6	0.4
AE ∆% Jan	-43.9	-49.9 (3.7)a	-51.2	7.4	4.9
2012
∆% Jan-Dec 2012***	8.3	8.3	6.5	3.4	1.7
Dec	2.6	2.5 (0.3)*	2.5 (0.5)*	0.0	0.0
Nov	1.4	1.3 (0.6)*	1.4 (0.9)*	0.3	0.4
AE ∆% Nov-Dec	26.8	25.3 (5.5)*	26.1 (8.7)*	1.8	2.4
Oct	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.3	0.1
Sep	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.2
Aug	0.0	-0.1	-0.4	0.2	-0.1
AE ∆% Aug-Oct	7.9	7.4	3.6	4.1	0.8
Jul	-0.6	-0.7	-0.7	0.3	0.2
Jun	0.1	0.0	0.1	-0.2	-0.1
May	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0
Apr	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.1
AE ∆% Apr-Jul	0.0	-0.6	-0.3	0.9	0.6
Mar	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.0	-0.2
Feb	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.6
Jan	0.8	1.1	0.7	0.8	0.5
AE ∆% Jan-Mar	9.2	10.0	7.0	6.6	3.7
2011
∆% Jan-Dec 2011*	5.2	4.3	1.6	3.7	1.0
Dec	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.1	0.1
Nov	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	-0.1
Oct	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Sep	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.4	0.2
AE ∆% Sep-Dec	3.6	4.3	2.7	2.1	0.9
Aug	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.0
Jul	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.2
Jun	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.3
May	0.2	0.2	-0.1	0.2	-0.1
AE ∆% May-Aug	4.0	4.0	1.8	3.0	1.2
Apr	0.2	0.2	-0.2	0.4	-0.1
Mar	0.1	0.1	-0.3	0.8	0.4
Feb	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.0
Jan	1.6	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.1
AE ∆% Jan-Apr	7.4	4.6	0.3	5.8	1.2
2010
∆% Jan-Dec 2010**	5.8	5.0	3.6	3.9	2.6
Dec	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.1
Nov	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.3
Oct	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.2
IVQ2010∆%	1.8	1.7	1.0	1.4	0.6
IVQ2010 AE ∆%	7.4	7.0	4.1	5.7	2.4

Notes: *Excluding exceptional income gains in Nov and Dec 2012 because of anticipated tax increases in Jan 2013 ((page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). ^a Excluding employee contributions for government social insurance (pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf )Excluding NPI: current dollars personal income; NDPI: current dollars disposable personal income; RDPI: chained (2005) dollars DPI; NPCE: current dollars personal consumption expenditures; RPCE: chained (2005) dollars PCE; AE: annual equivalent; IVQ2010: fourth quarter 2010; A: annual equivalent

Percentage change month to month seasonally adjusted

*∆% Dec 2011/Dec 2010 **∆% Dec 2010/Dec 2009 *** ∆% Dec 2012/Dec 2011

Source: US Bureau of Economic http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The 12-month rate of increase of real disposable income fell to minus 1.0 percent in Oct 2013 and minus 2.1 percent in Nov 2013 partly because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of incomes to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income fell 4.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 primarily because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of income to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014, partly because of the low level in Jan 2013 after anticipation of incomes in late 2012 in avoiding the fiscal cliff episode. Real disposable income increased 3.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2019.

RPCE growth decelerated less sharply from close to 3 percent in IVQ2010 to 2.3 percent in Jan 2019. Subdued growth of RPCE could affect revenues of business. Growth rates of personal consumption have weakened in oscillations. Goods and especially durable goods have been driving growth of PCE as shown by the much higher 12-month rates of growth of real goods PCE (RPCEG) and durable goods real PCE (RPCEGD) than services real PCE (RPCES). Growth of consumption of goods and, in particular, of consumer durable goods drives the faster expansion of the economy while growth of consumption of services is much more moderate. The 12-month rates of growth of RPCEGD have fallen from around 10 percent and even higher in several months from Sep 2010 to Feb 2011 to the range of 1.0 to 6.9 percent from Jan 2018 to Jan 2019. RPCEG growth rates have fallen from around 5 percent late in 2010 and early Jan-Feb 2011 to the range of 1.6 to 4.4 percent from Jan 2018 to Jan 2019. In Jan 2019, RPCEG increased 1.9 percent in 12 months and RPCEGD 1.0 percent while RPCES increased 2.4 percent. There are limits to sustained growth based on financial repression in an environment of weak labor markets and real labor remuneration.

Table IB-2, Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Personal Consumption Expenditures

Percentage Change from the Same Month a Year Earlier %

	RDPI	RPCE	RPCEG	RPCEGD	RPCES
2019
Jan	3.0	2.3	1.9	1.0	2.4
2018
Dec	3.9	2.0	1.6	1.8	2.2
Nov	3.1	2.8	3.7	4.3	2.4
Oct	2.9	2.8	3.5	4.1	2.5
Sep	2.8	2.7	3.3	4.4	2.4
Aug	2.9	3.1	4.4	6.9	2.6
Jul	2.7	3.0	4.2	5.5	2.4
Jun	2.8	2.7	3.9	6.2	2.2
May	2.5	2.6	4.1	6.7	1.9
Apr	2.8	2.5	3.8	6.9	1.9
Mar	2.6	2.2	3.9	6.9	1.5
Feb	2.7	2.4	4.0	6.5	1.7
Jan	3.0	2.5	3.9	6.4	1.9
2017
Dec	2.7	2.7	4.3	6.5	1.9
Nov	2.7	2.8	5.3	9.3	1.8
Oct	2.9	2.6	4.2	7.2	1.8
Sep	2.8	2.4	3.9	7.0	1.7
Aug	3.0	2.3	3.4	5.4	1.8
Jul	2.9	2.4	3.4	6.5	2.0
Jun	2.9	2.3	3.1	6.4	2.0
May	2.9	2.5	3.5	7.2	2.1
Apr	2.4	2.6	3.6	7.3	2.1
Mar	2.4	3.0	3.6	7.1	2.7
Feb	2.0	2.0	2.2	4.7	2.0
Jan	1.7	2.8	3.7	7.5	2.4
2016
Dec	1.6	2.8	3.7	7.7	2.4
Nov	1.8	2.8	3.1	5.2	2.6
Oct	1.3	2.7	3.9	7.4	2.2
Sep	1.1	2.8	3.6	6.8	2.5
Aug	1.0	2.6	3.3	4.9	2.3
Jul	1.2	2.7	3.5	5.5	2.3
Jun	1.3	2.9	4.1	5.3	2.4
May	1.5	2.6	3.5	4.1	2.2
Apr	2.0	2.7	3.6	4.0	2.3
Mar	2.7	2.5	3.0	3.5	2.3
Feb	2.3	3.1	4.7	7.2	2.3
Jan	2.6	2.6	3.4	4.7	2.2
2015
Dec	2.7	2.9	4.0	5.6	2.4
Nov	3.0	3.0	4.0	6.4	2.5
Oct	3.7	3.1	3.9	5.9	2.8
Sep	4.0	3.5	4.7	6.1	2.9
Aug	4.1	3.5	4.6	7.7	2.9
Jul	4.3	3.9	5.0	8.0	3.4
Jun	4.3	3.8	4.6	7.0	3.4
May	4.5	4.2	5.1	8.0	3.7
Apr	4.4	4.1	4.7	8.6	3.8
Mar	4.2	4.1	5.2	8.2	3.6
Feb	5.0	4.2	4.7	8.2	3.9
Jan	5.4	4.5	6.3	11.7	3.6
2014
Dec	5.4	3.8	5.3	10.1	3.2
Nov	5.1	3.6	4.8	8.8	3.1
Oct	5.0	3.8	4.8	8.7	3.3
Sep	4.3	3.5	4.4	9.1	3.1
Aug	4.4	3.7	5.1	8.4	3.1
Jul	4.2	3.1	4.1	7.3	2.7
Jun	3.7	3.1	4.5	8.2	2.4
May	3.4	2.6	3.7	7.1	2.1
Apr	3.7	2.6	4.2	6.3	1.8
Mar	3.8	2.2	3.8	7.3	1.4
Feb	3.4	1.7	2.5	3.4	1.4
Jan	2.2	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.4
2013
Dec	-4.2	1.9	3.1	3.4	1.3
Nov	-2.1	1.9	3.5	5.1	1.1
Oct	-1.0	1.8	3.9	6.6	0.9
Sep	0.0	1.6	3.3	5.2	0.7
Aug	0.0	1.5	2.9	6.5	0.8
Jul	-0.6	1.3	3.6	7.0	0.2
Jun	-1.1	1.4	3.3	7.0	0.5
May	-1.2	1.2	3.1	7.0	0.3
Apr	-1.6	1.0	2.5	6.1	0.2
Mar	-1.7	1.2	2.6	5.8	0.6
Feb	-1.5	1.0	2.4	6.1	0.3
Jan	-0.4	1.6	3.6	7.5	0.7
2012
Dec	6.5	1.7	2.9	7.6	1.2
Nov	4.8	1.8	2.7	7.3	1.3
Oct	3.3	1.2	1.6	4.2	1.0
Sep	2.7	1.3	2.3	6.3	0.8
Aug	2.1	1.3	2.8	6.8	0.5
Jul	2.3	1.3	2.2	6.3	0.9
Jun	3.4	1.3	1.8	6.7	1.0
May	3.8	1.7	2.6	6.1	1.3
Apr	3.6	1.6	1.7	5.4	1.6
Mar	3.0	1.4	1.4	4.5	1.4
Feb	2.3	2.0	2.4	6.3	1.8
Jan	1.9	1.4	1.1	4.5	1.5
Dec 2011	1.6	1.0	0.8	3.6	1.1
Dec 2010	3.6	2.6	4.1	8.3	1.8

Notes: RDPI: real disposable personal income; RPCE: real personal consumption expenditures (PCE); RPCEG: real PCE goods; RPCEGD: RPCEG durable goods; RPCES: RPCE services

Numbers are percentage changes from the same month a year earlier

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-1 shows US real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) between 2002 and 2019. There is an evident drop in RPCE during the global recession in 2007 to 2009 but the slope is flatter during the current recovery than in the period before 2007 with recent recovery.

Chart IB-1, US, Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 2002-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percent changes from the prior period in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent quarterly rates (SAAR) of real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) are in Chart IB-2 from 1995 to 2018. The average rate could be visualized as a horizontal line. Although there are not yet sufficient observations, it appears from Chart IB-2 that the average rate of growth of RPCE was higher before the recession than during the past thirty-eight quarters of expansion that began in IIIQ2009.

Chart IB-2, Percent Change from Prior Period in Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Personal income and its disposition are in Table IB-3. The latest estimates and revisions have changed movements in nine forms. (1) Decrease in Jan 2019 of personal income by 22.9 billion or 0.1 percent and decrease of disposable income of $34.9 billion or 0.2 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 0.3 percent. (2) Increase of personal income of $858.0 billion from Dec 2017 to Dec 2018 or 5.0 percent and increase of disposable income of $864.6 billion or 5.7 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 4.5 percent. (3) Increase of personal income of $749.9 billion from Dec 2016 to Dec 2017 or 4.6 percent and increase of disposable income of $664.6 billion or 4.6 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 4.6 percent. (4) Increase of personal income of $515.8 billion or 3.2 percent from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 and increase of disposable income of $476.8 billion or 3.4 percent. Wages and salaries increased $277.2 billion or 3.5 percent. (5) Increase of personal income of $532.9 billion from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 or 3.5 percent and increase of disposable income of $419.7 billion or 3.1 percent. Wages and salaries increased $308.7 billion or 4.0 percent. (6) Increase of personal income of $931.4 billion from Dec 2013 to Dec 2014 or 6.5 percent while disposable income increased $801.3 billion or 6.3 percent. Wages and salaries increased $419.1 billion or 5.8 percent. (7) Decrease of personal income of $266.5 billion from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or by 1.8 percent and decrease of disposable income of $372.3 billion or by 2.8 percent. Wages and salaries increased $55.9 billion from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or by 0.8 percent. Large part of these declines occurred because of the comparison of high levels in late 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in 2013. (8) In 2012, personal income increased $128.7 billion or 8.3 percent while wages and salaries increased 7.6 percent and disposable income 8.3 percent. Significant part of these gains occurred in Dec 2012 in anticipation of incomes because of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. (9) Increase of $672.2 billion of personal income in 2011 or by 5.2 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 2.7 percent and disposable income of 4.3 percent. (10) Increase of the rate of savings as percent of disposable income from 7.1 percent in Dec 2010 to 7.8 percent in Dec 2011 and 12.0 percent in Dec 2012, decreasing to 6.4 percent in Dec 2013. The savings rate increased to 7.6 percent in Dec 2014, decreasing to 7.3 percent in Dec 2015, 6.3 percent in Dec 2016, 6.2 percent in Dec 2017 and decreasing to 6.1 percent in Nov 2018. The savings ratio increased to 7.6 percent in Dec 2018.

Table IB-3, US, Personal Income and its Disposition, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates USD Billions

	Personal Income	Wages & Salaries	Personal Taxes	DPI	Savings Rate %
Jan 2019	17,999.7	9,047.6	2,086.4	15,913.4	7.5
Dec 2018	18,022.6	9,017.4	2,074.3	15,948.3	7.7
Change Jan 2019/      Dec 2018	-22.9 ∆% -0.1	30.2 ∆% 0.3	12.1 ∆% 0.6	-34.9 ∆% -0.2
Change Dec 2018/Dec 2017	858.0 ∆% 5.0	391.4 ∆% 4.5	-6.6 ∆% -0.3	864.6 ∆% 5.7
Dec 2017	17,164.6	8,626.0	2,080.9	15,083.7	6.2
Change Dec 2017/      Dec 2016	749.9 ∆% 4.6	378.6 ∆% 4.6	85.3 ∆% 4.3	664.6 ∆% 4.6
Dec 2016	16,414.7	8,247.4	1,995.6	14,419.1	6.3
Dec 2015	15,898.9	7,970.2	1,956.6	13,942.3	7.3
Change Dec 2016/      Dec 2015	515.8 ∆% 3.2	277.2 ∆% 3.5	39.0 ∆% 2.0	476.8 ∆% 3.4
Dec 2015	15,898.9	7,970.2	1,956.6	13,942.3	7.3
Change Dec 2015/Dec 2014	532.9 ∆% 3.5	308.7 ∆% 4.0	113.2 ∆% 6.1	419.7∆% 3.1
Dec 2014	15,366.0	7,661.5	1,843.4	13,522.6	7.6
Change Dec 2014/Dec 2013	931.4 ∆% 6.5	419.1 ∆% 5.8	130.1 ∆% 7.6	801.3 ∆% 6.3
Dec 2013	14,434.6	7,242.4	1,713.3	12,721.3	6.4
Dec 2012	14,701.1	7,186.5	1,607.6	13,093.6	12.0
Change Dec 2013/ Dec 2012	-266.5 ∆% -1.8	55.9 ∆% 0.8	105.7 ∆% 6.6	-372.3 ∆% -2.8
Change Dec 2012/ Dec 2011	1128.7 ∆% 8.3	508.9 ∆% 7.6	128.8 ∆% 8.7	1000.0 ∆% 8.3
Dec 2011	13,572.4	6,677.6	1,478.8	12,093.6	7.8
Dec 2010	12,900.2	6,500.6	1,299.8	11,600.4	7.1
Change Dec 2011/ Dec 2010	672.2 ∆% 5.2	177.0 ∆% 2.7	179.0 ∆% 13.8	493.2 ∆% 4.3

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

US personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table IB-4 provides growth rates of real disposable income and real disposable income per capita in the long-term and selected periods. Real disposable income consists of after-tax income adjusted for inflation. Real disposable income per capita is income per person after taxes and inflation. There is remarkable long-term trend of growth of real disposable income of 3.2 percent per year on average from 1929 to 2018 and 2.0 percent in real disposable income per capita. Real disposable income increased at the average yearly rate of 3.7 percent from 1947 to 1999 and real disposable income per capita at 2.3 percent. These rates of increase broadly accompany rates of growth of GDP. Institutional arrangements in the United States provided the environment for growth of output and income after taxes, inflation and population growth. There is significant break of growth by much lower 2.5 percent for real disposable income on average from 1999 to 2018 and 1.6 percent in real disposable per capita income. Real disposable income grew at 3.5 percent from 1980 to 1989 and real disposable per capita income at 2.6 percent. In contrast, real disposable income grew at only 2.1 percent on average from 2006 to 2018 and real disposable income per capita at 1.3 percent. Real disposable income grew at 2.0 percent from 2007 to 2018 and real disposable income per capita at 1.3 percent. The United States has interrupted its long-term and cyclical dynamism of output, income and employment growth. Recovery of this dynamism could prove to be a major challenge. Cyclical uncommonly slow growth explains weakness in the current whole cycle instead of the allegation of secular stagnation.

Table IB-4, Average Annual Growth Rates of Real Disposable Income (RDPI) and Real Disposable Income per Capita (RDPIPC), Percent per Year 

RDPI Average ∆%
1929-2018	3.2
1947-1999	3.7
1999-2018	2.5
1999-2006	3.2
1980-1989	3.5
2006-2018	2.1
2007-2018	2.0
RDPIPC Average ∆%
1929-2018	2.0
1947-1999	2.3
1999-2018	1.6
1999-2006	2.2
1980-1989	2.6
2006-2018	1.3
2007-2018	1.3

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-3 provides personal income in the US between 1980 and 1992. These data are not adjusted for inflation that was still high in the 1980s in the exit from the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html). Personal income grew steadily during the 1980s after recovery from two recessions from Jan IQ1980 to Jul IIIQ1980 and from Jul IIIQ1981 to Nov IVQ1982. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-3, US, Personal Income, Billion Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 1980-1992

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-4 provides personal income from 2007 to 2018. In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 10.4 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 11.9 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 15.1 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf).The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In IIIQ2014, personal income grew at 6.1 percent, nominal disposable income at 5.7 percent and real disposable personal income at 4.5 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2014, personal income grew at 5.0 percent in nominal terms while nominal disposable income grew at 4.6 percent in nominal terms and at 5.0 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 4.5 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.2 percent and at 5.0 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 5.6 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 5.1 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.1 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 2.9 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 4.7 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.4 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 1.0 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 0.7 percent and real disposable income at 0.9 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2016, personal income grew at 1.6 percent and fell at 2.1 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 2.7 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIQ2016, personal income grew at 2.2 percent and at 2.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 1.7 percent and real disposable income fell at 0.6 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIIQ2016, personal income grew at 3.5 percent and at 1.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.3 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.5 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2016, nominal personal income grew at 4.6 percent, decreasing at 2.6 percent excluding current transfers while disposable income grew at 4.7 percent and real disposable income increased at 2.7 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 6.3 percent and 4.7 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 6.6 percent and real disposable income at 4.5 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-09/pi0818.pdf). In IIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.8 percent and 2.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income at 2.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-12/pi1118.pdf). In IIIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 4.2 percent and at 2.5 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.9 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 2.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IVQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 5.0 percent and at 2.9 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.1 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 2.3 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 5.2 percent and at 2.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 7.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 4.4 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IIQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 3.5 percent and at 1.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.8 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.8 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IIIQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 4.4 percent and at 2.8 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 4.2 percent and real disposable income grew at 2.6 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IVQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 5.3 percent and at 4.0 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.8 percent and real disposable income grew at 4.3 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf).

Chart IB-4, US, Personal Income, Current Billions of Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Real or inflation-adjusted disposable personal income is in Chart IB-5 from 1980 to 1992. Real disposable income after allowing for taxes and inflation grew steadily at high rates during the entire decade. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-5, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1980-1992

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-6 provides real disposable income from 2007 to 2018. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 13.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 10.9 percent (Table 2.1 http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The BEA explains as follows: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). There are revisions since 1929 (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1117.pdf).

In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 10.4 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 11.9 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 15.1 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf).The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In IIIQ2014, personal income grew at 6.1 percent, nominal disposable income at 5.7 percent and real disposable personal income at 4.5 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2014, personal income grew at 5.0 percent in nominal terms while nominal disposable income grew at 4.6 percent in nominal terms and at 5.0 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 4.5 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.2 percent and at 5.0 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 5.6 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 5.1 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.1 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 2.9 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 4.7 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.4 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 1.0 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 0.7 percent and real disposable income at 0.9 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2016, personal income grew at 1.6 percent and fell at 2.1 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 2.7 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIQ2016, personal income grew at 2.2 percent and at 2.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 1.7 percent and real disposable income fell at 0.6 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIIQ2016, personal income grew at 3.5 percent and at 1.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.3 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.5 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2016, nominal personal income grew at 4.6 percent, decreasing at 2.6 percent excluding current transfers while disposable income grew at 4.7 percent and real disposable income increased at 2.7 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 6.3 percent and 4.7 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 6.6 percent and real disposable income at 4.5 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-09/pi0818.pdf). In IIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.8 percent and 2.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income at 2.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-12/pi1118.pdf). In IIIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 4.2 percent and at 2.5 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.9 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 2.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IVQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 5.0 percent and at 2.9 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.1 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 2.3 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 5.2 percent and at 2.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 7.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 4.4 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IIQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 3.5 percent and at 1.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.8 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.8 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IIIQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 4.4 percent and at 2.8 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 4.2 percent and real disposable income grew at 2.6 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IVQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 5.3 percent and at 4.0 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.8 percent and real disposable income grew at 4.3 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf).

Chart IB-6, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2018

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-7 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally adjusted annual rates from 1980 to 1992. Rates of changes were high during the decade with few negative changes. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-7, US, Real Disposable Income Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Quarterly Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 1980-1992

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-8 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally adjusted annual rates from 2007 to 2018. There has been a period of positive rates followed by decline of rates and then negative and low rates in 2011. Recovery in 2012 has not reproduced the dynamism of the brief early phase of expansion. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 13.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 10.9 percent (Table 2.1 http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The BEA explains as follows: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). There are revisions since 1929 (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1117.pdf).

In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 10.4 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 11.9 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 15.1 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf).The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In IIIQ2014, personal income grew at 6.1 percent, nominal disposable income at 5.7 percent and real disposable personal income at 4.5 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2014, personal income grew at 5.0 percent in nominal terms while nominal disposable income grew at 4.6 percent in nominal terms and at 5.0 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 4.5 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 3.2 percent and at 5.0 percent in real terms (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 5.6 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 5.1 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.1 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIIQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 2.9 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 4.7 percent and real disposable income grew at 3.4 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2015, nominal personal income grew at 1.0 percent while nominal disposable income grew at 0.7 percent and real disposable income at 0.9 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2016, personal income grew at 1.6 percent and fell at 2.1 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 2.7 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIQ2016, personal income grew at 2.2 percent and at 2.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 1.7 percent and real disposable income fell at 0.6 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IIIQ2016, personal income grew at 3.5 percent and at 1.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.3 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.5 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IVQ2016, nominal personal income grew at 4.6 percent, decreasing at 2.6 percent excluding current transfers while disposable income grew at 4.7 percent and real disposable income increased at 2.7 percent (Table 14 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-07/pi0618.pdf). In IQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 6.3 percent and 4.7 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 6.6 percent and real disposable income at 4.5 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-09/pi0818.pdf). In IIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 2.8 percent and 2.4 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.0 percent and real disposable income at 2.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-12/pi1118.pdf). In IIIQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 4.2 percent and at 2.5 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.9 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 2.2 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IVQ2017, nominal personal income grew at 5.0 percent and at 2.9 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.1 percent and real disposable personal income grew at 2.3 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 5.2 percent and at 2.3 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 7.0 percent and real disposable income grew at 4.4 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IIQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 3.5 percent and at 1.2 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 3.8 percent and real disposable income grew at 1.8 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IIIQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 4.4 percent and at 2.8 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 4.2 percent and real disposable income grew at 2.6 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). In IVQ2018, nominal personal income grew at 5.3 percent and at 4.0 percent excluding transfer receipts while nominal disposable income grew at 5.8 percent and real disposable income grew at 4.3 percent (Table 6 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf).

Chart, IB-8, US, Real Disposable Income, Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 2007-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates US personal income in Jan 2019 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate of $17,999.7 billion, as shown in Table IB-3 above (see Table 1 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). The major portion of personal income is compensation of employees of $11,102.5 billion, or 61.7 percent of the total. Wages and salaries are $9,047.6 billion, of which $7,647.8 billion by private industries and supplements to wages and salaries of $2,055.0 billion (contributions to government social insurance are $645.6 billion). In Jul 1992 (at the comparable month after the 38^th quarter of cyclical expansion), US personal income was $5,441.3 billion at SAAR (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Compensation of employees was $3,677.8 billion, or 67.6 percent of the total. Wages and salaries were $2,969.3 billion of which $2,395.6 billion by private industries. Supplements to wages and salaries were $708.5 billion with employer contributions to pension and insurance funds of $478.5 billion and $230.0 billion to government social insurance. Chart IB-9 provides US wages and salaries by private industries in the 1980s and 1990-1992. Growth was robust after the interruption of the recessions. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-9, US, Wages and Salaries, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates Billions of Dollars, 1980-1992

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates US personal income in Jan 2019 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate of $17,999.7 billion, as shown in Table IB-3 above (see Table 1 at https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/pi0219.pdf). The major portion of personal income is compensation of employees of $11,102.5 billion, or 61.7 percent of the total. Wages and salaries are $9,047.6 billion, of which $7,647.8 billion by private industries and supplements to wages and salaries of $2,055.0 billion (contributions to government social insurance are $645.6 billion). Chart IB-10 provides US wages and salaries by private industries since 2007. Growth was mediocre in the weak expansion phase after IIIQ2009.

Chart IB-10, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-11 provides finer detail with monthly wages and salaries of private industries from 2007 to 2019. Anticipations of income in late 2012 to avoid tax increases in 2013 cloud comparisons.

Chart IB-11, US, Wages and Salaries, Private Industries, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-12 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 1980 to 1992. This is the ultimate measure of wellbeing in receiving income by obtaining the value per inhabitant. The measure cannot adjust for the distribution of income. Real disposable income per capita grew rapidly during the expansion after 1983 and continued growing during the rest of the decade. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IB-12, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Chained 2009 Dollars 1980-1992

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IB-5 provides the comparison between the cycle of the 1980s and the current cycle. Real per capita disposable income (RDPI-PC) increased 29.2 percent from Dec 1979 to Jul 1992. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). In the comparable period in the current cycle from Dec 2007 to Jan 2019, real per capita disposable income increased 16.8 percent.

Table IB-5, Percentage Changes of Real Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

Month	RDPI-PC ∆% 12/79	RDPI-PC ∆% YOY	Month	RDPI-PC ∆% 12/07	RDPI-PC ∆% YOY
11/1982	2.7	0.6	6/2009	-0.6	-1.8
12/1982	3.1	1.2	9/2009	-1.4	-0.5
12/1983	8.2	5.0	6/2010	0.5	1.2
12/1987	20.6	2.8	6/2014	5.6	2.9
1/1988	20.8	2.6	7/2014	5.9	3.4
2/1988	21.4	2.7	8/2014	6.3	3.7
3/1988	21.9	3.0	9/2014	6.5	3.5
4/1988	22.2	7.4	10/2014	6.9	4.2
5/1988	22.3	3.3	11/2014	7.2	4.3
6/1988	22.6	3.8	12/2014	7.9	4.6
7/1988	23.0	4.0	1/2015	8.4	4.6
8/1988	23.3	3.8	2/2015	8.7	4.3
9/1988	23.4	4.0	3/2015	8.4	3.4
10/1988	23.9	3.9	4/2015	8.9	3.7
11/1988	23.9	3.5	5/2015	9.2	3.7
12/1988	24.4	3.1	6/2015	9.4	3.6
1/1989	24.9	3.4	7/2015	9.6	3.5
2/1989	25.2	3.1	8/2015	9.9	3.4
3/1989	25.7	3.2	9/2015	10.0	3.3
4/1989	25.0	2.3	10/2015	10.0	2.9
5/1989	24.3	1.6	11/2015	9.7	2.3
6/1989	24.5	1.6	12/2015	10.0	1.9
7/1989	24.9	1.5	1/2016	10.4	1.8
8/1989	25.1	1.5	2/2016	10.4	1.6
9/1989	25.3	1.6	3/2016	10.5	1.9
10/1989	25.8	1.5	4/2016	10.2	1.3
11/1989	25.8	1.6	5/2016	10.1	0.8
12/1989	25.7	1.1	6/2016	10.0	0.5
1/1990	26.4	1.2	7/2016	10.2	0.5
2/1990	26.5	1.1	8/2016	10.2	0.3
3/1990	26.5	0.6	9/2016	10.5	0.4
4/1990	27.1	1.7	10/216	10.7	0.6
5/1990	26.8	2.1	11/2016	10.9	1.1
6/1990	26.9	1.9	12/2016	11.0	1.0
7/1990	27.2	1.9	1/2017	11.4	1.0
8/1990	26.2	0.9	2/2017	11.9	1.3
9/1990	26.0	0.6	3/2017	12.4	1.7
10/1990	24.8	-0.8	4/2017	12.1	1.7
11/1990	24.7	-0.9	5/2017	12.5	2.2
12/1990	25.3	-0.3	06/2017	12.4	2.2
1/1991	24.8	-1.2	07/2017	12.6	2.2
2/1991	24.9	-1.3	08/2017	12.8	2.3
3/1991	24.9	-1.2	09/2017	12.9	2.2
4/1991	25.3	-1.4	10/2017	13.1	2.2
5/1991	25.2	-1.3	11/2017	13.2	2.1
6/1991	25.7	-0.9	12/2017	13.4	2.1
7/1991	25.3	-1.5	1/2018	14.1	2.4
8/1991	25.4	-0.6	2/2018	14.2	2.1
9/1991	25.6	-0.3	3/2018	14.6	2.0
10/1991	25.7	0.7	4/2018	14.5	2.1
11/1991	25.7	0.8	5/2018	14.6	1.8
12/1991	26.8	1.2	6/2018	14.8	2.2
1/1992	27.9	2.5	7/2018	15.0	2.1
2/1992	28.4	2.8	8/2018	15.3	2.2
3/1992	28.4	2.8	9/2018	15.3	2.1
4/1992	28.6	2.7	10/2018	15.6	2.2
5/1992	29.1	3.1	11/2018	15.9	2.4
6/1992	29.5	3.0	12/2018	17.1	3.3
7/1992	29.2	3.1	1/2019	16.8	2.4

RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income; RDPI-PC, Real Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

National Bureau of Economic Research

http://www.nber.org/cycles.html

Chart IB-13 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 2007 to 2019. There was initial recovery from the drop during the global recession followed by relative cyclical weakness.

Chart IB-13, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Chained 2009 Dollars 2007-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IB-6 provides data for analysis of the current cycle. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased 26.8 percent from Dec 2007 to Jan 2019 (column RDPI ∆% 12/07). In the same period, real disposable income per capita increased 16.8 percent (column RDPI-PC ∆% 12/07). The annual equivalent rate of increase of real disposable income per capita is 1.4 percent, only a fraction of 2.0 percent on average from 1929 to 2018, and 2.2 percent for real disposable income, much lower than 3.2 percent on average from 1929 to 2018.

Table IB-6, Percentage Changes of Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

Month	RDPI ∆% 12/07	RDPI ∆% Month	RDPI ∆% YOY	RDPI-PC ∆% 12/07	RDPI-PC ∆% Month	RDPI-PC ∆% YOY
6/09	0.7	-1.7	-0.9	-0.6	-1.7	-1.8
9/09	0.2	0.2	0.4	-1.4	0.1	-0.5
6/10	2.7	0.2	2.0	0.5	0.1	1.2
12/10	4.2	0.7	3.6	1.6	0.6	2.8
6/11	4.8	0.5	2.0	1.8	0.4	1.2
12/11	5.9	0.9	1.6	2.5	0.8	0.9
6/12	8.3	0.1	3.4	4.5	0.0	2.6
10/12	8.4	0.8	3.3	4.3	0.7	2.6
11/12	10.0	1.4	4.8	5.8	1.4	4.1
12/12	12.8	2.5	6.5	8.4	2.5	5.8
6/13	7.0	0.1	-1.1	2.6	0.0	-1.8
12/13	8.0	0.3	-4.2	3.1	0.3	-4.9
1/14	8.6	0.5	2.2	3.6	0.5	1.4
2/14	9.3	0.7	3.4	4.2	0.6	2.7
3/14	10.0	0.6	3.8	4.8	0.5	3.1
4/14	10.3	0.3	3.7	5.0	0.2	3.0
5/14	10.6	0.3	3.4	5.2	0.2	2.6
6/14	11.0	0.4	3.7	5.6	0.3	2.9
7/14	11.4	0.3	4.2	5.9	0.3	3.4
8/14	11.9	0.5	4.4	6.3	0.4	3.7
9/14	12.2	0.3	4.3	6.5	0.2	3.5
10/14	12.6	0.4	5.0	6.9	0.3	4.2
11/14	13.1	0.4	5.1	7.2	0.4	4.3
12/14	13.8	0.6	5.4	7.9	0.6	4.6
1/15	14.4	0.5	5.4	8.4	0.5	4.6
2/15	14.8	0.3	5.0	8.7	0.3	4.3
3/15	14.6	-0.2	4.2	8.4	-0.3	3.4
4/15	15.1	0.5	4.4	8.9	0.4	3.7
5/15	15.5	0.3	4.5	9.2	0.3	3.7
6/15	15.8	0.2	4.3	9.4	0.2	3.6
7/15	16.1	0.3	4.3	9.6	0.2	3.5
8/15	16.5	0.3	4.1	9.9	0.2	3.4
9/15	16.7	0.2	4.0	10.0	0.1	3.3
10/15	16.8	0.0	3.7	10.0	0.0	2.9
11/15	16.5	-0.2	3.0	9.7	-0.3	2.3
12/15	16.9	0.3	2.7	10.0	0.3	1.9
1/16	17.4	0.4	2.6	10.4	0.4	1.8
2/16	17.5	0.1	2.3	10.4	0.1	1.6
3/16	17.6	0.1	2.7	10.5	0.1	1.9
4/16	17.4	-0.2	2.0	10.2	-0.2	1.3
5/16	17.3	-0.1	1.5	10.1	-0.2	0.8
6/16	17.3	0.0	1.3	10.0	-0.1	0.5
7/16	17.6	0.3	1.2	10.2	0.2	0.5
8/16	17.7	0.1	1.0	10.2	0.0	0.3
9/16	18.0	0.3	1.1	10.5	0.2	0.4
10/16	18.3	0.2	1.3	10.7	0.2	0.6
11/16	18.6	0.2	1.8	10.9	0.2	1.1
12/16	18.8	0.2	1.6	11.0	0.1	1.0
1/17	19.3	0.4	1.7	11.4	0.4	1.0
2/17	19.8	0.4	2.0	11.9	0.4	1.3
3/17	20.4	0.5	2.4	12.4	0.4	1.7
4/17	20.2	-0.2	2.4	12.1	-0.2	1.7
5/17	20.7	0.4	2.9	12.5	0.4	2.2
6/17	20.6	-0.1	2.9	12.4	-0.1	2.2
7/17	21.0	0.3	2.9	12.6	0.2	2.2
8/17	21.2	0.2	3.0	12.8	0.1	2.3
9/17	21.4	0.2	2.8	12.9	0.1	2.2
10/17	21.7	0.3	2.9	13.1	0.2	2.2
11/17	21.8	0.1	2.7	13.2	0.0	2.1
12/17	22.1	0.2	2.7	13.4	0.2	2.1
1/18	22.9	0.7	3.0	14.1	0.6	2.4
2/18	23.1	0.2	2.7	14.2	0.1	2.1
3/18	23.6	0.3	2.6	14.6	0.3	2.0
4/18	23.5	0.0	2.8	14.5	-0.1	2.1
5/18	23.7	0.1	2.5	14.6	0.1	1.8
6/18	24.0	0.3	2.8	14.8	0.2	2.2
7/18	24.3	0.2	2.7	15.0	0.2	2.1
8/18	24.6	0.3	2.9	15.3	0.3	2.2
9/18	24.7	0.1	2.8	15.3	0.0	2.1
10/18	25.2	0.4	2.9	15.6	0.3	2.2
11/18	25.5	0.3	3.1	15.9	0.2	2.4
12/18	26.8	1.0	3.9	17.1	1.0	3.3
1/19	26.6	-0.2	3.0	16.8	-0.2	2.4

RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income; RDPI-PC, Real Disposable Personal Income Per Capita

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis  http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

National Bureau of Economic Research

http://www.nber.org/cycles.html

IA2 Financial Repression. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1974) argue that legal restrictions on financial institutions can be detrimental to economic development. “Financial repression” is the term used in the economic literature for these restrictions (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 81-6; for historical analysis see the landmark exhaustive research by Summerhill (2015) and earlier research by Pelaez (1975)). Theory and evidence support the role of financial institutions in efficiency and growth (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 22-6, Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 37-44). Excessive official regulation frustrates financial development required for growth (Haber 2011). Emphasis on disclosure can reduce bank fragility and corruption, empowering investors to enforce sound governance (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2006). Banking was important in facilitating economic growth in historical periods (Cameron 1961, 1967, 1972; Cameron et al. 1992). Banking is also important currently because small- and medium-size business may have no other form of financing than banks in contrast with many options for larger and more mature companies that have access to capital markets. Calomiris and Haber (2014) find that broad voting rights and institutions restricting coalitions of bankers and populists ensure stable banking systems and access to credit. Summerhill (2015) contributes momentous solid facts and analysis with an ideal method combining economic theory, econometrics, international comparisons, data reconstruction and exhaustive archival research. Summerhill (2015) finds that Brazil committed to service of sovereign foreign and internal debt. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Brazil generated primary fiscal surpluses during most of the Empire until 1889 (Summerhill 2015, 37-8, Figure 2.1). Econometric tests by Summerhill (2015, 19-44) show that Brazil’s sovereign debt was sustainable. Sovereign credibility in the North-Weingast (1989) sense spread to financial development that provided the capital for modernization in England and parts of Europe (see Cameron 1961, 1967). Summerhill (2015, 3,194-6, Figure 7.1) finds that “Brazil’s annual cost of capital in London fell from a peak of 13.9 percent in 1829 to only 5.12 percent in 1889. Average rates on secured loans in the private sector in Rio, however, remained well above 12 percent through 1850.” Financial development would have financed diversification of economic activities, increasing productivity and wages and ensuring economic growth. Brazil restricted creation of limited liability enterprises (Summerhill 2015, 151-82) that prevented raising capital with issue of stocks and corporate bonds. Cameron (1961) analyzed how the industrial revolution in England spread to France and then to the rest of Europe. The Société Générale de Crédit Mobilier of Émile and Isaac Péreire provided the “mobilization of credit” for the new economic activities (Cameron 1961). Summerhill (2015, 151-9) provides facts and analysis demonstrating that regulation prevented the creation of a similar vehicle for financing modernization by Irineu Evangelista de Souza, the legendary Visconde de Mauá. Regulation also prevented the use of negotiable bearing notes of the Caisse Générale of Jacques Lafitte (Cameron 1961, 118-9). The government also restricted establishment and independent operation of banks (Summerhill 2015, 183-214). Summerhill (2015, 198-9) measures concentration in banking that provided economic rents or a social loss. The facts and analysis of Summerhill (2015) provide convincing evidence in support of the economic theory of regulation, which postulates that regulated entities capture the process of regulation to promote their self-interest. There appears to be a case that excessively centralized government can result in regulation favoring private instead of public interests with adverse effects on economic activity. The contribution of Summerhill (2015) explains why Brazil did not benefit from trade as an engine of growth—as did regions of recent settlement in the vision of nineteenth-century trade and development of Ragnar Nurkse (1959)—partly because of restrictions on financing and incorporation. Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. Professor Rondo E. Cameron, in his memorable A Concise Economic History of the World (Cameron 1989, 307-8), finds that “from a broad spectrum of possible forms of interaction between the financial sector and other sectors of the economy that requires its services, one can isolate three type-cases: (1) that in which the financial sector plays a positive, growth-inducing role; (2) that in which the financial sector is essentially neutral or merely permissive; and (3) that in which inadequate finance restricts or hinders industrial and commercial development.” Summerhill (1985) proves exhaustively that Brazil failed to modernize earlier because of the restrictions of an inadequate institutional financial arrangement plagued by regulatory capture for self-interest. The Banking Act of 1933 imposed prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q.

Most regulatory actions trigger compensatory measures by the private sector that result in outcomes that are different from those intended by regulation (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Banks offered services to their customers and loans at rates lower than market rates to compensate for the prohibition to pay interest on demand deposits (Friedman 1970, 24). The prohibition of interest on demand deposits was eventually lifted in recent times. In the second half of the 1960s, already in the beginning of the Great Inflation (DeLong 1997), market rates rose above the ceilings of Regulation Q because of higher inflation. Nobody desires savings allocated to time or savings deposits that pay less than expected inflation. This is a fact currently with near zero real interest rates, 2¼ to 2½ percent, and consumer price inflation of 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2019 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/) but rising during waves of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html). Funding problems motivated compensatory measures by banks. Money-center banks developed the large certificate of deposit (CD) to accommodate increasing volumes of loan demand by customers. As Friedman (1970, 25) finds:

“Large negotiable CD’s were particularly hard hit by the interest rate ceiling because they are deposits of financially sophisticated individuals and institutions who have many alternatives. As already noted, they declined from a peak of $24 billion in mid-December, 1968, to less than $12 billion in early October, 1969.”

Banks created different liabilities to compensate for the decline in CDs. As Friedman (1970, 25; 1969) explains:

“The most important single replacement was almost surely ‘liabilities of US banks to foreign branches.’ Prevented from paying a market interest rate on liabilities of home offices in the United States (except to foreign official institutions that are exempt from Regulation Q), the major US banks discovered that they could do so by using the Euro-dollar market. Their European branches could accept time deposits, either on book account or as negotiable CD’s at whatever rate was required to attract them and match them on the asset side of their balance sheet with ‘due from head office.’ The head office could substitute the liability ‘due to foreign branches’ for the liability ‘due on CDs.”

Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:

“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”

In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:

“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.”

Chart IB-14 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides quarterly savings as percent of disposable income or the US savings rate from 1980 to 2018. There was a long-term downward sloping trend from 12 percent in the early 1980s to 2.2 percent in Jul 2005. The savings rate then rose during the contraction and in the expansion. In 2011 and into 2012 the savings rate declined as consumption is financed with savings in part because of the disincentive or frustration of receiving a few pennies for every $10,000 of deposits in a bank. The savings rate increased in the final segment of Chart IB-14 in 2012 because of the “fiscal cliff” episode followed by another decline because of the pain of the opportunity cost of zero remuneration for hard-earned savings. There are multiple recent oscillations during expectations of increase or “liftoff” of the fed funds rate in the United States followed by “shallow” or uncertain monetary policy with increase in policy interest rates and reduction of the balance sheet of the Fed.

of the Fed.

Chart IB-14, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Quarterly, 1980-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-14A provides the US personal savings rate, or personal savings as percent of disposable personal income, on an annual basis from 1929 to 2018. The US savings rate shows decline from around 10 percent in the 1960s to around 7 percent currently.

Chart IB-14A, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Annual, 1929-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IB-7 provides personal savings as percent of disposable income and annual change of real disposable personal income in selected years since 1930. Savings fell from 4.5 percent of disposable personal income in 1930 to minus 0.7 percent in 1933 while real disposable income contracted 6.3 percent in 1930 and 2.9 percent in 1933. Savings as percent of disposable personal income swelled during World War II to 27.9 percent in 1944 with increase of real disposable income of 3.1 percent. Savings as percent of personal disposable income fell steadily over decades from 12.0 percent in 1982 to 3.2 percent in 2005. Savings as percent of disposable personal income was 6.4 percent in 2013 while real disposable income fell 1.3 percent. The savings rate was 7.3 percent of GDP in 2014 with growth of real disposable income of 4.0 percent. The savings rate was 7.6 percent in 2015 with growth of real disposable income of 4.1 percent. The savings rate stood at 6.7 percent in 2016 with growth of real disposable income at 1.7 percent.

The saving rate eased to 6.7 percent in 2017 with growth of real disposable income at 2.6 percent. The savings rate stabilized at 6.7 percent in 2018 with growth of real disposable income at 2.9 percent. The average ratio of savings as percent of disposable income fell from 9.9 percent in 1980 to 1989 to 6.6 percent on average from 2007 to 2018. Real disposable income grew on average at 3.1 percent from 1980 to 1989 and at 2.0 percent on average from 2007 to 2018.

Table IB-7, US, Personal Savings as Percent of Disposable Personal Income, Annual, Selected Years 1929-2017

	Personal Savings as Percent of Disposable Personal Income	Annual Change of Real Disposable Personal Income
1930	4.5	-6.3
1933	-0.7	-2.9
1944	27.9	3.1
1947	6.3	-4.1
1954	10.3	1.4
1958	11.4	1.0
1960	10.1	2.6
1970	12.8	4.6
1975	13.4	2.5
1982	12.0	2.2
1989	8.4	2.9
1992	9.4	4.2
2002	5.8	3.0
2003	5.6	2.7
2004	5.2	3.3
2005	3.2	1.6
2006	3.8	4.0
2007	3.7	2.3
2008	5.0	1.0
2009	6.1	-0.2
2010	6.5	2.0
2011	7.2	2.3
2012	8.9	3.3
2013	6.4	-1.3
2014	7.3	4.0
2015	7.6	4.1
2016	6.7	1.7
2017	6.7	2.6
2018	6.7	2.9
Average Savings Ratio
1980-1989	9.9
2007-2018	6.6
Average Yearly ∆% Real Disposable Income
1980-1989		3.1
2007-2018		2.0

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-15 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides personal savings as percent of personal disposable income, or savings ratio, from Jan 2007 to Jan 2019.

Chart IB-15, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Income, Monthly 2007-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The uncertainties caused by the global recession resulted in sharp increase in the savings ratio that peaked at 7.8 percent in May 2008 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), as shown in Table IB-8. The second peak occurred at 8.2 percent in May 2009. There was another rising trend until 6.9 percent in Jun 2010 and then steady downward trend until 7.0 percent in Nov 2011. This was followed by an upward trend with 9.1 percent in Jun 2012 but decline to 8.0 percent in Aug 2012 followed by jump to 12.0 percent in Dec 2012. Swelling realization of income in Oct-Dec 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused the jump of the savings rate to 12.0 percent in Dec 2012. The BEA explains as “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). There was a reverse effect in Jan 2013 with decline of the savings rate to 6.3 percent. Real disposable personal income fell 5.8 percent and real disposable per capita income fell from $41,262 in Dec 2012 to $38,868 in Jan 2013 or by 5.8 percent (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), which is explained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion.”

Table IB-8, US, Savings Ratio and Real Disposable Income, % and ∆%

	Personal Saving as % Disposable Income	RDPI ∆% 12/07	RDPI ∆% Month	RDPI ∆% YOY
May 2008	7.8	4.4	4.8	4.8
May 2009	8.2	2.4	1.7	-1.9
Jun 2010	6.9	2.7	0.2	2.0
Nov 2011	7.0	4.9	0.0	1.4
Jun 2012	9.1	8.3	0.1	3.4
Aug 2012	8.0	7.1	-0.4	2.1
Dec 2012	12.0	12.8	2.5	6.5
Jan 2013	6.3	6.3	-5.8	-0.4
Feb 2013	5.8	5.7	-0.5	-1.5
Mar 2013	5.9	5.9	0.2	-1.7
Apr 2013	6.4	6.3	0.4	-1.6
May 2013	6.7	6.9	0.6	-1.2
Jun 2013	6.8	7.0	0.1	-1.1
Jul 2013	6.6	6.9	-0.1	-0.6
Aug 2013	6.7	7.2	0.2	0.0
Sep 2013	6.8	7.6	0.4	0.0
Oct 2013	6.3	7.3	-0.3	-1.0
Nov 2013	6.2	7.7	0.3	-2.1
Dec 2013	6.4	8.0	0.3	-4.2
Jan 2014	7.1	8.6	0.5	2.2
Feb 2014	7.3	9.3	0.7	3.4
Mar 2014	7.4	10.0	0.6	3.8
Apr 2014	7.4	10.3	0.3	3.7
May 2014	7.4	10.6	0.3	3.4
Jun 2014	7.4	11.0	0.4	3.7
Jul 2014	7.5	11.4	0.3	4.2
Aug 2014	7.2	11.9	0.5	4.4
Sep 2014	7.4	12.2	0.3	4.3
Oct 2014	7.2	12.6	0.4	5.0
Nov 2014	7.3	13.1	0.4	5.1
Dec 2014	7.6	13.8	0.6	5.4
Jan 2015	7.7	14.4	0.5	5.4
Feb 2015	7.9	14.8	0.3	5.0
Mar 2015	7.4	14.6	-0.2	4.2
Apr 2015	7.6	15.1	0.5	4.4
May 2015	7.5	15.5	0.3	4.5
Jun 2015	7.6	15.8	0.2	4.3
Jul 2015	7.6	16.1	0.3	4.3
Aug 2015	7.7	16.5	0.3	4.1
Sep 2015	7.7	16.7	0.2	4.0
Oct 2015	7.6	16.8	0.0	3.7
Nov 2015	7.2	16.5	-0.2	3.0
Dec 2015	7.3	16.9	0.3	2.7
Jan 2016	7.7	17.4	0.4	2.6
Feb 2016	7.2	17.5	0.1	2.3
Mar 2016	7.5	17.6	0.1	2.7
Apr 2016	7.0	17.4	-0.2	2.0
May 2016	6.6	17.3	-0.1	1.5
Jun 2016	6.2	17.3	0.0	1.3
Jul 2016	6.4	17.6	0.3	1.2
Aug 2016	6.3	17.7	0.1	1.0
Sep 2016	6.3	18.0	0.3	1.1
Oct 2016	6.4	18.3	0.2	1.3
Nov 2016	6.4	18.6	0.2	1.8
Dec 2016	6.3	18.8	0.2	1.6
Jan 2017	6.7	19.3	0.4	1.7
Feb 2017	7.2	19.8	0.4	2.0
Mar 2017	7.0	20.4	0.5	2.4
Apr 2017	6.7	20.2	-0.2	2.4
May 2017	6.9	20.7	0.4	2.9
Jun 2017	6.6	20.6	-0.1	2.9
Jul 2017	6.7	21.0	0.3	2.9
Aug 2017	6.8	21.2	0.2	3.0
Sep 2017	6.6	21.4	0.2	2.8
Oct 2017	6.5	21.7	0.3	2.9
Nov 2017	6.2	21.8	0.1	2.7
Dec 2017	6.2	22.1	0.2	2.7
Jan 2018	7.0	22.9	0.7	3.0
Feb 2018	7.4	23.1	0.2	2.7
Mar 2018	7.2	23.6	0.3	2.6
Apr 2018	6.8	23.5	0.0	2.8
May 2018	6.6	23.7	0.1	2.5
Jun 2018	6.5	24.0	0.3	2.8
Jul 2018	6.4	24.3	0.2	2.7
Aug 2018	6.4	24.6	0.3	2.9
Sep 2018	6.4	24.7	0.1	2.8
Oct 2018	6.4	25.2	0.4	2.9
Nov 2018	6.2	25.5	0.3	3.1
Dec 2018	7.7	26.8	1.0	3.9
Jan 2019	7.5	26.6	-0.2	3.0

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.