CMP Associates Regulation Blog: Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, Financial Instability, World Inflation Waves, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part I

Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, Financial Instability, World Inflation Waves, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

Executive Summary

I World Inflation Waves

IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IB United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

II Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

Executive Summary

Contents of Executive Summary

ESI Increasing Interest Rate Risk, Tapering Quantitative Easing, Duration Dumping, Steepening Yield Curve and Global Financial and Economic Risk

ESII World Inflation Waves

ESIII Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates

ESIV World Cyclical Slow Growth

ESV Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

ESI Increasing Interest Rate Risk, Tapering Quantitative Easing, Duration Dumping, Steepening Yield Curve and Global Financial and Economic Risk. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task for both theory and measurement. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task for both theory and measurement. The IMF (2013WEOOct) provides surveillance of the world economy with its Global Economic Outlook (WEO) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/), of the world financial system with its Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) (IMF 2013GFSROct) (http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2013/02/index.htm) and of fiscal affairs with the Fiscal Monitor (IMF 2013FMOct) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/fmindex.htm). There appears to be a moment of transition in global economic and financial variables that may prove of difficult analysis and measurement. It is useful to consider a summary of global economic and financial risks, which are analyzed in detail in the comments of this blog in Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets, Table VI-4.

Economic risks include the following:

China’s Economic Growth. China is lowering its growth target to 7.5 percent per year. China’s GDP growth decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 and 11.2 percent in IIQ2010 to 7.7 percent in IQ2013, 7.5 percent in IIQ2013 and 7.8 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP grew 7.7 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to IIIQ2013, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent per year (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and_7005.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/world-inflation-waves-stagnating-united_21.html). There is also concern about indebtedness.
United States Economic Growth, Labor Markets and Budget/Debt Quagmire. The US is growing slowly with 29.3 million in job stress, fewer 10 million full-time jobs, high youth unemployment, historically low hiring and declining/stagnating real wages. Actual GDP is about two trillion dollars lower than trend GDP.
Economic Growth and Labor Markets in Advanced Economies. Advanced economies are growing slowly. There is still high unemployment in advanced economies.
World Inflation Waves. Inflation continues in repetitive waves globally (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/world-inflation-waves-interest-rate.htmland earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). There is growing concern on capital outflows and currency depreciation of emerging markets.

A list of financial uncertainties includes:

Euro Area Survival Risk. The resilience of the euro to fiscal and financial doubts on larger member countries is still an unknown risk.
Foreign Exchange Wars. Exchange rate struggles continue as zero interest rates in advanced economies induce devaluation of their currencies with alternating episodes of revaluation.
Valuation of Risk Financial Assets. Valuations of risk financial assets have reached extremely high levels in markets with lower volumes.
Duration Trap of the Zero Bound. The yield of the US 10-year Treasury rose from 2.031 percent on Mar 9, 2012, to 2.294 percent on Mar 16, 2012. Considering a 10-year Treasury with coupon of 2.625 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years, the price would fall from 105.3512 corresponding to yield of 2.031 percent to 102.9428 corresponding to yield of 2.294 percent, for loss in a week of 2.3 percent but far more in a position with leverage of 10:1. Min Zeng, writing on “Treasurys fall, ending brutal quarter,” published on Mar 30, 2012, in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577313400029412564.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_markets), informs that Treasury bonds maturing in more than 20 years lost 5.52 percent in the first quarter of 2012.
Credibility and Commitment of Central Bank Policy. There is a credibility issue of the commitment of monetary policy (Sargent and Silber 2012Mar20).
Carry Trades. Commodity prices driven by zero interest rates have resumed their increasing path with fluctuations caused by intermittent risk aversion

Chart VIII-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate on the overnight fed funds rate and the yields of the 10-year constant maturity Treasury and the Baa seasoned corporate bond. Table VIII-3 provides the data for selected points in Chart VIII-1. There are two important economic and financial events, illustrating the ease of inducing carry trade with extremely low interest rates and the resulting financial crash and recession of abandoning extremely low interest rates.

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target of the fed funds rate from 7.03 percent on Jul 3, 2000, to 1.00 percent on Jun 22, 2004, in pursuit of non-existing deflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-85). Central bank commitment to maintain the fed funds rate at 1.00 percent induced adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS) linked to the fed funds rate. Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment. The exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at interest rates close to zero, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV). The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper with the objective of purchasing default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever-increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity by the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions. The put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4). The FOMC implemented increments of 25 basis points of the fed funds target from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006, raising the fed funds rate to 5.25 percent on Jul 3, 2006, as shown in Chart VIII-1. The gradual exit from the first round of unconventional monetary policy from 1.00 percent in Jun 2004 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/monetary/2004/20040630/default.htm) to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20060629a.htm) caused the financial crisis and global recession.
On Dec 16, 2008, the policy determining committee of the Fed decided (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm): “The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent.” Policymakers emphasize frequently that there are tools to exit unconventional monetary policy at the right time. At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states that: “The Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.” Perception of withdrawal of $2602 billion, or $2.6 trillion, of bank reserves (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1), would cause Himalayan increase in interest rates that would provoke another recession. There is no painless gradual or sudden exit from zero interest rates because reversal of exposures created on the commitment of zero interest rates forever.

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and r^e the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+r^e). Thus, g = [(r/r^e) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dr^e>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

Chart VIII-1, Fed Funds Rate and Yields of Ten-year Treasury Constant Maturity and Baa Seasoned Corporate Bond, Jan 2, 2001 to Feb 20, 2014

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Table VIII-3, Selected Data Points in Chart VIII-1, % per Year

	Fed Funds Overnight Rate	10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity	Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond
1/2/2001	6.67	4.92	7.91
10/1/2002	1.85	3.72	7.46
7/3/2003	0.96	3.67	6.39
6/22/2004	1.00	4.72	6.77
6/28/2006	5.06	5.25	6.94
9/17/2008	2.80	3.41	7.25
10/26/2008	0.09	2.16	8.00
10/31/2008	0.22	4.01	9.54
4/6/2009	0.14	2.95	8.63
4/5/2010	0.20	4.01	6.44
2/4/2011	0.17	3.68	6.25
7/25/2012	0.15	1.43	4.73
5/1/13	0.14	1.66	4.48
9/5/13	0.08	2.98	5.53
11/21/2013	0.09	2.79	5.44
11/27/13	0.09	2.74	5.34 (11/26/13)
12/6/13	0.09	2.88	5.47
12/12/13	0.09	2.89	5.42
12/19/13	0.09	2.94	5.36
12/26/13	0.08	3.00	5.37
1/2/2014	0.08	3.00	5.34
1/9/2014	0.07	2.97	5.28
1/16/2014	0.07	2.86	5.18
1/23/2014	0.07	2.79	5.11
1/31/2014	0.07	2.72	5.08
2/7/2014	0.07	2.73	5.13
2/14/2014	0.06	2.73	5.12
2/21/14	0.07	2.76	5.15

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

It is quite difficult to measure inflationary expectations because they tend to break abruptly from past inflation. There could still be an influence of past and current inflation in the calculation of future inflation by economic agents. Table VIII-1 provides inflation of the CPI. In the three months Nov 2013 to Jan 2014, CPI inflation for all items seasonally adjusted was 1.6 percent in annual equivalent, obtained by calculating accumulated inflation from Nov 2013 to Jan 2014 and compounding for a full year. In the 12 months ending in Jan 2014, CPI inflation of all items not seasonally adjusted was 1.6 percent. Inflation in Jan 2014 seasonally adjusted was 0.1 percent relative to Dec 2013, or 1.2 percent annual equivalent (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The second row provides the same measurements for the CPI of all items excluding food and energy: 1.6 percent in 12 months and 1.6 percent in annual equivalent Oct-Dec 2013. The Wall Street Journal provides the yield curve of US Treasury securities (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_bonds.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000). The shortest term is 0.023 percent for one month, 0.046 percent for three months, 0.086 percent for six months, 0.114 percent for one year, 0.322 percent for two years, 0.707 percent for three years, 1.538 percent for five years, 2.176 percent for seven years, 2.734 percent for ten years and 3.696 percent for 30 years. The Irving Fisher (1930) definition of real interest rates is approximately the difference between nominal interest rates, which are those estimated by the Wall Street Journal, and the rate of inflation expected in the term of the security, which could behave as in Table VIII-1. Inflation in Jan 2014 is low in 12 months because of the unwinding of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures prices but could ignite again with subdued risk aversion. Real interest rates in the US have been negative during substantial periods in the past decade while monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

Negative real rates of interest distort calculations of risk and returns from capital budgeting by firms, through lending by financial intermediaries to decisions on savings, housing and purchases of households. Inflation on near zero interest rates misallocates resources away from their most productive uses and creates uncertainty of the future path of adjustment to higher interest rates that inhibit sound decisions.

Table VIII-1, US, Consumer Price Index Percentage Changes 12 Months NSA and Annual Equivalent ∆%

	∆% 12 Months Jan 2014/Jan 2013 NSA	∆% Annual Equivalent Nov 2013 to Jan 2014 SA
CPI All Items	1.6	1.6
CPI ex Food and Energy	1.6	1.6

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Professionals use a variety of techniques in measuring interest rate risk (Fabozzi, Buestow and Johnson, 2006, Chapter Nine, 183-226):

Full valuation approach in which securities and portfolios are shocked by 50, 100, 200 and 300 basis points to measure their impact on asset values
Stress tests requiring more complex analysis and translation of possible events with high impact even if with low probability of occurrence into effects on actual positions and capital
Value at Risk (VaR) analysis of maximum losses that are likely in a time horizon
Duration and convexity that are short-hand convenient measurement of changes in prices resulting from changes in yield captured by duration and convexity
Yield volatility

Analysis of these methods is in Pelaez and Pelaez (International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-162) and Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. (I) (2008a), 78-100). Frederick R. Macaulay (1938) introduced the concept of duration in contrast with maturity for analyzing bonds. Duration is the sensitivity of bond prices to changes in yields. In economic jargon, duration is the yield elasticity of bond price to changes in yield, or the percentage change in price after a percentage change in yield, typically expressed as the change in price resulting from change of 100 basis points in yield. The mathematical formula is the negative of the yield elasticity of the bond price or –[dB/d(1+y)]((1+y)/B), where d is the derivative operator of calculus, B the bond price, y the yield and the elasticity does not have dimension (Hallerbach 2001). The duration trap of unconventional monetary policy is that duration is higher the lower the coupon and higher the lower the yield, other things being constant. Coupons and yields are historically low because of unconventional monetary policy. Duration dumping during a rate increase may trigger the same crossfire selling of high duration positions that magnified the credit crisis. Traders reduced positions because capital losses in one segment, such as mortgage-backed securities, triggered haircuts and margin increases that reduced capital available for positioning in all segments, causing fire sales in multiple segments (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 217-24). Financial markets are currently experiencing fear of duration and riskier asset classes resulting from the debate within and outside the Fed on tapering quantitative easing. Table VIII-2 provides the yield curve of Treasury securities on Feb 21, 2014, Dec 31, 2013, May 1, 2013, Feb 21, 2013 and Feb 21, 2006. There is oscillating steepening of the yield curve for longer maturities, which are also the ones with highest duration. The 10-year yield increased from 1.45 percent on Jul 26, 2012 to 3.04 percent on Dec 31, 2013 and 2.73 percent on Feb 21, 2014, as measured by the United States Treasury. Assume that a bond with maturity in 10 years were issued on Dec 31, 2013, at par or price of 100 with coupon of 1.45 percent. The price of that bond would be 86.3778 with instantaneous increase of the yield to 3.04 percent for loss of 13.6 percent and far more with leverage. Assume that the yield of a bond with exactly ten years to maturity and coupon of 2.73 percent as occurred on Feb 21, 2013 would jump instantaneously from yield of 2.73 percent on Feb 21, 2014 to 4.57 percent as occurred on Feb 21, 2006 when the economy was closer to full employment. The price of the hypothetical bond issued with coupon of 2.73 percent would drop from 100 to 85.3623 after an instantaneous increase of the yield to 4.57 percent. The price loss would be 14.6 percent. Losses absorb capital available for positioning, triggering crossfire sales in multiple asset classes (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). What is the path of adjustment of zero interest rates on fed funds and artificially low bond yields? There is no painless exit from unconventional monetary policy. Chris Dieterich, writing on “Bond investors turn to cash,” on Jul 25, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323971204578625900935618178.html), uses data of the Investment Company Institute (http://www.ici.org/) in showing withdrawals of $43 billion in taxable mutual funds in Jun, which is the largest in history, with flows into cash investments such as $8.5 billion in the week of Jul 17 into money-market funds.

Table VIII-2, United States, Treasury Yields

	2/21/14	12/31/13	5/01/13	2/21/13	2/21/06
1 M	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.12	4.42
3 M	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.13	4.56
6 M	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.13	4.73
1 Y	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.16	4.73
2 Y	0.33	0.38	0.20	0.26	4.71
3 Y	0.71	0.78	0.30	0.40	4.68
5 Y	1.56	1.75	0.65	0.86	4.59
7 Y	2.19	2.45	1.07	1.36	4.58
10 Y	2.73	3.04	1.66	1.99	4.57
20 Y	3.41	3.72	2.44	2.79	4.72
30 Y	3.69	3.96	2.83	3.17	4.53

M: Months; Y: Years

Source: United States Treasury

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield

Interest rate risk is increasing in the US with amplifying fluctuations. Chart VI-13 of the Board of Governors provides the conventional mortgage rate for a fixed-rate 30-year mortgage. The rate stood at 5.87 percent on Jan 8, 2004, increasing to 6.79 percent on Jul 6, 2006. The rate bottomed at 3.35 percent on May 2, 2013. Fear of duration risk in longer maturities such as mortgage-backed securities caused continuing increases in the conventional mortgage rate that rose to 4.51 percent on Jul 11, 2013, 4.58 percent on Aug 22, 2013 and 4.33 percent on Feb 20, 2014, which is the last data point in Chart VI-13. Shayndi Raice and Nick Timiraos, writing on “Banks cut as mortgage boom ends,” on Jan 9, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303754404579310940019239208), analyze the drop in mortgage applications to a 13-year low, as measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association.

Chart VI-13, US, Conventional Mortgage Rate, Jan 8, 2004 to Feb 20, 2014

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Carry trades induced by zero interest rates increase capital flows into emerging markets that appreciate exchange rates. Portfolio reallocations away from emerging markets depreciate their exchange rates in reversals of capital flows. Chart VI-4A provides the exchange rate of the Mexican peso (MXN) per US dollar from Nov 8, 1993 to Feb 14, 2014. The first data point in Chart VI-4A is MXN 3.1520 on Nov 8, 1993. The rate devalued to 11.9760 on Nov 14, 1995 during emerging market crises in the 1990s and the increase of interest rates in the US in 1994 that stressed world financial markets (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture 2005, The Global Recession Risk 2007, 147-77). The MXN depreciated sharply to MXN 15.4060/USD on Mar 2, 2009, during the global recession. The rate moved to MXN 11.5050/USD on May 2, 2011, during the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The rate depreciated to 11.9760 on May 9, 2013. The final data point in the current flight from emerging markets is MXN 13.2505/USD on Feb 14, 2014.

Chart VI-4A, Mexican Peso (MXN) per US Dollar (USD), Nov 8, 1993 to Feb 14, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

There are collateral effects worldwide from unconventional monetary policy. In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Professor Willem Buiter (2014Feb4), a distinguished economist currently Global Chief Economist at Citigroup (http://www.willembuiter.com/resume.pdf), writing on “The Fed’s bad manners risk offending foreigners,” on Feb 4, 2014, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fbb09572-8d8d-11e3-9dbb-00144feab7de.html#axzz2suwrwkFs), concurs with Raghuram Rajan. Buiter (2014Feb4) argues that international policy cooperation in monetary policy is both in the interest of the world and the United States. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows. Chart VI-4B provides the rate of the Indian rupee (INR) per US dollar (USD) from Jan 2, 1973 to Feb 14, 2014. The first data point is INR 8.0200 on Jan 2, 1973. The rate depreciated sharply to INR 51.9600 on Mar 3, 2009, during the global recession. The rate appreciated to INR 44.0300/USD on Jul 28, 2011 in the midst of the sovereign debt event in the euro area. The rate overshot to INR 68.8000 on Aug 28, 2013. The final data point if INR 61.8700/USD on Feb 14, 2014.

Chart VI-4B, Indian Rupee (INR) per US Dollar (USD), Jan 2, 1973 to Feb 14, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

ChVI-5 provides the exchange rate of JPY (Japan yen) per USD (US dollars). The first data point on the extreme left is JPY 357.7300/USD for Jan 4, 1971. The JPY has appreciated over the long term relative to the USD with fluctuations along an evident long-term appreciation. Before the global recession, the JPY stood at JPY 124.0900/USD on Jun 22, 2007. The use of the JPY as safe haven is evident by sharp appreciation during the global recession to JPY 110.48/USD on Aug 15, 2008, and to JPY 87.8000/USD on Jan 21, 2009. The final data point in Chart VI-5 is JPY 101.8200/USD on Feb 14, 2013 for appreciation of 17.9 percent relative to JPY 124.0900/USD on Jun 22, 2007 before the global recession and expansion characterized by recurring bouts of risk aversion. Takashi Nakamichi and Eleanor Warnock, writing on “Japan lashes out over dollar, euro,” on Dec 29, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323530404578207440474874604.html?mod=WSJ_markets_liveupdate&mg=reno64-wsj), analyze the “war of words” launched by Japan’s new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his finance minister Taro Aso, arguing of deliberate devaluations of the USD and EUR relative to the JPY, which are hurting Japan’s economic activity. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).

Chart VI-5, Japanese Yen JPY per US Dollars USD, Monthly, Jan 4, 1971-Feb 14, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html

Zero interest rates in the United States forever tend to depreciate the dollar against every other currency if there is no risk aversion preventing portfolio rebalancing toward risk financial assets, which include the capital markets and exchange rates of emerging-market economies. The objective of unconventional monetary policy as argued by Yellen 2011AS) is to devalue the dollar to increase net exports that increase US economic growth. Increasing net exports and internal economic activity in the US is equivalent to decreasing net exports and internal economic activity in other countries.

Continental territory, rich endowment of natural resources, investment in human capital, teaching and research universities, motivated labor force and entrepreneurial initiative provide Brazil with comparative advantages in multiple economic opportunities. Exchange rate parity is critical in achieving Brazil’s potential but is difficult in a world of zero interest rates. Chart IV-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate of Brazilian real (BRL) per US dollar (USD) from BRL 1.2074/USD on Jan 4, 1999 to BRL 2.3859/USD on Feb 14, 2013. The rate reached BRL 3.9450/USD on Oct 10, 2002 appreciating 60.5 percent to BRL 1.5580/USD on Aug 1, 2008. The rate depreciated 68.1 percent to BRL 2.6187/USD on Dec 5, 2008 during worldwide flight from risk. The rate appreciated again by 41.3 percent to BRL 1.5375/USD on Jul 26, 2011. The final data point in Chart VI-6 is BRL 2.3859/USD on Feb 14, 2014 for depreciation of 55.2 percent. The data in Table VI-6 is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).

Chart VI-6, Brazilian Real (BRL) per US Dollar (USD) Jan 4, 1999 to Feb 14, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

Chart VI-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the history of the BRL beginning with the first data point of BRL 0.8440/USD on Jan 2, 1995. The rate jumped to BRL 2.0700/USD on Jan 29, 1999 after changes in exchange rate policy and then to BRL 2.2000/USD on Mar 3, 1999. The rate depreciated 26.7 percent to BRL 2.7880/USD on Sep 21, 2001 relative to Mar 3, 1999.

Chart VI-7, Brazilian Real (BRL) per US Dollar (USD), Jan 2, 1995 to Feb 14, 2014

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/default.htm

The major reason and channel of transmission of unconventional monetary policy is through expectations of inflation. Fisher (1930) provided theoretical and historical relation of interest rates and inflation. Let i_n be the nominal interest rate, i_r the real or inflation-adjusted interest rate and π^e the expectation of inflation in the time term of the interest rate, which are all expressed as proportions. The following expression provides the relation of real and nominal interest rates and the expectation of inflation:

(1 + i_r) = (1 + i_n)/(1 + π^e) (1)

That is, the real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate discounted by the expectation of inflation in time term of the interest rate. Fisher (1933) analyzed the devastating effect of deflation on debts. Nominal debt contracts remained at original principal interest but net worth and income of debtors contracted during deflation. Real interest rates increase during declining inflation. For example, if the interest rate is 3 percent and prices decline 0.2 percent, equation (1) calculates the real interest rate as:

(1 +0.03)/(1 – 0.02) = 1.03/(0.998) = 1.032

That is, the real rate of interest is (1.032 – 1) 100 or 3.2 percent. If inflation were 2 percent, the real rate of interest would be 0.98 percent, or about 1.0 percent {[(1.03/1.02) -1]100 = 0.98%}.

The yield of the one-year Treasury security was quoted in the Wall Street Journal at 0.114 percent on Fri May 17, 2013 (http://online.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_topnav_marketdata_main). The expected rate of inflation π^e in the next twelve months is not observed. Assume that it would be equal to the rate of inflation in the past twelve months estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BLS) at 1.1 percent (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The real rate of interest would be obtained as follows:

(1 + 0.00114)/(1 + 0.011) = (1 + r_r) = 0.9902

That is, i_r is equal to 1 – 0.9902 or minus 0.98 percent. Investing in a one-year Treasury security results in a loss of 0.98 percent relative to inflation. The objective of unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates is to induce consumption and investment because of the loss to inflation of riskless financial assets. Policy would be truly irresponsible if it intended to increase inflationary expectations or π^e. The result could be the same rate of unemployment with higher inflation (Kydland and Prescott 1977).

Current focus is on tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases of $85 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed

(http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140129a.htm):

“Taking into account the extent of federal fiscal retrenchment since the inception of its current asset progress toward maximum employment and the improvement in the outlook for labor market conditions, the Committee decided to make a further measured reduction in the pace of its asset purchases. Beginning in February, the Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $30 billion per month rather than $35 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $35 billion per month rather than $40 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee's sizable and still-increasing holdings of longer-term securities should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative, which in turn should promote a stronger economic recovery and help to ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with the Committee's dual mandate.”

What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jan 29, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140129a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. The Committee also reaffirmed its expectation that the current exceptionally low target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal (emphasis added).”

There is a critical phrase in the statement of Sep 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm): “but mortgage rates have risen further.” Did the increase of mortgage rates influence the decision of the FOMC not to taper? Is FOMC “communication” and “guidance” successful? Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?

At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:

“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.

For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”

In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):

“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability. If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases. In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that it does not run persistently above or below that level (emphasis added).”

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differfrom each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and r^e the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+r^e). Thus, g = [(r/r^e) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dr^e>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (10

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.htm and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. The current reality is cyclical slow growth.

In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:

“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.

The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”

Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σ_y and prices σ_p. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity. A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 16,103.30 on Fri Feb 21, 2014, which is higher by 13.7 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 13.4 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs.

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. The DJIA has increased 66.2 percent since the trough of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe on Jul 2, 2010 to Feb 21, 2014; S&P 500 has gained 79.6 percent and DAX 70.3 percent. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 2/21/14” had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 followed by negative performance but now some valuations of equity indexes show varying behavior. China’s Shanghai Composite is 11.3 percent below the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 68.5 percent above the trough. DJ Asia Pacific TSM is 23.7 percent above the trough. Dow Global is 44.7 percent above the trough. STOXX 50 of 50 blue-chip European equities (http://www.stoxx.com/indices/index_information.html?symbol=sx5E) is 28.9 percent above the trough. NYSE Financial Index is 46.6 percent above the trough. DJ UBS Commodities is 7.8 percent above the trough. DAX index of German equities (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DAX:IND) is 70.3 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 68.5 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 30.5 percent above the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 14,865.67 on Fri Feb 21, 2014 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 45.0 percent higher than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar depreciated by 15.3 percent relative to the euro and even higher before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 2/21/14” in Table VI-4 shows decrease of 0.1 percent in the week for China’s Shanghai Composite. DJ Asia Pacific increased 1.5 percent. NYSE Financial decreased 0.3 percent in the week. DJ UBS Commodities increased 2.3 percent. Dow Global increased 0.3 percent in the week of Feb 21, 2014. The DJIA decreased 0.3 percent and S&P 500 decreased 0.1 percent. DAX of Germany decreased 0.1 percent. STOXX 50 increased 1.1 percent. The USD depreciated 0.3 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table VI-4 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 2/21/14” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to Feb 21, 2014. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 2/21/14” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 2/21/14.” There are now several equity indexes above the peak in Table VI-4: DJIA 43.7 percent, S&P 500 50.8 percent, DAX 52.5 percent, Dow Global 18.1 percent, DJ Asia Pacific 8.3 percent, NYSE Financial Index (http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/nykid.shtml) 16.8 percent, Nikkei Average 30.5 percent and STOXX 9.2 percent. There is only one equity index below the peak: Shanghai Composite by 33.2 percent. DJ UBS Commodities Index is now 7.8 percent below the peak. The US dollar strengthened 9.2 percent relative to the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010. Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. Future company cash flows derive from investment projects. In IQ1980, gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of 2009 dollars, growing to $1,143.0 billion in IVQ1986 or 20.1 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 0.8 percent from $2,605.2 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,627.2 billion in IIIQ2013. As shown in Table IAI-2, real private fixed investment fell 3.6 percent from $2,586.3 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,494.0 billion in IIIQ2013. Growth of real private investment is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The investment decision of United States corporations has been fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell $26.6 billion in IQ2013 after increasing $34.9 billion in IVQ2012 and $13.9 billion in IIIQ2012. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA rebounded with $66.8 billion in IIQ2013 and $39.2 billion in IIIQ2013. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA fell $1.7 billion in IQ2013 after increasing $40.8 billion in IVQ2012 and $4.5 billion in IIIQ2012. In IIQ2013, profits after tax with IVA and CCA increased $56.9 billion and $39.5 billion in IIIQ2013. Anticipation of higher taxes in the “fiscal cliff” episode caused increase of $120.9 billion in net dividends in IVQ2012 followed with adjustment in the form of decrease of net dividends by $103.8 billion in IQ2013, rebounding with $273.5 billion in IIQ2013. Net dividends fell at $179.0 billion in IIIQ2013. There is similar decrease of $80.1 billion in undistributed profits with IVA and CCA in IVQ2012 followed by increase of $102.1 billion in IQ2013 and decline of $216.6 billion in IIQ2013. Undistributed profits with IVA and CCA rose at $218.6 billion in IIIQ2013. Undistributed profits of US corporations swelled 382.4 percent from $107.7 billion IQ2007 to $519.5 billion in IIIQ2013 and changed signs from minus $55.9 billion in billion in IVQ2007 (Section IA2). In IQ2013, corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment fell $26.6 billion relative to IVQ2012, from $2047.2 billion to $2020.6 billion at the quarterly rate of minus 1.3 percent. In IIQ2013, corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $66.8 billion from $2020.6 billion in IQ2013 to $2087.4 billion at the quarterly rate of 3.3 percent. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $39.2 billion from $2087.4 billion in IIQ2013 to $2126.6 billion in IIIQ2013 at the annual rate of 1.9 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment. Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment. The investment decision of US business is fractured. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

Where R_τ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; C_τ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

declines. Equally, decline in expected revenue from the stock or project, R_τ, causes decline in valuation. An intriguing issue is the difference in performance of valuations of risk financial assets and economic growth and employment. Paul A. Samuelson (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1970/samuelson-bio.html) popularized the view of the elusive relation between stock markets and economic activity in an often-quoted phrase “the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions.” In the presence of zero interest rates forever, valuations of risk financial assets are likely to differ from the performance of the overall economy. The interrelations of financial and economic variables prove difficult to analyze and measure.

Table VI-4, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and 10-Year Treasury

	Peak	Trough	∆% to Trough	∆% Peak to 2/21/ /14	∆% Week 2/21/14	∆% Trough to 2/21/ 14
DJIA	4/26/ 10	7/2/10	-13.6	43.7	-0.3	66.2
S&P 500	4/23/ 10	7/20/ 10	-16.0	50.8	-0.1	79.6
NYSE Finance	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-20.3	16.8	-0.3	46.6
Dow Global	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-18.4	18.1	0.3	44.7
Asia Pacific	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-12.5	8.3	1.5	23.7
Japan Nikkei Aver.	4/05/ 10	8/31/ 10	-22.5	30.5	3.9	68.5
China Shang.	4/15/ 10	7/02 /10	-24.7	-33.2	-0.1	-11.3
STOXX 50	4/15/10	7/2/10	-15.3	9.2	1.1	28.9
DAX	4/26/ 10	5/25/ 10	-10.5	52.5	-0.1	70.3
Dollar Euro	11/25 2009	6/7 2010	21.2	9.2	-0.3	-15.3
DJ UBS Comm.	1/6/ 10	7/2/10	-14.5	-7.8	2.3	7.8
10-Year T Note	4/5/ 10	4/6/10	3.986	2.784	2.730

T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

ESII World Inflation Waves. Table IA-1 provides annual equivalent rates of inflation for producer price indexes followed in this blog of countries and regions that account for close to three quarters of world output. The behavior of the US producer price index in 2011 and into 2012-2014 shows neatly multiple waves. (1) In Jan-Apr 2011, without risk aversion, US producer prices rose at the annual equivalent rate of 10.4 percent. (2) After risk aversion, producer prices increased in the US at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2011. (3) From Jul to Sep 2011, under alternating episodes of risk aversion, producer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 4.1 percent. (4) Under the pressure of risk aversion because of the European debt crisis, US producer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of minus 0.4 percent in Oct-Dec 2011. (5) Inflation of producer prices returned with 2.8 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Mar 2012. (6) With return of risk aversion from the European debt crisis, producer prices fell at the annual equivalent rate of 4.1 percent in Apr-May 2012. (7) New positions in commodity futures even with continuing risk aversion caused annual equivalent inflation of 0.6 percent in Jun-Jul 2012. (8) Relaxed risk aversion because of announcement of sovereign bond buying by the European Central Bank induced carry trades that resulted in annual equivalent producer price inflation in the US of 12.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2012. (9) Renewed risk aversion caused unwinding of carry trades of zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures with annual equivalent inflation of minus 2.8 percent in Oct-Dec 2012. (10) In Jan-Feb 2013, producer prices rose at the annual equivalent rate of 6.2 percent with more relaxed risk aversion at the margin. (11) Return of risk aversion resulted in annual equivalent inflation of minus 6.4 percent in Mar-Apr 2013 with worldwide portfolio reallocation toward equities and high-yield bonds and away from commodity exposures. (12) Inflation of producer prices returned at 4.0 percent in annual equivalent in May-Aug 2013. (13) Continuing reallocation of investment portfolios away from commodities into equities is causing downward pressure on prices. In Sep-Nov 2013, the US producer price index fell at the annual equivalent rate of 0.4 percent. (14) Renewed carry trades caused annual equivalent inflation of 6.2 percent in US producer prices in Dec 2013-Jan 2014. Resolution of the European debt crisis if there is not an unfavorable growth event with political development in China would result in jumps of valuations of risk financial assets. Increases in commodity prices would cause the same high producer price inflation experienced in Jan-Apr 2011 and Aug-Sep 2012. An episode of exploding commodity prices could ignite inflationary expectations that would result in an inflation phenomenon of costly resolution. There are ten producer-price indexes in Table IA-1 for seven countries (two for the US and two for the UK) and one region (euro area) showing very similar behavior. Zero interest rates without risk aversion cause increases in commodity prices that in turn increase input prices at a faster pace than output prices. Producer price inflation rose at very high rates during the first part of 2011 for the US, Japan, China, Euro Area, Germany, France, Italy and the UK when risk aversion was contained. With the increase in risk aversion in May and Jun 2011, inflation moderated because carry trades were unwound. Producer price inflation returned after Jul 2011, with alternating bouts of risk aversion. In the final months of the year producer price inflation collapsed because of the disincentive to exposures in commodity futures resulting from fears of resolution of the European debt crisis. There is renewed worldwide inflation in the early part of 2012 with subsequent collapse because of another round of sharp risk aversion and relative portfolio reallocation away from commodities and into equities and high-yield bonds. Sharp worldwide jump in producer prices occurred recently because of the combination of zero interest rates forever or QE→∞ with temporarily relaxed risk aversion. Producer prices were moderating or falling in the final months of 2012 because of renewed risk aversion that causes unwinding of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures. In the first months of 2013, new carry trades caused higher worldwide inflation. Inflation of producer prices returned in the US and Japan in Dec 2013-Jan 2014. Lower inflation recently originates in portfolio reallocations away from commodity exposures into equities. Unconventional monetary policy fails in stimulating the overall real economy, merely introducing undesirable instability because monetary authorities cannot control allocation of floods of money at zero interest rates to carry trades into risk financial assets. The economy is constrained in a suboptimal allocation of resources that monetary policy perpetuates along a continuum of short-term periods. The result is long-term or dynamic inefficiency in the form of a trajectory of economic activity that is lower than what would be attained with rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). Inflation of producer prices returned in the US and Japan in Dec 2013-Jan 2014.

Table IA-1, Annual Equivalent Rates of Producer Price Indexes

INDEX 2011-2014	AE ∆%
US Producer Finished Goods Price Index
AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014	6.2
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2013	-0.4
AE ∆% May-Aug 2013	4.0
AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2013	-6.4
AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2013	6.2
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2012	-2.8
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012	12.7
AE ∆% Jun-Jul 2012	0.6
AE ∆% Apr-May 2012	-4.1
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012	2.8
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011	-0.4
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011	4.1
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	1.2
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	10.4
US Final Demand Producer Price Index
AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014	1.8
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2013	1.2
AE ∆% May-Aug 2013	1.8
AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2013	-0.6
AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2013	1.8
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2012	1.2
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012	5.5
AE ∆% Jun-Jul 2012	-1.2
AE ∆% Apr-May 2012	0.6
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012	3.7
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011	-0.8
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011	3.2
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	2.4
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	7.1
Japan Corporate Goods Price Index
AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014	2.4
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013	-0.6
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Sep 2013	3.3
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2012	-3.0
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012	2.4
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012	-5.5
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	2.0
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	-0.6
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011	-2.1
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	-1.2
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	5.8
China Producer Price Index
AE ∆% Oct 2013-Jan 2014	-0.3
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2013	1.8
AE ∆% Mar-Jul 2013	-4.9
AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2013	2.4
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012	-1.2
AE ∆% Oct 2012	2.4
AE ∆% May-Sep 2012	-5.8
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	2.4
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	-2.4
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011	-3.1
AE ∆% Jan-Jun 2011	6.4
Euro Zone Industrial Producer Prices
AE ∆% Dec	2.4
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013	-3.5
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2013	1.6
AE ∆% Mar-Jun 2013	-3.5
AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2013	2.4
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012	-2.4
AE ∆% Sep-Oct 2012	0.6
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012	6.8
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012	-2.4
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012	7.9
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011	0.4
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011	2.4
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	-0.6
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	11.3
Germany Producer Price Index
AE ∆% Jan	-1.2 NSA -4.7 SA
AE ∆% Dec	1.2 NSA 2.4 SA
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013	-1.8 NSA –1.2 SA
AE ∆% Sep 2013	3.7 NSA 0.0 SA
AE ∆% May-Aug 2013	-1.8 NSA –0.6 SA
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2013	-2.4 NSA –3.2 SA
AE ∆% Jan 2013	7.4 NSA 1.2 SA
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2012	-0.8 NSA 1.2 SA
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2012	4.3 NSA 2.4 SA
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012	-2.8 NSA –0.4 SA
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	4.9 NSA 2.4 SA
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	0.0 NSA –0.6 SA
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011	0.6 NSA 1.8 SA
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011	2.4 NSA 3.2 SA
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	0.6 NSA 3.7 SA
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	10.4 NSA 6.2 SA
France Producer Price Index for the French Market
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2013	4.3
AE ∆% Oct 2013	-3.5
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2013	4.9
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2013	-11.0
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2013	4.9
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012	-4.1
AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2012	7.4
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012	-4.3
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012	6.2
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011	2.8
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011	3.7
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	-1.8
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	10.4
Italy Producer Price Index
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2013	-4.7
AE ∆% Jun-Sep 2013	0.3
AE ∆% Apr-May 2013	-3.5
AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2013	1.2
AE ∆% Sep 2012-Jan 2013	-5.2
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012	9.4
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012	-0.6
AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2012	6.8
AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2012	8.1
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2011	2.0
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011	4.9
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	1.8
AE ∆% Jan-April 2011	10.7
UK Output Prices
AE ∆% Jan 2014	3.7
AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2013	-1.5
AE ∆% Jun-Aug 2013	2.0
AE ∆% Apr-May 2013	-0.6
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2013	4.9
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2012	-2.4
AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2012	3.0
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012	-3.5
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	5.3
AE ∆% Nov 2011-Jan-2012	1.2
AE ∆% May-Oct 2011	1.6
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	10.0
UK Input Prices
AE ∆% Jan 2014	-10.3
AE ∆% Dec 2013	2.4
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2013	-8.4
AE ∆% Jul 2013	18.2
AE ∆% Mar-Jun 2013	-9.5
AE ∆% Jan-Feb 2013	24.6
AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2012	3.0
AE ∆% Aug 2012	23.9
AE ∆% Apr-Jul 2012	-16.1
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2012	14.9
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2011	0.0
AE ∆% May-Oct 2011	-1.3
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	30.6
AE ∆% Oct-Dec 2010	31.8

AE: Annual Equivalent

Sources: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ http://www.boj.or.jp/en/

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html

http://www.insee.fr/en/default.asp

http://www.istat.it/en/

http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html

Similar world inflation waves are in the behavior of consumer price indexes of six countries and the euro zone in Table IA-2. US consumer price inflation shows similar waves. (1) Under risk appetite in Jan-Apr 2011, consumer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. (2) Risk aversion caused the collapse of inflation to annual equivalent 2.4 percent in May-Jun 2011. (3) Risk appetite drove the rate of consumer price inflation in the US to 3.2 percent in Jul-Sep 2011. (4) Gloomier views of carry trades caused the collapse of inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 to annual equivalent 1.2 percent. (5) Consumer price inflation resuscitated with increased risk appetite at annual equivalent of 1.8 percent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. (6) Consumer price inflation returned at 2.8 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Apr 2012. (7) Under renewed risk aversion, annual equivalent consumer price inflation in the US was minus 0.4 percent in May-Jul 2012. (8) Inflation jumped to annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. (9) Unwinding of carry trades caused negative annual equivalent inflation of minus 0.4 percent in Nov 2012-Jan 2013 but some countries experienced higher inflation in Dec 2012 and Jan 2013. (10) Inflation jumped again with annual equivalent inflation of 7.4 percent in Feb 2013 in a mood of relaxed risk aversion. (11) Inflation fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Mar-Apr 2013. (12) Inflation rose at 2.2 percent in annual equivalent in May-Sep 2013. (13) Inflation moderated at the annual equivalent rate of 0.6 percent in Oct-Nov 2013. (14) Inflation returned at annual equivalent 1.8 percent in Dec 2013-Jan 2014. Inflationary expectations can be triggered in one of these episodes of accelerating inflation because of commodity carry trades induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates in perpetuity or QE→∞ in almost continuous time. Alternating episodes of increase and decrease of inflation introduce uncertainty in household planning that frustrates consumption and home buying. Announcement of purchases of impaired sovereign bonds by the European Central Bank relaxed risk aversion that induced carry trades into commodity exposures, increasing prices of food, raw materials and energy. There is similar behavior in all the other consumer price indexes in Table IA-2. China’s CPI increased at annual equivalent 8.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2011, 2.0 percent in Apr-Jun, 2.9 percent in Jul-Nov and resuscitated at 5.8 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Mar 2012, declining to minus 3.9 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but resuscitating at 4.1 percent in Jul-Sep 2012, declining to minus 1.2 percent in Oct 2012 and 0.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2012. High inflation in China at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Nov-Dec 2012 is attributed to inclement winter weather that caused increases in food prices. Continuing pressure of food prices caused annual equivalent inflation of 12.2 percent in China in Dec 2012 to Feb 2013. Inflation in China fell at annual equivalent 10.3 percent in Mar 2013 and increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Apr 2013. Adjustment to lower food prices caused annual equivalent inflation of minus 7.0 percent in May 2013 and minus 3.5 percent in annual equivalent in May-Jun 2013. Inflation in China returned at annual equivalent 4.6 percent in Jul-Oct 2013, falling at 1.2 percent in annual equivalent in Nov 2013. As in most countries, inflation in China surged at 8.1 percent annual equivalent in Dec 201-Jan 2014 with significant effects of local increases in food prices. The euro zone harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) increased at annual equivalent 5.2 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, minus 2.4 percent in May-Jul 2011, 4.3 percent in Aug-Dec 2011, minus 3.0 percent in Dec 2011-Jan 2012 and then 9.6 percent in Feb-Apr 2012, falling to minus 2.8 percent annual equivalent in May-Jul 2012 but resuscitating at 5.3 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. The recent shock of risk aversion forced minus 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2012. As in several European countries, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 4.9 percent in the euro area in Dec 2012. The HICP price index fell at annual equivalent 11.4 percent in Jan 2013 and increased at 10.0 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. As in most countries and regions, euro zone inflation fell at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent in Apr 2013. Prices in the euro zone rose at 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2013. Inflation in the euro zone fell at annual equivalent 5.8 percent in Jul 2013. Inflation returned in the euro zone at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2013. Euro zone inflation fell at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent in Oct-Nov 2013. Euro zone inflation jumped at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2013 as in most countries worldwide. The price indexes of the largest members of the euro zone, Germany, France and Italy, and the euro zone as a whole, exhibit the same inflation waves. The United Kingdom CPI increased at annual equivalent 6.5 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, falling to only 0.4 percent in May-Jul 2011 and then increasing at 4.6 percent in Aug-Nov 2011. UK consumer prices fell at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 but increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent from Feb to Apr 2012. In May-Jun 2012, with renewed risk aversion, UK consumer prices fell at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the UK at average annual equivalent of 4.5 percent in Jul-Dec 2012 with inflation in Oct 2012 caused mostly by increases of university tuition fees. Inflation returned at 4.5 percent annual equivalent in Jul-Dec 2012 and was higher in annual equivalent inflation of producer prices in the UK in Jul-Oct 2012 at 3.0 percent for output prices and 23.9 percent for input prices in Aug 2012 (see Table IA-1). Consumer prices in the UK fell at annual equivalent 5.8 percent in Jan 2013. Inflation returned in the UK with annual equivalent 4.3 percent in Feb-May 2013 and fell at 1.2 percent in Jun-Jul 2013. UK annual equivalent inflation returned at 3.4 percent in Aug-Dec 2013. CPI inflation fell at annual equivalent 7.0 percent in Jan 2014.

Table IA-2, Annual Equivalent Rates of Consumer Price Indexes

Index 2011-2014	AE ∆%
US Consumer Price Index
AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014	1.8
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013	0.6
AE ∆% May-Sep 2013	2.2
AE ∆% Mar-Apr 2013	-2.4
AE ∆% Feb 2013	7.4
AE ∆% Nov 2012-Jan 2013	-0.4
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012	4.9
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012	-0.4
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	2.8
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	1.8
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011	1.2
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011	3.2
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	2.4
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	4.9
China Consumer Price Index
AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014	8.1
AE ∆% Nov 2013	-1.2
AE ∆% Jul-Oct 2013	4.6
AE ∆% May-Jun 2013	-3.5
AE ∆% Apr 2013	2.4
AE ∆% Mar 2013	-10.3
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Feb 2013	12.2
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2012	0.0
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2012	4.1
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2012	-3.9
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Mar 2012	5.8
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011	2.9
AE ∆% Apr-Jun 2011	2.0
AE ∆% Jan-Mar 2011	8.3
Euro Zone Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
AE ∆% Dec 2013	3.7
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2013	-2.4
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2013	3.7
AE ∆% Jul 2013	-5.8
AE ∆% May-Jun 2013	1.2
AE ∆% Apr 2013	-1.2
AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2013	10.0
AE ∆% Jan 2013	-11.4
AE ∆% Dec 2012	4.9
AE ∆% Nov 2012	-2.4
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012	5.3
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012	-2.8
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	9.6
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	-3.0
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011	4.3
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011	-2.4
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	5.2
Germany Consumer Price Index
AE ∆% Jan 2014	-7.0 NSA 0.0 SA
AE ∆% Nov-Dec 2013	3.7 NSA 2.4 SA
AE ∆% Oct 2013	-2.4 NSA 0.0 SA
AE ∆% Aug-Sep 2013	0.0 NSA 0.0 SA
AE ∆% May-Jul 2013	4.1 NSA 3.2 SA
AE ∆% Apr 2013	-5.8 NSA 0.0 SA
AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2013	6.8 NSA 1.2 SA
AE ∆% Jan 2013	-5.8 NSA 0.0 SA
AE ∆% Sep-Dec 2012	1.5 NSA 1.8 SA
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012	4.9 NSA 3.0 SA
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012	-1.2 NSA 0.6 SA
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	4.5 NSA 2.4 SA
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	0.6 NSA 1.8 SA
AE ∆% Jul-Nov 2011	1.7 NSA 1.9 SA
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	0.6 NSA 3.0 SA
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2011	3.0 NSA 2.4 SA
France Consumer Price Index
AE ∆% Jan 2014	-7.0
AE ∆% Dec 2013	3.7
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2013	-1.6
AE ∆% Aug 2013	6.2
AE ∆% Jul 2013	-3.5
AE ∆% May-Jun 2013	1.8
AE ∆% Apr 2013	-1.2
AE ∆% Feb-Mar 2013	6.8
AE ∆% Nov 2012-Jan 2013	-1.6
AE ∆% Aug-Oct 2012	2.8
AE ∆% May-Jul 2012	-2.4
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	5.3
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	0.0
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011	3.0
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011	-1.2
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	4.3
Italy Consumer Price Index
AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014	2.4
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2013	-3.2
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Aug 2013	2.0
AE ∆% Sep-Nov 2012	-0.8
AE ∆% Jul-Aug 2012	3.0
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012	1.2
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	5.7
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	4.3
AE ∆% Oct-Nov 2011	3.0
AE ∆% Jul-Sep 2011	2.4
AE ∆% May-Jun 2011	1.2
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	4.9
UK Consumer Price Index
AE ∆% Jan 2014	-7.0
AE ∆% Aug-Dec 2013	3.4
AE ∆% Jun-Jul 2013	-1.2
AE ∆% Feb-May 2013	4.3
AE ∆% Jan 2013	-5.8
AE ∆% Jul-Dec 2012	4.5
AE ∆% May-Jun 2012	-3.0
AE ∆% Feb-Apr 2012	6.2
AE ∆% Dec 2011-Jan 2012	-0.6
AE ∆% Aug-Nov 2011	4.6
AE ∆% May-Jul 2011	0.4
AE ∆% Jan-Apr 2011	6.5

AE: Annual Equivalent

Sources: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ http://www.boj.or.jp/en/

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html

http://www.insee.fr/en/default.asp

http://www.istat.it/en/

http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html

ESIII Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates. Long-term economic growth in Japan significantly improved by increasing competitiveness in world markets. Net trade of exports and imports is an important component of the GDP accounts of Japan. Table VB-3 provides quarterly data for net trade, exports and imports of Japan. Net trade had strong positive contributions to GDP growth in Japan in all quarters from IQ2007 to IIQ2009 with exception of IVQ2008, IIIQ2008 and IQ2009. The US recession is dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) as beginning in IVQ2007 (Dec) and ending in IIQ2009 (Jun) (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Net trade contributions helped to cushion the economy of Japan from the global recession. Net trade deducted from GDP growth in seven of the nine quarters from IVQ2010 IQ2012. The only strong contribution of net trade was 3.8 percent in IIIQ2011. Net trade added 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2013 and 0.5 percentage points in IIQ2013 but deducted 2.0 percentage points in IIIQ2013 and deducted 2.2 percentage points in IVQ2013. Private consumption assumed the role of driver of Japan’s economic growth but should moderate as in most mature economies.

Table VB-3, Japan, Contributions to Changes in Real GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates (SAAR), %

	Net Trade	Exports	Imports
2013
I	1.7	2.4	-0.7
II	0.5	1.7	-1.2
III	-2.0	-0.4	-1.6
IV	-2.2	0.2	-2.4
2012
I	0.4	1.7	-1.3
II	-1.3	-0.3	-1.0
III	-2.2	-2.5	0.2
IV	-0.5	-1.7	1.3
2011
I	-1.1	-0.4	-0.7
II	-4.4	-4.7	0.3
III	3.8	5.7	-1.9
IV	-3.0	-1.9	-1.1
2010
I	2.1	3.5	-1.4
II	0.1	2.6	-2.6
III	0.5	1.4	-0.9
IV	-0.4	0.1	-0.5
2009
I	-4.4	-16.4	12.0
II	7.4	4.7	2.7
III	2.2	5.3	-3.0
IV	2.7	4.1	-1.4
2008
I	1.1	2.1	-1.0
II	0.5	-1.6	2.1
III	0.1	0.2	-0.1
IV	-11.5	-10.2	-1.2
2007
I	1.1	1.7	-0.5
II	0.7	1.6	-0.8
III	2.1	1.5	0.6
IV	1.4	2.0	-0.7

Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

Chart IV-5A provides the export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency. The export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency increased from 97.9 in Jun 2009 to 103.1 in Apr 2012 or 5.3 percent but dropped to 100.2 in Apr 2013 or minus 2.8 percent relative to Apr 2012 and gained 1.1 percent to 99.0 in Jan 2014 relative to Jun 2009.

Chart IV-5A, Japan, Export Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Contract Currency Basis, 2008-2014

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

Japan imports primary commodities and raw materials. As a result, the import corporate goods price index on the yen basis in Chart IV-6 shows an upward trend after declining from the increase during the global recession in 2008 driven by carry trades from fed funds rates. The index increases with carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures and declines during risk aversion from late 2008 into beginning of 2008 originating in doubts about soundness of US bank balance sheets. More careful measurement should show that the terms of trade of Japan, export prices relative to import prices, declined during the commodity shocks originating in unconventional monetary policy. The decline of the terms of trade restricted potential growth of income in Japan. The import corporate goods price index on the yen basis increased from 93.5 in Jun 2009 to 113.1 in Apr 2012 or 21.0 percent and to 130.0 in Jan 2014 or gain of 14.9 percent relative to Apr 2012 and 39.0 percent relative to Jun 2009.

Chart IV-6, Japan, Import Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Yen Basis, 2008-2014

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

Chart IV-6A provides the import corporate goods price index on the contract currency basis. The import corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency increased from 86.2 in Jun 2009 to 119.5 in Apr 2012 or 38.6 percent and to 114.3 in Jan 2014 or minus 4.4 percent relative to Apr 2012 and gain of 32.6 percent relative to Jun 2009. There is evident deterioration of the terms of trade of Japan: the export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency increased 1.1 percent from Jun 2009 to Jan 2014 while the import corporate goods price index increased 32.6 percent. Prices of Japan’s exports of corporate goods, mostly industrial products, increased only 5.3 percent from Jun 2009 to Apr 2012, while imports of corporate goods, mostly commodities and raw materials increased 38.6 percent. Unconventional monetary policy induces carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in commodities that squeeze economic activity of industrial countries by increases in prices of imported commodities and raw materials during periods without risk aversion. Reversals of carry trades during periods of risk aversion decrease prices of exported commodities and raw materials that squeeze economic activity in economies exporting commodities and raw materials. Devaluation of the dollar by unconventional monetary policy could increase US competitiveness in world markets but economic activity is squeezed by increases in prices of imported commodities and raw materials. Unconventional monetary policy causes instability worldwide instead of the mission of central banks of promoting financial and economic stability.

Chart IV-6A, Japan, Import Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Contract Currency Basis, 2008-2014

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

Table IV-6 provides the Bank of Japan’s Corporate Goods Price indexes of exports and imports on the yen and contract bases from Jan 2008 to Jan 2014. There are oscillations of the indexes that are shown vividly in the four charts above. For the entire period from Jan 2008 to Jan 2014, the export index on the contract currency basis decreased 0.8 percent and decreased 4.8 percent on the yen basis. For the entire period from Jan 2008 to Jan 2014, the import price index increased 11.6 percent on the contract currency basis and increased 7.8 percent on the yen basis. The charts show sharp deteriorations in relative prices of exports to prices of imports during multiple periods. Price margins of Japan’s producers are subject to periodic squeezes resulting from carry trades from zero interest rates of monetary policy to exposures in commodities.

Table IV-6, Japan, Exports and Imports Corporate Goods Price Index, Contract Currency Basis and Yen Basis

Month	Exports Contract Currency	Exports Yen	Imports Contract Currency	Imports Yen
2008/01	99.2	115.5	100.7	119.0
2008/02	99.8	116.1	102.4	120.6
2008/03	100.5	112.6	104.5	117.4
2008/04	101.6	115.3	110.1	125.2
2008/05	102.4	117.4	113.4	130.4
2008/06	103.5	120.7	119.5	140.3
2008/07	104.7	122.1	122.6	143.9
2008/08	103.7	122.1	123.1	147.0
2008/09	102.7	118.3	117.1	137.1
2008/10	100.2	109.6	109.1	121.5
2008/11	98.6	104.5	97.8	105.8
2008/12	97.9	100.6	89.3	93.0
2009/01	98.0	99.5	85.6	88.4
2009/02	97.5	100.1	85.7	89.7
2009/03	97.3	104.2	85.2	93.0
2009/04	97.6	105.6	84.4	93.0
2009/05	97.5	103.8	84.0	90.8
2009/06	97.9	104.9	86.2	93.5
2009/07	97.5	103.1	89.2	95.0
2009/08	98.3	104.4	89.6	95.8
2009/09	98.3	102.1	91.0	94.7
2009/10	98.0	101.2	91.0	94.0
2009/11	98.4	100.8	92.8	94.8
2009/12	98.3	100.7	95.4	97.5
2010/01	99.4	102.2	97.0	100.0
2010/02	99.7	101.6	97.6	99.8
2010/03	99.7	101.8	97.0	99.2
2010/04	100.5	104.6	99.9	104.6
2010/05	100.7	102.9	101.7	104.9
2010/06	100.1	101.6	100.0	102.3
2010/07	99.4	99.0	99.9	99.8
2010/08	99.1	97.3	99.5	97.5
2010/09	99.4	97.0	100.0	97.2
2010/10	100.1	96.4	100.5	95.8
2010/11	100.7	97.4	102.6	98.2
2010/12	101.2	98.3	104.4	100.6
2011/01	102.1	98.6	107.2	102.6
2011/02	102.9	99.5	109.0	104.3
2011/03	103.5	99.6	111.8	106.3
2011/04	104.1	101.7	115.9	111.9
2011/05	103.9	99.9	118.8	112.4
2011/06	103.8	99.3	117.5	110.5
2011/07	103.6	98.3	118.3	110.2
2011/08	103.6	96.6	118.6	108.1
2011/09	103.7	96.1	117.0	106.2
2011/10	103.0	95.2	116.6	105.6
2011/11	101.9	94.8	115.4	105.4
2011/12	101.5	94.5	116.1	106.2
2012/01	101.8	94.0	115.0	104.2
2012/02	102.4	95.8	115.8	106.4
2012/03	102.9	99.2	118.3	112.9
2012/04	103.1	98.7	119.5	113.1
2012/05	102.3	96.3	118.1	109.8
2012/06	101.4	95.0	115.2	106.7
2012/07	100.6	94.0	112.0	103.5
2012/08	100.9	94.1	112.4	103.6
2012/09	101.0	94.1	114.7	105.2
2012/10	101.1	94.8	113.8	105.2
2012/11	100.9	95.9	113.2	106.5
2012/12	100.7	98.0	113.4	109.5
2013/01	101.0	102.4	113.8	115.4
2013/02	101.5	105.9	114.8	120.2
2013/03	101.3	106.6	115.1	122.0
2013/04	100.2	107.5	114.1	123.8
2013/05	99.6	109.1	112.6	125.3
2013/06	99.2	106.1	112.0	121.2
2013/07	99.0	107.4	111.6	122.9
2013/08	98.9	106.0	111.7	121.3
2013/09	98.9	107.1	112.9	123.9
2013/10	99.1	106.6	112.9	122.7
2013/11	99.0	107.9	112.9	124.7
2013-12	99.0	110.3	113.6	128.8
2014-01	99.0	110.5	114.3	130.0

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/index.htm/

Chart IV-7 provides the monthly corporate goods price index (CGPI) of Japan from 1970 to 2014. Japan also experienced sharp increase in inflation during the 1970s as in the episode of the Great Inflation in the US. Monetary policy focused on accommodating higher inflation, with emphasis solely on the mandate of promoting employment, has been blamed as deliberate or because of model error or imperfect measurement for creating the Great Inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). A remarkable similarity with US experience is the sharp rise of the CGPI of Japan in 2008 driven by carry trades from policy interest rates rapidly falling to zero to exposures in commodity futures during a global recession. Japan had the same sharp waves of consumer price inflation during the 1970s as in the US (see Chart IV-24 and associated table at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/exit-risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world_1.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or_561.html and at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk_1.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real_09.html).

Chart IV-7, Japan, Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, 1970-2014

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

The producer price index of the US from 1970 to 2013 in Chart IV-10 shows various periods of more rapid or less rapid inflation but no bumps. The major event is the decline in 2008 when risk aversion because of the global recession caused the collapse of oil prices from $148/barrel to less than $80/barrel with most other commodity prices also collapsing. The event had nothing in common with explanations of deflation but rather with the concentration of risk exposures in commodities after the decline of stock market indexes. Eventually, there was a flight to government securities because of the fears of insolvency of banks caused by statements supporting proposals for withdrawal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as explained by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). The bump in 2008 with decline in 2009 is consistent with the view that zero interest rates with subdued risk aversion induce carry trades into commodity futures.

Chart IV-8, US, Producer Price Index Finished Goods, Monthly, 1970-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Further insight into inflation of the corporate goods price index (CGPI) of Japan is provided in Table IV-7. Petroleum and coal with weight of 5.7 percent increased 2.6 percent in Jan 2014 and increased 10.7 percent in 12 months. Japan exports manufactured products and imports raw materials and commodities such that the country’s terms of trade, or export prices relative to import prices, deteriorate during commodity price increases. In contrast, prices of production machinery, with weight of 3.1 percent, increased 0.5 percent in Jan 2014 and decreased 0.8 percent in 12 months. In general, most manufactured products have been experiencing negative or low increases in prices while inflation rates have been high in 12 months for products originating in raw materials and commodities. Ironically, unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing that intended to increase aggregate demand and GDP growth deteriorated the terms of trade of advanced economies with adverse effects on real income (for analysis of terms of trade and growth see Pelaez (1979, 1976a). There are now inflation effects of the intentional policy of devaluing the yen.

Table IV-7, Japan, Corporate Goods Prices and Selected Components, % Weights, Month and 12 Months ∆%

Jan 2014	Weight	Month ∆%	12 Month ∆%
Total	1000.0	0.1	2.4
Food, Beverages, Tobacco, Feedstuffs	137.5	0.0	1.1
Petroleum & Coal	57.4	2.6	10.7
Production Machinery	30.8	0.5	-0.8
Electronic Components	31.0	-0.3	-1.8
Electric Power, Gas & Water	52.7	-0.3	11.0
Iron & Steel	56.6	0.3	5.9
Chemicals	92.1	0.7	2.5
Transport Equipment	136.4	0.0	-0.2

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/index.htm/

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/pi/cgpi_release/cgpi1401.pdf

Percentage point contributions to change of the corporate goods price index (CGPI) in Jan 2014 are provided in Table IV-8 divided into domestic, export and import segments. In the domestic CGPI, increasing 0.1 percent in Jan 2014, the energy shock is evident in the contribution of 0.19 percentage points by petroleum and coal products in new carry trades of exposures in commodity futures. The exports CGPI changed 0.0 percent on the basis of the contract currency with deduction of 0.05 percentage points by electric and electronic products. The imports CGPI increased 0.6 percent on the contract currency basis. Petroleum, coal and natural gas products contributed 0.48 percentage points. Shocks of risk aversion cause unwinding carry trades that result in declining commodity prices with resulting downward pressure on price indexes. The volatility of inflation adversely affects financial and economic decisions worldwide.

Table IV-8, Japan, Percentage Point Contributions to Change of Corporate Goods Price Index

Groups Jan 2014	Contribution to Change Percentage Points
A. Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index	Monthly Change: 0.1%
Petroleum & Coal Products	0.19
Chemicals & Related Products	0.06
Nonferrous Metals	0.05
Plastic Products	0.03
Iron & Steel	0.02
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery Products	-0.14
Scrap & Waste	-0.02
Electric Power, Gas & Water	-0.02
B. Export Price Index	Monthly Change: 0.0 % contract currency
General Purpose, Production & Business Oriented Machinery	0.07
Chemicals & Related Products	0.02
Transportation Equipment	0.02
Electric & Electronic Products	-0.05
Metals & Related Products	-0.03
C. Import Price Index	Monthly Change: 0.6% contract currency basis
Petroleum, Coal & Natural Gas	0.48
Metals & Related Products	0.17

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/index.htm/

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/pi/cgpi_release/cgpi1401.pdf

There are two categories of responses in the Empire State Manufacturing Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (http://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html): current conditions and expectations for the next six months. There are responses in the survey for two types of prices: prices received or inputs of production and prices paid or sales prices of products. Table IV-5 provides indexes for the two categories and within them for the two types of prices from Jan 2011 to Feb 2014. The index of current prices paid or costs of inputs increased from 16.13 in Dec 2012 to 25.0 in Feb 2014 while the index of current prices received or sales prices increased from 1.08 in Dec 2012 to 15.0 in Feb 2014. The farther the index is from the area of no change at zero, the faster the rate of change. Prices paid or of inputs at 25.0 in Feb 2014 are expanding at faster pace than prices received or of sales of products at 15.0. The index of future prices paid or expectations of costs of inputs in the next six months fell from 51.61 in Dec 2012 to 40.00 in Feb 2014 while the index of future prices received or expectation of sales prices in the next six months decreased from 25.81 in Dec 2012 to 23.75 in Feb 2014. Priced paid or of inputs are expected to increase at a faster pace in the next six months than prices received or prices of sales products. Prices of sales of finished products are less dynamic than prices of costs of inputs during waves of increases. Prices of costs of costs of inputs fall less rapidly than prices of sales of finished products during waves of price decreases. As a result, margins of prices of sales less costs of inputs oscillate with typical deterioration against producers, forcing companies to manage tightly costs and labor inputs. Instability of sales/costs margins discourages investment and hiring.

Table IV-5, US, FRBNY Empire State Manufacturing Survey, Diffusion Indexes, Prices Paid and Prices Received, SA

	Current Prices Paid	Current Prices Received	Six Months Prices Paid	Six Months Prices Received
Feb 2014	25.00	15.00	40.00	23.75
Jan	36.59	13.41	45.12	23.17
Dec 2013	15.66	3.61	48.19	27.71
Nov	17.11	-3.95	42.11	17.11
Oct	21.69	2.41	45.78	25.30
Sep	21.51	8.60	39.78	24.73
Aug	20.48	3.61	40.96	19.28
Jul	17.39	1.09	28.26	11.96
Jun	20.97	11.29	45.16	17.74
May	20.45	4.55	29.55	14.77
Apr	28.41	5.68	44.32	14.77
Mar	25.81	2.15	50.54	23.66
Feb	26.26	8.08	44.44	13.13
Jan	22.58	10.75	38.71	21.51
Dec 2012	16.13	1.08	51.61	25.81
Nov	14.61	5.62	39.33	15.73
Oct	17.20	4.30	44.09	24.73
Sep	19.15	5.32	40.43	23.40
Aug	16.47	2.35	31.76	14.12
Jul	7.41	3.70	35.80	16.05
Jun	19.59	1.03	34.02	17.53
May	37.35	12.05	57.83	22.89
Apr	45.78	19.28	50.60	22.89
Mar	50.62	13.58	66.67	32.10
Feb	25.88	15.29	62.35	34.12
Jan	26.37	23.08	53.85	30.77
Dec 2011	24.42	3.49	56.98	36.05
Nov	18.29	6.10	36.59	25.61
Oct	22.47	4.49	40.45	17.98
Sep	32.61	8.70	53.26	22.83
Aug	28.26	2.17	42.39	15.22
Jul	43.33	5.56	51.11	30.00
Jun	56.12	11.22	55.10	19.39
May	69.89	27.96	68.82	35.48
Apr	57.69	26.92	56.41	38.46
Mar	53.25	20.78	71.43	36.36
Feb	45.78	16.87	55.42	27.71
Jan 2014	35.79	15.79	60.00	42.11

Source: http://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html

Price indexes of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Outlook Survey are in Table IV-6. As inflation waves throughout the world (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/world-inflation-waves-interest-rate.html), indexes of both current and expectations of future prices paid and received were quite high until May 2011. Prices paid, or inputs, were more dynamic, reflecting carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. All indexes softened after May 2011 with even decline of prices received in Aug 2011 during the first round of risk aversion. Current and future price indexes have increased again but not back to the levels in the beginning of 2011 because of risk aversion frustrating carry trades even under zero interest rates. The index of prices paid or prices of inputs decreased from 20.6 in Dec 2012 to 14.2 in Feb 2014. The index of current prices received was minus 7.2 in Apr 2013, indicating decrease of prices received. The index of current prices received decreased from 10.9 in Dec 2012 to 7.6 in Feb 2014. The farther the index is from the area of no change at zero, the faster the rate of change. The index of current prices paid or costs of inputs at 14.2 in Feb 2014 indicates faster increase than the index of current prices received or sales prices of production at 7.6. The index of future prices paid decreased to 18.2 in Feb 2014 from 41.9 in Dec 2012 while the index of future prices received decreased from 27.3 in Dec 2012 to 18.2 in Feb 2014. Expectations are incorporating faster increases in prices of inputs or costs of production, 18.2 in Feb 2014, than of sales prices of produced goods, 16.3 in Feb 2014, forcing companies to manage tightly costs and labor inputs. Volatility of margins of sales/costs discourage investment and hiring.

Table IV-6, US, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, Current and Future Prices Paid and Prices Received, SA

	Current Prices Paid	Current Prices Received	Future Prices Paid	Future Prices Received
10-Dec	42.6	6.0	56.8	25.7
11-Jan	47.9	12.1	58.7	34.1
11-Feb	61.1	13.2	62.6	30.7
11-Mar	57.6	17	62.1	32.4
11-Apr	50.9	20.8	55.3	33.7
11-May	49.3	20.5	54.6	28.5
11-Jun	38.9	7.7	41.6	6.8
11-Jul	35.6	6.3	48.3	16.7
11-Aug	24.6	-4	45.2	23.4
11-Sep	32	7.1	40.9	22.2
11-Oct	24.3	2.8	42.9	27.8
11-Nov	22.8	6.3	35.4	28.3
11-Dec	25	7	43.1	24.7
12-Jan	25.3	8	47.5	20.8
12-Feb	31.9	9.4	43.4	24.8
12-Mar	14.1	5.3	37.8	22.6
12-Apr	18.1	6.2	35.2	20.2
12-May	7.7	0.7	39.5	9.7
12-Jun	5.5	-3.7	34.8	16.9
12-Jul	10.8	4.9	27.9	20.3
12-Aug	18	5.6	39.5	25
12-Sep	15.8	3.5	42.2	27.5
12-Oct	19.9	7.1	45.8	15.3
12-Nov	23.6	6.5	47.6	12.8
12-Dec	20.6	10.9	41.9	27.3
13-Jan	11.8	-1.6	33.9	20
13-Feb	10.6	-1.3	25.4	20.6
13-Mar	7.6	-1.3	32.4	16.8
13-Apr	5	-7.2	28.9	9.9
13-May	9.7	0.2	33.5	19.9
13-Jun	23.7	14.6	33.3	24.3
13-Jul	22.7	8	41	25.6
13-Aug	20.4	11.1	40.7	24.5
13-Sep	25.9	12.5	43	31.6
13-Oct	21	12.8	43.1	34.6
13-Nov	25.4	9	43.5	38.1
13-Dec	16.4	10.8	39.1	34.8
14-Jan	18.7	5.1	35.3	11.8
14-Feb	14.2	7.6	18.2	16.3

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

http://www.phil.frb.org/index.cfm

Chart IV-1 of the Business Outlook Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Outlook Survey provides the diffusion index of current prices paid or prices of inputs from 2006 to 2014. Recession dates are in shaded areas. In the middle of deep global contraction after IVQ2007, input prices continued to increase in speculative carry trades from central bank policy rates falling toward zero into commodities futures. The index peaked above 70 in the second half of 2008. Inflation of inputs moderated significantly during the shock of risk aversion in late 2008, even falling briefly into contraction territory below zero during several months in 2009 in the flight away from risk financial assets into US government securities (Cochrane and Zingales 2009) that unwound carry trades. Return of risk appetite induced carry trade with significant increase until return of risk aversion in the first round of the European sovereign debt crisis in Apr 2010. Carry trades returned during risk appetite in expectation that the European sovereign debt crisis was resolved. The various inflation waves originating in carry trades induced by zero interest rates with alternating episodes of risk aversion are mirrored in the prices of inputs after 2011, in particular after Aug 2012 with the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions Program of the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). Subsequent risk aversion and flows of capital away from commodities into stocks and high-yield bonds caused sharp decline in the index of prices paid followed by another recent rebound with marginal decline and new increase. The index falls in the final segment but there are no episodes of contraction after 2009.

Chart IV-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey Current Prices Paid Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

http://www.philadelphiafed.org/index.cfm

Chart IV-2 of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Outlook Survey provides the diffusion index of current prices received from 2006 to 2014. The significant difference between the index of current prices paid in Chart IV-1 and the index of current prices received in Chart IV-2 is that increases in prices paid are significantly sharper than increases in prices received. There were several periods of negative readings of prices received from 2010 to 2014 but none of prices paid. Prices paid relative to prices received deteriorate most of the time largely because of the carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. Profit margins of business are compressed intermittently by fluctuations of commodity prices induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates, frustrating production, investment and hiring decisions of business, which is precisely the opposite outcome pursued by unconventional monetary policy.

Chart IV-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey Current Prices Received Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

http://www.philadelphiafed.org/index.cfm

ESIV World Cyclical Slow Growth. Table V-3 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog from IQ2012 to IIQ2013 available now for all countries. There are preliminary estimates for all countries for IVQ2013. Growth is weak throughout most of the world.

Japan. The GDP of Japan increased 0.9 percent in IQ2012 and 3.2 percent relative to a year earlier but part of the jump could be the low level a year earlier because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan is experiencing difficulties with the overvalued yen because of worldwide capital flight originating in zero interest rates with risk aversion in an environment of softer growth of world trade. Japan’s GDP fell 0.4 percent in IIQ2012 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of minus 1.7 percent, which is much lower than 3.7 percent in IQ2012. Growth of 3.2 percent in IIQ2012 in Japan relative to IIQ2011 has effects of the low level of output because of Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.8 percent in IIIQ2012 at the SAAR of minus 3.1 percent and decreased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP contracted percent in IVQ2012 at the SAAR of minus 0.2 percent and decreased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan grew 1.2 percent in IQ2013 at the SAAR of 4.0 percent and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 1.0 percent in IIQ2013 at the SAAR of 3.9 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP grew 0.3 percent in IIIQ2013 at the SAAR of 1.1 percent and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2013, Japan’s GDP increased 0.3 percent at the SAAR of 1.0 percent, increasing 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier.
China. The GDP of China grew at 2.1 percent in IIQ2012, which annualizes to 8.7 percent and 7.6 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 2.0 percent in IIIQ2012, which annualizes at 8.2 percent and 7.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, China grew at 1.9 percent, which annualizes at 7.8 percent, and 7.9 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011. In IQ2013, China grew at 1.5 percent, which annualizes at 6.1 percent and 7.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2013, China grew at 1.8 percent, which annualizes at 7.4 percent and 7.5 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 2.2 percent in IIIQ2013, which annualizes at 9.1 percent and 7.8 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.8 percent in IVQ2013, which annualized to 7.4 percent and 7.7 percent relative to a year earlier. There is decennial change in leadership in China (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/index.htm). Growth rates of GDP of China in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier have been declining from 2011 to 2013.
Euro Area. GDP fell 0.1 percent in the euro area in IQ2012 and decreased 0.2 in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP contracted 0.3 percent IIQ2012 and fell 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.2 percent and declined 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.5 percent relative to the prior quarter and fell 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, the GDP of the euro area fell 0.2 percent and decreased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2013, euro area GDP increased 0.1 percent and fell 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2013 and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier.
Germany. The GDP of Germany increased 0.7 percent in IQ2012 and 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, Germany’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier but 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier when adjusted for calendar (CA) effects. In IIIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP contracted 0.5 percent in IVQ2012 and increased 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, Germany’s GDP increased 0.0 percent and fell 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2013, Germany’s GDP increased 0.7 percent and 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2013 and 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2013, Germany’s GDP increased 0.4 percent and 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier.
United States. Growth of US GDP in IQ2012 was 0.9 percent, at SAAR of 3.7 percent and higher by 3.3 percent relative to IQ2011. US GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2012, 1.2 percent at SAAR and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, US GDP grew 0.7 percent, 2.8 percent at SAAR and 3.1 percent relative to IIIQ2011. In IVQ2012, US GDP grew 0.0 percent, 0.1 percent at SAAR and 2.0 percent relative to IVQ2011. In IQ2013, US GDP grew at 1.1 percent SAAR, 0.3 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.3 percent relative to the same quarter in 2013. In IIQ2013, US GDP grew at 2.5 percent in SAAR, 0.6 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.6 percent relative to IIQ2012. US GDP grew at 4.1 percent in SAAR in IIIQ2013, 1.0 percent relative to the prior quarter and 2.0 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html) with weak hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.htmland earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html). In IVQ2013, US GDP grew 0.8 percent at 3.2 percent SAAR and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier.
United Kingdom. In IQ2012, UK GDP changed 0.0 percent, increasing 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP fell 0.4 percent in IIQ2012 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2012 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP fell 0.1 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IIIQ2012 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2013 and 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2013 and 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2013, UK GDP increased 0.8 percent and 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2013 and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier.
Italy. Italy has experienced decline of GDP in nine consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IIIQ2013. Italy’s GDP fell 1.1 percent in IQ2012 and declined 1.7 percent relative to IQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell 0.6 percent in IIQ2012 and declined 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, Italy’s GDP fell 0.4 percent and declined 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy contracted 0.9 percent in IVQ2012 and fell 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, Italy’s GDP contracted 0.6 percent and fell 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 0.3 percent in IIQ2013 and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2013 and declined 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IVQ2013 and decreased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier.
France. France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IQ2012 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.3 percent in IIQ2012 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP fell 0.2 percent in IVQ2012 and declined 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, France GDP changed 0.0 percent and declined 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.6 percent in IIQ2013 and 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2013 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2013 and 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier.

Table V-3, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%

	IQ2012/IVQ2011	IQ2012/IQ2011
United States	QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.7	3.3
Japan	QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.7	3.2
China	1.4	8.1
Euro Area	-0.1	-0.2
Germany	0.7	1.8
France	0.0	0.4
Italy	-1.1	-1.7
United Kingdom	0.0	0.6
	IIQ2012/IQ2012	IIQ2012/IIQ2011
United States	QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.2	2.8
Japan	QOQ: -0.4 SAAR: -1.7	3.2
China	2.1	7.6
Euro Area	-0.3	-0.5
Germany	-0.1	0.6 1.1 CA
France	-0.3	0.1
Italy	-0.6	-2.6
United Kingdom	-0.4	0.0
	IIIQ2012/ IIQ2012	IIIQ2012/ IIIQ2011
United States	QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 2.8	3.1
Japan	QOQ: –0.8 SAAR: –3.1	-0.2
China	2.0	7.4
Euro Area	-0.2	-0.7
Germany	0.2	0.4
France	0.2	0.0
Italy	-0.4	-2.8
United Kingdom	0.8	0.2
	IVQ2012/IIIQ2012	IVQ2012/IVQ2011
United States	QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: 0.1	2.0
Japan	QOQ: -0.1 SAAR: -0.2	-0.3
China	1.9	7.9
Euro Area	-0.5	-1.0
Germany	-0.5	0.0
France	-0.2	-0.3
Italy	-0.9	-3.0
United Kingdom	-0.1	0.2
	IQ2013/IVQ2012	IQ2013/IQ2012
United States	QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.1	1.3
Japan	QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 4.8	0.0
China	1.5	7.7
Euro Area	-0.2	-1.2
Germany	0.0	-1.6
France	0.0	-0.4
Italy	-0.6	-2.6
UK	0.5	0.7
	IIQ2013/IQ2013	IIQ2013/IIQ2012
United States	QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.5	1.6
Japan	QOQ: 1.0 SAAR: 3.9	1.2
China	1.8	7.5
Euro Area	0.3	-0.6
Germany	0.7	0.9
France	0.6	0.5
Italy	-0.3	-2.3
UK	0.8	2.0
	IIIQ2013/IIQ2013	III/Q2013/ IIIQ2012
USA	QOQ: 1.0 SAAR: 4.1	2.0
Japan	QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.1	2.3
China	2.2	7.8
Euro Area	0.1	-0.3
Germany	0.3	1.1
France	0.0	0.3
Italy	0.0	-1.9
UK	0.8	1.9
	IVQ2013/IIIQ2013	IVQ2013/IVQ2012
USA	QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2	2.7
Japan	QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.0	2.7
China	1.8	7.7
Euro Area	0.3	0.5
Germany	0.4	1.3
France	0.3	0.8
Italy	0.1	-0.8
UK	0.7	2.8

QOQ: Quarter relative to prior quarter; SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate

Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table V-4 provides two types of data: growth of exports and imports in the latest available months and in the past 12 months; and contributions of net trade (exports less imports) to growth of real GDP.

Japan. Japan provides the most worrisome data (Section VB and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/global-financial-risk-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations_8763.html http://cmpass ocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and_4699.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real_25.html and for GDP http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocreulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html). In Jan 2014, Japan’s exports grew 9.5 percent in 12 months while imports increased 25.0 percent. The second part of Table V-4 shows that net trade deducted 1.3 percentage points from Japan’s growth of GDP in IIQ2012, deducted 2.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2012 and deducted 0.5 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2012. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2012, 1.7 percentage points in IQ2013 and 0.5 percentage points in IIQ2013. In IIIQ2013, net trade deducted 2.0 percentage points from GDP growth in Japan. Net trade ducted 2.2 percentage points from GDP growth in Japan in IVQ2013.
China. In Jan 2014, China exports increased 10.6 percent relative to a year earlier and imports increased 10.0 percent.
Germany. Germany’s exports decreased 0.9 percent in the month of Dec 2013 and increased 4.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Germany’s imports decreased 0.6 percent in the month of Dec and increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to growth of GDP in IQ2012, contributed 0.4 percentage points in IIQ2012, contributed 0.3 percentage points in IIIQ2012, deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2012, deducted 0.2 percentage points in IQ2013 and added 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded deducted 0.4 percentage points from Germany’s GDP growth in IIIQ2013.
United Kingdom. Net trade deducted 0.8 percentage points from UK value added in IQ2012, deducted 0.8 percentage points in IIQ2012, added 0.7 percentage points in IIIQ2012 and subtracted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2012. In IQ2013, net trade added 0.5 percentage points to UK’s growth of value added and contributed 0.2 percentage points in IIQ2013. In IIIQ2013, net trade deducted 1.2 percentage points from UK GDP growth.
France. France’s exports increased 3.5 percent in Dec 2013 while imports increased 1.9 percent. Net traded added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IIIQ2012 and 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IQ2013 and added 0.2 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 0.7 percentage points in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to France’s GDP in IVQ2013.
United States. US exports decreased 1.8 percent in Dec 2013 and goods exports increased 2.1 percent in Jan-Dec 2013 relative to a year earlier but net trade deducted 0.03 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2012 and added 0.68 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade deducted 0.28 percentage points from US GDP growth in IQ2013 and deducted 0.07 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded added 0.14 percentage points to US GDP growth in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 1.33 percentage points to US GDP growth in IVQ2013. Industrial production decreased 0.3 percent in Jan 2014 after increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2013 and increasing 0.7 percent in Nov 2013, with all data seasonally adjusted. The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm):

“Industrial production decreased 0.3 percent in January after having risen 0.3 percent in December. In January, manufacturing output fell 0.8 percent, partly because of the severe weather that curtailed production in some regions of the country. Additionally, manufacturing production is now reported to have been lower in the fourth quarter; the index is now estimated to have advanced at an annual rate of 4.6 percent in the fourth quarter rather than 6.2 percent. The output of utilities rose 4.1 percent in January, as demand for heating was boosted by unseasonably cold temperatures. The production at mines declined 0.9 percent following a gain of 1.8 percent in December. At 101.0 percent of its 2007 average, total industrial production in January was 2.9 percent above its level of a year earlier. The capacity utilization rate for total industry decreased in January to 78.5 percent, a rate that is 1.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2013) average.”

In the six months ending in Jan 2014, United States national industrial production accumulated increase of 2.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent, which is higher than growth of 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. Excluding growth of -0.3 percent in Jan 2014, growth in the remaining five months from Aug to Dec 2013 accumulated to 2.4 percent or 5.9 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production fell in one of the past six months. Business equipment accumulated growth of 0.6 percent in the six months from Aug 2013 to Jan 2014 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent, which is lower than growth of 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “The capacity utilization rate for total industry decreased in January to 78.5 percent, a rate that is 1.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2013) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate with possible acceleration in the past few months.

Manufacturing decreased 0.8 percent in Jan 2014 after increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2013 and increasing 0.3 percent in Nov 2013 seasonally adjusted, increasing 1.3 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months ending in Jan 2014. Manufacturing grew cumulatively 1.2 percent in the six months ending in Jan 2014 or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent. Excluding the decrease of 0.3 percent in Jan 2014, manufacturing accumulated growth of 2.0 percent from Aug 2013 to Dec 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 into more recent months as shown by 12 months rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily in the past six months with some strength at the margin. Manufacturing increased 21.9 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased by 19.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2013. Manufacturing grew 17.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jan 2014. Manufacturing output in Jan 2013 is 8.5 percent below the peak in Jun 2007.

Table V-4, Growth of Trade and Contributions of Net Trade to GDP Growth, ∆% and % Points

	Exports M ∆%	Exports 12 M ∆%	Imports M ∆%	Imports 12 M ∆%
USA	-1.8 Dec	2.1 Jan-Dec	0.3 Dec	-0.3 Jan-Dec
Japan		Jan 2014 9.5 Dec 2013 15.3 Nov 2013 18.4 Oct 2013 18.6 Sep 2013 11.5 Aug 2013 14.7 Jul 2013 12.2 Jun 2013 7.4 May 2013 10.1 Apr 2013 3.8 Mar 2013 1.1 Feb 2013 -2.9 Jan 2013 6.4 Dec -5.8 Nov -4.1 Oct -6.5 Sep -10.3 Aug -5.8 Jul -8.1		Jan 2014 25.0 Dec 2013 24.7 Nov 2013 21.1 Oct 2013 26.1 Sep 2013 16.5 Aug 2013 16.0 Jul 2013 19.6 Jun 2013 11.8 May 2013 10.0 Apr 2013 9.4 Mar 2013 5.5 Feb 2013 7.3 Jan 2013 7.3 Dec 1.9 Nov 0.8 Oct -1.6 Sep 4.1 Aug -5.4 Jul 2.1
China		2014 10.6 Jan 2013 4.3 Dec 12.7 Nov 5.6 Oct -0.3 Sep 7.2 Aug 5.1 Jul -3.1 Jun 1.0 May 14.7 Apr 10.0 Mar 21.8 Feb 25.0 Jan		2014 10.0 Jan 2013 8.3 Dec 5.3 Nov 7.6 Oct 7.4 Sep 7.0 Aug 10.9 Jul -0.7 Jun -0.3 May 16.8 Apr 14.1 Mar -15.2 Feb 28.8 Jan
Euro Area	3.8 12-M Dec	0.8 Jan-Dec	1.0 12-M Dec	-3.3 Jan-Dec
Germany	-0.9 Dec CSA	4.6 Dec	-0.6 Nov CSA	2.0 Dec
France Dec	3.5	-0.5	1.9	-1.3
Italy Dec	5.1	4.9	3.6	0.6
UK	2.1 Dec	-0.1 Oct-Dec 13 /Dec-Oct 12	-3.8 Dec	-0.4 Oct-Dec 13/Oct-Dec 12
Net Trade % Points GDP Growth	% Points
USA	IVQ2013 1.33 IIIQ2013 0.14 IIQ2013 -0.07 IQ2013 -0.28 IVQ2012 +0.68 IIIQ2012 -0.03 IIQ2012 +0.10 IQ2012 +0.44
Japan	0.4 IQ2012 -1.3 IIQ2012 -2.2 IIIQ2012 -0.5 IVQ2012 1.7 IQ2013 0.5 IIQ2013 -2.0 IIIQ2013 -2.2 IVQ2013
Germany	IQ2012 0.8 IIQ2012 0.4 IIIQ2012 0.3 IVQ2012 -0.5 IQ2013 -0.2 IIQ2013 0.3 IIIQ2013 -0.4
France	0.1 IIIQ2012 0.1 IVQ2012 -0.1 IQ2013 0.2 IIQ2013 -0.7 IIIQ2013 0.2 IVQ2013
UK	-0.8 IQ2012 -0.8 IIQ2012 +0.7 IIIQ2012 -0.5 IVQ2012 0.5 IQ2013 0.2 IIQ2013 -1.2 IIIQ2013

Sources: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

ESV Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation. Lucas (2011May) estimates US economic growth in the long-term at 3 percent per year and about 2 percent per year in per capita terms. There are displacements from this trend caused by events such as wars and recessions but the economy grows much faster during the expansion, compensating for the contraction and maintaining trend growth over the entire cycle. Historical US GDP data exhibit remarkable growth: Lucas (2011May) estimates an increase of US real income per person by a factor of 12 in the period from 1870 to 2010. The explanation by Lucas (2011May) of this remarkable growth experience is that government provided stability and education while elements of “free-market capitalism” were an important driver of long-term growth and prosperity. Lucas sharpens this analysis by comparison with the long-term growth experience of G7 countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan) and Spain from 1870 to 2010. Countries benefitted from “common civilization” and “technology” to “catch up” with the early growth leaders of the US and UK, eventually growing at a faster rate. Significant part of this catch up occurred after World War II. Lucas (2011May) finds that the catch up stalled in the 1970s. The analysis of Lucas (2011May) is that the 20-40 percent gap that developed originated in differences in relative taxation and regulation that discouraged savings and work incentives in comparison with the US. A larger welfare and regulatory state, according to Lucas (2011May), could be the cause of the 20-40 percent gap. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in USD fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in Japan and France within the G7 in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. The key indicator of growth of real income per capita, which is what a person earns after inflation, measures long-term economic growth and prosperity. A refined concept would include real disposable income per capita, which is what a person earns after inflation and taxes.

Table IB-1 provides the data required for broader comparison of long-term and cyclical performance of the United States economy. Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. First, Long-term performance. Using annual data, US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.3 percent per year from 1929 to 2013 and at 3.2 percent per year from 1947 to 2013. Real disposable income grew at the average yearly rate of 3.2 percent from 1929 to 2013 and at 3.7 percent from 1947 to 1999. Real disposable income per capita grew at the average yearly rate of 2.0 percent from 1929 to 2013 and at 2.3 percent from 1947 to 1999. US economic growth was much faster during expansions, compensating contractions in maintaining trend growth for whole cycles. Using annual data, US real disposable income grew at the average yearly rate of 3.5 percent from 1980 to 1989 and real disposable income per capita at 2.6 percent. The US economy has lost its dynamism in the current cycle: real disposable income grew at the yearly average rate of 1.3 percent from 2006 to 2013 and real disposable income per capita at 0.5 percent. Table IB-1 illustrates the contradiction of long-term growth with the proposition of secular stagnation (Hansen 1938, 1938, 1941 with early critique by Simons (1942). Secular stagnation would occur over long periods. Table IB-1 also provides the corresponding rates of population growth that is only marginally lower at 0.8 to 0.9 percent recently from 1.1 percent over the long-term. GDP growth fell abruptly from 2.6 percent on average from 2000 to 2006 to 1.1 percent from 2006 to 2013 and real disposable income growth fell from 2.9 percent on average from 2000 to 2006 to 1.3 percent from 2006 to 2013. The decline of real per capita disposable income is even sharper from average 2.0 percent from 2000 to 2006 to 0.5 percent from 2006 to 2013 while population growth was 0.8 percent on average. Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul122) provide theory and measurements showing that cyclic factors explain currently depressed labor markets. This is also the case of the overall economy. Second, first four quarters of expansion. Growth in the first four quarters of expansion is critical in recovering loss of output and employment occurring during the contraction. In the first four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1983: GDP increased 7.8 percent, real disposable personal income 5.3 percent and real disposable income per capita 4.4 percent. In the first four quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010: GDP increased 2.7 percent, real disposable personal income 0.3 percent and real disposable income per capita decreased 0.5 percent. Third, first 18 quarters of expansion. In the expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987: GDP grew 24.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.0 percent; real disposable income grew 18.3 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.8 percent; and real disposable income per capita grew 13.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.9 percent. In the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013: GDP grew 11.2 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent; real disposable income grew 6.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita grew 2.9 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.6 percent. Fourth, entire quarterly cycle. In the entire cycle combining contraction and expansion from IQ1980 to IIQ1987: GDP grew 24.3 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.8 percent; real disposable personal income 25.2 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.9 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita 16.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.0 percent. In the entire cycle combining contraction and expansion from IVQ2007 to IVQ2013: GDP grew 6.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent; real disposable personal income 8.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita 3.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.5 percent. The United States grew during its history at high rates of per capita income that made its economy the largest in the world. That dynamism is disappearing. Bordo (2012 Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) provide strong evidence that recoveries have been faster after deeper recessions and recessions with financial crises, casting serious doubts on the conventional explanation of weak growth during the current expansion allegedly because of the depth of the contraction of 4.3 percent from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 and the financial crisis. The proposition of secular stagnation should explain a long-term process of decay and not the actual abrupt collapse of the economy and labor markets currently.

Table IB-1, US, GDP, Real Disposable Personal Income, Real Disposable Income per Capita and Population in 1983-85 and 2007-2013, %

Long-term Average ∆% per Year	GDP	Population
1929-2013	3.3	1.1
1947-2013	3.2	1.2
1947-1999	3.6	1.3
2000-2013	1.8	0.9
2000-2006	2.6	0.9
2006-2013	1.1	0.8
Long-term Average ∆% per Year	Real Disposable Income	Real Disposable Income per Capita	Population
1929-2013	3.2	2.0	1.1
1947-1999	3.7	2.3	1.3
2000-2013	2.1	1.2	0.9
2000-2006	2.9	2.0	0.9
2006-2013	1.3	0.5	0.8
Whole Cycles Average ∆% per Year
1980-1989	3.5	2.6	0.9
2006-2013	1.3	0.5	0.8
Comparison of Cycles	# Quarters	∆%	∆% Annual Equivalent
GDP
I83 to IV83 IQ83 to IQ87 IQ83 to IIQ87	4 17 18
I83 to IV83 I83 to IQ87 I83 to II87	4 17 18	7.8 23.1 24.5	7.8 5.0 5.0
RDPI
I83 to IV83 I83 to I87 I83 to II87	4 17 18	5.3 19.5 18.3	5.3 4.3 3.8
RDPI Per Capita
I83 to IV83 I83 to I87 I83 to II87	4 17 18	4.4 15.1 13.7	4.4 3.4 2.9
Whole Cycle IQ1980 to IIQ1987
GDP	31	24.3	2.8
RDPI	31	25.2	2.9
RDPI per Capita	31	16.7	2.0
Population	31	7.3	0.9
GDP
III09 to II10 III09 to IV13	4 18	2.7 11.2	2.7 2.4
RDPI
III09 to II10 III09 to IV13	4 18	0.3 6.5	0.3 1.4
RDPI per Capita
III09 to II10 II09 to IVQ13	4 18	-0.5 2.9	-0.5 0.6
Population
II09 to II010 II09 to IV13	4 18	0.8 3.4	0.8 0.8
IVQ2007 to IVQ2013	25
GDP	25	6.5	1.0
RDPI	25	8.1	1.3
RDPI per Capita	25	3.1	0.5
Population	25	4.8	0.8

RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

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Sunday, February 23, 2014

Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, Financial Instability, World Inflation Waves, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part I

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