Fluctuating Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Three Trillion Dollars Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Cyclically Stagnating Real Fixed Investment, Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits, United States Terms of International Trade, United States Housing, Sales of New Houses, United States House Prices, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020
I Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Three Trillion Dollars Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide
IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth
IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment
IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits
IID United States Terms of International Trade
IIA United States Housing Collapse
IIA1 Sales of New Houses
IIA2 United States House Prices
III World Financial Turbulence
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
V World Economic Slowdown. Table V-1 is constructed with the database of the IMF (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx) to show GDP in dollars in 2018 and the growth rate of real GDP of the world and selected regional countries from 2018 to 2021. The data illustrate the concept often repeated of “two-speed recovery” of the world economy from the recession of 2007 to 2009. The IMF has changed its measurement of the world economy to 3.6 percent in 2018 and reducing the forecast rate of growth to 3.0 percent in 2019, 3.4 percent in 2020 and 3.6 percent in 2021. Slow-speed recovery occurs in the “major advanced economies” of the G7 that account for $38,901 billion of world output of $84,930 billion, or 45.8 percent, but are projected to grow at much lower rates than world output, 1.7 percent on average from 2018 to 2021, in contrast with 3.4 percent for the world as a whole. While the world would grow 14.3 percent in the four years from 2018 to 2021, the G7 as a whole would grow 6.9 percent. The difference in dollars of 2018 is high: growing by 14.3 percent would add around $12.1 trillion of output to the world economy, or roughly, over two times the output of the economy of Japan of $4,972 billion but growing by 6.9 percent would add $5.9 trillion of output to the world, or somewhat higher than the output of Japan in 2018. The “two speed” concept is in reference to the growth of the 150 countries labeled as emerging and developing economies (EMDE) with joint output in 2018 of $33,687 billion, or 39.7 percent of world output. The EMDEs would grow cumulatively 19.0 percent or at the average yearly rate of 4.4 percent, contributing $6.4 trillion from 2018 to 2021 or the equivalent of close to one half the GDP of $13,368 billion of China in 2018. The final four countries in Table I-1 often referred as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), are large, rapidly growing emerging economies. Their combined output in 2018 adds to $19,613 billion, or 23.1 percent of world output, which is equivalent to 50.4 percent of the combined output of the major advanced economies of the G7.
Table V-1, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Real GDP Growth
GDP USD Billions 2018 | Real GDP ∆% | Real GDP ∆% | Real GDP ∆% | Real GDP ∆% | |
World | 84,930 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
G7 | 38,901 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 |
Canada | 1,712 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
France | 2,780 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
DE | 3,951 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
Italy | 2,076 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
Japan | 4,972 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
UK | 2,829 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
US | 20,580 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.7 |
Euro Area | 13,639 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
DE | 3,951 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
France | 2,780 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
Italy | 2,076 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
POT | 241 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
Ireland | 383 | 8.3 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.2 |
Greece | 218 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.7 |
Spain | 1,428 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
EMDE | 33,687 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
Brazil | 1,868 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 2.0 | 2.4 |
Russia | 1,658 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
India | 2,719 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 7.4 |
China | 13,368 | 6.6 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.9 |
Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries); POT: Portugal
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx
Continuing high rates of unemployment in advanced economies constitute another characteristic of the database of the WEO (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx). Table V-2 is constructed with the WEO database to provide rates of unemployment from 2017 to 2021 for major countries and regions. In fact, unemployment rates for 2017 in Table I-2 are high for all countries: unusually high for countries with high rates most of the time and unusually high for countries with low rates most of the time. The rates of unemployment are particularly high in 2017 for the countries with sovereign debt difficulties in Europe: 8.9 percent for Portugal (POT), 6.7 percent for Ireland, 21.5 percent for Greece, 17.2 percent for Spain and 11.3 percent for Italy, which is lower but still high. The G7 rate of unemployment is 5.0 percent. Unemployment rates are not likely to decrease substantially if relative slow cyclical growth persists in advanced economies.
Table V-2, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Unemployment Rate as Percent of Labor Force
% Labor Force 2017 | % Labor Force 2018 | % Labor Force 2019 | % Labor Force 2020 | % Labor Force 2021 | |
World | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
G7 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.3 |
Canada | 6.3 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.1 |
France | 9.4 | 9.1 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
DE | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
Italy | 11.3 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.2 |
Japan | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
UK | 4.4 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
US | 4.4 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
Euro Area | 9.1 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.3 |
DE | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
France | 9.4 | 9.1 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
Italy | 11.3 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.2 |
POT | 8.9 | 7.0 | 6.1 | 5.6 | 5.4 |
Ireland | 6.7 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 5.1 |
Greece | 21.5 | 19.3 | 17.8 | 16.8 | 15.7 |
Spain | 17.2 | 15.3 | 13.9 | 13.2 | 12.7 |
EMDE | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Brazil | 12.8 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 10.8 | 10.0 |
Russia | 5.2 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 |
India | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
China | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx
There are references to adverse periods as “lost decades.” There is a more prolonged and adverse period in Table V-3A: the lost economic cycle of the Global Recession with economic growth underperforming below trend worldwide. Economic contractions were relatively high but not comparable to the decline of GDP during the Great Depression. In fact, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, US GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. The contraction of GDP in the current cycle of the Global Recession was much lower, 4.0 percent (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html). Contractions were deeper in Japan, 8.6 percent, the euro area (19 members), 5.8 percent, Germany 6.9 percent and the UK 6.3 percent. The contraction in France was 3.9 percent. There is adversity in low rates of growth during the expansion that did not compensate for the contraction such that for the whole cycle performance is disappointingly low. As a result, GDP is substantially below what it would have been in trend growth in all countries and regions in the world. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 41 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2019. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIIQ2019 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-12/gdp3q19_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ2019, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2019 would have accumulated to 41.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2019 would be $22,303.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3182.1 billion than actual $19,121.1 billion. There are more than three trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 18.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 10.8 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html). US GDP in IIIQ2019 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,121.1 billion in IIIQ2019 or 21.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2019. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 154.0282 in Nov 2019. The actual index NSA in Nov 2019 is 104.7173 which is 32.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 159.4601 in Nov 2019. The actual index NSA in Nov 2019 is 104.7173, which is 34.3 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.9 percent between Dec 1986 and Nov 2019. Using trend growth of 1.9 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.5290 in Nov 2019. The output of manufacturing at 104.7173 in Nov 2019 is 22.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 105.8734 in Nov 2019 or 22.6 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 160.7359 in Nov 2019. The NAICS index at 105.8734 in Nov 2019 is 34.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 130.4112 in Nov 2019. The NAICS index at 105.8734 in Nov 2019 is 18.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Contraction ∆% | Expansion Average ∆% | Whole Cycle Average ∆% | Below Trend Percent | |
USA | 4.0 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 14.3 |
Japan | 8.6 | 1.5 | 0.6 | NA |
Euro Area 19 | 5.7 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 16.4 |
France | 3.9 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 10.1 |
Germany | 6.9 | 1.9 | 1.1 | NA |
UK | 6.0 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 17.6 |
Note: AV: Average. Expansion and Whole Cycle AV ∆% calculated with quarterly growth, seasonally adjusted and quarterly adjusted when applicable, rates and converted into annual equivalent.
Data reported periodically in this blog.
Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/related-sites.html
Manufacturing is underperforming in the lost cycle of the global recession. Manufacturing (NAICS) in Nov 2019 is lower by 4.2 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007, as shown in Chart V-3A. Manufacturing (SIC) in Nov 2019 at 104.7173 is lower by 6.8 percent relative to the peak at 112.3113 in Jun 2007. There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2019. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 154.0282 in Nov 2019. The actual index NSA in Nov 2019 is 104.7173 which is 32.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 159.4601 in Nov 2019. The actual index NSA in Nov 2019 is 104.7173, which is 34.3 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.9 percent between Dec 1986 and Nov 2019. Using trend growth of 1.9 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.5290 in Nov 2019. The output of manufacturing at 104.7173 in Nov 2019 is 22.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 105.8734 in Nov 2019 or 22.6 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 160.7359 in Nov 2019. The NAICS index at 105.8734 in Nov 2019 is 34.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 130.4112 in Nov 2019. The NAICS index at 105.8734 in Nov 2019 is 18.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing NSA, Nov 2007 to Nov 2019
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart V-3B provides the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States, or those available for work. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 231.713 million in Jun 2007 to 260.020 million in Nov 2019 or 28.307 million.
Chart V-3B, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 2007 to Nov 2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3C provides nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 2007 to Nov 2019. Nonfarm payroll jobs fell from 13.987 million in Jun 2007 to 12.862 million in Nov 2019, or 1.125 million.
Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 2007 to Nov 2019, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Nov 2019. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade.
Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Nov 2019
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart V-3E provides the US noninstitutional civilian population, or those in condition of working, from Jan 1948, when first available, to Nov 2019. The noninstitutional civilian population increased from 170.042 million in Jun 1981 to 260.020 million in Nov 2019, or 89.978 million.
Chart V-3E, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 1948 to Nov 2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3F provides manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 1939 to Nov 2019. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs decreased from a peak of 18.890 million in Jun 1981 to 12.862 million in Nov 2019.
Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 1939 to Nov 2019, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
There is global stress in manufacturing. Table V-3B provides month and 12-month percentage changes of new orders in manufacturing and output of manufacturing in Germany.
Table V-3B, Germany, Manufacturing Orders and Manufacturing Output, ∆% Month and 12 Months
MFG New Orders Month ∆% | MFG New Orders 12 Months ∆% | MFG Output Month ∆% | MFG Output 12 Month ∆% | |
Oct 2019 | -1.3 | -5.4 | -1.6 | -6.1 |
Sep | 1.9 | -2.2 | 0.3 | -1.7 |
Aug | -2.3 | -9.3 | -1.1 | -7.6 |
Jul | -1.3 | -2.2 | 1.1 | -1.2 |
Jun | 3.9 | -10.8 | -1.3 | -14.6 |
May | -3.1 | -3.8 | -0.6 | 1.0 |
Apr | 1.4 | -5.2 | -0.3 | -4.3 |
Mar | -0.3 | -7.0 | -2.4 | -3.9 |
Feb | -3.1 | -7.1 | 1.4 | -0.2 |
Jan | -1.9 | -3.6 | -0.4 | -3.8 |
Dec 2018 | 1.3 | -8.2 | 0.7 | -6.7 |
Dec 2017 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 0.2 | 3.7 |
Dec 2016 | 6.4 | 11.2 | -0.2 | 2.0 |
Source: Federal Statistical Agency of Germany, https://www.destatis.de/EN/Home/_node.html
Table V-3 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog from IQ2012 to IVQ2018 available now for all countries. There are estimates for all countries for IQ2019 and preliminary estimates for IIQ2019 for most countries. There are preliminary estimates for some countries for IIIQ2019. Growth is weak throughout most of the world.
- Japan. The GDP of Japan increased 1.2 percent in IQ2012, 4.9 percent at SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) and 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier but part of the jump could be the low level a year earlier because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan is experiencing difficulties with the overvalued yen because of worldwide capital flight originating in zero interest rates with risk aversion in an environment of softer growth of world trade. Japan’s GDP fell 0.7 percent in IIQ2012 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of minus 2.8 percent, which is much lower than 4.9 percent in IQ2012. Growth of 2.9 percent in IIQ2012 in Japan relative to IIQ2011 has effects of the low level of output because of Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.4 percent in IIIQ2012 at the SAAR of minus 1.5 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2012 at the SAAR of 1.0 percent and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan grew 1.2 percent in IQ2013 at the SAAR of 5.0 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2013 at the SAAR of 3.2 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP grew 0.8 percent in IIIQ2013 at the SAAR of 3.4 percent and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2013, Japan’s GDP changed 0.0 percent at the SAAR of minus 0.2 percent, increasing 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 1.0 percent in IQ2014 at the SAAR of 4.0 percent and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2014, Japan’s GDP fell 1.9 percent at the SAAR of minus 7.4 percent and fell 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 at the SAAR of 0.4 percent and fell 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, Japan’s GDP grew 0.5 percent, at the SAAR of 2.0 percent, decreasing 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Japan increased 1.4 percent in IQ2015 at the SAAR of 5.5 percent and increased 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIQ2015 at the SAAR of 0.5 percent and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Japan changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2015 at the SAAR of minus 0.2 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 at the SAAR of minus 1.6 percent and grew 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, the GDP of Japan increased 0.5 percent at the SAAR of 1.9 percent and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2016 at the SAAR of 0.7 percent and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, the GDP of Japan increased 0.3 percent at the SAAR of 1.1 percent and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2016 at the SAAR of 0.9 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, the GDP of Japan increased 1.1 percent at the SAAR of 4.6 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2017 at the SAAR of 1.6 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, the GDP of Japan increased 0.7 percent at the SAAR of 2.7 percent and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2017, at the SAAR of 1.2 percent, and increased 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, the GDP of Japan decreased 0.5 percent, at the SAAR of minus 1.9 percent and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2018, at the SAAR of 2.1 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, the GDP of Japan contracted 0.6 percent at the SAAR of minus 2.4 percent and decreased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2018, at the SAAR of 1.0 percent and decreased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, the GDP of Japan increased 0.6 percent at the SAAR of 2.6 percent and grew 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2019, at the SAAR of 2.0 percent and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2019, the GDP of Japan increased 0.4 percent at the SAAR of 1.8 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier.
- China. China’s GDP grew 1.9 percent in IQ2012, annualizing to 7.8 percent, and 8.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 2.1 percent in IIQ2012, which annualizes to 8.7 percent, and 7.6 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.8 percent in IIIQ2012, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, China grew at 2.0 percent, which annualizes at 8.2 percent, and 8.1 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011. In IQ2013, China grew at 1.9 percent, which annualizes at 7.8 percent, and 7.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2013, China grew at 1.8 percent, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.6 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 2.1 percent in IIIQ2013, which annualizes at 8.7 percent, and increased 7.9 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.6 percent in IVQ2013, which annualized to 6.6 percent, and 7.7 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.8 percent in IQ2014, which annualizes to 7.4 percent, and 7.4 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2014, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.5 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIIQ2014, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent in a year, and 7.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.7 percent in IVQ2014, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and 7.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.8 percent in IQ2015, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and increased 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, China’s GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.5 percent in IVQ2015, which annualizes at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.4 percent in IQ2016, which annualizes at 5.7 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, the GDP of China increased 1.9 percent, which annualizes to 7.8 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2016, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.6 percent in IVQ2016, which annualizes at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.5 percent in IQ2017, which annualizes at 6.1 percent and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.8 percent in IIQ2017, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.5 percent in IVQ2017, which annualizes at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.5 percent in IQ2018, which annualizes to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.7 percent in IIQ2018, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.6 percent in IIIQ2018, which annualizes to 6.6 percent, and increased 6.5 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased 1.5 percent in IVQ2018, which annualized at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.4 percent in IQ2019, which annualizes at 5.7 percent and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased 1.6 percent in IIQ2019, which annualized at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.5 percent in IIIQ2019, which annualizes at 6.1 percent and increased 6.0 percent relative to a year earlier. There was decennial change in leadership in China (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/index.htm). Xi Jinping initiated a second term of leadership in Oct 2017 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/25/c_136705344.htm). Growth rates of GDP of China in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier have been declining from 2011 to 2019.
- Euro Area. GDP fell 0.2 percent in the euro area in IQ2012 and decreased 0.5 in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP contracted 0.3 percent IIQ2012 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.1 percent and declined 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.4 percent relative to the prior quarter and fell 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, the GDP of the euro area fell 0.4 percent and decreased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2013, euro area GDP increased 0.3 percent and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and increased 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The euro area’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP increased 0.7 percent in IQ2015 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The euro area’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.8 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, euro area GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2017 and increased 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.8 percent and grew 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area grew 0.8 percent in IVQ2017 and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent and grew 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area grew 0.3 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2018 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2019, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier.
- Germany. The GDP of Germany increased 0.2 percent in IQ2012 and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier but 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier when adjusted for calendar effects (CA). In IIIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.3 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP contracted 0.4 percent in IVQ2012 and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, Germany’s GDP decreased 0.5 percent and fell 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2013, Germany’s GDP increased 1.1 percent and grew 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2013 and grew 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2013, Germany’s GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 1.0 percent in IQ2014 and grew 3.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2014, Germany’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.9 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany decreased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIQ2015 and grew 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2015 and grew 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 and grew 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, the GDP of Germany increased 0.8 percent and grew 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 3.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, the GDP of Germany increased 0.2 percent and grew 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2016 and grew 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, the GDP of Germany increased 1.2 percent and grew 3.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIQ2017 and grew 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier adjusting for calendar effects (CA). In IIIQ2017, the GDP of Germany increased 0.9 percent and increased 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier and 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). Germany’s GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2017, 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier and 3.4 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). The GDP of Germany increased 0.1 percent in IQ2018 and grew 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). Germany’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2018, 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier and 2.1 relative to a year earlier (CA). The GDP of Germany decreased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2018, increasing 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier and 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). Germany’s GDP changed 0.2 percent in IVQ2018, increasing 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier and 0.6 relative to a year earlier (CA). The GDP of Germany increased 0.5 percent in IQ2019, increasing 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier and increasing 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). Germany’s GDP contracted 0.2 percent in IIQ2019, decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier and increased 0.3 relative to a year earlier (CA). The GDP of Germany increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2019, increasing 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier and increasing 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier (CA).
- United States. Growth of US GDP in IQ2012 was 0.8 percent, at SAAR of 3.2 percent and higher by 2.7 percent relative to IQ2011. US GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2012, 1.7 percent at SAAR and 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, US GDP grew 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent at SAAR and 2.5 percent relative to IIIQ2011. In IVQ2012, US GDP grew 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent at SAAR and 1.5 percent relative to IVQ2011. In IQ2013, US GDP grew at 3.6 percent SAAR, 0.9 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.6 percent relative to the same quarter in 2012. In IIQ2013, US GDP grew at 0.5 percent in SAAR, 0.1 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.3 percent relative to IIQ2012. US GDP grew at 3.2 percent in SAAR in IIIQ2013, 0.8 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.9 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html). In IVQ2013, US GDP grew 0.8 percent at 3.2 percent SAAR and 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, US GDP decreased 0.3 percent, increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier and fell 1.1 percent at SAAR. In IIQ2014, US GDP increased 1.4 percent at 5.5 percent SAAR and increased 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP increased 1.2 percent in IIIQ2014 at 5.0 percent SAAR and increased 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, US GDP increased 0.6 percent at SAAR of 2.3 percent and increased 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2015 at SAAR of 3.2 percent and grew 4.0 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.0 percent in IIQ2015, increasing 0.7 percent in the quarter and 3.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2015 at SAAR of 1.3 percent and grew 2.4 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 0.1 percent in IVQ2015, increasing 0.0 percent in the quarter and 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, US GDP grew 0.5 percent at SAAR of 2.0 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 1.9 percent in IIQ2016, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter and 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, US GDP grew 0.5 percent at SAAR of 2.2 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.0 percent in IVQ2016, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, US GDP grew 0.6 percent at SAAR of 2.3 percent and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.2 percent in IIQ2017, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, US GDP grew 0.8 percent at SAAR of 3.2 percent and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.5 percent in IVQ2017, increasing 0.9 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.5 percent, increasing 0.6 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.5 percent in IIQ2018, increasing 0.9 percent in the quarter, and increasing 3.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.9 percent, increasing 0.7 percent in the quarter, and increasing 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 1.1 percent in IVQ2018, increasing 0.3 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.1 percent, increasing 0.8 percent in the quarter and increasing 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.0 percent in IIQ2019, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2019, US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.1 percent, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter and increasing 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier.
- United Kingdom. In IQ2012, UK GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, GDP fell 0.1 percent relative to IQ2012 and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, GDP increased 1.2 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IVQ2012, GDP fell 0.2 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Fiscal consolidation in an environment of weakening economic growth is much more challenging. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 0.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to IVQ2012. In IIQ2013, GDP increased 0.5 percent and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2013 and 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2013 and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, GDP increased 0.7 percent and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2014 and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2014 and 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, GDP increased 0.6 percent and 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2015 and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2016 and grew 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2017 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2017 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2019, GDP increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier.
- Italy. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2019 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2019, Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2019 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, the GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of Italy decreased 0.1 percent and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of Italy increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IVQ2014 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and fell 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 0.8 percent in IQ2013 and declined 2.9 percent relative to IQ2013. GDP had been growing during six consecutive quarters but at very low rates from IQ2010 to IIQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell in seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at increasingly higher rates of contraction from 0.5 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IVQ2011, 1.1 percent in IQ2012, 0.8 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012. The pace of decline accelerated to minus 0.8 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 0.8 percent in IQ2013. GDP contracted cumulatively 5.3 percent in seven consecutive quarterly contractions from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.1 percent. The year-on-year rate has fallen from 2.2 percent in IVQ2010 to minus 3.2 percent in IVQ2012, minus 2.9 percent in IQ2013, minus 2.2 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 1.5 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP fell 0.9 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.2 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.5 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.4 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.7 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.9 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.9 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.9 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to a year earlier and decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IQ2019 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.1 percent in IIQ2019 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIIQ2019 relative to a year earlier. Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/), the GDP of Italy in IIIQ2019 of €430,459.2 million (https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/236253) is lower by 5.2 percent relative to €452,802.5 million in IQ2008 (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/). Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/), the GDP of Italy increased from €392,018.4 million in IQ1998 to €452,802.5 million in IQ2008 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. The fiscal adjustment of Italy is significantly more difficult with the economy not growing especially on the prospects of increasing government revenue. The strategy is for reforms to improve productivity, facilitating future fiscal consolidation.
- France. France’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2012 and increased 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IIQ2012 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2012 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2013 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2013 and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2013 and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, France’s GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2014, France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.1 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IQ2015 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2015, France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2015, the GDP of France increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France decreased 0.3 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of France increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of France increased 0.7 percent and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of France increased 0.7 percent and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2018 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of France increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, the GDP of France increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2019 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2019, the GDP of France increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2019 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier.
Table V-3, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%
IQ2012/IVQ2011 | IQ2012/IQ2011 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 2.7 |
Japan | QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 4.9 | 3.1 |
China | 1.9 AE 7.8 | 8.1 |
Euro Area | -0.2 | -0.5 |
Germany | 0.2 | 1.5 CA 1.0 |
France | 0.1 | 0.7 |
Italy | -1.1 | -2.3 |
United Kingdom | 0.6 | 1.2 |
IIQ2012/IQ2012 | IIQ2012/IIQ2011 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.7 | 2.4 |
Japan | QOQ: -0.7 | 2.9 |
China | 2.1 AE 8.7 | 7.6 |
Euro Area | -0.3 | -0.8 |
Germany | 0.2 | 0.4 CA 0.9 |
France | -0.2 | 0.4 |
Italy | -0.8 | -3.2 |
United Kingdom | -0.1 | 1.1 |
IIIQ2012/ IIQ2012 | IIIQ2012/ IIIQ2011 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.1 | 2.5 |
Japan | QOQ: –0.4 | -0.1 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.5 |
Euro Area | -0.1 | -1.0 |
Germany | 0.3 | -0.1 |
France | 0.2 | 0.4 |
Italy | -0.5 | -3.3 |
United Kingdom | 1.2 | 2.0 |
IVQ2012/IIIQ2012 | IVQ2012/IVQ2011 | |
United States | QOQ: 0.1 | 1.5 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.0 | 0.3 |
China | 2.0 AE 8.2 | 8.1 |
Euro Area | -0.4 | -1.1 |
Germany | -0.4 | -0.1 |
France | -0.1 | 0.0 |
Italy | -0.8 | -3.2 |
United Kingdom | -0.2 | 1.6 |
IQ2013/IVQ2012 | IQ2013/IQ2012 | |
United States | QOQ: 0.9 | 1.6 |
Japan | QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 5.0 | 0.4 |
China | 1.9 AE 7.8 | 7.9 |
Euro Area | -0.4 | -1.2 |
Germany | -0.5 | -1.5 |
France | 0.0 | -0.1 |
Italy | -0.8 | -2.9 |
UK | 0.6 | 1.6 |
IIQ2013/IQ2013 | IIQ2013/IIQ2012 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.5 | 1.3 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 1.9 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.6 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | -0.4 |
Germany | 1.1 | 0.8 |
France | 0.7 | 0.8 |
Italy | 0.0 | -2.2 |
UK | 0.5 | 2.3 |
IIIQ2013/IIQ2013 | III/Q2013/IIIQ2012 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 | 1.9 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.4 | 3.0 |
China | 2.1 AE 8.7 | 7.9 |
Euro Area | 0.3 | 0.0 |
Germany | 0.5 | 1.2 |
France | 0.0 | 0.6 |
Italy | 0.2 | -1.5 |
UK | 0.9 | 2.0 |
IVQ2013/IIIQ2013 | IVQ2013/IVQ2012 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 2.6 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: -0.2 | 2.7 |
China | 1.6 AE 6.6 | 7.7 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 0.7 |
Germany | 0.3 | 1.2 |
France | 0.5 | 1.1 |
Italy | -0.2 | -0.9 |
UK | 0.5 | 2.7 |
IQ2014/IVQ2013 | IQ2014/IQ2013 | |
USA | QOQ -0.3 SAAR -1.1 | 1.4 |
Japan | QOQ: 1.0 SAAR: 4.0 | 3.0 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.4 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | 1.6 |
Germany | 1.0 | 3.2 |
France | 0.1 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.1 | 0.1 |
UK | 0.7 | 2.7 |
IIQ2014/IQ2014 | IIQ2014/IIQ2013 | |
USA | QOQ 1.4 SAAR 5.5 | 2.7 |
Japan | QOQ: -1.9 SAAR: -7.4 | -0.1 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.5 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 1.2 |
Germany | 0.0 | 1.4 |
France | 0.2 | 0.7 |
Italy | 0.0 | 0.1 |
UK | 0.7 | 2.8 |
IIIQ2014/IIQ2014 | IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013 | |
USA | QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 5.0 | 3.1 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.4 | -0.9 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.1 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | 1.4 |
Germany | 0.5 | 1.8 |
France | 0.5 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.1 | 0.0 |
UK | 0.6 | 2.4 |
IVQ2014/IIIQ2014 | IVQ2014/IVQ2013 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.3 | 2.9 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | -0.5 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 7.2 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 1.6 |
Germany | 0.9 | 2.4 |
France | 0.1 | 0.8 |
Italy | -0.2 | 0.0 |
UK | 0.6 | 2.5 |
IQ2015/IVQ2014 | IQ2015/IQ2014 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 4.0 |
Japan | QOQ: 1.4 SAAR: 5.5 | 0.0 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.0 |
Euro Area | 0.7 | 1.8 |
Germany | -0.2 | 1.3 |
France | 0.4 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.2 | 0.1 |
UK | 0.5 | 2.3 |
IIQ2015/IQ2015 | IIQ2015/IIQ2014 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 3.0 | 3.4 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.5 | 2.2 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.0 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 2.1 |
Germany | 0.6 | 1.8 |
France | 0.0 | 1.0 |
Italy | 0.4 | 0.5 |
UK | 0.7 | 2.4 |
IIIQ2015/IIQ2015 | IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.3 | 2.4 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: -0.2 | 1.9 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 6.9 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | 2.0 |
Germany | 0.5 | 1.8 |
France | 0.4 | 0.9 |
Italy | 0.2 | 0.6 |
UK | 0.4 | 2.2 |
IVQ2015/IIIQ2015 | IVQ2015/IVQ2014 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: 0.1 | 1.9 |
Japan | QOQ: -0.4 SAAR: -1.6 | 0.9 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 2.0 |
Germany | 0.4 | 2.1 |
France | 0.2 | 1.1 |
Italy | 0.5 | 1.3 |
UK | 0.7 | 2.4 |
IQ2016/IVQ2015 | IQ2016/IQ2015 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | 1.6 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 1.9 | 0.2 |
China | 1.4 AE 5.7 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.6 | 1.9 |
Germany | 0.8 | 2.0 |
France | 0.6 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.3 | 1.4 |
UK | 0.2 | 2.1 |
IIQ2016/IQ2016 | IIQ2016/IIQ2015 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 1.9 | 1.3 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 0.7 | 0.2 |
China | 1.9 AE 7.8 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.3 | 1.8 |
Germany | 0.6 | 3.7 |
France | -0.3 | 1.0 |
Italy | 0.2 | 1.2 |
UK | 0.5 | 1.9 |
IIIQ2016/IIQ2016 | IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.2 | 1.6 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.1 | 0.5 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | 1.8 |
Germany | 0.2 | 1.9 |
France | 0.3 | 0.8 |
Italy | 0.6 | 1.5 |
UK | 0.5 | 1.9 |
IVQ2016/IIIQ2016 | IVQ2016/IVQ2015 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | 2.0 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 0.9 | 1.2 |
China | 1.6 AE 6.6 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.8 | 2.1 |
Germany | 0.4 | 1.4 |
France | 0.6 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.3 | 1.4 |
UK | 0.6 | 1.8 |
IQ2017/IVQ2016 | IQ2017/IQ2016 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.3 | 2.1 |
Japan | QOQ: 1.1 SAAR: 4.6 | 1.8 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.6 | 2.2 |
Germany | 1.2 | 3.6 |
France | 0.8 | 1.4 |
Italy | 0.6 | 1.7 |
UK | 0.6 | 2.2 |
IIQ2017/IQ2017 | IIQ2017/IIQ2016 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.2 | 2.2 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.6 | 2.0 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.7 | 2.6 |
Germany | 0.6 | 1.0 CA 2.3 |
France | 0.7 | 2.4 |
Italy | 0.4 | 1.9 |
UK | 0.3 | 1.9 |
IIIQ2017/IIQ2017 | IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 2.4 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 2.7 | 2.4 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.8 | 2.9 |
Germany | 0.9 | 2.5 CA 3.0 |
France | 0.7 | 2.8 |
Italy | 0.4 | 1.7 |
UK | 0.3 | 1.8 |
IVQ2017/IIIQ2017 | IVQ2017/IVQ2016 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.5 | 2.8 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.2 | 2.5 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.8 | 3.0 |
Germany | 0.7 | 2.8 CA 3.4 |
France | 0.7 | 3.0 |
Italy | 0.5 | 1.9 |
UK | 0.4 | 1.6 |
IQ2018/IVQ2017 | IQ2018/IQ2017 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.5 | 2.9 |
Japan | QOQ: -0.5 SAAR: -1.9 | 0.8 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.3 | 2.6 |
Germany | 0.1 | 1.6 CA 2.3 |
France | 0.2 | 2.4 |
Italy | 0.1 | 1.4 |
UK | 0.1 | 1.1 |
IIQ2018/IQ2018 | IIQ2018/IIQ2017 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.5 | 3.2 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.1 | 1.0 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.3 | 2.2 |
Germany | 0.4 | 2.5 CA 2.1 |
France | 0.2 | 1.9 |
Italy | -0.1 | 0.9 |
UK | 0.5 | 1.3 |
IIIQ2018/IIQ2018 | IIIQ2018/IIIQ2017 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 2.9 | 3.1 |
Japan | QOQ -0.6 SAAR: -2.4 | -0.3 |
China | 1.6 AE 6.6 | 6.5 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 1.6 |
Germany | -0.1 | 1.1 CA 1.1 |
France | 0.3 | 1.5 |
Italy | -0.1 | 0.4 |
UK | 0.6 | 1.6 |
IVQ2018IIIQ2018 | IVQ2018/IVQ2017 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.1 | 2.5 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.0 | -0.2 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.4 |
Euro Area | 0.3 | 1.2 |
Germany | 0.2 | 0.9 CA 0.6 |
France | 0.4 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.1 | -0.1 |
UK | 0.2 | 1.4 |
IQ2019/IV2018 | IQ2019/IQ2018 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.1 | 2.7 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.6 | 0.8 |
China | 1.4 AE 5.7 | 6.4 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 1.4 |
Germany | 0.5 | 0.9 CA 1.0 |
France | 0.3 | 1.3 |
Italy | 0.1 | 0.0 |
UK | 0.6 | 2.0 |
IIQ2019/IQ2019 | IIQ2019/IIQ2018 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | 2.3 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | 0.9 |
China | 1.6 AE 6.6 | 6.2 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 1.2 |
Germany | -0.2 | -0.1 CA 0.3 |
France | 0.3 | 1.4 |
Italy | 0.1 | 0.1 |
UK | -0.2 | 1.2 |
IIIQ2019/IIQ2019 | IIIQ2019/IIIQ2018 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR 2.1 | 2.1 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.8 | 1.7 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.0 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 1.2 |
Germany | 0.1 | 1.0 CA 0.5 |
France | 0.3 | 1.3 |
Italy | 0.1 | 0.3 |
UK | 0.4 | 1.1 |
QOQ: Quarter relative to prior quarter; SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate
Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/related-sites.html
Table V-4 provides two types of data: growth of exports and imports in the latest available months and in the past 12 months; and contributions of net trade (exports less imports) to growth of real GDP.
- Japan. Japan provides the most worrisome data (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/valuation-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/global-financial-risk-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations_8763.html http://cmpass ocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and_4699.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real_25.html and for GDP http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html). In Nov 2019, Japan’s exports decreased 7.9 percent in 12 months while imports decreased 15.7 percent. The second part of Table V-4 shows that net trade added 0.7 percent in IQ2012, deducting 2.0 percent in IIQ2012. Net trade deducted 1.9 percent in IIIQ2012. Net traded deducted 0.4 percent in IVQ2012. Net trade added 1.5 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2013 but deducted 0.1 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 1.3 percentage points in IIIQ2013 and 2.2 percentage points in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Net trade added 4.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 1.5 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2014. Net trade contributed 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2015 and deducted 0.6-percentage points in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.5 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2015 and added 1.3 percentage points in IQ2016. Net trade contributed 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade added 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016 and contributed 1.4 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade contributed 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017 and deducted 1.0 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade contributed 2.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017 and deducted 0.3 percentage-point in IVQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018 and contributed 0.0 percentage points in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.5 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018 and deducted 1.8 percentage points in IVQ2018. Net trade contributed 1.6 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2019 with export contraction deducting 1.5 percent and import contraction contributing 3.1 percent. Net trade deducted 1.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2019. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2019.
- China. In Nov 2019, China exports decreased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier and imports increased 0.3 percent.
- Germany. Germany’s exports increased 1.2 percent in the month of Oct 2019 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2019. Germany’s imports changed 0.0 percent in the month of Oct 2019 and decreased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2019. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to growth of GDP in IQ2012, contributed 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2012, contributed 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2012, deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2012, deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2013 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded deducted 0.0 percentage points from Germany’s GDP growth in IIIQ2013 and added 0.9 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2014 and added 0.8 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.5 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.8 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018 and deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.9 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2019.
- United Kingdom. Net trade contributed 0.7 percentage points in IIQ2013. In IIIQ2013, net trade deducted 1.7 percentage points from UK growth. Net trade contributed 0.1 percentage points to UK value added in IVQ2013. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to UK value added in IQ2014 and 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2014 and added 0.0 percentage points in IVQ2014. Net traded deducted 0.4 percentage points from growth in IQ2015. Net trade added 1.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.1-percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.8 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade added 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.33 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017 and contributed 0.01 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.11 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.14 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade added 0.02 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.26 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.44 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade deducted 1.00 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2018. Net trade deducted 2.93 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2019. Net trade contributed 2.57 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2019. Net trade contributed 2.41 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2019.
- France. France’s exports increased 3.4 percent in Oct 2019 while imports increased 1.5 percent. France’s exports decreased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2019 and imports decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Net traded added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IIIQ2012 and 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IQ2013 and added 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 1.7 percentage points in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IVQ2013 and deducted 0.1 percentage points in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IIQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to France’s GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.6 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IIIQ2016 and added 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IQ2017 and added 0.9 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.6 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade added 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to GDP in IVQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP in IQ2019. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ219. Net trade deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2019.
- United States. US exports decreased 0.2 percent in Oct 2019 and goods exports decreased 1.4 percent in Jan-Oct 2019 relative to a year earlier. Imports decreased 1.7 percent in Oct 2019 and goods imports decreased 1.1 percent in Jan-Oct 2019 relative to a year earlier. Net trade added 0.27 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2012 and deducted 0.08 percentage points in IIIQ2012, adding 0.57 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade added 0.40 percentage points to US GDP growth in IQ2013 and deducted 0.33 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded subtracted 0.14 percentage points from US GDP growth in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 1.23 percentage points to US GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 1.11 percentage points from US GDP growth in IQ2014 and deducted 0.46 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade added 0.10 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2014. Net trade deducted 1.05 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 1.67 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.06 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 1.00 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.20 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.50 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.35 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade added 0.05 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.36 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.13 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.31 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.35 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.80 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.00 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade added 0.67 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 2.05 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018, deducting 0.35 percentage points in IVQ2018. Net trade added 0.73 percentage points in IQ2019, deducting 0.68 percentage points in IIQ2019. Net trade deducted 0.14 percentage points in IIIQ2019.
Industrial production increased 1.1 percent in Nov 2019 and decreased 0.9 percent in Oct 2019 after decreasing 0.4 percent in Sep 2019, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 27, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to the growth rates for total IP for recent years were small and positive, with the estimates for 2016 and 2017 a bit higher and the estimates for 2015 and 2018 slightly lower.[2] Total IP is still reported to have increased from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014 before declining in 2015 and rebounding in mid-2016. Subsequently, the index advanced around 7 1/2 percent over 2017 and 2018.
Capacity for total industry expanded modestly in each year from 2015 to 2017 before advancing 1 1/2 percent in 2018; it is expected to advance about 2 percent in 2019. Revisions for recent years were very small and showed slightly less expansion in most years relative to earlier reports.
In the fourth quarter of 2018, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 79.4 percent, about 3/4 percentage point above its previous estimate and about 1/2 percentage point below its long-run (1972–2018) average. The utilization rate in 2017 is also higher than its previous estimate.”
The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm):
“Industrial production and manufacturing production both rebounded 1.1 percent in November after declining in October. These sharp November increases were largely due to a bounceback in the output of motor vehicles and parts following the end of a strike at a major manufacturer. Excluding motor vehicles and parts, the indexes for total industrial production and for manufacturing moved up 0.5 percent and 0.3 percent, respectively. Mining production edged down 0.2 percent, while the output of utilities increased 2.9 percent.
At 109.7 percent of its 2012 average, total industrial production was 0.8 percent lower in November than it was a year earlier. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector increased 0.7 percentage point in November to 77.3 percent, a rate that is 2.5 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2018) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration and weakening growth in past months. There could be renewed growth with oscillations.
Manufacturing decreased 22.3 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increasing 19.7 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2018. Manufacturing grew 19.9 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Nov 2019. Manufacturing in Nov 2019 is lower by 6.8 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2019 would have accumulated to 41.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2019 would be $22,303.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3182.1 billion than actual $19,121.1 billion. There are more than three trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 18.5 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 10.8 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html). US GDP in IIIQ2019 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,121.1 billion in IIIQ2019 or 21.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2019. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 154.0282 in Nov 2019. The actual index NSA in Nov 2019 is 104.7173 which is 32.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 159.4601 in Nov 2019. The actual index NSA in Nov 2019 is 104.7173, which is 34.3 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 1.9 percent between Dec 1986 and Nov 2019. Using trend growth of 1.9 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.5290 in Nov 2019. The output of manufacturing at 104.7173 in Nov 2019 is 22.7 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 105.8734 in Nov 2019 or 22.6 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 160.7359 in Nov 2019. The NAICS index at 105.8734 in Nov 2019 is 34.1 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 130.4112 in Nov 2019. The NAICS index at 105.8734 in Nov 2019 is 18.8 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 86.9 percent in IIQ2019. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Nov 2019, there were 153.624 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 130.500 million NSA in Nov 2019 accounted for 84.9 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 153.624 million, of which 12.862 million, or 9.9 percent of total private jobs and 8.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 109.289 million NSA in Nov 2019, or 71.1 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.7 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 9.4 percent in US national income in IIIQ2019 and durable goods 5.6 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.
Table V-4, Growth of Trade and Contributions of Net Trade to GDP Growth, ∆% and % Points
Exports | Exports 12 M ∆% | Imports | Imports 12 M ∆% | |
USA | -0.2 Oct | -1.4 Jan-Oct | -1.7 Oct | -1.1 Jan-Oct |
Japan | Nov 2019 -7.9 Oct 2019 -9.2 Sep 2019 -5.2 Aug 2019 -8.2 Jul 2019 -1.6 Jun 2019 -6.7 May 2019 -7.8 Apr 2019 -2.4 Mar 2019 -2.4 Feb 2019 -1.2 Jan 2019 -8.4 Dec 2018 -3.8 Nov 2018 0.1 Oct 2018 8.2 Sep 2018 -1.2 Aug 2018 6.6 Jul 2018 3.9 Jun 2018 6.7 May 2018 8.1 Apr 2018 7.8 Mar 2018 2.1 Feb 2018 1.8 Jan 2018 12.2 Dec 2017 9.3 Nov 2017 16.2 Oct 2017 14.0 Sep 2017 14.1 Aug 2017 18.1 Jul 2017 13.4 Jun 2017 9.7 May 2017 14.9 Apr 2017 7.5 Mar 2017 12.0 Feb 2017 11.3 Jan 2017 1.3 Dec 2016 5.4 Nov 2016 -0.4 Oct 2016 -10.3 Sep 2016 -6.9 Aug 2016 9.6 Jul 2016 -14.0 Jun 2016 -7.8 May 2016 -11.3 Apr 2016 -10.1 Mar 2016 -6.8 Feb 2016 -4.0 Jan 2016 -12.9 Dec 2015 -8.0 Nov 2015 -3.3 Oct 2015 -2.1 Sep 2015 0.6 Aug 3.1 Jul 2015 7.6 Jun 2015 9.5 May 2015 2.4 Apr 8.0 Mar 8.5 Feb 2.4 Jan 17.0 Dec 12.9 Nov 4.9 Oct 9.6 Sep 6.9 Aug -1.3 Jul 3.9 Jun -2.0 May 2014 -2.7 Apr 2014 5.1 Mar 2014 1.8 Feb 2014 9.5 Jan 2014 9.5 Dec 2013 15.3 Nov 2013 18.4 Oct 2013 18.6 Sep 2013 11.5 Aug 2013 14.7 Jul 2013 12.2 Jun 2013 7.4 May 2013 10.1 Apr 2013 3.8 Mar 2013 1.1 Feb 2013 -2.9 Jan 2013 6.4 Dec -5.8 Nov -4.1 Oct -6.5 Sep -10.3 Aug -5.8 Jul -8.1 | Nov 2019 -15.7 Oct 2019 -14.8 Sep 2019 -1.5 Aug 2019 -12.0 Jul 2019 -1.2 Jun 2019 -5.2 May 2019 -1.5 Apr 2019 6.4 Mar 2019 1.1 Feb 2019 -6.7 Jan 2019 -0.6 Dec 2018 1.9 Nov 2018 12.5 Oct 2018 19.9 Sep 2018 7.0 Aug 2018 15.4 Jul 2018 14.6 Jun 2018 2.5 May 2018 14.0 Apr 2018 5.9 Mar 2018 -0.6 Feb 2018 16.6 Jan 2018 7.9 Dec 2017 14.9 Nov 2017 17.2 Oct 2017 18.9 Sep 2017 12.0 Aug 2017 15.2 Jul 2017 16.3 Jun 2017 15.5 May 2017 17.8 Apr 2017 15.1 Mar 2017 15.8 Feb 2017 1.2 Jan 2017 8.5 Dec 2016 -2.6 Nov 2016 -8.8 Oct 2016 -16.5 Sep 2016 -16.3 Aug 2016 -17.3 Jul 2016 -24.7 Jun 2016 -18.8 May 2016 -13.8 Apr 2016 -23.3 Mar 2016 -14.9 Feb 2016 -14.2 Jan 2016 -18.0 Dec 2015 -18.0 Nov 2015 -10.2 Oct 2015 -13.4 Sep 2015 -11.1 Aug -3.1 Jul 2015 -3.2 Jun 2015 -2.9 May 2015 -8.7 Apr -4.2 Mar -14.5 Feb -3.6 Jan -9.0 Dec 1.9 Nov -1.7 Oct 2.7 Sep 6.2 Aug -1.5 Jul 2.3 Jun 8.4 May 2014 -3.6 Apr 2013 3.4 Mar 2014 18.1 Feb 2014 9.0 Jan 2014 25.0 Dec 2013 24.7 Nov 2013 21.1 Oct 2013 26.1 Sep 2013 16.5 Aug 2013 16.0 Jul 2013 19.6 Jun 2013 11.8 May 2013 10.0 Apr 2013 9.4 Mar 2013 5.5 Feb 2013 7.3 Jan 2013 7.3 Dec 1.9 Nov 0.8 Oct -1.6 Sep 4.1 Aug -5.4 Jul 2.1 | ||
China | Jan-Dec 9.9 Jan-Dec 2017 7.9 Jan-Dec 2016 -7.7 Jan-Dec 2015 -2.8 | 2019 Nov -1.1 Oct -0.9 Sep -3.2 Aug -1.0 Jul 3.3 Jun -1.3 May 1.1 Apr -2.7 Mar 14.2 Feb -20.7 Jan 9.3 2018 Dec -4.4 Nov 5.4 Oct 15.6 Sep 14.5 Aug 9.8 Jul 12.2 Jun 11.3 May 12.6 Apr 12.9 Mar -2.7 Feb 44.5 Jan 11.1 2017 Dec 10.9 Nov 12.3 Oct 6.9 Sep 8.1 Aug 5.5 Jul 7.2 Jun 11.3 May 8.7 Apr 8.0 Mar 16.4 Feb -1.3 Jan 7.9 2016 Dec 3.1 Nov 0.1 Oct -7.3 Sep -10.0 Aug -2.8 Jul -4.4 Jun -4.8 May -4.1 Apr -1.8 Mar 11.5 Feb -25.4 Jan -11.2 2015 -1.4 Dec -6.8 Nov -6.9 Oct -3.7 Sep -5.5 Aug -8.3 Jul 2.8 Jun -2.5 May -6.4 Apr -15.0 Mar 48.3 Feb -3.3 Jan 2014 9.7 Dec 4.7 Nov 11.6 Oct 15.3 Sep 9.4 Aug 14.5 Jul 7.2 Jun 7.0 May 0.9 Apr -6.6 Mar -18.1 Feb 10.6 Jan 2013 4.3 Dec 12.7 Nov 5.6 Oct -0.3 Sep 7.2 Aug 5.1 Jul -3.1 Jun 1.0 May 14.7 Apr 10.0 Mar 21.8 Feb 25.0 Jan | Jan-Dec 15.8 Jan-Dec 2017 15.9 Jan-Dec 2016 -5.5 Jan-Dec 2015 -14.1 | 2019 Nov 0.3 Oct -6.4 Sep -8.5 Aug -5.6 Jul -5.3 Jun -7.3 May -8.5 Apr 4.0 Mar -7.6 Feb -5.2 Jan -1.5 2018 Dec -7.6 Nov 3.0 Oct 21.4 Sep 14.3 Aug 20.0 Jul 27.3 Jun 14.1 May 26.0 Apr 21.5 Mar 14.4 Feb 6.3 Jan 36.9 2017 Dec 4.5 Nov 17.7 Oct 17.2 Sep 18.7 Aug 13.3 Jul 11.0 Jun 17.2 May 14.8 Apr 11.9 Mar 20.3 Feb 38.1 Jan 16.7 2016 Dec -7.7 Nov 6.7 Oct -1.4 Sep -1.9 Aug 1.5 Jul -12.5 Jun -2.8 May -0.4 Apr -10.6 Mar -7.6 Feb -13.8 Jan -18.8 2015 -7.6 Dec -8.7 Nov -18.8 Oct -20.4 Sep -13.8 Aug -8.1 Jul -6.1 Jun -17.6 May -12.7 Mar -20.5 Feb -19.9 Jan 2014 -2.4 Dec -6.7 Nov 4.6 Oct 7.0 Sep -2.4 Aug -1.6 Jul 5.5 Jun -1.6 May -0.8 Apr -11.3 Mar 10.1 Feb 10.0 Jan 2013 8.3 Dec 5.3 Nov 7.6 Oct 7.4 Sep 7.0 Aug 10.9 Jul -0.7 Jun -0.3 May 16.8 Apr 14.1 Mar -15.2 Feb 28.8 Jan |
Euro Area | 4.1 12-Oct 19 | 3.1 Jan-Oct 19 | -3.2 12-Oct 19 | 2.0 Jan-Oct 19 |
Germany | 1.2 Oct CSA | 1.9 Oct | 0.0 Oct CSA | -0.6 Oct |
France Sep | 3.4 | -0.8 | 1.5 | -0.1 |
Italy Oct | 3.1 | 4.3 | -2.3 | -5.8 |
UK | 0.8 Oct | 3.7 | 6.2 Oct | 7.0 |
Net Trade % Points GDP Growth | Points | |||
USA | IIIQ2019 -0.14 IIQ2019 -0.68 IQ2019 0.73 IVQ 2018 -0.35 IIIQ 2018 -2.05 IIQ2018 0.67 IQ2018 0.00 IVQ2017 -0.80 IIIQ2017 0.35 IIQ2017 -0.31 IQ2017 0.13 IVQ2016 -1.36 IIIQ2016 0.05 IIQ2016 0.35 IQ2016 -0.50 IVQ2015 -0.20 IIIQ2015 -1.00 IIQ2015 0.06 IQ2015 -1.67 IVQ2014 -1.05 IIIQ2014 0.10 IIQ2014 -0.46 IQ2014 -1.11 IVQ2013 1.23 IIIQ2013 -0.14 IIQ2013 -0.33 IQ2013 0.40 IVQ2012 +0.57 IIIQ2012 -0.08 IIQ2012 0.27 IQ2012 0.00 | |||
Japan | 0.7 IQ2012 -2.0 IIQ2012 -1.9 IIIQ2012 -0.4 IVQ2012 1.5 IQ2013 -0.1 IIQ2013 -1.3 IIIQ2013 -2.2 IVQ2013 -0.7 IQ2014 4.0 IIQ2014 -0.2 IIIQ2014 1.5 IVQ2014 0.1 IQ2015 -0.6 IIQ2015 -0.5 IIIQ2015 0.0 IVQ2015 1.3 IQ2016 0.4 IIQ2016 1.4 IIIQ2016 1.4 IVQ2016 0.3 IQ2017 -1.0 IIQ2017 2.3 IIIQ2017 -0.3 IVQ2017 0.2 IQ2018 0.0 IIQ2018 -0.5 IIIQ2018 -1.8 IVQ2018 1.6 IQ2019 -1.2 IIQ2019 -0.7 IIIQ2019 | |||
Germany | IQ2012 0.8 IIQ2012 0.3 IIIQ2012 0.4 IVQ2012 -0.5 IQ2013 -0.3 IIQ2013 -0.3 IIIQ2013 0.0 IVQ2013 0.9 IQ2014 -0.2 IIQ2014 -0.2 IIIQ2014 0.8 IVQ2014 0.1 IQ2015 -0.5 IIQ2015 0.8 IIIQ2015 -0.3 IVQ2015 -0.7 IQ2016 -0.3 IIQ2016 0.7 IIIQ2016 -0.3 IVQ2016 -0.5 IQ2017 0.7 IIQ2017 -0.2 IIIQ2017 0.4 IVQ2017 0.2 IQ2018 0.0 IIQ2018 -0.2 IIIQ2018 -0.9 IVQ2018 0.0 IQ2019 0.2 | |||
France | 0.1 IIIQ2012 0.1 IVQ2012 -0.1 IQ2013 0.3 IIQ2013 -1.7 IIIQ2013 0.1 IVQ2013 -0.1 IQ2014 -0.2 IIQ2014 -0.2 IIIQ2014 0.2 IVQ2014 -0.2 IQ2015 0.4 IIQ2015 -0.6 IIIQ2015 -0.7 IVQ2015 -0.1 IQ2016 0.3 IIQ2016 -0.6 IIIQ2016 0.1 IVQ2016 -0.6 IQ2017 0.9 IIQ2017 -0.3 IIIQ2017 0.6 IVQ2017 0.0 IQ2018 0.0 IIQ2018 0.3 IIIQ2018 0.2 IVQ2018 -0.3 IQ2019 0.0 IIQ2019 -0.4 IIIQ2019 | |||
UK | 0.7 IIQ2013 -1.7 IIIQ2013 0.1 IVQ2013 0.8 IQ2014 0.3 IIQ2014 -0.7 IIIQ2014 0.0 IVQ2014 -0.4 IQ2015 1.1 IIQ2015 -0.4 IIIQ2015 -0.2 IVQ2015 -0.1 IQ2016 0.1 IIQ2016 -1.8 IIIQ2016 1.7 IVQ2016 0.33 IQ2017 0.01 IIQ2017 | |||
0.11 | ||||
IIIQ2017 -0.14 IVQ2017 0.02 IQ2018 -0.26 IIQ2018 0.44 IIIQ2018 -1.00 IVQ2018 -2.93 IQ2019 2.57 IIQ2019 2.41 IIIQ2019 |
Sources: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/related-sites.html
The geographical breakdown of exports and imports of Japan with selected regions and countries is in Table V-5 for Nov 2019. The share of Asia in Japan’s trade is close to one-half for 56.4 percent of exports and 48.3 percent of imports. Within Asia, exports to China are 20.5 percent of total exports and imports from China 24.4 percent of total imports. While exports of Japan to China decreased 5.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019, imports from China decreased 16.4 percent. The second largest export market for Japan in Nov 2019 is the US with share of 19.0 percent of total exports, which is close to that of China, and share of imports from the US of 10.6 percent in total imports. Japan’s exports to the US decreased 12.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019 and imports from the US decreased 10.3 percent. Western Europe has share of 11.0 percent in Japan’s exports and of 13.6 percent in imports. Rates of growth of exports of Japan in Nov 2019 are minus 12.9 percent for exports to the US, minus 13.0 percent for exports to Brazil and minus 10.1 percent for exports to Germany. Comparisons relative to 2011 may have some bias because of the effects of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Deceleration of growth in China and the US and threat of recession in Europe can reduce world trade and economic activity. Growth rates of imports in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019 are mixed. Imports from Asia decreased 14.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2019 while imports from China decreased 16.4 percent. Data are in millions of yen, which may have effects of recent depreciation of the yen relative to the United States dollar (USD) and revaluation of the dollar relative to the euro with multiple oscillations.
Table V-5, Japan, Value and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, ∆% and Millions of Yen
Nov 2019 | Exports | 12 months ∆% | Imports Millions of Yen | 12 months ∆% |
Total | 6,382,172 | -7.9 | 6,464,248 | -15.7 |
Asia | 3,601,457 % Total 56.4 | -5.7 | 3,120,231 % Total 48.3 | -14.6 |
China | 1,310,103 % Total 20.5 | -5.4 | 1,578,118 % Total 24.4 | -16.4 |
USA | 1,211,621 % Total 19.0 | -12.9 | 688,410 % Total 10.6 | -10.3 |
Canada | 75,675 | 1.7 | 106,399 | -22.6 |
Brazil | 27,844 | -13.0 | 95,597 | 54.1 |
Mexico | 96,673 | -18.3 | 49,826 | -6.9 |
Western Europe | 701,977 % Total 11.0 | -6.1 | 881,771 % Total 13.6 | -5.6 |
Germany | 170,518 | -10.1 | 220,111 | -14.9 |
France | 58,572 | -7.3 | 109,441 | -0.3 |
UK | 109,847 | -1.5 | 73,353 | -12.6 |
Middle East | 214,018 | 7.2 | 703,307 | -31.8 |
Australia | 122,619 | -18.5 | 373,802 | -16.1 |
Source: Japan, Ministry of Finance http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm
World trade projections of the IMF are in Table V-6. There is decreasing growth of the volume of world trade of goods and services from 3.6 percent in 2018 to 1.1 percent in 2019, stabilizing to 3.2 percent in 2020. Growth stabilizes at 3.3 percent on average from 2018 to 2024. World trade would be slower for advanced economies while emerging and developing economies (EMDE) experience faster growth. World economic slowdown would be more challenging with lower growth of world trade.
Table V-6, IMF, Projections of World Trade, USD Billions, USD/Barrel and Annual ∆%
2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Average ∆% 2018-2024 | |
World Trade Volume (Goods and Services) | 3.6 | 1.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
Exports Goods & Services | 3.4 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 3.5 |
Imports Goods & Services | 3.8 | 1.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
Exports Goods & Services | ||||
G7 | 2.6 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 2.5 |
EMDE | 3.9 | 1.9 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
Imports Goods & Services | ||||
G7 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
EMDE | 5.1 | 0.7 | 4.3 | 4.3 |
Terms of Trade Goods & Services | ||||
G7 | -0.7 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
EMDE | 1.5 | -1.3 | -1.1 | -0.2 |
World Crude Oil Price $/Barrel | 68.3 | 61.8 | 57.9 | 58.3 |
Crude Oil: Simple Average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate and the Dubai Fateh
Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook databank
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx
The JP Morgan Global Composite Output Index of the JP Morgan Manufacturing and Services PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and HIS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, with high association with world GDP, increased to 51.5 in Nov from 50.8 in Oct, indicating expansion at faster rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/70830dd316b945aca5a759c7b7b588b2). This index has remained above the contraction territory of 50.0 during 86 consecutive months. The employment index increased from 49.8 in Oct to 50.9 in Nov with input prices changing at the same rate, new orders increasing at faster rate and output increasing at faster rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/70830dd316b945aca5a759c7b7b588b2). Olya Borichevska, from Global Economic Research at JP Morgan, finds improving growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/70830dd316b945aca5a759c7b7b588b2). The JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and IHS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, decreased to 50.1 in Dec from 50.3 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/dfce262b1e9141259cf6b5358c88cf04). New export orders decreased. Olya Borichevska, from Global Economic Research at JP Morgan, finds indications of weak growth ((https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/dfce262b1e9141259cf6b5358c88cf04).The Markit Brazil Composite Output Index did not change from 51.8 in Oct to 51.8 in Nov, indicating expansion in activity of Brazil’s private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/56c7dac27129452da9554bd8f2f1d1d7). The Markit Brazil Services Business Activity index, compiled by Markit, decreased from 51.2 in Oct to 50.9 in Nov indicating expanding services activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/56c7dac27129452da9554bd8f2f1d1d7). Pollyanna De Lima, Principal Economist at Markit, finds expanding activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/56c7dac27129452da9554bd8f2f1d1d7). The HIS Markit Brazil Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ IndexTM (PMI™) decreased from 52.9 in Nov to 50.2 in Dec, indicating manufacturing above neutral 50.0 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e3f76504b1a34b3191a253e883461058). Pollyanna De Lima, Principal Economist at Markit, finds weaker manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e3f76504b1a34b3191a253e883461058).
VA United States. The HIS Markit Flash US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) seasonally adjusted decreased to 52.5 in Dec from 52.6 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/4a024793587146b3b3531072a063f56d). New export orders increased. The HIS Markit Flash US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index increased from 51.6 in Nov to 52.2 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/4a024793587146b3b3531072a063f56d). The IHS Markit Flash US Composite PMI™ Output Index increased from 52.0 in Nov to 52.2 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/4a024793587146b3b3531072a063f56d). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the surveys are consistent with quarterly GDP growth at annualized around 2.2 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/4a024793587146b3b3531072a063f56d). The HIS Markit US Composite PMI™ Output Index of Manufacturing and Services increased to 52.0 in Nov from 50.9 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/742a7acf2bbc418699e19482ce3e0670). The HIS Markit US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index increased from 50.6 in Oct to 51.6 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/742a7acf2bbc418699e19482ce3e0670). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds the indexes suggesting growth close to annualized below 1.5 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/742a7acf2bbc418699e19482ce3e0670). The HIS Markit US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) decreased to 52.4 in Dec from 52.6 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c582d7ce96cd4577aec39d8732716a53). New foreign orders increased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at HIS Markit, finds improving growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c582d7ce96cd4577aec39d8732716a53). The purchasing managers’ index (PMI) of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Report on Business® decreased 0.9-percentage points from 48.1 in Nov to 47.2 in Dec, which indicates contracting growth (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/MfgROB.cfm). The index of new export orders decreased 0.6 percentage points from 47.9 in Nov to 47.3 in Dec. The Non-Manufacturing ISM Report on Business® PMI decreased 0.8 percentage points from 54.7 in Oct to 53.9 in Nov, indicating growth of business activity/production during 118 consecutive months, while the index of new orders increased 1.5 percentage points from 55.6 in Oct to 57.1 in Nov (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/NonMfgROB.cfm). Table USA provides the country economic indicators for the US.
Table USA, US Economic Indicators
Consumer Price Index | Nov 12 months NSA ∆%: 2.1; Ex food and energy ∆%: 2.3 Nov month SA ∆%: 0.3; Ex food and energy ∆%: 0.2 WIW 11/24/19 |
Producer Price Index | Finished Goods Nov 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.1; ex food and energy ∆% 1.5 Final Demand Nov 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.1; ex food and energy ∆% 1.3 Nov month SA ∆% 0.0; ex food and energy ∆%: -0.2 WIW 11/24/19 |
PCE Inflation | Oct 12-month NSA ∆%: headline 1.3 ex food and energy ∆% 1.6 |
Employment Situation | Household Survey: Nov Unemployment Rate SA 3.5% |
Nonfarm Hiring | Nonfarm Hiring fell from 64.9 million in 2006 to 59.0 million in 2014 or by 5.9 million and to 63.7 million in 2016 or by 1.2 million. Nonfarm hiring increased to 68.9 million in 2018 or 4.0 million relative to 2006 while population grew 28.976 million. |
GDP Growth | BEA Revised National Income Accounts IIQ2012/IIQ2011 2.4 IIIQ2012/IIIQ2011 2.5 IVQ2012/IVQ2011 1.5 IQ2013/IQ2012 1.6 IIQ2013/IIQ2012 1.3 IIIQ2013/IIIQ2012 1.9 IVQ2013/IVQ2012 2.6 IQ2014/IQ2013 1.4 IIQ2014/IIQ2013 2.7 IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013 3.1 IVQ2014/IVQ2013 2.9 IQ2015/IQ2014 4.0 IIQ2015/IIQ2014 3.4 IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014 2.4 IVQ2015/IVQ2014 1.9 IQ2016/IQ2015 1.6 IIQ2016/IIQ2015 1.3 IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015 1.6 IVQ2016/IVQ2015 2.0 IQ2017/IQ2016 2.1 IIQ2017/IIQ2016 2.2 IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016 2.4 IVQ2017/IVQ2016 2.8 IQ2018/IQ2017 2.9 IIQ2018/IIQ2017 3.2 IIIQ2018/IIIQ2017: 3.1 IVQ2018/IVQ2017 2.5 IQ2019/IQ2018 2.7 IIQ2019/IIQ2018 2.3 IIIQ2019/IIIQ2019 2.1 IQ2012 SAAR 3.2 IIQ2012 SAAR 1.7 IIIQ2012 SAAR 0.5 IVQ2012 SAAR 0.5 IQ2013 SAAR 3.6 IIQ2013 SAAR 0.5 IIIQ2013 SAAR 3.2 IVQ2013 SAAR 3.2 IQ2014 SAAR -1.1 IIQ2014 SAAR 5.5 IIIQ2014 SAAR 5.0 IVQ2014 SAAR 2.3 IQ2015 SAAR 3.2 IIQ2015 SAAR: 3.0 IIIQ2015 SAAR: 1.3 IVQ2015 SAAR: 0.1 IQ2016 SAAR: 2.0 IIQ2016 SAAR: 1.9 IIIQ2016 SAAR: 2.2 IVQ2016 SAAR 2.0 IQ2017 SAAR 2.3 IIQ2017 SAAR 2.2 IIIQ2017 SAAR 3.2 IVQ2017 SAAR 3.5 IQ2018 SAAR 2.5 IIQ2018 SAAR 3.5 IIIQ2018 SAAR 2.9 IVQ2018 SAAR 1.1 IQ2019 SAAR 3.1 IIQ2019 SAAR 2.0 IIIQ2019 SAAR 2.1 |
Real Private Fixed Investment | SAAR IIIQ2019 ∆% -0.8 IVQ2007 to IIIQ2019: ∆%26.6 Blog 1/5/20 |
Corporate Profits | IIIQ2019 SAAR: Corporate Profits -0.2; Undistributed Profits 3.6 Blog 1/5/20 |
Personal Income and Consumption | Oct month ∆% SA Real Disposable Personal Income (RDPI) SA ∆% -0.3 |
Quarterly Services Report | IIIQ19/IIIQ18 NSA ∆%: Financial & Insurance 6.6 Earlier Data: |
Employment Cost Index | Compensation Private IIIQ2019 SA ∆%: 0.8 Sep 12 months ∆%: 2.7 Earlier Data: |
Industrial Production | Nov month SA ∆%: 1.1 Manufacturing Nov SA 1.1 ∆% Nov 12 months SA ∆% minus 0.8, NSA minus 0.7 |
Productivity and Costs | Nonfarm Business Productivity IIIQ2019∆% SAAE -0.3; IIIQ2019/IIQ2018 ∆% 1.4; Unit Labor Costs SAAE IIIQ2019 ∆% 3.6; IIIQ2019/IIIQ2018 ∆%: 3.1 Blog 12/1/19 |
New York Fed Manufacturing Index | General Business Conditions from Nov 2.9 to Dec 3.5 |
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Index | General Index from Nov 10.4 to Dec 0.3 |
Manufacturing Shipments and Orders | Oct Orders SA ∆% 0.3 Ex Transport 0.2 Jan-Oct 19/Jan-Oct 18 NSA New Orders ∆% -0.4 Ex transport 0.2 Earlier data: |
Durable Goods | Nov New Orders SA ∆%: minus 2.0; ex transport ∆%: 0.0 Earlier Data: |
Sales of New Motor Vehicles | IIQ2018 4,500,220; IIQ2017 4,419,349. Nov 19 Total Light Vehicles NSA 1411.7 thousand increasing 2.1% from 1382.6 thousand in Nov 2018. Nov 19 SAAR 17.1 million, Oct 19 SAAR 16.5 million, Nov 18 SAAR 17.4 million Blog 9/9/18 12/9/18 12/8/19 |
Sales of Merchant Wholesalers | Jan-Oct 2019/Jan-Oct 2018 NSA ∆%: Total 0.6; Durable Goods: 0.5; Nondurable EARLIER DATA: |
Sales and Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers | Oct 19 12-M NSA ∆%: Sales Total Business 0.1; Manufacturers -1.6 |
Sales for Retail and Food Services | Jan-Nov 2019/Jan-Nov 2018 ∆%: Retail and Food Services 3.4; Retail ∆% 3.2 |
Value of Construction Put in Place | SAAR month SA Oct ∆%: minus 0.8 Jan-Oct 19/Jan-Oct 18 NSA: minus 1.7 Earlier Data: |
Case-Shiller Home Prices | National Oct ∆% SA 0.5 National Oct 12M ∆% 3.3 |
FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only | Oct SA ∆% 0.2; |
New House Sales | Nov month SAAR ∆%: 1.3 |
Housing Starts and Permits | Nov Starts month SA ∆% 3.2; Permits ∆%: 1.4 Earlier Data: |
Rate of Homeownership | IIIQ2019 64.8 IIQ2019: 64.1 Blog 11/3/19 |
Trade Balance | Balance Oct SA -$47,199 million versus Sep -$51,100 million |
Export and Import Prices | Nov 12-month NSA ∆%: Imports -1.3; Exports -1.3 Earlier Data: |
International Terms of Trade | IIIQ2019 110.356 IVQ1947 150.474 2018 108.690 1929 142.590 Blog 1/5/20 |
Consumer Credit | Oct ∆% annual rate: Total 5.5; Revolving 8.8 Nonrevolving 4.3 Earlier Data: |
Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities | Oct Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term US Securities: $5.2 billion |
Treasury Budget | Fiscal Year 2020/2019 ∆% Nov: Receipts 2.6; Outlays 6.5 Individual Income Taxes 4.5 Deficit Fiscal Year 2012 $1,087 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2013 $680 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2014 $485 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2015 $439 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2016 $585 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2017 $665 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2018 $779 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2019 $984 billion Blog 12/22/19 |
CBO Budget and Economic Outlook | 2012 Deficit $1087 B 6.8% GDP Debt $11,281 B 70.4% GDP 2013 Deficit $680 B, 4.1% GDP Debt $11,983 B 72.6% GDP 2014 Deficit $485 B 2.8% GDP Debt $12,780 B 74.1% GDP 2015 Deficit $438 B 2.4% GDP Debt $13,117 B 72.9% GDP 2016 Deficit $585 3.2% GDP Debt $14,168.4 B 76.7% GDP 2017 Deficit $665 3.5% GDP Debt $14,665 76.5% GDP 2028 Deficit $1,526 B, 5.1 % GDP Debt $28,671 B 96.2% GDP 2048: Long-term Debt/GDP 152.0% Blog 8/26/12 11/18/12 2/10/13 9/22/13 2/16/14 8/24/14 9/14/14 3/1/15 6/21/15 1/3/16 4/10/16 7/24/16 1/8/17 4/2/17 10/14/18 |
Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities | Sep 2019 SAAR ∆%: Securities 21.0 Loans 2.2 Cash Assets -36.6 Deposits 7.9 Blog 10/20/19 |
Flow of Funds Net Worth of Families and Nonprofits | IIQ2019 ∆ since 2007 Assets +$44,566.4 BN Nonfinancial +$8,434.2 BN Real estate +$6,925.6 BN Financial +$36,132.3 BN Net Worth +$42,862.4 BN Net Worth IVQ2018/IIIQ2018 ∆% -3.5 Corporate Equity ∆% -16.1 Blog 9/29/19 |
Current Account Balance of Payments and Net International Investment Position | Current Account IIQ2019 NSA minus $138,326 MM % GDP 2.4 SA Minus $10,055 B Blog 9/23/2018 2/10/2018 3/31/2019 7/7/2019 9/29/2019 11/3/2019 |
Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation | Blog 11/24/19 |
Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades | Blog 12/29/19 |
IMF View | World Real Economic Growth 2020 ∆% 3.4 Blog 11/3/19 |
Income, Poverty and Health Insurance in the United States | 43.123 Million Below Poverty in 2015, 13.5% of Population Median Family Income CPI-2015 Adjusted $56,516 in 2015 back to 1999 Levels Uncovered by Health Insurance 28.966 Million in 2015 Blog 9/25/16 |
Monetary Policy and Cyclical Valuation of Risk Financial Assets | Blog 1/7/2018 |
Rules versus Discretionary Authorities in Monetary Policy | Blog 1/1/2017 |
Links to blog comments in Table USA: 12/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html
12/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html
12/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html
12/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
12/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
11/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html
11/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html
11/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/13/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
9/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/revaluation-of-us-dollar-falling-yields.html
8/25/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
8/11/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
6/30/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
6/23/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html
6/16/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
4/21/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html
12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html
11/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
1/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html
12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html
12/24/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html
10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html
4/2/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html
1/15/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html
1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html
12/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
10/16/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html
9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html
7/24/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html
4/10/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html
1/17/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html
1/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html
10/11/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html
6/21/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html
5/10/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html
4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html
3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html
2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html
9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html
8/24/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html
2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html
9/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html
2/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html
VB Japan. The GDP of Japan grew at 1.0 percent per year on average from 1991 to 2002, with the GDP implicit deflator falling at 0.8 percent per year on average. The average growth rate of Japan’s GDP was 4 percent per year on average from the middle of the 1970s to 1992 (Ito 2004). Low growth in Japan in the 1990s is commonly labeled as “the lost decade” (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 81-115). Table VB-GDP provides yearly growth rates of Japan’s GDP from 1995 to 2018. Growth weakened from 2.7 per cent in 1995 and 3.1 percent in 1996 to contractions of 1.1 percent in 1998 and 0.3 percent in 1999. Growth rates were below 2 percent with exception of 2.8 percent in 2000 and 2.2 percent in 2004. Japan’s GDP contracted sharply by 1.1 percent in 2008 and 5.4 percent in 2009. As in most advanced economies, growth was robust at 4.2 percent in 2010 but mediocre at minus 0.1 percent in 2011 because of the tsunami and 1.5 percent in 2012. Japan’s GDP grew 2.0 percent in 2013 and nearly stagnated in 2014 at 0.4 percent. The GDP of Japan increased 1.2 percent in 2015 and 0.5 percent in 2016. Japan’s GDP increased at 2.2 percent in 2017. The GDP of Japan increased 0.3 percent in 2018. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). Japan’s real GDP in calendar year 2018 is 5.5 percent higher than in calendar year 2007 for growth at the average yearly rate of 0.5 percent. Japan’s real GDP grew 12.8 percent from the trough of 2009 to 2018 at the average yearly rate of 1.3 percent (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html).
Table VB-GDP, Japan, Yearly Percentage Change of GDP ∆%
Calendar Year | ∆% |
1995 | 2.7 |
1996 | 3.1 |
1997 | 1.1 |
1998 | -1.1 |
1999 | -0.3 |
2000 | 2.8 |
2001 | 0.4 |
2002 | 0.1 |
2003 | 1.5 |
2004 | 2.2 |
2005 | 1.7 |
2006 | 1.4 |
2007 | 1.7 |
2008 | -1.1 |
2009 | -5.4 |
2010 | 4.2 |
2011 | -0.1 |
2012 | 1.5 |
2013 | 2.0 |
2014 | 0.4 |
2015 | 1.2 |
2016 | 0.5 |
2017 | 2.2 |
2018 | 0.3 |
Source: Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html
Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf) with changes on Jul 21, 2015 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 1.5 to 2.1 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food 0.2 to 1.2 to 3.3 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.2 to 1.2 percent in 2015 and 1.2 to 2.2 percent in 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was minus 0.4 percent in Mar 2014 and 2.2 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm), significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:
“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.
The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.
Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”
The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”
Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:
- Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
- Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
- Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).
Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf) with changes on Feb 1, 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). On Jun 19, 2015, the Bank of Japan announced a “New Framework for Monetary Policy Meetings,” which provides for quarterly release of the forecasts of the economy and prices beginning in Jan 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/rel150619a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 0.7 to 0.7 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food of 0.0 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.0 to 0.2 percent in 2016 and 1.8 to 3.0 percent in 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was 0.1 percent in Mar 2016 and minus 0.3 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm). The CPI increased significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:
“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.
The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.
Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”
The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”
Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:
- Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
- Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
- Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).
- Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) with Negative Nominal Interest Rate. On January 29, 2016, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan introduced a new policy to attain the “price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf). The new framework consists of three dimensions: quantity, quality and interest rate. The interest rate dimension consists of rates paid to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank of Japan of three tiers zero, positive and minus 0.1 percent. The quantitative dimension consists of increasing the monetary base at the annual rate of 80 trillion yen. The qualitative dimension consists of purchases by the Bank of Japan of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITS).
- Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control. The Bank of Japan introduced a new approach, QQE with Yield Curve Control (“Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control”) at its policy meeting on Sep 21, 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160921a.pdf). The policy consists of two measures. First “yield curve control” consists of controlling the long-term and short-term interest rates. The bank will fix the interest rates of policy balances held by financial institutions at the BOJ at minus 0.1 percent and will purchase Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) in the amount required to maintain the yield of the 10-year JGB at around zero percent. Second, “the inflation-overshooting commitment” consists of increasing base money to maintain the CPI price stability target above 2 percent.
Table VB-BOJF, Bank of Japan, Forecasts of the Majority of Members of the Policy Board, % Year on Year
Fiscal Year | Real GDP | CPI All Items Less Fresh Food | Excluding Effects of Consumption Tax Hikes |
2013 | |||
Apr 2014 | +2.2 to +2.3 | +0.8 | |
Jan 2014 | +2.5 to +2.9 [+2.7] | +0.7 to +0.9 [+0.7] | |
Oct 2013 | +2.6 to +3.0 [+2.7] | +0.6 to +1.0 [+0.7] | |
Jul 2013 | +2.5 to +3.0 [+2.8] | +0.5 to +0.8 [+0.6] | |
2014 | |||
Apr 2015 | -1.0 to -0.8 [-0.9] | +2.8 | +0.8 |
Jan 2015 | -0.6 to -0.4 [-0.5] | +2.9 to +3.2 [+2.9] | +0.9 to +1.2 [+0.9] |
Oct 2014 | +0.2 to +0.7 [+0.5] | +3.1 to +3.4 [+3.2] | +1.1 to +1.4 [+1.2] |
Jul 2014 | +0.6 to +1.3 [+1.0] | +3.2 to +3.5 [+3.3] | +1.2 to +1.5 [+1.3] |
Apr 2014 | +0.8 to +1.3 | +3.0 to +3.5 | +1.0 to +1.5 |
Jan 2014 | +0.9 to 1.5 [+1.4] | +2.9 to +3.6 [+3.3] | +0.9 to +1.6 [+1.3] |
Oct 2013 | +0.9 to +1.5 [+1.5] | +2.8 to +3.6 [+3.3] | +0.8 to +1.6 [+1.3] |
Jul 2013 | +0.8 to +1.5 [+1.3] | +2.7 to +3.6 [+3.3] | +0.7 to +1.6 [+1.3] |
2015 | |||
Feb 2016 | +0.7 to +0.7 [+0.7] | 0.0 | |
Jan 2016 | +1.0 to +1.3 [+1.1] | 0.0 to 0.2 [+0.1] | |
Oct 2015 | +0.8 to +1.4 [+1.2] | 0.0 to +0.4 [+0.1 | |
Jul 2015 | +1.5 to +1.9 [+1.7] | +0.3 to +1.0 [+0.7] | |
Apr 2015 | +1.5 to +2.1 [+2.0] | +0.2 to 1.2 [+0.8] | +0.2 to 1.2 [+0.8] |
Jan 2015 | +1.8 to +2.3 [+2.1] | +0.4 to +1.3 [+1.0] | +0.4 to +1.3 [+1.0] |
Oct 2014 | +1.2 to +1.7 [+1.5] | +1.8 to 2.6 [+2.4] | +1.1 to +1.9 [+1.7] |
Jul 2014 | +1.2 to +1.6 [+1.5] | +1.9 to +2.8 [+2.6] | +1.2 to +2.1 [+1.9] |
Apr 2014 | +1.2 to +1.5 | +1.9 to +2.8 | +1.2 to +2.1 |
Jan 2014 | +1.2 to +1.8 [+1.5] | +1.7 to +2.9 [+2.6] | +1.0 to +2.2 [+1.9] |
Oct 2013 | +1.3 to +1.8 [+1.5] | +1.6 to +2.9 [+2.6] | +0.9 to +2.2 [+1.9] |
Jul 2013 | +1.3 to +1.9 [+1.5] | +1.6 to +2.9 [+2.6] | +0.9 to +2.2 [+1.9] |
2016 | |||
Apr 2017 | +1.4 to +1.4 [+1.4] | -0.3 | |
Feb 2017 | +1.2 to +1.5 [+1.4] | -0.2 to -0.1 [-0.2] | |
Jul 2016 | +0.8 to +1.0 [+1.0] | 0.0 to +0.3 [0.5] | 0.0 to +0.3 [0.5] |
Apr 2016 | +0.8 to +1.4 [+1.2] | 0.0 to +0.8 [+0.5] | 0.0 to +0.8 [+0.5] |
Jan 2016 | +1.0 to +1.7 [+1.5] | 0.2 to +1.2 [+0.8] | |
Oct 2015 | +1.2 to +1.6 [+1.4] | +0.8 to +1.5 [+1.4] | |
Jul 2015 | +1.5 to 1.7 [+1.5] | +1.2 to +2.1 [+1.9] | |
Apr 2015 | +1.4 to +1.8 [+1.5] | +1.2 to +2.2 [+2.0] | +1.2 to +2.2 [+2.0] |
Jan 2015 | +1.5 to +1.7 [+1.6] | +1.5 to +2.3 [+2.2] | +1.5 to +2.3 [+2.2] |
Oct 2014 | +1.0 to +1.4 [+1.2] | +1.9 to 3.0 [+2.8] | +1.2 to 2.3 [+2.1] |
Jul 2014 | +1.0 to +1.5 [+1.3] | +2.0 to +3.0 [+2.8] | +1.3 to +2.3 [+2.1] |
Apr 2014 | +1.0 to +1.5 | +2.0 to +3.0 | +1.3 to +2.3 |
2017 | |||
Apr 2017 | +1.4 to +1.6 [+1.6] | +0.6 to +1.6 [+1.4] | |
Feb 2017 | +1.3 to +1.6 [+1.5] | +0.8 to +1.6 [+1.5] | |
Jul 2016 | 1.0 to +1.5 | +0.8 to +1.8 | +0.8 to +1.8 |
Apr 2016 | 0.0 to + +0.3 [+0.1] | 1.8 to +3.0 [+2.7] | 0.8 to +2.0 [+1.7 |
Jan 2016 | +0.1 to + 0.5 [+0.3] | +2.0 to +3.1 [+2.8] | + 1.0 to +2.1 [+1.8] |
Oct 2015 | +0.1 to +0.5 [+0.3] | +2.5 to +3.4 [+3.1] | +1.2 to 2.1 [+1.8] |
Jul 2015 | +0.1 to +0.5 [+0.2] | +2.7 to +3.4 [+3.1] | +1.4 to +2.1 [+1.8] |
Apr 2015 | +0.1 to +0.5 [+0.2] | +2.7 to +3.4 [+3.2] | +1.4 to +2.1 [+1.9] |
2018 | |||
Apr 2017 | +1.1 to +1.3 [+1.3] | +0.8 to +1.9 [+1.7] | |
Feb 2017 | +1.0 to +1.2 [+1.1] | +0.9 to +1.9 [+1.7] | |
Jul 2016 | +0.8 to +1.0 | +1.0 to +2.0 | +1.0 to +2.0 |
Apr 2016 | +0.6 to +1.2 [+1.0] | +1.0 to +2.1 [+1.9] | +1.0 to +2.1 [+1.9] |
2019 | |||
Apr 2017 | +0.6 to +0.7 [+0.7] | +1.4 to +2.5 [+2.4] | +0.9 to +2.0 [+1.9] |
Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members
Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan
Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members
Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140715a.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1510b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1601b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1607b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1704b.pdf
The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Composite Output Index did not change from 49.8 in Nov to 49.8 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/3a0fc101070843889329ca6eb9887de8). The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Services Business Activity Index increased from 50.3 in Nov to 50.6 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/3a0fc101070843889329ca6eb9887de8). The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Manufacturing PMI Index™ with the Flash Japan
Manufacturing PMI™ decreased from 48.9 in Nov to 48.8 in Dec
(https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/3a0fc101070843889329ca6eb9887de8). Joe Hayes, Economist at HIS
Markit, finds risk of contraction in the final quarter of 2019. (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/3a0fc101070843889329ca6eb9887de8).The Jibun Bank Composite Output PMI Index increased from 49.1 in Oct to 49.8 in Nov, indicating weak business activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1c8f41c3ee794064a87168b1b0932657). The Jibun Bank Business Activity Index of Services increased to 50.3 in Nov from 49.7 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1c8f41c3ee794064a87168b1b0932657). Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS Markit, finds weaker conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1c8f41c3ee794064a87168b1b0932657). The Jibun Bank Japan Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™), seasonally adjusted, increased from 48.4 in Oct to 48.9 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5c26cd29bd4a4ac59addaf21ac784aa8). New orders decreased while new foreign orders decreased. Joe Hayes, Associate Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5c26cd29bd4a4ac59addaf21ac784aa8). Table JPY provides the country data table for Japan.
Table JPY, Japan, Economic Indicators
Historical GDP and CPI | 1981-2010 Real GDP Growth and CPI Inflation 1981-2010 |
Corporate Goods Prices | Nov ∆% 0.2 |
Consumer Price Index | Nov NSA ∆% 0.1; Nov 12 months NSA ∆% 0.5 |
Real GDP Growth | IIIQQ2019 ∆%: 0.4 on IIQ2019; IIIQ2019 SAAR 1.8; |
Employment Report | Nov Unemployed 1.51 million Change in unemployed since last year: -17 thousand |
All Industry Indices | Sep month SA ∆% 1.5 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15 |
Industrial Production | Nov SA month ∆%: -0.9 Earlier Data: |
Machine Orders | Total Oct ∆% 5.2 Private ∆%: 1.8 Excluding Volatile Orders minus -6.0 Earlier Data: |
Tertiary Index | Sep month SA ∆% 1.8 Earlier Data: |
Wholesale and Retail Sales | Nov 12 months: Earlier Data: |
Family Income and Expenditure Survey | Oct 12-month ∆% total nominal consumption -4.8, real -5.1 Earlier Data: Blog 3/29/15 |
Trade Balance | Exports Nov 12 months ∆%: -7.9 Imports Nov 12 months ∆% -15.7 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15 |
Links to blog comments in Table JPY: 12/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html
12/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html
12/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html
12/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
11/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html
11/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
8/25/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
6/16/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html
11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html
9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
6/17/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html
5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html
3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html
2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html
12/17/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html
9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html
3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html
12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html
9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html
8/21/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html
6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html
5/22/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html
3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html
12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html
11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html
9/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html
08/23/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html
6/14/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html
5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html
4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html
3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html
2/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html
12/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html
11/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.htm
9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html
8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html
6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html
5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html
2/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html
12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html
11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html
9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html
VC China. China estimates an index of nonmanufacturing purchasing managers based on a sample of 1200 nonmanufacturing enterprises across the country (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Table CIPMNM provides this index and components. The total index increased from 55.7 in Jan 2011 to 58.0 in Mar 2012, decreasing to 53.9 in Aug 2013. The index decreased from 56.0 in Nov 2013 to 54.6 in Dec 2013, easing to 53.4 in Jan 2014. The index moved to 53.5 Dec 2019. The index of new orders increased from 52.2 in Jan 2012 to 54.3 in Dec 2012 but fell to 50.1 in May 2013, barely above the neutral frontier of 50.0. The index of new orders stabilized at 51.0 in Nov-Dec 2013, easing to 50.9 in Jan 2014. The index of new orders moved to 50.4 in Dec 2019.
Table CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted
Total Index | New Orders | Interm. | Subs Prices | Exp | |
Dec 2019 | 53.5 | 50.4 | 52.4 | 50.3 | 59.1 |
Nov | 54.4 | 51.3 | 53.2 | 51.3 | 61.0 |
Oct | 52.8 | 49.4 | 51.3 | 48.9 | 60.7 |
Sep | 53.7 | 50.5 | 52.8 | 50.0 | 59.7 |
Aug | 53.8 | 50.1 | 50.8 | 49.1 | 60.4 |
Jul | 53.7 | 50.4 | 52.9 | 50.6 | 59.8 |
Jun | 54.2 | 51.5 | 51.5 | 49.7 | 60.6 |
May | 54.3 | 50.3 | 52.2 | 49.9 | 60.2 |
Apr | 54.3 | 50.8 | 53.0 | 50.5 | 60.3 |
Mar | 54.8 | 52.5 | 52.5 | 51.0 | 61.1 |
Feb | 54.3 | 50.7 | 52.7 | 50.1 | 61.5 |
Jan | 54.7 | 51.0 | 52.0 | 49.8 | 59.6 |
Dec 2018 | 53.8 | 50.4 | 50.1 | 47.6 | 60.8 |
Nov | 53.4 | 50.1 | 50.8 | 49.4 | 60.9 |
Oct | 53.9 | 50.1 | 54.9 | 51.2 | 60.6 |
Sep | 54.9 | 51.0 | 55.6 | 51.5 | 60.1 |
Aug | 54.2 | 50.6 | 54.3 | 50.9 | 61.4 |
Jul | 54.0 | 51.0 | 53.9 | 52.0 | 60.2 |
Jun | 55.0 | 50.6 | 53.5 | 51.1 | 60.8 |
May | 54.9 | 51.0 | 54.2 | 50.6 | 61.0 |
Apr | 54.8 | 51.1 | 52.7 | 50.6 | 61.5 |
Mar | 54.6 | 50.1 | 49.9 | 49.3 | 61.1 |
Feb | 54.4 | 50.5 | 53.2 | 49.9 | 61.2 |
Jan | 55.3 | 51.9 | 53.9 | 52.6 | 61.7 |
Dec 2017 | 55.0 | 52.0 | 54.8 | 52.6 | 60.9 |
Nov | 54.8 | 51.8 | 56.2 | 52.8 | 61.6 |
Oct | 54.3 | 51.1 | 54.3 | 51.6 | 60.6 |
Sep | 55.4 | 52.3 | 56.1 | 51.7 | 61.7 |
Aug | 53.4 | 50.9 | 54.4 | 51.5 | 61.0 |
Jul | 54.5 | 51.1 | 53.1 | 50.9 | 61.1 |
Jun | 54.9 | 51.4 | 51.2 | 49.3 | 61.1 |
May | 54.5 | 50.9 | 51.1 | 48.8 | 60.2 |
Apr | 54.0 | 50.5 | 51.7 | 50.2 | 59.7 |
Mar | 55.1 | 51.9 | 52.3 | 49.7 | 61.3 |
Feb | 54.2 | 51.2 | 53.7 | 51.4 | 62.4 |
Jan | 54.6 | 51.3 | 55.1 | 51.0 | 58.9 |
Dec 2016 | 54.5 | 52.1 | 56.2 | 51.9 | 59.5 |
Nov | 54.7 | 51.8 | 53.5 | 51.4 | 60.7 |
Oct | 54.0 | 50.9 | 53.7 | 51.5 | 60.6 |
Sep | 53.7 | 51.4 | 51.7 | 50.1 | 61.1 |
Aug | 53.5 | 49.8 | 52.6 | 50.4 | 59.4 |
Jul | 53.9 | 49.9 | 51.4 | 49.5 | 59.5 |
Jun | 53.7 | 50.8 | 51.6 | 50.6 | 58.6 |
May | 53.1 | 49.2 | 51.6 | 49.8 | 57.8 |
Apr | 53.5 | 48.7 | 52.1 | 49.1 | 59.1 |
Mar | 53.8 | 50.8 | 51.4 | 49.5 | 59.0 |
Feb | 52.7 | 48.7 | 50.5 | 48.3 | 59.5 |
Jan | 53.5 | 49.6 | 49.9 | 47.7 | 58.4 |
Dec2015 | 54.4 | 51.7 | 49.0 | 48.2 | 58.3 |
Nov | 53.6 | 50.2 | 49.3 | 47.7 | 60.0 |
Oct | 53.1 | 51.2 | 51.2 | 48.8 | 61.1 |
Sep | 53.4 | 50.2 | 50.8 | 47.9 | 60.0 |
Aug | 53.4 | 49.6 | 49.6 | 47.8 | 59.7 |
Jul | 53.9 | 50.1 | 48.9 | 47.4 | 60.0 |
Jun | 53.8 | 51.3 | 50.6 | 48.7 | 59.7 |
May | 53.2 | 49.5 | 52.8 | 50.4 | 60.1 |
Apr | 53.4 | 49.1 | 50.8 | 48.9 | 60.0 |
Mar | 53.7 | 50.3 | 50.0 | 48.4 | 58.8 |
Feb | 53.9 | 51.2 | 52.5 | 51.2 | 58.7 |
Jan | 53.7 | 50.2 | 47.6 | 46.9 | 59.6 |
Dec 2014 | 54.1 | 50.5 | 50.1 | 47.3 | 59.5 |
Nov | 53.9 | 50.1 | 50.6 | 47.7 | 59.7 |
Oct | 53.8 | 51.0 | 52.0 | 48.8 | 59.9 |
Sep | 54.0 | 49.5 | 49.8 | 47.3 | 60.9 |
Aug | 54.4 | 50.0 | 52.2 | 48.3 | 61.2 |
Jul | 54.2 | 50.7 | 53.4 | 49.5 | 61.5 |
Jun | 55.0 | 50.7 | 56.0 | 50.8 | 60.4 |
May | 55.5 | 52.7 | 54.5 | 49.0 | 60.7 |
Apr | 54.8 | 50.8 | 52.4 | 49.4 | 61.5 |
Mar | 54.5 | 50.8 | 52.8 | 49.5 | 61.5 |
Feb | 55.0 | 51.4 | 52.1 | 49.0 | 59.9 |
Jan | 53.4 | 50.9 | 54.5 | 50.1 | 58.1 |
Dec 2013 | 54.6 | 51.0 | 56.9 | 52.0 | 58.7 |
Nov | 56.0 | 51.0 | 54.8 | 49.5 | 61.3 |
Oct | 56.3 | 51.6 | 56.1 | 51.4 | 60.5 |
Sep | 55.4 | 53.4 | 56.7 | 50.6 | 60.1 |
Aug | 53.9 | 50.9 | 57.1 | 51.2 | 62.9 |
Jul | 54.1 | 50.3 | 58.2 | 52.4 | 63.9 |
Jun | 53.9 | 50.3 | 55.0 | 50.6 | 61.8 |
May | 54.3 | 50.1 | 54.4 | 50.7 | 62.9 |
Apr | 54.5 | 50.9 | 51.1 | 47.6 | 62.5 |
Mar | 55.6 | 52.0 | 55.3 | 50.0 | 62.4 |
Feb | 54.5 | 51.8 | 56.2 | 51.1 | 62.7 |
Jan | 56.2 | 53.7 | 58.2 | 50.9 | 61.4 |
Dec 2012 | 56.1 | 54.3 | 53.8 | 50.0 | 64.6 |
Nov | 55.6 | 53.2 | 52.5 | 48.4 | 64.6 |
Oct | 55.5 | 51.6 | 58.1 | 50.5 | 63.4 |
Sep | 53.7 | 51.8 | 57.5 | 51.3 | 60.9 |
Aug | 56.3 | 52.7 | 57.6 | 51.2 | 63.2 |
Jul | 55.6 | 53.2 | 49.7 | 48.7 | 63.9 |
Jun | 56.7 | 53.7 | 52.1 | 48.6 | 65.5 |
May | 55.2 | 52.5 | 53.6 | 48.5 | 65.4 |
Apr | 56.1 | 52.7 | 57.9 | 50.3 | 66.1 |
Mar | 58.0 | 53.5 | 60.2 | 52.0 | 66.6 |
Feb | 57.3 | 52.7 | 59.0 | 51.2 | 63.8 |
Jan | 55.7 | 52.2 | 58.2 | 51.1 | 65.3 |
Notes: Interm.: Intermediate; Subs: Subscription; Exp: Business Expectations
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
Chart CIPMNM provides China’s nonmanufacturing purchasing managers’ index. The index fell from 56.0 in Oct 2013 to 53.5 in Dec 2019.
Chart CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Table CIPMMFG provides the index of purchasing managers of manufacturing seasonally adjusted of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The general index (IPM) rose from 50.5 in Jan 2012 to 53.3 in Apr 2012, falling to 49.2 in Aug 2012, rebounding to 50.6 in Dec 2012. The index fell to 50.3 in Jul 2013, barely above the neutral frontier at 50.0, recovering to 51.4 in Nov 2013 but falling to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.5 in Jan 2014, 50.1 in Dec 2014 and 50.2 in Dec 2019. The index of new orders fell from 54.5 in Apr 2012 to 51.2 in Dec 2012. The index of new orders fell from 52.3 in Nov 2013 to 52.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.9 in Jan 2014 and moved to 50.4 in Dec 2014. The index moved to 51.2 in Dec 2019.
Table CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted
IPM | PI | NOI | INV | EMP | SDEL | |
2019 | ||||||
Dec | 50.2 | 53.2 | 51.2 | 47.2 | 47.3 | 51.1 |
Nov | 50.2 | 52.6 | 51.3 | 47.8 | 47.3 | 50.5 |
Oct | 49.3 | 50.8 | 49.6 | 47.4 | 47.3 | 50.1 |
Sep | 49.8 | 52.3 | 50.5 | 47.6 | 47.0 | 50.5 |
Aug | 49.5 | 51.9 | 49.7 | 47.5 | 46.9 | 50.3 |
Jul | 49.7 | 52.1 | 49.8 | 48.0 | 47.1 | 50.1 |
Jun | 49.4 | 51.3 | 49.6 | 48.2 | 46.9 | 50.2 |
May | 49.4 | 51.7 | 49.8 | 47.4 | 47.0 | 50.9 |
Apr | 50.1 | 52.1 | 51.4 | 47.2 | 47.2 | 49.9 |
Mar | 50.5 | 52.7 | 51.6 | 48.4 | 47.6 | 50.2 |
Feb | 49.2 | 49.5 | 50.6 | 46.3 | 47.5 | 49.8 |
Jan | 49.5 | 50.9 | 49.6 | 48.1 | 47.8 | 50.1 |
2018 | ||||||
Dec | 49.4 | 50.8 | 49.7 | 47.1 | 48.0 | 50.4 |
Nov | 50.0 | 51.9 | 50.4 | 47.4 | 48.3 | 50.3 |
Oct | 50.2 | 52.0 | 50.8 | 47.2 | 48.1 | 49.5 |
Sep | 50.8 | 53.0 | 52.0 | 47.8 | 48.3 | 49.7 |
Aug | 51.3 | 53.3 | 52.2 | 48.7 | 49.4 | 49.6 |
Jul | 51.2 | 53.0 | 52.3 | 48.9 | 49.2 | 50.0 |
Jun | 51.5 | 53.6 | 53.2 | 48.8 | 49.0 | 50.2 |
May | 51.9 | 54.1 | 53.8 | 49.6 | 49.1 | 50.1 |
Apr | 51.4 | 53.1 | 52.9 | 49.5 | 49.0 | 50.2 |
Mar | 51.5 | 53.1 | 53.3 | 49.6 | 49.1 | 50.1 |
Feb | 50.3 | 50.7 | 51.0 | 49.3 | 48.1 | 48.4 |
Jan | 51.3 | 53.5 | 52.6 | 48.8 | 48.3 | 49.2 |
2017 | ||||||
Dec | 51.6 | 54.0 | 53.4 | 48.0 | 48.5 | 49.3 |
Nov | 51.8 | 54.3 | 53.6 | 48.4 | 48.8 | 49.5 |
Oct | 51.6 | 53.4 | 52.9 | 48.6 | 49.0 | 48.7 |
Sep | 52.4 | 54.7 | 54.8 | 48.9 | 49.0 | 49.3 |
Aug | 51.7 | 54.1 | 53.1 | 48.3 | 49.1 | 49.3 |
Jul | 51.4 | 53.5 | 52.8 | 48.5 | 49.2 | 50.1 |
Jun | 51.7 | 54.4 | 53.1 | 48.6 | 49.0 | 49.9 |
May | 51.2 | 53.4 | 52.3 | 48.5 | 49.4 | 50.2 |
Apr | 51.2 | 53.8 | 52.3 | 48.3 | 49.2 | 50.5 |
Mar | 51.8 | 54.2 | 53.3 | 48.3 | 50.0 | 50.3 |
Feb | 51.6 | 53.7 | 53.0 | 48.6 | 49.7 | 50.5 |
Jan | 51.3 | 53.1 | 52.8 | 48.0 | 49.2 | 49.8 |
2016 | ||||||
Dec | 51.4 | 53.3 | 53.2 | 48.0 | 48.9 | 50.0 |
Nov | 51.7 | 53.9 | 53.2 | 48.4 | 49.2 | 49.7 |
Oct | 51.2 | 53.3 | 52.8 | 48.1 | 48.8 | 50.2 |
Sep | 50.4 | 52.8 | 50.9 | 47.4 | 48.6 | 49.9 |
Aug | 50.4 | 52.6 | 51.3 | 47.6 | 48.4 | 50.6 |
Jul | 49.9 | 52.1 | 50.4 | 47.3 | 48.2 | 50.5 |
Jun | 50.0 | 52.5 | 50.5 | 47.0 | 47.9 | 50.7 |
May | 50.1 | 52.3 | 50.7 | 47.6 | 48.2 | 50.4 |
Apr | 50.1 | 52.2 | 51.0 | 47.4 | 47.8 | 50.1 |
Mar | 50.2 | 52.3 | 51.4 | 48.2 | 48.1 | 51.3 |
Feb | 49.0 | 50.2 | 48.6 | 48.0 | 47.6 | 49.8 |
Jan | 49.4 | 51.4 | 49.5 | 46.8 | 47.8 | 50.5 |
2015 | ||||||
Dec | 49.7 | 52.2 | 50.2 | 47.6 | 47.4 | 50.7 |
Nov | 49.6 | 51.9 | 49.8 | 47.1 | 47.6 | 50.6 |
Oct | 49.8 | 52.2 | 50.3 | 47.2 | 47.8 | 50.6 |
Sep | 49.8 | 52.3 | 50.2 | 47.5 | 47.9 | 50.8 |
Aug | 49.7 | 51.7 | 49.7 | 48.3 | 47.9 | 50.6 |
Jul | 50.0 | 52.4 | 49.9 | 48.4 | 48.0 | 50.4 |
Jun | 50.2 | 52.9 | 50.1 | 48.7 | 48.1 | 50.3 |
May | 50.2 | 52.9 | 50.6 | 48.2 | 48.2 | 50.9 |
Apr | 50.1 | 52.6 | 50.2 | 48.2 | 48.0 | 50.4 |
Mar | 50.1 | 52.1 | 50.2 | 48.0 | 48.4 | 50.1 |
Feb | 49.9 | 51.4 | 50.4 | 48.2 | 47.8 | 49.9 |
Jan | 49.8 | 51.7 | 50.2 | 47.3 | 47.9 | 50.2 |
2014 | ||||||
Dec | 50.1 | 52.2 | 50.4 | 47.5 | 48.1 | 49.9 |
Nov | 50.3 | 52.5 | 50.9 | 47.7 | 48.2 | 50.3 |
Oct | 50.8 | 53.1 | 51.6 | 48.4 | 48.4 | 50.1 |
Sep | 51.1 | 53.6 | 52.2 | 48.8 | 48.2 | 50.1 |
Aug | 51.1 | 53.2 | 52.5 | 48.6 | 48.2 | 50.0 |
Jul | 51.7 | 54.2 | 53.6 | 49.0 | 48.3 | 50.2 |
Jun | 51.0 | 53.0 | 52.8 | 48.0 | 48.6 | 50.5 |
May | 50.8 | 52.8 | 52.3 | 48.0 | 48.2 | 50.3 |
Apr | 50.4 | 52.5 | 51.2 | 48.1 | 48.3 | 50.1 |
Mar | 50.3 | 52.7 | 50.6 | 47.8 | 48.3 | 49.8 |
Feb | 50.2 | 52.6 | 50.5 | 47.4 | 48.0 | 49.9 |
Jan | 50.5 | 53.0 | 50.9 | 47.8 | 48.2 | 49.8 |
Dec 2013 | 51.0 | 53.9 | 52.0 | 47.6 | 48.7 | 50.5 |
Nov | 51.4 | 54.5 | 52.3 | 47.8 | 49.6 | 50.6 |
Oct | 51.4 | 54.4 | 52.5 | 48.6 | 49.2 | 50.8 |
Sep | 51.1 | 52.9 | 52.8 | 48.5 | 49.1 | 50.8 |
Aug | 51.0 | 52.6 | 52.4 | 48.0 | 49.3 | 50.4 |
Jul | 50.3 | 52.4 | 50.6 | 47.6 | 49.1 | 50.1 |
Jun | 50.1 | 52.0 | 50.4 | 47.4 | 48.7 | 50.3 |
May | 50.8 | 53.3 | 51.8 | 47.6 | 48.8 | 50.8 |
Apr | 50.6 | 52.6 | 51.7 | 47.5 | 49.0 | 50.8 |
Mar | 50.9 | 52.7 | 52.3 | 47.5 | 49.8 | 51.1 |
Feb | 50.1 | 51.2 | 50.1 | 49.5 | 47.6 | 48.3 |
Jan | 50.4 | 51.3 | 51.6 | 50.1 | 47.8 | 50.0 |
Dec 2012 | 50.6 | 52.0 | 51.2 | 47.3 | 49.0 | 48.8 |
Nov | 50.6 | 52.5 | 51.2 | 47.9 | 48.7 | 49.9 |
Oct | 50.2 | 52.1 | 50.4 | 47.3 | 49.2 | 50.1 |
Sep | 49.8 | 51.3 | 49.8 | 47.0 | 48.9 | 49.5 |
Aug | 49.2 | 50.9 | 48.7 | 45.1 | 49.1 | 50.0 |
Jul | 50.1 | 51.8 | 49.0 | 48.5 | 49.5 | 49.0 |
Jun | 50.2 | 52.0 | 49.2 | 48.2 | 49.7 | 49.1 |
May | 50.4 | 52.9 | 49.8 | 45.1 | 50.5 | 49.0 |
Apr | 53.3 | 57.2 | 54.5 | 48.5 | 51.0 | 49.6 |
Mar | 53.1 | 55.2 | 55.1 | 49.5 | 51.0 | 48.9 |
Feb | 51.0 | 53.8 | 51.0 | 48.8 | 49.5 | 50.3 |
Jan | 50.5 | 53.6 | 50.4 | 49.7 | 47.1 | 49.7 |
IPM: Index of Purchasing Managers; PI: Production Index; NOI: New Orders Index; EMP: Employed Person Index; SDEL: Supplier Delivery Time Index
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
China estimates the manufacturing index of purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 820 enterprises (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Chart CIPMMFG provides the manufacturing index of purchasing managers. The index fell to 50.1 in Jun 2013. The index decreased from 51.4 in Nov 2013 to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index moved to 50.2 in Dec 2019.
Chart CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Chart CIPCOMP provides China’s composite, manufacturing and nonmanufacturing, index. The index remains above the neutral 50.0, moving to 53.4 in Dec 2019.
Chart CIPCOMP, China, Composite Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Growth of China’s GDP in IIIQ2019 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.0 percent and cumulative growth to IIIQ2019 was 6.3 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 39.8 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2019. Tertiary industry accounts for 54.0 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2019 and primary industry for 6.2 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. The bottom block of Table VC-GDP provides quarter-on-quarter growth rates of GDP and their annual equivalent. China’s GDP growth decelerated significantly from annual equivalent 10.0 percent in IQ2011 to 6.1 percent in IVQ2011 and 7.8 percent in IQ2012, rebounding to 8.7 percent in IIQ2012, 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012 and 8.2 percent in IVQ2012. Annual equivalent growth in IQ2013 eased to 7.8 percent and to 7.4 percent in IIQ2013, rebounding to 8.7 percent in IIIQ2013. Annual equivalent growth was 6.6 percent in IVQ2013, stabilizing to 7.4 percent in IQ2014 and to 7.4 percent in IIQ2014. Annual equivalent growth stabilized at 7.4 percent in IIIQ2014 and 7.0 percent in IVQ2014. Growth moved to annual equivalent 7.4 percent in IQ2015, 7.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2015. Growth slowed to 6.1 percent in annual equivalent in IVQ2015 and 5.7 percent in IQ2016. Growth increased to annual equivalent 7.8 percent in IIQ2016 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2016, decreasing to 6.6 percent in IVQ2016. Growth decelerated to annual equivalent 6.1 percent in IQ2017, accelerating to 7.4 percent in IIQ2017 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2017. Growth decelerated to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2017. Growth decelerated to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IQ2018, accelerating to 7.0 percent in IIQ2018. Growth decelerated to annual equivalent 6.6 percent in IIIQ2018, decelerating to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2018. Growth decelerated to 5.7 percent annual equivalent in IQ2019 and 6.6 percent in IIQ2019. Growth eased to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IIIQ2019.
Table VC-GDP China, Quarterly Growth of GDP, Current CNY 100 Million and Inflation Adjusted ∆%
Cumulative GDP IQ2019 | Value Current CNY Billion IIIQ2019 | Value Current CNY Billion IQ2019 to IIIQ2019 | IIIQ2019 Year-on-Year Constant Prices ∆% | Cumulative to IIIQ2019 ∆% |
GDP | 24,686.5 | 69,779.8 | 6.0 | 6.2 |
Primary Industry | 1,979.8 | 4,300.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 |
Secondary Industry | 9,788.5 | 27,786.9 | 5.2 | 5.6 |
Tertiary Industry | 12,918.2 | 37,692.5 | 7.2 | 7.0 |
Growth in Quarter Relative to Prior Quarter | ∆% on Prior Quarter | ∆% Annual Equivalent | ∆% Year-on-Year | |
2019 | ||||
IIIQ2019 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.0 | |
IIQ2019 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 6.2 | |
IQ2019 | 1.4 | 5.7 | 6.4 | |
2018 | ||||
IVQ2018 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.4 | |
IIIQ2018 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 6.5 | |
IIQ2018 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | |
IQ2018 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.8 | |
2017 | ||||
IVQ2017 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.7 | |
IIIQ2017 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | |
IIQ2017 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 6.8 | |
IQ2017 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.8 | |
2016 | ||||
IVQ2016 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 6.8 | |
IIIQ2016 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | |
IIQ2016 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 6.7 | |
IQ2016 | 1.4 | 5.7 | 6.7 | |
2015 | ||||
IVQ2015 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.8 | |
IIIQ2015 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 6.9 | |
IIQ2015 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.0 | |
IQ2015 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.0 | |
2014 | ||||
IVQ2014 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 7.2 | |
IIIQ2014 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.1 | |
IIQ2014 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.5 | |
IQ2014 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.4 | |
2013 | ||||
IVQ2013 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 7.7 | |
IIIQ2013 | 2.1 | 8.7 | 7.9 | |
IIQ2013 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.6 | |
IQ2013 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 7.9 | |
2012 | ||||
IVQ2012 | 2.0 | 8.2 | 8.1 | |
IIIQ2012 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.5 | |
IIQ2012 | 2.1 | 8.7 | 7.6 | |
IQ2012 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 8.1 | |
2011 | ||||
IVQ2011 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 8.8 | |
IIIQ2011 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 9.4 | |
IIQ2011 | 2.4 | 10.0 | 10.0 | |
IQ2011 | 2.4 | 10.0 | 10.2 |
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
Growth of China’s GDP in IIIQ2019 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.0 percent and cumulative growth to IIIQ2019 was 6.3 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 39.8 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2019. Tertiary industry accounts for 54.0 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2019 and primary industry for 6.2 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. Table VC-GDPA shows that growth decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 and 11.2 percent in IIQ2010 to 7.9 percent in IQ2013, 7.6 percent in IIQ2013 and 7.9 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP grew 7.7 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 1.6 percent relative to IIIQ2013, which is equivalent to 6.6 percent per year. GDP grew 7.4 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent in IQ2014 that is equivalent to 7.4 percent per year. GDP grew 7.5 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is annual equivalent 7.4 percent. In IIIQ2014, GDP grew 7.1 percent relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is 7.4 percent in annual equivalent. GDP grew 1.7 percent in IVQ2014, which is 7.0 percent in annual equivalent and 7.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2015, GDP grew 1.8 percent, which is equivalent to 7.4 in a year and 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent in a year, and grew 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year, and grew 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IVQ2015, which is equivalent to 6.1 percent in a year and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, GDP grew at 1.4 percent, which is equivalent to 5.7 percent in a year, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.9 percent in IIQ2016, which is annual equivalent to 7.8 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, GDP grew at 1.6 percent, equivalent to 6.6 percent in a year, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 6.8 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased at 1.5 percent, which is 6.1 percent in annual equivalent. In IIQ2017, GDP grew at 1.8 percent, which is annual equivalent at 7.4 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017, which is annual equivalent at 7.0 percent, and increased at 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, GDP grew 1.5 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is annual equivalent to 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.6 percent in IIIQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, GDP grew at 1.5 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.4 percent in IQ2019, which is annual equivalent to 5.7 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2019, GDP grew at 1.6 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.6 percent and increased 6.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IIIQ2019, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.0 percent relative to a year earlier.
Table VC-GDPA China, Growth Rate of GDP, ∆% Relative to a Year Earlier and ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter
IQ2019 | IIQ2019 | IIIQ2019 | IVQ2019 | |
GDP | 6.4 | 6.2 | 6.0 | |
Primary Industry | 2.7 | 3.3 | 2.7 | |
Secondary Industry | 6.1 | 5.6 | 5.2 | |
Tertiary Industry | 7.0 | 7.0 | 7.2 | |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.4 (5.7) | 1.6 (6.6) | 1.5 (6.1) | |
IQ2018 | IIQ2018 | IIIQ2018 | IVQ2018 | |
GDP | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 6.4 |
Primary Industry | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
Secondary Industry | 6.3 | 6.0 | 5.3 | 5.8 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.5 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 7.4 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.5 (6.1) | 1.7 (7.0) | 1.6 (6.6) | 1.5 (6.1) |
IQ2017 | IIQ2017 | IIIQ2017 | IVQ2017 | |
GDP | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 |
Primary Industry | 3.0 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.4 |
Secondary Industry | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.0 | 5.7 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.7 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 8.3 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.5 (6.1) | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.7 (7.0) | 1.5 (6.1) |
IQ2016 | IIQ2016 | IIIQ2016 | IVQ2016 | |
GDP | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.8 |
Primary Industry | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 2.9 |
Secondary Industry | 5.8 | 6.3 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 8.3 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.4 (5.7) | 1.9 (7.8) | 1.7 (7.0) | 1.6 (6.6) |
IQ2015 | IIQ2015 | IIIQ2015 | IVQ2015 | |
GDP | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 6.8 |
Primary Industry | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.1 |
Secondary Industry | 6.4 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.1 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.9 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 8.2 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.7 (7.0) | 1.5 (6.1) |
IQ2014 | IIQ2014 | IIIQ2014 | IVQ2014 | |
GDP | 7.4 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 7.2 |
Primary Industry | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.1 |
Secondary Industry | 7.3 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 7.3 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.1 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 8.1 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.7 (7.0) |
IQ2013 | IIQ2013 | IIIQ2013 | IVQ2013 | |
GDP | 7.9 | 7.6 | 7.9 | 7.7 |
Primary Industry | 3.4 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 |
Secondary Industry | 7.8 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 7.8 |
Tertiary Industry | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.9 (7.8) | 1.8 (7.4) | 2.1 (8.7) | 1.6 (6.6) |
IQ2012 | IIQ2012 | IIIQ2012 | IVQ2012 | |
GDP | 8.1 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 8.1 |
Primary Industry | 3.8 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.5 |
Secondary Industry | 9.1 | 8.3 | 8.1 | 8.1 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.5 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.1 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.9 (7.8) | 2.1 (8.7) | 1.8 (7.4) | 2.0 (8.2) |
IQ2011 | IIQ2011 | IIIQ2011 | IVQ2011 | |
GDP | 10.2 | 10.0 | 9.4 | 8.8 |
Primary Industry | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 4.5 |
Secondary Industry | 11.1 | 11.0 | 10.8 | 10.6 |
Tertiary Industry | 9.1 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 8.9 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 2.4 (10.0) | 2.4 (10.0) | 1.9 (7.8) | 1.5 (6.1) |
IQ2010 | IIQ2010 | IIIQ2010 | IVQ2010 | |
GDP | 12.1 | 11.2 | 10.7 | 12.1 |
Primary Industry | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 3.8 |
Secondary Industry | 14.5 | 13.3 | 12.6 | 14.5 |
Tertiary Industry | 10.5 | 9.9 | 9.7 | 10.5 |
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
Growth of China’s GDP in IVQ2016 relative to the same period in 2016 was 6.8 percent and
Chart VC-GDP of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides annual value and growth rates of GDP. China’s GDP growth in 2016 is still high at 6.7 percent but at the lowest rhythm in five years.
Chart VC-GDP, China, Gross Domestic Product, Million Yuan and ∆%
Source: National bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
Chart VC-FXR provides China’s foreign exchange reserves. FX reserves grew from $2399.2 billion in 2009 to $38430 billion in 2013 driven by high growth of China’s trade surplus, decreasing to $30105 billion in 2016.
Chart VC-FXR, China, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2012-2016
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Chart VC-Trade provides China’s imports and exports. Exports exceeded imports with resulting large trade balance surpluses that increased foreign exchange reserves.
Chart VC-Trade, China, Imports and Exports of Goods, 2012-2016, $100 Million US Dollars
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Chart VC-PCDI provides the level and growth rates of per capita disposable income in China.
Chart VC-PCDI, China, Level and Growth Rates of Per Capita Disposable Income
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
The Caixin Flash China General Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) compiled by Markit (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727) is mixed. The overall Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing PMI™ decreased from 47.3 in Aug to 47.0 in Sep, while the Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing Output Index decreased from 46.4 in Aug to 45.7 in Sep, indicating weaker conditions. He Fan, Chief Economist at Caixin Insight Group finds need of fiscal and monetary policy (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727). The Caixin China General Services PMI™, compiled by Markit, shows that the Caixin Composite Output, combining manufacturing and services, increased from 52.0 in Oct to 53.2 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6dc0f3f13acc4d589b0dc645c3c19d67). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds improving services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6dc0f3f13acc4d589b0dc645c3c19d67). The Caixin General Manufacturing PMI™ decreased to 51.5 in Dec from 51.8 in Nov, indicating improving conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e23eb5ee069c4ec997419b9e5b290f8f). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds moderate growth conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/e23eb5ee069c4ec997419b9e5b290f8f). Table CNY provides the country data table for China.
Table CNY, China, Economic Indicators
Price Indexes for Industry | Nov 12-month ∆%: -1.4 Nov month ∆%: -0.1 |
Consumer Price Index | Nov 12-month ∆%: 4.5 Nov month ∆%: 0.4 |
Value Added of Industry | Oct month ∆%: 0.78 Jan-Nov 2019/Jan-Nov 2018 ∆%: 5.6 Earlier Data |
GDP Growth Rate | Year-on-Year IIIQ2019 ∆%: 6.0 III Quarter 2019 ∆%: 1.5 |
Investment in Fixed Assets | Total Jan-Nov 2019 ∆%: 5.2 Real estate development: 10.2 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Nov month ∆%: 0.80 Earlier Data: |
Trade Balance | Nov 2019 Balance $38.73 billion Nov 2018 $41.86 billion Exports 12M ∆% -1.1 Imports 12M ∆% 0.3 Dec 2018 balance 57.06 billion Dec 2017 balance $53.85 billion 2018 Exports ∆% 9.9 2018 Imports ∆% 15.8 2017 Exports ∆% 7.9 2017 Imports ∆% 15.9 2016 Exports ∆% 11.3 2016 Imports ∆% 17.3 Cumulative Dec 2018: $351.76 Cumulative Dec 2017: $422.50 billion Cumulative Dec 2016: $486.0 Earlier Data: |
Links to blog comments in Table CNY: 12/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html
11/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
4/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/high-levels-of-valuations-of-risk.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
VD Euro Area. Using calendar and seasonally adjusted chain-linked volumes (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of the euro area (19 countries) fell 5.7 percent from IQ2008 to IIQ2009. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) increased 15.2 percent from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2019 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) is higher by 8.6 percent in IIIQ2019 relative to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008, growing at annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. The GDP of the euro area (18) countries increased at the average yearly rate of 2.3 percent from IQ1999 to IQ2008 while that of the euro area (19 countries) increased at 2.3 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) grew at 2.3 percent annual equivalent from IQ1999 to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008. The GDP of the euro area would grow under trend of 2.3 percent from €2,614,693.8 million in IQ2008 to €3,396,179.4 million in IIIQ2019. The estimate of GDP of €2,840,462.4 million in IIIQ2019 is 16.4 percent below trend. Table VD-EUR provides yearly growth rates of the combined GDP of the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro area since 1999. Growth was very strong at 3.2 percent in 2006 and 3.0 percent in 2007. The global recession had strong impact with growth of only 0.4 percent in 2008 and decline of 4.5 percent in 2009. Recovery was at lower growth rates of 2.1 percent in 2010 and 1.5 percent in 2011. EUROSTAT estimates growth of GDP of the euro area of minus 0.9 percent in 2012 and minus 0.3 percent in 2013. Euro Area GDP grew 1.2 percent in 2014 and grew 2.0 percent in 2015. The GDP of the euro area grew 1.7 percent in 2016.
Table VD-EUR, Euro Area, Yearly Percentage Change of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, Unemployment and GDP ∆%
Year | HICP ∆% | Unemployment | GDP ∆% |
1999 | 1.2 | 9.7 | 3.0 |
2000 | 2.2 | 8.9 | 3.8 |
2001 | 2.4 | 8.3 | 2.1 |
2002 | 2.3 | 8.6 | 1.0 |
2003 | 2.1 | 9.1 | 0.7 |
2004 | 2.2 | 9.3 | 2.3 |
2005 | 2.2 | 9.1 | 1.7 |
2006 | 2.2 | 8.4 | 3.2 |
2007 | 2.2 | 7.5 | 3.0 |
2008 | 3.3 | 7.6 | 0.4 |
2009 | 0.3 | 9.6 | -4.5 |
2010 | 1.6 | 10.2 | 2.1 |
2011 | 2.7 | 10.2 | 1.5 |
2012 | 2.5 | 11.4 | -0.9 |
2013 | 1.3 | 12.0 | -0.3 |
2014 | 0.4 | 11.6 | 1.2 |
2015 | 0.0 | 10.9 | 2.0 |
2016 | 0.2 | 10.0 | 1.7 |
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
The GDP of the euro area in 2015 in current US dollars in the dataset of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is $11,990.9 billion or 16.3 percent of world GDP of $73,598.8 billion (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx). The sum of the GDP of France $2420.2 billion with the GDP of Germany of $3365.3 billion, Italy of $1815.8 billion and Spain $1199.7 billion is $8,801.0 billion or 73.4 percent of total euro area GDP and 13.1 percent of World GDP. The four largest economies account for slightly more than three quarters of economic activity of the euro area. Table VD-EUR1 is constructed with the dataset of EUROSTAT, providing growth rates of the euro area as a whole and of the largest four economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain annually from 1996 to 2016. The impact of the global recession on the overall euro area economy and on the four largest economies was quite strong. There was sharp contraction in 2009 and growth rates have not rebounded to earlier growth with exception of Germany in 2010 and 2011.
Table VD-EUR1, Euro Area, Real GDP Growth Rate, ∆%
Euro Area | Germany | France | Italy | Spain | |
2016 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 3.2 |
2015 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 3.2 |
2014 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 1.4 |
2013 | -0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | -1.7 | -1.7 |
2012 | -0.9 | 0.5 | 0.2 | -2.8 | -2.9 |
2011 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 0.6 | -1.0 |
2010 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 |
2009 | -4.5 | -5.6 | -2.9 | -5.5 | -3.6 |
2008 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 0.2 | -1.1 | 1.1 |
2007 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 3.8 |
2006 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 4.2 |
2005 | 1.7 | 0.7 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 3.7 |
2004 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 1.6 | 3.2 |
2003 | 0.7 | -0.7 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 3.2 |
2002 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 2.9 |
2001 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 4.0 |
2000 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 5.3 |
1999 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 1.6 | 4.5 |
1998 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 1.6 | 4.3 |
Average 1999-2016 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 1.7 |
Average 1999-2007 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 3.8 |
Average 2016-2007 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.6 | -7.0* | -0.5* |
1997 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 3.7 |
1996 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 2.7 |
Note: Absolute percentage change
Source: EUROSTAT
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
The Flash Eurozone PMI Composite Output Index of the HIS Markit Flash Eurozone PMI®, combining activity in manufacturing and services, did not change from 50.6 in Nov to 50.6 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/744e10d0074244fd8f007451da9de4f8). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the Markit Flash Eurozone PMI index suggests GDP growth about 0.1 percent quarterly with decline of manufacturing and weakness of services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/744e10d0074244fd8f007451da9de4f8). The IHS Markit Eurozone PMI® Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing activity with close association with GDP did not change from 50.6 in Oct to 50.6 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/137b904cd243418fa2f8d7faaa0cce2d). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds slower potential for quarterly growth at around 0.1 percent in GDP (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/137b904cd243418fa2f8d7faaa0cce2d). The IHS Markit Eurozone Services Business Activity Index decreased from 52.2 in Oct to 51.9 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/137b904cd243418fa2f8d7faaa0cce2d). The IHS Markit Eurozone Manufacturing PMI® decreased from 46.9 in Nov to 46.3 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/dcbe553bbebf421980b10e8f906d95ac). New export orders decreased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds manufacturing declining quarterly at 1.5 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/dcbe553bbebf421980b10e8f906d95ac). Table EUR provides the data table for the euro area.
Table EUR, Euro Area Economic Indicators
GDP | IIIQ2019 ∆% 0.2; IIIQ2019/IIIQ2018 ∆% 1.2 Blog 9/13/15 11/22/15 12/13/15 2/14/16 3/13/16 5/1/16 5/15/16 6/12/16 8/7/16 8/14/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/11/16 02/26/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/11/17 8/20/17 9/10/17 11/26/17 12/10/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/10/18 8/19/18 9/16/18 11/18/18 12/16/18 3/10/19 5/26/19 6/9/19 9/15/19 12/29/19 |
Unemployment | Oct 2019: 7.5 % unemployment rate; Oct 2019: 12.334 million unemployed Blog 12/8/19 |
HICP | Nov month ∆%: -0.3 12 months Nov ∆%: 1.0 |
Producer Prices | Euro Zone industrial producer prices Oct ∆%: 0.1 |
Industrial Production | Oct Month ∆%: -0.5; 12 months ∆%: -2.2 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Oct month ∆%: -0.6 Earlier Data: |
Confidence and Economic Sentiment Indicator | Sentiment 101.3 Nov 2019 Consumer -7.2 Nov 2019 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15 |
Trade | Jan-Oct 2019/Jan-Oct 2018 Exports ∆%: 3.1 Oct 2019 12-month Exports ∆% 4.1 Imports ∆% -3.2 Earlier Data: |
Links to blog comments in Table EUR: 12/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html
12/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html
12/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
1/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html
11/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
8/25/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
6/9/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html
5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html
12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html
9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
6/10/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
5/20/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html
3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html
2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html
12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
6/11/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html
5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html
3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html
2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html
11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html
11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html
9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html
8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html
6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html
5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html
3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html
3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html
2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html
12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html
VE Germany. Table VE-DE provides yearly growth rates of the German economy from 1971 to 2018, price adjusted chain-linked and price and calendar-adjusted chain-linked (https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/11/PE19_448_811.html). Germany’s GDP fell 5.7 percent in 2009 after growing below trend at 1.1 percent in 2008. Recovery had been robust in contrast with other advanced economies. The German economy grew at 4.2 percent in 2010, 3.9 percent in 2011 and 0.4 percent in 2012. Growth stabilized to 0.4 percent in 2013, increasing to 2.2 percent in 2014. The German economy grew at 1.7 percent in 2015 and grew at 2.2 percent in 2016. Germany’s GDP increased 2.5 percent in 2017 and increased 1.5 percent in 2018.
The Federal Statistical Agency of Germany analyzes the fall and recovery of the German economy in its earlier website (http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/Inlandsprodukt/Aktuell,templateId=renderPrint.psml):
“The German economy again grew strongly in 2011. The price-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 3.0% compared with the previous year. Accordingly, the catching-up process of the German economy continued during the second year after the economic crisis. In the course of 2011, the price-adjusted GDP again exceeded its pre-crisis level. The economic recovery occurred mainly in the first half of 2011. In 2009, Germany experienced the most serious post-war recession, when GDP suffered a historic decline of 5.1%. The year 2010 was characterised by a rapid economic recovery (+3.7%).”
Table VE-DE, Germany, GDP ∆% on Prior Year
Price Adjusted Chain-Linked | Price- and Calendar-Adjusted Chain Linked | |
Average ∆% 1991-2017 | 1.4 | |
Average ∆% 1991-2018 | 1.4 | |
Average ∆% 1991-1999 | 1.4 | |
Average ∆% 2000-2007 | 1.3 | |
Average ∆% 2003-2007 | 2.2 | |
Average ∆% 2007-2018 | 1.3 | |
Average ∆% 2009-2018 | 2.1 | |
2018 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
2017 | 2.5 | 2.8 |
2016 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
2015 | 1.7 | 1.5 |
2014 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
2013 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
2012 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
2011 | 3.9 | 4.0 |
2010 | 4.2 | 4.0 |
2009 | -5.7 | -5.6 |
2008 | 1.0 | 0.7 |
2007 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
2006 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
2005 | 0.7 | 0.9 |
2004 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
2003 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
2002 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
2001 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
2000 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
1999 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
1998 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
1997 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
1996 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
1995 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
1994 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
1993 | -1.0 | -1.0 |
1992 | 1.9 | 1.5 |
1991 | 5.1 | 5.2 |
1990 | 5.3 | 5.5 |
1989 | 3.9 | 4.0 |
1988 | 3.7 | 3.4 |
1987 | 1.4 | 1.3 |
1986 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
1985 | 2.3 | 2.6 |
1984 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
1983 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
1982 | -0.4 | -0.5 |
1981 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
1980 | 1.4 | 1.3 |
1979 | 4.2 | 4.3 |
1978 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
1977 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
1976 | 4.9 | 4.5 |
1975 | -0.9 | -0.9 |
1974 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
1973 | 4.8 | 5.0 |
1972 | 4.3 | 4.3 |
1971 | 3.1 | 3.0 |
1970 | NA | NA |
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Destatis)
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/11/PE19_448_811.html
The Flash Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Flash Germany PMI®, combining manufacturing and services, did not change from 48.9 in Nov to 49.9 in Dec. The index of manufacturing output reached 44.6 in Dec, decreasing from 45.2 in Nov, while the index of services increased to 52.0 in Dec from 51.7 in Nov. The overall Flash Germany Manufacturing PMI® decreased from 44.1 in Nov to 43.4 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b77ede1d579b4a3ea5d919ff161f6ae6). New orders decreased and new export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak manufacturing of Germany with growing services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b77ede1d579b4a3ea5d919ff161f6ae6). The IHS Markit Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Germany Services PMI®, combining manufacturing and services with close association with Germany’s GDP, increased from 48.9 in Oct to 49.4 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/be725ddacdee4a13a19ce22b55a96a13). Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak conditions of Germany (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/be725ddacdee4a13a19ce22b55a96a13). The Germany Services Business Activity Index increased from 51.6 in Oct to 51.7 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/be725ddacdee4a13a19ce22b55a96a13). The IHS Markit/BME Germany Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), showing close association with Germany’s manufacturing conditions, decreased from 44.1 in Nov to 43.7 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c2f473eeeca242e0963096d2aa0a0e61). New export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c2f473eeeca242e0963096d2aa0a0e61). Table DE provides the country data table for Germany.
Table DE, Germany, Economic Indicators
GDP | IIIQ2019 0.1 ∆%; IIIQ2019/IIIQ2018 NCSA ∆% 1.0 CA 0.5 2016/2015: 2.2 CA 2.1 2017/2016: 2.5 CA 2.8 2018/2017: 1.5 CA 1.5 GDP ∆% 1970-2018 Blog 8/26/12 5/27/12 11/25/12 2/24/13 5/19/13 5/26/13 8/18/13 8/25/13 11/17/13 11/24/13 1/26/14 2/16/14 3/2/14 5/18/14 5/25/14 8/17/14 9/7/14 11/16/14 11/30/14 2/15/15 3/1/15 5/17/15 5/24/15 8/16/15 8/30/15 11/22/15 11/29/15 2/14/16 2/28/16 5/15/16 5/29/16 8/14/16 8/28/16 11/20/16 11/27/16 2/19/17 02/26/17 05/14/17 5/28/17 8/20/17 8/27/17 11/26/17 2/18/18 2/25/18 5/20/18 5/27/18 8/19/18 9/2/18 11/18/18 11/25/18 4/14/19 5/26/19 9/1/19 12/1/19 |
Consumer Price Index | Nov month NSA ∆%: -0.8 |
Producer Price Index | Oct month 0.0 12 months -0.4 |
Industrial Production | MFG Production Aug month CSA ∆%: 0.3 Earlier Data: |
Machine Orders | MF Oct month ∆%: -1.3 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Nov Month ∆% -1.9 12-Month ∆% 0.8 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15 |
Employment Report | Unemployment Rate SA Sep 3.1% |
Trade Balance | Exports Oct 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.9 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15 |
Links to blog comments in Table DE: 12/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html
12/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html
12/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
12/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
11/24/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/oscillating-risk-financial-assets-world.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
9/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/revaluation-of-us-dollar-falling-yields.html
8/25/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
6/2/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
4/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html
1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html
11/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html
11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html
9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html
5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html
2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html
5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
5/14/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html
2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
02/19/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html
11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html
11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html
11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html
8/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/and-as-ever-economic-outlook-is.html
8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html
5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html
11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html
11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html
08/30/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuations-of-global-financial.html
08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html
5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html
4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html
2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html
11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html
9/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/competitive-monetary-policy-and.html
8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html
5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html
2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html
1/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html
11/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html
11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html
8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html
8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html
VF France. Table VF-FR provides growth rates of GDP of France with the estimates of Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE). The long-term rate of GDP growth of France from IVQ1949 to IIIQ2019 is quite high at 3.1 percent. France’s growth rates were quite high in the four decades of the 1950s, 1960, 1970s and 1980s with an average growth rate of 4.0 percent compounding the average rates in the decades and discounting to one decade. The growth impulse diminished with 2.0 percent in the 1990s and 1.8 percent from 2000 to 2007. The average growth rate from 2000 to 2019, using fourth quarter data, is 1.2 percent because of the sharp impact of the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in US fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in the G7 in Japan and France in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Lucas (2011May) compares growth of the G7 economies (US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada) and Spain, finding that catch-up growth with earlier rates for the US and UK stalled in the 1970s.
Table VF-FR, France, Average Growth Rates of GDP Fourth Quarter, 1949-2018
Period | Average ∆% |
1949-2019 | 3.1 |
2007-2019***** | 0.9 |
2007-2018**** | 0.9 |
2007-2017*** | 0.8 |
2007-2016** | 0.6 |
2007-2015* | 0.5 |
2007-2014 | 0.4 |
2000-2019 | 1.2 |
2000-2018 | 1.2 |
2000-2017 | 1.2 |
2000-2016 | 1.1 |
2000-2015 | 1.1 |
2000-2014 | 1.1 |
2000-2007 | 1.8 |
1990-1999 | 2.0 |
1980-1989 | 2.7 |
1970-1979 | 3.7 |
1960-1969 | 5.7 |
1950-1959 | 4.2 |
*IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 **IVQ2007 to IVQ2016 ***IVQ2007 to IVQ2017 ****IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 *****IVQ2007 to IIIQ2019
Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4241521
The IHS Markit Flash France Composite Output Index decreased from 52.1 in Nov to 52.0 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/fc726a442adf43e98f86a33019557516). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak manufacturing and services activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/fc726a442adf43e98f86a33019557516). The IHS Markit France Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing with close association with French GDP, decreased from 52.6 in Oct to 52.1 in Nov, indicating expanding activity of the private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b39b242df91445d5abb58a42ef8827e0). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit that compiles the France Services PMI®, finds continuing activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b39b242df91445d5abb58a42ef8827e0). The IHS Markit France Services Activity index decreased from 52.9 in Oct to 52.2 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b39b242df91445d5abb58a42ef8827e0). The IHS Markit France Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index® decreased to 50.4 in Dec from 51.7 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/166020dcf8114c16b0fcab5d9a7034bf). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit, finds slowing manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/166020dcf8114c16b0fcab5d9a7034bf). Table FR provides the country data table for France.
Table FR, France, Economic Indicators
CPI | Nov month ∆% 0.1 |
PPI | Nov month ∆%: -0.8 Nov 12 months ∆%: 1.1 Blog 12/29/19 |
GDP Growth | IIIQ2019/IIQ2019 ∆%: 0.3 |
Industrial Production | Manufacturing Oct 0.4 Quarter ∆%: -1.2 YOY -0.4 Earlier Data: |
Consumer Spending | Manufactured Goods Earlier Data: |
Employment | Unemployment Rate: IIIQ2019 8.3% |
Trade Balance | Oct Exports ∆%: month 3.4 12 months -0.8 Imports ∆%: month 1.5 12 months -0.1 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15 |
Confidence Indicators | Historical average 100 Dec Mfg Business Climate 102 Earlier Data: Blog 3/29/15 |
Links to blog comments in Table FR: 12/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html
12/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk_14.html
12/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
11/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
9/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
8/11/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html
7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
6/2/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html
12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html
11/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
7/29/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html
6/24/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
6/3/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html
5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
04/01/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html
3/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
2/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html
12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html
12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
11/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
6/25/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html
6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
5/7/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
3/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
3/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
2/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html
12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html
10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html
9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html
9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html
8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html
6/26/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html
6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html
5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html
3/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html
2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html
12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html
11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html
9/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html
08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
6/28/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html
5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html
4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html
2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html
12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html
9/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html
8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html
6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html
5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html
2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html
12/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html
11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html
9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html
6/30/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html
5/19/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
VG Italy. Table VG-IT provides revised percentage changes of GDP in Italy of quarter on prior quarter and quarter on same quarter a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2019 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2019, Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2019 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, the GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of Italy decreased 0.1 percent and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of Italy increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IVQ2014 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and fell 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 0.8 percent in IQ2013 and declined 2.9 percent relative to IQ2013. GDP had been growing during six consecutive quarters but at very low rates from IQ2010 to IIQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell in seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at increasingly higher rates of contraction from 0.5 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IVQ2011, 1.1 percent in IQ2012, 0.8 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012. The pace of decline accelerated to minus 0.8 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 0.8 percent in IQ2013. GDP contracted cumulatively 5.3 percent in seven consecutive quarterly contractions from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.1 percent. The year-on-year rate has fallen from 2.2 percent in IVQ2010 to minus 3.2 percent in IVQ2012, minus 2.9 percent in IQ2013, minus 2.2 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 1.5 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP fell 0.9 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.2 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.5 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.4 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.7 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.9 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.9 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.9 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to a year earlier and decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IQ2019 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.1 percent in IIQ2019 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIIQ2019 relative to a year earlier. Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/), the GDP of Italy in IIIQ2019 of €430,459.2 million (https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/236253) is lower by 5.2 percent relative to €452,802.5 million in IQ2008 (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/). Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/), the GDP of Italy increased from €392,018.4 million in IQ1998 to €452,802.5 million in IQ2008 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. The fiscal adjustment of Italy is significantly more difficult with the economy not growing especially on the prospects of increasing government revenue. The strategy is for reforms to improve productivity, facilitating future fiscal consolidation.
Table VG-IT, Italy, GDP ∆%
Quarter ∆% Relative to Preceding Quarter | Quarter ∆% Relative to Same Quarter Year Earlier | |
IIIQ2019 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
IIQ2019 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
IQ2019 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
IVQ2018 | 0.1 | -0.1 |
IIIQ2018 | -0.1 | 0.4 |
IIQ2018 | -0.1 | 0.9 |
IQ2018 | 0.1 | 1.4 |
IVQ2017 | 0.5 | 1.9 |
IIIQ2017 | 0.4 | 1.7 |
IIQ2017 | 0.4 | 1.9 |
IQ2017 | 0.6 | 1.7 |
IVQ2016 | 0.3 | 1.4 |
IIIQ2016 | 0.6 | 1.5 |
IIQ2016 | 0.2 | 1.2 |
IQ2016 | 0.3 | 1.4 |
IVQ2015 | 0.5 | 1.3 |
IIIQ2015 | 0.2 | 0.6 |
IIQ2015 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
IQ2015 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
IVQ2014 | -0.2 | 0.0 |
IIIQ2014 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
IIQ2014 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
IQ2014 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
IVQ2013 | -0.2 | -0.9 |
IIIQ2013 | 0.2 | -1.5 |
IIQ2013 | 0.0 | -2.2 |
IQ2013 | -0.8 | -2.9 |
IVQ2012 | -0.8 | -3.2 |
IIIQ2012 | -0.5 | -3.3 |
IIQ2012 | -0.8 | -3.2 |
IQ2012 | -1.1 | -2.3 |
IVQ2011 | -0.9 | -0.9 |
IIIQ2011 | -0.5 | 0.6 |
IIQ2011 | 0.1 | 1.5 |
IQ2011 | 0.3 | 2.2 |
IVQ2010 | 0.6 | 2.2 |
IIIQ2010 | 0.5 | 1.9 |
IIQ2010 | 0.7 | 1.9 |
IQ2010 | 0.3 | 0.8 |
IVQ2009 | 0.3 | -2.3 |
IIIQ2009 | 0.5 | -5.0 |
IIQ2009 | -0.3 | -6.6 |
IQ2009 | -2.8 | -7.2 |
IVQ2008 | -2.5 | -3.5 |
IIIQ2008 | -1.2 | -1.4 |
IIQ2008 | -0.9 | 0.0 |
IQ2008 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
IV2007 | -0.3 | 0.0 |
IIIQ2007 | 0.2 | 1.5 |
IIQ2007 | 0.1 | 1.7 |
IQ2007 | 0.0 | 2.2 |
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/236253
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
The HIS Markit Italy Composite Output Index decreased from 50.8 in Oct to 49.6 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/789d5000ec2c4dcf8c911cdf987761b2).The IHS Markit Italy Business Activity Index decreased from 52.2 in Oct to 50.4 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/789d5000ec2c4dcf8c911cdf987761b2). Amritpal Virdee, Economist at IHS Markit that compiles the Italy Services PMI®, finds challenging conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/789d5000ec2c4dcf8c911cdf987761b2). The IHS Markit Italy Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), decreased from 47.6 in Nov to 46.2 in Dec (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/83980f9ebca54b06b17c98353f3ae55f). New export orders decreased. Lewis Cooper, Economist at HIS Markit that compiles the Italian Manufacturing PMI®, finds deteriorating manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/83980f9ebca54b06b17c98353f3ae55f). Table IT provides the country data table for Italy.
Table IT, Italy, Economic Indicators
Consumer Price Index | Nov month ∆% -0.2 12 months ∆% 0.2 |
Producer Price Index | Nov month ∆%: -0.2 Nov 12-month ∆%: 0.2 Blog 12/29/19 |
GDP Growth | IIIQ2019/IIQ2019 SA ∆%: 0.1 |
Labor Report | Sep 2019 Participation rate 65.7% Employment ratio 59.2% Unemployment rate 9.7% Youth Unemployment 27.8% Blog 12/8/19 |
Industrial Production | Oct month ∆%: -0.3 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Sep month ∆%: 0.7 Sep 12-month ∆%: 0.9 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15 |
Business Confidence | Mfg Dec 99.1, Aug 99.7 Construction Dec 140.1 Aug 140.4 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15 |
Trade Balance | Balance Oct SA €6.476 million Earlier Data: |
Links to blog comments in Table IT: 12/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html
12/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
12/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
11/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
8/11/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
6/9/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html
5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html
12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html
9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html
3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html
2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html
12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html
3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html
2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html
11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html
9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html
8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html
5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html
2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html
12/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html
11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html
9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html
08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html
5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html
4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html
2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html
12/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html
11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html
10/19/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html
8/31/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopo7litical-and-financial-risks.html
8/10/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk_10.html
6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html
5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html
2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html
12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html
11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html
9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
8/11/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/recovery-without-hiring-loss-of-full.html
6/16/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html
3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
VH United Kingdom. Annual data in Table VH-UK show the strong impact of the global recession in the UK with decline of GDP of 4.2 percent in 2009 after dropping 0.3 percent in 2008. Recovery of 1.9 percent in 2010 is relatively low in comparison with annual growth rates in 2007 and earlier years. Growth was only 1.5 percent in 2011 and 1.5 percent in 2012. Growth increased to 2.1 percent in 2013 and 2.6 percent in 2014. Growth fell to 2.4 percent in 2015, and 1.9 percent in 2016. GDP grew 1.9 percent in 2017. GDP grew 1.3 percent in 2018. The bottom part of Table VH-UK provides average growth rates of UK GDP since 1948. The UK economy grew at 2.6 percent per year on average between 1948 and 2018, which is relatively high for an advanced economy. The growth rate of GDP between 2000 and 2007 is higher at 2.8 percent. Growth in the current cyclical expansion from 2010 to 2018 has been only at 1.9 percent as advanced economies struggle with weak internal demand and world trade. GDP in 2018 is higher by 13.2 percent relative to 2007 while it would have been 35.5 higher at trend of 2.8 percent as from 2000 to 2007.
Table VH-UK, UK, Gross Domestic Product, ∆%
∆% on Prior Year | |
1998 | 3.6 |
1999 | 3.4 |
2000 | 3.4 |
2001 | 3.0 |
2002 | 2.3 |
2003 | 3.3 |
2004 | 2.4 |
2005 | 3.2 |
2006 | 2.8 |
2007 | 2.4 |
2008 | -0.3 |
2009 | -4.2 |
2010 | 1.9 |
2011 | 1.5 |
2012 | 1.5 |
2013 | 2.1 |
2014 | 2.6 |
2015 | 2.4 |
2016 | 1.9 |
2017 | 1.9 |
2018 | 1.3 |
Average Growth Rates ∆% per Year | |
1948-2018 | 2.6 |
1950-1959 | 3.1 |
1960-1969 | 3.1 |
1970-1979 | 2.6 |
1980-1989 | 3.2 |
1990-1999 | 2.4 |
2000-2007 | 2.8 |
2007-2013* | 2.5 |
2007-2014* | 5.1 |
2007-2015 | 0.9 |
2007-2016 | 1.0 |
2007-2017 | 1.1 |
2007-2018 | 1.1 |
2000-2018 | 1.8 |
*Absolute change from 2007 to 2013 and 2007 to 2014
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
The HIS Markit Flash UK PMI® Composite Output Index fell from 52.4 in Jun to 47.7 in Jul, which is the lowest in 87 months (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds the index suggests pace of contraction of GDP at 0.4 percent in IIIQ2016 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). The HIS Markit/CIPS Flash UK Composite PMI decreased from 59.3 in Nov 2019 to 48.5 in Dec 2019 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/f73a3f4a419f4aac9f8b32b0831dfdd3). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at HIS Markit finds that the index suggests contraction of the UK economy in the fourth quarter (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/f73a3f4a419f4aac9f8b32b0831dfdd3). The CIPS UK Composite PMI shows the UK Composite Output Index decreasing from 50.0 in Oct 2019 to 49.3 in Nov 2019 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9418a78409c84e27bf6c58df14a40722). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds probable decline of GDP at 0.2 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9418a78409c84e27bf6c58df14a40722). The Business Activity Index of the IHS Markit/CIPS UK Services PMI® decreased from 50.0 in Oct to 49.3 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9418a78409c84e27bf6c58df14a40722). Tim Moore, Economics Associate Director at IHS Markit, finds weakness (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9418a78409c84e27bf6c58df14a40722). The IHS Markit/CIPS UK Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®) decreased to 47.5 in Dec from 48.9 in Nov (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/0b57169b91e54e68aec22549a912edbd). New export orders decreased. Rob Dobson, Director at IHS Markit that compiles the Markit/CIPS Manufacturing PMI®, finds challenges in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/0b57169b91e54e68aec22549a912edbd). Table UK provides the economic indicators for the United Kingdom.
Table UK, UK Economic Indicators
CPI | Nov month ∆%: 0.2 |
Output/Input Prices | Output Prices: Nov 12-month NSA ∆%: 0.5 excluding food, petroleum ∆%: 1.1 |
GDP Growth | IIIQ2019 prior quarter ∆% 0.4; year earlier same quarter ∆%: 1.1 |
Industrial Production | Oct 2019/Oct 2018 ∆%: Production Industries -1.3; Manufacturing -1.2 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Nov month ∆%: -0.6 Earlier Data: |
Labor Market | Aug-Oct 2019 Unemployment Rate: 3.8% |
GDP and the Labor Market | IQ2015 Employment 104.8 IQ2008 =100 GDP IQ15=104.0 IQ2008=100 Blog 5/17/14 |
Trade Balance UK Trade in Goods and Services | Balance SA Oct -£5188 million EARLIER DATA: |
Links to blog comments in Table UK: 12/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/12/diverging-economic-conditions-and.html
11/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_16.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
5/19/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
4/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html
2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html
12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html
10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
7/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html
5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
4/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
2/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html
12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html
10/8/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html
7/30/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html
7/9/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html
5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
2/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html
1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html
11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html
10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html
10/9/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html
9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html
7/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/business-fixed-investment-has-been-soft.html
7/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html
5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html
5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html
4/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html
2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html
12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html
11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html
11/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-increase-considered.html
10/4/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html
9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html
08/02/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html
7/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html
5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html
5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html
5/3/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html
4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html
4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html
2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html
12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html
10/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html
10/5/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html
8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html
7/27/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html
5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
5/4/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html
4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html
3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html
2/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
12/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html
12/1/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/exit-risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html
10/27/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html
9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html
8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html
7/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html
5/26/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
4/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html
03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html
The UK Office for National Statistics provides revision of the national accounts in accordance with the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010) (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/naa2/quarterly-national-accounts/q2-2015/index.html). The UK Office for National Statistics moved the base and reference year of chained volumes from 2015 to 2016 (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/januarytomarch2018). There are adjustments of the UK national accounts (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/articles/nationalaccountsarticles/previousReleases https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/januarytomarch2018). The second estimate for IIQ2019 (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/apriltojune2019) incorporates changes and notice of future revision: “(This release contains data that are consistent with the UK National Accounts, The Blue Book 2019, which will be released on 31 October 2019. As such, data for all periods within this release are subject to revision in line with the National Accounts Revisions Policy.)” GDP grew 0.4 percent in IIIQ2019 relative to IIQ2019. Growth of 1.2 percent in IIIQ2012 interrupted three consecutive quarters of weakness in GDP growth from IIQ2011 to IVQ2011. Most advanced economies are underperforming relative to the period before the global recession. The UK Office for National Statistics analyzes that the decline in the impulse of growth in the UK originated in weakness in markets in the UK and worldwide. The UK Office for National Statistics data shows that GDP in IIIQ2019 is higher by 13.2 percent relative to the peak in IQ2008 (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/julytoseptember2019). UK GDP in chained value measures is ₤461,472 million in IQ2008 and ₤494,144 million in IVQ2015 or increase of 7.1 percent. Growth at trend of 2.8 percent per year would bring GDP to ₤571,600 million in IVQ2015. UK GDP in IVQ2015 at ₤494,144 million is lower by ₤77,456 million relative to trend at ₤571,600 million or lower by 13.6 percent compared with trend. GDP estimates of the UK Office for National Statistics measure the contraction of 6.0 percent from peak to trough (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/julytoseptember2019), which is roughly equal at 6.0 percent to compounding the quarterly rates except for rounding in Table VH-1 from IIQ2008 to IIQ2009. UK GDP is ₤461,472 million in IQ2008 declining 6.0 percent to ₤433,618 million in IIQ2009. GDP increased 14.0 percent from IIQ2009 to ₤494,144 million in IVQ2015 or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent. GDP increased 7.1 percent from IQ2008 to IVQ2015 or at the annual equivalent rate of 0.9 percent. Using the seasonally adjusted chained-value measures (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/julytoseptember2019). GDP increased from ₤461,472 million in IQ2008 to ₤522,525 million in IIIQ2019, or 13.2 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. UK GDP in IIIQ2019 at ₤522,525 million is lower by ₤111,441 million relative to trend at ₤633,966 million or lower by 17.6 percent compared with trend. UK GDP increased 20.5 percent from IIQ2009 to IIIQ2019 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent.
Table VH-1, UK, Percentage Change of GDP from Prior Quarter, Chained Value Measures ∆%
IQ | IIQ | IIIQ | IV | |
2019 | 0.6 | -0.2 | 0.4 | |
2018 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.2 |
2017 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
2016 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
2015 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.7 |
2014 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
2013 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.5 |
2012 | 0.6 | -0.1 | 1.2 | -0.2 |
2011 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
2010 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.1 |
2009 | -1.7 | -0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
2008 | 0.5 | -0.6 | -1.6 | -2.1 |
2007 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
2006 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.5 |
2005 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.5 |
2004 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
2003 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
2002 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
2001 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
2000 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
1999 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 1.8 | 1.4 |
1998 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Chart VH-1 of the UK Office for National Statistics provides the quarterly growth rate of GDP of the United Kingdom and GDP in chained volume measures (CVM) from 2008 to 2019. GDP contracted sharply during the global recession, surpassing the pre-recession peak of IQ2008 and continuing growth in the expansion phase. There is recent deceleration in growth.
Chart VH-1, United Kingdom, Gross Domestic Product, CVM, SA, ₤ Billion, Percentage Change on Prior Quarter
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
There are four periods in Table VH-2 in growth of GDP in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier in the UK in the years from 1998 to the present. (1) Growth rates were quite high from 2000 to 2007. (2) There were six consecutive quarters of contraction of GDP from IIIQ2008 to IVQ2009. Contractions relative to the quarter a year earlier were quite sharp with the highest of 3.6 percent in IVQ2008, 5.8 percent in IQ2009, 5.5 percent in IIQ2009 and 3.9 percent in IIIQ2009. (3) The economy bounced strongly with 2.0 percent in IIQ2010, 2.6 percent in IIIQ2010 and 2.4 percent in IVQ2010. (4) Recovery did not continue at rates comparable to those in 2000 to 2007 and even relative to those in the final three quarters of 2010. Growth relative to the same quarter a year earlier fell from 2.4 percent in IVQ2010 to 1.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.1 percent in IIIQ2011, 1.2 percent in IVQ2011 but only 1.2 percent in IQ2012, increase of 1.1 percent in IIQ2012 relative to IIQ2011, increase of 2.0 percent in IIIQ2012 and 1.6 percent in IVQ2012. In IQ2012, UK GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, GDP fell 0.1 percent relative to IQ2012 and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, GDP increased 1.2 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IVQ2012, GDP fell 0.2 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Fiscal consolidation in an environment of weakening economic growth is much more challenging. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 0.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to IVQ2012. In IIQ2013, GDP increased 0.5 percent and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2013 and 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2013 and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, GDP increased 0.7 percent and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2014 and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2014 and 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, GDP increased 0.6 percent and 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2015 and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2016 and grew 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2017 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2017 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2019, GDP increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier.
Table VH-2, UK, Percentage Change of GDP from Same Quarter a Year Earlier, Chained Value Measures ∆%
IQ | IIQ | IIIQ | IVQ | |
2019 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 1.1 | |
2018 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.4 |
2017 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.6 |
2016 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
2015 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
2014 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
2013 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.7 |
2012 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 1.6 |
2011 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
2010 | 0.8 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.4 |
2009 | -5.8 | -5.5 | -3.9 | -1.6 |
2008 | 2.4 | 1.2 | -1.1 | -3.6 |
2007 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 2.8 |
2006 | 4.3 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
2005 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 4.8 |
2004 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 1.4 |
2003 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
2002 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.6 |
2001 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
2000 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 3.1 | 1.8 |
1999 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 4.2 |
1998 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.5 |
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Table VH-3 provides annual percentage changes of gross value added and key components. Production fell 7.7 percent in 2009 and its most important component manufacturing fell 8.6 percent. Services fell 2.7 percent in 2009. Services grew in all years from 2010 to 2018 while manufacturing fell 1.1 percent in 2012 and fell 1.1 percent in 2013. Manufacturing resumed growth with 2.9 percent in 2014 followed by decrease of 0.1 percent in 2015. Manufacturing increased 0.2 percent in 2016 and increased 2.2 percent in 2017. Manufacturing increased 0.9 percent in 2018.
Table VH-3, UK, Gross Value Added by Components, ∆% on Prior Year
TP | MFG | CONS | SERV | GVA BP | GVA EX | |
2016 Weights | 136 | 102 | 61 | 796 | 1000 | 995 |
2018 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0 | 2 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
2017 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 6.4 | 1.7 | 2 | 2 |
2016 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 3.9 | 2 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
2015 | 1 | -0.1 | 4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
2014 | 1.6 | 2.9 | 10 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
2013 | -1 | -1.1 | 1.7 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
2012 | -2.3 | -1.1 | -7.3 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
2011 | -0.1 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2 |
2010 | 3.4 | 4.6 | 8.5 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
2009 | -7.7 | -8.6 | -13.2 | -2.7 | -4.2 | -4.1 |
2008 | -2.5 | -2.8 | -2.6 | 0.5 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
2007 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
2006 | 1.1 | 2.4 | 0.8 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
2005 | -0.5 | 0.1 | -2.4 | 4.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 |
2004 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 5.3 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
2003 | -0.4 | -0.4 | 4.8 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
2002 | -1.5 | -2.4 | 5.7 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.4 |
2001 | -1.5 | -1.4 | 1.8 | 4.3 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
2000 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
1999 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.4 |
1998 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
Note: TP: Total Production; MFG: Manufacturing; CONS: Construction; SERV: Services; GVA BP: Gross Value Added at Basic Prices; GVA EX: Gross Value Added excluding Oil and Gas
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Table VH-4 shows for IIIQ2019 that gross valued at basic prices increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier while gross value added with exclusions increased 1.1 percent. Total production decreased 1.3 percent and manufacturing decreased 1.0 percent. Services grew 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier.
Table VH-4, UK, Gross Value Added by Components, ∆% on Same Quarter of Prior Year
TP | MFG | CONS | SERV | GVA BP | GVA EX | |
2016 Weights | 136 | 102 | 61 | 796 | 1000 | 995 |
2019 Q3 | -1.3 | -1 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1 | 1.1 |
2019 Q2 | -0.8 | -1.1 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
2019 Q1 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 2 |
2018 Q4 | -0.9 | -1.4 | 0 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
2018 Q3 | 1.1 | 1 | 0.8 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
2018 Q2 | 1.4 | 1.8 | -0.2 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
2018 Q1 | 1.5 | 2.1 | -0.7 | 1.4 | 1 | 1 |
2017 Q4 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 5.4 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
2017 Q3 | 2 | 2.6 | 5.9 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
2017 Q2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 6.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
2017 Q1 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 8 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
2016 Q4 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 4.8 | 1.8 | 2 | 2 |
2016 Q3 | 1 | 0.2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
2016 Q2 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 3.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
2016 Q1 | 0.1 | -1.4 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2 | 1.9 |
2015 Q4 | 0.3 | -1.3 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
2015 Q3 | 0.8 | -0.8 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2 | 1.9 |
2015 Q2 | 1.7 | 0.4 | 4.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
2015 Q1 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 6.8 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 |
2014 Q4 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 8.9 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
2014 Q3 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 9.6 | 2 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
2014 Q2 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 11.3 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
2014 Q1 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 10.2 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
2013 Q4 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 5.9 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
2013 Q3 | -1 | -0.9 | 5.4 | 2.3 | 2 | 2 |
2013 Q2 | -1.6 | -1.3 | 0.2 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
2013 Q1 | -2.8 | -3.1 | -4.4 | 3.3 | 1.9 | 2 |
2012 Q4 | -3.1 | -2.1 | -7.8 | 3.5 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
2012 Q3 | -1.8 | -0.8 | -8.5 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
2012 Q2 | -2.2 | -1.7 | -8.1 | 2.3 | 0.9 | 1 |
2012 Q1 | -2.2 | 0 | -5.1 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
2011 Q4 | -2 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
2011 Q3 | -0.3 | 1.5 | -1.9 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
2011 Q2 | 0.1 | 3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
2011 Q1 | 2 | 4.6 | 5.8 | 2.9 | 3 | 3.1 |
2010 Q4 | 4 | 5.2 | 9 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 3 |
2010 Q3 | 3.6 | 6 | 10.6 | 2.3 | 3 | 3 |
2010 Q2 | 3.2 | 4.3 | 10.5 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
2010 Q1 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 4 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
2009 Q4 | -3.2 | -3.6 | -7.8 | -0.8 | -1.6 | -1.6 |
2009 Q3 | -8.1 | -9 | -12.2 | -2.2 | -3.8 | -3.8 |
2009 Q2 | -8.9 | -9.9 | -16.2 | -3.8 | -5.4 | -5.4 |
2009 Q1 | -10.3 | -11.6 | -16.1 | -3.9 | -5.7 | -5.7 |
2008 Q4 | -6.6 | -6.9 | -8.7 | -2.6 | -3.6 | -3.5 |
2008 Q3 | -2 | -2.8 | -1.7 | -0.7 | -0.9 | -0.9 |
2008 Q2 | -1.2 | -1.6 | -0.4 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.4 |
2008 Q1 | -0.1 | 0 | 0.3 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
2007 Q4 | 0.7 | -0.4 | 0.5 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
2007 Q3 | 0.4 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
2007 Q2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 3 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
2007 Q1 | 0.6 | 1.8 | 4.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
2006 Q4 | 1.2 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
2006 Q3 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
2006 Q2 | 0.2 | 1.8 | -0.6 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
2006 Q1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | -1.9 | 5.8 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
2005 Q4 | -0.5 | -0.2 | -2.3 | 6.8 | 5.1 | 5.3 |
2005 Q3 | 0.1 | 1.1 | -3 | 5.3 | 4 | 4.2 |
2005 Q2 | -0.5 | 0.2 | -1.7 | 4.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
2005 Q1 | -1 | -0.6 | -2.7 | 3.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
2004 Q4 | 0 | 1 | -0.2 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 2 |
2004 Q3 | -0.3 | 0.6 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 2 | 2.2 |
2004 Q2 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 6.8 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
2004 Q1 | 1.6 | 3 | 11.7 | 3 | 3.2 | 3.4 |
2003 Q4 | 1 | 1.9 | 5.7 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
2003 Q3 | -0.2 | -0.7 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
2003 Q2 | -1 | -0.6 | 5.5 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
2003 Q1 | -1.3 | -2.3 | 3.5 | 4 | 2.9 | 3 |
2002 Q4 | -0.6 | -1.8 | 6.9 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
2002 Q3 | -1.4 | -1.9 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
2002 Q2 | -1.7 | -2.9 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
2002 Q1 | -2.2 | -3.1 | 5.2 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
2001 Q4 | -3.2 | -3.8 | 3.8 | 5.3 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
2001 Q3 | -1.3 | -1.1 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 3.3 |
2001 Q2 | -1.4 | -1.3 | 1.6 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 2.8 |
2001 Q1 | -0.1 | 0.6 | -1.9 | 3.5 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
2000 Q4 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 0 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
2000 Q3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | -1.9 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
2000 Q2 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 6.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
2000 Q1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 4.7 |
1999 Q4 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 4.2 |
1999 Q3 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
1999 Q2 | -0.3 | -0.9 | 1.3 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.4 |
1999 Q1 | -0.9 | -1.6 | -1.5 | 4.9 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
1998 Q4 | -0.1 | -1 | 0 | 5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
1998 Q3 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 4.8 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
1998 Q2 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
1998 Q1 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 4.7 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
Note: TP: Total Production; MFG: Manufacturing; CONS: Construction; SERV: Services; GVA BP: Gross Value Added at Basic Prices; GVA EX: Gross Value Added excluding Oil and Gas
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Table VH-5, UK, Contribution to Quarter on Prior Quarter of Growth of Value Added by Expenditure Components, %
IIIQ2018 | IVQ2018 | IQ2019 | IIQ2019 | IIIQ2019 | |
HFC | 0.27 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.29 | 0.17 |
NPISH | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.02 |
GOVT | 0.11 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.22 | -0.12 |
GCF | -0.36 | 0.73 | 3.19 | -3.17 | -2.00 |
GFCF | 0.05 | -0.02 | 0.18 | -0.09 | 0.03 |
BI | -0.09 | -0.05 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
Exports | 0.70 | -0.08 | 0.09 | -1.26 | 2.33 |
Less Imports | 0.25 | 0.92 | 3.01 | -3.83 | -0.08 |
Net Trade | 0.44 | -1.00 | -2.93 | 2.57 | 2.41 |
Components may not add because of rounding
HFC: Household Final Consumption; NPISH: NPISH Final Consumption; GOVT: General Government; GCF: Gross Capital Formation; GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation; BINV: Business Investment; EXP: Exports; IMP: Less Imports
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Contributions of value added by expenditure components in a year relative to the prior year are in Table VH-6. Household final consumption added 1.4 percentage points in 2014 and 1.7 percentage points in 2015. Household final consumption added 2.39 percentage points 2016. Household final consumption contributed 1.44 percentage points in 2017. Household final consumption contributed 1.02 percentage points in 2018. Gross capital formation contributed 1.8 percentage points in 2014 and 0.8 percentage points in 2015. Gross capital formation deducted 0.10 percentage points in 2016. Gross capital formation deducted 0.29 percentage points in 2017. Gross capital formation contributed 0.25 percentage points in 2018. GFCF added 1.1 percentage points in 2014 and 0.6 percentage points in 2015. GFCF added 0.62 percentage points in 2016. GFCF contributed 0.28 percentage points in 2017. GFCF deducted 0.04 percentage points in 2018. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points in 2014 and subtracted 0.4 percentage points in 2015. Net trade deducted 0.52 percentage points in 2016. Net trade contributed 0.68 percentage points in 2017. Net trade deducted 0.26 percentage points in 2018.
Table VH-6, UK, Contribution to Growth on Prior Year of Value Added by Expenditure Components, %
2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | |
HFC | 1.4 | 1.7 | 2.39 | 1.44 | 1.02 |
NPISH | 0.0 | 0.0 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
GOVT | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.19 | 0.05 | 0.08 |
GCF | 1.8 | 0.8 | -0.10 | -0.29 | 0.25 |
GFCF | 1.1 | 0.6 | 0.62 | 0.28 | -0.04 |
BINV | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.41 | 0.29 | -0.15 |
Exports | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.76 | 1.74 | 0.37 |
Less Imports | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.28 | 1.05 | 0.63 |
Net Trade | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.52 | 0.68 | -0.26 |
HFC: Household Final Consumption; NPISH: NPISH Final Consumption; GOVT: General Government; GCF: Gross Capital Formation; GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation; BINV: Business Investment; EXP: Exports; IMP: Less Imports
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.
No comments:
Post a Comment