Twenty Four Million Unemployed or Underemployed, Job Creation, Stagnating Real Wages, United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities, Unresolved US Balance of Payments Deficits and Fiscal Imbalance Threatening Risk Premium on Treasury Securities, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
I Twenty Four Million Unemployed or Underemployed
IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation
IA2 Number of People in Job Stress
IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment
IA4 Job Creation
IB Stagnating Real Wages
IIA United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
IA Transmission of Monetary Policy
IB Functions of Banking
IC United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
ID Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation
II Unresolved US Balance of Payments Deficits and Fiscal Imbalance Threatening Risk Premium on Treasury Securities
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
I Twenty Four Million Unemployed or Underemployed. This section analyzes the employment situation report of the United States of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). There are four subsections: IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation; IA2 Number of People in Job Stress; IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment; and IA4 Job Creation.
IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation. Table I-1 provides summary statistics of the employment situation report of the BLS. The first four rows provide the data from the establishment report of creation of nonfarm payroll jobs and remuneration of workers (for analysis of the differences in employment between the establishment report and the household survey see Abraham, Haltiwanger, Sandusky and Spletzer 2009). Total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 156,000 in Dec 2016 and private payroll employment increased 144,000. The average monthly number of nonfarm jobs created from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 was 228,667 using seasonally adjusted data, while the average number of nonfarm jobs created from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 was 179,750, or decrease by 21.4 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 was 220,917, using seasonally adjusted data, while the average from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 was 164,500, or decrease by 25.5 percent. This blog calculates the effective labor force of the US at 168,639 million in Dec 2016 and 166,782 million in Dec 2015 (Table I-4), for growth of 1.857 million at average 154,750 per month. The difference between the average increase of 164,500 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 and the 154,750 average monthly increase in the labor force from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 is 9,750 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 24.232 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 9,750 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 2,485 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (24.232 million divided by 9,750) or 207 years (2,485 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Dec 2016 not seasonally adjusted stood at 158.968 million with 7.170 million unemployed or effectively 16.841 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 168.639 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 8.5 years (1 million divided by product of 9,750 by 12, which is 117,000). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.948 million (0.05 times labor force of 158.968 million). New net job creation would be minus 0.778 million (7.170 million unemployed minus 7.948 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 0.0 years (0.778 million divided by 117,000). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 16.841 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 168.639 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 7.695 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 76.1 years (16.841 million minus 0.05(158.639 million) = 8.909 million divided by 117,000 using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in Dec 2016 was 151.798 million (NSA) or 4.483 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.742 million in Dec 2016 or by 22.784 million. The number employed increased 3.0 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2016 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 9.8 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employment as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2016 would result in 161.761 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 254.742 million). There are effectively 9.963 million fewer jobs in Dec 2016 than in Jul 2007, or 161.761 million minus 151.798 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:
“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html). The proper explanation is not in secular stagnation but in cyclically slow growth. Secular stagnation is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. Subsection IA4 Job Creation analyzes the types of jobs created, which are lower paying than earlier. Average hourly earnings in Dec 2016 were $26.00 seasonally adjusted (SA), increasing 2.9 percent not seasonally adjusted (NSA) relative to Dec 2015 and increasing 0.4 percent relative to Nov 2016 seasonally adjusted. In Nov 2016, average hourly earnings seasonally adjusted were $25.90, increasing 1.9 percent relative to Nov 2015 not seasonally adjusted and decreasing 0.1 percent seasonally adjusted relative to Oct 2016. These are nominal changes in workers’ wages. The following row “average hourly earnings in constant dollars” provides hourly wages in constant dollars calculated by the BLS or what is called “real wages” adjusted for inflation. Data are not available for Dec 2016 because the prices indexes of the BLS for Dec 2016 will only be released on Jan 18, 2017 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/), which will be covered in this blog’s comment on Jan 22, 2017, together with world inflation. The second column provides changes in real wages for Nov 2016. Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation or in constant dollars decreased 1.3 percent in Nov 2016 relative to Nov 2015 but have been decreasing/stagnating during multiple months. World inflation waves in bouts of risk aversion (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html) mask declining trend of real wages. The fractured labor market of the US is characterized by high levels of unemployment and underemployment together with falling real wages or wages adjusted for inflation (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The following section IB Stagnating Real Wages provides more detailed analysis. Average weekly hours of US workers seasonally adjusted remained virtually unchanged, not changing from 34.3 in Nov to 34.3 in Dec, which is substantial additional work on a labor force of 159.640 million SA in Dec 2016. Another headline number widely followed is the unemployment rate or number of people unemployed as percent of the labor force. The unemployment rate calculated in the household survey increased from 4.6 percent in Nov 2016 to 4.7 percent in Dec 2016, seasonally adjusted. This blog provides with every employment situation report the number of people in the US in job stress or unemployed plus underemployed calculated without seasonal adjustment (NSA) at 24.2 million in Dec 2016 and 23.6 million in Nov 2016. The final row in Table I-1 provides the number in job stress as percent of the actual labor force calculated at 13.8 percent in Dec 2016 and 14.0 percent in Nov 2016. Almost one in every five workers in the US is unemployed or underemployed.
There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:
- Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP two trillion dollars below trend (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.2 percent per year from 1929 to 2015, with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.2 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2015. GDP in IIIQ2016 is 13.8 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent
- Private fixed investment stagnating at increase of 7.5 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html)
- Twenty three million or 13.8 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with stagnating or declining real wages (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
- Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)
- Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/impact-of-monetary-policy-on-exchange.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
- Productivity growth fell from 2.2 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2015 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2015, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)
- Output of manufacturing in Nov 2016 at 27.5 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 20.9 percent below trend since 1986 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)
- Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (Section II and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Worldwide waves of inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
- Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier) (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
- Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
- 43 million in poverty and 29 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1999 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 18.1 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2016 when it would have grown over 30.6 percent at trend of 3.1 percent per year in real terms from IVQ1945 to IIIQ2016 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html). Financial assets increased $20.4 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $3.9 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation fell 2.4 percent.
Table I-1, US, Summary of the Employment Situation Report SA
Dec 2016 | Nov 2016 | |
New Nonfarm Payroll Jobs | 156,000 | 204,000 |
New Private Payroll Jobs | 144,000 | 198,000 |
Average Hourly Earnings | Dec 16 $26.00 SA ∆% Dec 16/Dec 15 NSA: 2.9 ∆% Dec 16/Nov 16 SA: 0.4 | Nov 16 $25.90 SA ∆% Nov 16/Nov 15 NSA: 1.9 ∆% Nov 16/Oct 16 SA: -0.1 |
Average Hourly Earnings in Constant Dollars | ∆% Nov 2016/Nov 2015 NSA: -1.3 | |
Average Weekly Hours | 34.3 SA 34.3 NSA | 34.3 SA 34.4 NSA |
Unemployment Rate Household Survey % of Labor Force SA | 4.7 | 4.6 |
Number in Job Stress Unemployed and Underemployed Blog Calculation | 24.2 million NSA | 23.6 million NSA |
In Job Stress as % Labor Force | 14.4 NSA | 14.0 NSA |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the US Department of Labor provides both seasonally adjusted (SA) and not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) or unadjusted data with important uses (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012Feb3; 2011Feb11):
“Most series published by the Current Employment Statistics program reflect a regularly recurring seasonal movement that can be measured from past experience. By eliminating that part of the change attributable to the normal seasonal variation, it is possible to observe the cyclical and other nonseasonal movements in these series. Seasonally adjusted series are published monthly for selected employment, hours, and earnings estimates.”
Requirements of using best available information and updating seasonality factors affect the comparability over time of United States employment data. In the first month of the year, the BLS revises data for several years by adjusting benchmarks and seasonal factors (page 4 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015), which is the case of the data for Jan 2015 released on Feb 6, 2015:
“In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2014. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which enumerates jobs covered by the unemployment insurance tax system. The benchmark process results in revisions to not seasonally adjusted data from April 2013 forward.
Seasonally adjusted data from January 2010 forward are subject to revision. In addition, data for some series prior to 2010, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted, incorporate revisions. The total nonfarm employment level for March 2014 was revised upward by 91,000 (+67,000 on a not seasonally adjusted basis, or less than 0.05 percent). The average benchmark revision over the past 10 years was plus or minus 0.3 percent. Table A presents revised total nonfarm employment data on a seasonally adjusted basis for January through
December 2014.
An article that discusses the benchmark and post-benchmark revisions and other technical issues can be accessed through the BLS website at www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesbmart.pdf.
Information on the data released today also may be obtained by calling (202) 691-6555.”
There are also adjustments of population that affect comparability of labor statistics over time (page 5 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015):
“Effective with data for January 2015, updated population estimates have been used in the household survey. Population estimates for the household survey are developed by the U.S. Census Bureau. Each year, the Census Bureau updates the estimates to reflect new information and assumptions about the growth of the population since the previous decennial census. The change in population reflected in the new estimates results from adjustments for net international migration, updated vital statistics and other information, and some methodological changes in the estimation process. In accordance with usual practice, BLS will not revise the official household survey estimates for December 2014 and earlier months. To show the impact of the population adjustments, however, differences in selected December 2014 labor force series based on the old and new population estimates are shown in table B.”
There are also adjustments of benchmarks and seasonality factors for establishment data that affect comparability over time (page 4 at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf release of Jan 2015 at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/empsit_nr.htm#2015):
“In accordance with annual practice, the establishment survey data released today [Feb 6, 2015] have been benchmarked to reflect comprehensive counts of payroll jobs for March 2014. These counts are derived principally from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which enumerates jobs covered by the unemployment insurance tax system. The benchmark process results in revisions to not seasonally adjusted data from April 2013 forward. Seasonally adjusted data from January 2010 forward are subject to revision. In addition, data for some series prior to 2010, both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted, incorporate revisions.”
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal factors in the release for Dec 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf):
“Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2011 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2015 through November 2015 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised household data for seasonal factors in the release for Dec 2016 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf):
“Seasonally adjusted household survey data have been revised using updated seasonal adjustment factors, a procedure done at the end of each calendar year. Seasonally adjusted estimates back to January 2012 were subject to revision. The unemployment rates for January 2016 through November 2016 (as originally published and as revised) appear in table A on page 5, along with additional information about the revisions.”
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised establishment data for seasonal and benchmarks in the release for Jan 2016 (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf): “Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. Also, household survey data for January 2016 reflect updated population estimates. See the notes beginning on page 4 for more information about these changes.”
All comparisons over time are affected by yearly adjustments of benchmarks and seasonality factors. All data in this blog comment use revised data released by the BLS (http://www.bls.gov/).
IA2 Number of People in Job Stress. There are two approaches to calculating the number of people in job stress. The first approach consists of calculating the number of people in job stress unemployed or underemployed with the raw data of the employment situation report as in Table I-2. The data are seasonally adjusted (SA). The first three rows provide the labor force and unemployed in millions and the unemployment rate of unemployed as percent of the labor force. There is decrease in the number unemployed from 7.740 million in Oct 2016 to 7.409 million in Nov 2016 and increase to 7.529 million in Dec 2016. The rate of unemployment decreased from 4.8 percent in Oct 2016 to 4.6 percent in Nov 2016 and increased to 4.7 percent in Dec 2016. An important aspect of unemployment is its persistence for more than 27 weeks with 1.831 million in Dec 2016, corresponding to 24.3 percent of the unemployed. The longer the period of unemployment the lower are the chances of finding another job with many long-term unemployed ceasing to search for a job. Another key characteristic of the current labor market is the high number of people trying to subsist with part-time jobs because they cannot find full-time employment or part-time for economic reasons. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals were working part time because their hours had been cut back or because they were unable to find full-time work” (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number of part-time for economic reasons decreased from 5.850 million in Oct 2016 to 5.659 million in Nov 2016 and decreased to 5.598 million in Dec 2016. Another important fact is the marginally attached to the labor force. The BLS explains as follows: “these individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey” (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf 2). The number in job stress unemployed or underemployed of 14.811 million in Dec 2016 consists of:
· 7.529 million unemployed (of whom 1.831 million, or 24.3 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more) compared with 7.409 million unemployed in Nov 2016 (of whom 1.856 million, or 25.1 percent, unemployed for 27 weeks or more).
· 5.598 million employed part-time for economic reasons in Dec 2016 (who suffered reductions in their work hours or could not find full-time employment) compared with 5.659 million in Nov 2016
· 1.684 million who were marginally attached to the labor force in Dec 2016 (who were not in the labor force but wanted and were available for work) compared with 1.932 million in Nov 2016
Table I-2, US, People in Job Stress, Millions and % SA
Dec 2016 | Nov 2016 | Oct 2016 | |
Labor Force Millions | 159.640 | 159.456 | 159.643 |
Unemployed | 7.529 | 7.409 | 7.740 |
Unemployment Rate (unemployed as % labor force) | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
Unemployed ≥27 weeks | 1.831 | 1.856 | 1.964 |
Unemployed ≥27 weeks % | 24.3 | 25.1 | 25.4 |
Part Time for Economic Reasons | 5.598 | 5.659 | 5.850 |
Marginally | 1.684 | 1.932 | 1.700 |
Job Stress | 14.811 | 15.000 | 15.290 |
In Job Stress as % Labor Force | 9.3 | 9.4 | 9.6 |
Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-3 repeats the data in Table I-2 but including Sep and additional data. What really matters is the number of people with jobs or the total employed, representing the opportunity for exit from unemployment. The final row of Table I-3 provides people employed as percent of the population or employment to population ratio. The number has remained relatively constant around 59 percent, reaching 59.8 in Sep 2015, 59.7 in Oct 2016, 59.7 in Nov 2016 and 59.7 in Dec 2016. The employment to population ratio fell from an annual level of 63.1 percent in 2006 to 58.6 percent in 2012, 58.6 percent in 2013 and 59.0 in 2014 with the lowest level at 58.4 percent in 2011. The employment population ratio reached 59.3 in 2015.
Table I-3, US, Unemployment and Underemployment, SA, Millions and Percent
Dec 2016 | Nov 2016 | Oct 2016 | Sep 2016 | |
Labor Force | 159.640 | 159.456 | 159.643 | 159.830 |
Participation Rate | 62.7 | 62.6 | 62.8 | 62.9 |
Unemployed | 7.529 | 7.409 | 7.740 | 7.904 |
UNE Rate % | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.9 |
Part Time Economic Reasons | 5.598 | 5.659 | 5.850 | 5.874 |
Marginally Attached to Labor Force | 1.684 | 1.932 | 1.700 | 1.844 |
In Job Stress | 14.811 | 15.000 | 15.290 | 15.622 |
In Job Stress % Labor Force | 9.3 | 9.4 | 9.6 | 9.8 |
Employed | 152.111 | 152.048 | 151.902 | 151.926 |
Employment % Population | 59.7 | 59.7 | 59.7 | 59.8 |
Job Stress = Unemployed + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached Labor Force
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The balance of this section considers the second approach. Charts I-1 to I-12 explain the reasons for considering another approach to calculating job stress in the US. Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2016. There was a big drop of the number of people employed from 147.315 million at the peak in Jul 2007 (NSA) to 136.809 million at the trough in Jan 2010 (NSA) with 10.506 million fewer people employed. Recovery has been anemic compared with the shallow recession of 2001 that was followed by nearly vertical growth in jobs. The number employed in Dec 2016 was 151.798 million (NSA) or 4.483 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.742 million in Dec 2016 or by 22.784 million. The number employed increased 3.0 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2016 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 9.8 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employment as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2016 would result in 161.761 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 254.742 million). There are effectively 9.963 million fewer jobs in Dec 2016 than in Jul 2007, or 161.761 million minus 151.798 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
Chart I-1, US, Employed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-2 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the number of people employed in the US from 2001 to 2016. There was recovery since 2010 but not sufficient to recover lost jobs. Many people in the US who had jobs before the global recession are not working now and many who entered the labor force cannot find employment.
Chart I-2, US, Employed, 12-Month Percentage Change NSA, 2001-2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The foundation of the second approach derives from Chart I-3 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics providing the level of the civilian labor force in the US. The civilian labor force consists of people who are available and willing to work and who have searched for employment recently. The labor force of the US NSA grew 9.4 percent from 142.828 million in Jan 2001 to 156.255 million in Jul 2009. The civilian labor force is 1.7 percent higher at 158.968 million in Dec 2016 than in Jul 2009, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. Chart I-3 shows the flattening of the curve of expansion of the labor force and its decline in 2010 and 2011. The ratio of the labor force of 154.871 million in Jul 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.958 million in Jul 2007 was 66.8 percent while the ratio of the labor force of 158.968 million in Dec 2016 to the noninstitutional population of 254.742 million in Dec 2016 was 62.4 percent. The labor force of the US in Dec 2016 corresponding to 66.8 percent of participation in the population would be 170.168 million (0.668 x 254.742). The difference between the measured labor force in Dec 2016 of 158.968 million and the labor force in Dec 2016 with participation rate of 66.8 percent (as in Jul 2007) of 170.168 million is 11.200 million. The level of the labor force in the US has stagnated and is 11.200 million lower than what it would have been had the same participation rate been maintained. Millions of people have abandoned their search for employment because they believe there are no jobs available for them. The key issue is whether the decline in participation of the population in the labor force is the result of people giving up on finding another job.
Chart I-3, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, SA, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-4 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of the labor force in the US. The rate of growth fell almost instantaneously with the global recession and became negative from 2009 to 2011. The labor force of the US collapsed and did not recover. Growth in the beginning of the summer originates in younger people looking for jobs in the summer after graduation or during school recess.
Chart I-4, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 12-month Percentage Change, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-5 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the labor force participation rate in the US or labor force as percent of the population. The labor force participation rate of the US fell from 66.8 percent in Jan 2001 to 62.4 percent NSA in Dec 2016, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. The annual labor force participation rate for 1979 was 63.7 percent and also 63.7 percent in Nov 1980 during sharp economic contraction. This comparison is further elaborated below. Chart I-5 shows an evident downward trend beginning with the global recession that has continued throughout the recovery beginning in IIIQ2009. The critical issue is whether people left the workforce of the US because they believe there is no longer a job for them.
Chart I-5, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Population in Labor Force SA, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-6 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the level of unemployed in the US. The number unemployed rose from the trough of 6.272 million NSA in Oct 2006 to the peak of 16.147 million in Jan 2010, declining to 13.400 million in Jul 2012, 12.696 million in Aug 2012 and 11.741 million in Sep 2012. The level unemployed fell to 11.741 million in Oct 2012, 11.404 million in Nov 2012, 11.844 million in Dec 2012, 13.181 million in Jan 2013, 12.500 million in Feb 2013 and 9.984 million in Dec 2013. The level of unemployment reached 7.170 million in Dec 2016, all numbers not seasonally adjusted.
Chart I-6, US, Unemployed, Thousands, SA, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-7 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the rate of unemployment in the US or unemployed as percent of the labor force. The rate of unemployment of the US rose from 4.7 percent in Jan 2001 to 6.5 percent in Jun 2003, declining to 4.1 percent in Oct 2006. The rate of unemployment jumped to 10.6 percent in Jan 2010 and declined to 7.6 percent in Dec 2012 but increased to 8.5 percent in Jan 2013 and 8.1 percent in Feb 2013, falling back to 7.3 percent in May 2013 and 7.8 percent in Jun 2013, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. The rate of unemployment not seasonally adjusted stabilized at 7.7 percent in Jul 2013 and fell to 6.5 percent in Dec 2013 and 5.4 percent in Dec 2014. The rate of unemployment NSA decreased to 4.8 percent in Dec 2015 and 4.5 percent in Dec 2016.
Chart I-7, US, Unemployment Rate, SA, 2001-2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-8 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the level of unemployed. There was a jump of 81.8 percent in Apr 2009 with subsequent decline and negative rates since 2010. On an annual basis, the level of unemployed rose 59.8 percent in 2009 and 26.1 percent in 2008 with increase of 3.9 percent in 2010, decline of 7.3 percent in 2011 and decrease of 9.0 percent in 2012. The annual level of unemployment decreased 8.4 percent in 2013 and fell 16.1 percent in 2014. The annual level of unemployment fell 13.7 percent in 2015. The level of unemployment decreased 4.9 percent in Dec 2016 relative to a year earlier.
Chart I-8, US, Unemployed, 12-month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-9 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the number of people in part-time occupations because of economic reasons, that is, because they cannot find full-time employment. The number underemployed in part-time occupations not seasonally adjusted rose from 3.732 million in Jan 2001 to 5.270 million in Jan 2004, falling to 3.787 million in Apr 2006. The number underemployed seasonally adjusted jumped to 9.114 million in Nov 2009, falling to 8.171 million in Dec 2011 but increasing to 8.267 million in Jan 2012 and 8.214 million in Feb 2012 but then falling to 7.922 million in Dec 2012 and increasing to 8.093 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons seasonally adjusted reached 5.669 million in Nov 2016. Without seasonal adjustment, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 9.354 million in Dec 2009, declining to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 and 8.166 million in Dec 2012 but increasing to 8.324 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA stood at 7.990 million in Dec 2013, 6.970 million in Dec 2014 and 6.179 million in Dec 2015. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA stood at 5.707 million in Dec 2016. The longer the period in part-time jobs the lower are the chances of finding another full-time job.
Chart I-9, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, SA, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-10 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics repeats the behavior of unemployment. The 12-month percentage change of the level of people at work part-time for economic reasons jumped 84.7 percent in Mar 2009 and declined subsequently. The declines have been insufficient to reduce significantly the number of people who cannot shift from part-time to full-time employment. On an annual basis, the number of part-time for economic reasons increased 33.5 percent in 2008 and 51.7 percent in 2009, declining 0.4 percent in 2010, 3.5 percent in 2011 and 5.1 percent in 2012. The annual number of part-time for economic reasons decreased 2.3 percent in 2013 and fell 9.1 percent in 2014. The annual number of part-time for economic reasons fell 11.7 percent in 2015. The number of part-time for economic reasons decreased 7.6 percent in Dec 2016 relative to a year earlier.
Chart I-10, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons NSA 12-Month Percentage Change, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-11 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the same pattern of the number marginally attached to the labor force jumping to significantly higher levels during the global recession and remaining at historically high levels. The number marginally attached to the labor force not seasonally adjusted increased from 1.295 million in Jan 2001 to 1.691 million in Feb 2004. The number of marginally attached to the labor force fell to 1.299 million in Sep 2006 and increased to 2.609 million in Dec 2010 and 2.800 million in Jan 2011. The number marginally attached to the labor force was 2.540 million in Dec 2011, increasing to 2.809 million in Jan 2012, falling to 2.608 million in Feb 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell to 2.352 million in Mar 2012, 2.363 million in Apr 2012, 2.423 million in May 2012, 2.483 million in Jun 2012, 2.529 million in Jul 2012 and 2.561 million in Aug 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell to 2.517 million in Sep 2012, 2.433 million in Oct 2012, 2.505 million in Nov 2012 and 2.427 million in in Dec 2013. The number marginally attached to the labor force reached 2.260 million in Dec 2014 and 1.833 million in Dec 2015. The number marginally attached to the labor force stood at 1.684 million in Dec 2016.
Chart I-11, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-12 provides 12-month percentage changes of the marginally attached to the labor force from 2001 to 2016. There was a jump of 56.1 percent in May 2009 during the global recession followed by declines in percentage changes but insufficient negative changes. On an annual basis, the number of marginally attached to the labor force increased in four consecutive years: 15.7 percent in 2008, 37.9 percent in 2009, 11.7 percent in 2010 and 3.5 percent in 2011. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 2.2 percent on annual basis in 2012 but increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012, fell 13.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013, falling 10.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. The number marginally attached to the labor force increased 4.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 and fell 4.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and 8.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013. The annual number of marginally attached to the labor force fell 6.2 percent in 2013 and fell 6.5 percent in 2014. The annual number of marginally attached to the labor force fell 11.4 percent in 2015. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 7.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 and fell 6.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. The number marginally attached to the labor force fell 18.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015 and decreased 8.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016.
Chart I-12, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table I-4 consists of data and additional calculations using the BLS household survey, illustrating the possibility that the actual rate of unemployment could be 10.0 percent and the number of people in job stress could be around 24.3 million, which is 14.4 percent of the effective labor force. The first column provides for 2006 the yearly average population (POP), labor force (LF), participation rate or labor force as percent of population (PART %), employment (EMP), employment population ratio (EMP/POP %), unemployment (UEM), the unemployment rate as percent of labor force (UEM/LF Rate %) and the number of people not in the labor force (NLF). All data are unadjusted or not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA). The numbers in column 2006 are averages in millions while the monthly numbers for Dec 2015, Nov 2016 and Dec 2016 are in thousands, not seasonally adjusted. The average yearly participation rate of the population in the labor force was in the range of 66.0 percent minimum to 67.1 percent maximum between 2000 and 2006 with the average of 66.4 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). Table I-4b provides the yearly labor force participation rate from 1979 to 2016. The objective of Table I-4 is to assess how many people could have left the labor force because they do not think they can find another job. Row “LF PART 66.2 %” applies the participation rate of 2006, almost equal to the rates for 2000 to 2006, to the noninstitutional civilian population in Dec 2015, Nov 2016 and Dec 2016 to obtain what would be the labor force of the US if the participation rate had not changed. In fact, the participation rate fell to 62.4 percent by Dec 2015 and was 62.6 percent in Nov 2016 and 62.4 percent in Dec 2016, suggesting that many people simply gave up on finding another job. Row “∆ NLF UEM” calculates the number of people not counted in the labor force because they could have given up on finding another job by subtracting from the labor force with participation rate of 66.2 percent (row “LF PART 66.2%”) the labor force estimated in the household survey (row “LF”). Total unemployed (row “Total UEM”) is obtained by adding unemployed in row “∆NLF UEM” to the unemployed of the household survey in row “UEM.” The row “Total UEM%” is the effective total unemployed “Total UEM” as percent of the effective labor force in row “LF PART 66.2%.” The results are that:
- there are an estimated 9.671 million unemployed in Dec 2016 who are not counted because they left the labor force on their belief they could not find another job (∆NLF UEM), that is, they dropped out of their job searches
- the total number of unemployed is effectively 16.841 million (Total UEM) and not 7.170 million (UEM) of whom many have been unemployed long term
- the rate of unemployment is 10.0 percent (Total UEM%) and not 4.5 percent, not seasonally adjusted, or 4.7 percent seasonally adjusted
- the number of people in job stress is close to 24.2 million by adding the 9.054 million leaving the labor force because they believe they could not find another job, corresponding to 14.4 percent of the effective labor force.
The row “In Job Stress” in Table I-4 provides the number of people in job stress not seasonally adjusted at 23.373 million in Oct 2016, adding the total number of unemployed (“Total UEM”), plus those involuntarily in part-time jobs because they cannot find anything else (“Part Time Economic Reasons”) and the marginally attached to the labor force (“Marginally attached to LF”). The final row of Table I-4 shows that the number of people in job stress is equivalent to 14.4 percent of the labor force in Nov 2016. The employment population ratio “EMP/POP %” dropped from 62.9 percent on average in 2006 to 59.4 percent in Dec 2015, 59.9 percent in Nov 2016 and 59.6 percent in Dec 2016. The number employed in Dec 2016 was 151.798 million (NSA) or 4.483 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.742 million in Dec 2016 or by 22.784 million. The number employed increased 3.0 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2016 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 9.8 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employment as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2016 would result in 161.761 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 254.742 million). There are effectively 9.963 million fewer jobs in Dec 2016 than in Jul 2007, or 161.761 million minus 151.798 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. The number of hiring relative to the number unemployed measures the chances of becoming employed. The number of hiring in the US economy has declined by 10 million and does not show signs of increasing in an unusual recovery without hiring. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 29 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIIQ2016 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2016/pdf/gdp3q16_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 would have accumulated to 29.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2016 would be $19,414.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2687.4 billion than actual $16,727.0 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.4 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP in IIIQ2016 is 13.8 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,727.0 billion in IIIQ2016 or 11.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2016. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.1081 in Nov 2016. The actual index NSA in Nov 2016 is 103.0759, which is 27.5 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 130.3109 in Nov 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.0759 in Nov 2016 is 20.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-4, US, Population, Labor Force and Unemployment, NSA
2006 | Dec 2015 | Nov 2016 | Dec 2016 | |
POP | 229 | 251,936 | 254,540 | 254,742 |
LF | 151 | 157,245 | 159,451 | 158,968 |
PART% | 66.2 | 62.4 | 62.6 | 62.4 |
EMP | 144 | 149,703 | 152,385 | 151,798 |
EMP/POP% | 62.9 | 59.4 | 59.9 | 59.6 |
UEM | 7 | 7,542 | 7,066 | 7,170 |
UEM/LF Rate% | 4.6 | 4.8 | 4.4 | 4.5 |
NLF | 77 | 94,691 | 95,089 | 95,774 |
LF PART 66.2% | 166,782 | 168,505 | 168,639 | |
∆NLF UEM | 9,537 | 9,054 | 9,671 | |
Total UEM | 17,079 | 16,120 | 16,841 | |
Total UEM% | 10.2 | 9.6 | 10.0 | |
Part Time Economic Reasons | 6,179 | 5,518 | 5,707 | |
Marginally Attached to LF | 1,833 | 1,932 | 1,684 | |
In Job Stress | 25,091 | 23,570 | 24,232 | |
People in Job Stress as % Labor Force | 15.0 | 14.0 | 14.4 |
Pop: population; LF: labor force; PART: participation; EMP: employed; UEM: unemployed; NLF: not in labor force; ∆NLF UEM: additional unemployed; Total UEM is UEM + ∆NLF UEM; Total UEM% is Total UEM as percent of LF PART 66.2%; In Job Stress = Total UEM + Part Time Economic Reasons + Marginally Attached to LF
Note: the first column for 2006 is in average millions; the remaining columns are in thousands; NSA: not seasonally adjusted
The labor force participation rate of 66.2% in 2006 is applied to current population to obtain LF PART 66.2%; ∆NLF UEM is obtained by subtracting the labor force with participation of 66.2 percent from the household survey labor force LF; Total UEM is household data unemployment plus ∆NLF UEM; and total UEM% is total UEM divided by LF PART 66.2%
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 3) of secular stagnation, economic progress consists of growth of real income per person driven by growth of productivity. The “constituent elements” of economic progress are “(a) inventions, (b) the discovery and development of new territory and new resources, and (c) the growth of population” (Hansen 1939, 3). Secular stagnation originates in decline of population growth and discouragement of inventions. According to Hansen (1939, 2), US population grew by 16 million in the 1920s but grew by one half or about 8 million in the 1930s with forecasts at the time of Hansen’s writing in 1938 of growth of around 5.3 million in the 1940s. Hansen (1939, 2) characterized demography in the US as “a drastic decline in the rate of population growth. Hansen’s plea was to adapt economic policy to stagnation of population in ensuring full employment. In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 8), population caused half of the growth of US GDP per year. Growth of output per person in the US and Europe was caused by “changes in techniques and to the exploitation of new natural resources.” In this analysis, population caused 60 percent of the growth of capital formation in the US. Declining population growth would reduce growth of capital formation. Residential construction provided an important share of growth of capital formation. Hansen (1939, 12) argues that market power of imperfect competition discourages innovation with prolonged use of obsolete capital equipment. Trade unions would oppose labor-savings innovations. The combination of stagnating and aging population with reduced innovation caused secular stagnation. Hansen (1939, 12) concludes that there is role for public investments to compensate for lack of dynamism of private investment but with tough tax/debt issues.
The current application of Hansen’s (1938, 1939, 1941) proposition argues that secular stagnation occurs because full employment equilibrium can be attained only with negative real interest rates between minus 2 and minus 3 percent. Professor Lawrence H. Summers (2013Nov8) finds that “a set of older ideas that went under the phrase secular stagnation are not profoundly important in understanding Japan’s experience in the 1990s and may not be without relevance to America’s experience today” (emphasis added). Summers (2013Nov8) argues there could be an explanation in “that the short-term real interest rate that was consistent with full employment had fallen to -2% or -3% sometime in the middle of the last decade. Then, even with artificial stimulus to demand coming from all this financial imprudence, you wouldn’t see any excess demand. And even with a relative resumption of normal credit conditions, you’d have a lot of difficulty getting back to full employment.” The US economy could be in a situation where negative real rates of interest with fed funds rates close to zero as determined by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) do not move the economy to full employment or full utilization of productive resources. Summers (2013Oct8) finds need of new thinking on “how we manage an economy in which the zero nominal interest rates is a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economy activity holding our economies back to their potential.”
Former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (2014Jan8) finds three major risks in prolonged unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing: (1) incentive of delaying action by political leaders; (2) “financial moral hazard” in inducing excessive exposures pursuing higher yields of risker credit classes; and (3) major risks in exiting unconventional policy. Rubin (2014Jan8) proposes reduction of deficits by structural reforms that could promote recovery by improving confidence of business attained with sound fiscal discipline.
Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) provides clear thought on the lack of relevance of Hansen’s contention of secular stagnation to current economic conditions. The application of secular stagnation argues that the economy of the US has attained full-employment equilibrium since around 2000 only with negative real rates of interest of minus 2 to minus 3 percent. At low levels of inflation, the so-called full-employment equilibrium of negative interest rates of minus 2 to minus 3 percent cannot be attained and the economy stagnates. Taylor (2014Jan01) analyzes multiple contradictions with current reality in this application of the theory of secular stagnation:
- Secular stagnation would predict idle capacity, in particular in residential investment when fed fund rates were fixed at 1 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. Taylor (2014Jan01) finds unemployment at 4.4 percent with house prices jumping 7 percent from 2002 to 2003 and 14 percent from 2004 to 2005 before dropping from 2006 to 2007. GDP prices doubled from 1.7 percent to 3.4 percent when interest rates were low from 2003 to 2005.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the application of secular stagnation based on low interest rates because of savings glut and lack of investment opportunities. Taylor (2009) shows that there was no savings glut. The savings rate of the US in the past decade is significantly lower than in the 1980s.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the low ratio of investment to GDP currently and reduced investment and hiring by US business firms.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the financial crisis and global recession were caused by weak implementation of existing regulation and departure from rules-based policies.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the recovery from the global recession was constrained by a change in the regime of regulation and fiscal/monetary policies.
In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share si of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate yi of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):
Y = ∑isiyi (1)
This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):
∆Y = ∑i∆siy*i + ∑i∆yis*i (2)
The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆si multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*i , or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆yi, multiplied by the average share of the group s*i, or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:
“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”
Table I-4b and Chart I-12-b provide the US labor force participation rate or percentage of the labor force in population. It is not likely that simple demographic trends caused the sharp decline during the global recession and failure to recover earlier levels. The civilian labor force participation rate dropped from the peak of 66.9 percent in Jul 2006 to 62.6 percent in Dec 2013, 62.5 percent in Dec 2014, 62.4 percent in Dec 2015 and 62.4 in Dec 2016. The civilian labor force participation rate was 62.4 percent in Dec 2016. The civilian labor force participation rate was 63.7 percent on an annual basis in 1979 and 63.4 percent in Dec 1980 and Dec 1981, reaching even 62.9 percent in both Apr and May 1979. The civilian labor force participation rate jumped with the recovery to 64.8 percent on an annual basis in 1985 and 65.9 percent in Jul 1985. Structural factors cannot explain these sudden changes vividly shown visually in the final segment of Chart I-12b. Seniors would like to delay their retiring especially because of the adversities of financial repression on their savings. Labor force statistics are capturing the disillusion of potential workers with their chances in finding a job in what Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) characterize as accentuated cyclical factors. The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html). “Secular stagnation” would be a process over many years and not from one year to another. This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals.
Table I-4b, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2016
Year | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual |
1979 | 62.9 | 62.9 | 64.5 | 64.9 | 64.5 | 63.8 | 64.0 | 63.8 | 63.8 | 63.7 |
1980 | 63.2 | 63.5 | 64.6 | 65.1 | 64.5 | 63.6 | 63.9 | 63.7 | 63.4 | 63.8 |
1981 | 63.6 | 63.9 | 64.6 | 65.0 | 64.6 | 63.5 | 64.0 | 63.8 | 63.4 | 63.9 |
1982 | 63.3 | 63.9 | 64.8 | 65.3 | 64.9 | 64.0 | 64.1 | 64.1 | 63.8 | 64.0 |
1983 | 63.2 | 63.4 | 65.1 | 65.4 | 65.1 | 64.3 | 64.1 | 64.1 | 63.8 | 64.0 |
1984 | 63.7 | 64.3 | 65.5 | 65.9 | 65.2 | 64.4 | 64.6 | 64.4 | 64.3 | 64.4 |
1985 | 64.3 | 64.6 | 65.5 | 65.9 | 65.4 | 64.9 | 65.1 | 64.9 | 64.6 | 64.8 |
1986 | 64.6 | 65.0 | 66.3 | 66.6 | 66.1 | 65.3 | 65.5 | 65.4 | 65.0 | 65.3 |
1987 | 64.9 | 65.6 | 66.3 | 66.8 | 66.5 | 65.5 | 65.9 | 65.7 | 65.5 | 65.6 |
1988 | 65.3 | 65.5 | 66.7 | 67.1 | 66.8 | 65.9 | 66.1 | 66.2 | 65.9 | 65.9 |
1989 | 65.9 | 66.2 | 67.4 | 67.7 | 67.2 | 66.3 | 66.6 | 66.7 | 66.3 | 66.5 |
1990 | 66.1 | 66.5 | 67.4 | 67.7 | 67.1 | 66.4 | 66.5 | 66.3 | 66.1 | 66.5 |
1991 | 66.0 | 66.0 | 67.2 | 67.3 | 66.6 | 66.1 | 66.1 | 66.0 | 65.8 | 66.2 |
1992 | 66.0 | 66.4 | 67.6 | 67.9 | 67.2 | 66.3 | 66.2 | 66.2 | 66.1 | 66.4 |
1993 | 65.6 | 66.3 | 67.3 | 67.5 | 67.0 | 66.1 | 66.4 | 66.3 | 66.2 | 66.3 |
1994 | 66.0 | 66.5 | 67.2 | 67.5 | 67.2 | 66.5 | 66.8 | 66.7 | 66.5 | 66.6 |
1995 | 66.4 | 66.4 | 67.2 | 67.7 | 67.1 | 66.5 | 66.7 | 66.5 | 66.2 | 66.6 |
1996 | 66.2 | 66.7 | 67.4 | 67.9 | 67.2 | 66.8 | 67.1 | 67.0 | 66.7 | 66.8 |
1997 | 66.7 | 67.0 | 67.8 | 68.1 | 67.6 | 67.0 | 67.1 | 67.1 | 67.0 | 67.1 |
1998 | 66.6 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.9 | 67.3 | 67.0 | 67.1 | 67.1 | 67.0 | 67.1 |
1999 | 66.7 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.9 | 67.3 | 66.8 | 67.0 | 67.0 | 67.0 | 67.1 |
2000 | 67.0 | 67.0 | 67.7 | 67.6 | 67.2 | 66.7 | 66.9 | 66.9 | 67.0 | 67.1 |
2001 | 66.7 | 66.6 | 67.2 | 67.4 | 66.8 | 66.6 | 66.7 | 66.6 | 66.6 | 66.8 |
2002 | 66.4 | 66.5 | 67.1 | 67.2 | 66.8 | 66.6 | 66.6 | 66.3 | 66.2 | 66.6 |
2003 | 66.2 | 66.2 | 67.0 | 66.8 | 66.3 | 65.9 | 66.1 | 66.1 | 65.8 | 66.2 |
2004 | 65.7 | 65.8 | 66.5 | 66.8 | 66.2 | 65.7 | 66.0 | 66.1 | 65.8 | 66.0 |
2005 | 65.8 | 66.0 | 66.5 | 66.8 | 66.5 | 66.1 | 66.2 | 66.1 | 65.9 | 66.0 |
2006 | 65.8 | 66.0 | 66.7 | 66.9 | 66.5 | 66.1 | 66.4 | 66.4 | 66.3 | 66.2 |
2007 | 65.7 | 65.8 | 66.6 | 66.8 | 66.1 | 66.0 | 66.0 | 66.1 | 65.9 | 66.0 |
2008 | 65.7 | 66.0 | 66.6 | 66.8 | 66.4 | 65.9 | 66.1 | 65.8 | 65.7 | 66.0 |
2009 | 65.4 | 65.5 | 66.2 | 66.2 | 65.6 | 65.0 | 64.9 | 64.9 | 64.4 | 65.4 |
2010 | 64.9 | 64.8 | 65.1 | 65.3 | 65.0 | 64.6 | 64.4 | 64.4 | 64.1 | 64.7 |
2011 | 63.9 | 64.1 | 64.5 | 64.6 | 64.3 | 64.2 | 64.1 | 63.9 | 63.8 | 64.1 |
2012 | 63.4 | 63.8 | 64.3 | 64.3 | 63.7 | 63.6 | 63.8 | 63.5 | 63.4 | 63.7 |
2013 | 63.1 | 63.5 | 64.0 | 64.0 | 63.4 | 63.2 | 62.9 | 62.9 | 62.6 | 63.2 |
2014 | 62.6 | 62.9 | 63.4 | 63.5 | 63.0 | 62.8 | 63.0 | 62.8 | 62.5 | 62.9 |
2015 | 62.6 | 63.0 | 63.1 | 63.2 | 62.7 | 62.3 | 62.5 | 62.5 | 62.4 | 62.7 |
2016 | 62.7 | 62.7 | 63.2 | 63.4 | 62.9 | 62.8 | 62.8 | 62.6 | 62.4 | 62.8 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-12b, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1979-2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Broader perspective is in Chart I-12c of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The United States civilian noninstitutional population has increased along a consistent trend since 1948 that continued through earlier recessions and the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 and the cyclical expansion after IIIQ2009.
Chart I-12c, US, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Thousands, NSA, 1948-2016
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The labor force of the United States in Chart I-12d has increased along a trend similar to that of the civilian noninstitutional population in Chart I-12c. There is an evident stagnation of the civilian labor force in the final segment of Chart I-12d during the current economic cycle. This stagnation is explained by cyclical factors similar to those analyzed by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) that motivated an increasing population to drop out of the labor force instead of structural factors. Large segments of the potential labor force are not observed, constituting unobserved unemployment and of more permanent nature because those afflicted have been seriously discouraged from working by the lack of opportunities.
Chart I-12d, US, Labor Force, Thousands, NSA, 1948-2016
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of labor force participation in the US is in Chart I-12E from 1948 to 2016. There is sudden decline during the global recession after 2007 without recovery explained by cyclical factors (Lazear and Spletzer2012JHJul22) as may many potential workers stopped their searches disillusioned that there could be an opportunity for them in sharply contracted markets.
Chart I-12E, US, Labor Force Participation Rate, Percent of Labor Force in Population, NSA, 1948-2016
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment. There is initial discussion here of long-term employment trends followed by cyclical comparison. Growth and employment creation have been mediocre in the expansion beginning in Jul IIIQ2009 from the contraction between Dec IVQ2007 and Jun IIQ2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). A series of charts from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides significant insight. Chart I-13 provides the monthly employment level of the US from 1948 to 2016. The number of people employed has trebled. There are multiple contractions throughout the more than six decades but followed by resumption of the strong upward trend. The contraction of employment after 2007 is sharp and followed by a flatter curve of job creation. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery that historically eliminated unemployment and underemployment created during the contraction. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment. There is initial discussion here of long-term employment trends followed by cyclical comparison. Growth and employment creation have been mediocre in the expansion beginning in Jul IIIQ2009 from the contraction between Dec IVQ2007 and Jun IIQ2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). A series of charts from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides significant insight. Chart I-13 provides the monthly employment level of the US from 1948 to 2016. The number of people employed has trebled. There are multiple contractions throughout the more than six decades but followed by resumption of the strong upward trend. The contraction of employment after 2007 is sharp and followed by a flatter curve of job creation. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery that historically eliminated unemployment and underemployment created during the contraction. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 29 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIIQ2016 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2016/pdf/gdp3q16_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 would have accumulated to 29.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2016 would be $19,414.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2687.4 billion than actual $16,727.0 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.4 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP in IIIQ2016 is 13.8 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,727.0 billion in IIIQ2016 or 11.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2016. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.1081 in Nov 2016. The actual index NSA in Nov 2016 is 103.0759, which is 27.5 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 130.3109 in Nov 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.0759 in Nov 2016 is 20.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart I-13, US, Employment Level, Thousands, SA, 1948-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The steep and consistent curve of growth of the US labor force is in Chart I-14. The contraction beginning in Dec 2007 flattened the path of the US civilian labor force and with flatter curve during the current expansion.
Chart I-14, US, Civilian Labor Force, SA, 1948-2016, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-15 for the period from 1948 to 2016. The labor force participation rate is influenced by numerous factors such as the age of the population. There is no comparable episode in the postwar economy to the sharp collapse of the labor force participation rate in Chart I-15 during the contraction and subsequent expansion after 2007. Aging can reduce the labor force participation rate as many people retire but many may have decided to work longer as their wealth and savings have been significantly reduced. There is an important effect of many people just exiting the labor force because they believe there is no job available for them.
Chart I-15, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, SA, 1948-2016, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number of unemployed in the US jumped seasonally adjusted from 5.8 million in May 1979 to 12.1 million in Dec 1982, by 6.3 million, or 108.6 percent. The jump not seasonally adjusted was from 5.4 million in May 1979 to 12.5 million in Jan 1983, by 7.1 million or 131.5 percent. The number of unemployed seasonally adjusted jumped from 6.7 million in Mar 2007 to 15.4 million in Oct 2009, by 8.7 million, or 129.9 percent. The number of unemployed not seasonally adjusted jumped from 6.5 million in Apr 2007 to 16.1 million in Jan 2010, by 9.6 million or 147.7 percent. These are the two episodes with steepest increase in the level of unemployment in Chart I-16.
Chart I-16, US, Unemployed, SA, 1948-2016, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-17 provides the rate of unemployment of the US from 1948 to 2016. The peak of the series is 10.8 percent in both Nov and Dec 1982. The second highest rates are 10.0 percent in Oct 2009 and 9.9 percent in both Nov and Dec 2009 SA. The unadjusted rate of unemployment NSA reached 4.5 percent in Dec 2016.
Chart I-17, US, Unemployment Rate, SA, 1948-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number unemployed 27 weeks or more in Chart I-18 jumped to peak levels in the current cycle. There is insufficient decline to return to earlier levels.
Chart I-18, US, Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More, SA, 1948-2016, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The employment-population ratio in Chart I-19 is an important indicator of wellbeing in labor markets, measuring the number of people with jobs. The US employment-population ratio fell from 63.5 in Dec 2006 to 58.6 in Jul 2011 and stands at 59.6 NSA in Dec 2016. There is no comparable decline followed by stabilization during a cyclical expansion in Chart I-19.
Chart I-19, US, Employment-Population Ratio, 1948-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number employed part-time for economic reasons in Chart I-20 increased in the recessions and declined during the expansions. In the current cycle, the number employed part-time for economic reasons increased sharply and has not returned to normal levels. Lower growth of economic activity in the expansion after IIIQ2009 failed to reduce the number desiring to work full time but finding only part-time occupations. The lack of full-time jobs is evidently cyclical and not secular.
Chart I-20, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, NSA, 1955-2016, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-5 provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.7 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.2 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.3 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. In contrast, GDP grew 2.5 percent in 2010, 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.7 percent in 2013, 2.4 percent in 2014 and 2.6 percent in 2015. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, twelve quarters from IQ2013 to IVQ2015, IQ2016, IIQ2016 and IIIQ2016 is 2.1 percent and 1.7 percent in the four quarters ending in IIIQ2016. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. The forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 1.9 to 2.3 percent in 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20161214.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 1.8 to 2.2 percent in 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20161214.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016 has been at average 2.1 percent in annual equivalent.
Table I-5, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%
Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% |
1930 | -8.5 | 1980 | -0.2 | 2000 | 4.1 |
1931 | -6.4 | 1981 | 2.6 | 2001 | 1.0 |
1932 | -12.9 | 1982 | -1.9 | 2002 | 1.8 |
1933 | -1.3 | 1983 | 4.6 | 2003 | 2.8 |
1934 | 10.8 | 1984 | 7.3 | 2004 | 3.8 |
1935 | 8.9 | 1985 | 4.2 | 2005 | 3.3 |
1936 | 12.9 | 1986 | 3.5 | 2006 | 2.7 |
1937 | 5.1 | 1987 | 3.5 | 2007 | 1.8 |
1938 | -3.3 | 1988 | 4.2 | 2008 | -0.3 |
1939 | 8.0 | 1989 | 3.7 | 2009 | -2.8 |
1940 | 8.8 | 1990 | 1.9 | 2010 | 2.5 |
1941 | 17.7 | 1991 | -0.1 | 2011 | 1.6 |
1942 | 18.9 | 1992 | 3.6 | 2012 | 2.2 |
1943 | 17.0 | 1993 | 2.7 | 2013 | 1.7 |
1944 | 8.0 | 1994 | 4.0 | 2014 | 2.4 |
1945 | -1.0 | 1995 | 2.7 | 2015 | 2.6 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are in Table I-6 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.7 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.2 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.
Table I-6, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions
Number of Quarters | Cumulative Percentage Contraction | Average Percentage Rate | |
IIQ1953 to IIQ1954 | 3 | -2.4 | -0.8 |
IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958 | 3 | -3.0 | -1.0 |
IVQ1973 to IQ1975 | 5 | -3.1 | -0.6 |
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 | 2 | -2.2 | -1.1 |
IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | 4 | -2.5 | -0.64 |
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | 6 | -4.2 | -0.72 |
Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table I-7 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.1 percent of the US economy in the twenty-nine quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:
- 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
- 5.4 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
- 5.2 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
- 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
- 5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
- 4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987
- 5.0 percent in the first twenty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1987
- 4.9 percent in the first twenty-first quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1988
- 4.9 percent in the first twenty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1988
- 4.8 percent in the first twenty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988
- 4.8 percent in the first twenty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1988
- 4.8 percent in the first twenty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1989
- 4.7 percent in the first twenty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1989
- 4.7 percent in the first twenty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989
- 4.5 percent in the first twenty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1989
- 4.5 percent in the first twenty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1990
The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.5 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.6 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.7 percent in 2013, 2.4 percent in 2014 and 2.6 percent in 2015 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988. 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. GDP grew 2.7 percent in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013, the four quarters of 2014, the four quarters of Q2015, IQ2016, IIQ2016 and IIIQ2016 accumulated to 10.0 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.1 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IIIQ2016 of $16,727.0 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,190.3 billion and compounding by 4/19: {[($16,727.0/$15,190.3)4/19 -1]100 = 2.1 percent}.
Table I-7 shows that GDP grew 16.5 percent in the first twenty-nine quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016 at the annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent.
Table I-7, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions
Number | Cumulative Growth ∆% | Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate | |
IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957 | 11 | 12.8 | 4.5 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955 | 4 | 7.8 | |
IIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 5 | 10.0 | 7.9 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 4 | 9.2 | |
IIQ1975 to IVQ1976 | 8 | 8.3 | 4.1 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 | 4 | 6.1 | |
IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983 to IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 IQ1983 to IQ1989 IQ1983 to IIQ1989 IQ1983 to IIIQ1989 IQ1983 to IVQ1989 IQ1983 to IQ1990 | 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 | 19.9 21.6 22.3 23.1 24.5 25.6 27.7 28.4 30.1 30.9 32.6 34.0 35.0 36.0 36.3 37.8 | 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 |
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983 | 4 | 7.8 | |
Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions* | 7.7 | ||
IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016 | 29 | 16.5 | 2.1 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 | 2.7 |
*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
A group of charts from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics facilitates the comparison of employment in the 1980s and 2000s. The long-term charts and tables from I-5 to I-7 in the discussion above confirm the view that the comparison of the current expansion should be with that in the 1980s because of similar dimensions. Chart I-21 provides the level of employment in the US between 1979 and 1989. Employment surged after the contraction and grew rapidly during the decade.
Chart I-21, US, Employed, Thousands, 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-22 provides the level of employment in the US from 2001 to 2016. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs. Recovery has been anemic compared with the shallow recession of 2001 that was followed by nearly vertical growth in jobs. The number employed in Dec 2016 was 151.798 million (NSA) or 4.483 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.742 million in Dec 2016 or by 22.784 million. The number employed increased 3.0 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2016 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 9.8 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employment as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2016 would result in 161.761 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 254.742 million). There are effectively 9.963 million fewer jobs in Dec 2016 than in Jul 2007, or 161.761 million minus 151.798 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
Chart I-22, US, Employed, Thousands, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The US civilian labor force in Chart I-23 grew with few interruptions from 1979 to 1989.
Chart I-23, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The civilian labor force in Chart I-24 grew steadily on an upward trend in the 2000s until it contracted together with the economy after 2007. There has not been recovery during the expansion but rather decline and marginal turn of the year 2011 into expansion in 2012 followed by stability and oscillation into 2013-2016. There is substantial underperformance relative to trend before the global recession. The civilian labor force consists of people who are available and willing to work and who have searched for employment recently. The labor force of the US NSA grew 9.4 percent from 142.828 million in Jan 2001 to 156.255 million in Jul 2009. The civilian labor force is 2.0 percent higher at 159.451 million in Nov 2016 than in Jul 2009, all numbers not seasonally adjusted. Chart I-3 shows the flattening of the curve of expansion of the labor force and its decline in 2010 and 2011. The ratio of the labor force of 154.871 million in Jul 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.958 million in Jul 2007 was 66.8 percent while the ratio of the labor force of 158.968 million in Dec 2016 to the noninstitutional population of 254.742 million in Dec 2016 was 62.4 percent. The labor force of the US in Dec 2016 corresponding to 66.8 percent of participation in the population would be 170.168 million (0.668 x 254.742). The difference between the measured labor force in Dec 2016 of 158.968 million and the labor force in Dec 2016 with participation rate of 66.8 percent (as in Jul 2007) of 170.168 million is 11.200 million. The level of the labor force in the US has stagnated and is 11.200 million lower than what it would have been had the same participation rate been maintained. Millions of people have abandoned their search for employment because they believe there are no jobs available for them. The key issue is whether the decline in participation of the population in the labor force is the result of people giving up on finding another job.
Chart I-24, US, Civilian Labor Force, Thousands, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of participation of the labor force in population stagnated during the stagflation and conquest of inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as shown in Chart I-25. Recovery was vigorous during the expansion and lasted through the remainder of the decade.
Chart I-25, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, 1979-1989, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of participation in the labor force declined after the recession of 2001 followed by stability until 2007, as shown in Chart I-26. The rate of participation in the labor force continued to decline both during the contraction after 2007 and during the expansion after 2009 with marginal expansion at the turn of the year into 2012 followed by trend of decline and stability. Sharp decline occurred during the cycle and not secularly.
Chart I-26, US, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, 2001-2016, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-27 provides the number unemployed during the 1980s. The number unemployed peaked at 12.051 million in Dec 1982 seasonally adjusted and 12.517 in Jan 1983 million not seasonally adjusted, declining to 8.358 million in Dec 1984 seasonally adjusted and 7.978 million in Dec 1984 not seasonally adjusted during the first two years of expansion from the contraction. The number unemployed then fell to 6.667 million in Dec 1989 seasonally adjusted and 6.300 million not seasonally adjusted.
Chart I-27, US, Unemployed Thousands 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-28 provides the number unemployed from 2001 to 2016. Using seasonally adjusted data, the number unemployed rose from 6.727 million in Oct 2006 to 15.352 million in Oct 2009, declining to 13.093 million in Dec 2011, 8.704 million in Dec 2014 and 7.927 million in Dec 2015. The number unemployed SA stood at 7.529 million in Dec 2016. Using data not seasonally adjusted, the number unemployed rose from 6.272 million in Oct 2006 to 16.147 million in Jan 2010, declining to 11.844 million in Dec 2012, increasing to 13.181 million in Jan 2013 and declining to 9.984 million in Dec 2013. The level of unemployment fell from 10.855 million in Jan 2014 to 8.331 million in Dec 2014. The level of unemployment was 7.542 million in Dec 2015 and 7.170 million in Dec 2016.
Chart I-28, US, Unemployed Thousands 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of unemployment peaked at 10.8 percent in both Nov and Dec 1982 seasonally adjusted, as shown in Chart I-29. The rate of unemployment dropped sharply during the expansion after 1984 and continued to decline during the rest of the decade to 5.4 percent in Dec 1989. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the rate of unemployment peaked at 11.4 percent in Jan 1983, declining to 7.0 percent in Dec 1984 and 5.1 percent in Dec 1989.
Chart I-29, US, Unemployment Rate, 1979-1989, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of unemployment in the US seasonally adjusted jumped from 4.4 percent in May 2007 to 10.0 percent in Oct 2009 and 9.9 percent in both Nov and Dec 2009, as shown in Chart I-30. The rate of unemployment fluctuated at around 9.0 percent in 2011, declining to 7.9 percent in Dec 2012 and 6.7 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of unemployed eased to 5.6 percent in Dec 2014 and 5.0 percent in Dec 2015. The rate of unemployment SA stood at 4.7 percent in Dec 2016.
Chart I-30, US, Unemployment Rate, 2001-2016, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The employment population ratio seasonally adjusted fell from around 60.1 in Dec 1979 to 57.1 in both Feb and Mar 1983, as shown in Chart I-31. The employment population ratio seasonally adjusted rose back to 59.9 in Dec 1984 and reached 63.0 later in the decade in Dec 1989. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the employment population ratio dropped from 60.4 percent in Oct 1979 to 56.1 percent in Jan 1983, increasing to 59.8 in Dec 1984 and to 62.9 percent in Dec 1989.
Chart I-31, US, Employment Population Ratio, 1979-1989, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The US employment-population ratio seasonally adjusted has fallen from 63.4 in Dec 2006 to 58.6 in Dec 2011, 58.6 in Dec 2012, 58.6 in Dec 2013, 59.2 in Dec 2014 and 59.6 in Dec 2015, as shown in Chart I-32. The employment-population ratio reached 59.7 in Dec 2016. The employment population-ratio has stagnated during the expansion. Using not seasonally adjusted data, the employment population ratio fell from 63.6 percent in Jul 2006 to 57.6 percent in Jan 2011, 58.5 percent in Dec 2012, 58.5 percent in Dec 2013 and 59.1 in Dec 2014. The employment population ratio reached 59.4 percent in Dec 2015 and 59.6 percent in Dec 2016.
Chart I-32, US, Employment Population Ratio, 2001-2016, %
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number unemployed 27 weeks or more rose in Chart I-33 rose from 492,000 NSA in Oct 1979 to 2.978 million in Mar 1983. The level unemployed 27 weeks or more NSA fell to 566,000 in Aug 1989.
Chart I-33, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More 1979-1989, SA, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number unemployed for 27 weeks or over, seasonally adjusted, increased sharply during the contraction as shown in Chart I-34 from 1.131 million in Nov 2006 to 6.800 million in Apr 2010 seasonally adjusted. The number of unemployed for 27 weeks remained at around 6 million during the expansion compared with somewhat above 1 million before the contraction, falling to 1.831 million in Dec 2016 seasonally adjusted and 1.769 million not seasonally adjusted.
Chart I-34, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or More, 2001-2016, SA, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number of persons working part-time for economic reasons because they cannot find full-time work peaked during the contraction at 6.857 million SA in Oct 1982, as shown in Chart I-35. The number of persons at work part-time for economic reasons fell sharply during the expansion to 5.797 million in Dec 1984 and continued to fall throughout the decade to 4.817 million in Dec 1989 SA and 4.709 million NSA.
Chart I-35, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, 1979-1989, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number of people working part-time because they cannot find full-time employment, not seasonally adjusted, increased sharply during the contraction from 3.787 million in Apr 2006, not seasonally adjusted, to 9.354 million in Dec 2009, as shown in Chart I-36. The number of people working part-time because of failure to find an alternative occupation stagnated at a very high level during the expansion, declining to 5.707 million not seasonally adjusted in Dec 2016.
Chart I-36, US, Part-Time for Economic Reasons, 2001-2016, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number marginally attached to the labor force in Chart I-37 jumped from 1.252 million in Dec 2006 to 2.800 million in Jan 2011, remaining at a high level of 2.540 million in Dec 2011, 2.809 million in Jan 2012 and 2.614 million in Dec 2012. The number marginally attached to the labor force eased to 2.427 million in Dec 2013, 2.260 million in Dec 2014 and 1.833 million in Dec 2015. The level of marginally attached to the labor force reached 1.684 million in Dec 2016.
Chart I-37, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
IA4 Job Creation. What is striking about the data in Table I-8 is that the numbers of monthly increases in jobs in 1983 and 1984 are several times higher than in 2010 to 2015. The civilian noninstitutional population grew by 44.0 percent from 174.215 million in 1983 to 250.801 million in 2015 and labor force higher by 40.9 percent, growing from 111.550 million in 1983 to 157.130 million in 2015. Total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 156,000 in Dec 2016 and private payroll employment increased 144,000. The average monthly number of nonfarm jobs created from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 was 228,667 using seasonally adjusted data, while the average number of nonfarm jobs created from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 was 179,750, or decrease by 21.4 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 was 220,917, using seasonally adjusted data, while the average from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 was 164,500, or decrease by 25.5 percent. This blog calculates the effective labor force of the US at 168,639 million in Dec 2016 and 166,782 million in Dec 2015 (Table I-4), for growth of 1.857 million at average 154,750 per month. The difference between the average increase of 164,500 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 and the 154,750 average monthly increase in the labor force from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 is 9,750 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 24.232 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 9,750 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 2,485 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (24.232 million divided by 9,750) or 207 years (2,485 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Dec 2016 not seasonally adjusted stood at 158.968 million with 7.170 million unemployed or effectively 16.841 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 168.639 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 8.5 years (1 million divided by product of 9,750 by 12, which is 117,000). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.948 million (0.05 times labor force of 158.968 million). New net job creation would be minus 0.778 million (7.170 million unemployed minus 7.948 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 0.0 years (0.778 million divided by 117,000). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 16.841 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 168.639 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 7.695 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 76.1 years (16.841 million minus 0.05(158.639 million) = 8.909 million divided by 117,000 using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in Dec 2016 was 151.798 million (NSA) or 4.483 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.742 million in Dec 2016 or by 22.784 million. The number employed increased 3.0 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2016 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 9.8 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employment as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2016 would result in 161.761 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 254.742 million). There are effectively 9.963 million fewer jobs in Dec 2016 than in Jul 2007, or 161.761 million minus 151.798 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:
“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html). The proper explanation is not in secular stagnation but in cyclically slow growth. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 would have accumulated to 29.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2016 would be $19,414.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2687.4 billion than actual $16,727.0 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.4 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP in IIIQ2016 is 13.8 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,727.0 billion in IIIQ2016 or 11.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2016. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.1081 in Nov 2016. The actual index NSA in Nov 2016 is 103.0759, which is 27.5 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 130.3109 in Nov 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.0759 in Nov 2016 is 20.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-8, US, Monthly Change in Jobs, Number SA
Month | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | Private |
Jan | 94 | -326 | 224 | 19 | -791 | 28 | 19 |
Feb | 68 | -5 | -75 | -86 | -703 | -69 | -54 |
Mar | 105 | -130 | 172 | -78 | -823 | 163 | 121 |
Apr | 73 | -280 | 276 | -210 | -686 | 243 | 192 |
May | 10 | -45 | 277 | -185 | -351 | 522 | 95 |
Jun | 197 | -243 | 379 | -165 | -470 | -133 | 123 |
Jul | 112 | -342 | 418 | -209 | -329 | -70 | 101 |
Aug | -36 | -158 | -308 | -266 | -212 | -34 | 115 |
Sep | -87 | -181 | 1115 | -452 | -219 | -52 | 121 |
Oct | -99 | -277 | 271 | -473 | -200 | 257 | 207 |
Nov | -209 | -123 | 353 | -769 | -7 | 123 | 133 |
Dec | -278 | -14 | 356 | -695 | -279 | 88 | 109 |
1984 | 2011 | Private | |||||
Jan | 446 | 42 | 50 | ||||
Feb | 481 | 188 | 231 | ||||
Mar | 275 | 225 | 248 | ||||
Apr | 363 | 346 | 354 | ||||
May | 308 | 73 | 128 | ||||
Jun | 379 | 235 | 200 | ||||
Jul | 313 | 70 | 185 | ||||
Aug | 242 | 107 | 139 | ||||
Sep | 310 | 246 | 280 | ||||
Oct | 286 | 202 | 187 | ||||
Nov | 349 | 146 | 173 | ||||
Dec | 128 | 207 | 224 | ||||
1985 | 2012 | Private | |||||
Jan | 266 | 338 | 347 | ||||
Feb | 124 | 257 | 261 | ||||
Mar | 346 | 239 | 237 | ||||
Apr | 196 | 75 | 90 | ||||
May | 274 | 115 | 130 | ||||
Jun | 146 | 87 | 72 | ||||
Jul | 190 | 143 | 160 | ||||
Aug | 193 | 190 | 174 | ||||
Sep | 203 | 181 | 180 | ||||
Oct | 188 | 132 | 164 | ||||
Nov | 209 | 149 | 171 | ||||
Dec | 167 | 243 | 233 | ||||
1986 | 2013 | Private | |||||
Jan | 125 | 190 | 203 | ||||
Feb | 107 | 311 | 297 | ||||
Mar | 94 | 135 | 150 | ||||
Apr | 187 | 192 | 193 | ||||
May | 127 | 218 | 225 | ||||
Jun | -94 | 146 | 173 | ||||
Jul | 318 | 140 | 162 | ||||
Aug | 114 | 269 | 242 | ||||
Sep | 347 | 185 | 179 | ||||
Oct | 186 | 189 | 203 | ||||
Nov | 186 | 291 | 280 | ||||
Dec | 205 | 45 | 71 | ||||
1987 | 2014 | Private | |||||
Jan | 172 | 187 | 197 | ||||
Feb | 232 | 168 | 158 | ||||
Mar | 249 | 272 | 261 | ||||
Apr | 338 | 310 | 282 | ||||
May | 226 | 213 | 215 | ||||
Jun | 172 | 306 | 267 | ||||
Jul | 347 | 232 | 244 | ||||
Aug | 171 | 218 | 231 | ||||
Sep | 228 | 286 | 237 | ||||
Oct | 492 | 200 | 190 | ||||
Nov | 232 | 331 | 324 | ||||
Dec | 294 | 292 | 279 | ||||
1988 | 2015 | Private | |||||
Jan | 94 | 221 | 214 | ||||
Feb | 453 | 265 | 252 | ||||
Mar | 276 | 84 | 90 | ||||
Apr | 245 | 251 | 241 | ||||
May | 229 | 273 | 256 | ||||
Jun | 363 | 228 | 226 | ||||
Jul | 222 | 277 | 245 | ||||
Aug | 124 | 150 | 123 | ||||
Sep | 339 | 149 | 162 | ||||
Oct | 268 | 295 | 304 | ||||
Nov | 339 | 280 | 279 | ||||
Dec | 290 | 271 | 259 | ||||
1989 | 2016 | Private | |||||
Jan | 262 | 168 | 155 | ||||
Feb | 258 | 233 | 222 | ||||
Mar | 193 | 186 | 167 | ||||
Apr | 173 | 144 | 147 | ||||
May | 118 | 24 | -1 | ||||
Jun | 116 | 271 | 238 | ||||
Jul | 40 | 252 | 221 | ||||
Aug | 49 | 176 | 132 | ||||
Sep | 250 | 208 | 205 | ||||
Oct | 111 | 135 | 146 | ||||
Nov | 277 | 204 | 198 | ||||
Dec | 96 | 156 | 144 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Charts numbered from I-38 to I-41 from the database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide a comparison of payroll survey data for the contractions and expansions in the 1980s and after 2007. Chart I-38 provides total nonfarm payroll jobs from 2001 to 2016. The sharp decline in total nonfarm jobs during the contraction after 2007 has been followed by initial stagnation and then inadequate growth in 2012 and 2013-2016 while population growth continued.
Chart I-38, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-39 provides total nonfarm jobs SA from 1979 to 1989. Recovery is strong throughout the decade with the economy growing at trend over the entire economic cycle.
Chart I-39, US, Total Nonfarm Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Most job creation in the US is by the private sector. Chart I-40 shows the sharp destruction of private payroll jobs during the contraction after 2007. There has been growth after 2010 but insufficient to recover higher levels of employment prevailing before the contraction. At current rates, recovery of employment may spread over several years in contrast with past expansions of the business cycle in the US.
Chart I-40, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 2001-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
In contrast, growth of private payroll jobs in the US recovered vigorously during the expansion in 1983 through 1985, as shown in Chart I-41. Rapid growth of creation of private jobs continued throughout the 1980s.
Chart I-41, US, Total Private Payroll Jobs SA 1979-1989
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Types of jobs created, and not only the pace of job creation, may be important. Aspects of growth of payroll jobs from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016, not seasonally adjusted (NSA), are in Table I-9. Total nonfarm employment increased by 2,032,000 (row A, column Change), consisting of growth of total private employment by 1,873,000 (row B, column Change) and increase by 159,000 of government employment (row C, column Change). Monthly average growth of private payroll employment has been 156,083, which is mediocre relative to 24 to 30 million in job stress, while total nonfarm employment has grown on average by only 169,333 per month, which does not significantly reduce job stress with 154.750 new entrants per month in the labor force. These monthly rates of job creation net of the demands of new entrants in the labor force perpetuate unemployment and underemployment. Manufacturing employment decreased by 46,000, at the monthly rate of minus 3833 while private service providing employment grew by 1,901,000, at the monthly average rate of 158,417. An important feature in Table I-9 is that jobs in professional and business services increased 545,000 with temporary help services increasing 49,000. This episode of jobless recovery is characterized by part-time jobs and creation of jobs that are inferior to those that have been lost. Monetary and fiscal stimuli fail to increase consumption and investment in a fractured job market. The segment leisure and hospitality added 279,000 jobs in 12 months. An important characteristic is that the loss of government jobs has stabilized in federal government with increase of 39,000 jobs while states decreased 8,000 jobs and local government added 128,000 jobs. Local government provides the bulk of government jobs, 14.518 million, while federal government provides 2.824 million and states’ government 5.223 million.
Table I-9, US, Employees in Nonfarm Payrolls Not Seasonally Adjusted, in Thousands
Dec 2015 | Dec 2016 | Change | |
A Total Nonfarm | 144,116 | 146,148 | 2,032 |
B Total Private | 121,710 | 123,583 | 1,873 |
B1 Goods Producing | 19,595 | 19,567 | -28 |
B1a Manufacturing | 12,323 | 12,277 | -46 |
B2 Private service providing | 102,115 | 104,016 | 1,901 |
B2a Wholesale Trade | 5,908 | 5,959 | 51 |
B2b Retail Trade | 16,303 | 16,519 | 216 |
B2c Transportation & Warehousing | 5,093 | 5,142 | 49 |
B2d Financial Activities | 8,201 | 8,359 | 158 |
B2e Professional and Business Services | 20,079 | 20,624 | 545 |
B2e1 Temporary help services | 3,057 | 3,106 | 49 |
B2f Health Care & Social Assistance | 18,945 | 19,421 | 476 |
B2g Leisure & Hospitality | 15,000 | 15,279 | 279 |
C Government | 22,406 | 22,565 | 159 |
C1 Federal | 2,785 | 2,824 | 39 |
C2 State | 5,231 | 5,223 | -8 |
C3 Local | 14,390 | 14,518 | 128 |
Note: A = B+C, B = B1 + B2, C=C1 + C2 + C3
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Greater detail on the types of jobs created is provided in Table I-10 with data for Nov 2016 and
Dec 2016. Strong seasonal effects are shown by the significant difference between seasonally adjusted (SA) and not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA) data. The purpose of adjusting for seasonality is to isolate nonseasonal effects. The 156,000 SA total nonfarm jobs created in Dec 2016 relative to Nov 2016 actually correspond to increase of 0 jobs NSA, as shown in row A. Most of this difference in Jan 2016 is due to the necessary benchmark and seasonal adjustments in the beginning of every year. The 144,000 total private payroll jobs SA created in Dec 2016 relative to Dec 2016 actually correspond to decrease of 137,000 jobs NSA. The analysis of NSA job creation in the prior Table I-9 does show improvement over the 12 months ending in Dec 2016 that is not clouded by seasonal variations but is inadequate number of jobs created. In fact, the 12-month rate of job creation without seasonal adjustment is stronger indication of marginal improvement in the US job market but that is insufficient in even making a dent in about 30 million people unemployed or underemployed. Benchmark and seasonal adjustments affect comparability of data over time.
Table I-10, US, Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls and Selected Industry Detail, Thousands, SA and NSA
Nov 2016 SA | Dec 2016 SA | ∆ | Nov 2016 NSA | Dec 2016 NSA | ∆ | |
A Total Nonfarm | 145,147 | 145,303 | 156 | 146,418 | 146,418 | 0 |
B Total Private | 122,936 | 123,080 | 144 | 123,720 | 123,583 | -137 |
B1 Goods Producing | 19,643 | 19,655 | 12 | 19,771 | 19,567 | -204 |
B1a Constr. | 6,702 | 6,699 | -3 | 6,815 | 6,604 | -211 |
B Mfg | 12,258 | 12,275 | 17 | 12,263 | 12,277 | 14 |
B2 Private Service Providing | 103,293 | 103,425 | 132 | 103,949 | 104,016 | 67 |
B2a Wholesale Trade | 5,951 | 5,953 | 2 | 5,964 | 5,959 | -5 |
B2b Retail Trade | 16,011 | 16,017 | 6 | 16,411 | 16,519 | 108 |
B2c Couriers & Mess. | 642 | 654 | 12 | 688 | 821 | 133 |
B2d Health-care & Social Assistance | 19,327 | 19,390 | 63 | 19,384 | 19,421 | 37 |
B2De Profess. & Business Services | 20,488 | 20,503 | 15 | 20,673 | 20,624 | -49 |
B2De1 Temp Help Services | 2,983 | 2,967 | -16 | 3,114 | 3,106 | -8 |
B2f Leisure & Hospit. | 15,613 | 15,637 | 24 | 15,338 | 15,279 | -59 |
Notes: ∆: Absolute Change; Constr.: Construction; Mess.: Messengers; Temp: Temporary; Hospit.: Hospitality. SA aggregates do not add because of seasonal adjustment.
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted decreased 46,000 from Dec 2015 to
Dec 2016 or at the average monthly rate of minus 3833. There are effects of the weaker economy and international trade together with the yearly adjustment of labor statistics. Industrial production decreased 0.4 percent in Nov 2016 and increased 0.1 percent in Oct 2016 after decreasing 0.2 percent in Sep 2016, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Apr 1, 2016 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] Total IP is now reported to have increased about 2 1/2 percent per year, on average, from 2011 through 2014 before falling 1 1/2 percent in 2015.[2] Relative to earlier reports, the current rates of change are lower, especially for 2014 and 2015. Total IP is now estimated to have returned to its pre-recession peak in November 2014, six months later than previously estimated. Capacity for total industry is now reported to have increased about 2 percent in 2014 and 2015 after having increased only 1 percent in 2013. Compared with the previously reported estimates, the gain in 2015 is 1/2 percentage point higher, and the gain in 2013 is 1/2 percentage point lower. Industrial capacity is expected to increase 1/2 percent in 2016.”
Manufacturing fell 22.3 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 16.0 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2015. Manufacturing grew 19.6 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Nov 2016. Manufacturing in Nov 2016 is lower by 8.4 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 would have accumulated to 29.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2016 would be $19,414.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2687.4 billion than actual $16,727.0 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 23.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.8 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html). US GDP in IIIQ2016 is 13.8 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,727.0 billion in IIIQ2016 or 11.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2016. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.1081 in Nov 2016. The actual index NSA in Nov 2016 is 103.0759, which is 27.5 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 130.3109 in Nov 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.0759 in Nov 2016 is 20.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 87.1 percent in IIIQ2016. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Dec 2016, there were 146.148 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 123.583 million NSA in Dec 2016 accounted for 84.6 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 146.148 million, of which 12.277 million, or 9.9 percent of total private jobs and 8.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 104.016 million NSA in Dec 2016, or 71.2 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 84.2 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 10.4 percent in US national income in IIIQ2016 and durable goods 6.0 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.
Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total
SAAR | % Total | SAAR IIIQ2016 | % Total | |
National Income WCCA | 15,905.5 | 100.0 | 16,163.0 | 100.0 |
Domestic Industries | 15,697.6 | 98.7 | 15,959.0 | 98.7 |
Private Industries | 13,843.4 | 87.0 | 14,084.7 | 87.1 |
Agriculture | 123.9 | 0.8 | 121.3 | 0.8 |
Mining | 187.7 | 1.2 | 188.3 | 1.2 |
Utilities | 164.9 | 1.0 | 171.8 | 1.1 |
Construction | 765.2 | 4.8 | 767.2 | 4.7 |
Manufacturing | 1658.4 | 10.4 | 1674.2 | 10.4 |
Durable Goods | 972.8 | 6.1 | 976.3 | 6.0 |
Nondurable Goods | 685.6 | 4.3 | 697.9 | 4.3 |
Wholesale Trade | 920.7 | 5.8 | 959.9 | 5.9 |
Retail Trade | 1118.6 | 7.0 | 1137.2 | 7.0 |
Transportation & WH | 495.7 | 3.1 | 501.2 | 3.1 |
Information | 578.8 | 3.6 | 597.0 | 3.7 |
Finance, Insurance, RE | 2807.8 | 17.7 | 2862.2 | 17.7 |
Professional & Business Services | 2246.5 | 14.1 | 2290.8 | 14.2 |
Education, Health Care | 1633.0 | 10.3 | 1653.2 | 10.2 |
Arts, Entertainment | 675.1 | 4.2 | 687.0 | 4.3 |
Other Services | 467.1 | 2.9 | 473.2 | 2.9 |
Government | 1854.3 | 11.7 | 1874.3 | 11.6 |
Rest of the World | 207.8 | 1.3 | 204.0 | 1.3 |
Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart I-42 provides output of durable manufacturing from 1972 to 2016. Output fell sharply during the global recession, recovering at relatively high pace. Output is lower than extrapolation of trend.
Chart I-42, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 1972-2016
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
The NBER dates recessions in the US from peaks to troughs as: IQ80 to IIIQ80, IIIQ81 to IV82 and IVQ07 to IIQ09 (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Table I-12 provides total annual level nonfarm employment in the US for the 1980s and the 2000s, which is different from 12-month comparisons. Nonfarm jobs rose by 4.859 million from 1982 to 1984, or 5.4 percent, and continued rapid growth in the rest of the decade. In contrast, nonfarm jobs are down by 7.638 million in 2010 relative to 2007 and fell by 952,000 in 2010 relative to 2009 even after six quarters of GDP growth. Monetary and fiscal stimuli have failed in increasing growth to rates required for mitigating job stress. The initial growth impulse reflects a flatter growth curve in the current expansion. Nonfarm jobs declined from 137.999 million in 2007 to 136.381 million in 2013, by 1.618 million or 1.2 percent. Nonfarm jobs increased from 137.999 million in 2007 to 141,865 million in 2015, by 3.866 million or 2.8 percent. The US noninstitutional population or in condition to work increased from 231.867 million in 2007 to 250,801 million in 2015, by 18.934 million or 8.2 percent. The ratio of nonfarm jobs of 137.999 million in 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.867 was 59.5. Nonfarm jobs in 2015 corresponding to the ratio of 59.5 of nonfarm jobs/noninstitutional population would be 149.227 million (0.595x250.801). The difference between actual nonfarm jobs of 141.865 million in 2015 and nonfarm jobs of 149.227 million that are equivalent to 59.5 percent of the noninstitutional population as in 2007 is 7.362 million fewer jobs. The proper explanation for this loss of work opportunities is not in secular stagnation but in cyclically slow growth. The NBER dates recessions in the US from peaks to troughs as: IQ80 to IIIQ80, IIIQ81 to IV82 and IVQ07 to IIQ09 (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Table I-12 provides total annual level nonfarm employment in the US for the 1980s and the 2000s, which is different from 12-month comparisons. Nonfarm jobs rose by 4.859 million from 1982 to 1984, or 5.4 percent, and continued rapid growth in the rest of the decade. In contrast, nonfarm jobs are down by 7.638 million in 2010 relative to 2007 and fell by 952,000 in 2010 relative to 2009 even after six quarters of GDP growth. Monetary and fiscal stimuli have failed in increasing growth to rates required for mitigating job stress. The initial growth impulse reflects a flatter growth curve in the current expansion. Nonfarm jobs declined from 137.999 million in 2007 to 136.381 million in 2013, by 1.618 million or 1.2 percent. Nonfarm jobs increased from 137.999 million in 2007 to 141,865 million in 2015, by 3.866 million or 2.8 percent. The US noninstitutional population or in condition to work increased from 231.867 million in 2007 to 250,801 million in 2015, by 18.934 million or 8.2 percent. The ratio of nonfarm jobs of 137.999 million in 2007 to the noninstitutional population of 231.867 was 59.5. Nonfarm jobs in 2015 corresponding to the ratio of 59.5 of nonfarm jobs/noninstitutional population would be 149.227 million (0.595x250.801). The difference between actual nonfarm jobs of 141.865 million in 2015 and nonfarm jobs of 149.227 million that are equivalent to 59.5 percent of the noninstitutional population as in 2007 is 7.362 million fewer jobs. The proper explanation for this loss of work opportunities is not in secular stagnation but in cyclically slow growth. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 would have accumulated to 29.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2016 would be $19,414.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2687.4 billion than actual $16,727.0 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.4 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP in IIIQ2016 is 13.8 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,727.0 billion in IIIQ2016 or 11.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2016. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.1081 in Nov 2016. The actual index NSA in Nov 2016 is 103.0759, which is 27.5 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 130.3109 in Nov 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.0759 in Nov 2016 is 20.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Employment in Thousands
Year | Total Nonfarm | Year | Total Nonfarm |
1980 | 90,533 | 2000 | 132,024 |
1981 | 91,297 | 2001 | 132,087 |
1982 | 89,689 | 2002 | 130,649 |
1983 | 90,295 | 2003 | 130,347 |
1984 | 94,548 | 2004 | 131,787 |
1985 | 97,532 | 2005 | 134,051 |
1986 | 99,500 | 2006 | 136,453 |
1987 | 102,116 | 2007 | 137,999 |
1988 | 105,378 | 2008 | 137,242 |
1989 | 108,051 | 2009 | 131,313 |
1990 | 109,527 | 2010 | 130,361 |
1991 | 108,427 | 2011 | 131,932 |
1992 | 108,802 | 2012 | 134,175 |
1993 | 110,935 | 2013 | 136,381 |
1994 | 114,398 | 2014 | 139,958 |
1995 | 117,407 | 2015 | 141,865 |
1996 | 119,836 | 2016 | 144,319 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/
Chart I-43 provides annual nonfarm jobs from 2000 to 2016. Cyclically slow growth in the expansion since IIIQ2009 has not been sufficient to recover nonfarm jobs. Because of population growth, there are 7.362 million fewer nonfarm jobs in the US in 2015 than in 2007.
Chart I-43, US, Annual Nonfarm Jobs, NSA, Thousands, 2000-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/
Chart I-44 provides annual nonfarm jobs in the US from 1980 to 1995. Much more rapid cyclical growth as in other expansions historically allowed steady and rapid growth of nonfarm job opportunities even with similarly dynamic population growth.
Chart I-44, US, Annual Nonfarm Jobs, NSA, Thousands, 1980-1996
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov
The highest average yearly percentage of unemployed to the labor force since 1940 was 14.6 percent in 1940 followed by 9.9 percent in 1941, 8.5 percent in 1975, 9.7 percent in 1982 and 9.6 percent in 1983 (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aa2006/pdf/cpsaat1.pdf). The rate of unemployment remained at high levels in the 1930s, rising from 3.2 percent in 1929 to 22.9 percent in 1932 in one estimate and 23.6 percent in another with real wages increasing by 16.4 percent (Margo 1993, 43; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 214-5). There are alternative estimates of 17.2 percent or 9.5 percent for 1940 with real wages increasing by 44 percent. Employment declined sharply during the 1930s. The number of hours worked remained in 1939 at 29 percent below the level of 1929 (Cole and Ohanian 1999). Private hours worked fell in 1939 to 25 percent of the level in 1929. The policy of encouraging collusion through the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), to maintain high prices, together with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), to maintain high wages, prevented the US economy from recovering employment levels until Roosevelt abandoned these policies toward the end of the 1930s (for review of the literature analyzing the Great Depression see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 198-217).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) makes yearly revisions of its establishment survey (Harris 2011BA):
“With the release of data for January 2011, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) introduced its annual revision of national estimates of employment, hours, and earnings from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) monthly survey of nonfarm establishments. Each year, the CES survey realigns its sample-based estimates to incorporate universe counts of employment—a process known as benchmarking. Comprehensive counts of employment, or benchmarks, are derived primarily from unemployment insurance (UI) tax reports that nearly all employers are required to file with State Workforce Agencies.”
The number of not seasonally adjusted total private jobs in the US in Dec 2010 is 108.464 million, declining to 106.079 million in Jan 2011, or by 2.385 million, because of the adjustment of a different benchmark and not actual job losses. The not seasonally adjusted number of total private jobs in Dec 1984 is 80.250 million, declining to 78.704 million in Jan 1985, or by 1.546 million for the similar adjustment. Table I-13 attempts to measure job losses and gains in the recessions and expansions of 1981-1985 and 2007-2011. The final ten rows provide job creation from May 1983 to May 1984 and from May 2010 to May 2011, that is, at equivalent stages of the recovery from two comparable strong recessions. The row “Change ∆%” for May 1983 to May 1984 shows an increase of total nonfarm jobs by 4.9 percent and of 5.9 percent for total private jobs. The row “Change ∆%” for May 2010 to May 2011 shows an increase of total nonfarm jobs by 0.7 percent and of 1.7 percent for total private jobs. The last two rows of Table 7 provide a calculation of the number of jobs that would have been created from May 2010 to May 2011 if the rate of job creation had been the same as from May 1983 to May 1984. If total nonfarm jobs had grown between May 2010 and May 2011 by 4.9 percent, as between May 1983 and May 1984, 6.409 million jobs would have been created in the past 12 months for a difference of 5.457 million more total nonfarm jobs relative to 0.952 million jobs actually created. If total private jobs had grown between May 2010 and May 2011 by 5.9 percent as between May 1983 and May 1984, 6.337 million private jobs would have been created for a difference of 4.539 million more total private jobs relative to 1.798 million jobs actually created.
Table I-13, US, Total Nonfarm and Total Private Jobs Destroyed and Subsequently Created in Two Recessions IIIQ1981-IVQ1982 and IVQ2007-IIQ2009, Thousands and Percent
Total Nonfarm Jobs | Total Private Jobs | |
06/1981 # | 92,288 | 75,969 |
11/1982 # | 89,482 | 73,260 |
Change # | -2,806 | -2,709 |
Change ∆% | -3.0 | -3.6 |
12/1982 # | 89,383 | 73,185 |
05/1984 # | 94,471 | 78,049 |
Change # | 5,088 | 4,864 |
Change ∆% | 5.7 | 6.6 |
11/2007 # | 139,090 | 116,291 |
05/2009 # | 131,626 | 108,601 |
Change % | -7,464 | -7,690 |
Change ∆% | -5.4 | -6.6 |
12/2009 # | 130,178 | 107,338 |
05/2011 # | 131,753 | 108,494 |
Change # | 1,575 | 1,156 |
Change ∆% | 1.2 | 1.1 |
05/1983 # | 90,005 | 73,667 |
05/1984 # | 94,471 | 78,049 |
Change # | 4,466 | 4,382 |
Change ∆% | 4.9 | 5.9 |
05/2010 # | 130,801 | 107,405 |
05/2011 # | 131,753 | 109,203 |
Change # | 952 | 1,798 |
Change ∆% | 0.7 | 1.7 |
Change # by ∆% as in 05/1984 to 05/1985 | 6,409* | 6,337** |
Difference in Jobs that Would Have Been Created | 5,457 = | 4,539 = |
*[(130,801x1.049)-130,801] = 6,409 thousand
**[(107,405)x1.059 – 107,405] = 6,337 thousand
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
IB Stagnating Real Wages. The wage bill is the product of average weekly hours times the earnings per hour. Table IB-1 provides the estimates by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of earnings per hour seasonally adjusted, increasing from $25.26/hour in Dec 2015 to $26.00/hour in Dec 2016, or by 2.9 percent. There has been disappointment about the pace of wage increases because of rising food and energy costs that inhibit consumption and thus sales and similar concern about growth of consumption that accounts for about 68.7 percent of GDP (Table I-10 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). Growth of consumption by decreasing savings by means of controlling interest rates in what is called financial repression may not be lasting and sound for personal finances (See Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008c), 81-6, Pelaez (1975), (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitical-and-financial-risks.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-instability-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/global-financial-risk-mediocre-united.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/historically-sharper-recoveries-from.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/mediocre-recovery-without-jobs.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/mediocre-growth-with-high-unemployment.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/mediocre-economic-growth-falling-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/mediocre-economic-growth-flattening.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/mediocre-economic-growth-financial.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/12/slow-growth-falling-real-disposable.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/us-growth-standstill-falling-real.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/slow-growth-driven-by-reducing-savings.html). Average hourly earnings seasonally adjusted increased 0.4 percent from $25.90 in Nov 2016 to $26.00 in Dec 2016. Average private weekly earnings increased $20.33 from $871.47 in Dec 2015 to $891.80 in Dec 2016 or 2.3 percent and increased $3.43 from $888.37 in Nov 2016 to $891.80 in Dec 2016 or 0.4 percent. The inflation-adjusted wage bill can only be calculated for Nov, which is the most recent month for which there are estimates of the consumer price index. Earnings per hour (not-seasonally-adjusted (NSA)) rose from $25.39 in Nov 2015 to $25.86 in Nov 2016 or by 1.9 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/; see Table IB-3 below). Data NSA are more suitable for comparison over a year. Average weekly hours NSA were 34.8 in Nov 2015 and 34.3 in Nov 2016 (http://www.bls.gov/data/; see Table IB-2 below). The wage bill increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016:
{[(wage bill in Nov 2016)/(wage bill in Nov 2015)]-1}100 =
{[($25.86x34.3)/($25.39x34.8)]-1]}100
= {[($887.00)/($883.57)]-1}100 = 0.4%
CPI inflation was 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/) for an inflation-adjusted wage-bill change of minus 1.3 percent :{[(1.004/1.017)-1]100 = -1.3%} (see Table IB-5 below for Nov 2016 with minor rounding difference). The wage bill for Dec 2016 before inflation adjustment increased 2.3 percent relative to the wage bill for Dec 2015:
{[(wage bill in Dec 2016)/(wage bill in Dec 2015)]-1}100 =
{[($25.94x34.3)/($25.22x34.5)]-1]}100
= {[$889.74)/$870.09]-1}100 = 2.3%}
Average hourly earnings increased 2.9 percent from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 {[($25.94/$25.22) – 1]100 = 2.9%} while hours worked decreased 0.6 percent {[(34.3/34.5) – 1]100 = -0.6%}. The increase of the wage bill is the product of the increase of hourly earnings of 2.9 percent and decrease of hours worked of 0.6 percent {[(1.029x0.9942) -1]100 = 2.3%} with small rounding error. Energy and food price increases are similar to a “silent tax” that is highly regressive, harming the most those with lowest incomes. There are concerns that the wage bill would deteriorate in purchasing power because of renewed raw materials shocks in the form of increases in prices of commodities such as the 31.1 percent steady increase in the DJ-UBS Commodity Index from Jul 2, 2010 to Sep 2, 2011. The charts of four commodity price indexes by Bloomberg show steady increase since Jul 2, 2010 that was interrupted briefly only in Nov 2010 with the sovereign issues in Europe triggered by Ireland; in Mar 2011 by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and in the beginning of May 2011 by the decline in oil prices and sovereign risk difficulties in Europe (http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/commodities/futures/). Renewed risk aversion because of the sovereign risks in Europe had reduced the rate of increase of the DJ UBS commodity index to 10.2 percent on May 2, 2014, relative to Jul 2, 2010 (see Table VI-4) but there has been a shift in investor preferences into equities. Inflation has been rising in waves with carry trades driven by zero interest rates to commodity futures during periods of risk appetite with interruptions during risk aversion (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html). Inflation-adjusted wages fall sharply during carry trades from zero interest rates to long positions in commodity futures during periods of risk appetite.
Table IB-1, US, Earnings per Hour and Average Weekly Hours SA
Earnings per Hour | Dec 2015 | Oct 2016 | Nov 2016 | Dec 2016 |
Total Private | $25.26 | $25.92 | $25.90 | $26.00 |
Goods Producing | $26.44 | $27.25 | $27.14 | $27.26 |
Service Providing | $24.99 | $25.62 | $25.61 | $25.71 |
Average Weekly Earnings | ||||
Total Private | $871.47 | $891.65 | $888.37 | $891.80 |
Goods Producing | $1,068.18 | $1,100.90 | $1,091.03 | $1,093.13 |
Service Providing | $834.67 | $850.58 | $850.25 | $853.57 |
Average Weekly Hours | ||||
Total Private | 34.5 | 34.4 | 34.3 | 34.3 |
Goods Producing | 40.4 | 40.4 | 40.2 | 40.1 |
Service Providing | 33.4 | 33.2 | 33.2 | 33.2 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Average weekly hours in Table IB-2 fell from 34.8 in Dec 2007 at the beginning of the contraction to 33.7 in Jun 2009, which was the last month of the contraction. Average weekly hours rose to 34.4 in Dec 2011 and oscillated to 34.8 in Dec 2012 and 34.7 in Dec 2013. Average weekly hours of all employees decreased to 34.6 in Dec 2014 and 34.5 in Dec 2015. Average weekly hours stood at 34.3 in Dec 2016. The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent months.
Table IB-2, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, NSA 2006-2016
Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual |
2006 | 34.0 | 34.4 | 34.1 | 34.5 | 34.7 | 34.5 | 34.3 | 34.7 | 34.3 | 34.4 | |||
2007 | 33.9 | 34.0 | 34.2 | 34.5 | 34.3 | 34.5 | 34.8 | 34.5 | 34.8 | 34.3 | 34.3 | 34.8 | 34.4 |
2008 | 34.0 | 34.0 | 34.6 | 34.2 | 34.2 | 34.8 | 34.3 | 34.5 | 34.2 | 34.2 | 34.4 | 33.9 | 34.3 |
2009 | 33.6 | 34.0 | 33.9 | 33.5 | 33.6 | 33.7 | 33.8 | 34.3 | 33.7 | 33.8 | 34.2 | 33.8 | 33.8 |
2010 | 33.7 | 33.6 | 33.8 | 34.0 | 34.4 | 34.1 | 34.2 | 34.7 | 34.1 | 34.3 | 34.2 | 34.2 | 34.1 |
2011 | 34.2 | 34.0 | 34.1 | 34.2 | 34.6 | 34.3 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.8 | 34.3 | 34.4 | 34.3 |
2012 | 34.5 | 34.2 | 34.2 | 34.6 | 34.2 | 34.4 | 34.7 | 34.5 | 34.9 | 34.3 | 34.3 | 34.8 | 34.5 |
2013 | 34.0 | 34.2 | 34.3 | 34.3 | 34.3 | 34.9 | 34.4 | 34.5 | 34.9 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.7 | 34.4 |
2014 | 34.0 | 34.4 | 34.7 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.9 | 34.5 | 34.6 | 34.5 | 34.5 | 34.9 | 34.6 | 34.5 |
2015 | 34.2 | 34.6 | 34.7 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.5 | 34.5 | 35.1 | 34.3 | 34.5 | 34.8 | 34.5 | 34.5 |
2016 | 34.2 | 34.1 | 34.2 | 34.3 | 34.6 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.4 | 34.8 | 34.3 | 34.3 | 34.4 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart IB-1 provides average weekly hours of all employees seasonally adjusted. There was sharp contract during the global recession. Hours returned to levels before the contraction.
Chart IB-1, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, SA 2006-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Calculations of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings using BLS data are in Table IB-3. The final column of Table IB-3 (“12-Month Real ∆%”) provides inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of all employees in the US. Average hourly earnings rose above inflation throughout the first nine months of 2007 just before the global recession that began in the final quarter of 2007 when average hourly earnings began to lose to inflation. In contrast, average hourly earnings of all US workers have risen less than inflation in four months in 2010 and in all but the first month in 2011 and the loss accelerated at 1.8 percent in Sep 2011, declining to a real loss of 1.2 percent in Feb 2012 and 0.6 percent in Mar 2012. There was a gain of 0.6 percent in Apr 2012 in inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings but another fall of 0.6 percent in May 2012 followed by increases of 0.3 percent in Jun and 1.0 percent in Jul 2012. Real hourly earnings stagnated in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 with increase of only 0.1 percent, and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 1.3 percent in Oct 2012 and gained 1.0 percent in Dec 2012 but declined 0.2 percent in Jan 2013 and stagnated at change of 0.2 percent in Feb 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013 and 0.2 percent in Apr 2013, increasing 0.7 percent in May 2013. In Jun 2013, real hourly earnings increased 1.0 percent relative to Jun 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013 and 1.0 percent in Nov 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014. Real hourly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Real hourly earnings stagnated at 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014. Real hourly earnings fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Real hourly earnings fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014 and increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015 and 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015 and increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015 and increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015 and increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2016 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016 and increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016 and increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016 and increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016. Real hourly earnings are oscillating in part because of world inflation waves caused by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html) and in part because of the collapse of hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html) originating in weak economic growth (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.
Table IB-3, US, Average Hourly Earnings Nominal and Inflation Adjusted, Dollars and % NSA
AHE ALL | 12 Month- | ∆% 12 Month CPI | 12-Month | |
2007 | ||||
Jan* | $20.69* | 4.2* | 2.1 | 2.1* |
Feb* | $20.78* | 4.1* | 2.4 | 1.7* |
Mar | $20.76 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 0.6 |
Apr | $20.99 | 3.0 | 2.6 | 0.4 |
May | $20.77 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 0.8 |
Jun | $20.77 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 0.9 |
Jul | $20.94 | 3.3 | 2.4 | 0.9 |
Aug | $20.80 | 3.3 | 2.0 | 1.3 |
Sep | $21.13 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 1.0 |
Oct | $21.01 | 2.4 | 3.5 | -1.1 |
Nov | $21.07 | 3.1 | 4.3 | -1.2 |
Dec | $21.31 | 3.4 | 4.1 | -0.7 |
2010 | ||||
Jan | $22.51 | 2.1 | 2.6 | -0.5 |
Feb | $22.57 | 1.5 | 2.1 | -0.6 |
Mar | $22.49 | 1.2 | 2.3 | -1.1 |
Apr | $22.53 | 1.8 | 2.2 | -0.4 |
May | $22.60 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 0.5 |
Jun | $22.34 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
Jul | $22.41 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 0.6 |
Aug | $22.55 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
Sep | $22.60 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
Oct | $22.70 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
Nov | $22.69 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.0 |
Dec | $22.76 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 0.2 |
2011 | ||||
Jan | $23.16 | 2.9 | 1.6 | 1.3 |
Feb | $23.00 | 1.9 | 2.1 | -0.2 |
Mar | $22.90 | 1.8 | 2.7 | -0.9 |
Apr | $22.96 | 1.9 | 3.2 | -1.3 |
May | $23.06 | 2.0 | 3.6 | -1.5 |
Jun | $22.81 | 2.1 | 3.6 | -1.4 |
Jul | $22.94 | 2.4 | 3.6 | -1.2 |
Aug | $22.85 | 1.3 | 3.8 | -2.4 |
Sep | $23.05 | 2.0 | 3.9 | -1.8 |
Oct | $23.30 | 2.6 | 3.5 | -0.9 |
Nov | $23.15 | 2.0 | 3.4 | -1.4 |
Dec | $23.22 | 2.0 | 3.0 | -1.0 |
2012 | ||||
Jan | $23.56 | 1.7 | 2.9 | -1.2 |
Feb | $23.40 | 1.7 | 2.9 | -1.2 |
Mar | $23.39 | 2.1 | 2.7 | -0.6 |
Apr | $23.62 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 0.6 |
May | $23.32 | 1.1 | 1.7 | -0.6 |
Jun | $23.27 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 0.3 |
Jul | $23.48 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 1.0 |
Aug | $23.26 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 0.1 |
Sep | $23.67 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 0.7 |
Oct | $23.52 | 0.9 | 2.2 | -1.3 |
Nov | $23.59 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 0.1 |
Dec | $23.85 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 1.0 |
2013 | ||||
Jan | $23.88 | 1.4 | 1.6 | -0.2 |
Feb | $23.91 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 0.2 |
Mar | $23.84 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 0.4 |
Apr | $23.92 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 0.2 |
May | $23.80 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 0.7 |
Jun | $23.93 | 2.8 | 1.8 | 1.0 |
Jul | $23.81 | 1.4 | 2.0 | -0.6 |
Aug | $23.80 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 0.8 |
Sep | $24.17 | 2.1 | 1.2 | 0.9 |
Oct | $24.05 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 1.3 |
Nov | $24.12 | 2.2 | 1.2 | 1.0 |
Dec | $24.30 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 0.4 |
2014 | ||||
Jan | $24.35 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 0.4 |
Feb | $24.58 | 2.8 | 1.1 | 1.7 |
Mar | $24.50 | 2.8 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
Apr | $24.40 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 0.0 |
May | $24.31 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 0.0 |
Jun | $24.42 | 2.0 | 2.1 | -0.1 |
Jul | $24.31 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 0.1 |
Aug | $24.33 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 0.5 |
Sep | $24.50 | 1.4 | 1.7 | -0.3 |
Oct | $24.52 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 0.3 |
Nov | $24.79 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
Dec | $24.59 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
2015 | ||||
Jan | $24.88 | 2.2 | -0.1 | 2.3 |
Feb | $25.06 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 |
Mar | $25.05 | 2.2 | -0.1 | 2.3 |
Apr | $24.95 | 2.3 | -0.2 | 2.5 |
May | $24.89 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 2.4 |
Jun | $24.78 | 1.5 | 0.1 | 1.4 |
Jul | $24.84 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 2.0 |
Aug | $25.05 | 3.0 | 0.2 | 2.8 |
Sep | $25.07 | 2.3 | 0.0 | 2.3 |
Oct | $25.16 | 2.6 | 0.2 | 2.4 |
Nov | $25.39 | 2.4 | 0.5 | 1.9 |
Dec | $25.22 | 2.6 | 0.7 | 1.9 |
2016 | ||||
Jan | $25.52 | 2.6 | 1.4 | 1.2 |
Feb | $25.51 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
Mar | $25.49 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
Apr | $25.60 | 2.6 | 1.1 | 1.5 |
May | $25.68 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 2.2 |
Jun | $25.42 | 2.6 | 1.0 | 1.6 |
Jul | $25.53 | 2.8 | 0.8 | 2.0 |
Aug | $25.52 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 0.8 |
Sep | $25.74 | 2.7 | 1.5 | 1.2 |
Oct | $26.04 | 3.5 | 1.6 | 1.9 |
Nov | $25.86 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 0.2 |
Dec | $25.94 | 2.9 |
Note: AHE ALL: average hourly earnings of all employees; CPI: consumer price index; Real: adjusted by CPI inflation; NA: not available
*AHE of production and nonsupervisory employees because of unavailability of data for all employees for Jan-Feb 2006
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Calculations of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings by the BLS are in Table IB-4. Average hourly earnings rose above inflation throughout the first nine months of 2007 just before the global recession that began in the final quarter of 2007 when average hourly earnings began to lose to inflation. In contrast, average hourly earnings of all US workers have risen less than inflation in five months in 2010 and in all but the first month in 2011 and the loss accelerated at 1.8 percent in Sep 2011, declining to a real loss of 1.1 percent in Feb 2012 and 0.5 percent in Mar 2012. There was a gain of 0.6 percent in Apr 2012 in inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings but another fall of 0.6 percent in May 2012 followed by increases of 0.3 percent in Jun and 1.0 percent in Jul 2012. Real hourly earnings stagnated in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 with increase of only 0.1 percent, and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 1.2 percent in Oct 2012 and gained 1.0 percent in Dec 2012 but declined 0.2 percent in Jan 2013 and stagnated at change of 0.2 percent in Feb 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013 and 0.2 percent in Apr 2013, increasing 0.7 percent in May 2013. In Jun 2013, real hourly earnings increased 1.1 percent relative to Jun 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013 and 1.0 percent in Nov 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014. Real hourly changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Real hourly changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014. Real hourly earnings changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Real hourly earnings fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014 and 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. Real hourly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015 and increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015 and increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015 and 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015 and increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015. Real hourly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015. Average hourly earnings increased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015 and increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2016 and increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016 and increased 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016 and increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016. Real hourly earnings increased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016. Real hourly earnings are oscillating in part because of world inflation waves caused by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html) and in part because of the collapse of hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html) originating in weak economic growth (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.
Table IB-4, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984
Year | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |
2006 | 9.88 | 9.97 | 9.87 | 10.03 | 10.16 | 10.14 | 10.21 |
2007 | 9.97 | 10.05 | 10.00 | 10.13 | 10.06 | 10.02 | 10.15 |
2008 | 9.82 | 9.75 | 9.81 | 9.91 | 10.03 | 10.34 | 10.45 |
2009 | 10.18 | 10.22 | 10.27 | 10.28 | 10.30 | 10.38 | 10.36 |
2010 | 10.25 | 10.28 | 10.33 | 10.35 | 10.38 | 10.37 | 10.38 |
2011 | 10.11 | 10.15 | 10.09 | 10.16 | 10.29 | 10.23 | 10.29 |
2012 | 10.14 | 10.25 | 10.10 | 10.23 | 10.17 | 10.25 | 10.39 |
∆%12M | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.7 | -1.2 | 0.2 | 1.0 |
2013 | 10.25 | 10.19 | 10.18 | 10.32 | 10.30 | 10.35 | 10.43 |
∆%12M | 1.1 | -0.6 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.4 |
2014 | 10.25 | 10.20 | 10.23 | 10.29 | 10.33 | 10.50 | 10.47 |
∆%12M | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | -0.3 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 0.4 |
2015 | 10.38 | 10.41 | 10.51 | 10.54 | 10.58 | 10.70 | 10.66 |
∆%12M | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
2016 | 10.55 | 10.61 | 10.60 | 10.66 | 10.77 | 10.71 | |
∆%12M | 1.6 | 1.9 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.8 | 0.1 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart IB-2 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics plots average hourly earnings of all US employees in constant 1982-1984 dollars with evident decline from annual earnings of $10.34 in 2009 and $10.35 in 2010 to $10.24 in 2011 and $10.24 again in 2012 or loss of 1.1 percent (data in http://www.bls.gov/data/). Annual real hourly earnings increased 0.5 percent in 2013 relative to 2012 and increased 0.5 percent in 2014 relative to 2013. Annual real hourly earnings increased 2.1 percent in 2015 relative to 2014. Annual real hourly earnings increased 4.7 percent from 2007 to 2015 at the rate of 0.6 percent per year. Annual real hourly earnings increased 2.1 percent from 2009 to 2015 at the rate of 0.4 percent per year. Real hourly earnings of US workers are crawling in a fractured labor market. The economic welfare or wellbeing of United States workers deteriorated in a recovery without hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html), stagnating/declining real wages and 24.2 million unemployed or underemployed (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html) because of mediocre economic growth (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) now available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.
Chart IB-2, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/
Chart IB-3 provides 12-month percentage changes of average hourly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984, that is, adjusted for inflation. There was sharp contraction of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of US employees during parts of 2007 and 2008. Rates of change in 12 months became positive in parts of 2009 and 2010 but then became negative again in 2011 and into 2012 with temporary increase in Apr 2012 that was reversed in May with another gain in Jun and Jul 2012 followed by stagnation in Aug 2012. There was marginal gain in Sep 2012 with sharp decline in Oct 2012, stagnation in Nov 2012, increase in Dec 2012 and renewed decrease in Jan 2013 with near stagnation in Feb 2013 followed by mild increase in Mar-Apr 2013. Hourly earnings adjusted for inflation increased in Jun 2013 and fell in Jul 2013, increasing in Aug-Dec 2013 and Jan-Mar 2014. Average hourly earnings stagnated in Apr-May 2014 and rebounded mildly in Jul 2014, increasing in Aug 2014 and Sep 2014. Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation increased in Oct-Dec 2014, Jan-Dec 2015 and Jan-Nov 2016.
Chart IB-3, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA 12-Month Percent Change, 1982-1984 Dollars, NSA 2007-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/
Average weekly earnings of all US employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984 from the dataset of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are in Table IB-5. Average weekly earnings fell 3.2 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Aug 2011, decreased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2011 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2011. Average weekly earnings fell 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2011 and fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2011. Average weekly earnings declined 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 and fell 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars were virtually flat in Mar 2012 relative to Mar 2011, decreasing 0.2 percent. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 1.7 percent in Apr 2012 relative to Apr 2011 but fell 1.7 percent in May 2012 relative to May 2011, increasing 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2012 and 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2012. Real weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 and 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 2.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2012 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2012 and 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 and virtually stagnated with gain of 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013, increasing 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013. Real weekly earnings fell 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013 and increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 and fell 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013. Real weekly earnings increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013, 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013 and 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014 and 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014 and changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Real average weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Real weekly earnings decreased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. Average weekly earnings increased 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015 and increased 2.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015 and increased 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015. Average weekly earnings increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015 and 4.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015 and increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015. Average weekly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015 and increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016. Average weekly earnings contracted 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015 and contracted 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016 and increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016 and increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016. Average weekly earnings decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016 and increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016. Average weekly earnings increased 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016 and decreased 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016. Table I-5 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average weekly earnings in 2011 and into 2013 with oscillations according to carry trades causing world inflation waves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html). On an annual basis, average weekly earnings in constant 1982-1984 dollars increased from $347.19 in 2007 to $354.30 in 2013, by 2.0 percent or at the average rate of 0.3 percent per year (data in http://www.bls.gov/data/). Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars of $352.96 in 2010 fell 0.4 percent to $351.68 in 2012. Annual average weekly earnings increased from $347.19 in 2007 to $356.94 in 2014 or by 2.8 at the average rate of 0.4 percent. Annual average weekly earnings in constant increased from $347.19 in 2007 to $364.78 in 2015 by 5.1 percent at the average rate of 0.6 percent per year. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer high-quality goods than a year earlier. The fractured US job market does not provide an opportunity for advancement as in past booms following recessions because of poor job creation with 24.2 million unemployed or underemployed (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html) in a recovery without hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html) because of mediocre economic growth (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) available in the release for Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.
Table IB-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, NSA 2007-2016
Year | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov |
2006 | 340.92 | 345.81 | 340.60 | 344.02 | 352.68 | 347.94 |
2007 | 343.92 | 349.84 | 345.14 | 352.69 | 344.91 | 343.85 |
2008 | 341.61 | 334.32 | 338.41 | 338.90 | 342.99 | 355.78 |
2009 | 343.10 | 345.45 | 352.16 | 346.57 | 348.20 | 354.92 |
2010 | 349.50 | 351.55 | 358.43 | 352.80 | 356.00 | 354.66 |
2011 | 346.61 | 349.30 | 346.97 | 349.47 | 358.11 | 350.99 |
2012 | 348.83 | 355.63 | 348.33 | 356.98 | 348.76 | 351.46 |
∆%12M | 0.6 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 2.1 | -2.6 | 0.1 |
2013 | 357.66 | 350.63 | 351.08 | 360.25 | 354.24 | 356.00 |
∆%12M | 2.5 | -1.4 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 1.3 |
2014 | 357.58 | 352.03 | 353.93 | 355.10 | 356.29 | 366.36 |
∆%12M | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.8 | -1.4 | 0.6 | 2.9 |
2015 | 358.25 | 359.09 | 368.95 | 361.39 | 364.96 | 372.29 |
∆%12M | 0.2 | 2.0 | 4.2 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 1.6 |
2016 | 362.82 | 364.97 | 364.50 | 366.76 | 374.88 | 367.51 |
∆%12M | 1.3 | 1.6 | -1.2 | 1.5 | 2.7 | -1.3 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/
Chart IB-4 provides average weekly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984. The same pattern emerges of sharp decline during the contraction, followed by recovery in the expansion and continuing fall with oscillations caused by carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures from 2010 to 2011 and into 2012-2016. The increase in the final segment is mostly because of collapse of commodity prices in reversals of carry trade exposures. The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases.
Chart IB-4, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/
Chart IB-5 provides 12-month percentage changes of average weekly earnings of all employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984. The BLS is revising the data from 2006 to 2009 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/#notices) available for the release of Jan 2016 and subsequent releases. There is the same pattern of contraction during the global recession in 2008 and then again weakness in the recovery without hiring and inflation waves. (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/imf-view-world-inflation-waves-squeeze.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/world-inflation-waves-interest-rate.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/world-inflation-waves-regional-economic.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/recovery-without-hiring-forecast-growth.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012_09_01_archive.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/world-inflation-waves-financial.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/destruction-of-three-trillion-dollars.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/fractured-labor-market-with-hiring.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012_09_01_archive.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/world-inflation-waves-financial.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/05/world-inflation-waves-monetary-policy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/recovery-without-hiring-continuance-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/04/fractured-labor-market-with-hiring.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html).
Chart IB-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984 12-Month Percent Change, NSA 2007-2016
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/
I United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities. Subsection IA
Transmission of Monetary Policy recapitulates the mechanism of transmission of monetary policy. Subsection IB Functions of Banking analyzes the functions of banks in modern banking theory. Subsection IC United States Commercial Bank Assets and Liabilities provides data and analysis of US commercial bank balance sheets in report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm). Subsection ID Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation analyzes and compares unconventional monetary policy.
IA Transmission of Monetary Policy. The critical fact of current world financial markets is the combination of “unconventional” monetary policy with intermittent shocks of financial risk aversion. There are two interrelated unconventional monetary policies. First, unconventional monetary policy consists primarily of reducing short-term policy interest rates toward the “zero bound” such as fixing the fed funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent by decision of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since Dec 16, 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate at ¼ to ½ percent on Dec 16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm). Fixing policy rates at zero is the strongest measure of monetary policy with collateral effects of inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets such as commodities, exchange rates, stocks and higher yielding fixed income. Second, unconventional monetary policy also includes a battery of measures in also reducing long-term interest rates of government securities and asset-backed securities such as mortgage-backed securities.
When inflation is low, the central bank lowers interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand in the economy, which consists of consumption and investment. When inflation is subdued and unemployment high, monetary policy would lower interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand, reducing unemployment. When interest rates decline to zero, unconventional monetary policy would consist of policies such as large-scale purchases of long-term securities to lower their yields. Long-term asset-backed securities finance a major portion of credit in the economy. Loans for purchasing houses, automobiles and other consumer products are bundled in securities that in turn are sold to investors. Corporations borrow funds for investment by issuing corporate bonds. Loans to small businesses are also financed by bundling them in long-term bonds. Securities markets bridge the needs of higher returns by savers obtaining funds from investors that are channeled to consumers and business for consumption and investment. Lowering the yields of these long-term bonds could lower costs of financing purchases of consumer durables and investment by business. The essential mechanism of transmission from lower interest rates to increases in aggregate demand is portfolio rebalancing. Withdrawal of bonds in a specific maturity segment or directly in a bond category such as currently mortgage-backed securities causes reductions in yields that are equivalent to increases in the prices of the bonds. There can be secondary increases in purchases of those bonds in private portfolios in pursuit of their increasing prices. Lower yields translate into lower costs of buying homes and consumer durables such as automobiles and also lower costs of investment for business. There are two additional intended routes of transmission.
1. Unconventional monetary policy or its expectation can increase stock market valuations (Bernanke 2010WP). Increases in equities traded in stock markets can augment perceptions of the wealth of consumers inducing increases in consumption.
2. Unconventional monetary policy causes devaluation of the dollar relative to other currencies, which can cause increases in net exports of the US that increase aggregate economic activity (Yellen 2011AS).
Monetary policy can lower short-term interest rates quite effectively. Lowering long-term yields is somewhat more difficult. The critical issue is that monetary policy cannot ensure that increasing credit at low interest cost increases consumption and investment. There is a large variety of possible allocation of funds at low interest rates from consumption and investment to multiple risk financial assets. Monetary policy does not control how investors will allocate asset categories. A critical financial practice is to borrow at low short-term interest rates to invest in high-risk, leveraged financial assets. Investors may increase in their portfolios asset categories such as equities, emerging market equities, high-yield bonds, currencies, commodity futures and options and multiple other risk financial assets including structured products. If there is risk appetite, the carry trade from zero interest rates to risk financial assets will consist of short positions at short-term interest rates (or borrowing) and short dollar assets with simultaneous long positions in high-risk, leveraged financial assets such as equities, commodities and high-yield bonds. Low interest rates may induce increases in valuations of risk financial assets that may fluctuate in accordance with perceptions of risk aversion by investors and the public. During periods of muted risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets cause temporary waves of inflation that may foster instead of preventing financial instability. During periods of risk aversion such as fears of disruption of world financial markets and the global economy resulting from events such as collapse of the European Monetary Union, carry trades are unwound with sharp deterioration of valuations of risk financial assets. More technical discussion is in IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy.
In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These policies and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.
In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These policies and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.
Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):
“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.
Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.
The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”
Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:
“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”
Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):
“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.”
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.
Unconventional monetary policy, or reinvestment of principal in securities and issue of bank reserves to maintain policy interest rates near zero, will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at around 2.0 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 29 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIIQ2016 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2016/pdf/gdp3q16_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 would have accumulated to 29.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2016 would be $19,414.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2687.4 billion than actual $16,727.0 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.4 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP in IIIQ2016 is 13.8 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,727.0 billion in IIIQ2016 or 11.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2016. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.1081 in Nov 2016. The actual index NSA in Nov 2016 is 103.0759, which is 27.5 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 130.3109 in Nov 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.0759 in Nov 2016 is 20.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
First, total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 156,000 in Dec 2016 and private payroll employment increased 144,000. The average monthly number of nonfarm jobs created from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 was 228,667 using seasonally adjusted data, while the average number of nonfarm jobs created from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 was 179,750, or decrease by 21.4 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 was 220,917, using seasonally adjusted data, while the average from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 was 164,500, or decrease by 25.5 percent. This blog calculates the effective labor force of the US at 168,639 million in Dec 2016 and 166,782 million in Dec 2015 (Table I-4), for growth of 1.857 million at average 154,750 per month. The difference between the average increase of 164,500 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 and the 154,750 average monthly increase in the labor force from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 is 9,750 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 24.232 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 9,750 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 2,485 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (24.232 million divided by 9,750) or 207 years (2,485 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Dec 2016 not seasonally adjusted stood at 158.968 million with 7.170 million unemployed or effectively 16.841 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 168.639 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 8.5 years (1 million divided by product of 9,750 by 12, which is 117,000). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.948 million (0.05 times labor force of 158.968 million). New net job creation would be minus 0.778 million (7.170 million unemployed minus 7.948 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 0.0 years (0.778 million divided by 117,000). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 16.841 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 168.639 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 7.695 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 76.1 years (16.841 million minus 0.05(158.639 million) = 8.909 million divided by 117,000 using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in Dec 2016 was 151.798 million (NSA) or 4.483 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.742 million in Dec 2016 or by 22.784 million. The number employed increased 3.0 percent from Jul 2007 to Dec 2016 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 9.8 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employment as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Dec 2016 would result in 161.761 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 254.742 million). There are effectively 9.963 million fewer jobs in Dec 2016 than in Jul 2007, or 161.761 million minus 151.798 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:
“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html).
Second, long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 29 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIIQ2016 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2016/pdf/gdp3q16_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 would have accumulated to 29.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2016 would be $19,414.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2687.4 billion than actual $16,727.0 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.4 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP in IIIQ2016 is 13.8 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,727.0 billion in IIIQ2016 or 11.6 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Nov 1919 to Nov 2016. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.1081 in Nov 2016. The actual index NSA in Nov 2016 is 103.0759, which is 27.5 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2015. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 130.3109 in Nov 2016. The output of manufacturing at 103.0759 in Nov 2016 is 20.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as fluctuating from mediocre growth of 2.5 percent on an annual basis in 2010 to 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.7 percent in 2013, 2.4 percent in 2014 and 2.6 percent in 2015. The following calculations show that actual growth is around 2.1 percent per year. The rate of growth of 1.2 percent in the entire cycle from 2007 to 2015 is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which the economy of the US always attained for entire cycles in expansions after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.
Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita
GDP | ||
Long-Term | ||
1929-2015 | 3.2 | |
1947-2015 | 3.2 | |
Whole Cycles | ||
1980-1989 | 3.5 | |
2006-2015 | 1.3 | |
2007-2015 | 1.2 | |
Cyclical Contractions ∆% | ||
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | -4.7 | |
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | -4.2 | |
Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆% | ||
IQ1983 to IVQ1985 IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983-IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 IQ1983 to IQ1989 IQ1983 to IIQ1989 IQ1983 to IIIQ1989 IQ1983 to IVQ1989 IQ1983 to IQ1990 | 5.9 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 | |
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983 | 7.8 | |
IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016 | 2.1 | |
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 | 2.7 | |
Real Disposable Income | Real Disposable Income per Capita | |
Long-Term | ||
1929-2015 | 3.2 | 2.0 |
1947-1999 | 3.7 | 2.3 |
Whole Cycles | ||
1980-1989 | 3.5 | 2.6 |
2006-2015 | 1.6 | 0.8 |
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace around 2.1 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.
1. Average Annual Growth in the Past Nineteen Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013, the four quarters of 2014, the four quarters of Q2015 and the three quarters of 2016 accumulated to 10.1 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.1 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IIIQ2016 of $16,727.0 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,190.3 billion and compounding by 4/19: {[($16,727.0/$15,190.3)4/19 -1]100 = 2.1 percent}.
2. Average Annual Growth in the Past Four Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of IIQ2015 to IIIQ2016 accumulated to 1.7 percent that is equivalent to 1.7 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IIIQ2016 of $16,727.0 billion by GDP in IIIQ2015 of $16,454.9 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($16,727.0/$16,454.9)4/4 -1]100 = 1.7%}. The US economy grew 1.7 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IIIQ2015. Growth was at annual equivalent 4.0 percent in IIQ2014 and 5.0 percent IIIQ2014 and only at 2.3 percent in IVQ2014. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.0 percent in IQ2015, 2.6 percent in IIQ2015, 2.0 percent in IIIQ2015 and 0.9 percent in IVQ2015. GDP grew at annual equivalent 0.8 percent in IQ2016 and at 1.4 percent annual equivalent in IIQ2016. GDP increased at 3.5 percent annual equivalent in IIIQ2016. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is in the borderline of contraction, and negative in IQ2014. US GDP fell 0.3 percent in IQ2014. The rate of growth of GDP in the revision of IIIQ2013 is 3.1 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR).
Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%
Real GDP, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars | ∆% Relative to IVQ2007 | ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter | ∆% | |
IVQ2007 | 14,991.8 | NA | 0.4 | 1.9 |
IVQ2011 | 15,190.3 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.7 |
IQ2012 | 15,291.0 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 2.8 |
IIQ2012 | 15,362.4 | 2.5 | 0.5 | 2.5 |
IIIQ2012 | 15,380.8 | 2.6 | 0.1 | 2.4 |
IVQ2012 | 15,384.3 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 1.3 |
IQ2013 | 15,491.9 | 3.3 | 0.7 | 1.3 |
IIQ2013 | 15,521.6 | 3.5 | 0.2 | 1.0 |
IIIQ2013 | 15,641.3 | 4.3 | 0.8 | 1.7 |
IVQ2013 | 15,793.9 | 5.4 | 1.0 | 2.7 |
IQ2014 | 15,747.0 | 5.0 | -0.3 | 1.6 |
IIQ2014 | 15,900.8 | 6.1 | 1.0 | 2.4 |
IIIQ2014 | 16,094.5 | 7.4 | 1.2 | 2.9 |
IVQ2014 | 16,186.7 | 8.0 | 0.6 | 2.5 |
IQ2015 | 16,269.0 | 8.5 | 0.5 | 3.3 |
IIQ2015 | 16,374.2 | 9.2 | 0.6 | 3.0 |
IIIQ2015 | 16,454.9 | 9.8 | 0.5 | 2.2 |
IVQ2015 | 16,490.7 | 10.0 | 0.2 | 1.9 |
IQ2016 | 16,525.0 | 10.2 | 0.2 | 1.6 |
IIQ2016 | 16,583.1 | 10.6 | 0.4 | 1.3 |
IIIQ2016 | 16,727.0 | 11.6 | 0.9 | 1.7 |
Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IIIQ2016 | 10.1 | 10.3 | ||
Annual Equivalent ∆% | 2.1 | 2.1 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart GDP of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the rates of growth of GDP at SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the 16 quarters from IVQ2012 to IIIQ2016. Growth has been fluctuating.
Chart GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Rates of Growth of United States GDP, ∆%
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdp_glance.htm
In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QE→∞, or reinvestment of principal in securities and issue of bank reserves to maintain interest rates at zero, cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.
The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm). The FOMC updated in the statement at its meeting on Dec 16, 2015 with maintenance of the current level of the balance sheet and liftoff of interest rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm) followed by the statement of the meeting on Dec 14, 2016 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20161214a.htm):
“Press Release
Release Date: December 14, 2016
For release at 2:00 p.m. EST
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in November indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been expanding at a moderate pace since mid-year. Job gains have been solid in recent months and the unemployment rate has declined. Household spending has been rising moderately but business fixed investment has remained soft. Inflation has increased since earlier this year but is still below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective, partly reflecting earlier declines in energy prices and in prices of non-energy imports. Market-based measures of inflation compensation have moved up considerably but still are low; most survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance, in recent months.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace and labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further. Inflation is expected to rise to 2 percent over the medium term as the transitory effects of past declines in energy and import prices dissipate and the labor market strengthens further. Near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced. The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments.
In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1/2 to 3/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation.
In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.
The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee's holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Stanley Fischer; Esther L. George; Loretta J. Mester; Jerome H. Powell; Eric Rosengren; and Daniel K. Tarullo.
Implementation Note issued December 14, 2016.”
There are several important issues in this statement.
- Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):
“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”
- Open-ended Quantitative Easing or QE∞ with End of Bond Purchases and Continuing Reinvestment of Principal in Securities. Earlier programs are continued with reinvestment of principal in securities and bank reserves at $2,393.4 billion on Dec 14, 2016 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1): “The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee's holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions.”
- Increase of interest rates: “In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1/2 to 3/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation.”
- New Advance Guidance. “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added).
- Policy Commitment with Maximum Employment. The emphasis of policy is in maintaining full employment: “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”
- World Financial and Economic Conditions. There is concern with the world economy and financial markets: “The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments” (emphasis added).
Focus is shifting from tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at ¼ to ½ percent and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Markets overreacted to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases to $25 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at ½ to ¾ percent with gradual consideration of further rate increases (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20161214a.htm): “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added).
How long is “considerable time”? At the press conference following the meeting on Mar 19, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question of Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal explaining “In particular, the Committee has endorsed the view that it anticipates that will be a considerable period after the asset purchase program ends before it will be appropriate to begin to raise rates. And of course on our present path, well, that's not utterly preset. We would be looking at next, next fall. So, I think that's important guidance” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140319.pdf). Many focused on “next fall,” ignoring that the path of increasing rates is not “utterly preset.”
At the press conference following the meeting on Dec 17, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question by Jon Hilseranth of the Wall Street Journal explaining “patience” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20141217.pdf):
“So I did say that this statement that the committee can be patient should be interpreted as meaning that it is unlikely to begin the normalization process, for at least the next couple of meetings. Now that doesn't point to any preset or predetermined time at which normalization is -- will begin. There are a range of views on the committee, and it will be dependent on how incoming data bears on the progress, the economy is making. First of all, I want to emphasize that no meeting is completely off the table in the sense that if we do see faster progress toward our objectives than we currently expect, then it is possible that the process of normalization would occur sooner than we now anticipated. And of course the converse is also true. So at this point, we think it unlikely that it will be appropriate, that we will see conditions for at least the next couple of meetings that will make it appropriate for us to decide to begin normalization. A number of committee participants have indicated that in their view, conditions could be appropriate by the middle of next year. But there is no preset time.”
Chair Yellen explained the removal of the word “patience” from the advanced guidance at the press conference following the FOMC meeting on Mar 18, 2015(http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150318.pdf):
“In other words, just because we removed the word “patient” from the statement doesn’t mean we are going to be impatient. Moreover, even after the initial increase in the target funds rate, our policy is likely to remain highly accommodative to support continued progress toward our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”
At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):
“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.
Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.
Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) provides comprehensive review of the theory and measurement of labor markets. Monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):
“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”
Yellen (2014Aug22) finds that the unemployment rate is not sufficient in determining slack:
“One convenient way to summarize the information contained in a large number of indicators is through the use of so-called factor models. Following this methodology, Federal Reserve Board staff developed a labor market conditions index from 19 labor market indicators, including four I just discussed. This broadly based metric supports the conclusion that the labor market has improved significantly over the past year, but it also suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) restates that the FOMC determines monetary policy on newly available information and interpretation of labor markets and inflation and does not follow a preset path:
“But if progress in the labor market continues to be more rapid than anticipated by the Committee or if inflation moves up more rapidly than anticipated, resulting in faster convergence toward our dual objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target could come sooner than the Committee currently expects and could be more rapid thereafter. Of course, if economic performance turns out to be disappointing and progress toward our goals proceeds more slowly than we expect, then the future path of interest rates likely would be more accommodative than we currently anticipate. As I have noted many times, monetary policy is not on a preset path. The Committee will be closely monitoring incoming information on the labor market and inflation in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”
The minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 16-17, 2014, reveal concern with global economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20140917.htm):
“Most viewed the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as broadly balanced. However, a number of participants noted that economic growth over the medium term might be slower than they expected if foreign economic growth came in weaker than anticipated, structural productivity continued to increase only slowly, or the recovery in residential construction continued to lag.”
There is similar concern in the minutes of the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16-17, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20141217.htm):
“In their discussion of the foreign economic outlook, participants noted that the implications of the drop in crude oil prices would differ across regions, especially if the price declines affected inflation expectations and financial markets; a few participants said that the effect on overseas employment and output as a whole was likely to be positive. While some participants had lowered their assessments of the prospects for global economic growth, several noted that the likelihood of further responses by policymakers abroad had increased. Several participants indicated that they expected slower economic growth abroad to negatively affect the U.S. economy, principally through lower net exports, but the net effect of lower oil prices on U.S. economic activity was anticipated to be positive.”
Chair Yellen analyzes the view of inflation (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140416a.htm):
“Inflation, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, has slowed from an annual rate of about 2-1/2 percent in early 2012 to less than 1 percent in February of this year. This rate is well below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective. Many advanced economies are observing a similar softness in inflation.
To some extent, the low rate of inflation seems due to influences that are likely to be temporary, including a deceleration in consumer energy prices and outright declines in core import prices in recent quarters. Longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably steady, however. We anticipate that, as the effects of transitory factors subside and as labor market gains continue, inflation will gradually move back toward 2 percent.”
There is a critical phrase in the statement of Sep 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm): “but mortgage rates have risen further.” Did the increase of mortgage rates influence the decision of the FOMC not to taper? Is FOMC “communication” and “guidance” successful? Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?
A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/peaking-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 19,963.80 on Jan 6, 2017, which is higher by 40.9 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 40.6 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial assets have been approaching or exceeding historical highs. Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):
So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).
In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):
“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”
Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:
“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).
Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:
“Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).
Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
The Communiqué of the Istanbul meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on February 10, 2015, sanctions the need of unconventional monetary policy with warning on collateral effects (http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/150210-finance.html):
“We agree that consistent with central banks' mandates, current economic conditions require accommodative monetary policies in some economies. In this regard, we welcome that central banks take appropriate monetary policy action. The recent policy decision by the ECB aims at fulfilling its price stability mandate, and will further support the recovery in the euro area. We also note that some advanced economies with stronger growth prospects are moving closer to conditions that would allow for policy normalization. In an environment of diverging monetary policy settings and rising financial market volatility, policy settings should be carefully calibrated and clearly communicated to minimize negative spillovers.”
Professor Raguram G Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation. Rajan (2005) anticipated the risks of the world financial crisis. Professor John B. Taylor (2016Dec 7, 2016Dec20), in Testimony to the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade Committee on Financial Services, on Dec 7, 2016, analyzes the adverse effects of unconventional monetary policy:
“My research and that of others over the years shows that these policies were not effective, and may have been counterproductive. Economic growth was consistently below the Fed’s forecasts with the policies, and was much weaker than in earlier U.S. recoveries from deep recessions. Job growth has been insufficient to raise the percentage of the population that is working above pre-recession levels. There is a growing consensus that the extra low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy have reached diminishing or negative returns. Many have argued that these policies widen the income distribution, adversely affect savers, and increase the volatility of the dollar exchange rate. Experienced market participants have expressed concerns about bubbles, imbalances, and distortions caused by the policies. The unconventional policies have also raised public policy concerns about the Fed being transformed into a multipurpose institution, intervening in particular sectors and allocating credit, areas where Congress may have a role, but not a limited-purpose independent agency of government.”
Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor 2007, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2015, 2012 Oct 25; 2013Oct28, 2014 Jan01, 2014Jan3, 2014Jun26, 2014Jul15, 2015, 2016Dec7, 2016Dec20 http://www.johnbtaylor.com/) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between ½ and ¾ percent. Accelerated increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
The FOMC provides guidelines on the process of normalization of monetary policy at the meeting on Dec 16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a1.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has made the following decisions to implement the monetary policy stance announced by the Federal Open Market Committee in its statement on December 16, 2015:
- The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to raise the interest rate paid on required and excess reserve balances to 0.50 percent, effective December 17, 2015.
- As part of its policy decision, the Federal Open Market Committee voted to authorize and direct the Open Market Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the System Open Market Account in accordance with the following domestic policy directive:1
"Effective December 17, 2015, the Federal Open Market Committee directs the Desk to undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the federal funds rate in a target range of 1/4 to 1/2 percent, including: (1) overnight reverse repurchase operations (and reverse repurchase operations with maturities of more than one day when necessary to accommodate weekend, holiday, or similar trading conventions) at an offering rate of 0.25 percent, in amounts limited only by the value of Treasury securities held outright in the System Open Market Account that are available for such operations and by a per-counterparty limit of $30 billion per day; and (2) term reverse repurchase operations to the extent approved in the resolution on term RRP operations approved by the Committee at its March 17-18, 2015, meeting.
The Committee directs the Desk to continue rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction and to continue reinvesting principal payments on all agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. The Committee also directs the Desk to engage in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve's agency mortgage-backed securities transactions."
More information regarding open market operations may be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's website.
- In a related action, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to approve a 1/4 percentage point increase in the discount rate (the primary credit rate) to 1.00 percent, effective December 17, 2015. In taking this action, the Board approved requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco.
This information will be updated as appropriate to reflect decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Board of Governors regarding details of the Federal Reserve's operational tools and approach used to implement monetary policy.”
In the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress on Feb 24, 2015, Chair Yellen analyzes the timing of interest rate increases (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150224a.htm):
“The FOMC's assessment that it can be patient in beginning to normalize policy means that the Committee considers it unlikely that economic conditions will warrant an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate for at least the next couple of FOMC meetings. If economic conditions continue to improve, as the Committee anticipates, the Committee will at some point begin considering an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate on a meeting-by-meeting basis. Before then, the Committee will change its forward guidance. However, it is important to emphasize that a modification of the forward guidance should not be read as indicating that the Committee will necessarily increase the target range in a couple of meetings. Instead the modification should be understood as reflecting the Committee's judgment that conditions have improved to the point where it will soon be the case that a change in the target range could be warranted at any meeting. Provided that labor market conditions continue to improve and further improvement is expected, the Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate when, on the basis of incoming data, the Committee is reasonably confident that inflation will move back over the medium term toward our 2 percent objective.”
In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):
“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability. If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases. In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that it does not run persistently above or below that level (emphasis added).”
At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:
“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.
For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”
In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm):
“The economy has continued to recover from the steep recession of 2008 and 2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth stepped up to an average annual rate of about 3-1/4 percent over the second half of last year, a faster pace than in the first half and during the preceding two years. Although real GDP growth is currently estimated to have paused in the first quarter of this year, I see that pause as mostly reflecting transitory factors, including the effects of the unusually cold and snowy winter weather. With the harsh winter behind us, many recent indicators suggest that a rebound in spending and production is already under way, putting the overall economy on track for solid growth in the current quarter. One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.
Conditions in the labor market have continued to improve. The unemployment rate was 6.3 percent in April, about 1-1/4 percentage points below where it was a year ago. Moreover, gains in payroll employment averaged nearly 200,000 jobs per month over the past year. During the economic recovery so far, payroll employment has increased by about 8-1/2 million jobs since its low point, and the unemployment rate has declined about 3-3/4 percentage points since its peak.
While conditions in the labor market have improved appreciably, they are still far from satisfactory. Even with recent declines in the unemployment rate, it continues to be elevated. Moreover, both the share of the labor force that has been unemployed for more than six months and the number of individuals who work part time but would prefer a full-time job are at historically high levels. In addition, most measures of labor compensation have been rising slowly--another signal that a substantial amount of slack remains in the labor market.
Inflation has been quite low even as the economy has continued to expand. Some of the factors contributing to the softness in inflation over the past year, such as the declines seen in non-oil import prices, will probably be transitory. Importantly, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained stable. That said, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recognizes that inflation persistently below 2 percent--the rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its dual mandate--could pose risks to economic performance, and we are monitoring inflation developments closely.
Looking ahead, I expect that economic activity will expand at a somewhat faster pace this year than it did last year, that the unemployment rate will continue to decline gradually, and that inflation will begin to move up toward 2 percent. A faster rate of economic growth this year should be supported by reduced restraint from changes in fiscal policy, gains in household net worth from increases in home prices and equity values, a firming in foreign economic growth, and further improvements in household and business confidence as the economy continues to strengthen. Moreover, U.S. financial conditions remain supportive of growth in economic activity and employment.”
In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):
“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”
Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:
W = Y/r (10
Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.
In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:
“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.
The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”
Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
The key policy is maintaining the fed funds rate between ½ and ¾ percent with gradual increases. Accelerated increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) is that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This is a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.
In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Professor Raguram G Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation.
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced on Jan 15, 2015, the termination of its peg of the exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the euro (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):
“The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has decided to discontinue the minimum exchange rate of
CHF 1.20 per euro with immediate effect and to cease foreign currency purchases associated with enforcing it.”
The SNB also lowered interest rates to nominal negative percentages (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):
“At the same time as discontinuing the minimum exchange rate, the SNB will be lowering the interest rate for balances held on sight deposit accounts to –0.75% from 22 January. The exemption thresholds remain unchanged. Further lowering the interest rate makes Swiss-franc investments considerably less attractive and will mitigate the effects of the decision to discontinue the minimum exchange rate. The target range for the three-month Libor is being lowered by 0.5 percentage points to between –1.25% and –0.25%.”
The Swiss franc rate relative to the euro (CHF/EUR) appreciated 18.7 percent on Jan 15, 2015. The Swiss franc rate relative to the dollar (CHF/USD) appreciated 17.7 percent. Central banks are taking measures in anticipation of the quantitative easing by the European Central Bank.
On Jan 22, 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to implement an “expanded asset purchase program” with combined asset purchases of €60 billion per month “until at least Sep 2016 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html). The objective of the program is that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html):
“Asset purchases provide monetary stimulus to the economy in a context where key ECB interest rates are at their lower bound. They further ease monetary and financial conditions, making access to finance cheaper for firms and households. This tends to support investment and consumption, and ultimately contributes to a return of inflation rates towards 2%.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, explains the coordination of asset purchases with NCBs (National Central Banks) of the euro area and risk sharing (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“In March 2015 the Eurosystem will start to purchase euro-denominated investment-grade securities issued by euro area governments and agencies and European institutions in the secondary market. The purchases of securities issued by euro area governments and agencies will be based on the Eurosystem NCBs’ shares in the ECB’s capital key. Some additional eligibility criteria will be applied in the case of countries under an EU/IMF adjustment programme. As regards the additional asset purchases, the Governing Council retains control over all the design features of the programme and the ECB will coordinate the purchases, thereby safeguarding the singleness of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Eurosystem will make use of decentralised implementation to mobilise its resources. With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, rejected the possibility of seigniorage in the new asset purchase program, or central bank financing of fiscal expansion (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“As I just said, it would be a big mistake if countries were to consider that the presence of this programme might be an incentive to fiscal expansion. They would undermine the confidence, so it’s not directed to monetary financing at all. Actually, it’s been designed as to avoid any monetary financing.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, does not find effects of monetary policy in inflating asset prices (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“On the first question, we monitor closely any potential instance of risk to financial stability. So we're very alert to that risk. So far we don't see bubbles. There may be some local episodes of certain specific markets where prices are going up fast. But to have a bubble, besides having that, one should also identify, detect an increase, dramatic increase in leverage or in bank credit, and we don't see that now. However, we, as I said, we are alert. If bubbles are of a local nature, they should be addressed by local instruments, namely macro-prudential instruments rather than by monetary policy.”
The DAX index of German equities increased 1.3 percent on Jan 22, 2015 and 2.1 percent on Jan 23, 2015. The euro depreciated from EUR 1.1611/USD (EUR 0.8613/USD) on Wed Jan 21, 2015, to EUR 1.1206/USD (EUR 0.8924/USD) on Fri Jan 23, 2015, or 3.6 percent. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar.
Dan Strumpf and Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, writing on “Fed’s Yellen: Stock Valuations ‘Generally are Quite High,’” on May 6, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-cites-progress-on-bank-regulation-1430918155?tesla=y ), quote Chair Yellen at open conversation with Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, finding “equity-market valuations” as “quite high” with “potential dangers” in bond valuations. The DJIA fell 0.5 percent on May 6, 2015, after the comments and then increased 0.5 percent on May 7, 2015 and 1.5 percent on May 8, 2015.
Fri May 1 | Mon 4 | Tue 5 | Wed 6 | Thu 7 | Fri 8 |
DJIA 18024.06 -0.3% 1.0% | 18070.40 0.3% 0.3% | 17928.20 -0.5% -0.8% | 17841.98 -1.0% -0.5% | 17924.06 -0.6% 0.5% | 18191.11 0.9% 1.5% |
There are two approaches in theory considered by Bordo (2012Nov20) and Bordo and Lane (2013). The first approach is in the classical works of Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963a, 1987) and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (1973). There is a similar approach in Tobin (1969). Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 66) trace the effects of expansionary monetary policy into increasing initially financial asset prices: “It seems plausible that both nonbank and bank holders of redundant balances will turn first to securities comparable to those they have sold, say, fixed-interest coupon, low-risk obligations. But as they seek to purchase these they will tend to bid up the prices of those issues. Hence they, and also other holders not involved in the initial central bank open-market transactions, will look farther afield: the banks, to their loans; the nonbank holders, to other categories of securities-higher risk fixed-coupon obligations, equities, real property, and so forth.”
The second approach is by the Austrian School arguing that increases in asset prices can become bubbles if monetary policy allows their financing with bank credit. Professor Michael D. Bordo provides clear thought and empirical evidence on the role of “expansionary monetary policy” in inflating asset prices (Bordo2012Nov20, Bordo and Lane 2013). Bordo and Lane (2013) provide revealing narrative of historical episodes of expansionary monetary policy. Bordo and Lane (2013) conclude that policies of depressing interest rates below the target rate or growth of money above the target influences higher asset prices, using a panel of 18 OECD countries from 1920 to 2011. Bordo (2012Nov20) concludes: “that expansionary money is a significant trigger” and “central banks should follow stable monetary policies…based on well understood and credible monetary rules.” Taylor (2007, 2009) explains the housing boom and financial crisis in terms of expansionary monetary policy. Professor Martin Feldstein (2016), at Harvard University, writing on “A Federal Reserve oblivious to its effects on financial markets,” on Jan 13, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-federal-reserve-oblivious-to-its-effect-on-financial-markets-1452729166), analyzes how unconventional monetary policy drove values of risk financial assets to high levels. Quantitative easing and zero interest rates distorted calculation of risks with resulting vulnerabilities in financial markets.
Another hurdle of exit from zero interest rates is “competitive easing” that Professor Raghuram Rajan, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, characterizes as disguised “competitive devaluation” (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). The fed has been considering increasing interest rates. The European Central Bank (ECB) announced, on Mar 5, 2015, the beginning on Mar 9, 2015 of its quantitative easing program denominated as Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP), consisting of “combined monthly purchases of EUR 60 bn [billion] in public and private sector securities” (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/pspp.en.html). Expectation of increasing interest rates in the US together with euro rates close to zero or negative cause revaluation of the dollar (or devaluation of the euro and of most currencies worldwide). US corporations suffer currency translation losses of their foreign transactions and investments (http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Pronouncement_C/SummaryPage&cid=900000010318) while the US becomes less competitive in world trade (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c)). The DJIA fell 1.5 percent on Mar 6, 2015 and the dollar revalued 2.2 percent from Mar 5 to Mar 6, 2015. The euro has devalued 51.0 percent relative to the dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Jan 6, 2017.
Fri 27 Feb | Mon 3/2 | Tue 3/3 | Wed 3/4 | Thu 3/5 | Fri 3/6 |
USD/ EUR 1.1197 1.6% 0.0% | 1.1185 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1176 0.2% 0.1% | 1.1081 1.0% 0.9% | 1.1030 1.5% 0.5% | 1.0843 3.2% 1.7% |
Chair Yellen explained the removal of the word “patience” from the advanced guidance at the press conference following the FOMC meeting on Mar 18, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150318.pdf):
“In other words, just because we removed the word “patient” from the statement doesn’t mean we are going to be impatient. Moreover, even after the initial increase in the target funds rate, our policy is likely to remain highly accommodative to support continued progress toward our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”
Exchange rate volatility is increasing in response of “impatience” in financial markets with monetary policy guidance and measures:
Fri Mar 6 | Mon 9 | Tue 10 | Wed 11 | Thu 12 | Fri 13 |
USD/ EUR 1.0843 3.2% 1.7% | 1.0853 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.0700 1.3% 1.4% | 1.0548 2.7% 1.4% | 1.0637 1.9% -0.8% | 1.0497 3.2% 1.3% |
Fri Mar 13 | Mon 16 | Tue 17 | Wed 18 | Thu 19 | Fri 20 |
USD/ EUR 1.0497 3.2% 1.3% | 1.0570 -0.7% -0.7% | 1.0598 -1.0% -0.3% | 1.0864 -3.5% -2.5% | 1.0661 -1.6% 1.9% | 1.0821 -3.1% -1.5% |
Fri Apr 24 | Mon 27 | Tue 28 | Wed 29 | Thu 30 | May Fri 1 |
USD/ EUR 1.0874 -0.6% -0.4% | 1.0891 -0.2% -0.2% | 1.0983 -1.0% -0.8% | 1.1130 -2.4% -1.3% | 1.1223 -3.2% -0.8% | 1.1199 -3.0% 0.2% |
In a speech at Brown University on May 22, 2015, Chair Yellen stated (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150522a.htm):
“For this reason, if the economy continues to improve as I expect, I think it will be appropriate at some point this year to take the initial step to raise the federal funds rate target and begin the process of normalizing monetary policy. To support taking this step, however, I will need to see continued improvement in labor market conditions, and I will need to be reasonably confident that inflation will move back to 2 percent over the medium term. After we begin raising the federal funds rate, I anticipate that the pace of normalization is likely to be gradual. The various headwinds that are still restraining the economy, as I said, will likely take some time to fully abate, and the pace of that improvement is highly uncertain.”
The US dollar appreciated 3.8 percent relative to the euro in the week of May 22, 2015:
Fri May 15 | Mon 18 | Tue 19 | Wed 20 | Thu 21 | Fri 22 |
USD/ EUR 1.1449 -2.2% -0.3% | 1.1317 1.2% 1.2% | 1.1150 2.6% 1.5% | 1.1096 3.1% 0.5% | 1.1113 2.9% -0.2% | 1.1015 3.8% 0.9% |
The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, warned on Jun 4, 2015, that: (http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2015/06/04/u-s-economy-returning-to-growth-but-pockets-of-vulnerability/):
“The Fed’s first rate increase in almost 9 years is being carefully prepared and telegraphed. Nevertheless, regardless of the timing, higher US policy rates could still result in significant market volatility with financial stability consequences that go well beyond US borders. I weighing these risks, we think there is a case for waiting to raise rates until there are more tangible signs of wage or price inflation than are currently evident. Even after the first rate increase, a gradual rise in the federal fund rates will likely be appropriate.”
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, warned on Jun 3, 2015 that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150603.en.html):
“But certainly one lesson is that we should get used to periods of higher volatility. At very low levels of interest rates, asset prices tend to show higher volatility…the Governing Council was unanimous in its assessment that we should look through these developments and maintain a steady monetary policy stance.”
The Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet L. Yellen, stated on Jul 10, 2015 that (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150710a.htm):
“Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or accelerate this first step. I currently anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.”
There is essentially the same view in the Testimony of Chair Yellen in delivering the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jul 15, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150715a.htm).
At the press conference after the meeting of the FOMC on Sep 17, 2015, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150917.pdf 4):
“The outlook abroad appears to have become more uncertain of late, and heightened concerns about growth in China and other emerging market economies have led to notable volatility in financial markets. Developments since our July meeting, including the drop in equity prices, the further appreciation of the dollar, and a widening in risk spreads, have tightened overall financial conditions to some extent. These developments may restrain U.S. economic activity somewhat and are likely to put further downward pressure on inflation in the near term. Given the significant economic and financial interconnections between the United States and the rest of the world, the situation abroad bears close watching.”
Some equity markets fell on Fri Sep 18, 2015:
Fri Sep 11 | Mon 14 | Tue 15 | Wed 16 | Thu 17 | Fri 18 |
DJIA 16433.09 2.1% 0.6% | 16370.96 -0.4% -0.4% | 16599.85 1.0% 1.4% | 16739.95 1.9% 0.8% | 16674.74 1.5% -0.4% | 16384.58 -0.3% -1.7% |
Nikkei 225 18264.22 2.7% -0.2% | 17965.70 -1.6% -1.6% | 18026.48 -1.3% 0.3% | 18171.60 -0.5% 0.8% | 18432.27 0.9% 1.4% | 18070.21 -1.1% -2.0% |
DAX 10123.56 0.9% -0.9% | 10131.74 0.1% 0.1% | 10188.13 0.6% 0.6% | 10227.21 1.0% 0.4% | 10229.58 1.0% 0.0% | 9916.16 -2.0% -3.1% |
Frank H. Knight (1963, 233), in Risk, uncertainty and profit, distinguishes between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty. Chair Yellen, in a lecture on “Inflation dynamics and monetary policy,” on Sep 24, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm), states that (emphasis added):
· “The economic outlook, of course, is highly uncertain”
· “Considerable uncertainties also surround the outlook for economic activity”
· “Given the highly uncertain nature of the outlook…”
Is there a “science” or even “art” of central banking under this extreme uncertainty in which policy does not generate higher volatility of money, income, prices and values of financial assets?
Lingling Wei, writing on Oct 23, 2015, on China’s central bank moves to spur economic growth,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-central-bank-cuts-rates-1445601495), analyzes the reduction by the People’s Bank of China (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/ http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130437/index.html) of borrowing and lending rates of banks by 50 basis points and reserve requirements of banks by 50 basis points. Paul Vigna, writing on Oct 23, 2015, on “Stocks rally out of correction territory on latest central bank boost,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/10/23/stocks-rally-out-of-correction-territory-on-latest-central-bank-boost/), analyzes the rally in financial markets following the statement on Oct 22, 2015, by the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi of consideration of new quantitative measures in Dec 2015 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0814riKW25k&rel=0) and the reduction of bank lending/deposit rates and reserve requirements of banks by the People’s Bank of China on Oct 23, 2015. The dollar revalued 2.8 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23, 2015, following the intended easing of the European Central Bank. The DJIA rose 2.8 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23 and the DAX index of German equities rose 5.4 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23, 2015.
Fri Oct 16 | Mon 19 | Tue 20 | Wed 21 | Thu 22 | Fri 23 |
USD/ EUR 1.1350 0.1% 0.3% | 1.1327 0.2% 0.2% | 1.1348 0.0% -0.2% | 1.1340 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1110 2.1% 2.0% | 1.1018 2.9% 0.8% |
DJIA 17215.97 0.8% 0.4% | 17230.54 0.1% 0.1% | 17217.11 0.0% -0.1% | 17168.61 -0.3% -0.3% | 17489.16 1.6% 1.9% | 17646.70 2.5% 0.9% |
Dow Global 2421.58 0.3% 0.6% | 2414.33 -0.3% -0.3% | 2411.03 -0.4% -0.1% | 2411.27 -0.4% 0.0% | 2434.79 0.5% 1.0% | 2458.13 1.5% 1.0% |
DJ Asia Pacific 1402.31 1.1% 0.3% | 1398.80 -0.3% -0.3% | 1395.06 -0.5% -0.3% | 1402.68 0.0% 0.5% | 1396.03 -0.4% -0.5% | 1415.50 0.9% 1.4% |
Nikkei 225 18291.80 -0.8% 1.1% | 18131.23 -0.9% -0.9% | 18207.15 -0.5% 0.4% | 18554.28 1.4% 1.9% | 18435.87 0.8% -0.6% | 18825.30 2.9% 2.1% |
Shanghai 3391.35 6.5% 1.6% | 3386.70 -0.1% -0.1% | 3425.33 1.0% 1.1% | 3320.68 -2.1% -3.1% | 3368.74 -0.7% 1.4% | 3412.43 0.6% 1.3% |
DAX 10104.43 0.1% 0.4% | 10164.31 0.6% 0.6% | 10147.68 0.4% -0.2% | 10238.10 1.3% 0.9% | 10491.97 3.8% 2.5% | 10794.54 6.8% 2.9% |
Ben Leubsdorf, writing on “Fed’s Yellen: December is “Live Possibility” for First Rate Increase,” on Nov 4, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-december-is-live-possibility-for-first-rate-increase-1446654282) quotes Chair Yellen that a rate increase in “December would be a live possibility.” The remark of Chair Yellen was during a hearing on supervision and regulation before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20151104a.htm) and a day before the release of the employment situation report for Oct 2015 (Section I). The dollar revalued 2.4 percent during the week. The euro has devalued 51.0 percent relative to the dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Jan 6, 2017.
Fri Oct 30 | Mon 2 | Tue 3 | Wed 4 | Thu 5 | Fri 6 |
USD/ EUR 1.1007 0.1% -0.3% | 1.1016 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.0965 0.4% 0.5% | 1.0867 1.3% 0.9% | 1.0884 1.1% -0.2% | 1.0742 2.4% 1.3% |
The release on Nov 18, 2015 of the minutes of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) meeting held on Oct 28, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20151028.htm) states:
“Most participants anticipated that, based on their assessment of the current economic situation and their outlook for economic activity, the labor market, and inflation, these conditions [for interest rate increase] could well be met by the time of the next meeting. Nonetheless, they emphasized that the actual decision would depend on the implications for the medium-term economic outlook of the data received over the upcoming intermeeting period… It was noted that beginning the normalization process relatively soon would make it more likely that the policy trajectory after liftoff could be shallow.”
Markets could have interpreted a symbolic increase in the fed funds rate at the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 15-16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm) followed by “shallow” increases, explaining the sharp increase in stock market values and appreciation of the dollar after the release of the minutes on Nov 18, 2015:
Fri Nov 13 | Mon 16 | Tue 17 | Wed 18 | Thu 19 | Fri 20 |
USD/ EUR 1.0774 -0.3% 0.4% | 1.0686 0.8% 0.8% | 1.0644 1.2% 0.4% | 1.0660 1.1% -0.2% | 1.0735 0.4% -0.7% | 1.0647 1.2% 0.8% |
DJIA 17245.24 -3.7% -1.2% | 17483.01 1.4% 1.4% | 17489.50 1.4% 0.0% | 17737.16 2.9% 1.4% | 17732.75 2.8% 0.0% | 17823.81 3.4% 0.5% |
DAX 10708.40 -2.5% -0.7% | 10713.23 0.0% 0.0% | 10971.04 2.5% 2.4% | 10959.95 2.3% -0.1% | 11085.44 3.5% 1.1% | 11119.83 3.8% 0.3% |
In testimony before The Joint Economic Committee of Congress on Dec 3, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20151203a.htm), Chair Yellen reiterated that the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) “anticipates that even after employment and inflation are near mandate-consistent levels, economic condition may, for some time, warrant keeping the target federal funds rate below the Committee views as normal in the longer run.” Todd Buell and Katy Burne, writing on “Draghi says ECB could step up stimulus efforts if necessary,” on Dec 4, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/draghi-says-ecb-could-step-up-stimulus-efforts-if-necessary-1449252934), analyze that the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, reassured financial markets that the ECB will increase stimulus if required to raise inflation the euro area to targets. The USD depreciated 3.1 percent on Thu Dec 3, 2015 after weaker than expected measures by the European Central Bank. DJIA fell 1.4 percent on Dec 3 and increased 2.1 percent on Dec 4. DAX fell 3.6 percent on Dec 3.
Fri Nov 27 | Mon 30 | Tue 1 | Wed 2 | Thu 3 | Fri 4 |
USD/ EUR 1.0594 0.5% 0.2% | 1.0565 0.3% 0.3% | 1.0634 -0.4% -0.7% | 1.0616 -0.2% 0.2% | 1.0941 -3.3% -3.1% | 1.0885 -2.7% 0.5% |
DJIA 17798.49 -0.1% -0.1% | 17719.92 -0.4% -0.4% | 17888.35 0.5% 1.0% | 17729.68 -0.4% -0.9% | 17477.67 -1.8% -1.4% | 17847.63 0.3% 2.1% |
DAX 11293.76 1.6% -0.2% | 11382.23 0.8% 0.8% | 11261.24 -0.3% -1.1% | 11190.02 -0.9% -0.6% | 10789.24 -4.5% -3.6% | 10752.10 -4.8% -0.3% |
At the press conference following the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16, 2015, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20151216.pdf page 8):
“And we recognize that monetary policy operates with lags. We would like to be able to move in a prudent, and as we've emphasized, gradual manner. It's been a long time since the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates, and I think it's prudent to be able to watch what the impact is on financial conditions and spending in the economy and moving in a timely fashion enables us to do this.”
The implication of this statement is that the state of the art is not accurate in analyzing the effects of monetary policy on financial markets and economic activity. The US dollar appreciated and equities fluctuated:
Fri Dec 11 | Mon 14 | Tue 15 | Wed 16 | Thu 17 | Fri 18 |
USD/ EUR 1.0991 -1.0% -0.4% | 1.0993 0.0% 0.0% | 1.0932 0.5% 0.6% | 1.0913 0.7% 0.2% | 1.0827 1.5% 0.8% | 1.0868 1.1% -0.4% |
DJIA 17265.21 -3.3% -1.8% | 17368.50 0.6% 0.6% | 17524.91 1.5% 0.9% | 17749.09 2.8% 1.3% | 17495.84 1.3% -1.4% | 17128.55 -0.8% -2.1% |
DAX 10340.06 -3.8% -2.4% | 10139.34 -1.9% -1.9% | 10450.38 -1.1% 3.1% | 10469.26 1.2% 0.2% | 10738.12 3.8% 2.6% | 10608.19 2.6% -1.2% |
On January 29, 2016, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan introduced a new policy to attain the “price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf). The new framework consists of three dimensions: quantity, quality and interest rate. The interest rate dimension consists of rates paid to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank of Japan of three tiers zero, positive and minus 0.1 percent. The quantitative dimension consists of increasing the monetary base at the annual rate of 80 trillion yen. The qualitative dimension consists of purchases by the Bank of Japan of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITS). The yen devalued sharply relative to the dollar and world equity markets soared after the new policy announced on Jan 29, 2016:
Fri 22 | Mon 25 | Tue 26 | Wed 27 | Thu 28 | Fri 29 |
JPY/ USD 118.77 -1.5% -0.9% | 118.30 0.4% 0.4% | 118.42 0.3% -0.1% | 118.68 0.1% -0.2% | 118.82 0.0% -0.1% | 121.13 -2.0% -1.9% |
DJIA 16093.51 0.7% 1.3% | 15885.22 -1.3% -1.3% | 16167.23 0.5% 1.8% | 15944.46 -0.9% -1.4% | 16069.64 -0.1% 0.8% | 16466.30 2.3% 2.5% |
Nikkei 16958.53 -1.1% 5.9% | 17110.91 0.9% 0.9% | 16708.90 -1.5% -2.3% | 17163.92 1.2% 2.7% | 17041.45 0.5% -0.7% | 17518.30 3.3% 2.8% |
Shanghai 2916.56 0.5% 1.3 | 2938.51 0.8% 0.8% | 2749.79 -5.7% -6.4% | 2735.56 -6.2% -0.5% | 2655.66 -8.9% -2.9% | 2737.60 -6.1% 3.1% |
DAX 9764.88 2.3% 2.0% | 9736.15 -0.3% -0.3% | 9822.75 0.6% 0.9% | 9880.82 1.2% 0.6% | 9639.59 -1.3% -2.4% | 9798.11 0.3% 1.6% |
In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Feb 10-11, 2016, Chair Yellen (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20160210a.htm) states: “U.S. real gross domestic product is estimated to have increased about 1-3/4 percent in 2015. Over the course of the year, subdued foreign growth and the appreciation of the dollar restrained net exports. In the fourth quarter of last year, growth in the gross domestic product is reported to have slowed more sharply, to an annual rate of just 3/4 percent; again, growth was held back by weak net exports as well as by a negative contribution from inventory investment.”
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Yellen Says Fed Should Be Prepared to Use Negative Rates if Needed,” on Feb 11, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-reiterates-concerns-about-risks-to-economy-in-senate-testimony-1455203865), analyzes the statement of Chair Yellen in Congress that the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) is considering negative interest rates on bank reserves. The Wall Street Journal provides yields of two and ten-year sovereign bonds with negative interest rates on shorter maturities where central banks pay negative interest rates on excess bank reserves:
Sovereign Yields 2/12/16 | Japan | Germany | USA |
2 Year | -0.168 | -0.498 | 0.694 |
10 Year | 0.076 | 0.262 | 1.744 |
On Mar 10, 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced (1) reduction of the refinancing rate by 5 basis points to 0.00 percent; decrease the marginal lending rate to 0.25 percent; reduction of the deposit facility rate to 0,40 percent; increase of the monthly purchase of assets to €80 billion; include nonbank corporate bonds in assets eligible for purchases; and new long-term refinancing operations (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310.en.html). The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, stated in the press conference (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2016/html/is160310.en.html): “How low can we go? Let me say that rates will stay low, very low, for a long period of time, and well past the horizon of our purchases…We don’t anticipate that it will be necessary to reduce rates further. Of course, new facts can change the situation and the outlook.”
The dollar devalued relative to the euro and open stock markets traded lower after the announcement on Mar 10, 2016, but stocks rebounded on Mar 11:
Fri 4 | Mon 7 | Tue 8 | Wed 9 | Thu10 | Fri 11 |
USD/ EUR 1.1006 -0.7% -0.4% | 1.1012 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.1013 -0.1% 0.0% | 1.0999 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1182 -1.6% -1.7% | 1.1151 -1.3% 0.3% |
DJIA 17006.77 2.2% 0.4% | 17073.95 0.4% 0.4% | 16964.10 -0.3% -0.6% | 17000.36 0.0% 0.2% | 16995.13 -0.1% 0.0% | 17213.31 1.2% 1.3% |
DAX 9824.17 3.3% 0.7% | 9778.93 -0.5% 0.5% | 9692.82 -1.3% -0.9% | 9723.09 -1.0% 0.3% | 9498.15 -3.3% -2.3% | 9831.13 0.1% 3.5% |
At the press conference after the FOMC meeting on Sep 21, 2016, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20160921.pdf ): “However, the economic outlook is inherently uncertain.” In the address to the Jackson Hole symposium on Aug 26, 2016, Chair Yellen states: “I believe the case for an increase in in federal funds rate has strengthened in recent months…And, as ever, the economic outlook is uncertain, and so monetary policy is not on a preset course” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160826a.htm). In a speech at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, on Jun 6, 2016 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160606a.htm), Chair Yellen finds that “there is considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook.” There are fifteen references to this uncertainty in the text of 18 pages double-spaced. In the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jun 21, 2016, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20160621a.htm), “Of course, considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook remains.” Frank H. Knight (1963, 233), in Risk, uncertainty and profit, distinguishes between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty. Is there a “science” or even “art” of central banking under this extreme uncertainty in which policy does not generate higher volatility of money, income, prices and values of financial assets?
Professor Ronald I. McKinnon (2013Oct27), writing on “Tapering without tears—how to end QE3,” on Oct 27, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579153693500945608?KEYWORDS=Ronald+I+McKinnon), finds that the major central banks of the world have fallen into a “near-zero-interest-rate trap.” World economic conditions are weak such that exit from the zero interest rate trap could have adverse effects on production, investment and employment. The maintenance of interest rates near zero creates long-term near stagnation. The proposal of Professor McKinnon is credible, coordinated increase of policy interest rates toward 2 percent. Professor John B. Taylor at Stanford University, writing on “Economic failures cause political polarization,” on Oct 28, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303442004579121010753999086?KEYWORDS=John+B+Taylor), analyzes that excessive risks induced by near zero interest rates in 2003-2004 caused the financial crash. Monetary policy continued in similar paths during and after the global recession with resulting political polarization worldwide.
It may be quite painful to exit QE∞ or use of the balance sheet of the central bank together with zero interest rates forever. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:
Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that discount rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or
declines.
IB Functions of Banks. Modern banking theory analyzes three important functions provided by banks: monitoring of borrowers, provision of liquidity services and transformation of illiquid assets into immediately liquid assets (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 51-60). These functions require valuation of alternative investment projects that may be distorted by zero interest rates of monetary policy and artificially low long-term interest rates. The QE∞ trap frustrates essential banking functions.
- Monitoring. Banks monitor projects to ensure that funds are allocated to their intended projects (Diamond 1984, 1996). Banks issue deposits, which are secondary assets, to acquire loans, which are primary assets. Monitoring reduces costs of participating in business projects. Acting as delegated monitor, banks obtain information on the borrower, allowing less costly participation through the issue of unmonitored deposits. Monitoring of borrowers provides enhanced less costly participation by investors through the issue of deposits. There is significant reduction of monitoring costs by delegating to a bank. If there are many potential investors, monitoring by the bank of a credit name is less costly than the sum of individual monitoring of the same credit name by all potential investors. Banks permit borrowers to reach many investors for their projects while affording investors less costly participation in the returns of projects of bank borrowers.
- Transformation of Illiquid Loans into Liquid Deposits. Diamond and Dybvig (1986) analyze bank services through bank balance sheets.
i. Assets. Banks provide loans to borrowers. The evaluation of borrowers prevents “adverse selection,” which consists of banks choosing unsound projects and failing to finance sound projects. Monitoring of loans prevents “moral hazard,” which consists of borrowers using the funds of the loan for purposes other than the project for which they were lent, as for example, using borrowed bank funds for speculative real estate instead of for the intended industrial project. Relationship banking improves the information on borrowers and the monitoring function.
ii. Liabilities. Banks provide numerous services to their clients such as holding deposits, clearing transactions, currency inventory and payments for goods, services and obligations.
iii. Assets and Liabilities: Transformation Function. The transformation function operates through both sides of the balance sheet: banks convert illiquid loans in the asset side into liquid deposits in the liability side. There is rich theory of banking (Diamond and Rajan 2000, 2001a,b). Securitized banking provides the same transformation function by bundling mortgage and other consumer loans into securities that are then sold to investors who finance them in short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 61-6).
Banking was important in facilitating economic growth in historical periods (Cameron 1961, 1967, 1972; Cameron et al. 1992). Banking is also important currently because small- and medium-size business may have no other form of financing than banks in contrast with many options for larger and more mature companies that have access to capital markets. Calomiris and Haber (2014) find that broad voting rights and institutions restricting coalitions of bankers and populists ensure stable banking systems and access to credit. Summerhill (2015) provides convincing evidence that commitment to sovereign credibility is not sufficient to promote financial development in the presence of inadequate regulatory organization. Personal consumptions expenditures have share of 68.9 percent of GDP in IIQ2016 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/and-as-ever-economic-outlook-is.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/business-fixed-investment-has-been-soft.html). Most consumers rely on their banks for real estate loans, credit cards and personal consumer loans. Thus, it should be expected that success of monetary policy in stimulating the economy would be processed through bank balance sheets.
IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy. Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, provides analysis of the policy of purchasing large amounts of long-term securities for the Fed’s balance sheet. The new analysis provides three channels of transmission of quantitative easing to the ultimate objectives of increasing growth and employment and increasing inflation to “levels of 2 percent or a bit less that most Committee participants judge to be consistent, over the long run, with the FOMC’s dual mandate” (Yellen 2011AS, 4, 7):
“There are several distinct channels through which these purchases tend to influence aggregate demand, including a reduced cost of credit to consumers and businesses, a rise in asset prices that boost household wealth and spending, and a moderate change in the foreign exchange value of the dollar that provides support to net exports.”
The new analysis by Yellen (2011AS) is considered below in four separate subsections: IA1 Theory; IA2 Policy; IA3 Evidence; and IA4 Unwinding Strategy.
IA1 Theory. The transmission mechanism of quantitative easing can be analyzed in three different forms. (1) Portfolio choice theory. General equilibrium value theory was proposed by Hicks (1935) in analyzing the balance sheets of individuals and institutions with assets in the capital segment consisting of money, debts, stocks and productive equipment. Net worth or wealth would be comparable to income in value theory. Expected yield and risk would be the constraint comparable to income in value theory. Markowitz (1952) considers a portfolio of individual securities with mean μp and variance σp. The Markowitz (1952, 82) rule states that “investors would (or should” want to choose a portfolio of combinations of (μp, σp) that are efficient, which are those with minimum variance or risk for given expected return μp or more and maximum expected μp for given variance or risk or less. The more complete model of Tobin (1958) consists of portfolio choice of monetary assets by maximizing a utility function subject to a budget constraint. Tobin (1961, 28) proposes general equilibrium analysis of the capital account to derive choices of capital assets in balance sheets of economic units with the determination of yields in markets for capital assets with the constraint of net worth. A general equilibrium model of choice of portfolios was developed simultaneously by various authors (Hicks 1962; Treynor 1962; Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965; Mossin 1966). If shocks such as by quantitative easing displace investors from the efficient frontier, there would be reallocations of portfolios among assets until another efficient point is reached. Investors would bid up the prices or lower the returns (interest plus capital gains) of long-term assets targeted by quantitative easing, causing the desired effect of lowering long-term costs of investment and consumption.
(2) General Equilibrium Theory. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004, 88) argue that “the possibility monetary policy works through portfolio substitution effects, even in normal times, has a long intellectual history, having been espoused by both Keynesians (James Tobin 1969) and monetarists (Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer 1973).” Andres et al. (2004) explain the Tobin (1969) contribution by optimizing agents in a general-equilibrium model. Both Tobin (1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973) consider capital assets to be gross instead of perfect substitutes with positive partial derivatives of own rates of return and negative partial derivatives of cross rates in the vector of asset returns (interest plus principal gain or loss) as argument in portfolio balancing equations (see Pelaez and Suzigan 1978, 113-23). Tobin (1969, 26) explains portfolio substitution after monetary policy:
“When the supply of any asset is increased, the structure of rates of return, on this and other assets, must change in a way that induces the public to hold the new supply. When the asset’s own rate can rise, a large part of the necessary adjustment can occur in this way. But if the rate is fixed, the whole adjustment must take place through reductions in other rates or increases in prices of other assets. This is the secret of the special role of money; it is a secret that would be shared by any other asset with a fixed interest rate.”
Andrés et al. (2004, 682) find that in their multiple-channels model “base money expansion now matters for the deviations of long rates from the expected path of short rates. Monetary policy operates by both the expectations channel (the path of current and expected future short rates) and this additional channel. As in Tobin’s framework, interest rates spreads (specifically, the deviations from the pure expectations theory of the term structure) are an endogenous function of the relative quantities of assets supplied.”
The interrelation among yields of default-free securities is measured by the term structure of interest rates. This schedule of interest rates along time incorporates expectations of investors. (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1985). The expectations hypothesis postulates that the expectations of investors about the level of future spot rates influence the level of current long-term rates. The normal channel of transmission of monetary policy in a recession is to lower the target of the fed funds rate that will lower future spot rates through the term structure and also the yields of long-term securities. The expectations hypothesis is consistent with term premiums (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1981, 774-7) such as liquidity to compensate for risk or uncertainty about future events that can cause changes in prices or yields of long-term securities (Hicks 1935; see Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 1981, 784; Chung et al. 2011, 22).
(3) Preferred Habitat. Another approach is by the preferred-habitat models proposed by Culbertson (1957, 1963) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966). This approach is formalized by Vayanos and Vila (2009). The model considers investors or “clientele” who do not abandon their segment of operations unless there are extremely high potential returns and arbitrageurs who take positions to profit from discrepancies. Pension funds matching benefit liabilities would operate in segments above 15 years; life insurance companies operate around 15 years or more; and asset managers and bank treasury managers are active in maturities of less than 10 years (Ibid, 1). Hedge funds, proprietary trading desks and bank maturity transformation activities are examples of potential arbitrageurs. The role of arbitrageurs is to incorporate “information about current and future short rates into bond prices” (Ibid, 12). Suppose monetary policy raises the short-term rate above a certain level. Clientele would not trade on this information, but arbitrageurs would engage in carry trade, shorting bonds and investing at the short-term rate, in a “roll-up” trade, resulting in decline of bond prices or equivalently increases in yields. This is a situation of an upward-sloping yield curve. If the short-term rate were lowered, arbitrageurs would engage in carry trade borrowing at the short-term rate and going long bonds, resulting in an increase in bond prices or equivalently decline in yields, or “roll-down” trade. The carry trade is the mechanism by which bond yields adjust to changes in current and expected short-term interest rates. The risk premiums of bonds are positively associated with the slope of the term structure (Ibid, 13). Fama and Bliss (1987, 689) find with data for 1964-85 that “1-year expected returns for US Treasury maturities to 5 years, measured net of the interest rate on a 1-year bond, vary through time. Expected term premiums are mostly positive during good times but mostly negative during recessions.” Vayanos and Vila (2009) develop a model with two-factors, the short-term rate and demand or quantity. The term structure moves because of shocks of short-term rates and demand. An important finding is that demand or quantity shocks are largest for intermediate and long maturities while short-rate shocks are largest for short-term maturities.
IA2 Policy. A simplified analysis could consider the portfolio balance equations Aij = f(r, x) where Aij is the demand for i = 1,2,∙∙∙n assets from j = 1,2, ∙∙∙m sectors, r the 1xn vector of rates of return, ri, of n assets and x a vector of other relevant variables. Tobin (1969) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973) assume imperfect substitution among capital assets such that the own first derivatives of Aij are positive, demand for an asset increases if its rate of return (interest plus capital gains) is higher; and cross first derivatives are negative, demand for an asset decreases if the rate of return of alternative assets increases. Theoretical purity would require the estimation of the complete model with all rates of return. In practice, it may be impossible to observe all rates of return such as in the critique of Roll (1976). Policy proposals by the Fed have been focused on the likely impact of withdrawals of stocks of securities in specific segments, that is, of effects of one or several specific rates of return among the n possible rates. There have been at least seven approaches on the role of monetary policy in purchasing long-term securities that have increased the classes of rates of return targeted by the Fed:
(1) Suspension of Auctions of 30-year Treasury Bonds. Auctions of 30-year Treasury bonds were suspended between 2001 and 2005. This was Treasury policy not Fed policy. The effects were similar to those of quantitative easing: withdrawal of supply from the segment of 30-year bonds would result in higher prices or lower yields for close-substitute mortgage-backed securities with resulting lower mortgage rates. The objective was to encourage refinancing of house loans that would increase family income and consumption by freeing income from reducing monthly mortgage payments.
(2) Purchase of Long-term Securities by the Fed. Between Nov 2008 and Mar 2009 the Fed announced the intention of purchasing $1750 billion of long-term securities: $600 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities and agency debt announced on Nov 25 and $850 billion of agency mortgaged-backed securities and agency debt plus $300 billion of Treasury securities announced on Mar 18, 2009 (Yellen 2011AS, 5-6). The objective of buying mortgage-backed securities was to lower mortgage rates that would “support the housing sector” (Bernanke 2009SL). The FOMC statement on Dec 16, 2008 informs that: “over the next few quarters the Federal Reserve will purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and its stands ready to expand its purchases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm). The Mar 18, 2009, statement of the FOMC explained that: “to provide greater support to mortgage lending and housing markets, the Committee decided today to increase the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its purchase of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion. Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090318a.htm). Policy changed to increase prices or reduce yields of mortgage-backed securities and Treasury securities with the objective of supporting housing markets and private credit markets by lowering costs of housing and long-term private credit.
(3) Portfolio Reinvestment. On Aug 10, 2010, the FOMC statement explains the reinvestment policy: “to help support the economic recovery in a context of price stability, the Committee will keep constant the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities at their current level by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in long-term Treasury securities. The Committee will continue to roll over the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities as they mature” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100810a.htm). The objective of policy appears to be supporting conditions in housing and mortgage markets with slow transfer of the portfolio to Treasury securities that would support private-sector markets.
(4) Increasing Portfolio. As widely anticipated, the FOMC decided on Dec 3, 2010: “to promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to expand its holdings of securities. The Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. In addition, the Committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20101103a.htm). The emphasis appears to shift from housing markets and private-sector credit markets to the general economy, employment and preventing deflation.
(5) Increasing Stock Market Valuations. Chairman Bernanke (2010WP) explained on Nov 4 the objectives of purchasing an additional $600 billion of long-term Treasury securities and reinvesting maturing principal and interest in the Fed portfolio. Long-term interest rates fell and stock prices rose when investors anticipated the new round of quantitative easing. Growth would be promoted by easier lending such as for refinancing of home mortgages and more investment by lower corporate bond yields. Consumers would experience higher confidence as their wealth in stocks rose, increasing outlays. Income and profits would rise and, in a “virtuous circle,” support higher economic growth. Bernanke (2000) analyzes the role of stock markets in central bank policy (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-100). Fed policy in 1929 increased interest rates to avert a gold outflow and failed to prevent the deepening of the banking crisis without which the Great Depression may not have occurred. In the crisis of Oct 19, 1987, Fed policy supported stock and futures markets by persuading banks to extend credit to brokerages. Collapse of stock markets would slow consumer spending.
(6) Devaluing the Dollar. Yellen (2011AS, 6) broadens the effects of quantitative easing by adding dollar devaluation: “there are several distinct channels through which these purchases tend to influence aggregate demand, including a reduced cost of credit to consumers and businesses, a rise in asset prices that boosts household wealth and spending, and a moderate change in the foreign exchange value of the dollar that provides support to net exports.”
(7) Let’s Twist Again Monetary Policy. The term “operation twist” grew out of the dance “twist” popularized by successful musical performer Chubby Chekker (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWaJ0s0-E1o). Meulendyke (1998, 39) describes the coordination of policy by Treasury and the FOMC in the beginning of the Kennedy administration in 1961 (see Modigliani and Sutch 1966, 1967; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/collapse-of-household-income-and-wealth.html):
“In 1961, several developments led the FOMC to abandon its “bills only” restrictions. The new Kennedy administration was concerned about gold outflows and balance of payments deficits and, at the same time, it wanted to encourage a rapid recovery from the recent recession. Higher rates seemed desirable to limit the gold outflows and help the balance of payments, while lower rates were wanted to speed up economic growth.
To deal with these problems simultaneously, the Treasury and the FOMC attempted to encourage lower long-term rates without pushing down short-term rates. The policy was referred to in internal Federal Reserve documents as “operation nudge” and elsewhere as “operation twist.” For a few months, the Treasury engaged in maturity exchanges with trust accounts and concentrated its cash offerings in shorter maturities.
The Federal Reserve participated with some reluctance and skepticism, but it did not see any great danger in experimenting with the new procedure.
It attempted to flatten the yield curve by purchasing Treasury notes and bonds while selling short-term Treasury securities. The domestic portfolio grew by $1.7 billion over the course of 1961. Note and bond holdings increased by a substantial $8.8 billion, while certificate of indebtedness holdings fell by almost $7.4 billion (Table 2). The extent to which these actions changed the yield curve or modified investment decisions is a source of dispute, although the predominant view is that the impact on yields was minimal. The Federal Reserve continued to buy coupon issues thereafter, but its efforts were not very aggressive. Reference to the efforts disappeared once short-term rates rose in 1963. The Treasury did not press for continued Fed purchases of long-term debt. Indeed, in the second half of the decade, the Treasury faced an unwanted shortening of its portfolio. Bonds could not carry a coupon with a rate above 4 1/4 percent, and market rates persistently exceeded that level. Notes—which were not subject to interest rate restrictions—had a maximum maturity of five years; it was extended to seven years in 1967.”
As widely anticipated by markets, perhaps intentionally, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Sep 21 that it was again “twisting time” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20110921a.htm):
“Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August indicates that economic growth remains slow. Recent indicators point to continuing weakness in overall labor market conditions, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending has been increasing at only a modest pace in recent months despite some recovery in sales of motor vehicles as supply-chain disruptions eased. Investment in nonresidential structures is still weak, and the housing sector remains depressed. However, business investment in equipment and software continues to expand. Inflation appears to have moderated since earlier in the year as prices of energy and some commodities have declined from their peaks. Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee continues to expect some pickup in the pace of recovery over coming quarters but anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only gradually toward levels that the Committee judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. Moreover, there are significant downside risks to the economic outlook, including strains in global financial markets. The Committee also anticipates that inflation will settle, over coming quarters, at levels at or below those consistent with the Committee's dual mandate as the effects of past energy and other commodity price increases dissipate further. However, the Committee will continue to pay close attention to the evolution of inflation and inflation expectations.
To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the Committee decided today to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. The Committee intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less. This program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate.
To help support conditions in mortgage markets, the Committee will now reinvest principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. In addition, the Committee will maintain its existing policy of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.
The Committee also decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.
The Committee discussed the range of policy tools available to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. It will continue to assess the economic outlook in light of incoming information and is prepared to employ its tools as appropriate.”
The FOMC decided at its meeting on Jun 20, 2012, to continue “Let’s Twist Again” monetary policy until the end of 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120620a.htm http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_120620.html):
“The Committee also decided to continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. Specifically, the Committee intends to purchase Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years at the current pace and to sell or redeem an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of approximately 3 years or less. This continuation of the maturity extension program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. The Committee is prepared to take further action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”
IA3 Evidence. There are multiple empirical studies on the effectiveness of quantitative easing that have been covered in past posts such as (Andrés et al. 2004, D’Amico and King 2010, Doh 2010, Gagnon et al. 2010, Hamilton and Wu 2010). On the basis of simulations of quantitative easing with the FRB/US econometric model, Chung et al (2011, 28-9) find that:
”Lower long-term interest rates, coupled with higher stock market valuations and a lower foreign exchange value of the dollar, provide a considerable stimulus to real activity over time. Phase 1 of the program by itself is estimated to boost the level of real GDP almost 2 percent above baseline by early 2012, while the full program raises the level of real GDP almost 3 percent by the second half of 2012. This boost to real output in turn helps to keep labor market conditions noticeably better than they would have been without large scale asset purchases. In particular, the model simulations suggest that private payroll employment is currently 1.8 million higher, and the unemployment rate ¾ percentage point lower, that would otherwise be the case. These benefits are predicted to grow further over time; by 2012, the incremental contribution of the full program is estimated to be 3 million jobs, with an additional 700,000 jobs provided by the most recent phase of the program alone.”
An additional conclusion of these simulations is that quantitative easing may have prevented actual deflation. Empirical research is continuing.
IA4 Unwinding Strategy. Fed Vice-Chair Yellen (2011AS) considers four concerns on quantitative easing discussed below in turn. First, Excessive Inflation. Yellen (2011AS, 9-12) considers concerns that quantitative easing could result in excessive inflation because fast increases in aggregate demand from quantitative easing could raise the rate of inflation, posing another problem of adjustment with tighter monetary policy or higher interest rates. The Fed estimates significant slack of resources in the economy as measured by the difference of four percentage points between the high current rate of unemployment above 9 percent and the NAIRU (non-accelerating rate of unemployment) of 5.75 percent (Ibid, 2). Thus, faster economic growth resulting from quantitative easing would not likely result in upward trend of costs as resources are bid up competitively. The Fed monitors frequently slack indicators and is committed to maintaining inflation at a “level of 2 percent or a bit less than that” (Ibid, 13), say, in the narrow open interval (1.9, 2.1).
Second, Inflation and Bank Reserves. On Jan 12, 2012, the line “Reserve Bank credit” in the Fed balance sheet stood at $2450.6 billion, or $2.5 trillion, with the portfolio of long-term securities of $2175.7 billion, or $2.2 trillion, composed of $987.6 billion of notes and bonds, $49.7 billion of inflation-adjusted notes and bonds, $146.3 billion of Federal agency debt securities, and $992.1 billion of mortgage-backed securities; reserves balances with Federal Reserve Banks stood at $1095.5 billion, or $1.1 trillion (http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). The concern addressed by Yellen (2011AS, 12-4) is that this high level of reserves could eventually result in demand growth that could accelerate inflation. Reserves would be excessively high relative to the levels before the recession. Reserves of depository institutions at the Federal Reserve Banks rose from $45.6 billion in Aug 2008 to $1084.8 billion in Aug 2010, not seasonally adjusted, multiplying by 23.8 times, or to $1038.2 billion in Nov 2010, multiplying by 22.8 times. The monetary base consists of the monetary liabilities of the government, composed largely of currency held by the public plus reserves of depository institutions at the Federal Reserve Banks. The monetary base not seasonally adjusted, or issue of money by the government, rose from $841.1 billion in Aug 2008 to $1991.1 billion or by 136.7 percent and to $1968.1 billion in Nov 2010 or by 133.9 percent (http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/hist/h3hist1.pdf). Policy can be viewed as creating government monetary liabilities that ended mostly in reserves of banks deposited at the Fed to purchase $2.1 trillion of long-term securities or assets, which in nontechnical language would be “printing money” (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html). The marketable debt of the US government in Treasury securities held by the public stood at $8.7 trillion on Nov 30, 2010 (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/2010/opds112010.pdf). The current holdings of long-term securities by the Fed of $2.1 trillion, in the process of converting fully into Treasury securities, are equivalent to 24 percent of US government debt held by the public, and would represent 29.9 percent with the new round of quantitative easing if all the portfolio of the Fed, as intended, were in Treasury securities. Debt in Treasury securities held by the public on Dec 31, 2009, stood at $7.2 trillion (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/2009/opds122009.pdf), growing on Nov 30, 2010, to $1.5 trillion or by 20.8 percent. In spite of this growth of bank reserves, “the 12-month change in core PCE [personal consumption expenditures] prices dropped from about 2 ½ percent in mid-2008 to around 1 ½ percent in 2009 and declined further to less than 1 percent by late 2010” (Yellen 2011AS, 3). The PCE price index, excluding food and energy, is around 0.8 percent in the past 12 months, which could be, in the Fed’s view, too close for comfort to negative inflation or deflation. Yellen (2011AS, 12) agrees “that an accommodative monetary policy left in place too long can cause inflation to rise to undesirable levels” that would be true whether policy was constrained or not by “the zero bound on interest rates.” The FOMC is monitoring and reviewing the “asset purchase program regularly in light of incoming information” and will “adjust the program as needed to meet its objectives” (Ibid, 12). That is, the FOMC would withdraw the stimulus once the economy is closer to full capacity to maintain inflation around 2 percent. In testimony at the Senate Committee on the Budget, Chairman Bernanke stated that “the Federal Reserve has all the tools its needs to ensure that it will be able to smoothly and effectively exit from this program at the appropriate time” (http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20110107a.htm). The large quantity of reserves would not be an obstacle in attaining the 2 percent inflation level. Yellen (2011A, 13-4) enumerates Fed tools that would be deployed to withdraw reserves as desired: (1) increasing the interest rate paid on reserves deposited at the Fed currently at 0.25 percent per year; (2) withdrawing reserves with reverse sale and repurchase agreement in addition to those with primary dealers by using mortgage-backed securities; (3) offering a Term Deposit Facility similar to term certificates of deposit for member institutions; and (4) sale or redemption of all or parts of the portfolio of long-term securities. The Fed would be able to increase interest rates and withdraw reserves as required to attain its mandates of maximum employment and price stability.
Third, Financial Imbalances. Fed policy intends to lower costs to business and households with the objective of stimulating investment and consumption generating higher growth and employment. Yellen (2011A, 14-7) considers a possible consequence of excessively reducing interest rates: “a reasonable fear is that this process could go too far, encouraging potential borrowers to employ excessive leverage to take advantage of low financing costs and leading investors to accept less compensation for bearing risks as they seek to enhance their rates of return in an environment of very low yields. This concern deserves to be taken seriously, and the Federal Reserve is carefully monitoring financial indicators for signs of potential threats to financial stability.” Regulation and supervision would be the “first line of defense” against imbalances threatening financial stability but the Fed would also use monetary policy to check imbalances (Yellen 2011AS, 17).
Fourth, Adverse Effects on Foreign Economies. The issue is whether the now recognized dollar devaluation would promote higher growth and employment in the US at the expense of lower growth and employment in other countries.
IC United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities. Selected assets and liabilities of US commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, in billions of dollars, from Report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are in Table I-1. Data are not seasonally adjusted to permit comparison between Nov 2015 and Nov 2016. Total assets of US commercial banks grew 2.7 percent from $15,634.9 billion in Nov 2015 to $15,061.8 billion in Nov 2016. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates US GDP in 2015 at $18,036.6 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Thus, total assets of US commercial banks are equivalent to over 80 percent of US GDP. Bank credit grew 8.0 percent from $11,507.5 billion in Oct 2015 to $12,432.5 billion in Oct 2016. Securities in bank credit increased 8.2 percent from $3094 billion in Nov 2015 to $3347 billion in Nov 2016. A large part of securities in banking credit consists of US Treasury and agency securities, increasing 10.5 percent from $2208 billion in Nov 2015 to $2440 billion in Nov 2016. Credit to the government that issues or backs Treasury and agency securities of $2440 billion in Nov 2016 is about 19.5 percent of total bank credit of US commercial banks of $12,492.7 billion. Mortgage-backed securities, providing financing of home loans, increased 8.3 percent, from $1559 billion in Nov 2015 to $1688 billion in Nov 2016. Loans and leases are relatively dynamic, growing 7.2 percent from $8529 billion in Nov 2015 to $9146 billion in Nov 2016. A dynamic class is commercial and industrial loans, growing 8.1 percent from $1941 billion in Nov 2015 and providing $2099 billion or 22.9 percent of total loans and leases of $9146 billion in Nov 2016. Real estate loans increased 6.9 percent, providing $4115 billion in Nov 2016 or 45.0 percent of total loans and leases. Consumer loans increased 8.0 percent, providing $1355 billion in Nov 2016 or 14.8 percent of total loans. Cash assets are measured to “include vault cash, cash items in process of collection, balances due from depository institutions and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks” (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm). Cash assets in US commercial banks decreased 16.9 percent from $2710 billion in Nov 2015 to $2252 billion in Nov 2016 but a single year of the series masks exploding cash in banks because of unconventional monetary policy, which is discussed below. Bank deposits increased 4.1 percent from $10,981 billion in Nov 2015 to $11,429 billion in Nov 2016. The difference between bank deposits and total loans and leases in banks decreased from $2452 billion in Nov 2015 to $2283 billion in Nov 2016 or by $169 billion. Securities in bank credit increased $253 billion from $3094 billion in Nov 2015 to $3347 billion in Nov 2016 and Treasury and agency securities increased $232 billion from $2208 billion in Nov 2015 to $2440 billion in Nov 2016. Loans and leases increased $617 billion from $8529 billion in Nov 2015 to $9146 billion in Nov 2016. Banks expanded both lending and investment in lower risk securities partly because of the weak economy and credit disappointments during the global recession that has resulted in an environment of fewer sound lending opportunities. Investing in securities with high duration, or price elasticity of yields, is riskier because of the increase in yields that can cause loss of principal as investors shift away from bond funds into money market funds invested in short-term assets. Lower interest rates resulting from monetary policy may not necessarily encourage higher borrowing in the current loss of dynamism of the US economy. Real disposable income per capita in IIIQ2016 is higher by only 9,2 percent than in IVQ2007 (Table IB-2 IX Conclusion and extended analysis in IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation), which is significantly lower than 18.9 percent higher if the economy had performed in long-term growth of per capita income in the United States at 2 percent per year from 1870 to 2010 (Lucas 2011May). In contrast, real disposable income per capita grew cumulatively 26.6 percent in the cycle from IQ1980 to IQ1990 that was close to trend growth of 23.1 percent.
Table I-1, US, Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, NSA, Billions of Dollars
Nov 2015 | Nov 2016 | ∆% | |
Total Assets | 15,634.9 | 16,061.8 | 2.7 |
Bank Credit | 11,622.8 | 12,492.7 | 7.5 |
Securities in Bank Credit | 3094 | 3347 | 8.2 |
Treasury & Agency Securities | 2208 | 2440 | 10.5 |
Mortgage-Backed Securities | 1559 | 1688 | 8.3 |
Loans & Leases | 8529 | 9146 | 7.2 |
Real Estate Loans | 3850 | 4115 | 6.9 |
Commercial Real Estate Loans | 1762 | 1954 | 10.9 |
Consumer Loans | 1255 | 1355 | 8.0 |
Commercial & Industrial Loans | 1941 | 2099 | 8.1 |
Other Loans & Leases | 1483 | 1578 | 6.4 |
Cash Assets* | 2710 | 2252 | -16.9 |
Total Liabilities | 13,942 | 14,314 | 2.7 |
Deposits | 10,981 | 11,429 | 4.1 |
Residual (Assets less Liabilities) | 1693 | 1748 | NA |
Note: balancing item of residual assets less liabilities not included
*”Includes vault cash, cash items in process of collection, balances due from depository institutions and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks.”
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Table I-2, US, Selected Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, at Break Adjusted, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, ∆%
2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Oct 2016 | Nov 2016 | |
Total Assets | 5.2 | 2.6 | 7.1 | 7.4 | 3.5 | -3.4 | 1.8 |
Bank Credit | 1.6 | 4.1 | 1.3 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 2.5 |
Securities in Bank Credit | 1.9 | 7.6 | -1.5 | 7.1 | 5.9 | 10.5 | 0.8 |
Treasury & Agency Securities | 3.2 | 8.4 | -5.2 | 11.8 | 8.8 | 16.8 | 3.8 |
Other Securities | -0.9 | 5.8 | 6.8 | -2.3 | -0.6 | -5.8 | -7.1 |
Loans & Leases | 1.5 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 6.8 | 7.8 | 6.3 | 3.2 |
Real Estate Loans | -3.7 | -1.1 | -1.0 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 7.7 | 3.8 |
Commercial Real Estate Loans | -6.3 | -1.2 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 7.9 |
Consumer Loans | -1.7 | 0.5 | 3.2 | 5.3 | 5.9 | 7.0 | 6.0 |
Commercial & Industrial Loans | 8.6 | 11.6 | 6.9 | 12.0 | 10.6 | 9.1 | 2.9 |
Other Loans & Leases | 18.6 | 8.1 | 6.0 | 14.6 | 13.3 | -1.7 | -0.2 |
Cash Assets | 48.1 | -2.3 | 54.5 | 12.2 | -7.9 | -59.6 | -4.1 |
Total Liabilities | 5.5 | 2.4 | 8.2 | 7.6 | 3.3 | -5.1 | 2.6 |
Deposits | 6.7 | 7.2 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 5.0 | 0.3 | 4.9 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of cash assets in US commercial banks from 1973 to 2016. Unconventional monetary policy caused an increase in cash assets in late 2008 of close to 500 percent at SAAR and also in following policy impulses. Such aggressive policies were not required for growth of GDP at the average rate of 4.5 percent in 29 quarters of cyclical expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1990. In contrast, the average rate in 29 quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016 has been at the rate of 2.1 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). The difference in magnitude of the recessions is not sufficient to explain weakness of the current cyclical expansion. Bordo (2012Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) find that growth is higher after deeper contractions and contractions with financial crises. There were two consecutive contractions in the 1980s with decline of 2.2 percent in two quarters from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and 2.5 percent from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 that are almost identical to the contraction of 4.2 percent from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2009. There was also a decade-long financial and banking crisis during the 1980s. The debt crisis of 1982 (Pelaez 1986) wiped out a large part of the capital of large US money-center banks. Benston and Kaufman (1997, 139) find that there was failure of 1150 US commercial and savings banks between 1983 and 1990, or about 8 percent of the industry in 1980, which is nearly twice more than between the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1934 through 1983. More than 900 savings and loans associations, representing 25 percent of the industry, were closed, merged or placed in conservatorships (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 74-7). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) that received $150 billion of taxpayer funds to resolve insolvent savings and loans. The GDP of the US in 1989 was $5657.7 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the partial cost to taxpayers of that bailout was around 2.65 percent of GDP in a year. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates GDP of $18,036.6 billion in 2015, such that the bailout would be equivalent to cost to taxpayers of about $478.0 billion in current GDP terms. A major difference with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for private-sector banks is that most of the costs were recovered with interest gains whereas in the case of savings and loans there was no recovery.
Chart I-1, US, Cash Assets, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2016, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides quarterly SAARs of bank credit at US commercial banks from 1947 to 2016. Rates collapsed sharply during the global recession as during the recessions of the 1980s and then rebounded. In both episodes, rates of growth of bank credit did not return to earlier magnitudes.
Chart I-2, US, Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1947-2016, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides deposits at US commercial banks from 1973 to 2016. Deposits fell sharply during and after the global recession but then rebounded in the cyclical expansion.
Chart I-3, US, Deposits, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2016, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is similar behavior in the 1980s and in the current cyclical expansion of SAARs holdings of Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks provided in Chart I-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the period 1947 to 2016. Sharp reductions of holdings during the contraction were followed by sharp increases.
Chart I-4, US, Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1947-2016,
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides SAARs of change of total loans and leases in US commercial banks from 1947 to 2016. The decline of SAARs in the current cycle was much sharper and the rebound did not recover earlier growth rates. Part of the explanation originates in demand for loans that was high during rapid economic growth at 4.5 percent per year on average in the cyclical expansion of the 1980s in contrast with lower demand during tepid economic growth at 2.1 percent per year on average in the current weak expansion.
Chart I-5, US, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1947-2016, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is significant difference in the two cycles of the 1980s and the current one in quarterly SAARs of real estate loans in US commercial banks provided in Chart I-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The difference is explained by the debacle in real estate after 2006 compared to expansion during the 1980s even in the midst of the crisis of savings and loans and real estate credit. In both cases, government policy tried to influence recovery and avoid market clearing.
Chart I-6, US, Real Estate Loans in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1947-2016, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is significant difference in quarterly SAARs of change of consumer loans in US commercial banks in the 1980s and during the current cycle as shown in Chart I-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Quarterly SAARs of consumer loans in US commercial banks fell sharply during the contraction of 1980 and oscillated with upward trend during the contraction of 1983-1984 but increased sharply in the cyclical expansion. In contrast, SAARs of consumer loans in US commercial banks collapsed to high negative magnitudes during the contraction, increased at very low magnitudes during the current cyclical expansion with recent higher rates.
Chart I-7, US, Consumer Loans in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1958-2016, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
The departing theoretical framework of Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) is the plucking model of Friedman (1964, 1988). Friedman (1988, 1) recalls, “I was led to the model in the course of investigating the direction of influence between money and income. Did the common cyclical fluctuation in money and income reflect primarily the influence of money on income or of income on money?” Friedman (1964, 1988) finds useful for this purpose to analyze the relation between expansions and contractions. Analyzing the business cycle in the United States between 1870 and 1961, Friedman (1964, 15) found that “a large contraction in output tends to be followed on the average by a large business expansion; a mild contraction, by a mild expansion.” The depth of the contraction opens up more room in the movement toward full employment (Friedman 1964, 17):
“Output is viewed as bumping along the ceiling of maximum feasible output except that every now and then it is plucked down by a cyclical contraction. Given institutional rigidities and prices, the contraction takes in considerable measure the form of a decline in output. Since there is no physical limit to the decline short of zero output, the size of the decline in output can vary widely. When subsequent recovery sets in, it tends to return output to the ceiling; it cannot go beyond, so there is an upper limit to output and the amplitude of the expansion tends to be correlated with the amplitude of the contraction.”
Kim and Nelson (1999) test the asymmetric plucking model of Friedman (1964, 1988) relative to a symmetric model using reference cycles of the NBER and find evidence supporting the Friedman model. Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) analyze 27 cycles beginning in 1872, using various measures of financial crises while considering different regulatory and monetary regimes. The revealing conclusion of Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR, 2) is that:
“Our analysis of the data shows that steep expansions tend to follow deep contractions, though this depends heavily on when the recovery is measured. In contrast to much conventional wisdom, the stylized fact that deep contractions breed strong recoveries is particularly true when there is a financial crisis. In fact, on average, it is cycles without a financial crisis that show the weakest relation between contraction depth and recovery strength. For many configurations, the evidence for a robust bounce-back is stronger for cycles with financial crises than those without.”
The average rate of growth of real GDP in expansions after recessions with financial crises was 8 percent but only 6.9 percent on average for recessions without financial crises (Bordo 2012Sep27). Real GDP declined 12 percent in the Panic of 1907 and increased 13 percent in the recovery, consistent with the plucking model of Friedman (Bordo 2012Sep27). Bordo (2012Sep27) finds two probable explanations for the weak recovery during the current economic cycle: (1) collapse of United States housing; and (2) uncertainty originating in fiscal policy, regulation and structural changes. There are serious doubts if monetary policy is adequate to recover the economy under these conditions.
Lucas (2011May) estimates US economic growth in the long-term at 3 percent per year and about 2 percent per year in per capita terms. There are displacements from this trend caused by events such as wars and recessions but the economy grows much faster during the expansion, compensating for the contraction and maintaining trend growth over the entire cycle. Historical US GDP data exhibit remarkable growth: Lucas (2011May) estimates an increase of US real income per person by a factor of 12 in the period from 1870 to 2010. The explanation by Lucas (2011May) of this remarkable growth experience is that government provided stability and education while elements of “free-market capitalism” were an important driver of long-term growth and prosperity. Lucas sharpens this analysis by comparison with the long-term growth experience of G7 countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan) and Spain from 1870 to 2010. Countries benefitted from “common civilization” and “technology” to “catch up” with the early growth leaders of the US and UK, eventually growing at a faster rate. Significant part of this catch up occurred after World War II. Lucas (2011May) finds that the catch up stalled in the 1970s. The analysis of Lucas (2011May) is that the 20-40 percent gap that developed originated in differences in relative taxation and regulation that discouraged savings and work incentives in comparison with the US. A larger welfare and regulatory state, according to Lucas (2011May), could be the cause of the 20-40 percent gap. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in USD fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in Japan and France within the G7 in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. The key indicator of growth of real income per capita, which is what a person earns after inflation, measures long-term economic growth and prosperity. A refined concept would include real disposable income per capita, which is what a person earns after inflation and taxes.
Table IB-1 provides the data required for broader comparison of long-term and cyclical performance of the United States economy. Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. First, Long-term performance. Using annual data, US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.2 percent per year from 1929 to 2015 and at 3.2 percent per year from 1947 to 2015. Real disposable income grew at the average yearly rate of 3.2 percent from 1929 to 2015 and at 3.7 percent from 1947 to 1999. Real disposable income per capita grew at the average yearly rate of 2.0 percent from 1929 to 2015 and at 2.3 percent from 1947 to 1999. US economic growth was much faster during expansions, compensating contractions in maintaining trend growth for whole cycles. Using annual data, US real disposable income grew at the average yearly rate of 3.5 percent from 1980 to 1989 and real disposable income per capita at 2.6 percent. The US economy has lost its dynamism in the current cycle: real disposable income grew at the yearly average rate of 1.7 percent from 2006 to 2015 and real disposable income per capita at 0.9 percent. Real disposable income grew at the average rate of 1.7 percent from 2007 to 2015 and real disposable income per capita at 0.8 percent. Table IB-1 illustrates the contradiction of long-term growth with the proposition of secular stagnation (Hansen 1938, 1938, 1941 with early critique by Simons (1942). Secular stagnation would occur over long periods. Table IB-1 also provides the corresponding rates of population growth that is only marginally lower at 0.8 to 0.9 percent recently from 1.1 percent over the long-term. GDP growth fell abruptly from 2.6 percent on average from 2000 to 2006 to 1.3 percent from 2006 to 2015 and 1.2 percent from 2007 to 2015 and real disposable income growth fell from 2.9 percent on average from 2000 to 2006 to 1.7 percent from 2006 to 2015. The decline of growth of real per capita disposable income is even sharper from average 2.0 percent from 2000 to 2006 to 0.9 percent from 2006 to 2015 and 0.8 percent from 2007 to 2015 while population growth was 0.8 percent on average. Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul122) provide theory and measurements showing that cyclic factors explain currently depressed labor markets. This is also the case of the overall economy. Second, first four quarters of expansion. Growth in the first four quarters of expansion is critical in recovering loss of output and employment occurring during the contraction. In the first four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1983: GDP increased 7.8 percent, real disposable personal income 5.3 percent and real disposable income per capita 4.4 percent. In the first four quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010: GDP increased 2.7 percent, real disposable personal income 0.2 percent and real disposable income per capita decreased 0.7 percent. Third, first 29 quarters of expansion. In the expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1990: GDP grew 37.8 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.5 percent; real disposable income grew 31.8 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.9 percent; and real disposable income per capita grew 23.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.9 percent. In the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2016: GDP grew 16.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent; real disposable income grew 15.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.0 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita grew 9.2 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent. Fourth, entire quarterly cycle. In the entire cycle combining contraction and expansion from IQ1980 to IQ1990: GDP grew 37.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.1 percent; real disposable personal income grew 39.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.2 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita 26.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.3 percent. In the entire cycle combining contraction and expansion from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016: GDP grew 11.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent; real disposable personal income increased 17.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita grew 9.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The United States grew during its history at high rates of per capita income that made its economy the largest in the world. That dynamism is disappearing. Bordo (2012 Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) provide strong evidence that recoveries have been faster after deeper recessions and recessions with financial crises, casting serious doubts on the conventional explanation of weak growth during the current expansion allegedly because of the depth of the contraction of 4.2 percent from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 and the financial crisis. The proposition of secular stagnation should explain a long-term process of decay and not the actual abrupt collapse of the economy and labor markets currently.
Table IB-1, US, GDP, Real Disposable Personal Income, Real Disposable Income per Capita and Population Long-term and in 1983-89 and 2007-2016, %
Long-term Average ∆% per Year | GDP | Population | |
1929-2015 | 3.2 | 1.1 | |
1947-2015 | 3.2 | 1.2 | |
1947-1999 | 3.6 | 1.3 | |
1980-1989 | 3.5 | 0.9 | |
2000-2015 | 1.8 | 0.9 | |
2000-2006 | 2.6 | 0.9 | |
2006-2015 | 1.3 | 0.8 | |
2007-2015 | 1.2 | 0.8 | |
Long-term Average ∆% per Year | Real Disposable Income | Real Disposable Income per Capita | Population |
1929-2015 | 3.2 | 2.0 | 1.1 |
1947-1999 | 3.7 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
2000-2015 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 0.9 |
2000-2006 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 0.9 |
2006-2015 | 1.7 | 0.9 | 0.8 |
2007-2015 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
Whole Cycles Average ∆% per Year | |||
1980-1989 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 0.9 |
2006-2015 | 1.7 | 0.9 | 0.8 |
2007-2015 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
Comparison of Cycles | # Quarters | ∆% | ∆% Annual Equivalent |
GDP | |||
I83 to IV83 I83 to IQ87 I83 to II87 I83 to III87 I83 to IV87 I83 to I88 I83 to II88 I83 to III88 I83 to IV88 I83 to I89 I83 to II89 I83 to III89 I83 to IV89 I83 to I90 | 4 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 | 7.8 23.1 24.5 25.6 27.7 28.4 30.1 30.9 32.6 34.0 35.0 36.0 36.3 37.8 | 7.8 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 |
RDPI | |||
I83 to IV83 I83 to I87 I83 to III87 I83 to IV87 I83 to I88 I83 to II88 I83 to III88 I83 to IV88 I83 to I89 I83 to II89 I83 to III89 I83 to IV89 I83 to I90 | 4 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 | 5.3 19.5 20.5 22.1 23.8 25.1 26.3 27.5 29.1 28.7 29.6 30.7 31.8 | 5.3 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 |
RDPI Per Capita | |||
I83 to IV83 I83 to I87 I83 to III87 I83 to IV87 I83 to I88 I83 to II88 I83 to III88 I83 to IV88 I83 to I89 I83 to II89 I83 to III89 I83 to IV89 I83 to I 90 | 4 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 | 4.4 15.1 15.5 16.7 18.2 19.2 20.0 20.9 22.1 21.5 22.0 22.6 23.4 | 4.4 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 |
Whole Cycle IQ1980 to IQ1990 | |||
GDP | 42 | 37.1 | 3.1 |
RDPI | 42 | 39.4 | 3.2 |
RDPI per Capita | 42 | 26.6 | 2.3 |
Population | 42 | 10.1 | 0.9 |
GDP | |||
III09 to II10 III09 to III16 | 4 29 | 2.7 16.5 | 2.7 2.1 |
RDPI | |||
III09 to II10 III09 to III16 | 4 29 | 0.2 15.4 | 0.2 2.0 |
RDPI per Capita | |||
III09 to II10 III09 to III16 | 4 29 | -0.7 9.2 | -0.7 1.2 |
Population | |||
III09 to II10 III09 to II16 | 4 29 | 0.8 5.7 | 0.8 0.8 |
IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016 | 35 | ||
GDP | 35 | 11.6 | 1.3 |
RDPI | 35 | 17.4 | 1.8 |
RDPI per Capita | 35 | 9.5 | 1.0 |
Population | 35 | 7.2 | 0.8 |
RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart I-8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides cash assets in commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2016. Increases in bank cash reserves processed acquisitions of securities for the portfolio of the central bank. There is no comparable experience in US economic history and such flood of money was never required to return US economic growth to trend of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita income after events such as recessions and wars (Lucas 2011May). It is difficult to argue that higher magnitudes of monetary and fiscal policy impulses would have been more successful. Discovery of such painless and fast adjustment by gigantic impulses of monetary policy of zero interest rates and trillions of dollars of bond buying would have occurred earlier with prior cases of successful implementation. Selective incentives to the private sector of a long-term nature could have been more effective.
Chart I-8, US, Cash Assets in Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-9 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides total assets of Federal Reserve Banks in millions of dollars on Wednesdays from Dec 18, 2002 to Dec 28, 2016. This is what is referred as the leverage of the central bank balance sheet in monetary policy (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-62, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b) 224-27). Consecutive rounds of unconventional monetary policy increased total assets by purchase of mortgage-backed securities, agency securities and Treasury securities. Bank reserves in cash and deposited at the central bank swelled as shown in Chart I-8. The central bank created assets in the form of securities financed with creation of liabilities in the form of reserves of depository institutions.
Chart I-9, US, Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday Level, Millions of Dollars, Dec 18, 2002 to Dec 28, 2016
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1
Chart I-10 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides deposits in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2016. Deposit growth clearly accelerated after 2001 and continued during the current cyclical expansion after bumps during the global recession.
Chart I-10, US, Deposits in Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-11 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2016. Holdings stabilized between the recessions of 2001 and after IVQ2007. There was rapid growth during the global contraction especially after unconventional monetary policy in 2008 and nearly vertical increase without prior similar historical experience during the various bouts of unconventional monetary policy. Banks hoard cash and less risky Treasury and agency securities instead of risky lending because of the weakness of the economy and the lack of demand for financing sound business projects. Banks and investors in general are avoiding exposures to high-duration fixed-income securities because of possible price losses during increases in yields. There is decline of bank holdings of Treasury and agency securities in the final segment with subsequent sharp recovery.
Chart I-11, US, Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1947-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-12 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides total loans and leases in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2016. Total loans and leases of US commercial banks contracted sharply, stalled during the cyclical expansion and resumed growth.
Chart I-12, US, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1947-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-13 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides real estate loans in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2016. Housing subsidies and low interest rates caused a point of inflexion to higher, nearly vertical growth until 2007. Real estate loans have contracted in downward trend partly because of adverse effects of uncertainty on the impact on balance sheets of the various mechanisms of resolution imposed by policy. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Push for cheaper credit hits wall,” on Dec 24, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324660404578197782701079650.html), provides important information and analysis on housing finance. Quantitative easing consists of withdrawing supply of mortgage-backed securities by acquiring them as assets in the Fed balance sheet. Lending banks obtain funds for mortgages by bundling them according to risk and other characteristics and selling them to investors, using the proceeds from the sale to provide the loans to homebuyers or refinancing homeowners. Banks earn net revenue to remunerate capital required for operations from the spread between the rate received from mortgage debtors and the rate implicit in the yield of the mortgage-backed securities. Nick Timiraos (Ibid) finds that the spread was around 0.5 percentage points before the financial crisis of 2007, widening to 1 percentage point after the crisis but jumping to 1.6 percentage points after the Fed engaged in another program of buying mortgage-backed securities, oscillating currently around 1.3 percentage points. The spread has widened because banks have higher costs originating in regulation, litigation on repurchasing defaulted mortgages, loss in case of default and more prudent but more costly scrutiny of property appraisals and income verification. As a result, even if quantitative easing had lowered yields of mortgage-backed securities there would not be proportionate reduction in mortgage rates and even less likely construction and sales of houses. There is sharp recovery in the final segment.
Chart I-13, US, Real Estate Loans in Bank Credit, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1947-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-14 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides consumer loans in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2016. Consumer loans even increased during the contraction then declined and increased vertically to decline again. There is renewed growth. There was high demand for reposition of durable goods that exhausted and limited consumption again with increase in savings rates in recent periods. Shayndi Raice and Nick Timiraos, writing on “Banks cut as mortgage boom ends,” on Jan 9, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303754404579310940019239208), analyze the drop in mortgage applications to a 13-year low, as measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Demand for home loans plunges,” on Apr 24, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579522051733228402?mg=reno64-wsj), analyzes data in Inside Mortgage Finance that mortgage lending of $235 billion in IQ2014 is 58 percent lower than a year earlier and 23 percent below IVQ2013. Mortgage lending collapsed to the lowest level in 14 years. In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2014, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm): “One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.”
Chart I-14, US, Consumer Loans in Bank Credit, Not Seasonally Adjusted, US Commercial Banks, Monthly, 1947-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-15 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides commercial and industrial loans not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2016. Commercial and industrial loans fell sharply during both contractions in 2001 and after IVQ2007 and then rebounded with accelerated growth. Commercial and industrial loans have not reached again the trend extrapolated from the peak during the global recession.
Chart I-15, US, Commercial and Industrial Loans in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1947-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-16 and Chart I-16A are quite revealing in analyzing the state of bank credit in the US economy. The upper curves are (1) deposits and (2) loans and leases in bank credit. Historically since 1973, the level and rate of change of deposits and loans and leases in bank credit were almost identical. The lower two curves are Treasury and agency securities in bank credit and cash assets with treasury and agency securities moving closely with cash assets until the 1990s when Treasury and agency securities exceeded cash assets. There is convergence in the final segment after cash assets exceeded treasury and agency securities. The shaded area of the recession from IV2007 to IIQ2009 shows a break in the level and rate of movement of the series. Deposits continued to expand rapidly through the recession and the following expansion period. Loans and leases fell and barely recovered the level of trend before the recession while deposits moved nearly vertically well above the level before the recession. While Treasury and agency securities in bank credit continued to expand at a higher rate, reaching a level well above that before the recession, cash assets jumped as the counterpart of excess reserves in banks that financed quantitative easing or massive outright purchases of securities for the balance sheet of the Fed. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and outright purchases of securities caused sharp increases of deposits, cash assets and Treasury and agency securities in bank credit but not in loans and leases. There is much discussion about the almost impossible task of evaluating monetary policy in terms of costs and benefits. Before the financial crisis, Chairman Greenspan (2004) analyzes monetary policy and its limitations (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 13-4, 212-13) that do not differ from those of private financial institutions:
“The Federal Reserve’s experiences over the past two decades make it clear that uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape. The term “uncertainty” is meant here to encompass both “Knightian uncertainty,” in which the probability distribution of outcomes is unknown, and “risk,” in which uncertainty of outcomes is delimited by a known probability distribution. In practice, one is never quite sure what type of uncertainty one is dealing with in real time, and it may be best to think of a continuum ranging from well-defined risks to the truly unknown.
As a consequence, the conduct of monetary policy in the United States has come to involve, at its core, crucial elements of risk management. This conceptual framework emphasizes understanding as much as possible the many sources of risk and uncertainty that policymakers face, quantifying those risks when possible, and assessing the costs associated with each of the risks. In essence, the risk management approach to monetary policymaking is an application of Bayesian decision making.
This framework also entails devising, in light of those risks, a strategy for policy directed at maximizing the probabilities of achieving over time our goals of price stability and the maximum sustainable economic growth that we associate with it. In designing strategies to meet our policy objectives, we have drawn on the work of analysts, both inside and outside the Fed, who over the past half century have devoted much effort to improving our understanding of the economy and its monetary transmission mechanism. A critical result has been the identification of a relatively small set of key relationships that, taken together, provide a useful approximation of our economy’s dynamics. Such an approximation underlies the statistical models that we at the Federal Reserve employ to assess the likely influence of our policy decisions.
However, despite extensive efforts to capture and quantify what we perceive as the key macroeconomic relationships, our knowledge about many of the important linkages is far from complete and, in all likelihood, will always remain so. Every model, no matter how detailed or how well designed, conceptually and empirically, is a vastly simplified representation of the world that we experience with all its intricacies on a day-to-day basis.
Given our inevitably incomplete knowledge about key structural aspects of an ever-changing economy and the sometimes asymmetric costs or benefits of particular outcomes, a central bank needs to consider not only the most likely future path for the economy but also the distribution of possible outcomes about that path. The decision makers then need to reach a judgment about the probabilities, costs, and benefits of the various possible outcomes under alternative choices for policy.”
Risk management tools are as likely to fail in private financial institutions as in central banks because of the difficulty of modeling risk during uncertainty. There is no such thing as riskless financial management. “Whale” trades at official institutions causing wide swings of financial and economic variables do not receive the same attention as those in large private banking institutions such as the teapot storm over JP Morgan Chase.
The post of this blog on Nov 8, 2009 is currently relevant (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2009/11/how-big-bank-carlos-manuel-pelaezs.html):
Sunday, November 8, 2009
How Big a Bank
Carlos Manuel Peláez's Latest Blog Posts
How Big a Bank
5:56 PM PST, November 8, 2009
Agendas of financial regulation in parliaments, international official institutions and monetary authorities include limits on the size of banks or how big a bank should be. These proposals imply that regulators would decide the total value of assets held by banks. Assets would have to be weighted by risk, which is the best practice applied in the Basel capital accords. Regulators would decide not only the total value of assets but also the structure or percentage share of assets by risk class and credit rating such as how much in consumer credit, real estate lending, securities holding, corporate lending and so on. If the regulators decide on the total value of assets and their risk, they effectively micro manage bank decisions on risk and return. Managers would only implement regulatory criteria with little decision power on how best to reward shareholder capital. Regulators would mandate maximum assets and their risk distribution by leverage, credit and liquidity regulation. There are two concerns on the regulation of how big a bank should be. First, there is the issue of best practice in bank management and its consequences for financing prosperity. Banking is characterized by declining costs because of bulky fixed investments required for initiation of lines of business (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 82-9, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 63-9). There has been a new industrial/technological revolution in the past three decades centered on information technology (IT). Banking is highly intensive in the creation, processing, transmission and decision use of information. The first transaction of a $100 million IT facility costs $100 million but the hundred millionth costs only one dollar. Competitive banking requires a large volume of transactions to reach the minimum cost of operations. At the time of the call report for the implementation of Basel II in 2006, 11 banking organizations had total assets of $4.6 trillion, equivalent to 44 percent of total US banking assets of $10.5 trillion, and about $978 billion in foreign assets, equivalent to 96 percent of US foreign banking assets of $1 trillion (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State: Vol. II, 147). Concentration likely increased during the credit/dollar crisis and its reversal by regulation could cause another confidence shock. The regulation of how big a bank should be would disrupt investment in the best practice of using technology and delivery of products at lowest cost by US banking organizations. It would also undermine the competitiveness of US banks in international business, violating the essential principle of the Basel capital accords of maintaining fair competitive international banking. Second, the regulation of how big a bank should be is based on an inadequate interpretation of the credit crisis/global recession. The panic of confidence in financial markets is commonly attributed to the failure of Lehman Bros. in September 2008. Cochrane and Zingales have shown that the crisis of confidence originated in the proposal of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of $700 billion two weeks after the failure of Lehman Bros. TARP was proposed in negative terms of: withdraw "toxic" assets from bank balance sheets of banks or there would be an economic catastrophe similar to the Great Depression. Counterparty risk perception rose sharply because of fear of banking panics, paralyzing sale and repurchase transactions and causing illiquidity of multiple market segments. The "toxin" was introduced by zero interest rates in 2003-4 that induced high leverage and risk, low liquidity and imprudent credit together with the purchase or guarantee of $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages by Fannie and Freddie on the good faith and credit of the US. Regulatory micro management of the volume and structure of risk of banks and financial markets will weaken banks, reducing the volume of credit required for steering the world economy from currently low levels of activity. It will also restructure markets with arbitrary concession of monopolistic power to less efficient banks, creating vulnerabilities to new crises. There is need for less intrusive regulation that induces a sustainable path of prosperity, using effectively the staff, expertise and resources of existing regulatory agencies.
Chart I-16, US, Deposits, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, Cash Assets and Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart I-16A, Deposits, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, Cash Assets and Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1995-2016, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.
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