Increasing Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, Recovery Without Hiring in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Labor Underutilization, Ten Million Fewer Full-Time Jobs, Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment, United States Inflation, United States International Trade, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.
I Recovery without Hiring
IA1 Hiring Collapse
IA2 Labor Underutilization
ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs
IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment
IIB United States Inflation
IIA United States International Trade
III World Financial Turbulence
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
V World Economic Slowdown. Table V-1 is constructed with the database of the IMF (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx) to show GDP in dollars in 2018 and the growth rate of real GDP of the world and selected regional countries from 2018 to 2021. The data illustrate the concept often repeated of “two-speed recovery” of the world economy from the recession of 2007 to 2009. The IMF has changed its measurement of the world economy to 3.6 percent in 2018 and reducing the forecast rate of growth to 3.0 percent in 2019, 3.4 percent in 2020 and 3.6 percent in 2021. Slow-speed recovery occurs in the “major advanced economies” of the G7 that account for $38,901 billion of world output of $84,930 billion, or 45.8 percent, but are projected to grow at much lower rates than world output, 1.7 percent on average from 2018 to 2021, in contrast with 3.4 percent for the world as a whole. While the world would grow 14.3 percent in the four years from 2018 to 2021, the G7 as a whole would grow 6.9 percent. The difference in dollars of 2018 is high: growing by 14.3 percent would add around $12.1 trillion of output to the world economy, or roughly, over two times the output of the economy of Japan of $4,972 billion but growing by 6.9 percent would add $5.9 trillion of output to the world, or somewhat higher than the output of Japan in 2018. The “two speed” concept is in reference to the growth of the 150 countries labeled as emerging and developing economies (EMDE) with joint output in 2018 of $33,687 billion, or 39.7 percent of world output. The EMDEs would grow cumulatively 19.0 percent or at the average yearly rate of 4.4 percent, contributing $6.4 trillion from 2018 to 2021 or the equivalent of close to one half the GDP of $13,368 billion of China in 2018. The final four countries in Table I-1 often referred as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), are large, rapidly growing emerging economies. Their combined output in 2018 adds to $19,613 billion, or 23.1 percent of world output, which is equivalent to 50.4 percent of the combined output of the major advanced economies of the G7.
Table V-1, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Real GDP Growth
GDP USD Billions 2018 | Real GDP ∆% | Real GDP ∆% | Real GDP ∆% | Real GDP ∆% | |
World | 84,930 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
G7 | 38,901 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 |
Canada | 1,712 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
France | 2,780 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
DE | 3,951 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
Italy | 2,076 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
Japan | 4,972 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
UK | 2,829 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
US | 20,580 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.7 |
Euro Area | 13,639 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
DE | 3,951 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
France | 2,780 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
Italy | 2,076 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
POT | 241 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
Ireland | 383 | 8.3 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 3.2 |
Greece | 218 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.7 |
Spain | 1,428 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 |
EMDE | 33,687 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
Brazil | 1,868 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 2.0 | 2.4 |
Russia | 1,658 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
India | 2,719 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 7.4 |
China | 13,368 | 6.6 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 5.9 |
Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries); POT: Portugal
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx
Continuing high rates of unemployment in advanced economies constitute another characteristic of the database of the WEO (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx). Table V-2 is constructed with the WEO database to provide rates of unemployment from 2017 to 2021 for major countries and regions. In fact, unemployment rates for 2017 in Table I-2 are high for all countries: unusually high for countries with high rates most of the time and unusually high for countries with low rates most of the time. The rates of unemployment are particularly high in 2017 for the countries with sovereign debt difficulties in Europe: 8.9 percent for Portugal (POT), 6.7 percent for Ireland, 21.5 percent for Greece, 17.2 percent for Spain and 11.3 percent for Italy, which is lower but still high. The G7 rate of unemployment is 5.0 percent. Unemployment rates are not likely to decrease substantially if relative slow cyclical growth persists in advanced economies.
Table V-2, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Unemployment Rate as Percent of Labor Force
% Labor Force 2017 | % Labor Force 2018 | % Labor Force 2019 | % Labor Force 2020 | % Labor Force 2021 | |
World | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
G7 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.3 |
Canada | 6.3 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.1 |
France | 9.4 | 9.1 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
DE | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
Italy | 11.3 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.2 |
Japan | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
UK | 4.4 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
US | 4.4 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
Euro Area | 9.1 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.3 |
DE | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
France | 9.4 | 9.1 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
Italy | 11.3 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.2 |
POT | 8.9 | 7.0 | 6.1 | 5.6 | 5.4 |
Ireland | 6.7 | 5.8 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 5.1 |
Greece | 21.5 | 19.3 | 17.8 | 16.8 | 15.7 |
Spain | 17.2 | 15.3 | 13.9 | 13.2 | 12.7 |
EMDE | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
Brazil | 12.8 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 10.8 | 10.0 |
Russia | 5.2 | 4.8 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.7 |
India | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
China | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx
There are references to adverse periods as “lost decades.” There is a more prolonged and adverse period in Table V-3A: the lost economic cycle of the Global Recession with economic growth underperforming below trend worldwide. Economic contractions were relatively high but not comparable to the decline of GDP during the Great Depression. In fact, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, US GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. The contraction of GDP in the current cycle of the Global Recession was much lower, 4.0 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html). Contractions were deeper in Japan, 8.7 percent, the euro area (19 members), 5.8 percent, Germany 6.9 percent and the UK 6.3 percent. The contraction in France was 3.9 percent. There is adversity in low rates of growth during the expansion that did not compensate for the contraction such that for the whole cycle performance is disappointingly low. As a result, GDP is substantially below what it would have been in trend growth in all countries and regions in the world. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 41 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2019. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIIQ2019 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-10/gpd3q19_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ2019, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1993 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2019 would have accumulated to 41.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2019 would be $22,303.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3190.7 billion than actual $19,112.5 billion. There are more than three trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 18.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 10.6 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html). US GDP in IIQ2019 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,112.5 billion in IIIQ2019 or 21.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Sep 1919 to Sep 2019. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 153.2712 in Sep 2019. The actual index NSA in Sep 2019 is 105.8717 which is 30.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 158.5996 in Sep 2019. The actual index NSA in Sep 2019 is 105.8717, which is 33.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Sep 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 136.6707 in Sep 2019. The output of manufacturing at 105.8717 in Sep 2019 is 22.5 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 106.8222 in Sep 2019 or 23.7 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 159.8169 in Sep 2019. The NAICS index at 106.8222 in Sep 2019 is 33.2 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 130.0453 in Sep 2019. The NAICS index at 106.8222 in Sep 2019 is 17.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table V-3A, Cycle 2007-2019, Percentage Contraction, Average Growth Rate in Expansion, Average Growth Rate in Whole Cycle and GDP Percent Below Trend
Contraction ∆% | Expansion Av ∆% | Whole Cycle Av ∆% | Below Trend Percent | |
USA | 4.0 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 14.3 |
Japan | 8.7 | 1.5 | 0.6 | NA |
Euro Area 19 | 5.8 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 16.2 |
France | 3.9 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 10.1 |
Germany | 6.9 | 2.0 | 1.1 | NA |
UK | 6.0 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 17.6 |
Note: AV: Average. Expansion and Whole Cycle AV ∆% calculated with quarterly growth, seasonally adjusted and quarterly adjusted when applicable, rates and converted into annual equivalent.
Data reported periodically in this blog.
Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/related-sites.html
Manufacturing is underperforming in the lost cycle of the global recession. Manufacturing (SIC) in Sep 2019 is lower by 3.3 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007, as shown in Chart V-3A. Manufacturing (NAICS) in Aug 2019 at 107.5806 is lower by 2.7 percent relative to the peak at 110.5147 in Jun 2007. There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Sep 1919 to Sep 2019. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 153.2712 in Sep 2019. The actual index NSA in Sep 2019 is 105.8717 which is 30.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 158.5996 in Sep 2019. The actual index NSA in Sep 2019 is 105.8717, which is 33.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Sep 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 136.6707 in Sep 2019. The output of manufacturing at 105.8717 in Sep 2019 is 22.5 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 106.8222 in Sep 2019 or 23.7 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 159.8169 in Sep 2019. The NAICS index at 106.8222 in Sep 2019 is 33.2 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 130.0453 in Sep 2019. The NAICS index at 106.8222 in Sep 2019 is 17.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jun 2007 to Sep 2019
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart V-3B provides the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States, or those available for work. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 231.713 million in Jun 2007 to 259.845 million in Oct 2019 or 28.132 million.
Chart V-3B, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 2007 to Oct 2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3C provides nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 2007 to Oct 2019. Nonfarm payroll jobs fell from 13.987 million in Jun 2007 to 12.820 million in Oct 2019, or 1.167 million.
Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 2007 to Oct 2019, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Sep 2019. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade.
Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Sep 2019
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart V-3E provides the US noninstitutional civilian population, or those in condition of working, from Jan 1948, when first available, to Oct 2019. The noninstitutional civilian population increased from 170.042 million in Jun 1981 to 259.845 million in Oct 2019, or 89.803 million.
Chart V-3E, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 1948 to Oct 2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart V-3F provides manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 1939 to Oct 2019. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs decreased from a peak of 18.890 million in Jun 1981 to 12.884 million in Oct 2019.
Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 1939 to Oct 2019, Thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
There is global stress in manufacturing. Table V-3B provides month and 12-month percentage changes of new orders in manufacturing and output of manufacturing in Germany.
Table V-3B, Germany, Manufacturing Orders and Manufacturing Output, ∆% Month and 12 Months
MFG New Orders Month ∆% | MFG New Orders 12 Months ∆% | MFG Output Month ∆% | MFG Output 12 Month ∆% | |
Sep 2019 | 1.6 | -2.4 | 0.4 | -1.5 |
Aug | -2.3 | -9.3 | -1.1 | -7.5 |
Jul | -1.1 | -2.2 | 1.2 | -1.0 |
Jun | 3.8 | -10.8 | -1.3 | -14.4 |
May | -3.2 | -3.8 | -0.6 | 1.1 |
Apr | 1.4 | -5.2 | -0.1 | -4.1 |
Mar | -0.1 | -7.0 | -2.5 | -3.9 |
Feb | -3.2 | -7.1 | 1.5 | -0.2 |
Jan | -1.8 | -3.6 | -0.5 | -3.8 |
Dec 2018 | 1.2 | -8.2 | 0.8 | -6.7 |
Dec 2017 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 0.2 | 3.7 |
Dec 2016 | 6.4 | 11.2 | -0.2 | 2.0 |
Source: Federal Statistical Agency of Germany, https://www.destatis.de/EN/Home/_node.html
Table V-3 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog from IQ2012 to IVQ2018 available now for all countries. There are estimates for all countries for IQ2019 and preliminary estimates for IIQ2019 for most countries. There are preliminary estimates for some countries for IIIQ2019. Growth is weak throughout most of the world.
- Japan. The GDP of Japan increased 1.3 percent in IQ2012, 5.2 percent at SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) and 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier but part of the jump could be the low level a year earlier because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan is experiencing difficulties with the overvalued yen because of worldwide capital flight originating in zero interest rates with risk aversion in an environment of softer growth of world trade. Japan’s GDP fell 0.8 percent in IIQ2012 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of minus 3.2 percent, which is much lower than 5.2 percent in IQ2012. Growth of 2.9 percent in IIQ2012 in Japan relative to IIQ2011 has effects of the low level of output because of Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.4 percent in IIIQ2012 at the SAAR of minus 1.4 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2012 at the SAAR of 1.0 percent and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan grew 1.2 percent in IQ2013 at the SAAR of 4.8 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2013 at the SAAR of 3.3 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP grew 0.8 percent in IIIQ2013 at the SAAR of 3.4 percent and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2013, Japan’s GDP changed 0.0 percent at the SAAR of minus 0.2 percent, increasing 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.9 percent in IQ2014 at the SAAR of 3.9 percent and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2014, Japan’s GDP fell 1.9 percent at the SAAR of minus 7.3 percent and fell 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 at the SAAR of 0.4 percent and fell 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, Japan’s GDP grew 0.5 percent, at the SAAR of 2.0 percent, decreasing 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Japan increased 1.3 percent in IQ2015 at the SAAR of 5.4 percent and increased 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2015 at the SAAR of 0.6 percent and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Japan changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2015 at the SAAR of minus 0.2 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 at the SAAR of minus 1.6 percent and grew 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, the GDP of Japan increased 0.7 percent at the SAAR of 2.8 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2016 at the SAAR of 0.1 percent and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, the GDP of Japan increased 0.3 percent at the SAAR of 1.1 percent and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2016 at the SAAR of 0.8 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, the GDP of Japan increased 0.8 percent at the SAAR of 3.4 percent and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2017 at the SAAR of 1.8 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, the GDP of Japan increased 0.7 percent at the SAAR of 2.9 percent and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2017, at the SAAR of 1.3 percent, and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, the GDP of Japan decreased 0.1 percent, at the SAAR of minus 0.6 percent and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2018, at the SAAR of 1.9 percent and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, the GDP of Japan contracted 0.5 percent at the SAAR of minus 1.9 percent and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2018, at the SAAR of 1.8 percent and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, the GDP of Japan increased 0.5 percent at the SAAR of 2.2 percent and grew 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. . Japan’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2019, at the SAAR of 1.3 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier.
- China. China’s GDP grew 1.9 percent in IQ2012, annualizing to 7.8 percent, and 8.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 2.1 percent in IIQ2012, which annualizes to 8.7 percent, and 7.6 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.8 percent in IIIQ2012, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, China grew at 2.0 percent, which annualizes at 8.2 percent, and 8.1 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011. In IQ2013, China grew at 1.9 percent, which annualizes at 7.8 percent, and 7.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2013, China grew at 1.8 percent, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.6 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 2.1 percent in IIIQ2013, which annualizes at 8.7 percent, and increased 7.9 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.6 percent in IVQ2013, which annualized to 6.6 percent, and 7.7 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.8 percent in IQ2014, which annualizes to 7.4 percent, and 7.4 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2014, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.5 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIIQ2014, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent in a year, and 7.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.7 percent in IVQ2014, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and 7.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.8 percent in IQ2015, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and increased 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, China’s GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.5 percent in IVQ2015, which annualizes at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.4 percent in IQ2016, which annualizes at 5.7 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, the GDP of China increased 1.9 percent, which annualizes to 7.8 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2016, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.6 percent in IVQ2016, which annualizes at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.5 percent in IQ2017, which annualizes at 6.1 percent and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.8 percent in IIQ2017, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.5 percent in IVQ2017, which annualizes at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.5 percent in IQ2018, which annualizes to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.7 percent in IIQ2018, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.6 percent in IIIQ2018, which annualizes to 6.6 percent, and increased 6.5 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased 1.5 percent in IVQ2018, which annualized at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.4 percent in IQ2019, which annualizes at 5.7 percent and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased 1.6 percent in IIQ2019, which annualized at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.5 percent in IIIQ2019, which annualizes at 6.1 percent and increased 6.0 percent relative to a year earlier. There was decennial change in leadership in China (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/index.htm). Xi Jinping initiated a second term of leadership in Oct 2017 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/25/c_136705344.htm). Growth rates of GDP of China in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier have been declining from 2011 to 2019.
- Euro Area. GDP fell 0.2 percent in the euro area in IQ2012 and decreased 0.4 in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP contracted 0.4 percent IIQ2012 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.1 percent and declined 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.4 percent relative to the prior quarter and fell 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, the GDP of the euro area fell 0.4 percent and decreased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2013, euro area GDP increased 0.4 percent and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and increased 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The euro area’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP increased 0.7 percent in IQ2015 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. The euro area’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.8 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, euro are GDP increased 0.7 percent and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2017 and increased 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.8 percent and grew 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area grew 0.8 percent in IVQ2017 and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent and grew 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area grew 0.4 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2018 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier.
- Germany. The GDP of Germany increased 0.3 percent in IQ2012 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier but 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier when adjusted for calendar effects (CA). In IIIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.3 percent and 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP contracted 0.5 percent in IVQ2012 and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, Germany’s GDP decreased 0.3 percent and fell 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2013, Germany’s GDP increased 0.9 percent and grew 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2013 and grew 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2013, Germany’s GDP increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 1.0 percent in IQ2014 and grew 3.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2014, Germany’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 1.0 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany decreased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIQ2015 and grew 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Germany increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2015 and grew 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 and grew 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, the GDP of Germany increased 0.8 percent and grew 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 3.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, the GDP of Germany increased 0.2 percent and grew 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2016 and grew 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, the GDP of Germany increased 1.2 percent and grew 3.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIQ2017 and grew 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier adjusting for calendar effects (CA). In IIIQ2017, the GDP of Germany increased 0.9 percent and increased 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier and 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). Germany’s GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2017, 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier and 3.4 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). The GDP of Germany increased 0.1 percent in IQ2018 and grew 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). Germany’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2018, 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier and 2.1 relative to a year earlier (CA). The GDP of Germany decreased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2018, increasing 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier and 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). Germany’s GDP changed 0.2 percent in IVQ2018, increasing 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier and 0.6 relative to a year earlier (CA). The GDP of Germany increased 0.4 percent in IQ2019, increasing 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier and increasing 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier (CA). Germany’s GDP contracted 0.1 percent in IIQ2019, changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier and increased 0.4 relative to a year earlier (CA).
- United States. Growth of US GDP in IQ2012 was 0.8 percent, at SAAR of 3.2 percent and higher by 2.7 percent relative to IQ2011. US GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2012, 1.7 percent at SAAR and 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, US GDP grew 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent at SAAR and 2.5 percent relative to IIIQ2011. In IVQ2012, US GDP grew 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent at SAAR and 1.5 percent relative to IVQ2011. In IQ2013, US GDP grew at 3.6 percent SAAR, 0.9 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.6 percent relative to the same quarter in 2012. In IIQ2013, US GDP grew at 0.5 percent in SAAR, 0.1 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.3 percent relative to IIQ2012. US GDP grew at 3.2 percent in SAAR in IIIQ2013, 0.8 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.9 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html). In IVQ2013, US GDP grew 0.8 percent at 3.2 percent SAAR and 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, US GDP decreased 0.3 percent, increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier and fell 1.1 percent at SAAR. In IIQ2014, US GDP increased 1.4 percent at 5.5 percent SAAR and increased 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP increased 1.2 percent in IIIQ2014 at 5.0 percent SAAR and increased 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, US GDP increased 0.6 percent at SAAR of 2.3 percent and increased 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2015 at SAAR of 3.2 percent and grew 4.0 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.0 percent in IIQ2015, increasing 0.7 percent in the quarter and 3.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2015 at SAAR of 1.3 percent and grew 2.4 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 0.1 percent in IVQ2015, increasing 0.0 percent in the quarter and 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, US GDP grew 0.5 percent at SAAR of 2.0 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 1.9 percent in IIQ2016, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter and 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, US GDP grew 0.5 percent at SAAR of 2.2 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.0 percent in IVQ2016, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, US GDP grew 0.6 percent at SAAR of 2.3 percent and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.2 percent in IIQ2017, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, US GDP grew 0.8 percent at SAAR of 3.2 percent and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.5 percent in IVQ2017, increasing 0.9 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.5 percent, increasing 0.6 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.5 percent in IIQ2018, increasing 0.9 percent in the quarter, and increasing 3.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.9 percent, increasing 0.7 percent in the quarter, and increasing 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 1.1 percent in IVQ2018, increasing 0.3 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.1 percent, increasing 0.8 percent in the quarter and increasing 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.0 percent in IIQ2019, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2019, US GDP grew at SAAR of 1.9 percent, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter and increasing 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier.
- United Kingdom. In IQ2012, UK GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, GDP fell 0.1 percent relative to IQ2012 and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, GDP increased 1.2 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IVQ2012, GDP fell 0.2 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Fiscal consolidation in an environment of weakening economic growth is much more challenging. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 0.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to IVQ2012. In IIQ2013, GDP increased 0.5 percent and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2013 and 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2013 and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, GDP increased 0.7 percent and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2014 and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2014 and 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, GDP increased 0.6 percent and 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2015 and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2016 and grew 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2017 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2017 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2018 and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2019, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier.
- Italy. In IIQ2019, Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2019 and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, the GDP of Italy decreased 0.1 percent and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of Italy changed 0.0 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of Italy increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 1.0 percent in IQ2013 and declined 2.9 percent relative to IQ2012. GDP had been growing during six consecutive quarters but at very low rates from IQ2010 to IIQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell in seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at increasingly higher rates of contraction from 0.6 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IVQ2011, 0.9 percent in IQ2012, 0.9 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012. The pace of decline accelerated to minus 0.5 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 1.0 percent in IQ2013. GDP contracted cumulatively 5.2 percent in seven consecutive quarterly contractions from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent. The year-on-year rate has fallen from 2.3 percent in IVQ2010 to minus 2.8 percent in IVQ2012, minus 2.9 percent in IQ2013, minus 2.0 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 1.2 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP fell 0.8 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.3 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.1 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.8 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.8 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.7 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.0 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to a year earlier and changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IQ2019 relative to a year earlier and decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2019 relative to a year earlier. Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy in IIQ2019 of €403,786.1 million (https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/230842) is lower by 5.1 percent relative to €425,552.0 million in IQ2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy increased from €368,036.0 million in IQ1998 to €425,552.0 million in IQ2008 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. The fiscal adjustment of Italy is significantly more difficult with the economy not growing especially on the prospects of increasing government revenue. The strategy is for reforms to improve productivity, facilitating future fiscal consolidation.
- France. France’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2012 and increased 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IIQ2012 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2012 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2013 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2013 and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2013 and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, France’s GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2014, France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.1 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IQ2015 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2015, France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2015, the GDP of France increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France decreased 0.3 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of France increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of France increased 0.7 percent and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of France increased 0.7 percent and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2018 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of France increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, the GDP of France increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2019 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2019, the GDP of France increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2019 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier.
Table V-3, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%
IQ2012/IVQ2011 | IQ2012/IQ2011 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 2.7 |
Japan | QOQ: 1.3 SAAR: 5.2 | 3.1 |
China | 1.9 AE 7.8 | 8.1 |
Euro Area | -0.2 | -0.4 |
Germany | 0.3 | 1.6 |
France | 0.1 | 0.7 |
Italy | -0.9 | -2.2 |
United Kingdom | 0.6 | 1.2 |
IIQ2012/IQ2012 | IIQ2012/IIQ2011 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.7 | 2.4 |
Japan | QOQ: -0.8 | 2.9 |
China | 2.1 AE 8.7 | 7.6 |
Euro Area | -0.4 | -0.8 |
Germany | 0.1 | 0.4 0.9 CA |
France | -0.2 | 0.4 |
Italy | -0.9 | -3.2 |
United Kingdom | -0.1 | 1.1 |
IIIQ2012/ IIQ2012 | IIIQ2012/ IIIQ2011 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.1 | 2.5 |
Japan | QOQ: –0.4 | -0.1 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.5 |
Euro Area | -0.1 | -1.0 |
Germany | 0.3 | 0.2 |
France | 0.2 | 0.4 |
Italy | -0.5 | -3.1 |
United Kingdom | 1.2 | 2.0 |
IVQ2012/IIIQ2012 | IVQ2012/IVQ2011 | |
United States | QOQ: 0.1 | 1.5 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.0 | 0.3 |
China | 2.0 AE 8.2 | 8.1 |
Euro Area | -0.4 | -1.0 |
Germany | -0.5 | -0.1 |
France | -0.1 | 0.0 |
Italy | -0.5 | -2.8 |
United Kingdom | -0.2 | 1.6 |
IQ2013/IVQ2012 | IQ2013/IQ2012 | |
United States | QOQ: 0.9 | 1.6 |
Japan | QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 4.8 | 0.4 |
China | 1.9 AE 7.8 | 7.9 |
Euro Area | -0.4 | -1.3 |
Germany | -0.3 | -1.5 |
France | 0.0 | -0.1 |
Italy | -1.0 | -2.9 |
UK | 0.6 | 1.6 |
IIQ2013/IQ2013 | IIQ2013/IIQ2012 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.5 | 1.3 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.3 | 1.9 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.6 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | -0.4 |
Germany | 0.9 | 0.9 |
France | 0.7 | 0.8 |
Italy | 0.0 | -2.0 |
UK | 0.5 | 2.3 |
IIIQ2013/IIQ2013 | III/Q2013/IIIQ2012 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 | 1.9 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.4 | 3.0 |
China | 2.1 AE 8.7 | 7.9 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 0.1 |
Germany | 0.6 | 1.2 |
France | 0.0 | 0.6 |
Italy | 0.4 | -1.2 |
UK | 0.9 | 2.0 |
IVQ2013/IIIQ2013 | IVQ2013/IVQ2012 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 2.6 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: -0.2 | 2.7 |
China | 1.6 AE 6.6 | 7.7 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 0.7 |
Germany | 0.4 | 1.4 |
France | 0.5 | 1.1 |
Italy | -0.2 | -0.8 |
UK | 0.5 | 2.7 |
IQ2014/IVQ2013 | IQ2014/IQ2013 | |
USA | QOQ -0.3 SAAR -1.1 | 1.4 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.9 | 3.0 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.4 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | 1.6 |
Germany | 1.0 | 3.2 |
France | 0.1 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.1 | 0.3 |
UK | 0.7 | 2.7 |
IIQ2014/IQ2014 | IIQ2014/IIQ2013 | |
USA | QOQ 1.4 SAAR 5.5 | 2.7 |
Japan | QOQ: -1.9 SAAR: -7.3 | -0.1 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.5 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 1.2 |
Germany | -0.1 | 1.5 |
France | 0.2 | 0.7 |
Italy | -0.1 | 0.2 |
UK | 0.7 | 2.8 |
IIIQ2014/IIQ2014 | IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013 | |
USA | QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 5.0 | 3.1 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.4 | -0.9 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.1 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | 1.3 |
Germany | 0.3 | 1.7 |
France | 0.5 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.2 | 0.1 |
UK | 0.6 | 2.4 |
IVQ2014/IIIQ2014 | IVQ2014/IVQ2013 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.3 | 2.9 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | -0.5 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 7.2 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 1.6 |
Germany | 1.0 | 2.4 |
France | 0.1 | 0.8 |
Italy | 0.0 | 0.2 |
UK | 0.6 | 2.5 |
IQ2015/IVQ2014 | IQ2015/IQ2014 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 4.0 |
Japan | QOQ: 1.3 SAAR: 5.4 | 0.0 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.0 |
Euro Area | 0.7 | 1.8 |
Germany | -0.2 | 1.3 |
France | 0.4 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.2 | 0.3 |
UK | 0.5 | 2.3 |
IIQ2015/IQ2015 | IIQ2015/IIQ2014 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 3.0 | 3.4 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 0.6 | 2.2 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 7.0 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 2.0 |
Germany | 0.6 | 1.8 |
France | 0.0 | 1.0 |
Italy | 0.4 | 0.8 |
UK | 0.7 | 2.4 |
IIIQ2015/IIQ2015 | IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.3 | 2.4 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: -0.2 | 1.9 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 6.9 |
Euro Area | 0.5 | 2.0 |
Germany | 0.5 | 1.8 |
France | 0.4 | 0.9 |
Italy | 0.3 | 0.8 |
UK | 0.4 | 2.2 |
IVQ2015/IIIQ2015 | IVQ2015/IVQ2014 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: 0.1 | 1.9 |
Japan | QOQ: -0.4 SAAR: -1.6 | 0.9 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 2.0 |
Germany | 0.4 | 2.1 |
France | 0.2 | 1.1 |
Italy | 0.4 | 1.3 |
UK | 0.7 | 2.4 |
IQ2016/IVQ2015 | IQ2016/IQ2015 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | 1.6 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 2.8 | 0.4 |
China | 1.4 AE 5.7 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.6 | 1.9 |
Germany | 0.8 | 2.0 |
France | 0.6 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.2 | 1.3 |
UK | 0.2 | 2.1 |
IIQ2016/IQ2016 | IIQ2016/IIQ2015 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 1.9 | 1.3 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: 0.1 | 0.3 |
China | 1.9 AE 7.8 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.3 | 1.8 |
Germany | 0.6 | 3.7 |
France | -0.3 | 1.0 |
Italy | 0.2 | 1.1 |
UK | 0.5 | 1.9 |
IIIQ2016/IIQ2016 | IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.2 | 1.6 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.1 | 0.5 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 1.7 |
Germany | 0.2 | 1.9 |
France | 0.3 | 0.8 |
Italy | 0.4 | 1.2 |
UK | 0.5 | 1.9 |
IVQ2016/IIIQ2016 | IVQ2016/IVQ2015 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | 2.0 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 0.8 | 1.2 |
China | 1.6 AE 6.6 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.8 | 2.1 |
Germany | 0.4 | 1.4 |
France | 0.6 | 1.2 |
Italy | 0.5 | 1.3 |
UK | 0.6 | 1.8 |
IQ2017/IVQ2016 | IQ2017/IQ2016 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.3 | 2.1 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.4 | 1.5 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.7 | 2.2 |
Germany | 1.2 | 3.6 |
France | 0.8 | 1.4 |
Italy | 0.6 | 1.6 |
UK | 0.6 | 2.2 |
IIQ2017/IQ2017 | IIQ2017/IIQ2016 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.2 | 2.2 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.8 | 1.7 |
China | 1.8 AE 7.4 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.7 | 2.6 |
Germany | 0.6 | 1.0 CA 2.3 |
France | 0.7 | 2.4 |
Italy | 0.4 | 1.8 |
UK | 0.3 | 1.9 |
IIIQ2017/IIQ2017 | IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2 | 2.4 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 2.9 | 2.2 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.8 | 2.9 |
Germany | 0.9 | 2.5 CA 3.0 |
France | 0.7 | 2.8 |
Italy | 0.4 | 1.8 |
UK | 0.3 | 1.8 |
IVQ2017/IIIQ2017 | IVQ2017/IVQ2016 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.5 | 2.8 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.3 | 2.4 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.8 | 3.0 |
Germany | 0.7 | 2.8 CA 3.4 |
France | 0.7 | 3.0 |
Italy | 0.4 | 1.7 |
UK | 0.4 | 1.6 |
IQ2018/IVQ2017 | IQ2018/IQ2017 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.5 | 2.9 |
Japan | QOQ: -0.1 SAAR: -0.6 | 1.3 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.8 |
Euro Area | 0.3 | 2.6 |
Germany | 0.1 | 1.6 CA 2.3 |
France | 0.2 | 2.4 |
Italy | 0.2 | 1.4 |
UK | 0.1 | 1.1 |
IIQ2018/IQ2018 | IIQ2018/IIQ2017 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.5 | 3.2 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.9 | 1.5 |
China | 1.7 AE 7.0 | 6.7 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 2.3 |
Germany | 0.4 | 2.5 CA 2.1 |
France | 0.2 | 1.9 |
Italy | 0.0 | 1.0 |
UK | 0.5 | 1.3 |
IIIQ2018/IIQ2018 | IIIQ2018/IIIQ2017 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 2.9 | 3.1 |
Japan | QOQ -0.5 SAAR: -1.9 | 0.1 |
China | 1.6 AE 6.6 | 6.5 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 1.7 |
Germany | -0.1 | 1.1 CA 1.1 |
France | 0.3 | 1.5 |
Italy | -0.1 | 0.5 |
UK | 0.6 | 1.6 |
IVQ2018IIIQ2018 | IVQ2018/IVQ2017 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.1 | 2.5 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.8 | 0.3 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.4 |
Euro Area | 0.3 | 1.2 |
Germany | 0.2 | 0.9 CA 0.6 |
France | 0.4 | 1.2 |
Italy | -0.1 | 0.0 |
UK | 0.3 | 1.5 |
IQ2019/IV2018 | IQ2019/IQ2018 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.1 | 2.7 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.2 | 1.0 |
China | 1.4 AE 5.7 | 6.4 |
Euro Area | 0.4 | 1.3 |
Germany | 0.4 | 0.8 CA 0.9 |
France | 0.3 | 1.3 |
Italy | 0.1 | -0.1 |
UK | 0.6 | 2.1 |
IIQ2019/IQ2019 | IIQ2019/IIQ2018 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0 | 2.3 |
Japan | QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.3 | 1.0 |
China | 1.6 AE 6.6 | 6.2 |
Euro Area | 0.2 | 1.2 |
Germany | -0.1 | 0.0 CA 0.4 |
France | 0.3 | 1.4 |
Italy | 0.0 | -0.1 |
UK | -0.2 | 1.3 |
IIIQ2019/IIQ2019 | IIIQ2019/IIIQ2018 | |
USA | QOQ: 0.5 SAAR 1.9 | 2.0 |
China | 1.5 AE 6.1 | 6.0 |
France | 0.3 | 1.3 |
UK | 0.3 | 1.0 |
QOQ: Quarter relative to prior quarter; SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate
Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/related-sites.html
Table V-4 provides two types of data: growth of exports and imports in the latest available months and in the past 12 months; and contributions of net trade (exports less imports) to growth of real GDP.
- Japan. Japan provides the most worrisome data (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/valuation-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/global-financial-risk-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations_8763.html http://cmpass ocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and_4699.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real_25.html and for GDP http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html). In Sep 2019, Japan’s exports decreased 5.2 percent in 12 months while imports decreased 1.5 percent. The second part of Table V-4 shows that net trade added 0.8 percent in IQ2012, deducting 1.9 percent in IIQ2012. Net trade deducted 1.9 percent in IIIQ2012. Net traded deducted 0.4 percent in IVQ2012. Net trade added 1.5 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2013 but deducted 0.1 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 1.4 percentage points in IIIQ2013 and 2.2 percentage points in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Net trade added 4.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2014 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 1.5 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2014. Net trade contributed 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2015 and deducted 0.5-percentage points in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2015 and added 1.4 percentage points in IQ2016. Net trade contributed 0.5 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade added 1.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016 and contributed 1.4 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade contributed 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017 and deducted 1.0 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade contributed 2.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017 and deducted 0.2 percentage-point in IVQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018 and contributed 0.0 percentage points in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018 and deducted 1.6 percentage points in IVQ2018. Net trade contributed 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2019 with export contraction deducting 1.4 percent and import contraction contributing 3.2 percent. Net trade deducted 1.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2019.
- China. In Oct 2019, China exports decreased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier and imports decreased 6.4 percent.
- Germany. Germany’s exports increased 1.5 percent in the month of Sep 2019 and increased 4.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. Germany’s imports increased 1.3 percent in the month of Sep 2019 and increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to growth of GDP in IQ2012, contributed 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2012, contributed 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2012, deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2012, deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2013 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded deducted 0.0 percentage points from Germany’s GDP growth in IIIQ2013 and added 0.9 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2014 and added 0.8 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.5 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.8 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018 and deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.9 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2019.
- United Kingdom. Net trade contributed 0.7 percentage points in IIQ2013. In IIIQ2013, net trade deducted 1.7 percentage points from UK growth. Net trade contributed 0.1 percentage points to UK value added in IVQ2013. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to UK value added in IQ2014 and 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2014 and added 0.0 percentage points in IVQ2014. Net traded deducted 0.4 percentage points from growth in IQ2015. Net trade added 1.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.1-percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.8 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade added 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.33 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017 and contributed 0.01 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.11 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.14 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade added 0.07 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.90 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.70 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.73 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2018. Net trade deducted 2.86 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2019. Net trade contributed 2.60 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2019. Net trade contributed 1.22 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2019.
- France. France’s exports decreased 2.3 percent in Sep 2019 while imports decreased 1.8 percent. France’s exports increased 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019 and imports increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Net traded added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IIIQ2012 and 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IQ2013 and added 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 1.7 percentage points in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IVQ2013 and deducted 0.1 percentage points in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IIQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to France’s GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.6 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IIIQ2016 and added 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IQ2017 and added 0.9 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.6 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade added 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to GDP in IVQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP in IQ2019. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ219. Net trade deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2019.
- United States. US exports decreased 0.9 percent in Sep 2019 and goods exports decreased 1.2 percent in Jan-Sep 2019 relative to a year earlier. Imports decreased 1.7 percent in Sep 2019 and goods imports decreased 0.3 percent in Jan-Sep 2019 relative to a year earlier. Net trade added 0.27 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2012 and deducted 0.08 percentage points in IIIQ2012, adding 0.57 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade added 0.40 percentage points to US GDP growth in IQ2013 and deducted 0.33 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded subtracted 0.14 percentage points from US GDP growth in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 1.23 percentage points to US GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 1.11 percentage points from US GDP growth in IQ2014 and deducted 0.46 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade added 0.10 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2014. Net trade deducted 1.05 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 1.67 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.06 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 1.00 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.20 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.50 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.35 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade added 0.05 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.36 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.13 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.31 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.35 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.80 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.00 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade added 0.67 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 2.05 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018, deducting 0.35 percentage points in IVQ2018. Net trade added 0.73 percentage points in IQ2019, deducting 0.68 percentage points in IIQ2019. Net trade deducted 0.08 percentage points in IIIQ2019.
Industrial production decreased 0.4 percent in Sep 2019 and increased 0.8 percent in Aug 2019 after decreasing 0.2 percent in Jul 2019, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 27, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to the growth rates for total IP for recent years were small and positive, with the estimates for 2016 and 2017 a bit higher and the estimates for 2015 and 2018 slightly lower.[2] Total IP is still reported to have increased from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014 before declining in 2015 and rebounding in mid-2016. Subsequently, the index advanced around 7 1/2 percent over 2017 and 2018.
Capacity for total industry expanded modestly in each year from 2015 to 2017 before advancing 1 1/2 percent in 2018; it is expected to advance about 2 percent in 2019. Revisions for recent years were very small and showed slightly less expansion in most years relative to earlier reports.
In the fourth quarter of 2018, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 79.4 percent, about 3/4 percentage point above its previous estimate and about 1/2 percentage point below its long-run (1972–2018) average. The utilization rate in 2017 is also higher than its previous estimate.”
The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm):
“Industrial production fell back 0.4 percent in September after advancing 0.8 percent in August. For the third quarter, industrial production rose at an annual rate of 1.2 percent following declines of about 2 percent in both the first and the second quarters. Manufacturing production decreased 0.5 percent in September, with output reduced by a strike at a major manufacturer of motor vehicles. Excluding motor vehicles and parts, the overall index and the manufacturing index each moved down 0.2 percent. Mining production fell 1.3 percent, while utilities output rose 1.4 percent. At 109.5 percent of its 2012 average, total industrial production was 0.1 percent lower in September than it was a year earlier. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector decreased 0.4 percentage point in September to 77.5 percent, a rate that is 2.3 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2018) average.” In the six months ending in Sep 2019, United States national industrial production accumulated change of minus 0.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of minus 0.2 percent, which is lower than growth of minus 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. Excluding growth of 0.8 percent in Aug 2019, growth in the remaining five months from Apr 2019 to Sep 2019 accumulated to minus 0.9 percent or minus 2.1 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production increased 0.8 percent in one of the past six months, increased 0.2 percent in one month, 0.1 percent in one month, minus 0.6 minus in one month, minus 0.4 percent in one month, and minus 0.2 percent in one month. Industrial production increased at annual equivalent 0.8 percent in the most recent quarter from Jul 2019 to Sep 2019 and decreased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in the prior quarter from Apr to Jun 2019. Business equipment accumulated change of minus 1.0 percent in the six months from Apr 2018 to Sep 2019, at the annual equivalent rate of minus 2.0 percent, which is lower than growth of minus 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): ” Capacity utilization for the industrial sector decreased 0.4 percentage point in September to 77.5 percent, a rate that is 2.3 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2018) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration and weakening growth in past months. There could be renewed growth with oscillations.
Manufacturing decreased 22.3 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 19.7 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2018. Manufacturing grew 21.3 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Sep 2019. Manufacturing in Sep 2019 is lower by 5.7 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2019 would have accumulated to 41.5 percent. GDP in IIIQ2019 would be $22,303.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3190.7 billion than actual $19,112.5 billion. There are more than three trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 18.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 10.6 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html). US GDP in IIQ2019 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,112.5 billion in IIIQ2019 or 21.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.7 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.0 percent per year from Sep 1919 to Sep 2019. Growth at 3.0 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 153.2712 in Sep 2019. The actual index NSA in Sep 2019 is 105.8717 which is 30.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output (SIC, Standard Industrial Classification) from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 158.5996 in Sep 2019. The actual index NSA in Sep 2019 is 105.8717, which is 33.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Sep 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 136.6707 in Sep 2019. The output of manufacturing at 105.8717 in Sep 2019 is 22.5 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Using the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), manufacturing output fell from the high of 110.5147 in Jun 2007 to the low of 86.3800 in Apr 2009 or 21.8 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased from 86.3800 in Apr 2009 to 106.8222 in Sep 2019 or 23.7 percent. The NAICS manufacturing index increased at the annual equivalent rate of 3.5 percent from Dec 1986 to Dec 2006. Growth at 3.5 percent would increase the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 159.8169 in Sep 2019. The NAICS index at 106.8222 in Sep 2019 is 33.2 below trend. The NAICS manufacturing output index grew at 1.7 percent annual equivalent from Dec 1999 to Dec 2006. Growth at 1.7 percent would raise the NAICS manufacturing output index from 106.6777 in Dec 2007 to 130.0453 in Sep 2019. The NAICS index at 106.8222 in Sep 2019 is 17.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 86.9 percent in IIQ2019. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Oct 2019, there were 152.962 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 129.941 million NSA in Oct 2019 accounted for 85.0 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 152.962 million, of which 12.820 million, or 9.9 percent of total private jobs and 8.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 108.661 million NSA in Oct 2019, or 71.0 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.6 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 9.3 percent in US national income in IIQ2019 and durable goods 5.6 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.
Table V-4, Growth of Trade and Contributions of Net Trade to GDP Growth, ∆% and % Points
Exports | Exports 12 M ∆% | Imports | Imports 12 M ∆% | |
USA | -0.9 Sep | -1.2 Jan-Sep | -1.7 Sep | -0.3 Jan-Sep |
Japan | Sep 2019 -5.2 Aug 2019 -8.2 Jul 2019 -1.6 Jun 2019 -6.7 May 2019 -7.8 Apr 2019 -2.4 Mar 2019 -2.4 Feb 2019 -1.2 Jan 2019 -8.4 Dec 2018 -3.8 Nov 2018 0.1 Oct 2018 8.2 Sep 2018 -1.2 Aug 2018 6.6 Jul 2018 3.9 Jun 2018 6.7 May 2018 8.1 Apr 2018 7.8 Mar 2018 2.1 Feb 2018 1.8 Jan 2018 12.2 Dec 2017 9.3 Nov 2017 16.2 Oct 2017 14.0 Sep 2017 14.1 Aug 2017 18.1 Jul 2017 13.4 Jun 2017 9.7 May 2017 14.9 Apr 2017 7.5 Mar 2017 12.0 Feb 2017 11.3 Jan 2017 1.3 Dec 2016 5.4 Nov 2016 -0.4 Oct 2016 -10.3 Sep 2016 -6.9 Aug 2016 9.6 Jul 2016 -14.0 Jun 2016 -7.8 May 2016 -11.3 Apr 2016 -10.1 Mar 2016 -6.8 Feb 2016 -4.0 Jan 2016 -12.9 Dec 2015 -8.0 Nov 2015 -3.3 Oct 2015 -2.1 Sep 2015 0.6 Aug 3.1 Jul 2015 7.6 Jun 2015 9.5 May 2015 2.4 Apr 8.0 Mar 8.5 Feb 2.4 Jan 17.0 Dec 12.9 Nov 4.9 Oct 9.6 Sep 6.9 Aug -1.3 Jul 3.9 Jun -2.0 May 2014 -2.7 Apr 2014 5.1 Mar 2014 1.8 Feb 2014 9.5 Jan 2014 9.5 Dec 2013 15.3 Nov 2013 18.4 Oct 2013 18.6 Sep 2013 11.5 Aug 2013 14.7 Jul 2013 12.2 Jun 2013 7.4 May 2013 10.1 Apr 2013 3.8 Mar 2013 1.1 Feb 2013 -2.9 Jan 2013 6.4 Dec -5.8 Nov -4.1 Oct -6.5 Sep -10.3 Aug -5.8 Jul -8.1 | Sep 2019 -1.5 Aug 2019 -12.0 Jul 2019 -1.2 Jun 2019 -5.2 May 2019 -1.5 Apr 2019 6.4 Mar 2019 1.1 Feb 2019 -6.7 Jan 2019 -0.6 Dec 2018 1.9 Nov 2018 12.5 Oct 2018 19.9 Sep 2018 7.0 Aug 2018 15.4 Jul 2018 14.6 Jun 2018 2.5 May 2018 14.0 Apr 2018 5.9 Mar 2018 -0.6 Feb 2018 16.6 Jan 2018 7.9 Dec 2017 14.9 Nov 2017 17.2 Oct 2017 18.9 Sep 2017 12.0 Aug 2017 15.2 Jul 2017 16.3 Jun 2017 15.5 May 2017 17.8 Apr 2017 15.1 Mar 2017 15.8 Feb 2017 1.2 Jan 2017 8.5 Dec 2016 -2.6 Nov 2016 -8.8 Oct 2016 -16.5 Sep 2016 -16.3 Aug 2016 -17.3 Jul 2016 -24.7 Jun 2016 -18.8 May 2016 -13.8 Apr 2016 -23.3 Mar 2016 -14.9 Feb 2016 -14.2 Jan 2016 -18.0 Dec 2015 -18.0 Nov 2015 -10.2 Oct 2015 -13.4 Sep 2015 -11.1 Aug -3.1 Jul 2015 -3.2 Jun 2015 -2.9 May 2015 -8.7 Apr -4.2 Mar -14.5 Feb -3.6 Jan -9.0 Dec 1.9 Nov -1.7 Oct 2.7 Sep 6.2 Aug -1.5 Jul 2.3 Jun 8.4 May 2014 -3.6 Apr 2013 3.4 Mar 2014 18.1 Feb 2014 9.0 Jan 2014 25.0 Dec 2013 24.7 Nov 2013 21.1 Oct 2013 26.1 Sep 2013 16.5 Aug 2013 16.0 Jul 2013 19.6 Jun 2013 11.8 May 2013 10.0 Apr 2013 9.4 Mar 2013 5.5 Feb 2013 7.3 Jan 2013 7.3 Dec 1.9 Nov 0.8 Oct -1.6 Sep 4.1 Aug -5.4 Jul 2.1 | ||
China | Jan-Dec 9.9 Jan-Dec 2017 7.9 Jan-Dec 2016 -7.7 Jan-Dec 2015 -2.8 | 2019 Oct -0.9 Sep -3.2 Aug -1.0 Jul 3.3 Jun -1.3 May 1.1 Apr -2.7 Mar 14.2 Feb -20.7 Jan 9.3 2018 Dec -4.4 Nov 5.4 Oct 15.6 Sep 14.5 Aug 9.8 Jul 12.2 Jun 11.3 May 12.6 Apr 12.9 Mar -2.7 Feb 44.5 Jan 11.1 2017 Dec 10.9 Nov 12.3 Oct 6.9 Sep 8.1 Aug 5.5 Jul 7.2 Jun 11.3 May 8.7 Apr 8.0 Mar 16.4 Feb -1.3 Jan 7.9 2016 Dec 3.1 Nov 0.1 Oct -7.3 Sep -10.0 Aug -2.8 Jul -4.4 Jun -4.8 May -4.1 Apr -1.8 Mar 11.5 Feb -25.4 Jan -11.2 2015 -1.4 Dec -6.8 Nov -6.9 Oct -3.7 Sep -5.5 Aug -8.3 Jul 2.8 Jun -2.5 May -6.4 Apr -15.0 Mar 48.3 Feb -3.3 Jan 2014 9.7 Dec 4.7 Nov 11.6 Oct 15.3 Sep 9.4 Aug 14.5 Jul 7.2 Jun 7.0 May 0.9 Apr -6.6 Mar -18.1 Feb 10.6 Jan 2013 4.3 Dec 12.7 Nov 5.6 Oct -0.3 Sep 7.2 Aug 5.1 Jul -3.1 Jun 1.0 May 14.7 Apr 10.0 Mar 21.8 Feb 25.0 Jan | Jan-Dec 15.8 Jan-Dec 2017 15.9 Jan-Dec 2016 -5.5 Jan-Dec 2015 -14.1 | 2019 Oct -6.4 Sep -8.5 Aug -5.6 Jul -5.3 Jun -7.3 May -8.5 Apr 4.0 Mar -7.6 Feb -5.2 Jan -1.5 2018 Dec -7.6 Nov 3.0 Oct 21.4 Sep 14.3 Aug 20.0 Jul 27.3 Jun 14.1 May 26.0 Apr 21.5 Mar 14.4 Feb 6.3 Jan 36.9 2017 Dec 4.5 Nov 17.7 Oct 17.2 Sep 18.7 Aug 13.3 Jul 11.0 Jun 17.2 May 14.8 Apr 11.9 Mar 20.3 Feb 38.1 Jan 16.7 2016 Dec -7.7 Nov 6.7 Oct -1.4 Sep -1.9 Aug 1.5 Jul -12.5 Jun -2.8 May -0.4 Apr -10.6 Mar -7.6 Feb -13.8 Jan -18.8 2015 -7.6 Dec -8.7 Nov -18.8 Oct -20.4 Sep -13.8 Aug -8.1 Jul -6.1 Jun -17.6 May -12.7 Mar -20.5 Feb -19.9 Jan 2014 -2.4 Dec -6.7 Nov 4.6 Oct 7.0 Sep -2.4 Aug -1.6 Jul 5.5 Jun -1.6 May -0.8 Apr -11.3 Mar 10.1 Feb 10.0 Jan 2013 8.3 Dec 5.3 Nov 7.6 Oct 7.4 Sep 7.0 Aug 10.9 Jul -0.7 Jun -0.3 May 16.8 Apr 14.1 Mar -15.2 Feb 28.8 Jan |
Euro Area | 5.2 12-Sep 19 | 2.9 Jan-Sep 19 | 2.1 12-Sep 19 | 2.7 Jan-Sep 19 |
Germany | 1.5 Sep CSA | 4.6 Sep | 1.3 Sep CSA | 2.3 Sep |
France Sep | -2.3 | 1.5 | -1.8 | 1.2 |
Italy Sep | 1.2 | 6.2 | -0.2 | 2.1 |
UK | 1.1 Sep | 3.0 | 3.9 Sep | 5.7 |
Net Trade % Points GDP Growth | Points | |||
USA | IIIQ2019 -0.08 IIQ2019 -0.68 IQ2019 0.73 IVQ 2018 -0.35 IIIQ 2018 -2.05 IIQ2018 0.67 IQ2018 0.00 IVQ2017 -0.80 IIIQ2017 0.35 IIQ2017 -0.31 IQ2017 0.13 IVQ2016 -1.36 IIIQ2016 0.05 IIQ2016 0.35 IQ2016 -0.50 IVQ2015 -0.20 IIIQ2015 -1.00 IIQ2015 0.06 IQ2015 -1.67 IVQ2014 -1.05 IIIQ2014 0.10 IIQ2014 -0.46 IQ2014 -1.11 IVQ2013 1.23 IIIQ2013 -0.14 IIQ2013 -0.33 IQ2013 0.40 IVQ2012 +0.57 IIIQ2012 -0.08 IIQ2012 0.27 IQ2012 0.00 | |||
Japan | 0.8 IQ2012 -1.9 IIQ2012 -1.9 IIIQ2012 -0.4 IVQ2012 1.5 IQ2013 -0.1 IIQ2013 -1.4 IIIQ2013 -2.2 IVQ2013 -0.7 IQ2014 4.0 IIQ2014 -0.3 IIIQ2014 1.5 IVQ2014 0.2 IQ2015 -0.5 IIQ2015 -0.6 IIIQ2015 0.0 IVQ2015 1.4 IQ2016 0.5 IIQ2016 1.3 IIIQ2016 1.4 IVQ2016 0.4 IQ2017 -1.0 IIQ2017 2.1 IIIQ2017 -0.2 IVQ2017 0.4 IQ2018 -0.0 IIQ2018 -0.7 IIIQ2018 -1.6 IVQ2018 1.7 IQ2019 -1.2 IIQ2019 | |||
Germany | IQ2012 0.8 IIQ2012 0.3 IIIQ2012 0.4 IVQ2012 -0.5 IQ2013 -0.3 IIQ2013 -0.3 IIIQ2013 0.0 IVQ2013 0.9 IQ2014 -0.2 IIQ2014 -0.2 IIIQ2014 0.8 IVQ2014 0.1 IQ2015 -0.5 IIQ2015 0.8 IIIQ2015 -0.3 IVQ2015 -0.7 IQ2016 -0.3 IIQ2016 0.7 IIIQ2016 -0.3 IVQ2016 -0.5 IQ2017 0.7 IIQ2017 -0.2 IIIQ2017 0.4 IVQ2017 0.2 IQ2018 0.0 IIQ2018 -0.2 IIIQ2018 -0.9 IVQ2018 0.0 IQ2019 0.2 | |||
France | 0.1 IIIQ2012 0.1 IVQ2012 -0.1 IQ2013 0.3 IIQ2013 -1.7 IIIQ2013 0.1 IVQ2013 -0.1 IQ2014 -0.2 IIQ2014 -0.2 IIIQ2014 0.2 IVQ2014 -0.2 IQ2015 0.4 IIQ2015 -0.6 IIIQ2015 -0.7 IVQ2015 -0.1 IQ2016 0.3 IIQ2016 -0.6 IIIQ2016 0.1 IVQ2016 -0.6 IQ2017 0.9 IIQ2017 -0.3 IIIQ2017 0.6 IVQ2017 0.0 IQ2018 0.0 IIQ2018 0.3 IIIQ2018 0.2 IVQ2018 -0.3 IQ2019 0.0 IIQ2019 -0.4 IIIQ2019 | |||
UK | 0.7 IIQ2013 -1.7 IIIQ2013 0.1 IVQ2013 0.8 IQ2014 0.3 IIQ2014 -0.7 IIIQ2014 0.0 IVQ2014 -0.4 IQ2015 1.1 IIQ2015 -0.4 IIIQ2015 -0.2 IVQ2015 -0.1 IQ2016 0.1 IIQ2016 -1.8 IIIQ2016 1.7 IVQ2016 0.33 IQ2017 0.01 IIQ2017 | |||
0.11 | ||||
IIIQ2017 -0.14 IVQ2017 0.07 IQ2018 -0.90 IIQ2018 0.70 IIIQ2018 -0.73 IVQ2018 -2.86 IQ2019 2.60 IIQ2019 1.22 IIIQ2019 |
Sources: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/related-sites.html
The geographical breakdown of exports and imports of Japan with selected regions and countries is in Table V-5 for Sep 2019. The share of Asia in Japan’s trade is close to one-half for 54.1 percent of exports and 49.1 percent of imports. Within Asia, exports to China are 18.5 percent of total exports and imports from China 24.9 percent of total imports. While exports of Japan to China decreased 6.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019, imports from China decreased 1.0 percent. The largest export market for Japan in Sep 2019 is the US with share of 18.6 percent of total exports, which is close to that of China, and share of imports from the US of 11.6 percent in total imports. Japan’s exports to the US decreased 7.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019 and imports from the US decreased 11.6 percent. Western Europe has share of 11.8 percent in Japan’s exports and of 13.9 percent in imports. Rates of growth of exports of Japan in Sep 2019 are minus 7.9 percent for exports to the US, 4.0 percent for exports to Brazil and minus 1.5 percent for exports to Germany. Comparisons relative to 2011 may have some bias because of the effects of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Deceleration of growth in China and the US and threat of recession in Europe can reduce world trade and economic activity. Growth rates of imports in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019 are mixed. Imports from Asia increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019 while imports from China decreased 1.0 percent. Data are in millions of yen, which may have effects of recent depreciation of the yen relative to the United States dollar (USD) and revaluation of the dollar relative to the euro with multiple oscillations.
Table V-5, Japan, Value and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, ∆% and Millions of Yen
Sep 2019 | Exports | 12 months ∆% | Imports Millions of Yen | 12 months ∆% |
Total | 6,368,496 | -5.2 | 6,491,476 | -1.5 |
Asia | 3,446,008 % Total 54.1 | -7.8 | 3,185,082 % Total 49.1 | 0.3 |
China | 1,177,058 % Total 18.5 | -6.7 | 1,618,126 % Total 24.9 | -1.0 |
USA | 1,187,404 % Total 18.6 | -7.9 | 623,280 % Total 9.6 | -11.6 |
Canada | 64,790 | -6.3 | 110,610 | 21.3 |
Brazil | 34,661 | 4.0 | 79,961 | 41.1 |
Mexico | 94,458 | -10.9 | 48,575 | -1.6 |
Western Europe | 748,643 % Total 11.8 | 3.4 | 902,871 % Total 13.9 | 12.4 |
Germany | 188,095 | -1.5 | 247,484 | 9.8 |
France | 59,039 | -4.3 | 108,027 | -4.0 |
UK | 108,819 | -13.6 | 75,077 | 13.3 |
Middle East | 220,099 | 8.5 | 689,707 | -13.6 |
Australia | 146,221 | -8.4 | 416,284 | -3.3 |
Source: Japan, Ministry of Finance http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm
World trade projections of the IMF are in Table V-6. There is decreasing growth of the volume of world trade of goods and services from 3.6 percent in 2018 to 1.1 percent in 2019, stabilizing to 3.2 percent in 2020. Growth stabilizes at 3.3 percent on average from 2018 to 2024. World trade would be slower for advanced economies while emerging and developing economies (EMDE) experience faster growth. World economic slowdown would be more challenging with lower growth of world trade.
Table V-6, IMF, Projections of World Trade, USD Billions, USD/Barrel and Annual ∆%
2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Average ∆% 2018-2024 | |
World Trade Volume (Goods and Services) | 3.6 | 1.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
Exports Goods & Services | 3.4 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 3.5 |
Imports Goods & Services | 3.8 | 1.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
Exports Goods & Services | ||||
G7 | 2.6 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 2.5 |
EMDE | 3.9 | 1.9 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
Imports Goods & Services | ||||
G7 | 3.2 | 1.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
EMDE | 5.1 | 0.7 | 4.3 | 4.3 |
Terms of Trade Goods & Services | ||||
G7 | -0.7 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
EMDE | 1.5 | -1.3 | -1.1 | -0.2 |
World Crude Oil Price $/Barrel | 68.3 | 61.8 | 57.9 | 58.3 |
Crude Oil: Simple Average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate and the Dubai Fateh
Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook databank
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx
The JP Morgan Global Composite Output Index of the JP Morgan Manufacturing and Services PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and HIS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, with high association with world GDP, decreased to 50.8 in Oct from 51.1 in Aug, indicating expansion at slower rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/107d07e6e4d9436a9de1ab79d654ea54). This index has remained above the contraction territory of 50.0 during 85 consecutive months. The employment index decreased from 50.3 in Sep to 49.8 in Oct with input prices rising at faster rate, new orders increasing at slower rate and output increasing at slower rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/107d07e6e4d9436a9de1ab79d654ea54). Olya Borichevska, from Global Economic Research at JP Morgan, finds slowing growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/107d07e6e4d9436a9de1ab79d654ea54). The JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and IHS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, increased to 49.8 in Oct from 49.7 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/f211439278174b239f65c3a6051a2db6). New export orders decreased. The Markit Brazil Composite Output Index increased from 51.9 in Aug to 52.5 in Sep, indicating expansion in activity of Brazil’s private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/7db6e623018043ddae0a4f771e7e37c9). The Markit Brazil Services Business Activity index, compiled by Markit, decreased from 51.8 in Sep to 51.2 in Oct indicating expanding services activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ffabb4e51d0d40f4bf2d7d041e683ef2). Pollyanna De Lima, Principal Economist at Markit, finds expanding activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ffabb4e51d0d40f4bf2d7d041e683ef2). The HIS Markit Brazil Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ IndexTM (PMI™) decreased from 53.4 in Sep to 52.2 in Oct, indicating manufacturing above neutral 50.0 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/91b86f41b5ab4c539282ce3411fbeab8). Pollyanna De Lima, Principal Economist at Markit, finds stronger manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/91b86f41b5ab4c539282ce3411fbeab8).
VA United States. The HIS Markit Flash US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) seasonally adjusted increased to 51.0 in Sep from 50.3 in Aug (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a37ed6d3c08e4ce4a68711ffaba8423d). New export orders decreased. The HIS Markit Flash US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index increased from 50.7 in Aug to 50.9 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a37ed6d3c08e4ce4a68711ffaba8423d). The IHS Markit Flash US Composite PMI™ Output Index increased from 50.7 in Aug to 51.0 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a37ed6d3c08e4ce4a68711ffaba8423d). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the surveys are consistent with quarterly GDP growth at annualized around 1.5 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a37ed6d3c08e4ce4a68711ffaba8423d). The HIS Markit US Composite PMI™ Output Index of Manufacturing and Services decreased to 50.9 in Oct from 51.0 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/2bdcabcf5f9b4ebbbf353622934d584f). The HIS Markit US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index decreased from 50.9 in Sep to 50.6 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/2bdcabcf5f9b4ebbbf353622934d584f). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds the indexes suggesting growth close to annualized below 1.5 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/2bdcabcf5f9b4ebbbf353622934d584f). The HIS Markit US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) increased to 51.3 in Oct from 51.1 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9da0cc4fff534c799b83ca979f389627). New foreign orders increased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at HIS Markit, finds improving growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9da0cc4fff534c799b83ca979f389627). The purchasing managers’ index (PMI) of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Report on Business® increased 0.5-percentage points from 47.8 in Sep to 48.3 in Oct, which indicates contracting growth (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/MfgROB.cfm). The index of new export orders increased 9.4 percentage points from 41.0 in Sep to 50.4 in Oct. The Non-Manufacturing ISM Report on Business® PMI increased 2.1 percentage points from 52.6 in Sep to 54.7 in Oct, indicating growth of business activity/production during 117 consecutive months, while the index of new orders increased 1.9 percentage points from 53.7 in Sep to 55.6 in Oct (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/NonMfgROB.cfm). Table USA provides the country economic indicators for the US.
Table USA, US Economic Indicators
Consumer Price Index | Oct 12 months NSA ∆%: 1.8; Ex food and energy ∆%: 2.3 Oct month SA ∆%: 0.4; Ex food and energy ∆%: 0.2 WIW 10/20/19 |
Producer Price Index | Finished Goods Oct 12-month NSA ∆%: -0.2; ex food and energy ∆% 1.6 Final Demand Oct 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.1; ex food and energy ∆% 1.6 Oct month SA ∆% 0.4; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.3 WIW 10/20/19 |
PCE Inflation | Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: headline 1.4 ex food and energy ∆% 1.7 |
Employment Situation | Household Survey: Oct Unemployment Rate SA 3.6% |
Nonfarm Hiring | Nonfarm Hiring fell from 64.9 million in 2006 to 59.0 million in 2014 or by 5.9 million and to 63.7 million in 2016 or by 1.2 million. Nonfarm hiring increased to 68.9 million in 2018 or 4.0 million relative to 2006 while population grew 28.976 million. |
GDP Growth | BEA Revised National Income Accounts IIQ2012/IIQ2011 2.4 IIIQ2012/IIIQ2011 2.5 IVQ2012/IVQ2011 1.5 IQ2013/IQ2012 1.6 IIQ2013/IIQ2012 1.3 IIIQ2013/IIIQ2012 1.9 IVQ2013/IVQ2012 2.6 IQ2014/IQ2013 1.4 IIQ2014/IIQ2013 2.7 IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013 3.1 IVQ2014/IVQ2013 2.9 IQ2015/IQ2014 4.0 IIQ2015/IIQ2014 3.4 IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014 2.4 IVQ2015/IVQ2014 1.9 IQ2016/IQ2015 1.6 IIQ2016/IIQ2015 1.3 IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015 1.6 IVQ2016/IVQ2015 2.0 IQ2017/IQ2016 2.1 IIQ2017/IIQ2016 2.2 IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016 2.4 IVQ2017/IVQ2016 2.8 IQ2018/IQ2017 2.9 IIQ2018/IIQ2017 3.2 IIIQ2018/IIIQ2017: 3.1 IVQ2018/IVQ2017 2.5 IQ2019/IQ2018 2.7 IIQ2019/IIQ2018 2.3 IIIQ2019/IIIQ2019 2.0 IQ2012 SAAR 3.2 IIQ2012 SAAR 1.7 IIIQ2012 SAAR 0.5 IVQ2012 SAAR 0.5 IQ2013 SAAR 3.6 IIQ2013 SAAR 0.5 IIIQ2013 SAAR 3.2 IVQ2013 SAAR 3.2 IQ2014 SAAR -1.1 IIQ2014 SAAR 5.5 IIIQ2014 SAAR 5.0 IVQ2014 SAAR 2.3 IQ2015 SAAR 3.2 IIQ2015 SAAR: 3.0 IIIQ2015 SAAR: 1.3 IVQ2015 SAAR: 0.1 IQ2016 SAAR: 2.0 IIQ2016 SAAR: 1.9 IIIQ2016 SAAR: 2.2 IVQ2016 SAAR 2.0 IQ2017 SAAR 2.3 IIQ2017 SAAR 2.2 IIIQ2017 SAAR 3.2 IVQ2017 SAAR 3.5 IQ2018 SAAR 2.5 IIQ2018 SAAR 3.5 IIIQ2018 SAAR 2.9 IVQ2018 SAAR 1.1 IQ2019 SAAR 3.1 IIQ2019 SAAR 2.0 IIIQ2019 SAAR 1.9 |
Real Private Fixed Investment | SAAR IIQ2019 ∆% -1.3 IVQ2007 to IIQ2019: ∆%26.5 Blog 9/29/19 |
Corporate Profits | IIQ2019 SAAR: Corporate Profits 3.8; Undistributed Profits 9.4 Blog 9/29/19 |
Personal Income and Consumption | Sep month ∆% SA Real Disposable Personal Income (RDPI) SA ∆% 0.3 |
Quarterly Services Report | IIQ19/IIQ18 NSA ∆%: Financial & Insurance 6.8 Earlier Data: |
Employment Cost Index | Compensation Private IIIQ2019 SA ∆%: 0.8 Sep 12 months ∆%: 2.7 Earlier Data: |
Industrial Production | Sep month SA ∆%: -0.4 Manufacturing Sep SA -0.5 ∆% Sep 12 months SA ∆% minus 0.9, NSA minus 1.0 |
Productivity and Costs | Nonfarm Business Productivity IIQ2019∆% SAAE 2.3; IIQ2019/IIQ2018 ∆% 1.8; Unit Labor Costs SAAE IIQ2019 ∆% 2.6; IIQ2019/IIQ2018 ∆%: 2.6 Blog 9/22/19 |
New York Fed Manufacturing Index | General Business Conditions from Sep 2.0 to Oct 4.0 |
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Index | General Index from Sep 12.0 to Oct 5.6 |
Manufacturing Shipments and Orders | Sep Orders SA ∆% -0.6 Ex Transport -0.1 Jan-Sep 19/Jan-Sep 18 NSA New Orders ∆% -0.3 Ex transport 0.4 Earlier data: |
Durable Goods | Sep New Orders SA ∆%: -1.1; ex transport ∆%: -0.3 Earlier Data: |
Sales of New Motor Vehicles | IIQ2018 4,500,220; IIQ2017 4,419,349. Sep 19 Total Light Vehicles NSA 1270.0 thousand decreasing 11.3% from 1432.1 thousand in Sep 2018. Sep 19 SAAR 17.2 million, Aug 19 SAAR 17.0 million, Sep 18 SAAR 17.3 million Blog 9/9/18 12/9/18 10/6/19 |
Sales of Merchant Wholesalers | Jan-Sep 2019/Jan-Sep 2018 NSA ∆%: Total 0.9; Durable Goods: 0.8; Nondurable EARLIER DATA: |
Sales and Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers | Sep 19 12-M NSA ∆%: Sales Total Business 1.5; Manufacturers -0.5 |
Sales for Retail and Food Services | Jan-Oct 2019/Jan-Oct 2018 ∆%: Retail and Food Services 3.4; Retail ∆% 3.3 |
Value of Construction Put in Place | SAAR month SA Sep ∆%: 0.5 Jan-Sep 19/Jan-Sep 18 NSA: minus 2.2 Earlier Data: |
Case-Shiller Home Prices | National Aug ∆% SA 0.3 National Aug 12M ∆% 3.2 |
FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only | Aug SA ∆% 0.2; |
New House Sales | Sep month SAAR ∆%: -0.7 |
Housing Starts and Permits | Sep Starts month SA ∆% -9.4; Permits ∆%: -2.7 Earlier Data: |
Rate of Homeownership | IIIQ2019 64.8 IIQ2019: 64.1 Blog 11/3/19 |
Trade Balance | Balance Sep SA -$52,450 million versus Aug -$55,036 million |
Export and Import Prices | Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: Imports -1.6; Exports -1.6 Earlier Data: |
International Terms of Trade | IIIQ2019 110.158 IVQ1947 150.474 2018 108.690 1929 142.590 Blog 11/3/19 |
Consumer Credit | Aug ∆% annual rate: Total 5.2; Revolving -2.2 Nonrevolving 7.8 Earlier Data: |
Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities | Aug Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term US Securities: $65.4 billion |
Treasury Budget | Fiscal Year 2020/2019 ∆% Oct: Receipts -2.8; Outlays 7.6 Individual Income Taxes minus 1.9 Deficit Fiscal Year 2012 $1,087 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2013 $680 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2014 $485 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2015 $439 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2016 $585 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2017 $665 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2018 $779 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2019 $984 billion Blog 11/17/19 |
CBO Budget and Economic Outlook | 2012 Deficit $1087 B 6.8% GDP Debt $11,281 B 70.4% GDP 2013 Deficit $680 B, 4.1% GDP Debt $11,983 B 72.6% GDP 2014 Deficit $485 B 2.8% GDP Debt $12,780 B 74.1% GDP 2015 Deficit $438 B 2.4% GDP Debt $13,117 B 72.9% GDP 2016 Deficit $585 3.2% GDP Debt $14,168.4 B 76.7% GDP 2017 Deficit $665 3.5% GDP Debt $14,665 76.5% GDP 2028 Deficit $1,526 B, 5.1 % GDP Debt $28,671 B 96.2% GDP 2048: Long-term Debt/GDP 152.0% Blog 8/26/12 11/18/12 2/10/13 9/22/13 2/16/14 8/24/14 9/14/14 3/1/15 6/21/15 1/3/16 4/10/16 7/24/16 1/8/17 4/2/17 10/14/18 |
Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities | Sep 2019 SAAR ∆%: Securities 21.0 Loans 2.2 Cash Assets -36.6 Deposits 7.9 Blog 10/20/19 |
Flow of Funds Net Worth of Families and Nonprofits | IIQ2019 ∆ since 2007 Assets +$44,566.4 BN Nonfinancial +$8,434.2 BN Real estate +$6,925.6 BN Financial +$36,132.3 BN Net Worth +$42,862.4 BN Net Worth IVQ2018/IIIQ2018 ∆% -3.5 Corporate Equity ∆% -16.1 Blog 9/29/19 |
Current Account Balance of Payments and Net International Investment Position | Current Account IIQ2019 NSA minus $138,326 MM % GDP 2.4 SA Minus $10,055 B Blog 9/23/2018 2/10/2018 3/31/2019 7/7/2019 9/29/2019 11/3/2019 |
Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation | Blog 10/27/19 |
Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades | Blog 10/27/19 |
IMF View | World Real Economic Growth 2020 ∆% 3.4 Blog 11/3/19 |
Income, Poverty and Health Insurance in the United States | 43.123 Million Below Poverty in 2015, 13.5% of Population Median Family Income CPI-2015 Adjusted $56,516 in 2015 back to 1999 Levels Uncovered by Health Insurance 28.966 Million in 2015 Blog 9/25/16 |
Monetary Policy and Cyclical Valuation of Risk Financial Assets | Blog 1/7/2018 |
Rules versus Discretionary Authorities in Monetary Policy | Blog 1/1/2017 |
Links to blog comments in Table USA: 11/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/13/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
9/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/revaluation-of-us-dollar-falling-yields.html
8/25/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
8/11/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
6/30/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
6/23/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html
6/16/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
4/21/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html
12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html
11/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
1/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html
12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html
12/24/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html
10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html
4/2/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html
1/15/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html
1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html
12/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
10/16/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html
9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html
7/24/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html
4/10/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html
1/17/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html
1/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html
10/11/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html
6/21/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html
5/10/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html
4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html
3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html
2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html
9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html
8/24/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html
2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html
9/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html
2/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html
Table VA-1 provides the value of total sales of US business (manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers) and monthly and 12-month percentage changes. Sales of manufacturers decreased 0.2 percent in Sep and decreased 0.3 percent in Aug, decreasing 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019. Sales of retailers decreased 0.5 percent in Sep and increased 0.6 percent in Aug, increasing 3.6 percent in 12 months. Sales of merchant wholesalers changed 0.0 percent in Sep, decreasing 0.1 percent in Aug and increasing 1.8 percent in 12 months. Total business sales decreased 0.2 percent in Sep and increased 0.1 percent in Aug, increasing 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2019.
Table VA-1, US, Percentage Changes for Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers
Sep 19/Aug 19 | Sep 2019 | Aug 19/ Jul 19 ∆% SA | Sep 19/ Sep 18 | |
Total Business | -0.2 | 1,446,291 | 0.1 | 1.5 |
Manufacturers | -0.2 | 514,561 | -0.3 | -0.5 |
Retailers | -0.5 | 433,733 | 0.6 | 3.6 |
Merchant Wholesalers | 0.0 | 495,997 | -0.1 | 1.8 |
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/
Chart VA-1, US, Total Business Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, SA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Sep 2019
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/
Chart VA-2 of the US Census Bureau provides total US sales of manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers not seasonally adjusted (NSA) in millions of dollars. The series without seasonal adjustment shows sharp jagged behavior because of monthly fluctuations following seasonal patterns. There is sharp recovery from the global recession in a robust trend, which is mixture of price and quantity effects because data are not adjusted for price changes. There is stability in the final segment with monthly marginal weakness in data without adjustment for price changes with following recovery.
Chart VA-2, US, Total Business Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, NSA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Sep 2019
Source: US Census Bureau
Businesses added cautiously to inventories to replenish stocks. Retailers’ inventories increased 0.2 percent in Sep 2019 and decreased 0.2 percent in
Aug with growth of 3.7 percent in 12 months, as shown in Table VA-2. Total business changed inventories 0.0 percent in Sep, decreasing 0.1 percent in Aug and increasing 3.6 percent in 12 months. Inventories sales/ratios of total business continued at a level close to 1.30 under careful management to avoid costs and risks, changing to 1.40 in Sep 2019. Inventory/sales ratios of manufacturers and retailers are higher than for merchant wholesalers. There is stability in inventory/sales ratios in individual months and relative to a year earlier with increase at the margin.
Inventory Change | Sep 19 | Sep 19/Aug 19 ∆% SA | Aug 19/ Jul 19 ∆% SA | Sep 19/Sep 18 ∆% NSA |
Total Business | 2,036,042 | 0.0 | -0.1 | 3.6 |
Manufacturers | 698,015 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 2.5 |
Retailers | 666,223 | 0.2 | -0.2 | 3.7 |
Merchant | 671,804 | -0.4 | 0.1 | 4.9 |
Inventory/ | Sep 19 | Sep 2019 SA | Aug 2019 SA | Sep 2018 SA |
Total Business | 2,035,042 | 1.40 | 1.40 | 1.36 |
Manufacturers | 698,015 | 1.39 | 1.39 | 1.34 |
Retailers | 666,223 | 1.45 | 1.44 | 1.45 |
Merchant Wholesalers | 671,804 | 1.36 | 1.36 | 1.29 |
US Census Bureau
Chart VA-3 of the US Census Bureau provides total business inventories of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers seasonally adjusted (SA) in millions of dollars from Jan 1992 to Sep 2019. The impact of the two recessions of 2001 and IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 is evident in the form of sharp reductions in inventories. Inventories have surpassed the peak before the global recession. Data are not adjusted for price changes.
Chart VA-3, US, Total Business Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, SA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Sep 2019
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/
Chart VA-4 provides total business inventories of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers not seasonally adjusted (NSA) from Jan 1992 to Sep 2019 in millions of dollars. The recessions of 2001 and IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 are evident in the form of sharp reductions of inventories. There is sharp upward trend of inventory accumulation after both recessions. Total business inventories are higher than in the peak before the global recession.
Chart VA-4, US, Total Business Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, NSA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Sep 2019
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/
Inventories follow business cycles. When recession hits sales inventories pile up, declining with expansion of the economy. In a fascinating classic opus, Lloyd Meltzer (1941, 129) concludes:
“The dynamic sequences (i) through (6) were intended to show what types of behavior are possible for a system containing a sales output lag. The following conclusions seem to be the most important:
(i) An economy in which business men attempt to recoup inventory losses will always undergo cyclical fluctuations when equilibrium is disturbed, provided the economy is stable.
This is the pure inventory cycle.
(2) The assumption of stability imposes severe limitations upon the possible size of the marginal propensity to consume, particularly if the coefficient of expectation is positive.
(3) The inventory accelerator is a more powerful de-stabilizer than the ordinary acceleration principle. The difference in stability conditions is due to the fact that the former allows for replacement demand whereas the usual analytical formulation of the latter does not. Thus, for inventories, replacement demand acts as a de-stabilizer. Whether it does so for all types of capital goods is a moot question, but I believe cases may occur in which it does not.
(4) Investment for inventory purposes cannot alter the equilibrium of income, which depends only upon the propensity to consume and the amount of non-induced investment.
(5) The apparent instability of a system containing both an accelerator and a coefficient of expectation makes further investigation of possible stabilizers highly desirable.”
Chart VA-5 shows the increase in the inventory/sales ratios during the recession of 2007-2009. The inventory/sales ratio fell during the expansions. The inventory/sales ratio declined to a trough in 2011, climbed and then stabilized at current levels in 2012, 2013 and 2015 with increase into 2015-2016 and then decreasing at the margin from 2016 into 2017-2019.
Chart VA-5, Total Business Inventories/Sales Ratios 2008 to 2019
https://www.census.gov/mtis/img/mtisbrf.gif
Sales of retail and food services increased 0.3 percent in Oct 2019 after decreasing 0.3 percent in Sep 2019 seasonally adjusted (SA), growing 3.4 percent in Jan-Oct 2019 relative to Jan-Oct 2018 not seasonally adjusted (NSA), as shown in Table VA-3. Excluding motor vehicles and parts, retail sales increased 0.2 percent in Oct 2019, decreasing 0.1 percent in Sep 2019 SA and increasing 3.3 percent NSA in Jan-Oct 2019 relative to a year earlier. Sales of motor vehicles and parts increased 0.5 percent in Oct 2019 after decreasing 1.3 percent in Sep 2019 SA and increasing 3.7 percent NSA in Jan-Oct 2019 relative to a year earlier. Gasoline station sales increased 1.1 percent SA in Oct 2019 after decreasing 0.1 percent in Sep 2019 in oscillating prices of gasoline that are moderating, decreasing 0.5 percent in Jan-Oct 2019 relative to a year earlier.
Table VA-3, US, Percentage Change in Monthly Sales for Retail and Food Services, ∆%
Oct ∆% SA | Sep ∆% SA | Jan-Oct 2019 Million Dollars NSA | Jan-Oct 2019 from Jan-Oct 2018 ∆% NSA | |
Retail and Food Services | 0.3 | -0.3 | 5,101,958 | 3.4 |
Excluding Motor Vehicles and Parts | 0.2 | -0.1 | 4,057,611 | 3.3 |
Motor Vehicles & Parts Dealers | 0.5 | -1.3 | 1,044,347 | 3.7 |
Retail | 0.3 | -0.5 | 4,460,337 | 3.3 |
Building Materials | -0.5 | -1.8 | 320,473 | 0.6 |
Food and Beverage | 0.5 | -0.6 | 641,139 | 3.1 |
Grocery | 0.4 | -0.6 | 575,693 | 3.2 |
Health & Personal Care Stores | 0.0 | 0.6 | 293,192 | 3.5 |
Clothing & Clothing Accessories Stores | -1.0 | 0.3 | 208,870 | -0.5 |
Gasoline Stations | 1.1 | -0.1 | 429,808 | -0.5 |
General Merchandise Stores | 0.4 | -0.4 | 569,285 | 1.6 |
Food Services & Drinking Places | -0.3 | 0.8 | 641,621 | 4.3 |
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/
Chart VA-6 provides monthly percentage changes of sales of retail and food services. There is significant monthly volatility that prevents identification of clear trends.
Chart VA-6, US, Monthly Percentage Change of Retail and Food Services Sales, Jan 1992-Oct 2019
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/
Chart VA-7 of the US Census Bureau provides total sales of retail trade and food services seasonally adjusted (SA) from Jan 1992 to Oct 2019 in millions of dollars. The impact on sales of the shallow recession of 2001 was much milder than the sharp contraction in the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. There is flattening in the final segment of the series followed by another increase/decrease. Data are not adjusted for price changes.
Chart VA-7, US, Total Sales of Retail Trade and Food Services, SA, Jan 1992-Oct 2019, Millions of Dollars
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/
Chart VA-8, US, Total Sales of Retail Trade and Food Services, NSA, Jan 1992-Oct 2019, Millions of Dollars
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/
Table VI-7C provides additional information required for understanding the deficit/debt situation of the United States. The table is divided into four parts: Treasury budget in the 2020 fiscal year beginning on Oct 1, 2019 and ending on Sep 30, 2020; federal fiscal data for the years from 2009 to 2019; federal fiscal data for the years from 2005 to 2008; and Treasury debt held by the public from 2005 to 2018. Receipts decreased 2.8 percent in the cumulative fiscal year 2020 ending in Oct 2019 relative to the cumulative in fiscal year 2019. Individual income taxes decreased 1.9 percent relative to the same fiscal period a year earlier. Outlays increased 7.6 percent relative to a year earlier. There are also receipts, outlays, deficit and debt for fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. In fiscal year 2019, the deficit reached $984 billion or 4.6 percent of GDP. Outlays of 4,447 billion were 20.9 percent of GDP and receipts of $3,462 billion were 16.3 percent of GDP. It is quite difficult for the US to raise receipts above 18 percent of GDP. Total revenues of the US from 2009 to 2012 accumulate to $9022 billion, or $9.0 trillion, while expenditures or outlays accumulate to $14,115 billion, or $14.1 trillion, with the deficit accumulating to $5094 billion, or $5.1 trillion. Revenues decreased 6.5 percent from $9653 billion in the four years from 2005 to 2008 to $9022 billion in the years from 2009 to 2012. Decreasing revenues were caused by the global recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (Jun) and by growth of only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2019. In contrast, the expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1993 was at the average annual growth rate of 3.7 percent and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html). Because of mediocre GDP growth, there are 18.2 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment/underemployment rate of 10.6 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html). Weakness of growth and employment creation is analyzed in II Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html). In contrast with the decline of revenue, outlays or expenditures increased 30.2 percent from $10,839 billion, or $10.8 trillion, in the four years from 2005 to 2008, to $14,115 billion, or $14.1 trillion, in the four years from 2009 to 2012. Increase in expenditures by 30.2 percent while revenue declined by 6.5 percent caused the increase in the federal deficit from $1186 billion in 2005-2008 to $5094 billion in 2009-2012. Federal revenue was 14.9 percent of GDP on average in the years from 2009 to 2012, which is well below 17.4 percent of GDP on average from 1968 to 2017. Federal outlays were 23.3 percent of GDP on average from 2009 to 2012, which is well above 20.3 percent of GDP on average from 1968 to 2017. The lower part of Table VI-7C shows that debt held by the public swelled from $5803 billion in 2008 to $13,117 billion in 2015, by $7314 billion or 126.0 percent. Debt held by the public as percent of GDP or economic activity jumped from 39.4 percent in 2008 to 77.8 percent in 2018, which is well above the average of 40.7 percent from 1968 to 2017. The United States faces tough adjustment because growth is unlikely to recover, creating limits on what can be obtained by increasing revenues, while continuing stress of social programs restricts what can be obtained by reducing expenditures.
Table VI-7C, US, Treasury Budget in Fiscal Year to Date Million Dollars
Oct 2019 | Fiscal Year 2020 | Fiscal Year 2019 | ∆% |
Receipts | 245,520 | 252,692 | -2.8 |
Outlays | 379,988 | 353,183 | 7.6 |
Deficit | -134,468 | -100,491 | |
Individual Income Tax | 126,389 | 128,866 | -1.9 |
Corporation Income Tax | 6,571 | 8,000 | -17.9 |
Social Insurance | 64,426 | 61,777 | 4.3 |
Receipts | Outlays | Deficit (-), Surplus (+) | |
$ Billions | |||
Fiscal Year 2019 | 3,462 | 4,447 | -984 |
% GDP | 16.3 | 20.9 | -4.6 |
Fiscal Year 2018 | 3,329 | 4,108 | -779 |
% GDP | 16.4 | 20.3 | -3.8 |
Fiscal Year 2017 | 3,316 | 3,982 | -665 |
% GDP | 17.2 | 20.7 | -3.5 |
Fiscal Year 2016 | 3,268 | 3,853 | -585 |
% GDP | 17.6 | 20.8 | -3.2 |
Fiscal Year 2015 | 3,250 | 3,688 | -439 |
% GDP | 18.0 | 20.4 | -2.4 |
Fiscal Year 2014 | 3,022 | 3,506 | -485 |
% GDP | 17.4 | 20.2 | 2.8 |
Fiscal Year 2013 | 2,775 | 3,455 | -680 |
% GDP | 16.7 | 20.8 | -4.1 |
Fiscal Year 2012 | 2,450 | 3,537 | -1,087 |
% GDP | 15.3 | 22.0 | -6.8 |
Fiscal Year 2011 | 2,304 | 3,603 | -1,300 |
% GDP | 15.0 | 23.4 | -8.4 |
Fiscal Year 2010 | 2,163 | 3,457 | -1,294 |
% GDP | 14.6 | 23.3 | -8.7 |
Fiscal Year 2009 | 2,105 | 3,518 | -1,413 |
% GDP | 14.6 | 24.4 | -9.8 |
Total 2009-2012 | 9,022 | 14,115 | -5,094 |
Average % GDP 2009-2012 | 14.9 | 23.3 | -8.5 |
Fiscal Year 2008 | 2,524 | 2,983 | -459 |
% GDP | 17.1 | 20.2 | -3.1 |
Fiscal Year 2007 | 2,568 | 2,729 | -161 |
% GDP | 18.0 | 19.1 | -1.1 |
Fiscal Year 2006 | 2,407 | 2,655 | -248 |
% GDP | 17.6 | 19.5 | -1.8 |
Fiscal Year 2005 | 2,154 | 2,472 | -318 |
% GDP | 16.8 | 19.3 | -2.5 |
Total 2005-2008 | 9,653 | 10,839 | -1,186 |
Average % GDP 2005-2008 | 17.4 | 19.5 | -2.1 |
Debt Held by the Public | Billions of Dollars | Percent of GDP | |
2005 | 4,592 | 35.8 | |
2006 | 4,829 | 35.4 | |
2007 | 5,035 | 35.2 | |
2008 | 5,803 | 39.4 | |
2009 | 7,545 | 52.3 | |
2010 | 9,019 | 60.8 | |
2011 | 10,128 | 65.8 | |
2012 | 11,281 | 70.3 | |
2013 | 11,983 | 72.2 | |
2014 | 12,780 | 73.7 | |
2015 | 13,117 | 72.5 | |
2016 | 14,168 | 76.4 | |
2017 | 14,666 | 76.1 | |
2018 | 15,751 | 77.8 |
Source: https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0184.aspx https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm806 CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2018 to 2028. Washington, DC, Apr 9 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53651
CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2017-2027. Washington, DC, Jan 24, 2017 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370 CBO, An update to the budget and economic outlook: 2016 to 2026. Washington, DC, Aug 23, 2016.
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6
CBO (2012NovMBR). CBO (2011AugBEO); Office of Management and Budget 2011. Historical Tables. Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: OMB; CBO. 2011JanBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Jan. CBO. 2012AugBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Aug 22. CBO. 2012Jan31. Historical budget data. Washington, DC, Jan 31. CBO. 2012NovCDR. Choices for deficit reduction. Washington, DC. Nov. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO (2013Aug12). 2013AugHBD. Historical budget data—August 2013. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Aug. CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb. CBO, Historical budget data—April 2014 release. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Apr. Congressional Budget Office, August 2014 baseline: an update to the budget and economic outlook: 2014 to 2024. Washington, DC, CBO, Aug 27, 2014. CBO, Monthly budget review: summary of fiscal year 2014. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Nov 10, 2014. CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2015 to 2025. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Jan 26, 2015.
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#3 https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#2
VB Japan. The GDP of Japan grew at 1.0 percent per year on average from 1991 to 2002, with the GDP implicit deflator falling at 0.8 percent per year on average. The average growth rate of Japan’s GDP was 4 percent per year on average from the middle of the 1970s to 1992 (Ito 2004). Low growth in Japan in the 1990s is commonly labeled as “the lost decade” (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 81-115). Table VB-GDP provides yearly growth rates of Japan’s GDP from 1995 to 2018. Growth weakened from 2.7 per cent in 1995 and 3.1 percent in 1996 to contractions of 1.1 percent in 1998 and 0.3 percent in 1999. Growth rates were below 2 percent with exception of 2.8 percent in 2000 and 2.2 percent in 2004. Japan’s GDP contracted sharply by 1.1 percent in 2008 and 5.4 percent in 2009. As in most advanced economies, growth was robust at 4.2 percent in 2010 but mediocre at minus 0.1 percent in 2011 because of the tsunami and 1.5 percent in 2012. Japan’s GDP grew 2.0 percent in 2013 and nearly stagnated in 2014 at 0.4 percent. The GDP of Japan increased 1.2 percent in 2015 and 0.6 percent in 2016. Japan’s GDP increased at 1.9 percent in 2017. The GDP of Japan increased 0.8 percent in 2018. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). Japan’s real GDP in calendar year 2018 is 5.8 percent higher than in calendar year 2007 for growth at the average yearly rate of 0.5 percent. Japan’s real GDP grew 13.1 percent from the trough of 2009 to 2018 at the average yearly rate of 1.4 percent (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html).
Table VB-GDP, Japan, Yearly Percentage Change of GDP ∆%
Calendar Year | ∆% |
1995 | 2.7 |
1996 | 3.1 |
1997 | 1.1 |
1998 | -1.1 |
1999 | -0.3 |
2000 | 2.8 |
2001 | 0.4 |
2002 | 0.1 |
2003 | 1.5 |
2004 | 2.2 |
2005 | 1.7 |
2006 | 1.4 |
2007 | 1.7 |
2008 | -1.1 |
2009 | -5.4 |
2010 | 4.2 |
2011 | -0.1 |
2012 | 1.5 |
2013 | 2.0 |
2014 | 0.4 |
2015 | 1.2 |
2016 | 0.6 |
2017 | 1.9 |
2018 | 0.8 |
Source: Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html
Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf) with changes on Jul 21, 2015 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 1.5 to 2.1 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food 0.2 to 1.2 to 3.3 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.2 to 1.2 percent in 2015 and 1.2 to 2.2 percent in 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was minus 0.4 percent in Mar 2014 and 2.2 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm), significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:
“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.
The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.
Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”
The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”
Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:
- Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
- Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
- Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).
Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf) with changes on Feb 1, 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). On Jun 19, 2015, the Bank of Japan announced a “New Framework for Monetary Policy Meetings,” which provides for quarterly release of the forecasts of the economy and prices beginning in Jan 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/rel150619a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 0.7 to 0.7 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food of 0.0 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.0 to 0.2 percent in 2016 and 1.8 to 3.0 percent in 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was 0.1 percent in Mar 2016 and minus 0.3 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm). The CPI increased significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:
“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.
The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.
Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”
The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”
Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:
- Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
- Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
- Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).
- Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) with Negative Nominal Interest Rate. On January 29, 2016, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan introduced a new policy to attain the “price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf). The new framework consists of three dimensions: quantity, quality and interest rate. The interest rate dimension consists of rates paid to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank of Japan of three tiers zero, positive and minus 0.1 percent. The quantitative dimension consists of increasing the monetary base at the annual rate of 80 trillion yen. The qualitative dimension consists of purchases by the Bank of Japan of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITS).
- Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control. The Bank of Japan introduced a new approach, QQE with Yield Curve Control (“Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control”) at its policy meeting on Sep 21, 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160921a.pdf). The policy consists of two measures. First “yield curve control” consists of controlling the long-term and short-term interest rates. The bank will fix the interest rates of policy balances held by financial institutions at the BOJ at minus 0.1 percent and will purchase Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) in the amount required to maintain the yield of the 10-year JGB at around zero percent. Second, “the inflation-overshooting commitment” consists of increasing base money to maintain the CPI price stability target above 2 percent.
Table VB-BOJF, Bank of Japan, Forecasts of the Majority of Members of the Policy Board, % Year on Year
Fiscal Year | Real GDP | CPI All Items Less Fresh Food | Excluding Effects of Consumption Tax Hikes |
2013 | |||
Apr 2014 | +2.2 to +2.3 | +0.8 | |
Jan 2014 | +2.5 to +2.9 [+2.7] | +0.7 to +0.9 [+0.7] | |
Oct 2013 | +2.6 to +3.0 [+2.7] | +0.6 to +1.0 [+0.7] | |
Jul 2013 | +2.5 to +3.0 [+2.8] | +0.5 to +0.8 [+0.6] | |
2014 | |||
Apr 2015 | -1.0 to -0.8 [-0.9] | +2.8 | +0.8 |
Jan 2015 | -0.6 to -0.4 [-0.5] | +2.9 to +3.2 [+2.9] | +0.9 to +1.2 [+0.9] |
Oct 2014 | +0.2 to +0.7 [+0.5] | +3.1 to +3.4 [+3.2] | +1.1 to +1.4 [+1.2] |
Jul 2014 | +0.6 to +1.3 [+1.0] | +3.2 to +3.5 [+3.3] | +1.2 to +1.5 [+1.3] |
Apr 2014 | +0.8 to +1.3 | +3.0 to +3.5 | +1.0 to +1.5 |
Jan 2014 | +0.9 to 1.5 [+1.4] | +2.9 to +3.6 [+3.3] | +0.9 to +1.6 [+1.3] |
Oct 2013 | +0.9 to +1.5 [+1.5] | +2.8 to +3.6 [+3.3] | +0.8 to +1.6 [+1.3] |
Jul 2013 | +0.8 to +1.5 [+1.3] | +2.7 to +3.6 [+3.3] | +0.7 to +1.6 [+1.3] |
2015 | |||
Feb 2016 | +0.7 to +0.7 [+0.7] | 0.0 | |
Jan 2016 | +1.0 to +1.3 [+1.1] | 0.0 to 0.2 [+0.1] | |
Oct 2015 | +0.8 to +1.4 [+1.2] | 0.0 to +0.4 [+0.1 | |
Jul 2015 | +1.5 to +1.9 [+1.7] | +0.3 to +1.0 [+0.7] | |
Apr 2015 | +1.5 to +2.1 [+2.0] | +0.2 to 1.2 [+0.8] | +0.2 to 1.2 [+0.8] |
Jan 2015 | +1.8 to +2.3 [+2.1] | +0.4 to +1.3 [+1.0] | +0.4 to +1.3 [+1.0] |
Oct 2014 | +1.2 to +1.7 [+1.5] | +1.8 to 2.6 [+2.4] | +1.1 to +1.9 [+1.7] |
Jul 2014 | +1.2 to +1.6 [+1.5] | +1.9 to +2.8 [+2.6] | +1.2 to +2.1 [+1.9] |
Apr 2014 | +1.2 to +1.5 | +1.9 to +2.8 | +1.2 to +2.1 |
Jan 2014 | +1.2 to +1.8 [+1.5] | +1.7 to +2.9 [+2.6] | +1.0 to +2.2 [+1.9] |
Oct 2013 | +1.3 to +1.8 [+1.5] | +1.6 to +2.9 [+2.6] | +0.9 to +2.2 [+1.9] |
Jul 2013 | +1.3 to +1.9 [+1.5] | +1.6 to +2.9 [+2.6] | +0.9 to +2.2 [+1.9] |
2016 | |||
Apr 2017 | +1.4 to +1.4 [+1.4] | -0.3 | |
Feb 2017 | +1.2 to +1.5 [+1.4] | -0.2 to -0.1 [-0.2] | |
Jul 2016 | +0.8 to +1.0 [+1.0] | 0.0 to +0.3 [0.5] | 0.0 to +0.3 [0.5] |
Apr 2016 | +0.8 to +1.4 [+1.2] | 0.0 to +0.8 [+0.5] | 0.0 to +0.8 [+0.5] |
Jan 2016 | +1.0 to +1.7 [+1.5] | 0.2 to +1.2 [+0.8] | |
Oct 2015 | +1.2 to +1.6 [+1.4] | +0.8 to +1.5 [+1.4] | |
Jul 2015 | +1.5 to 1.7 [+1.5] | +1.2 to +2.1 [+1.9] | |
Apr 2015 | +1.4 to +1.8 [+1.5] | +1.2 to +2.2 [+2.0] | +1.2 to +2.2 [+2.0] |
Jan 2015 | +1.5 to +1.7 [+1.6] | +1.5 to +2.3 [+2.2] | +1.5 to +2.3 [+2.2] |
Oct 2014 | +1.0 to +1.4 [+1.2] | +1.9 to 3.0 [+2.8] | +1.2 to 2.3 [+2.1] |
Jul 2014 | +1.0 to +1.5 [+1.3] | +2.0 to +3.0 [+2.8] | +1.3 to +2.3 [+2.1] |
Apr 2014 | +1.0 to +1.5 | +2.0 to +3.0 | +1.3 to +2.3 |
2017 | |||
Apr 2017 | +1.4 to +1.6 [+1.6] | +0.6 to +1.6 [+1.4] | |
Feb 2017 | +1.3 to +1.6 [+1.5] | +0.8 to +1.6 [+1.5] | |
Jul 2016 | 1.0 to +1.5 | +0.8 to +1.8 | +0.8 to +1.8 |
Apr 2016 | 0.0 to + +0.3 [+0.1] | 1.8 to +3.0 [+2.7] | 0.8 to +2.0 [+1.7 |
Jan 2016 | +0.1 to + 0.5 [+0.3] | +2.0 to +3.1 [+2.8] | + 1.0 to +2.1 [+1.8] |
Oct 2015 | +0.1 to +0.5 [+0.3] | +2.5 to +3.4 [+3.1] | +1.2 to 2.1 [+1.8] |
Jul 2015 | +0.1 to +0.5 [+0.2] | +2.7 to +3.4 [+3.1] | +1.4 to +2.1 [+1.8] |
Apr 2015 | +0.1 to +0.5 [+0.2] | +2.7 to +3.4 [+3.2] | +1.4 to +2.1 [+1.9] |
2018 | |||
Apr 2017 | +1.1 to +1.3 [+1.3] | +0.8 to +1.9 [+1.7] | |
Feb 2017 | +1.0 to +1.2 [+1.1] | +0.9 to +1.9 [+1.7] | |
Jul 2016 | +0.8 to +1.0 | +1.0 to +2.0 | +1.0 to +2.0 |
Apr 2016 | +0.6 to +1.2 [+1.0] | +1.0 to +2.1 [+1.9] | +1.0 to +2.1 [+1.9] |
2019 | |||
Apr 2017 | +0.6 to +0.7 [+0.7] | +1.4 to +2.5 [+2.4] | +0.9 to +2.0 [+1.9] |
Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members
Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan
Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members
Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140715a.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1510b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1601b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1607b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1704b.pdf
The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Composite Output Index decreased from 51.5 in Sep to 49.8 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ddfd100b9b404ca994338a9d25cf0280). The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Services Business Activity Index decreased from 52.8 in Sep to 50.3 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ddfd100b9b404ca994338a9d25cf0280). The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Manufacturing PMI Index™ with the Flash Japan
Manufacturing PMI™ decreased from 48.9 in Sep to 48.5 in Oct
(https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ddfd100b9b404ca994338a9d25cf0280). Joe Hayes, Economist at HIS
Markit, finds impact of demand conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/ddfd100b9b404ca994338a9d25cf0280).The Jibun Bank Composite Output PMI Index decreased from 51.5 in Sep to 49.1 in Oct, indicating weak business activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b81ba91579314945b7f7e2a497b74919). The Jibun Bank Business Activity Index of Services decreased to 49.7 in Oct from 52.8 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b81ba91579314945b7f7e2a497b74919). Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS Markit, finds weaker conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b81ba91579314945b7f7e2a497b74919). The Jibun Bank Japan Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™), seasonally adjusted, decreased from 49.9 in Sep to 48.4 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/55872ef0c3704c3e94c223cc0dc19f14). New orders decreased while new foreign orders decreased. Joe Hayes, Associate Economist at IHS Markit, finds weaker conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/55872ef0c3704c3e94c223cc0dc19f14). Table JPY provides the country data table for Japan.
Table JPY, Japan, Economic Indicators
Historical GDP and CPI | 1981-2010 Real GDP Growth and CPI Inflation 1981-2010 |
Corporate Goods Prices | Oct ∆% 1.1 |
Consumer Price Index | Sep NSA ∆% 0.1; Aug 12 months NSA ∆% 0.2 |
Real GDP Growth | IIQQ2019 ∆%: 0.3 on IIQ2019; IIQ2019 SAAR 1.3; |
Employment Report | Sep Unemployed 1.68 million Change in unemployed since last year: +60 thousand |
All Industry Indices | Aug month SA ∆% 0.0 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15 |
Industrial Production | Sep SA month ∆%: 1.7 Earlier Data: |
Machine Orders | Total Jul ∆% 0.1 Private ∆%: -6.5 Excluding Volatile Orders minus -6.6 Earlier Data: |
Tertiary Index | Sep month SA ∆% 1.8 Earlier Data: |
Wholesale and Retail Sales | Sep 12 months: Earlier Data: |
Family Income and Expenditure Survey | Sep 12-month ∆% total nominal consumption 9.8, real 9.5 Earlier Data: Blog 3/29/15 |
Trade Balance | Exports Sep 12 months ∆%: -5.2 Imports Sep 12 months ∆% -1.5 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15 |
Links to blog comments in Table JPY: 11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
8/25/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
6/16/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html
11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html
9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
6/17/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html
5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html
3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html
2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html
12/17/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html
9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html
3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html
12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html
9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html
8/21/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html
6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html
5/22/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html
3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html
12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html
11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html
9/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html
08/23/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html
6/14/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html
5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html
4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html
3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html
2/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html
12/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html
11/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.htm
9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html
8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html
6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html
5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html
2/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html
12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html
11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html
9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html
VC China. China estimates an index of nonmanufacturing purchasing managers based on a sample of 1200 nonmanufacturing enterprises across the country (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Table CIPMNM provides this index and components. The total index increased from 55.7 in Jan 2011 to 58.0 in Mar 2012, decreasing to 53.9 in Aug 2013. The index decreased from 56.0 in Nov 2013 to 54.6 in Dec 2013, easing to 53.4 in Jan 2014. The index moved to 52.8 in Oct 2019. The index of new orders increased from 52.2 in Jan 2012 to 54.3 in Dec 2012 but fell to 50.1 in May 2013, barely above the neutral frontier of 50.0. The index of new orders stabilized at 51.0 in Nov-Dec 2013, easing to 50.9 in Jan 2014. The index of new orders moved to 49.4 in Oct 2019.
Table CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted
Total Index | New Orders | Interm. | Subs Prices | Exp | |
Oct 2019 | 52.8 | 49.4 | 51.3 | 48.9 | 60.7 |
Sep | 53.7 | 50.5 | 52.8 | 50.0 | 59.7 |
Aug | 53.8 | 50.1 | 50.8 | 49.1 | 60.4 |
Jul | 53.7 | 50.4 | 52.9 | 50.6 | 59.8 |
Jun | 54.2 | 51.5 | 51.5 | 49.7 | 60.6 |
May | 54.3 | 50.3 | 52.2 | 49.9 | 60.2 |
Apr | 54.3 | 50.8 | 53.0 | 50.5 | 60.3 |
Mar | 54.8 | 52.5 | 52.5 | 51.0 | 61.1 |
Feb | 54.3 | 50.7 | 52.7 | 50.1 | 61.5 |
Jan | 54.7 | 51.0 | 52.0 | 49.8 | 59.6 |
Dec 2018 | 53.8 | 50.4 | 50.1 | 47.6 | 60.8 |
Nov | 53.4 | 50.1 | 50.8 | 49.4 | 60.9 |
Oct | 53.9 | 50.1 | 54.9 | 51.2 | 60.6 |
Sep | 54.9 | 51.0 | 55.6 | 51.5 | 60.1 |
Aug | 54.2 | 50.6 | 54.3 | 50.9 | 61.4 |
Jul | 54.0 | 51.0 | 53.9 | 52.0 | 60.2 |
Jun | 55.0 | 50.6 | 53.5 | 51.1 | 60.8 |
May | 54.9 | 51.0 | 54.2 | 50.6 | 61.0 |
Apr | 54.8 | 51.1 | 52.7 | 50.6 | 61.5 |
Mar | 54.6 | 50.1 | 49.9 | 49.3 | 61.1 |
Feb | 54.4 | 50.5 | 53.2 | 49.9 | 61.2 |
Jan | 55.3 | 51.9 | 53.9 | 52.6 | 61.7 |
Dec 2017 | 55.0 | 52.0 | 54.8 | 52.6 | 60.9 |
Nov | 54.8 | 51.8 | 56.2 | 52.8 | 61.6 |
Oct | 54.3 | 51.1 | 54.3 | 51.6 | 60.6 |
Sep | 55.4 | 52.3 | 56.1 | 51.7 | 61.7 |
Aug | 53.4 | 50.9 | 54.4 | 51.5 | 61.0 |
Jul | 54.5 | 51.1 | 53.1 | 50.9 | 61.1 |
Jun | 54.9 | 51.4 | 51.2 | 49.3 | 61.1 |
May | 54.5 | 50.9 | 51.1 | 48.8 | 60.2 |
Apr | 54.0 | 50.5 | 51.7 | 50.2 | 59.7 |
Mar | 55.1 | 51.9 | 52.3 | 49.7 | 61.3 |
Feb | 54.2 | 51.2 | 53.7 | 51.4 | 62.4 |
Jan | 54.6 | 51.3 | 55.1 | 51.0 | 58.9 |
Dec 2016 | 54.5 | 52.1 | 56.2 | 51.9 | 59.5 |
Nov | 54.7 | 51.8 | 53.5 | 51.4 | 60.7 |
Oct | 54.0 | 50.9 | 53.7 | 51.5 | 60.6 |
Sep | 53.7 | 51.4 | 51.7 | 50.1 | 61.1 |
Aug | 53.5 | 49.8 | 52.6 | 50.4 | 59.4 |
Jul | 53.9 | 49.9 | 51.4 | 49.5 | 59.5 |
Jun | 53.7 | 50.8 | 51.6 | 50.6 | 58.6 |
May | 53.1 | 49.2 | 51.6 | 49.8 | 57.8 |
Apr | 53.5 | 48.7 | 52.1 | 49.1 | 59.1 |
Mar | 53.8 | 50.8 | 51.4 | 49.5 | 59.0 |
Feb | 52.7 | 48.7 | 50.5 | 48.3 | 59.5 |
Jan | 53.5 | 49.6 | 49.9 | 47.7 | 58.4 |
Dec2015 | 54.4 | 51.7 | 49.0 | 48.2 | 58.3 |
Nov | 53.6 | 50.2 | 49.3 | 47.7 | 60.0 |
Oct | 53.1 | 51.2 | 51.2 | 48.8 | 61.1 |
Sep | 53.4 | 50.2 | 50.8 | 47.9 | 60.0 |
Aug | 53.4 | 49.6 | 49.6 | 47.8 | 59.7 |
Jul | 53.9 | 50.1 | 48.9 | 47.4 | 60.0 |
Jun | 53.8 | 51.3 | 50.6 | 48.7 | 59.7 |
May | 53.2 | 49.5 | 52.8 | 50.4 | 60.1 |
Apr | 53.4 | 49.1 | 50.8 | 48.9 | 60.0 |
Mar | 53.7 | 50.3 | 50.0 | 48.4 | 58.8 |
Feb | 53.9 | 51.2 | 52.5 | 51.2 | 58.7 |
Jan | 53.7 | 50.2 | 47.6 | 46.9 | 59.6 |
Dec 2014 | 54.1 | 50.5 | 50.1 | 47.3 | 59.5 |
Nov | 53.9 | 50.1 | 50.6 | 47.7 | 59.7 |
Oct | 53.8 | 51.0 | 52.0 | 48.8 | 59.9 |
Sep | 54.0 | 49.5 | 49.8 | 47.3 | 60.9 |
Aug | 54.4 | 50.0 | 52.2 | 48.3 | 61.2 |
Jul | 54.2 | 50.7 | 53.4 | 49.5 | 61.5 |
Jun | 55.0 | 50.7 | 56.0 | 50.8 | 60.4 |
May | 55.5 | 52.7 | 54.5 | 49.0 | 60.7 |
Apr | 54.8 | 50.8 | 52.4 | 49.4 | 61.5 |
Mar | 54.5 | 50.8 | 52.8 | 49.5 | 61.5 |
Feb | 55.0 | 51.4 | 52.1 | 49.0 | 59.9 |
Jan | 53.4 | 50.9 | 54.5 | 50.1 | 58.1 |
Dec 2013 | 54.6 | 51.0 | 56.9 | 52.0 | 58.7 |
Nov | 56.0 | 51.0 | 54.8 | 49.5 | 61.3 |
Oct | 56.3 | 51.6 | 56.1 | 51.4 | 60.5 |
Sep | 55.4 | 53.4 | 56.7 | 50.6 | 60.1 |
Aug | 53.9 | 50.9 | 57.1 | 51.2 | 62.9 |
Jul | 54.1 | 50.3 | 58.2 | 52.4 | 63.9 |
Jun | 53.9 | 50.3 | 55.0 | 50.6 | 61.8 |
May | 54.3 | 50.1 | 54.4 | 50.7 | 62.9 |
Apr | 54.5 | 50.9 | 51.1 | 47.6 | 62.5 |
Mar | 55.6 | 52.0 | 55.3 | 50.0 | 62.4 |
Feb | 54.5 | 51.8 | 56.2 | 51.1 | 62.7 |
Jan | 56.2 | 53.7 | 58.2 | 50.9 | 61.4 |
Dec 2012 | 56.1 | 54.3 | 53.8 | 50.0 | 64.6 |
Nov | 55.6 | 53.2 | 52.5 | 48.4 | 64.6 |
Oct | 55.5 | 51.6 | 58.1 | 50.5 | 63.4 |
Sep | 53.7 | 51.8 | 57.5 | 51.3 | 60.9 |
Aug | 56.3 | 52.7 | 57.6 | 51.2 | 63.2 |
Jul | 55.6 | 53.2 | 49.7 | 48.7 | 63.9 |
Jun | 56.7 | 53.7 | 52.1 | 48.6 | 65.5 |
May | 55.2 | 52.5 | 53.6 | 48.5 | 65.4 |
Apr | 56.1 | 52.7 | 57.9 | 50.3 | 66.1 |
Mar | 58.0 | 53.5 | 60.2 | 52.0 | 66.6 |
Feb | 57.3 | 52.7 | 59.0 | 51.2 | 63.8 |
Jan | 55.7 | 52.2 | 58.2 | 51.1 | 65.3 |
Notes: Interm.: Intermediate; Subs: Subscription; Exp: Business Expectations
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
Chart CIPMNM provides China’s nonmanufacturing purchasing managers’ index. The index fell from 56.0 in Oct 2013 to 52.8 in Oct 2019.
Chart CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Table CIPMMFG provides the index of purchasing managers of manufacturing seasonally adjusted of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The general index (IPM) rose from 50.5 in Jan 2012 to 53.3 in Apr 2012, falling to 49.2 in Aug 2012, rebounding to 50.6 in Dec 2012. The index fell to 50.3 in Jul 2013, barely above the neutral frontier at 50.0, recovering to 51.4 in Nov 2013 but falling to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.5 in Jan 2014, 50.1 in Dec 2014 and 49.3 in Oct 2019. The index of new orders fell from 54.5 in Apr 2012 to 51.2 in Dec 2012. The index of new orders fell from 52.3 in Nov 2013 to 52.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.9 in Jan 2014 and moved to 50.4 in Dec 2014. The index moved to 49.6 in Oct 2019.
Table CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted
IPM | PI | NOI | INV | EMP | SDEL | |
2019 | ||||||
Oct | 49.3 | 50.8 | 49.6 | 47.4 | 47.3 | 50.1 |
Sep | 49.8 | 52.3 | 50.5 | 47.6 | 47.0 | 50.5 |
Aug | 49.5 | 51.9 | 49.7 | 47.5 | 46.9 | 50.3 |
Jul | 49.7 | 52.1 | 49.8 | 48.0 | 47.1 | 50.1 |
Jun | 49.4 | 51.3 | 49.6 | 48.2 | 46.9 | 50.2 |
May | 49.4 | 51.7 | 49.8 | 47.4 | 47.0 | 50.9 |
Apr | 50.1 | 52.1 | 51.4 | 47.2 | 47.2 | 49.9 |
Mar | 50.5 | 52.7 | 51.6 | 48.4 | 47.6 | 50.2 |
Feb | 49.2 | 49.5 | 50.6 | 46.3 | 47.5 | 49.8 |
Jan | 49.5 | 50.9 | 49.6 | 48.1 | 47.8 | 50.1 |
2018 | ||||||
Dec | 49.4 | 50.8 | 49.7 | 47.1 | 48.0 | 50.4 |
Nov | 50.0 | 51.9 | 50.4 | 47.4 | 48.3 | 50.3 |
Oct | 50.2 | 52.0 | 50.8 | 47.2 | 48.1 | 49.5 |
Sep | 50.8 | 53.0 | 52.0 | 47.8 | 48.3 | 49.7 |
Aug | 51.3 | 53.3 | 52.2 | 48.7 | 49.4 | 49.6 |
Jul | 51.2 | 53.0 | 52.3 | 48.9 | 49.2 | 50.0 |
Jun | 51.5 | 53.6 | 53.2 | 48.8 | 49.0 | 50.2 |
May | 51.9 | 54.1 | 53.8 | 49.6 | 49.1 | 50.1 |
Apr | 51.4 | 53.1 | 52.9 | 49.5 | 49.0 | 50.2 |
Mar | 51.5 | 53.1 | 53.3 | 49.6 | 49.1 | 50.1 |
Feb | 50.3 | 50.7 | 51.0 | 49.3 | 48.1 | 48.4 |
Jan | 51.3 | 53.5 | 52.6 | 48.8 | 48.3 | 49.2 |
2017 | ||||||
Dec | 51.6 | 54.0 | 53.4 | 48.0 | 48.5 | 49.3 |
Nov | 51.8 | 54.3 | 53.6 | 48.4 | 48.8 | 49.5 |
Oct | 51.6 | 53.4 | 52.9 | 48.6 | 49.0 | 48.7 |
Sep | 52.4 | 54.7 | 54.8 | 48.9 | 49.0 | 49.3 |
Aug | 51.7 | 54.1 | 53.1 | 48.3 | 49.1 | 49.3 |
Jul | 51.4 | 53.5 | 52.8 | 48.5 | 49.2 | 50.1 |
Jun | 51.7 | 54.4 | 53.1 | 48.6 | 49.0 | 49.9 |
May | 51.2 | 53.4 | 52.3 | 48.5 | 49.4 | 50.2 |
Apr | 51.2 | 53.8 | 52.3 | 48.3 | 49.2 | 50.5 |
Mar | 51.8 | 54.2 | 53.3 | 48.3 | 50.0 | 50.3 |
Feb | 51.6 | 53.7 | 53.0 | 48.6 | 49.7 | 50.5 |
Jan | 51.3 | 53.1 | 52.8 | 48.0 | 49.2 | 49.8 |
2016 | ||||||
Dec | 51.4 | 53.3 | 53.2 | 48.0 | 48.9 | 50.0 |
Nov | 51.7 | 53.9 | 53.2 | 48.4 | 49.2 | 49.7 |
Oct | 51.2 | 53.3 | 52.8 | 48.1 | 48.8 | 50.2 |
Sep | 50.4 | 52.8 | 50.9 | 47.4 | 48.6 | 49.9 |
Aug | 50.4 | 52.6 | 51.3 | 47.6 | 48.4 | 50.6 |
Jul | 49.9 | 52.1 | 50.4 | 47.3 | 48.2 | 50.5 |
Jun | 50.0 | 52.5 | 50.5 | 47.0 | 47.9 | 50.7 |
May | 50.1 | 52.3 | 50.7 | 47.6 | 48.2 | 50.4 |
Apr | 50.1 | 52.2 | 51.0 | 47.4 | 47.8 | 50.1 |
Mar | 50.2 | 52.3 | 51.4 | 48.2 | 48.1 | 51.3 |
Feb | 49.0 | 50.2 | 48.6 | 48.0 | 47.6 | 49.8 |
Jan | 49.4 | 51.4 | 49.5 | 46.8 | 47.8 | 50.5 |
2015 | ||||||
Dec | 49.7 | 52.2 | 50.2 | 47.6 | 47.4 | 50.7 |
Nov | 49.6 | 51.9 | 49.8 | 47.1 | 47.6 | 50.6 |
Oct | 49.8 | 52.2 | 50.3 | 47.2 | 47.8 | 50.6 |
Sep | 49.8 | 52.3 | 50.2 | 47.5 | 47.9 | 50.8 |
Aug | 49.7 | 51.7 | 49.7 | 48.3 | 47.9 | 50.6 |
Jul | 50.0 | 52.4 | 49.9 | 48.4 | 48.0 | 50.4 |
Jun | 50.2 | 52.9 | 50.1 | 48.7 | 48.1 | 50.3 |
May | 50.2 | 52.9 | 50.6 | 48.2 | 48.2 | 50.9 |
Apr | 50.1 | 52.6 | 50.2 | 48.2 | 48.0 | 50.4 |
Mar | 50.1 | 52.1 | 50.2 | 48.0 | 48.4 | 50.1 |
Feb | 49.9 | 51.4 | 50.4 | 48.2 | 47.8 | 49.9 |
Jan | 49.8 | 51.7 | 50.2 | 47.3 | 47.9 | 50.2 |
2014 | ||||||
Dec | 50.1 | 52.2 | 50.4 | 47.5 | 48.1 | 49.9 |
Nov | 50.3 | 52.5 | 50.9 | 47.7 | 48.2 | 50.3 |
Oct | 50.8 | 53.1 | 51.6 | 48.4 | 48.4 | 50.1 |
Sep | 51.1 | 53.6 | 52.2 | 48.8 | 48.2 | 50.1 |
Aug | 51.1 | 53.2 | 52.5 | 48.6 | 48.2 | 50.0 |
Jul | 51.7 | 54.2 | 53.6 | 49.0 | 48.3 | 50.2 |
Jun | 51.0 | 53.0 | 52.8 | 48.0 | 48.6 | 50.5 |
May | 50.8 | 52.8 | 52.3 | 48.0 | 48.2 | 50.3 |
Apr | 50.4 | 52.5 | 51.2 | 48.1 | 48.3 | 50.1 |
Mar | 50.3 | 52.7 | 50.6 | 47.8 | 48.3 | 49.8 |
Feb | 50.2 | 52.6 | 50.5 | 47.4 | 48.0 | 49.9 |
Jan | 50.5 | 53.0 | 50.9 | 47.8 | 48.2 | 49.8 |
Dec 2013 | 51.0 | 53.9 | 52.0 | 47.6 | 48.7 | 50.5 |
Nov | 51.4 | 54.5 | 52.3 | 47.8 | 49.6 | 50.6 |
Oct | 51.4 | 54.4 | 52.5 | 48.6 | 49.2 | 50.8 |
Sep | 51.1 | 52.9 | 52.8 | 48.5 | 49.1 | 50.8 |
Aug | 51.0 | 52.6 | 52.4 | 48.0 | 49.3 | 50.4 |
Jul | 50.3 | 52.4 | 50.6 | 47.6 | 49.1 | 50.1 |
Jun | 50.1 | 52.0 | 50.4 | 47.4 | 48.7 | 50.3 |
May | 50.8 | 53.3 | 51.8 | 47.6 | 48.8 | 50.8 |
Apr | 50.6 | 52.6 | 51.7 | 47.5 | 49.0 | 50.8 |
Mar | 50.9 | 52.7 | 52.3 | 47.5 | 49.8 | 51.1 |
Feb | 50.1 | 51.2 | 50.1 | 49.5 | 47.6 | 48.3 |
Jan | 50.4 | 51.3 | 51.6 | 50.1 | 47.8 | 50.0 |
Dec 2012 | 50.6 | 52.0 | 51.2 | 47.3 | 49.0 | 48.8 |
Nov | 50.6 | 52.5 | 51.2 | 47.9 | 48.7 | 49.9 |
Oct | 50.2 | 52.1 | 50.4 | 47.3 | 49.2 | 50.1 |
Sep | 49.8 | 51.3 | 49.8 | 47.0 | 48.9 | 49.5 |
Aug | 49.2 | 50.9 | 48.7 | 45.1 | 49.1 | 50.0 |
Jul | 50.1 | 51.8 | 49.0 | 48.5 | 49.5 | 49.0 |
Jun | 50.2 | 52.0 | 49.2 | 48.2 | 49.7 | 49.1 |
May | 50.4 | 52.9 | 49.8 | 45.1 | 50.5 | 49.0 |
Apr | 53.3 | 57.2 | 54.5 | 48.5 | 51.0 | 49.6 |
Mar | 53.1 | 55.2 | 55.1 | 49.5 | 51.0 | 48.9 |
Feb | 51.0 | 53.8 | 51.0 | 48.8 | 49.5 | 50.3 |
Jan | 50.5 | 53.6 | 50.4 | 49.7 | 47.1 | 49.7 |
IPM: Index of Purchasing Managers; PI: Production Index; NOI: New Orders Index; EMP: Employed Person Index; SDEL: Supplier Delivery Time Index
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
China estimates the manufacturing index of purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 820 enterprises (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Chart CIPMMFG provides the manufacturing index of purchasing managers. The index fell to 50.1 in Jun 2013. The index decreased from 51.4 in Nov 2013 to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index moved to 49.3 in Oct 2019.
Chart CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Chart CIPCOMP provides China’s composite, manufacturing and nonmanufacturing, index. The index remains above the neutral 50.0, moving to 52.0 in Oct 2019.
Chart CIPCOMP, China, Composite Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Growth of China’s GDP in IIIQ2019 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.0 percent and cumulative growth to IIIQ2019 was 6.3 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 39.8 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2019. Tertiary industry accounts for 54.0 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2019 and primary industry for 6.2 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. The bottom block of Table VC-GDP provides quarter-on-quarter growth rates of GDP and their annual equivalent. China’s GDP growth decelerated significantly from annual equivalent 10.0 percent in IQ2011 to 6.1 percent in IVQ2011 and 7.8 percent in IQ2012, rebounding to 8.7 percent in IIQ2012, 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012 and 8.2 percent in IVQ2012. Annual equivalent growth in IQ2013 eased to 7.8 percent and to 7.4 percent in IIQ2013, rebounding to 8.7 percent in IIIQ2013. Annual equivalent growth was 6.6 percent in IVQ2013, stabilizing to 7.4 percent in IQ2014 and to 7.4 percent in IIQ2014. Annual equivalent growth stabilized at 7.4 percent in IIIQ2014 and 7.0 percent in IVQ2014. Growth moved to annual equivalent 7.4 percent in IQ2015, 7.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2015. Growth slowed to 6.1 percent in annual equivalent in IVQ2015 and 5.7 percent in IQ2016. Growth increased to annual equivalent 7.8 percent in IIQ2016 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2016, decreasing to 6.6 percent in IVQ2016. Growth decelerated to annual equivalent 6.1 percent in IQ2017, accelerating to 7.4 percent in IIQ2017 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2017. Growth decelerated to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2017. Growth decelerated to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IQ2018, accelerating to 7.0 percent in IIQ2018. Growth decelerated to annual equivalent 6.6 percent in IIIQ2018, decelerating to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2018. Growth decelerated to 5.7 percent annual equivalent in IQ2019 and 6.6 percent in IIQ2019. Growth eased to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IIIQ2019.
Table VC-GDP China, Quarterly Growth of GDP, Current CNY 100 Million and Inflation Adjusted ∆%
Cumulative GDP IQ2019 | Value Current CNY Billion IIIQ2019 | Value Current CNY Billion IQ2019 to IIIQ2019 | IIIQ2019 Year-on-Year Constant Prices ∆% | Cumulative to IIIQ2019 ∆% |
GDP | 24,686.5 | 69,779.8 | 6.0 | 6.2 |
Primary Industry | 1,979.8 | 4,300.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 |
Secondary Industry | 9,788.5 | 27,786.9 | 5.2 | 5.6 |
Tertiary Industry | 12,918.2 | 37,692.5 | 7.2 | 7.0 |
Growth in Quarter Relative to Prior Quarter | ∆% on Prior Quarter | ∆% Annual Equivalent | ∆% Year-on-Year | |
2019 | ||||
IIIQ2019 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.0 | |
IIQ2019 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 6.2 | |
IQ2019 | 1.4 | 5.7 | 6.4 | |
2018 | ||||
IVQ2018 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.4 | |
IIIQ2018 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 6.5 | |
IIQ2018 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | |
IQ2018 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.8 | |
2017 | ||||
IVQ2017 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.7 | |
IIIQ2017 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | |
IIQ2017 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 6.8 | |
IQ2017 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.8 | |
2016 | ||||
IVQ2016 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 6.8 | |
IIIQ2016 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 6.7 | |
IIQ2016 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 6.7 | |
IQ2016 | 1.4 | 5.7 | 6.7 | |
2015 | ||||
IVQ2015 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 6.8 | |
IIIQ2015 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 6.9 | |
IIQ2015 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.0 | |
IQ2015 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.0 | |
2014 | ||||
IVQ2014 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 7.2 | |
IIIQ2014 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.1 | |
IIQ2014 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.5 | |
IQ2014 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.4 | |
2013 | ||||
IVQ2013 | 1.6 | 6.6 | 7.7 | |
IIIQ2013 | 2.1 | 8.7 | 7.9 | |
IIQ2013 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.6 | |
IQ2013 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 7.9 | |
2012 | ||||
IVQ2012 | 2.0 | 8.2 | 8.1 | |
IIIQ2012 | 1.8 | 7.4 | 7.5 | |
IIQ2012 | 2.1 | 8.7 | 7.6 | |
IQ2012 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 8.1 | |
2011 | ||||
IVQ2011 | 1.5 | 6.1 | 8.8 | |
IIIQ2011 | 1.9 | 7.8 | 9.4 | |
IIQ2011 | 2.4 | 10.0 | 10.0 | |
IQ2011 | 2.4 | 10.0 | 10.2 |
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
Growth of China’s GDP in IIIQ2019 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.0 percent and cumulative growth to IIIQ2019 was 6.3 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 39.8 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2019. Tertiary industry accounts for 54.0 percent of cumulative GDP in IIIQ2019 and primary industry for 6.2 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. Table VC-GDPA shows that growth decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 and 11.2 percent in IIQ2010 to 7.9 percent in IQ2013, 7.6 percent in IIQ2013 and 7.9 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP grew 7.7 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 1.6 percent relative to IIIQ2013, which is equivalent to 6.6 percent per year. GDP grew 7.4 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent in IQ2014 that is equivalent to 7.4 percent per year. GDP grew 7.5 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is annual equivalent 7.4 percent. In IIIQ2014, GDP grew 7.1 percent relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is 7.4 percent in annual equivalent. GDP grew 1.7 percent in IVQ2014, which is 7.0 percent in annual equivalent and 7.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2015, GDP grew 1.8 percent, which is equivalent to 7.4 in a year and 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent in a year, and grew 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year, and grew 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IVQ2015, which is equivalent to 6.1 percent in a year and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, GDP grew at 1.4 percent, which is equivalent to 5.7 percent in a year, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.9 percent in IIQ2016, which is annual equivalent to 7.8 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, GDP grew at 1.6 percent, equivalent to 6.6 percent in a year, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 6.8 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased at 1.5 percent, which is 6.1 percent in annual equivalent. In IIQ2017, GDP grew at 1.8 percent, which is annual equivalent at 7.4 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017, which is annual equivalent at 7.0 percent, and increased at 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, GDP grew 1.5 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is annual equivalent to 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.6 percent in IIIQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, GDP grew at 1.5 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.4 percent in IQ2019, which is annual equivalent to 5.7 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2019, GDP grew at 1.6 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.6 percent and increased 6.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IIIQ2019, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.0 percent relative to a year earlier.
Table VC-GDPA China, Growth Rate of GDP, ∆% Relative to a Year Earlier and ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter
IQ2019 | IIQ2019 | IIIQ2019 | IVQ2019 | |
GDP | 6.4 | 6.2 | 6.0 | |
Primary Industry | 2.7 | 3.3 | 2.7 | |
Secondary Industry | 6.1 | 5.6 | 5.2 | |
Tertiary Industry | 7.0 | 7.0 | 7.2 | |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.4 (5.7) | 1.6 (6.6) | 1.5 (6.1) | |
IQ2018 | IIQ2018 | IIIQ2018 | IVQ2018 | |
GDP | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 6.4 |
Primary Industry | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
Secondary Industry | 6.3 | 6.0 | 5.3 | 5.8 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.5 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 7.4 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.5 (6.1) | 1.7 (7.0) | 1.6 (6.6) | 1.5 (6.1) |
IQ2017 | IIQ2017 | IIIQ2017 | IVQ2017 | |
GDP | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 |
Primary Industry | 3.0 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.4 |
Secondary Industry | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.0 | 5.7 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.7 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 8.3 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.5 (6.1) | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.7 (7.0) | 1.5 (6.1) |
IQ2016 | IIQ2016 | IIIQ2016 | IVQ2016 | |
GDP | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.8 |
Primary Industry | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 2.9 |
Secondary Industry | 5.8 | 6.3 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 8.3 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.4 (5.7) | 1.9 (7.8) | 1.7 (7.0) | 1.6 (6.6) |
IQ2015 | IIQ2015 | IIIQ2015 | IVQ2015 | |
GDP | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 6.8 |
Primary Industry | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.1 |
Secondary Industry | 6.4 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.1 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.9 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 8.2 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.7 (7.0) | 1.5 (6.1) |
IQ2014 | IIQ2014 | IIIQ2014 | IVQ2014 | |
GDP | 7.4 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 7.2 |
Primary Industry | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.1 |
Secondary Industry | 7.3 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 7.3 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.1 | 8.0 | 7.9 | 8.1 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.8 (7.4) | 1.7 (7.0) |
IQ2013 | IIQ2013 | IIIQ2013 | IVQ2013 | |
GDP | 7.9 | 7.6 | 7.9 | 7.7 |
Primary Industry | 3.4 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 |
Secondary Industry | 7.8 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 7.8 |
Tertiary Industry | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 8.3 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.9 (7.8) | 1.8 (7.4) | 2.1 (8.7) | 1.6 (6.6) |
IQ2012 | IIQ2012 | IIIQ2012 | IVQ2012 | |
GDP | 8.1 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 8.1 |
Primary Industry | 3.8 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.5 |
Secondary Industry | 9.1 | 8.3 | 8.1 | 8.1 |
Tertiary Industry | 7.5 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.1 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 1.9 (7.8) | 2.1 (8.7) | 1.8 (7.4) | 2.0 (8.2) |
IQ2011 | IIQ2011 | IIIQ2011 | IVQ2011 | |
GDP | 10.2 | 10.0 | 9.4 | 8.8 |
Primary Industry | 3.5 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 4.5 |
Secondary Industry | 11.1 | 11.0 | 10.8 | 10.6 |
Tertiary Industry | 9.1 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 8.9 |
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter | 2.4 (10.0) | 2.4 (10.0) | 1.9 (7.8) | 1.5 (6.1) |
IQ2010 | IIQ2010 | IIIQ2010 | IVQ2010 | |
GDP | 12.1 | 11.2 | 10.7 | 12.1 |
Primary Industry | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 3.8 |
Secondary Industry | 14.5 | 13.3 | 12.6 | 14.5 |
Tertiary Industry | 10.5 | 9.9 | 9.7 | 10.5 |
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
Growth of China’s GDP in IVQ2016 relative to the same period in 2016 was 6.8 percent and
Chart VC-GDP of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides annual value and growth rates of GDP. China’s GDP growth in 2016 is still high at 6.7 percent but at the lowest rhythm in five years.
Chart VC-GDP, China, Gross Domestic Product, Million Yuan and ∆%
Source: National bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/
Chart VC-FXR provides China’s foreign exchange reserves. FX reserves grew from $2399.2 billion in 2009 to $38430 billion in 2013 driven by high growth of China’s trade surplus, decreasing to $30105 billion in 2016.
Chart VC-FXR, China, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2012-2016
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Chart VC-Trade provides China’s imports and exports. Exports exceeded imports with resulting large trade balance surpluses that increased foreign exchange reserves.
Chart VC-Trade, China, Imports and Exports of Goods, 2012-2016, $100 Million US Dollars
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
Chart VC-PCDI provides the level and growth rates of per capita disposable income in China.
Chart VC-PCDI, China, Level and Growth Rates of Per Capita Disposable Income
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english
The Caixin Flash China General Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) compiled by Markit (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727) is mixed. The overall Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing PMI™ decreased from 47.3 in Aug to 47.0 in Sep, while the Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing Output Index decreased from 46.4 in Aug to 45.7 in Sep, indicating weaker conditions. He Fan, Chief Economist at Caixin Insight Group finds need of fiscal and monetary policy (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727). The Caixin China General Services PMI™, compiled by Markit, shows that the Caixin Composite Output, combining manufacturing and services, increased from 51.9 in Sep to 52.0 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/0f475a49c4844590aa992e4b230b5f3e). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds slower services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/0f475a49c4844590aa992e4b230b5f3e). The Caixin General Manufacturing PMI™ increased to 51.7 in Oct from 51.4 in Sep, indicating improving conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/f178e9177fb0498b93590cb7967b893e). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds improving conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/f178e9177fb0498b93590cb7967b893e). Table CNY provides the country data table for China.
Table CNY, China, Economic Indicators
Price Indexes for Industry | Oct 12-month ∆%: -1.6 Oct month ∆%: 0.1 |
Consumer Price Index | Oct 12-month ∆%: 3.8 Oct month ∆%: 0.9 |
Value Added of Industry | Oct month ∆%: 0.17 Jan-Oct 2019/Jan-Oct 2018 ∆%: 5.6 Earlier Data |
GDP Growth Rate | Year-on-Year IIIQ2019 ∆%: 6.0 III Quarter 2019 ∆%: 1.5 |
Investment in Fixed Assets | Total Jan-Oct 2019 ∆%: 5.2 Real estate development: 10.3 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Oct month ∆%: 0.46 Earlier Data: |
Trade Balance | Oct 2019 Balance $42.81 billion Oct 2018 $32.97 billion Exports 12M ∆% -0.9 Imports 12M ∆% -6.4 Dec 2018 balance 57.06 billion Dec 2017 balance $53.85 billion 2018 Exports ∆% 9.9 2018 Imports ∆% 15.8 2017 Exports ∆% 7.9 2017 Imports ∆% 15.9 2016 Exports ∆% 11.3 2016 Imports ∆% 17.3 Cumulative Dec 2018: $351.76 Cumulative Dec 2017: $422.50 billion Cumulative Dec 2016: $486.0 Earlier Data: |
Links to blog comments in Table CNY: 11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
4/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/high-levels-of-valuations-of-risk.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
VD Euro Area. Using calendar and seasonally adjusted chain-linked volumes (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of the euro area (19 countries) fell 5.8 percent from IQ2008 to IIQ2009. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) increased 14.8 percent from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2019 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) is higher by 8.2 percent in IIQ2019 relative to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008, growing at annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. The GDP of the euro area (18) countries increased at the average yearly rate of 2.3 percent from IQ1999 to IQ2008 while that of the euro area (19 countries) increased at 2.3 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) grew at 2.3 percent annual equivalent from IQ1999 to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008. Table VD-EUR provides yearly growth rates of the combined GDP of the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro area since 1999. Growth was very strong at 3.2 percent in 2006 and 3.0 percent in 2007. The global recession had strong impact with growth of only 0.4 percent in 2008 and decline of 4.5 percent in 2009. Recovery was at lower growth rates of 2.1 percent in 2010 and 1.5 percent in 2011. EUROSTAT estimates growth of GDP of the euro area of minus 0.9 percent in 2012 and minus 0.3 percent in 2013. Euro Area GDP grew 1.2 percent in 2014 and grew 2.0 percent in 2015. The GDP of the euro area grew 1.7 percent in 2016.
Table VD-EUR, Euro Area, Yearly Percentage Change of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, Unemployment and GDP ∆%
Year | HICP ∆% | Unemployment | GDP ∆% |
1999 | 1.2 | 9.7 | 3.0 |
2000 | 2.2 | 8.9 | 3.8 |
2001 | 2.4 | 8.3 | 2.1 |
2002 | 2.3 | 8.6 | 1.0 |
2003 | 2.1 | 9.1 | 0.7 |
2004 | 2.2 | 9.3 | 2.3 |
2005 | 2.2 | 9.1 | 1.7 |
2006 | 2.2 | 8.4 | 3.2 |
2007 | 2.2 | 7.5 | 3.0 |
2008 | 3.3 | 7.6 | 0.4 |
2009 | 0.3 | 9.6 | -4.5 |
2010 | 1.6 | 10.2 | 2.1 |
2011 | 2.7 | 10.2 | 1.5 |
2012 | 2.5 | 11.4 | -0.9 |
2013 | 1.3 | 12.0 | -0.3 |
2014 | 0.4 | 11.6 | 1.2 |
2015 | 0.0 | 10.9 | 2.0 |
2016 | 0.2 | 10.0 | 1.7 |
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
The GDP of the euro area in 2015 in current US dollars in the dataset of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is $11,990.9 billion or 16.3 percent of world GDP of $73,598.8 billion (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx). The sum of the GDP of France $2420.2 billion with the GDP of Germany of $3365.3 billion, Italy of $1815.8 billion and Spain $1199.7 billion is $8,801.0 billion or 73.4 percent of total euro area GDP and 13.1 percent of World GDP. The four largest economies account for slightly more than three quarters of economic activity of the euro area. Table VD-EUR1 is constructed with the dataset of EUROSTAT, providing growth rates of the euro area as a whole and of the largest four economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain annually from 1996 to 2016. The impact of the global recession on the overall euro area economy and on the four largest economies was quite strong. There was sharp contraction in 2009 and growth rates have not rebounded to earlier growth with exception of Germany in 2010 and 2011.
Table VD-EUR1, Euro Area, Real GDP Growth Rate, ∆%
Euro Area | Germany | France | Italy | Spain | |
2016 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 3.2 |
2015 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 3.2 |
2014 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 1.4 |
2013 | -0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | -1.7 | -1.7 |
2012 | -0.9 | 0.5 | 0.2 | -2.8 | -2.9 |
2011 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 0.6 | -1.0 |
2010 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 |
2009 | -4.5 | -5.6 | -2.9 | -5.5 | -3.6 |
2008 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 0.2 | -1.1 | 1.1 |
2007 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 3.8 |
2006 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 4.2 |
2005 | 1.7 | 0.7 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 3.7 |
2004 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 1.6 | 3.2 |
2003 | 0.7 | -0.7 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 3.2 |
2002 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 2.9 |
2001 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 4.0 |
2000 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 5.3 |
1999 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 1.6 | 4.5 |
1998 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 1.6 | 4.3 |
Average 1999-2016 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 1.7 |
Average 1999-2007 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 3.8 |
Average 2016-2007 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.6 | -7.0* | -0.5* |
1997 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 3.7 |
1996 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 2.7 |
Note: Absolute percentage change
Source: EUROSTAT
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
The Flash Eurozone PMI Composite Output Index of the HIS Markit Flash Eurozone PMI®, combining activity in manufacturing and services, increased from 50.1 in Sep to 50.2 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/0d41ffba58df4fafa8e3d8fdfdf40730). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the Markit Flash Eurozone PMI index suggests GDP growth about 0.1 percent quarterly with decline of manufacturing and growth of services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/0d41ffba58df4fafa8e3d8fdfdf40730). The IHS Markit Eurozone PMI® Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing activity with close association with GDP increased from 50.1 in Sep to 50.6 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a227956fa7c844cf8ed86ca390c59214). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds slower potential for quarterly growth at around 0.1 percent in GDP (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a227956fa7c844cf8ed86ca390c59214). The IHS Markit Eurozone Services Business Activity Index increased from 51.6 in Sep to 52.2 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a227956fa7c844cf8ed86ca390c59214). The IHS Markit Eurozone Manufacturing PMI® increased from 45.7 in Sep to 45.9 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1c462101cb924c64a158757794c7f13a). New export orders decreased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds manufacturing declining quarterly at more than 1 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1c462101cb924c64a158757794c7f13a). Table EUR provides the data table for the euro area.
Table EUR, Euro Area Economic Indicators
GDP | IIQ2019 ∆% 0.2; IIQ2019/IIQ2018 ∆% 1.2 Blog 9/13/15 11/22/15 12/13/15 2/14/16 3/13/16 5/1/16 5/15/16 6/12/16 8/7/16 8/14/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/11/16 02/26/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/11/17 8/20/17 9/10/17 11/26/17 12/10/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/10/18 8/19/18 9/16/18 11/18/18 12/16/18 3/10/19 5/26/19 6/9/19 9/15/19 |
Unemployment | Sep 2019: 7.5 % unemployment rate; Sep 2019: 12.335 million unemployed Blog 11/3/19 |
HICP | Sep month ∆%: 0.2 12 months Sep ∆%: 0.8 |
Producer Prices | Euro Zone industrial producer prices Sep ∆%: 0.1 |
Industrial Production | Sep Month ∆%: 0.1; 12 months ∆%: -1.7 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Sep month ∆%: 0.1 Earlier Data: |
Confidence and Economic Sentiment Indicator | Sentiment 100.8 Oct 2019 Consumer -7.6 Oct 2019 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15 |
Trade | Jan-Sep 2019/Jan-Sep 2018 Exports ∆%: 2.9 Sep 2019 12-month Exports ∆% 5.2 Imports ∆% 2.1 Earlier Data: |
Links to blog comments in Table EUR: 11/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
8/25/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
6/9/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html
5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html
12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html
9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
6/10/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
5/20/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html
3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html
2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html
12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
6/11/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html
5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html
3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html
2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html
11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html
11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html
9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html
8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html
6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html
5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html
3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html
3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html
2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html
12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html
VE Germany. The Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis) is updating GDP calculations (https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_299_811.html): “As every year in August, new statistical information was incorporated in the calculations of results for the last four years (from 2014) and for the first quarter of 2018 (see table "Comparison between previous and new figures: gross domestic product, price-adjusted, chain-linked") in the context of the first calculation of data for the second quarter of 2018. There are new releases (https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/05/PE19_196_811.html https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/05/PE19_184_811.html) As is usual for seasonally and calendar-adjusted series, modified results may also appear in the whole time series from 1991 onwards.” Table VE-DE provides yearly growth rates of the German economy from 1971 to 2018, price adjusted chain-linked and price and calendar-adjusted chain-linked. Germany’s GDP fell 5.6 percent in 2009 after growing below trend at 1.1 percent in 2008. Recovery has been robust in contrast with other advanced economies. The German economy grew at 4.1 percent in 2010, 3.7 percent in 2011 and 0.5 percent in 2012. Growth stabilized to 0.5 percent in 2013, increasing to 2.2 percent in 2014. The German economy grew at 1.7 percent in 2015 and grew at 2.2 percent in 2016. Germany’s GDP increased 2.2 percent in 2017 and increased 1.4 percent in 2018.
The Federal Statistical Agency of Germany analyzes the fall and recovery of the German economy (http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/Inlandsprodukt/Aktuell,templateId=renderPrint.psml):
“The German economy again grew strongly in 2011. The price-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 3.0% compared with the previous year. Accordingly, the catching-up process of the German economy continued during the second year after the economic crisis. In the course of 2011, the price-adjusted GDP again exceeded its pre-crisis level. The economic recovery occurred mainly in the first half of 2011. In 2009, Germany experienced the most serious post-war recession, when GDP suffered a historic decline of 5.1%. The year 2010 was characterised by a rapid economic recovery (+3.7%).”
Table VE-DE, Germany, GDP ∆% on Prior Year
Price Adjusted Chain-Linked | Price- and Calendar-Adjusted Chain Linked | |
Average ∆% 1991-2017 | 1.4 | |
Average ∆% 1991-2018 | 1.4 | |
Average ∆% 1991-1999 | 1.5 | |
Average ∆% 2000-2007 | 1.4 | |
Average ∆% 2003-2007 | 2.2 | |
Average ∆% 2007-2018 | 1.2 | |
Average ∆% 2009-2018 | 2.0 | |
2018 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
2017 | 2.5 | 2.8 |
2016 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
2015 | 1.7 | 1.5 |
2014 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
2013 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
2012 | 0.5 | 0.7 |
2011 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
2010 | 4.1 | 3.9 |
2009 | -5.6 | -5.6 |
2008 | 1.1 | 0.8 |
2007 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
2006 | 3.7 | 3.9 |
2005 | 0.7 | 0.9 |
2004 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
2003 | -0.7 | -0.7 |
2002 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
2001 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
2000 | 3.0 | 3.2 |
1999 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
1998 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
1997 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
1996 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
1995 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
1994 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
1993 | -1.0 | -1.0 |
1992 | 1.9 | 1.5 |
1991 | 5.1 | 5.2 |
1990 | 5.3 | 5.5 |
1989 | 3.9 | 4.0 |
1988 | 3.7 | 3.4 |
1987 | 1.4 | 1.3 |
1986 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
1985 | 2.3 | 2.6 |
1984 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
1983 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
1982 | -0.4 | -0.5 |
1981 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
1980 | 1.4 | 1.3 |
1979 | 4.2 | 4.3 |
1978 | 3.0 | 3.1 |
1977 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
1976 | 4.9 | 4.5 |
1975 | -0.9 | -0.9 |
1974 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
1973 | 4.8 | 5.0 |
1972 | 4.3 | 4.3 |
1971 | 3.1 | 3.0 |
1970 | NA | NA |
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Destatis)
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/05/PE19_196_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/05/PE19_184_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/02/PE14_048_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/08/PE13_278_811.html https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/11/PE13_381_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/01/PE14_016_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/05/PE14_167_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/09/PE14_306_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/11/PE14_401_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/02/PE15_048_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/02/PE15_61_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/05/PE15_173_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/05/PE15_187_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/08/PE15_293_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/08/PE15_305_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/11/PE15_419_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/11/PE15_430_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/02/PE16_056_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/02/PE16_044_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/05/PE16_162_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/05/PE16_171_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_279_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_291_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/11/PE16_403_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/11/PE16_413_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_050_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_062_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/05/PE17_155_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/05/PE17_169_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/08/PE17_277_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/08/PE17_294_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/11/PE17_422_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/02/PE18_044_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/05/PE18_168_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/02/PE18_058_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/05/PE18_182_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_299_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_316_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/11/PE18_440_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/11/PE18_454_811.html
https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/08/PE19_321_811.html
The Flash Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Flash Germany PMI®, combining manufacturing and services, increased from 48.5 in Sep to 48.6 in Oct. The index of manufacturing output reached 43.6 in Oct, increasing from 43.0 in Sep, while the index of services decreased to 51.2 in Oct from 51.4 in Sep. The overall Flash Germany Manufacturing PMI® increased from 41.7 in Sep to 41.9 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/644e5c6de3254a518b8a0791b1506f9e). New orders decreased and new export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak manufacturing of Germany with slowing services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/644e5c6de3254a518b8a0791b1506f9e). The IHS Markit Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Germany Services PMI®, combining manufacturing and services with close association with Germany’s GDP, increased from 48.5 in Sep to 48.9 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c8c1672905614a9f943be90638e14550). Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak conditions of Germany (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c8c1672905614a9f943be90638e14550). The Germany Services Business Activity Index increased from 51.4 in Sep to 51.6 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c8c1672905614a9f943be90638e14550). The IHS Markit/BME Germany Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), showing close association with Germany’s manufacturing conditions, increased from 41.7 in Sep to 42.1 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/cbd30415d7b5492eaed46eca6e550d75). New export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/cbd30415d7b5492eaed46eca6e550d75). Table DE provides the country data table for Germany.
Table DE, Germany, Economic Indicators
GDP | IIQ2019 -0.1 ∆%; IIQ2019/IIQ2018 NCSA ∆% 0.0 CA 0.4 2016/2015: 2.2 CA 2.1 2017/2016: 2.5 CA 2.8 2018/2017: 1.5 CA 1.5 GDP ∆% 1970-2018 Blog 8/26/12 5/27/12 11/25/12 2/24/13 5/19/13 5/26/13 8/18/13 8/25/13 11/17/13 11/24/13 1/26/14 2/16/14 3/2/14 5/18/14 5/25/14 8/17/14 9/7/14 11/16/14 11/30/14 2/15/15 3/1/15 5/17/15 5/24/15 8/16/15 8/30/15 11/22/15 11/29/15 2/14/16 2/28/16 5/15/16 5/29/16 8/14/16 8/28/16 11/20/16 11/27/16 2/19/17 02/26/17 05/14/17 5/28/17 8/20/17 8/27/17 11/26/17 2/18/18 2/25/18 5/20/18 5/27/18 8/19/18 9/2/18 11/18/18 11/25/18 4/14/19 5/26/19 9/1/19 |
Consumer Price Index | Oct month NSA ∆%: 0.1 |
Producer Price Index | Sep month 0.1 12 months 0.1 |
Industrial Production | MFG Production Aug month CSA ∆%: 0.3 Earlier Data: |
Machine Orders | MF Sep month ∆%: 1.6 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Sep Month ∆% 0.1 12-Month ∆% 3.4 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15 |
Employment Report | Unemployment Rate SA Sep 3.1% |
Trade Balance | Exports Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: 4.6 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15 |
Links to blog comments in Table DE: 11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
9/1/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/revaluation-of-us-dollar-falling-yields.html
8/25/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
6/2/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
4/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html
1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html
11/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html
11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html
9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html
5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html
2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html
5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
5/14/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html
2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
02/19/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html
11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html
11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html
11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html
8/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/and-as-ever-economic-outlook-is.html
8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html
5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html
11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html
11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html
08/30/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuations-of-global-financial.html
08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html
5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html
4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html
2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html
11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html
9/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/competitive-monetary-policy-and.html
8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html
5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html
2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html
1/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html
11/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html
11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html
8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html
8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html
VF France. Table VF-FR provides growth rates of GDP of France with the estimates of Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE). The long-term rate of GDP growth of France from IVQ1949 to IIIQ2019 is quite high at 3.1 percent. France’s growth rates were quite high in the four decades of the 1950s, 1960, 1970s and 1980s with an average growth rate of 4.0 percent compounding the average rates in the decades and discounting to one decade. The growth impulse diminished with 2.0 percent in the 1990s and 1.8 percent from 2000 to 2007. The average growth rate from 2000 to 2019, using fourth quarter data, is 1.2 percent because of the sharp impact of the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in US fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in the G7 in Japan and France in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Lucas (2011May) compares growth of the G7 economies (US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada) and Spain, finding that catch-up growth with earlier rates for the US and UK stalled in the 1970s.
Table VF-FR, France, Average Growth Rates of GDP Fourth Quarter, 1949-2018
Period | Average ∆% |
1949-2019 | 3.1 |
2007-2019***** | 0.9 |
2007-2018**** | 0.9 |
2007-2017*** | 0.8 |
2007-2016** | 0.6 |
2007-2015* | 0.5 |
2007-2014 | 0.4 |
2000-2019 | 1.2 |
2000-2018 | 1.2 |
2000-2017 | 1.2 |
2000-2016 | 1.1 |
2000-2015 | 1.1 |
2000-2014 | 1.1 |
2000-2007 | 1.8 |
1990-1999 | 2.0 |
1980-1989 | 2.7 |
1970-1979 | 3.7 |
1960-1969 | 5.7 |
1950-1959 | 4.2 |
*IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 **IVQ2007 to IVQ2016 ***IVQ2007 to IVQ2017 ****IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 *****IVQ2007 to IIIQ2019
Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4241521
http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312
The IHS Markit Flash France Composite Output Index increased from 50.8 in Sep to 52.6 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/7b398ba3d337414b88a81a2ae8149ca6). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit, finds combined manufacturing and services activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/7b398ba3d337414b88a81a2ae8149ca6). The IHS Markit France Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing with close association with French GDP, increased from 50.8 in Sep to 52.6 in Oct, indicating expanding activity of the private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/00c73675eef142c2a4c16d56f26635a8). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit that compiles the France Services PMI®, finds continuing activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/00c73675eef142c2a4c16d56f26635a8). The IHS Markit France Services Activity index increased from 51.1 in Sep to 52.9 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/00c73675eef142c2a4c16d56f26635a8). The IHS Markit France Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index® increased to 50.7 in Oct from 50.1 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5e2c9921d98c4cc79ab410aee6518c05). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit, finds improving manufacturing ((https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5e2c9921d98c4cc79ab410aee6518c05). Table FR provides the country data table for France.
Table FR, France, Economic Indicators
CPI | Oct month ∆% 0.0 |
PPI | Sep month ∆%: 0.1 Sep 12 months ∆%: -1.0 Blog 10/27/19 |
GDP Growth | IIIQ2019/IIQ2019 ∆%: 0.3 |
Industrial Production | Manufacturing Sep 0.6 Quarter ∆%: -1.0 YOY -0.4 Earlier Data: |
Consumer Spending | Manufactured Goods Earlier Data: |
Employment | Unemployment Rate: IIQ2019 8.2% |
Trade Balance | Sep Exports ∆%: month -2.3 12 months 1.5 Imports ∆%: month -1.8 12 months 1.2 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15 |
Confidence Indicators | Historical average 100 Oct Mfg Business Climate 99 Earlier Data: Blog 3/29/15 |
Links to blog comments in Table FR: 11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/27/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial_26.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
9/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
8/11/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html
7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html
7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html
6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
6/2/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html
12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html
11/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
7/29/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html
6/24/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
6/3/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html
5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
04/01/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html
3/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
2/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html
12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html
12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
11/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
6/25/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html
6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
5/7/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
3/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
3/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
2/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html
12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html
10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html
9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html
9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html
8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html
6/26/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html
6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html
5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html
3/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html
2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html
12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html
11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html
9/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html
08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
6/28/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html
5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html
4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html
2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html
12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html
9/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html
8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html
6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html
5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html
2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html
12/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html
11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html
9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html
6/30/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html
5/19/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
VG Italy. Table VG-IT provides revised percentage changes of GDP in Italy of quarter on prior quarter and quarter on same quarter a year earlier. In IIQ2019, Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2019 and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, the GDP of Italy decreased 0.1 percent and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of Italy changed 0.0 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of Italy increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 1.0 percent in IQ2013 and declined 2.9 percent relative to IQ2012. GDP had been growing during six consecutive quarters but at very low rates from IQ2010 to IIQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell in seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at increasingly higher rates of contraction from 0.6 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IVQ2011, 0.9 percent in IQ2012, 0.9 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012. The pace of decline accelerated to minus 0.5 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 1.0 percent in IQ2013. GDP contracted cumulatively 5.2 percent in seven consecutive quarterly contractions from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent. The year-on-year rate has fallen from 2.3 percent in IVQ2010 to minus 2.8 percent in IVQ2012, minus 2.9 percent in IQ2013, minus 2.0 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 1.2 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP fell 0.8 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.3 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.1 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.8 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.8 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.7 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.0 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to a year earlier and changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IQ2019 relative to a year earlier and decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2019 relative to a year earlier. Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy in IIQ2019 of €403,786.1 million (https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/230842) is lower by 5.1 percent relative to €425,552.0 million in IQ2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy increased from €368,036.0 million in IQ1998 to €425,552.0 million in IQ2008 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. The fiscal adjustment of Italy is significantly more difficult with the economy not growing especially on the prospects of increasing government revenue. The strategy is for reforms to improve productivity, facilitating future fiscal consolidation.
Table VG-IT, Italy, GDP ∆%
Quarter ∆% Relative to Preceding Quarter | Quarter ∆% Relative to Same Quarter Year Earlier | |
IIQ2019 | 0.0 | -0.1 |
IQ2019 | 0.1 | -0.1 |
IVQ2018 | -0.1 | 0.0 |
IIIQ2018 | -0.1 | 0.5 |
IIQ2018 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
IQ2018 | 0.2 | 1.4 |
IVQ2017 | 0.4 | 1.7 |
IIIQ2017 | 0.4 | 1.8 |
IIQ2017 | 0.4 | 1.8 |
IQ2017 | 0.6 | 1.6 |
IVQ2016 | 0.5 | 1.3 |
IIIQ2016 | 0.4 | 1.2 |
IIQ2016 | 0.2 | 1.1 |
IQ2016 | 0.2 | 1.3 |
IVQ2015 | 0.4 | 1.3 |
IIIQ2015 | 0.3 | 0.8 |
IIQ2015 | 0.4 | 0.8 |
IQ2015 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
IVQ2014 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
IIIQ2014 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
IIQ2014 | -0.1 | 0.2 |
IQ2014 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
IVQ2013 | -0.2 | -0.8 |
IIIQ2013 | 0.4 | -1.2 |
IIQ2013 | 0.0 | -2.0 |
IQ2013 | -1.0 | -2.9 |
IVQ2012 | -0.5 | -2.8 |
IIIQ2012 | -0.5 | -3.1 |
IIQ2012 | -0.9 | -3.2 |
IQ2012 | -0.9 | -2.2 |
IVQ2011 | -0.9 | -1.1 |
IIIQ2011 | -0.6 | 0.4 |
IIQ2011 | 0.1 | 1.6 |
IQ2011 | 0.2 | 2.0 |
IVQ2010 | 0.7 | 2.3 |
IIIQ2010 | 0.5 | 1.9 |
IIQ2010 | 0.6 | 1.9 |
IQ2010 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
IVQ2009 | 0.4 | -2.6 |
IIIQ2009 | 0.5 | -5.2 |
IIQ2009 | -0.8 | -7.0 |
IQ2009 | -2.7 | -7.2 |
IVQ2008 | -2.3 | -3.6 |
IIIQ2008 | -1.4 | -1.4 |
IIQ2008 | -0.9 | -0.1 |
IQ2008 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
IV2007 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
IIIQ2007 | 0.0 | 1.3 |
IIQ2007 | -0.1 | 1.7 |
IQ2007 | 0.2 | 2.4 |
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/232922
The HIS Markit Italy Composite Output Index increased from 50.6 in Sep to 50.8 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/96902d3571b24915ac3dad3b50c607ed).The IHS Markit Italy Business Activity Index increased from 51.4 in Sep to 52.2 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/96902d3571b24915ac3dad3b50c607ed). Amritpal Virdee, Economist at IHS Markit that compiles the Italy Services PMI®, finds improving conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/96902d3571b24915ac3dad3b50c607ed). The IHS Markit Italy Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), decreased from 47.8 in Sep to 47.7 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1626f497aed44ac58894e70cd3e60038). New export orders decreased. Amritpal Virdee, Economist at HIS Markit that compiles the Italian Manufacturing PMI®, finds deteriorating manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1626f497aed44ac58894e70cd3e60038). Table IT provides the country data table for Italy.
Table IT, Italy, Economic Indicators
Consumer Price Index | Oct month ∆% -0.1 12 months ∆% 0.2 |
Producer Price Index | Sep month ∆%: 0.1 Sep 12-month ∆%: -2.4 Blog 11/3/19 |
GDP Growth | IIQ2019/IQ2019 SA ∆%: 0.0 |
Labor Report | Sep 2019 Participation rate 65.7% Employment ratio 59.1% Unemployment rate 9.9% Youth Unemployment 28.7% Blog 11/3/19 |
Industrial Production | Sep month ∆%: 0.4 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Sep month ∆%: 0.7 Sep 12-month ∆%: 0.9 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15 |
Business Confidence | Mfg Oct 99.6, Jun 100.7 Construction Oct 141.3 Jun 140.9 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15 |
Trade Balance | Balance Sep SA €4,315 million Earlier Data: |
Links to blog comments in Table IT: 11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/29/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/dollar-appreciation-decreasing.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
9/8/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/increase-in-valuations-of-risk.html
8/11/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/competitive-exchange-rate-policies.html
8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
6/9/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html
5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html
3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html
12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html
9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html
3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html
2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html
12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html
6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html
3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html
2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html
11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html
9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html
8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html
5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html
2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html
12/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html
11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html
9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html
08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html
5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html
4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html
4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html
2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html
12/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html
11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html
10/19/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html
8/31/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopo7litical-and-financial-risks.html
8/10/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk_10.html
6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html
5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html
2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html
12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html
11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html
9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
8/11/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/recovery-without-hiring-loss-of-full.html
6/16/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html
3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html
VH United Kingdom. Annual data in Table VH-UK show the strong impact of the global recession in the UK with decline of GDP of 4.2 percent in 2009 after dropping 0.3 percent in 2008. Recovery of 1.9 percent in 2010 is relatively low in comparison with annual growth rates in 2007 and earlier years. Growth was only 1.5 percent in 2011 and 1.5 percent in 2012. Growth increased to 2.1 percent in 2013 and 2.6 percent in 2014. Growth fell to 2.4 percent in 2015, and 1.9 percent in 2016. GDP grew 1.9 percent in 2017. GDP grew 1.4 percent in 2018. The bottom part of Table VH-UK provides average growth rates of UK GDP since 1948. The UK economy grew at 2.6 percent per year on average between 1948 and 2018, which is relatively high for an advanced economy. The growth rate of GDP between 2000 and 2007 is higher at 2.8 percent. Growth in the current cyclical expansion from 2010 to 2018 has been only at 1.9 percent as advanced economies struggle with weak internal demand and world trade. GDP in 2018 is higher by 13.3 percent relative to 2007 while it would have been 35.5 higher at trend of 2.8 percent as from 2000 to 2007.
Table VH-UK, UK, Gross Domestic Product, ∆%
∆% on Prior Year | |
1998 | 3.6 |
1999 | 3.4 |
2000 | 3.4 |
2001 | 3.0 |
2002 | 2.3 |
2003 | 3.3 |
2004 | 2.4 |
2005 | 3.2 |
2006 | 2.8 |
2007 | 2.4 |
2008 | -0.3 |
2009 | -4.2 |
2010 | 1.9 |
2011 | 1.5 |
2012 | 1.5 |
2013 | 2.1 |
2014 | 2.6 |
2015 | 2.4 |
2016 | 1.9 |
2017 | 1.9 |
2018 | 1.4 |
Average Growth Rates ∆% per Year | |
1948-2018 | 2.6 |
1950-1959 | 3.1 |
1960-1969 | 3.1 |
1970-1979 | 2.6 |
1980-1989 | 3.2 |
1990-1999 | 2.4 |
2000-2007 | 2.8 |
2007-2013* | 2.5 |
2007-2014* | 5.1 |
2007-2015 | 0.9 |
2007-2016 | 1.0 |
2007-2017 | 1.1 |
2007-2018 | 1.1 |
2000-2018 | 1.8 |
*Absolute change from 2007 to 2013 and 2007 to 2014
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
The HIS Markit Flash UK PMI® Composite Output Index fell from 52.4 in Jun to 47.7 in Jul, which is the lowest in 87 months (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds the index suggests pace of contraction of GDP at 0.4 percent in IIIQ2016 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). The Business Activity Index of the IHS Markit/CIPS UK Services PMI® increased from 49.5 in Sep to 50.0 in Oct (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/8a036061b3ba4085a99c31b28421a1c8). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds quarterly GDP contraction around 0.1 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/8a036061b3ba4085a99c31b28421a1c8). The IHS Markit/CIPS UK Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®) increased to 49.6 in Oct from 48.3 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6ec3a0438b8249c497ec645bb279d7c1). New export orders increased. Rob Dobson, Director at IHS Markit that compiles the Markit/CIPS Manufacturing PMI®, finds challenges in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6ec3a0438b8249c497ec645bb279d7c1). Table UK provides the economic indicators for the United Kingdom.
Table UK, UK Economic Indicators
CPI | Oct month ∆%: -0.2 |
Output/Input Prices | Output Prices: Oct 12-month NSA ∆%: 0.8 excluding food, petroleum ∆%: 1.3 |
GDP Growth | IIIQ2019 prior quarter ∆% 0.3; year earlier same quarter ∆%: 1.0 |
Industrial Production | Sep 2019/Sep 2018 ∆%: Production Industries -1.4; Manufacturing -1.8 Earlier Data: |
Retail Sales | Oct month ∆%: -0.1 Earlier Data: |
Labor Market | Jul/Sep 2019 Unemployment Rate: 3.8% |
GDP and the Labor Market | IQ2015 Employment 104.8 IQ2008 =100 GDP IQ15=104.0 IQ2008=100 Blog 5/17/14 |
Trade Balance UK Trade in Goods and Services | Balance SA Sep -£3360 million EARLIER DATA: |
Links to blog comments in Table UK: 11/3/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/11/decrease-of-fomc-policy-rate-monetary.html
10/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/dollar-depreciation-fluctuating.html
10/6/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/10/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk.html
9/22/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/uncertain-fomc-outlook-of-monetary.html
9/15/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/09/competitive-exchange-rate-and-interest.html
8/18/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/global-decline-of-yields-of-government.html
7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html
7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html
5/19/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html
4/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html
2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html
12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html
10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html
7/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html
5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
4/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html
2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
2/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html
12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html
11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html
10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html
10/8/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html
8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html
7/30/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html
7/9/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html
5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
2/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html
1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html
11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html
10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html
10/9/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html
9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html
7/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/business-fixed-investment-has-been-soft.html
7/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html
5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html
5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html
4/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html
2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html
12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html
11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html
11/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-increase-considered.html
10/4/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html
9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html
08/02/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html
7/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html
5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html
5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html
5/3/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html
4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html
4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html
4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html
3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html
2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html
12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html
11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html
10/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html
10/5/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html
8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html
7/27/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html
6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html
5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
5/4/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html
4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html
3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html
2/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html
12/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html
12/1/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/exit-risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html
10/27/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html
9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html
8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html
7/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html
5/26/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html
4/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html
03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html
The UK Office for National Statistics provides revision of the national accounts in accordance with the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010) (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/naa2/quarterly-national-accounts/q2-2015/index.html). The UK Office for National Statistics moved the base and reference year of chained volumes from 2015 to 2016 (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/januarytomarch2018). There are adjustments of the UK national accounts (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/articles/nationalaccountsarticles/previousReleases https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/januarytomarch2018). The second estimate for IIQ2019 (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/apriltojune2019) incorporates changes and notice of future revision: “(This release contains data that are consistent with the UK National Accounts, The Blue Book 2019, which will be released on 31 October 2019. As such, data for all periods within this release are subject to revision in line with the National Accounts Revisions Policy.)” GDP grew 0.3 percent in IIIQ2019 relative to IIQ2019. Growth of 1.2 percent in IIIQ2012 interrupted three consecutive quarters of weakness in GDP growth from IIQ2011 to IVQ2011. Most advanced economies are underperforming relative to the period before the global recession. The UK Office for National Statistics analyzes that the decline in the impulse of growth in the UK originated in weakness in markets in the UK and worldwide. The UK Office for National Statistics data shows that GDP in IIIQ2019 is higher by 13.2 percent relative to the peak in IQ2008 (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/julytoseptember2019). UK GDP in chained value measures is ₤461,472 million in IQ2008 and ₤494,144 million in IVQ2015 or increase of 7.1 percent. Growth at trend of 2.8 percent per year would bring GDP to ₤571,600 million in IVQ2015. UK GDP in IVQ2015 at ₤494,144 million is lower by ₤77,456 million relative to trend at ₤571,600 million or lower by 13.6 percent compared with trend. GDP estimates of the UK Office for National Statistics measure the contraction of 6.0 percent from peak to trough (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/julytoseptember2019), which is roughly equal at 6.0 percent to compounding the quarterly rates except for rounding in Table VH-1 from IIQ2008 to IIQ2009. UK GDP is ₤461,472 million in IQ2008 declining 6.0 percent to ₤433,618 million in IIQ2009. GDP increased 14.0 percent from IIQ2009 to ₤494,144 million in IVQ2015 or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent. GDP increased 7.1 percent from IQ2008 to IVQ2015 or at the annual equivalent rate of 0.9 percent. Using the seasonally adjusted chained-value measures (https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/gdpfirstquarterlyestimateuk/julytoseptember2019). GDP increased from ₤461,472 million in IQ2008 to ₤522,247 million in IIIQ2019, or 13.2 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. UK GDP in IIIQ2019 at ₤522,247 million is lower by ₤111,719 million relative to trend at ₤633,966 million or lower by 17.6 percent compared with trend. UK GDP increased 20.4 percent from IIQ2009 to IIIQ2019 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent.
Table VH-1, UK, Percentage Change of GDP from Prior Quarter, Chained Value Measures ∆%
IQ | IIQ | IIIQ | IV | |
2019 | 0.6 | -0.2 | 0.3 | |
2018 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
2017 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
2016 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
2015 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.7 |
2014 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
2013 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.5 |
2012 | 0.6 | -0.1 | 1.2 | -0.2 |
2011 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
2010 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.1 |
2009 | -1.7 | -0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
2008 | 0.5 | -0.6 | -1.6 | -2.1 |
2007 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
2006 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.5 |
2005 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.5 |
2004 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
2003 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
2002 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
2001 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
2000 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
1999 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 1.8 | 1.4 |
1998 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Chart VH-1 of the UK Office for National Statistics provides the quarterly growth rate of GDP of the United Kingdom and GDP in chained volume measures (CVM) from 2008 to 2019. GDP contracted sharply during the global recession, surpassing the pre-recession peak of IQ2008 and continuing growth in the expansion phase. There is recent deceleration in growth.
Chart VH-1, United Kingdom, Gross Domestic Product, CVM, SA, ₤ Billion, Percentage Change on Prior Quarter
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
There are four periods in Table VH-2 in growth of GDP in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier in the UK in the years from 1998 to the present. (1) Growth rates were quite high from 2000 to 2007. (2) There were six consecutive quarters of contraction of GDP from IIIQ2008 to IVQ2009. Contractions relative to the quarter a year earlier were quite sharp with the highest of 3.6 percent in IVQ2008, 5.8 percent in IQ2009, 5.5 percent in IIQ2009 and 3.9 percent in IIIQ2009. (3) The economy bounced strongly with 2.0 percent in IIQ2010, 2.6 percent in IIIQ2010 and 2.4 percent in IVQ2010. (4) Recovery did not continue at rates comparable to those in 2000 to 2007 and even relative to those in the final three quarters of 2010. Growth relative to the same quarter a year earlier fell from 2.4 percent in IVQ2010 to 1.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.1 percent in IIIQ2011, 1.2 percent in IVQ2011 but only 1.2 percent in IQ2012, increase of 1.1 percent in IIQ2012 relative to IIQ2011, increase of 2.0 percent in IIIQ2012 and 1.6 percent in IVQ2012. In IQ2012, UK GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, GDP fell 0.1 percent relative to IQ2012 and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, GDP increased 1.2 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IVQ2012, GDP fell 0.2 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Fiscal consolidation in an environment of weakening economic growth is much more challenging. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 0.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to IVQ2012. In IIQ2013, GDP increased 0.5 percent and 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2013 and 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2013 and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, GDP increased 0.7 percent and 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2014 and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2014 and 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, GDP increased 0.6 percent and 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2015 and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2016 and grew 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2017 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2017 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2018, GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2018 and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2019, GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IIQ2019 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2019, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier.
Table VH-2, UK, Percentage Change of GDP from Same Quarter a Year Earlier, Chained Value Measures ∆%
IQ | IIQ | IIIQ | IVQ | |
2019 | 2.1 | 1.3 | 1.0 | |
2018 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
2017 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.6 |
2016 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
2015 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
2014 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
2013 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.7 |
2012 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 1.6 |
2011 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
2010 | 0.8 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.4 |
2009 | -5.8 | -5.5 | -3.9 | -1.6 |
2008 | 2.4 | 1.2 | -1.1 | -3.6 |
2007 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 2.8 |
2006 | 4.3 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 1.3 |
2005 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 4.8 |
2004 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 1.4 |
2003 | 2.8 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
2002 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.6 |
2001 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
2000 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 3.1 | 1.8 |
1999 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 4.2 |
1998 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.5 |
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Table VH-3 provides annual percentage changes of gross value added and key components. Production fell 7.7 percent in 2009 and its most important component manufacturing fell 8.6 percent. Services fell 2.7 percent in 2009. Services grew in all years from 2010 to 2018 while manufacturing fell 1.1 percent in 2012 and fell 1.1 percent in 2013. Manufacturing resumed growth with 2.9 percent in 2014 followed by decrease of 0.1 percent in 2015. Manufacturing increased 0.2 percent in 2016 and increased 2.2 percent in 2017. Manufacturing increased 0.4 percent in 2018.
Table VH-3, UK, Gross Value Added by Components, ∆% on Prior Year
TP | MFG | CONS | SERV | GVA BP | GVA EX | |
2016 Weights | 136 | 102 | 61 | 796 | 1000 | 995 |
2018 | 0.1 | 0.4 | -0.4 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 1.3 |
2017 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 6.4 | 1.7 | 2 | 2 |
2016 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 3.9 | 2 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
2015 | 1 | -0.1 | 4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 |
2014 | 1.6 | 2.9 | 10 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
2013 | -1 | -1.1 | 1.7 | 2.9 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
2012 | -2.3 | -1.1 | -7.3 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
2011 | -0.1 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2 |
2010 | 3.4 | 4.6 | 8.5 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
2009 | -7.7 | -8.6 | -13.2 | -2.7 | -4.2 | -4.1 |
2008 | -2.5 | -2.8 | -2.6 | 0.5 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
2007 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
2006 | 1.1 | 2.4 | 0.8 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
2005 | -0.5 | 0.1 | -2.4 | 4.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 |
2004 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 5.3 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
2003 | -0.4 | -0.4 | 4.8 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 |
2002 | -1.5 | -2.4 | 5.7 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.4 |
2001 | -1.5 | -1.4 | 1.8 | 4.3 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
2000 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 4.7 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
1999 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.4 |
1998 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
Note: TP: Total Production; MFG: Manufacturing; CONS: Construction; SERV: Services; GVA BP: Gross Value Added at Basic Prices; GVA EX: Gross Value Added excluding Oil and Gas
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Table VH-4 shows for IIIQ2019 that gross valued at basic prices increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier while gross value added with exclusions increased 1.0 percent. Total production decreased 1.4 percent and manufacturing decreased 1.4 percent. Services grew 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier.
Table VH-4, UK, Gross Value Added by Components, ∆% on Same Quarter of Prior Year
TP | MFG | CONS | SERV | GVA BP | GVA EX | |
2016 Weights | 136 | 102 | 61 | 796 | 1000 | 995 |
2019 Q3 | -1.4 | -1.4 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
2019 Q2 | -0.9 | -1.3 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
2019 Q1 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 3.7 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2 |
2018 Q4 | -1.5 | -1.7 | -0.2 | 2.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
2018 Q3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
2018 Q2 | 0.7 | 1.2 | -0.6 | 2 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
2018 Q1 | 1.1 | 1.7 | -1.1 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 |
2017 Q4 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 5.4 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.6 |
2017 Q3 | 2 | 2.6 | 5.9 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
2017 Q2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 6.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
2017 Q1 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 8 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
2016 Q4 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 4.8 | 1.8 | 2 | 2 |
2016 Q3 | 1 | 0.2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
2016 Q2 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 3.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
2016 Q1 | 0.1 | -1.4 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2 | 1.9 |
2015 Q4 | 0.3 | -1.3 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
2015 Q3 | 0.8 | -0.8 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2 | 1.9 |
2015 Q2 | 1.7 | 0.4 | 4.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
2015 Q1 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 6.8 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 |
2014 Q4 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 8.9 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
2014 Q3 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 9.6 | 2 | 2.4 | 2.5 |
2014 Q2 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 11.3 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.7 |
2014 Q1 | 1.9 | 2.9 | 10.2 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
2013 Q4 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 5.9 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
2013 Q3 | -1 | -0.9 | 5.4 | 2.3 | 2 | 2 |
2013 Q2 | -1.6 | -1.3 | 0.2 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
2013 Q1 | -2.8 | -3.1 | -4.4 | 3.3 | 1.9 | 2 |
2012 Q4 | -3.1 | -2.1 | -7.8 | 3.5 | 1.8 | 1.9 |
2012 Q3 | -1.8 | -0.8 | -8.5 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
2012 Q2 | -2.2 | -1.7 | -8.1 | 2.3 | 0.9 | 1 |
2012 Q1 | -2.2 | 0 | -5.1 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
2011 Q4 | -2 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
2011 Q3 | -0.3 | 1.5 | -1.9 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
2011 Q2 | 0.1 | 3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
2011 Q1 | 2 | 4.6 | 5.8 | 2.9 | 3 | 3.1 |
2010 Q4 | 4 | 5.2 | 9 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 3 |
2010 Q3 | 3.6 | 6 | 10.6 | 2.3 | 3 | 3 |
2010 Q2 | 3.2 | 4.3 | 10.5 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
2010 Q1 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 4 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
2009 Q4 | -3.2 | -3.6 | -7.8 | -0.8 | -1.6 | -1.6 |
2009 Q3 | -8.1 | -9 | -12.2 | -2.2 | -3.8 | -3.8 |
2009 Q2 | -8.9 | -9.9 | -16.2 | -3.8 | -5.4 | -5.4 |
2009 Q1 | -10.3 | -11.6 | -16.1 | -3.9 | -5.7 | -5.7 |
2008 Q4 | -6.6 | -6.9 | -8.7 | -2.6 | -3.6 | -3.5 |
2008 Q3 | -2 | -2.8 | -1.7 | -0.7 | -0.9 | -0.9 |
2008 Q2 | -1.2 | -1.6 | -0.4 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.4 |
2008 Q1 | -0.1 | 0 | 0.3 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
2007 Q4 | 0.7 | -0.4 | 0.5 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
2007 Q3 | 0.4 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 3.5 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
2007 Q2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 3 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
2007 Q1 | 0.6 | 1.8 | 4.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 |
2006 Q4 | 1.2 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 |
2006 Q3 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
2006 Q2 | 0.2 | 1.8 | -0.6 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
2006 Q1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | -1.9 | 5.8 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
2005 Q4 | -0.5 | -0.2 | -2.3 | 6.8 | 5.1 | 5.3 |
2005 Q3 | 0.1 | 1.1 | -3 | 5.3 | 4 | 4.2 |
2005 Q2 | -0.5 | 0.2 | -1.7 | 4.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 |
2005 Q1 | -1 | -0.6 | -2.7 | 3.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
2004 Q4 | 0 | 1 | -0.2 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 2 |
2004 Q3 | -0.3 | 0.6 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 2 | 2.2 |
2004 Q2 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 6.8 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 |
2004 Q1 | 1.6 | 3 | 11.7 | 3 | 3.2 | 3.4 |
2003 Q4 | 1 | 1.9 | 5.7 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
2003 Q3 | -0.2 | -0.7 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
2003 Q2 | -1 | -0.6 | 5.5 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
2003 Q1 | -1.3 | -2.3 | 3.5 | 4 | 2.9 | 3 |
2002 Q4 | -0.6 | -1.8 | 6.9 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
2002 Q3 | -1.4 | -1.9 | 7.4 | 2.6 | 2.2 | 2.4 |
2002 Q2 | -1.7 | -2.9 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
2002 Q1 | -2.2 | -3.1 | 5.2 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
2001 Q4 | -3.2 | -3.8 | 3.8 | 5.3 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
2001 Q3 | -1.3 | -1.1 | 3.7 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 3.3 |
2001 Q2 | -1.4 | -1.3 | 1.6 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 2.8 |
2001 Q1 | -0.1 | 0.6 | -1.9 | 3.5 | 2.4 | 2.6 |
2000 Q4 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 0 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
2000 Q3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | -1.9 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 3.5 |
2000 Q2 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 6.3 | 5.3 | 5.3 |
2000 Q1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 4.7 |
1999 Q4 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 4.2 |
1999 Q3 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
1999 Q2 | -0.3 | -0.9 | 1.3 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.4 |
1999 Q1 | -0.9 | -1.6 | -1.5 | 4.9 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
1998 Q4 | -0.1 | -1 | 0 | 5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
1998 Q3 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 4.8 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
1998 Q2 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 3.2 |
1998 Q1 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 4.7 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 3.1 |
Note: TP: Total Production; MFG: Manufacturing; CONS: Construction; SERV: Services; GVA BP: Gross Value Added at Basic Prices; GVA EX: Gross Value Added excluding Oil and Gas
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Table VH-5, UK, Contribution to Quarter on Prior Quarter of Growth of Value Added by Expenditure Components, %
IIIQ2018 | IVQ2018 | IQ2019 | IIQ2019 | IIIQ2019 | |
HFC | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.25 |
NPISH | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.03 | 0.01 |
GOVT | 0.08 | 0.30 | 0.15 | 0.20 | 0.06 |
GCF | -0.52 | 0.45 | 3.03 | -3.18 | -1.24 |
GFCF | 0.08 | -0.02 | 0.15 | -0.16 | -0.04 |
BI | -0.08 | -0.10 | 0.08 | -0.04 | 0.00 |
Exports | 1.00 | 0.14 | 0.47 | -2.01 | 1.47 |
Less Imports | 0.29 | 0.87 | 3.33 | -4.61 | 0.25 |
Net Trade | 0.70 | -0.73 | -2.86 | 2.60 | 1.22 |
Components may not add because of rounding
HFC: Household Final Consumption; NPISH: NPISH Final Consumption; GOVT: General Government; GCF: Gross Capital Formation; GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation; BINV: Business Investment; EXP: Exports; IMP: Less Imports
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Contributions of value added by expenditure components in a year relative to the prior year are in Table VH-6. Household final consumption added 1.4 percentage points in 2014 and 1.7 percentage points in 2015. Household final consumption added 2.39 percentage points 2016. Household final consumption contributed 1.44 percentage points in 2017. Household final consumption contributed 1.01 percentage points in 2018. Gross capital formation contributed 1.8 percentage points in 2014 and 0.8 percentage points in 2015. Gross capital formation deducted 0.10 percentage points in 2016. Gross capital formation deducted 0.29 percentage points in 2017. Gross capital formation contributed 0.24 percentage points in 2018. GFCF added 1.1 percentage points in 2014 and 0.6 percentage points in 2015. GFCF added 0.62 percentage points in 2016. GFCF contributed 0.28 percentage points in 2017. GFCF deducted 0.01 percentage points in 2018. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points in 2014 and subtracted 0.4 percentage points in 2015. Net trade deducted 0.52 percentage points in 2016. Net trade contributed 0.68 percentage points in 2017. Net trade deducted 0.49 percentage points in 2018.
Table VH-6, UK, Contribution to Growth on Prior Year of Value Added by Expenditure Components, %
2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | |
HFC | 1.4 | 1.7 | 2.39 | 1.44 | 1.01 |
NPISH | 0.0 | 0.0 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
GOVT | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.19 | 0.05 | 0.12 |
GCF | 1.8 | 0.8 | -0.10 | -0.29 | 0.24 |
GFCF | 1.1 | 0.6 | 0.62 | 0.28 | -0.01 |
BINV | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.41 | 0.29 | -0.16 |
Exports | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.76 | 1.74 | -0.26 |
Less Imports | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.28 | 1.05 | 0.23 |
Net Trade | -0.6 | -0.4 | -0.52 | 0.68 | -0.49 |
HFC: Household Final Consumption; NPISH: NPISH Final Consumption; GOVT: General Government; GCF: Gross Capital Formation; GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation; BINV: Business Investment; EXP: Exports; IMP: Less Imports
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Table VH-L3 provides indicators of the labor force survey of the UK for Jun-Aug 2019 and earlier quarters. There has been improvement in UK labor markets with the rate of unemployment decreasing from 4.1 percent in Jul-Sep 2018 to 3.8 percent in Jul-Sep 2019.
Table VH-L3, UK, Labor Force Survey Indicators, Thousands, SA
LFHP | EMP | PART | UNE | RATE | |
Jul-Sep 2017 | 41,173 | 32,063 | 75.0 | 1,429 | 4.3 |
Jul-Sep 2018 | 41,264 | 32,431 | 75.6 | 1,377 | 4.1 |
Oct-Dec 2018 | 41,284 | 32,597 | 75.8 | 1,363 | 4.0 |
Jan-Mar 2019 | 41,304 | 32,697 | 76.1 | 1,298 | 3.8 |
Apr-Jun 2019 | 41,323 | 32,811 | 76.1 | 1,329 | 3.9 |
Jul-Sep 2019 | 41,347 | 32,753 | 76.0 | 1,306 | 3.8 |
∆ on Quarter | 23 | -58 | -0.1 | -23 | -0.1 |
∆% | 0.1 | -0.2 | -1.8 | ||
∆ on Year | 83 | 323 | 0.5 | -72 | -0.2 |
∆% | 0.2 | 1.0 | -5.2 |
Notes: LFHP: Labor Force Household Population Ages 16 to 64 in thousands; EMP: Employed Ages 16 and over in thousands; PART: Employment as % of Population Ages 16 to 64; UNE: Unemployed Ages 16 and over in thousands; Rate: Number Unemployed Ages 16 and over as % of Employed plus Unemployed
Source: UK Office for National Statistics
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.
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