Saturday, August 10, 2019

Competitive Exchange Rate Policies, Weakening Flows of International Trade, Contraction of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, Inverted Yield Curve, Recovery Without Hiring in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Ten Million Fewer Full-Time Jobs, Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment, United States International Trade, Annual Revision of US National Accounts PCE Prices, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk: Part V


Competitive Exchange Rate Policies, Weakening Flows of International Trade, Contraction of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, Inverted Yield Curve, Recovery Without Hiring in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Ten Million Fewer Full-Time Jobs, Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment, United States International Trade, Annual Revision of US National Accounts PCE Prices, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019

I Recovery without Hiring

IA1 Hiring Collapse

IA2 Labor Underutilization

ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs

IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment

IID United States International Trade

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

V World Economic Slowdown. Table V-1 is constructed with the database of the IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=29) to show GDP in dollars in 2017 and the growth rate of real GDP of the world and selected regional countries from 2017 to 2020. The data illustrate the concept often repeated of “two-speed recovery” of the world economy from the recession of 2007 to 2009. The IMF has changed its measurement of the world economy to 3.8 percent in 2017 and reducing the forecast rate of growth to 3.6 percent in 2018, 3.3 percent in 2019 and 3.6 percent in 2020. Slow-speed recovery occurs in the “major advanced economies” of the G7 that account for $36,871 billion of world output of $80,145 billion, or 46.0 percent, but are projected to grow at much lower rates than world output, 1.9 percent on average from 2017 to 2020, in contrast with 3.6 percent for the world as a whole. While the world would grow 15.1 percent in the four years from 2017 to 2020, the G7 as a whole would grow 7.6 percent. The difference in dollars of 2017 is high: growing by 15.1 percent would add around $12.1 trillion of output to the world economy, or roughly, over two times the output of the economy of Japan of $4,860 billion but growing by 7.6 percent would add $6.1 trillion of output to the world, or somewhat higher than the output of Japan in 2017. The “two speed” concept is in reference to the growth of the 150 countries labeled as emerging and developing economies (EMDE) with joint output in 2017 of $31,792 billion, or 39.7 percent of world output. The EMDEs would grow cumulatively 19.8 percent or at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent, contributing $6.3 trillion from 2017 to 2020 or the equivalent of somewhat more than one half the GDP of $12,062 billion of China in 2017. The final four countries in Table V-1 often referred as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), are large, rapidly growing emerging economies. Their combined output in 2017 adds to $18,345 billion, or 22.9 percent of world output, which is equivalent to 49.8 percent of the combined output of the major advanced economies of the G7.

Table V-1, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Real GDP Growth

GDP USD Billions 2017

Real GDP ∆%
2017

Real GDP ∆%
2018

Real GDP ∆%
2019

Real GDP ∆%
2020

World

80,145

3.8

3.6

3.3

3.6

G7

36,871

2.2

2.1

1.6

1.5

Canada

1,650

3.0

1.8

1.5

1.9

France

2,588

2.2

1.5

1.3

1.4

DE

3,701

2.5

1.5

0.8

1.4

Italy

1,947

1.6

0.9

0.1

0.9

Japan

4,860

1.9

0.8

1.0

0.5

UK

2,640

1.8

1.4

1.2

1.4

US

19,485

2.2

2.9

2.3

1.9

Euro Area

12,652

2.4

1.8

1.3

1.5

DE

3,701

2.5

1.5

0.8

1.4

France

2,588

2.2

1.5

1.3

1.4

Italy

1,947

1.6

0.9

0.1

0.9

POT

220

2.8

2.1

1.7

1.5

Ireland

332

7.2

6.8

4.2

3.4

Greece

204

1.5

2.1

2.4

2.2

Spain

1,317

3.0

2.5

2.1

1.9

EMDE

31,792

4.8

4.5

4.4

4.8

Brazil

2,053

1.1

1.1

2.1

2.5

Russia

1,578

1.6

2.3

1.6

1.7

India

2,652

7.2

7.1

7.3

7.5

China

12,062

6.8

6.6

6.3

6.1

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries); POT: Portugal

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx

Continuing high rates of unemployment in advanced economies constitute another characteristic of the database of the WEO (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx). Table V-2 is constructed with the WEO database to provide rates of unemployment from 2016 to 2020 for major countries and regions. In fact, unemployment rates for 2016 in Table V-2 are high for all countries: unusually high for countries with high rates most of the time and unusually high for countries with low rates most of the time. The rates of unemployment are particularly high in 2016 for the countries with sovereign debt difficulties in Europe: 11.1 percent for Portugal (POT), 8.4 percent for Ireland, 23.6 percent for Greece, 19.6 percent for Spain and 11.7 percent for Italy, which is lower but still high. The G7 rate of unemployment is 5.4 percent. Unemployment rates are not likely to decrease substantially if relative slow cyclical growth persists in advanced economies.

Table V-2, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Unemployment Rate as Percent of Labor Force

% Labor Force 2016

% Labor Force 2017

% Labor Force 2018

% Labor Force 2019

% Labor Force 2020

World

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

G7

5.4

5.0

4.5

4.5

4.4

Canada

7.0

6.3

5.8

5.9

6.0

France

10.1

9.4

9.1

8.8

8.4

DE

4.2

3.8

3.4

3.4

3.3

Italy

11.7

11.3

10.6

10.7

10.5

Japan

3.1

2.8

2.4

2.4

2.4

UK

4.9

4.4

4.1

4.2

4.4

US

4.9

4.4

3.9

3.8

3.7

Euro Area

10.0

9.1

8.2

8.0

7.7

DE

4.2

3.8

3.4

3.4

3.3

France

10.1

9.4

9.1

8.8

8.4

Italy

11.7

11.3

10.6

10.7

10.5

POT

11.1

8.9

7.1

6.8

6.3

Ireland

8.4

6.7

5.7

5.3

5.0

Greece

23.6

21.5

19.6

18.5

17.5

Spain

19.6

17.2

15.3

14.2

14.1

EMDE

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Brazil

11.3

12.8

12.3

11.4

10.2

Russia

5.5

5.2

4.8

4.8

4.7

India

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

China

4.0

3.9

3.8

3.8

3.8

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries)

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx

There are references to adverse periods as “lost decades.” There is a more prolonged and adverse period in Table V-3A: the lost economic cycle of the Global Recession with economic growth underperforming below trend worldwide. Economic contractions were relatively high but not comparable to the decline of GDP during the Great Depression. In fact, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, US GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. The contraction of GDP in the current cycle of the Global Recession was much lower, 4.0 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). Contractions were deeper in Japan, 8.7 percent, the euro area (19 members), 5.7 percent, Germany 6.9 percent and the UK 6.3 percent. The contraction in France was 3.9 percent. There is adversity in low rates of growth during the expansion that did not compensate for the contraction such that for the whole cycle performance is disappointingly low. As a result, GDP is substantially below what it would have been in trend growth in all countries and regions in the world. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 40 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2019. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2019 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-07/gdp2q19_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ2019, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2019 would have accumulated to 40.5 percent. GDP in IIQ2019 would be $22,145.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3121.8 billion than actual $19,023.8 billion. There are more than three trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 18.8 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 11.0 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IIQ2019 is 14.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,023.8 billion in IIQ2019 or 20.7 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jun 1919 to Jun 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 153.8501 in Jun 2019. The actual index NSA in Jun 2019 is 107.3417, which is 30.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 157.3175 in Jun 2019. The actual index NSA in Jun 2019 is 107.3417, which is 31.8 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Jun 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.9957 in Jun 2019. The output of manufacturing at 107.3417 in Jun 2019 is 21.1 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table V-3A, Cycle 2007-2018, Percentage Contraction, Average Growth Rate in Expansion,

Table V-3A, Cycle 2007-2018, Percentage Contraction, Average Growth Rate in Expansion, Average Growth Rate in Whole Cycle and GDP Percent Below Trend

Contraction ∆%

Expansion AV ∆%

Whole Cycle AV ∆%

Below Trend Percent

USA

4.0

2.3

1.6

14.1

Japan

8.7

1.5

0.6

NA

Euro Area (19)

5.7

1.4

0.7

16.1

France

3.9

1.4

0.8

10.0

Germany

6.9

2.0

1.1

NA

UK

6.3

1.9

1.1

16.9

Note: AV: Average. Expansion and Whole Cycle AV ∆% calculated with quarterly growth, seasonally adjusted and quarterly adjusted when applicable, rates and converted into annual equivalent.

Data reported periodically in this blog.

Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm

Manufacturing is underperforming in the lost cycle of the global recession. Manufacturing (SIC) in Jun 2019 is lower by 4.4 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007, as shown in Chart V-3A. Manufacturing (NAICS) in Jun 2019 at 108.3755 is lower by 1.8 percent relative to the peak at 110.3108 in Sep 2007. There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jun 1919 to Jun 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 153.8501 in Jun 2019. The actual index NSA in Jun 2019 is 107.3417, which is 30.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 157.3175 in Jun 2019. The actual index NSA in Jun 2019 is 107.3417, which is 31.8 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Jun 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.9957 in Jun 2019. The output of manufacturing at 107.3417 in Jun 2019 is 21.1 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

clip_image001

Chart V-3A, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jun 2007 to Jun 2019

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V-3B provides the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States, or those available for work. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 231.713 million in Jun 2007 to 259.037 million in Jun 2019 or 27.324 million.

clip_image002

Chart V-3B, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 2007 to Jun 2019

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3C provides nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 2007 to Jun 2019. Nonfarm payroll jobs fell from 13.987 million in Jun 2007 to 12.932 million in Jun 2019, or 1.055 million.

clip_image003

Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jun 2007 to Jun 2019, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov

Chart V-3D provides the index of US manufacturing (NAICS) from Jan 1972 to Jun 2019. The index continued increasing during the decline of manufacturing jobs after the early 1980s. There are likely effects of changes in the composition of manufacturing with also changes in productivity and trade.

clip_image004

Chart V-3D, United States Manufacturing (NAICS) NSA, Jan 1972 to Jun 2019

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

Chart V3E provides the US noninstitutional civilian population, or those in condition of working, from Jan 1948, when first available, to Jun 2019. The noninstitutional civilian population increased from 170.042 million in Jun 1981 to 259.037 million in Jun 2019, or 88.995 million.

clip_image005

Chart V-3E, United States, Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Million, NSA, Jan 1948 to Jun 2019

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Chart V-3F provides manufacturing jobs in the United States from Jan 1939 to May 2019. Nonfarm payroll manufacturing jobs decreased from a peak of 18.890 million in Jun 1981 to 12.932 million in Jun 2019.

clip_image006

Chart V-3C, United States, Payroll Manufacturing Jobs, NSA, Jan 1939 to Jun 2019, Thousands

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/

Table V-3 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog from IQ2012 to IVQ2018 available now for all countries. There are estimates for all countries for IQ2019 and preliminary estimates for IIQ2019 for some countries. Growth is weak throughout most of the world.

Table V-3, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%

IQ2012/IVQ2011

IQ2012/IQ2011

USA

QOQ: 0.8       

SAAR: 3.2

2.7

Japan

QOQ: 1.2

SAAR: 5.0

3.1

China

1.9 AE 7.8

8.1

Euro Area

-0.2

-0.4

Germany

0.3

1.6

France

0.1

0.6

Italy

-0.9

-2.2

United Kingdom

0.6

1.2

IIQ2012/IQ2012

IIQ2012/IIQ2011

USA

QOQ: 0.4        

SAAR: 1.7

2.4

Japan

QOQ: -0.8
SAAR: -3.2

2.9

China

2.1 AE 8.7

7.6

Euro Area

-0.4

-0.8

Germany

0.1

0.4 0.9 CA

France

-0.2

0.4

Italy

-0.9

-3.2

United Kingdom

-0.1

1.0

IIIQ2012/ IIQ2012

IIIQ2012/ IIIQ2011

USA

QOQ: 0.1 
SAAR: 0.5

2.5

Japan

QOQ: –0.4
SAAR: –1.4

-0.1

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.5

Euro Area

-0.1

-0.9

Germany

0.3

0.2

France

0.2

0.4

Italy

-0.5

-3.1

United Kingdom

1.2

2.0

IVQ2012/IIIQ2012

IVQ2012/IVQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.1
SAAR: 0.5

1.5

Japan

QOQ: 0.3

SAAR: 1.2

0.3

China

2.0 AE 8.2

8.1

Euro Area

-0.4

-1.1

Germany

-0.5

-0.1

France

-0.1

0.0

Italy

-0.5

-2.8

United Kingdom

-0.2

1.6

IQ2013/IVQ2012

IQ2013/IQ2012

United States

QOQ: 0.9
SAAR: 3.6

1.6

Japan

QOQ: 1.1

SAAR: 4.6

0.4

China

1.9 AE 7.8

7.9

Euro Area

-0.4

-1.3

Germany

-0.3

-1.5

France

0.0

-0.1

Italy

-1.0

-2.9

UK

0.6

1.6

IIQ2013/IQ2013

IIQ2013/IIQ2012

USA

QOQ: 0.1

SAAR: 0.5

1.3

Japan

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.4

1.9

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.6

Euro Area

0.5

-0.4

Germany

0.9

0.9

France

0.7

0.8

Italy

0.0

-2.0

UK

0.5

2.2

IIIQ2013/IIQ2013

III/Q2013/IIIQ2012

USA

QOQ: 0.8
SAAR: 3.2

1.9

Japan

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.4

3.0

China

2.1 AE 8.7

7.9

Euro Area

0.4

0.1

Germany

0.6

1.2

France

0.0

0.6

Italy

0.4

-1.2

UK

0.9

1.9

IVQ2013/IIIQ2013

IVQ2013/IVQ2012

USA

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.2

2.6

Japan

QOQ: 0.0

SAAR: -0.1

2.7

China

1.6 AE 6.6

7.7

Euro Area

0.2

0.8

Germany

0.4

1.4

France

0.5

1.1

Italy

-0.2

-0.8

UK

0.5

2.6

IQ2014/IVQ2013

IQ2014/IQ2013

USA

QOQ -0.3

SAAR -1.1

1.4

Japan

QOQ: 0.9

SAAR: 3.7

3.0

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.4

Euro Area

0.5

1.6

Germany

1.0

3.2

France

0.1

1.2

Italy

0.1

0.3

UK

0.8

2.8

IIQ2014/IQ2014

IIQ2014/IIQ2013

USA

QOQ 1.4

SAAR 5.5

2.7

Japan

QOQ: -1.8

SAAR: -7.1

-0.1

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.5

Euro Area

0.2

1.2

Germany

-0.1

1.5

France

0.2

0.7

Italy

-0.1

0.2

UK

0.8

3.1

IIIQ2014/IIQ2014

IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013

USA

QOQ: 1.2

SAAR: 5.0

3.1

Japan

QOQ: 0.1

SAAR: 0.3

-0.9

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.1

Euro Area

0.4

1.3

Germany

0.3

1.7

France

0.5

1.2

Italy

0.2

0.1

UK

0.7

2.9

IVQ2014/IIIQ2014

IVQ2014/IVQ2013

USA

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.3

2.9

Japan

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.0

-0.5

China

1.7 AE 7.0

7.2

Euro Area

0.5

1.5

Germany

1.0

2.4

France

0.1

0.8

Italy

0.0

0.2

UK

0.7

3.1

IQ2015/IVQ2014

IQ2015/IQ2014

USA

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.2

4.0

Japan

QOQ: 1.3

SAAR: 5.3

0.0

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.0

Euro Area

0.7

1.8

Germany

-0.1

1.3

France

0.5

1.2

Italy

0.2

0.3

UK

0.4

2.7

IIQ2015/IQ2015

IIQ2015/IIQ2014

USA

QOQ: 0.7

SAAR: 3.0

3.4

Japan

QOQ: 0.2

SAAR: 0.9

2.2

China

1.8 AE 7.4

7.0

Euro Area

0.4

2.1

Germany

0.6

1.8

France

0.0

1.0

Italy

0.4

0.8

UK

0.6

2.4

IIIQ2015/IIQ2015

IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014

USA

QOQ: 0.3

SAAR: 1.3

2.4

Japan

QOQ: -0.1

SAAR: -0.3

1.9

China

1.7 AE 7.0

6.9

Euro Area

0.4

2.0

Germany

0.3

1.8

France

0.4

0.9

Italy

0.3

0.8

UK

0.4

2.1

IVQ2015/IIIQ2015

IVQ2015/IVQ2014

USA

QOQ: 0.0

SAAR: 0.1

1.9

Japan

QOQ: -0.4

SAAR: -1.6

0.9

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.8

Euro Area

0.5

2.0

Germany

0.5

2.1

France

0.2

1.0

Italy

0.4

1.3

UK

0.7

2.2

IQ2016/IVQ2015

IQ2016/IQ2015

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.0

1.6

Japan

QOQ: 0.7

SAAR: 2.7

0.4

China

1.4 AE 5.7

6.7

Euro Area

0.7

2.0

Germany

0.9

2.0

France

0.6

1.2

Italy

0.2

1.3

UK

0.3

2.1

IIQ2016/IQ2016

IIQ2016/IIQ2015

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 1.9

1.3

Japan

QOQ: 0.1

SAAR: 0.4

0.3

China

1.9 AE 7.8

6.7

Euro Area

0.3

1.8

Germany

0.4

3.7

France

-0.3

1.0

Italy

0.2

1.1

UK

0.2

1.7

IIIQ2016/IIQ2016

IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.2

1.6

Japan

QOQ: 0.2

SAAR: 0.8

0.5

China

1.7 AE 7.0

6.7

Euro Area

0.3

1.8

Germany

0.2

1.9

France

0.2

0.8

Italy

0.4

1.2

UK

0.5

1.7

IVQ2016/IIIQ2016

IVQ2016/IVQ2015

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.0

2.0

Japan

QOQ: 0.2

SAAR: 0.8

1.2

China

1.6 AE 6.6

6.8

Euro Area

0.8

2.1

Germany

0.4

1.4

France

0.6

1.2

Italy

0.5

1.3

UK

0.7

1.7

IQ2017/IVQ2016

IQ2017/IQ2016

USA

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.3

2.1

Japan

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.4

1.5

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.8

Euro Area

0.7

2.1

Germany

1.1

3.4

France

0.8

1.4

Italy

0.6

1.6

UK

0.4

1.8

IIQ2017/IQ2017

IIQ2017/IIQ2016

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.2

2.2

Japan

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.2

1.7

China

1.8 AE 7.4

6.8

Euro Area

0.7

2.5

Germany

0.5

0.9 CA 2.2

France

0.7

2.4

Italy

0.4

1.8

UK

0.3

1.9

IIIQ2017/IIQ2017

IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016

USA

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.2

2.4

Japan

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.4

2.1

China

1.7 AE 7.0

6.7

Euro Area

0.7

2.8

Germany

0.6

2.2 CA 2.6

France

0.7

2.8

Italy

0.4

1.8

UK

0.5

2.0

IVQ2017/IIIQ2017

IVQ2017/IVQ2016

USA

QOQ: 0.9

SAAR: 3.5

2.8

Japan

QOQ: 0.3

SAAR: 1.3

2.4

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.7

Euro Area

0.7

2.8

Germany

0.5

2.2 CA 2.8

France

0.7

3.0

Italy

0.4

1.8

UK

0.4

1.6

IQ2018/IVQ2017

IQ2018/IQ2017

USA

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.5

2.9

Japan

QOQ: -0.1

SAAR: -0.4

1.3

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.8

Euro Area

0.4

2.5

Germany

0.4

1.4 CA 2.1

France

0.2

2.4

Italy

0.2

1.4

UK

0.1

1.2

IIQ2018/IQ2018

IIQ2018/IIQ2017

USA

QOQ: 0.9

SAAR: 3.5

3.2

Japan

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.3

1.5

China

1.7 AE 7.0

6.7

Euro Area

0.4

2.2

Germany

0.5

2.3 CA 2.0

France

0.2

1.9

Italy

0.0

1.0

UK

0.4

1.4

IIIQ2018/IIQ2018

IIIQ2018/IIIQ2017

USA

QOQ: 0.7

SAAR: 2.9

3.1

Japan

QOQ -0.6

SAAR: -2.6

0.1

China

1.6 AE 6.6

6.5

Euro Area

0.1

1.7

Germany

-0.2

1.1 CA 1.1

France

0.3

1.5

Italy

-0.1

0.5

UK

0.7

1.6

IVQ2018IIIQ2018

IVQ2018/IVQ2017

USA

QOQ: 0.3

SAAR: 1.1

2.5

Japan

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 1.8

0.3

China

1.5 AE 6.1

6.4

Euro Area

0.2

1.2

Germany

0.0

0.9 CA 0.6

France

0.4

1.1

Italy

-0.1

0.0

UK

0.2

1.4

IQ2019/IV2018

IQ2019/IQ2018

USA

QOQ: 0.8

SAAR: 3.1

2.7

Japan

QOQ: 0.6

SAAR: 2.2

0.9

China

1.4 AE 5.7

6.4

Euro Area

0.4

1.2

Germany

0.4

0.6 CA 0.7

France

0.3

1.2

Italy

0.1

-0.1

UK

0.5

1.8

IIQ2019/IQ2019

IIQ2019/IIQ2018

USA

QOQ: 0.5

SAAR: 2.1

2.3

China

1.6 AE 6.6

6.2

France

0.2

1.3

QOQ: Quarter relative to prior quarter; SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate

Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/related-sites.html

Table V-4 provides two types of data: growth of exports and imports in the latest available months and in the past 12 months; and contributions of net trade (exports less imports) to growth of real GDP.

  • China. In Jul 2019, China exports increased 3.3 percent relative to a year earlier and imports decreased 5.6 percent.
  • Germany. Germany’s exports decreased 0.1 percent in the month of Jun 2019 and decreased 8.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019. Germany’s imports increased 0.5 percent in the month of Jun 2019 and decreased 4.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to growth of GDP in IQ2012, contributed 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2012, contributed 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2012, deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2012, deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2013 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded deducted 0.0 percentage points from Germany’s GDP growth in IIIQ2013 and added 0.9 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2014 and added 0.8 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.5 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.8 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018 and deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.9 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2019.
  • United Kingdom. Net trade contributed 0.7 percentage points in IIQ2013. In IIIQ2013, net trade deducted 1.7 percentage points from UK growth. Net trade contributed 0.1 percentage points to UK value added in IVQ2013. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to UK value added in IQ2014 and 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2014 and added 0.0 percentage points in IVQ2014. Net traded deducted 0.4 percentage points from growth in IQ2015. Net trade added 1.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.1-percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.8 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade added 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.21 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2017 and contributed 0.09 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.39 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.20 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.21 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.41 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.17 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2018. Net trade deducted 2.99 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2019.
  • France. France’s exports decreased 4.9 percent in Jun 2019 while imports decreased 0.6 percent. France’s exports increased 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019 and imports increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Net traded added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IIIQ2012 and 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IQ2013 and added 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 1.7 percentage points in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IVQ2013 and deducted 0.1 percentage points in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IIQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to France’s GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.6 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IIIQ2016 and added 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IQ2017 and added 0.9 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.6 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade added 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2018. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to GDP in IVQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP in IQ2019. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ219.
  • United States. US exports decreased 2.1 percent in Jun 2019 and goods exports decreased 0.9 percent in Jan-Jun 2019 relative to a year earlier. Imports decreased 1.7 percent in Jun 2019 and goods imports increased 0.3 percent in Jan-Jun 2019 relative to a year earlier. Net trade added 0.27 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2012 and deducted 0.08 percentage points in IIIQ2012, adding 0.57 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade added 0.40 percentage points to US GDP growth in IQ2013 and deducted 0.33 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded subtracted 0.14 percentage points from US GDP growth in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 1.23 percentage points to US GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 1.11 percentage points from US GDP growth in IQ2014 and deducted 0.46 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade added 0.10 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2014. Net trade deducted 1.05 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 1.67 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.06 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 1.00 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.20 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.50 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.35 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade added 0.05 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.36 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2016.  Net trade added 0.13 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017.  Net trade deducted 0.31 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.35 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.80 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.00 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade added 0.67 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2018. Net trade deducted 2.05 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2018, deducting 0.35 percentage points in IVQ2018. Net trade added 0.73 percentage points in IQ2019, deducting 0.65 percentage points in IIQ2019.

Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted increased 152,000 from Jul 2018 to
Jul 2019 or at the average monthly rate of 12,667. Industrial production changed 0.0 percent in Jun 2019 and increased 0.4 percent in May 2019 after decreasing 0.5 percent in Apr 2019, with all data seasonally adjusted. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 27, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to the growth rates for total IP for recent years were small and positive, with the estimates for 2016 and 2017 a bit higher and the estimates for 2015 and 2018 slightly lower.[2] Total IP is still reported to have increased from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014 before declining in 2015 and rebounding in mid-2016. Subsequently, the index advanced around 7 1/2 percent over 2017 and 2018.

Capacity for total industry expanded modestly in each year from 2015 to 2017 before advancing 1 1/2 percent in 2018; it is expected to advance about 2 percent in 2019. Revisions for recent years were very small and showed slightly less expansion in most years relative to earlier reports.

In the fourth quarter of 2018, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 79.4 percent, about 3/4 percentage point above its previous estimate and about 1/2 percentage point below its long-run (1972–2018) average. The utilization rate in 2017 is also higher than its previous estimate.”

Manufacturing decreased 22.3 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increasing 19.7 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2018. Manufacturing grew 23.0 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jun 2019. Manufacturing in Jun 2019 is lower by 4.4 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007.

The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2019 would have accumulated to 40.5 percent. GDP in IIQ2019 would be $22,145.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3121.8 billion than actual $19,023.8 billion. There are more than three trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 18.8 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 11.0 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IIQ2019 is 14.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $19,023.8 billion in IIQ2019 or 20.7 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jun 1919 to Jun 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 153.8501 in Jun 2019. The actual index NSA in Jun 2019 is 107.3417, which is 30.2 percent below trend. Manufacturing grew at the average annual rate of 3.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2006. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2987 in Dec 2007 to 157.3175 in Jun 2019. The actual index NSA in Jun 2019 is 107.3417, which is 31.8 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Jun 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.9957 in Jun 2019. The output of manufacturing at 107.3417 in Jun 2019 is 21.1 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 87.0 percent in IQ2019. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Jul 2019, there were 151.183 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 129.926 million NSA in Jul 2019 accounted for 85.9 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 151.183 million, of which 12.935 million, or 10.0 percent of total private jobs and 8.6 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 108.473 million NSA in Jul 2019, or 71.7 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.5 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 9.4 percent in US national income in IQ2019 and durable goods 5.7 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table V-4, Growth of Trade and Contributions of Net Trade to GDP Growth, ∆% and % Points

Exports
M ∆%

Exports 12 M ∆%

Imports
M ∆%

Imports 12 M ∆%

USA

-2.1 Jun

-0.9

Jan-Jun

-1.7 Jun

0.3

Jan-Jun

Japan

Jun 2019

-6.7

May 2019

-7.8

Apr 2019

-2.4

Mar 2019

-2.4

Feb 2019

-1.2

Jan 2019

-8.4

Dec 2018

-3.8

Nov 2018

0.1

Oct 2018

8.2

Sep 2018

-1.2

Aug 2018

6.6

Jul 2018

3.9

Jun 2018

6.7

May 2018

8.1

Apr 2018

7.8

Mar 2018

2.1

Feb 2018

1.8

Jan 2018

12.2

Dec 2017

9.3

Nov 2017

16.2

Oct 2017

14.0

Sep 2017

14.1

Aug 2017

18.1

Jul 2017

13.4

Jun 2017

9.7

May 2017

14.9

Apr 2017

7.5

Mar 2017

12.0

Feb 2017

11.3

Jan 2017

1.3

Dec 2016

5.4

Nov 2016 -0.4

Oct 2016

-10.3

Sep 2016

-6.9

Aug 2016

9.6

Jul 2016

-14.0

Jun 2016

-7.8

May 2016

-11.3

Apr 2016

-10.1

Mar 2016

-6.8

Feb 2016

-4.0

Jan 2016

-12.9

Dec 2015

-8.0

Nov 2015

-3.3

Oct 2015

-2.1

Sep 2015

0.6

Aug

3.1

Jul 2015

7.6

Jun 2015

9.5

May 2015

2.4

Apr

8.0

Mar

8.5

Feb

2.4

Jan

17.0

Dec

12.9

Nov

4.9

Oct

9.6

Sep

6.9

Aug

-1.3

Jul

3.9

Jun

-2.0

May 2014

-2.7

Apr 2014

5.1

Mar 2014

1.8

Feb 2014

9.5

Jan 2014

9.5

Dec 2013

15.3

Nov 2013

18.4

Oct 2013

18.6

Sep 2013

11.5

Aug 2013

14.7

Jul 2013

12.2

Jun 2013 7.4

May 2013

10.1

Apr 2013

3.8

Mar 2013

1.1

Feb 2013

-2.9

Jan 2013 6.4

Dec -5.8

Nov -4.1

Oct -6.5

Sep -10.3

Aug -5.8

Jul -8.1

Jun 2019

-5.2

May 2019

-1.5

Apr 2019

6.4

Mar 2019

1.1

Feb 2019

-6.7

Jan 2019

-0.6

Dec 2018

1.9

Nov 2018

12.5

Oct 2018

19.9

Sep 2018

7.0

Aug 2018

15.4

Jul 2018

14.6

Jun 2018

2.5

May 2018

14.0

Apr 2018

5.9

Mar 2018

-0.6

Feb 2018

16.6

Jan 2018

7.9

Dec 2017

14.9

Nov 2017

17.2

Oct 2017

18.9

Sep 2017

12.0

Aug 2017

15.2

Jul 2017

16.3

Jun 2017

15.5

May 2017

17.8

Apr 2017

15.1

Mar 2017

15.8

Feb 2017

1.2

Jan 2017

8.5

Dec 2016

-2.6

Nov 2016

-8.8

Oct 2016

-16.5

Sep 2016

-16.3

Aug 2016

-17.3

Jul 2016

-24.7

Jun 2016

-18.8

May 2016

-13.8

Apr 2016

-23.3

Mar 2016

-14.9

Feb 2016

-14.2

Jan 2016

-18.0

Dec 2015

-18.0

Nov 2015

-10.2

Oct 2015

-13.4

Sep 2015

-11.1

Aug

-3.1

Jul 2015

-3.2

Jun 2015

-2.9

May 2015

-8.7

Apr

-4.2

Mar

-14.5

Feb

-3.6

Jan

-9.0

Dec

1.9

Nov

-1.7

Oct

2.7

Sep

6.2

Aug

-1.5

Jul

2.3

Jun

8.4

May 2014

-3.6

Apr 2013

3.4

Mar 2014

18.1

Feb 2014

9.0

Jan 2014

25.0

Dec 2013 24.7

Nov 2013

21.1

Oct 2013

26.1

Sep 2013

16.5

Aug 2013

16.0

Jul 2013

19.6

Jun 2013

11.8

May 2013

10.0

Apr 2013

9.4

Mar 2013

5.5

Feb 2013

7.3

Jan 2013 7.3

Dec 1.9

Nov 0.8

Oct -1.6

Sep 4.1

Aug -5.4

Jul 2.1

China

Jan-Dec

9.9

Jan-Dec

2017 7.9

Jan-Dec 2016 -7.7

Jan-Dec

2015 -2.8

2019

Jul

3.3

Jun

-1.3

May

1.1

Apr

-2.7

Mar

14.2

Feb

-20.7

Jan

9.3

2018

Dec

-4.4

Nov

5.4

Oct

15.6

Sep

14.5

Aug

9.8

Jul

12.2

Jun

11.3

May

12.6

Apr

12.9

Mar

-2.7

Feb

44.5

Jan

11.1

2017

Dec

10.9

Nov

12.3

Oct

6.9

Sep

8.1

Aug

5.5

Jul

7.2

Jun

11.3

May

8.7

Apr

8.0

Mar

16.4

Feb

-1.3

Jan

7.9

2016

Dec

3.1

Nov

0.1

Oct

-7.3

Sep

-10.0

Aug

-2.8

Jul

-4.4

Jun

-4.8

May

-4.1

Apr

-1.8

Mar

11.5

Feb

-25.4

Jan

-11.2

2015

-1.4 Dec

-6.8 Nov

-6.9 Oct

-3.7 Sep

-5.5 Aug

-8.3 Jul

2.8 Jun

-2.5 May

-6.4 Apr

-15.0 Mar

48.3 Feb

-3.3 Jan

2014

9.7 Dec

4.7 Nov

11.6 Oct

15.3 Sep

9.4 Aug

14.5 Jul

7.2 Jun

7.0 May

0.9 Apr

-6.6 Mar

-18.1 Feb

10.6 Jan

2013

4.3 Dec

12.7 Nov

5.6 Oct

-0.3 Sep

7.2 Aug

5.1 Jul

-3.1 Jun

1.0 May

14.7 Apr

10.0 Mar

21.8 Feb

25.0 Jan

Jan-Dec

15.8

Jan-Dec 2017 15.9

Jan-Dec 2016 -5.5

Jan-Dec 2015 -14.1

2019

Jul

-5.6

Jun

-7.3

May

-8.5

Apr

4.0

Mar

-7.6

Feb

-5.2

Jan

-1.5

2018

Dec

-7.6

Nov

3.0

Oct

21.4

Sep

14.3

Aug

20.0

Jul

27.3

Jun

14.1

May

26.0

Apr

21.5

Mar

14.4

Feb

6.3

Jan

36.9

2017

Dec

4.5

Nov

17.7

Oct

17.2

Sep

18.7

Aug

13.3

Jul

11.0

Jun

17.2

May

14.8

Apr

11.9

Mar

20.3

Feb

38.1

Jan

16.7

2016

Dec

-7.7

Nov

6.7

Oct

-1.4

Sep

-1.9

Aug

1.5

Jul

-12.5

Jun

-2.8

May

-0.4

Apr

-10.6

Mar

-7.6

Feb

-13.8

Jan

-18.8

2015

-7.6 Dec

-8.7 Nov

-18.8 Oct

-20.4 Sep

-13.8 Aug

-8.1 Jul

-6.1 Jun

-17.6 May

-12.7 Mar

-20.5 Feb

-19.9 Jan

2014

-2.4 Dec

-6.7 Nov

4.6 Oct

7.0 Sep

-2.4 Aug

-1.6 Jul

5.5 Jun

-1.6 May

-0.8 Apr

-11.3 Mar

10.1 Feb

10.0 Jan

2013

8.3 Dec

5.3 Nov

7.6 Oct

7.4 Sep

7.0 Aug

10.9 Jul

-0.7 Jun

-0.3 May

16.8 Apr

14.1 Mar

-15.2 Feb

28.8 Jan

Euro Area

7.1 12-May

19

5.0 Jan-May 19

4.2 12-May 19

5.2 Jan-May 19

Germany

-0.1 Jun CSA

-8.0 Jun

0.5 Jun CSA

-4.4 Jun

France

Jun

-4.9

2.3

-0.6

1.5

Italy Jun

1.2

-3.5

-2.1

-5.5

UK

4.5 May

3.5

-2.6 May

6.4

Net Trade % Points GDP Growth

Points

USA

IIQ2019

-0.65

IQ2019

0.73

IVQ 2018

-0.35

IIIQ 2018

-2.05

IIQ2018

0.67

IQ2018

0.00

IVQ2017

-0.80

IIIQ2017

0.35

IIQ2017

-0.31

IQ2017

0.13

IVQ2016

-1.36

IIIQ2016

0.05

IIQ2016

0.35

IQ2016

-0.50

IVQ2015

-0.20

IIIQ2015

-1.00

IIQ2015

0.06

IQ2015

-1.67

IVQ2014

-1.05

IIIQ2014

0.10

IIQ2014

-0.46

IQ2014

-1.11

IVQ2013

1.23

IIIQ2013

-0.14

IIQ2013

-0.33

IQ2013

0.40

IVQ2012 +0.57

IIIQ2012

-0.08

IIQ2012 0.27

IQ2012 0.00

Japan

0.6

IQ2012

-1.9 IIQ2012

-2.0

IIIQ2012

-0.3

IVQ2012

1.3

IQ2013

-0.1

IIQ2013

-1.4

IIIQ2013

-2.1

IVQ2013

-0.9

IQ2014

4.0

IIQ2014

-0.2

IIIQ2014

1.6

IVQ2014

0.0

IQ2015

-0.6

IIQ2015

-0.5

IIIQ2015

0.2

IVQ2015

1.3

IQ2016

0.3

IIQ2016

1.4

IIIQ2016

1.7

IVQ2016

0.3

IQ2017

-1.2

IIQ2017

2.1

IIIQ2017

0.1

IVQ2017

0.2

IQ2018

-0.6

IIQ2018

-0.6

IIIQ2018

-1.2

IVQ2018

Germany

IQ2012

0.8 IIQ2012 0.3 IIIQ2012 0.4 IVQ2012

-0.5

IQ2013

-0.3 IIQ2013

-0.3

IIIQ2013

0.0

IVQ2013

0.9

IQ2014

-0.2

IIQ2014

-0.2

IIIQ2014

0.8

IVQ2014

0.1

IQ2015

-0.5

IIQ2015

0.8

IIIQ2015

-0.3

IVQ2015

-0.7

IQ2016

-0.3

IIQ2016

0.7

IIIQ2016

-0.3

IVQ2016

-0.5

IQ2017

0.7

IIQ2017

-0.2

IIIQ2017

0.4

IVQ2017

0.2

IQ2018

0.0

IIQ2018

-0.2

IIIQ2018

-0.9

IVQ2018

0.0

IQ2019

0.2

France

0.1 IIIQ2012

0.1 IVQ2012

-0.1 IQ2013

0.3

IIQ2013 -1.7

IIIQ2013

0.1

IVQ2013

-0.1

IQ2014

-0.2

IIQ2014

-0.2

IIIQ2014

0.2

IVQ2014

-0.2

IQ2015

0.4

IIQ2015

-0.6

IIIQ2015

-0.7

IVQ2015

-0.1

IQ2016

0.3

IIQ2016

-0.6

IIIQ2016

0.1

IVQ2016

-0.6

IQ2017

0.9

IIQ2017

-0.3

IIIQ2017

0.6

IVQ2017

0.0

IQ2018

0.0

IIQ2018

0.2

IIIQ2018

0.2

IVQ2018

-0.3

IQ2019

0.0

IIQ2019

UK

0.7

IIQ2013

-1.7

IIIQ2013

0.1

IVQ2013

0.8

IQ2014

0.3

IIQ2014

-0.7

IIIQ2014

0.0

IVQ2014

-0.4

IQ2015

1.1

IIQ2015

-0.4

IIIQ2015

-0.2

IVQ2015

-0.1

IQ2016

0.1

IIQ2016

-1.8

IIIQ2016

1.7

IVQ2016

-0.21

IQ2017

0.09

IIQ2017

0.39

IIIQ2017

0.20

IVQ2017

-0.21

IQ2018

-0.41

IIQ2018

0.03

IIIQ2018

-0.17

IVQ2018

-2.99

IQ2019

Sources: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/international-programs/about/related-sites.html

The geographical breakdown of exports and imports of Japan with selected regions and countries is in Table V-5 for Jun 2019. The share of Asia in Japan’s trade is close to one-half for 54.1 percent of exports and 47.9 percent of imports. Within Asia, exports to China are 18.9 percent of total exports and imports from China 23.0 percent of total imports. While exports of Japan to China decreased 10.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019, imports from China decreased 5.3 percent. The largest export market for Japan in Jun 2019 is the US with share of 20.3 percent of total exports, which is close to that of China, and share of imports from the US of 11.4 percent in total imports. Japan’s exports to the US increased 4.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019 and imports from the US decreased 2.5 percent. Western Europe has share of 11.2 percent in Japan’s exports and of 13.2 percent in imports. Rates of growth of exports of Japan in Jun 2019 are 4.8 percent for exports to the US, minus 14.1 percent for exports to Brazil and minus 8.2 percent for exports to Germany. Comparisons relative to 2011 may have some bias because of the effects of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Deceleration of growth in China and the US and threat of recession in Europe can reduce world trade and economic activity. Growth rates of imports in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019 are mixed. Imports from Asia decreased 6.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2019 while imports from China decreased 5.3 percent. Data are in millions of yen, which may have effects of recent depreciation of the yen relative to the United States dollar (USD) and revaluation of the dollar relative to the euro.

Table V-5, Japan, Value and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, ∆% and Millions of Yen

Jun 2019

Exports
Millions of Yen

12 months ∆%

Imports Millions of Yen

12 months ∆%

Total

6,584,505

-6.7

5,995,044

-5.2

Asia

3,563,591

% Total 54.1

-8.2

2,873,802 % Total 47.9

-6.3

China

1,245,932

% Total 18.9

-10.1

1,377,207 % Total 23.0

-5.3

USA

1,335,517

% Total 20.3

4.8

685,611

% Total

11.4

-2.5

Canada

90,006

4.1

98,653

-5.5

Brazil

33,228

-14.1

53,907

-16.5

Mexico

87,873

-21.9

52,083

-9.6

Western Europe

738,582 % Total 11.2

-9.4

791,509 % Total 13.2

-2.4

Germany

187,993

-8.2

198,810

-10.2

France

59,231

-5.0

102,841

3.7

UK

134,515

5.3

60,748

-19.0

Middle East

175,323

-16.4

653,382

-6.0

Australia

138,788

-18.7

351,277

-4.1

Source: Japan, Ministry of Finance http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm

World trade projections of the IMF are in Table V-6. There is decreasing growth of the volume of world trade of goods and services from 3.8 percent in 2018 to 3.4 percent in 2019, stabilizing to 3.9 percent in 2020. Growth stabilizes at 3.8 percent on average from 2018 to 2024. World trade would be slower for advanced economies while emerging and developing economies (EMDE) experience faster growth. World economic slowdown would be more challenging with lower growth of world trade.

Table V-6, IMF, Projections of World Trade, USD Billions, USD/Barrel and Annual ∆%

2018

2019

2020

Average ∆% 2018-2024

World Trade Volume (Goods and Services)

3.8

3.4

3.9

3.8

Exports Goods & Services

3.5

3.2

3.7

3.6

Imports Goods & Services

4.1

3.6

4.0

3.9

Exports Goods & Services

G7

2.8

2.8

2.9

3.0

EMDE

4.3

4.0

4.8

4.5

Imports Goods & Services

G7

3.2

3.1

2.9

3.1

EMDE

5.6

4.6

5.3

5.1

Terms of Trade Goods & Services

G7

-0.6

-0.4

0.2

0.0

EMDE

1.3

-0.9

0.0

0.8

World Crude Oil Price $/Barrel

68.3

59.2

59.0

59.5

Crude Oil: Simple Average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate and the Dubai Fateh

Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook databank

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx

The JP Morgan Global Composite Output Index of the JP Morgan Manufacturing and Services PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and HIS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, with high association with world GDP, increased to 51.7 in Jul from 51.2 in Jun, indicating expansion at higher rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b80f0526728e464588c914eb698267df). This index has remained above the contraction territory of 50.0 during 82 consecutive months. The employment index decreased from 51.3 in Jun to 51.3 in Jul with input prices rising at slower rate, new orders increasing at faster rate and output increasing at the faster rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b80f0526728e464588c914eb698267df). Olya Borichevska, from Global Economic Research at JP Morgan, finds stagnating manufacturing because of weakening trade and improving services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b80f0526728e464588c914eb698267df). The JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI™, produced by JP Morgan and IHS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, decreased to 49.3 in Jul from 49.4 in Jun (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/cd5ff69a25e34fb29f365f8c87d5ed5d). New export orders decreased. Olya Borichevska, from Global Economic Research at JP Morgan, finds weak conditions in Jun 2019 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/cd5ff69a25e34fb29f365f8c87d5ed5d). The Markit Brazil Composite Output Index increased from 48.4 in May to 49.0 in Jun, indicating expansion in activity of Brazil’s private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/746e26dc029740409abe3044347c48d7). The Markit Brazil Services Business Activity index, compiled by Markit, increased from 48.2 in Jun to 52.2 in Jul indicating expanding services activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/39b434a680284bec9849ef2cd80022ca). Pollyanna De Lima, Principal Economist at Markit, finds expanding activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/39b434a680284bec9849ef2cd80022ca). The HIS Markit Brazil Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ IndexTM (PMI™) decreased from 51.0 in Jun to 49.9 in Jul, indicating manufacturing marginally below neutral 50.0 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c5b4c19693e94ecea75271580b55d4cd). Pollyanna De Lima, Principal Economist at Markit, finds weaker manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c5b4c19693e94ecea75271580b55d4cd).

VA United States. The HIS Markit Flash US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) seasonally adjusted decreased to 50.0 in Jul from 50.6 in Jun (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/185bc294d61c400d9b6463a1d54864be). New export orders decreased. The HIS Markit Flash US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index increased from 51.5 in Jun to 52.2 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/185bc294d61c400d9b6463a1d54864be). The IHS Markit Flash US Composite PMI™ Output Index increased from 51.5 in Jun to 51.6 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/185bc294d61c400d9b6463a1d54864be). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the surveys are consistent with quarterly GDP growth at annualized around 1.6 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/185bc294d61c400d9b6463a1d54864be). The HIS Markit US Composite PMI™ Output Index of Manufacturing and Services increased to 52.6 in Jul from 51,5 in Jun (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a610f304a4604718b5384566e770e053). The HIS Markit US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index increased from 51.5 in Jun to 53.0 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a610f304a4604718b5384566e770e053). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds the indexes suggesting growth close to annualized less than 2.0 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/a610f304a4604718b5384566e770e053). The HIS Markit US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) decreased to 50.4 in Jul from 50.6 in Jun (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5d26dd60063444448aaa1dec7831b182). New foreign orders decreased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at HIS Markit, finds weaker growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5d26dd60063444448aaa1dec7831b182). The purchasing managers’ index (PMI) of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Report on Business® decreased 0.5-percentage points from 51.7 in Jun to 51.2 in Jul, which indicates slower growth (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ismreport/mfgrob.cfm?SSO=1). The index of new export orders decreased 2.4 percentage points from 50.5 in Jun to 48.1 in Jul. The Non-Manufacturing ISM Report on Business® PMI decreased 1.8 percentage points from 56.9 in May to 55.1 in Jun, indicating growth of business activity/production during 113 consecutive months, while the index of new orders decreased 2.8 percentage points from 58.6 in May to 55.8 in Jun (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/NonMfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=31139). Table USA provides the country economic indicators for the US.

Table USA, US Economic Indicators

Consumer Price Index

May 12 months NSA ∆%: 1.8; Ex food and energy ∆%: 2.0 May month SA ∆%: 0.1; Ex food and energy ∆%: 0.1
Blog 7/14/19

WIW 7/21/19

Producer Price Index

Finished Goods

Jun 12-month NSA ∆%: 0.4; ex food and energy ∆% 2.4
Jun month SA ∆% -0.4; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.0

Final Demand

Jun 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.7; ex food and energy ∆% 2.3 Jun month SA ∆% 0.1; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.3
Blog 7/14/19

WIW 7/21/19

PCE Inflation

Jun 12-month NSA ∆%: headline 1.4 ex food and energy ∆% 1.6
Blog 8/11/19

Employment Situation

Household Survey: Jul Unemployment Rate SA 3.7%
Blog calculation People in Job Stress Jul: 18.8 million NSA, 11.0% of Labor Force
Establishment Survey:
Jul Nonfarm Jobs 164,000; Private 148,000 jobs created 
Jun 12-month Average Hourly Earnings Inflation Adjusted ∆%: 2.4
Blog 8/4/19

Nonfarm Hiring

Nonfarm Hiring fell from 64.9 million in 2006 to 59.0 million in 2014 or by 5.9 million and to 63.7 million in 2016 or by 1.2 million. Nonfarm hiring increased to 68.9 million in 2018 or 4.0 million relative to 2006 while population grew 28.976 million.
Private-Sector Hiring Jun 2019 6.043 million higher by 5.7 percent than 5.716 million in Jun 2006 while population grew 30.366 million or 13.3 percent
Blog 8/11/19

GDP Growth

BEA Revised National Income Accounts
IQ2012/IQ2011 ∆%: 2.7

IIQ2012/IIQ2011 2.4

IIIQ2012/IIIQ2011 2.5

IVQ2012/IVQ2011 1.5

IQ2013/IQ2012 1.6

IIQ2013/IIQ2012 1.3

IIIQ2013/IIIQ2012 1.9

IVQ2013/IVQ2012 2.6

IQ2014/IQ2013 1.4

IIQ2014/IIQ2013 2.7

IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013 3.1

IVQ2014/IVQ2013 2.9

IQ2015/IQ2014 4.0

IIQ2015/IIQ2014 3.4

IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014 2.4

IVQ2015/IVQ2014 1.9

IQ2016/IQ2015 1.6

IIQ2016/IIQ2015 1.3

IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015 1.6

IVQ2016/IVQ2015 2.0

IQ2017/IQ2016 2.1

IIQ2017/IIQ2016 2.2

IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016 2.4

IVQ2017/IVQ2016 2.8

IQ2018/IQ2017 2.9

IIQ2018/IIQ2017 3.2

IIIQ2018/IIIQ2017: 3.1

IVQ2018/IVQ2017 2.5

IQ2019/IQ2018 2.7

IIQ2019/IIQ2018 2.3

IQ2012 SAAR 3.2

IIQ2012 SAAR 1.7

IIIQ2012 SAAR 0.5

IVQ2012 SAAR 0.5

IQ2013 SAAR 3.6

IIQ2013 SAAR 0.5

IIIQ2013 SAAR 3.2

IVQ2013 SAAR 3.2

IQ2014 SAAR -1.1

IIQ2014 SAAR 5.5

IIIQ2014 SAAR 5.0

IVQ2014 SAAR 2.3

IQ2015 SAAR 3.2

IIQ2015 SAAR: 3.0

IIIQ2015 SAAR: 1.3

IVQ2015 SAAR: 0.1

IQ2016 SAAR: 2.0

IIQ2016 SAAR: 1.9

IIIQ2016 SAAR: 2.2

IVQ2016 SAAR 2.0

IQ2017 SAAR 2.3

IIQ2017 SAAR 2.2

IIIQ2017 SAAR 3.2

IVQ2017 SAAR 3.5

IQ2018 SAAR 2.5

IIQ2018 SAAR 3.5

IIIQ2018 SAAR 2.9

IVQ2018 SAAR 1.1

IQ2019 SAAR 3.1

IIQ2019 SAAR 2.1
Blog 7/28/19

Real Private Fixed Investment

SAAR IIQ2019 ∆% -0.8 IVQ2007 to IIQ2019: 27.1% Blog 7/28/19

Corporate Profits

IQ2019 SAAR: Corporate Profits -2.6; Undistributed Profits -3.0 Blog 6/30/19

Personal Income and Consumption

Jun month ∆% SA Real Disposable Personal Income (RDPI) SA ∆% 0.3
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (RPCE): 0.2
12-month Jun NSA ∆%:
RDPI: 3.3; RPCE ∆%: 2.5
Blog 8/4/19

Quarterly Services Report

IQ19/IQ18 NSA ∆%:
Information 6.3

Financial & Insurance 7.1

Earlier Data:
Blog 3/22/15

Employment Cost Index

Compensation Private IQ2019 SA ∆%: 0.9 Mar 12 months ∆%: 2.8

Earlier Data:
Blog 2/1/15

Industrial Production

Jun month SA ∆%: 0.0
12 months SA ∆%: 1.3

Manufacturing Jun SA 0.4 ∆% Jun 12 months SA ∆% 0.4, NSA 0.3
Capacity Utilization: 77.9
Blog 7/21/19

Productivity and Costs

Nonfarm Business Productivity IQ2019∆% SAAE 3.4; IQ2019/IQ2018 ∆% 2.4; Unit Labor Costs SAAE IQ2019 ∆% -1.6; IQ2019/IQ2018 ∆%: -0.8

Blog 6/16/19

New York Fed Manufacturing Index

General Business Conditions from Jun -8.6 to Jul 4.3
New Orders: From Jun -12.0 to Jul -1.5
Blog 7/21/19

Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Index

General Index from Jun 0.3 to Jul 21.8
New Orders from Jun 8.3 to Jul 18.9
Blog 7/21/19

Manufacturing Shipments and Orders

Apr Orders SA ∆% -0.7 Ex Transport 0.1

Jan-Apr 19/Jan-Apr 18 NSA New Orders ∆% 0.9 Ex transport 1.1

Earlier data:
Blog 4/5/15

Durable Goods

Apr New Orders SA ∆%: -2.1; ex transport ∆%: 0.0
Jan-Apr 19/Jan-Apr 18 New Orders NSA ∆%: 2.0 ex transport ∆% 1.9

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/26/15

Sales of New Motor Vehicles

IIQ2018 4,500,220; IIQ2017 4,419,349. Jul 19 Total Light Vehicles NSA 1392.2 thousand increasing 2.1% from 1363.0 thousand in Jul 2018. Jul 19 SAAR 16.8 million, Jun 19 SAAR 17.1 million, Jul 18 SAAR 16.9 million

Blog 9/9/18 12/9/18 8/11/19

Sales of Merchant Wholesalers

Jan-Jun 2019/Jan-Jun 2018 NSA ∆%: Total 1.2; Durable Goods: 1.5; Nondurable
Goods: 0.8

EARLIER DATA:
Blog 4/12/15

Sales and Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers

May 19 12-M NSA ∆%: Sales Total Business 1.4; Manufacturers 1.5
Retailers 3.0; Merchant Wholesalers -0.1
Blog 7/21/19

Sales for Retail and Food Services

Jan-Jun 2019/Jan-Jun 2018 ∆%: Retail and Food Services 2.9; Retail ∆% 2.7
Blog 7/21/19

Value of Construction Put in Place

SAAR month SA May ∆%: -2.3 Jan-May 19/Jan-May 18 NSA: -0.3

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/5/15

Case-Shiller Home Prices

May 2019/May 2018 ∆% NSA: 10 Cities 2.2; 20 Cities: 2.4; National: 3.4
∆% May SA: 10 Cities 0.1; 20 Cities: 0.1
Blog 8/11/19

FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only

May SA ∆% 0.1;
12-month NSA ∆%: 5.0
Blog 7/28/19

New House Sales

Jun month SAAR ∆%: 7.0
Jan-Jun 2019/Jan-Jun 2018 NSA ∆%: 1.7
Blog 7/28/19

Housing Starts and Permits

Jun Starts month SA ∆% -0.9; Permits ∆%: -6.1
Jan-Jun 2019/Jan-May 2018 NSA ∆% Starts -3.7; Permits ∆% -4.3

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Rate of Homeownership

IQ2019 64.2

IVQ2018: 64.8

Blog 5/5/19

Trade Balance

Balance Jun SA -$55,154 million versus May -$55,344 million
Exports Jun SA ∆%: -2.1 Imports Jun SA ∆%: -1.7
Goods Exports Jan-Jun 2019/Jan-Jun 2018 NSA ∆%: -0.9
Goods Imports Jan-Jun 2019/Jan-Jun 2018 NSA ∆%: minus 0.3
Blog 8/11/19

Export and Import Prices

Jun 12-month NSA ∆%: Imports -2.0; Exports -1.6

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

International Terms of Trade

IIQ2019 109.838 IVQ1947 150.474

2018 108.690 1929 142.590

Blog 7/28/19

Consumer Credit

Jun ∆% annual rate: Total 4.3; Revolving -0.1 Nonrevolving 5.8

Earlier Data:
Blog 5/10/15

Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities

May Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term US Securities: minus $14.6 billion
Major Holders of Treasury Securities: China $1110.2 billion; Japan $1101.0 billion; Total Foreign US Treasury Holdings Dec $6539.1 billion
Blog 7/21/19

Treasury Budget

Fiscal Year 2019/2018 ∆% A Jun: Receipts 2.7; Outlays 6.6 Individual Income Taxes -0.3
Deficit Fiscal Year 2011 $1,300 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2012 $1,087 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2013 $680 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2014 $485 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2015 $439 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2016 $585 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2017 $665 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2018 $779 billion

Blog 7/14/19

CBO Budget and Economic Outlook

2012 Deficit $1087 B 6.8% GDP Debt $11,281 B 70.4% GDP

2013 Deficit $680 B, 4.1% GDP Debt $11,983 B 72.6% GDP

2014 Deficit $485 B 2.8% GDP Debt $12,780 B 74.1% GDP

2015 Deficit $438 B 2.4% GDP Debt $13,117 B 72.9% GDP

2016 Deficit $585 3.2% GDP Debt $14,168.4 B 76.7% GDP

2017 Deficit $665 3.5% GDP

Debt $14,665 76.5% GDP

2028 Deficit $1,526 B, 5.1 % GDP Debt $28,671 B 96.2% GDP

2048: Long-term Debt/GDP 152.0%

Blog 8/26/12 11/18/12 2/10/13 9/22/13 2/16/14 8/24/14 9/14/14 3/1/15 6/21/15 1/3/16 4/10/16 7/24/16 1/8/17 4/2/17 10/14/18

Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities

Jun 2019 SAAR ∆%: Securities 13.2 Loans 4.1 Cash Assets -7.3 Deposits 9.3

Blog 7/21/19

Flow of Funds Net Worth of Families and Nonprofits

IQ2019 ∆ since 2007

Assets +$42,084.7 BN

Nonfinancial +$7,786.5 BN

Real estate +$6,334.4 BN

Financial +$34,298.1 BN

Net Worth +$40,538.0 BN

Net Worth IVQ2018/IIIQ2018 ∆% -3.7 Corporate Equity ∆% -16.8

Blog 6/30/19

Current Account Balance of Payments and Net International Investment Position

Current Account IVQ2018 NSA minus $138,400 MM

% GDP 2.6 SA
NIIP IVQ2018:

Minus $9,717 B

Blog 9/23/2018 2/10/2018 3/31/2019 7/7/2019

Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

Blog 7/21/19

Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades

Blog 7/21/19

IMF View

World Real Economic Growth 2019 ∆% 3.3 Blog 4/21/19

Income, Poverty and Health Insurance in the United States

43.123 Million Below Poverty in 2015, 13.5% of Population

Median Family Income CPI-2015 Adjusted $56,516 in 2015 back to 1999 Levels

Uncovered by Health Insurance 28.966 Million in 2015

Blog 9/25/16

Monetary Policy and Cyclical Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

Blog 1/7/2018

Rules versus Discretionary Authorities in Monetary Policy

Blog 1/1/2017

Links to blog comments in Table USA: 8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html

7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html

7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html

7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html

7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html

6/30/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

6/23/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/fomc-outlook-uncertainty-central-bank.html

6/16/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

4/21/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html

12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

11/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/contraction-of-valuations-of-risk.html

1/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

12/24/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html

10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html

4/2/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html

1/15/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

12/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

10/16/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html

9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html

7/24/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html

4/10/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html

1/17/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html

1/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html

10/11/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html

6/21/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html

5/10/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html

9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html

8/24/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

9/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

2/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

Motor vehicle sales and production in the US have been in long-term structural change. Table VA-1A provides the data on new motor vehicle sales and domestic car production in the US from 1990 to 2010. New motor vehicle sales grew from 14,137 thousand in 1990 to the peak of 17,806 thousand in 2000 or 29.5 percent. In that same period, domestic car production fell from 6,231 thousand in 1990 to 5,542 thousand in 2000 or -11.1 percent. New motor vehicle sales fell from 17,445 thousand in 2005 to 11,772 in 2010 or 32.5 percent while domestic car production fell from 4,321 thousand in 2005 to 2,840 thousand in 2010 or 34.3 percent. In IIQ2018, light vehicle sales accumulated to 4,500,220, which is higher by 1.8 percent relative to 4,419,349 a year earlier in IIQ2017 (http://www.motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html). Total not seasonally adjusted light vehicle sales reached 1392.2 thousands in Jul 2019, increasing 2.1 percent from 1363.0 thousands in Jul 2018 (https://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gap_hist.xlsx). The seasonally adjusted annual rate of light vehicle sales in the US reached 16.8 million in Jul 2019, lower than 17.1 million in Jun 2019 and lower than 16.9 million in Jul 2018 (https://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gap_hist.xlsx).

Table VA-1A, US, New Motor Vehicle Sales and Car Production, Thousand Units 7

New Motor Vehicle Sales

New Car Sales and Leases

New Truck Sales and Leases

Domestic Car Production

1990

14,137

9,300

4,837

6,231

1991

12,725

8,589

4,136

5,454

1992

13,093

8,215

4,878

5,979

1993

14,172

8,518

5,654

5,979

1994

15,397

8,990

6,407

6,614

1995

15,106

8,536

6,470

6,340

1996

15,449

8,527

6,922

6,081

1997

15,490

8,273

7,218

5,934

1998

15,958

8,142

7,816

5,554

1999

17,401

8,697

8,704

5,638

2000

17,806

8,852

8,954

5,542

2001

17,468

8,422

9,046

4,878

2002

17,144

8,109

9,036

5,019

2003

16,968

7,611

9,357

4,510

2004

17,298

7,545

9,753

4,230

2005

17,445

7,720

9,725

4,321

2006

17,049

7,821

9,228

4,367

2007

16,460

7,618

8,683

3,924

2008

13,494

6,814

6.680

3,777

2009

10,601

5,456

5,154

2,247

2010

11,772

5,729

6,044

2,840

Source: US Census Bureau

https://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gap_hist.xlsx

Chart I-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve provides output of motor vehicles and parts in the United States from 1972 to 2019. Output virtually stagnated since the late 1990s with recent increase.

clip_image007

Chart 1-5, US, Motor Vehicles and Parts Output, 1972-2019

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm

The explanation of the sharp contraction of household wealth can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ibid, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

There are significant elements of the theory of bank financial fragility of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b) that help to explain the financial fragility of banks during the credit/dollar crisis (see also Diamond 2007). The theory of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) as exposed by Diamond (2007) is that banks funding with demand deposits have a mismatch of liquidity (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 58-66). A run occurs when too many depositors attempt to withdraw cash at the same time. All that is needed is an expectation of failure of the bank. Three important functions of banks are providing evaluation, monitoring and liquidity transformation. Banks invest in human capital to evaluate projects of borrowers in deciding if they merit credit. The evaluation function reduces adverse selection or financing projects with low present value. Banks also provide important monitoring services of following the implementation of projects, avoiding moral hazard that funds be used for, say, real estate speculation instead of the original project of factory construction. The transformation function of banks involves both assets and liabilities of bank balance sheets. Banks convert an illiquid asset or loan for a project with cash flows in the distant future into a liquid liability in the form of demand deposits that can be withdrawn immediately.

In the theory of banking of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a, 2001b), the bank creates liquidity by tying human assets to capital. The collection skills of the relationship banker convert an illiquid project of an entrepreneur into liquid demand deposits that are immediately available for withdrawal. The deposit/capital structure is fragile because of the threat of bank runs. In these days of online banking, the run on Washington Mutual was through withdrawals online. A bank run can be triggered by the decline of the value of bank assets below the value of demand deposits.

Pelaez and Pelaez (Regulation of Banks and Finance 2009b, 60, 64-5) find immediate application of the theories of banking of Diamond, Dybvig and Rajan to the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. It is a credit crisis because the main issue was the deterioration of the credit portfolios of securitized banks as a result of default of subprime mortgages. It is a dollar crisis because of the weakening dollar resulting from relatively low interest rate policies of the US. It caused systemic effects that converted into a global recession not only because of the huge weight of the US economy in the world economy but also because the credit crisis transferred to the UK and Europe. Management skills or human capital of banks are illustrated by the financial engineering of complex products. The increasing importance of human relative to inanimate capital (Rajan and Zingales 2000) is revolutionizing the theory of the firm (Zingales 2000) and corporate governance (Rajan and Zingales 2001). Finance is one of the most important examples of this transformation. Profits were derived from the charter in the original banking institution. Pricing and structuring financial instruments was revolutionized with option pricing formulas developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973, 1974, 1998) that permitted the development of complex products with fair pricing. The successful financial company must attract and retain finance professionals who have invested in human capital, which is a sunk cost to them and not of the institution where they work.

The complex financial products created for securitized banking with high investments in human capital are based on houses, which are as illiquid as the projects of entrepreneurs in the theory of banking. The liquidity fragility of the securitized bank is equivalent to that of the commercial bank in the theory of banking (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 65). Banks created off-balance sheet structured investment vehicles (SIV) that issued commercial paper receiving AAA rating because of letters of liquidity guarantee by the banks. The commercial paper was converted into liquidity by its use as collateral in SRPs at the lowest rates and minimal haircuts because of the AAA rating of the guarantor bank. In the theory of banking, default can be triggered when the value of assets is perceived as lower than the value of the deposits. Commercial paper issued by SIVs, securitized mortgages and derivatives all obtained SRP liquidity on the basis of illiquid home mortgage loans at the bottom of the pyramid. The run on the securitized bank had a clear origin (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 65):

“The increasing default of mortgages resulted in an increase in counterparty risk. Banks were hit by the liquidity demands of their counterparties. The liquidity shock extended to many segments of the financial markets—interbank loans, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), high-yield bonds and many others—when counterparties preferred lower returns of highly liquid safe havens, such as Treasury securities, than the risk of having to sell the collateral in SRPs at deep discounts or holding an illiquid asset. The price of an illiquid asset is near zero.”

Gorton and Metrick (2010H, 507) provide a revealing quote to the work in 1908 of Edwin R. A. Seligman, professor of political economy at Columbia University, founding member of the American Economic Association and one of its presidents and successful advocate of progressive income taxation. The intention of the quote is to bring forth the important argument that financial crises are explained in terms of “confidence” but as Professor Seligman states in reference to historical banking crises in the US, the important task is to explain what caused the lack of confidence. It is instructive to repeat the more extended quote of Seligman (1908, xi) on the explanations of banking crises:

“The current explanations may be divided into two categories. Of these the first includes what might be termed the superficial theories. Thus it is commonly stated that the outbreak of a crisis is due to lack of confidence,--as if the lack of confidence was not in itself the very thing which needs to be explained. Of still slighter value is the attempt to associate a crisis with some particular governmental policy, or with some action of a country’s executive. Such puerile interpretations have commonly been confined to countries like the United States, where the political passions of democracy have had the fullest way. Thus the crisis of 1893 was ascribed by the Republicans to the impending Democratic tariff of 1894; and the crisis of 1907 has by some been termed the ‘[Theodore] Roosevelt panic,” utterly oblivious of the fact that from the time of President Jackson, who was held responsible for the troubles of 1837, every successive crisis had had its presidential scapegoat, and has been followed by a political revulsion. Opposed to these popular, but wholly unfounded interpretations, is the second class of explanations, which seek to burrow beneath the surface and to discover the more occult and fundamental causes of the periodicity of crises.”

Scholars ignore superficial explanations in the effort to seek good and truth. The problem of economic analysis of the credit/dollar crisis is the lack of a structural model with which to attempt empirical determination of causes (Gorton and Metrick 2010SB). There would still be doubts even with a well-specified structural model because samples of economic events do not typically permit separating causes and effects. There is also confusion is separating the why of the crisis and how it started and propagated, all of which are extremely important.

In true heritage of the principles of Seligman (1908), Gorton (2009EFM) discovers a prime causal driver of the credit/dollar crisis. The objective of subprime and Alt-A mortgages was to facilitate loans to populations with modest means so that they could acquire a home. These borrowers would not receive credit because of (1) lack of funds for down payments; (2) low credit rating and information; (3) lack of information on income; and (4) errors or lack of other information. Subprime mortgage “engineering” was based on the belief that both lender and borrower could benefit from increases in house prices over the short run. The initial mortgage would be refinanced in two or three years depending on the increase of the price of the house. According to Gorton (2009EFM, 13, 16):

“The outstanding amounts of Subprime and Alt-A [mortgages] combined amounted to about one quarter of the $6 trillion mortgage market in 2004-2007Q1. Over the period 2000-2007, the outstanding amount of agency mortgages doubled, but subprime grew 800%! Issuance in 2005 and 2006 of Subprime and Alt-A mortgages was almost 30% of the mortgage market. Since 2000 the Subprime and Alt-A segments of the market grew at the expense of the Agency (i.e., the government sponsored entities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) share, which fell from almost 80% (by outstanding or issuance) to about half by issuance and 67% by outstanding amount. The lender’s option to rollover the mortgage after an initial period is implicit in the subprime mortgage. The key design features of a subprime mortgage are: (1) it is short term, making refinancing important; (2) there is a step-up mortgage rate that applies at the end of the first period, creating a strong incentive to refinance; and (3) there is a prepayment penalty, creating an incentive not to refinance early.”

The prime objective of successive administrations in the US during the past 20 years and actually since the times of Roosevelt in the 1930s has been to provide “affordable” financing for the “American dream” of home ownership. The US housing finance system is mixed with public, public/private and purely private entities. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system was established by Congress in 1932 that also created the Federal Housing Administration in 1934 with the objective of insuring homes against default. In 1938, the government created the Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae, to foster a market for FHA-insured mortgages. Government-insured mortgages were transferred from Fannie Mae to the Government National Mortgage Association, or Ginnie Mae, to permit Fannie Mae to become a publicly-owned company. Securitization of mortgages began in 1970 with the government charter to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac, with the objective of bundling mortgages created by thrift institutions that would be marketed as bonds with guarantees by Freddie Mac (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 42-8). In the third quarter of 2008, total mortgages in the US were $12,057 billion of which 43.5 percent, or $5423 billion, were retained or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 45). In 1990, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had a share of only 25.4 percent of total mortgages in the US. Mortgages in the US increased from $6922 billion in 2002 to $12,088 billion in 2007, or by 74.6 percent, while the retained or guaranteed portfolio of Fannie and Freddie rose from $3180 billion in 2002 to $4934 billion in 2007, or by 55.2 percent.

According to Pinto (2008) in testimony to Congress:

“There are approximately 25 million subprime and Alt-A loans outstanding, with an unpaid principal amount of over $4.5 trillion, about half of them held or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie. Their high risk activities were allowed to operate at 75:1 leverage ratio. While they may deny it, there can be no doubt that Fannie and Freddie now own or guarantee $1.6 trillion in subprime, Alt-A and other default prone loans and securities. This comprises over 1/3 of their risk portfolios and amounts to 34% of all the subprime loans and 60% of all Alt-A loans outstanding. These 10.5 million unsustainable, nonprime loans are experiencing a default rate 8 times the level of the GSEs’ 20 million traditional quality loans. The GSEs will be responsible for a large percentage of an estimated 8.8 million foreclosures expected over the next 4 years, accounting for the failure of about 1 in 6 home mortgages. Fannie and Freddie have subprimed America.”

In perceptive analysis of growth and macroeconomics in the past six decades, Rajan (2012FA) argues that “the West can’t borrow and spend its way to recovery.” The Keynesian paradigm is not applicable in current conditions. Advanced economies in the West could be divided into those that reformed regulatory structures to encourage productivity and others that retained older structures. In the period from 1950 to 2000, Cobet and Wilson (2002) find that US productivity, measured as output/hour, grew at the average yearly rate of 2.9 percent while Japan grew at 6.3 percent and Germany at 4.7 percent (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). In the period from 1995 to 2000, output/hour grew at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US but at lower rates of 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in the US. Rajan (2012FA) argues that the differential in productivity growth was accomplished by deregulation in the US at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. In contrast, Europe did not engage in reform with the exception of Germany in the early 2000s that empowered the German economy with significant productivity advantage. At the same time, technology and globalization increased relative remunerations in highly-skilled, educated workers relative to those without skills for the new economy. It was then politically appealing to improve the fortunes of those left behind by the technological revolution by means of increasing cheap credit. As Rajan (2012FA) argues:

“In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, partly to gain more control over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant private mortgage agencies, and partly to promote affordable homeownership for low-income groups. Such policies helped money flow to lower-middle-class households and raised their spending—so much so that consumption inequality rose much less than income inequality in the years before the crisis. These policies were also politically popular. Unlike when it came to an expansion in government welfare transfers, few groups opposed expanding credit to the lower-middle class—not the politicians who wanted more growth and happy constituents, not the bankers and brokers who profited from the mortgage fees, not the borrowers who could now buy their dream houses with virtually no money down, and not the laissez-faire bank regulators who thought they could pick up the pieces if the housing market collapsed. The Federal Reserve abetted these shortsighted policies. In 2001, in response to the dot-com bust, the Fed cut short-term interest rates to the bone. Even though the overstretched corporations that were meant to be stimulated were not interested in investing, artificially low interest rates acted as a tremendous subsidy to the parts of the economy that relied on debt, such as housing and finance. This led to an expansion in housing construction (and related services, such as real estate brokerage and mortgage lending), which created jobs, especially for the unskilled. Progressive economists applauded this process, arguing that the housing boom would lift the economy out of the doldrums. But the Fed-supported bubble proved unsustainable. Many construction workers have lost their jobs and are now in deeper trouble than before, having also borrowed to buy unaffordable houses. Bankers obviously deserve a large share of the blame for the crisis. Some of the financial sector’s activities were clearly predatory, if not outright criminal. But the role that the politically induced expansion of credit played cannot be ignored; it is the main reason the usual checks and balances on financial risk taking broke down.”

In fact, Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) anticipated low liquidity in financial markets resulting from low interest rates before the financial crisis that caused distortions of risk/return decisions provoking the credit/dollar crisis and global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Near zero interest rates of unconventional monetary policy induced excessive risks and low liquidity in financial decisions that were critical as a cause of the credit/dollar crisis after 2007. Rajan (2012FA) argues that it is not feasible to return to the employment and income levels before the credit/dollar crisis because of the bloated construction sector, financial system and government budgets.

Table IIA-1 shows the euphoria of prices during the housing boom and the subsequent decline. House prices rose 94.1 percent in the 10-city composite of the Case-Shiller home price index, 78.0 percent in the 20-city composite and 63.5 percent in the US national home price index between May 2000 and May 2005. Prices rose around 100 percent from May 2000 to May 2006, increasing 113.2 percent for the 10-city composite, 95.7 percent for the 20-city composite and 77.8 percent in the US national index. House prices rose 38.9 percent between May 2003 and May 2005 for the 10-city composite, 33.7 percent for the 20-city composite and 28.6 percent for the US national propelled by low fed funds rates of 1.0 percent between Jul 2003 and Jun 2004. Fed funds rates increased by 0.25 basis points at every meeting of the Federal Open Mayket Committee (FOMC) from Jun 2004 until Jun 2006, reaching 5.25 percent. Simultaneously, the suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury bond caused decline of yields of mortgage-backed securities with intended decrease in mortgage rates. Similarly, between May 2003 and May 2006, the 10-city index gained 52.5 percent; the 20-city index increased 47.0 percent; and the US national 39.9 percent. House prices have increased from May 2006 to May 2019 by 1.8 percent for the 10-city composite, increasing 5.4 percent for the 20-city composite and increasing 13.7 percent for the US national. Measuring house prices is quite difficult because of the lack of homogeneity that is typical of standardized commodities. In the 12 months ending in May 2019, house prices increased 2.2 percent in the 10-city composite, increasing 2.4 percent in the 20-city composite and 3.4 percent in the US national. Table IIA-1 also shows that house prices increased 117.1 percent between May 2000 and May 2019 for the 10-city composite, increasing 106.2 percent for the 20-city composite and 102.2 percent for the US national. House prices are close to the lowest level since peaks during the boom before the financial crisis and global recession. The 10-city composite increased 1.7 percent from the peak in Jun 2006 to May 2019 and the 20-city composite increased 5.0 percent from the peak in Jul 2006 to May 2019. The US national increased 13.6 percent in May 2019 from the peak of the 10-city composite in Jun 2006 and increased 13.6 percent from the peak of the 20-city composite in Jul 2006. The final part of Table II-2 provides average annual percentage rates of growth of the house price indexes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller. The average annual growth rate between Dec 1987 and Dec 2018 for the 10-city composite was 3.8 percent and 3.6 percent for the US national. Data for the 20-city composite are available only beginning in Jan 2000. House prices accelerated in the 1990s with the average rate of the 10-city composite of 5.0 percent between Dec 1992 and Dec 2000 while the average rate for the period Dec 1987 to Dec 2000 was 3.8 percent. The average rate for the US national was 3.6 percent from Dec 1987 to Dec 2018 and 3.6 percent from Dec 1987 to Dec 2000. Although the global recession affecting the US between IVQ2007 (Dec) and IIQ2009 (Jun) caused decline of house prices of slightly above 30 percent, the average annual growth rate of the 10-city composite between Dec 2000 and Dec 2018 was 3.9 percent while the rate of the 20-city composite was 3.6 percent and 3.6 percent for the US national.

Table IIA-1, US, Percentage Changes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%

10-City Composite

20-City Composite

US National

∆% May 2000 to May 2003

39.8

33.1

27.1

∆% May 2000 to May 2005

94.1

78.0

63.5

∆% May 2003 to May 2005

38.9

33.7

28.6

∆% May 2000 to May 2006

113.2

95.7

77.8

∆% May 2003 to May 2006

52.5

47.0

39.9

∆% May 2005 to May 2019

11.8

15.9

23.7

∆% May 2006 to May 2019

1.8

5.4

13.7

∆% May 2009 to May 2019

52.2

55.0

41.5

∆% May 2010 to May 2019

44.4

48.1

42.6

∆% May 2011 to May 2019

50.1

55.1

49.0

∆% May 2012 to May 2019

51.6

55.8

48.6

∆% May 2013 to May 2019

35.8

39.0

36.3

∆% May 2014 to May 2019

24.2

27.2

27.3

∆% May 2015 to May 2019

18.8

21.3

22.0

∆% May 2016 to May 2019

13.7

15.2

16.2

∆% May 2017 to May 2019

8.4

9.0

10.0

∆% May 2018 to May 2019

2.2

2.4

3.4

∆% May 2000 to May 2019

117.1

106.2

102.2

∆% Peak Jun 2006 to May 2019

1.7

13.6

∆% Peak Jul 2006 to May 2019

5.0

13.6

Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2018

3.8

NA

3.6

Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2000

3.8

NA

3.6

Average ∆% Dec 1992-Dec 2000

5.0

NA

4.5

Average ∆% Dec 2000-Dec 2018

3.9

3.6

3.6

Source: https://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-corelogic-case-shiller

Price increases measured by the Case-Shiller house price indices show in data for May 2019 that “the rate of home price increases across the U.S. has continued to slow” (https://my.spindices.com/documents/indexnews/announcements/20190730-965771/965771_cshomeprice-release-0730.pdf?force_download=true). Monthly house prices increased sharply from Feb 2013 to Jan 2014 for both the 10- and 20-city composites, as shown in Table IIA-2. In Jan 2013, the seasonally adjusted 10-city composite increased 0.8 percent and the 20-city increased 0.8 percent while the 10-city not seasonally adjusted changed 0.0 percent and the 20-city changed 0.0 percent. House prices increased at high monthly percentage rates from Feb to Nov 2013. House prices seasonally adjusted declined in most months for both the 10-city and 20-city Case-Shiller composites from Dec 2010 to Jan 2012, as shown in Table IIA-2. The most important seasonal factor in house prices is school changes for wealthier homeowners with more expensive houses. Without seasonal adjustment, house prices fell from Dec 2010 throughout Mar 2011 and then increased in every month from Apr to Aug 2011 but fell in every month from Sep 2011 to Feb 2012. The not seasonally adjusted index registers decline in Mar 2012 of 0.1 percent for the 10-city composite and is flat for the 20-city composite. Not seasonally adjusted house prices increased 1.4 percent in Apr 2012 and at high monthly percentage rates until Sep 2012. House prices not seasonally adjusted stalled from Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 and surged from Feb to Sep 2013, decelerating in Oct 2013-Feb 2014. House prices grew at fast rates in Mar 2014. The 10-city NSA index changed 0.5 percent in May 2019 and the 20-city changed 0.6 percent. The 10-city SA changed 0.1 percent in May 2019 and the 20-city composite SA changed 0.1 percent. Declining house prices cause multiple adverse effects of which two are quite evident. (1) There is a disincentive to buy houses in continuing price declines. (2) More mortgages could be losing fair market value relative to mortgage debt. Another possibility is a wealth effect that consumers restrain purchases because of the decline of their net worth in houses.

Table IIA-2, US, Monthly Percentage Change of S&P Corelogic Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, Seasonally Adjusted and Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%

10-City Composite. SA

10-City Composite. NSA

20-City Composite. SA

20-City Composite

NSA

May 2019

0.1

0.5

0.1

0.6

April 2019

0.2

0.8

0.0

0.8

March 2019

0.1

0.7

0.3

0.7

February 2019

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.1

January 2019

0.1

-0.3

0.1

-0.3

December 2018

0.1

-0.3

0.2

-0.3

November 2018

0.1

-0.2

0.2

-0.2

October 2018

0.4

0.0

0.4

-0.1

September 2018

0.7

0.0

0.7

0.0

August 2018

-0.1

0.1

-0.2

0.0

July 2018

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.3

June 2018

0.2

0.5

0.2

0.6

May 2018

0.2

0.6

0.3

0.7

April 2018

0.1

0.7

0.1

0.9

March 2018

0.3

0.9

0.6

1.0

February 2018

0.7

0.7

0.8

0.7

January 2018

0.7

0.3

0.7

0.3

December 2017

0.6

0.2

0.6

0.2

November 2017

0.7

0.3

0.6

0.2

October 2017

0.6

0.2

0.6

0.2

September 2017

1.0

0.4

1.1

0.3

August 2017

0.2

0.4

0.1

0.4

July 2017

0.5

0.8

0.5

0.7

June 2017

0.2

0.6

0.3

0.7

May 2017

0.3

0.8

0.4

0.9

April 2017

0.2

0.8

0.2

1.0

March 2017

0.3

0.8

0.5

1.0

February 2017

0.4

0.3

0.5

0.4

January 2017

0.7

0.3

0.7

0.2

December 2016

0.7

0.2

0.7

0.2

November 2016

0.6

0.2

0.6

0.2

October 2016

0.4

-0.1

0.5

0.0

September 2016

0.6

0.0

0.7

0.1

August 2016

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.3

July 2016

0.3

0.5

0.3

0.6

June 2016

0.2

0.7

0.3

0.8

May 2016

0.2

0.8

0.3

0.9

April 2016

0.4

1.0

0.3

1.1

March 2016

0.4

0.9

0.5

1.0

February 2016

0.3

0.2

0.4

0.2

January 2016

0.4

-0.1

0.5

0.0

December 2015

0.4

-0.1

0.5

0.0

November 2015

0.5

0.0

0.6

0.0

October 2015

0.5

-0.1

0.6

0.0

September 2015

0.6

0.1

0.7

0.1

August 2015

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.3

July 2015

0.2

0.6

0.3

0.7

June 2015

0.3

0.9

0.3

1.0

May 2015

0.3

1.0

0.3

1.1

April 2015

0.4

1.1

0.3

1.1

March 2015

0.3

0.8

0.4

0.9

February 2015

0.7

0.5

0.7

0.5

January 2015

0.5

-0.1

0.5

-0.1

December 2014

0.6

0.0

0.6

0.0

November 2014

0.4

-0.3

0.5

-0.2

October 2014

0.5

-0.1

0.5

-0.1

September 2014

0.4

-0.1

0.4

-0.1

August 2014

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.2

July 2014

0.1

0.6

0.1

0.6

June 2014

0.2

1.0

0.2

1.0

May 2014

0.2

1.1

0.2

1.1

April 2014

0.4

1.1

0.4

1.2

March 2014

0.4

0.8

0.4

0.9

February 2014

0.4

0.0

0.4

0.0

January 2014

0.6

-0.1

0.6

-0.1

December 2013

0.5

-0.1

0.5

-0.1

November 2013

0.7

0.0

0.7

-0.1

October 2013

0.9

0.2

0.9

0.2

September 2013

1.1

0.7

1.1

0.7

August 2013

1.2

1.3

1.2

1.3

July 2013

1.2

1.9

1.1

1.8

June 2013

1.2

2.2

1.2

2.2

May 2013

1.4

2.5

1.4

2.5

April 2013

2.0

2.6

1.9

2.6

March 2013

1.0

1.3

0.9

1.3

February 2013

0.9

0.3

0.9

0.2

January 2013

0.8

0.0

0.8

0.0

December 2012

0.9

0.2

0.9

0.2

November 2012

0.6

-0.3

0.7

-0.2

October 2012

0.6

-0.2

0.7

-0.1

September 2012

0.6

0.3

0.6

0.3

August 2012

0.6

0.8

0.7

0.9

July 2012

0.6

1.5

0.7

1.6

June 2012

1.0

2.1

1.1

2.3

May 2012

1.0

2.2

1.1

2.4

April 2012

0.8

1.4

0.9

1.4

March 2012

-0.2

-0.1

-0.3

0.0

February 2012

-0.2

-0.9

-0.1

-0.8

January 2012

-0.3

-1.1

-0.2

-1.0

December 2011

-0.5

-1.2

-0.4

-1.1

November 2011

-0.6

-1.4

-0.5

-1.3

October 2011

-0.5

-1.3

-0.5

-1.4

September 2011

-0.3

-0.6

-0.4

-0.7

August 2011

-0.2

0.1

-0.2

0.1

July 2011

0.0

0.9

0.0

1.0

June 2011

-0.1

1.0

0.0

1.2

May 2011

-0.2

1.0

-0.2

1.0

April 2011

0.1

0.6

0.2

0.6

March 2011

-0.9

-1.0

-1.1

-1.0

February 2011

-0.5

-1.3

-0.4

-1.2

January 2011

-0.3

-1.1

-0.3

-1.1

December 2010

-0.2

-0.9

-0.2

-1.0

Source: https://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-corelogic-case-shiller

Table IIA-4 summarizes the brutal drops in assets and net worth of US households and nonprofit organizations from 2007 to 2008 and 2009. Total assets fell $10.2 trillion or 12.3 percent from 2007 to 2008 and $8.0 trillion or 9.7 percent to 2009. Net worth fell $10.1 trillion from 2007 to 2008 or 14.8 percent and $7.8 trillion to 2009 or 11.4 percent. Subsidies to housing prolonged over decades together with interest rates at 1.0 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 inflated valuations of real estate and risk financial assets such as equities. The increase of fed funds rates by 25 basis points until 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 reversed carry trades through exotic vehicles such as subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) and world financial markets. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9).

Table IIA-4, Difference of Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations, Billions of Dollars from 2007 to 2008 and 2009

2007

2008

Change to 2008

2009

Change to 2009

A

82,609.2

72,415.7

-10,193.5

74,625.7

-7,983.5

Non
FIN

28,012.9

24,409.0

-3,603.9

23,505.7

-4,507.2

RE

23,216.2

19,489.4

-3,726.8

18,569.1

-4,647.1

FIN

54,596.4

48,006.7

-6,589.7

51,120.1

-3,476.3

LIAB

14,504.2

14,400.6

-103.6

14,278.7

-225.5

NW

68,105.1

58,015.2

-10,089.9

60,347.1

-7,758.0

A: Assets; Non FIN: Nonfinancial Assets; RE: Real Estate; FIN: Financial Assets; LIAB: Liabilities; NW: Net Worth

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2019. Flow of funds, balance sheets and integrated macroeconomic accounts: first quarter 2019. Washington, DC, Federal Reserve System, Jun 6. https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/default.htm

VB Japan. The GDP of Japan grew at 1.0 percent per year on average from 1991 to 2002, with the GDP implicit deflator falling at 0.8 percent per year on average. The average growth rate of Japan’s GDP was 4 percent per year on average from the middle of the 1970s to 1992 (Ito 2004). Low growth in Japan in the 1990s is commonly labeled as “the lost decade” (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 81-115). Table VB-GDP provides yearly growth rates of Japan’s GDP from 1995 to 2018. Growth weakened from 2.7 per cent in 1995 and 3.1 percent in 1996 to contractions of 1.1 percent in 1998 and 0.3 percent in 1999. Growth rates were below 2 percent with exception of 2.8 percent in 2000 and 2.2 percent in 2004. Japan’s GDP contracted sharply by 1.1 percent in 2008 and 5.4 percent in 2009. As in most advanced economies, growth was robust at 4.2 percent in 2010 but mediocre at minus 0.1 percent in 2011 because of the tsunami and 1.5 percent in 2012. Japan’s GDP grew 2.0 percent in 2013 and nearly stagnated in 2014 at 0.4 percent. The GDP of Japan increased 1.2 percent in 2015 and 0.6 percent in 2016. Japan’s GDP increased at 1.9 percent in 2017. The GDP of Japan increased 0.8 percent in 2018. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). Japan’s real GDP in calendar year 2018 is 5.8 percent higher than in calendar year 2007 for growth at the average yearly rate of 0.5 percent. Japan’s real GDP grew 13.1 percent from the trough of 2009 to 2018 at the average yearly rate of 1.4 percent (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html).

Table VB-GDP, Japan, Yearly Percentage Change of GDP ∆%

Calendar Year

∆%

1995

2.7

1996

3.1

1997

1.1

1998

-1.1

1999

-0.3

2000

2.8

2001

0.4

2002

0.1

2003

1.5

2004

2.2

2005

1.7

2006

1.4

2007

1.7

2008

-1.1

2009

-5.4

2010

4.2

2011

-0.1

2012

1.5

2013

2.0

2014

0.4

2015

1.2

2016

0.6

2017

1.9

2018

0.8

Source: Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf) with changes on Jul 21, 2015 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 1.5 to 2.1 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food 0.2 to 1.2 to 3.3 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.2 to 1.2 percent in 2015 and 1.2 to 2.2 percent in 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was minus 0.4 percent in Mar 2014 and 2.2 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm), significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:

“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.

The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.

Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”

The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

  1. Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  2. Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
  3. Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  4. Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
  5. Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).

Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf) with changes on Feb 1, 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). On Jun 19, 2015, the Bank of Japan announced a “New Framework for Monetary Policy Meetings,” which provides for quarterly release of the forecasts of the economy and prices beginning in Jan 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/rel150619a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 0.7 to 0.7 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food of 0.0 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.0 to 0.2 percent in 2016 and 1.8 to 3.0 percent in 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was 0.1 percent in Mar 2016 and minus 0.3 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm). The CPI increased significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:

“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.

The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.

Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”

The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

  1. Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  2. Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
  3. Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  4. Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
  5. Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).
  6. Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) with Negative Nominal Interest Rate. On January 29, 2016, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan introduced a new policy to attain the “price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf). The new framework consists of three dimensions: quantity, quality and interest rate. The interest rate dimension consists of rates paid to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank of Japan of three tiers zero, positive and minus 0.1 percent. The quantitative dimension consists of increasing the monetary base at the annual rate of 80 trillion yen. The qualitative dimension consists of purchases by the Bank of Japan of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITS).
  7. Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control. The Bank of Japan introduced a new approach, QQE with Yield Curve Control (“Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control”) at its policy meeting on Sep 21, 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160921a.pdf). The policy consists of two measures. First “yield curve control” consists of controlling the long-term and short-term interest rates. The bank will fix the interest rates of policy balances held by financial institutions at the BOJ at minus 0.1 percent and will purchase Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) in the amount required to maintain the yield of the 10-year JGB at around zero percent. Second, “the inflation-overshooting commitment” consists of increasing base money to maintain the CPI price stability target above 2 percent.

Table VB-BOJF, Bank of Japan, Forecasts of the Majority of Members of the Policy Board, % Year on Year

Fiscal Year
Date of Forecast

Real GDP

CPI All Items Less Fresh Food

Excluding Effects of Consumption Tax Hikes

2013

Apr 2014

+2.2 to +2.3
[+2.2]

+0.8

Jan 2014

+2.5 to +2.9

[+2.7]

+0.7 to +0.9

[+0.7]

Oct 2013

+2.6 to +3.0

[+2.7]

+0.6 to +1.0

[+0.7]

Jul 2013

+2.5 to +3.0

[+2.8]

+0.5 to +0.8

[+0.6]

2014

Apr 2015

-1.0 to -0.8

[-0.9]

+2.8

+0.8

Jan 2015

-0.6 to -0.4

[-0.5]

+2.9 to +3.2

[+2.9]

+0.9 to +1.2

[+0.9]

Oct 2014

+0.2 to +0.7

[+0.5]

+3.1 to +3.4

[+3.2]

+1.1 to +1.4

[+1.2]

Jul 2014

+0.6 to +1.3

[+1.0]

+3.2 to +3.5

[+3.3]

+1.2 to +1.5

[+1.3]

Apr 2014

+0.8 to +1.3
[+1.1]

+3.0 to +3.5
[+3.3]

+1.0 to +1.5
[+1.3]

Jan 2014

+0.9 to 1.5

[+1.4]

+2.9 to +3.6

[+3.3]

+0.9 to +1.6

[+1.3]

Oct 2013

+0.9 to +1.5

[+1.5]

+2.8 to +3.6

[+3.3]

+0.8 to +1.6

[+1.3]

Jul 2013

+0.8 to +1.5

[+1.3]

+2.7 to +3.6

[+3.3]

+0.7 to +1.6

[+1.3]

2015

Feb 2016

+0.7 to +0.7

[+0.7]

0.0

Jan 2016

+1.0 to +1.3

[+1.1]

0.0 to 0.2

[+0.1]

Oct 2015

+0.8 to +1.4

[+1.2]

0.0 to +0.4

[+0.1

Jul 2015

+1.5 to +1.9

[+1.7]

+0.3 to +1.0

[+0.7]

Apr 2015

+1.5 to +2.1

[+2.0]

+0.2 to 1.2

[+0.8]

+0.2 to 1.2

[+0.8]

Jan 2015

+1.8 to +2.3

[+2.1]

+0.4 to +1.3

[+1.0]

+0.4 to +1.3

[+1.0]

Oct 2014

+1.2 to +1.7

[+1.5]

+1.8 to 2.6

[+2.4]

+1.1 to +1.9

[+1.7]

Jul 2014

+1.2 to +1.6

[+1.5]

+1.9 to +2.8

[+2.6]

+1.2 to +2.1

[+1.9]

Apr 2014

+1.2 to +1.5
[+1.5]

+1.9 to +2.8
[+2.6]

+1.2 to +2.1
[+1.9]

Jan 2014

+1.2 to +1.8

[+1.5]

+1.7 to +2.9

[+2.6]

+1.0 to +2.2

[+1.9]

Oct 2013

+1.3 to +1.8

[+1.5]

+1.6 to +2.9

[+2.6]

+0.9 to +2.2

[+1.9]

Jul 2013

+1.3 to +1.9 [+1.5]

+1.6 to +2.9 [+2.6]

+0.9 to +2.2 [+1.9]

2016

Apr 2017

+1.4 to +1.4

[+1.4]

-0.3

Feb 2017

+1.2 to +1.5

[+1.4]

-0.2 to -0.1

[-0.2]

Jul 2016

+0.8 to +1.0

[+1.0]

0.0 to +0.3

[0.5]

0.0 to +0.3

[0.5]

Apr 2016

+0.8 to +1.4

[+1.2]

0.0 to +0.8

[+0.5]

0.0 to +0.8

[+0.5]

Jan 2016

+1.0 to +1.7

[+1.5]

0.2 to +1.2

[+0.8]

Oct 2015

+1.2 to +1.6

[+1.4]

+0.8 to +1.5

[+1.4]

Jul 2015

+1.5 to 1.7

[+1.5]

+1.2 to +2.1

[+1.9]

Apr 2015

+1.4 to +1.8

[+1.5]

+1.2 to +2.2

[+2.0]

+1.2 to +2.2

[+2.0]

Jan 2015

+1.5 to +1.7

[+1.6]

+1.5 to +2.3

[+2.2]

+1.5 to +2.3

[+2.2]

Oct 2014

+1.0 to +1.4

[+1.2]

+1.9 to 3.0

[+2.8]

+1.2 to 2.3

[+2.1]

Jul 2014

+1.0 to +1.5

[+1.3]

+2.0 to +3.0

[+2.8]

+1.3 to +2.3

[+2.1]

Apr 2014

+1.0 to +1.5
[+1.3]

+2.0 to +3.0
[+2.8]

+1.3 to +2.3
[+2.1]

2017

Apr 2017

+1.4 to +1.6

[+1.6]

+0.6 to +1.6

[+1.4]

Feb 2017

+1.3 to +1.6

[+1.5]

+0.8 to +1.6

[+1.5]

Jul 2016

1.0 to +1.5
[+1.3]

+0.8 to +1.8
[+1.7]

+0.8 to +1.8
[+1.7]

Apr 2016

0.0 to + +0.3

[+0.1]

1.8 to +3.0

[+2.7]

0.8 to +2.0

[+1.7

Jan 2016

+0.1 to + 0.5

[+0.3]

+2.0 to +3.1

[+2.8]

+ 1.0 to +2.1

[+1.8]

Oct 2015

+0.1 to +0.5

[+0.3]

+2.5 to +3.4

[+3.1]

+1.2 to 2.1

[+1.8]

Jul 2015

+0.1 to +0.5

[+0.2]

+2.7 to +3.4

[+3.1]

+1.4 to +2.1

[+1.8]

Apr 2015

+0.1 to +0.5

[+0.2]

+2.7 to +3.4

[+3.2]

+1.4 to +2.1

[+1.9]

2018

Apr 2017

+1.1 to +1.3

[+1.3]

+0.8 to +1.9

[+1.7]

Feb 2017

+1.0 to +1.2

[+1.1]

+0.9 to +1.9

[+1.7]

Jul 2016

+0.8 to +1.0
[+0.9]

+1.0 to +2.0
[+1.9]

+1.0 to +2.0
[+1.9]

Apr 2016

+0.6 to +1.2

[+1.0]

+1.0 to +2.1

[+1.9]

+1.0 to +2.1

[+1.9]

2019

Apr 2017

+0.6 to +0.7

[+0.7]

+1.4 to +2.5

[+2.4]

+0.9 to +2.0

[+1.9]

Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members

Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan

Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members

Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140715a.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1510b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1601b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1607b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1704b.pdf

The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Composite Output Index increased from 50.8 in Jun to 51.2 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/71cb3c8fe4254f65b95c747a92ab4c5d). The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Services Business Activity Index increased from 51.9 in Jun to 52.3 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/71cb3c8fe4254f65b95c747a92ab4c5d). The Jibun Bank Flash Japan Manufacturing PMI Index™ with the Flash Japan

Manufacturing PMI™ changed from 49.3 in Jun to 49.6 in Jul

(https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/71cb3c8fe4254f65b95c747a92ab4c5d). Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS

Markit, finds some improvement in conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/71cb3c8fe4254f65b95c747a92ab4c5d).The Jibun Bank Composite Output PMI Index decreased from 50.8 in Jun to 50.6 in Jul, indicating mild business activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/acf45b0c90d94d31ba37b6fd76d41ace). The Jibun Bank Business Activity Index of Services decreased to 51.8 in Jul from 51.9 in Jun (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/acf45b0c90d94d31ba37b6fd76d41ace). Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/acf45b0c90d94d31ba37b6fd76d41ace). The Jibun Bank Japan Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™), seasonally adjusted, increased from 49.3 in Jun to 49.4 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/daa3dbc8f1d043768141174fe4e081b0). New orders decreased while new foreign orders decreased. Joe Hayes, Associate Economist at IHS Markit, finds weaker conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/daa3dbc8f1d043768141174fe4e081b0). Table JPY provides the country data table for Japan.

Table JPY, Japan, Economic Indicators

Historical GDP and CPI

1981-2010 Real GDP Growth and CPI Inflation 1981-2010
Blog 8/9/11 Table 26

Corporate Goods Prices

Jun ∆% -0.5
12 months ∆% -0.1
Blog 7/14/19

Consumer Price Index

Jun NSA ∆% -0.1; Jun 12 months NSA ∆% 0.7
Blog 7/21/19

Real GDP Growth

IQQ2019 ∆%: 0.6 on IVQ2018; IQ2019 SAAR 2.2;
∆% from quarter a year earlier: 0.9
Blog 6/16/13 8/18/13 9/15/13 11/17/13 12/15/13 2/23/14 3/16/14 5/18/14 6/15/14 8/17/14 9/14/14 11/23/14 12/14/14 2/22/15 3/15/15 5/24/15 6/14/15 8/23/15 9/13/15 11/22/15 12/13/15 2/21/16 3/13/16 5/22/16 6/12/16 8/21/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/11/16 2/19/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/11/17 8/20/17 9/10/17 11/26/17 12/17/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/17/18 8/19/18 9/16/18 11/18/18 2/17/19 3/17/19 5/26/19 6/16/19

Employment Report

Jun Unemployed 1.62 million

Change in unemployed since last year: -70 thousand
Unemployment rate: 2.3%
Blog 8/4/19

All Industry Indices

May month SA ∆% 0.3
12-month NSA ∆% 0.0

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/26/15

Industrial Production

Jun SA month ∆%: -3.6
Jun 12-month NSA ∆% 4.1

Earlier Data:
Blog 3/29/15

Machine Orders

Total Apr ∆% 4.3

Private ∆%: 10.7 Excluding Volatile Orders minus 5.2

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Tertiary Index

May month SA ∆% -0.2
May 12 months NSA ∆% 0.5

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/26/15

Wholesale and Retail Sales

Jun 12 months:
Total ∆%: -2.8
Wholesale ∆%: -4.3
Retail ∆%: 0.5

Earlier Data:
Blog 3/29/15

Family Income and Expenditure Survey

Jun 12-month ∆% total nominal consumption 3.5, real 2.7

Earlier Data:

Blog 3/29/15

Trade Balance

Exports Jun 12 months ∆%: -6.7 Imports Jun 12 months ∆% -5.2

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/26/15

Links to blog comments in Table JPY: 8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html

7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html

7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html

6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

6/16/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html

3/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html

11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

6/17/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/17/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html

9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/21/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html

6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html

5/22/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html

3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html

12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html

11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html

9/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html

08/23/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html

6/14/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html

5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

2/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html

12/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html

11/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.htm

9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html

2/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html

12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

VC China. China estimates an index of nonmanufacturing purchasing managers based on a sample of 1200 nonmanufacturing enterprises across the country (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Table CIPMNM provides this index and components. The total index increased from 55.7 in Jan 2011 to 58.0 in Mar 2012, decreasing to 53.9 in Aug 2013. The index decreased from 56.0 in Nov 2013 to 54.6 in Dec 2013, easing to 53.4 in Jan 2014. The index moved to 53.7 in Jul 2019. The index of new orders increased from 52.2 in Jan 2012 to 54.3 in Dec 2012 but fell to 50.1 in May 2013, barely above the neutral frontier of 50.0. The index of new orders stabilized at 51.0 in Nov-Dec 2013, easing to 50.9 in Jan 2014. The index of new orders moved to 50.4 in Jul 2019.

Table CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

Total Index

New Orders

Interm.
Input Prices

Subs Prices

Exp

Jul 2019

53.7

50.4

52.9

50.6

59.8

Jun

54.2

51.5

51.5

49.7

60.6

May

54.3

50.3

52.2

49.9

60.2

Apr

54.3

50.8

53.0

50.5

60.3

Mar

54.8

52.5

52.5

51.0

61.1

Feb

54.3

50.7

52.7

50.1

61.5

Jan

54.7

51.0

52.0

49.8

59.6

Dec 2018

53.8

50.4

50.1

47.6

60.8

Nov

53.4

50.1

50.8

49.4

60.9

Oct

53.9

50.1

54.9

51.2

60.6

Sep

54.9

51.0

55.6

51.5

60.1

Aug

54.2

50.6

54.3

50.9

61.4

Jul

54.0

51.0

53.9

52.0

60.2

Jun

55.0

50.6

53.5

51.1

60.8

May

54.9

51.0

54.2

50.6

61.0

Apr

54.8

51.1

52.7

50.6

61.5

Mar

54.6

50.1

49.9

49.3

61.1

Feb

54.4

50.5

53.2

49.9

61.2

Jan

55.3

51.9

53.9

52.6

61.7

Dec 2017

55.0

52.0

54.8

52.6

60.9

Nov

54.8

51.8

56.2

52.8

61.6

Oct

54.3

51.1

54.3

51.6

60.6

Sep

55.4

52.3

56.1

51.7

61.7

Aug

53.4

50.9

54.4

51.5

61.0

Jul

54.5

51.1

53.1

50.9

61.1

Jun

54.9

51.4

51.2

49.3

61.1

May

54.5

50.9

51.1

48.8

60.2

Apr

54.0

50.5

51.7

50.2

59.7

Mar

55.1

51.9

52.3

49.7

61.3

Feb

54.2

51.2

53.7

51.4

62.4

Jan

54.6

51.3

55.1

51.0

58.9

Dec 2016

54.5

52.1

56.2

51.9

59.5

Nov

54.7

51.8

53.5

51.4

60.7

Oct

54.0

50.9

53.7

51.5

60.6

Sep

53.7

51.4

51.7

50.1

61.1

Aug

53.5

49.8

52.6

50.4

59.4

Jul

53.9

49.9

51.4

49.5

59.5

Jun

53.7

50.8

51.6

50.6

58.6

May

53.1

49.2

51.6

49.8

57.8

Apr

53.5

48.7

52.1

49.1

59.1

Mar

53.8

50.8

51.4

49.5

59.0

Feb

52.7

48.7

50.5

48.3

59.5

Jan

53.5

49.6

49.9

47.7

58.4

Dec2015

54.4

51.7

49.0

48.2

58.3

Nov

53.6

50.2

49.3

47.7

60.0

Oct

53.1

51.2

51.2

48.8

61.1

Sep

53.4

50.2

50.8

47.9

60.0

Aug

53.4

49.6

49.6

47.8

59.7

Jul

53.9

50.1

48.9

47.4

60.0

Jun

53.8

51.3

50.6

48.7

59.7

May

53.2

49.5

52.8

50.4

60.1

Apr

53.4

49.1

50.8

48.9

60.0

Mar

53.7

50.3

50.0

48.4

58.8

Feb

53.9

51.2

52.5

51.2

58.7

Jan

53.7

50.2

47.6

46.9

59.6

Dec 2014

54.1

50.5

50.1

47.3

59.5

Nov

53.9

50.1

50.6

47.7

59.7

Oct

53.8

51.0

52.0

48.8

59.9

Sep

54.0

49.5

49.8

47.3

60.9

Aug

54.4

50.0

52.2

48.3

61.2

Jul

54.2

50.7

53.4

49.5

61.5

Jun

55.0

50.7

56.0

50.8

60.4

May

55.5

52.7

54.5

49.0

60.7

Apr

54.8

50.8

52.4

49.4

61.5

Mar

54.5

50.8

52.8

49.5

61.5

Feb

55.0

51.4

52.1

49.0

59.9

Jan

53.4

50.9

54.5

50.1

58.1

Dec 2013

54.6

51.0

56.9

52.0

58.7

Nov

56.0

51.0

54.8

49.5

61.3

Oct

56.3

51.6

56.1

51.4

60.5

Sep

55.4

53.4

56.7

50.6

60.1

Aug

53.9

50.9

57.1

51.2

62.9

Jul

54.1

50.3

58.2

52.4

63.9

Jun

53.9

50.3

55.0

50.6

61.8

May

54.3

50.1

54.4

50.7

62.9

Apr

54.5

50.9

51.1

47.6

62.5

Mar

55.6

52.0

55.3

50.0

62.4

Feb

54.5

51.8

56.2

51.1

62.7

Jan

56.2

53.7

58.2

50.9

61.4

Dec 2012

56.1

54.3

53.8

50.0

64.6

Nov

55.6

53.2

52.5

48.4

64.6

Oct

55.5

51.6

58.1

50.5

63.4

Sep

53.7

51.8

57.5

51.3

60.9

Aug

56.3

52.7

57.6

51.2

63.2

Jul

55.6

53.2

49.7

48.7

63.9

Jun

56.7

53.7

52.1

48.6

65.5

May

55.2

52.5

53.6

48.5

65.4

Apr

56.1

52.7

57.9

50.3

66.1

Mar

58.0

53.5

60.2

52.0

66.6

Feb

57.3

52.7

59.0

51.2

63.8

Jan

55.7

52.2

58.2

51.1

65.3

Notes: Interm.: Intermediate; Subs: Subscription; Exp: Business Expectations

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart CIPMNM provides China’s nonmanufacturing purchasing managers’ index. The index fell from 56.0 in Oct 2013 to 53.7 in Jul 2019.

clip_image009

Chart CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Table CIPMMFG provides the index of purchasing managers of manufacturing seasonally adjusted of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The general index (IPM) rose from 50.5 in Jan 2012 to 53.3 in Apr 2012, falling to 49.2 in Aug 2012, rebounding to 50.6 in Dec 2012. The index fell to 50.3 in Jul 2013, barely above the neutral frontier at 50.0, recovering to 51.4 in Nov 2013 but falling to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.5 in Jan 2014, 50.1 in Dec 2014 and 49.7 in Jul 2019. The index of new orders fell from 54.5 in Apr 2012 to 51.2 in Dec 2012. The index of new orders fell from 52.3 in Nov 2013 to 52.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.9 in Jan 2014 and moved to 50.4 in Dec 2014. The index moved to 49.8 in Jul 2019.

Table CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

IPM

PI

NOI

INV

EMP

SDEL

2019

Jul

49.7

52.1

49.8

48.0

47.1

50.1

Jun

49.4

51.3

49.6

48.2

46.9

50.2

May

49.4

51.7

49.8

47.4

47.0

50.9

Apr

50.1

52.1

51.4

47.2

47.2

49.9

Mar

50.5

52.7

51.6

48.4

47.6

50.2

Feb

49.2

49.5

50.6

46.3

47.5

49.8

Jan

49.5

50.9

49.6

48.1

47.8

50.1

2018

Dec

49.4

50.8

49.7

47.1

48.0

50.4

Nov

50.0

51.9

50.4

47.4

48.3

50.3

Oct

50.2

52.0

50.8

47.2

48.1

49.5

Sep

50.8

53.0

52.0

47.8

48.3

49.7

Aug

51.3

53.3

52.2

48.7

49.4

49.6

Jul

51.2

53.0

52.3

48.9

49.2

50.0

Jun

51.5

53.6

53.2

48.8

49.0

50.2

May

51.9

54.1

53.8

49.6

49.1

50.1

Apr

51.4

53.1

52.9

49.5

49.0

50.2

Mar

51.5

53.1

53.3

49.6

49.1

50.1

Feb

50.3

50.7

51.0

49.3

48.1

48.4

Jan

51.3

53.5

52.6

48.8

48.3

49.2

2017

Dec

51.6

54.0

53.4

48.0

48.5

49.3

Nov

51.8

54.3

53.6

48.4

48.8

49.5

Oct

51.6

53.4

52.9

48.6

49.0

48.7

Sep

52.4

54.7

54.8

48.9

49.0

49.3

Aug

51.7

54.1

53.1

48.3

49.1

49.3

Jul

51.4

53.5

52.8

48.5

49.2

50.1

Jun

51.7

54.4

53.1

48.6

49.0

49.9

May

51.2

53.4

52.3

48.5

49.4

50.2

Apr

51.2

53.8

52.3

48.3

49.2

50.5

Mar

51.8

54.2

53.3

48.3

50.0

50.3

Feb

51.6

53.7

53.0

48.6

49.7

50.5

Jan

51.3

53.1

52.8

48.0

49.2

49.8

2016

Dec

51.4

53.3

53.2

48.0

48.9

50.0

Nov

51.7

53.9

53.2

48.4

49.2

49.7

Oct

51.2

53.3

52.8

48.1

48.8

50.2

Sep

50.4

52.8

50.9

47.4

48.6

49.9

Aug

50.4

52.6

51.3

47.6

48.4

50.6

Jul

49.9

52.1

50.4

47.3

48.2

50.5

Jun

50.0

52.5

50.5

47.0

47.9

50.7

May

50.1

52.3

50.7

47.6

48.2

50.4

Apr

50.1

52.2

51.0

47.4

47.8

50.1

Mar

50.2

52.3

51.4

48.2

48.1

51.3

Feb

49.0

50.2

48.6

48.0

47.6

49.8

Jan

49.4

51.4

49.5

46.8

47.8

50.5

2015

Dec

49.7

52.2

50.2

47.6

47.4

50.7

Nov

49.6

51.9

49.8

47.1

47.6

50.6

Oct

49.8

52.2

50.3

47.2

47.8

50.6

Sep

49.8

52.3

50.2

47.5

47.9

50.8

Aug

49.7

51.7

49.7

48.3

47.9

50.6

Jul

50.0

52.4

49.9

48.4

48.0

50.4

Jun

50.2

52.9

50.1

48.7

48.1

50.3

May

50.2

52.9

50.6

48.2

48.2

50.9

Apr

50.1

52.6

50.2

48.2

48.0

50.4

Mar

50.1

52.1

50.2

48.0

48.4

50.1

Feb

49.9

51.4

50.4

48.2

47.8

49.9

Jan

49.8

51.7

50.2

47.3

47.9

50.2

2014

Dec

50.1

52.2

50.4

47.5

48.1

49.9

Nov

50.3

52.5

50.9

47.7

48.2

50.3

Oct

50.8

53.1

51.6

48.4

48.4

50.1

Sep

51.1

53.6

52.2

48.8

48.2

50.1

Aug

51.1

53.2

52.5

48.6

48.2

50.0

Jul

51.7

54.2

53.6

49.0

48.3

50.2

Jun

51.0

53.0

52.8

48.0

48.6

50.5

May

50.8

52.8

52.3

48.0

48.2

50.3

Apr

50.4

52.5

51.2

48.1

48.3

50.1

Mar

50.3

52.7

50.6

47.8

48.3

49.8

Feb

50.2

52.6

50.5

47.4

48.0

49.9

Jan

50.5

53.0

50.9

47.8

48.2

49.8

Dec 2013

51.0

53.9

52.0

47.6

48.7

50.5

Nov

51.4

54.5

52.3

47.8

49.6

50.6

Oct

51.4

54.4

52.5

48.6

49.2

50.8

Sep

51.1

52.9

52.8

48.5

49.1

50.8

Aug

51.0

52.6

52.4

48.0

49.3

50.4

Jul

50.3

52.4

50.6

47.6

49.1

50.1

Jun

50.1

52.0

50.4

47.4

48.7

50.3

May

50.8

53.3

51.8

47.6

48.8

50.8

Apr

50.6

52.6

51.7

47.5

49.0

50.8

Mar

50.9

52.7

52.3

47.5

49.8

51.1

Feb

50.1

51.2

50.1

49.5

47.6

48.3

Jan

50.4

51.3

51.6

50.1

47.8

50.0

Dec 2012

50.6

52.0

51.2

47.3

49.0

48.8

Nov

50.6

52.5

51.2

47.9

48.7

49.9

Oct

50.2

52.1

50.4

47.3

49.2

50.1

Sep

49.8

51.3

49.8

47.0

48.9

49.5

Aug

49.2

50.9

48.7

45.1

49.1

50.0

Jul

50.1

51.8

49.0

48.5

49.5

49.0

Jun

50.2

52.0

49.2

48.2

49.7

49.1

May

50.4

52.9

49.8

45.1

50.5

49.0

Apr

53.3

57.2

54.5

48.5

51.0

49.6

Mar

53.1

55.2

55.1

49.5

51.0

48.9

Feb

51.0

53.8

51.0

48.8

49.5

50.3

Jan

50.5

53.6

50.4

49.7

47.1

49.7

IPM: Index of Purchasing Managers; PI: Production Index; NOI: New Orders Index; EMP: Employed Person Index; SDEL: Supplier Delivery Time Index

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

China estimates the manufacturing index of purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 820 enterprises (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Chart CIPMMFG provides the manufacturing index of purchasing managers. The index fell to 50.1 in Jun 2013. The index decreased from 51.4 in Nov 2013 to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index moved to 49.7 in Jul 2019.

clip_image011

Chart CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Chart CIPCOMP provides China’s composite, manufacturing and nonmanufacturing, index. The index remains above the neutral 50.0, moving to 53.1 in Jul 2019.

clip_image013

Chart CIPCOMP, China, Composite Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Growth of China’s GDP in IIQ2019 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.2 percent and cumulative growth to IIQ2019 was 6.3 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 39.9 percent of cumulative GDP in IIQ2019. Tertiary industry accounts for 54.9 percent of cumulative GDP in IIQ2019 and primary industry for 5.1 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. The bottom block of Table VC-GDP provides quarter-on-quarter growth rates of GDP and their annual equivalent. China’s GDP growth decelerated significantly from annual equivalent 10.0 percent in IQ2011 to 6.1 percent in IVQ2011 and 7.8 percent in IQ2012, rebounding to 8.7 percent in IIQ2012, 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012 and 8.2 percent in IVQ2012. Annual equivalent growth in IQ2013 eased to 7.8 percent and to 7.4 percent in IIQ2013, rebounding to 8.7 percent in IIIQ2013. Annual equivalent growth was 6.6 percent in IVQ2013, stabilizing to 7.4 percent in IQ2014 and to 7.4 percent in IIQ2014. Annual equivalent growth stabilized at 7.4 percent in IIIQ2014 and 7.0 percent in IVQ2014. Growth moved to annual equivalent 7.4 percent in IQ2015, 7.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2015. Growth slowed to 6.1 percent in annual equivalent in IVQ2015 and 5.7 percent in IQ2016. Growth increased to annual equivalent 7.8 percent in IIQ2016 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2016, decreasing to 6.6 percent in IVQ2016. Growth decelerated to annual equivalent 6.1 percent in IQ2017, accelerating to 7.4 percent in IIQ2017 and 7.0 percent in IIIQ2017. Growth decelerated to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2017. Growth decelerated to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IQ2018, accelerating to 7.0 percent in IIQ2018. Growth decelerated to annual equivalent 6.6 percent in IIIQ2018, decelerating to 6.1 percent annual equivalent in IVQ2018. Growth decelerated to 5.7 percent annual equivalent in IQ2019 and 6.6 percent in IIQ2019.

Table VC-GDP China, Quarterly Growth of GDP, Current CNY 100 Million and Inflation Adjusted ∆%

Cumulative GDP IQ2019

Value Current CNY Billion IIQ2019

Value Current CNY Billion IQ2019 to IIQ2019

IIQ2019 Year-on-Year Constant Prices ∆%

Cumulative to IIQ2019

∆%

GDP

23,750.0

45,093.3

6.2

6.3

Primary Industry

1,443.8

2,320.7

3.3

3.0

Secondary Industry

9,763.7

17,998.4

5.6

5.8

Tertiary Industry

12,542.6

24,774.3

7.0

7.0

Growth in Quarter Relative to Prior Quarter

∆% on Prior Quarter

∆% Annual Equivalent

∆% Year-on-Year

2019

IIQ2019

1.6

6.6

6.2

IQ2019

1.4

5.7

6.4

2018

IVQ2018

1.5

6.1

6.4

IIIQ2018

1.6

6.6

6.5

IIQ2018

1.7

7.0

6.7

IQ2018

1.5

6.1

6.8

2017

IVQ2017

1.5

6.1

6.7

IIIQ2017

1.7

7.0

6.7

IIQ2017

1.8

7.4

6.8

IQ2017

1.5

6.1

6.8

2016

IVQ2016

1.6

6.6

6.8

IIIQ2016

1.7

7.0

6.7

IIQ2016

1.9

7.8

6.7

IQ2016

1.4

5.7

6.7

2015

IVQ2015

1.5

6.1

6.8

IIIQ2015

1.7

7.0

6.9

IIQ2015

1.8

7.4

7.0

IQ2015

1.8

7.4

7.0

2014

IVQ2014

1.7

7.0

7.2

IIIQ2014

1.8

7.4

7.1

IIQ2014

1.8

7.4

7.5

IQ2014

1.8

7.4

7.4

2013

IVQ2013

1.6

6.6

7.7

IIIQ2013

2.1

8.7

7.9

IIQ2013

1.8

7.4

7.6

IQ2013

1.9

7.8

7.9

2012

IVQ2012

2.0

8.2

8.1

IIIQ2012

1.8

7.4

7.5

IIQ2012

2.1

8.7

7.6

IQ2012

1.9

7.8

8.1

2011

IVQ2011

1.5

6.1

8.8

IIIQ2011

1.9

7.8

9.4

IIQ2011

2.4

10.0

10.0

IQ2011

2.4

10.0

10.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Growth of China’s GDP in IIQ2019 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.2 percent and cumulative growth to IIQ2019 was 6.3 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 39.9 percent of cumulative GDP in IIQ2019. Tertiary industry accounts for 54.9 percent of cumulative GDP in IIQ2019 and primary industry for 5.1 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. Table VC-GDPA shows that growth decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 and 11.2 percent in IIQ2010 to 7.9 percent in IQ2013, 7.6 percent in IIQ2013 and 7.9 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP grew 7.7 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 1.6 percent relative to IIIQ2013, which is equivalent to 6.6 percent per year. GDP grew 7.4 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent in IQ2014 that is equivalent to 7.4 percent per year. GDP grew 7.5 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is annual equivalent 7.4 percent. In IIIQ2014, GDP grew 7.1 percent relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is 7.4 percent in annual equivalent. GDP grew 1.7 percent in IVQ2014, which is 7.0 percent in annual equivalent and 7.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2015, GDP grew 1.8 percent, which is equivalent to 7.4 in a year and 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent in a year, and grew 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year, and grew 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IVQ2015, which is equivalent to 6.1 percent in a year and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, GDP grew at 1.4 percent, which is equivalent to 5.7 percent in a year, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.9 percent in IIQ2016, which is annual equivalent to 7.8 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, GDP grew at 1.6 percent, equivalent to 6.6 percent in a year, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 6.8 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased at 1.5 percent, which is 6.1 percent in annual equivalent. In IIQ2017, GDP grew at 1.8 percent, which is annual equivalent at 7.4 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017, which is annual equivalent at 7.0 percent, and increased at 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, GDP grew 1.5 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is annual equivalent to 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.6 percent in IIIQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, GDP grew at 1.5 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.1 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.4 percent in IQ2019, which is annual equivalent to 5.7 percent, and increased 6.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2019, GDP grew at 1.6 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.6 percent and increased 6.2 percent relative to a year earlier.

Table VC-GDPA China, Growth Rate of GDP, ∆% Relative to a Year Earlier and ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

IQ2019

IIQ2019

IIIQ2019

IVQ2019

GDP

6.4

6.2

Primary Industry

2.7

3.3

Secondary Industry

6.1

5.6

Tertiary Industry

7.0

7.0

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.4

(5.7)

1.6

(6.6)

IQ2018

IIQ2018

IIIQ2018

IVQ2018

GDP

6.8

6.7

6.5

6.4

Primary Industry

3.2

3.2

3.6

3.5

Secondary Industry

6.3

6.0

5.3

5.8

Tertiary Industry

7.5

7.8

7.9

7.4

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.5

(6.1)

1.7

(7.0)

1.6

(6.6)

1.5

(6.1)

IQ2017

IIQ2017

IIIQ2017

IVQ2017

GDP

6.8

6.8

6.7

6.7

Primary Industry

3.0

3.8

3.9

4.4

Secondary Industry

6.4

6.4

6.0

5.7

Tertiary Industry

7.7

7.6

8.0

8.3

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.5

(6.1)

1.8

(7.4)

1.7

(7.0)

1.5

(6.1)

IQ2016

IIQ2016

IIIQ2016

IVQ2016

GDP

6.7

6.7

6.7

6.8

Primary Industry

2.9

3.1

3.5

2.9

Secondary Industry

5.8

6.3

6.1

6.1

Tertiary Industry

7.6

7.5

7.6

8.3

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.4

(5.7)

1.9

(7.8)

1.7

(7.0)

1.6

(6.6)

IQ2015

IIQ2015

IIIQ2015

IVQ2015

GDP

7.0

7.0

6.9

6.8

Primary Industry

3.2

3.5

3.8

4.1

Secondary Industry

6.4

6.1

6.0

6.1

Tertiary Industry

7.9

8.4

8.4

8.2

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.8

(7.4)

1.8

(7.4)

1.7

(7.0)

1.5

(6.1)

IQ2014

IIQ2014

IIIQ2014

IVQ2014

GDP

7.4

7.5

7.1

7.2

Primary Industry

3.5

3.9

4.2

4.1

Secondary Industry

7.3

7.4

7.4

7.3

Tertiary Industry

7.1

8.0

7.9

8.1

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.8

(7.4)

1.8

(7.4)

1.8

(7.4)

1.7

(7.0)

IQ2013

IIQ2013

IIIQ2013

IVQ2013

GDP

7.9

7.6

7.9

7.7

Primary Industry

3.4

3.0

3.4

4.0

Secondary Industry

7.8

7.6

7.8

7.8

Tertiary Industry

8.3

8.3

8.4

8.3

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.9

(7.8)

1.8

(7.4)

2.1

(8.7)

1.6

(6.6)

IQ2012

IIQ2012

IIIQ2012

IVQ2012

GDP

8.1

7.6

7.5

8.1

Primary Industry

3.8

4.3

4.2

4.5

Secondary Industry

9.1

8.3

8.1

8.1

Tertiary Industry

7.5

7.7

7.9

8.1

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

1.9

(7.8)

2.1

(8.7)

1.8

(7.4)

2.0

(8.2)

IQ2011

IIQ2011

IIIQ2011

IVQ2011

GDP

10.2

10.0

9.4

8.8

Primary Industry

3.5

3.2

3.8

4.5

Secondary Industry

11.1

11.0

10.8

10.6

Tertiary Industry

9.1

9.2

9.0

8.9

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

2.4

(10.0)

2.4

(10.0)

1.9

(7.8)

1.5

(6.1)

IQ2010

IIQ2010

IIIQ2010

IVQ2010

GDP

12.1

11.2

10.7

12.1

Primary Industry

3.8

3.6

4.0

3.8

Secondary Industry

14.5

13.3

12.6

14.5

Tertiary Industry

10.5

9.9

9.7

10.5

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Growth of China’s GDP in IVQ2016 relative to the same period in 2016 was 6.8 percent and

Chart VC-GDP of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides annual value and growth rates of GDP. China’s GDP growth in 2016 is still high at 6.7 percent but at the lowest rhythm in five years.

clip_image014

Chart VC-GDP, China, Gross Domestic Product, Million Yuan and ∆%

Source: National bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart VC-FXR provides China’s foreign exchange reserves. FX reserves grew from $2399.2 billion in 2009 to $38430 billion in 2013 driven by high growth of China’s trade surplus, decreasing to $30105 billion in 2016.

clip_image015

Chart VC-FXR, China, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2012-2016

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Chart VC-Trade provides China’s imports and exports. Exports exceeded imports with resulting large trade balance surpluses that increased foreign exchange reserves.

clip_image016

Chart VC-Trade, China, Imports and Exports of Goods, 2012-2016, $100 Million US Dollars

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Chart VC-PCDI provides the level and growth rates of per capita disposable income in China.

clip_image017

Chart VC-PCDI, China, Level and Growth Rates of Per Capita Disposable Income

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

The Caixin Flash China General Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI™) compiled by Markit (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727) is mixed. The overall Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing PMI™ decreased from 47.3 in Aug to 47.0 in Sep, while the Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing Output Index decreased from 46.4 in Aug to 45.7 in Sep, indicating weaker conditions. He Fan, Chief Economist at Caixin Insight Group finds need of fiscal and monetary policy (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727). The Caixin China General Services PMI™, compiled by Markit, shows that the Caixin Composite Output, combining manufacturing and services, increased from 50.6 in Jun to 50.9 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/28a5e6c5a60d4b369793a4a9c3d10dac). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds slower services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/28a5e6c5a60d4b369793a4a9c3d10dac). The Caixin General Manufacturing PMI™ increased to 49.9 in Jul from 49.4 in Jun, indicating weaker conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c777ba6bdb9249529adea78034658761). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds weak conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c777ba6bdb9249529adea78034658761). Table CNY provides the country data table for China.

Table CNY, China, Economic Indicators

Price Indexes for Industry

Jun 12-month ∆%: 0.0

Jun month ∆%: -0.3
Blog 7/14/19

Consumer Price Index

Jun 12-month ∆%: 2.7 Jun month ∆%: -0.1
Blog 7/14/19

Value Added of Industry

Jun month ∆%: 0.68

Jan-Jun 2019/Jan-Jun 2018 ∆%: 6.0

Earlier Data
Blog 4/19/15

GDP Growth Rate

Year-on-Year IIQ2019 ∆%: 6.2

II Quarter 2019 ∆%: 1.6
Quarter IIQ2019 AE ∆%: 6.6
Blog 7/28/19

Investment in Fixed Assets

Total Jan-Jun 2019 ∆%: 5.8

Real estate development: 10.9

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Retail Sales

Jun month ∆%: 0.96
Jan-Jun 2019 ∆%: 8.4

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Trade Balance

Jul 2019 Balance $45.05 billion

Jul 2018 $27.49 billion

Exports 12M ∆% 3.3

Imports 12M ∆% -5.6

Dec 2018 balance 57.06 billion
Exports 12M ∆% -4.4
Imports 12M ∆% -7.6

Dec 2017 balance $53.85 billion

2018 Exports ∆% 9.9

2018 Imports ∆% 15.8

2017 Exports ∆% 7.9

2017 Imports ∆% 15.9

2016 Exports ∆% 11.3

2016 Imports ∆% 17.3

Cumulative Dec 2018: $351.76

Cumulative Dec 2017: $422.50 billion

Cumulative Dec 2016: $486.0

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table CNY: 7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html

7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html

4/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/high-levels-of-valuations-of-risk.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

VD Euro Area. Using calendar and seasonally adjusted chain-linked volumes (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of the euro area (19 countries) fell 5.8 percent from IQ2008 to IIQ2009. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) increased 13.6 percent from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2018 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) is higher by 7.1 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008, growing at annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent. The GDP of the euro area (18) countries increased at the average yearly rate of 2.3 percent from IQ1999 to IQ2008 while that of the euro area (19 countries) increased at 2.3 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) grew at 2.3 percent annual equivalent from IQ1999 to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008. The GDP of the euro area would grow under trend of 2.3 percent from €2,472,400.8 million in IQ2008 to €3,139,156.9 million in IIIQ2018. The estimate of GDP of €2,647,594.5 million in IIIQ2018 is 15.7 percent below trend. Table VD-EUR provides yearly growth rates of the combined GDP of the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro area since 1999. Growth was very strong at 3.2 percent in 2006 and 3.0 percent in 2007. The global recession had strong impact with growth of only 0.4 percent in 2008 and decline of 4.5 percent in 2009. Recovery was at lower growth rates of 2.1 percent in 2010 and 1.5 percent in 2011. EUROSTAT estimates growth of GDP of the euro area of minus 0.9 percent in 2012 and minus 0.3 percent in 2013. Euro Area GDP grew 1.2 percent in 2014 and grew 2.0 percent in 2015. The GDP of the euro area grew 1.7 percent in 2016.

Table VD-EUR, Euro Area, Yearly Percentage Change of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, Unemployment and GDP ∆%

Year

HICP ∆%

Unemployment
%

GDP ∆%

1999

1.2

9.7

3.0

2000

2.2

8.9

3.8

2001

2.4

8.3

2.1

2002

2.3

8.6

1.0

2003

2.1

9.1

0.7

2004

2.2

9.3

2.3

2005

2.2

9.1

1.7

2006

2.2

8.4

3.2

2007

2.2

7.5

3.0

2008

3.3

7.6

0.4

2009

0.3

9.6

-4.5

2010

1.6

10.2

2.1

2011

2.7

10.2

1.5

2012

2.5

11.4

-0.9

2013

1.3

12.0

-0.3

2014

0.4

11.6

1.2

2015

0.0

10.9

2.0

2016

0.2

10.0

1.7

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

The GDP of the euro area in 2015 in current US dollars in the dataset of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is $11,990.9 billion or 16.3 percent of world GDP of $73,598.8 billion (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx). The sum of the GDP of France $2420.2 billion with the GDP of Germany of $3365.3 billion, Italy of $1815.8 billion and Spain $1199.7 billion is $8,801.0 billion or 73.4 percent of total euro area GDP and 13.1 percent of World GDP. The four largest economies account for slightly more than three quarters of economic activity of the euro area. Table VD-EUR1 is constructed with the dataset of EUROSTAT, providing growth rates of the euro area as a whole and of the largest four economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain annually from 1996 to 2016. The impact of the global recession on the overall euro area economy and on the four largest economies was quite strong. There was sharp contraction in 2009 and growth rates have not rebounded to earlier growth with exception of Germany in 2010 and 2011.

Table VD-EUR1, Euro Area, Real GDP Growth Rate, ∆%

Euro Area

Germany

France

Italy

Spain

2016

1.7

1.9

1.2

0.9

3.2

2015

2.0

1.7

1.3

0.8

3.2

2014

1.2

1.6

0.6

0.1

1.4

2013

-0.3

0.5

0.6

-1.7

-1.7

2012

-0.9

0.5

0.2

-2.8

-2.9

2011

1.5

3.7

2.1

0.6

-1.0

2010

2.1

4.1

2.0

1.7

0.0

2009

-4.5

-5.6

-2.9

-5.5

-3.6

2008

0.4

1.1

0.2

-1.1

1.1

2007

3.0

3.3

2.4

1.5

3.8

2006

3.2

3.7

2.4

2.0

4.2

2005

1.7

0.7

1.6

0.9

3.7

2004

2.3

1.2

2.8

1.6

3.2

2003

0.7

-0.7

0.8

0.2

3.2

2002

1.0

0.0

1.1

0.2

2.9

2001

2.1

1.7

2.0

1.8

4.0

2000

3.8

3.0

3.9

3.7

5.3

1999

3.0

2.0

3.4

1.6

4.5

1998

2.9

2.0

3.6

1.6

4.3

Average 1999-2016

1.2

1.3

1.3

0.3

1.7

Average 1999-2007

2.2

1.6

2.1

1.5

3.8

Average 2016-2007

0.3

1.0

0.6

-7.0*

-0.5*

1997

2.6

1.8

2.3

1.8

3.7

1996

1.6

0.8

1.4

1.3

2.7

Note: Absolute percentage change

Source: EUROSTAT

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

The Flash Eurozone PMI Composite Output Index of the HIS Markit Flash Eurozone PMI®, combining activity in manufacturing and services, decreased from 52.2 in Jun to 51.5 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/fda5991f04e84ea5a76bf1d0c6095af5). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the Markit Flash Eurozone PMI index suggests GDP growth about 0.1 percent quarterly with decline of manufacturing and growth of services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/fda5991f04e84ea5a76bf1d0c6095af5). The IHS Markit Eurozone PMI® Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing activity with close association with GDP decreased from 52.2 in Jun to 51.5 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/43fd7b59e09d433692a3bd82945deb98). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds slower potential for quarterly growth at around 0.1 percent in GDP (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/43fd7b59e09d433692a3bd82945deb98). The IHS Markit Eurozone Services Business Activity Index decreased from 53.6 in Jun to 53.2 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/43fd7b59e09d433692a3bd82945deb98). The IHS Markit Eurozone Manufacturing PMI® decreased from 47.6 in Jun to 46.5 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5ea690f5df6b47c2b4789aa9d34e5e3e). New export orders decreased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds manufacturing declining quarterly at the highest pace in more than three years (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/5ea690f5df6b47c2b4789aa9d34e5e3e). Table EUR provides the data table for the euro area.

Table EUR, Euro Area Economic Indicators

GDP

IQ2019 ∆% 0.4; IQ2019/IQ2018 ∆% 1.2 Blog 9/13/15 11/22/15 12/13/15 2/14/16 3/13/16 5/1/16 5/15/16 6/12/16 8/7/16 8/14/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/11/16 02/26/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/11/17 8/20/17 9/10/17 11/26/17 12/10/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/10/18 8/19/18 9/16/18 11/18/18 12/16/18 3/10/19 5/26/19 6/9/19

Unemployment 

Jun 2019: 7.5 % unemployment rate; Jun 2019: 12.377 million unemployed

Blog 8/4/19

HICP

Jun month ∆%: 0.2

12 months Jun ∆%: 1.3
Blog 7/21/19

Producer Prices

Euro Zone industrial producer prices Jun ∆%: -0.6
Jun 12-month ∆%: 0.7
Blog 8/11/19

Industrial Production

May Month ∆%: 0.9; 12 months ∆%: -0.5

Earlier Data:
Blog 5/19/15

Retail Sales

Jun month ∆%: -0.3
Jun 12 months ∆%: 1.3

Earlier Data:
Blog 3/15/15

Confidence and Economic Sentiment Indicator

Sentiment 103.3 Jun 2019

Consumer -7.2 Jun 2019

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/5/15

Trade

Jan-May 2019/Jan-Apr 2018 Exports ∆%: 5.0
Imports ∆%: 5.2

May 2019 12-month Exports ∆% 7.1 Imports ∆% 4.2

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table EUR: 8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html

7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html

7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html

6/9/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html

5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html

3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html

12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

6/10/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

5/20/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/11/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html

11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html

6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html

3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

VE Germany. The Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis) is updating GDP calculations (https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_299_811.html): “As every year in August, new statistical information was incorporated in the calculations of results for the last four years (from 2014) and for the first quarter of 2018 (see table "Comparison between previous and new figures: gross domestic product, price-adjusted, chain-linked") in the context of the first calculation of data for the second quarter of 2018. There are new releases (https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/05/PE19_196_811.html https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/05/PE19_184_811.html) As is usual for seasonally and calendar-adjusted series, modified results may also appear in the whole time series from 1991 onwards.” Table VE-DE provides yearly growth rates of the German economy from 1971 to 2018, price adjusted chain-linked and price and calendar-adjusted chain-linked. Germany’s GDP fell 5.6 percent in 2009 after growing below trend at 1.1 percent in 2008. Recovery has been robust in contrast with other advanced economies. The German economy grew at 4.1 percent in 2010, 3.7 percent in 2011 and 0.5 percent in 2012. Growth stabilized to 0.5 percent in 2013, increasing to 2.2 percent in 2014. The German economy grew at 1.7 percent in 2015 and grew at 2.2 percent in 2016. Germany’s GDP increased 2.2 percent in 2017 and increased 1.4 percent in 2018.

The Federal Statistical Agency of Germany analyzes the fall and recovery of the German economy (http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/Inlandsprodukt/Aktuell,templateId=renderPrint.psml):

“The German economy again grew strongly in 2011. The price-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 3.0% compared with the previous year. Accordingly, the catching-up process of the German economy continued during the second year after the economic crisis. In the course of 2011, the price-adjusted GDP again exceeded its pre-crisis level. The economic recovery occurred mainly in the first half of 2011. In 2009, Germany experienced the most serious post-war recession, when GDP suffered a historic decline of 5.1%. The year 2010 was characterised by a rapid economic recovery (+3.7%).”

Table VE-DE, Germany, GDP ∆% on Prior Year

Price Adjusted Chain-Linked

Price- and Calendar-Adjusted Chain Linked

Average ∆% 1991-2017

1.4

Average ∆% 1991-2018

1.4

Average ∆% 1991-1999

1.5

Average ∆% 2000-2007

1.4

Average ∆% 2003-2007

2.2

Average ∆% 2007-2018

1.2

Average ∆% 2009-2018

2.0

2018

1.4

1.5

2017

2.2

2.5

2016

2.2

2.2

2015

1.7

1.5

2014

2.2

2.2

2013

0.5

0.6

2012

0.5

0.7

2011

3.7

3.7

2010

4.1

3.9

2009

-5.6

-5.6

2008

1.1

0.8

2007

3.3

3.4

2006

3.7

3.9

2005

0.7

0.9

2004

1.2

0.7

2003

-0.7

-0.7

2002

0.0

0.0

2001

1.7

1.8

2000

3.0

3.2

1999

2.0

1.8

1998

2.0

1.8

1997

1.8

1.9

1996

0.8

0.9

1995

1.7

1.8

1994

2.5

2.5

1993

-1.0

-1.0

1992

1.9

1.5

1991

5.1

5.2

1990

5.3

5.5

1989

3.9

4.0

1988

3.7

3.4

1987

1.4

1.3

1986

2.3

2.3

1985

2.3

2.6

1984

2.8

2.9

1983

1.6

1.5

1982

-0.4

-0.5

1981

0.5

0.6

1980

1.4

1.3

1979

4.2

4.3

1978

3.0

3.1

1977

3.3

3.5

1976

4.9

4.5

1975

-0.9

-0.9

1974

0.9

1.0

1973

4.8

5.0

1972

4.3

4.3

1971

3.1

3.0

1970

NA

NA

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Destatis)

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/05/PE19_196_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2019/05/PE19_184_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economy/Nationalaccounts-domesticproduct/nationalaccountsdomesticproduct_node.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/NationalAccounts.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/DomesticProduct/CurrentRevision.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Methods/NationalAccountRevision/Revision2014_BackgroundPaper.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/02/PE14_048_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/08/PE13_278_811.html https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/11/PE13_381_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/01/PE14_016_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressekonferenzen/2014/BIP2013/Pressebroschuere_BIP2013.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/05/PE14_167_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/09/PE14_306_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/11/PE14_401_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/02/PE15_048_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/02/PE15_61_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/05/PE15_173_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/05/PE15_187_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/08/PE15_293_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/08/PE15_305_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/11/PE15_419_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/11/PE15_430_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/DomesticProduct/DomesticProduct.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/02/PE16_056_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/02/PE16_044_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/05/PE16_162_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/05/PE16_171_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_279_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_291_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/11/PE16_403_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/11/PE16_413_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_050_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_062_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/05/PE17_155_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/05/PE17_169_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/08/PE17_277_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/08/PE17_294_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/11/PE17_422_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/02/PE18_044_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/05/PE18_168_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/02/PE18_058_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/05/PE18_182_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_299_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_316_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/11/PE18_440_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/11/PE18_454_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/NationalAccounts.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economy/Nationalaccounts-domesticproduct/nationalaccountsdomesticproduct_node.html

The Flash Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Flash Germany PMI®, combining manufacturing and services, decreased from 52.6 in Jun to 51.4 in Jul. The index of manufacturing output reached 44.1 in Jul, decreasing from 46.7 in Jun, while the index of services decreased to 55.4 in Jul from 55.8 in Jun. The overall Flash Germany Manufacturing PMI® decreased from 45.0 in Jun to 43.1 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1dc4bbe1b1b14a6b930277baa1ec963f). New orders decreased and new export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak manufacturing of Germany with strength in services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1dc4bbe1b1b14a6b930277baa1ec963f). The IHS Markit Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Germany Services PMI®, combining manufacturing and services with close association with Germany’s GDP, did decreased from 52.6 in Jun to 50.9 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/89f61a78892d4f878f5feb90c655cee6). Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak conditions of Germany (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/89f61a78892d4f878f5feb90c655cee6). The Germany Services Business Activity Index decreased from 55.8 in Jun to 54.5 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/89f61a78892d4f878f5feb90c655cee6). The IHS Markit/BME Germany Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), showing close association with Germany’s manufacturing conditions, decreased from 45.0 in Jun to 43.2 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/dc3da4267f934d05902a9db2535b5185). New export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds weak conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/dc3da4267f934d05902a9db2535b5185). Table DE provides the country data table for Germany.

Table DE, Germany, Economic Indicators

GDP

IQ2019 0.4 ∆%; IQ2019/IQ2018 NCSA ∆% 0.6 CA 0.7

2016/2015: 2.2 CA 2.2

2017/2016: 2.2 CA 2.5

GDP ∆% 1970-2017

Blog 8/26/12 5/27/12 11/25/12 2/24/13 5/19/13 5/26/13 8/18/13 8/25/13 11/17/13 11/24/13 1/26/14 2/16/14 3/2/14 5/18/14 5/25/14 8/17/14 9/7/14 11/16/14 11/30/14 2/15/15 3/1/15 5/17/15 5/24/15 8/16/15 8/30/15 11/22/15 11/29/15 2/14/16 2/28/16 5/15/16 5/29/16 8/14/16 8/28/16 11/20/16 11/27/16 2/19/17 02/26/17 05/14/17 5/28/17 8/20/17 8/27/17 11/26/17 2/18/18 2/25/18 5/20/18 5/27/18 8/19/18 9/2/18 11/18/18 11/25/18 4/14/19 5/26/19

Consumer Price Index

Jun month NSA ∆%: 0.3
Jun 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.6
Blog 1/20/19 7/14/19

Producer Price Index

Feb month ∆%: -0.1 NSA, minus 0.2 CSA
12-month NSA ∆%: 2.6
Blog 3/17/19

Industrial Production

MFG Production Jun month CSA ∆%: -1.5
12-month NSA: NA -5.2

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

Machine Orders

MF Jun month ∆%: 2.5
Jun 12-month ∆%: -3.7

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

Retail Sales

Jun Month ∆% 3.5

12-Month ∆% 1.6

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/5/15

Employment Report

Unemployment Rate SA Jun 3.1%
Blog 8/4/19

Trade Balance

Exports Jun 12-month NSA ∆%: -8.0
Imports Jun 12 months NSA ∆%: -4.4
Exports Jun month CSA ∆%: -0.1; Imports Jun month CSA 0.5

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/12/15

Links to blog comments in Table DE: 8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html

7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html

7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html

6/2/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html

5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html

5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

4/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html

1/20/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html

11/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html

11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html

9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html

5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

5/14/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

02/19/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html

11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html

8/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/and-as-ever-economic-outlook-is.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html

11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html

08/30/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuations-of-global-financial.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

9/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/competitive-monetary-policy-and.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

1/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html

11/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html

8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

VF France. Table VF-FR provides growth rates of GDP of France with the estimates of Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE). The long-term rate of GDP growth of France from IVQ1949 to IQ2019 is quite high at 3.1 percent. France’s growth rates were quite high in the four decades of the 1950s, 1960, 1970s and 1980s with an average growth rate of 4.0 percent compounding the average rates in the decades and discounting to one decade. The growth impulse diminished with 2.0 percent in the 1990s and 1.8 percent from 2000 to 2007. The average growth rate from 2000 to 2019, using fourth quarter data, is 1.2 percent because of the sharp impact of the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in US fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in the G7 in Japan and France in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Lucas (2011May) compares growth of the G7 economies (US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada) and Spain, finding that catch-up growth with earlier rates for the US and UK stalled in the 1970s.

Table VF-FR, France, Average Growth Rates of GDP Fourth Quarter, 1949-2018

Period

Average ∆%

1949-2019

3.1

2007-2019*****

0.9

2007-2018****

0.9

2007-2017***

0.8

2007-2016**

0.6

2007-2015*

0.5

2007-2014

0.4

2000-2019

1.2

2000-2018

1.2

2000-2017

1.2

2000-2016

1.1

2000-2015

1.1

2000-2014

1.1

2000-2007

1.8

1990-1999

2.0

1980-1989

2.7

1970-1979

3.7

1960-1969

5.7

1950-1959

4.2

*IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 **IVQ2007 to IVQ2016 ***IVQ2007 to IVQ2017 ****IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 *****IVQ2007 to IIQ2019

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4198151

http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312

The IHS Markit Flash France Composite Output Index decreased from 52.7 in Jun to 51.7 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/8468035dbd04463fb12c4b3dbd37a67e). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit, finds easing activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/8468035dbd04463fb12c4b3dbd37a67e). The IHS Markit France Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing with close association with French GDP, decreased from 52.7 in Jun to 51.9 in Jul, indicating expanding activity of the private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9f5637adb7fa4e5db08f338327caa7cc). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit that compiles the France Services PMI®, finds continuing activity ((https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9f5637adb7fa4e5db08f338327caa7cc). The IHS Markit France Services Activity index decreased from 52.9 in Jun to 52.6 in Jul ((https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/9f5637adb7fa4e5db08f338327caa7cc). The IHS Markit France Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index® decreased to 49.7 in Jul from 51.9 in Jun (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/f955c88c25a2432da95917e944caf100). Eliot Kerr, Economist at IHS Markit, finds deteriorating manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/f955c88c25a2432da95917e944caf100). Table FR provides the country data table for France.

Table FR, France, Economic Indicators

CPI

Jun month ∆% 0.2
12 months ∆%: 1.2
7/14/19

PPI

Jun month ∆%: -0.5 Jun 12 months ∆%: 0.2

Blog 7/28/19

GDP Growth

IIQ2019/IQ2019 ∆%: 0.2
IIQ2019/IIQ2018 ∆%: 1.3
Blog 3/31/13 5/19/12 6/30/13 9/29/13 11/17/13 12/29/13 2/16/14 4/6/14 5/18/14 6/29/14 8/17/14 9/28/14 11/16/14 12/28/14 2/15/15 3/29/15 5/17/15 6/28/15 8/16/15 9/27/15 11/15/15 12/27/15 1/31/16 2/28/16 3/27/16 5/1/16 6/5/16 06/26/16 8/7/16 9/4/16 9/25/16 10/30/16 12/4/16 1/1/17 2/12/17 3/5/17 3/26/17 5/7/17 6/4/17 6/25/17 8/20/17 9/3/17 11/12/17 12/10/17 12/31/17 2/11/18 3/4/18 4/1/18 5/6/18 6/3/18 6/24/18 9/2/18 11/11/18 12/9/18 12/30/18 3/10/19 3/31/19 5/5/19 6/2/19 8/11/19

Industrial Production

Jun ∆%:
Manufacturing -2.2 Quarter ∆%: -0.3 YOY 1.0

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

Consumer Spending

Manufactured Goods
Jun ∆%: 0.4 12-Month Manufactured Goods
∆%: -0.7

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/5/15

Employment

Unemployment Rate: IQ2019 8.4%
Blog 5/19/19

Trade Balance

Jun Exports ∆%: month -4.9 12 months 2.3

Imports ∆%: month -0.6 12 months 1.5

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/12/15

Confidence Indicators

Historical average 100

Jul Mfg Business Climate 101

Earlier Data:

Blog 3/29/15

Links to blog comments in Table FR: 7/28/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/dollar-appreciation-in-anticipations-of.html

7/14/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/fomc-uncertain-outlook-frank-h-knights.html

6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

6/2/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html

5/5/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

3/31/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/inverted-yield-curve-of-treasury_30.html

12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

12/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

11/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html

9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

7/29/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html

6/24/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

6/3/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

04/01/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html

3/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

11/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/25/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html

6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

5/7/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

3/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

2/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html

10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html

9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html

9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html

8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html

6/26/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html

6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

3/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html

12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html

11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html

9/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

6/28/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

9/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

12/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

6/30/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

5/19/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

Growth of GDP in a quarter relative to the prior quarter for France is in Table VF-1. GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2012 and changed 0.0 percent in IQ2013, rebounding with growth of 0.7 percent in IIQ2013. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2013. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent in IVQ2014. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2015 and changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2015. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2015. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2016. GDP decreased 0.3 percent in IIQ2016. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 0.6 percent in IVQ2016. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2017 and increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2017. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIIQ2017. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2017. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2018. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2018. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2018. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2018. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2019. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2019. The French economy grew 0.3 percent in IVQ2011, increasing 0.1 percent in IQ2012, contracting 0.2 percent in IIQ2012 and growing 0.2 percent in IIIQ2012. In the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, France’s GDP contracted in two quarters and stagnated in one quarter. Growth in the ten quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2011 accumulated 4.8 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.9 percent. Recovery has been much weaker than the cumulative 2.5 percent in the four quarters of 2006. The GDP of France contracted 3.9 percent from the pre-recession peak in IQ2008 at €525,547 million SA-WDA (seasonally adjusted working day adjusted volumes chained at previous year prices) to the trough in IIQ2009 at €505,136 million SA-WDA. The GDP of France increased 10.0 percent from the pre-recession peak in IQ2008 at €525,547 million SA-WDA to €577,905 million SA-WDA in IIQ2019 at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent. French GDP increased 14.4 percent from €505,136 million SA-WDA in IIQ2009 to €577,905 million SA-WDA in IIQ2019 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent. French GDP in IIQ2019 is 10.0 percent below trend at average 1.8 percent from 2000 to 2007. Weak recoveries in advanced economies have prevented full utilization of labor, capital and productive resources.

Table VF-1, France, Quarterly Real GDP Growth, Quarter on Prior Quarter ∆%

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IVQ

2019

0.3

0.2

2018

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.4

2017

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.7

2016

0.6

-0.3

0.2

0.6

2015

0.5

0.0

0.4

0.2

2014

0.1

0.2

0.5

0.1

2013

0.0

0.7

0.0

0.5

2012

0.1

-0.2

0.2

-0.1

2011

1.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

2010

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

2009

-1.6

-0.1

0.2

0.7

2008

0.5

-0.4

-0.3

-1.4

2007

0.8

0.8

0.4

0.2

2006

0.8

1.0

0.0

0.7

2005

0.2

0.2

0.5

0.7

2004

0.9

0.7

0.3

0.7

2003

0.1

-0.2

0.7

0.8

2002

0.3

0.5

0.4

0.0

2001

0.6

0.1

0.4

0.0

2000

0.9

0.9

0.6

0.8

1999

0.5

0.8

1.2

1.4

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4198151

http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312

Table VF-2. France has not recovered the rates of growth exceeding 2 percent prior to the global recession. GDP fell 3.8 percent in IQ2009, 3.5 percent in IIQ2009, 3.0 percent in IIIQ2009 and 0.9 percent in IVQ2009. Growth in IVQ2011 relative to IVQ2010 was 1.6 percent and GDP growth declined to 0.6 percent in IQ2012, 0.4 percent in IIQ2012 relative to the same quarter a year earlier, 0.4 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to a year earlier and 0.0 percent in IVQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Growth in IQ2013 relative to a year earlier was minus 0.1 percent. France’s GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 0.6 percent in IIIQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.1 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 1.2 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.8 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.0 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.0 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.0 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.2 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 2.4 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 2.8 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 3.0 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 2.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.9 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.5 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.1 percent in IVQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IQ2019 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IIQ2019 relative to a year earlier.

Table VF-2, France, Real GDP Growth Current Quarter Relative to Same Quarter Year Earlier ∆%

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IVQ

2019

1.2

1.3

2018

2.4

1.9

1.5

1.1

2017

1.4

2.4

2.8

3.0

2016

1.2

1.0

0.8

1.2

2015

1.2

1.0

0.9

1.0

2014

1.2

0.7

1.2

0.8

2013

-0.1

0.8

0.6

1.1

2012

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.0

2011

2.9

2.4

2.1

1.6

2010

1.2

1.8

2.2

2.2

2009

-3.8

-3.5

-3.0

-0.9

2008

1.8

0.6

-0.1

-1.7

2007

2.6

2.3

2.7

2.1

2006

2.2

3.1

2.6

2.6

2005

2.0

1.5

1.7

1.7

2004

2.1

3.0

2.7

2.6

2003

1.1

0.3

0.6

1.4

2002

0.8

1.2

1.2

1.2

2001

3.0

2.1

1.9

1.1

2000

4.4

4.5

4.0

3.4

1999

2.9

2.9

3.4

4.0

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4198151

http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312

Chart VF-1 provides the GDP of France from IQ1949 to IQ2017. There was substantial drop during the global recession followed by hesitant growth and more recent higher growth. The update is here: https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/010565708#Graphique

clip_image018

Chart VF-1, France, Quarterly Real GDP, Seasonally and Working Day Adjusted, IQ1949-IQ2017

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3047950

Update: https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/010565708#Graphique

http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312

Percentage changes and contributions of segments of GDP in France are in Table VF-3. Internal demand added 0.5 percentage points in IIIQ2018. Internal demand added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2018. Internal demand added 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2019. Internal demand added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2019. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2018. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points in IVQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2019. Net trade contributed 0.0 percentage points in IIQ2019.

Table VF-3, France, Contributions to GDP Growth, Calendar and Seasonally Adjusted, %

∆% from Prior Period

IIIQ

2018

IVQ

2018

IQ

2019

IIQ 2019

2018

2019

GDP

0.3

0.4

0.3

0.2

1.7

1.0

Imports

-0.2

1.1

1.1

0.1

1.2

2.1

Household Consump.

0.4

0.3

0.4

0.2

0.9

0.9

Govt.
Consump.

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.4

0.8

0.7

GFCF

1.0

0.6

0.5

0.9

2.8

2.4

General Government

0.8

1.0

0.6

0.8

2.4

2.6

Exports

0.6

1.8

0.2

0.2

3.5

2.1

% Point
Contribs.

Internal Demand ex Inventory Changes

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.4

1.3

1.2

Inventory Changes

-0.4

-0.2

0.3

-0.2

-0.2

0.1

Net Foreign Trade

0.2

0.2

-0.3

0.0

0.7

0.0

Notes: Consump.: Consumption; Gvt.: Government; GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation; Contribus.: Contributions; OVHG: “annual growth rate carried over at the mid-year point.”

Source:  Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4198151

http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312

Chart VF-2 of France’s Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques provides percentage point contributions to GDP growth (Update: https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4198151). The economy was driven in IQ2013 by consumption with net trade and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) deducting from growth.  Final consumption drove the economy in IIQ2013 together with contribution by net trade and capital formation. Gross fixed capital formation and net trade constrained the economy in IIIQ2013. Inventory changed deducted from growth in IVQ2013 with contributions by consumption and net trade. Inventory change contributed to growth in IQ2014 with deductions by consumption, GFCF and net foreign trade. Consumption contributed to growth in IIQ2014 with deductions by GFCF and net trade. Consumption and inventory change drove the economy in IIIQ2014 with deduction by net trade. Consumption and net trade drove the economy in IVQ2014 with deductions by GFCF and inventory change. Consumption, GFCF and inventory change drove the economy in IQ2015 with net trade deducting from growth. Net trade and consumption drove the economy in IIQ2015 with inventory change and GFCF deducting from growth. Consumption and inventory change drove the economy in IIIQ2015 with lower contribution by GFCF and significant deduction by net trade. Inventory change, consumption and GFCF drove the economy in IVQ2015 with deduction by net trade. Consumption and GFCF drove the economy in IQ2016 with deductions by inventory change and negligible contribution by net trade. Consumption and net trade drove the economy in IIQ2016 with deduction by inventory change. Inventory change and GFCF drove the economy in IIIQ2016 with deductions by net trade and consumption. Consumption, GFCF and net trade drove the economy in IVQ2016 with deduction by inventory change. Inventory change, GFCF and consumption drove the economy in IQ2017 with deduction by net trade. GFCF, consumption and net trade drove the economy in IIQ2017 with deduction by inventory change. Consumption, GFCF and inventory change drove the economy in IIIQ2017 with deduction by net trade. Consumption, GFCF and net trade drove the economy in IVQ2017 with deduction by inventory change. Consumption and GFCF drove the economy in IQ2018 with nil contributions by net trade and inventory change. Inventory change and GFCF drove the economy in IIQ2018 with nearly flat consumption and deduction by net trade. Consumption, GFCF and net trade drove the economy in IIIQ2018 with deduction by inventory divestment. Net trade drove the economy in IVQ2018 with contributions by consumption and GFCF and deduction by inventory change. Consumption and inventory change drove the economy in IQ2019 with contribution by GFCF and deduction by net trade. Consumption and GFCF drove the economy in IIQ2019 with deduction by inventory change.

clip_image019

Chart VF-2, France, Percentage Point Contributions to GDP Growth

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3683868?sommaire=3637721

Update: https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/4198151

http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312

VG Italy. Table VG-IT provides revised percentage changes of GDP in Italy of quarter on prior quarter and quarter on same quarter a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2019 and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2018, the GDP of Italy decreased 0.1 percent and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of Italy changed 0.0 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.6 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of Italy increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 1.0 percent in IQ2013 and declined 2.9 percent relative to IQ2012. GDP had been growing during six consecutive quarters but at very low rates from IQ2010 to IIQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell in seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at increasingly higher rates of contraction from 0.6 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IVQ2011, 0.9 percent in IQ2012, 0.9 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012. The pace of decline accelerated to minus 0.5 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 1.0 percent in IQ2013. GDP contracted cumulatively 5.2 percent in seven consecutive quarterly contractions from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent. The year-on-year rate has fallen from 2.3 percent in IVQ2010 to minus 2.8 percent in IVQ2012, minus 2.9 percent in IQ2013, minus 2.0 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 1.2 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP fell 0.8 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.3 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.1 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.3 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.8 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.8 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.8 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.0 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2018 relative to a year earlier and changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2018 relative to a year earlier. GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IQ2019 relative to a year earlier. Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy in IQ2019 of €403,596.0 million (https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/230842) is lower by 5.2 percent relative to €425,552.0 million in IQ2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy increased from €368,036.0 million in IQ1998 to €425,552.0 million in IQ2008 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. The fiscal adjustment of Italy is significantly more difficult with the economy not growing especially on the prospects of increasing government revenue. The strategy is for reforms to improve productivity, facilitating future fiscal consolidation.

Table VG-IT, Italy, GDP ∆%

Quarter ∆% Relative to Preceding Quarter

Quarter ∆% Relative to Same Quarter Year Earlier

IQ2019

0.1

-0.1

IVQ2018

-0.1

0.0

IIIQ2018

-0.1

0.5

IIQ2018

0.0

1.0

IQ2018

0.2

1.4

IVQ2017

0.4

1.8

IIIQ2017

0.4

1.8

IIQ2017

0.4

1.8

IQ2017

0.6

1.6

IVQ2016

0.5

1.3

IIIQ2016

0.4

1.2

IIQ2016

0.2

1.1

IQ2016

0.2

1.3

IVQ2015

0.4

1.3

IIIQ2015

0.3

0.8

IIQ2015

0.4

0.8

IQ2015

0.2

0.3

IVQ2014

0.0

0.2

IIIQ2014

0.2

0.1

IIQ2014

-0.1

0.2

IQ2014

0.1

0.3

IVQ2013

-0.2

-0.8

IIIQ2013

0.4

-1.2

IIQ2013

0.0

-2.0

IQ2013

-1.0

-2.9

IVQ2012

-0.5

-2.8

IIIQ2012

-0.5

-3.1

IIQ2012

-0.9

-3.2

IQ2012

-0.9

-2.2

IVQ2011

-0.9

-1.1

IIIQ2011

-0.6

0.4

IIQ2011

0.1

1.6

IQ2011

0.2

2.0

IVQ2010

0.7

2.3

IIIQ2010

0.5

1.9

IIQ2010

0.6

1.9

IQ2010

0.4

0.5

IVQ2009

0.4

-2.6

IIIQ2009

0.5

-5.2

IIQ2009

-0.8

-7.0

IQ2009

-2.7

-7.2

IVQ2008

-2.3

-3.6

IIIQ2008

-1.4

-1.4

IIQ2008

-0.9

-0.1

IQ2008

1.0

0.8

IV2007

-0.1

-0.1

IIIQ2007

0.0

1.3

IIQ2007

-0.1

1.7

IQ2007

0.2

2.4

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/230842

The IHS Markit Italy Business Activity Index increased from 50.5 in Jun to 51.7 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/052309e2cbf74e45a42b2cf5b3e983c5). Amritpal Virdee, Economist at IHS Markit that compiles the Italy Services PMI®, finds improving conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/052309e2cbf74e45a42b2cf5b3e983c5). The IHS Markit Italy Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), increased from 48.4 in Jun to 48.5 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/2781182ac9f8474f8504e8049d848269). New export orders decreased. Amritpal Virdee, Economist at HIS Markit that compiles the Italian Manufacturing PMI®, finds deteriorating manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/2781182ac9f8474f8504e8049d848269). Table IT provides the country data table for Italy.

Table IT, Italy, Economic Indicators

Consumer Price Index

Jul month ∆% 0.0

12 months ∆% 0.4
Blog 8/11/19

Producer Price Index

Jun month ∆%: 0.5 Jun 12-month ∆%: 1.1

Blog 6/30/19

GDP Growth

IQ2019/IVQ2018 SA ∆%: 0.1
IQ2019/IQ2018 NSA ∆%:-0.1
Blog 3/17/13 6/16/13 8/11/13 9/15/13 11/17/13 12/15/13 2/16/14 3/16/14 5/18/14 6/15/14 8/10/14 8/31/14 10/19/14 11/16/14 12/7/14 2/15/15 3/15/15 5/17/15 5/31/15 8/16/15 9/6/15 11/15/15 12/6/15 2/14/16 3/6/16 5/15/16 6/5/16 8/14/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/4/16 02/26/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/4/17 8/20/17 9/3/17 11/26/17 12/10/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/10/18 9/9/18 12/16/18 3/10/19 5/26/19 6/9/19

Labor Report

Jun 2019

Participation rate 65.7%

Employment ratio 59.2%

Unemployment rate 9.7%

Youth Unemployment 28.1%

Blog 8/4/19

Industrial Production

Jun month ∆%: -0.2
12 months CA ∆%: -1.2

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Retail Sales

Jun month ∆%: 1.9

May 12-month ∆%: 1.3

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/26/15

Business Confidence

Mfg Jul 100.1, Mar 101.9

Construction Jul 142.8 Mar 140.3

Earlier Data:

Blog 4/5/15

Trade Balance

Balance Jun SA €5,378 million
Exports Jun month SA ∆%: 1.2; Imports month ∆%: -2.1
Exports 12 months Jun NSA ∆%: -3.5 Imports 12 months NSA ∆%: -5.5

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table IT: 8/4/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/08/dollar-appreciation-contraction-of.html

7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html

7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html

6/30/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

6/9/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/increase-of-valuations-of-risk.html

5/26/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/contraction-of-risk-financial-assets.html

3/10/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html

12/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html

9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

12/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html

11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html

9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

12/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

10/19/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html

8/31/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopo7litical-and-financial-risks.html

8/10/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk_10.html

6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

8/11/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/recovery-without-hiring-loss-of-full.html

6/16/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html

3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

VH United Kingdom. Annual data in Table VH-UK show the strong impact of the global recession in the UK with decline of GDP of 4.2 percent in 2009 after dropping 0.3 percent in 2008. Recovery of 1.7 percent in 2010 is relatively low in comparison with annual growth rates in 2007 and earlier years. Growth was only 1.6 percent in 2011 and 1.4 percent in 2012. Growth increased to 2.0 percent in 2013 and 2.9 percent in 2014. Growth fell to 2.3 percent in 2015, and 1.8 percent in 2016.  GDP grew 1.8 percent in 2017. GDP grew 1.4 percent in 2018. The bottom part of Table VH-UK provides average growth rates of UK GDP since 1948. The UK economy grew at 2.5 percent per year on average between 1948 and 2018, which is relatively high for an advanced economy. The growth rate of GDP between 2000 and 2007 is higher at 2.8 percent. Growth in the current cyclical expansion from 2010 to 2018 has been only at 1.9 percent as advanced economies struggle with weak internal demand and world trade. GDP in 2018 is higher by 13.1 percent relative to 2007 while it would have been 35.5 higher at trend of 2.8 percent as from 2000 to 2007.

Table VH-UK, UK, Gross Domestic Product, ∆%

∆% on Prior Year

1998

3.3

1999

3.2

2000

3.5

2001

2.8

2002

2.5

2003

3.3

2004

2.3

2005

3.1

2006

2.5

2007

2.5

2008

-0.3

2009

-4.2

2010

1.7

2011

1.6

2012

1.4

2013

2.0

2014

2.9

2015

2.3

2016

1.8

2017

1.8

2018

1.4

Average Growth Rates ∆% per Year

1948-2018

2.5

1950-1959

3.1

1960-1969

3.1

1970-1979

2.6

1980-1989

3.2

1990-1999

2.4

2000-2007

2.8

2007-2013*

2.1

2007-2014*

5.1

2007-2015

0.9

2007-2016

1.0

2007-2017

1.1

2007-2018

1.1

2000-2018

1.8

*Absolute change from 2007 to 2013 and 2007 to 2014

Source: UK Office for National Statistics

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/januarytomarch2019

The HIS Markit Flash UK PMI® Composite Output Index fell from 52.4 in Jun to 47.7 in Jul, which is the lowest in 87 months (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds the index suggests pace of contraction of GDP at 0.4 percent in IIIQ2016 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). The Business Activity Index of the IHS Markit/CIPS UK Services PMI® increased from 50.2 in Jun to 51.4 in Jul (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/0cc0c4f6f7f14c65aaa27338a9abbfc5). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds slowing conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/0cc0c4f6f7f14c65aaa27338a9abbfc5). The IHS Markit/CIPS UK Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®) did not change to 48.0 in Jul from 48.0 in Jun (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/bea8330e4ec940f29fe8ea2e2f4c8490). New export orders decreased. Rob Dobson, Director at IHS Markit that compiles the Markit/CIPS Manufacturing PMI®, finds challenges in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/bea8330e4ec940f29fe8ea2e2f4c8490). Table UK provides the economic indicators for the United Kingdom.

Table UK, UK Economic Indicators

CPI

Jun month ∆%: 0.0
Jun 12-month ∆%: 2.0
Blog 7/21/19

Output/Input Prices

Output Prices: Jun 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.6 excluding food, petroleum ∆%: 1.7
Input Prices: Jun 12-month NSA
∆%: -0.3
Excluding ∆%: 1.9
Blog 7/21/19

GDP Growth

IQ2019 prior quarter ∆% 0.5; year earlier same quarter ∆%: 1.8
Blog 3/31/13 4/28/13 5/26/13 7/28/13 8/25/13 9/29/13 10/27/13 12/1/13 12/22/13 2/2/14 3/2/14 4/6/14 5/4/14 5/25/14 6/29/14 7/27/14 8/17/14 10/5/14 10/26/14 11/30/14 12/28/14 2/1/15 3/1/15 4/5/15 5/3/15 5/31/15 7/5/15 8/2/15 9/6/15 10/4/15 11/1/15 11/29/15 12/27/15 1/31/16 2/28/16 4/3/16 5/1/16 5/29/16 7/3/16 7/31/16 9/4/16 10/9/16 10/30/16 11/27/16 1/1/17 2/5/17 2/26/17 4/9/17 5/7/2017 5/28/17 7/9/17 7/30/17 8/19/17 10/8/17 10/29/17 11/26/17 12/31/17 2/4/18 2/25/18 4/8/18 5/6/18 5/2718 7/8/18 8/19/18 10/7/18 11/18/18 12/30/18 2/17/19 4/7/19 5/19/19 7/7/19

Industrial Production

Jun 2019/Jun 2018 ∆%: Production Industries -0.6; Manufacturing -1.4

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/12/15

Retail Sales

Jun month ∆%: 1.0
Jun 12-month ∆%: 3.8

Earlier Data:
Blog 4/26/15

Labor Market

Mar-May 2019 Unemployment Rate: 3.8%
Blog 7/21/19 LMGDP 5/17/15

GDP and the Labor Market

IQ2015 Employment 104.8

IQ2008 =100

GDP IQ15=104.0 IQ2008=100

Blog 5/17/14

Trade Balance UK Trade in Goods and Services

Balance SA Jun £1779 million
Exports Jun ∆%: 4.5; Jun 12 M ∆%: 3.5
Imports Jun ∆%: -2.6 Jun 12M ∆%: 6.4

EARLIER DATA:
Blog 4/12/15

Links to blog comments in Table UK: 7/21/2019 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/global-manufacturing-stress-world.html

7/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/07/twenty-million-unemployed-or.html

5/19/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/05/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

4/7/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/04/flattening-yield-curve-of-treasury.html

2/17/19 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html

12/30/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

11/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html

10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

7/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html

5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

4/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

2/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html

10/8/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html

7/30/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html

7/9/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html

5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

2/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html

10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html

10/9/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html

9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html

7/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/business-fixed-investment-has-been-soft.html

7/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html

5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

4/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html

12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html

11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html

11/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-increase-considered.html

10/4/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html

9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html

08/02/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html

7/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html

5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

5/3/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html

12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

10/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html

10/5/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

7/27/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

5/4/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html

4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html

3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html

2/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

12/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html

12/1/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/exit-risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html

10/27/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html

9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html

7/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html

5/26/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

4/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html

03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.

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