CMP Associates Regulation Blog: Oscillation of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Inflation Waves, Recovery without Hiring, Ten Million Fewer Full-Time Jobs, United States Industrial Production, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, World Financial Turbulence, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk: Part VII

Oscillation of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Inflation Waves, Recovery without Hiring, Ten Million Fewer Full-Time Jobs, United States Industrial Production, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, World Financial Turbulence, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk

I World Inflation Waves

IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IC United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

I Recovery without Hiring

IA1 Hiring Collapse

IA2 Labor Underutilization

ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs

IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment

II United States Industrial Production

IIB Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates

II IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

V World Economic Slowdown. Table V-1 is constructed with the database of the IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=29) to show GDP in dollars in 2016 and the growth rate of real GDP of the world and selected regional countries from 2016 to 2019. The data illustrate the concept often repeated of “two-speed recovery” of the world economy from the recession of 2007 to 2009. The IMF has changed its forecast of the world economy to 3.7 percent in 2017 but accelerating to 3.9 percent in 2018 and 3.9 percent in 2019. Slow-speed recovery occurs in the “major advanced economies” of the G7 that account for $35,576 billion of world output of $75,485 billion, or 47.1 percent, but are projected to grow at much lower rates than world output, 2.0 percent on average from 2016 to 2019, in contrast with 3.7 percent for the world as a whole. While the world would grow 15.5 percent in the four years from 2016 to 2019, the G7 as a whole would grow 8.2 percent. The difference in dollars of 2016 is high: growing by 15.5 percent would add around $11.7 trillion of output to the world economy, or roughly, over two times the output of the economy of Japan of $4,949 billion but growing by 8.2 percent would add $6.2 trillion of output to the world, or somewhat higher than the output of Japan in 2016. The “two speed” concept is in reference to the growth of the 150 countries labeled as emerging and developing economies (EMDE) with joint output in 2016 of $29,206 billion, or 38.7 percent of world output. The EMDEs would grow cumulatively 20.6 percent or at the average yearly rate of 4.8 percent, contributing $6.0 trillion from 2016 to 2019 or the equivalent of somewhat more than one half the GDP of $11,222 billion of China in 2016. The final four countries in Table I-1 often referred as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), are large, rapidly growing emerging economies. Their combined output in 2016 adds to $16,570 billion, or 22.0 percent of world output, which is equivalent to 46.6 percent of the combined output of the major advanced economies of the G7.

Table I-1, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Real GDP Growth

	GDP USD Billions 2016	Real GDP ∆% 2016	Real GDP ∆% 2017	Real GDP ∆% 2018	Real GDP ∆% 2019
World	75,485	3.2	3.7	3.9	3.9
G7	35,576	1.4	2.1	2.4	2.1
Canada	1,536	1.4	3.0	2.1	2.0
France	2,466	1.2	1.8	2.0	2.0
DE	3,479	1.9	2.5	2.5	2.0
Italy	1,860	0.9	1.5	1.5	1.1
Japan	4,949	0.9	1.7	1.2	0.9
UK	2,661	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.5
US	18,624	1.5	2.3	2.9	2.7
Euro Area	11,940	1.8	2.3	2.4	2.0
DE	3,479	1.9	2.5	2.5	2.0
France	2,466	1.2	1.8	2.0	2.0
Italy	1,860	0.9	1.5	1.5	1.1
POT	205	1.6	2.7	2.4	1.8
Ireland	304	5.1	7.8	4.5	4.0
Greece	193	-0.2	1.4	2.0	1.8
Spain	1,238	3.3	3.1	2.8	2.2
EMDE	29,206	4.4	4.8	4.9	5.1
Brazil	1,793	-3.5	1.0	2.3	2.5
Russia	1,281	-0.2	1.5	1.7	1.5
India	2,274	7.1	6.7	7.4	7.8
China	11,222	6.7	6.9	6.6	6.4

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries); POT: Portugal

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx

Continuing high rates of unemployment in advanced economies constitute another characteristic of the database of the WEO (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx). Table V-2 is constructed with the WEO database to provide rates of unemployment from 2015 to 2019 for major countries and regions. In fact, unemployment rates for 2015 in Table I-2 are high for all countries: unusually high for countries with high rates most of the time and unusually high for countries with low rates most of the time. The rates of unemployment are particularly high in 2015 for the countries with sovereign debt difficulties in Europe: 12.4 percent for Portugal (POT), 9.5 percent for Ireland, 24.9 percent for Greece, 22.1 percent for Spain and 11.9 percent for Italy, which is lower but still high. The G7 rate of unemployment is 5.8 percent. Unemployment rates are not likely to decrease substantially if slow growth persists in advanced economies.

Table V-2, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Unemployment Rate as Percent of Labor Force

	% Labor Force 2015	% Labor Force 2016	% Labor Force 2017	% Labor Force 2018	% Labor Force 2019
World	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
G7	5.8	5.4	5.0	4.7	4.5
Canada	6.9	7.0	6.3	6.2	6.2
France	10.4	10.0	9.4	8.8	8.4
DE	4.6	4.2	3.8	3.6	3.5
Italy	11.9	11.7	11.3	10.9	10.6
Japan	3.4	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.9
UK	5.4	4.9	4.4	4.4	4.5
US	5.3	4.9	4.4	3.9	3.5
Euro Area	10.9	10.0	9.1	8.4	8.1
DE	4.6	4.2	3.8	3.6	3.5
France	10.4	10.0	9.4	8.8	8.4
Italy	11.9	11.7	11.3	10.9	10.6
POT	12.4	11.1	8.9	7.3	6.7
Ireland	9.5	8.4	6.7	5.5	5.2
Greece	24.9	23.6	21.5	19.8	18.0
Spain	22.1	19.6	17.2	15.5	14.8
EMDE	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Brazil	8.3	11.3	12.8	11.6	10.5
Russia	5.6	5.5	5.2	5.5	5.5
India	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
China	4.1	4.0	3.9	4.0	4.0

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries)

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx

There are references to adverse periods as “lost decades.” There is a more prolonged and adverse period in Table V-3A: the lost economic cycle of the Global Recession with economic growth underperforming below trend worldwide. Economic contractions were relatively high but not comparable to the decline of GDP during the Great Depression. In fact, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, US GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. The contraction of GDP in the current cycle of the Global Recession was much lower, 4.0 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html). Contractions were deeper in Japan, 8.7 percent, the euro area (19 members), 5.8 percent, Germany, 6.9 percent and the UK 6.3 percent. The contraction in France was 4.0 percent. There is adversity in low rates of growth during the expansion that did not compensate for the contraction such that for the whole cycle performance is disappointingly low. As a result, GDP is substantially below what it would have been in trend growth in all countries and regions in the world. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 36 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IIQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2018-09/gdp2q18_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2018 would have accumulated to 36.4 percent. GDP in IIQ2018 would be $21,499.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2987.8 billion than actual $18,511.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.1 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IIQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,511.6 billion in IIQ2018 or 17.4 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Sep 1919 to Sep 2018. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 150.3999 in Sep 2018. The actual index NSA in Sep 2018 is 106.1908, which is 29.4 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Sep 2018. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.4390 in Sep 2018. The output of manufacturing at 106.1908 in Sep 2018 is 21.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table V-3A, Cycle 2007-2018, Percentage Contraction, Average Growth Rate in Expansion, Average Growth Rate in Whole Cycle and GDP Percent Below Trend

	Contraction ∆%	Expansion AV ∆%	Whole Cycle AV ∆%	Below Trend Percent
USA	4.0	2.3	1.5	13.9
Japan	8.7	1.6	0.6	NA
Euro Area (19)	5.8	1.4	0.6	15.4
France	3.9	1.3	0.8	9.8
Germany	6.9	2.1	1.2	NA
UK	6.3	1.9	1.0	16.5

Note: AV: Average. Expansion and Whole Cycle AV ∆% calculated with quarterly growth, seasonally adjusted and quarterly adjusted when applicable, rates and converted into annual equivalent.

Data reported periodically in this blog.

Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table V-3 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog from IQ2012 to IVQ2016 available now for all countries. There are estimates for all countries for IQ2017, IIQ2017 and IIIQ2017. There are estimates for IVQ2017 and IQ2018 and preliminary estimates for IIQ2018. Growth is weak throughout most of the world.

Japan. The GDP of Japan increased 1.2 percent in IQ2012, 4.9 percent at SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) and 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier but part of the jump could be the low level a year earlier because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan is experiencing difficulties with the overvalued yen because of worldwide capital flight originating in zero interest rates with risk aversion in an environment of softer growth of world trade. Japan’s GDP fell 0.7 percent in IIQ2012 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of minus 2.6 percent, which is much lower than 4.9 percent in IQ2012. Growth of 2.9 percent in IIQ2012 in Japan relative to IIQ2011 has effects of the low level of output because of Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.4 percent in IIIQ2012 at the SAAR of minus 1.5 percent and decreased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2012 at the SAAR of 0.8 percent and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan grew 1.2 percent in IQ2013 at the SAAR of 4.9 percent and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIQ2013 at the SAAR of 3.5 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP grew 0.8 percent in IIIQ2013 at the SAAR of 3.2 percent and increased 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2013, Japan’s GDP changed 0.0 percent at the SAAR of minus 0.2 percent, increasing 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 1.0 percent in IQ2014 at the SAAR of 3.9 percent and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2014, Japan’s GDP fell 1.8 percent at the SAAR of minus 7.1 percent and fell 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2014 at the SAAR of 0.0 percent and fell 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, Japan’s GDP grew 0.6 percent, at the SAAR of 2.4 percent, decreasing 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Japan increased 1.5 percent in IQ2015 at the SAAR of 6.1 percent and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2015 at the SAAR of minus 0.3 percent and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Japan increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2015 at the SAAR of 0.5 percent and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.3 percent in IVQ2015 at the SAAR of minus 1.3 percent and grew 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, the GDP of Japan increased 0.8 percent at the SAAR of 3.4 percent and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2016 at the SAAR of 0.9 percent and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, the GDP of Japan increased 0.3 percent at the SAAR of 1.0 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2016 at the SAAR of 0.8 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, the GDP of Japan increased 0.7 percent at the SAAR of 2.7 percent and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2017 at the SAAR of 2.0 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, the GDP of Japan increased 0.6 percent at the SAAR of 2.3 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2017, at the SAAR of 0.9 percent, and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, the GDP of Japan decreased 0.2 percent, at the SAAR of minus 0.9 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2018, at the SAAR of 3.0 percent and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier.

· China. China’s GDP grew 1.9 percent in IQ2012, annualizing to 7.8 percent, and 8.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 2.1 percent in IIQ2012, which annualizes to 8.7 percent, and 7.6 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.8 percent in IIIQ2012, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, China grew at 2.0 percent, which annualizes at 8.2 percent, and 8.1 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011. In IQ2013, China grew at 1.9 percent, which annualizes at 7.8 percent, and 7.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2013, China grew at 1.7 percent, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and 7.6 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 2.1 percent in IIIQ2013, which annualizes at 8.7 percent, and increased 7.9 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.6 percent in IVQ2013, which annualized to 6.6 percent, and 7.7 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.7 percent in IQ2014, which annualizes to 7.0 percent, and 7.4 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2014, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and 7.5 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIIQ2014, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent in a year, and 7.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.7 percent in IVQ2014, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and 7.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.7 percent in IQ2015, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and increased 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, China’s GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.5 percent in IVQ2015, which annualizes at 6.1 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew 1.4 percent in IQ2016, which annualizes at 5.7 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, the GDP of China increased 1.9 percent, which annualizes to 7.8 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2016, which annualizes at 7.0 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.6 percent in IVQ2016, which annualizes at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased at 1.5 percent in IQ2017, which annualizes at 6.1 percent and increased 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.9 percent in IIQ2017, which annualizes at 7.8 percent, and increased 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China increased 1.8 percent in IIIQ2017, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.6 percent in IVQ2017, which annualizes at 6.6 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of China grew at 1.4 percent in IQ2018, which annualizes to 5.7 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. China’s GDP increased at 1.8 percent in IIQ2018, which annualizes at 7.4 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. There was decennial change in leadership in China (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/index.htm). Xi Jinping initiated a second term of leadership in Oct 2017 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/25/c_136705344.htm). Growth rates of GDP of China in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier have been declining from 2011 to 2017.

· Euro Area. GDP fell 0.2 percent in the euro area in IQ2012 and decreased 0.4 in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP contracted 0.3 percent IIQ2012 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.1 percent and declined 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.4 percent relative to the prior quarter and fell 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, the GDP of the euro area fell 0.4 percent and decreased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.5 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2013, euro area GDP increased 0.4 percent and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The euro area’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP increased 0.7 percent in IQ2015 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. The euro area’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Euro area’s GDP increased 0.7 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.8 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, euro are GDP increased 0.7 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2017 and increased 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.7 percent and grew 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area grew 0.7 percent in IVQ2017 and increased 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, the GDP of the euro area increased 0.4 percent and grew 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of the euro area grew 0.4 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier.

· United States. Growth of US GDP in IQ2012 was 0.8 percent, at SAAR of 3.2 percent and higher by 2.7 percent relative to IQ2011. US GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2012, 1.7 percent at SAAR and 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, US GDP grew 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent at SAAR and 2.5 percent relative to IIIQ2011. In IVQ2012, US GDP grew 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent at SAAR and 1.5 percent relative to IVQ2011. In IQ2013, US GDP grew at 3.6 percent SAAR, 0.9 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.6 percent relative to the same quarter in 2012. In IIQ2013, US GDP grew at 0.5 percent in SAAR, 0.1 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.3 percent relative to IIQ2012. US GDP grew at 3.2 percent in SAAR in IIIQ2013, 0.8 percent relative to the prior quarter and 1.9 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html). In IVQ2013, US GDP grew 0.8 percent at 3.2 percent SAAR and 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, US GDP decreased 0.3 percent, increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier and fell 1.0 percent at SAAR. In IIQ2014, US GDP increased 1.3 percent at 5.1 percent SAAR and increased 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP increased 1.2 percent in IIIQ2014 at 4.9 percent SAAR and increased 3.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, US GDP increased 0.5 percent at SAAR of 1.9 percent and increased 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2015 at SAAR of 3.3 percent and grew 3.8 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.3 percent in IIQ2015, increasing 0.8 percent in the quarter and 3.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2015 at SAAR of 1.0 percent and grew 2.4 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 0.4 percent in IVQ2015, increasing 0.1 percent in the quarter and 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, US GDP grew 0.4 percent at SAAR of 1.5 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.3 percent in IIQ2016, increasing 0.6 percent in the quarter and 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, US GDP grew 0.5 percent at SAAR of 1.9 percent and increased 1.5 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 1.8 percent in IVQ2016, increasing 0.4 percent in the quarter, and increasing 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2017, US GDP grew 0.4 percent at SAAR of 1.8 percent and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 3.0 percent in IIQ2017, increasing 0.7 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, US GDP grew 0.7 percent at SAAR of 2.8 percent and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.3 percent in IVQ2017, increasing 0.6 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, US GDP grew at SAAR of 2.2 percent, increasing 0.5 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP grew at SAAR of 4.2 percent in IIQ2018, increasing 1.0 percent in the quarter, and increasing 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier.

· United Kingdom. In IQ2012, UK GDP increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, GDP fell 0.1 percent relative to IQ2012 and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, GDP increased 1.2 percent and increased 2.0 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IVQ2012, GDP fell 0.2 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Fiscal consolidation in an environment of weakening economic growth is much more challenging. GDP increased 1.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 0.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to IVQ2012. In IIQ2013, GDP increased 0.5 percent and 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2013 and 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IVQ2013 and 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, GDP increased 0.8 percent and 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2014 and 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIIQ2014 and 2.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2014, GDP increased 0.7 percent and 3.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IQ2015 and increased 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2016 and increased 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2016 and grew 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2016 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.4 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2017 and increased 1.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2017, GDP increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2017 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2018, GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2018 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier.

· Italy. Table VG-IT provides revised percentage changes of GDP in Italy of quarter on prior quarter and quarter on same quarter a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of Italy increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of Italy increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy changed 0.0 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2013 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 1.0 percent in IQ2013 and declined 2.9 percent relative to IQ2012. GDP had been growing during six consecutive quarters but at very low rates from IQ2010 to IIQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell in seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at increasingly higher rates of contraction from 0.6 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IVQ2011, 0.9 percent in IQ2012, 0.9 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012. The pace of decline accelerated to minus 0.6 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 1.0 percent in IQ2013. GDP contracted cumulatively 5.3 percent in seven consecutive quarterly contractions from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.1 percent. The yearly rate has fallen from 2.2 percent in IVQ2010 to minus 2.8 percent in IVQ2012, minus 2.9 percent in IQ2013, minus 2.0 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 1.2 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP fell 0.8 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.9 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.2 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.0 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.3 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.6 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.6 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.2 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy in IIQ2018 of €402,976.4 million (https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/220583) is lower by 5.3 percent relative to €425,734.7 million in IQ2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy increased from €368,105.8 million in IQ1998 to €425,734.7 million in IQ2008 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. The fiscal adjustment of Italy is significantly more difficult with the economy not growing especially on the prospects of increasing government revenue. The strategy is for reforms to improve productivity, facilitating future fiscal consolidation.

· France. France’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IQ2012 and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2012 and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, France’s GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2012 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2013, France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.7 percent in IIQ2013 and increased 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2013 and increased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.4 percent in IVQ2013 and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2014, France’s GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2014, France’s GDP increased 0.3 percent and increased 0.7 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France increased 0.1 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IQ2015 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2015, France’s GDP changed 0.0 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2015, the GDP of France increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.7 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of France decreased 0.2 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 1.1 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of France increased 0.6 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.8 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of France increased 0.6 percent and increased 2.3 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.7 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 2.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of France increased 0.7 percent and increased 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2018 and increased 2.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of France increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier

Table V-3, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%

	IQ2012/IVQ2011	IQ2012/IQ2011
United States	QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2	2.7
Japan	QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 4.9	3.1
China	1.9 AE 7.8	8.1
Euro Area	-0.2	-0.4
Germany	0.3	1.6
France	0.1	0.6
Italy	-0.9	-2.3
United Kingdom	0.6	1.2
	IIQ2012/IQ2012	IIQ2012/IIQ2011
United States	QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.7	2.4
Japan	QOQ: -0.7 SAAR: -2.6	2.9
China	2.1 AE 8.7	7.6
Euro Area	-0.3	-0.8
Germany	0.1	0.4 0.9 CA
France	-0.1	0.5
Italy	-0.9	-3.2
United Kingdom	-0.1	1.0
	IIIQ2012/ IIQ2012	IIIQ2012/ IIIQ2011
United States	QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.5	2.5
Japan	QOQ: –0.4 SAAR: –1.5	-0.1
China	1.8 AE 7.4	7.5
Euro Area	-0.1	-0.9
Germany	0.3	0.2
France	0.1	0.4
Italy	-0.5	-3.1
United Kingdom	1.2	2.0
	IVQ2012/IIIQ2012	IVQ2012/IVQ2011
United States	QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.5	1.5
Japan	QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 0.8	0.2
China	2.0 AE 8.2	8.1
Euro Area	-0.4	-1.1
Germany	-0.5	-0.1
France	-0.1	0.1
Italy	-0.6	-2.8
United Kingdom	-0.2	1.6
	IQ2013/IVQ2012	IQ2013/IQ2012
United States	QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.6	1.6
Japan	QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 4.9	0.5
China	1.9 AE 7.8	7.9
Euro Area	-0.4	-1.2
Germany	-0.3	-1.5
France	0.0	0.0
Italy	-1.0	-2.9
UK	0.6	1.6
	IIQ2013/IQ2013	IIQ2013/IIQ2012
United States	QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.5	1.3
Japan	QOQ: 0.9 SAAR: 3.5	1.8
China	1.7 AE 7.0	7.6
Euro Area	0.5	-0.4
Germany	0.9	0.9
France	0.7	0.7
Italy	0.0	-2.0
UK	0.5	2.2
	IIIQ2013/IIQ2013	III/Q2013/ IIIQ2012
USA	QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2	1.9
Japan	QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2	2.9
China	2.1 AE 8.7	7.9
Euro Area	0.4	0.1
Germany	0.6	1.2
France	0.0	0.6
Italy	0.3	-1.2
UK	0.9	1.9
	IVQ2013/IIIQ2013	IVQ2013/IVQ2012
USA	QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.2	2.6
Japan	QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: -0.2	2.7
China	1.6 AE 6.6	7.7
Euro Area	0.2	0.8
Germany	0.4	1.4
France	0.4	1.1
Italy	-0.1	-0.8
UK	0.5	2.6
	IQ2014/IVQ2013	IQ2014/IQ2013
USA	QOQ -0.3 SAAR -1.0	1.5
Japan	QOQ: 1.0 SAAR: 3.9	3.0
China	1.7 AE 7.0	7.4
Euro Area	0.5	1.6
Germany	1.0	3.2
France	0.1	1.2
Italy	0.0	0.3
UK	0.8	2.8
	IIQ2014/IQ2014	IIQ2014/IIQ2013
USA	QOQ 1.3 SAAR 5.1	2.6
Japan	QOQ: -1.8 SAAR: -7.1	-0.1
China	1.8 AE 7.4	7.5
Euro Area	0.2	1.3
Germany	-0.1	1.5
France	0.3	0.7
Italy	-0.1	0.2
UK	0.8	3.1
	IIIQ2014/IIQ2014	IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013
USA	QOQ: 1.2 SAAR: 4.9	3.0
Japan	QOQ: 0.0 SAAR: 0.0	-1.0
China	1.8 AE 7.4	7.1
Euro Area	0.4	1.3
Germany	0.3	1.7
France	0.4	1.2
Italy	0.2	0.1
UK	0.7	2.9
	IVQ2014/IIIQ2014	IVQ2014/IVQ2013
USA	QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 1.9	2.7
Japan	QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.4	-0.4
China	1.7 AE 7.0	7.2
Euro Area	0.5	1.6
Germany	1.0	2.4
France	0.1	0.9
Italy	0.0	0.2
UK	0.7	3.1
	IQ2015/IVQ2014	IQ2015/IQ2014
USA	QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.3	3.8
Japan	QOQ: 1.5 SAAR: 6.1	0.2
China	1.7 AE 7.0	7.0
Euro Area	0.7	1.8
Germany	-0.1	1.3
France	0.4	1.2
Italy	0.2	0.4
UK	0.4	2.7
	IIQ2015/IQ2015	IIQ2015/IIQ2014
USA	QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.3	3.4
Japan	QOQ: -0.1 SAAR: -0.3	2.1
China	1.8 AE 7.4	7.0
Euro Area	0.4	2.0
Germany	0.6	1.8
France	0.0	1.0
Italy	0.4	0.9
UK	0.6	2.4
	IIIQ2015/IIQ2015	IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014
USA	QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 1.0	2.4
Japan	QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.5	2.1
China	1.7 AE 7.0	6.9
Euro Area	0.4	2.0
Germany	0.3	1.8
France	0.4	0.9
Italy	0.2	0.9
UK	0.4	2.1
	IVQ2015/IIIQ2015	IVQ2015/IVQ2014
USA	QOQ: 0.1 SAAR: 0.4	2.0
Japan	QOQ: -0.3 SAAR: -1.3	1.1
China	1.5 AE 6.1	6.8
Euro Area	0.5	1.9
Germany	0.6	2.1
France	0.2	1.0
Italy	0.3	1.2
UK	0.7	2.2
	IQ2016/IVQ2015	IQ2016/IQ2015
USA	QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.5	1.6
Japan	QOQ: 0.8 SAAR: 3.4	0.5
China	1.4 AE 5.7	6.7
Euro Area	0.7	1.9
Germany	0.9	2.0
France	0.7	1.3
Italy	0.2	1.2
UK	0.3	2.1
	IIQ2016/IQ2016	IIQ2016/IIQ2015
USA	QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.3	1.3
Japan	QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 0.9	0.8
China	1.9 AE 7.8	6.7
Euro Area	0.3	1.8
Germany	0.4	3.7
France	-0.2	1.1
Italy	0.1	0.8
UK	0.2	1.7
	IIIQ2016/IIQ2016	IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015
United States	QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 1.9	1.5
Japan	QOQ: 0.3 SAAR: 1.0	1.0
China	1.7 AE 7.0	6.7
Euro Area	0.3	1.7
Germany	0.2	1.9
France	0.2	0.9
Italy	0.2	0.8
UK	0.5	1.7
	IVQ2016/IIIQ2016	IVQ2016/IVQ2015
United States	QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.8	1.9
Japan	QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 0.8	1.6
China	1.6 AE 6.6	6.8
Euro Area	0.8	2.0
Germany	0.4	1.4
France	0.6	1.2
Italy	0.5	1.0
UK	0.7	1.7
	IQ2017/IVQ2016	IQ2017/IQ2016
United States	QOQ: 0.4 SAAR: 1.8	1.9
Japan	QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 2.7	1.5
China	1.5 AE 6.1	6.9
Euro Area	0.7	2.0
Germany	1.1	3.4
France	0.8	1.4
Italy	0.5	1.3
UK	0.4	1.8
	IIQ2017/IQ2017	IIQ2017/IIQ2016
USA	QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 3.0	2.1
Japan	QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.0	1.6
China	1.9 AE 7.8	6.9
Euro Area	0.7	2.5
Germany	0.5	0.9 CA 2.2
France	0.6	2.3
Italy	0.4	1.6
UK	0.3	1.9
	IIIQ2017/IIQ2017	IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016
USA	QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 2.8	2.3
Japan	QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.3	2.0
China	1.8 AE 7.4	6.8
Euro Area	0.7	2.8
Germany	0.6	2.2 CA 2.6
France	0.7	2.7
Italy	0.4	1.7
UK	0.4	1.8
	IVQ2017/IIIQ2017	IVQ2017/IVQ2016
USA	QOQ: 0.6 SAAR: 2.3	2.5
Japan	QOQ: 0.2 SAAR: 0.9	2.0
China	1.6 AE 6.6	6.8
Euro Area	0.7	2.7
Germany	0.5	2.2 CA 2.8
France	0.7	2.8
Italy	0.3	1.6
UK	0.4	1.4
	IQ2018/IVQ2017	IQ2018/IQ2017
USA	QOQ: 0.5 SAAR: 2.2	2.6
Japan	QOQ: -0.2 SAAR: -0.9	1.0
China	1.4 AE 5.7	6.8
Euro Area	0.4	2.4
Germany	0.4	1.4 CA 2.1
France	0.2	2.2
Italy	0.3	1.4
UK	0.1	1.1
	IIQ2018/IQ2018	IIQ2018/IIQ2017
USA	QOQ: 1.0 SAAR: 4.2	2.9
Japan	QOQ: 0.7 SAAR: 3.0	1.3
China	1.8 AE 7.4	6.7
Euro Area	0.4	2.1
Germany	0.5	2.3 CA 2.0
France	0.2	1.7
Italy	0.2	1.2
UK	0.4	1.2

QOQ: Quarter relative to prior quarter; SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate

Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table V-4 provides two types of data: growth of exports and imports in the latest available months and in the past 12 months; and contributions of net trade (exports less imports) to growth of real GDP.

Japan. Japan provides the most worrisome data (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/valuation-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/global-financial-risk-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations_8763.html http://cmpass ocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and_4699.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real_25.html and for GDP http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html). In Sep 2018, Japan’s exports decreased 1.2 percent in 12 months while imports increased 7.0 percent. The second part of Table V-4 shows that net trade deducted 2.0 percentage points from Japan’s growth of GDP in IIQ2012, deducted 1.9 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2012 and deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2012. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2012, 1.4 percentage points in IQ2013 and subtracted 0.2 percentage points in IIQ2013. In IIIQ2013, net trade deducted 1.3 percentage points from GDP growth in Japan. Net trade deducted 2.2 percentage points from GDP growth in Japan in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.8 percentage points from GDP growth of Japan in IQ2014. Net trade added 3.9 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.0 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2014 and added 1.4 percentage points in IVQ2014. Net trade contributed 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2015 and deducted 0.7 percentage points in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IVQ2015. Net trade added 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2016 and added 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2016. Net trade added 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016 and added 1.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points in IQ2017 and deducted 1.1 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade added 2.3 percentage points in IIIQ2017 and deducted 0.6 percentage points in IVQ2017. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points in IQ2018 and deducted 0.5 percentage points in IIQ2018.

China. In Sep 2018, China exports increased 14.5 percent relative to a year earlier and imports increased 14.3 percent.
Germany. Germany’s exports decreased 0.1 percent in the month of Aug 2018 and increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018. Germany’s imports decreased 2.7 percent in the month of Aug 2018 and increased 6.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to growth of GDP in IQ2012, contributed 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2012, contributed 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2012, deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2012, deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2013 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded deducted 0.0 percentage points from Germany’s GDP growth in IIIQ2013 and added 0.9 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2014 and added 0.7 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.5 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.8 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.3 percentage points in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.8 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.5 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade added 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2018 and deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018.
United Kingdom. Net trade contributed 0.7 percentage points in IIQ2013. In IIIQ2013, net trade deducted 1.7 percentage points from UK growth. Net trade contributed 0.1 percentage points to UK value added in IVQ2013. Net trade contributed 0.8 percentage points to UK value added in IQ2014 and 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2014 and added 0.0 percentage points in IVQ2014. Net traded deducted 0.4 percentage points from growth in IQ2015. Net trade added 1.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.1-percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.8 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade added 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.0 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2017 and contributed 0.1 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.5 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade contributed 0.3 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018.
France. France’s exports decreased 0.1 percent in Aug 2018 while imports increased 4.9 percent. France’s exports increased 3.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018 and imports increased 5.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Net traded added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IIIQ2012 and 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade deducted 0.1 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IQ2013 and added 0.3 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 1.7 percentage points in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points to France’s GDP in IVQ2013 and deducted 0.1 percentage points in IQ2014. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from France’s GDP growth in IIQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 0.2 percentage points to France’s GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IQ2015. Net trade added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015 and deducted 0.6 percentage points in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015 and deducted 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.3 percentage points to GDP in IIQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IIIQ2016 and added 0.1 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP in IQ2017 and added 0.9 percentage points in IIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade added 0.6 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade added 0.1 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2018.
United States. US exports decreased 0.8 percent in Aug 2018 and goods exports increased 9.4 percent in Jan-Aug 2018 relative to a year earlier. Imports increased 0.6 percent in Aug 2018 and goods imports increased 9.5 percent in Jan-Aug 2018 relative to a year earlier. Net trade added 0.27 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2012 and deducted 0.08 percentage points in IIIQ2012, adding 0.57 percentage points in IVQ2012. Net trade added 0.40 percentage points to US GDP growth in IQ2013 and deducted 0.33 percentage points in IIQ2013. Net traded subtracted 0.14 percentage points from US GDP growth in IIIQ2013. Net trade added 1.23 percentage points to US GDP growth in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 1.08 percentage points from US GDP growth in IQ2014 and deducted 0.51 percentage points in IIQ2014. Net trade added 0.12 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2014. Net trade deducted 1.08 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2014 and deducted 1.58 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.01 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 1.05 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.21 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.36 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016. Net trade added 0.29 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade added 0.03 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016. Net trade deducted 1.32 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.10 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2017. Net trade added 0.08 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2017. Net trade added 0.01 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.89 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2017. Net trade deducted 0.02 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018. Net trade added 1.22 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2018.

Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted increased 278,000 from Sep 2017 to
Sep 2018 or at the average monthly rate of 23,167. Industrial production increased 0.3 percent in Sep 2018 and increased 0.4 percent in Aug 2018 after increasing 0.3 percent in Jul 2018, with all data seasonally adjusted. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 23, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization.[1] On net, the revisions to total IP for recent years were negative: For the 2015–17 period, the current estimates show rates of change that are 0.4 to 0.7 percentage point lower in each year.[2] Total IP is still reported to have moved up about 22 1/2 percent from the end of the recession in mid-2009 through late 2014. Subsequently, the index declined in 2015, edged down in 2016, and increased in 2017. The incorporation of detailed data for manufacturing from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2016 Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) accounts for the majority of the differences between the current and the previously published estimates.

Revisions to capacity for total industry were mixed. Capacity growth was revised up about 1/2 percentage point for 2016, but revisions to other recent years were negative. Capacity for total industry is estimated to have expanded less than 1 percent in 2015, 2016, and 2017, but it is expected to increase about 2 percent in 2018.

In the fourth quarter of 2017, capacity utilization for total industry stood at 77.0 percent, about 1/2 percentage point below its previous estimate and about 3 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2017) average. The utilization rate for 2016 is also lower than the previous estimate.”

Manufacturing decreased 22.3 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 16.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2017. Manufacturing grew 21.7 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Sep 2018. Manufacturing in Sep 2018 is lower by 5.5 percent relative to the peak in Jun 2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2018 would have accumulated to 36.4 percent. GDP in IIQ2018 would be $21,499.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2987.8 billion than actual $18,511.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.1 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IIQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,511.6 billion in IIQ2018 or 17.4 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Sep 1919 to Sep 2018. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 150.3999 in Sep 2018. The actual index NSA in Sep 2018 is 106.1908, which is 29.4 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Sep 2018. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.4390 in Sep 2018. The output of manufacturing at 106.1908 in Sep 2018 is 21.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table V-4, Growth of Trade and Contributions of Net Trade to GDP Growth, ∆% and % Points

	Exports M ∆%	Exports 12 M ∆%	Imports M ∆%	Imports 12 M ∆%
USA	-0.8 Aug	9.4 Jan-Aug	0.6 Aug	9.5 Jan-Aug
Japan		Sep -1.2 Aug 6.6 Jul 3.9 Jun 2018 6.7 May 2018 8.1 Apr 2018 7.8 Mar 2018 2.1 Feb 2018 1.8 Jan 2018 12.2 Dec 2017 9.3 Nov 2017 16.2 Oct 2017 14.0 Sep 2017 14.1 Aug 2017 18.1 Jul 2017 13.4 Jun 2017 9.7 May 2017 14.9 Apr 2017 7.5 Mar 2017 12.0 Feb 2017 11.3 Jan 2017 1.3 Dec 2016 5.4 Nov 2016 -0.4 Oct 2016 -10.3 Sep 2016 -6.9 Aug 2016 9.6 Jul 2016 -14.0 Jun 2016 -7.8 May 2016 -11.3 Apr 2016 -10.1 Mar 2016 -6.8 Feb 2016 -4.0 Jan 2016 -12.9 Dec 2015 -8.0 Nov 2015 -3.3 Oct 2015 -2.1 Sep 2015 0.6 Aug 3.1 Jul 2015 7.6 Jun 2015 9.5 May 2015 2.4 Apr 8.0 Mar 8.5 Feb 2.4 Jan 17.0 Dec 12.9 Nov 4.9 Oct 9.6 Sep 6.9 Aug -1.3 Jul 3.9 Jun -2.0 May 2014 -2.7 Apr 2014 5.1 Mar 2014 1.8 Feb 2014 9.5 Jan 2014 9.5 Dec 2013 15.3 Nov 2013 18.4 Oct 2013 18.6 Sep 2013 11.5 Aug 2013 14.7 Jul 2013 12.2 Jun 2013 7.4 May 2013 10.1 Apr 2013 3.8 Mar 2013 1.1 Feb 2013 -2.9 Jan 2013 6.4 Dec -5.8 Nov -4.1 Oct -6.5 Sep -10.3 Aug -5.8 Jul -8.1		Sep 7.0 Aug 15.4 Jul 14.6 Jun 2018 2.5 May 2018 14.0 Apr 5.9 Mar 2018 -0.6 Feb 2018 16.6 Jan 2018 7.9 Dec 2017 14.9 Nov 2017 17.2 Oct 2017 18.9 Sep 2017 12.0 Aug 2017 15.2 Jul 2017 16.3 Jun 2017 15.5 May 2017 17.8 Apr 2017 15.1 Mar 2017 15.8 Feb 2017 1.2 Jan 2017 8.5 Dec 2016 -2.6 Nov 2016 -8.8 Oct 2016 -16.5 Sep 2016 -16.3 Aug 2016 -17.3 Jul 2016 -24.7 Jun 2016 -18.8 May 2016 -13.8 Apr 2016 -23.3 Mar 2016 -14.9 Feb 2016 -14.2 Jan 2016 -18.0 Dec 2015 -18.0 Nov 2015 -10.2 Oct 2015 -13.4 Sep 2015 -11.1 Aug -3.1 Jul 2015 -3.2 Jun 2015 -2.9 May 2015 -8.7 Apr -4.2 Mar -14.5 Feb -3.6 Jan -9.0 Dec 1.9 Nov -1.7 Oct 2.7 Sep 6.2 Aug -1.5 Jul 2.3 Jun 8.4 May 2014 -3.6 Apr 2013 3.4 Mar 2014 18.1 Feb 2014 9.0 Jan 2014 25.0 Dec 2013 24.7 Nov 2013 21.1 Oct 2013 26.1 Sep 2013 16.5 Aug 2013 16.0 Jul 2013 19.6 Jun 2013 11.8 May 2013 10.0 Apr 2013 9.4 Mar 2013 5.5 Feb 2013 7.3 Jan 2013 7.3 Dec 1.9 Nov 0.8 Oct -1.6 Sep 4.1 Aug -5.4 Jul 2.1
China	Jan-Dec 2017 7.9 Jan-Dec 2016 -7.7 Jan-Dec 2015 -2.8	2018 Sep 14.5 Aug 9.8 Jul 12.2 Jun 11.3 May 12.6 Apr 12.9 Mar -2.7 Feb 44.5 Jan 11.1 2017 Dec 10.9 Nov 12.3 Oct 6.9 Sep 8.1 Aug 5.5 Jul 7.2 Jun 11.3 May 8.7 Apr 8.0 Mar 16.4 Feb -1.3 Jan 7.9 2016 Dec 3.1 Nov 0.1 Oct -7.3 Sep -10.0 Aug -2.8 Jul -4.4 Jun -4.8 May -4.1 Apr -1.8 Mar 11.5 Feb -25.4 Jan -11.2 2015 -1.4 Dec -6.8 Nov -6.9 Oct -3.7 Sep -5.5 Aug -8.3 Jul 2.8 Jun -2.5 May -6.4 Apr -15.0 Mar 48.3 Feb -3.3 Jan 2014 9.7 Dec 4.7 Nov 11.6 Oct 15.3 Sep 9.4 Aug 14.5 Jul 7.2 Jun 7.0 May 0.9 Apr -6.6 Mar -18.1 Feb 10.6 Jan 2013 4.3 Dec 12.7 Nov 5.6 Oct -0.3 Sep 7.2 Aug 5.1 Jul -3.1 Jun 1.0 May 14.7 Apr 10.0 Mar 21.8 Feb 25.0 Jan	Jan-Dec 2017 15.9 Jan-Dec 2016 -5.5 Jan-Dec 2015 -14.1	2018 Sep 14.3 Aug 20.0 Jul 27.3 Jun 14.1 May 26.0 Apr 21.5 Mar 14.4 Feb 6.3 Jan 36.9 2017 Dec 4.5 Nov 17.7 Oct 17.2 Sep 18.7 Aug 13.3 Jul 11.0 Jun 17.2 May 14.8 Apr 11.9 Mar 20.3 Feb 38.1 Jan 16.7 2016 Dec -7.7 Nov 6.7 Oct -1.4 Sep -1.9 Aug 1.5 Jul -12.5 Jun -2.8 May -0.4 Apr -10.6 Mar -7.6 Feb -13.8 Jan -18.8 2015 -7.6 Dec -8.7 Nov -18.8 Oct -20.4 Sep -13.8 Aug -8.1 Jul -6.1 Jun -17.6 May -12.7 Mar -20.5 Feb -19.9 Jan 2014 -2.4 Dec -6.7 Nov 4.6 Oct 7.0 Sep -2.4 Aug -1.6 Jul 5.5 Jun -1.6 May -0.8 Apr -11.3 Mar 10.1 Feb 10.0 Jan 2013 8.3 Dec 5.3 Nov 7.6 Oct 7.4 Sep 7.0 Aug 10.9 Jul -0.7 Jun -0.3 May 16.8 Apr 14.1 Mar -15.2 Feb 28.8 Jan
Euro Area	9.2 12-Aug 18	4.2 Jan-Aug 18	10.3 12-Aug 18	5.3 Jan-Aug 18
Germany	-0.1 Aug CSA	2.2 Aug	-2.7 Aug CSA	6.2 Aug
France Aug	-0.1	3.3	4.9	5.8
Italy Aug	2.9	5.1	0.4	6.4
UK	1.4 Aug	5.6	3.1 Aug	2.9
Net Trade % Points GDP Growth	Points
USA	IIQ2018 1.22 IQ2018 -0.02 IVQ2017 -0.89 IIIQ2017 0.01 IIQ2017 0.08 IQ2017 -0.10 IVQ2016 -1.32 IIIQ2016 0.03 IIQ2016 0.29 IQ2016 -0.36 IVQ2015 -0.21 IIIQ2015 -1.05 IIQ2015 -0.01 IQ2015 -1.58 IVQ2014 -1.08 IIIQ2014 0.12 IIQ2014 -0.51 IQ2014 -1.08 IVQ2013 1.23 IIIQ2013 -0.14 IIQ2013 -0.33 IQ2013 0.40 IVQ2012 +0.57 IIIQ2012 -0.08 IIQ2012 0.27 IQ2012 0.00
Japan	0.7 IQ2012 -2.0 IIQ2012 -1.9 IIIQ2012 -0.4 IVQ2012 1.4 IQ2013 -0.2 IIQ2013 -1.3 IIIQ2013 -2.2 IVQ2013 -0.8 IQ2014 3.9 IIQ2014 0.0 IIIQ2014 1.4 IVQ2014 0.1 IQ2015 -0.7 IIQ2015 -0.2 IIIQ2015 -0.2 IVQ2015 1.4 IQ2016 0.3 IIQ2016 1.7 IIIQ2016 1.2 IVQ2016 0.4 IQ2017 -1.1 IIQ2017 2.3 IIIQ2017 -0.6 IVQ2017 0.3 IQ2018 -0.5 IIQ2018
Germany	IQ2012 0.8 IIQ2012 0.3 IIIQ2012 0.4 IVQ2012 -0.5 IQ2013 -0.3 IIQ2013 -0.3 IIIQ2013 0.0 IVQ2013 0.9 IQ2014 -0.2 IIQ2014 -0.2 IIIQ2014 0.7 IVQ2014 0.1 IQ2015 -0.5 IIQ2015 0.8 IIIQ2015 -0.4 IVQ2015 -0.7 IQ2016 -0.3 IIQ2016 0.8 IIIQ2016 -0.4 IVQ2016 -0.5 IQ2017 0.7 IIQ2017 -0.2 IIIQ2017 0.3 IVQ2017 0.3 IQ2018 -0.1 IIQ2018 -0.4
France	0.1 IIIQ2012 0.1 IVQ2012 -0.1 IQ2013 0.3 IIQ2013 -1.7 IIIQ2013 0.1 IVQ2013 -0.1 IQ2014 -0.2 IIQ2014 -0.2 IIIQ2014 0.2 IVQ2014 -0.2 IQ2015 0.4 IIQ2015 -0.6 IIIQ2015 -0.7 IVQ2015 -0.1 IQ2016 0.3 IIQ2016 -0.6 IIIQ2016 0.1 IVQ2016 -0.6 IQ2017 0.9 IIQ2017 -0.3 IIIQ2017 0.6 IVQ2017 0.1 IQ2018 -0.2 IIQ2018
UK	0.7 IIQ2013 -1.7 IIIQ2013 0.1 IVQ2013 0.8 IQ2014 0.3 IIQ2014 -0.7 IIIQ2014 0.0 IVQ2014 -0.4 IQ2015 1.1 IIQ2015 -0.4 IIIQ2015 -0.2 IVQ2015 -0.1 IQ2016 0.1 IIQ2016 -1.8 IIIQ2016 1.7 IVQ2016 0.0 IQ2017 0.1 IIQ2017
	0.5
	IIIQ2017 0.3 IVQ2017 -0.1 IQ2018 -0.6 IIQ2018

Sources: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

The geographical breakdown of exports and imports of Japan with selected regions and countries is in Table V-5 for Sep 2018. The share of Asia in Japan’s trade is close to one-half for 55.6 percent of exports and 48.1 percent of imports. Within Asia, exports to China are 18.8 percent of total exports and imports from China 24.8 percent of total imports. While exports of Japan to China decreased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018, imports from China increased 4.2 percent. The largest export market for Japan in Sep 2018 is the US with share of 19.2 percent of total exports, which is close to that of China, and share of imports from the US of 10.7 percent in total imports. Japan’s exports to the US decreased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018 and imports from the US increased 3.1 percent. Western Europe has share of 10.8 percent in Japan’s exports and of 12.2 percent in imports. Rates of growth of exports of Japan in Sep 2018 are minus 0.2 percent for exports to the US, minus 5.3 percent for exports to Brazil and minus 9.4 percent for exports to Germany. Comparisons relative to 2011 may have some bias because of the effects of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Deceleration of growth in China and the US and threat of recession in Europe can reduce world trade and economic activity. Growth rates of imports in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018 are mixed. Imports from Asia increased 2.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2018 while imports from China increased 4.2 percent. Data are in millions of yen, which may have effects of recent depreciation of the yen relative to the United States dollar (USD) and revaluation of the dollar relative to the euro.

Table V-5, Japan, Value and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, ∆% and Millions of Yen

Sep 2018	Exports Millions of Yen	12 months ∆%	Imports Millions of Yen	12 months ∆%
Total	6,726,649	-1.2	6,587,088	7.0
Asia	3,738,608 % Total 55.6	0.9	3,171,112 % Total 48.1	2.6
China	1,262,683 % Total 18.8	-1.7	1,632,894 % Total 24.8	4.2
USA	1,294,447 % Total 19.2	-0.2	704,187 % Total 10.7	3.1
Canada	69,114	-19.2	91,082	-15.4
Brazil	33,530	-5.3	56,705	-24.7
Mexico	106,309	-1.9	49,307	8.9
Western Europe	727,022 % Total 10.8	-9.4	802,792 % Total 12.2	-0.8
Germany	192,057	-0.5	225,233	-7.1
France	61,718	0.4	112,451	4.7
UK	126,647	-10.8	66,102	-1.7
Middle East	202,821	-5.3	798,575	35.4
Australia	159,685	-8.1	429,839	30.5

Source: Japan, Ministry of Finance http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm

World trade projections of the IMF are in Table V-6. There is increasing growth of the volume of world trade of goods and services from 4.9 percent in 2017 to 5.1 percent in 2018, stabilizing to 4.7 percent in 2019. Growth stabilizes at 4.3 percent on average from 2017 to 2023. World trade would be slower for advanced economies while emerging and developing economies (EMDE) experience faster growth. World economic slowdown would be more challenging with lower growth of world trade.

Table V-6, IMF, Projections of World Trade, USD Billions, USD/Barrel and Annual ∆%

	2017	2018	2019	Average ∆% 2017-2023
World Trade Volume (Goods and Services)	4.9	5.1	4.7	4.3
Exports Goods & Services	5.0	4.7	4.4	4.2
Imports Goods & Services	4.8	5.4	4.9	4.4
Exports Goods & Services
G7	4.3	4.6	3.7	3.6
EMDE	6.4	5.1	5.3	5.1
Imports Goods & Services
G7	4.1	5.4	4.6	3.6
EMDE	6.4	6.0	5.6	5.6
Terms of Trade Goods & Services
G7	-0.4	0.8	0.4	0.1
EMDE	0.6	1.1	-0.5	0.2
World Crude Oil Price $/Barrel	52.81	62.31	58.24	55.73

Crude Oil: Simple Average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate and the Dubai Fateh

Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook databank

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx

The JP Morgan Global Composite Output Index of the JP Morgan Manufacturing and Services PMI^™, produced by JP Morgan and HIS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, with high association with world GDP, decreased to 52.8 in Sep from 53.4 in Aug, indicating expansion at slower rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c8324938964d4072a1ac1240fae76e27). This index has remained above the contraction territory of 50.0 during 72 consecutive months. The employment index decreased from 52.4 in Aug to 53.0 Sep with input prices rising at faster rate, new orders increasing at the same rate and output increasing at slower rate (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c8324938964d4072a1ac1240fae76e27). David Hensley, Director of Global Economic Coordination at JP Morgan, finds consistent growth at slow pace (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c8324938964d4072a1ac1240fae76e27). The JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI^™, produced by JP Morgan and IHS Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, decreased to 52.2 in Sep from 52.6 in Aug (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/61641e1b9699423d9a0303aff0e71822). New export orders decreased. David Hensley, Director of Global Economic Coordination at JP Morgan, finds consistent growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/61641e1b9699423d9a0303aff0e71822). The Markit Brazil Composite Output Index decreased from 47.8 in Aug to 47.3 in Sep, indicating contraction in activity of Brazil’s private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/41c222e0e2d646079617ecd0f4a5ff45). The Markit Brazil Services Business Activity index, compiled by Markit, decreased from 46.8 in Aug to 46.4 in Sep indicating contracting services activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/41c222e0e2d646079617ecd0f4a5ff45). Phil Smith, Principal Economist at Markit, finds weakening services (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/41c222e0e2d646079617ecd0f4a5ff45). The HIS Markit Brazil Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index^TM (PMI^™) decreased from 51.1 in Aug to 50.9 in Sep, indicating manufacturing above neutral 50.0 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b86fd8e5d7924a42bf92267db044e372). Paul Smith, Economics Director at Markit, finds growing manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b86fd8e5d7924a42bf92267db044e372).

VA United States. The HIS Markit Flash US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index^™ (PMI^™) seasonally adjusted increased to 55.6 in Sep from 54.7 in Aug (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/97fb3daa507944cba1740664bfc20257). New export orders increased. The HIS Markit Flash US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index decreased from 54.8 in Aug to 52.9 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/97fb3daa507944cba1740664bfc20257). The IHS Markit Flash US Composite PMI™ Output Index decreased from 54.7 in Aug to 53.4 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/97fb3daa507944cba1740664bfc20257). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the surveys are consistent with GDP growth at annualized about 3.0 percent. (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/97fb3daa507944cba1740664bfc20257). The HIS Markit US Composite PMI™ Output Index of Manufacturing and Services decreased to 53.9 in Sep from 54.7 in Aug (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b704f3ee7adb46c68a4324bd1bfaaff1). The HIS Markit US Services PMI™ Business Activity Index decreased from 54.8 in Aug to 53.5 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b704f3ee7adb46c68a4324bd1bfaaff1). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds the indexes suggesting growth close to 3.0 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b704f3ee7adb46c68a4324bd1bfaaff1). The HIS Markit US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index^™ (PMI^™) increased to 55.6 in Sep from 54.7 in Aug (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6fe76902b2b74200a6708cea6c40b4ce). New foreign orders increased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at HIS Markit, finds growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6fe76902b2b74200a6708cea6c40b4ce). The purchasing managers’ index (PMI) of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Report on Business^® decreased 1.5-percentage points from 61.3 in Aug to 59.8 in Sep, which indicates slower growth (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/MfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=31076). The index of new export orders increased 0.8 percentage points from 55.2 in Aug to 56.0 in Sep. The Non-Manufacturing ISM Report on Business^® PMI increased 3.1 percentage points from 58.5 in Aug to 61.6 in Sep, indicating growth of business activity/production during 110 consecutive months, while the index of new orders increased 1.2 percentage points from 60.4 in Aug to 61.6 in Sep (https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/NonMfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=30177). Table USA provides the country economic indicators for the US.

Table USA, US Economic Indicators

Consumer Price Index	Sep 12 months NSA ∆%: 2.3; Ex food and energy ∆%: 2.2 Sep month SA ∆%: 0.1; Ex food and energy ∆%: 0.1 Blog 10/14/18 WIW 10/21/18
Producer Price Index	Finished Goods Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: 3.0; ex food and energy ∆% 2.7 Sep month SA ∆% -0.1; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.3 Final Demand Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: 2.6; ex food and energy ∆% 2.5 Sep month SA ∆% 0.2; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.2 Blog 10/14/18 WIW 10/21/18
PCE Inflation	Aug 12-month NSA ∆%: headline 2.2 ex food and energy ∆% 2.0 Blog 10/7/18
Employment Situation	Household Survey: Sep Unemployment Rate SA 3.7% Blog calculation People in Job Stress Sep: 20.7 million NSA, 12.1% of Labor Force Establishment Survey: Sep Nonfarm Jobs 134,000; Private 121,000 jobs created Aug 12-month Average Hourly Earnings Inflation Adjusted ∆%: 0.2 Blog 10/7/18
Nonfarm Hiring	Nonfarm Hiring fell from 63.5 million in 2006 to 58.6 million in 2014 or by 4.9 million and to 63.1 million in 2016 or by 0.375 million. Nonfarm hiring increased to 65.1 million in 2017 or 2.0 million relative to 2016. Private-Sector Hiring Aug 2018 5.805 million higher by 12.9 percent than 5.142 million in Aug 2006 while population grew 28.899 million or 12.6 percent Blog 10/21/18
GDP Growth	BEA Revised National Income Accounts IQ2012/IQ2011 ∆%: 2.7 IIQ2012/IIQ2011 2.4 IIIQ2012/IIIQ2011 2.5 IVQ2012/IVQ2011 1.5 IQ2013/IQ2012 1.6 IIQ2013/IIQ2012 1.3 IIIQ2013/IIIQ2012 1.9 IVQ2013/IVQ2012 2.6 IQ2014/IQ2013 1.5 IIQ2014/IIQ2013 2.6 IIIQ2014/IIIQ2013 3.0 IVQ2014/IVQ2013 2.7 IQ2015/IQ2014 3.8 IIQ2015/IIQ2014 3.4 IIIQ2015/IIIQ2014 2.4 IVQ2015/IVQ2014 2.0 IQ2016/IQ2015 1.6 IIQ2016/IIQ2015 1.3 IIIQ2016/IIIQ2015 1.5 IVQ2016/IVQ2015 1.9 IQ2017/IQ2016 1.9 IIQ2017/IIQ2016 2.1 IIIQ2017/IIIQ2016 2.3 IVQ2017/IVQ2016 2.5 IQ2018/IQ2017 2.6 IIQ2018/IIQ2017 2.9 IQ2012 SAAR 3.2 IIQ2012 SAAR 1.7 IIIQ2012 SAAR 0.5 IVQ2012 SAAR 0.5 IQ2013 SAAR 3.6 IIQ2013 SAAR 0.5 IIIQ2013 SAAR 3.2 IVQ2013 SAAR 3.2 IQ2014 SAAR -1.0 IIQ2014 SAAR 5.1 IIIQ2014 SAAR 4.9 IVQ2014 SAAR 1.9 IQ2015 SAAR 3.3 IIQ2015 SAAR: 3.3 IIIQ2015 SAAR: 1.0 IVQ2015 SAAR: 0.4 IQ2016 SAAR: 1.5 IIQ2016 SAAR: 2.3 IIIQ2016 SAAR: 1.9 IVQ2016 SAAR 1.8 IQ2017 SAAR 1.8 IIQ2017 SAAR 3.0 IIIQ2017 SAAR 2.8 IVQ2017 SAAR 2.3 IQ2018 SAAR 2.2 IIQ2018 SAAR 4.2 Blog 9/30/18
Real Private Fixed Investment	SAAR IIQ2018 ∆% 6.4 IIQ2018 to IVQ2017: 26.3% Blog 9/30/18
Corporate Profits	IIQ2018 SAAR: Corporate Profits 3.0; Undistributed Profits 4.3 Blog 9/30/18
Personal Income and Consumption	Aug month ∆% SA Real Disposable Personal Income (RDPI) SA ∆% 0.2 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (RPCE): 0.2 12-month Aug NSA ∆%: RDPI: 2.9; RPCE ∆%: 3.0 Blog 10/7/18
Quarterly Services Report	IIQ18/IIQ17 NSA ∆%: Information 8.4 Financial & Insurance 6.5 Earlier Data: Blog 3/22/15
Employment Cost Index	Compensation Private IIQ2018 SA ∆%: 0.6 Jun 12 months ∆%: 2.9 Earlier Data: Blog 2/1/15
Industrial Production	Sep month SA ∆%: 0.3 Sep 12 months SA ∆%: 5.1 Manufacturing Sep SA 0.2 ∆% Sep 12 months SA ∆% 3.6, NSA 3.2 Capacity Utilization: 78.1 Blog 10/21/18
Productivity and Costs	Nonfarm Business Productivity IIQ2018∆% SAAE 2.9; IIQ2018/IIQ2017 ∆% 1.3; Unit Labor Costs SAAE IIQ2018 ∆% -1.0; IIQ2018/IIQ2017 ∆%: 1.9 Blog 9/16/18
New York Fed Manufacturing Index	General Business Conditions from Sep 19.0 to Oct 21.1 New Orders: From Sep 16.5 to Oct 22.5 Blog 10/21/18
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Index	General Index from Sep 22.9 to Oct 22.2 New Orders from Sep 21.4 to Oct 19.3 Blog 10/21/18
Manufacturing Shipments and Orders	Aug Orders SA ∆% 2.3 Ex Transport 0.1 Jan-Aug 18/Jan-Aug 17 NSA New Orders ∆% 8.6 Ex transport 8.0 Earlier data: Blog 4/5/15
Durable Goods	Aug New Orders SA ∆%: 4.5; ex transport ∆%: 0.1 Jan-Aug 18/Jan-Aug 17 New Orders NSA ∆%: 9.2 ex transport ∆% 8.2 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15
Sales of New Motor Vehicles	IIQ2018 4,500,220; IIQ2017 4,419,349. Sep 18 SAAR 17.9 million, Aug 18 SAAR 17.1 million, Sep 2017 SAAR 18.5 million Blog 9/9/18 10/7/2018
Sales of Merchant Wholesalers	Jan-Jul 2018/Jan-Jul 2017 NSA ∆%: Total 8.9; Durable Goods: 9.2; Nondurable Goods: 8.5 EARLIER DATA: Blog 4/12/15
Sales and Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers	Aug 18 12-M NSA ∆%: Sales Total Business 7.7; Manufacturers 7.9 Retailers 6.2; Merchant Wholesalers 8.8 Blog 10/21/18
Sales for Retail and Food Services	Jan-Sep 2018/Jan-Sep 2017 ∆%: Retail and Food Services 5.4; Retail ∆% 5.3 Blog 10/21/18
Value of Construction Put in Place	SAAR month SA Aug ∆%: 0.1 Jan-Aug 18/Jan-Aug 17 NSA: 5.3 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15
Case-Shiller Home Prices	Jul 2018/May 2017 ∆% NSA: 10 Cities 5.5; 20 Cities: 5.9; National: 6.0 ∆% Jul SA: 10 Cities 0.0; 20 Cities: 0.1 Blog 9/30/18
FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only	Jul SA ∆% 0.2; 12-month NSA ∆%: 6.4 Blog 9/30/18
New House Sales	Aug 2018 month SAAR ∆%: 3.5 Jan-Aug 2018/Jan-Aug 2017 NSA ∆%: 7.5 Blog 9/30/18
Housing Starts and Permits	Sep Starts month SA ∆% -5.3; Permits ∆%: 1.2 Jan-Sep 2018/Jan-Sep 2017 NSA ∆% Starts 6.4; Permits ∆% 4.1 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15
Rate of Homeownership	IIQ2018 64.3 IQ2018: 64.2 Blog 8/12/18
Trade Balance	Balance Aug SA -$52,237 million versus Jul -$50,037 million Exports Aug SA ∆%: -0.8 Imports Aug SA ∆%: 0.6 Goods Exports Jan-Aug 2018/Jan-Aug 2017 NSA ∆%: 9.4 Goods Imports Jan-Aug 2018/Jan-Aug 2017 NSA ∆%: 9.5 Blog 10/7/18
Export and Import Prices	Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: Imports 3.5; Exports 2.7 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15
Consumer Credit	Aug ∆% annual rate: Total 6.2; Revolving 5.6; Nonrevolving 6.4 Earlier Data: Blog 5/10/15
Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities	Aug Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term US Securities: $111.5 billion Major Holders of Treasury Securities: China $1165.1 billion; Japan $1029.9 billion; Total Foreign US Treasury Holdings Jun $6287.0 billion Blog 10/21/18
Treasury Budget	Fiscal Year 2018/2017 ∆% Sep: Receipts 0.4; Outlays 3.2; Individual Income Taxes 6.1 Deficit Fiscal Year 2011 $1,300 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2012 $1,087 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2013 $680 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2014 $485 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2015 $439 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2016 $585 billion Deficit Fiscal Year 2017 $666 billion Blog 10/21/18
CBO Budget and Economic Outlook	2012 Deficit $1087 B 6.8% GDP Debt $11,281 B 70.4% GDP 2013 Deficit $680 B, 4.1% GDP Debt $11,983 B 72.6% GDP 2014 Deficit $485 B 2.8% GDP Debt $12,780 B 74.1% GDP 2015 Deficit $438 B 2.4% GDP Debt $13,117 B 72.9% GDP 2016 Deficit $585 3.2% GDP Debt $14,168.4 B 76.7% GDP 2017 Deficit $665 3.5% GDP Debt $14,665 76.5% GDP 2028 Deficit $1,526 B, 5.1 % GDP Debt $28,671 B 96.2% GDP 2048: Long-term Debt/GDP 152.0% Blog 8/26/12 11/18/12 2/10/13 9/22/13 2/16/14 8/24/14 9/14/14 3/1/15 6/21/15 1/3/16 4/10/16 7/24/16 1/8/17 4/2/17 10/14/18
Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities	Aug 2018 SAAR ∆%: Securities 0.0 Loans 1.3 Cash Assets -50.2 Deposits 0.1 Blog 9/30/18
Flow of Funds Net Worth of Families and Nonprofits	IIQ2018 ∆ since 2007 Assets +$39,727.4 BN Nonfinancial $6,865,5 BN Real estate $5,623.0 BN Financial +32,862.0 BN Net Worth +$38,522.0 BN Blog 9/30/18
Current Account Balance of Payments and Net International Investment Position	Current Account IIQ2018 NSA minus $118,684 MM % GDP 2.0 SA NIIP IQ2018: Minus $7,888 B Blog 9/23/2018 7/15/18
Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation	Blog 10/21/18
Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades	Blog 10/21/18
IMF View	World Real Economic Growth 2017 ∆% 3.7 Blog 4/29/18
Income, Poverty and Health Insurance in the United States	43.123 Million Below Poverty in 2015, 13.5% of Population Median Family Income CPI-2015 Adjusted $56,516 in 2015 back to 1999 Levels Uncovered by Health Insurance 28.966 Million in 2015 Blog 9/25/16
Monetary Policy and Cyclical Valuation of Risk Financial Assets	Blog 1/7/2018
Rules versus Discretionary Authorities in Monetary Policy	Blog 1/1/2017

Links to blog comments in Table USA : 10/14/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html

10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/30/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html

9/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/26/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

8/12/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

8/5/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html

7/29/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html

7/22/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html

7/15/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

7/1/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/24/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

4/29/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

12/24/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html

10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html

4/2/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html

1/15/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

12/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

10/16/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html

9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html

7/24/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html

4/10/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html

1/17/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html

1/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html

10/11/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html

6/21/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html

5/10/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html

9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html

8/24/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

9/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

2/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

Table VA-1 provides the value of total sales of US business (manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers) and monthly and 12-month percentage changes. Sales of manufacturers increased 0.5 percent in Aug and changed 0.0 percent in Jul, increasing 7.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018. Sales of retailers changed 0.0 percent in Aug and increased 0.5 percent in Jul, increasing 6.2 percent in 12 months. Sales of merchant wholesalers increased 0.8 percent in Aug, increasing 0.2 percent in Jul and increasing 8.8 percent in 12 months. Total business sales increased 0.5 percent in Aug and increased 0.2 percent in Jul, increasing 7.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2018.

Table VA-1, US, Percentage Changes for Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers

	Aug 18/Jul 18 ∆% SA	Jul 2018 Millions of Dollars NSA	Jul 18/Jun 18 ∆% SA	Aug 18/ Aug 17 ∆% NSA
Total Business	0.5	1,523,731	0.2	7.7
Manufacturers	0.5	528,427	0.0	7.9
Retailers	0.0	461,937	0.5	6.2
Merchant Wholesalers	0.8	533,367	0.2	8.8

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-1 of the US Census Bureau provides total US sales of manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers seasonally adjusted (SA) in millions of dollars. The series with adjustment evens fluctuations following seasonal patterns. There is sharp recovery from the global recession in a robust trend, which is mixture of price and quantity effects because data are not adjusted for price changes. There is stability in the final segment with subdued prices with data not adjusted for price changes. There is recovery in the recent segment with occasional vacillation.

Chart VA-1, US, Total Business Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, SA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Aug 2018

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-2 of the US Census Bureau provides total US sales of manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers not seasonally adjusted (NSA) in millions of dollars. The series without seasonal adjustment shows sharp jagged behavior because of monthly fluctuations following seasonal patterns. There is sharp recovery from the global recession in a robust trend, which is mixture of price and quantity effects because data are not adjusted for price changes. There is stability in the final segment with monthly marginal weakness in data without adjustment for price changes with following recovery.

Chart VA-2, US, Total Business Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, NSA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Aug 2018

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Businesses added cautiously to inventories to replenish stocks. Retailers’ inventories increased 0.7 percent in Aug 2018 and increased 0.6 percent in

Jul with growth of 2.2 percent in 12 months, as shown in Table VA-2. Total business increased inventories 0.5 percent in Aug, increasing 0.7 percent in Jul and increasing 4.1 percent in 12 months. Inventories sales/ratios of total business continued at a level close to 1.30 under careful management to avoid costs and risks, changing to 1.34 in Aug 2018. Inventory/sales ratios of manufacturers and retailers are higher than for merchant wholesalers. There is stability in inventory/sales ratios in individual months and relative to a year earlier with increase at the margin.

Table VA-2, US, Percentage Changes for Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers and Inventory/Sales Ratios

Inventory Change	Aug 18 Millions of Dollars NSA	Aug 18/Jul 18 ∆% SA	Jul 18/Jun 18 ∆% SA	Aug 18/Aug 17 ∆% NSA
Total Business	1,941,020	0.5	0.7	4.1
Manufacturers	679,325	-0.1	0.9	5.1
Retailers	630,140	0.7	0.6	2.2
Merchant Wholesalers	630,555	1.0	0.6	5.1
Inventory/ Sales Ratio	Aug 18 Millions of Dollars NSA	Aug 2018 SA	Jul 2018 SA	Aug 2017 SA
Total Business	1,930,490	1.34	1.34	1.39
Manufacturers	679,515	1.34	1.35	1.37
Retailers	621,988	1.44	1.43	1.49
Merchant Wholesalers	628,977	1.26	1.26	1.30

US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-3 of the US Census Bureau provides total business inventories of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers seasonally adjusted (SA) in millions of dollars from Jan 1992 to Aug 2018. The impact of the two recessions of 2001 and IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 is evident in the form of sharp reductions in inventories. Inventories have surpassed the peak before the global recession. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

Chart VA-3, US, Total Business Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, SA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Aug 2018

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-4 provides total business inventories of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers not seasonally adjusted (NSA) from Jan 1992 to Aug 2018 in millions of dollars. The recessions of 2001 and IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 are evident in the form of sharp reductions of inventories. There is sharp upward trend of inventory accumulation after both recessions. Total business inventories are higher than in the peak before the global recession.

Chart VA-4, US, Total Business Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, NSA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Aug 2018

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Inventories follow business cycles. When recession hits sales inventories pile up, declining with expansion of the economy. In a fascinating classic opus, Lloyd Meltzer (1941, 129) concludes:

“The dynamic sequences (i) through (6) were intended to show what types of behavior are possible for a system containing a sales output lag. The following conclusions seem to be the most important:

(i) An economy in which business men attempt to recoup inventory losses will always undergo cyclical fluctuations when equilibrium is disturbed, provided the economy is stable.

This is the pure inventory cycle.

(2) The assumption of stability imposes severe limitations upon the possible size of the marginal propensity to consume, particularly if the coefficient of expectation is positive.

(3) The inventory accelerator is a more powerful de-stabilizer than the ordinary acceleration principle. The difference in stability conditions is due to the fact that the former allows for replacement demand whereas the usual analytical formulation of the latter does not. Thus, for inventories, replacement demand acts as a de-stabilizer. Whether it does so for all types of capital goods is a moot question, but I believe cases may occur in which it does not.

(4) Investment for inventory purposes cannot alter the equilibrium of income, which depends only upon the propensity to consume and the amount of non-induced investment.

(5) The apparent instability of a system containing both an accelerator and a coefficient of expectation makes further investigation of possible stabilizers highly desirable.”

Chart VA-5 shows the increase in the inventory/sales ratios during the recession of 2007-2009. The inventory/sales ratio fell during the expansions. The inventory/sales ratio declined to a trough in 2011, climbed and then stabilized at current levels in 2012, 2013 and 2015 with increase into 2015-2016 and then decreasing at the margin from 2016 into 2017-2018.

Chart VA-5, Total Business Inventories/Sales Ratios 2008 to 2018

https://www.census.gov/mtis/img/mtisbrf.gif

Sales of retail and food services increased 0.1 percent in Sep 2018 after increasing 0.1 percent in Aug 2018 seasonally adjusted (SA), growing 5.4 percent in Jan-Sep 2018 relative to Jan-Sep 2017 not seasonally adjusted (NSA), as shown in Table VA-3. Excluding motor vehicles and parts, retail sales decreased 0.1 percent in Sep 2018, increasing 0.2 percent in Aug 2018 SA and increasing 6.0 percent NSA in Jan-Aug 2018 relative to a year earlier. Sales of motor vehicles and parts increased 0.8 percent in Sep 2018 after decreasing 0.5 percent in Aug 2018 SA and increasing 3.2 percent NSA in Jan-Sep 2018 relative to a year earlier. Gasoline station sales decreased 0.8 percent SA in Sep 2018 after increasing 1.1 percent in Aug 2018 in oscillating prices of gasoline that are moderating, increasing 14.8 percent in Jan-Sep 2018 relative to a year earlier.

Table VA-3, US, Percentage Change in Monthly Sales for Retail and Food Services, ∆%

	Sep/Aug ∆% SA	Aug/Jul ∆% SA	Jan-Sep 2018 Million Dollars NSA	Jan-Sep 2018 from Jan-Sep 2017 ∆% NSA
Retail and Food Services	0.1	0.1	4,440,041	5.4
Excluding Motor Vehicles and Parts	-0.1	0.2	3,512,852	6.0
Motor Vehicles & Parts Dealers	0.8	-0.5	927,189	3.2
Retail	0.4	0.0	3,902,605	5.3
Building Materials	0.1	0.8	294,467	3.6
Food and Beverage	0.2	-0.3	549,994	3.8
Grocery	-0.1	-0.3	491,458	3.7
Health & Personal Care Stores	-0.3	0.5	255,497	4.1
Clothing & Clothing Accessories Stores	0.5	-2.8	191,254	5.0
Gasoline Stations	-0.8	1.1	387,823	14.8
General Merchandise Stores	0.3	0.1	509,833	3.7
Food Services & Drinking Places	-1.8	0.3	537,436	6.1

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Chart VA-6 provides monthly percentage changes of sales of retail and food services. There is significant monthly volatility that prevents identification of clear trends.

Chart VA-6, US, Monthly Percentage Change of Retail and Food Services Sales, Jan 1992-Sep 2018

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Chart VA-7 of the US Census Bureau provides total sales of retail trade and food services seasonally adjusted (SA) from Jan 1992 to Sep 2018 in millions of dollars. The impact on sales of the shallow recession of 2001 was much milder than the sharp contraction in the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. There is flattening in the final segment of the series followed by another increase/decrease. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

Chart VA-7, US, Total Sales of Retail Trade and Food Services, SA, Jan 1992-Sep 2018, Millions of Dollars

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Chart VA-8 of the US Census Bureau provides total sales of retail trade and food services seasonally adjusted (NSA) from Jan 1992 to Sep 2018 in millions of dollars. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

Chart VA-8, US, Total Sales of Retail Trade and Food Services, NSA, Jan 1992-Sep 2018, Millions of Dollars

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Table VI-7C provides additional information required for understanding the deficit/debt situation of the United States. The table is divided into four parts: Treasury budget in the 2018 fiscal year beginning on Oct 1, 2017 and ending on Sep 30, 2018; federal fiscal data for the years from 2009 to 2017; federal fiscal data for the years from 2005 to 2008; and Treasury debt held by the public from 2005 to 2017. Receipts increased 0.4 percent in the cumulative fiscal year 2018 ending in Sep 2018 relative to the cumulative in fiscal year 2017. Individual income taxes increased 6.1 percent relative to the same fiscal period a year earlier. Outlays increased 3.2 percent relative to a year earlier. There are also receipts, outlays, deficit and debt for fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. In fiscal year 2017, the deficit reached $666 billion or 3.5 percent of GDP. Outlays of 3,982 billion were 20.8 percent of GDP and receipts of $3,316 were 17.3 percent of GDP. It is quite difficult for the US to raise receipts above 18 percent of GDP. Total revenues of the US from 2009 to 2012 accumulate to $9022 billion, or $9.0 trillion, while expenditures or outlays accumulate to $14,115 billion, or $14.1 trillion, with the deficit accumulating to $5094 billion, or $5.1 trillion. Revenues decreased 6.5 percent from $9653 billion in the four years from 2005 to 2008 to $9022 billion in the years from 2009 to 2012. Decreasing revenues were caused by the global recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (Jun) and by growth of only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2018. In contrast, the expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1991 was at the average annual growth rate of 3.7 percent and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html). Because of mediocre GDP growth, there are 20.7 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment/underemployment rate of 12.1 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). Weakness of growth and employment creation is analyzed in II Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html). In contrast with the decline of revenue, outlays or expenditures increased 30.2 percent from $10,839 billion, or $10.8 trillion, in the four years from 2005 to 2008, to $14,115 billion, or $14.1 trillion, in the four years from 2009 to 2012. Increase in expenditures by 30.2 percent while revenue declined by 6.5 percent caused the increase in the federal deficit from $1186 billion in 2005-2008 to $5094 billion in 2009-2012. Federal revenue was 14.9 percent of GDP on average in the years from 2009 to 2012, which is well below 17.4 percent of GDP on average from 1968 to 2017. Federal outlays were 23.3 percent of GDP on average from 2009 to 2012, which is well above 20.3 percent of GDP on average from 1968 to 2017. The lower part of Table VI-7C shows that debt held by the public swelled from $5803 billion in 2008 to $13,117 billion in 2015, by $7314 billion or 126.0 percent. Debt held by the public as percent of GDP or economic activity jumped from 39.3 percent in 2008 to 76.5 percent in 2017, which is well above the average of 40.7 percent from 1968 to 2017. The United States faces tough adjustment because growth is unlikely to recover, creating limits on what can be obtained by increasing revenues, while continuing stress of social programs restricts what can be obtained by reducing expenditures.

Table VI-7C, US, Treasury Budget in Fiscal Year to Date Million Dollars

Sep	Fiscal Year 2018	Fiscal Year 2017	∆%
Receipts	3,328,745	3,314,894	0.4
Outlays	4,107,741	3,980,720	3.2
Deficit	-778,996	-665,826
Individual Income Tax	1,683,537	1,587,119	6.1
Corporation Income Tax	204,733	297,048	-31.1
Social Insurance	854,747	850,618	0.5
	Receipts	Outlays	Deficit (-), Surplus (+)
$ Billions
Fiscal Year 2017	3,316	3,982	-666
% GDP	17.3	20.8	-3.5
Fiscal Year 2016	3,268	3,853	-585
% GDP	17.7	20.9	-3.2
Fiscal Year 2015	3,250	3,688	-439
% GDP	18.1	20.5	-2.4
Fiscal Year 2014	3,022	3,506	-485
% GDP	17.5	20.3	2.8
Fiscal Year 2013	2,775	3,455	-680
% GDP	16.8	20.9	-4.1
Fiscal Year 2012	2,450	3,537	-1,087
% GDP	15.3	22.1	-6.8
Fiscal Year 2011	2,304	3,603	-1,300
% GDP	15.0	23.4	-8.5
Fiscal Year 2010	2,163	3,457	-1,294
% GDP	14.6	23.4	-8.7
Fiscal Year 2009	2,105	3,518	-1,413
% GDP	14.6	24.4	-9.8
Total 2009-2012	9,022	14,115	-5,094
Average % GDP 2009-2012	14.9	23.3	-8.5
Fiscal Year 2008	2,524	2,983	-459
% GDP	17.1	20.2	-3.1
Fiscal Year 2007	2,568	2,729	-161
% GDP	17.9	19.1	-1.1
Fiscal Year 2006	2,407	2,655	-248
% GDP	17.6	19.4	-1.8
Fiscal Year 2005	2,154	2,472	-318
% GDP	16.7	19.2	-2.5
Total 2005-2008	9,653	10,839	-1,186
Average % GDP 2005-2008	17.3	19.5	-2.1
Debt Held by the Public	Billions of Dollars	Percent of GDP
2005	4,592	35.6
2006	4,829	35.3
2007	5,035	35.2
2008	5,803	39.3
2009	7,545	52.3
2010	9,019	60.9
2011	10,128	65.9
2012	11,281	70.4
2013	11,983	72.6
2014	12,780	74.1
2015	13,117	72.9
2016	14,168	76.7
2017	14,666	76.5

Source: http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/mthTreasStmt/mthTreasStmt_home.htm

https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0184.aspx CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2018 to 2028. Washington, DC, Apr 9 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53651

CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2017-2027. Washington, DC, Jan 24, 2017 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370 CBO, An update to the budget and economic outlook: 2016 to 2026. Washington, DC, Aug 23, 2016.

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6

CBO (2012NovMBR). CBO (2011AugBEO); Office of Management and Budget 2011. Historical Tables. Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: OMB; CBO. 2011JanBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Jan. CBO. 2012AugBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Aug 22. CBO. 2012Jan31. Historical budget data. Washington, DC, Jan 31. CBO. 2012NovCDR. Choices for deficit reduction. Washington, DC. Nov. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO (2013Aug12). 2013AugHBD. Historical budget data—August 2013. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Aug. CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb. CBO, Historical budget data—April 2014 release. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Apr. Congressional Budget Office, August 2014 baseline: an update to the budget and economic outlook: 2014 to 2024. Washington, DC, CBO, Aug 27, 2014. CBO, Monthly budget review: summary of fiscal year 2014. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Nov 10, 2014. CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2015 to 2025. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Jan 26, 2015.

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#3 https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#2

Risk aversion channels funds toward US long-term and short-term securities that finance the US balance of payments and fiscal deficits benefitting from risk flight to US dollar denominated assets. There are now temporary interruptions because of fear of rising interest rates that erode prices of US government securities because of mixed signals on monetary policy and exit from the Fed balance sheet of four trillion dollars of securities held outright. Net foreign purchases of US long-term securities (row C in Table VA-4) strengthened from $48.5 billion in Jul 2018 to $111.5 billion in Aug

2018. Foreign residents’ purchases minus sales of US long-term securities (row A in Table VA-4) in Jul 2018 of $32.4 billion strengthened to $77.1 billion in Aug 2018. Net US (residents) purchases of long-term foreign securities (row B in Table VA-4) strengthened from 34.2 billion in Jul 2018 to $54.7 billion in Aug 2018. Other transactions (row C2 in Table VA-4) changed from minus $18.2 billion in Jul 2018 to minus $20.3 billion in Aug 2018. In Aug 2018,

C = A + B + C2 = $77.1 billion + 54.7 billion - $20.3 billion = $111.5 billion

There are minor rounding errors. There is strengthening demand in Table VA-4 in Aug 2018 in A1 private purchases by residents overseas of US long-term securities of $70.0 billion of which strengthening in A11 Treasury securities of $55.2 billion, strengthening in A12 of $14.4 billion in agency securities, strengthening of $14.9 billion of corporate bonds and weakening of minus $14.6 billion in equities. Worldwide risk aversion causes flight into US Treasury obligations with significant oscillations. Official purchases of securities in row A2 increased $7.2 billion with increase of Treasury securities of $7.9 billion in Aug 2018. Official purchases of agency securities increased $1.6 billion in Aug 2018. Row D shows increase in Aug 2018 of $8.0 billion in purchases of short-term dollar denominated obligations. Foreign holdings of US Treasury bills increased $2.5 billion (row D11) with foreign official holdings decreasing $10.3 billion while the category “other” increased $15.8 billion. Foreign private holdings of US Treasury bills increased $2.5 billion in what could be arbitrage of duration exposures and international risks. Risk aversion of default losses in foreign securities dominates decisions to accept zero interest rates in Treasury securities with no perception of principal losses. In the case of long-term securities, investors prefer to sacrifice inflation and possible duration risk to avoid principal losses with significant oscillations

in risk perceptions.

Table VA-4, Net Cross-Borders Flows of US Long-Term Securities, Billion Dollars, NSA

	Aug 2017 12 Months	Aug 2018 12 Months	Jul 2018	Aug 2018
A Foreign Purchases less Sales of US LT Securities	212.7	386.9	32.4	77.1
A1 Private	354.4	410.0	45.8	70.0
A11 Treasury	96.8	154.1	41.7	55.2
A12 Agency	117.7	119.2	13.4	14.4
A13 Corporate Bonds	97.1	114.6	5.0	14.9
A14 Equities	42.8	22.1	-14.4	-14.6
A2 Official	-141.7	-23.2	-13.3	7.2
A21 Treasury	-188.8	-96.4	-22.8	7.9
A22 Agency	44.1	82.4	10.2	1.6
A23 Corporate Bonds	-0.1	-3.6	-1.1	0.0
A24 Equities	3.1	-5.6	0.3	-2.3
B Net US Purchases of LT Foreign Securities	141.6	279.6	34.2	54.7
B1 Foreign Bonds	237.9	286.0	32.9	56.0
B2 Foreign Equities	-96.3	-6.5	1.4	-1.3
C1 Net Transactions	354.3	666.4	66.7	131.8
C2 Other	-252.4	-98.8	-18.2	-20.3
C Net Foreign Purchases of US LT Securities	102.0	567.6	48.5	111.5
D Increase in Foreign Holdings of Dollar Denominated Short-term
US Securities & Other Liab	23.3	471.3	4.0	8.0
D1 US Treasury Bills	-15.8	76.6	8.5	-7.8
D11 Private	-67.2	71.4	5.2	2.5
D12 Official	51.3	5.2	3.3	-10.3
D2 Other	39.1	394.6	-4.5	15.8

C1 = A + B; C = C1+C2

A = A1 + A2

A1 = A11 + A12 + A13 + A14

A2 = A21 + A22 + A23 + A24

B = B1 + B2

D = D1 + D2

Sources: United States Treasury

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticpress.aspx

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2609.aspx

Table VA-5 provides major foreign holders of US Treasury securities. China is the largest holder with $1165.1 billion in Aug 2018, decreasing 0.5 percent from $1171.0 billion in Jul 2018 while decreasing $36.6 billion from Aug 2017 or 3.0 percent. The United States Treasury estimates US government debt held by private investors at $12,530 billion in Jun 2018 (Fiscal Year 2018). China’s holding of US Treasury securities represents 9.3 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors (https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/treasBulletin/treasBulletin_home.htm). Min Zeng, writing on “China plays a big role as US Treasury yields fall,” on Jul 16, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-plays-a-big-role-as-u-s-treasury-yields-fall-1405545034?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj), finds that acceleration in purchases of US Treasury securities by China has been an important factor in the decline of Treasury yields in 2014. Japan decreased its holdings from $1101.7 billion in Aug 2017 to $1029.9 billion in Aug 2018 or 6.5 percent. The combined holdings of China and Japan in Aug 2018 add to $2195.0 billion, which is equivalent to 17.5 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing securities held by investors of $12,530 billion in Jun 2018 (Fiscal Year 2018) (https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/treasBulletin/treasBulletin_home.htm). Total foreign holdings of Treasury securities increased from $6249.4 billion in Aug 2017 to $6287.0 billion in Aug 2018, or 0.6 percent. The US continues to finance its fiscal and balance of payments deficits with foreign savings (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). A point of saturation of holdings of US Treasury debt may be reached as foreign holders evaluate the threat of reduction of principal by dollar devaluation and reduction of prices by increases in yield, including possibly risk premium. Shultz et al (2012) find that the Fed financed three-quarters of the US deficit in fiscal year 2011, with foreign governments financing significant part of the remainder of the US deficit while the Fed owns one in six dollars of US national debt. Concentrations of debt in few holders are perilous because of sudden exodus in fear of devaluation and yield increases and the limit of refinancing old debt and placing new debt. In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

Table VA-5, US, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities $ Billions at End of Period

	Aug 2018	Aug 2018	Aug 2017
Total	6287.0	6251.6	6249.4
China	1165.1	1171.0	1201.7
Japan	1029.9	1035.5	1101.7
Brazil	317.8	299.7	273.6
Ireland	315.8	300.2	309.0
United Kingdom	272.6	271.7	225.0
Switzerland	231.9	233.1	248.2
Luxembourg	224.1	221.5	213.3
Cayman Islands	197.9	196.3	242.9
Hong Kong	193.2	194.4	194.5
Saudi Arabia	169.5	166.8	137.9
Taiwan	163.2	164.2	182.0
Belgium	154.3	154.5	96.9
India	140.6	142.6	138.9
Singapore	130.0	127.6	119.3
Foreign Official Holdings	4021.2	4007.8	4051.7
A. Treasury Bills	329.3	339.6	324.1
B. Treasury Bonds and Notes	3691.9	3668.1	3727.6

Source: United States Treasury

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticpress.aspx

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/index.aspx

http://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt

VB Japan. The GDP of Japan grew at 1.0 percent per year on average from 1991 to 2002, with the GDP implicit deflator falling at 0.8 percent per year on average. The average growth rate of Japan’s GDP was 4 percent per year on average from the middle of the 1970s to 1992 (Ito 2004). Low growth in Japan in the 1990s is commonly labeled as “the lost decade” (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 81-115). Table VB-GDP provides yearly growth rates of Japan’s GDP from 1995 to 2017. Growth weakened from 2.7 per cent in 1995 and 3.1 percent in 1996 to contractions of 1.1 percent in 1998 and 0.3 percent in 1999. Growth rates were below 2 percent with exception of 2.8 percent in 2000 and 2.2 percent in 2004. Japan’s GDP contracted sharply by 1.1 percent in 2008 and 5.4 percent in 2009. As in most advanced economies, growth was robust at 4.2 percent in 2010 but mediocre at minus 0.1 percent in 2011 because of the tsunami and 1.5 percent in 2012. Japan’s GDP grew 2.0 percent in 2013 and nearly stagnated in 2014 at 0.4. The GDP of Japan increased 1.4 percent in 2015 and 1.0 percent in 2016. Japan’s GDP increased at 1.7 percent in 2017. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). Japan’s real GDP in calendar year 2017 is 5.3 percent higher than in calendar year 2007. Japan’s real GDP grew 12.6 percent from the trough of 2009 to 2017 at the average yearly rate of 1.5 percent (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html).

Table VB-GDP, Japan, Yearly Percentage Change of GDP ∆%

Calendar Year	∆%
1995	2.7
1996	3.1
1997	1.1
1998	-1.1
1999	-0.3
2000	2.8
2001	0.4
2002	0.1
2003	1.5
2004	2.2
2005	1.7
2006	1.4
2007	1.7
2008	-1.1
2009	-5.4
2010	4.2
2011	-0.1
2012	1.5
2013	2.0
2014	0.4
2015	1.4
2016	1.0
2017	1.7

Source: Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf) with changes on Jul 21, 2015 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 1.5 to 2.1 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food 0.2 to 1.2 to 3.3 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.2 to 1.2 percent in 2015 and 1.2 to 2.2 percent in 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was minus 0.4 percent in Mar 2014 and 2.2 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm), significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:

“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.

The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.

Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”

The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).

Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf) with changes on Feb 1, 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). On Jun 19, 2015, the Bank of Japan announced a “New Framework for Monetary Policy Meetings,” which provides for quarterly release of the forecasts of the economy and prices beginning in Jan 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/rel150619a.pdf). For fiscal 2015, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 0.7 to 0.7 percent, with the all items CPI less fresh food of 0.0 percent (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). The critical difference is forecast of the CPI excluding fresh food of 0.0 to 0.2 percent in 2016 and 1.8 to 3.0 percent in 2017 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf). Consumer price inflation in Japan excluding fresh food was 0.1 percent in Mar 2016 and minus 0.3 percent in 12 months (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1581.htm). The CPI increased significantly because of the increase of the tax on value added of consumption in Apr 2014. The new monetary policy of the Bank of Japan aims to increase inflation to 2 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:

Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
Bank Lending Facility and Growth Supporting Funding Facility. At the meeting on Feb 18, the Bank of Japan doubled the scale of these lending facilities to prevent their expiration in the near future (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140218a.pdf).
Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) with Negative Nominal Interest Rate. On January 29, 2016, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan introduced a new policy to attain the “price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf). The new framework consists of three dimensions: quantity, quality and interest rate. The interest rate dimension consists of rates paid to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank of Japan of three tiers zero, positive and minus 0.1 percent. The quantitative dimension consists of increasing the monetary base at the annual rate of 80 trillion yen. The qualitative dimension consists of purchases by the Bank of Japan of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITS).
Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control. The Bank of Japan introduced a new approach, QQE with Yield Curve Control (“Quantitative and Qualitative Easing with Yield Curve Control”) at its policy meeting on Sep 21, 2016 (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160921a.pdf). The policy consists of two measures. First “yield curve control” consists of controlling the long-term and short-term interest rates. The bank will fix the interest rates of policy balances held by financial institutions at the BOJ at minus 0.1 percent and will purchase Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) in the amount required to maintain the yield of the 10-year JGB at around zero percent. Second, “the inflation-overshooting commitment” consists of increasing base money to maintain the CPI price stability target above 2 percent.

Table VB-BOJF, Bank of Japan, Forecasts of the Majority of Members of the Policy Board, % Year on Year

Fiscal Year Date of Forecast	Real GDP	CPI All Items Less Fresh Food	Excluding Effects of Consumption Tax Hikes
2013
Apr 2014	+2.2 to +2.3 [+2.2]	+0.8
Jan 2014	+2.5 to +2.9 [+2.7]	+0.7 to +0.9 [+0.7]
Oct 2013	+2.6 to +3.0 [+2.7]	+0.6 to +1.0 [+0.7]
Jul 2013	+2.5 to +3.0 [+2.8]	+0.5 to +0.8 [+0.6]
2014
Apr 2015	-1.0 to -0.8 [-0.9]	+2.8	+0.8
Jan 2015	-0.6 to -0.4 [-0.5]	+2.9 to +3.2 [+2.9]	+0.9 to +1.2 [+0.9]
Oct 2014	+0.2 to +0.7 [+0.5]	+3.1 to +3.4 [+3.2]	+1.1 to +1.4 [+1.2]
Jul 2014	+0.6 to +1.3 [+1.0]	+3.2 to +3.5 [+3.3]	+1.2 to +1.5 [+1.3]
Apr 2014	+0.8 to +1.3 [+1.1]	+3.0 to +3.5 [+3.3]	+1.0 to +1.5 [+1.3]
Jan 2014	+0.9 to 1.5 [+1.4]	+2.9 to +3.6 [+3.3]	+0.9 to +1.6 [+1.3]
Oct 2013	+0.9 to +1.5 [+1.5]	+2.8 to +3.6 [+3.3]	+0.8 to +1.6 [+1.3]
Jul 2013	+0.8 to +1.5 [+1.3]	+2.7 to +3.6 [+3.3]	+0.7 to +1.6 [+1.3]
2015
Feb 2016	+0.7 to +0.7 [+0.7]	0.0
Jan 2016	+1.0 to +1.3 [+1.1]	0.0 to 0.2 [+0.1]
Oct 2015	+0.8 to +1.4 [+1.2]	0.0 to +0.4 [+0.1
Jul 2015	+1.5 to +1.9 [+1.7]	+0.3 to +1.0 [+0.7]
Apr 2015	+1.5 to +2.1 [+2.0]	+0.2 to 1.2 [+0.8]	+0.2 to 1.2 [+0.8]
Jan 2015	+1.8 to +2.3 [+2.1]	+0.4 to +1.3 [+1.0]	+0.4 to +1.3 [+1.0]
Oct 2014	+1.2 to +1.7 [+1.5]	+1.8 to 2.6 [+2.4]	+1.1 to +1.9 [+1.7]
Jul 2014	+1.2 to +1.6 [+1.5]	+1.9 to +2.8 [+2.6]	+1.2 to +2.1 [+1.9]
Apr 2014	+1.2 to +1.5 [+1.5]	+1.9 to +2.8 [+2.6]	+1.2 to +2.1 [+1.9]
Jan 2014	+1.2 to +1.8 [+1.5]	+1.7 to +2.9 [+2.6]	+1.0 to +2.2 [+1.9]
Oct 2013	+1.3 to +1.8 [+1.5]	+1.6 to +2.9 [+2.6]	+0.9 to +2.2 [+1.9]
Jul 2013	+1.3 to +1.9 [+1.5]	+1.6 to +2.9 [+2.6]	+0.9 to +2.2 [+1.9]
2016
Apr 2017	+1.4 to +1.4 [+1.4]	-0.3
Feb 2017	+1.2 to +1.5 [+1.4]	-0.2 to -0.1 [-0.2]
Jul 2016	+0.8 to +1.0 [+1.0]	0.0 to +0.3 [0.5]	0.0 to +0.3 [0.5]
Apr 2016	+0.8 to +1.4 [+1.2]	0.0 to +0.8 [+0.5]	0.0 to +0.8 [+0.5]
Jan 2016	+1.0 to +1.7 [+1.5]	0.2 to +1.2 [+0.8]
Oct 2015	+1.2 to +1.6 [+1.4]	+0.8 to +1.5 [+1.4]
Jul 2015	+1.5 to 1.7 [+1.5]	+1.2 to +2.1 [+1.9]
Apr 2015	+1.4 to +1.8 [+1.5]	+1.2 to +2.2 [+2.0]	+1.2 to +2.2 [+2.0]
Jan 2015	+1.5 to +1.7 [+1.6]	+1.5 to +2.3 [+2.2]	+1.5 to +2.3 [+2.2]
Oct 2014	+1.0 to +1.4 [+1.2]	+1.9 to 3.0 [+2.8]	+1.2 to 2.3 [+2.1]
Jul 2014	+1.0 to +1.5 [+1.3]	+2.0 to +3.0 [+2.8]	+1.3 to +2.3 [+2.1]
Apr 2014	+1.0 to +1.5 [+1.3]	+2.0 to +3.0 [+2.8]	+1.3 to +2.3 [+2.1]
2017
Apr 2017	+1.4 to +1.6 [+1.6]	+0.6 to +1.6 [+1.4]
Feb 2017	+1.3 to +1.6 [+1.5]	+0.8 to +1.6 [+1.5]
Jul 2016	1.0 to +1.5 [+1.3]	+0.8 to +1.8 [+1.7]	+0.8 to +1.8 [+1.7]
Apr 2016	0.0 to + +0.3 [+0.1]	1.8 to +3.0 [+2.7]	0.8 to +2.0 [+1.7
Jan 2016	+0.1 to + 0.5 [+0.3]	+2.0 to +3.1 [+2.8]	+ 1.0 to +2.1 [+1.8]
Oct 2015	+0.1 to +0.5 [+0.3]	+2.5 to +3.4 [+3.1]	+1.2 to 2.1 [+1.8]
Jul 2015	+0.1 to +0.5 [+0.2]	+2.7 to +3.4 [+3.1]	+1.4 to +2.1 [+1.8]
Apr 2015	+0.1 to +0.5 [+0.2]	+2.7 to +3.4 [+3.2]	+1.4 to +2.1 [+1.9]
2018
Apr 2017	+1.1 to +1.3 [+1.3]	+0.8 to +1.9 [+1.7]
Feb 2017	+1.0 to +1.2 [+1.1]	+0.9 to +1.9 [+1.7]
Jul 2016	+0.8 to +1.0 [+0.9]	+1.0 to +2.0 [+1.9]	+1.0 to +2.0 [+1.9]
Apr 2016	+0.6 to +1.2 [+1.0]	+1.0 to +2.1 [+1.9]	+1.0 to +2.1 [+1.9]
2019
Apr 2017	+0.6 to +0.7 [+0.7]	+1.4 to +2.5 [+2.4]	+0.9 to +2.0 [+1.9]

Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members

Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan

Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members

Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2015/k150121a.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k140715a.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1504b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1510b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1601b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1604b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1607b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1701b.pdf

https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1704b.pdf

The Nikkei Flash Japan Manufacturing PMI Index™ with the Flash Japan

Manufacturing PMI™ increased from 52.5 in Aug to 52.9 in Sep

(https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/445022caeb2c4387904f111dc180dea2). New export orders increased. Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS

Markit, finds growth conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/445022caeb2c4387904f111dc180dea2).The Nikkei Composite Output PMI Index decreased from 52.0 in Aug to 50.7 in Sep, indicating continuing business activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/fab68ddbef3f49b3b121f257eff6e8d5). The Nikkei Business Activity Index of Services decreased to 50.2 in Sep from 51.5 in Aug (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/fab68ddbef3f49b3b121f257eff6e8d5). Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS Markit, finds weaker business activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/fab68ddbef3f49b3b121f257eff6e8d5). The Nikkei Japan Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index^™ (PMI™), seasonally adjusted, did not change from 52.5 in Aug to 52.5 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6ed063ca095e4bba880e5ccf24f3cc21). New orders increased while new foreign orders contracted. Joe Hayes, Economist at IHS Markit, finds growth conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6ed063ca095e4bba880e5ccf24f3cc21). Table JPY provides the country data table for Japan.

Table JPY, Japan, Economic Indicators

Historical GDP and CPI	1981-2010 Real GDP Growth and CPI Inflation 1981-2010 Blog 8/9/11 Table 26
Corporate Goods Prices	Sep ∆% 0.3 12 months ∆% 3.0 Blog 10/14/18
Consumer Price Index	Aug NSA ∆% 0.5; Aug 12 months NSA ∆% 1.3 Blog 9/23/18
Real GDP Growth	IIQ2018 ∆%: 0.7 on IQ2018; IIQ2018 SAAR 3.0; ∆% from quarter a year earlier: 1.3 Blog 6/16/13 8/18/13 9/15/13 11/17/13 12/15/13 2/23/14 3/16/14 5/18/14 6/15/14 8/17/14 9/14/14 11/23/14 12/14/14 2/22/15 3/15/15 5/24/15 6/14/15 8/23/15 9/13/15 11/22/15 12/13/15 2/21/16 3/13/16 5/22/16 6/12/16 8/21/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/11/16 2/19/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/11/17 8/20/17 9/10/17 11/26/17 12/17/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/17/18 8/19/18 9/16/18
Employment Report	Aug Unemployed 1.70 million Change in unemployed since last year: -190 thousand Unemployment rate: 2.4% Blog 10/7/18
All Industry Indices	Jul month SA ∆% 0.0 12-month NSA ∆% 1.0 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15
Industrial Production	Aug SA month ∆%: 0.7 Aug 12-month NSA ∆% 0.6 Earlier Data: Blog 3/29/15
Machine Orders	Total Aug ∆% 1.8 Private ∆%: 3.9 Aug ∆% Excluding Volatile Orders 6.8 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15
Tertiary Index	Aug month SA ∆% 0.5 Aug 12 months NSA ∆% 1.3 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15
Wholesale and Retail Sales	Aug 12 months: Total ∆%: 4.3 Wholesale ∆%: 5.0 Retail ∆%: 2.7 Earlier Data: Blog 3/29/15
Family Income and Expenditure Survey	Jul 12-month ∆% total nominal consumption 1.2, real 0.1 Earlier Data: Blog 3/29/15
Trade Balance	Exports Sep 12 months ∆%: minus 1.2 Imports Sep 12 months ∆% 7.0 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15

Links to blog comments in Table JPY: 10/14/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html

10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

8/26/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

8/12/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

8/5/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html

6/17/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/17/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html

9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/21/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html

6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html

5/22/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html

3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html

12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html

11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html

9/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html

08/23/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html

6/14/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html

5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

2/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html

12/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/global-financial-and-economic-risk.html

11/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.htm

9/14/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html

2/23/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html

12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

VC China. China estimates an index of nonmanufacturing purchasing managers based on a sample of 1200 nonmanufacturing enterprises across the country (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Table CIPMNM provides this index and components. The total index increased from 55.7 in Jan 2011 to 58.0 in Mar 2012, decreasing to 53.9 in Aug 2013. The index decreased from 56.0 in Nov 2013 to 54.6 in Dec 2013, easing to 53.4 in Jan 2014. The index moved to 54.9 in Sep 2018. The index of new orders increased from 52.2 in Jan 2012 to 54.3 in Dec 2012 but fell to 50.1 in May 2013, barely above the neutral frontier of 50.0. The index of new orders stabilized at 51.0 in Nov-Dec 2013, easing to 50.9 in Jan 2014. The index of new orders moved to 51.0 in Sep 2018.

Table CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

	Total Index	New Orders	Interm. Input Prices	Subs Prices	Exp
Sep 2018	54.9	51.0	55.6	51.5	60.1
Aug	54.2	50.6	54.3	50.9	61.4
Jul	54.0	51.0	53.9	52.0	60.2
Jun	55.0	50.6	53.5	51.1	60.8
May	54.9	51.0	54.2	50.6	61.0
Apr	54.8	51.1	52.7	50.6	61.5
Mar	54.6	50.1	49.9	49.3	61.1
Feb	54.4	50.5	53.2	49.9	61.2
Jan	55.3	51.9	53.9	52.6	61.7
Dec 2017	55.0	52.0	54.8	52.6	60.9
Nov	54.8	51.8	56.2	52.8	61.6
Oct	54.3	51.1	54.3	51.6	60.6
Sep	55.4	52.3	56.1	51.7	61.7
Aug	53.4	50.9	54.4	51.5	61.0
Jul	54.5	51.1	53.1	50.9	61.1
Jun	54.9	51.4	51.2	49.3	61.1
May	54.5	50.9	51.1	48.8	60.2
Apr	54.0	50.5	51.7	50.2	59.7
Mar	55.1	51.9	52.3	49.7	61.3
Feb	54.2	51.2	53.7	51.4	62.4
Jan	54.6	51.3	55.1	51.0	58.9
Dec 2016	54.5	52.1	56.2	51.9	59.5
Nov	54.7	51.8	53.5	51.4	60.7
Oct	54.0	50.9	53.7	51.5	60.6
Sep	53.7	51.4	51.7	50.1	61.1
Aug	53.5	49.8	52.6	50.4	59.4
Jul	53.9	49.9	51.4	49.5	59.5
Jun	53.7	50.8	51.6	50.6	58.6
May	53.1	49.2	51.6	49.8	57.8
Apr	53.5	48.7	52.1	49.1	59.1
Mar	53.8	50.8	51.4	49.5	59.0
Feb	52.7	48.7	50.5	48.3	59.5
Jan	53.5	49.6	49.9	47.7	58.4
Dec2015	54.4	51.7	49.0	48.2	58.3
Nov	53.6	50.2	49.3	47.7	60.0
Oct	53.1	51.2	51.2	48.8	61.1
Sep	53.4	50.2	50.8	47.9	60.0
Aug	53.4	49.6	49.6	47.8	59.7
Jul	53.9	50.1	48.9	47.4	60.0
Jun	53.8	51.3	50.6	48.7	59.7
May	53.2	49.5	52.8	50.4	60.1
Apr	53.4	49.1	50.8	48.9	60.0
Mar	53.7	50.3	50.0	48.4	58.8
Feb	53.9	51.2	52.5	51.2	58.7
Jan	53.7	50.2	47.6	46.9	59.6
Dec 2014	54.1	50.5	50.1	47.3	59.5
Nov	53.9	50.1	50.6	47.7	59.7
Oct	53.8	51.0	52.0	48.8	59.9
Sep	54.0	49.5	49.8	47.3	60.9
Aug	54.4	50.0	52.2	48.3	61.2
Jul	54.2	50.7	53.4	49.5	61.5
Jun	55.0	50.7	56.0	50.8	60.4
May	55.5	52.7	54.5	49.0	60.7
Apr	54.8	50.8	52.4	49.4	61.5
Mar	54.5	50.8	52.8	49.5	61.5
Feb	55.0	51.4	52.1	49.0	59.9
Jan	53.4	50.9	54.5	50.1	58.1
Dec 2013	54.6	51.0	56.9	52.0	58.7
Nov	56.0	51.0	54.8	49.5	61.3
Oct	56.3	51.6	56.1	51.4	60.5
Sep	55.4	53.4	56.7	50.6	60.1
Aug	53.9	50.9	57.1	51.2	62.9
Jul	54.1	50.3	58.2	52.4	63.9
Jun	53.9	50.3	55.0	50.6	61.8
May	54.3	50.1	54.4	50.7	62.9
Apr	54.5	50.9	51.1	47.6	62.5
Mar	55.6	52.0	55.3	50.0	62.4
Feb	54.5	51.8	56.2	51.1	62.7
Jan	56.2	53.7	58.2	50.9	61.4
Dec 2012	56.1	54.3	53.8	50.0	64.6
Nov	55.6	53.2	52.5	48.4	64.6
Oct	55.5	51.6	58.1	50.5	63.4
Sep	53.7	51.8	57.5	51.3	60.9
Aug	56.3	52.7	57.6	51.2	63.2
Jul	55.6	53.2	49.7	48.7	63.9
Jun	56.7	53.7	52.1	48.6	65.5
May	55.2	52.5	53.6	48.5	65.4
Apr	56.1	52.7	57.9	50.3	66.1
Mar	58.0	53.5	60.2	52.0	66.6
Feb	57.3	52.7	59.0	51.2	63.8
Jan	55.7	52.2	58.2	51.1	65.3

Notes: Interm.: Intermediate; Subs: Subscription; Exp: Business Expectations

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart CIPMNM provides China’s nonmanufacturing purchasing managers’ index. The index fell from 56.0 in Oct 2013 to 54.9 in Sep 2018.

Chart CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Table CIPMMFG provides the index of purchasing managers of manufacturing seasonally adjusted of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The general index (IPM) rose from 50.5 in Jan 2012 to 53.3 in Apr 2012, falling to 49.2 in Aug 2012, rebounding to 50.6 in Dec 2012. The index fell to 50.3 in Jul 2013, barely above the neutral frontier at 50.0, recovering to 51.4 in Nov 2013 but falling to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.5 in Jan 2014, 50.1 in Dec 2014 and 50.8 in Sep 2018. The index of new orders fell from 54.5 in Apr 2012 to 51.2 in Dec 2012. The index of new orders fell from 52.3 in Nov 2013 to 52.0 in Dec 2013. The index fell to 50.9 in Jan 2014 and moved to 50.4 in Dec 2014. The index moved to 52.0 in Sep 2018.

Table CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

	IPM	PI	NOI	INV	EMP	SDEL
2018
Sep	50.8	53.0	52.0	47.8	48.3	49.7
Aug	51.3	53.3	52.2	48.7	49.4	49.6
Jul	51.2	53.0	52.3	48.9	49.2	50.0
Jun	51.5	53.6	53.2	48.8	49.0	50.2
May	51.9	54.1	53.8	49.6	49.1	50.1
Apr	51.4	53.1	52.9	49.5	49.0	50.2
Mar	51.5	53.1	53.3	49.6	49.1	50.1
Feb	50.3	50.7	51.0	49.3	48.1	48.4
Jan	51.3	53.5	52.6	48.8	48.3	49.2
2017
Dec	51.6	54.0	53.4	48.0	48.5	49.3
Nov	51.8	54.3	53.6	48.4	48.8	49.5
Oct	51.6	53.4	52.9	48.6	49.0	48.7
Sep	52.4	54.7	54.8	48.9	49.0	49.3
Aug	51.7	54.1	53.1	48.3	49.1	49.3
Jul	51.4	53.5	52.8	48.5	49.2	50.1
Jun	51.7	54.4	53.1	48.6	49.0	49.9
May	51.2	53.4	52.3	48.5	49.4	50.2
Apr	51.2	53.8	52.3	48.3	49.2	50.5
Mar	51.8	54.2	53.3	48.3	50.0	50.3
Feb	51.6	53.7	53.0	48.6	49.7	50.5
Jan	51.3	53.1	52.8	48.0	49.2	49.8
2016
Dec	51.4	53.3	53.2	48.0	48.9	50.0
Nov	51.7	53.9	53.2	48.4	49.2	49.7
Oct	51.2	53.3	52.8	48.1	48.8	50.2
Sep	50.4	52.8	50.9	47.4	48.6	49.9
Aug	50.4	52.6	51.3	47.6	48.4	50.6
Jul	49.9	52.1	50.4	47.3	48.2	50.5
Jun	50.0	52.5	50.5	47.0	47.9	50.7
May	50.1	52.3	50.7	47.6	48.2	50.4
Apr	50.1	52.2	51.0	47.4	47.8	50.1
Mar	50.2	52.3	51.4	48.2	48.1	51.3
Feb	49.0	50.2	48.6	48.0	47.6	49.8
Jan	49.4	51.4	49.5	46.8	47.8	50.5
2015
Dec	49.7	52.2	50.2	47.6	47.4	50.7
Nov	49.6	51.9	49.8	47.1	47.6	50.6
Oct	49.8	52.2	50.3	47.2	47.8	50.6
Sep	49.8	52.3	50.2	47.5	47.9	50.8
Aug	49.7	51.7	49.7	48.3	47.9	50.6
Jul	50.0	52.4	49.9	48.4	48.0	50.4
Jun	50.2	52.9	50.1	48.7	48.1	50.3
May	50.2	52.9	50.6	48.2	48.2	50.9
Apr	50.1	52.6	50.2	48.2	48.0	50.4
Mar	50.1	52.1	50.2	48.0	48.4	50.1
Feb	49.9	51.4	50.4	48.2	47.8	49.9
Jan	49.8	51.7	50.2	47.3	47.9	50.2
2014
Dec	50.1	52.2	50.4	47.5	48.1	49.9
Nov	50.3	52.5	50.9	47.7	48.2	50.3
Oct	50.8	53.1	51.6	48.4	48.4	50.1
Sep	51.1	53.6	52.2	48.8	48.2	50.1
Aug	51.1	53.2	52.5	48.6	48.2	50.0
Jul	51.7	54.2	53.6	49.0	48.3	50.2
Jun	51.0	53.0	52.8	48.0	48.6	50.5
May	50.8	52.8	52.3	48.0	48.2	50.3
Apr	50.4	52.5	51.2	48.1	48.3	50.1
Mar	50.3	52.7	50.6	47.8	48.3	49.8
Feb	50.2	52.6	50.5	47.4	48.0	49.9
Jan	50.5	53.0	50.9	47.8	48.2	49.8
Dec 2013	51.0	53.9	52.0	47.6	48.7	50.5
Nov	51.4	54.5	52.3	47.8	49.6	50.6
Oct	51.4	54.4	52.5	48.6	49.2	50.8
Sep	51.1	52.9	52.8	48.5	49.1	50.8
Aug	51.0	52.6	52.4	48.0	49.3	50.4
Jul	50.3	52.4	50.6	47.6	49.1	50.1
Jun	50.1	52.0	50.4	47.4	48.7	50.3
May	50.8	53.3	51.8	47.6	48.8	50.8
Apr	50.6	52.6	51.7	47.5	49.0	50.8
Mar	50.9	52.7	52.3	47.5	49.8	51.1
Feb	50.1	51.2	50.1	49.5	47.6	48.3
Jan	50.4	51.3	51.6	50.1	47.8	50.0
Dec 2012	50.6	52.0	51.2	47.3	49.0	48.8
Nov	50.6	52.5	51.2	47.9	48.7	49.9
Oct	50.2	52.1	50.4	47.3	49.2	50.1
Sep	49.8	51.3	49.8	47.0	48.9	49.5
Aug	49.2	50.9	48.7	45.1	49.1	50.0
Jul	50.1	51.8	49.0	48.5	49.5	49.0
Jun	50.2	52.0	49.2	48.2	49.7	49.1
May	50.4	52.9	49.8	45.1	50.5	49.0
Apr	53.3	57.2	54.5	48.5	51.0	49.6
Mar	53.1	55.2	55.1	49.5	51.0	48.9
Feb	51.0	53.8	51.0	48.8	49.5	50.3
Jan	50.5	53.6	50.4	49.7	47.1	49.7

IPM: Index of Purchasing Managers; PI: Production Index; NOI: New Orders Index; EMP: Employed Person Index; SDEL: Supplier Delivery Time Index

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

China estimates the manufacturing index of purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 820 enterprises (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Chart CIPMMFG provides the manufacturing index of purchasing managers. The index fell to 50.1 in Jun 2013. The index decreased from 51.4 in Nov 2013 to 51.0 in Dec 2013. The index moved to 50.8 in Sep 2018.

Chart CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Table VC-GDP China, Quarterly Growth of GDP, Current CNY 100 Million and Inflation Adjusted ∆%

Cumulative GDP IIQ2018	Value Current CNY Billion IIQ2018	Value Current CNY Billion IQ2018 to IIQ2018	IIQ2018 Year-on-Year Constant Prices ∆%	Cumulative to IIQ2018 ∆%
GDP	22,017.8	41,896.1	6.7	6.8
Primary Industry	1,318.3	2,208.7	3.2	3.2
Farming	1,379.5	2,312.8	3.4	3.4
Secondary Industry	9,184.7	16,929.9	6.0	6.1
Industry	7,653.9	14,465.6	6.4	6.4
Construction	1,558.6	2,516.9	4.0	4.5
Tertiary Industry	11,514.8	22,757.6	7.8	7.6
Transport, Storage, Post	1,018.1	1,904.2	8.1	7.9
Wholesale and Retail Trades	2,023.5	3,968.3	6.6	6.7
Accommodation and Restaurants	364.2	738.9	6.8	6.9
Finance	1,705.6	3,488.0	4.3	3.6
Real Estate	1,495.3	2,879.8	4.2	4.5
Other	3,393.0	6,803.8	5.7	5.9
Growth in Quarter Relative to Prior Quarter	∆% on Prior Quarter		∆% Annual Equivalent	∆% Year-on-Year
2018
IIQ2018	1.8		7.4	6.7
IQ2018	1.4		5.7	6.8
2017
IVQ2017	1.6		6.6	6.8
IIIQ2017	1.8		7.4	6.8
IIQ2017	1.9		7.8	6.9
IQ2017	1.5		6.1	6.9
2016
IVQ2016	1.6		6.6	6.8
IIIQ2016	1.7		7.0	6.7
IIQ2016	1.9		7.8	6.7
IQ2016	1.4		5.7	6.7
2015
IVQ2015	1.5		6.1	6.8
IIIQ2015	1.7		7.0	6.9
IIQ2015	1.8		7.4	7.0
IQ2015	1.7		7.0	7.0
2014
IVQ2014	1.7		7.0	7.2
IIIQ2014	1.8		7.4	7.1
IIQ2014	1.8		7.4	7.5
IQ2014	1.7		7.0	7.4
2013
IVQ2013	1.6		6.6	7.7
IIIQ2013	2.1		8.7	7.9
IIQ2013	1.7		7.0	7.6
IQ2013	1.9		7.8	7.9
2012
IVQ2012	2.0		8.2	8.1
IIIQ2012	1.8		7.4	7.5
IIQ2012	2.1		8.7	7.6
IQ2012	1.9		7.8	8.1
2011
IVQ2011	1.5		6.1	8.8
IIIQ2011	1.9		7.8	9.4
IIQ2011	2.4		10.0	10.0
IQ2011	2.4		10.0	10.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Growth of China’s GDP in IIQ2018 relative to the same period in 2018 was 6.7 percent and cumulative growth to IIQ2018 was 6.8 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 40.4 percent of cumulative GDP in IIQ2018. In cumulative IIQ2018, industry accounts for 34.5 percent of GDP and construction for 6.0 percent. Tertiary industry accounts for 54.3 percent of cumulative GDP in IIQ2018 and primary industry for 5.3 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The strategy is shifting to lower growth rates with improvement in living standards by increasing growth of services. Table VC-GDPA shows that growth decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 and 11.2 percent in IIQ2010 to 7.9 percent in IQ2013, 7.6 percent in IIQ2013 and 7.9 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP grew 7.7 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier and 1.6 percent relative to IIIQ2013, which is equivalent to 6.6 percent per year. GDP grew 7.4 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.7 percent in IQ2014 that is equivalent to 7.0 percent per year. GDP grew 7.5 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is annual equivalent 7.4 percent. In IIIQ2014, GDP grew 7.1 percent relative to a year earlier and 1.8 percent relative to the prior quarter, which is 7.4 percent in annual equivalent. GDP grew 1.7 percent in IVQ2014, which is 7.0 percent in annual equivalent and 7.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2015, GDP grew 1.7 percent, which is equivalent to 7.0 in a year and 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.4 percent in a year, and grew 7.0 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2015, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year, and grew 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.5 percent in IVQ2015, which is equivalent to 6.1 percent in a year and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IQ2016, GDP grew at 1.4 percent, which is equivalent to 5.7 percent in a year, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.9 percent in IIQ2016, which is annual equivalent to 7.8 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2016, GDP grew at 1.7 percent, which is equivalent to 7.0 percent in a year and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, GDP grew at 1.6 percent, equivalent to 6.6 percent in a year, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew 6.9 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased at 1.5 percent, which is 6.1 percent in annual equivalent. In IIQ2017, GDP grew at 1.9 percent, which is annual equivalent at 7.8 percent, and increased 6.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.8 percent in IIIQ2017, which is annual equivalent at 7.4 percent, and increased at 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, GDP grew 1.6 percent, which is annual equivalent to 6.6 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP grew at 1.4 percent in IQ2018, which is annual equivalent at 5.7 percent, and increased 6.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2018, GDP grew at 1.8 percent, which is annual equivalent to 7.4 percent, and increased 6.7 percent relative to a year earlier.

Table VC-GDPA China, Growth Rate of GDP, ∆% Relative to a Year Earlier and ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

	IQ2018	IIQ2018
GDP	6.8	6.7
Primary Industry	3.2	3.2
Secondary Industry	6.3	6.0
Tertiary Industry	7.5	7.8
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter	1.4 (5.7)	1.8 (7.4)
	IQ2017	IIQ2017	IIIQ2017	IVQ2017
GDP	6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8
Primary Industry	3.0	3.8	3.9	4.4
Secondary Industry	6.4	6.4	6.0	5.7
Tertiary Industry	7.7	7.6	8.0	8.3
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter	1.5 (6.1)	1.9 (7.8)	1.8 (7.4)	1.6 (6.6)

	IQ2015	IIQ2015	IIIQ2015	IVQ2015	IQ2016	IIQ2016	IIIQ2016	IVQ2016
GDP	7.0	7.0	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.8
Primary Industry	3.2	3.5	3.8	4.1	2.9	3.1	3.5	2.9
Secondary Industry	6.4	6.1	6.0	6.1	5.8	6.3	6.1	6.1
Tertiary Industry	7.9	8.4	8.4	8.2	7.6	7.5	7.6	8.3
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter	1.7 (7.0)	1.8 (7.4)	1.7 (7.0)	1.5 (6.1)	1.4 (5.7)	1.9 (7.8)	1.7 (7.0)	1.6 (6.6)
	IQ 2013	IIQ 2013	IIIQ 2013	IVQ 2013	IQ 2014	IIQ 2014	IIIQ 2014	IVQ 2014
GDP	7.9	7.6	7.9	7.7	7.4	7.5	7.1	7.2
Primary Industry	3.4	3.0	3.4	4.0	3.5	3.9	4.2	4.1
Secondary Industry	7.8	7.6	7.8	7.8	7.3	7.4	7.4	7.3
Tertiary Industry	8.3	8.3	8.4	8.3	7.1	8.0	7.9	8.1
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter	1.9 (7.8)	1.7 (7.0)	2.1 (8.7)	1.6 (6.6)	1.7 (7.0)	1.8 (7.4)	1.8 (7.4)	1.7 (7.0)
	IQ 2011	IIQ 2011	IIIQ 2011	IVQ 2011	IQ 2012	IIQ 2012	IIIQ 2012	IVQ 2012
GDP	10.2	10.0	9.4	8.8	8.1	7.6	7.5	8.1
Primary Industry	3.5	3.2	3.8	4.5	3.8	4.3	4.2	4.5
Secondary Industry	11.1	11.0	10.8	10.6	9.1	8.3	8.1	8.1
Tertiary Industry	9.1	9.2	9.0	8.9	7.5	7.7	7.9	8.1
GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter	2.4 (10.0)	2.4 (10.0)	1.9 (7.8)	1.5 (6.1)	1.9 (7.8)	2.1 (8.7)	1.8 (7.4)	2.0 (8.2)
	IQ 2010	IIQ 2010	IIIQ 2010	IVQ 2010
GDP	12.1	11.2	10.7	12.1
Primary Industry	3.8	3.6	4.0	3.8
Secondary Industry	14.5	13.3	12.6	14.5
Tertiary Industry	10.5	9.9	9.7	10.5

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Growth of China’s GDP in IVQ2016 relative to the same period in 2016 was 6.8 percent and

Chart VC-GDP of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides annual value and growth rates of GDP. China’s GDP growth in 2016 is still high at 6.7 percent but at the lowest rhythm in five years.

Chart VC-GDP, China, Gross Domestic Product, Million Yuan and ∆%

Source: National bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart VC-FXR provides China’s foreign exchange reserves. FX reserves grew from $2399.2 billion in 2009 to $38430 billion in 2013 driven by high growth of China’s trade surplus, decreasing to $30105 billion in 2016.

Chart VC-FXR, China, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2012-2016

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Chart VC-Trade provides China’s imports and exports. Exports exceeded imports with resulting large trade balance surpluses that increased foreign exchange reserves.

Chart VC-Trade, China, Imports and Exports of Goods, 2012-2016, $100 Million US Dollars

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

Chart VC-PCDI provides the level and growth rates of per capita disposable income in China.

Chart VC-PCDI, China, Level and Growth Rates of Per Capita Disposable Income

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english

The Caixin Flash China General Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index^™ (PMI^™) compiled by Markit (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727) is mixed. The overall Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing PMI^™ decreased from 47.3 in Aug to 47.0 in Sep, while the Flash Caixin China General Manufacturing Output Index decreased from 46.4 in Aug to 45.7 in Aug, indicating weaker conditions. He Fan, Chief Economist at Caixin Insight Group finds need of fiscal and monetary policy (http://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/883014a121534f51bc42e5060845f727). The Caixin China General Services PMI^™, compiled by Markit, shows that the Caixin Composite Output, combining manufacturing and services, increased from 52.0 in Aug to 52.1 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/cd4605905dfe4a679313162de6e9b865). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds stable activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/cd4605905dfe4a679313162de6e9b865). The Caixin General Manufacturing PMI^™ decreased to 50.0 in Sep from 50.6 in Aug, indicating neutral conditions in manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b369c6f870f444998432430d73870b6e). Zhengsheng Zhong, Director of Macroeconomic Analysis at CEBM Group, finds weaker conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b369c6f870f444998432430d73870b6e). Table CNY provides the country data table for China.

Table CNY, China, Economic Indicators

Price Indexes for Industry	Sep 12-month ∆%: 3.6 Sep month ∆%: 0.6 Blog 10/21/18
Consumer Price Index	Sep 12-month ∆%: 2.5 Sep month ∆%: 0.7 Blog 10/21/18
Value Added of Industry	Aug month ∆%: 0.52 Jan-Aug 2018/Jan-Aug 2017 ∆%: 6.5 Earlier Data Blog 4/19/15
GDP Growth Rate	Year-on-Year IIQ2018 ∆%: 6.7 II Quarter 2018 ∆%: 1.8 Quarter IIQ2018 AE ∆%: 7.4 Blog 7/29/18
Investment in Fixed Assets	Total Jan-Aug 2018 ∆%: 5.3 Real estate development: 10.1 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15
Retail Sales	Aug month ∆%: 0.65 Aug 12M ∆%: 9.0 Jan-Aug 2018 ∆%: 9.3 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15
Trade Balance	Sep 2018 balance 31.69 billion Exports 12M ∆% 14.5 Imports 12M ∆% 14.3 Sep 2017 balance $27.38 billion 2017 Exports ∆% 7.9 2017 Imports ∆% 15.9 2016 Exports ∆% 11.3 2016 Imports ∆% 17.3 Cumulative Dec 2017: $422.50 billion Cumulative Dec 2016: $486.0 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table CNY: 9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

8/12/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

7/29/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

VD Euro Area. Using calendar and seasonally adjusted data (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of the euro area (19 countries) fell 5.7 percent from IQ2008 to IIQ2009. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) increased 8.6 percent from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2016 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. The GDP of the euro area (19 countries) is higher by 2.4 percent in IVQ2016 relative to the pre-recession peak in IQ2008, growing at annual equivalent rate of 0.3 percent. The GDP of the euro area (18) countries increased at the average yearly rate of 2.3 percent from IQ1999 to IQ2008 while that of the euro area (19 countries) increased at 2.3 percent. Table VD-EUR provides yearly growth rates of the combined GDP of the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro area since 1999. Growth was very strong at 3.2 percent in 2006 and 3.0 percent in 2007. The global recession had strong impact with growth of only 0.4 percent in 2008 and decline of 4.5 percent in 2009. Recovery was at lower growth rates of 2.1 percent in 2010 and 1.5 percent in 2011. EUROSTAT estimates growth of GDP of the euro area of minus 0.9 percent in 2012 and minus 0.3 percent in 2013. Euro Area GDP grew 1.2 percent in 2014 and grew 2.0 percent in 2015. The GDP of the euro area grew 1.7 percent in 2016.

Table VD-EUR, Euro Area, Yearly Percentage Change of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, Unemployment and GDP ∆%

Year	HICP ∆%	Unemployment %	GDP ∆%
1999	1.2	9.7	3.0
2000	2.2	8.9	3.8
2001	2.4	8.3	2.1
2002	2.3	8.6	1.0
2003	2.1	9.1	0.7
2004	2.2	9.3	2.3
2005	2.2	9.1	1.7
2006	2.2	8.4	3.2
2007	2.2	7.5	3.0
2008	3.3	7.6	0.4
2009	0.3	9.6	-4.5
2010	1.6	10.2	2.1
2011	2.7	10.2	1.5
2012	2.5	11.4	-0.9
2013	1.3	12.0	-0.3
2014	0.4	11.6	1.2
2015	0.0	10.9	2.0
2016	0.2	10.0	1.7

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

The GDP of the euro area in 2015 in current US dollars in the dataset of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is $11,990.9 billion or 16.3 percent of world GDP of $73,598.8 billion (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx). The sum of the GDP of France $2420.2 billion with the GDP of Germany of $3365.3 billion, Italy of $1815.8 billion and Spain $1199.7 billion is $8,801.0 billion or 73.4 percent of total euro area GDP and 13.1 percent of World GDP. The four largest economies account for slightly more than three quarters of economic activity of the euro area. Table VD-EUR1 is constructed with the dataset of EUROSTAT, providing growth rates of the euro area as a whole and of the largest four economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain annually from 1996 to 2016. The impact of the global recession on the overall euro area economy and on the four largest economies was quite strong. There was sharp contraction in 2009 and growth rates have not rebounded to earlier growth with exception of Germany in 2010 and 2011.

Table VD-EUR1, Euro Area, Real GDP Growth Rate, ∆%

	Euro Area	Germany	France	Italy	Spain
2016	1.7	1.9	1.2	0.9	3.2
2015	2.0	1.7	1.3	0.8	3.2
2014	1.2	1.6	0.6	0.1	1.4
2013	-0.3	0.5	0.6	-1.7	-1.7
2012	-0.9	0.5	0.2	-2.8	-2.9
2011	1.5	3.7	2.1	0.6	-1.0
2010	2.1	4.1	2.0	1.7	0.0
2009	-4.5	-5.6	-2.9	-5.5	-3.6
2008	0.4	1.1	0.2	-1.1	1.1
2007	3.0	3.3	2.4	1.5	3.8
2006	3.2	3.7	2.4	2.0	4.2
2005	1.7	0.7	1.6	0.9	3.7
2004	2.3	1.2	2.8	1.6	3.2
2003	0.7	-0.7	0.8	0.2	3.2
2002	1.0	0.0	1.1	0.2	2.9
2001	2.1	1.7	2.0	1.8	4.0
2000	3.8	3.0	3.9	3.7	5.3
1999	3.0	2.0	3.4	1.6	4.5
1998	2.9	2.0	3.6	1.6	4.3
Average 1999-2016	1.2	1.3	1.3	0.3	1.7
Average 1999-2007	2.2	1.6	2.1	1.5	3.8
Average 2016-2007	0.3	1.0	0.6	-7.0*	-0.5*
1997	2.6	1.8	2.3	1.8	3.7
1996	1.6	0.8	1.4	1.3	2.7

Note: Absolute percentage change

Source: EUROSTAT

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

The Flash Eurozone PMI Composite Output Index of the HIS Markit Flash Eurozone PMI^®, combining activity in manufacturing and services, decreased from 54.5 in Aug to 54.2 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/d5095bcc27914975afaef5e2b27b1709). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds that the Markit Flash Eurozone PMI index suggests GDP growth about 0.5 percent quarterly (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/d5095bcc27914975afaef5e2b27b1709). The IHS Markit Eurozone PMI^® Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing activity with close association with GDP decreased from 54.5 in Aug to 54.1 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/d8f59f9ea9c94d139936d5ea9273a94f). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds potential for growth of about 0.5 percent in quarterly GDP (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/d8f59f9ea9c94d139936d5ea9273a94f). The IHS Markit Eurozone Services Business Activity Index increased from 54.4 in Aug to 54.7 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/d8f59f9ea9c94d139936d5ea9273a94f). The IHS Markit Eurozone Manufacturing PMI^® decreased from 54.6 in Aug to 53.2 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b3b808eb02bf46f596caf8e3b40cfe5d). New export orders increased. Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds slower industrial growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/b3b808eb02bf46f596caf8e3b40cfe5d). Table EUR provides the data table for the euro area.

Table EUR, Euro Area Economic Indicators

GDP	IIQ2018 ∆% 0.4; IIQ2018/IIQ2017 ∆% 2.1 Blog 9/13/15 11/22/15 12/13/15 2/14/16 3/13/16 5/1/16 5/15/16 6/12/16 8/7/16 8/14/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/11/16 02/26/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/11/17 8/20/17 9/10/17 11/26/17 12/10/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/10/18 8/19/18 9/16/18
Unemployment	Aug 2018: 8.1 % unemployment rate; Aug 2018: 13,220 million unemployed Blog 10/7/18
HICP	Sep month ∆%: 0.5 12 months Aug ∆%: 2.1 Blog 10/21/18
Producer Prices	Euro Zone industrial producer prices Aug ∆%: 0.3 Aug 12-month ∆%: 4.2 Blog 10/7/18
Industrial Production	Aug Month ∆%: 1.0; 12 months ∆%: 0.9 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15
Retail Sales	Aug month ∆%: -0.2 Aug 12 months ∆%: 1.8 Earlier Data: Blog 3/15/15
Confidence and Economic Sentiment Indicator	Sentiment 112.3 Jun 2018 Consumer -0.5 Jun 2018 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15
Trade	Jan-Aug 2018/Jan-Aug 2017 Exports ∆%: 4.2 Imports ∆%: 5.3 Aug 2018 12-month Exports ∆% 9.2 Imports ∆% 10.3 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table EUR: 10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

8/12/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

8/5/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html

6/10/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

5/20/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

9/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/11/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

12/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html

11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html

6/12/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

3/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html

3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

12/13/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

VE Germany. The Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis) is updating GDP calculations (https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_299_811.html): “As every year in August, new statistical information was incorporated in the calculations of results for the last four years (from 2014) and for the first quarter of 2018 (see table "Comparison between previous and new figures: gross domestic product, price-adjusted, chain-linked") in the context of the first calculation of data for the second quarter of 2018. As is usual for seasonally and calendar-adjusted series, modified results may also appear in the whole time series from 1991 onwards.” Table VE-DE provides yearly growth rates of the German economy from 1971 to 2017, price adjusted chain-linked and price and calendar-adjusted chain-linked. Germany’s GDP fell 5.6 percent in 2009 after growing below trend at 1.1 percent in 2008. Recovery has been robust in contrast with other advanced economies. The German economy grew at 4.1 percent in 2010, 3.7 percent in 2011 and 0.5 percent in 2012. Growth stabilized to 0.5 percent in 2013, increasing to 2.2 percent in 2014. The German economy grew at 1.7 percent in 2015 and grew at 2.2 percent in 2016. Germany’s GDP increased 2.2 percent in 2017.

The Federal Statistical Agency of Germany analyzes the fall and recovery of the German economy (http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/Inlandsprodukt/Aktuell,templateId=renderPrint.psml):

“The German economy again grew strongly in 2011. The price-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 3.0% compared with the previous year. Accordingly, the catching-up process of the German economy continued during the second year after the economic crisis. In the course of 2011, the price-adjusted GDP again exceeded its pre-crisis level. The economic recovery occurred mainly in the first half of 2011. In 2009, Germany experienced the most serious post-war recession, when GDP suffered a historic decline of 5.1%. The year 2010 was characterised by a rapid economic recovery (+3.7%).”

Table VE-DE, Germany, GDP ∆% on Prior Year

	Price Adjusted Chain-Linked	Price- and Calendar-Adjusted Chain Linked
Average ∆% 1991-2017	1.4
Average ∆% 1991-1999	1.5
Average ∆% 2000-2007	1.4
Average ∆% 2003-2007	2.2
Average ∆% 2007-2017	1.2
Average ∆% 2009-2017	2.1
2017	2.2	2.5
2016	2.2	2.2
2015	1.7	1.5
2014	2.2	2.2
2013	0.5	0.6
2012	0.5	0.7
2011	3.7	3.7
2010	4.1	3.9
2009	-5.6	-5.6
2008	1.1	0.8
2007	3.3	3.4
2006	3.7	3.9
2005	0.7	0.9
2004	1.2	0.7
2003	-0.7	-0.7
2002	0.0	0.0
2001	1.7	1.8
2000	3.0	3.2
1999	2.0	1.8
1998	2.0	1.8
1997	1.8	1.9
1996	0.8	0.9
1995	1.7	1.8
1994	2.5	2.5
1993	-1.0	-1.0
1992	1.9	1.5
1991	5.1	5.2
1990	5.3	5.5
1989	3.9	4.0
1988	3.7	3.4
1987	1.4	1.3
1986	2.3	2.3
1985	2.3	2.6
1984	2.8	2.9
1983	1.6	1.5
1982	-0.4	-0.5
1981	0.5	0.6
1980	1.4	1.3
1979	4.2	4.3
1978	3.0	3.1
1977	3.3	3.5
1976	4.9	4.5
1975	-0.9	-0.9
1974	0.9	1.0
1973	4.8	5.0
1972	4.3	4.3
1971	3.1	3.0
1970	NA	NA

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Destatis)

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/NationalAccounts.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/DomesticProduct/CurrentRevision.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/Methods/NationalAccountRevision/Revision2014_BackgroundPaper.pdf?__blob=publicationFile

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/02/PE14_048_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/08/PE13_278_811.html https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/11/PE13_381_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/01/PE14_016_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressekonferenzen/2014/BIP2013/Pressebroschuere_BIP2013.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/05/PE14_167_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/09/PE14_306_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/11/PE14_401_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/02/PE15_048_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/02/PE15_61_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/05/PE15_173_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/05/PE15_187_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/08/PE15_293_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/08/PE15_305_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/11/PE15_419_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2015/11/PE15_430_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/DomesticProduct/DomesticProduct.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/02/PE16_056_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/02/PE16_044_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/05/PE16_162_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/05/PE16_171_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_279_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/08/PE16_291_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/11/PE16_403_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2016/11/PE16_413_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_050_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_062_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/05/PE17_155_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/05/PE17_169_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/08/PE17_277_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/08/PE17_294_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/11/PE17_422_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/02/PE18_044_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/05/PE18_168_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/02/PE18_058_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/05/PE18_182_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_299_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2018/08/PE18_316_811.html

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/NationalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/NationalAccounts.html

The Flash Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Flash Germany PMI^®, combining manufacturing and services, decreased from 55.6 in Aug to 55.3 in Sep. The index of manufacturing output reached 53.2 in Sep, decreasing from 56.6 in Aug, while the index of services increased to 56.5 in Sep from 55.0 in Aug. The overall Flash Germany Manufacturing PMI^® decreased from 55.9 in Aug to 53.7 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/72e0ddce9d2b47e5b02edad840b357a2). New orders stabilized and new export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds consistent growth of the private sector of Germany (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/72e0ddce9d2b47e5b02edad840b357a2). The IHS Markit Germany Composite Output Index of the IHS Markit Germany Services PMI^®, combining manufacturing and services with close association with Germany’s GDP, decreased from 55.6 in Aug to 55.0 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/55f726566fd342b0814f7e32ab2b6558). Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds growth of Germany (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/55f726566fd342b0814f7e32ab2b6558). The Germany Services Business Activity Index increased from 55.0 in Aug to 55.9 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/55f726566fd342b0814f7e32ab2b6558). The IHS Markit/BME Germany Purchasing Managers’ Index^® (PMI^®), showing close association with Germany’s manufacturing conditions, decreased from 55.9 in Aug to 53.7 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/254cbe5edf3644a8ae8650b0c0410eaa). New export orders decreased. Phil Smith, Principal Economist at IHS Markit, finds continuing growth conditions (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/254cbe5edf3644a8ae8650b0c0410eaa). Table DE provides the country data table for Germany.

Table DE, Germany, Economic Indicators

GDP	IIQ2018 0.5 ∆%; IIQ2018/IIQ2017 NCSA ∆% 2.3 CA 2.0 2016/2015: 2.2% 2017/2016: 2.2 CA 2.5 GDP ∆% 1970-2017 Blog 8/26/12 5/27/12 11/25/12 2/24/13 5/19/13 5/26/13 8/18/13 8/25/13 11/17/13 11/24/13 1/26/14 2/16/14 3/2/14 5/18/14 5/25/14 8/17/14 9/7/14 11/16/14 11/30/14 2/15/15 3/1/15 5/17/15 5/24/15 8/16/15 8/30/15 11/22/15 11/29/15 2/14/16 2/28/16 5/15/16 5/29/16 8/14/16 8/28/16 11/20/16 11/27/16 2/19/17 02/26/17 05/14/17 5/28/17 8/20/17 8/27/17 11/26/17 2/18/18 2/25/18 5/20/18 5/27/18 8/19/18 9/2/18
Consumer Price Index	Sep month NSA ∆%: 0.4 Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: 2.3 Blog 10/21/18
Producer Price Index	Jun month ∆%: 0.3 NSA, 0.3 CSA 12-month NSA ∆%: 3.0 Blog 8/26/18
Industrial Production	MFG Aug month CSA ∆%: minus 0.1 12-month NSA: -0.7 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15
Machine Orders	MFG Aug month ∆%: 2.0 Aug 12-month ∆%: -2.3 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15
Retail Sales	Aug Month ∆% -0.1 Jul -1.1 12-Month Aug % 1.6 Jul 0.9 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15
Employment Report	Unemployment Rate SA Aug 3.4% Blog 10/7/18
Trade Balance	Exports Aug 12-month NSA ∆%: 2.2 Imports Aug 12 months NSA ∆%: 6.2 Exports Aug month CSA ∆%: minus 0.1; Imports Aug month CSA minus 2.7 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15

Links to blog comments in Table DE: 9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

8/5/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html

7/22/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html

5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html

5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

5/14/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

02/19/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

11/13/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html

11/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html

8/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/and-as-ever-economic-outlook-is.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html

11/22/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html

08/30/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuations-of-global-financial.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

5/24/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

9/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/competitive-monetary-policy-and.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

1/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.html

11/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html

8/18/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html

VF France. Table VF-FR provides growth rates of GDP of France with the estimates of Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE). The long-term rate of GDP growth of France from IVQ1949 to IIQ2018 is quite high at 3.1 percent. France’s growth rates were quite high in the four decades of the 1950s, 1960, 1970s and 1980s with an average growth rate of 4.0 percent compounding the average rates in the decades and discounting to one decade. The growth impulse diminished with 2.0 percent in the 1990s and 1.8 percent from 2000 to 2007. The average growth rate from 2000 to 2017, using fourth quarter data, is 1.2 percent because of the sharp impact of the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in US fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in the G7 in Japan and France in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Lucas (2011May) compares growth of the G7 economies (US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada) and Spain, finding that catch-up growth with earlier rates for the US and UK stalled in the 1970s.

Table VF-FR, France, Average Growth Rates of GDP Fourth Quarter, 1949-2016

Period	Average ∆%
1949-2018	3.1
2007-2018****	0.8
2007-2017***	0.8
2007-2016**	0.6
2007-2015*	0.5
2007-2014	0.4
2000-2017	1.2
2000-2016	1.1
2000-2015	1.1
2000-2014	1.1
2000-2007	1.8
1990-1999	2.0
1980-1989	2.6
1970-1979	3.7
1960-1969	5.7
1950-1959	4.2

*IVQ2007 to IVQ2015 **IVQ2007 to IVQ2016 ***IVQ2007 to IVQ2017 ****IVQ2007 to IIQ2018

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3602903 https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3592635

http://www.bdm.insee.fr/bdm2/choixTheme?request_locale=en&code=10#arbo:montrerbranches=theme312

The IHS Markit Flash France Composite Output Index decreased from 54.9 in Aug to 53.6 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1982ef2766de4ce585ed6d0a8df4965a). Sam Teague, Economist at IHS Markit, finds continuing activity (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/1982ef2766de4ce585ed6d0a8df4965a). The IHS Markit France Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing with close association with French GDP, decreased from 54.9 in Aug to 54.0 in Sep, indicating activity of the private sector (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/91719ec21fee4ab08d71fd148af9f80b). Tim Moore, Economics Associate Director at IHS Markit that compiles the France Services PMI^®, finds continuing growth (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/91719ec21fee4ab08d71fd148af9f80b). The IHS Markit France Services Activity index decreased from 55.4 in Aug to 54.8 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/91719ec21fee4ab08d71fd148af9f80b). The IHS Markit France Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index^® decreased to 52.5 in Sep from 53.5 in Aug (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/4dadc82f9fa4492b84b8629d8f3dc1d1). Tim Moore, Associate Director at IHS Markit, finds slowing manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/4dadc82f9fa4492b84b8629d8f3dc1d1). Table FR provides the country data table for France.

Table FR, France, Economic Indicators

CPI	Sep month ∆% -0.2 12 months ∆%: 2.2 10/14/18
PPI	Aug month ∆%: 0.2 Aug 12 months ∆%: 3.6 Blog 10/7/18
GDP Growth	IIQ2018/IQ2018 ∆%: 0.2 IIQ2018/IIQ2017 ∆%: 1.7 Blog 3/31/13 5/19/12 6/30/13 9/29/13 11/17/13 12/29/13 2/16/14 4/6/14 5/18/14 6/29/14 8/17/14 9/28/14 11/16/14 12/28/14 2/15/15 3/29/15 5/17/15 6/28/15 8/16/15 9/27/15 11/15/15 12/27/15 1/31/16 2/28/16 3/27/16 5/1/16 6/5/16 06/26/16 8/7/16 9/4/16 9/25/16 10/30/16 12/4/16 1/1/17 2/12/17 3/5/17 3/26/17 5/7/17 6/4/17 6/25/17 8/20/17 9/3/17 11/12/17 12/10/17 12/31/17 2/11/18 3/4/18 4/1/18 5/6/18 6/3/18 6/24/18 9/2/18
Industrial Production	Aug ∆%: Manufacturing 0.6 Quarter ∆%: 1.1 YOY 1.9 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15
Consumer Spending	Manufactured Goods Aug ∆%: 1.2 12-Month Manufactured Goods ∆%: 1.9 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15
Employment	Unemployment Rate: IIQ2018 8.7% Blog 8/19/18
Trade Balance	Aug Exports ∆%: month -0.1 12 months 3.3 Imports ∆%: month 4.9 12 months 5.8 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15
Confidence Indicators	Historical average 100 Aug Mfg Business Climate 110 Earlier Data: Blog 3/29/15

Links to blog comments in Table FR: 10/14/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html

10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

7/29/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html

6/24/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

6/3/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

04/01/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html

3/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

11/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/25/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html

6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

5/7/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

3/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

2/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html

10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html

9/25/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html

9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html

8/7/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html

6/26/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html

6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

3/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html

12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html

11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html

9/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

6/28/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

9/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

12/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

6/30/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

5/19/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

VG Italy. Table VG-IT provides revised percentage changes of GDP in Italy of quarter on prior quarter and quarter on same quarter a year earlier. In IIQ2018, the GDP of Italy increased 0.2 percent and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2018 and increased 1.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.3 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2017, the GDP of Italy increased 0.4 percent and increased 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2017 and increased 1.3 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2016, the GDP of Italy increased 0.5 percent and increased 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2016, GDP increased 0.1 percent and increased 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2016 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IVQ2015 and increased 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2015, GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2015 and 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP changed 0.0 percent in IVQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy changed 0.0 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2013 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2013 and fell 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIQ2013 and fell 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy’s GDP fell 1.0 percent in IQ2013 and declined 2.9 percent relative to IQ2012. GDP had been growing during six consecutive quarters but at very low rates from IQ2010 to IIQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell in seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at increasingly higher rates of contraction from 0.6 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IVQ2011, 0.9 percent in IQ2012, 0.9 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012. The pace of decline accelerated to minus 0.6 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 1.0 percent in IQ2013. GDP contracted cumulatively 5.3 percent in seven consecutive quarterly contractions from IIIQ2011 to IQ2013 at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.1 percent. The yearly rate has fallen from 2.2 percent in IVQ2010 to minus 2.8 percent in IVQ2012, minus 2.9 percent in IQ2013, minus 2.0 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 1.2 percent in IIIQ2013. GDP fell 0.8 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IIQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2014 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.9 percent in IIQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.2 percent in IVQ2015 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.2 percent in IQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 0.8 percent in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2016 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.0 percent in IVQ2016 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.3 percent in IQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.6 percent in IIQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.7 percent in IIIQ2017 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.6 percent in IVQ2017 relative to a year earlier. GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2018 relative to a year earlier and increased 1.2 percent in IIQ2018 relative to a year earlier. Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy in IIQ2018 of €402,976.4 million (https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/220583) is lower by 5.3 percent relative to €425,734.7 million in IQ2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). Using seasonally and calendar adjusted chained volumes in the dataset of EUROSTAT (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat), the GDP of Italy increased from €368,105.8 million in IQ1998 to €425,734.7 million in IQ2008 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. The fiscal adjustment of Italy is significantly more difficult with the economy not growing especially on the prospects of increasing government revenue. The strategy is for reforms to improve productivity, facilitating future fiscal consolidation.

Table VG-IT, Italy, GDP ∆%

	Quarter ∆% Relative to Preceding Quarter	Quarter ∆% Relative to Same Quarter Year Earlier
IIQ2018	0.2	1.2
IQ2018	0.3	1.4
IVQ2017	0.3	1.6
IIIQ2017	0.4	1.7
IIQ2017	0.4	1.6
IQ2017	0.5	1.3
IVQ2016	0.5	1.0
IIIQ2016	0.2	0.8
IIQ2016	0.1	0.8
IQ2016	0.2	1.2
IVQ2015	0.3	1.2
IIIQ2015	0.2	0.9
IIQ2015	0.4	0.9
IQ2015	0.2	0.4
IVQ2014	0.0	0.2
IIIQ2014	0.2	0.1
IIQ2014	-0.1	0.2
IQ2014	0.0	0.3
IVQ2013	-0.1	-0.8
IIIQ2013	0.3	-1.2
IIQ2013	0.0	-2.0
IQ2013	-1.0	-2.9
IVQ2012	-0.6	-2.8
IIIQ2012	-0.5	-3.1
IIQ2012	-0.9	-3.2
IQ2012	-0.9	-2.3
IVQ2011	-0.9	-1.1
IIIQ2011	-0.6	0.4
IIQ2011	0.1	1.6
IQ2011	0.3	2.0
IVQ2010	0.6	2.2
IIIQ2010	0.5	1.9
IIQ2010	0.5	1.9
IQ2010	0.4	0.6
IVQ2009	0.4	-2.6
IIIQ2009	0.6	-5.2
IIQ2009	-0.8	-7.0
IQ2009	-2.8	-7.2
IVQ2008	-2.3	-3.5
IIIQ2008	-1.4	-1.4
IIQ2008	-1.0	-0.1
IQ2008	1.1	0.8
IV2007	-0.1	-0.1
IIIQ2007	0.0	1.3
IIQ2007	-0.1	1.7
IQ2007	0.2	2.4

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/220583

The IHS Markit Italy Business Activity Index increased from 52.6 in Aug to 53.3 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/dd3e1738022d44f4bdabce9147943717). Paul Smith, Economics Director at IHS Markit that compiles the Italy Services PMI^®, finds consistent condition (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/dd3e1738022d44f4bdabce9147943717). The IHS Markit Italy Purchasing Managers’ Index^® (PMI^®), decreased from 50.1 in Aug to 50.0 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6b0b6e2c793c4ee4b9c448ecc81e2098). New export orders increased. Paul Smith, Economics Director at HIS Markit that compiles the Italian Manufacturing PMI^®, finds stagnating manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/6b0b6e2c793c4ee4b9c448ecc81e2098). Table IT provides the country data table for Italy.

Table IT, Italy, Economic Indicators

Consumer Price Index	Sep month ∆% -0.5 12 months ∆% 1.4 Blog 10/21/18
Producer Price Index	Aug month ∆%: 0.5 Aug 12-month ∆%: 5.1 Blog 9/30/18
GDP Growth	IIQ2018/IQ2018 SA ∆%: 0.2 IIQ2018/IIQ2017 NSA ∆%: 1.2 Blog 3/17/13 6/16/13 8/11/13 9/15/13 11/17/13 12/15/13 2/16/14 3/16/14 5/18/14 6/15/14 8/10/14 8/31/14 10/19/14 11/16/14 12/7/14 2/15/15 3/15/15 5/17/15 5/31/15 8/16/15 9/6/15 11/15/15 12/6/15 2/14/16 3/6/16 5/15/16 6/5/16 8/14/16 9/11/16 11/20/16 12/4/16 02/26/17 3/12/17 5/21/17 6/4/17 8/20/17 9/3/17 11/26/17 12/10/17 2/18/18 3/11/18 5/20/18 6/10/18 9/9/18
Labor Report	Aug 2018 Participation rate 65.5% Employment ratio 59.0% Unemployment rate 9.7% Youth Unemployment 31.0% Blog 10/7/18
Industrial Production	Aug month ∆%: 1.7 12 months CA ∆%: -0.8 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15
Retail Sales	Aug month ∆%: 0.7 Aug 12-month ∆%: 2.2 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15
Business Confidence	Mfg Aug 104.8, Apr 107.5 Construction Aug 139.3, Apr 135.2 Earlier Data: Blog 4/5/15
Trade Balance	Balance Aug SA €3,546 million Exports Aug month SA ∆%: 2.9; Imports month ∆%: 0.4 Exports 12 months Aug NSA ∆%: 5.1 Imports 12 months NSA ∆%: 6.4 Earlier Data: Blog 4/19/15

Links to blog comments in Table IT: 10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/30/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html

9/16/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html

9/9/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/2/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

8/5/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html

5/20/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html

3/11/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html

2/18/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html

12/10/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

9/3/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

8/20/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html

6/4/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

5/21/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html

3/12/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

12/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html

11/20/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html

9/11/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html

8/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html

6/5/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html

5/15/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/6/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html

2/14/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html

12/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html

11/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html

9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html

08/16/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/19/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html

2/15/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html

12/7/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html

11/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/fluctuating-financial-variables.html

10/19/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html

8/31/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopo7litical-and-financial-risks.html

8/10/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/volatility-of-valuations-of-risk_10.html

6/15/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html

5/18/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html

3/16/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html

2/16/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html

12/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html

11/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/risks-of-unwinding-monetary-policy.html

9/15/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

8/11/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/recovery-without-hiring-loss-of-full.html

6/16/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html

3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

VH United Kingdom. Annual data in Table VH-UK show the strong impact of the global recession in the UK with decline of GDP of 4.2 percent in 2009 after dropping 0.3 percent in 2008. Recovery of 1.7 percent in 2010 is relatively low in comparison with annual growth rates in 2007 and earlier years. Growth was only 1.6 percent in 2011 and 1.4 percent in 2012. Growth increased to 2.0 percent in 2013 and 2.9 percent in 2014. Growth fell to 2.3 percent in 2015, and 1.8 percent in 2016. GDP grew 1.7 percent in 2017. The bottom part of Table VH-UK provides average growth rates of UK GDP since 1948. The UK economy grew at 2.6 percent per year on average between 1948 and 2017, which is relatively high for an advanced economy. The growth rate of GDP between 2000 and 2007 is higher at 2.8 percent. Growth in the current cyclical expansion from 2010 to 2017 has been only at 2.0 percent as advanced economies struggle with weak internal demand and world trade. GDP in 2017 is higher by 11.4 percent relative to 2007 while it would have been 31.8 higher at trend of 2.8 percent as from 2000 to 2007.

Table VH-UK, UK, Gross Domestic Product, ∆%

	∆% on Prior Year
1998	3.3
1999	3.2
2000	3.5
2001	2.8
2002	2.5
2003	3.3
2004	2.3
2005	3.1
2006	2.5
2007	2.5
2008	-0.3
2009	-4.2
2010	1.7
2011	1.6
2012	1.4
2013	2.0
2014	2.9
2015	2.3
2016	1.8
2017	1.7
Average Growth Rates ∆% per Year
1948-2017	2.6
1950-1959	3.1
1960-1969	3.1
1970-1979	2.6
1980-1989	3.2
1990-1999	2.4
2000-2007	2.8
2007-2013*	2.1
2007-2014*	5.1
2007-2015	0.9
2007-2016	1.0
2007-2017	1.1
2000-2017	1.8

*Absolute change from 2007 to 2013 and 2007 to 2014

Source: UK Office for National Statistics

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/quarterlynationalaccounts/apriltojune2018

The HIS Markit Flash UK PMI^® Composite Output Index fell from 52.4 in Jun to 47.7 in Jul, which is the lowest in 87 months (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds the index suggests pace of contraction of GDP at 0.4 percent in IIIQ2016 (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Survey//PressRelease.mvc/b68c3686a48c40198505b81e4e55cd81). The Business Activity Index of the IHS Markit/CIPS UK Services PMI^® decreased from 54.3 in Aug to 53.9 in Sep (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/baf2b9734d8d4194a8d5a39f0f26a3f4). Chris Williamson, Chief Business Economist at IHS Markit, finds growth at 0.4 percent (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/baf2b9734d8d4194a8d5a39f0f26a3f4). The IHS Markit/CIPS UK Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index^® (PMI^®) increased to 53.8 in Sep from 53.0 in Aug (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/3b66306ed7584d15a46aad546e0c0a42). New export orders increased. Rob Dobson, Director at IHS Markit that compiles the Markit/CIPS Manufacturing PMI^®, finds improving manufacturing (https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/3b66306ed7584d15a46aad546e0c0a42). Table UK provides the economic indicators for the United Kingdom.

Table UK, UK Economic Indicators

CPI	Sep month ∆%: 0.1 Sep 12-month ∆%: 2.4 Blog 10/21/18
Output/Input Prices	Output Prices: Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: 3.1; excluding food, petroleum ∆%: 2.4 Input Prices: Sep 12-month NSA ∆%: 10.3 Excluding ∆%: 6.2 Blog 10/21/18
GDP Growth	IIQ2018 prior quarter ∆% 0.4; year earlier same quarter ∆%: 1.2 Blog 3/31/13 4/28/13 5/26/13 7/28/13 8/25/13 9/29/13 10/27/13 12/1/13 12/22/13 2/2/14 3/2/14 4/6/14 5/4/14 5/25/14 6/29/14 7/27/14 8/17/14 10/5/14 10/26/14 11/30/14 12/28/14 2/1/15 3/1/15 4/5/15 5/3/15 5/31/15 7/5/15 8/2/15 9/6/15 10/4/15 11/1/15 11/29/15 12/27/15 1/31/16 2/28/16 4/3/16 5/1/16 5/29/16 7/3/16 7/31/16 9/4/16 10/9/16 10/30/16 11/27/16 1/1/17 2/5/17 2/26/17 4/9/17 5/7/2017 5/28/17 7/9/17 7/30/17 8/19/17 10/8/17 10/29/17 11/26/17 12/31/17 2/4/18 2/25/18 4/8/18 5/6/18 5/2718 7/8/18 8/19/18 10/7/18
Industrial Production	Aug 2018/Aug 2017 ∆%: Production Industries 1.3; Manufacturing 1.3 Earlier Data: Blog 4/12/15
Retail Sales	Sep month ∆%: -0.8 Sep 12-month ∆%: 3.0 Earlier Data: Blog 4/26/15
Labor Market	Jun-Aug 2018 Unemployment Rate: 4.0% Blog 9/16/18 LMGDP 5/17/15
GDP and the Labor Market	IQ2015 Employment 104.8 IQ2008 =100 GDP IQ15=104.0 IQ2008=100 Blog 5/17/14
Trade Balance UK Trade in Goods and Services	Balance SA Aug -£11,195 million Exports Aug ∆%: 1.4; Aug 12 M ∆%: 5.6 Imports Aug ∆%: 3.1 Aug 12M ∆%: 2.9 EARLIER DATA: Blog 4/12/15

Links to blog comments in Table UK: 10/7/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

9/23/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

8/19/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html

7/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

5/27/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.html

5/6/2018 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

4/8/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html

2/25/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

2/4/18 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html

12/31/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html

11/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html

10/29/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/dollar-revaluation-and-increase-of.html

10/8/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

8/27/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/dollar-devaluation-and-interest-rate.html

7/30/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html

7/9/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html

5/28/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

2/26/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

2/5/17 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html

1/1/17 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html

11/27/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html

10/30/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_30.html

10/9/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html

9/4/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html

7/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/business-fixed-investment-has-been-soft.html

7/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html

5/29/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/appropriate-for-fed-to-increase.html

5/1/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/economic-activity-appears-to-have.html

4/3/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html

2/28/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

1/31/16 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html

12/27/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html

11/29/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html

11/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-increase-considered.html

10/4/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html

9/6/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html

08/02/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html

7/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html

5/31/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/dollar-revaluation-squeezing-corporate.html

5/17/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html

5/3/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html

4/26/2015 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/imf-view-of-economy-and-finance-united.html

4/12/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html

4/5/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html

3/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html

2/1/15 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/financial-and-international.html

12/28/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

11/30/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html

10/26/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html

10/5/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html

8/17/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html

7/27/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

6/29/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html

5/25/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

5/4/2014 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html

4/6/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html

3/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html

2/2/14 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html

12/22/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html

12/1/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/exit-risks-of-zero-interest-rates-world.html

10/27/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/10/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html

9/29/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

8/25/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html

7/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/duration-dumping-steepening-yield-curve.html

5/26/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

4/28/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html

03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

Table VH-L3 provides indicators of the labor force survey of the UK for May-Jul 2018 and earlier quarters. There has been improvement in UK labor markets with the rate of unemployment decreasing from 4.3 percent in Jun-Aug 2017 to 4.0 percent in Jun-Aug 2018.

Table VH-L3, UK, Labor Force Survey Indicators, Thousands, SA

	LFHP	EMP	PART	UNE	RATE
Jun-Aug 2016	41,028	31,788	74.5	1,658	5.0
Jun-Aug 2017	41,154	32,105	75.1	1,443	4.3
Sep-Nov 2017	41,177	32,207	75.3	1,439	4.3
Dec-Feb 2018	41,201	32,262	75.4	1,423	4.2
Mar-May 2018	41,224	32,399	75.7	1,411	4.2
Jun-Aug 2018	41,247	32,394	75.5	1,363	4.0
∆ on Quarter	22	-5	-0.1	-47	-0.1
∆%	0.1	0.0		-3.4
∆ on Year	92	289	0.4	-79	-0.3
∆%	0.2	0.9		-5.5

Notes: LFHP: Labor Force Household Population Ages 16 to 64 in thousands; EMP: Employed Ages 16 and over in thousands; PART: Employment as % of Population Ages 16 to 64; UNE: Unemployed Ages 16 and over in thousands; Rate: Number Unemployed Ages 16 and over as % of Employed plus Unemployed

Source: UK Office for National Statistics

https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/october2018

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