Monday, August 3, 2020


Contraction of United States GDP at 32.9 Percent SAAR in First Quarter 2020 in the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, Mediocre Cyclical United States Growth in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Contraction of Real Private Fixed Investment at 29.9 Percent SAAR, United States Terms of Trade, Beginning Recovery in United States New House Sales, United States House Prices, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part III

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth
            IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment
IID United States Terms of International Trade
IIA United States Housing Collapse
            IIA1 Sales of New Houses
            IIA2 United States House Prices
III World Financial Turbulence
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. The DJIA has increased 172.8 percent since the trough of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe on Jul 16, 2010 to Jul 31, 2020; S&P 500 has gained 219.9 percent and DAX 117.2 percent. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 07/31/20” in Table VI-4 had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 followed by negative performance but now some valuations of equity indexes show varying behavior. China’s Shanghai Composite is 38.9 percent above the trough.  Japan’s Nikkei Average is 146.0 percent above the trough. Dow Global is 71.7 percent above the trough. STOXX 50 of 50 blue-chip European equities (https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=sx5E) is 26.8 percent above the trough. NYSE Financial Index is 61.1 percent above the trough. DAX index of German equities (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DAX:IND) is 117.2 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 146.0 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 90.6 percent above the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 21,710.00 on Jul 31, 2020 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 111.7 percent higher than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar appreciated 1.2 percent relative to the euro. The dollar devalued before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 07/31/20” in Table VI-4 shows increase of 3.5 percent for China’s Shanghai Composite. The Nikkei decreased 4.6 percent. NYSE Financial decreased 0.7 percent in the week. Dow Global decreased 1.0 percent in the week of Jul 31, 2020. The DJIA decreased 0.2 percent and S&P 500 increased 1.7 percent. DAX of Germany decreased 4.1 percent. STOXX 50 decreased 3.2 percent. The USD depreciated 1.1 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table VI-4 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 07/31/20” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to Jul 31, 2020. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 07/31/20” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 07/31/20.” There are now several equity indexes above the peak in Table VI-4: DJIA 135.9 percent, S&P 500 168.7 percent, DAX 94.5 percent, Dow Global 40.1 percent, NYSE Financial Index (https://www.nyse.com/quote/index/NYK.ID) 28.3 percent and Nikkei Average 90.6 percent. STOXX 50 is 7.4 percent above the peak. Shanghai Composite is 4.6 percent above the peak. The Shanghai Composite increased 67.6 percent from March 12, 2014, to Jul 31, 2020. The US dollar strengthened 22.1 percent relative to the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010.
Table VI-4, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and Ten-Year Treasury  

Peak
Trough
∆% to Trough
∆% Peak to 07/31/
/20
∆% Week 07/31/20
∆% Trough to 07/31/
20
DJIA
4/26/
10
7/2/10
-13.6
135.9
-0.2
172.8
S&P 500
4/23/
10
7/20/
10
-16.0
168.7
1.7
219.9
NYSE Finance
4/15/
10
7/2/10
-20.3
28.3
-0.7
61.1
Dow Global
4/15/
10
7/2/10
-18.4
40.1
-1.0
71.7
Asia Pacific
4/15/
10
7/2/10
-12.5
NA
NA
NA
Japan Nikkei Aver.
4/05/
10
8/31/
10
-22.5
90.6
-4.6
146.0
China Shang.
4/15/
10
7/02
/10
-24.7
4.6
3.5
38.9
STOXX 50
4/15/10
7/2/10
-15.3
7.4
-3.2
26.8
DAX
4/26/
10
5/25/
10
-10.5
94.5
-4.1
117.2
Dollar
Euro
11/25 2009
6/7
2010
21.2
22.1
-1.1
1.2
DJ UBS Comm.
1/6/
10
7/2/10
-14.5
NA
NA
NA
10-Year T Note
4/5/
10
4/6/10
3.986
2.784
2.658
0.540
T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)
Table VI-6, updated with every blog comment, shows that exchange rate valuations affect a large variety of countries, in fact, almost the entire world, in magnitudes that cause major problems for domestic monetary policy and trade flows. Dollar devaluation/fluctuation is expected to continue because of zero fed funds rate, expectations of rising inflation, large budget deficit of the federal government (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703907004576279321350926848.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) and now near zero interest rates indefinitely but with interruptions caused by risk aversion events. The euro has devalued 35.0 percent relative to the US dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Jul 31, 2020. There are complex economic, financial and political effects of the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union or BREXIT after the referendum on Jun 23, 2016 (https://next.ft.com/eu-referendum for extensive coverage by the Financial Times). The British pound (GBP) devalued 6.1 percent from the trough of USD/₤1.388 on Jan 2, 2009 to USD/₤1.3085 on Jul 31, 2020 and devalued 53.3 percent from the high of USD/₤2.006 on Jul 15, 2008, exchange rate changes measuring ₤/USD.  Such similar event occurred in the week of Sep 23, 2011 reversing the devaluation of the dollar in the form of sharp appreciation of the dollar relative to other currencies from all over the world including the offshore Chinese yuan market. The Bank of England reduced the Bank Rate to 0.25 percent on Aug 4, 2016, and announced new measures of quantitative easing
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2016/008.aspx). The Bank of England increased the policy interest rate by 0.25 percentage points to 0.75 percent at the meeting of its Monetary Policy Committee on Aug 1, 2018 (https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-summary-and-minutes/2018/august-2018). Column “Peak” in Table VI-6 shows exchange rates during the crisis year of 2008. There was a flight to safety in dollar-denominated government assets because of the arguments in favor of TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). This is evident in various exchange rates that depreciated sharply against the dollar such as the South African rand (ZAR) at the peak of depreciation of ZAR 11.578/USD on Oct 22, 2008. Subsequently, the ZAR appreciated to the trough of ZAR 7.238/USD by Aug 15, 2010 but now depreciating 135.9 percent to ZAR 17.0714/USD on Jul 31, 2020, which is depreciation of 47.4 percent relative to Oct 22, 2008. An example from Asia is the Singapore Dollar (SGD) that depreciated at the peak of SGD 1.553/USD on Mar 3, 2009. The SGD depreciated by 13.2 percent to the trough of SGD 1.348/USD on Aug 9, 2010 but is now depreciating 2.0 percent at SGD 1.3747/USD on Jul 24, 2020 relative to the trough of depreciation but still stronger by 11.5 percent relative to the peak of depreciation on Mar 3, 2009. Another example is the Brazilian real (BRL) that depreciated at the peak to BRL 2.43/USD on Dec 5, 2008. The BRL appreciated 28.5 percent to the trough at BRL 1.737/USD on Apr 30, 2010, showing depreciation of 200.7 percent relative to the trough to BRL 5.2232/USD on Jul 24, 2020 but depreciating by 114.9 percent relative to the peak on Dec 5, 2008. At one point in 2011, the Brazilian real traded at BRL 1.55/USD and in the week of Sep 23 surpassed BRL 1.90/USD in intraday trading for depreciation of more than 20 percent. The Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), Brazil’s central bank, decreased its policy rate SELIC for ten consecutive meetings (http://www.bcb.gov.br/?INTEREST) of its monetary policy committee, COPOM. Brazil’s central bank reduced the SELIC rate at its most recent meeting (https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/pressdetail/2336/nota):
“231st Meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) of the Central Bank of Brazil Press Release
06/16/2020
In its 231st meeting, the COPOM unanimously decided to lower the Selic rate to 2.25 percent per year” (https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/pressdetail/2336/nota). The Banco Central do Brasil is engaging in repurchase operations in foreign currency beginning Mar 18, 2020 (https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/pressdetail/2319/nota). The monetary authorities also provides multiple measures to face the COVID-19 event (https://www.bcb.gov.br/en/pressdetail/2322/nota). The Banco Central do Brasil also engaged in FX auctions (http://www.bcb.gov.br/en/#!/c/news/1828):
“BC announces FX auctions program 22/08/2013 6:44:00 PM
With the aim of providing FX ‘hedge” (protection) to the economic agents and liquidity to the FX market, the Banco Central do Brasil informs that a program of FX swap auctions and US dollar sale auctions with repurchase program will begin, as of Friday, August 23. This program will last, at least, until December 31, 2013. The swap auctions will occur every Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, when US$500 million will be offered per day. On Fridays, a credit line of US$1 billion will be offered to the market, through sale auctions with repurchase agreement. If it is considered appropriate, the Banco Central do Brasil will carry out additional operations.”
Jeffrey T. Lewis, writing on “Brazil steps up battle to curb real’s rise,” on Mar 1, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203986604577255793224099580.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes new measures by Brazil to prevent further appreciation of its currency, including the extension of the tax on foreign capital for three years terms, subsequently broadened to five years, and intervention in the foreign exchange market by the central bank. Jeff Fick, writing on “Brazil shifts tack to woo wary investors,” on Jun 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324299104578527000680111188.html), analyzes the lifting in the week of Jun 7, 2013, of the tax on foreign transactions designed in Oct 2010 to contain the flood of foreign capital into Brazil that overvalued its currency. Jeffrey T. Lewis, writing on “Brazil’s real closes weaker,” on Jun 14, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323734304578545680335302180.html), analyzes measures to contain accelerated depreciation such as currency swaps and the lifting of the 1 percent tax on exchange derivatives on Jun 12, 2013. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing creates trends such as the depreciation of the dollar followed by Table VI-6 but with abrupt reversals during risk aversion. The main effects of unconventional monetary policy are on valuations of risk financial assets and not necessarily on consumption and investment or aggregate demand.
Table VI-6, Exchange Rates

Peak
Trough
∆% P/T
Jul 31, 2020
   ∆% T
Jul 31, 2020
∆% P
Jul 31,
2020
EUR USD
7/15
2008
6/7 2010

07/31/2020


Rate
1.59
1.192

1.1781


∆%


-33.4

-1.2
-35.0
JPY USD
8/18
2008
9/15
2010

07/31/2020


Rate
110.19
83.07

105.84


∆%


24.6

-27.4
3.9
CHF USD
11/21 2008
12/8 2009

07/31/2020


Rate
1.225
1.025

0.9134


∆%


16.3

10.9
25.4
USD GBP
7/15
2008
1/2/ 2009

07/31/2020


Rate
2.006
1.388

1.3085


∆%


-44.5

-6.1
-53.3
USD AUD
7/15 2008
10/27 2008

07/31/2020


Rate
1.0215
1.6639

0.7142


∆%


-62.9

15.8
-37.1
ZAR USD
10/22 2008
8/15
2010

07/31/2020


Rate
11.578
7.238

17.0714


∆%


37.5
-135.9
-47.4
SGD USD
3/3
2009
8/9
2010

07/31/2020


Rate
1.553
1.348

1.3747


∆%


13.2

-2.0
11.5
HKD USD
8/15 2008
12/14 2009

07/31/2020


Rate
7.813
7.752

7.7506


∆%


0.8

0.0
0.8
BRL USD
12/5 2008
4/30 2010

07/31/2020


Rate
2.43
1.737

5.2232


∆%


28.5

-200.7
-114.9
CZK USD
2/13 2009
8/6 2010

07/31/2020

Rate
22.19
18.693

22.289


∆%


15.7

-19.2
-0.4
SEK USD
3/4 2009
8/9 2010

07/31/2020
Rate
9.313
7.108

8.7826


∆%


23.7

-23.6
5.7
CNY USD
7/20 2005
7/15
2008

07/31/2020


Rate
8.2765
6.8211

6.9752
 -2.3
15.7
∆%


17.6

Symbols: USD: US dollar; EUR: euro; JPY: Japanese yen; CHF: Swiss franc; GBP: UK pound; AUD: Australian dollar; ZAR: South African rand; SGD: Singapore dollar; HKD: Hong Kong dollar; BRL: Brazil real; CZK: Czech koruna; SEK: Swedish krona; CNY: Chinese yuan; P: peak; T: trough
Note: percentages calculated with currencies expressed in units of domestic currency per dollar; negative sign means devaluation and no sign appreciation
Source:
 Table VI-7, updated with every blog comment, provides in the second column the yield at the close of market of the 10-year Treasury note on the date in the first column. The price in the third column is calculated with the coupon of 2.625 percent of the 10-year note current at the time of the second round of quantitative easing after Nov 3, 2010 and the final column “∆% 11/04/10” calculates the percentage change of the price on the date relative to that of 101.2573 at the close of market on Nov 4, 2010, one day after the decision on quantitative easing by the Fed on Nov 3, 2010. Prices with new coupons such as 2.0 percent in recent auctions (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/RI/OFAuctions?form=extended&cusip=912828RR3) are not comparable to prices in Table VI-7. The highest yield in the decade was 5.510 percent on May 1, 2001 that would result in a loss of principal of 22.9 percent relative to the price on Nov 4. Monetary policy has created a “duration trap” of bond prices. Duration is the percentage change in bond price resulting from a percentage change in yield or what economists call the yield elasticity of bond price. Duration is higher the lower the bond coupon and yield, all other things constant. This means that the price loss in a yield rise from low coupons and yields is much higher than with high coupons and yields. Intuitively, the higher coupon payments offset part of the price loss. Prices/yields of Treasury securities were affected by the combination of Fed purchases for its program of quantitative easing and by the flight to dollar-denominated assets because of geopolitical risks in the Middle East, subsequently by the tragic Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and now again by the sovereign risk doubts in Europe and the growth recession in the US and the world. The yield of 0.540 percent at the close of market on Fri Jul 31, 2020 would be equivalent to price of 120.2704 in a hypothetical bond maturing in 10 years with coupon of 2.625 percent for price increase of 18.8 percent relative to the price on Nov 4, 2010, one day after the decision on the second program of quantitative easing, as shown in the last row of Table VI-7. The price loss between Sep 7, 2012 and Sep 14, 2012 would have been 1.7 percent in just five trading days. The price loss between Jun 1, 2012 and Jun 8, 2012 would have been 1.6 percent, in just a week, and much higher with leverage of 10:1 as typical in Treasury positions. The price loss between Mar 9, 2012 and Mar 16, 2012 is 2.3 percent but much higher when using common leverage of 10:1. The price loss between Dec 28, 2012 and Jan 4, 2013 would have been 1.7 percent. These losses defy annualizing. If inflation accelerates, yields of Treasury securities may rise sharply. Yields are not observed without special yield-lowering effects such as the flight into dollars caused by the events in the Middle East, continuing purchases of Treasury securities by the Fed, the tragic Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 affecting Japan, recurring fears on European sovereign credit issues and worldwide risk aversion in the week of Sep 30 caused by “let’s twist again” monetary policy. There is a difficult climb from the record federal deficit of 9.8 percent of GDP in 2009 and cumulative deficit of $5090 billion in four consecutive years of deficits exceeding one trillion dollars from 2009 to 2012, which is the worst fiscal performance since World War II (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html and earlier Section IB at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html). There is no subsequent jump of debt in US peacetime history as the one from 39.4 percent of GDP in 2008 to 65.8 percent of GDP in 2011, 70.3 percent in 2012, 72.2 percent in 2013, 73.7 percent in 2014, 72.5 percent in 2015, 76.4 percent in 2016, 76.1 percent in 2017 and 77.8 percent in 2018 (https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html

 and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). The US is facing an unsustainable debt/GDP path (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html).
The Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, at the 61st Annual Meeting on the National Association for Business Economics, on Oct 28, 2019, in Denver, Colorado, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20191008a.htm): “Reserve balances are one among several items on the liability side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and demand for these liabilities—notably, currency in circulation—grows over time. Hence, increasing the supply of reserves or even maintaining a given level over time requires us to increase the size of our balance sheet. As we indicated in our March statement on balance sheet normalization, at some point, we will begin increasing our securities holdings to maintain an appropriate level of reserves.18 That time is now upon us.
I want to emphasize that growth of our balance sheet for reserve management purposes should in no way be confused with the large-scale asset purchase programs that we deployed after the financial crisis. Neither the recent technical issues nor the purchases of Treasury bills we are contemplating to resolve them should materially affect the stance of monetary policy, to which I now turn.” On October 25, 2017, at the beginning of the FOMC programmed reduction of the balance sheet, Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks stood at $4,461,117 million. Total Assets increased $2,487,915 million from $4,461,117 on Oct 25, 2017 to $6,949,032 on Jul 29, 2020. Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks increased from $3,981,420 million on Feb 20, 2019 to $6,949,032 million on Jul 29, 2020, by $2,967,612 million or 74.5 percent. The policy of reducing the fed funds policy rate requires increasing the balance sheet. The line “Securities Held Outright” increased from $4,019,823 million on Oct 25, 2017 to $6,229,291 on Jul 29, 2020 or $2,209,468 million. Securities Held Outright increased from $3,617,939 million on Jul 1, 2019 to $6,229,291 on Jul 29, 2020 by $2,611,352 million or 72.2 percent. The portfolio of long-term securities (“securities held outright”) for monetary policy consists primarily of $5866 billion, or $5.9 trillion, of which $3,661 billion Treasury nominal notes and bonds, $270 billion of notes and bonds inflation-indexed, $2 billion Federal agency debt securities and $1933 billion mortgage-backed securities ($1,933,380 million). Reserve balances deposited with Federal Reserve Banks reached $2685 billion ($2,685,376 million) or $2.7 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). The rounded values of $1649 billion of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks and mortgage-backed securities are identical on Dec 19, 2018, by pure coincidence. There is no simple exit of this trap created by the highest monetary policy accommodation in US history together with the highest deficits and debt in percent of GDP since World War II. Risk aversion from various sources, discussed in section III World Financial Turbulence, has been affecting financial markets for several months. The risk is that in a reversal of exposures because of increasing risk aversion that has been typical in this cyclical expansion of the economy yields of Treasury securities may back up sharply.
Table VI-7, Yield, Price and Percentage Change to November 4, 2010 of Ten-Year Treasury Note
Date
Yield
Price
∆% 11/04/10
05/01/01
5.510
78.0582
-22.9
06/10/03
3.112
95.8452
-5.3
06/12/07
5.297
79.4747
-21.5
12/19/08
2.213
104.4981
3.2
12/31/08
2.240
103.4295
2.1
03/19/09
2.605
100.1748
-1.1
06/09/09
3.862
89.8257
-11.3
10/07/09
3.182
95.2643
-5.9
11/27/09
3.197
95.1403
-6.0
12/31/09
3.835
90.0347
-11.1
02/09/10
3.646
91.5239
-9.6
03/04/10
3.605
91.8384
-9.3
04/05/10
3.986
88.8726
-12.2
08/31/10
2.473
101.3338
0.08
10/07/10
2.385
102.1224
0.8
10/28/10
2.658
99.7119
-1.5
11/04/10
2.481
101.2573
-
11/15/10
2.964
97.0867
-4.1
11/26/10
2.869
97.8932
-3.3
12/03/10
3.007
96.7241
-4.5
12/10/10
3.324
94.0982
-7.1
12/15/10
3.517
92.5427
-8.6
12/17/10
3.338
93.9842
-7.2
12/23/10
3.397
93.5051
-7.7
12/31/10
3.228
94.3923
-6.7
01/07/11
3.322
94.1146
-7.1
01/14/11
3.323
94.1064
-7.1
01/21/11
3.414
93.4687
-7.7
01/28/11
3.323
94.1064
-7.1
02/04/11
3.640
91.750
-9.4
02/11/11
3.643
91.5319
-9.6
02/18/11
3.582
92.0157
-9.1
02/25/11
3.414
93.3676
-7.8
03/04/11
3.494
92.7235
-8.4
03/11/11
3.401
93.4727
-7.7
03/18/11
3.273
94.5115
-6.7
03/25/11
3.435
93.1935
-7.9
04/01/11
3.445
93.1129
-8.0
04/08/11
3.576
92.0635
-9.1
04/15/11
3.411
93.3874
-7.8
04/22/11
3.402
93.4646
-7.7
04/29/11
3.290
94.3759
-6.8
05/06/11
3.147
95.5542
-5.6
05/13/11
3.173
95.3387
-5.8
05/20/11
3.146
95.5625
-5.6
05/27/11
3.068
96.2089
-4.9
06/03/11
2.990
96.8672
-4.3
06/10/11
2.973
97.0106
-4.2
06/17/11
2.937
97.3134
-3.9
06/24/11
2.872
97.8662
-3.3
07/01/11
3.186
95.2281
-5.9
07/08/11
3.022
96.5957
-4.6
07/15/11
2.905
97.5851
-3.6
07/22/11
2.964
97.0847
-4.1
07/29/11
2.795
98.5258
-2.7
08/05/11
2.566
100.5175
-0.7
08/12/11
2.249
103.3504
2.1
08/19/11
2.066
105.270
3.7
08/26/11
2.202
103.7781
2.5
09/02/11
1.992
105.7137
4.4
09/09/11
1.918
106.4055
5.1
09/16/11
2.053
101.5434
0.3
09/23/11
1.826
107.2727
5.9
09/30/11
1.912
106.4602
5.1
10/07/11
2.078
104.9161
3.6
10/14/11
2.251
103.3323
2.0
10/21/11
2.220
103.6141
2.3
10/28/11
2.326
102.6540
1.4
11/04/11
2.066
105.0270
3.7
11/11/11
2.057
105.1103
3.8
11/18/11
2.003
105.6113
4.3
11/25/11
1.964
105.9749
4.7
12/02/11
2.042
105.2492
3.9
12/09/11
2.065
105.0363
3.7
12/16/11
1.847
107.0741
5.7
12/23/11
2.027
105.3883
4.1
12/30/11
1.871
106.8476
5.5
01/06/12
1.957
106.0403
4.7
01/13/12
1.869
106.8664
5.5
01/20/12
2.026
105.3976
4.1
01/27/12
1.893
106.6404
5.3
02/03/12
1.923
106.3586
5.0
02/10/12
1.974
105.8815
4.6
02/17/12
2.000
105.6392
4.3
02/24/12
1.977
105.8535
4.5
03/02/12
1.977
105.8535
4.5
03/09/12
2.031
105.3512
4.0
03/16/12
2.294
102.9428
1.7
03/23/12
2.234
103.4867
2.2
03/30/12
2.214
103.6687
2.4
04/06/12
2.058
105.1010
3.8
04/13/12
1.987
105.7603
4.4
04/20/12
1.959
106.0216
4.7
04/27/12
1.931
106.2836
5.0
05/04/12
1.876
106.8004
5.5
05/11/12
1.845
107.0930
5.8
05/18/12
1.714
108.3393
7.0
05/25/12
1.738
108.1098
6.8
06/01/12
1.454
110.8618
9.5
06/08/12
1.635
109.0989
7.7
06/15/12
1.584
109.5924
8.2
06/22/12
1.676
108.7039
7.4
06/29/12
1.648
108.9734
7.6
07/06/12
1.548
109.9423
8.6
07/13/12
1.49
110.5086
9.1
07/20/12
1.459
110.8127
9.4
07/27/12
1.544
109.9812
8.6
08/03/12
1.569
109.7380
8.4
08/10/12
1.658
108.8771
7.5
08/17/12
1.814
107.3864
6.1
08/24/12
1.684
108.6270
7.3
08/31/12
1.543
109.9910
8.6
9/7/12
1.668
108.7808
7.4
9/14/12
1.863
106.9230
5.6
9/21/12
1.753
107.9666
6.6
9/28/12
1.631
109.1375
7.8
10/05/12
1.737
108.1193
6.8
10/12/12
1.663
108.8290
7.5
10/19/12
1.766
107.8426
6.5
10/26/12
1.748
108.0143
6.7
11/02/12
1.715
108.3297
7.0
11/09/12
1.614
109.3018
7.9
11/16/12
1.584
109.5924
8.2
11/23/12
1.691
108.5598
7.2
11/30/12
1.612
109.3211
7.9
12/7/12
1.625
109.1954
7.8
12/14/12
1.704
108.4351
7.1
12/21/12
1.770
107.8045
6.5
12/28/12
1.699
108.4831
7.1
1/4/13
1.898
106.5934
5.3
1/11/13
1.862
106.9324
5.6
1/18/13
1.840
107.1403
5.8
1/25/13
1.947
106.1338
4.8
2/1/13
2.024
105.4161
4.1
2/8/13
1.949
106.1151
4.8
2/15/13
2.007
105.5741
4.3
2/22/13
1.967
105.9469
4.6
3/1/13
1.842
107.1213
5.8
3/8/13
2.056
105.1195
3.8
3/15/13
1.992
105.7137
4.4
03/22/13
1.931
106.2836
5.0
03/29/13
1.847
107.0741
5.7
04/05/13
1.706
108.4160
7.1
04/12/13
1.719
108.2914
6.9
04/19/13
1.702
108.4543
7.1
04/26/13
1.663
108.8290
7.5
05/3/13
1.742
108.2436
6.9
05/10/13
1.896
106.6122
5.3
05/17/13
1.952
106.0870
4.8
05/24/13
2.009
105.5555
4.2
05/31/13
2.132
104.5015
3.2
06/07/13
2.174
104.0338
2.7
06/14/13
2.125
104.4831
3.2
06/21/13
2.542
100.7288
-0.5
06/28/13
2.486
101.2240
0.0
07/5/13
2.734
99.0519
-2.2
07/12/13
2.585
100.3505
-0.9
07/19/13
2.480
101.2772
0.0
07/26/13
2.565
100.5263
-0.7
08/2/13
2.597
100.2452
-1.0
8/9/13
2.579
100.4032
-0.8
8/16/13
2.829
98.2339
-3.0
8/23/13
2.818
98.3283
-2.9
8/30/13
2.784
98.6205
-2.6
9/6/13
2.941
97.2795
-3.9
9/13/13
2.890
97.7128
-3.5
9/20/13
2.734
99.0519
-2.2
9/27/13
2.626
99.9913
-1.3
10/4/13
2.645
99.8253
-1.4
10/11/13
2.688
99.4508
-1.8
10/18/13
2.588
100.3242
-0.9
10/25/13
2.507
101.0380
-0.2
11/1/13
2.622
100.0262
-1.2
11/8/13
2.750
98.9136
-2.3
11/15/13
2.704
99.3118
-1.9
11/22/13
2.746
98.9482
-2.3
11/29/13
2.743
98.9741
-2.3
12/6/13
2.858
97.9858
-3.2
12/13/13
2.865
97.9260
-3.3
12/20/13
2.891
97.7043
-3.5
12/27/13
3.004
96.7472
-4.5
1/3/2014
2.999
96.7893
-4.4
1/10/14
2.858
97.9858
-3.2
1/17/14
2.818
98.3283
-2.9
1/24/14
2.720
99.1731
-2.1
1/31/14
2.645
99.8253
-1.4
2/7/14
2.681
99.5116
-1.7
2/14/14
2.743
98.9741
-2.3
2/21/14
2.730
99.0865
-2.1
2/28/14
2.655
99.7380
-1.5
3/7/14
2.792
98.5516
-2.7
3/14/14
2.654
99.7468
-1.5
3/21/14
2.743
98.9741
-2.3
3/28/14
2.721
99.1645
-2.1
4/4/14
2.724
99.1385
-2.1
4/11/14
2.628
99.9738
-1.3
4/18/14
2.724
99.1385
-2.1
4/25/14
2.668
99.6248
-1.6
5/2/14
2.583
100.3681
-0.9
5/9/14
2.624
100.0088
-1.2
5/16/14
2.520
100.9320
-0.3
5/23/14
2.532
100.8171
-0.4
5/30/14
2.473
101.3394
0.1
6/6/2014
2.598
100.2364
-1.0
6/13/14
2.605
100.1751
-1.1
6/20/14
2.609
00.1400
-1.1
6/27/14
2.536
100.7818
-0.05
7/4/14
2.641
99.8602
-1.4
7/11/14
2.516
100.9584
-0.3
7/18/14
2.484
101.2417
0.0
7/25/14
2.464
101.4193
0.2
8/1/14
2.497
101.1265
-0.1
8/8/14
2.420
101.8111
0.5
8/15/14
2.341
102.5190
1.2
8/22/14
2.399
101.9988
0.7
8/29/14
2.342
102.5100
1.2
9/5/14
2.457
101.4815
0.2
9/12/14
2.606
10.1663
-1.1
9/19/14
2.576
100.4296
-0.8
9/26/14
2.527
100.8612
-0.4
10/03/14
2.437
101.6595
0.4
10/10/14
2.292
102.9609
1.7
10/17/14
2.197
103.8237
2.5
10/24/14
2.263
103.2234
1.9
10/31/14
2.332
102.6000
1.3
11/07/14
2.302
102.8705
1.6
11/14/14
2.319
102.7171
1.4
11/21/14
2.307
102.8254
1.5
11/28/14
2.165
104.1162
2.8
12/5/14
2.306
102.8344
1.6
12/12/14
2.086
104.8423
3.5
12/19/14
2.185
103.9333
2.6
12/26/14
2.248
103.3595
2.1
01/02/15
2.126
104.4739
3.2
01/09/15
1.973
105.8909
4.6
01/16/15
1.826
107.2727
5.9
01/23/15
1.804
107.4813
6.1
01/30/15
1.683
108.6367
7.3
02/06/15
1.941
106.1899
4.9
02/13/15
2.043
105.2399
3.9
02/20/15
2.119
104.5383
3.2
02/27/15
2.016
105.4905
4.2
03/06/15
2.238
103.4503
2.2
03/13/15
2.103
104.6856
3.4
03/20/15
1.927
106.3211
5.0
03/27/15
1.951
106.0964
4.8
04/02/15
1.911
106.4712
5.1
04/10/15
1.950
106.1057
4.8
04/17/15
1.864
106.9136
5.6
04/24/15
1.917
106.4149
5.1
05/01/15
2.118
104.5475
3.2
05/08/15
2.153
104.2261
2.9
05/15/15
2.136
104.3821
3.1
05/22/15
2.211
103.6961
2.4
05/29/15
2.092
104.7869
3.5
06/05/15
2.400
101.9898
0.7
06/12/15
2.388
102.0972
0.8
06/19/15
2.270
103.1599
1.9
06/26/15
2.473
101.3394
0.1
07/03/15
2.383
102.1420
0.9
07/10/15
2.414
101.8647
0.6
07/17/15
2.346
102.4740
1.2
07/24/15
2.268
103.1781
1.9
07/31/15
2.207
103.7325
2.4
08/07/15
2.164
104.1254
2.8
08/14/15
2.196
103.8328
2.5
08/21/15
2.052
105.1565
3.9
08/28/15
2.182
103.9607
2.7
09/04/15
2.127
104.4647
3.2
09/11/15
2.181
103.9698
2.7
09/18/15
2.131
104.4280
3.1
09/25/15
2.168
104.0887
2.8
10/02/15
1.988
105.7510
4.4
10/09/15
2.096
104.7501
3.4
10/16/15
2.024
105.4161
4.1
10/23/15
2.083
104.8700
3.6
10/30/15
2.150
104.2536
3.0
11/06/15
2.332
102.6000
1.3
11/13/15
2.278
103.0875
1.8
11/20/15
2.260
103.2506
2.0
11/27/15
2.223
103.5868
2.3
12/04/15
2.276
103.1056
1.8
12/11/15
2.134
104.4004
3.1
12/18/15
2.197
103.8237
2.5
12/25/15
2.242
103.4140
2.1
01/01/16
2.269
103.1690
1.9
01/08/16
2.135
104.3913
3.1
01/15/16
2.036
105.3048
4.0
01/22/15
2.048
105.1936
3.9
01/29/16
1.923
106.3586
5.0
02/05/16
1.848
107.0646
5.7
02/12/16
1.744
108.0525
6.7
02/19/16
1.748
108.0143
6.7
02/26/16
1.766
107.8426
6.5
03/04/16
1.884
106.7251
5.4
03/11/16
1.977
105.8535
4.5
03/18/16
1.871
106.8476
5.5
03/25/16
1.900
106.5746
5.3
04/01/16
1.795
107.5667
6.2
04/08/16
1.722
108.2627
6.9
04/15/16
1.752
107.9761
6.6
04/22/16
1.886
106.7063
5.4
04/29/16
1.820
107.3296
6.0
05/06/16
1.780
107.7094
6.4
05/13/16
1.706
108.4160
7.1
05/20/16
1.849
107.0552
5.7
05/27/16
1.851
107.0363
5.7
06/03/16
1.704
108.4351
7.1
06/10/16
1.638
109.0699
7.7
06/17/16
1.618
109.2631
7.9
06/24/16
1.575
109.6797
8.3
07/01/16
1.443
110.9700
9.6
07/08/16
1.366
111.7306
10.3
07/15/16
1.595
109.4857
8.1
07/22/16
1.567
109.7575
8.4
07/29/16
1.458
110.8225
9.4
08/05/16
1.583
109.6021
8.2
08/12/16
1.514
110.2739
8.9
08/19/16
1.580
109.6312
8.3
08/26/16
1.635
109.0989
7.7
09/02/16
1.597
109.4663
8.1
09/09/16
1.675
108.7135
7.4
09/16/16
1.699
108.4831
7.1
09/23/16
1.614
109.3018
7.9
09/30/16
1.602
109.4179
8.1
10/07/16
1.732
108.1671
6.8
10/14/16
1.791
107.6048
6.3
10/21/16
1.738
108.1098
6.8
10/28/16
1.843
107.1119
5.8
11/04/16
1.784
107.6173
6.3
11/11/16
2.152
104.2353
2.9
11/18/16
2.340
102.5280
1.3
11/25/16
2.358
102.3662
1.1
12/01/16
2.389
102.0883
0.8
12/09/16
2.466
101.4015
0.1
12/16/16
2.597
100.2452
-1.0
12/23/16
2.542
100.7289
-0.5
12/30/16
2.447
101.5705
0.3
01/06/17
2.416
101.8469
0.6
01/13/17
2.381
102.1599
0.9
01/20/17
2.466
101.4015
0.1
01/27/17
2.479
101.2861
0.0
02/03/17
2.488
101.2063
-0.1
02/10/17
2.408
101.9183
0.7
02/17/17
2.425
101.7665
0.5
02/24/17
2.314
102.7622
1.5
03/03/17
2.492
101.1708
-0.1
03/10/17
2.584
100.3593
-0.9
03/17/17
2.502
101.0823
-0.2
03/24/17
2.399
101.9888
0.7
03/31/17
2.396
102.0256
0.8
04/07/17
2.373
102.2316
1.0
04/14/17
2.234
103.4867
2.2
04/21/17
2.233
103.4958
2.2
04/28/17
2.286
103.0151
1.7
05/05/17
2.352
102.4201
1.1
05/12/17
2.333
102.5910
1.3
05/19/17
2.243
103.4049
2.1
05/26/17
2.247
103.3686
2.1
06/02/17
2.161
104.1528
2.9
06/09/17
2.199
103.8055
2.5
06/16/17
2.154
104.2170
2.9
06/23/17
2.144
104.3087
3.0
06/30/17
2.304
102.8525
1.6
07/07/17
2.393
102.0524
0.8
07/14/17
2.323
102.6811
1.4
07/21/17
2.233
103.4985
2.2
07/28/17
2.288
102.9970
1.7
08/04/17
2.268
103.1781
1.9
08/11/17
2.189
103.8968
2.6
08/18/17
2.196
103.8328
2.5
08/25/17
2.171
104.0613
2.8
09/01/17
2.157
101.2573
2.9
09/08/17
2.061
105.0733
3.8
09/15/17
2.201
103.7872
2.5
09/22/17
2.263
103.2234
1.9
09/29/17
2.327
102.6450
1.4
10/06/17
2.368
102.2765
1.0
10/13/17
2.278
103.0875
1.8
10/20/17
2.379
102.1778
0.9
10/27/17
2.423
101.7844
0.5
11/03/17
2.343
102.5010
1.2
11/10/17
2.404
101.9541
0.7
11/17/17
2.354
102.4021
1.1
11/24/17
3.343
102.5010
1.2
12/01/17
2.361
102.3393
1.1
12/08/17
2.383
102.1420
0.9
12/15/17
2.355
102.3932
1.1
12/22/17
2.487
101.2151
0.0
12/29/17
2.411
101.8915
0.6
01/05/18
2.475
101.3216
0.1
01/12/18
2.550
100.6583
-0.6
01/19/18
2.638
99.8864
-1.4
01/26/18
2.661
99.6857
-1.6
02/02/18
2.848
98.0713
-3.1
02/09/18
2.830
98.2254
-3.0
02/16/18
2.877
97.8236
-3.4
02/23/18
2.870
97.8833
-3.3
03/02/18
2.855
98.0114
-3.2
03/09/18
2.893
97.6872
-3.5
03/16/18
2.845
98.0969
-3.1
03/23/18
2.826
98.2597
-3.0
03/30/18
2.739
99.0087
-2.2
04/06/18
2.778
98.6721
-2.6
04/13/18
2.825
98.2682
-3.0
04/20/18
2.953
97.1778
-4.0
04/27/18
2.955
97.1609
-4.1
05/04/18
2.943
97.2625
-3.9
05/11/18
2.970
97.0340
-4.2
05/18/18
3.065
96.2350
-5.0
05/25/18
2.928
97.3897
-3.8
06/01/18
2.889
97.7213
-3.5
06/08/18
2.938
97.3049
-3.9
06/15/18
2.922
97.4406
-3.8
06/22/18
2.902
97.6106
-3.6
06/29/18
2.850
98.0542
-3.2
07/06/18
2.821
98.3025
-2.9
07/13/18
2.830
98.2254
-3.0
07/20/18
2.890
97.7128
-3.5
07/27/18
2.959
97.1270
-4.1
08/03/18
2.952
97.1863
-4.0
08/10/18
2.859
97.9772
-3.2
08/17/18
2.870
97.8833
-3.3
08/24/18
2.823
98.2854
-2.9
08/31/18
2.850
98.0542
-3.2
09/07/18
2.936
97.3218
-3.9
08/14/18
2.987
96.8905
-4.3
09/21/18
3.067
96.2182
-5.0
09/28/18
3.055
96.3187
-4.9
10/05/18
3.231
94.8567
-6.3
10/12/18
3.137
95.6344
-5.6
10/19/18
3.198
95.1289
-6.1
10/26/18
3.077
96.1346
-5.1
11/02/18
3.216
94.9803
-6.2
11/09/18
3.188
95.2115
-6.0
11/16/18
3.075
96.1513
-5.0
11/23/18
3.039
96.4529
-4.7
11/30/18
3.014
96.6630
-4.5
12/07/18
2.848
98.0713
-3.1
12/14/18
2.892
97.6957
-3.5
12/21/18
2.791
98.5602
-2.7
12/28/18
2.736
99.0346
-2.2
01/04/19
2.568
99.7119
-1.5
01/11/19
2.700
99.3466
-1.9
01/18/19
2.780
98.6549
-2.6
01/25/19
2.750
98.9136
-2.3
02/01/19
2.691
99.4247
-1.8
02/08/19
2.636
99.039
-1.3
02/15/19
2.667
99.6335
-1.6
02/22/19
2.652
99.7642
-1.5
03/01/19
2.747
98.9395
-2.3
03/08/19
2.630
99.9563
-1.3
03/15/19
2.593
100.2803
-1.0
03/22/19
2.453
101.5171
0.3
03/29/19
2.416
101.8469
0.6
04/05/19
2.503
101.0734
-0.2
04/12/19
2.557
100.5967
-0.7
04/19/19
2.564
100.5351
-0.7
04/26/19
2.505
101.0557
-0.2
05/03/19
2.526
100.8700
-0.4
05/10/19
2.457
101.4815
0.2
05/17/19
2.398
102.0077
0.7
05/24/19
2.323
102.6811
1.4
05/31/19
2.141
104.3362
3.0
06/07/19
2.082
104.8792
3.6
06/14/19
2.095
104.7593
3.5
06/21/19
2.062
105.0640
3.8
06/28/19
2.006
105.5834
4.3
07/05/19
2.045
105.2214
3.9
07/12/19
2.107
104.6487
3.3
07/19/19
2.049
105.1843
3.9
07/26/19
2.080
104.8977
3.6
08/02/19
1.860
106.9513
5.6
08/09/19
1.736
108.1289
6.8
08/16/19
1.540
110.0202
8.7
08/23/19
1.526
110.1567
8.8
08/30/19
1.504
110.3716
9.0
09/06/19
1.554
109.8839
8.5
09/13/19
1.894
106.6310
5.3
09/20/19
1.754
107.9570
6.6
09/27/19
1.676
108.7039
7.4
10/04/19
1.515
110.2641
8.9
10/11/19
1.753
107.9666
6.6
10/18/19
1.749
108.0047
6.7
10/25/19
1.800
107.5193
6.2
11/01/19
1.716
108.3202
7.0
11/08/19
1.929
106.3024
5.0
11/15/19
1.835
107.1876
5.9
11/22/19
1.773
107.7760
6.4
11/29/19
1.782
107.6903
6.4
12/06/19
1.838
107.1592
5.8
12/13/19
1.820
107.3296
6.0
12/20/19
1.915
106.4337
5.1
12/27/19
1.869
106.8664
5.5
01/03/20
1.791
107.6048
6.3
01/10/20
1.826
107.2727
5.9
01/17/20
1.836
107.1781
5.8
01/24/20
1.678
108.6847
9.3
01/31/20
1.521
110.2055
8.8
02/07/20
1.579
109.6409
8.3
02/14/20
1.587
109.5633
8.2
02/21/20
1.473
110.6753
9.3
02/28/20
1.148
113.9161
12.5
03/06/20
0.709
118.4650
17.0
03/13/20
0.955
115.8912
14.5
03/20/20
0.949
115.9533
14.5
03/27/20
0.731
118.2322
16.8
04/03/20
0.592
119.7116
18.2
04/10/20
0.729
118.2536
16.8
04/17/20
0.657
119.0192
17.5
04/20/20
0.598
119.6473
18.2
05/01/20
0.637
119.2304
17.7
05/08/20
0.679
118.7832
17.3
05/15/20
0.641
119.1877
17.7
05/22/20
0.661
118.9747
17.5
05/29/20
0.649
119.1025
17.6
06/05/20
0.912
116.3365
14.9
06/12/20
0.700
118.5604
17.1
06/19/20
0.686
118.7089
17.2
06/26/20
0.643
119.1664
17.7
07/03/20
0.673
118.8470
17.4
07/10/20
0.632
119.2838
17.8
07/17/20
0.627
119.3372
17.9
07/24/20
0.587
119.7652
18.3
07/31/20
0.540
120.2704
18.8
Note: price is calculated for an artificial 10-year note paying semi-annual coupon and maturing in ten years using the actual yields traded on the dates and the coupon of 2.625% on 11/04/10
Source:

Table VI-7C provides additional information required for understanding the deficit/debt situation of the United States. The table is divided into four parts: Treasury budget in the 2020 fiscal year beginning on Oct 1, 2019 and ending on Sep 30, 2020; federal fiscal data for the years from 2009 to 2019; federal fiscal data for the years from 2005 to 2008; and Treasury debt held by the public from 2005 to 2019. Receipts decreased 13.4 percent in the cumulative fiscal year 2020 ending in Jun 2020 relative to the cumulative in fiscal year 2019. Individual income taxes decreased 24.3 percent relative to the same fiscal period a year earlier. Outlays increased 49.1 percent relative to a year earlier. There are also receipts, outlays, deficit and debt for fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. In fiscal year 2019, the deficit reached $984.4 billion or 4.6 percent of GDP. Outlays of 4,446.6 billion were 21.0 percent of GDP and receipts of $3,462.2 billion were 16.3 percent of GDP. It is quite difficult for the US to raise receipts above 18 percent of GDP. Total revenues of the US from 2009 to 2012 accumulate to $9021.2 billion, or $9.0 trillion, while expenditures or outlays accumulate to $14,104.5 billion, or $14.1 trillion, with the deficit accumulating to $5083.3 billion, or $5.1 trillion. Revenues decreased 6.5 percent from $9652.5 billion in the four years from 2005 to 2008 to $9021.2 billion in the years from 2009 to 2012. Decreasing revenues were caused by the global recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (Jun) and by growth of only 1.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020. In contrast, the expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 was at the average annual growth rate of 3.7 percent and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). Because of mediocre GDP growth, there are 41.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment/underemployment rate of 23.9 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/increase-of-total-nonfarm-payroll-jobs.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/06/creation-of-three-million-private.html). Weakness of growth and employment creation is analyzed in II Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html). In contrast with the decline of revenue, outlays or expenditures increased 30.1 percent from $10,838.2 billion, or $10.8 trillion, in the four years from 2005 to 2008, to $14,104.5 billion, or $14.1 trillion, in the four years from 2009 to 2012. Increase in expenditures by 30.1 percent while revenue declined by 6.5 percent caused the increase in the federal deficit from $1185.8 billion in 2005-2008 to $5083.3 billion in 2009-2012. Federal revenue was 14.8 percent of GDP on average in the years from 2009 to 2012, which is well below 17.3 percent of GDP on average from 1962 to 2019. Federal outlays were 23.3 percent of GDP on average from 2009 to 2012, which is well above 20.1 percent of GDP on average from 1962 to 2019. The lower part of Table VI-7C shows that debt held by the public swelled from $5803 billion in 2008 to $13,117 billion in 2015, by $7314 billion or 126.0 percent. Debt held by the public as percent of GDP or economic activity jumped from 39.4 percent in 2008 to 79.2 percent in 2019, which is well above the average of 41.7 percent from 1962 to 2019. The United States faces tough adjustment because growth is unlikely to recover, creating limits on what can be obtained by increasing revenues, while continuing stress of social programs restricts what can be obtained by reducing expenditures. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides a preliminary estimate of the impact of Public Law 116-136 of Mar 27, 2020, CARES Act or Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-04/hr748.pdf). This preliminary estimate finds that the CARES Act “will increase federal deficits by about $1.8 trillion over the 2020-2030 period (https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-04/hr748.pdf).
Jun 2020
Fiscal Year 2020
Fiscal Year 2019
∆%
Receipts
2,260,069
2,608,855
-13.4
Outlays
5,004,372
3,355,971
49.1
Deficit
-2,744,303
-747,116

Individual Income Tax
984,593
1,301,477
-24.3
Corporation Income Tax
92,106
164,355
-44.0
Social Insurance
723,785
697,303
5.1

Receipts
Outlays
Deficit (-), Surplus (+)
$ Billions
Fiscal Year 2019
3,462.2
4,446.6
-984.4
% GDP
16.3
21.0
-4.6
Fiscal Year 2018
3,329.9
4,109.0
-779.1
% GDP
16.4
20.2
-3.8
Fiscal Year 2017
3,316.2
3,981.6
-665.4
% GDP
17.2
20.6
-3.5
Fiscal Year 2016
3,268.0
3,852.6
-584.7
% GDP
17.6
20.8
-3.2
Fiscal Year 2015
3,249.9
3,691.8
-442.0
% GDP
18.0
20.4
-2.4
Fiscal Year 2014
3,021.5
3,506.3
-484.8
% GDP
17.4
20.2
-2.8
Fiscal Year 2013
2,775.1
3,454.9
-679.8
% GDP
16.7
20.8
-4.1
Fiscal Year 2012
2,450.0
3,526.6
-1,076.6
% GDP
15.3
22.0
-6.7
Fiscal Year 2011
2,303.5
3,603.1
-1,299.6
% GDP
15.0
23.4
-8.4
Fiscal Year 2010
2,162.7
3,457.1
-1,294.4
% GDP
14.6
23.3
-8.7
Fiscal Year 2009
2,105.0
3,517.7
-1,412.7
% GDP
14.6
24.4
-9.8
Total 2009-2012
9,021.2
14,104.5
-5,083.3
Average % GDP 2009-2012
14.8
23.3
-8.4
Fiscal Year 2008
2,524.0
2,982.5
-458.6
% GDP
17.1
20.2
-3.1
Fiscal Year 2007
2,568.0
2,728.7
-160.7
% GDP
18.0
19.1
-1.1
Fiscal Year 2006
2,406.9
2,655.1
-248.2
% GDP
17.6
19.5
-1.8
Fiscal Year 2005
2,153.6
2,472.0
-318.3
% GDP
16.8
19.3
-2.5
Total 2005-2008
9,652.5
10,838.2
-1,185.8
Average % GDP 2005-2008
17.4
19.5
-2.1
Debt Held by the Public
Billions of Dollars
Percent of GDP

2005
4,592
35.8

2006
4,829
35.4

2007
5,035
35.2

2008
5,803
39.4

2009
7,545
52.3

2010
9,019
60.8

2011
10,128
65.8

2012
11,281
70.3

2013
11,983
72.2

2014
12,780
73.7

2015
13,117
72.5

2016
14,168
76.4

2017
14,666
76.0

2018
15,750
77.4

2019
16,803
79.2

CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2017-2027. Washington, DC, Jan 24, 2017 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370 CBO, An update to the budget and economic outlook: 2016 to 2026. Washington, DC, Aug 23, 2016.
CBO (2012NovMBR). CBO (2011AugBEO); Office of Management and Budget 2011. Historical Tables. Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: OMB; CBO. 2011JanBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Jan. CBO. 2012AugBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Aug 22. CBO. 2012Jan31. Historical budget data. Washington, DC, Jan 31. CBO. 2012NovCDR. Choices for deficit reduction. Washington, DC. Nov. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO (2013Aug12). 2013AugHBD. Historical budget data—August 2013. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Aug. CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb. CBO, Historical budget data—April 2014 release. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Apr. Congressional Budget Office, August 2014 baseline: an update to the budget and economic outlook: 2014 to 2024. Washington, DC, CBO, Aug 27, 2014. CBO, Monthly budget review: summary of fiscal year 2014. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Nov 10, 2014. CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2015 to 2025. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Jan 26, 2015.
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#3 https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#2
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.

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