Sunday, August 30, 2020

Dollar Devaluation and Yuan Revaluation, FOMC Changed Long-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy to Target “Inflation Moderately Above 2 Percent For Some Time” If Inflation Had Been Below 2 Percent “Persistently,” US GDP Contracted at SAAR of 31.7 Percent in IIQ2020 and Decreased 9.1 Percent Relative to a Year Earlier In the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Five Trillion Dollars Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Cyclically Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment, Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits with Profit Contraction in the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, Increasing US New Home Sales and Home Prices, World Inflation Waves with Increasing Price Levels In Most Countries and Regions Worldwide, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

 

Carlos M. Pelaez

 

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.

 

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

            IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment

            IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits

IID United States Terms of International Trade

IIA United States Housing Collapse

            IIA1 Sales of New Houses

            IIA2 United States House Prices

I World Inflation Waves

            IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IC United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

 

IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment. Table IA1-1 provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of growth of private fixed investment for the recessions of the 1980s and the current economic cycle. In the cyclical expansion beginning in IQ1983 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), real private fixed investment in the United States grew at the average annual rate of 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. Growth rates fell to an average of 2.2 percent in the following eight quarters from IQ1985 to IVQ1986 and to an average of 1.9 percent in the 12 quarters of 1985, 1986 and 1987. The average rate of growth in the four quarters of 1988 was 3.7 percent. There were only four quarters of contraction of private fixed investment from IQ1983 to IVQ1987. The National Bureau of Economic Research dates another cycle from Jul 1990 (IIIQ1981) to Mar 1991 (IQ1991) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), showing in Table III-1 with contractions of fixed investment in the final three quarters of 1990 and the first quarter of 1991. There is quite different behavior of private fixed investment in the thirty-six quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2018. The average annual growth rate in the first eight quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2011 was 4.6 percent, which is significantly lower than 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. There is only robust growth of private fixed investment in the four quarters of expansion from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 at the average annual rate of 12.8 percent. Growth has fallen from the SAAR of 17.9 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.6 percent in IIIQ2012, recovering to 7.4 percent in IVQ2012 and increasing to 7.0 percent in IQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment fell to 7.1 percent in IIIQ2013 and to 5.5 percent in IVQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment decreased to 4.1 percent in IQ2014. Fixed investment grew at the SAAR of 11.6 percent in IIQ2014 and at 7.9 percent in IIIQ2014. Fixed investment grew at 4.7 percent in IVQ2014, 1.1 percent in IQ2015 and 3.5 percent in IIQ2015. Fixed investment grew at 3.4 percent in IIIQ2015 and fell at 1.1 percent in IVQ2015. Fixed investment increased at 2.0 percent in IQ2016 and increased at 1.5 percent in IIQ2016. Fixed investment increased at 3.2 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased at 2.7 percent in IVQ2016. Fixed investment increased at 7.1 percent in IQ2017 and increased at 1.6 percent in IIQ2017. Fixed investment grew at 1.2 percent in IIIQ2017. Fixed investment grew at 9.5 percent in IVQ2017 and increased at 8.5 percent in IQ2018. Fixed investment grew at 4.4 percent in IIQ2018. Fixed investment increased at 0.8 percent in IIIQ2018 and increased at 2.6 percent in IVQ2018. Fixed investment increased at 2.9 percent in IQ2019 and decreased at 0.4 percent in IIQ2019. Fixed investment decreased at 2.4 percent in IIIQ2019. Fixed investment increased at 1.0 percent in IVQ2019. Fixed investment decreased at 1.4 percent in IQ2020 and decreased at 28.9 percent in IIQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Sudeep Reddy and Scott Thurm, writing on “Investment falls off a cliff,” on Nov 18, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123593211825394.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories) analyze the decline of private investment in the US and inform that a review by the Wall Street Journal of filing and conference calls finds that 40 of the largest publicly traded corporations in the US have announced intentions to reduce capital expenditures in 2012.

Table IA1-1, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of Real Private Fixed Investment, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q

1981

1982

1983

1984

2008

2009

2010

I

3.8

-10.6

9.3

13.2

-6.1

-28.2

-0.2

II

3.2

-12.0

15.9

16.6

-3.2

-13.7

15.4

III

0.2

-9.2

24.4

8.2

-9.7

1.5

2.2

IV

-1.3

0.2

24.3

7.4

-23.9

2.0

7.8

 

 

 

 

1985

 

 

2011

I

 

 

 

3.7

 

 

-0.7

II

 

 

 

5.2

 

 

9.7

III

 

 

 

-1.6

 

 

17.9

IV

 

 

 

7.8

 

 

10.6

 

 

 

 

1986

 

 

2012

I

 

 

 

1.1

 

 

13.1

II

 

 

 

0.1

 

 

8.3

III

 

 

 

-1.8

 

 

0.6

IV

 

 

 

3.1

 

 

7.4

 

 

 

 

1987

 

 

2013

I

 

 

 

-6.7

 

 

7.0

II

 

 

 

6.3

 

 

3.3

III

 

 

 

7.1

 

 

7.1

IV

 

 

 

-0.2

 

 

5.5

 

 

 

 

1988

 

 

2014 

I

 

 

 

0.2

 

 

 4.1

II

 

 

 

8.1

 

 

 11.6

III

 

 

 

1.9

 

 

 7.9

IV

 

 

 

4.8

 

 

 4.7

 

 

 

 

1989

 

 

2015

IQ

 

 

 

3.6

 

 

1.1

IIQ

 

 

 

0.5

 

 

3.5

IIIQ

 

 

 

7.2

 

 

3.4

IVQ

 

 

 

-5.1

 

 

-1.1

 

 

 

 

1990

 

 

2016

IQ

 

 

 

4.8

 

 

2.0

IIQ

 

 

 

-7.7

 

 

1.5

IIIQ

 

 

 

-3.2

 

 

3.2

IVQ

 

 

 

-9.9

 

 

2.7

 

 

 

 

1991

 

 

2017

I

 

 

 

-10.6

 

 

7.1

II

 

 

 

1.2

 

 

1.6

III

 

 

 

0.5

 

 

1.2

IV

 

 

 

1.7

 

 

9.5

 

 

 

 

1992

 

 

2018

I

 

 

 

4.5

 

 

8.5

II

 

 

 

13.8

 

 

4.4

III

 

 

 

4.7

 

 

0.8

IV

 

 

 

12.2

 

 

2.6

1993

 

 

 

 

 

 

2019

I

 

 

 

3.0

 

 

2.9

II

 

 

 

7.4

 

 

-0.4

III

 

 

 

6.4

 

 

2.4

IV

 

 

 

17.1

 

 

1.0

1994

 

 

 

 

 

 

2020

I

 

 

 

4.8

 

 

-1.4

II

 

 

 

8.3

 

 

-28.9

III

 

 

 

3.3

 

 

 

IV

 

 

 

10.0

 

 

 

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-1 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth of real private fixed investment from 1980 to 1993. Growth rates recovered sharply during the first eight quarters, which was essential in returning the economy to trend growth and eliminating unemployment and most underemployment accumulated during the contractions. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IA1-1, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 1980-1993

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Weak behavior of real private fixed investment from 2007 to 2020 is in Chart IA1-2. Growth rates of real private fixed investment were much lower during the initial phase of the current economic cycle, entered sharp trend of decline and recovered recently, with another decline followed by increase and renewed decline. Fixed investment contracted sharply, at 1.4 percent in IQ2020 and at 28.9 percent in IIQ2020. There is a downward effect in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 2007-2020

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-2 provides real private fixed investment at seasonally adjusted annual rates from IVQ2007 to IIQ2020 or for the complete economic cycle. The first column provides the quarter, the second column percentage change relative to IVQ2007, the third column the quarter percentage change in the quarter relative to the prior quarter and the final column percentage change in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IQ1980, real gross private domestic investment in the US was $933.1 billion of chained 2012 dollars, growing to $1,372.1 billion in IVQ1993 or 47.0 percent. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 7.6 percent from $2,653.1 billion in IVQ2007 to $2,854.9 billion in IIQ2020. Real private fixed investment increased 17.9 percent from $2,630.0 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IVQ2007 to $3,099.6 billion in IQ2020. Real gross private domestic investment fell at SAAR 46.2 percent in IIQ2020, and private fixed investment fell at SAAR 28.9 percent in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. Private fixed investment fell relative to IVQ2007 in all quarters preceding IVQ2012 and increased 0.8 percent in IIIQ2016, increasing 0.4 percent in IIQ2016 and increasing 0.5 percent in IQ2016. Private fixed investment increased 0.7 percent in IVQ2016. Private fixed investment increased 1.7 percent in IQ2017 and increased 0.4 percent in IIQ2017. Private fixed investment increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2017 and increased 2.3 percent in IVQ2017. Private fixed investment increased 2.1 percent in IQ2018, increasing 1.1 percent in IIQ2018. Private fixed investment increased 0.2 percent in IIIQ2018, increasing 0.7 percent in IVQ2018. Private fixed investment increased 0.7 percent in IQ2019, decreasing 0.1 percent in IIQ2019. Private fixed investment increased 0.6 percent in IIIQ2019. Private fixed investment increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2019. Private fixed investment decreased 0.3 percent in IQ2020. Private fixed investment decreased 8.2 percent in IIQ2020. Growth of real private investment in Table IA1-2 is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012. There is recent robust growth followed by sharp contraction in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. The investment decision of United States corporations is fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash.

Table IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions of Chained 2012 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real PFI, Billions Chained 2012

 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

2630.0

NA

-1.0

-1.1

IQ2008

2589.1

-1.6

-1.6

-2.6

IIQ2008

2567.9

-2.4

-0.8

-3.8

IIIQ2008

2503.0

-4.8

-2.5

-5.7

IV2008

2337.8

-11.1

-6.6

-11.1

IQ2009

2151.9

-18.2

-8.0

-16.9

IIQ2009

2073.9

-21.1

-3.6

-19.2

IIIQ2009

2081.6

-20.9

0.4

-16.8

IVQ2009

2092.0

-20.5

0.5

-10.5

IQ2010

2091.0

-20.5

0.0

-2.8

IIQ2010

2167.1

-17.6

3.6

4.5

IIIQ2010

2178.7

-17.2

0.5

4.7

IVQ2010

2220.0

-15.6

1.9

6.1

IQ2011

2216.2

-15.7

-0.2

6.0

IIQ2011

2268.0

-13.8

2.3

4.7

IIIQ2011

2363.3

-10.1

4.2

8.5

IVQ2011

2423.7

-7.8

2.6

9.2

IQ2012

2499.4

-5.0

3.1

12.8

IIQ2012

2549.8

-3.0

2.0

12.4

IIIQ2012

2553.6

-2.9

0.1

8.1

IVQ2012

2599.4

-1.2

1.8

7.2

IQ2013

2643.9

0.5

1.7

5.8

IIQ2013

2665.3

1.3

0.8

4.5

IIIQ2013

2711.3

3.1

1.7

6.2

IVQ2013

2748.0

4.5

1.4

5.7

IQ2014

2775.6

5.5

1.0

5.0

IIQ2014

2852.8

8.5

2.8

7.0

IIIQ2014

2907.3

10.5

1.9

7.2

IVQ2014

2941.2

11.8

1.2

7.0

IQ2015

2949.5

12.1

0.3

6.3

IIQ2015

2974.9

13.1

0.9

4.3

IIIQ2015

2999.8

14.1

0.8

3.2

IVQ2015

2991.8

13.8

-0.3

1.7

IQ2016

3006.8

14.8

0.5

1.9

IIQ2016

3018.0

14.8

0.4

1.4

IIIQ2016

3041.8

15.7

0.8

1.4

IVQ2016

3062.2

16.4

0.7

2.4

IQ2017

3115.5

18.5

1.7

3.6

IIQ2017

3127.7

18.9

0.4

3.6

IIIQ2017

3137.1

19.3

0.3

3.1

IVQ2017

3209.2

22.0

2.3

4.8

IQ2018

3275.2

24.5

2.1

5.1

IIQ2018

3310.6

25.9

1.1

5.8

IIIQ2018

3317.0

26.1

0.2

5.7

IVQ2018

3338.7

26.9

0.7

4.0

IQ2019

3362.3

27.8

0.7

2.7

IIQ2019

3358.6

27.7

-0.1

1.4

IIIQ2019

3378.9

28.5

0.6

1.9

IVQ2019

3387.2

28.8

0.2

1.5

IQ2020

3375.4

28.3

-0.3

0.4

IIQ2020

3099.6

17.9

-8.2

-7.7

PFI: Private Fixed Investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-3 provides real private fixed investment in chained dollars of 2009 from 2007 to 2020. Real private fixed investment increased 17.9 percent from $2,630.0 billion of chained 2012 dollars in IVQ2007 to $3,099.6 billion in IIQ2020. Real private fixed investment decreased at SAAR 28.9 percent in IIQ2020 after decreasing at SAAR 1.4 percent in IQ2020.

Chart IA1-3, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, 2007 to 2020

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-4 provides real gross private domestic investment in chained dollars of 2012 from 1980 to 1993. Real gross private domestic investment climbed 47.0 percent to $1,372.1 billion of 2012 dollars in IIIQ1993 above the level of $933.1 billion in IQ1980. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IA1-4, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 1980-1993

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-5 provides real gross private domestic investment in the United States in billions of chained dollars of 2012 from 2007 to 2020. Real gross private domestic investment reached a level of $2,854.9 billion in IIQ2020, which was 7.6 percent higher than the level of $2,653.1 billion in IVQ2007 (https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IA1-5, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 2007-2020

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-3 shows that the share of gross private domestic investment in GDP has decreased from 20.3 percent in IIQ2000 and 19.7 percent in IIQ2006 to 16.1 percent in IIQ2020. There are declines in percentage shares in GDP of all components with sharp reduction of residential investment from 4.7 percent in IIQ2000 and 6.2 percent in IIQ2006 to 4.0 percent in IIQ2020. The share of fixed investment in GDP fell from 19.4 percent in IIQ2000 and 19.2 percent in IIQ2006 to 17.6 percent in IIQ2020.

Table IA1-3, Percentage Shares of Gross Private Domestic Investment and Components in Gross Domestic Product, % of GDP

 

IIQ2020

IIQ2006

IIQ2000

Gross Private Domestic Investment

16.1

19.7

20.3

  Fixed Investment

17.6

19.2

19.4

     Nonresidential

13.6

12.9

14.6

          Structures

3.0

3.1

3.1

          Equipment

          and Software

5.4

6.2

7.6

          Intellectual
           Property

5.2

3.6

4.0

     Residential

4.0

6.2

4.7

   Change in Private Inventories

-1.5

0.5

0.9

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Broader perspective is in Chart IA1-6 with the percentage share of gross private domestic investment in GDP in annual data from 1929 to 2019. There was sharp drop during the current economic cycle with incomplete recovery in contrast with sharp recovery after the recessions of the 1980s.

Chart IA1-6, US, Percentage Share of Gross Private Domestic Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-7 provides percentage shares of private fixed investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2019. The sharp contraction after the recessions of the 1980s was followed by sustained recovery while the sharp drop in the current economic cycle has not been recovered.

Chart IA1-7, US, Percentage Share of Private Fixed Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-8 provides percentage shares in GDP of nonresidential investment from 1929 to 2019. There is again recovery from sharp contraction in the 1980s but inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

Chart IA1-8, US, Percentage Share of Nonresidential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-9 provides percentage shares of business equipment and software in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2019. There is again inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

Chart IA1-9, US, Percentage Share of Business Equipment and Software in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-10 provides percentage shares of residential investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2019. The salient characteristic of Chart IA1-10 is the vertical increase of the share of residential investment in GDP up to 2006 and subsequent collapse.

Chart IA1-10, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Finer detail is provided by the quarterly share of residential investment in GDP from 1979 to 2020 in Chart IA1-11. There was protracted growth of that share, accelerating sharply into 2006 followed with nearly vertical drop. The explanation of the sharp contraction of United States housing can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the

interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ingersoll 1987, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

Chart IA1-11, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2020

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-12 provides the share of intellectual property products investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2019. This is an important addition in the revision and enhancement of GDP provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The share rose sharply over time.

Chart IA1-12, US, Percentage Share of Intellectual Property Products Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2019

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-13 provides the percentage share of intellectual property investment in GDP on a quarterly basis from 1979 to 2019.

Chart IA1-13, US, Percentage Share of Intellectual Property Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2020

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

 

Table IA1-4 provides the seasonally adjusted annual rate of real GDP percentage change and contributions in percentage points in annual equivalent rate of gross domestic investment (GDI), real private fixed investment (PFI), nonresidential investment (NRES), business equipment and software (EQP), residential investment (RES), intellectual property products (IPP) and change in inventories (∆INV) for the cyclical expansions from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 and from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020. GDI contributed 2.46 percentage points to GDP in IQ2015 with 0.19 percentage points by PFI, 2.28 percentage points by inventory accumulation and deduction of 0.12 percentage points by intellectual property products. GDI contributed 0.23 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2015: 0.58 percentage points in PFI, 0.24 percentage points in NRES and 0.34 percentage points in RES. Inventory investment deducted 0.35 percentage points and IPP added 0.06 percentage points.  GDI deducted 0.13 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015 with deduction of 0.69 percentage points by inventory divestment while EQP added 0.39 percentage points. PFI added 0.56 percentage points, nonresidential investment added 0.19 percentage points and residential investment added 0.37 percentage points. IPP added 0.22 percentage points. GDI deducted 0.83 percentage points in IVQ2015 with percentage point deductions of 0.44 by NRES, 0.19 by PFI, 0.32 by EQP and 0.64 by inventory divestment. Percentage point contributions were 0.39 by IPP and 0.25 by RES. GDI deducted 0.39 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2016 with percentage point contribution of 0.34 by fixed investment, deduction of 0.15 by nonresidential investment and deduction of 0.73 by inventory change. Residential investment added 0.49 percentage points and intellectual property products contributed 0.45 percentage points. GDI deducted 0.58 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2016 with deductions of 0.06 by RES and 0.83 percentage points by inventory change. IPP added 0.35 percentage points, NRES contributed 0.31 and PFI added 0.25. GDI contributed 0.03 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016 with contributions by NRES, and IPP and deduction by inventory divestment. PFI added 0.53 percentage points and RES deducted 0.08 percentage points. GDI contributed 1.80 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2016 with contributions by NRES, RES and inventory investment. PFI added 0.45 percentage points, RES added 0.26 percentage points and inventory investment added 1.35 percentage points. GDI deducted 0.23 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2017 with contributions by all segments except for deduction of 1.41 percentage points by inventory divestment. PFI contributed 1.17 percentage points. NRES contributed 0.75 percentage points and RES added 0.43 percentage points. EQP contributed 0.26 percentage points and IPP added 0.25 percentage points. GDI added 0.61 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2017 with contributions of 0.27 PPs by PFI, 0.31 PPs by NRES, 0.28 PPs by EQP and 0.05 PPs by IPP. RES deducted 0.04 PPs and inventory change added 0.34 PPs. GDI added 1.26 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2017 with contributions of 0.21 PPs by PFI, 0.28 PPs by NRES and 0.28 PPs by IPP. EQP contributed 0.35 PPs, RES deducted 0.07 PPs and inventory change added 1.05 PPs. GDI added 1.07 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2017 with contributions of 1.57 PPs by PFI, 1.18 PPs by NRES and 0.26 PPs by IPP. EQP contributed 0.78 PPs, RES added 0.39 PPs and inventory change deducted 0.50 PPs. GDI added 1.83 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2018 with contributions of 1.42 PPs by PFI, 1.55 PPs by NRES and 0.38 PPs by IPP. EQP contributed 0.57 PPs, RES deducted 0.13 PPs and inventory change contributed 0.41 PPs. GDI deducted 0.19 PPs from GDP growth in IIQ2018 with contributions of 0.76 by PFI, 0.82 by NRES, 0.15 by EQP and 0.52 by IPP. RES deducted 0.07 and inventory divestment deducted 0.94. GDI added 1.72 PPs to GDP growth in IIIQ2018 with contributions of 0.36 by NRSE, 0.35 by EQP, 0.19 by IPP and 1.58 by inventory change. RES added 0.36 and PFI added 0.14. GDI added 0.69 PPs to GDP growth in IVQ2018 with contributions of 0.66 by NRSE, 0.54 by EQP, 0.52 by IPP and 0.23 by inventory change. RES deducted 0.21 and PFI added 0.46. GDI added 0.71 PPs to GDP growth in IQ2019 with contributions of 0.56 by NRSE, 0.20 by IPP and 0.21 by inventory change. RES deducted 0.06 and EQP added 0.12. PFI added 0.50. GDI deducted 1.04 PPs from GDP in IIQ2019. PFI deducted 0.07, NRES added 0.01, RES deducted 0.08 and inventory divestment deducted 0.97. EQP deducted 0.23 and IPP added 0.19. GDI contributed 0.34 PPs to GDP in IIIQ2019. PFI added 0.42, NRES contributed 0.25, EQP deducted 0.10 and inventory divestment deducted 0.09. RES added 0.17 and IPP added 0.24. GDI deducted 0.64 PPs from GDP in IVQ2019. PFI added 0.17, NRES deducted 0.04, EQP deducted 0.10 and inventory divestment deducted 0.82. RES added 0.22 and IPP added 0.21. GDP contracted at 5.0 percent SAAR in IQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. GDI deducted 1.56 PPs from GDP in IQ2020. PFI deducted 0.23, NRES deducted 0.91, EQP deducted 0.91 and inventory divestment deducted 1.34. RES added 0.68 and IPP added 0.11. GDP contracted at 31.7 percent SAAR in IIQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. GDI deducted 8.66 PPs from GDP in IIQ2020. PFI deducted 5.20, NRES deducted 3.48, EQP added 2.02, IPP deducted 0.35, RES deducted 1.72 and inventory divestment deducted 3.46.

Table IA1-4, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of Real GDP in Percentage Points

 

GDP

GDI

PFI

NRES

EQP

IPP

RES

∆INV

2020

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

-5.0

-1.56

-0.23

-0.91

-0.91

0.11

0.68

-1.34

II

-31.7

-8.66

-5.20

-3.48

2.02

-0.35

-1.72

-3.46

2019

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

2.9

0.71

0.50

0.56

0.12

0.20

-0.06

0.21

II

1.5

-1.04

-0.07

0.01

-0.23

0.19

-0.08

-0.97

III

2.6

0.34

0.42

0.25

-0.10

0.24

0.17

-0.09

IV

2.4

-0.64

0.17

-0.04

-0.10

0.21

0.22

-0.82

2018

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

3.8

1.83

1.42

1.55

0.57

0.38

-0.13

0.41

II

2.7

-0.19

0.76

0.82

0.15

0.52

-0.07

-0.94

III

2.1

1.72

0.14

0.36

0.35

0.19

-0.22

1.58

IV

1.3

0.69

0.46

0.66

0.54

0.52

-0.21

0.23

2017

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

2.3

-0.23

1.17

0.75

0.26

0.25

0.43

-1.41

II

1.7

0.61

0.27

0.31

0.28

0.05

-0.04

0.34

III

2.9

1.26

0.21

0.28

0.35

0.28

-0.07

1.05

IV

3.9

1.07

1.57

1.18

0.78

0.26

0.39

-0.50

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

2.3

-0.39

0.34

-0.15

-0.15

0.45

0.49

-0.73

II

1.3

-0.58

0.25

0.31

-0.26

0.35

-0.06

-0.83

III

2.2

0.03

0.53

0.61

-0.08

0.23

-0.08

-0.50

IV

2.5

1.80

0.45

0.19

-0.04

0.04

0.26

1.35

2015

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

3.8

2.46

0.19

-0.07

0.20

-0.12

0.26

2.28

II

2.7

0.23

0.58

0.24

0.09

0.06

0.34

-0.35

III

1.5

-0.13

0.56

0.19

0.39

0.22

0.37

-0.69

IV

0.6

-0.83

-0.19

-0.44

-0.32

0.39

0.25

-0.64

2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

-1.1

-0.74

0.66

0.75

0.21

0.10

-0.09

-1.40

II

5.5

2.92

1.86

1.47

0.62

0.38

0.40

1.05

III

5.0

1.47

1.30

1.11

0.76

0.30

0.19

0.17

IV

2.3

0.09

0.78

0.33

-0.23

0.34

0.46

-0.69

2013

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

3.6

2.43

1.10

0.69

0.44

0.50

0.41

1.33

II

0.5

0.75

0.52

0.14

-0.05

-0.14

0.37

0.23

III

3.2

2.60

1.12

0.90

0.00

0.31

0.22

1.48

IV

3.2

0.27

0.89

1.08

0.92

0.05

-0.20

-0.62

2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

3.2

1.32

1.90

1.30

0.73

0.04

0.60

-0.59

II

1.7

1.47

1.25

1.16

0.68

0.21

0.09

0.21

III

0.5

0.29

0.09

-0.18

-0.07

0.03

0.27

0.20

IV

0.5

-0.58

1.13

0.57

0.48

0.32

0.56

-1.70

2011

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

-1.0

-1.10

-0.09

-0.05

0.53

0.16

-0.03

-1.02

II

2.9

2.36

1.34

1.23

0.31

0.26

0.11

1.03

III

-0.1

0.19

2.42

2.25

1.32

0.32

0.17

-2.23

IV

4.7

4.60

1.55

1.29

0.54

0.37

0.25

3.06

2010

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

1.5

1.28

-0.02

0.32

1.32

-0.27

-0.34

1.30

II

3.7

2.95

2.03

1.49

1.28

-0.08

0.53

0.92

III

3.0

2.60

0.32

1.26

1.11

0.30

-0.94

2.28

IV

2.0

-0.17

1.08

0.92

0.44

0.29

0.16

-1.25

2009

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

-4.4

-7.21

-5.07

-3.89

-2.35

-0.41

-1.18

-2.14

II

-0.6

-3.15

-2.11

-1.44

-0.74

0.39

-0.68

-1.04

III

1.5

-0.08

0.25

-0.24

0.46

0.16

0.49

-0.33

IV

4.5

4.76

0.32

0.33

0.86

0.48

-0.02

4.44

1982

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

-6.1

-7.33

-2.00

-1.19

-0.57

0.14

-0.81

-5.33

II

1.8

-0.05

-2.32

-1.88

-1.20

0.08

-0.44

2.27

III

-1.5

-0.62

-1.73

-1.71

-0.55

0.06

-0.02

1.11

IV

0.2

-5.38

-0.04

-1.05

-0.57

0.00

1.01

-5.34

1983

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

5.4

2.34

1.44

-0.93

-0.27

0.16

2.36

0.91

II

9.4

5.95

2.53

0.67

1.24

0.29

1.86

3.42

III

8.2

4.40

3.83

2.13

1.43

0.31

1.70

0.57

IV

8.6

6.95

3.93

3.14

2.32

0.35

0.79

3.01

1984

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

8.1

7.23

2.29

1.71

0.46

0.30

0.58

4.94

II

7.1

2.57

2.87

2.53

1.36

0.29

0.34

-0.29

III

3.9

1.70

1.48

1.70

0.89

0.25

-0.22

0.21

IV

3.3

-1.07

1.36

1.34

0.86

0.29

0.02

-2.43

1985

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

3.9

-2.14

0.72

0.67

-0.23

0.14

0.05

-2.86

II

3.6

1.34

0.99

0.83

0.65

0.20

0.16

0.35

III

6.2

-0.43

-0.28

-0.62

-0.38

0.13

0.34

-0.15

IV

3.0

2.81

1.40

1.00

0.53

0.26

0.40

1.40

1986

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

3.8

0.04

0.21

-0.55

-0.28

0.17

0.76

-0.17

II

1.8

-1.30

0.00

-1.12

0.34

0.15

1.12

-1.30

III

3.9

-1.97

-0.34

-0.63

-0.17

0.10

0.28

-1.62

IV

2.2

0.25

0.54

0.48

0.30

0.10

0.05

-0.29

1987

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

3.0

1.99

-1.30

-1.26

-0.97

0.07

-0.04

3.29

II

4.4

0.08

1.07

1.00

0.76

0.08

0.07

-1.00

III

3.5

0.03

1.23

1.40

0.70

0.11

-0.17

-1.20

IV

7.0

4.96

-0.01

-0.05

-0.48

0.16

0.04

4.97

1988

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

2.1

-3.64

0.06

0.41

0.82

0.15

-0.36

-3.69

II

5.4

1.73

1.39

1.15

0.67

0.18

0.25

0.33

III

2.4

0.38

0.33

0.32

0.29

0.22

0.01

0.05

IV

5.4

1.12

0.84

0.71

0.35

0.40

0.13

0.28

1989

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

4.1

2.43

0.62

0.81

0.32

0.27

-0.19

1.80

II

3.1

-0.71

0.09

0.68

0.57

0.27

-0.59

-0.80

III

3.0

-0.64

1.20

1.28

0.52

0.29

-0.08

-1.84

IV

0.8

-0.54

-0.91

-0.53

-0.74

0.30

-0.38

0.37

1990

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

4.4

0.70

0.80

0.64

0.11

0.23

0.16

-0.10

II

1.5

0.03

-1.35

-0.67

-0.79

0.19

-0.69

1.38

III

0.3

-1.29

-0.56

0.33

0.34

0.05

-0.89

-0.74

IV

-3.6

-3.66

-1.69

-0.79

-0.38

0.20

-0.90

-1.97

1991

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

-1.9

-2.04

-1.78

-1.00

-0.90

0.18

-0.78

-0.26

II

3.2

0.05

0.17

-0.26

-0.17

0.26

0.43

-0.12

III

2.0

1.21

0.05

-0.43

0.33

0.04

0.48

1.16

IV

1.4

2.15

0.24

-0.05

-0.13

0.31

0.29

1.91

1992

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

4.9

-1.16

0.64

-0.20

-0.21

0.15

0.84

-1.81

II

4.4

3.40

1.96

1.44

1.29

0.14

0.53

1.44

III

4.0

0.50

0.70

0.69

0.52

0.07

0.01

-0.19

IV

4.2

1.92

1.78

1.18

0.85

0.19

0.60

0.14

1993

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I

0.7

1.49

0.46

0.45

0.44

0.15

0.01

1.04

II

2.3

0.39

1.11

0.89

0.95

0.12

0.22

-0.72

III

1.9

-0.42

0.96

0.35

0.26

0.07

0.61

-1.38

IV

5.6

3.40

2.52

1.66

1.34

0.00

0.87

0.87

GDP: Gross Domestic Product; GDI: Gross Domestic Investment; PFI: Private Fixed Investment; NRES: Nonresidential; EQP: Business Equipment and Software; IPP: Intellectual Property Products; RES: Residential; ∆INV: Change in Private Inventories.

GDI = PFI + ∆INV, may not add exactly because of errors of rounding.

GDP: Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate of growth in a quarter; components: percentage points at annual rate.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

 

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.

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