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Dollar Devaluation and Yuan Revaluation, FOMC Changed Long-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy to Target “Inflation Moderately Above 2 Percent For Some Time” If Inflation Had Been Below 2 Percent “Persistently,” US GDP Contracted at SAAR of 31.7 Percent in IIQ2020 and Decreased 9.1 Percent Relative to a Year Earlier In the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Five Trillion Dollars Below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Cyclically Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment, Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits with Profit Contraction in the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, Increasing US New Home Sales and Home Prices, World Inflation Waves with Increasing Price Levels In Most Countries and Regions Worldwide, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part IX

Carlos M. Pelaez

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment

IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits

IID United States Terms of International Trade

IIA United States Housing Collapse

IIA1 Sales of New Houses

IIA2 United States House Prices

I World Inflation Waves

IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IC United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Aug 21 and daily values throughout the week ending on Aug 28, 2020, of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at the close of business. The first column provides the value on Fri Aug 21, 2020 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Aug 21, 2020,” first row “USD/EUR 1.1796 0.4% 0.5%,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) appreciated 0.4 percent to USD 1.1796/EUR in the week ending on Aug 21 relative to the exchange rate on Aug 14 and appreciated 0.5 percent relative to Thu Aug 20. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. An important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf). There are complex economic, financial and political effects of the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union or BREXIT after the referendum on Jun 23, 2016 (https://next.ft.com/eu-referendum for extensive coverage by the Financial Times). The most important source of financial turbulence is shifting toward fluctuating interest rates in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per euro EUR, USD 1.1796/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Aug 21, appreciating to USD 1.1789/EUR on Mon Aug 24, 2020, or by 0.1 percent. The dollar appreciated because fewer dollars, $1.1789, were required on Mon Aug 24 to buy one euro than $1.1796 on Fri Aug 21. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the market closing exchange rate at New York time, such as USD 1.1796/EUR on Aug 21. The second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Aug 21, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Aug 28, such as depreciation of 0.9 percent to USD 1.1907/EUR by Aug 28. The third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD depreciated (denoted by negative sign) by 0.9 percent from the rate of USD 1.1796/EUR on Fri Aug 21 to the rate of USD 1.1907 on Aug 28 {[(1.1907/1.1796) - 1]100 = 0.9%}. The dollar depreciated (denoted by negative sign) by 0.7 percent from the rate of USD 1.1822 on Thu Aug 27 to USD 1.1907/EUR on Fri Aug 28 {[(1.1907/1.1822) -1]100 = 0.7%}. Other factors constant, increasing risk aversion causes appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro, with rising uncertainty on European and global sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues.

Chart III-1C provides the yields of the ten-year, two-year, one-month Treasury Constant Maturity, and the overnight Fed funds rate from Jan 2, 1962 to Aug 27, 2020. The final data point is for Aug 27, 2020 with the Fed funds rate at 0.08 percent, the one-month Treasury constant

maturity at 0.09 percent, the two-year at 0.16 percent and the ten-year at 0.74 percent. The causes of the financial crisis and global recession were interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero-interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash. The yields of Treasury securities inverted on Mar 22, 2019 with the ten-year yield at 2.44 percent below those of 2.49 percent for one-month, 2.48 percent for two months, 2.46 percent for three months, 2.48 percent for six months and 2.45 percent for one year (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield). There was some flattening on Mar 29, 2019, with the 10-year at 2.41 percent, the 1-month at 2.43 percent, the 3-month at 2.40 percent, the 6-month at 2.44 percent and the 1-year at 2.40 percent. There was further mild steepening on Apr 12, 2019, with the 10-year at 2.568 percent, the 1-month at 2.419 percent, the 3-month at 2.440 percent, the 6-month at 2.463 percent and the 1-year at 2.453 percent. The final segment after 2001 shows the effects of unconventional monetary policy of extremely low, below inflation fed funds rate in lowering yields. This was an important cause of the global recession and financial crisis inducing as analyzed by Taylor (2018Oct 19, 2) “search for yield, excessive risk taking, a boom and bust in the housing market, and eventually the financial crisis and recession.” Monetary policy deviated from the Taylor Rule (Taylor 2018Oct19 see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2019Oct19 and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html)). An explanation is in the research of Adrian, Estrella and Shin (2018, 21-22): “Our findings suggest that the monetary tightening of 2004-2006 period ultimately did achieve a slowdown in real activity not because of its impact on the level of longer term interest rates, but rather because of its impact on the slope of the yield curve. In fact, while the level of the 10-year yield only increased 38 basis points between June 2004 and 2006, the term spread declined 325 basis points (from 3.44 to .19 percent). The fact that the slope flattened meant that intermediary profitability was compressed, thus shifting the supply of credit, and hence inducing changes in real activity. The 18 month lag between the end of the tightening cycle, and the beginning of the recession is perfectly compatible with effective monetary tightening.” See (https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html). A major difference in the current cycle is the balance sheet of the Fed with purchases used to lower interest rates in specific segments and maturities such as mortgage-backed securities and longer terms.

Chart III-1C, Yield US Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields and Overnight Fed Funds Rate, Jan 3, 1962-Aug 27, 2020

Note: US Recessions in shaded areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

There is mixed performance in equity indexes with several indexes in Table III-1 oscillating sharply in the week ending on Aug 28, 2020, after wide swings caused by reallocations of investment portfolios worldwide. The global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event, is having strong effects in the economy and financial markets. Stagnating revenues, corporate cash hoarding, effects of currency oscillations on corporate earnings and declining investment are causing reevaluation of discounted net earnings with deteriorating views on the world economy and United States fiscal sustainability but investors have been driving indexes higher. There are complex economic, financial and political effects of the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union or BREXIT after the referendum on Jun 23, 2016 (https://next.ft.com/eu-referendum for extensive coverage by the Financial Times). Nuclear conflicts in the Korean Peninsula and global geopolitics are also affecting financial markets. An immediate factor is the path of raising interest rates by the Fed, becoming a path of decreasing interest rates with increasing balance sheet. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues. DJIA increased 0.6 percent on Aug 28, increasing 2.6 percent in the week. Germany’s DAX decreased 0.5 percent on Aug 28 and increased 2.1 percent in the week. Dow Global increased 0.6 percent on Aug 28 and increased 2.8 percent in the week. Japan’s Nikkei Average decreased 1.4 percent on Aug 28 and decreased 0.2 percent in the week of Aug 28, as the yen continues oscillating and the stock market gains in expectations of success of fiscal stimulus by a new administration and monetary stimulus by a new board of the Bank of Japan. Shanghai Composite that decreased 1.0 percent on Mar 8 and decreased 1.7 percent in the week of Mar 8, falling below 2000 at 1974.38 on Mar 12, 2014 but closing at 3403.81 on Aug 28, 2020 for increase of 1.6 percent and increasing 0.7 percent in the week. The Shanghai Composite increased 72.4 percent from March 12, 2014 to Aug 28, 2020. There is deceleration with oscillations of the world economy that could affect corporate revenue and equity valuations, causing fluctuations in equity markets with increases during favorable risk appetite. The global hunt for yield induced by central bank policy rates of near zero percent motivates wide portfolio reshufflings among classes of risk financial assets.

Commodities were mixed in the week of Aug 28, 2020. Table III-1 shows that WTI increased 1.5 percent in the week of Aug 28 while Brent increased 3.3 percent in the week with turmoil in oil producing regions but oscillating action by OPEC now in negotiations with Russia. Gold increased 2.2 percent on Aug 28 and increased 1.4 percent in the week of Aug 28.

Table III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Aug 24 to Aug 28, 2020

Fri 21

Mon 24

Tue 25

Wed 26

Thu 27

Fri 28

USD/EUR

1.1796

0.4%

0.5%

1.1789

0.1%

1.1836

-0.3%

-0.4%

1.1832

-0.3%

0.0%

1.1822

-0.2%

0.1%

1.1907

-0.9%

-0.7%

JPY/ USD

105.81

0.7%

0.0%

105.97

-0.2%

106.39

-0.5%

-0.4%

105.99

-0.2%

0.4%

106.57

-0.7%

-0.5%

105.37

0.4%

1.1%

CHF/ USD

0.9116

-0.3%

-0.4%

0.9119

0.0%

0.9078

0.4%

0.9084

0.4%

-0.1%

0.9090

0.3%

-0.1%

0.9041

0.8%

0.5%

CHF/EUR

1.0756

0.1%

1.0752

0.0%

1.0746

0.1%

1.0744

0.1%

0.0%

1.0746

0.1%

0.0%

1.0766

-0.1%

-0.2%

USD/ AUD

0.7162

1.3963

-0.1%

-0.4%

0.7162

1.3963

0.0%

0.7195

1.3899

0.5%

0.7234

1.3824

1.0%

0.5%

0.7259

1.3776

1.3%

0.3%

0.7365

1.3578

2.8%

1.4%

10Y Note

0.633

0.649

0.682

0.694

0.745

0.733

2Y Note

0.157

0.153

0.162

0.152

0.156

German Bond

2Y -0.68 10Y-0.50

2Y -0.67 10Y -0.49

2Y -0.65 10Y -0.43

2Y -0.65 10Y -0.41

2Y -0.65 10Y -0.40

2Y -0.66 10Y-0.41

DJIA

27930.33

0.0%

0.7%

28308.46

1.4%

28248.44

1.1%

-0.2%

28331.92

1.4%

0.3%

28492.27

2.0%

0.6%

28653.87

2.6%

0.6%

Dow Global

3027.07

-0.7%

0.0%

3074.65

1.6%

3079.57

1.7%

0.2%

3103.29

2.5%

0.8%

3093.01

2.2%

-0.3%

3111.97

2.8%

0.6%

DJ Asia Pacific

Nikkei

22920.30

-1.6%

0.2%

22985.51

0.3%

23296.77

1.6%

1.4%

23290.86

1.6%

0.0%

23208.86

1.3%

-0.4%

22882.65

-0.2%

-1.4%

Shanghai

3380.68

0.6%

0.5%

3385.64

0.1%

3373.58

-0.2%

-0.4%

3329.74

-1.5%

-1.3%

3350.11

-0.9%

0.6%

3403.81

0.7%

1.6%

DAX

12764.80

-1.1%

-0.5%

13066.54

2.4%

13061.62

2.3%

0.0%

13190.15

3.3%

1.0%

13096.36

2.6%

-0.7%

13033.20

2.1%

-0.5%

BOVESPA

101521.29

0.2%

0.1%

102297.95

0.8%

102117.64

0.6%

-0.2%

100627.33

-0.9%

-1.5%

100623.64

-0.9%

0.6%

102142.93

0.6%

1.5%

DJ UBS Comm.

WTI $/B

42.34

0.8%

-0.6%

42.62

0.7%

43.35

2.4%

1.7%

43.39

2.5%

0.1%

43.04

1.7%

-0.8%

42.97

1.5%

-0.2%

Brent $/B

44.35

-1.0%

-1.2%

45.13

1.8%

45.86

3.4%

1.6%

46.16

4.1%

0.7%

45.60

2.8%

-1.2%

45.81

3.3%

0.5%

Gold

1947.0

-0.1%

0.0%

1939.2

-0.4%

1923.1

-1.2%

-0.8%

1952.5

0.3%

1.5%

1932.6

-0.7%

-1.0%

1974.9

1.4%

2.2%

Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss

Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce

Sources: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/world-government-bonds

The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues. The DJIA has increased 195.8 percent since the trough of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe on Jul 16, 2010 to Aug 28, 2020; S&P 500 has gained 243.1 percent and DAX 129.8 percent. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 08/28/20” in Table VI-4 had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 followed by negative performance but now some valuations of equity indexes show varying behavior. China’s Shanghai Composite is 42.8 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 159.3 percent above the trough. Dow Global is 82.7 percent above the trough. STOXX 50 of 50 blue-chip European equities (https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=sx5E) is 29.6 percent above the trough. NYSE Financial Index is 71.4 percent above the trough. DAX index of German equities (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DAX:IND) is 129.8 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 159.3 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 100.8 percent above the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 22,882.65 on Aug 28, 2020 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 123.1 percent higher than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar appreciated 0.1 percent relative to the euro. The dollar devalued before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 08/28/20” in Table VI-4 shows increase of 0.7 percent for China’s Shanghai Composite. The Nikkei decreased 0.2 percent. NYSE Financial increased 4.3 percent in the week. Dow Global increased 2.8 percent in the week of Aug 28, 2020. The DJIA increased 2.6 percent and S&P 500 increased 3.3 percent. DAX of Germany increased 2.1 percent. STOXX 50 increased 0.6 percent. The USD depreciated 0.9 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table VI-4 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 08/28/20” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to Aug 28, 2020. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 08/28/20” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 08/28/20.” There are now several equity indexes above the peak in Table VI-4: DJIA 155.7 percent, S&P 500 188.2 percent, DAX 105.8 percent, Dow Global 49.1 percent, NYSE Financial Index (https://www.nyse.com/quote/index/NYK.ID) 36.5 percent and Nikkei Average 100.8 percent. STOXX 50 is 9.8 percent above the peak. Shanghai Composite is 7.5 percent above the peak. The Shanghai Composite increased 72.4 percent from March 12, 2014, to Aug 28, 2020. The US dollar strengthened 21.3 percent relative to the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010.

Table VI-4, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and Ten-Year Treasury

	Peak	Trough	∆% to Trough	∆% Peak to 08/28/ /20	∆% Week 08/28/20	∆% Trough to 08/28/ 20
DJIA	4/26/ 10	7/2/10	-13.6	155.7	2.6	195.8
S&P 500	4/23/ 10	7/20/ 10	-16.0	188.2	3.3	243.1
NYSE Finance	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-20.3	36.5	4.3	71.4
Dow Global	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-18.4	49.1	2.8	82.7
Asia Pacific	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-12.5	NA	NA	NA
Japan Nikkei Aver.	4/05/ 10	8/31/ 10	-22.5	100.8	-0.2	159.3
China Shang.	4/15/ 10	7/02 /10	-24.7	7.5	0.7	42.8
STOXX 50	4/15/10	7/2/10	-15.3	9.8	0.6	29.6
DAX	4/26/ 10	5/25/ 10	-10.5	105.8	2.1	129.8
Dollar Euro	11/25 2009	6/7 2010	21.2	21.3	-0.9	0.1
DJ UBS Comm.	1/6/ 10	7/2/10	-14.5	NA	NA	NA
10-Year T Note	4/5/ 10	4/6/10	3.986	2.784	2.658	0.733

T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

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