Sunday, September 27, 2020

Wealth of Households and Nonprofit Organizations Recovering In Second Quarter 2020 by Growing 7.0 Percent Inflation Adjusted Above Levels Relative to First Quarter 2020 and Equal in Inflation Adjusted Levels Relative to Fourth Quarter 2019, Financial Assets and Real Estate Lead Wealth Recovery, World Inflation Waves, Destruction of Household Nonfinancial Wealth with Cyclically Stagnating Total Real Wealth in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part IV

 

Carlos M. Pelaez

 

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.

 

I World Inflation Waves

            IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IC United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

IIB Destruction of Household Nonfinancial Wealth with Stagnating Total Real Wealth in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

 

The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues. The DJIA has increased 180.5 percent since the trough of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe on Jul 16, 2010 to Sep 25, 2020; S&P 500 has gained 222.6 percent and DAX 119.9 percent. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 09/25/20” in Table VI-4 had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 followed by negative performance but now some valuations of equity indexes show varying behavior. China’s Shanghai Composite is 35.1 percent above the trough.  Japan’s Nikkei Average is 163.0 percent above the trough. Dow Global is 71.2 percent above the trough. STOXX 50 of 50 blue-chip European equities (https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=sx5E) is 25.5 percent above the trough. NYSE Financial Index is 58.4 percent above the trough. DAX index of German equities (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DAX:IND) is 119.9 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 163.0 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 103.7 percent above the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 23,204.62 on Aug 25, 2020 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 126.3 percent higher than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar appreciated 2.4 percent relative to the euro. The dollar devalued before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 09/25/20” in Table VI-4 shows decrease of 3.6 percent for China’s Shanghai Composite. The Nikkei decreased 0.7 percent. NYSE Financial decreased 3.7 percent in the week. Dow Global decreased 4.3 percent in the week of Sep 25, 2020. The DJIA decreased 1.7 percent and S&P 500 decreased 0.6 percent. DAX of Germany decreased 4.9 percent. STOXX 50 decreased 3.2 percent. The USD appreciated 1.8 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table VI-4 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 09/25/20” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to Sep 25, 2020. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 09/25/20” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 09/25/20.” There are now several equity indexes above the peak in Table VI-4: DJIA 142.5 percent, S&P 500 171.0 percent, DAX 96.9 percent, Dow Global 39.7 percent, NYSE Financial Index (https://www.nyse.com/quote/index/NYK.ID) 26.1 percent and Nikkei Average 103.7 percent. STOXX 50 is 6.3 percent above the peak. Shanghai Composite is 1.7 percent above the peak. The Shanghai Composite increased 63.1 percent from March 12, 2014, to Sep 25, 2020. The US dollar strengthened 23.1 percent relative to the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010.

Table VI-4, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and Ten-Year Treasury  

 

Peak

Trough

∆% to Trough

∆% Peak to 09/25/

/20

∆% Week 09/25/20

∆% Trough to 09/25/

20

DJIA

4/26/
10

7/2/10

-13.6

142.5

-1.7

180.5

S&P 500

4/23/
10

7/20/
10

-16.0

171.0

-0.6

222.6

NYSE Finance

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-20.3

26.1

-3.7

58.4

Dow Global

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-18.4

39.7

-4.3

71.2

Asia Pacific

4/15/
10

7/2/10

-12.5

NA

NA

NA

Japan Nikkei Aver.

4/05/
10

8/31/
10

-22.5

103.7

-0.7

163.0

China Shang.

4/15/
10

7/02
/10

-24.7

1.7

-3.6

35.1

STOXX 50

4/15/10

7/2/10

-15.3

6.3

-3.2

25.5

DAX

4/26/
10

5/25/
10

-10.5

96.9

-4.9

119.9

Dollar
Euro

11/25 2009

6/7
2010

21.2

23.1

1.8

2.4

DJ UBS Comm.

1/6/
10

7/2/10

-14.5

NA

NA

NA

10-Year T Note

4/5/
10

4/6/10

3.986

2.784

2.658

0.660

T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. Table VI-5 shows a gain by Apr 29, 2011 in the DJIA of 14.3 percent and of the S&P 500 of 12.5 percent since Apr 26, 2010, around the time when sovereign risk issues in Europe began to be acknowledged in financial risk asset valuations. The last row of Table VI-5 for Sep 25, 2020 shows that the S&P 500 is now 172.1 percent above the Apr 26, 2010 level and the DJIA is 142.5 percent above the level on Apr 26, 2010. Multiple rounds of risk aversion eroded earlier gains, showing that risk aversion can destroy market value even with zero interest rates. Relaxed risk aversion has contributed to recovery of valuations. Much the same as zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not had any effects in recovering economic activity while distorting financial markets and resources.

Table VI-5, Percentage Changes of DJIA and S&P 500 in Selected Dates

 

∆% DJIA from prior date

∆% DJIA from
Apr 26 2010

∆% S&P 500 from prior date

∆% S&P 500 from
Apr 26 2010

Apr 26, 2010

 

 

 

 

May 06/10

-6.1

-6.1

-6.9

-6.9

May 26/10

-5.2

-10.9

-5.4

-11.9

Jun 08/10

-1.2

-11.3

2.1

-12.4

Jul 02/10

-2.6

-13.6

-3.8

-15.7

Aug 09/10

10.5

-4.3

10.3

-7.0

Aug 31/10

-6.4

-10.6

-6.9

-13.4

Nov 5/10

14.2

2.1

16.8

1.0

Nov 30/10

-3.8

-3.8

-3.7

-2.6

Dec 17/10

4.4

2.5

5.3

2.6

Dec 23/10

0.7

3.3

1.0

3.7

Dec 31/10

0.03

3.3

0.0

3.8

Jan 7, 2011

0.8

4.2

1.1

4.9

Jan 14/11

0.9

5.2

1.7

6.7

Jan 21/11

0.7

5.9

-0.8

5.9

Jan 28/11

-0.4

5.5

-0.5

5.3

Feb 04/11

2.3

7.9

2.7

8.1

Feb 11/11

1.5

9.5

1.4

9.7

Feb 18/11

0.9

10.6

1.0

10.8

Feb 25/11

-2.1

8.3

-1.7

8.9

Mar 4/11

0.3

8.6

0.1

9.0

Mar 11/11

-1.0

7.5

-1.3

7.6

Mar 18/11

-1.5

5.8

-1.9

5.5

Mar 25/11

3.1

9.1

2.7

8.4

Apr 01/11

1.3

10.5

1.4

9.9

Apr 08/11

0.03

10.5

-0.3

9.6

Apr 15/11

-0.3

10.1

-0.6

8.9

Apr 22/11

1.3

11.6

1.3

10.3

Apr 29/11

2.4

14.3

1.9

12.5

May 06/11

-1.3

12.8

-1.7

10.6

May 13/11

-0.3

12.4

-0.2

10.4

May 20/11

-0.7

11.7

-0.3

10.0

May 27/11

-0.6

11.0

-0.2

9.8

Jun 03/11

-2.3

8.4

-2.3

7.3

Jun 10/11

-1.6

6.7

-2.2

4.9

Jun 17/11

0.4

7.1

0.04

4.9

Jun 24/11

-0.6

6.5

-0.2

4.6

Jul 01/11

5.4

12.3

5.6

10.5

Jul 08/11

0.6

12.9

0.3

10.9

Jul 15/11

-1.4

11.4

-2.1

8.6

Jul 22/11

1.6

13.2

2.2

10.9

Jul 29/11

-4.2

8.4

-3.9

6.6

Aug 05/11

-5.8

2.1

-7.2

-1.0

Aug 12/11

-1.5

0.6

-1.7

-2.7

Aug 19/11

-4.0

-3.5

-4.7

-7.3

Aug 26/11

4.3

0.7

4.7

-2.9

Sep 02/11

-0.4

0.3

-0.2

-3.1

Sep 09/11

-2.2

-1.9

-1.7

-4.8

Sep 16/11

4.7

2.7

5.4

0.3

Sep 23/11

-6.4

-3.9

-6.5

-6.2

Sep 30/11

1.3

-2.6

-0.4

-6.7

Oct 7/11

1.7

-0.9

2.1

-4.7

Oct 14/11

4.9

3.9

5.9

1.0

Oct 21/11

1.4

5.4

1.1

2.2

Oct 28/11

3.6

9.2

3.8

6.0

Nov 04/11

-2.0

6.9

-2.5

3.4

Nov 11/11

1.4

8.5

0.8

4.3

Nov 18/11

-2.9

5.3

-3.8

0.3

Nov 25/11

-4.8

0.2

-4.7

-4.4

Dec 02/11

7.0

7.3

7.4

2.7

Dec 09/11

1.4

8.7

0.9

3.6

Dec 16/11

-2.6

5.9

-2.8

0.6

Dec 23/11

3.6

9.7

3.7

4.4

Dec 30/11

-0.6

9.0

-0.6

3.8

Jan 06 2012

1.2

10.3

1.6

5.4

Jan 13/12

0.5

10.9

0.9

6.4

Jan 20/12

2.4

13.5

2.0

8.5

Jan 27/12

-0.5

13.0

0.1

8.6

Feb 3/12

1.6

14.8

2.2

11.0

Feb 10/12

-0.5

14.2

-0.2

10.8

Feb 17/12

1.2

15.6

1.4

12.3

Feb 24/12

0.3

15.9

0.3

12.7

Mar 2/12

0.0

15.8

0.3

13.0

Mar 9/12

-0.4

15.3

0.1

13.1

Mar 16/12

2.4

18.1

2.4

15.9

Mar 23/12

-1.1

16.7

-0.5

15.3

Mar 30/12

1.0

17.9

0.8

16.2

Apr 6/12

-1.1

16.6

-0.7

15.3

Apr 13/12

-1.6

14.7

-2.0

13.1

Apr 20/12

1.4

16.3

0.6

13.7

Apr 27/12

1.5

18.1

1.8

15.8

May 4/12

-1.4

16.4

-2.3

12.9

May 11/12

-1.7

14.4

-1.1

11.7

May 18/12

-3.5

10.4

-4.3

6.4

May 25/12

0.7

11.2

1.7

8.7

Jun 01/12

-2.7

8.2

-3.0

5.4

Jun 08/12

3.6

12.0

3.7

9.4

Jun 15/12

1.7

13.9

1.3

10.8

Jun 22/12

-1.0

12.8

-0.6

10.1

Jun 29/12

1.9

14.9

2.0

12.4

Jul 06/12

-0.8

14.0

-0.5

11.8

Jul 13/12

0.0

14.0

0.2

11.9

Jul 20/12

0.4

14.4

0.4

12.4

Jul 27/12

2.0

16.7

1.7

14.3

Aug 03/12

0.2

16.9

0.4

14.8

Aug 10/12

0.9

17.9

1.1

16.0

Aug 17/12

0.5

18.5

0.9

17.0

Aug 24/12

-0.9

17.4

-0.5

16.4

Aug 31/12

-0.5

16.8

-0.3

16.0

Sep 07/12

1.6

18.8

2.2

18.6

Sep 14/12

2.2

21.3

1.90

20.9

Sep 21/12

-0.1

21.2

-0.4

20.5

Sep 28/12

-1.0

19.9

-1.3

18.9

Oct 05/12

1.3

21.5

1.4

20.5

Oct 12/12

-2.1

18.9

-2.2

17.9

Oct 19/12

0.1

19.1

0.3

18.3

Oct 26/12

-1.8

17.0

-1.5

16.5

Nov 02/12

-0.1

16.9

0.2

16.7

Nov 09/12

-2.1

14.4

-2.4

13.8

Nov 16/12

-1.8

12.3

-1.4

12.2

Nov 23/12

3.3

16.1

3.6

16.3

Nov 30/12

0.1

16.2

0.5

16.8

Dec 07/12

1.0

17.4

0.1

17.0

Dec 14/12

-0.2

17.2

-0.3

16.6

Dec 21/12

0.4

17.7

1.2

18.0

Dec 28/12

-1.9

15.5

-1.9

15.7

Jan 04, 2013

3.8

19.9

4.6

21.0

Jan 11/13

0.4

20.4

0.4

21.5

Jan 18/13

1.2

21.8

0.9

22.6

Jan 25/13

1.8

24.0

1.1

24.0

Feb 01/13

0.8

25.0

0.7

24.8

Feb 08/13

-0.1

24.9

0.3

25.2

Feb 15/13

-0.1

24.8

0.1

25.4

Feb 22/13

0.1

24.9

-0.3

25.0

Mar 1/13

0.6

25.7

0.2

25.3

Mar 8/13

2.2

28.5

2.2

28.0

Mar 15/13

0.8

29.5

0.6

28.8

Mar 22/13

0.0

29.5

-0.2

28.5

Mar 29/13

0.5

30.1

0.8

29.5

Apr 05/13

-0.1

30.0

-1.0

28.2

Apr 12/13

2.1

32.7

2.3

31.1

Apr 19/13

-2.1

29.8

-2.1

28.3

Aug 26/13

1.1

31.3

1.7

30.5

May 03/13

1.8

33.6

2.0

33.2

May 10/13

1.0

34.9

1.2

34.8

May 17/13

1.6

37.0

2.1

37.6

May 24/13

-0.3

36.6

-1.1

36.1

May 31/13

-1.2

34.9

-1.1

34.5

Jun 07/13

0.9

36.1

0.8

35.6

Jun 14/13

-1.2

34.5

-0.9

34.4

Jun 21/13

-1.8

32.1

-2.2

31.4

Jun 28/13

0.7

33.1

0.9

32.5

Jul 05/13

1.5

35.1

1.6

34.6

Jul 12/13

2.2

38.0

3.0

38.6

Jul 19/13

0.5

38.7

0.7

39.6

Jul 26/13

0.1

38.9

0.0

39.6

Aug 02/13

0.6

39.7

1.1

41.1

Aug 09/13

-1.5

37.7

-1.1

39.6

Aug 16/13

-2.2

34.6

-2.1

36.6

Aug 23/13

-0.5

34.0

0.5

37.2

Aug 30/13

-1.3

32.2

-1.8

34.7

Sep 06/13

0.8

33.2

1.4

36.6

Sep 13/13

3.0

37.2

2.0

39.3

Sep 20/13

0.5

37.9

1.3

41.1

Sep 27/13

-1.2

36.2

-1.1

39.6

Oct 04/13

-1.2

34.5

-0.1

39.5

Oct 11/13

1.1

36.0

0.8

40.5

Oct 18/13

1.1

37.4

2.4

43.9

Oct 25/13

1.1

39.0

0.9

45.2

Nov 01/13

0.3

39.4

0.1

45.3

Nov 08/13

0.9

40.7

0.5

46.1

Nov 15/13

1.3

42.5

1.6

48.4

Nov 22/13

0.6

43.4

0.4

48.9

Nov 29/13

0.1

43.6

0.1

49.0

Dec 06/13

-0.4

43.0

0.0

48.9

Dec 13/13

-1.7

40.6

-1.6

46.5

Dec 20/13

3.0

44.8

2.4

50.0

Dec 27/13

1.6

47.1

1.3

51.9

Jan 03, 2014

-0.1

47.0

-0.5

79.1

Jan 10/14

-0.2

46.7

0.6

52.0

Jan 17/14

0.1

46.9

-0.2

51.7

Jan 24/14

-3.5

41.7

-2.6

47.7

Jan 31/14

-1.1

40.1

-0.4

47.1

Feb 7/14

0.6

41.0

0.8

48.3

Feb 14/14

2.3

44.2

2.3

51.7

Feb 21/14

-0.3

43.7

-0.1

51.5

Feb 28/14

1.4

45.7

1.3

53.4

Mar 7/14

0.8

46.8

1.0

54.9

Mar 14/14

-2.4

43.4

-2.0

51.9

Mar 21/14

1.5

45.5

1.4

54.0

Mar 28/14

0.1

45.7

-0.5

53.3

Apr 04/14

0.5

46.5

0.4

53.9

Apr 11/14

-2.4

43.0

-2.6

49.8

Apr 17/14

2.4

46.4

2.7

53.9

Apr 25/14

-0.3

46.0

-0.1

53.7

May 02/14

0.9

47.4

1.0

55.2

May 09/14

0.4

48.0

-0.1

55.0

May 16, 14

-0.6

47.2

0.0

54.9

May 23, 14

0.7

48.2

1.2

56.8

May 30, 14

0.7

49.2

1.2

58.7

Jun 06, 14

1.2

51.0

1.3

60.8

Jun 13, 14

-0.9

49.7

-0.7

59.7

Jun 20, 14

1.0

51.2

1.4

61.9

Jun 27, 14

-0.6

50.4

-0.1

61.8

Jul 04, 14

1.3

52.3

1.2

63.8

Jul 11, 14

-0.7

51.2

-0.9

62.3

Jul 18, 14

0.9

52.6

0.5

63.2

Jul 25, 14

-0.8

51.4

0.0

63.2

Aug 1, 14

-2.8

47.2

-2.7

58.8

Aug 8, 14

0.4

47.7

0.3

59.4

Aug 15, 14

0.7

48.7

1.2

61.3

Aug 22, 14

2.0

51.7

1.7

64.1

Aug 29, 14

0.6

52.6

0.8

65.3

Sep 5, 14

0.2

52.9

0.2

65.6

Sep 12, 14

-0.9

51.6

-1.1

63.8

Sep 19, 14

1.7

54.2

1.3

65.9

Sep 26,14

-1.0

52.7

-1.4

63.6

Oct 3, 14

-0.6

51.8

-0.8

62.4

Oct 10, 14

-2.7

47.6

-3.1

57.3

Oct 17, 14

-1.0

46.2

-1.0

55.7

Oct 24, 14

2.6

50.0

4.1

62.1

Oct 31, 14

3.5

55.2

2.7

66.5

Nov 7, 14

1.1

56.8

0.7

67.6

Nov 14, 14

0.3

57.4

0.4

68.3

Nov 21,14

1.0

58.9

1.2

70.2

Nov 28, 14

0.1

59.1

0.2

70.6

Dec 5, 14

0.7

60.3

0.4

71.2

Dec 12, 14

-3.8

54.2

-3.5

65.2

Dec 19, 14

3.0

58.9

3.4

70.8

Dec 26, 14

1.4

61.1

0.9

72.3

Jan 02, 2015

-1.2

59.2

-1.5

69.8

Jan 09, 15

-0.5

58.3

-0.7

68.7

Jan 16, 15

-1.3

56.3

-1.2

66.6

Jan 23, 15

0.9

57.7

1.6

69.3

Jan 30, 15

-2.9

53.2

-2.8

64.6

Feb 06, 15

3.8

59.1

3.0

69.6

Feb 13, 15

1.1

60.8

2.0

73.0

Feb 20, 15

0.7

61.9

0.6

74.1

Feb 27, 15

0.0

61.8

-0.3

73.6

Feb 6, 15

-1.5

59.4

-1.6

70.9

Feb 13 15

-0.6

58.4

-0.9

69.4

Feb 20, 15

2.1

61.8

2.7

73.9

Feb 27, 15

-2.3

58.1

-2.2

70.0

Apr 03, 15

0.3

58.5

0.3

70.5

Apr 10, 15

1.7

61.2

1.7

73.4

Apr 17, 15

-1.3

59.1

-1.0

71.7

Apr 24, 2015

1.4

61.4

1.8

74.7

May 1, 2015

-0.3

60.9

-0.4

73.9

May 8, 2015

0.9

62.3

0.4

74.6

May 15, 2015

0.4

63.1

0.3

75.1

May 22, 2015

-0.2

62.7

0.2

75.4

May 29, 2015

-1.2

60.7

-0.9

73.9

Jun 5, 2015

-0.9

59.3

-0.7

72.7

Jun 12, 2015

0.3

59.7

0.1

72.8

Jun 19, 2015

0.7

60.8

0.8

74.1

Jun 26, 2015

-0.4

60.2

-0.4

73.4

Jul 3, 2015

-1.2

58.2

-1.2

71.3

Jul 10, 2015

0.2

58.5

0.0

71.3

Jul 17, 2015

1.8

61.4

2.4

75.5

Jul 24, 2015

-2.9

56.8

-2.2

71.6

Jul 31, 2015

0.7

57.9

1.2

73.6

Aug 7, 2015

-1.8

55.0

-1.2

71.4

Aug 14, 2015

0.6

56.0

0.7

72.6

Aug 21, 2015

-5.8

46.9

-5.8

62.6

Aug 28, 2015

1.1

48.5

0.9

64.1

Sep 4, 2015

-3.2

43.7

-3.4

58.5

Sep 11, 2015

2.1

46.7

2.1

61.8

Sep 18, 2015

-0.3

46.2

-0.2

61.5

Sep 25, 2015

-0.4

45.6

-1.4

59.3

Oct 2, 2015

1.0

47.0

1.0

70.1

Oct 9, 2015

3.7

52.5

3.3

66.2

Oct 16, 2015

0.8

53.6

0.9

67.7

Oct 23, 2015

2.5

57.5

2.1

71.2

Oct 30, 2015

0.1

57.6

0.2

71.6

Nov 6, 2015

0.4

59.8

1.0

73.2

Nov 13, 2015

-3.7

53.9

-3.6

66.9

Nov 20, 2015

3.4

59.1

3.3

72.4

Nov 27, 2015

-0.1

58.8

0.0

72.4

Dec 4, 2015

0.3

59.3

0.1

72.6

Dec 11, 2015

-3.3

54.1

-3.8

66.0

Dec 18, 2015

-0.8

52.9

-0.3

65.5

Dec 23, 2015

2.5

56.6

2.8

70.0

Dec 31, 2015

-0.7

55.5

-0.8

68.6

Jan 08, 2016

-6.2

45.9

-6.0

58.6

Jan 15, 2016

-2.2

42.7

-2.2

55.1

Jan 22, 2016

0.7

43.6

1.4

57.3

Jan 29, 2016

2.3

47.0

1.7

60.1

Feb 05, 2016

-1.6

44.6

-3.1

55.1

Feb 12, 2016

-1.4

42.6

-0.8

53.9

Feb 19, 2016

2.6

46.3

2.8

58.2

Feb 26, 2016

1.5

48.5

1.6

60.7

Mar 04, 2016

2.2

51.8

2.7

65.0

Mar 11, 2016

1.2

53.6

1.1

66.8

Mar 18, 2016

2.3

57.1

1.4

69.1

Mar 25, 2016

-0.5

56.3

-0.7

68.0

Apr 01, 2016

1.6

58.8

1.8

71.0

Apr 08, 2016

-1.2

56.9

-1.2

68.9

Apr 15, 2016

1.8

59.7

1.6

71.7

Apr 22, 2016

0.6

60.7

0.5

72.6

Apr 29, 2016

-1.3

58.6

-1.3

70.4

May 6, 2016

-0.2

58.3

-0.4

69.7

May 13, 2016

-1.2

56.5

-0.5

68.9

May 20, 2016

-0.2

56.2

0.3

69.3

May 27, 2016

2.1

59.5

2.3

73.2

Jun 03, 2016

-0.4

58.9

0.0

73.2

Jun 10, 2016

0.3

59.4

-0.1

72.9

Jun 17, 2016

-1.1

57.7

-1.2

70.9

Jun 24, 2016

-1.6

55.3

-1.6

68.1

Jul 01, 2016

3.2

60.2

3.2

73.5

Jul 08, 2016

1.1

62.0

1.3

75.7

Jul 15, 2016

2.0

65.3

1.5

78.4

Jul 22, 2016

0.3

65.7

0.6

79.5

Jul 29, 2016

-0.7

64.5

-0.1

79.3

Aug 05, 2016

0.6

65.5

0.4

80.1

Aug 12, 2016

0.2

65.8

0.1

80.2

Aug 19, 2016

-0.1

65.6

0.0

80.2

Aug 26, 2016

-0.8

64.2

-0.7

79.0

Sep 02, 2016

0.5

65.0

0.5

79.9

Sep 09, 2016

-2.2

61.4

-2.4

75.6

Sep 16, 2016

0.2

61.7

0.5

76.5

Sep 23, 2016

0.8

63.0

1.2

78.6

Sep 30, 2016

0.3

63.4

0.2

78.9

Oct 07, 2016

-0.4

62.8

-0.7

77.7

Oct 14, 2016

-0.6

61.9

-1.0

76.0

Oct 21, 2016

0.0

61.9

0.4

87.3

Oct 28, 2016

0.1

62.1

-0.7

75.4

Nov 04, 2016

-1.5

59.6

-1.9

72.0

Nov 11, 2016

5.4

68.2

3.8

78.6

Nov 18, 2016

0.1

68.4

0.8

94.8

Nov 25, 2016

1.5

70.9

1.4

82.6

Dec 02, 2016

0.1

71.1

-1.0

80.8

Dec 09, 2016

3.1

76.3

3.1

86.4

Dec 16, 2016

0.4

77.1

-0.1

86.3

Dec 23, 2016

0.5

77.9

0.3

86.8

Dec 30, 2016

-0.9

76.4

-1.1

84.7

Jan 06, 2017

1.0

78.2

1.7

87.9

Jan 13, 2017

-0.4

77.5

-0.1

87.7

Jan 20, 2017

-0.3

76.9

-0.1

122.1

Jan 27, 2017

1.3

79.3

1.0

89.3

Feb 03, 2017

-0.1

79.1

0.1

89.5

Feb 10, 2017

1.0

80.9

0.8

91.1

Feb 17, 2017

1.7

84.1

1.5

94.0

Feb 24, 2017

1.0

85.8

0.7

95.3

Mar 03, 2017

0.9

87.5

0.7

96.6

Mar 10, 2017

-0.5

86.5

-0.4

95.8

Mar 17, 2017

0.1

86.7

0.2

96.2

Mar 24, 2017

-1.5

83.8

-1.4

93.4

Mar 31, 2017

0.3

84.4

0.8

94.9

Apr 07, 2017

0.0

84.3

-0.3

94.3

Apr 14, 2017

-1.0

82.5

-1.1

92.1

Apr 21, 2017

0.5

83.4

0.8

93.8

Apr 28, 2017

1.9

86.9

1.5

96.7

May 05, 2017

0.3

87.5

0.6

98.0

May 12, 2017

-0.5

86.5

-0.3

97.3

Mar 19, 2017

-0.4

85.7

-0.4

96.5

Mar 26, 2017

1.3

88.1

1.4

99.3

Jun 02, 2017

0.6

89.3

1.0

101.2

Jun 09, 2017

0.3

89.8

-0.3

100.6

Jun 16, 2017

0.5

90.8

0.1

100.7

Jun 23, 2017

0.0

90.9

0.2

101.2

Jun 30, 2017

-0.2

90.5

-0.6

99.9

Jul 07, 2017

0.3

91.1

0.1

100.1

Jul 14, 2017

1.0

93.1

1.4

102.9

Jul 21, 2017

-0.3

92.6

0.5

104.0

Jul 28, 2017

1.2

94.8

0.0

104.0

Aug 04, 2017

1.2

97.2

0.2

104.4

Aug 11. 2017

-1.1

95.1

-1.4

101.4

Aug 18, 2017

-0.8

93.4

-0.6

100.1

Aug 25, 2017

0.6

94.7

0.7

101.6

Sep 01, 2017

0.8

96.2

1.4

104.3

Sep 08, 2017

-0.9

94.5

-0.6

103.1

Sep 15, 2017

2.2

98.7

1.6

106.3

Sep 22, 2017

0.4

99.5

0.1

106.4

Sep 29, 2017

0.2

100.0

0.7

107.9

Oct 06, 2017

1.6

103.2

1.2

110.3

Oct 13, 2017

0.4

104.1

0.2

110.6

Oct 20, 2017

2.0

108.2

0.9

112.5

Oct 27, 2017

0.5

109.1

0.2

113.0

Nov 03, 2017

0.4

110.1

0.3

113.5

Nov 10, 2017

-0.5

109.0

-0.2

113.1

Nov 17, 2017

-0.3

108.5

-0.1

112.8

Nov 24, 2017

0.9

110.2

0.9

114.7

Dec 01, 2017

2.9

116.3

1.5

118.0

Dec 08, 2017

0.4

117.1

0.4

118.8

Dec 15, 2017

1.3

120.0

0.9

120.8

Dec 22, 2017

0.4

120.9

0.3

121.4

Dec 29, 2017

-0.1

120.6

-0.4

120.6

Jan 05, 2018

2.3

125.8

2.6

126.3

Jan 12, 2018

2.0

130.3

1.6

129.9

Jan 19, 2018

1.0

132.7

0.9

131.9

Jan 26, 2018

2.1

137.5

2.2

137.0

Feb 02, 2018

-4.1

127.8

-3.9

127.9

Feb 09, 2018

-5.2

115.9

-5.2

116.1

Feb 16, 2018

4.3

125.1

4.3

125.4

Feb 23, 2018

0.4

125.9

0.6

126.7

Mar 02, 2018

-3.0

119.0

-2.0

122.0

Mar 09, 2018

3.3

126.1

3.5

129.9

Mar 16, 2018

-1.5

122.6

-1.2

127.1

Mar 23, 2018

-5.7

110.0

-6.0

113.5

Mar 30, 2018

2.4

115.1

2.0

117.9

Apr 06, 2018

-0.7

113.6

-1.4

114.9

Apr 13, 2018

1.8

117.4

2.0

119.2

Apr 20, 2018

0.4

118.3

0.5

120.3

Apr 27, 2018

-0.6

117.0

0.0

120.3

May 04, 2018

-0.2

116.5

-0.2

119.7

May 11, 2018

2.3

121.6

2.4

125.1

May 18, 2018

-0.5

120.6

-0.5

123.8

May 25, 2018

0.2

120.9

0.3

124.5

Jun 01, 2018

-0.5

119.9

0.5

125.6

Jun 08, 2018

2.8

125.9

2.4

130.9

Jun 15, 2018

-0.9

123.9

-0.7

129.3

Jun 22, 2018

-2.0

119.4

-0.9

127.3

Jun 29, 2018

-1.3

116.6

-1.3

124.3

Jul 06, 2018

0.8

118.3

1.5

127.7

Jul 13, 2018

2.3

123.3

1.5

131.1

Jul 20, 2018

0.2

123.6

0.0

131.2

Jul 27, 2018

1.6

127.1

0.6

132.6

Aug 03, 2018

0.0

127.2

0.8

134.3

Aug 10, 2018

-0.6

125.9

-0.2

133.8

Aug 17, 2018

1.4

129.1

0.6

135.1

Aug 24, 2018

0.5

130.2

0.9

137.2

Aug 31, 2018

0.7

131.7

0.9

139.4

Sep 07, 2018

-0.2

131.3

-1.0

136.9

Sep 14, 2018

0.9

133.4

1.2

139.7

Sep 21, 2018

2.3

138.7

0.8

141.7

Sep 28, 2018

-1.1

136.1

-0.5

140.4

Oct 05, 2018

0.0

136.0

-1.0

138.1

Oct 12, 2018

-4.2

126.1

-4.1

128.3

Oct 19, 2018

0.4

127.1

0.0

128.4

Oct 26, 2018

-3.0

120.3

-3.9

119.4

Nov 02, 2018

2.4

125.5

2.4

124.7

Nov 09, 2018

2.8

131.9

2.1

129.4

Nov 16, 2018

-2.2

126.8

-1.6

125.8

Nov 23, 2018

-4.4

116.7

-3.8

117.2

Nov 30, 2018

5.2

127.9

4.8

127.7

Dec 07, 2018

-4.5

117.7

-4.6

117.2

Dec 14, 2018

-1.2

115.1

-1.3

114.5

Dec 21, 2018

-6.9

100.3

-7.1

99.4

Dec 28, 2018

2.7

105.8

2.9

105.1

Jan 04, 2019

1.6

109.1

1.9

108.9

Jan 11, 2019

2.4

114.2

2.5

114.2

Jan 18, 2019

3.0

120.5

2.9

120.3

Jan 25, 2019

0.1

120.8

-0.2

119.9

Feb 01, 2019

1.3

123.7

1.6

123.3

Feb 08, 2019

0.2

124.1

0.0

123.4

Feb 15, 2019

3.1

131.0

2.5

129.0

Feb 22, 2019

0.6

132.3

0.6

130.4

Mar 01, 2019

0.0

132.3

0.4

131.3

Mar 08, 2019

-2.2

127.1

-2.2

126.3

Mar 15, 2019

1.6

130.7

2.9

132.9

Mar 22, 2019

-1.3

127.6

-0.8

131.1

Mar 29, 2019

1.7

131.4

1.2

133.9

Apr 05, 2019

1.9

135.8

2.1

138.7

Apr 12, 2019

0.0

135.7

0.5

139.9

Apr 19, 2019

0.6

137.0

-0.1

139.7

Apr 26, 2019

-0.1

136.9

1.2

142.6

May 03, 2019

-0.1

136.5

0.2

143.0

May 10, 2019

-2.1

131.5

-2.2

137.7

May 17, 2019

-0.7

129.9

-0.8

135.9

May 24, 2019

-0.7

128.3

-1.2

133.2

May 31, 2019

-3.0

121.5

-2.6

127.1

Jun 07, 2019

4.7

131.9

4.4

137.1

Jun 14, 2019

0.4

132.8

0.5

138.2

Jun 21, 2019

2.4

138.5

2.2

143.4

Jun 28, 2019

-0.4

137.4

-0.3

142.7

Jul 05, 2019

1.2

140.3

1.7

146.7

Jul 12, 2019

1.5

143.9

0.8

148.7

Jul 19, 2019

-0.7

142.3

-1.2

145.6

Jul 26, 2019

0.1

142.7

1.7

149.6

Aug 02, 2019

-2.6

136.4

-3.1

141.9

Aug 09, 2019

-0.7

134.6

-0.5

140.8

Aug 16, 2019

-1.5

131.0

-1.0

138.3

Aug 23, 2019

-1.0

128.7

-1.4

134.9

Aug 30, 2019

3.0

135.6

2.8

141.4

Sep 06, 2019

1.5

139.2

1.8

145.8

Sep 13, 2019

1.6

142.9

1.0

148.1

Sep 20, 2019

-1.0

140.4

-0.5

146.9

Sep 27, 2019

-0.4

139.4

-1.0

144.4

Oct 04, 2019

-0.9

137.2

-0.3

143.6

Oct 11, 2019

0.9

139.3

0.6

145.1

Oct 18, 2019

-0.2

138.9

0.5

146.4

Oct 25, 2019

0.7

140.6

1.2

149.4

Nov 01, 2019

1.4

144.1

1.5

153.0

Nov 08, 2019

1.2

147.0

0.9

155.2

Nov 15, 2019

1.2

149.9

0.9

157.5

Nov 22, 2019

-0.5

148.8

-0.3

156.6

Nov 29, 2019

0.6

150.3

1.0

159.1

Dec 06, 2019

-0.1

150.0

0.2

159.6

Dec 13, 2019

0.4

151.1

0.7

161.4

Dec 20, 2019

1.1

153.9

1.7

165.8

Dec 27, 2019

0.7

155.6

0.6

167.3

Jan 03, 2020

0.0

155.6

-0.2

166.9

Jan 10, 2020

0.7

157.2

0.9

169.4

Jan 17, 2020

1.8

161.9

2.0

174.7

Jan 24, 2020

-1.2

158.7

-1.0

171.9

Jan 31, 2020

-2.5

152.2

-2.1

166.1

Feb 07, 2020

3.0

159.7

3.2

174.6

Feb 14, 2020

1.0

162.4

1.6

178.9

Feb 21, 2020

-1.4

158.7

-1.3

175.4

Feb 28, 2020

-12.4

126.8

-11.5

143.7

Mar 06, 2020

1.8

130.8

0.6

145.2

Mar 13, 2020

-10.4

106.9

-8.8

123.7

Mar 20, 2020

-17.3

71.1

-15.0

90.2

Mar 27, 2020

12.8

93.1

10.3

109.7

Apr 03, 2020

-2.7

87.9

-2.1

105.3

Apr 10, 2020

12.7

111.7

12.1

130.2

Apr 17, 2020

2.2

116.4

3.0

137.2

Apr 24, 2020

-1.9

112.2

-1.3

134.0

May 01, 2020

-0.2

111.7

-0.2

133.5

May 08, 2020

2.6

117.1

3.5

141.7

May 15, 2020

-2.7

111.4

-2.3

126.3

May 22, 2020

3.3

118.3

3.2

143.8

May 29, 2020

3.8

126.5

3.0

151.2

Jun 05, 2020

6.8

142.0

4.9

163.5

Jun 12, 2020

-5.6

128.5

-4.8

150.9

Jun 19, 2020

1.0

130.9

1.9

155.6

Jun 26, 2020

-3.3

123.3

-2.9

148.3

Jul 03, 2020

3.2

130.5

4.0

158.2

Jul 10, 2020

1.0

132.7

1.8

162.8

Jul 17, 2020

2.3

138.0

1.2

166.1

Jul 24, 2020

-0.8

136.2

-0.3

`65.3

Jul 31, 2020

-0.2

135.9

1.7

169.9

Aug 07, 2020

3.8

144.8

2.5

176.5

Aug 14, 2020

1.8

149.3

0.6

178.3

Aug 21, 2020

0.0

149.3

0.7

180.3

Aug 28, 2020

2.6

155.7

3.3

189.4

Sep 04, 2020

-1.8

151.1

-2.3

182.7

Sep 11, 2020

-1.7

146.9

-2.5

175.6

Sep 18, 2020

0.0

146.8

-0.6

173.9

Sep 25, 2020

-1.7

142.5

-0.6

172.1

Source:

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_us_stocks.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3014

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_currencies.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000

Table VI-7, updated with every blog comment, provides in the second column the yield at the close of market of the 10-year Treasury note on the date in the first column. The price in the third column is calculated with the coupon of 2.625 percent of the 10-year note current at the time of the second round of quantitative easing after Nov 3, 2010 and the final column “∆% 11/04/10” calculates the percentage change of the price on the date relative to that of 101.2573 at the close of market on Nov 4, 2010, one day after the decision on quantitative easing by the Fed on Nov 3, 2010. Prices with new coupons such as 2.0 percent in recent auctions (http://www.treasurydirect.gov/RI/OFAuctions?form=extended&cusip=912828RR3) are not comparable to prices in Table VI-7. The highest yield in the decade was 5.510 percent on May 1, 2001 that would result in a loss of principal of 22.9 percent relative to the price on Nov 4. Monetary policy has created a “duration trap” of bond prices. Duration is the percentage change in bond price resulting from a percentage change in yield or what economists call the yield elasticity of bond price. Duration is higher the lower the bond coupon and yield, all other things constant. This means that the price loss in a yield rise from low coupons and yields is much higher than with high coupons and yields. Intuitively, the higher coupon payments offset part of the price loss. Prices/yields of Treasury securities were affected by the combination of Fed purchases for its program of quantitative easing and by the flight to dollar-denominated assets because of geopolitical risks in the Middle East, subsequently by the tragic Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and now again by the sovereign risk doubts in Europe and the growth recession in the US and the world. The yield of 0.660 percent at the close of market on Fri Sep 25, 2020 would be equivalent to price of 118.9853 in a hypothetical bond maturing in 10 years with coupon of 2.625 percent for price increase of 17.5 percent relative to the price on Nov 4, 2010, one day after the decision on the second program of quantitative easing, as shown in the last row of Table VI-7. The price loss between Sep 7, 2012 and Sep 14, 2012 would have been 1.7 percent in just five trading days. The price loss between Jun 1, 2012 and Jun 8, 2012 would have been 1.6 percent, in just a week, and much higher with leverage of 10:1 as typical in Treasury positions. The price loss between Mar 9, 2012 and Mar 16, 2012 is 2.3 percent but much higher when using common leverage of 10:1. The price loss between Dec 28, 2012 and Jan 4, 2013 would have been 1.7 percent. These losses defy annualizing. If inflation accelerates, yields of Treasury securities may rise sharply. Yields are not observed without special yield-lowering effects such as the flight into dollars caused by the events in the Middle East, continuing purchases of Treasury securities by the Fed, the tragic Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 affecting Japan, recurring fears on European sovereign credit issues and worldwide risk aversion in the week of Sep 30 caused by “let’s twist again” monetary policy. There is a difficult climb from the record federal deficit of 9.8 percent of GDP in 2009 and cumulative deficit of $5090 billion in four consecutive years of deficits exceeding one trillion dollars from 2009 to 2012, which is the worst fiscal performance since World War II (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html and earlier Section IB at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html). There is no subsequent jump of debt in US peacetime history as the one from 39.4 percent of GDP in 2008 to 65.8 percent of GDP in 2011, 70.3 percent in 2012, 72.2 percent in 2013, 73.7 percent in 2014, 72.5 percent in 2015, 76.4 percent in 2016, 76.1 percent in 2017 and 77.8 percent in 2018 (https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html

 and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). The US is facing an unsustainable debt/GDP path (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html).

The Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, at the 61st Annual Meeting on the National Association for Business Economics, on Oct 28, 2019, in Denver, Colorado, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20191008a.htm): “Reserve balances are one among several items on the liability side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and demand for these liabilities—notably, currency in circulation—grows over time. Hence, increasing the supply of reserves or even maintaining a given level over time requires us to increase the size of our balance sheet. As we indicated in our March statement on balance sheet normalization, at some point, we will begin increasing our securities holdings to maintain an appropriate level of reserves.18 That time is now upon us.

I want to emphasize that growth of our balance sheet for reserve management purposes should in no way be confused with the large-scale asset purchase programs that we deployed after the financial crisis. Neither the recent technical issues nor the purchases of Treasury bills we are contemplating to resolve them should materially affect the stance of monetary policy, to which I now turn.” On October 25, 2017, at the beginning of the FOMC programmed reduction of the balance sheet, Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks stood at $4,461,117 million. Total Assets increased $2,632,044 million from $4,461,117 on Oct 25, 2017 to $7,093,161 on Sep 23, 2020. Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks increased from $3,981,420 million on Feb 20, 2019 to $7,093,161 million on Sep 23, 2020, by $3,111,741 million or 78.2 percent. The policy of reducing the fed funds policy rate requires increasing the balance sheet. The line “Securities Held Outright” increased from $4,019,823 million on Oct 25, 2017 to $6,458,738 on Sep 23, 2020 or $2,438,915 million. Securities Held Outright increased from $3,617,939 million on Jul 1, 2019 to $6,458,738 on Sep 23, 2020 by $2,840,799 million or 78.5 percent. The portfolio of long-term securities (“securities held outright”) for monetary policy consists primarily of $6093 billion, or $6.09 trillion, of which $3,780 billion Treasury nominal notes and bonds, $286 billion of notes and bonds inflation-indexed, $2 billion Federal agency debt securities and $2025 billion mortgage-backed securities ($2,024,868 million). Reserve balances deposited with Federal Reserve Banks reached $2848 billion ($2,848,082 million) or $2.8 trillion (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1). The rounded values of $1649 billion of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks and mortgage-backed securities are identical on Dec 19, 2018, by pure coincidence. There is no simple exit of this trap created by the highest monetary policy accommodation in US history together with the highest deficits and debt in percent of GDP since World War II. Risk aversion from various sources, discussed in section III World Financial Turbulence, has been affecting financial markets for several months. The risk is that in a reversal of exposures because of increasing risk aversion that has been typical in this cyclical expansion of the economy yields of Treasury securities may back up sharply.

Table VI-7, Yield, Price and Percentage Change to November 4, 2010 of Ten-Year Treasury Note

Date

Yield

Price

∆% 11/04/10

05/01/01

5.510

78.0582

-22.9

06/10/03

3.112

95.8452

-5.3

06/12/07

5.297

79.4747

-21.5

12/19/08

2.213

104.4981

3.2

12/31/08

2.240

103.4295

2.1

03/19/09

2.605

100.1748

-1.1

06/09/09

3.862

89.8257

-11.3

10/07/09

3.182

95.2643

-5.9

11/27/09

3.197

95.1403

-6.0

12/31/09

3.835

90.0347

-11.1

02/09/10

3.646

91.5239

-9.6

03/04/10

3.605

91.8384

-9.3

04/05/10

3.986

88.8726

-12.2

08/31/10

2.473

101.3338

0.08

10/07/10

2.385

102.1224

0.8

10/28/10

2.658

99.7119

-1.5

11/04/10

2.481

101.2573

-

11/15/10

2.964

97.0867

-4.1

11/26/10

2.869

97.8932

-3.3

12/03/10

3.007

96.7241

-4.5

12/10/10

3.324

94.0982

-7.1

12/15/10

3.517

92.5427

-8.6

12/17/10

3.338

93.9842

-7.2

12/23/10

3.397

93.5051

-7.7

12/31/10

3.228

94.3923

-6.7

01/07/11

3.322

94.1146

-7.1

01/14/11

3.323

94.1064

-7.1

01/21/11

3.414

93.4687

-7.7

01/28/11

3.323

94.1064

-7.1

02/04/11

3.640

91.750

-9.4

02/11/11

3.643

91.5319

-9.6

02/18/11

3.582

92.0157

-9.1

02/25/11

3.414

93.3676

-7.8

03/04/11

3.494

92.7235

-8.4

03/11/11

3.401

93.4727

-7.7

03/18/11

3.273

94.5115

-6.7

03/25/11

3.435

93.1935

-7.9

04/01/11

3.445

93.1129

-8.0

04/08/11

3.576

92.0635

-9.1

04/15/11

3.411

93.3874

-7.8

04/22/11

3.402

93.4646

-7.7

04/29/11

3.290

94.3759

-6.8

05/06/11

3.147

95.5542

-5.6

05/13/11

3.173

95.3387

-5.8

05/20/11

3.146

95.5625

-5.6

05/27/11

3.068

96.2089

-4.9

06/03/11

2.990

96.8672

-4.3

06/10/11

2.973

97.0106

-4.2

06/17/11

2.937

97.3134

-3.9

06/24/11

2.872

97.8662

-3.3

07/01/11

3.186

95.2281

-5.9

07/08/11

3.022

96.5957

-4.6

07/15/11

2.905

97.5851

-3.6

07/22/11

2.964

97.0847

-4.1

07/29/11

2.795

98.5258

-2.7

08/05/11

2.566

100.5175

-0.7

08/12/11

2.249

103.3504

2.1

08/19/11

2.066

105.270

3.7

08/26/11

2.202

103.7781

2.5

09/02/11

1.992

105.7137

4.4

09/09/11

1.918

106.4055

5.1

09/16/11

2.053

101.5434

0.3

09/23/11

1.826

107.2727

5.9

09/30/11

1.912

106.4602

5.1

10/07/11

2.078

104.9161

3.6

10/14/11

2.251

103.3323

2.0

10/21/11

2.220

103.6141

2.3

10/28/11

2.326

102.6540

1.4

11/04/11

2.066

105.0270

3.7

11/11/11

2.057

105.1103

3.8

11/18/11

2.003

105.6113

4.3

11/25/11

1.964

105.9749

4.7

12/02/11

2.042

105.2492

3.9

12/09/11

2.065

105.0363

3.7

12/16/11

1.847

107.0741

5.7

12/23/11

2.027

105.3883

4.1

12/30/11

1.871

106.8476

5.5

01/06/12

1.957

106.0403

4.7

01/13/12

1.869

106.8664

5.5

01/20/12

2.026

105.3976

4.1

01/27/12

1.893

106.6404

5.3

02/03/12

1.923

106.3586

5.0

02/10/12

1.974

105.8815

4.6

02/17/12

2.000

105.6392

4.3

02/24/12

1.977

105.8535

4.5

03/02/12

1.977

105.8535

4.5

03/09/12

2.031

105.3512

4.0

03/16/12

2.294

102.9428

1.7

03/23/12

2.234

103.4867

2.2

03/30/12

2.214

103.6687

2.4

04/06/12

2.058

105.1010

3.8

04/13/12

1.987

105.7603

4.4

04/20/12

1.959

106.0216

4.7

04/27/12

1.931

106.2836

5.0

05/04/12

1.876

106.8004

5.5

05/11/12

1.845

107.0930

5.8

05/18/12

1.714

108.3393

7.0

05/25/12

1.738

108.1098

6.8

06/01/12

1.454

110.8618

9.5

06/08/12

1.635

109.0989

7.7

06/15/12

1.584

109.5924

8.2

06/22/12

1.676

108.7039

7.4

06/29/12

1.648

108.9734

7.6

07/06/12

1.548

109.9423

8.6

07/13/12

1.49

110.5086

9.1

07/20/12

1.459

110.8127

9.4

07/27/12

1.544

109.9812

8.6

08/03/12

1.569

109.7380

8.4

08/10/12

1.658

108.8771

7.5

08/17/12

1.814

107.3864

6.1

08/24/12

1.684

108.6270

7.3

08/31/12

1.543

109.9910

8.6

9/7/12

1.668

108.7808

7.4

9/14/12

1.863

106.9230

5.6

9/21/12

1.753

107.9666

6.6

9/28/12

1.631

109.1375

7.8

10/05/12

1.737

108.1193

6.8

10/12/12

1.663

108.8290

7.5

10/19/12

1.766

107.8426

6.5

10/26/12

1.748

108.0143

6.7

11/02/12

1.715

108.3297

7.0

11/09/12

1.614

109.3018

7.9

11/16/12

1.584

109.5924

8.2

11/23/12

1.691

108.5598

7.2

11/30/12

1.612

109.3211

7.9

12/7/12

1.625

109.1954

7.8

12/14/12

1.704

108.4351

7.1

12/21/12

1.770

107.8045

6.5

12/28/12

1.699

108.4831

7.1

1/4/13

1.898

106.5934

5.3

1/11/13

1.862

106.9324

5.6

1/18/13

1.840

107.1403

5.8

1/25/13

1.947

106.1338

4.8

2/1/13

2.024

105.4161

4.1

2/8/13

1.949

106.1151

4.8

2/15/13

2.007

105.5741

4.3

2/22/13

1.967

105.9469

4.6

3/1/13

1.842

107.1213

5.8

3/8/13

2.056

105.1195

3.8

3/15/13

1.992

105.7137

4.4

03/22/13

1.931

106.2836

5.0

03/29/13

1.847

107.0741

5.7

04/05/13

1.706

108.4160

7.1

04/12/13

1.719

108.2914

6.9

04/19/13

1.702

108.4543

7.1

04/26/13

1.663

108.8290

7.5

05/3/13

1.742

108.2436

6.9

05/10/13

1.896

106.6122

5.3

05/17/13

1.952

106.0870

4.8

05/24/13

2.009

105.5555

4.2

05/31/13

2.132

104.5015

3.2

06/07/13

2.174

104.0338

2.7

06/14/13

2.125

104.4831

3.2

06/21/13

2.542

100.7288

-0.5

06/28/13

2.486

101.2240

0.0

07/5/13

2.734

99.0519

-2.2

07/12/13

2.585

100.3505

-0.9

07/19/13

2.480

101.2772

0.0

07/26/13

2.565

100.5263

-0.7

08/2/13

2.597

100.2452

-1.0

8/9/13

2.579

100.4032

-0.8

8/16/13

2.829

98.2339

-3.0

8/23/13

2.818

98.3283

-2.9

8/30/13

2.784

98.6205

-2.6

9/6/13

2.941

97.2795

-3.9

9/13/13

2.890

97.7128

-3.5

9/20/13

2.734

99.0519

-2.2

9/27/13

2.626

99.9913

-1.3

10/4/13

2.645

99.8253

-1.4

10/11/13

2.688

99.4508

-1.8

10/18/13

2.588

100.3242

-0.9

10/25/13

2.507

101.0380

-0.2

11/1/13

2.622

100.0262

-1.2

11/8/13

2.750

98.9136

-2.3

11/15/13

2.704

99.3118

-1.9

11/22/13

2.746

98.9482

-2.3

11/29/13

2.743

98.9741

-2.3

12/6/13

2.858

97.9858

-3.2

12/13/13

2.865

97.9260

-3.3

12/20/13

2.891

97.7043

-3.5

12/27/13

3.004

96.7472

-4.5

1/3/2014

2.999

96.7893

-4.4

1/10/14

2.858

97.9858

-3.2

1/17/14

2.818

98.3283

-2.9

1/24/14

2.720

99.1731

-2.1

1/31/14

2.645

99.8253

-1.4

2/7/14

2.681

99.5116

-1.7

2/14/14

2.743

98.9741

-2.3

2/21/14

2.730

99.0865

-2.1

2/28/14

2.655

99.7380

-1.5

3/7/14

2.792

98.5516

-2.7

3/14/14

2.654

99.7468

-1.5

3/21/14

2.743

98.9741

-2.3

3/28/14

2.721

99.1645

-2.1

4/4/14

2.724

99.1385

-2.1

4/11/14

2.628

99.9738

-1.3

4/18/14

2.724

99.1385

-2.1

4/25/14

2.668

99.6248

-1.6

5/2/14

2.583

100.3681

-0.9

5/9/14

2.624

100.0088

-1.2

5/16/14

2.520

100.9320

-0.3

5/23/14

2.532

100.8171

-0.4

5/30/14

2.473

101.3394

0.1

6/6/2014

2.598

100.2364

-1.0

6/13/14

2.605

100.1751

-1.1

6/20/14

2.609

00.1400

-1.1

6/27/14

2.536

100.7818

-0.05

7/4/14

2.641

99.8602

-1.4

7/11/14

2.516

100.9584

-0.3

7/18/14

2.484

101.2417

0.0

7/25/14

2.464

101.4193

0.2

8/1/14

2.497

101.1265

-0.1

8/8/14

2.420

101.8111

0.5

8/15/14

2.341

102.5190

1.2

8/22/14

2.399

101.9988

0.7

8/29/14

2.342

102.5100

1.2

9/5/14

2.457

101.4815

0.2

9/12/14

2.606

10.1663

-1.1

9/19/14

2.576

100.4296

-0.8

9/26/14

2.527

100.8612

-0.4

10/03/14

2.437

101.6595

0.4

10/10/14

2.292

102.9609

1.7

10/17/14

2.197

103.8237

2.5

10/24/14

2.263

103.2234

1.9

10/31/14

2.332

102.6000

1.3

11/07/14

2.302

102.8705

1.6

11/14/14

2.319

102.7171

1.4

11/21/14

2.307

102.8254

1.5

11/28/14

2.165

104.1162

2.8

12/5/14

2.306

102.8344

1.6

12/12/14

2.086

104.8423

3.5

12/19/14

2.185

103.9333

2.6

12/26/14

2.248

103.3595

2.1

01/02/15

2.126

104.4739

3.2

01/09/15

1.973

105.8909

4.6

01/16/15

1.826

107.2727

5.9

01/23/15

1.804

107.4813

6.1

01/30/15

1.683

108.6367

7.3

02/06/15

1.941

106.1899

4.9

02/13/15

2.043

105.2399

3.9

02/20/15

2.119

104.5383

3.2

02/27/15

2.016

105.4905

4.2

03/06/15

2.238

103.4503

2.2

03/13/15

2.103

104.6856

3.4

03/20/15

1.927

106.3211

5.0

03/27/15

1.951

106.0964

4.8

04/02/15

1.911

106.4712

5.1

04/10/15

1.950

106.1057

4.8

04/17/15

1.864

106.9136

5.6

04/24/15

1.917

106.4149

5.1

05/01/15

2.118

104.5475

3.2

05/08/15

2.153

104.2261

2.9

05/15/15

2.136

104.3821

3.1

05/22/15

2.211

103.6961

2.4

05/29/15

2.092

104.7869

3.5

06/05/15

2.400

101.9898

0.7

06/12/15

2.388

102.0972

0.8

06/19/15

2.270

103.1599

1.9

06/26/15

2.473

101.3394

0.1

07/03/15

2.383

102.1420

0.9

07/10/15

2.414

101.8647

0.6

07/17/15

2.346

102.4740

1.2

07/24/15

2.268

103.1781

1.9

07/31/15

2.207

103.7325

2.4

08/07/15

2.164

104.1254

2.8

08/14/15

2.196

103.8328

2.5

08/21/15

2.052

105.1565

3.9

08/28/15

2.182

103.9607

2.7

09/04/15

2.127

104.4647

3.2

09/11/15

2.181

103.9698

2.7

09/18/15

2.131

104.4280

3.1

09/25/15

2.168

104.0887

2.8

10/02/15

1.988

105.7510

4.4

10/09/15

2.096

104.7501

3.4

10/16/15

2.024

105.4161

4.1

10/23/15

2.083

104.8700

3.6

10/30/15

2.150

104.2536

3.0

11/06/15

2.332

102.6000

1.3

11/13/15

2.278

103.0875

1.8

11/20/15

2.260

103.2506

2.0

11/27/15

2.223

103.5868

2.3

12/04/15

2.276

103.1056

1.8

12/11/15

2.134

104.4004

3.1

12/18/15

2.197

103.8237

2.5

12/25/15

2.242

103.4140

2.1

01/01/16

2.269

103.1690

1.9

01/08/16

2.135

104.3913

3.1

01/15/16

2.036

105.3048

4.0

01/22/15

2.048

105.1936

3.9

01/29/16

1.923

106.3586

5.0

02/05/16

1.848

107.0646

5.7

02/12/16

1.744

108.0525

6.7

02/19/16

1.748

108.0143

6.7

02/26/16

1.766

107.8426

6.5

03/04/16

1.884

106.7251

5.4

03/11/16

1.977

105.8535

4.5

03/18/16

1.871

106.8476

5.5

03/25/16

1.900

106.5746

5.3

04/01/16

1.795

107.5667

6.2

04/08/16

1.722

108.2627

6.9

04/15/16

1.752

107.9761

6.6

04/22/16

1.886

106.7063

5.4

04/29/16

1.820

107.3296

6.0

05/06/16

1.780

107.7094

6.4

05/13/16

1.706

108.4160

7.1

05/20/16

1.849

107.0552

5.7

05/27/16

1.851

107.0363

5.7

06/03/16

1.704

108.4351

7.1

06/10/16

1.638

109.0699

7.7

06/17/16

1.618

109.2631

7.9

06/24/16

1.575

109.6797

8.3

07/01/16

1.443

110.9700

9.6

07/08/16

1.366

111.7306

10.3

07/15/16

1.595

109.4857

8.1

07/22/16

1.567

109.7575

8.4

07/29/16

1.458

110.8225

9.4

08/05/16

1.583

109.6021

8.2

08/12/16

1.514

110.2739

8.9

08/19/16

1.580

109.6312

8.3

08/26/16

1.635

109.0989

7.7

09/02/16

1.597

109.4663

8.1

09/09/16

1.675

108.7135

7.4

09/16/16

1.699

108.4831

7.1

09/23/16

1.614

109.3018

7.9

09/30/16

1.602

109.4179

8.1

10/07/16

1.732

108.1671

6.8

10/14/16

1.791

107.6048

6.3

10/21/16

1.738

108.1098

6.8

10/28/16

1.843

107.1119

5.8

11/04/16

1.784

107.6173

6.3

11/11/16

2.152

104.2353

2.9

11/18/16

2.340

102.5280

1.3

11/25/16

2.358

102.3662

1.1

12/01/16

2.389

102.0883

0.8

12/09/16

2.466

101.4015

0.1

12/16/16

2.597

100.2452

-1.0

12/23/16

2.542

100.7289

-0.5

12/30/16

2.447

101.5705

0.3

01/06/17

2.416

101.8469

0.6

01/13/17

2.381

102.1599

0.9

01/20/17

2.466

101.4015

0.1

01/27/17

2.479

101.2861

0.0

02/03/17

2.488

101.2063

-0.1

02/10/17

2.408

101.9183

0.7

02/17/17

2.425

101.7665

0.5

02/24/17

2.314

102.7622

1.5

03/03/17

2.492

101.1708

-0.1

03/10/17

2.584

100.3593

-0.9

03/17/17

2.502

101.0823

-0.2

03/24/17

2.399

101.9888

0.7

03/31/17

2.396

102.0256

0.8

04/07/17

2.373

102.2316

1.0

04/14/17

2.234

103.4867

2.2

04/21/17

2.233

103.4958

2.2

04/28/17

2.286

103.0151

1.7

05/05/17

2.352

102.4201

1.1

05/12/17

2.333

102.5910

1.3

05/19/17

2.243

103.4049

2.1

05/26/17

2.247

103.3686

2.1

06/02/17

2.161

104.1528

2.9

06/09/17

2.199

103.8055

2.5

06/16/17

2.154

104.2170

2.9

06/23/17

2.144

104.3087

3.0

06/30/17

2.304

102.8525

1.6

07/07/17

2.393

102.0524

0.8

07/14/17

2.323

102.6811

1.4

07/21/17

2.233

103.4985

2.2

07/28/17

2.288

102.9970

1.7

08/04/17

2.268

103.1781

1.9

08/11/17

2.189

103.8968

2.6

08/18/17

2.196

103.8328

2.5

08/25/17

2.171

104.0613

2.8

09/01/17

2.157

101.2573

2.9

09/08/17

2.061

105.0733

3.8

09/15/17

2.201

103.7872

2.5

09/22/17

2.263

103.2234

1.9

09/29/17

2.327

102.6450

1.4

10/06/17

2.368

102.2765

1.0

10/13/17

2.278

103.0875

1.8

10/20/17

2.379

102.1778

0.9

10/27/17

2.423

101.7844

0.5

11/03/17

2.343

102.5010

1.2

11/10/17

2.404

101.9541

0.7

11/17/17

2.354

102.4021

1.1

11/24/17

3.343

102.5010

1.2

12/01/17

2.361

102.3393

1.1

12/08/17

2.383

102.1420

0.9

12/15/17

2.355

102.3932

1.1

12/22/17

2.487

101.2151

0.0

12/29/17

2.411

101.8915

0.6

01/05/18

2.475

101.3216

0.1

01/12/18

2.550

100.6583

-0.6

01/19/18

2.638

99.8864

-1.4

01/26/18

2.661

99.6857

-1.6

02/02/18

2.848

98.0713

-3.1

02/09/18

2.830

98.2254

-3.0

02/16/18

2.877

97.8236

-3.4

02/23/18

2.870

97.8833

-3.3

03/02/18

2.855

98.0114

-3.2

03/09/18

2.893

97.6872

-3.5

03/16/18

2.845

98.0969

-3.1

03/23/18

2.826

98.2597

-3.0

03/30/18

2.739

99.0087

-2.2

04/06/18

2.778

98.6721

-2.6

04/13/18

2.825

98.2682

-3.0

04/20/18

2.953

97.1778

-4.0

04/27/18

2.955

97.1609

-4.1

05/04/18

2.943

97.2625

-3.9

05/11/18

2.970

97.0340

-4.2

05/18/18

3.065

96.2350

-5.0

05/25/18

2.928

97.3897

-3.8

06/01/18

2.889

97.7213

-3.5

06/08/18

2.938

97.3049

-3.9

06/15/18

2.922

97.4406

-3.8

06/22/18

2.902

97.6106

-3.6

06/29/18

2.850

98.0542

-3.2

07/06/18

2.821

98.3025

-2.9

07/13/18

2.830

98.2254

-3.0

07/20/18

2.890

97.7128

-3.5

07/27/18

2.959

97.1270

-4.1

08/03/18

2.952

97.1863

-4.0

08/10/18

2.859

97.9772

-3.2

08/17/18

2.870

97.8833

-3.3

08/24/18

2.823

98.2854

-2.9

08/31/18

2.850

98.0542

-3.2

09/07/18

2.936

97.3218

-3.9

08/14/18

2.987

96.8905

-4.3

09/21/18

3.067

96.2182

-5.0

09/28/18

3.055

96.3187

-4.9

10/05/18

3.231

94.8567

-6.3

10/12/18

3.137

95.6344

-5.6

10/19/18

3.198

95.1289

-6.1

10/26/18

3.077

96.1346

-5.1

11/02/18

3.216

94.9803

-6.2

11/09/18

3.188

95.2115

-6.0

11/16/18

3.075

96.1513

-5.0

11/23/18

3.039

96.4529

-4.7

11/30/18

3.014

96.6630

-4.5

12/07/18

2.848

98.0713

-3.1

12/14/18

2.892

97.6957

-3.5

12/21/18

2.791

98.5602

-2.7

12/28/18

2.736

99.0346

-2.2

01/04/19

2.568

99.7119

-1.5

01/11/19

2.700

99.3466

-1.9

01/18/19

2.780

98.6549

-2.6

01/25/19

2.750

98.9136

-2.3

02/01/19

2.691

99.4247

-1.8

02/08/19

2.636

99.039

-1.3

02/15/19

2.667

99.6335

-1.6

02/22/19

2.652

99.7642

-1.5

03/01/19

2.747

98.9395

-2.3

03/08/19

2.630

99.9563

-1.3

03/15/19

2.593

100.2803

-1.0

03/22/19

2.453

101.5171

0.3

03/29/19

2.416

101.8469

0.6

04/05/19

2.503

101.0734

-0.2

04/12/19

2.557

100.5967

-0.7

04/19/19

2.564

100.5351

-0.7

04/26/19

2.505

101.0557

-0.2

05/03/19

2.526

100.8700

-0.4

05/10/19

2.457

101.4815

0.2

05/17/19

2.398

102.0077

0.7

05/24/19

2.323

102.6811

1.4

05/31/19

2.141

104.3362

3.0

06/07/19

2.082

104.8792

3.6

06/14/19

2.095

104.7593

3.5

06/21/19

2.062

105.0640

3.8

06/28/19

2.006

105.5834

4.3

07/05/19

2.045

105.2214

3.9

07/12/19

2.107

104.6487

3.3

07/19/19

2.049

105.1843

3.9

07/26/19

2.080

104.8977

3.6

08/02/19

1.860

106.9513

5.6

08/09/19

1.736

108.1289

6.8

08/16/19

1.540

110.0202

8.7

08/23/19

1.526

110.1567

8.8

08/30/19

1.504

110.3716

9.0

09/06/19

1.554

109.8839

8.5

09/13/19

1.894

106.6310

5.3

09/20/19

1.754

107.9570

6.6

09/27/19

1.676

108.7039

7.4

10/04/19

1.515

110.2641

8.9

10/11/19

1.753

107.9666

6.6

10/18/19

1.749

108.0047

6.7

10/25/19

1.800

107.5193

6.2

11/01/19

1.716

108.3202

7.0

11/08/19

1.929

106.3024

5.0

11/15/19

1.835

107.1876

5.9

11/22/19

1.773

107.7760

6.4

11/29/19

1.782

107.6903

6.4

12/06/19

1.838

107.1592

5.8

12/13/19

1.820

107.3296

6.0

12/20/19

1.915

106.4337

5.1

12/27/19

1.869

106.8664

5.5

01/03/20

1.791

107.6048

6.3

01/10/20

1.826

107.2727

5.9

01/17/20

1.836

107.1781

5.8

01/24/20

1.678

108.6847

9.3

01/31/20

1.521

110.2055

8.8

02/07/20

1.579

109.6409

8.3

02/14/20

1.587

109.5633

8.2

02/21/20

1.473

110.6753

9.3

02/28/20

1.148

113.9161

12.5

03/06/20

0.709

118.4650

17.0

03/13/20

0.955

115.8912

14.5

03/20/20

0.949

115.9533

14.5

03/27/20

0.731

118.2322

16.8

04/03/20

0.592

119.7116

18.2

04/10/20

0.729

118.2536

16.8

04/17/20

0.657

119.0192

17.5

04/20/20

0.598

119.6473

18.2

05/01/20

0.637

119.2304

17.7

05/08/20

0.679

118.7832

17.3

05/15/20

0.641

119.1877

17.7

05/22/20

0.661

118.9747

17.5

05/29/20

0.649

119.1025

17.6

06/05/20

0.912

116.3365

14.9

06/12/20

0.700

118.5604

17.1

06/19/20

0.686

118.7089

17.2

06/26/20

0.643

119.1664

17.7

07/03/20

0.673

118.8470

17.4

07/10/20

0.632

119.2838

17.8

07/17/20

0.627

119.3372

17.9

07/24/20

0.587

119.7652

18.3

07/31/20

0.540

120.2704

18.8

08/07/20

0.567

119.9799

18.5

08/14/20

0.708

118.4756

17.0

08/21/20

0.633

119.2731

17.8

08/28/20

0.733

118.2111

16.7

09/04/20

0.722

118.3274

16.9

09/11/20

0.672

118.8576

17.4

09/18/20

0.689

118.6771

17.2

09/25/20

0.660

118.9853

17.5

Note: price is calculated for an artificial 10-year note paying semi-annual coupon and maturing in ten years using the actual yields traded on the dates and the coupon of 2.625% on 11/04/10

Source:

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_bonds.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000

Table VI-7B provides the maturity distribution and average length in months of marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors from 2007 to 2020. Total debt held by investors increased from $3635 billion in 2007 to $15,688 billion in Jun 2020 (Fiscal Year 2020) or increase by 331.6 percent. There are two concerns with the maturity distribution of US debt. (1) Growth of debt is moving total debt to the point of saturation in investors’ portfolio. In a new environment of risk appetite and nonzero fed funds rates with economic growth at historical trend of around 3 percent, yields on risk financial assets are likely to increase. Placement of new debt may require increasing interest rates in an environment of continuing placement of debt by the US Treasury without strong fiscal constraints. (2) Refinancing of maturing debt is likely to occur in an environment of higher interest rates, exerting pressure on future fiscal budgets. In Jun (fiscal year 2020), $6416 billion or 40.9 percent of outstanding debt held by investors matures in less than a year and $5442 billion or 34.7 percent of total debt matures in one to five years. Debt maturing in five years or less adds to $11,858 billion or 75.6 percent of total outstanding debt held by investors of $15,688 billion. This historical episode may be remembered as one in which the US managed its government debt with short-dated instruments during record low long-dated yields and on the verge of fiscal pressures on all interest rates. This strategy maximizes over time interest payments on government debt by taxpayers that is precisely the opposite of the objective of sound debt management and taxpayer welfare.

Table VI-7B, Maturity Distribution and Average Length in Months of Marketable Interest-Bearing Public Debt Held by Private Investors, Billions of Dollars

End of Fiscal Year or Month

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Total*

3635

4745

6229

7676

7951

9040

<1 Year

1176

2042

2605

2480

2504

2897

1-5 Years

1310

1468

2075

2956

3085

3852

5-10 Years

678

719

995

1529

1544

1488

10-20 Years

292

352

351

341

309

271

>20 Years

178

163

204

371

510

533

Average
Months

58

49

49

57

60

55

 

End of Fiscal Year or Month

 

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Total*

 

9518

9829

10379

11184

11643

<1 Year

 

2940

2932

2923

3321

3263

1-5 Years

 

4135

4217

4356

4478

4746

5-10 Years

 

1648

1814

2084

2219

2321

10-20 Years

 

231

223

184

168

152

>20 Years

 

565

644

832

998

1161

Average
Months

 

55

56

61

63

66

End of Fiscal Year or Month

2018

2019

 

2020 Jun

 

 

 

Total*

12881

14225

15,688

 

 

 

<1 Year

3794

4147

6416

 

 

 

1-5 Years

5181

5822

5442

 

 

 

5-10 Years

2445

2625

2287

 

 

 

10-20 Years

121

105

166

 

 

 

>20 Years

1339

1526

1376

 

 

 

Average
Months

65

65

55

 

 

 

*Amount Outstanding Privately Held

Source: United States Treasury. 2020 Sep. Treasury Bulletin. Washington, Dec

https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/

Table VI-7C provides additional information required for understanding the deficit/debt situation of the United States. The table is divided into four parts: Treasury budget in the 2020 fiscal year beginning on Oct 1, 2019 and ending on Sep 30, 2020; federal fiscal data for the years from 2009 to 2019; federal fiscal data for the years from 2005 to 2008; and Treasury debt held by the public from 2005 to 2019. Receipts decreased 1.3 percent in the cumulative fiscal year 2020 ending in Aug 2020 relative to the cumulative in fiscal year 2019. Individual income taxes decreased 5.7 percent relative to the same fiscal period a year earlier. Outlays increased 45.7 percent relative to a year earlier. There are also receipts, outlays, deficit and debt for fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. In fiscal year 2019, the deficit reached $984.4 billion or 4.6 percent of GDP. Outlays of 4,446.6 billion were 21.0 percent of GDP and receipts of $3,462.2 billion were 16.3 percent of GDP. It is quite difficult for the US to raise receipts above 18 percent of GDP. Total revenues of the US from 2009 to 2012 accumulate to $9021.2 billion, or $9.0 trillion, while expenditures or outlays accumulate to $14,104.5 billion, or $14.1 trillion, with the deficit accumulating to $5083.3 billion, or $5.1 trillion. Revenues decreased 6.5 percent from $9652.5 billion in the four years from 2005 to 2008 to $9021.2 billion in the years from 2009 to 2012. Decreasing revenues were caused by the global recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (Jun) and by growth of only 1.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2020. In contrast, the expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1993 was at the average annual growth rate of 3.7 percent and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/d-ollar-devaluation-and-yuan.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/contraction-of-united-states-gdp-at-32_57.html). Because of mediocre GDP growth, there are 34.8 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment/underemployment rate of 20.2 percent (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/09/exchange-rate-fluctuations-1.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/08/thirty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html). Weakness of growth and employment creation is analyzed in II Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2020/07/contraction-of-household-wealth-by-14.html). In contrast with the decline of revenue, outlays or expenditures increased 30.1 percent from $10,838.2 billion, or $10.8 trillion, in the four years from 2005 to 2008, to $14,104.5 billion, or $14.1 trillion, in the four years from 2009 to 2012. Increase in expenditures by 30.1 percent while revenue declined by 6.5 percent caused the increase in the federal deficit from $1185.8 billion in 2005-2008 to $5083.3 billion in 2009-2012. Federal revenue was 14.8 percent of GDP on average in the years from 2009 to 2012, which is well below 17.3 percent of GDP on average from 1962 to 2019. Federal outlays were 23.3 percent of GDP on average from 2009 to 2012, which is well above 20.1 percent of GDP on average from 1962 to 2019. The lower part of Table VI-7C shows that debt held by the public swelled from $5803 billion in 2008 to $13,117 billion in 2015, by $7314 billion or 126.0 percent. Debt held by the public as percent of GDP or economic activity jumped from 39.4 percent in 2008 to 79.2 percent in 2019, which is well above the average of 41.7 percent from 1962 to 2019. The United States faces tough adjustment because growth is unlikely to recover, creating limits on what can be obtained by increasing revenues, while continuing stress of social programs restricts what can be obtained by reducing expenditures. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides a preliminary estimate of the impact of Public Law 116-136 of Mar 27, 2020, CARES Act or Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-04/hr748.pdf). This preliminary estimate finds that the CARES Act “will increase federal deficits by about $1.8 trillion over the 2020-2030 period (https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-04/hr748.pdf).

 Table VI-7C, US, Treasury Budget in Fiscal Year to Date Million Dollars

Aug 2020

Fiscal Year 2020

Fiscal Year 2019

∆%

Receipts

3,046,786

3,088,167

-1.3

Outlays

6,054,175

4,155,323

45.7

Deficit

-3,007,390

-1,067,156

 

Individual Income Tax

1,447,184

1,534,886

-5.7

Corporation Income Tax

162,185

169,927

-4.6

Social Insurance

879,522

836,607

5.1

 

Receipts

Outlays

Deficit (-), Surplus (+)

$ Billions

Fiscal Year 2019

3,462.2

4,446.6

-984.4

% GDP

16.3

21.0

-4.6

Fiscal Year 2018

3,329.9

4,109.0

-779.1

% GDP

16.4

20.2

-3.8

Fiscal Year 2017

3,316.2

3,981.6

-665.4

% GDP

17.2

20.6

-3.5

Fiscal Year 2016

3,268.0

3,852.6

-584.7

% GDP

17.6

20.8

-3.2

Fiscal Year 2015

3,249.9

3,691.8

-442.0

% GDP

18.0

20.4

-2.4

Fiscal Year 2014

3,021.5

3,506.3

-484.8

% GDP

17.4

20.2

-2.8

Fiscal Year 2013

2,775.1

3,454.9

-679.8

% GDP

16.7

20.8

-4.1

Fiscal Year 2012

2,450.0

3,526.6

-1,076.6

% GDP

15.3

22.0

-6.7

Fiscal Year 2011

2,303.5

3,603.1

-1,299.6

% GDP

15.0

23.4

-8.4

Fiscal Year 2010

2,162.7

3,457.1

-1,294.4

% GDP

14.6

23.3

-8.7

Fiscal Year 2009

2,105.0

3,517.7

-1,412.7

% GDP

14.6

24.4

-9.8

Total 2009-2012

9,021.2

14,104.5

-5,083.3

Average % GDP 2009-2012

14.8

23.3

-8.4

Fiscal Year 2008

2,524.0

2,982.5

-458.6

% GDP

17.1

20.2

-3.1

Fiscal Year 2007

2,568.0

2,728.7

-160.7

% GDP

18.0

19.1

-1.1

Fiscal Year 2006

2,406.9

2,655.1

-248.2

% GDP

17.6

19.5

-1.8

Fiscal Year 2005

2,153.6

2,472.0

-318.3

% GDP

16.8

19.3

-2.5

Total 2005-2008

9,652.5

10,838.2

-1,185.8

Average % GDP 2005-2008

17.4

19.5

-2.1

Debt Held by the Public

Billions of Dollars

Percent of GDP

 

2005

4,592

35.8

 

2006

4,829

35.4

 

2007

5,035

35.2

 

2008

5,803

39.4

 

2009

7,545

52.3

 

2010

9,019

60.8

 

2011

10,128

65.8

 

2012

11,281

70.3

 

2013

11,983

72.2

 

2014

12,780

73.7

 

2015

13,117

72.5

 

2016

14,168

76.4

 

2017

14,666

76.0

 

2018

15,750

77.4

 

2019

16,803

79.2

 

Source: https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/mts/

https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0184.aspx https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm806 CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2018 to 2028. Washington, DC, Apr 9 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53651

CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2017-2027. Washington, DC, Jan 24, 2017 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370 CBO, An update to the budget and economic outlook: 2016 to 2026. Washington, DC, Aug 23, 2016.

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6

CBO (2012NovMBR). CBO (2011AugBEO); Office of Management and Budget 2011. Historical Tables. Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: OMB; CBO. 2011JanBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Jan. CBO. 2012AugBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Aug 22. CBO. 2012Jan31. Historical budget data. Washington, DC, Jan 31. CBO. 2012NovCDR. Choices for deficit reduction. Washington, DC. Nov. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO (2013Aug12). 2013AugHBD. Historical budget data—August 2013. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Aug. CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb. CBO, Historical budget data—April 2014 release. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Apr. Congressional Budget Office, August 2014 baseline: an update to the budget and economic outlook: 2014 to 2024. Washington, DC, CBO, Aug 27, 2014. CBO, Monthly budget review: summary of fiscal year 2014. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Nov 10, 2014. CBO, The budget and economic outlook: 2015 to 2025. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Jan 26, 2015.

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#3 https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#2

 

Chart VI-8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the yield of the ten-year constant maturity Treasury and the overnight fed funds rate from Jan 2, 1962 to Sep 24, 2020. The yield of the ten-year constant maturity Treasury stood at 7.67 percent on Feb 16, 1977. A peak was reached at 15.21 percent on Oct 26, 1981 during the inflation control effort by the Fed. There is a second local peak in Chart VI-8 on May 3, 1984 at 13.94 percent followed by another local peak at 8.14 percent on Nov 21, 1994 during another inflation control effort (see Appendix I The Great Inflation). There was sharp reduction of the yields from 5.44 percent on Apr 1, 2002 until they reached a low point of 3.13 percent on Jun 13, 2003. The fed funds rate was 1.18 percent on Jun 23, 2003 and the ten-year yield 3.36 percent. Yields rose again to 4.89 percent on Jun 14, 2004 with the fed funds rate at 1.02 percent and the ten-year yield stood at 5.23 percent on Jul 5, 2006. At the onset of the financial crisis on Sep 17, 2007, the fed funds rate was 5.33 percent and the ten-year yield 4.48 percent. On Dec 26, 2008, the fed funds rate was 0.09 percent and the ten-year yield 2.16 percent. Yields declined sharply during the financial crisis, reaching 2.08 percent on Dec 18, 2008, lowered by higher prices originating in sharply increasing demand in the flight to the US dollar and obligations of the US government. Yields rose again to 4.01 percent on Apr 5, 2010 but collapsed to 2.41 percent on Oct 8, 2010 because of higher demand originating in the flight from the European sovereign risk event. During higher risk appetite, yields rose to 3.75 percent on Feb 8, 2011 and reached 0.67 percent on Sep 24, 2020 with the fed funds rate at 0.09 percent. Chart VI-8A provides the fed funds rate and the yield of the ten-year constant maturity Treasury from Jan 2, 2001 to Sep 17, 2020. The final data point for Sep 24, 2020, shows the fed funds rate at 0.09 percent and the yield of the ten-year constant maturity Treasury at 0.67 percent. There has been a trend of decline of yields with oscillations. During periods of risk aversion investors seek protection in obligations of the US government, causing decline in their yields. In an eventual resolution of international financial risks with higher economic growth, there could be the trauma of rising yields with significant capital losses in portfolios of government securities. The data in Table VI-7 in the text is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).


Chart VI-8, US, Overnight Federal Funds Rate and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yield, Jan 2, 1962 to Sep 18, 2020

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H15

Chart VI-8A provides the fed funds rate and the yield of the ten-year constant maturity Treasury from Jan 2, 2001 to Sep 24, 2020. The final data point for Sep 24, 2020, shows the fed funds rate at 0.09 percent and the yield of the ten-year constant maturity Treasury at 0.67 percent. There has been a trend of decline of yields with oscillations. During periods of risk aversion investors seek protection in obligations of the US government, causing decline in their yields. In an eventual resolution of international financial risks with higher economic growth, there could be the trauma of rising yields with significant capital losses in portfolios of government securities. The data in Table VI-7 in the text is obtained from closing dates in New York published by the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata).

 


Chart VI-8A, US, Overnight Federal Funds Rate and Ten-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yield, Jan 2, 2001 to Sep 18, 2020

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H15

Chart VI-9 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides securities held outright by Federal Reserve banks from 2002 to 2020. The first data point in Chart VI-9 is the level for Dec 18, 2002 of $629,407 million and the final data point in Chart VI-9 is level of $6,458,738 million on Sep 23, 2020. On October 25, 2017, at the beginning of the FOMC programmed reduction of the balance sheet, Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks stood at $4,461,117 million. Total Assets increased $2,632,044 million from $4,461,117 on Oct 25, 2017 to $7,093,161 on Sep 23, 2020. Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks increased from $3,981,420 million on Feb 20, 2019 to $7,093,161 million on Sep 23, 2020 by $3,111,741 million or 78.2 percent. The policy of reducing the fed funds policy rate requires increasing the balance sheet. The line “Securities Held Outright” increased from $4,019,823 million on Oct 25, 2017 to $6,458,738 on Sep 23, 2020 or $2,438,915 million. Securities Held Outright increased from $3,617,939 million on Jul 24, 2019 to $6,458,738 on Sep 23, 2020 by $2,840,799 million or 78.5 percent. The Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, at the 61st Annual Meeting on the National Association for Business Economics, on Oct 28, 2019, in Denver, Colorado, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20191008a.htm): “Reserve balances are one among several items on the liability side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and demand for these liabilities—notably, currency in circulation—grows over time. Hence, increasing the supply of reserves or even maintaining a given level over time requires us to increase the size of our balance sheet. As we indicated in our March statement on balance sheet normalization, at some point, we will begin increasing our securities holdings to maintain an appropriate level of reserves.18 That time is now upon us.

I want to emphasize that growth of our balance sheet for reserve management purposes should in no way be confused with the large-scale asset purchase programs that we deployed after the financial crisis. Neither the recent technical issues nor the purchases of Treasury bills we are contemplating to resolve them should materially affect the stance of monetary policy, to which I now turn.


Chart VI-9, US, Securities Held Outright by Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday Level, Dec 23, 2002 to Sep 23, 2020, USD Millions

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_fedsbalancesheet.htm

Chart VI-9A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides Total Assets by Federal Reserve banks from 2002 to 2020 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H41). The first data point in Chart VI-9A is the level for Dec 18, 2002 of $720,761 million and the final data point in Chart VI-9A is level of $7,093,161 million on Sep 23, 2020.  On October 25, 2017, at the beginning of the FOMC programmed reduction of the balance sheet, Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks stood at $4,461,117 million. Total Assets increased $2,632,044 million from $4,461,117 on Oct 25, 2017 to $7,093,161 on Sep 23, 2020. Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks increased from $3,981,420 million on Feb 20, 2019 to $7,093,161 million on Sep 23, 2020, by $3,111.741 million or 78.2 percent. The policy of reducing the fed funds policy rate requires increasing the balance sheet. The Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, Jerome H. Powell, at the 61st Annual Meeting on the National Association for Business Economics, on Oct 28, 2019, in Denver, Colorado, stated (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20191008a.htm): “Reserve balances are one among several items on the liability side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and demand for these liabilities—notably, currency in circulation—grows over time. Hence, increasing the supply of reserves or even maintaining a given level over time requires us to increase the size of our balance sheet. As we indicated in our March statement on balance sheet normalization, at some point, we will begin increasing our securities holdings to maintain an appropriate level of reserves.18 That time is now upon us.

I want to emphasize that growth of our balance sheet for reserve management purposes should in no way be confused with the large-scale asset purchase programs that we deployed after the financial crisis. Neither the recent technical issues nor the purchases of Treasury bills we are contemplating to resolve them should materially affect the stance of monetary policy, to which I now turn.


Chart VI-9A, US, Total Assets by Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday Level, Dec 18, 2002 to Sep 23, USD Millions

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_fedsbalancesheet.htm

Chart VI-10 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the overnight Fed funds rate on business days from Jul 1, 1954 at 1.13 percent through Jan 10, 1979, at 9.91 percent per year, to Sep 24, 2020, at 0.09 percent per year. US recessions are in shaded areas according to the reference dates of the NBER (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). In the Fed effort to control the “Great Inflation” of the 1970s (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html), the fed funds rate increased from 8.34 percent on Jan 3, 1979 to a high in Chart VI-10 of 22.36 percent per year on Jul 22, 1981 with collateral adverse effects in the form of impaired savings and loans associations in the United States, emerging market debt and money-center banks (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 72-7; Pelaez 1986, 1987). Another episode in Chart VI-10 is the increase in the fed funds rate from 3.15 percent on Jan 3, 1994, to 6.56 percent on Dec 21, 1994, which also had collateral effects in impairing emerging market debt in Mexico and Argentina and bank balance sheets in a world bust of fixed income markets during pursuit by central banks of non-existing inflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 113-5). Another interesting policy impulse is the reduction of the fed funds rate from 7.03 percent on Jul 3, 2000, to 1.00 percent on Jun 22, 2004, in pursuit of equally non-existing deflation (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-85), followed by increments of 25 basis points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006, raising the fed funds rate to 5.25 percent on Jul 3, 2006 in Chart VI-10. Central bank commitment to maintain the fed funds rate at 1.00 percent induced adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMS) linked to the fed funds rate. Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at interest rates close to zero, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper with the objective of purchasing default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever-increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4). A final episode in Chart VI-10 is the reduction of the fed funds rate from 5.41 percent on Aug 9, 2007, to 2.97 percent on October 7, 2008, to 0.12 percent on Dec 5, 2008 and close to zero throughout a long period with the final point at 0.09 percent on Sep 24, 2020. Evidently, this behavior of policy would not have occurred had there been theory, measurements and forecasts to avoid these violent oscillations that are clearly detrimental to economic growth and prosperity without inflation. The Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet L. Yellen, stated on Jul 10, 2015 that (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150710a.htm):

 

Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or accelerate this first step. I currently anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.

 

There is essentially the same view in the Testimony of Chair Yellen in delivering the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jul 15, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150715a.htm). The FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) raised the fed funds rate to ¼ to ½ percent at its meeting on Dec 16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm).

It is a forecast mandate because of the lags in effect of monetary policy impulses on income and prices (Romer and Romer 2004). The intention is to reduce unemployment close to the “natural rate” (Friedman 1968, Phelps 1968) of around 5 percent and inflation at or below 2.0 percent. If forecasts were reasonably accurate, there would not be policy errors. A commonly analyzed risk of zero interest rates is the occurrence of unintended inflation that could precipitate an increase in interest rates similar to the Himalayan rise of the fed funds rate from 9.91 percent on Jan 10, 1979, at the beginning in Chart VI-10, to 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981. There is a less commonly analyzed risk of the development of a risk premium on Treasury securities because of the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier  https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html

 and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). There is not a fiscal cliff or debt limit issue ahead but rather free fall into a fiscal abyss. The combination of the fiscal abyss with zero interest rates could trigger the risk premium on Treasury debt or Himalayan hike in interest rates.


Chart VI-10, US, Fed Funds Rate, Business Days, Jul 1, 1954 to Sep 24, 2020, Percent per Year

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H15

Chart VI-11 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the fed funds rate and the prime bank loan rate in business days from Aug 4, 1955 to Sep 17, 2020. The overnight fed funds rate was 2.0 percent on Aug 4, 1955 and the bank prime rate 3.25 percent. The fed funds overnight rate is the rate charged by a depository institution with idle reserves deposited at a federal reserve bank to exchange its deposits overnight to another depository institution in need of reserves. In a sense, it is the marginal cost of funding for a bank in the United States, or the cost of a unit of additional funding. The fed funds rate is the rate charged by a bank to another bank in an uncollateralized overnight loan. The fed funds rate is the traditional policy rate or rate used to implement policy directives of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Thus, there should be an association between the fed funds rate or cost of funding of a bank and its prime lending rate. Such an association is verified in Chart VI-11 with the rates moving quite closely over time. On January 10, 1979, the fed funds rate was set at 9.91 percent and banks set their prime lending rate at 11.75 percent. On Dec 16, 2008, the policy determining committee of the Fed decided (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm): “The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to ¼  percent.” On Dec 14, 2016 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20161214a.htm), “the Committee decided to raise the target level for the federal funds rate to ½ to ¾ percent.” On Mar 15, 2017, “the Committee decided to raise the federal funds rate to ¾ to 1 percent (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20170315a.htm). The FOMC raised the fed funds rate to 1 to 1 ¼ percent at its meeting on Jun 14, 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20170201a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 1¼ to 1½ percent on Dec 13, 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20171213a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 1½ to 1¾ percent on Mar 21, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180321a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 1¾ to 2.0 percent on Jun 13, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180613a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 2.0 to 2¼ percent on Sep 26, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180926a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 2¼ to 2½ percent on Dec 19, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20181219a.htm). The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 2 to 2¼ percent on Jul 31, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190731a.htm). The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 1¾ to 2.0 percent on Sep 18, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190918a.htm).

The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 1½ to 1¾ percent on Oct 30, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20191030a.htm). The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 1 to 1¼ percent on Mar 3, 2020 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200303a.htm). The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 0 to ¼ percent on Mar 15, 2020 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm). On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues.

The final segment of Chart VI-11 shows similar movement of the fed funds rate and the prime bank loan rate following the fixing of the fed funds rate to approximately zero. In the final data point of Chart VI-11 on Sep 17, 2020, the fed funds rate is 0.09 percent and the prime rate 3.25 percent. The causes of the financial crisis and global recession were interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero-interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash. The yields of Treasury securities inverted on Mar 22, 2019 with the ten-year yield at 2.44 percent below those of 2.49 percent for one-month, 2.48 percent for two months, 2.46 percent for three months, 2.48 percent for six months and 2.45 percent for one year (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield). The final segment after 2001 shows the effects of unconventional monetary policy of extremely low, below inflation fed funds rate in lowering yields. This was an important cause of the global recession and financial crisis inducing as analyzed by Taylor (2018Oct 19, 2) “search for yield, excessive risk taking, a boom and bust in the housing market, and eventually the financial crisis and recession.” Monetary policy deviated from the Taylor Rule (Taylor 2018Oct19 see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2019Oct19 and  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html)). An explanation is in the research of Adrian, Estrella and Shin (2018, 21-22): “Our findings suggest that the monetary tightening of 2004-2006 period ultimately did achieve a slowdown in real activity not because of its impact on the level of longer term interest rates, but rather because of its impact on the slope of the yield curve. In fact, while the level of the 10-year yield only increased 38 basis points between June 2004 and 2006, the term spread declined 325 basis points (from 3.44 to .19 percent). The fact that the slope flattened meant that intermediary profitability was compressed, thus shifting the supply of credit, and hence inducing changes in real activity. The 18 month lag between the end of the tightening cycle, and the beginning of the recession is perfectly compatible with effective monetary tightening.” See (https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html). A major difference in the current cycle is the balance sheet of the Fed with purchases used to lower interest rates in specific segments and maturities such as mortgage-backed securities and longer terms.


Chart VI-11, US, Fed Funds Rate and Prime Bank Loan, Aug 4, 1955 to Sep 24, 2020, Percent per Year

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H15

Lending has become more complex over time. The critical fact of current world financial markets is the combination of “unconventional” monetary policy with intermittent shocks of financial risk aversion. There are two interrelated unconventional monetary policies. First, unconventional monetary policy consists of (1) reducing short-term policy interest rates toward the “zero bound” such as fixing the fed funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent by decision of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since Dec 16, 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm). Second, unconventional monetary policy also includes a battery of measures to also reduce long-term interest rates of government securities and asset-backed securities such as mortgage-backed securities. When inflation is low, the central bank lowers interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand in the economy, which consists of consumption and investment. When inflation is subdued and unemployment high, monetary policy would lower interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand, reducing unemployment. When interest rates decline to zero, unconventional monetary policy would consist of policies such as large-scale purchases of long-term securities to lower their yields. A major portion of credit in the economy is financed with long-term asset-backed securities. Loans for purchasing houses, automobiles and other consumer products are bundled in securities that in turn are sold to investors. Corporations borrow funds for investment by issuing corporate bonds. Loans to small businesses are also financed by bundling them in long-term bonds. Securities markets bridge the needs of higher returns by investors obtaining funds from savers that are channeled to consumers and business for consumption and investment. Lowering the yields of these long-term bonds could lower costs of financing purchases of consumer durables and investment by business. The essential mechanism of transmission from lower interest rates to increases in aggregate demand is portfolio rebalancing. Withdrawal of bonds in a specific maturity segment or directly in a bond category such as currently mortgage-backed securities causes reductions in yield that are equivalent to increases in the prices of the bonds. There can be secondary increases in purchases of those bonds in private portfolios in pursuit of their increasing prices. Lower yields translate into lower costs of buying homes and consumer durables such as automobiles and also lower costs of investment for business.

Monetary policy can lower short-term interest rates quite effectively. Lowering long-term yields is somewhat more difficult. The critical issue is that monetary policy cannot ensure that increasing credit at low interest cost increases consumption and investment. There is a large variety of possible allocation of funds at low interest rates from consumption and investment to multiple risk financial assets. Monetary policy does not control how investors will allocate asset categories. A critical financial practice is to borrow at low short-term interest rates to invest in high-risk, leveraged financial assets. Investors may increase in their portfolios asset categories such as equities, emerging market equities, high-yield bonds, currencies, commodity futures and options and multiple other risk financial assets including structured products. If there is risk appetite, the carry trade from zero interest rates to risk financial assets will consist of short positions at short-term interest rates (or borrowing) and short dollar assets with simultaneous long positions in high-risk, leveraged financial assets such as equities, commodities and high-yield bonds. Low interest rates may induce increases in valuations of risk financial assets that may fluctuate in accordance with perceptions of risk aversion by investors and the public. During periods of muted risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets cause temporary waves of inflation that may foster instead of preventing financial instability (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html). During periods of risk aversion such as fears of disruption of world financial markets and the global economy resulting from collapse of the European Monetary Union, carry trades are unwound with sharp deterioration of valuations of risk financial assets. More technical  discussion is in IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html.

Chart VI-12 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the fed funds rate, prime bank loan rate and the yield of a corporate bond rated Baa by Moody’s. On Jan 10, 1979, the fed funds rate was fixed at 9.91 percent and banks fixed the prime loan rate at 11.75 percent. Reflecting differences in risk, the fed funds rate was 8.76 percent on Jan 2, 1986, the prime rate 9.50 percent and the Baa Corporate bond yield 11.38 percent. The yield of the Baa corporate bond collapsed toward the bank prime loan rate after the end of extreme risk aversion in the beginning of 2009. The final data point in Chart VI-12 is for Jul 7, 2016, with the fed funds rate at 0.40 percent, the bank prime rate at 3.50 percent and the yield of the Baa corporate bond at 4.19 percent. Empirical tests of the transmission of unconventional monetary policy to actual increases in consumption and investment or aggregate demand find major hurdles (see IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html).

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html).


Chart VI-12, US, Fed Funds Rate, Prim Bank Loan Rate and Yield of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond, Business Days, Aug 4, 1955 to Jul 7, 2016, Percent per Year

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H15

Chart VI-12A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the overnight fed funds rate and the bank prime rate on business days from Jan 5, 2007 to Sep 24, 2020. There is a jump in the rates and yield with the increase in fed funds rates target range from 0 to ½ percent to ¼ to ½ percent on Dec 16, 2015 by the Federal Open Market Committee (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm), ½ to ¾ percent on Dec 14, 2016 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20161214a.htm) and ¾ to 1 percent on Mar 15, 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20170315a.htm). The FOMC raised the fed funds rate to 1 to 1¼ percent at its meeting on Jun 14, 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20170201a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 1¼ to 1½ percent on Dec 13, 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20171213a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 1½ to 1¾ percent on Mar 21, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180321a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 1¾ to 2.0 percent on Jun 13, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180613a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 2.0 to 2¼ percent on Sep 26, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180926a.htm). The FOMC increased the fed funds rate to 2¼ to 2½ percent on Dec 19, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20181219a.htm).  The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 2 to 2¼ on Jul 31, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190731a.htm). The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 1¾ to 2.0 percent on Sep 18, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190918a.htm). The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 1½ to 1¾ on Oct 30, 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20191030a.htm). The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 1 to 1¼ percent on Mar 3, 2020 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200303a.htm). The FOMC decreased the fed funds rate to 0 to ¼ percent on Mar 15, 2020 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm). On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues. The final segment of Chart VI-11 shows similar movement of the fed funds rate and the prime bank loan rate following the fixing of the fed funds rate to approximately zero. In the final data point of Chart VI-12A on Sep 24, 2020, the fed funds rate is 0.09 percent and the prime rate 3.25 percent.  The causes of the financial crisis and global recession were interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero-interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash. The yields of Treasury securities inverted on Mar 22, 2019 with the ten-year yield at 2.44 percent below those of 2.49 percent for one-month, 2.48 percent for two months, 2.46 percent for three months, 2.48 percent for six months and 2.45 percent for one year (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield). Unconventional monetary policy of extremely low interest rates was an important cause of the global recession and financial crisis inducing as analyzed by Taylor (2018Oct 19, 2) “search for yield, excessive risk taking, a boom and bust in the housing market, and eventually the financial crisis and recession.” Monetary policy deviated from the Taylor Rule (Taylor 2018Oct19 see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2019Oct19 and  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html)). An explanation is in the research of Adrian, Estrella and Shin (2018, 21-22): “Our findings suggest that the monetary tightening of 2004-2006 period ultimately did achieve a slowdown in real activity not because of its impact on the level of longer term interest rates, but rather because of its impact on the slope of the yield curve. In fact, while the level of the 10-year yield only increased 38 basis points between June 2004 and 2006, the term spread declined 325 basis points (from 3.44 to .19 percent). The fact that the slope flattened meant that intermediary profitability was compressed, thus shifting the supply of credit, and hence inducing changes in real activity. The 18 month lag between the end of the tightening cycle, and the beginning of the recession is perfectly compatible with effective monetary tightening.” See (https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html). A major difference in the current cycle is the balance sheet of the Fed with purchases used to lower interest rates in specific segments and maturities such as mortgage-backed securities and longer terms.


Chart VI-12A, US, Fed Funds Rate and Prime Bank Loan Rate, Business Days, Jan 5, 2007 to Sep 24, 2020, Percent per Year

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H15

Chart VI-12B of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the fed funds rate and prime bank loan rate on business days from Jan 2, 2001 to Sep 24, 2020. The behavior over time is that of controlled interest rates. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero-interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash. The final segment shows the repetition of this policy with minute increases in interest rates. The causes of the financial crisis and global recession were interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero-interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash. The yields of Treasury securities inverted on Mar 22, 2019 with the ten-year yield at 2.44 percent below those of 2.49 percent for one-month, 2.48 percent for two months, 2.46 percent for three months, 2.48 percent for six months and 2.45 percent for one year (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield). The final segment after 2001 shows the effects of unconventional monetary policy of extremely low, below inflation fed funds rate in lowering yields. This was an important cause of the global recession and financial crisis inducing as analyzed by Taylor (2018Oct 19, 2) “search for yield, excessive risk taking, a boom and bust in the housing market, and eventually the financial crisis and recession.” Monetary policy deviated from the Taylor Rule (Taylor 2018Oct19 see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2019Oct19 and  http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html)). An explanation is in the research of Adrian, Estrella and Shin (2018, 21-22): “Our findings suggest that the monetary tightening of 2004-2006 period ultimately did achieve a slowdown in real activity not because of its impact on the level of longer term interest rates, but rather because of its impact on the slope of the yield curve. In fact, while the level of the 10-year yield only increased 38 basis points between June 2004 and 2006, the term spread declined 325 basis points (from 3.44 to .19 percent). The fact that the slope flattened meant that intermediary profitability was compressed, thus shifting the supply of credit, and hence inducing changes in real activity. The 18 month lag between the end of the tightening cycle, and the beginning of the recession is perfectly compatible with effective monetary tightening.” See (https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html). A major difference in the current cycle is the balance sheet of the Fed with purchases used to lower interest rates in specific segments and maturities such as mortgage-backed securities and longer terms.


Chart VI-12B, US, Fed Funds Rate and Prime Bank Loan Rate, Business Days, Jan 2, 2001 to Sep 24, 2020, Percent per Year

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H15

 

 

Interest rate risk in the US is showing amplifying fluctuations. Chart VI-13 of the Board of Governors provides the conventional mortgage rate for a fixed-rate 30-year mortgage. The rate stood at 5.87 percent on Jan 8, 2004, increasing to 6.79 percent on Jul 6, 2006. The rate bottomed at 3.35 percent on May 2, 2013. Fear of duration risk in longer maturities such as mortgage-backed securities caused continuing increases in the conventional mortgage rate that rose to 4.51 percent on Jul 11, 2013, 4.58 percent on Aug 22, 2013 and 3.42 percent on Oct 6, 2016, which is the last data point in Chart VI-13. The thirty-year mortgage rate was 2.9 percent on Sep 24, 2020 (http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/ http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/index.html). The current decline of yields is encouraging a surge in mortgage applications that could be reversed in a new increase. Shayndi Raice and Nick Timiraos, writing on “Banks cut as mortgage boom ends,” on Jan 16, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303754404579310940019239208), analyze the drop in mortgage applications to a 13-year low, as measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Demand for home loans plunges,” on Apr 24, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579522051733228402?mg=reno64-wsj), analyzes data in Inside Mortgage Finance that mortgage lending of $235 billion in IQ2014 is 58 percent lower than a year earlier and 23 percent below IVQ2013. Mortgage lending collapsed to the lowest level in 14 years. In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm): “One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.”


Chart VI-13, US, Conventional Mortgage Rate, Jan 8, 2004 to Oct 6, 2016

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update

Table IIB-8, US, Fed Funds Rate, Thirty Year Treasury Bond and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Percent per Year, Dec 2012 to Jan 2020

Fed Funds Rate

Yield of Thirty Year Constant Maturity

Conventional Mortgage Rate

2012-12

0.16

2.88

3.35

2013-01

0.14

3.08

3.41

2013-02

0.15

3.17

3.53

2013-03

0.14

3.16

3.57

2013-04

0.15

2.93

3.45

2013-05

0.11

3.11

3.54

2013-06

0.09

3.4

4.07

2013-07

0.09

3.61

4.37

2013-08

0.08

3.76

4.46

2013-09

0.08

3.79

4.49

2013-10

0.09

3.68

4.19

2013-11

0.08

3.8

4.26

2013-12

0.09

3.89

4.46

2014-01

0.07

3.77

4.43

2014-02

0.07

3.66

4.3

2014-03

0.08

3.62

4.34

2014-04

0.09

3.52

4.34

2014-05

0.09

3.39

4.19

2014-06

0.1

3.42

4.16

2014-07

0.09

3.33

4.13

2014-08

0.09

3.2

4.12

2014-09

0.09

3.26

4.16

2014-10

0.09

3.04

4.04

2014-11

0.09

3.04

4

2014-12

0.12

2.83

3.86

2015-01

0.11

2.46

3.67

2015-02

0.11

2.57

3.71

2015-03

0.11

2.63

3.77

2015-04

0.12

2.59

3.67

2015-05

0.12

2.96

3.84

2015-06

0.13

3.11

3.98

2015-07

0.13

3.07

4.05

2015-08

0.14

2.86

3.91

2015-09

0.14

2.95

3.89

2015-10

0.12

2.89

3.8

2015-11

0.12

3.03

3.94

2015-12

0.24

2.97

3.96

2016-01

0.34

2.86

3.87

2016-02

0.38

2.62

3.66

2016-03

0.36

2.68

3.69

2016-04

0.37

2.62

3.61

2016-05

0.37

2.63

3.6

2016-06

0.38

2.45

3.57

2016-07

0.39

2.23

3.44

2016-08

0.4

2.26

3.44

2016-09

0.4

2.35

3.46

2016-10

0.4

2.5

3.47

2016-11

0.41

2.86

3.77

2016-12

0.54

3.11

4.2

2017-01

0.65

3.02

4.15

2017-02

0.66

3.03

4.17

2017-03

0.79

3.08

4.2

2017-04

0.9

2.94

4.05

2017-05

0.91

2.96

4.01

2017-06

1.04

2.8

3.9

2017-07

1.15

2.88

3.97

2017-08

1.16

2.8

3.88

2017-09

1.15

2.78

3.81

2017-10

1.15

2.88

3.9

2017-11

1.16

2.8

3.92

2017-12

1.3

2.77

3.95

2018-01

1.41

2.88

4.03

2018-02

1.42

3.13

4.33

2018-03

1.51

3.09

4.44

2018-04

1.69

3.07

4.47

2018-05

1.7

3.13

4.59

2018-06

1.82

3.05

4.57

2018-07

1.91

3.01

4.53

2018-08

1.91

3.04

4.55

2018-09

1.95

3.15

4.63

2018-10

2.19

3.34

4.83

2018-11

2.2

3.36

4.87

2018-12

2.27

3.10

4.64

2019-01

2.40

3.04

4.46

2019-02

2.40

3.02

4.37

2019-03

2.41

2.98

4.27

2019-04

2.42

2.94

4.14

2019-05

2.39

2.82

4.07

2019-06

2.38

2.57

3.80

2019-07

2.40

2.57

3.77

2019-08

2.13

2.12

3.62

2019-09

2.04

2.16

3.61

2019-10

1.83

2.19

3.69

2019-11

1.55

2.28

3.70

2019-12

1.55

2.30

3.72

2020-01

1.55

2.22

3.62

2020-02

1.58

1.97

3.47

2020-03

0.65

1.46

3.45

2020-04

0.05

1.27

3.31

2020-05

0.05

1.38

3.23

2020-06

0.08

1.49

3.16

2020-07

0.09

1.31

3.02

2020-08

0.10

1.36

2.94

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm

http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.html

 

There is a false impression of the existence of a monetary policy “science,” measurements and forecasting with which to steer the economy into “prosperity without inflation.” Market participants are remembering the Great Bond Crash of 1994 shown in Table VI-7G when monetary policy pursued nonexistent inflation, causing trillions of dollars of losses in fixed income worldwide while increasing the fed funds rate from 3 percent in Jan 1994 to 6 percent in Dec. The exercise in Table VI-7G shows a drop of the price of the 30-year bond by 18.1 percent and of the 10-year bond by 14.1 percent. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). The pursuit of nonexistent deflation during the past ten years has resulted in the largest monetary policy accommodation in history that created the 2007 financial market crash and global recession and is currently preventing smoother recovery while creating another financial crash in the future. The issue is not whether there should be a central bank and monetary policy but rather whether policy accommodation in doses from zero interest rates to trillions of dollars in the fed balance sheet endangers economic stability.

Table VI-7G, Fed Funds Rates, Thirty and Ten-Year Treasury Yields and Prices, 30-Year Mortgage Rates and 12-month CPI Inflation 1994

1994

FF

30Y

30P

10Y

10P

MOR

CPI

Jan

3.00

6.29

100

5.75

100

7.06

2.52

Feb

3.25

6.49

97.37

5.97

98.36

7.15

2.51

Mar

3.50

6.91

92.19

6.48

94.69

7.68

2.51

Apr

3.75

7.27

88.10

6.97

91.32

8.32

2.36

May

4.25

7.41

86.59

7.18

88.93

8.60

2.29

Jun

4.25

7.40

86.69

7.10

90.45

8.40

2.49

Jul

4.25

7.58

84.81

7.30

89.14

8.61

2.77

Aug

4.75

7.49

85.74

7.24

89.53

8.51

2.69

Sep

4.75

7.71

83.49

7.46

88.10

8.64

2.96

Oct

4.75

7.94

81.23

7.74

86.33

8.93

2.61

Nov

5.50

8.08

79.90

7.96

84.96

9.17

2.67

Dec

6.00

7.87

81.91

7.81

85.89

9.20

2.67

Notes: FF: fed funds rate; 30Y: yield of 30-year Treasury; 30P: price of 30-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 6.29 percent and maturity in exactly 30 years; 10Y: yield of 10-year Treasury; 10P: price of 10-year Treasury assuming coupon equal to 5.75 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years; MOR: 30-year mortgage; CPI: percent change of CPI in 12 months

Sources: yields and mortgage rates http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm CPI ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.t

Chart VI-14 provides the overnight fed funds rate, the yield of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond, the yield of the 30-year constant maturity bond and the conventional mortgage rate from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. In Jan 1991, the fed funds rate was 6.91 percent, the 10-year Treasury yield 8.09 percent, the 30-year Treasury yield 8.27 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 9.64 percent. Before monetary policy tightening in Oct 1993, the rates and yields were 2.99 percent for the fed funds, 5.33 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 5.94 for the 30-year Treasury and 6.83 percent for the conventional mortgage rate. After tightening in Nov 1994, the rates and yields were 5.29 percent for the fed funds rate, 7.96 percent for the 10-year Treasury, 8.08 percent for the 30-year Treasury and 9.17 percent for the conventional mortgage rate.


Chart VI-14, US, Overnight Fed Funds Rate, 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Chart VI-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. There does not appear acceleration of consumer prices requiring aggressive tightening.


Chart VI-15, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the all items consumer price index from Jan 1991 to Dec 1996. Inflation collapsed during the recession from Jul 1990 (III) and Mar 1991 (I) and the end of the Kuwait War on Feb 25, 1991 that stabilized world oil markets. CPI inflation remained almost the same and there is no valid counterfactual that inflation would have been higher without monetary policy tightening because of the long lag in effect of monetary policy on inflation (see Culbertson 1960, 1961, Friedman 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Policy tightening had adverse collateral effects in the form of emerging market crises in Mexico and Argentina and fixed income markets worldwide.


Chart VI-16, US, Consumer Price Index All Items, Twelve-Month Percentage Change, Jan 1991 to Dec 1996

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

https://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

 

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.

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