New Nonfarm Hires of 6.343 Million in Jul 2020, New 2.421 Million Full-Time Jobs Created in August 2020, Recovery Without Hiring in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Fifteen Million Fewer Full-Time Jobs In the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment, United States Inflation, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part V
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.
IA1 Hiring Collapse
IA2 Labor Underutilization
ICA3 Fifteen Million Fewer Full-time
Jobs
IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow
Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment
IC United
States Inflation
IC Long-term US Inflation
ID Current US Inflation
III World Financial Turbulence
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic
Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk
Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe
Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on
Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on
European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the
Debt Crisis
Headline and core producer
price indexes are in Table I-6. The headline PPI SA changed 0.0 percent in Aug
2020 and decreased 1.5 percent NSA in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020. The
core PPI SA changed 0.2 percent in Aug 2020 and increased 1.3 percent in 12
months. Analysis of annual equivalent rates of change shows inflation waves
similar to those worldwide. In the first wave, the absence of risk
aversion from the sovereign risk crisis in Europe motivated the carry trade
from zero interest rates into commodity futures that caused the annual
equivalent rate of 11.1 percent in the headline PPI in Jan-Apr 2011 and 3.7
percent in the core PPI. In the second wave, commodity futures prices
collapsed in Jun 2011 with the return of risk aversion originating in the
sovereign risk crisis of Europe. The annual equivalent rate of headline PPI
inflation collapsed to 0.6 percent in May-Jun 2011 but the core annual
equivalent inflation rate was higher at 2.4 percent. In the third wave,
headline PPI inflation resuscitated with annual equivalent at 4.1 percent in
Jul-Sep 2011 and core PPI inflation at 3.2 percent. Core PPI inflation was
persistent throughout 2011, jumping from annual equivalent at 2.0 percent in
the first three months of 2010 to 3.0 percent in 12 months ending in Dec 2011.
Unconventional monetary policy is based on the proposition that core rates
reflect more fundamental inflation and are thus better predictors of the
future. In practice, the relation of core and headline inflation is as
difficult to predict as future inflation (see IIID Supply Shocks in https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html). In the fourth wave,
risk aversion originating in the lack of resolution of the European debt crisis
caused unwinding of carry trades with annual equivalent headline PPI inflation
of 0.0 percent in Oct-Dec 2011 and 2.0 percent in the core annual equivalent.
In the fifth wave from Jan to Mar 2012, annual equivalent
inflation was 3.2 percent for the headline index but 3.2 percent for the core
index excluding food and energy. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent
inflation in Apr-May 2012 during renewed risk aversion was minus 4.1 percent
for the headline PPI and 1.8 percent for the core. In the seventh wave,
continuing risk aversion caused reversal of carry trades into commodity
exposures with annual equivalent headline inflation of minus 1.2 percent in
Jun-Jul 2012 while core PPI inflation was at annual equivalent 3.7 percent. In
the eighth wave, relaxed risk aversion because of the announcement of
the impaired bond buying program or Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) of the
European Central Bank (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html) induced carry trades that
drove annual equivalent inflation of producer prices of the United States at
13.4 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 1.2 percent in the core index. In the ninth
wave, renewed risk aversion caused annual equivalent inflation of minus 2.4
percent in Oct 2012-Dec 2012 in the headline index and 1.2 percent in the core
index. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 7.4 percent in
the headline index in Jan-Feb 2013 and 1.8 percent in the core index. In the eleventh
wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 7.0 percent in Mar-Apr 2012 and
1.2 percent for the core index. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent
inflation returned at 2.7 percent in May-Aug 2013 and 1.2 percent in the core
index. In the thirteenth wave, portfolio reallocations away from
commodities and into equities reversed commodity carry trade with annual
equivalent inflation of 0.8 percent in Sep-Nov 2013 in the headline PPI and 1.6
percent in the core. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation
returned at 5.7 percent annual equivalent for the headline index in Dec
2013-Feb 2014 and 3.7 percent for the core index. In the fifteenth wave,
annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent for the general PPI index in Mar
2014 and 0.0 percent for the core PPI index. In the sixteenth wave,
annual equivalent headline PPI inflation increased at 0.9 percent in Apr-Jul
2014 and 1.8 percent for the core PPI. In the seventeenth wave, annual
equivalent inflation in Aug-Nov 2014 was minus 2.7 percent and 1.8 percent for
the core index. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell
at 17.6 percent for the general index in Dec 2014 to Jan 2015 and increased at
3.7 percent in the core index. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent
inflation increased at 1.2 percent in Feb 2015 and increased at 3.7 percent for
the core index. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent producer prices
increased at 4.9 percent in Mar 2015 and the core at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-first
wave, producer prices fell at 8.1 percent annual equivalent in Apr 2015
while the core index increased at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-second wave,
producer prices increased at annual equivalent 10.7 percent in May-Jun 2015 and
core producer prices at 2.8 percent. In the twenty-third wave, producer
prices fell at 1.2 percent in Jul 2015 and the core index increased at 2.4
percent. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at
7.4 percent in Aug-Oct 2015 and the core index changed at 0.0 percent annual
equivalent. In the twenty-fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was
1.2 percent in Nov 2015 with the core at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-sixth
wave, the headline PPI fell at annual equivalent 6.6 percent and the core
increased at 2.0 percent in Dec 2015-Feb 2016. In the twenty-seventh wave,
annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent for the central index in Mar-May
2016 and 1.6 percent for the core. In the twenty-eighth wave, annual
equivalent inflation was 8.7 percent for the headline index in Jun 2016 and 3.7
percent for the core. In the twenty-ninth wave, producer prices fell at
annual equivalent 1.2 percent in Jul 2016 and core producer prices changed at
0.0 percent. In the thirtieth wave, producer prices fell at 3.5 percent
annual equivalent in Aug 2016 while core producer prices increased at 1.2
percent. In the thirty-first wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent
6.2 percent in Sep-Oct 2016 while core prices increased at 1.8 percent. In the thirty-second wave, producer
prices decreased at 3.5 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2016 and the core
index increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-third wave, producer
prices increased at 11.4 percent in Dec 2016 and the core index increased at
2.4 percent. In the thirty-fourth
wave, producer prices increased at 8.7 percent in Jan 2017 while the core
increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-fifth wave, producer prices
increased at 3.7 percent in Feb 2017 while the core index increased at 1.2
percent. In the thirty-sixth wave, producer prices increased at annual
equivalent 1.2 percent in Mar 2017 while core producer prices increased at 3.7
percent. In the thirty-seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation of the
headline index was at 4.9 percent in Apr 2017 and 4.9 percent for the core. In
the thirty-eighth wave, producer prices fell at 9.2 percent annual
equivalent in May 2017 while core producer prices changed at 0.0 percent. In
the thirty-ninth wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent
2.4 percent in Jun 2017 while core producer prices increased at 2.4 percent. In
the fortieth wave, headline producer prices fell at 1.2 percent annual
equivalent in Jul 2017 while core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the forty-first
wave, central producer prices increased at 8.7 percent annual equivalent in
Aug-Sep 2017 while core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the forty-second
wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 6.8 percent in Oct-Nov
2017 while core producer prices increased at 4.3 percent. In the forty-third
wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent in Dec
2017 while core prices changed at 0.0 percent. In the forty-fourth wave,
producer prices increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Jan 2018 while
core producer prices changed at 1.2 percent. In the forty-fifth wave,
producer prices increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Feb 2018 while
core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the forty-sixth wave, producer
prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Mar 2018 while core prices
increased at 3.7 percent. In the forty-seventh wave, producer prices
fell at 3.5 percent annual equivalent in Apr 2018 while core prices increased
at 2.4 percent. In the forty-eighth wave, producer prices increased at
annual equivalent 8.7 percent in May 2018 while core prices increased at 2.4
percent. In the forty-ninth wave, producer prices increased at annual
equivalent 1.8 percent in Jun-Jul 2018 while core prices increased at 3.0
percent. In the fiftieth wave, producer prices increased at annual
equivalent 1.8 percent in Aug-Sep 2018 while core prices increased at 2.4
percent. In the fifty-first wave, producer prices increased at annual
equivalent 8.7 percent in Oct 2018 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent.
In the fifty-second wave, producer prices decreased at annual equivalent
7.7 percent in Nov 2018-Jan 2019 while core prices increased at 2.8 percent. In
the fifty-third wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 8.3
percent in Feb-Apr 2019 while core prices increased at 1.6 percent. In the fifty-fourth
wave, producer prices decreased at annual equivalent 3.0 percent in May-Jun
2019 while core prices increased at 0.6 percent. In the fifty-fifth wave,
producer prices increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Jul 2019 while
core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the fifty-sixth wave, producer
prices fell at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Aug-Sep 2019 while core prices
increased at 0.6 percent. In the fifty-seventh wave, producer prices
increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Oct-Dec 2019 while core prices
increased at 0.8 percent. In the fifty-eighth wave, producer prices
changed at 0.0 percent annual equivalent in Jan 2020 while core prices changed
at 0.0 percent. In the fifty-ninth wave, producer prices decreased at
annual equivalent 20.3 percent in Feb-Apr 2020 while core prices increased at 2.0
percent. In the sixtieth wave, producer prices increased at annual
equivalent 34.5 percent in May 2020 while core prices changed at 0.0 percent.
In the sixty-first wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 2.8
percent in Jun-Aug 2020 while core prices increased at 1.6 percent. It is
almost impossible to forecast PPI inflation and its relation to CPI inflation.
“Inflation surprise” by monetary policy could be proposed to climb along a
downward sloping Phillips curve, resulting in higher inflation but lower
unemployment (see Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro and Gordon 1983 and past
comments of this blog http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). The architects of monetary
policy would require superior inflation forecasting ability compared to
forecasting naivety by everybody else. In practice, we are all naïve in forecasting
inflation and other economic variables and events.
Table I-6, US,
Headline and Core PPI Inflation Monthly SA and 12-Month NSA ∆%
|
Finished |
Finished |
Finished Core
SA |
Finished Core
NSA |
Aug |
0.0 |
-1.5 |
0.2 |
1.3 |
Jul |
0.7 |
-1.8 |
0.2 |
1.1 |
Jun |
0.0 |
-2.2 |
0.0 |
1.1 |
AE Jun-Aug |
2.8 |
|
1.6 |
|
May |
2.5 |
-2.8 |
0.0 |
1.1 |
AE May |
34.5 |
|
0.0 |
|
Apr |
-3.0 |
-5.3 |
0.2 |
1.3 |
Mar |
-1.7 |
-1.5 |
0.0 |
1.1 |
Feb |
-0.9 |
1.3 |
0.3 |
1.2 |
AE Feb-Apr |
-20.3 |
|
2.0 |
|
Jan |
0.0 |
2.5 |
0.0 |
1.0 |
AE Jan |
0.0 |
|
0.0 |
|
Dec 2019 |
0.2 |
1.7 |
0.0 |
1.5 |
Nov |
0.4 |
1.0 |
0.2 |
1.6 |
Oct |
0.6 |
-0.2 |
0.0 |
1.7 |
AE Oct-Dec |
4.9 |
|
0.8 |
|
Sep |
-0.1 |
-0.1 |
0.1 |
1.9 |
Aug |
-0.3 |
0.3 |
0.0 |
2.0 |
AE Aug-Sep |
-2.4 |
|
0.6 |
|
Jul |
0.3 |
0.7 |
0.1 |
2.2 |
AE Jul |
3.7 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jun |
-0.5 |
0.5 |
0.0 |
2.3 |
May |
0.0 |
1.3 |
0.1 |
2.5 |
AE May-Jun |
-3.0 |
|
0.6 |
|
Apr |
0.5 |
2.1 |
0.1 |
2.5 |
Mar |
1.1 |
1.4 |
0.2 |
2.7 |
Feb |
0.4 |
0.5 |
0.1 |
2.7 |
AE Feb-Apr |
8.3 |
|
1.6 |
|
Jan |
-0.6 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
2.9 |
Dec 2018 |
-0.6 |
1.3 |
0.1 |
2.6 |
Nov |
-0.8 |
2.0 |
0.2 |
2.6 |
AE Nov-Jan |
-7.7 |
|
2.8 |
|
Oct |
0.7 |
3.7 |
0.2 |
2.5 |
AE Oct |
8.7 |
|
2.4 |
|
Sep |
0.2 |
3.2 |
0.2 |
2.8 |
Aug |
0.1 |
3.7 |
0.2 |
2.6 |
AE Aug-Sep |
1.8 |
|
2.4 |
|
Jul |
0.1 |
4.3 |
0.3 |
2.4 |
Jun |
0.2 |
4.1 |
0.2 |
2.1 |
AE Jun-Jul |
1.8 |
|
3.0 |
|
May |
0.7 |
4.1 |
0.2 |
2.1 |
AE May |
8.7 |
|
2.4 |
|
Apr |
-0.3 |
2.4 |
0.2 |
1.9 |
AE Apr |
-3.5 |
|
2.4 |
|
Mar |
0.2 |
3.0 |
0.3 |
2.0 |
AE Mar |
2.4 |
|
3.7 |
|
Feb |
0.2 |
2.7 |
0.1 |
2.0 |
AE Feb |
2.4 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jan |
0.3 |
2.9 |
0.1 |
1.8 |
AE Jan |
3.7 |
|
1.2 |
|
Dec 2017 |
0.1 |
3.2 |
0.0 |
2.0 |
AE Dec |
1.2 |
|
0.0 |
|
Nov |
0.9 |
4.2 |
0.3 |
2.1 |
Oct |
0.2 |
2.9 |
0.4 |
2.0 |
AE Oct-Nov |
6.8 |
|
4.3 |
|
Sep |
0.8 |
3.3 |
0.0 |
1.7 |
Aug |
0.6 |
3.0 |
0.2 |
1.8 |
AE Aug-Sep |
8.7 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jul |
-0.1 |
2.1 |
0.1 |
1.8 |
AE Jul |
-1.2 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jun |
0.2 |
2.1 |
0.2 |
1.7 |
AE Jun |
2.4 |
|
2.4 |
|
May |
-0.8 |
2.8 |
0.0 |
1.9 |
AE May |
-9.2 |
|
0.0 |
|
Apr |
0.4 |
4.0 |
0.4 |
2.0 |
AE Apr |
4.9 |
|
4.9 |
|
Mar |
0.1 |
3.8 |
0.3 |
1.8 |
AE Mar |
1.2 |
|
3.7 |
|
Feb |
0.3 |
3.8 |
0.1 |
1.6 |
AE Feb |
3.7 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jan |
0.7 |
2.9 |
0.2 |
1.7 |
AE Jan |
8.7 |
|
2.4 |
|
Dec 2016 |
0.9 |
1.9 |
0.2 |
1.7 |
AE Dec |
11.4 |
|
2.4 |
|
Nov |
-0.3 |
0.4 |
0.1 |
1.6 |
AE Nov |
-3.5 |
|
1.2 |
|
Oct |
0.5 |
0.7 |
0.1 |
1.6 |
Sep |
0.5 |
-0.1 |
0.2 |
1.4 |
AE Sep-Oct |
6.2 |
|
1.8 |
|
Aug |
-0.3 |
-1.9 |
0.1 |
1.4 |
AE Aug |
-3.5 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jul |
-0.1 |
-2.0 |
0.0 |
1.2 |
AE Jul |
-1.2 |
|
0.0 |
|
Jun |
0.7 |
-2.0 |
0.3 |
1.5 |
AE Jun |
8.7 |
|
3.7 |
|
May |
0.5 |
-2.2 |
0.1 |
1.6 |
Apr |
0.2 |
-1.5 |
0.2 |
1.6 |
Mar |
0.2 |
-2.3 |
0.1 |
1.5 |
AE Mar-May |
3.7 |
|
1.6 |
|
Feb |
-0.7 |
-2.0 |
0.1 |
1.5 |
Jan |
-0.3 |
-1.2 |
0.3 |
1.7 |
Dec 2015 |
-0.7 |
-2.7 |
0.1 |
1.8 |
AE Dec-Feb |
-6.6 |
|
2.0 |
|
Nov |
0.1 |
-3.3 |
0.1 |
1.7 |
AE Nov |
1.2 |
|
1.2 |
|
Oct |
-0.3 |
-4.0 |
-0.1 |
1.8 |
Sep |
-1.2 |
-4.1 |
0.1 |
2.1 |
Aug |
-0.4 |
-3.1 |
0.0 |
2.1 |
AE ∆% Aug-Oct |
-7.4 |
|
0.0 |
|
Jul |
-0.1 |
-2.8 |
0.2 |
2.3 |
AE ∆% Jul |
-1.2 |
|
2.4 |
|
Jun |
0.6 |
-2.6 |
0.5 |
2.3 |
May |
1.1 |
-2.9 |
0.2 |
2.0 |
AE ∆% May-Jun |
10.7 |
|
2.8 |
|
Apr |
-0.7 |
-4.5 |
0.1 |
2.0 |
AE ∆% Apr |
-8.1 |
|
1.2 |
|
Mar |
0.4 |
-3.3 |
0.1 |
2.1 |
AE ∆% Mar |
4.9 |
|
1.2 |
|
Feb |
0.1 |
-3.2 |
0.3 |
1.9 |
AE ∆% Feb |
1.2 |
|
3.7 |
|
Jan |
-1.8 |
-3.0 |
0.5 |
1.7 |
Dec 2014 |
-1.4 |
-0.6 |
0.1 |
1.7 |
AE ∆% Dec-Jan |
-17.6 |
|
3.7 |
|
Nov |
-0.3 |
1.1 |
0.0 |
2.0 |
Oct |
-0.3 |
1.8 |
0.3 |
2.2 |
Sep |
-0.3 |
2.2 |
0.1 |
2.1 |
Aug |
0.0 |
2.3 |
0.2 |
1.9 |
AE ∆% Aug-Nov |
-2.7 |
|
1.8 |
|
July |
0.0 |
2.9 |
0.1 |
1.9 |
Jun |
0.2 |
2.8 |
0.2 |
1.9 |
May |
-0.3 |
2.5 |
0.2 |
1.8 |
Apr |
0.4 |
3.1 |
0.1 |
1.7 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jul |
0.9 |
|
1.8 |
|
Mar |
0.3 |
1.8 |
0.0 |
1.7 |
AE ∆% Mar |
3.7 |
|
0.0 |
|
Feb |
0.2 |
1.3 |
0.1 |
1.9 |
Jan |
0.8 |
1.6 |
0.4 |
2.0 |
Dec 2013 |
0.4 |
1.4 |
0.4 |
1.6 |
AE ∆% Dec-Feb |
5.7 |
|
3.7 |
|
Nov |
0.3 |
0.8 |
0.2 |
1.3 |
Oct |
0.2 |
0.3 |
0.1 |
1.2 |
Sep |
-0.3 |
0.2 |
0.1 |
1.2 |
AE ∆% Sep-Nov |
0.8 |
|
1.6 |
|
Aug |
0.5 |
1.2 |
0.1 |
1.2 |
Jul |
-0.1 |
2.1 |
0.1 |
1.3 |
Jun |
0.1 |
2.3 |
0.1 |
1.6 |
May |
0.4 |
1.6 |
0.1 |
1.7 |
AE ∆%
May-Aug |
2.7 |
|
1.2 |
|
Apr |
-0.6 |
0.5 |
0.1 |
1.7 |
Mar |
-0.6 |
1.1 |
0.1 |
1.7 |
AE ∆%
Mar-Apr |
-7.0 |
|
1.2 |
|
Feb |
0.6 |
1.8 |
0.2 |
1.8 |
Jan |
0.6 |
1.5 |
0.1 |
1.8 |
AE ∆%
Jan-Feb |
7.4 |
|
1.8 |
|
Dec 2012 |
-0.2 |
1.4 |
0.0 |
2.1 |
Nov |
-0.5 |
1.4 |
0.2 |
2.2 |
Oct |
0.1 |
2.3 |
0.1 |
2.2 |
AE ∆%
Oct-Dec |
-2.4 |
|
1.2 |
|
Sep |
0.9 |
2.1 |
0.0 |
2.4 |
Aug |
1.2 |
1.9 |
0.2 |
2.6 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep |
13.4 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jul |
0.2 |
0.5 |
0.4 |
2.6 |
Jun |
-0.4 |
0.7 |
0.2 |
2.6 |
AE ∆% Jun-Jul |
-1.2 |
|
3.7 |
|
May |
-0.6 |
0.6 |
0.1 |
2.7 |
Apr |
-0.1 |
1.8 |
0.2 |
2.7 |
AE ∆% Apr-May |
-4.1 |
|
1.8 |
|
Mar |
0.1 |
2.7 |
0.2 |
2.9 |
Feb |
0.3 |
3.4 |
0.2 |
3.1 |
Jan |
0.4 |
4.1 |
0.4 |
3.1 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar |
3.2 |
|
3.2 |
|
Dec 2011 |
-0.1 |
4.7 |
0.2 |
3.0 |
Nov |
0.3 |
5.7 |
0.1 |
3.0 |
Oct |
-0.2 |
5.9 |
0.2 |
2.9 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec |
0.0 |
|
2.0 |
|
Sep |
0.9 |
7.1 |
0.3 |
2.8 |
Aug |
-0.3 |
6.6 |
0.2 |
2.7 |
Jul |
0.4 |
7.2 |
0.3 |
2.7 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep |
4.1 |
|
3.2 |
|
Jun |
-0.4 |
7.0 |
0.3 |
2.3 |
May |
0.5 |
7.1 |
0.1 |
2.1 |
AE ∆%
May-Jun |
0.6 |
|
2.4 |
|
Apr |
0.9 |
6.7 |
0.3 |
2.3 |
Mar |
0.7 |
5.7 |
0.3 |
2.0 |
Feb |
1.1 |
5.5 |
0.2 |
1.8 |
Jan |
0.8 |
3.7 |
0.4 |
1.6 |
AE ∆%
Jan-Apr |
11.0 |
|
3.7 |
|
Dec 2010 |
0.9 |
3.8 |
0.2 |
1.4 |
Nov |
0.4 |
3.4 |
0.0 |
1.2 |
Oct |
0.8 |
4.3 |
0.0 |
1.6 |
Sep |
0.3 |
3.9 |
0.2 |
1.6 |
Aug |
0.6 |
3.3 |
0.1 |
1.3 |
Jul |
0.1 |
4.1 |
0.1 |
1.5 |
Jun |
-0.3 |
2.7 |
0.1 |
1.1 |
May |
0.0 |
5.1 |
0.3 |
1.3 |
Apr |
0.0 |
5.4 |
0.0 |
0.9 |
Mar |
0.7 |
5.9 |
0.2 |
0.9 |
Feb |
-0.7 |
4.1 |
0.1 |
1.0 |
Jan |
1.0 |
4.5 |
0.2 |
1.0 |
Note: Core:
excluding food and energy; AE: annual equivalent
Source: US
Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/ppi/data.htm
The US producer
price index NSA from 2000 to 2020 is in Chart I-24. There are two episodes of
decline of the PPI during recessions in 2001 and in 2008. Barsky and Kilian
(2004) consider the 2001 episode as one in which real oil prices were declining
when recession began. Recession and the fall of commodity prices instead of
generalized deflation explain the behavior of US inflation in 2008. There is
similar collapse of producer prices into 2015 as in 2009 caused by the drop of
commodity
prices.
Chart I-24, US, Producer Price Index, NSA, 2000-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Twelve-month percentage
changes of the PPI NSA from 2000 to 2020 are in Chart I-25. It may be possible
to forecast trends a few months in the future under adaptive expectations but
turning points are almost impossible to anticipate especially when related to
fluctuations of commodity prices in response to risk aversion. In a sense,
monetary policy has been tied to behavior of the PPI in the negative 12-month
rates in 2001 to 2003 and then again in 2009 to 2010. There is similar sharp
decline of inflation into 2015 caused by the drop of commodities. Monetary
policy following deflation fears caused by commodity price fluctuations would
introduce significant volatility and risks in financial markets and eventually
in consumption and investment.
Chart I-25, US, Producer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage
Change NSA, 2000-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The US PPI excluding food
and energy from 2000 to 2020 is in Chart I-26. There is here again a smooth
trend of inflation instead of prolonged deflation as in Japan.
Chart I-26, US, Producer Price Index Excluding Food and
Energy, NSA, 2000-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Twelve-month percentage changes
of the producer price index excluding food and energy are in Chart I-27.
Fluctuations replicate those in the headline PPI. There is an evident trend of
increase of 12-month rates of core PPI inflation in 2011 but lower rates in
2012-2014. Prices rose less rapidly into 2015-2018 as during earlier
fluctuations. Twelve-month rates decrease in the final segment 2019-2020.
Chart I-27, US, Producer Price Index Excluding Food and
Energy, NSA, 12-Month Percentage Changes, 2000-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The US producer price index
of energy goods from 2000 to 2020 is in Chart I-28. There is a clear upward
trend with fluctuations, which would not occur under persistent deflation.
Chart I-28, US, Producer Price Index Finished Energy Goods,
NSA, 2000-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-29 provides 12-month
percentage changes of the producer price index of energy goods from 2000 to
2020. Barsky and Killian (2004) relate the episode of declining prices of
energy goods in 2001 to 2002 to the analysis of decline of real oil prices.
Interest rates dropping to zero during the global recession in 2008 induced
carry trades that explain the rise of the PPI of energy goods toward 30
percent. Bouts of risk aversion with policy interest rates held close to zero
explain the fluctuations in the 12-month rates of the PPI of energy goods in
the expansion phase of the economy. Symmetric inflation targets induce
significant instability in inflation and interest rates with adverse effects on
financial markets and the overall economy.
Chart I-29, US, Producer Price Index Finished Energy Goods,
12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2000-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Effective with the January 2014 Producer Price Index (PPI) data
release in February 2014 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ppi_02192014.pdf 8), “BLS transitions from the Stage of
Processing (SOP) to the Final Demand-Intermediate Demand (FD-ID) aggregation
system. This shift results in significant changes to the PPI news release, as
well as other documents available from PPI. The transition to the FD-ID system
is the culmination of a long-standing PPI objective to improve the current SOP
aggregation system by incorporating PPIs for services, construction, government
purchases, and exports. In comparison to the SOP system, the FD-ID system more
than doubles PPI coverage of the United States economy to over 75 percent of
in-scope domestic production. The FD-ID system was introduced as a set of
experimental indexes in January 2011. Nearly all new FD-ID goods, services, and
construction indexes provide historical data back to either November 2009 or
April 2010, while the indexes for goods that correspond with the historical SOP
indexes go back to the 1970s or earlier.”
Headline and core final demand producer price
indexes are in Table I-6B. The headline FD PPI SA increased 0.3 percent in Aug
2020 and decreased 0.2 percent NSA in the 12 months ending in Aug 2020. The
core FD PPI SA increased 0.4 percent in Aug 2020 and increased 0.6 percent in
12 months. Analysis of annual equivalent rates of change shows inflation waves
similar to those worldwide. In the first wave, the absence of risk
aversion from the sovereign risk crisis in Europe motivated the carry trade
from zero interest rates into commodity futures that caused the average
equivalent rate of 7.4 percent in the headline FD PPI in Jan-Apr 2011 and 4.6
percent in the core FD PPI. In the second wave, commodity futures prices
collapsed in Jun 2011 with the return of risk aversion originating in the
sovereign risk crisis of Europe. The annual equivalent rate of headline FD PPI
inflation collapsed to 2.4 percent in May-Jun 2011 but the core annual
equivalent inflation rate was at 2.4 percent. In the third wave,
headline FD PPI inflation resuscitated with annual equivalent at 3.2 percent in
Jul-Sep 2011 and core PPI inflation at 3.2 percent. Core FD PPI inflation was
persistent throughout 2011, from annual equivalent at 4.6 percent in the first
four months of 2011 to 2.6 percent in 12 months ending in Dec 2011.
Unconventional monetary policy is based on the proposition that core rates
reflect more fundamental inflation and are thus better predictors of the
future. In practice, the relation of core and headline inflation is as
difficult to predict as future inflation (see IIID Supply Shocks in https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html). In the fourth
wave, risk aversion originating in the lack of resolution of the European
debt crisis caused unwinding of carry trades with annual equivalent headline FD
PPI inflation of minus 0.8 percent in Oct-Dec 2011 and minus 0.4 percent in the
core annual equivalent. In the fifth wave from Jan to Mar 2012,
annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent for the headline index and 3.7
percent for the core index excluding food and energy. In the sixth wave,
annual equivalent inflation in Apr-May 2012 during renewed risk aversion was
1.2 percent for the headline FD PPI and 3.0 percent for the core. In the seventh
wave, continuing risk aversion caused reversal of carry trades into
commodity exposures with annual equivalent headline inflation of minus 2.4
percent in Jun-Jul 2012 while core FD PPI inflation was at annual equivalent
minus 1.2 percent. In the eighth wave, relaxed risk aversion because of
the announcement of the impaired bond buying program or Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) of the European Central Bank (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html) induced carry
trades that drove annual equivalent inflation of final demand producer prices
of the United States at 6.2 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 1.2 percent in the core
index. In the ninth wave, renewed risk aversion caused annual equivalent
inflation of 0.8 percent in Oct 2011-Dec 2012 in the headline index and 2.8
percent in the core index. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent
inflation was 3.0 percent in the headline index in Jan-Feb 2013 and 0.6 percent
in the core index. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent price change
was minus 1.2 percent in Mar-Apr 2013 and 2.4 percent for the core index. In
the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 1.8 percent in
May-Aug 2013 and 1.6 percent in the core index. In the thirteenth wave,
portfolio reallocations away from commodities and into equities reversed
commodity carry trade with annual equivalent inflation of 1.6 percent in
Sep-Nov 2013 in the headline FD PPI and 2.0 percent in the core. In the fourteenth
wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent annual equivalent for the
headline index in Dec 2013-Feb 2014 and 1.6 percent for the core index. In the fifteenth
wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 2.4 percent in the headline
FD PPI and 2.7 percent in the core in Mar-Jul 2014. In the sixteenth wave,
annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent for the headline FD index and
minus 0.6 percent for the core FD index in Aug-Sep 2014. In the seventeenth
wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent for the headline FD and
4.9 percent for the core FD in Oct 2014. In the eighteenth wave, annual
equivalent inflation was minus 3.0 percent for the headline FDI and 1.2 percent
for the core in Nov-Dec 2014. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent
inflation was minus 6.4 percent for the general index and minus 2.4 percent for
the core in Jan-Feb 2015. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent
inflation was 2.4 percent for the general index in Mar 2015 and 1.2 percent for
the core. In the twenty-first wave, final demand prices decreased at
annual equivalent 2.4 percent for the headline index in Apr 2015 and changed at
0.0 percent for the core index. In the twenty-second
wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 3.7 percent for the headline
index in May-Jul 2015 and at 2.4 percent for the core index. In the twenty-third
wave, the headline final demand index fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent
in Aug 2015 and the core changed at 0.0 percent annual equivalent. In the twenty-fourth
wave, FD prices fell at annual equivalent 4.1 percent in Sep-Oct 2015. In
the twenty-fifth wave, FD prices increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent
in Nov 2015. In the twenty-sixth wave, FD prices decreased at 1.2
percent annual equivalent in Dec 2015. In the twenty-seventh wave, FD
prices increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Jan 2016 and the core FD
increased at 6.2 percent. In the twenty-eighth wave, FD prices fell at
annual equivalent 1.8 percent in Feb-Mar 2016 while the core decreased at 0.6
percent. In the twenty-ninth wave, FD prices increased at 3.7 percent
annual equivalent in Apr-Jun 2016 and core FD increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirtieth
wave, final demand prices decreased at 1.2 percent in annual equivalent in
Jul 2016 while the core decreased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-first wave,
final demand prices decreased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Aug 2016 and
the core changed at 0.0 percent. In the thirty-second wave, final demand
prices increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Sep 2016 while core final
demand increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-third wave, final demand
prices increased at 2.4 percent and core final demand prices increased at 1.2
percent in Oct 2016. In the thirty-fourth wave, final demand producer
prices increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent in Nov-Dec 2016 while the
core increased at 3.0 percent. In the thirty-fifth
wave, final demand producer prices increased at 4.9 percent in Jan 2017
while core prices increased at 3.7 percent. In the thirty-sixth wave,
final demand prices changed at 0.0 percent annual equivalent in Feb 2017 while
the core index decreased at 1.2 percent. In the thirty-seventh wave,
final demand prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Mar 2017
while the core index increased at 2.4 percent. In the thirty-eighth wave,
final demand prices increased at 4.9 percent in Apr 2017 while the core
increased at 4.9 percent. In the thirty-ninth wave, final demand prices
increased at annual equivalent 0.4 percent in May-Jun 2017 while core prices
increased at 1.8 percent. In the fortieth wave, final demand prices
increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Jul 2017 while core prices
increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-first wave, final demand prices
increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Aug-Nov 2017 while core prices
increased at 4.1 percent. In the forty-second wave, final demand prices
changed at annual equivalent 0.0 percent in Dec 2017 while core prices changed
at 0.0 percent. In the forty-third wave, final demand prices increased
at annual equivalent 4.1 percent in Jan-Mar 2018 while core prices increased at
4.1 percent. In the forty-fourth wave, final demand prices increased at
3.2 percent in Apr-Jun 2018 while core prices increased at 3.2 percent. In the
forty-fifth wave, final demand prices increased at 1.2 percent in
Jul-Aug 2018 while core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the forty-sixth
wave, final demand prices increased at 5.5 percent annual equivalent in
Sep-Oct 2018 while core prices increased at 4.3 percent. In the forty-seventh
wave, final demand prices decreased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Nov
2018 while core prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the forty-eighth wave,
final demand prices decreased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2018-Jan
2019 while core prices increased at 1.2 percent. In the forty-ninth wave,
final demand prices increased at annual equivalent 4.1 percent in Feb-Apr 2019
while core prices increased at 2.8 percent. In the fiftieth wave, final
demand prices increased at 2.4 percent in May 2019 while core prices changed at
2.4 percent. In the fifty-first wave, final demand prices increased at
annual equivalent 0.8 percent in Jun-Aug 2019 while core prices increased at
2.0 percent. In the fifty-second wave, final demand prices decreased at
annual equivalent 3.5 percent in Sep 2019 while core prices decreased at 2.4
percent. In the fifty-third wave,
final demand prices increased at 1.2 percent in Oct-Nov 2019 while core prices
decreased at 0.6 percent. In the fifty-fourth wave, final demand prices
increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Dec 2019-Jan 2020 while core
prices increased at 3.7 percent. In the fifty-fifth wave, final demand
prices decreased at annual equivalent 8.5 percent in Feb-Apr 2020 while core
prices decreased at 2.4 percent. In the fifty-sixth wave, final demand
prices increased at annual equivalent 10.0 percent in May 2020 while core
prices increased at 2.4 percent. In the fifty-seventh wave, final demand
prices decreased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Jun 2020 while core prices
decreased at 3.5 percent. In the fifty-eighth wave, final demand prices
increased at annual equivalent 5.5 percent in Jul-Aug 2020 while core prices
increased at 5.5 percent. It is almost impossible to forecast PPI inflation and
its relation to CPI inflation. “Inflation surprise” by monetary policy could be
proposed to climb along a downward sloping Phillips curve, resulting in higher
inflation but lower unemployment (see Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro and
Gordon 1983 and past comments of this blog http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). The
architects of monetary policy would require superior inflation forecasting
ability compared to forecasting naivety by everybody else. In practice, we are
all naïve in forecasting inflation and other economic variables and events.
|
Final Demand |
Final Demand |
Final Demand
Core SA |
Final Demand
Core NSA |
Aug 2020 |
0.3 |
-0.2 |
0.4 |
0.6 |
Jul |
0.6 |
-0.4 |
0.5 |
0.3 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug |
5.5 |
|
5.5 |
|
Jun |
-0.2 |
-0.8 |
-0.3 |
0.1 |
AE ∆% Jun |
-2.4 |
|
-3.5 |
|
May |
0.8 |
-0.8 |
0.2 |
0.3 |
AE ∆% May |
10.0 |
|
2.4 |
|
Apr |
-1.3 |
-1.5 |
-0.4 |
0.3 |
Mar |
-0.4 |
0.3 |
0.1 |
1.1 |
Feb |
-0.5 |
1.1 |
-0.3 |
1.2 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr |
-8.5 |
|
-2.4 |
|
Jan |
0.3 |
2.0 |
0.3 |
1.6 |
Dec 2019 |
0.3 |
1.4 |
0.3 |
1.3 |
AE ∆% Dec-Jan |
3.7 |
|
3.7 |
|
Nov |
-0.1 |
1.0 |
-0.3 |
1.2 |
Oct |
0.3 |
1.0 |
0.2 |
1.6 |
AE ∆% Oct-Nov |
1.2 |
|
-0.6 |
|
Sep |
-0.3 |
1.5 |
-0.2 |
2.0 |
AE ∆% Sep |
-3.5 |
|
-2.4 |
|
Aug |
0.1 |
1.9 |
0.3 |
2.3 |
Jul |
0.3 |
1.6 |
0.2 |
2.2 |
Jun |
-0.2 |
1.6 |
0.0 |
2.2 |
AE ∆% Jun-Aug |
0.8 |
|
2.0 |
|
May |
0.2 |
2.1 |
0.2 |
2.4 |
AE ∆% May |
2.4 |
|
2.4 |
|
Apr |
0.4 |
2.4 |
0.4 |
2.5 |
Mar |
0.4 |
2.0 |
0.1 |
2.3 |
Feb |
0.2 |
1.9 |
0.2 |
2.5 |
AE ∆% Feb-Apr |
4.1 |
|
2.8 |
|
Jan |
-0.3 |
1.9 |
0.0 |
2.6 |
Dec 2018 |
-0.1 |
2.6 |
0.2 |
2.9 |
AE ∆% Dec-Jan |
-2.4 |
|
1.2 |
|
Nov |
-0.1 |
2.6 |
0.2 |
2.7 |
AE ∆% Nov |
-1.2 |
|
2.4 |
|
Oct |
0.7 |
3.1 |
0.5 |
2.7 |
Sep |
0.2 |
2.7 |
0.2 |
2.6 |
AE ∆% Sep-Oct |
5.5 |
|
4.3 |
|
Aug |
0.0 |
3.0 |
0.0 |
2.6 |
Jul |
0.2 |
3.4 |
0.2 |
2.8 |
AE ∆% Jul-Aug |
1.2 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jun |
0.3 |
3.3 |
0.3 |
2.7 |
May |
0.4 |
3.1 |
0.3 |
2.4 |
Apr |
0.1 |
2.7 |
0.2 |
2.4 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun |
3.2 |
|
3.2 |
|
Mar |
0.3 |
2.9 |
0.3 |
2.7 |
Feb |
0.3 |
2.8 |
0.3 |
2.5 |
Jan |
0.4 |
2.6 |
0.4 |
2.2 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar |
4.1 |
|
4.1 |
|
Dec 2017 |
0.0 |
2.5 |
0.0 |
2.2 |
AE ∆% Dec |
0.0 |
|
0.0 |
|
Nov |
0.4 |
3.0 |
0.2 |
2.3 |
Oct |
0.4 |
2.8 |
0.4 |
2.4 |
Sep |
0.4 |
2.6 |
0.2 |
2.2 |
Aug |
0.4 |
2.4 |
0.2 |
2.2 |
AE ∆% Aug-Nov |
4.9 |
|
4.1 |
|
Jul |
0.1 |
2.0 |
0.2 |
1.9 |
AE ∆% Jul |
1.2 |
|
2.4 |
|
Jun |
0.0 |
1.9 |
0.0 |
1.8 |
May |
0.1 |
2.3 |
0.3 |
2.0 |
AE ∆% May-Jun |
0.4 |
|
1.8 |
|
Apr |
0.4 |
2.5 |
0.4 |
1.9 |
AE ∆% Apr |
4.9 |
|
4.9 |
|
Mar |
0.2 |
2.2 |
0.2 |
1.5 |
AE ∆% Mar |
2.4 |
|
2.4 |
|
Feb |
0.0 |
2.0 |
-0.1 |
1.3 |
AE ∆% Feb |
0.0 |
|
-1.2 |
|
Jan |
0.4 |
1.7 |
0.3 |
1.4 |
AE ∆% Jan |
4.9 |
|
3.7 |
|
Dec 2016 |
0.3 |
1.7 |
0.2 |
1.7 |
Nov |
0.2 |
1.3 |
0.3 |
1.7 |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec |
3.0 |
|
3.0 |
|
Oct |
0.2 |
1.1 |
0.1 |
1.5 |
AE ∆% Oct |
2.4 |
|
1.2 |
|
Sep |
0.4 |
0.6 |
0.2 |
1.2 |
AE ∆% Sep |
4.9 |
|
2.4 |
|
Aug |
-0.2 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
1.0 |
AE ∆% Aug |
-2.4 |
|
0.0 |
|
July |
-0.1 |
0.0 |
-0.1 |
0.9 |
AE ∆% Jul |
-1.2 |
|
-1.2 |
|
Jun |
0.5 |
0.2 |
0.3 |
1.2 |
May |
0.3 |
0.0 |
0.1 |
1.2 |
Apr |
0.1 |
0.2 |
0.2 |
1.1 |
AE ∆% Apr-Jun |
3.7 |
|
2.4 |
|
Mar |
0.0 |
-0.1 |
-0.1 |
1.1 |
Feb |
-0.3 |
0.1 |
0.0 |
1.3 |
AE ∆% Mar-Feb |
-1.8 |
|
-0.6 |
|
Jan |
0.4 |
0.0 |
0.5 |
0.8 |
AE ∆% Jan |
4.9 |
|
6.2 |
|
Dec 2015 |
-0.1 |
-1.1 |
0.2 |
0.2 |
AE ∆% Dec |
-1.2 |
|
2.4 |
|
Nov |
0.1 |
-1.3 |
0.1 |
0.3 |
AE ∆% Nov |
1.2 |
|
1.2 |
|
Oct |
-0.3 |
-1.4 |
-0.2 |
0.2 |
Sep |
-0.4 |
-1.1 |
-0.1 |
0.7 |
AE ∆% Sep-Oct |
-4.1 |
|
-1.8 |
|
Aug |
-0.2 |
-1.0 |
0.0 |
0.6 |
AE ∆% Aug |
-2.4 |
|
0.0 |
|
Jul |
0.2 |
-0.7 |
0.2 |
0.8 |
Jun |
0.3 |
-0.5 |
0.3 |
1.1 |
May |
0.4 |
-0.8 |
0.1 |
0.7 |
AE ∆% May-Jul |
3.7 |
|
2.4 |
|
Apr |
-0.2 |
-1.1 |
0.0 |
1.0 |
AE ∆% Apr |
-2.4 |
|
0.0 |
|
Mar |
0.2 |
-0.9 |
0.1 |
0.8 |
AE ∆% Mar |
2.4 |
|
1.2 |
|
Feb |
-0.5 |
-0.5 |
-0.4 |
1.0 |
Jan |
-0.6 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
1.7 |
AE ∆% Jan-Feb |
-6.4 |
|
-2.4 |
|
Dec 2014 |
-0.3 |
0.9 |
0.2 |
2.0 |
Nov |
-0.2 |
1.3 |
0.0 |
1.7 |
AE ∆% Nov-Dec |
-3.0 |
|
1.2 |
|
Oct |
0.2 |
1.5 |
0.4 |
1.9 |
AE ∆% Oct |
2.4 |
|
4.9 |
|
Sep |
-0.2 |
1.6 |
-0.1 |
1.6 |
Aug |
0.0 |
1.9 |
0.0 |
1.9 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep |
-1.2 |
|
-0.6 |
|
Jul |
0.4 |
1.9 |
0.5 |
1.9 |
Jun |
-0.1 |
1.8 |
0.0 |
1.6 |
May |
0.2 |
2.1 |
0.3 |
2.1 |
Apr |
0.1 |
1.8 |
0.0 |
1.5 |
Mar |
0.4 |
1.6 |
0.3 |
1.6 |
AE ∆% Mar-Jul |
2.4 |
|
2.7 |
|
Feb |
0.2 |
1.2 |
0.2 |
1.6 |
Jan |
0.3 |
1.3 |
0.2 |
1.4 |
Dec 2013 |
0.1 |
1.2 |
0.0 |
1.2 |
AE ∆% Dec-Feb |
2.4 |
|
1.6 |
|
Nov |
0.2 |
1.1 |
0.2 |
1.4 |
Oct |
0.2 |
1.3 |
0.2 |
1.7 |
Sep |
0.0 |
1.1 |
0.1 |
1.6 |
AE ∆% Sep-Nov |
1.6 |
|
2.0 |
|
Aug |
0.1 |
1.7 |
0.0 |
1.8 |
Jul |
0.2 |
2.0 |
0.3 |
1.7 |
Jun |
0.4 |
1.7 |
0.4 |
1.3 |
May |
-0.1 |
0.9 |
-0.3 |
0.9 |
AE ∆%
May-Aug |
1.8 |
|
1.6 |
|
Apr |
-0.2 |
0.9 |
0.2 |
1.3 |
Mar |
0.0 |
1.3 |
0.2 |
1.5 |
AE ∆%
Mar-Apr |
-1.2 |
|
2.4 |
|
Feb |
0.2 |
1.6 |
0.0 |
1.4 |
Jan |
0.3 |
1.6 |
0.1 |
1.7 |
AE ∆%
Jan-Feb |
3.0 |
|
0.6 |
|
Dec 2012 |
0.0 |
1.9 |
0.1 |
2.0 |
Nov |
0.1 |
1.7 |
0.5 |
1.8 |
Oct |
0.1 |
1.9 |
0.1 |
1.6 |
AE ∆%
Oct-Dec |
0.8 |
|
2.8 |
|
Sep |
0.7 |
1.5 |
0.3 |
1.4 |
Aug |
0.3 |
1.2 |
-0.1 |
1.2 |
AE ∆% Aug-Sep |
6.2 |
|
1.2 |
|
Jul |
-0.1 |
1.0 |
-0.1 |
1.7 |
Jun |
-0.3 |
1.3 |
-0.1 |
1.9 |
AE ∆% Jun-Jul |
-2.4 |
|
-1.2 |
|
May |
-0.1 |
1.6 |
0.2 |
2.2 |
Apr |
0.3 |
2.0 |
0.3 |
2.1 |
AE ∆% Apr-May |
1.2 |
|
3.0 |
|
Mar |
0.2 |
2.4 |
0.2 |
2.3 |
Feb |
0.3 |
2.8 |
0.3 |
2.6 |
Jan |
0.4 |
3.1 |
0.4 |
2.5 |
AE ∆% Jan-Mar |
3.7 |
|
3.7 |
|
Dec 2011 |
-0.1 |
3.2 |
0.0 |
2.6 |
Nov |
0.3 |
3.7 |
0.2 |
2.7 |
Oct |
-0.4 |
3.7 |
-0.3 |
2.7 |
AE ∆% Oct-Dec |
-0.8 |
|
-0.4 |
|
Sep |
0.4 |
4.5 |
0.2 |
2.9 |
Aug |
0.2 |
4.4 |
0.4 |
3.0 |
Jul |
0.2 |
4.5 |
0.2 |
2.7 |
AE ∆% Jul-Sep |
3.2 |
|
3.2 |
|
Jun |
0.1 |
4.3 |
0.2 |
2.6 |
May |
0.3 |
4.2 |
0.2 |
2.3 |
AE ∆%
May-Jun |
2.4 |
|
2.4 |
|
Apr |
0.5 |
4.2 |
0.3 |
2.5 |
Mar |
0.7 |
4.0 |
0.5 |
NA |
Feb |
0.6 |
3.3 |
0.3 |
NA |
Jan |
0.6 |
2.4 |
0.4 |
NA |
AE ∆%
Jan-Apr |
7.4 |
|
4.6 |
|
Dec 2010 |
0.3 |
2.8 |
0.1 |
NA |
Nov |
0.3 |
2.6 |
0.1 |
NA |
Oct |
0.4 |
NA |
0.1 |
NA |
Sep |
0.3 |
NA |
0.2 |
NA |
Aug |
0.2 |
NA |
0.0 |
NA |
Jul |
0.2 |
NA |
0.2 |
NA |
Jun |
-0.2 |
NA |
-0.1 |
NA |
May |
0.2 |
NA |
0.3 |
NA |
Apr |
0.3 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Mar |
0.1 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Feb |
-0.2 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Jan |
0.9 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
Dec 2009 |
0.1 |
|
|
|
Note: Core:
excluding food and energy; AE: annual equivalent
Source: US
Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/ppi/data.htm
Chart I-24B provides the FD PPI
NSA from 2009 to 2020. There is persistent inflation with periodic declines in
inflation waves similar to those worldwide.
Chart I-24B, US, Final Demand Producer Price Index, NSA,
2009-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Twelve-month percentage changes of the FD PPI from 2010 to
2020 are in Chart I-25B. There are fluctuations in the rates with evident trend
of decline to more subdued inflation. Reallocations of investment portfolios of
risk financial assets from commodities to stocks explain much lower FD PPI
inflation.
Chart I-25B, US, Final Demand Producer Price Index, 12-Month
Percentage Change NSA, 2010-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The core FD PPI NSA is in Chart I-26B. The behavior is
similar to the headline index but with less fluctuation.
Chart I-26B, US, Final Demand Producer Price Index Excluding
Food and Energy, NSA, 2009-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Percentage changes in 12 months of the core
FD PPI are in Chart I-27B. There are fluctuations in 12-month percentage
changes but with evident declining trend to more moderate inflation.
Chart I-27B, US, Final Demand Producer Price Index Excluding
Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2010-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The energy FD PPI NSA is in
Chart I-28B. The index increased during the reposition of carry trades after
the discovery of lack of toxic assets in banks that caused flight away from
risk financial assets into government obligations of the US (Cochrane and
Zingales 2009). Alternating risk aversion and appetite with reallocations among
classes of risk financial assets explain the behavior of the index after late
2010.
Chart I-28B, US, Final Demand Energy Producer Price Index,
NSA, 2009-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Twelve-month percentage
changes of the FD energy PPI are in Chart I-29B. Rates moderated from late 2010
to the present. There are multiple negative rates. Investors create and reverse
carry trades from zero interest rates to derivatives of commodities in
accordance with relative risk evaluations of classes of risk financial assets.
Chart I-29B, US, Final Demand Energy Producer Price Index, 12-Month
Percentage Change, NSA, 2010-2020
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-7 provides 12-month percentage changes of the CPI all
items, CPI core and CPI housing from 2001 to 2019. There is no evidence in
these data supporting symmetric inflation targets that would only induce
greater instability in inflation, interest rates and financial markets.
Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions
into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended
pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and
imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output
constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval (1.99, 2.0).
Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in a favor of a self-imposed
single jobs mandate of easing
monetary policy even with the economy growing
at or close to potential output.
Table I-7, CPI
All Items, CPI Core and CPI Housing, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA 2001-2020
Jul |
CPI All Items |
CPI Core ex
Food and Energy |
CPI Housing |
2020 |
1.3 |
1.7 |
2.1 |
2019 |
1.7 |
2.4 |
2.8 |
2018 |
2.7 |
2.2 |
2.9 |
2017 |
1.9 |
1.7 |
2.9 |
2016 |
1.1 |
2.3 |
2.6 |
2015 |
0.2 |
1.8 |
2.0 |
2014 |
1.7 |
1.7 |
2.6 |
2013 |
1.5 |
1.8 |
2.2 |
2012 |
1.7 |
1.9 |
1.4 |
2011 |
3.8 |
2.0 |
1.6 |
2010 |
1.1 |
0.9 |
-0.4 |
2009 |
-1.5 |
1.4 |
-0.6 |
2008 |
5.4 |
2.5 |
3.8 |
2007 |
2.0 |
2.1 |
2.9 |
2006 |
3.8 |
2.8 |
4.2 |
2005 |
3.6 |
2.1 |
3.0 |
2004 |
2.7 |
1.7 |
2.7 |
2003 |
2.2 |
1.3 |
2.4 |
2002 |
1.8 |
2.4 |
2.1 |
2001 |
2.7 |
2.7 |
4.2 |
Source: US
Bureau of Labor Statistics https://www.bls.gov/cpi/
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020.
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