CANNOT UPLOAD CHARTS AND IMAGES: ERROR 400
Inverted Yield Curve of Treasury Securities with Yields of Maturities from One Month to One Year Below Ten-Year Yields, Unchanged FOMC Fed Funds Rate With Continuing Patience on Rate Increases, Decline of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Inflation Waves, United States Industrial Production, Global Manufacturing Output Recession in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates, Recovery Without Hiring, Labor Underutilization, Ten Million Fewer Full-Time Jobs, Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk
CANNOT UPLOAD CHARTS AND IMAGES: ERROR 400
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019
I World Inflation Waves
IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy
IB1 Theory
IB2 Policy
IB3 Evidence
IB4 Unwinding Strategy
IC United States Inflation
IC Long-term US Inflation
ID Current US Inflation
IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation
II United States Industrial Production
IIB Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates
I Recovery without Hiring
IA1 Hiring Collapse
IA2 Labor Underutilization
ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs
IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment
III World Financial Turbulence
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
I Recovery without Hiring. Professor Edward P. Lazear (2012Jan19) at Stanford University finds that recovery of hiring in the US to peaks attained in 2007 requires an increase of hiring by 30 percent while hiring levels increased by only 4 percent from Jan 2009 to Jan 2012. The high level of unemployment with low level of hiring reduces the statistical probability that the unemployed will find a job. According to Lazear (2012Jan19), the probability of finding a new job in early 2012 is about one third of the probability of finding a job in 2007. Improvements in labor markets have not increased the probability of finding a new job. Lazear (2012Jan19) quotes an essay coauthored with James R. Spletzer in the American Economic Review (Lazear and Spletzer 2012Mar, 2012May) on the concept of churn. A dynamic labor market occurs when a similar number of workers is hired as those who are separated. This replacement of separated workers is called churn, which explains about two-thirds of total hiring. Typically, wage increases received in a new job are higher by 8 percent. Lazear (2012Jan19) argues that churn has declined 35 percent from the level before the recession in IVQ2007. Because of the collapse of churn, there are no opportunities in escaping falling real wages by moving to another job. As this blog argues, there are meager chances of escaping unemployment because of the collapse of hiring and those employed cannot escape falling real wages by moving to another job (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html). Lazear and Spletzer (2012Mar, 1) argue that reductions of churn reduce the operational effectiveness of labor markets. Churn is part of the allocation of resources or in this case labor to occupations of higher marginal returns. The decline in churn can harm static and dynamic economic efficiency. Losses from decline of churn during recessions can affect an economy over the long-term by preventing optimal growth trajectories because resources are not used in the occupations where they provide highest marginal returns. Lazear and Spletzer (2012Mar 7-8) conclude that: “under a number of assumptions, we estimate that the loss in output during the recession [of 2007 to 2009] and its aftermath resulting from reduced churn equaled $208 billion. On an annual basis, this amounts to about .4% of GDP for a period of 3½ years.”
There are two additional facts discussed below: (1) there are about ten million fewer full-time jobs currently than before the recession of 2008 and 2009; and (2) the extremely high and rigid rate of youth unemployment is denying an early start to young people ages 16 to 24 years while unemployment of ages 45 years or over has swelled. There are four subsections. IA1 Hiring Collapse provides the data and analysis on the weakness of hiring in the United States economy. IA2 Labor Underutilization provides the measures of labor underutilization of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Statistics on the decline of full-time employment are in IA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment provides the data on high unemployment of ages 16 to 24 years and of ages 45 years or over.
IA1 Hiring Collapse. An important characteristic of the current fractured labor market of the US is the closing of the avenue for exiting unemployment and underemployment normally available through dynamic hiring. Another avenue that is closed is the opportunity for advancement in moving to new jobs that pay better salaries and benefits again because of the collapse of hiring in the United States. Those who are unemployed or underemployed cannot find a new job even accepting lower wages and no benefits. The employed cannot escape declining inflation-adjusted earnings because there is no hiring. The objective of this section is to analyze hiring and labor underutilization in the United States.
Blanchard and Katz (1997, 53 consider an appropriate measure of job stress:
“The right measure of the state of the labor market is the exit rate from unemployment, defined as the number of hires divided by the number unemployed, rather than the unemployment rate itself. What matters to the unemployed is not how many of them there are, but how many of them there are in relation to the number of hires by firms.”
The natural rate of unemployment and the similar NAIRU are quite difficult to estimate in practice (Ibid; see Ball and Mankiw 2002).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) created the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) with the purpose that (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/jltover.htm#purpose):
“These data serve as demand-side indicators of labor shortages at the national level. Prior to JOLTS, there was no economic indicator of the unmet demand for labor with which to assess the presence or extent of labor shortages in the United States. The availability of unfilled jobs—the jobs opening rate—is an important measure of tightness of job markets, parallel to existing measures of unemployment.”
The BLS collects data from about 16,000 US business establishments in nonagricultural industries through the 50 states and DC. The data are released monthly and constitute an important complement to other data provided by the BLS (see also Lazear and Spletzer 2012Mar, 6-7).
There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:
- Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP two trillion dollars below trend (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.2 percent per year from 1929 to 2018, with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.6 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2018. GDP in IVQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent
- Private fixed investment stagnating initially followed by cumulative increase of 27.9 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html).
- Twenty-one million or 12.2 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with stagnating or declining real wages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/the-fed-will-be-patient-adjusting.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
- Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/fomc-policy-rate-unchanged-competitive.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)
- Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/dollar-revaluation-with-increases-in.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/slowing-world-economic-growth-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-rising.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/impact-of-monetary-policy-on-exchange.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
- Productivity growth fell from 2.1 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2018 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2018, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/recovery-without-hiring-in-lost.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/ii-rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)
- Output of manufacturing in Jan 2019 at 31.9 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 23.2 percent below trend since 1986 (Section II and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)
- Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/global-contraction-of-valuations-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Worldwide waves of inflation (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/world-inflation-waves-world-financial_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weakening-gdp-growth-in-major-economies.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
- Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/revaluation-of-yuanus-dollar-exchange.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/delays-in-updating-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/increase-of-interest-rates-by-monetary.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/weaker-world-economic-growth-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/10/oscillation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/world-inflation-waves-lost-economic.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier) (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
- Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/fluctuation-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/11/fluctuations-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/08/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
- 43 million in poverty and 29 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1999 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 32.6 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2018 when it would have grown over 40.3 percent at trend of 3.2 percent per year in real terms from IVQ1945 to IIIQ2018 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/01/recovery-without-hiring-labor.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/09/fomc-increases-policy-interest-rate.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/destruction-of-household-nonfinancial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html). Financial assets increased $34.9 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $7.1 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation increased 4.0 percent.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised on Mar 17, 2016 “With the release of January 2016 data on March 17, job openings, hires, and separations data have been revised from December 2000 forward to incorporate annual updates to the Current Employment Statistics employment estimates and the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) seasonal adjustment factors. In addition, all data series are now available on a seasonally adjusted basis. Tables showing the revisions from 2000 through 2015 can be found using this link: http://www.bls.gov/jlt/revisiontables.htm.” (https://www.bls.gov/jlt/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised on Mar 16, 2017: “With the release of January 2017 data on March 16, job openings, hires, and separations data have been revised to incorporate annual updates to the Current Employment Statistics employment estimates and the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) seasonal adjustment factors” (https://www.bls.gov/jlt/revisiontables.htm) (https://www.bls.gov/jlt/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised on Mar 16, 2018 “With the release of January 2018 data on March 16, job openings, hires, and separations data have been revised to incorporate annual updates to the Current Employment Statistics employment estimates and the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) seasonal adjustment factors. Tables showing the revisions from 2013 through 2017 can be found using this link: https://www.bls.gov/jlt/revisiontables.htm (https://www.bls.gov/jlt/).“ The Bureau of Labor Statistics incorporated corrections on Sep 11, 2018: “This news release contains corrections to previously released data in tables A, 1-3, 5, 7-9, and 11. More information on these corrections as well as a complete list of corrections in this news release and in the JOLTS database can be found at www.bls.gov/bls/errata/jolts-errata-06122018.htm.” (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/jolts.pdf). The Bureau of Labor Statistics introduced revisions on Mar 15, 2019: (Revisions and Methodology Change
“With the release of January 2019 data on March 15, job openings, hires, and separations data have been revised to incorporate annual updates to the Current Employment Statistics employment estimates and the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) seasonal adjustment factors. Tables showing the revisions from 2000 through 2018 can be found using this link: https://www.bls.gov/jlt/revisiontables.htm.
JOLTS Data by Firm Size
The firm size data have been updated to add calendar year 2017. There were no changes to the methodology. All estimates from December 2000 through December 2016 were subject to revision in the new release. The experimental firm size class estimates and information regarding the methodology are available on the JOLTS firm size class page)”.
Hiring in the nonfarm sector (HNF) has increased from 64.873 million in 2006 to 68.949 million in 2018 or by 4.076 million while hiring in the private sector (HP) has increased from 60.540 million in 2006 to 64.569 million in 2018 or by 4.029 million, as shown in Table I-1. The ratio of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) has fallen from 47.5 in 2005 to 46.3 in 2018 and in the private sector (RHP) from 53.2 in 2005 to 51.0 in 2018. Hiring has not recovered as in previous cyclical expansions because of the low rate of economic growth in the current cyclical expansion. The civilian noninstitutional population or those in condition to work increased from 228.815 million in 2006 to 257.791 million in 2018 or by 28.976 million. Hiring has not recovered prerecession levels while needs of hiring multiplied because of growth of population by more than 28 million. Private hiring of 60.450 million in 2006 was equivalent to 26.4 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, increasing to 64.569 million in 2018 or 25.0 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 257.791 million in 2018. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 26.4 percent in 2006 would correspond to 68.057 million of hiring in 2018 (0.26.4x257.791), which would be 3.488 million higher than actual 64.569 million in 2018. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 38 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the initial estimate of GDP for IVQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-02/gdp4q18_ini_0.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 would have accumulated to 38.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2018 would be $21,814.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3030.0 billion than actual $18,784.6 billion. There are more than two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.2 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html). US GDP in IVQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,784.6 billion in IVQ2018 or 19.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Feb 1919 to Feb 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 152.3255 in Feb 2019. The actual index NSA in Feb 2019 is 103.7365, which is 31.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Feb 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.1303 in Feb 2019. The output of manufacturing at 103.7365 in Feb 2019 is 23.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-1, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in Thousands and Percentage of Total Employment
| HNF | Rate RNF | HP | Rate HP | |
| 2001 | 62,569 | 47.4 | 58,463 | 52.7 |
| 2002 | 58,199 | 44.5 | 54,254 | 49.7 |
| 2003 | 56,852 | 43.6 | 53,295 | 49.0 |
| 2004 | 60,525 | 45.9 | 56,673 | 51.4 |
| 2005 | 63,697 | 47.5 | 59,760 | 53.2 |
| 2006 | 64,873 | 47.5 | 60,540 | 52.9 |
| 2007 | 63,864 | 46.3 | 59,431 | 51.3 |
| 2008 | 56,407 | 41.1 | 52,808 | 46.0 |
| 2009 | 46,750 | 35.6 | 43,391 | 39.9 |
| 2010 | 49,655 | 38.1 | 45,749 | 42.4 |
| 2011 | 51,655 | 39.2 | 48,550 | 44.2 |
| 2012 | 53,343 | 39.8 | 49,818 | 44.4 |
| 2013 | 54,947 | 40.3 | 51,519 | 45.0 |
| 2014 | 58,955 | 42.4 | 55,369 | 47.3 |
| 2015 | 62,616 | 44.1 | 58,548 | 48.9 |
| 2016 | 63,724 | 44.1 | 59,915 | 48.7 |
| 2017 | 65,669 | 44.8 | 61,526 | 49.5 |
| 2018 | 68,949 | 46.3 | 64,569 | 51.0 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-1 shows the annual level of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) that collapsed during the global recession after 2007 in contrast with milder decline in the shallow recession of 2001. Nonfarm hiring has not recovered, remaining at a depressed level. The civilian noninstitutional population or those in condition to work increased from 228.815 million in 2006 to 257.791 million in 2018 or by 28.976 million. Hiring has not recovered precession levels while needs of hiring multiplied because of growth of population by more than 28 million.
Chart I-1, US, Level Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2018
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-2 shows the ratio or rate of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) that also fell much more in the recession of 2007 to 2009 than in the shallow recession of 2001. Recovery is weak in the current environment of cyclical slow growth.
Chart I-2, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2018
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Yearly percentage changes of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) are provided in Table I-2. There were much milder declines in 2002 of 7.0 percent and 2.3 percent in 2003 followed by strong rebounds of 6.5 percent in 2004 and 5.2 percent in 2005. In contrast, the contractions of nonfarm hiring in the recession after 2007 were much sharper in percentage points: 1.6 in 2007, 11.7 in 2008 and 17.1 percent in 2009. On a yearly basis, nonfarm hiring grew 6.2 percent in 2010 relative to 2009, 4.0 percent in 2011, 3.3 percent in 2012 and 3.0 percent in 2013. Nonfarm hiring grew 7.3 percent in 2014 and increased 6.2 percent in 2015. Nonfarm hiring grew 1.8 percent in 2016, increasing 3.1 percent in 2017. Nonfarm hiring increased 5.0 percent in 2018. The relatively large length of 38 quarters of the current expansion reduces the likelihood of significant recovery of hiring levels in the United States because lower rates of growth and hiring in the final phase of expansions.
Table I-2, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual Percentage Change, 2002-2017
| Year | Annual ∆% |
| 2002 | -7.0 |
| 2003 | -2.3 |
| 2004 | 6.5 |
| 2005 | 5.2 |
| 2006 | 1.8 |
| 2007 | -1.6 |
| 2008 | -11.7 |
| 2009 | -17.1 |
| 2010 | 6.2 |
| 2011 | 4.0 |
| 2012 | 3.3 |
| 2013 | 3.0 |
| 2014 | 7.3 |
| 2015 | 6.2 |
| 2016 | 1.8 |
| 2017 | 3.1 |
| 2018 | 5.0 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-5, US, Total Private Hiring, Annual, 2001-2018
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-5A shows the ratio or rate of total private hiring to employment (RHP) that also fell much more in the recession of 2007 to 2009 than in the shallow recession of 2001. Recovery is weak in the current environment of cyclical slow growth.
Chart I-5A, US, Rate Total Private Hiring, Annual, 2001-2018
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total nonfarm hiring (HNF), total private hiring (HP) and their respective rates are in Table I-3 for the month of Jan in the years from 2001 to 2019. Hiring numbers are in thousands. There is recovery in HNF from 3940 thousand in Jan 2009 to 3735 thousand in Jan 2010, 3820 thousand in Jan 2011, 4250 thousand in Jan 2012, 4279 thousand in Jan 2013, 4418 thousand in Jan 2014, 4823 thousand in Jan 2015, 4966 thousand in Jan 2016, 5275 thousand in Jan 2017, 5250 thousand in Jan 2018 and 5514 in Jan 2019 for cumulative gain of 39.9 percent at the average yearly rate of 3.4 percent. HP rose from 3670 thousand in Jan 2009 to 3471 thousand in Jan 2010, 3561 thousand in Jan 2011, 3990 thousand in Jan 2012, 4021 thousand in Jan 2013, 4156 thousand in Jan 2014, 4539 thousand in Jan 2015, 4645 thousand in Jan 2016, 4963 thousand in Jan 2017, 4959 thousand in Jan 2018 and 5180 in Jan 2019 for cumulative gain of 41.1 percent at the average yearly rate of 3.5 percent. HNF has increased from 5142 thousand in Jan 2006 to 5514 thousand in Jan 2019 or by 7.2 percent. HP has increased from 4852 thousand in Jan 2006 to 5180 thousand in Jan 2019 or by 6.8 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working, rose from 227.553 million in Jan 2006 to 258.239 million in Jan 2019, by 30.686 million or 13.5 percent. There is often ignored ugly fact that hiring increased by around 6.8 percent while population available for working increased around 13.5 percent. Private hiring of 60.450 million in 2006 was equivalent to 26.4 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, increasing to 64.569 million in 2018 or 25.0 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 257.791 million in 2018. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 26.4 percent in 2006 would correspond to 68.057 million of hiring in 2018 (0.26.4x257.791), which would be 3.488 million higher than actual 64.569 million in 2018. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. Cyclical slow growth over the entire business cycle from IVQ2007 to the present in comparison with earlier cycles and long-term trend (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html) explains the fact that there are many million fewer hires in the US than before the global recession. The labor market continues to be fractured, failing to provide an opportunity to exit from unemployment/underemployment or to find an opportunity for advancement away from declining inflation-adjusted earnings.
Table I-3, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in
Thousands and in Percentage of Total Employment Not Seasonally Adjusted
| HNF | Rate RNF | HP | Rate HP | |
| 2001 Jan | 5707 | 4.4 | 5400 | 4.9 |
| 2002 Jan | 4878 | 3.8 | 4584 | 4.3 |
| 2003 Jan | 5041 | 3.9 | 4724 | 4.4 |
| 2004 Jan | 4853 | 3.8 | 4586 | 4.3 |
| 2005 Jan | 5115 | 3.9 | 4790 | 4.4 |
| 2006 Jan | 5142 | 3.9 | 4852 | 4.3 |
| 2007 Jan | 5257 | 3.9 | 4927 | 4.3 |
| 2008 Jan | 4906 | 3.6 | 4622 | 4.1 |
| 2009 Jan | 3940 | 3.0 | 3670 | 3.3 |
| 2010 Jan | 3735 | 2.9 | 3471 | 3.3 |
| 2011 Jan | 3820 | 3.0 | 3561 | 3.3 |
| 2012 Jan | 4250 | 3.2 | 3990 | 3.6 |
| 2013 Jan | 4279 | 3.2 | 4021 | 3.6 |
| 2014 Jan | 4418 | 3.3 | 4156 | 3.7 |
| 2015 Jan | 4823 | 3.5 | 4539 | 3.9 |
| 2016 Jan | 4966 | 3.5 | 4645 | 3.9 |
| 2017 Jan | 5275 | 3.7 | 4963 | 4.1 |
| 2018 Jan | 5250 | 3.6 | 4959 | 4.0 |
| 2019 Jan | 5514 | 3.7 | 5180 | 4.1 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-6 provides total nonfarm hiring monthly from 2001 to 2019. Nonfarm hiring rebounded in early 2010 but then fell and stabilized at a lower level than the early peak not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) of 4883 in May 2010 until it surpassed it with 5051 in Jun 2011 but declined to 3206 in Dec 2012. Nonfarm hiring fell to 3128 in Dec 2011 from 3956 in Nov 2011 and to revised 3744 in Feb 2012, increasing to 4288 in Mar 2012, 3206 in Dec 2012 and 4279 in Jan 2013 and declining to 3737 in Feb 2013. Nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted increased to 4274 in Nov 2013 and 3335 in Dec 2013. Nonfarm hires reached 3822 in Dec 2014, 4149 in Dec 2015 and 3985 in Dec 2016. Nonfarm hires reached 4055 in Dec 2017 and 4210 in Dec 2018. Chart I-6 provides seasonally adjusted (SA) monthly data. The number of seasonally-adjusted hires in Oct 2011 was 4365 thousand, increasing to revised 4560 thousand in Feb 2012, or 4.5 percent, moving to 4452 in Dec 2012 for cumulative increase of 2.2 percent from 4356 in Dec 2011 and 4614 in Dec 2013 for increase of 3.6 percent relative to 4452 in Dec 2012. The number of hires not seasonally adjusted was 5051 in Jun 2011, falling to 3128 in Dec 2011 but increasing to 4250 in Jan 2012 and declining to 3206 in Dec 2012. The number of nonfarm hiring not seasonally adjusted fell by 38.1 percent from 5051 in Jun 2011 to 3128 in Dec 2011 and fell 37.4 percent from 5120 in Jun 2012 to 3206 in Dec 2012 in a yearly-repeated seasonal pattern. The number of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5129 in Jun 2013 to 3335 in Dec 2013, or decline of 35.0 percent, showing strong seasonality. The number of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5612 in Jun 2014 to 3822 in Dec 2014 or 31.9 percent. The level of nonfarm hires fell from 5857 in Jun 2015 to 4149 in Dec 2015 or 29.2 percent. The level of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 6055 in Jun 2016 to 3985 in Dec 2016 or 34.2 percent. The level of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 6469 in Jun 2017 to 4055 in Dec 2017 or 37.3 percent. The level of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 6669 in Jun 2018 to 4210 in Dec 2018 or 36.9 percent.
Chart I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), 2001-2019 Month SA
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Similar behavior occurs in the rate of nonfarm hiring in Chart I-7. Recovery in early 2010 was followed by decline and stabilization at a lower level but with stability in monthly SA estimates of 3.3 in Aug 2011 to 3.3 in Jan 2012, increasing to 3.4 in May 2012 and stabilizing to 3.3 in Jun 2012. The rate stabilized at 3.2 in Jul 2012, increasing to 3.3 in Aug 2012 but moving to 3.3 in Dec 2012 and 3.4 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.8 in Jun 2011 to 2.3 in Dec 2011, climbing to 3.8 in Jun 2012 but falling to 2.4 in Dec 2012. The rate of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Jun 2013 to 2.4 in Dec 2013. The NSA rate of nonfarm hiring fell from 4.0 in Jun 2014 to 2.7 in Dec 2014. The NSA rate fell from 4.1 in Jun 2015 to 2.9 in Dec 2015. The NSA rate fell from 4.2 in Jun 2016 to 2.7 in Dec 2016. The NSA rate fell from 4.2 in Jun 2016 to 2.7 in Dec 2016. The NSA rate fell from 4.4 in Jun 2017 to 2.7 in Dec 2017. The NSA rate fell from 4.4 in Jun 2018 to 2.8 in Dec 2018. Rates of nonfarm hiring NSA were in the range of 2.8 (Dec) to 4.5 (Jun) in 2006. The rate of nonfarm hiring SA stood at 3.9 in Jan 2019 and at 3.7 NSA.
Chart I-7, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring, Month SA 2001-2019
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
There is only milder improvement in total private hiring shown in Chart I-8. Hiring private (HP) rose in 2010 with stability and renewed increase in 2011 followed by almost stationary series in 2012. The number of private hiring seasonally adjusted fell from 4159 thousand in Sep 2011 to 4062 in Dec 2011 or by 2.3 percent, increasing to 4172 in Jan 2012 or increase by 0.3 percent relative to the level in Sep 2011. Private hiring fell to 4022 in Sep 2012 or lower by 3.3 percent relative to Sep 2011, moving to 4162 in Dec 2012 for decrease of 0.2 percent relative to 4172 in Jan 2012. The number of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 4670 in Jun 2011 to 2949 in Dec 2011 or by 36.9 percent, reaching 3990 in Jan 2012 or decline of 14.6 percent relative to Jun 2011 and moving to 3030 in Dec 2012 or 35.6 percent lower relative to 4708 in Jun 2012. Hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 4791 in Jun 2013 to 3168 in Dec 2013, or 33.9 percent. The level of private hiring NSA fell from 5199 in Jun 2014 to 3620 in Dec 2014 or 30.4 percent. The level of private hiring fell from 5437 in Jun 2015 to 3923 in Dec 2015 or 27.8 percent. The level of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 5611 in Jun 2016 to 3785 in Dec 2016 or 32.5 percent. The level of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 6030 in Jun 2017 to 3837 in Dec 2017 or 36.4 percent. The level of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 6210 in Jun 2018 to 3991 in Dec 2018 or 35.7 percent. Companies reduce hiring in the latter part of the year that explains the high seasonality in year-end employment data. For example, NSA private hiring fell from 5716 in Jun 2006 to 3652 in Dec 2006 or by 36.1 percent. Private hiring NSA data are useful in showing the huge declines from the period before the global recession. Hiring in the nonfarm sector (HNF) has increased from 64.873 million in 2006 to 68.949 million in 2018 or by 4.076 million while hiring in the private sector (HP) has increased from 60.540 million in 2006 to 64.569 million in 2018 or by 4.029 million, as shown in Table I-1. The ratio of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) has fallen from 47.5 in 2005 to 46.3 in 2018 and in the private sector (RHP) from 53.2 in 2005 to 51.0 in 2018. Hiring has not recovered as in previous cyclical expansions because of the low rate of economic growth in the current cyclical expansion. The civilian noninstitutional population or those in condition to work increased from 228.815 million in 2006 to 257.791 million in 2018 or by 28.976 million. Hiring has not recovered prerecession levels while needs of hiring multiplied because of growth of population by more than 28 million. Private hiring of 60.450 million in 2006 was equivalent to 26.4 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, increasing to 64.569 million in 2018 or 25.0 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 257.791 million in 2018. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 26.4 percent in 2006 would correspond to 68.057 million of hiring in 2018 (0.26.4x257.791), which would be 3.488 million higher than actual 64.569 million in 2018.
Chart I-8, US, Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2019
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-9 shows similar behavior in the rate of private hiring. The rate in 2011 in monthly SA data did not rise significantly above the peak in 2010. The rate seasonally adjusted decreased from 3.8 in Sep 2011 to 3.7 in Dec 2011 and reached 3.7 in Dec 2012 and 3.7 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted (NSA) fell from 3.9 in Sep 2011 to 2.6 in Dec 2011, increasing to 3.9 in Oct 2012 but falling to 2.7 in Dec 2012 and 3.5 in Mar 2013. The NSA rate of private hiring fell from 4.9 in Jul 2006 to 3.5 in Aug 2009 but recovery was insufficient to only 3.9 in Aug 2012, 2.7 in Dec 2012 and 2.7 in Dec 2013. The NSA rate increased to 3.2 in Dec 2015 and 3.1 in Dec
2016. The rate NSA reached 3.1 in Dec 2017. The rate NSA stood at 3.1 in Dec 2018.
Chart I-9, US, Rate Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2019
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The JOLTS report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides total nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB), TNF JOB rate and TNF LD (layoffs and discharges) shown in Table I-4 for the month of Jan from 2001 to 2019. The final column provides annual TNF LD for the years from 2001 to 2018. Nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB) increased from 4827 in Jan 2007 to 7484 in Jan 2019 or by 55.0 percent while the rate increased from 3.4 to 4.8. This was mediocre performance because the civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working rose from 230.650 million in Jan 2007 to 258.239 million in Jan 2019, by 27.589 million or 12.0 percent. Nonfarm layoffs and discharges (TNF LD) increased from 2278 in Jan 2006 to 3269 in Jan 2009 or 43.5 percent. The annual data show layoffs and discharges rising from 22.267 million in 2006 to 27.434 million in 2009 or by 23.2 percent. Business pruned payroll jobs to survive the global recession but there has not been hiring because of the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions.
Table I-4, US, Total Nonfarm Job Openings and Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands NSA
| TNF JOB | TNF JOB | TNF LD | TNF LD | |
| Jan 2001 | 5592 | 4.1 | 2965 | 24971 |
| Jan 2002 | 3983 | 3.0 | 2529 | 23621 |
| Jan 2003 | 3661 | 2.8 | 2744 | 24353 |
| Jan 2004 | 3598 | 2.7 | 2614 | 23701 |
| Jan 2005 | 3929 | 2.9 | 2585 | 23495 |
| Jan 2006 | 4488 | 3.3 | 2278 | 22267 |
| Jan 2007 | 4827 | 3.4 | 2433 | 23556 |
| Jan 2008 | 4682 | 3.3 | 2520 | 25443 |
| Jan 2009 | 2792 | 2.1 | 3269 | 27434 |
| Jan 2010 | 2877 | 2.2 | 2339 | 22562 |
| Jan 2011 | 3098 | 2.3 | 2296 | 22134 |
| Jan 2012 | 3864 | 2.9 | 2195 | 22023 |
| Jan 2013 | 3839 | 2.8 | 2101 | 20959 |
| Jan 2014 | 4026 | 2.9 | 2275 | 21147 |
| Jan 2015 | 5260 | 3.7 | 2242 | 21777 |
| Jan 2016 | 5867 | 4.0 | 2264 | 21243 |
| Jan 2017 | 5519 | 3.7 | 2183 | 21581 |
| Jan 2018 | 6484 | 4.3 | 2432 | 21888 |
| Jan 2019 | 7484 | 4.8 | 2173 |
Notes: TNF JOB: Total Nonfarm Job Openings; LD: Layoffs and Discharges
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-10 shows monthly job openings rising from the trough in 2009 to a high in the beginning of 2010. Job openings then stabilized into 2011 but have surpassed the peak of 3217 seasonally adjusted in Apr 2010 with 3840 seasonally adjusted in Dec 2012, which is higher by 19.4 percent relative to Apr 2010 but higher by 1.4 percent relative to 3787 in Nov 2012 and lower by 3.4 percent than 3976 in Mar 2012. Nonfarm job openings increased from 3840 in Dec 2012 to 3996 in Dec 2013 or by 4.1 percent and to 4981 in Dec 2014 or 24.6 percent relative to Dec 2013. The high of job openings not seasonally adjusted was 3460 in Apr 2010 that was surpassed by 3807 in Jul 2011, increasing to 4128 in Oct 2012 but declining to 3404 in Dec 2012 and increasing to 3520 in Dec 2013. The level of job opening NSA increased to 5147 in Dec 2015. The level of job opening NSA increased to 5285 in Dec 2016, reaching 5673 in Dec 2017, and 6921 in Dec 2018. The level of job openings not seasonally adjusted fell to 3404 in Dec 2012 or by 18.9 percent relative to 4196 in Apr 2012. There is here again the strong seasonality of year-end labor data. Job openings fell from 4421 in Apr 2013 to 3520 in Dec 2013 and from 5070 in Apr 2014 to 4467 in Dec 2014, showing strong seasonal effects. The level of nonfarm job openings decreased from 6182 in Apr 2015 to 5147 in Dec 2015 or by 16.7 percent. The level of nonfarm job openings decreased from 6381 in Apr 2016 to 5285 in Dec 2016 or by 17.2 percent. The level of nonfarm job openings decreased from 6673 in Apr 2017 to 5673 in Dec 2017 or by 15.0 percent. The level of nonfarm job openings decreased from 7611 in Apr 2018 to 6921 in Dec 2018 or by 9.1 percent. Nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB) increased from 4827 in Jan 2007 to 7484 in Jan 2019 or by 55.0 percent while the rate increased from 3.4 to 4.8. This was mediocre performance because the civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working rose from 230.650 million in Jan 2007 to 258.239 million in Jan 2019, by 27.589 million or 12.0 percent. Nonfarm layoffs and discharges (TNF LD) increased from 2278 in Jan 2006 to 3269 in Jan 2009 or 43.5 percent. The annual data show layoffs and discharges rising from 22.267 million in 2006 to 27.434 million in 2009 or by 23.2 percent. Business pruned payroll jobs to survive the global recession but there has not been hiring because of the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 38 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the initial estimate of GDP for IVQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-02/gdp4q18_ini_0.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 would have accumulated to 38.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2018 would be $21,814.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3030.0 billion than actual $18,784.6 billion. There are more than two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.2 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html). US GDP in IVQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,784.6 billion in IVQ2018 or 19.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Feb 1919 to Feb 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 152.3255 in Feb 2019. The actual index NSA in Feb 2019 is 103.7365, which is 31.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Feb 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.1303 in Feb 2019. The output of manufacturing at 103.7365 in Feb 2019 is 23.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart I-10, US Job Openings, Thousands NSA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of job openings in Chart I-11 shows similar behavior. The rate seasonally adjusted increased from 2.3 in Jan 2011 to 2.7 in Dec 2011, 2.8 in Dec 2012, 2.8 in Dec 2013 and 3.4 in Dec 2014. The rate seasonally adjusted stood at 3.8 in Dec 2015 and 3.9 in Dec 2016. The rate seasonally adjusted reached 4.0 in Dec 2017 and 4.7 in Dec 2018. The rate SA stood at 4.8 in Jan 2019. The rate not seasonally adjusted rose from the high of 2.6 in Apr 2010 to 3.1 in Apr 2013, easing to 2.5 in Dec 2013. The rate of job openings NSA fell from 3.4 in Jul 2007 to 1.7 in Nov-Dec 2009, recovering to 3.4 in Dec 2015. The rate of job opening NSA stood at 3.5 in Dec 2016, reaching 3.7 in Dec 2017 and 4.4 in Dec 2018. The rate of job openings NSA was 4.8 in Jan 2019.
Chart I-11, US, Rate of Job Openings, NSA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total separations are in Chart I-12. Separations are lower in 2012-17 than before the global recession but hiring has not recovered.
Chart I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Separations, Month Thousands SA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-13 provides annual total separations. Separations fell sharply during the global recession but hiring has not recovered relative to population growth.
Chart I-13, US, Total Separations, Annual, Thousands, 2001-2018
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-5 provides total nonfarm total separations from 2001 to 2018 Separations fell from 62.632 million in 2006 to 48.671 million in 2010 or by 13.961 million and 49.614 million in 2011 or by 13.018 million. Total separations increased from 49.614 million in 2011 to 52.564 million in 2013 or by 2.950 million and to 55.931 million in 2014 or by 6.317 million relative to 2011. Total separations increased to 59.925 million in 2015 or by 10.311 million relative to 2011. Total separations increased to 61.509 million in 2016 or 11.895 million relative to 2011. Total separations increased to 63.454 million in 2017 or 13.840 million relative to 2011.Total separations increased to 66.097 million in 2018 or 16.483 million relative to 2011.
Table I-5, US, Total Nonfarm Total Separations, Thousands, 2001-2018
| Year | Annual |
| 2001 | 64348 |
| 2002 | 58719 |
| 2003 | 56918 |
| 2004 | 58459 |
| 2005 | 61185 |
| 2006 | 62632 |
| 2007 | 62652 |
| 2008 | 59882 |
| 2009 | 51939 |
| 2010 | 48671 |
| 2011 | 49614 |
| 2012 | 51093 |
| 2013 | 52564 |
| 2014 | 55931 |
| 2015 | 59925 |
| 2016 | 61509 |
| 2017 | 63454 |
| 2018 | 66097 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Monthly data of layoffs and discharges reach a peak in early 2009, as shown in Chart I-14. Layoffs and discharges dropped sharply with the recovery of the economy in 2010 and 2011 once employers reduced their job count to what was required for cost reductions and loss of business. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth. Growth rates have been unusually low in the expansion of the current economic cycle.
Chart I-14, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Monthly Thousands SA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Layoffs and discharges in Chart I-15 rose sharply to a peak in 2009. There was pronounced drop into 2010 and 2011 with mild increase into 2012 and renewed decline into 2013. There is mild increase into 2014-2015 followed by decline in 2016 and increase in 2017-2018.
Chart I-15, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Annual, 2001-2018
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Annual layoff and discharges are in Table I-6. Layoffs and discharges increased sharply from 22.267 million in 2006 to 27.434 million in 2009 or 23.2 percent. Layoff and discharges fell to 20.959 million in 2013 or 23.6 percent relative to 2009 and increased to 21.147 million in 2014 or 0.9 percent relative to 2013. Layoffs and discharges increased to 21.777 million in 2015 or 3.0 percent relative to 2014. Layoffs and discharges fell to 21.243 in 2016 or 2.5 percent relative to 2015. Layoffs and discharges increased to 21.581 million in 2017 or 1.6 percent relative to 2016. Layoffs and discharges increased to 21.888 million in 2018 or 1.4 percent relative to 2017.
Table I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands, 2001-2018
| Year | Annual |
| 2001 | 24971 |
| 2002 | 23621 |
| 2003 | 24353 |
| 2004 | 23701 |
| 2005 | 23495 |
| 2006 | 22267 |
| 2007 | 23556 |
| 2008 | 25443 |
| 2009 | 27434 |
| 2010 | 22562 |
| 2011 | 22134 |
| 2012 | 22023 |
| 2013 | 20959 |
| 2014 | 21147 |
| 2015 | 21777 |
| 2016 | 21243 |
| 2017 | 21581 |
| 2018 | 21888 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-7, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization NSA %
| U1 | U2 | U3 | U4 | U5 | U6 | |
| 2019 | ||||||
| Feb | 1.5 | 2.0 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 7.7 |
| Jan | 1.4 | 2.3 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 8.8 |
| 2018 | ||||||
| Dec | 1.3 | 1.8 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 7.5 |
| Nov | 1.2 | 1.6 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 7.2 |
| Oct | 1.3 | 1.5 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 7.0 |
| Sep | 1.3 | 1.5 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 7.1 |
| Aug | 1.3 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 7.4 |
| Jul | 1.4 | 1.9 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 7.9 |
| Jun | 1.3 | 1.9 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 8.1 |
| May | 1.4 | 1.5 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 7.3 |
| Apr | 1.5 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 7.4 |
| Mar | 1.5 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 8.1 |
| Feb | 1.6 | 2.3 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 8.6 |
| Jan | 1.5 | 2.4 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 5.5 | 8.9 |
| 2017 | ||||||
| Dec | 1.4 | 2.1 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 8.0 |
| Nov | 1.5 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 7.7 |
| Oct | 1.5 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 7.6 |
| Sep | 1.6 | 1.9 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 5.0 | 8.0 |
| Aug | 1.7 | 2.2 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 8.6 |
| Jul | 1.6 | 2.2 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 8.9 |
| Jun | 1.5 | 2.1 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 8.9 |
| May | 1.8 | 1.9 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 5.0 | 8.1 |
| Apr | 1.8 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 8.1 |
| Mar | 1.9 | 2.4 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 5.5 | 8.9 |
| Feb | 1.9 | 2.6 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 9.5 |
| Jan | 2.0 | 2.7 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6.2 | 10.1 |
| 2016 | ||||||
| Dec | 1.9 | 2.3 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 5.5 | 9.1 |
| Nov | 1.8 | 2.1 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 5.6 | 9.0 |
| Oct | 1.9 | 2.1 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 9.2 |
| Sep | 1.9 | 2.2 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.9 | 9.3 |
| Aug | 1.8 | 2.4 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 9.7 |
| Jul | 1.9 | 2.4 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6.3 | 10.1 |
| Jun | 1.9 | 2.3 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 9.9 |
| May | 2.0 | 2.1 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 9.4 |
| Apr | 2.2 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 9.3 |
| Mar | 2.3 | 2.6 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 9.9 |
| Feb | 2.2 | 2.7 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 10.1 |
| Jan | 2.1 | 2.7 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 6.5 | 10.5 |
| 2015 | ||||||
| Dec | 2.1 | 2.4 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 5.9 | 9.8 |
| Nov | 2.1 | 2.3 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 9.6 |
| Oct | 2.1 | 2.3 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 6.0 | 9.5 |
| Sep | 2.0 | 2.2 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 9.6 |
| Aug | 2.1 | 2.5 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 10.3 |
| Jul | 2.0 | 2.7 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.7 | 10.7 |
| Jun | 2.1 | 2.5 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 10.8 |
| May | 2.4 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 10.4 |
| Apr | 2.4 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6.4 | 10.4 |
| Mar | 2.6 | 2.9 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 11.0 |
| Feb | 2.7 | 3.0 | 5.8 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 11.4 |
| Jan | 2.7 | 3.1 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 7.4 | 12.0 |
| 2014 | ||||||
| Dec | 2.5 | 2.8 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 11.1 |
| Nov | 2.7 | 2.7 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 11.0 |
| Oct | 2.7 | 2.6 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 11.1 |
| Sep | 2.7 | 2.7 | 5.7 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 11.3 |
| Aug | 2.8 | 3.0 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.0 |
| Jul | 2.8 | 3.1 | 6.5 | 7.0 | 7.8 | 12.6 |
| Jun | 2.8 | 3.0 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.4 |
| May | 3.1 | 3.0 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 11.7 |
| Apr | 3.3 | 3.2 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 7.2 | 11.8 |
| Mar | 3.7 | 3.7 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 12.8 |
| Feb | 3.6 | 3.9 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.4 | 13.1 |
| Jan | 3.5 | 4.0 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.6 | 13.5 |
| 2013 | ||||||
| Dec | 3.5 | 3.5 | 6.5 | 7.0 | 7.9 | 13.0 |
| Dec | 3.7 | 3.5 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 12.7 |
| Oct | 3.7 | 3.6 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 8.3 | 13.2 |
| Sep | 3.7 | 3.5 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.4 | 13.1 |
| Aug | 3.7 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 13.6 |
| Jul | 3.7 | 3.8 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.1 | 14.3 |
| Jun | 3.9 | 3.8 | 7.8 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 14.6 |
| May | 4.1 | 3.7 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 8.5 | 13.4 |
| Apr | 4.3 | 3.9 | 7.1 | 7.6 | 8.5 | 13.4 |
| Mar | 4.3 | 4.3 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 9.0 | 13.9 |
| Feb | 4.3 | 4.6 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 14.9 |
| Jan | 4.3 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 9.0 | 9.9 | 15.4 |
| 2012 | ||||||
| Dec | 4.2 | 4.3 | 7.6 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
| Nov | 4.2 | 3.9 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 13.9 |
| Oct | 4.3 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 13.9 |
| Sep | 4.2 | 4.0 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 14.2 |
| Aug | 4.3 | 4.4 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.7 | 14.6 |
| Jul | 4.3 | 4.6 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 15.2 |
| Jun | 4.5 | 4.4 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 9.9 | 15.1 |
| May | 4.7 | 4.3 | 7.9 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 14.3 |
| Apr | 4.8 | 4.3 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.1 | 14.1 |
| Mar | 4.9 | 4.8 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 9.7 | 14.8 |
| Feb | 4.9 | 5.1 | 8.7 | 9.3 | 10.2 | 15.6 |
| Jan | 4.9 | 5.4 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.5 | 16.2 |
| 2011 | ||||||
| Dec | 4.8 | 5.0 | 8.3 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 15.2 |
| Dec | 4.9 | 4.7 | 8.2 | 8.9 | 9.7 | 15.0 |
| Oct | 5.0 | 4.8 | 8.5 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 15.3 |
| Sep | 5.2 | 5.0 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.2 | 15.7 |
| Aug | 5.2 | 5.1 | 9.1 | 9.6 | 10.6 | 16.1 |
| Jul | 5.2 | 5.2 | 9.3 | 10.0 | 10.9 | 16.3 |
| Jun | 5.1 | 5.1 | 9.3 | 9.9 | 10.9 | 16.4 |
| May | 5.5 | 5.1 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 10.0 | 15.4 |
| Apr | 5.5 | 5.2 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 15.5 |
| Mar | 5.7 | 5.8 | 9.2 | 9.7 | 10.6 | 16.2 |
| Feb | 5.6 | 6.0 | 9.5 | 10.1 | 11.1 | 16.7 |
| Jan | 5.6 | 6.2 | 9.8 | 10.4 | 11.4 | 17.3 |
| Dec 2010 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 9.1 | 9.9 | 10.7 | 16.6 |
| Annual | ||||||
| 2018 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 7.7 |
| 2017 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 8.5 |
| 2016 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.9 | 9.6 |
| 2015 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 10.4 |
| 2014 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 12.0 |
| 2013 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 13.8 |
| 2012 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.5 | 14.7 |
| 2011 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 8.9 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 15.9 |
| 2010 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 9.6 | 10.3 | 11.1 | 16.7 |
| 2009 | 4.7 | 5.9 | 9.3 | 9.7 | 10.5 | 16.2 |
| 2008 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.8 | 10.5 |
| 2007 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 8.3 |
| 2006 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 8.2 |
| 2005 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 8.9 |
| 2004 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.5 | 9.6 |
| 2003 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 7.0 | 10.1 |
| 2002 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.7 | 9.6 |
| 2001 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 8.1 |
| 2000 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 7.0 |
Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Monthly seasonally adjusted measures of labor underutilization are provided in Table I-8. U6 climbed from 16.1 percent in Aug 2011 to 16.4 percent in Sep 2011 and then fell to 14.5 percent in Mar 2012, reaching 7.3 percent in Feb 2019. Unemployment is an incomplete measure of the stress in US job markets. A different calculation in this blog is provided by using the participation rate in the labor force before the global recession. This calculation shows 20.9 million in job stress of unemployment/underemployment in Feb 2019, not seasonally adjusted, corresponding to 12.2 percent of the labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html).
Table I-8, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization SA %
| U1 | U2 | U3 | U4 | U5 | U6 | |
| Feb 2019 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 7.3 |
| Jan | 1.3 | 1.9 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 8.1 |
| Dec 2018 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 7.6 |
| Nov | 1.3 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 7.6 |
| Oct | 1.4 | 1.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 7.5 |
| Sep | 1.4 | 1.7 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 7.5 |
| Aug | 1.4 | 1.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 7.4 |
| Jul | 1.5 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 7.5 |
| Jun | 1.4 | 1.9 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.9 | 7.8 |
| May | 1.3 | 1.8 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 7.7 |
| Apr | 1.4 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 7.8 |
| Mar | 1.4 | 1.9 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 7.9 |
| Feb | 1.4 | 2.0 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.1 | 8.2 |
| Jan | 1.5 | 2.0 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.1 | 8.2 |
| Dec 2017 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.1 | 8.1 |
| Nov | 1.6 | 2.0 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 8.0 |
| Oct | 1.6 | 2.0 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 8.0 |
| Sep | 1.7 | 2.1 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 5.1 | 8.3 |
| Aug | 1.7 | 2.2 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 8.6 |
| Jul | 1.7 | 2.1 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 8.5 |
| Jun | 1.7 | 2.1 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 8.5 |
| May | 1.7 | 2.1 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 8.5 |
| Apr | 1.7 | 2.2 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 8.6 |
| Mar | 1.7 | 2.2 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 8.7 |
| Feb | 1.8 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 9.1 |
| Jan | 1.9 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 5.8 | 9.3 |
| Dec 2016 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 5.7 | 9.2 |
| Nov | 1.9 | 2.2 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 9.4 |
| Oct | 2.0 | 2.4 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.9 | 9.6 |
| Sep | 1.9 | 2.5 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 9.7 |
| Aug | 1.9 | 2.4 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.9 | 9.6 |
| Jul | 2.0 | 2.3 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 6.0 | 9.7 |
| Jun | 2.0 | 2.4 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 6.0 | 9.5 |
| May | 1.9 | 2.4 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.8 | 9.9 |
| Apr | 2.1 | 2.4 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 9.7 |
| Mar | 2.1 | 2.4 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 9.8 |
| Feb | 2.1 | 2.3 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 9.7 |
| Jan | 2.0 | 2.3 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 9.8 |
| Dec 2015 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 9.9 |
| Nov | 2.1 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 10.0 |
| Oct | 2.1 | 2.5 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 6.2 | 9.8 |
| Sep | 2.1 | 2.5 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 6.2 | 10.0 |
| Aug | 2.2 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6.2 | 10.2 |
| Jul | 2.2 | 2.6 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 10.3 |
| Jun | 2.3 | 2.6 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 10.4 |
| May | 2.4 | 2.8 | 5.6 | 5.9 | 6.7 | 10.9 |
| Apr | 2.3 | 2.6 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 6.7 | 10.8 |
| Mar | 2.4 | 2.6 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 6.7 | 10.8 |
| Feb | 2.5 | 2.7 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 11.0 |
| Jan | 2.6 | 2.7 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 11.3 |
| Dec 2014 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.9 | 11.2 |
| Nov | 2.7 | 2.9 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 11.4 |
| Oct | 2.7 | 2.8 | 5.7 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 11.5 |
| Sep | 2.8 | 2.9 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 7.3 | 11.7 |
| Aug | 2.9 | 3.0 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 7.4 | 12.0 |
| July | 3.0 | 3.1 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 12.1 |
| Jun | 3.0 | 3.1 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 12.0 |
| May | 3.1 | 3.2 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 7.6 | 12.2 |
| Apr | 3.2 | 3.3 | 6.2 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.3 |
| Mar | 3.5 | 3.4 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 12.6 |
| Feb | 3.5 | 3.5 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 8.0 | 12.6 |
| Jan | 3.4 | 3.4 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 8.1 | 12.7 |
| Dec 2013 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 6.7 | 7.3 | 8.1 | 13.1 |
| Nov | 3.7 | 3.7 | 6.9 | 7.4 | 8.2 | 13.1 |
| Oct | 3.7 | 4.0 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 8.5 | 13.6 |
| Sep | 3.8 | 3.8 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 13.5 |
| Aug | 3.8 | 3.8 | 7.2 | 7.8 | 8.6 | 13.6 |
| Jul | 3.9 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 13.8 |
| Jun | 4.0 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.2 | 9.1 | 14.2 |
| May | 4.1 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 8.8 | 13.8 |
| Apr | 4.1 | 4.1 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 8.9 | 14.0 |
| Mar | 4.1 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 8.9 | 13.8 |
| Feb | 4.2 | 4.2 | 7.7 | 8.2 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
| Jan | 4.2 | 4.3 | 8.0 | 8.5 | 9.4 | 14.6 |
| Dec 2012 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 9.4 | 14.4 |
| Nov | 4.2 | 4.2 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
| Oct | 4.4 | 4.2 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
| Sep | 4.4 | 4.2 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 9.3 | 14.8 |
| Aug | 4.5 | 4.4 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 14.6 |
| Jul | 4.5 | 4.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.8 |
| Jun | 4.7 | 4.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.8 |
| May | 4.6 | 4.5 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.7 |
| Apr | 4.6 | 4.4 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 9.6 | 14.6 |
| Mar | 4.6 | 4.5 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.5 |
| Feb | 4.7 | 4.6 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 9.8 | 15.0 |
| Jan | 4.8 | 4.7 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 9.9 | 15.2 |
| Dec 2011 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 15.2 |
| Nov | 5.0 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 9.3 | 10.1 | 15.5 |
| Oct | 5.1 | 5.1 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.3 | 15.8 |
| Sep | 5.4 | 5.2 | 9.0 | 9.7 | 10.5 | 16.4 |
| Aug | 5.4 | 5.2 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.5 | 16.1 |
| Jul | 5.3 | 5.3 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.6 | 15.9 |
| Jun | 5.3 | 5.3 | 9.1 | 9.7 | 10.7 | 16.1 |
| May | 5.3 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 10.3 | 15.8 |
| Apr | 5.2 | 5.4 | 9.1 | 9.7 | 10.5 | 16.1 |
| Mar | 5.3 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 15.9 |
| Feb | 5.3 | 5.5 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.6 | 16.0 |
| Jan | 5.5 | 5.5 | 9.1 | 9.7 | 10.8 | 16.2 |
Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-16 provides U6 monthly from 2001 to 2019. There was a steep climb from 2007 into 2009 and then this measure of unemployment and underemployment stabilized at that high level but declined into 2012. The low of U6 SA was 8.0 percent in Mar 2007 and the peak was 17.1 percent in Apr 2010. The low NSA was 7.6 percent in Oct 2006 and the peak was 18.0 percent in Jan 2010.
Chart I-16, US, U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Month, SA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-17 provides the number employed part-time for economic reasons or who cannot find full-time employment. There are sharp declines at the end of 2009, 2010 and 2011 but an increase in 2012 followed by relative decline into 2018 and recent increase.
Chart I-17, US, Working Part-time for Economic Reasons
Thousands, Month SA 2001-2019
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. There is strong seasonality in US labor markets around the end of the year.
- Seasonally adjusted part-time for economic reasons. The number employed part-time for economic reasons because they could not find full-time employment fell from 9.166 million in Sep 2011 to 7.775 million in Mar 2012, seasonally adjusted, or decline of 1.391 million in six months, as shown in Table I-9. The number employed part-time for economic reasons rebounded to 8.671 million in Sep 2012 for increase of 697,000 in one month from Aug to Sep 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons declined to 8.203 million in Oct 2012 or by 468,000 again in one month, further declining to 8.166 million in Nov 2012 for another major one-month decline of 37,000 and 7.943 million in Dec 2012 or fewer 223,000 in just one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 8.151 million in Jan 2013 or 208,000 more than in Dec 2012 and to 8.178 million in Feb 2013, declining to 7.937 million in May 2013 but increasing to 8.103 million in Jun 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.816 million in Aug 2013 for decline of 283,000 in one month from 8.099 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons decreased 52,000 from 7.816 million in Aug 2013 to 7.764 million in Sep 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons rose to 7.936 million in Oct 2013, falling by 218,000 to 7.718 million in Nov 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.827 million in Dec 2013, decreasing to 7.296 million in Jan 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased from 7.296 million in Jan 2014 to 7.299 million in Feb 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.435 million in Mar 2014 and 7.509 million in Apr 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.254 million in May 2014, increasing to 7.422 million in Jun 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.402 million in Jul 2014 and 7.177 million in Aug 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.020 million in Sep 2014, 7.025 million in Oct 2014 and 6.898 million in Nov 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.856 million in Dec 2014, decreasing to 6.808 million in Jan 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.671 million in Feb 2015, decreasing to 6.629 million in Mar 2015. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.608 million in Apr 2015, increasing to 6.628 million in May 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.383 million in Jun 2015 and 6.249 million in Jul 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.423 million in Aug 2015, declining to 6.043 million in Sep 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.811 million in Oct 2015, increasing to 6.174 million in Nov 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.084 million in Dec 2015, decreasing to 5.941 million in Jan 2016. The level employed part-time for economic reasons decreased to 5.978 million in Feb 2016 and increased to 6.066 million in Mar 2016. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.006 million in Apr 2016 and increased to 6.467 million in May 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.748 million in Jun 2016, increasing to 5.926 million in Jul 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.995 million in Aug 2016, decreasing to 5.918 million in Sep 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons reached 5.971 million in Oct 2016, decreasing to 5.738 million in Nov 2016 and 5.621 million in Dec 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.753 million in Jan 2017, decreasing to 5.603 million in Feb 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.455 million in Mar 2017 and fell to 5.279 million in Apr 2017, decreasing to 5.234 million in May 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.266 million in Jun 2017, increasing to 5.281 million in Jul 2017 and 5.237 million in Aug 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.179 million in Sep 2017, decreasing to 4.912 million in Oct 2017 and decreasing to 4.866 million in Nov 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 4.986 million in Dec 2017, decreasing to 4.982 million in Jan 2018 and increasing to 5.115 million in Feb 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 4.969 million in Mar 2018, decreasing to 4.952 million in Apr 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons eased to 4.920 million in May 2018 and to 4.736 million in Jun 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 4.588 million in Jul 2018, decreasing to 4.368 million in Aug 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 4.656 million in Sep 2018, decreasing to 4.630 million in Oct 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 4.781 million in Nov 2018, decreasing to 4.657 million in Dec 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.147 million in Jan 2019, decreasing to 5.147 million in Feb 2019.
- Seasonally adjusted full-time. The number employed full-time increased from 112.923 million in Oct 2011 to 115.024 million in Mar 2012 or 2.101 million but then fell to 114.233 million in May 2012 or 0.791 million fewer full-time employed than in Mar 2012. The number employed full-time increased from 114.736 million in Aug 2012 to 115.570 million in Oct 2012 or increase of 0.834 million full-time jobs in two months and further to 115.563 million in Jan 2013 or increase of 0.827 million more full-time jobs in five months from Aug 2012 to Jan 2013. The number of full time jobs decreased slightly to 115.695 million in Feb 2013, increasing to 116.240 million in May 2013 and 116.166 million in Jun 2013. Then number of full-time jobs increased to 116.201 million in Jul 2013, 116.417 million in Aug 2013 and 116.846 million in Sep 2013. The number of full-time jobs fell to 116.352 million in Oct 2013 and increased to 117.078 in Nov 2013. The level of full-time jobs increased to 117.394 million in Dec 2013, increasing to 117.468 million in Jan 2014 and 117.734 million in Feb 2014. The level of employment full-time increased to 117.959 million in Mar 2014 and 118.433 million in Apr 2014. The level of full-time employment reached 118.791 million in May 2014, decreasing to 118.229 million in Jun 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 118.426 million in Jul 2014 and 118.715 million in Aug 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 119.306 million in Sep 2014, 119.787 million in Oct 2014 and 119.717 million in Nov 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 120.138 million in Dec 2014 and 120.459 million in Jan 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 120.663 million in Feb 2015 and 120.980 million in Mar 2015. The level of full-time jobs decreased to 120.795 million in Apr 2015, increasing to 121.489 million in May 2015 and decreasing to 121.004 million in Jun 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 121.628 million in Jul 2015 and increased to 122.062 million in Aug 2015, decreasing to 121.791 million in Sep 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 122.101 million in Oct 2015 and increased to 122.204 million in Nov 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 122.781 million in Dec 2015 and 122.985 million in Jan 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 123.071 million in Feb 2016 and increased to 123.561 million in Mar 2016. The level of full-time jobs decreased to 123.183 million in Apr 2016 and 123.172 million in May 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 123.608 million in Jun 2016, increasing to 123.934 million in Jul 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 124.541 million in Aug 2016, decreasing to 124.215 million in Sep 2016 and 124.224 million in Oct 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 124.287 million in Nov 2016 and 124.356 million in Dec 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 124.591 million in Jan 2017, increasing to 124.898 million in Feb 2017. The level of full-time jobs increased to 125.641 million in Mar 2017 and increased to 126.009 million in Apr 2017, decreasing to 125.535 million in May 2017. The level of full-time jobs increased to 126.003 million in Jun 2017, decreasing to 125.910 million in Jul 2017 and 126.012 million in Aug 2017. The level of full-time jobs increased to 126.725 million in Sep 2017, decreasing to 126.685 million in Oct 2017. The level of full-time jobs increased to 126.795 million in Nov 2017, decreasing to 126.771 million in Dec 2017. The level of full-time jobs increased to 127.045 million in Jan 2018, increasing to 127.700 million in Feb 2018. The level of full-time jobs decreased to 127.523 million in Mar 2018, increasing to 127.826 million in Apr 2018. The level of full-time jobs increased to 128.623 million in May 2018, decreasing to 128.571 million in Jun 2018. The level of full-time jobs increased to 128.978 million in Jul 2018, decreasing to 128.649 million in Aug 2018. The level of full-time jobs increased to 128.958 million in Sep 2018, increasing to 129.555 million in Oct 2018. The level of full-time jobs increased to 129.774 million in Nov 2018, increasing to 129.913 million in Dec 2018. The level of full-time jobs decreased to 129.837 million in Jan 2019, increasing to 130.159 million in Feb 2019. Adjustments of benchmark and seasonality-factors at the turn of every year could affect comparability of labor market indicators (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html).
- Not seasonally adjusted part-time for economic reasons. The number of employed part-time for economic reasons actually increased without seasonal adjustment from 8.271 million in Nov 2011 to 8.428 million in Dec 2011 or by 157,000 and then to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 or by an additional 490,000 for cumulative increase from Nov 2011 to Jan 2012 of 647,000. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons then fell from 8.918 million in Jan 2012 to 7.867 million in Mar 2012 or by 1.051 million and to 7.694 million in Apr 2012 or 1.224 million fewer relative to Jan 2012. In Aug 2012, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.842 million NSA or 148,000 more than in Apr 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased from 7.842 million in Aug 2012 to 8.110 million in Sep 2012 or by 3.4 percent. The number part-time for economic reasons fell from 8.110 million in Sep 2012 to 7.870 million in Oct 2012 or by 240.000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA increased to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 or 758,000 more than in Oct 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.298 million in Feb 2013, which is lower by 330,000 relative to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 but higher by 428,000 relative to 7.870 million in Oct 2012. The number employed part time for economic reasons fell to 7.734 million in Mar 2013 or 564,000 fewer than in Feb 2013 and fell to 7.709 million in Apr 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.618 million in May 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons jumped from 7.618 million in May 2013 to 8.440 million in Jun 2013 or 822,000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.324 million in Jul 2013 and 7.690 million in Aug 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA fell to 7.522 million in Sep 2013, increasing to 7.700 million in Oct 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.563 million in Nov 2013 and increased to 7.990 million in Dec 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.771 million in Jan 2014 and 7.397 million in Feb 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.455 million in Mar 2014 and fell to 7.243 million in Apr 2014. The number of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.960 million in May 2014, increasing to 7.805 million in Jun 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.665 million in Jul 2014 and 7.083 million in Aug 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.711 million in Sep 2014 and increased to 6.787 million in Oct 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons reached 6.713 million in Nov 2014 and 6.970 million in Dec 2014, increasing to 7.269 million in Jan 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.772 million in Feb 2015 and 6.672 million in Mar 2015, falling to 6.356 million in Apr 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.363 million in May 2015 and to 6.776 million in Jun 2015, decreasing to 6.511 million in Jul 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.361 million in Aug 2015 and 5.693 million in Sep 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.536 million in Oct 2015, increasing to 5.967 million in Nov 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.179 million in Dec 2015, increasing to 6.406 million in Jan 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 6.106 million in Feb 2016 and increased to 6.138 million in Mar 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 5.771 million in Apr 2016 and increased to 6.238 million in May 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 6.119 million in Jun 2016, increasing to 6.157 million in Jul 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.963 million in Aug 2016, decreasing to 5.550 million in Sep 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.648 million in Oct 2016, decreasing to 5.518 million in Nov 2016 and increasing to 5.707 million in Dec 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.226 million in Jan 2017, decreasing to 5.773 million in Feb 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.552 million in Mar 2017, decreasing to 5.058 million in Apr 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.038 million in May 2017, increasing to 5.602 million in Jun 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.475 million in Jul 2017, 5.204 million in Aug 2017 and 4.818 million in Sep 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 4.553 million in Oct 2017, decreasing to 4.462 million in Nov 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.060 million in Dec 2017, increasing to 5.474 million in Jan 2018 and decreasing to 5.331 million in Feb 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 5.080 million in Mar 2018, decreasing to 4.734 million in Apr 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 4.739 million in May 2018, increasing to 5.042 million in Jun 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 4.766 million in Jul 2018, decreasing to 4.319 million in Aug 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 4.306 million in Sep 2018, decreasing to 4.246 million in Oct 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 4.558 million in Nov 2018, increasing to 4.740 million in Dec 2018. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.640 million in Jan 2019, decreasing to 4.561 million in Feb 2019.
- Not seasonally adjusted full-time. The number employed full time without seasonal adjustment fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 113.050 million in Dec 2011 or by 88,000 and fell further to 111.879 in Jan 2012 for cumulative decrease of 1.259 million. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 112.587 million in Feb 2012 or by 551.000 but increased to 116.214 million in Aug 2012 or 3.076 million more full-time jobs than in Nov 2011. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted decreased from 116.214 million in Aug 2012 to 115.678 million in Sep 2012 for loss of 536,000 full-time jobs and rose to 116.045 million in Oct 2012 or by 367,000 full-time jobs in one month relative to Sep 2012. The number employed full-time NSA fell from 116.045 million in Oct 2012 to 115.515 million in Nov 2012 or decline of 530.000 in one month. The number employed full-time fell from 115.515 in Nov 2012 to 115.079 million in Dec 2012 or decline by 436,000 in one month. The number employed full time fell from 115.079 million in Dec 2012 to 113.868 million in Jan 2013 or decline of 1.211 million in one month. The number of full-time jobs increased to 114.191 in Feb 2012 or by 323,000 in one month and increased to 114.796 million in Mar 2013 for cumulative increase from Jan by 928,000 full-time jobs but decrease of 283,000 from Dec 2012. The number employed full time reached 117.400 million in Jun 2013 and increased to 117.688 in Jul 2013 or by 288,000. The number employed full-time reached 117.868 million in Aug 2013 for increase of 180,000 in one month relative to Jul 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 117.308 million in Sep 2013 or by 560,000. The number employed full-time fell to 116.798 million in Oct 2013 or decline of 510.000 in one month. The number employed full-time rose to 116.875 million in Nov 2013, falling to 116.661 million in Dec 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 115.744 million in Jan 2014 but increased to 116.323 million in Feb 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 116.985 in Mar 2014 and 118.073 million in Apr 2014. The number of full-time jobs increased to 119.179 million in May 2014, increasing to 119.472 million in Jun 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 119.900 million in Jul 2014. Comparisons over long periods require use of NSA data. The number with full-time jobs fell from a high of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to 108.777 million in Jan 2010 or by 14.442 million. The number with full-time jobs in Feb 2019 is 128.836 million, which is higher by 5.617 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007.
- Loss of full-time jobs. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 258.392 million in Feb 2019 or by 26.434 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The number with full-time jobs in Feb 2019 is 128.836 million, which is higher by 5.617 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 137.206 million full-time jobs with population of 258.392 million in Jan 2019 (0.531 x 258.392) or 8.370 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 128.836 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 20 million. Mediocre GDP growth is the main culprit of the fractured US labor market. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 38 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the initial estimate of GDP for IVQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-02/gdp4q18_ini_0.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 would have accumulated to 38.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2018 would be $21,814.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3030.0 billion than actual $18,784.6 billion. There are more than two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.2 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html). US GDP in IVQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,784.6 billion in IVQ2018 or 19.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Feb 1919 to Feb 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 152.3255 in Feb 2019. The actual index NSA in Feb 2019 is 103.7365, which is 31.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Feb 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.1303 in Feb 2019. The output of manufacturing at 103.7365 in Feb 2019 is 23.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-9, US, Employed Part-time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, and Full-time, Millions
| Part-time Thousands | Full-time Millions | |
| Seasonally Adjusted | ||
| Feb 2019 | 4,310 | 130.159 |
| Jan 2019 | 5,147 | 129.837 |
| Dec 2018 | 4,657 | 129.913 |
| Nov 2018 | 4,781 | 129.774 |
| Oct 2018 | 4,630 | 129.555 |
| Sep 2018 | 4,656 | 128.958 |
| Aug 2018 | 4,368 | 128.649 |
| Jul 2018 | 4,588 | 128.978 |
| Jun 2018 | 4,736 | 128.571 |
| May 2018 | 4,920 | 128.623 |
| Apr 2018 | 4,952 | 127.826 |
| Mar 2018 | 4,969 | 127.523 |
| Feb 2018 | 5,115 | 127.700 |
| Jan 2018 | 4,982 | 127.045 |
| Dec 2017 | 4,986 | 126.771 |
| Nov 2017 | 4,866 | 126.795 |
| Oct 2017 | 4,912 | 126.685 |
| Sep 2017 | 5,179 | 126.725 |
| Aug 2017 | 5,237 | 126.012 |
| Jul 2017 | 5,281 | 125.910 |
| Jun 2017 | 5,266 | 126.003 |
| May 2017 | 5,234 | 125.535 |
| Apr 2017 | 5,279 | 126.009 |
| Mar 2017 | 5,455 | 125.641 |
| Feb 2017 | 5,603 | 124.898 |
| Jan 2017 | 5,753 | 124.591 |
| Dec 2016 | 5,621 | 124.356 |
| Nov 2016 | 5,738 | 124.287 |
| Oct 2016 | 5,971 | 124.224 |
| Sep 2016 | 5,918 | 124.215 |
| Aug 2016 | 5,995 | 124.541 |
| Jul 2016 | 5,926 | 123.934 |
| Jun 2016 | 5,748 | 123.608 |
| May 2016 | 6,467 | 123.172 |
| Apr 2016 | 6,006 | 123.183 |
| Mar 2016 | 6,066 | 123.561 |
| Feb 2016 | 5,978 | 123.071 |
| Jan 2016 | 5,941 | 122.985 |
| Dec 2015 | 6,084 | 122.781 |
| Nov 2015 | 6,174 | 122.204 |
| Oct 2015 | 5,811 | 122.101 |
| Sep 2015 | 6,043 | 121.791 |
| Aug 2015 | 6,423 | 122.062 |
| Jul 2015 | 6,249 | 121.628 |
| Jun 2015 | 6,383 | 121.004 |
| May 2015 | 6,628 | 121.489 |
| Apr 2015 | 6,608 | 120.795 |
| Mar 2015 | 6,629 | 120.980 |
| Feb 2015 | 6,671 | 120.663 |
| Jan 2015 | 6,808 | 120.459 |
| Dec 2014 | 6,856 | 120.138 |
| Nov 2014 | 6,898 | 119.717 |
| Oct 2014 | 7,025 | 119.787 |
| Sep 2014 | 7,020 | 119.306 |
| Aug 2014 | 7,177 | 118.715 |
| Jul 2014 | 7,402 | 118.426 |
| Jun 2014 | 7,422 | 118.229 |
| May 2014 | 7,254 | 118.791 |
| Apr 2014 | 7,509 | 118.433 |
| Mar 2014 | 7,435 | 117.959 |
| Feb 2014 | 7,299 | 117.734 |
| Jan 2014 | 7,296 | 117.468 |
| Dec 2013 | 7,827 | 117.394 |
| Nov 2013 | 7,718 | 117.078 |
| Oct 2013 | 7,936 | 116.352 |
| Sep 2013 | 7,764 | 116.846 |
| Aug 2013 | 7,816 | 116.417 |
| Jul 2013 | 8,099 | 116.201 |
| Jun 2013 | 8,103 | 116.166 |
| May 2013 | 7,937 | 116.240 |
| Apr 2013 | 7,964 | 116.014 |
| Mar 2013 | 7,722 | 115.808 |
| Feb 2013 | 8,178 | 115.695 |
| Jan 2013 | 8,151 | 115.653 |
| Dec 2012 | 7,943 | 115.791 |
| Nov 2012 | 8,166 | 115.655 |
| Oct 2012 | 8,203 | 115.570 |
| Sep 2012 | 8,671 | 115.252 |
| Aug 2012 | 7,974 | 114.736 |
| Jul 2012 | 8,082 | 114.575 |
| Jun 2012 | 8,072 | 114.749 |
| May 2012 | 8,101 | 114.233 |
| Apr 2012 | 7,913 | 114.371 |
| Mar 2012 | 7,775 | 115.024 |
| Feb 2012 | 8,238 | 114.141 |
| Jan 2012 | 8,305 | 113.755 |
| Dec 2011 | 8,171 | 113.774 |
| Dec 2011 | 8,447 | 113.213 |
| Oct 2011 | 8,657 | 112.923 |
| Sep 2011 | 9,166 | 112.544 |
| Aug 2011 | 8,788 | 112.723 |
| Jul 2011 | 8,281 | 112.193 |
| Not Seasonally Adjusted | ||
| Feb 2019 | 4,561 | 128.836 |
| Jan 2019 | 5,640 | 128.166 |
| Dec 2018 | 4,740 | 129.143 |
| Nov 2018 | 4,558 | 129.464 |
| Oct 2018 | 4,246 | 129.627 |
| Sep 2018 | 4,306 | 129.466 |
| Aug 2018 | 4,319 | 129.975 |
| Jul 2018 | 4,766 | 130.644 |
| Jun 2018 | 5,042 | 129.937 |
| May 2018 | 4,739 | 129.014 |
| Apr 2018 | 4,734 | 127.340 |
| Mar 2018 | 5,080 | 126.424 |
| Feb 2018 | 5,331 | 126.401 |
| Jan 2018 | 5,474 | 125.435 |
| Dec 2017 | 5,060 | 125.985 |
| Nov 2017 | 4,462 | 126.468 |
| Oct 2017 | 4,553 | 127.055 |
| Sep 2017 | 4,818 | 127.235 |
| Aug 2017 | 5,204 | 127.353 |
| Jul 2017 | 5,475 | 127.542 |
| Jun 2017 | 5,602 | 127.337 |
| May 2017 | 5,038 | 125.911 |
| Apr 2017 | 5,058 | 125.532 |
| Mar 2017 | 5,552 | 124.566 |
| Feb 2017 | 5,773 | 123.610 |
| Jan 2017 | 6,226 | 123.015 |
| Dec 2016 | 5,707 | 123.570 |
| Nov 2016 | 5,518 | 123.960 |
| Oct 2016 | 5,648 | 124.588 |
| Sep 2016 | 5,550 | 124.728 |
| Aug 2016 | 5,963 | 125.892 |
| Jul 2016 | 6,157 | 125.507 |
| Jun 2016 | 6,119 | 124.903 |
| May 2016 | 6,238 | 123.548 |
| Apr 2016 | 5,771 | 122.742 |
| Mar 2016 | 6,138 | 122.522 |
| Feb 2016 | 6,106 | 121.757 |
| Jan 2016 | 6,406 | 121.411 |
| Dec 2015 | 6,179 | 122.013 |
| Nov 2015 | 5,967 | 121.897 |
| Oct 2015 | 5,536 | 122.466 |
| Sep 2015 | 5,693 | 122.303 |
| Aug 2015 | 6,361 | 123.420 |
| Jul 2015 | 6,511 | 123.142 |
| Jun 2015 | 6,776 | 122.268 |
| May 2015 | 6,363 | 121.863 |
| Apr 2015 | 6,356 | 120.402 |
| Mar 2015 | 6,672 | 119.981 |
| Feb 2015 | 6,772 | 119.313 |
| Jan 2015 | 7,269 | 118.840 |
| Dec 2014 | 6,970 | 119.394 |
| Nov 2014 | 6,713 | 119.441 |
| Oct 2014 | 6,787 | 120.176 |
| Sep 2014 | 6,711 | 119.791 |
| Aug 2014 | 7,083 | 120.110 |
| Jul 2014 | 7,665 | 119.900 |
| Jun 2014 | 7,805 | 119.472 |
| May 2014 | 6,960 | 119.179 |
| Apr 2014 | 7,243 | 118.073 |
| Mar 2014 | 7,455 | 116.985 |
| Feb 2014 | 7,397 | 116.323 |
| Jan 2014 | 7,771 | 115.774 |
| Dec 2013 | 7,990 | 116.661 |
| Nov 2013 | 7,563 | 116.875 |
| Oct 2013 | 7,700 | 116.798 |
| Sep 2013 | 7,522 | 117.308 |
| Aug 2013 | 7,690 | 117.868 |
| Jul 2013 | 8,324 | 117.688 |
| Jun 2013 | 8,440 | 117.400 |
| May 2013 | 7,618 | 116.643 |
| Apr 2013 | 7,709 | 115.674 |
| Mar 2013 | 7,734 | 114.796 |
| Feb 2013 | 8,298 | 114.191 |
| Jan 2013 | 8,628 | 113.868 |
| Dec 2012 | 8,166 | 115.079 |
| Nov 2012 | 7,994 | 115.515 |
| Oct 2012 | 7,870 | 116.045 |
| Sep 2012 | 8,110 | 115.678 |
| Aug 2012 | 7,842 | 116.214 |
| Jul 2012 | 8,316 | 116.131 |
| Jun 2012 | 8,394 | 116.024 |
| May 2012 | 7,837 | 114.634 |
| Apr 2012 | 7,694 | 113.999 |
| Mar 2012 | 7,867 | 113.916 |
| Feb 2012 | 8,455 | 112.587 |
| Jan 2012 | 8,918 | 111.879 |
| Dec 2011 | 8,428 | 113.050 |
| Nov 2011 | 8,271 | 113.138 |
| Oct 2011 | 8,258 | 113.456 |
| Sep 2011 | 8,541 | 112.980 |
| Aug 2011 | 8,604 | 114.286 |
| Jul 2011 | 8,514 | 113.759 |
| Jun 2011 | 8,738 | 113.255 |
| May 2011 | 8,270 | 112.618 |
| Apr 2011 | 8,425 | 111.844 |
| Mar 2011 | 8,737 | 111.186 |
| Feb 2011 | 8,749 | 110.731 |
| Jan 2011 | 9,187 | 110.373 |
| Dec 2010 | 9,205 | 111.207 |
| Nov 2010 | 8,670 | 111.348 |
| Oct 2010 | 8,408 | 112.342 |
| Sep 2010 | 8,628 | 112.385 |
| Aug 2010 | 8,628 | 113.508 |
| Jul 2010 | 8,737 | 113.974 |
| Jun 2010 | 8,867 | 113.856 |
| May 2010 | 8,513 | 112.809 |
| Apr 2010 | 8,921 | 111.391 |
| Mar 2010 | 9,343 | 109.877 |
| Feb 2010 | 9,282 | 109.100 |
| Jan 2010 | 9,290 | 108.777 (low) |
| Dec 2009 | 9,354 (high) | 109.875 |
| Nov 2009 | 8,894 | 111.274 |
| Oct 2009 | 8,474 | 111.599 |
| Sep 2009 | 8,255 | 111.991 |
| Aug 2009 | 8,835 | 113.863 |
| Jul 2009 | 9,103 | 114.184 |
| Jun 2009 | 9,301 | 114.014 |
| May 2009 | 8,785 | 113.083 |
| Apr 2009 | 8,648 | 112.746 |
| Mar 2009 | 9,305 | 112.215 |
| Feb 2009 | 9,170 | 112.947 |
| Jan 2009 | 8,829 | 113.815 |
| Dec 2008 | 8,250 | 116.422 |
| Nov 2008 | 7,135 | 118.432 |
| Oct 2008 | 6,267 | 120.020 |
| Sep 2008 | 5,701 | 120.213 |
| Aug 2008 | 5,736 | 121.556 |
| Jul 2008 | 6,054 | 122.378 |
| Jun 2008 | 5,697 | 121.845 |
| May 2008 | 5,096 | 120.809 |
| Apr 2008 | 5,071 | 120.027 |
| Mar 2008 | 5,038 | 119.875 |
| Feb 2008 | 5,114 | 119.452 |
| Jan 2008 | 5,340 | 119.332 |
| Dec 2007 | 4,750 | 121.042 |
| Nov 2007 | 4,374 | 121.846 |
| Oct 2007 | 4,028 | 122.006 |
| Sep 2007 | 4,137 | 121.728 |
| Aug 2007 | 4,494 | 122.870 |
| Jul 2007 | 4,516 | 123.219 (high) |
| Jun 2007 | 4,469 | 122.150 |
| May 2007 | 4,315 | 120.846 |
| Apr 2007 | 4,205 | 119.609 |
| Mar 2007 | 4,384 | 119.640 |
| Feb 2007 | 4,417 | 119.041 |
| Jan 2007 | 4,726 | 119.094 |
| Dec 2006 | 4,281 | 120.371 |
| Nov 2006 | 4,054 | 120.507 |
| Oct 2006 | 4,010 | 121.199 |
| Sep 2006 | 3,735 (low) | 120.780 |
| Aug 2006 | 4,104 | 121.979 |
| Jul 2006 | 4,450 | 121.951 |
| Jun 2006 | 4,456 | 121.070 |
| May 2006 | 3,968 | 118.925 |
| Apr 2006 | 3,787 | 118.559 |
| Mar 2006 | 4,097 | 117.693 |
| Feb 2006 | 4,403 | 116.823 |
| Jan 2006 | 4,597 | 116.395 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20 provides the level of full-time jobs from 2001 to 2019. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 258.392 million in Feb 2019 or by 26.434 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The number with full-time jobs in Feb 2019 is 128.836 million, which is higher by 5.617 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 137.206 million full-time jobs with population of 258.392 million in Jan 2019 (0.531 x 258.392) or 8.370 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 128.836 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 20 million. Mediocre GDP growth is the main culprit of the fractured US labor market.
There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:
“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals.
Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets, during cyclical slow growth not secular stagnation, is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.
Chart I-20, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2019
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20A provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 2001 to 2019. There is clear trend of increase of the population while the number of full-time jobs collapsed after 2008 without sufficient recovery as shown in the preceding Chart I-20.
Chart I-20A, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 2001-2019
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20B provides number of full-time jobs in the US from 1968 to 2019. There were multiple recessions followed by expansions without contraction of full-time jobs and without recovery as during the period after 2008. The problem is specific of the current cycle and not secular.
Chart I-20B, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 1968-2019
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20C provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 1968 to 2019. Population expanded at a relatively constant rate of increase with the assurance of creation of full-time jobs that has been broken since 2008.
Chart I-20C, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 1968-2019
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-9A provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.8 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.0 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.2 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. In contrast, GDP grew 2.6 percent in 2010, 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.5 percent in 2014 and 2.9 percent in 2015. GDP grew 1.6 percent in 2016 and 2.2 percent in 2017. GDP grew 2.9 percent in 2018. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the twenty-eight quarters from IQ2012 to IVQ2018 is 2.3 percent and 3.1 percent in the four quarters ending in IVQ2018. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. The forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 3.0 to 3.1 percent in 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20181219.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 2.3 to 2.5 percent in 2019 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20181219.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018 has been at average 2.3 percent in annual equivalent.
Table I-9A, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%
| Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% |
| 1930 | -8.5 | 1980 | -0.3 | 2000 | 4.1 |
| 1931 | -6.4 | 1981 | 2.5 | 2001 | 1.0 |
| 1932 | -12.9 | 1982 | -1.8 | 2002 | 1.7 |
| 1933 | -1.2 | 1983 | 4.6 | 2003 | 2.9 |
| 1934 | 10.8 | 1984 | 7.2 | 2004 | 3.8 |
| 1935 | 8.9 | 1985 | 4.2 | 2005 | 3.5 |
| 1936 | 12.9 | 1986 | 3.5 | 2006 | 2.9 |
| 1937 | 5.1 | 1987 | 3.5 | 2007 | 1.9 |
| 1938 | -3.3 | 1988 | 4.2 | 2008 | -0.1 |
| 1939 | 8.0 | 1989 | 3.7 | 2009 | -2.5 |
| 1940 | 8.8 | 1990 | 1.9 | 2010 | 2.6 |
| 1941 | 17.7 | 1991 | -0.1 | 2011 | 1.6 |
| 1942 | 18.9 | 1992 | 3.5 | 2012 | 2.2 |
| 1943 | 17.0 | 1993 | 2.8 | 2013 | 1.8 |
| 1944 | 8.0 | 1994 | 4.0 | 2014 | 2.5 |
| 1945 | -1.0 | 1995 | 2.7 | 2015 | 2.9 |
| 1946 | -11.6 | 1996 | 3.8 | 2016 | 1.6 |
| 1947 | -1.1 | 1997 | 4.4 | 2017 | 2.2 |
| 1948 | 4.1 | 1998 | 4.5 | 2018 | 2.9 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are in Table I-9B with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.8 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.0 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.3 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.
Table I-9B, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions
| Number of Quarters | Cumulative Percentage Contraction | Average Percentage Rate | |
| IIQ1953 to IIQ1954 | 3 | -2.4 | -0.8 |
| IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958 | 3 | -3.0 | -1.0 |
| IVQ1973 to IQ1975 | 5 | -3.1 | -0.6 |
| IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 | 2 | -2.2 | -1.1 |
| IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | 4 | -2.6 | -0.65 |
| IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | 6 | -4.0 | -0.7 |
Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table I-9C shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.3 percent of the US economy in the thirty-eight quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:
- 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
- 5.3 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
- 5.1 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
- 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
- 5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
- 4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987
- 5.0 percent in the first twenty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1987
- 4.9 percent in the first twenty-first quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1988
- 4.9 percent in the first twenty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1988
- 4.8 percent in the first twenty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988
- 4.8 percent in the first twenty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1988
- 4.8 percent in the first twenty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1989
- 4.7 percent in the first twenty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1989
- 4.6 percent in the first twenty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989
- 4.5 percent in the first twenty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1989
- 4.5 percent in the first twenty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1990
- 4.4 percent in the first thirty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1990
- 4.3 percent in the first thirty-one quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990
- 4.0 percent in the first thirty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1990
- 3.8 percent in the first thirty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1991
- 3.8 percent in the first thirty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1991
- 3.8 percent in the first thirty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991
- 3.7 percent in the thirty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1991
- 3.7 percent in the thirty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1992
- 3.7 percent in the thirty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1992
The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill relative to historical experience with annual growth of 2.6 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.6 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.8 percent in 2013, 2.5 percent in 2014, 2.9 percent in 2015, 1.6 percent in 2016, 2.2 percent in 2017 and 2.9 percent in 2018 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988. 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990. 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990. 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991. 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). GDP grew 2.8 percent in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010. GDP growth in the twenty-eight quarters from 2012 to 2018 accumulated to 17.4 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.3 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2018 of $18,784.6 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $16,004.1 billion and compounding by 4/28: {[($18,784.6/$16,004.1)4/28 -1]100 = 2.3 percent}.
Table I-9C, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions
| Number | Cumulative Growth ∆% | Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate | |
| IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957 | 11 | 12.8 | 4.5 |
| First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955 | 4 | 7.8 | |
| IIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 5 | 10.0 | 7.9 |
| First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 4 | 9.2 | |
| IIQ1975 to IVQ1976 | 8 | 8.3 | 4.1 |
| First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 | 4 | 6.1 | |
| IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983 to IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 IQ1983 to IQ1989 IQ1983 to IIQ1989 IQ1983 to IIIQ1989 IQ1983 to IVQ1989 IQ1983 to IQ1990 IQ1983 to IIQ1990 IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 IQ1983 to IVQ1990 IQ1983 to IQ1991 IQ1983 to IIQ1991 IQ1983 to IIIQ1991 IQ1983 to IVQ1991 IQ1983 to IQ1992 IQ1983 to IIQ1992 | 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 | 19.8 21.5 22.1 23.0 24.4 25.4 27.6 28.3 29.9 30.7 32.5 33.8 34.8 35.8 36.1 37.6 38.1 38.2 36.9 36.3 37.3 38.0 38.5 40.2 41.7 | 5.7 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 |
| First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983 | 4 | 7.9 | |
| Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions* | 7.7 | ||
| IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018 | 38 | 24.1 | 2.3 |
| First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 | 2.8 |
*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table EMP, US, Annual Level of Employed, Full-Time Employed, Employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons and Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Millions
| Employed | Full-Time Employed | Part Time Economic Reasons | Noninstitutional Civilian Population | |
| 2000s | ||||
| 2000 | 136.891 | 113.846 | 3.227 | 212.577 |
| 2001 | 136.933 | 113.573 | 3.715 | 215.092 |
| 2002 | 136.485 | 112.700 | 4.213 | 217.570 |
| 2003 | 137.736 | 113.324 | 4.701 | 221.168 |
| 2004 | 139.252 | 114.518 | 4.567 | 223.357 |
| 2005 | 141.730 | 117.016 | 4.350 | 226.082 |
| 2006 | 144.427 | 119.688 | 4.162 | 228.815 |
| 2007 | 146.047 | 121.091 | 4.401 | 231.867 |
| 2008 | 145.362 | 120.030 | 5.875 | 233.788 |
| 2009 | 139.877 | 112.634 | 8.913 | 235.801 |
| 2010 | 139.064 | 111.714 | 8.874 | 237.830 |
| 2011 | 139.869 | 112.556 | 8.560 | 239.618 |
| 2012 | 142.469 | 114.809 | 8.122 | 243.284 |
| 2013 | 143.929 | 116.314 | 7.935 | 245.679 |
| 2014 | 146.305 | 118.718 | 7.213 | 247.947 |
| 2015 | 148.834 | 121.492 | 6.371 | 250.801 |
| 2016 | 151.436 | 123.761 | 5.943 | 253.538 |
| 2017 | 153.337 | 125.967 | 5.250 | 255.079 |
| 2018 | 155.761 | 128.572 | 4.778 | 257.791 |
| ∆2007-2018 | 9.714 | 7.481 | 0.377 | 25.924 |
| ∆% 2007-2018 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 8.6 | 11.2 |
| 1980s | ||||
| 1979 | 98.824 | 82.654 | 3.577 | 164.863 |
| 1980 | 99.303 | 82.562 | 4.321 | 167.745 |
| 1981 | 100.397 | 83.243 | 4.768 | 170.130 |
| 1982 | 99.526 | 81.421 | 6.170 | 172.271 |
| 1983 | 100.834 | 82.322 | 6.266 | 174.215 |
| 1984 | 105.005 | 86.544 | 5.744 | 176.383 |
| 1985 | 107.150 | 88.534 | 5.590 | 178.206 |
| 1986 | 109.597 | 90.529 | 5.588 | 180.587 |
| 1987 | 112.440 | 92.957 | 5.401 | 182.753 |
| 1988 | 114.968 | 95.214 | 5.206 | 184.613 |
| 1989 | 117.342 | 97.369 | 4.894 | 186.393 |
| ∆1979-1989 | 18.518 | 14.715 | 1.317 | 21.530 |
| ∆% 1979-1989 | 18.7 | 17.8 | 36.8 | 13.1 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. There are accentuated cyclic factors for both the entire population and the young population of ages 16 to 24 years. Table Summary Total provides the total noninstitutional population (ICP) of the US, full-time employment level (FTE), employment level (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP), employment/population ratio (EPOP) and unemployment level (UNE). Secular stagnation would spread over long periods instead of immediately. All indicators of the labor market weakened sharply during the contraction and did not recover. Population continued to grow but all other variables collapsed and did not recover. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-16). Hansen (1938, 1939) finds secular stagnation in lower growth of an aging population. In the current US economy, Table Summary shows that population is dynamic while the labor market is fractured. There is key explanation in the behavior of the civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and the employment population ratio (EPOP) that collapsed during the global recession with inadequate recovery. Abandoning job searches are difficult to capture in labor statistics but likely explain the decline in the participation of the population in the labor force. Allowing for abandoning job searches, the total number of people unemployed or underemployed is 20.9 million or 12.2 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html).
Table Summary Total, US, Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Millions and Percent
| ICP | FTE | EMP | CLF | CLFP | EPOP | UNE | |
| 2006 | 228.8 | 119.7 | 144.4 | 151.4 | 66.2 | 63.1 | 7.0 |
| 2009 | 235.8 | 112.6 | 139.9 | 154.1 | 65.4 | 59.3 | 14.3 |
| 2012 | 243.3 | 114.8 | 142.5 | 155.0 | 63.7 | 58.6 | 12.5 |
| 2013 | 245.7 | 116.3 | 143.9 | 155.4 | 63.2 | 58.6 | 11.5 |
| 2014 | 247.9 | 118.7 | 146.3 | 155.9 | 62.9 | 59.0 | 9.6 |
| 2015 | 250.8 | 121.5 | 148.8 | 157.1 | 62.7 | 59.3 | 8.3 |
| 2016 | 253.5 | 123.8 | 151.4 | 159.2 | 62.8 | 59.7 | 7.8 |
| 2017 | 255.1 | 126.0 | 153.3 | 160.3 | 62.9 | 60.1 | 7.0 |
| 2018 | 257.8 | 128.6 | 155.8 | 162.1 | 62.9 | 60.4 | 6.3 |
| 12/07 | 233.2 | 121.0 | 146.3 | 153.7 | 65.9 | 62.8 | 7.4 |
| 9/09 | 236.3 | 112.0 | 139.1 | 153.6 | 65.0 | 58.9 | 14.5 |
| 02/19 | 258.4 | 128.8 | 156.2 | 162.8 | 63.0 | 60.4 | 6.6 |
ICP: Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population; FTE: Full-time Employment Level, EMP: Total Employment Level; CLF: Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The same situation is present in the labor market for young people in ages 16 to 24 years with data in Table Summary Youth. The youth noninstitutional civilian population (ICP) continued to increase during and after the global recession. There is the same disastrous labor market with decline for young people in employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and employment population ratio (EPOP). There are only increases for unemployment of young people (UNE) and youth unemployment rate (UNER). If aging were a factor of secular stagnation, growth of population of young people would attract a premium in remuneration in labor markets. The sad fact is that young people are also facing tough labor markets. The application of the theory of secular stagnation to the US economy and labor markets is void of reality in the form of key facts, which are best explained by accentuated cyclic factors analyzed by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22).
| ICP | EMP | CLF | CLFP | EPOP | UNE | UNER | |
| 2006 | 36.9 | 20.0 | 22.4 | 60.6 | 54.2 | 2.4 | 10.5 |
| 2009 | 37.6 | 17.6 | 21.4 | 56.9 | 46.9 | 3.8 | 17.6 |
| 2012 | 38.8 | 17.8 | 21.3 | 54.9 | 46.0 | 3.5 | 16.2 |
| 2013 | 38.8 | 18.1 | 21.4 | 55.0 | 46.5 | 3.3 | 15.5 |
| 2014 | 38.7 | 18.4 | 21.3 | 55.0 | 47.6 | 2.9 | 13.4 |
| 2015 | 38.6 | 18.8 | 21.2 | 55.0 | 48.6 | 2.5 | 11.6 |
| 2016 | 38.4 | 19.0 | 21.2 | 55.2 | 49.4 | 2.2 | 10.4 |
| 2017 | 38.2 | 19.2 | 21.2 | 55.5 | 50.3 | 2.0 | 9.2 |
| 2018 | 38.0 | 19.2 | 21.0 | 55.2 | 50.5 | 1.8 | 8.6 |
| 12/07 | 37.5 | 19.4 | 21.7 | 57.8 | 51.6 | 2.3 | 10.7 |
| 9/09 | 37.6 | 17.0 | 20.7 | 55.2 | 45.1 | 3.8 | 18.2 |
| 2/19 | 37.8 | 18.5 | 20.4 | 53.9 | 48.9 | 1.9 | 9.3 |
ICP: Youth Noninstitutional Civilian Population; EMP: Youth Employment Level; CLF: Youth Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Youth Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Youth Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment; UNER: Youth Unemployment Rate
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The United States is experiencing high youth unemployment as in European economies. Table I-10 provides the employment level for ages 16 to 24 years of age estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. On an annual basis, youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 17.362 million in 2011 or 2.679 million fewer youth jobs and to 17.834 million in 2012 or 2.207 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.057 million in 2013 or 1.984 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.442 million in 2014 or 1.599 million. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.756 Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.756 million in 2015 or 1.285 million. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.992 million in 2016 or 1.049 million. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 19.206 million in 2017 or 0.835 million. The level of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.347 million in Dec 2014 for 1.782 million fewer youth jobs. The level of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.720 million in Dec 2015 or 1.409 million fewer jobs. Youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.830 million in Dec 2016 or 1.299 million. Youth jobs fell from 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 20.038 million in Aug 2017 or 1.129 million. During the seasonal peak months of youth employment in the summer from Jun to Aug, youth employment has fallen by more than two million jobs relative to 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 18.972 million in Aug 2014 for 2.195 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 20.085 million in Jul 2014 for 1.829 million fewer youth jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 million to 19.421 million in Jun 2014 or 1.847 million fewer youth jobs. The number of jobs ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 18.636 million in Aug 2013 or by 2.531 million. The number of youth jobs fell from 19.604 million in Sep 2006 to 18.043 million in Sep 2013 or 1.561 million fewer youth jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.106 million in Dec 2013 or 2.023 million fewer jobs. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 2.058 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 while jobs for ages 16 to 24 years decreased 1.599 million from 19.538 million in Mar 2007 to 17.939 million in Mar 2014. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased 1.410 million from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.347 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.379 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.128 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.330 million from 37.410 million in Jun 2007 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.847 million from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 to 19.421 million in Jun 2014. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased by 1.292 million from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.632 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.445 million in Aug 2007 to 38.706 million in Aug 2014 or 1.251 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.441 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.500 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.072 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.327 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.782 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.971 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.091 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.960 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.215 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.165 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.060 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.479 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.581 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.548 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.556 million in Aug 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.590 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,498 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.525 million in Sep 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.249 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.444 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.491 million in Oct 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.199 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.392 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.468 million in Nov 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.418 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.341 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.441 million in Dec 2015 while the level of youth jobs 1.409 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.734 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.495 million in Jan 2016 while the level of youth jobs fell 0.844 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.698 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.489 million in Feb 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.726 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,662 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.483 million in Mar 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.711 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.626 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.480 million in Apr 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.895 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.571 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.468 million in May 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.894 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.516 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.459 million in Jun 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.301 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.461 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.450 million in Jul 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.458 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.414 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.422 million in Aug 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.291 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.368 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.395 million in Sep 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.911 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.320 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.367 million in Oct 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.158 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.283 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.359 million in Nov 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.102 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.248 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.348 million in Dec 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.299 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.249 million in Jan 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.692 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.440 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.231 million in Feb 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.578 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.393 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.214 million in Mar 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.377 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.343 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.197 million in Apr 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.458 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.284 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.181 million in May 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.699 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.223 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.166 million in Jun 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.938 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.163 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.152 million in Jul 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.024 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.163 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.152 million in Jul 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.024 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.120 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.128 million in Aug 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.129 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.076 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.103 million in Sep 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.485 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.032 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.079 million in Oct 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.852 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.984 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.060 million in Nov 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.272 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.938 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.038 million in Dec 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.519 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.304 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.065 million in Jan 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.500 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.264 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.055 million in Feb 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.380 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.225 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.046 million in Mar 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.244 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.185 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.039 million in Apr 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.533 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.126 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.023 million in May 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.785 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.066 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.009 million in Jun 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.936 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.008 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 37.997 million in Jul 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.017 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.977 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 37.985 million in Aug 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.795 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.947 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 37.974 million in Sep 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.818 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.915 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 37.962 million in Oct 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.943 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.876 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 37.952 million in Nov 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.063 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.876 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 37.952 million in Nov 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.063 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.840 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 37.940 million in Dec 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.354 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.038 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 37.799 million in Jan 2019 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.707 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.996 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 37.787 million in Feb 2019 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.706 million. This hardship does not originate in low growth of population but in underperformance of the economy in the expansion from the business cycle. There are two hardships behind these data. First, young people cannot find employment after finishing high school and college, reducing prospects for achievement in older age. Second, students with more modest means cannot find employment to keep them in college.
Table I-10, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA
| Year | Jan | Feb | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual |
| 2001 | 19678 | 19745 | 19694 | 19675 | 19547 | 20088 |
| 2002 | 18653 | 19074 | 19542 | 19397 | 19394 | 19683 |
| 2003 | 18811 | 18880 | 19139 | 19163 | 19136 | 19351 |
| 2004 | 18852 | 18841 | 19609 | 19615 | 19619 | 19630 |
| 2005 | 18858 | 18670 | 19794 | 19750 | 19733 | 19770 |
| 2006 | 19003 | 19182 | 19853 | 19903 | 20129 | 20041 |
| 2007 | 19407 | 19415 | 19564 | 19660 | 19361 | 19875 |
| 2008 | 18724 | 18546 | 18757 | 18454 | 18378 | 19202 |
| 2009 | 17467 | 17606 | 16671 | 16689 | 16615 | 17601 |
| 2010 | 16166 | 16412 | 16867 | 16946 | 16727 | 17077 |
| 2011 | 16512 | 16638 | 17532 | 17402 | 17234 | 17362 |
| 2012 | 16944 | 17150 | 17842 | 17877 | 17604 | 17834 |
| 2013 | 17183 | 17257 | 17976 | 18104 | 18106 | 18057 |
| 2014 | 17372 | 17357 | 18781 | 18576 | 18347 | 18442 |
| 2015 | 17912 | 18222 | 18654 | 18485 | 18720 | 18756 |
| 2016 | 18159 | 18456 | 18695 | 18801 | 18830 | 18992 |
| 2017 | 18311 | 18604 | 19001 | 18631 | 18610 | 19206 |
| 2018 | 18503 | 18802 | 18910 | 18840 | 18775 | 19177 |
| 2019 | 18296 | 18476 |
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-21, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21A provides the US civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted from 2001 to 2019. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 2.058 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 while jobs for ages 16 to 24 years decreased 1.599 million from 19.538 million in Mar 2007 to 17.939 million in Mar 2014. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased 1.410 million from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.347 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.379 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.128 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.330 million from 37.410 million in Jun 2007 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.847 million from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 to 19.421 million in Jun 2014. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased by 1.292 million from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.632 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.445 million in Aug 2007 to 38.706 million in Aug 2014 or 1.251 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.441 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.500 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.072 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.327 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.782 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.971 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.091 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.960 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.215 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.165 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.060 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.479 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.581 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.548 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.556 million in Aug 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.590 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,498 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.525 million in Sep 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.249 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.444 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.491 million in Oct 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.199 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.392 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.468 million in Nov 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.418 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.341 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.441 million in Dec 2015 while the level of youth jobs 1.409 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.734 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.495 million in Jan 2016 while the level of youth jobs fell 0.844 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.698 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.489 million in Feb 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.726 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,662 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.483 million in Mar 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.711 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.626 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.480 million in Apr 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.895 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.571 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.468 million in May 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.894 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.516 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.459 million in Jun 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.301 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.461 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.450 million in Jul 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.458 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.414 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.422 million in Aug 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.291 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.368 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.395 million in Sep 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.911 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.320 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.367 million in Oct 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.158 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.283 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.359 million in Nov 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.102 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.248 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.348 million in Dec 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.299 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.249 million in Jan 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.692 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.440 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.231 million in Feb 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.578 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.393 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.214 million in Mar 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.377 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.343 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.197 million in Apr 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.458 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.284 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.181 million in May 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.699 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.223 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.166 million in Jun 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.938 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.163 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.152 million in Jul 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.024 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.163 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.152 million in Jul 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.024 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.120 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.128 million in Aug 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.129 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.076 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.103 million in Sep 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.485 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.032 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.079 million in Oct 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.852 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.984 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.060 million in Nov 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.272 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.938 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.038 million in Dec 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.519 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.304 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.065 million in Jan 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.500 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.264 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.055 million in Feb 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.380 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.225 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.046 million in Mar 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.244 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.185 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.039 million in Apr 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.533 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.126 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.023 million in May 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.785 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.066 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.009 million in Jun 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.936 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.008 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 37.997 million in Jul 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.017 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.977 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 37.985 million in Aug 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.795 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.947 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 37.974 million in Sep 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.818 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.915 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 37.962 million in Oct 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.943 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.876 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 37.952 million in Nov 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.063 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.876 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 37.952 million in Nov 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.063 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.840 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 37.940 million in Dec 2018 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.354 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.038 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 37.799 million in Jan 2019 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.707 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.996 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 37.787 million in Feb 2019 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.706 million. This hardship does not originate in low growth of population but in underperformance of the economy in the expansion from the business cycle. There are two hardships behind these data. First, young people cannot find employment after finishing high school and college, reducing prospects for achievement in older age. Second, students with more modest means cannot find employment to keep them in college.
Chart I-21A, US, Civilian Noninstitutional Population Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21B provides the civilian labor force of the US ages 16 to 24 years NSA from 2001 to 2018. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 24.339 million in Jul 2007 to 23.506 million in Jul 2013, by 0.833 million or decline of 3.4 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population NSA increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013, by 1.418 million or 3.8 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 fell from 22.801 million in Aug 2007 to 22.089 million in Aug 2013, by 0.712 million or 3.1 percent, while the noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013, by 1.386 million or 3.7 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.917 million in Sep 2007 to 21.183 million in Sep 2013, by 0.734 million or 3.3 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 by 1.355 million or 3.6 percent. The US civilian labor force fell from 21.821 million in Oct 2007 to 21.003 million in Oct 2013, by 0.818 million or 3.7 percent while the noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013, by 1.324 million or 3.5 percent. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.909 million in Nov 2007 to 20.825 million in Nov 2013, by 1.084 million or 4.9 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.684 million in Dec 2007 to 20.642 million in Dec 2013, by 1.042 million or 4.8 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013, by 1.272 million or 3.4 percent. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell from 21.770 million in Jan 2007 to 20.423 million in Jan 2014, by 1.347 million or 6.2 percent while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014, by 1.488 million or 4.0 percent. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell 1.255 million from 21.645 million in Feb 2007 to 20.390 million in Feb 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 million in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell 0.693 million from 21.634 million in Mar 2007 to 20.941 million in Mar 2014 or 3.2 person while the youth noninstitutional civilian population 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 or 3.9 percent. The US youth civilian labor force fell 981 thousand from 21.442 million in Apr 2007 to 20.461 million in Apr 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 by 1.410 thousand or 3.8 percent. The youth civilian labor force decreased from 21.659 million in May 2007 to 21.160 million in May 2014 by 499 thousand or 2.3 percent while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.739 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2007 or by 2.7 percent. The youth civilian labor force decreased from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.851 million in Jun 2014 by 1.277 million or 5.3 percent while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 by 1.797 million or 4.9 percent. The youth civilian labor force fell from 24.664 million in Jul 2006 to 23.437 million in Jul 2014 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014. The youth civilian labor force fell 1.818 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 21.816 million in Aug 2014 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.706 million in Aug 2914 or 1.698 million. The youth civilian labor force fell 0.942 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.959 million in Sep 2014 while the noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.702 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 21.403 million in Oct 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.111 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 21.034 million in Nov 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.472 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.664 million in Dec 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.831 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.555 million in Jan 2015 while the youth noninstitutional population increased from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 or 1.971 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.864 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.751 million in Feb 2015 while the youth noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.907 million from 21.507 million in Mar 2006 to 20.600 million in Mar 2015 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.082 million from 21.498 million in Apr 2006 to 20.416 million in Apr 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.681 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 21.342 million in May 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.202 million from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.926 million in Jun 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.502 million from 24.664 million in Jul 2007 to 23.162 million in Jul 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.667 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 21.967 million in Aug 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.548 million from 37.008 in Aug 2006 to 38.556 million in Aug 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.290 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.611 in Sep 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.498 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.525 million in Sep 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.228 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 20.877 million in Oct 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.444 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.491 million in Oct 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.513 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 20.632 million in Nov 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.392 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.468 million in Nov 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.301 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.835 million in Dec 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.341 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.441 million in Dec 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.004 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.364 million in Jan 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.734 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.495 million in Jan 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.930 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.685 million in Feb 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.698 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.489 million in Feb 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.767 million from 21.507 million in Mar 2006 to 20.740 million in Mar 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.662 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.483 million in Mar 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.950 million from 21.498 million in Apr 2006 to 20.548 million in Apr 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.626 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.480 million in Apr 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.921 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 21.102 million in May 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.571 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.468 million in May 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.373 million from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.755 million in Jun 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.516 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.459 million in Jun 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.560 million from 24.664 million in Jul 2006 to 23.104 million in Jul 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,461 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.450 million in Jul 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.536 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 22.098 million in Aug 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.414 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.422 million in Aug 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.082 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.891 million in Sep 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.368 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.395 million in Sep 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.315 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 20.790 million in Oct 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.320 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.367 million in Oct 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.410 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 20.735 million in Nov 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.283 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.359 million in Nov 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.447 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.689 million in Dec 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.248 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.348 million in Dec 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.861 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.507 million in Jan 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.249 million in Jan 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.918 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.697 million in Feb 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.440 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.231 million in Feb 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.751 million from 21.507 million in Mar 2006 to 20.756 million in Mar 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.393 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.214 million in Mar 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.790 million from 21.498 million in Apr 2006 to 20.708 million in Apr 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.343 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.197 million in Apr 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.124 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 20.899 million in May 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.284 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.181 million in May 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.408 million from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.720 million in Jun 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.223 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.166 million in Jun 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.557 million from 24.664 million in Jul 2006 to 23.107 million in Jul 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.163 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.152 million in Jul 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.666 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 21.968 million in Aug 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.120 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.128 million in Aug 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.904 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.997 million in Sep 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.076 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.103 million in Sep 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.284 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 20.821 million in Oct 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.032 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.079 million in Oct 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.652 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 20.493 million in Nov 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.984 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.060 million in Nov 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.885 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.251 million in Dec 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.938 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.038 million in Dec 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.835 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.533 million in Jan 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.304 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.065 million in Jan 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.835 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.533 million in Jan 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.304 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.065 million in Jan 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.907 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.708 million in Jan 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.264 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.055 million in Feb 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.755 million from 21.507 million in Mar 2006 to 20.752 million in Mar 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.225 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.046 million in Mar 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.073 million from 21.498 million in Apr 2006 to 20.425 million in Apr 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.185 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.039 million in Apr 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.244 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 20.779 million in May 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.126 million from 36.897 million in Apr 2006 to 38.023 million in Apr 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.244 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 20.779 million in May 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.126 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.023 million in May 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.488 million from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.640 million in Jun 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.066 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.009 million in Jun 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.648 million from 24.664 million in Jul 2006 to 23.016 million in Jul 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.008 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 37.997 million in Jul 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 2.542 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 21.092 million in Aug 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.977 million from 37.027 million in Aug 2006 to 37.985 million in Aug 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.400 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.501 million in Sep 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.947 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 37.974 million in Sep 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.544 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 20.561 million in Oct 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.915 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 37.962 million in Oct 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.743 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 20.402 million in Nov 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.876 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 37.952 million in Nov 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.735 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.401 million in Dec 2018 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.840 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 37.940 million in Dec 2018. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.045 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.323 million in Jan 2019 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.038 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 37.799 million in Jan 2019. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.252 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.363 million in Feb 2019 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 0.996 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 37.787 million in Feb 2019. Youth in the US abandoned their participation in the labor force because of the frustration that there are no jobs available for them.
Chart I-21B, US, Civilian Labor Force Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21C provides the ratio of labor force to noninstitutional population or labor force participation of ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted. The US labor force participation rates for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.5 in Jul 2013 because of the frustration of young people who believe there may not be jobs available for them. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 56.9 in Aug 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.1 percent in Sep 2006 to 54.6 percent in Sep 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Oct 2006 to 54.1 in Oct 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Nov 2006 to 53.7 percent in Nov 2013. The US labor force participation rate fell from 57.8 in Dec 2007 to 53.2 in Dec 2013. The youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.4 in Jan 2007 to 52.7 in Jan 2014. The US youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.0 percent in Feb 2007 to 52.6 percent in Feb 2013. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 58.0 in Mar 2007 to 54.0 in Mar 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.4 in Apr 2007 to 52.8 in Apr 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.9 in May 2007 to 54.6 in May 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.0 in Jun 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.5 in Jul 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 56.4 in Aug 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 54.2 in Sep 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 55.4 in Oct 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 54.5 in Nov 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 53.5 in Dec 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 53.1 in Jan 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 53.6 in Feb 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 53.3 in Mar 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 58.7 in Apr 2005 to 52.8 in Apr 2006. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 59.7 in May 2006 to 55.2 in May 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.4 in Jun 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.0 in Jul 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 57.0 in Aug 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 53.5 in Sep 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 54.2 in Oct 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 53.6 in Nov 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 54.2 in Dec 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 52.9 in Jan 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 53.7 in Feb 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 53.9 in Mar 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.3 in Apr 2006 to 53.4 in Apr 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in May 2006 to 54.9 in May 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.2 in Jun 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.1 in Jul 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 57.5 in Aug 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 54.2 in Sep 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 54.2 in Oct 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 54.1 in Nov 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 54.0 in Dec 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 53.6 in Jan 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 54.1 in Feb 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 54.3 in Mar 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 54.3 in Mar 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.3 in Apr 2006 to 54.2 in Apr 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in May 2006 to 54.7 in May 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.5 in Jun 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.6 in Jul 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 57.6 in Aug 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 55.1 in Sep 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 54.7 in Oct 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 53.8 in Nov 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 53.2 in Dec 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 53.9 in Jan 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 54.4 in Feb 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 54.5 in Mar 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.3 in Apr 2006 to 53.7 in Apr 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in May 2006 to 54.6 in May 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.6 in Jun 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.6 in Jul 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 55.5 in Aug 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 54.0 in Sep 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 54.2 in Oct 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 53.8 in Nov 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 53.8 in Dec 2018. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 53.8 in Jan 2019. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 53.9 in Feb 2019. Many young people abandoned searches for employment, dropping from the labor force.
Chart I-21C, US, Labor Force Participation Rate Ages 16 to 24 Years, NSA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
An important measure of the job market is the number of people with jobs relative to population available for work (civilian noninstitutional population) or employment/population ratio. Chart I-21D provides the employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years. The US employment/population ratio NSA for ages 16 to 24 years collapsed from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 50.7 in Jul 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years dropped from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 48.0 in Aug 2013. The employment population ratio for ages to 16 to 24 years declined from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 46.5 in Sep 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 46.3 in Oct 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.7 in Nov 2007 to 46.7 in Nov 2013. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.6 in Dec 2007 to 46.7 in Dec 2013. The US employment population ratio fell from 52.1 in Jan 2007 to 44.8 in Jan 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.0 in Feb 2007 to 44.8 in Feb 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.3 in Mar 2007 to 46.3 in Mar 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.9 in Apr 2007 to 46.5 in Apr 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.1 in May 2007 to 47.3 in May 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 50.1 in Jun 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 50.1 in Jul 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 49.0 in Aug 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 46.8 in Sep 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 48.6 in Oct 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 48.1 in Nov 2014. The employment population ration for ages 16 to 24 fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 47.5 in Dec 2014. The employment population ration for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 46.2 in Jan 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 47.1 in Feb 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.4 in Mar 2006 to 46.7 in Mar 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.7 in Apr 2006 to 47.2 in Apr 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in May 206 to 48.4 in May 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 51.3 in Jun 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 52.7 in Jul 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 50.8 in Aug 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 47.6 in Sep 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 48.5 in Oct 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 48.1 in Nov 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 48.7 in Dec 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 47.2 in Jan 2016. The employment population ration for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 48.0 in Feb 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.4 in Mar 2006 to 48.3 in Mar 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.7 in Apr 2006 to 48.1 in Apr 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in May 2006 to 49.1 in May 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 51.9 in Jun 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 53.2 in Jul 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 51.7 in Aug 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 48.7 in Sep 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 48.7 in Oct 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 49.0 in Nov 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 49.1 in Dec 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 47.9 in Jan 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 48.7 in Feb 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.4 in Mar 2006 to 49.5 in Mar 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.7 in Apr 2006 to 49.6 in Apr 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in May 2006 to 49.9 in May 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 53.3 in Jun 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 54.8 in Jul 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 52.6 in Aug 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 50.2 in Sep 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 49.9 in Oct 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 49.0 in Nov 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 48.9 in Dec 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 48.6 in Jan 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 49.4 in Feb 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.4 in Mar 2006 to 50.1 in Mar 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.7 in Apr 2006 to 49.6 in Apr 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in May 2006 to 49.9 in May 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 53.5 in Jun 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 55.0 in Jul 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 51.0 in Aug 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 49.5 in Sep 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 49.8 in Oct 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 49.6 in Nov 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 49.5 in Dec 2018. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 48.4 in Jan 2019. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 48.9 in Feb 2019. Chart I-21D shows vertical drop during the global recession without recovery.
Chart I-21D, US, Employment Population Ratio Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table I-11 provides US unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years. The number unemployed ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 3634 thousand in 2011 or by 1.292 million and 3451 thousand in 2012 or by 1.109 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 in 2007 to 3324 thousand in 2013 or by 0.982 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 2853 thousand in 2014 or by 0.511 million. The unemployment level for ages 16 to 24 increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 2467 thousand in 2015, decreasing to 2.211 million in 2016. The unemployment level for ages 16 to 24 increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 2467 thousand in 2015, decreasing to 2.211 million in 2016. The unemployment level decreased to 1.955 million in 2017. The unemployment level decreased to 1.807 million in 2018. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years decreased from 2.433 million in Feb 2006 to 1.887 million in Feb 2019 or decrease by 0.546 million. This situation may persist for many years.
Table I-11, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, NSA, Thousands
| Year | Jan | Feb | Nov | Dec | Annual |
| 2001 | 2250 | 2258 | 2470 | 2412 | 2371 |
| 2002 | 2754 | 2731 | 2570 | 2374 | 2683 |
| 2003 | 2748 | 2740 | 2522 | 2248 | 2746 |
| 2004 | 2767 | 2631 | 2448 | 2294 | 2638 |
| 2005 | 2661 | 2787 | 2369 | 2055 | 2521 |
| 2006 | 2366 | 2433 | 2242 | 2007 | 2353 |
| 2007 | 2363 | 2230 | 2250 | 2323 | 2342 |
| 2008 | 2633 | 2480 | 2833 | 2928 | 2830 |
| 2009 | 3278 | 3457 | 3699 | 3532 | 3760 |
| 2010 | 3983 | 3888 | 3561 | 3352 | 3857 |
| 2011 | 3851 | 3696 | 3287 | 3161 | 3634 |
| 2012 | 3416 | 3507 | 3102 | 3153 | 3451 |
| 2013 | 3674 | 3449 | 2721 | 2536 | 3324 |
| 2014 | 3051 | 3033 | 2458 | 2317 | 2853 |
| 2015 | 2644 | 2529 | 2147 | 2114 | 2467 |
| 2016 | 2205 | 2229 | 1934 | 1859 | 2211 |
| 2017 | 2195 | 2093 | 1862 | 1640 | 1955 |
| 2018 | 2029 | 1906 | 1562 | 1626 | 1807 |
| 2019 | 2027 | 1887 |
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-22 provides the unemployment level for ages 16 to 24 from 2001 to 2019. The level rose sharply from 2007 to 2010 with tepid improvement into 2012 and deterioration into 2013-2014 with recent marginal improvement in 2015-2019 alternating with deterioration.
Chart I-22, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table I-12, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA
| Year | Jan | Feb | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual |
| 2001 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 11.0 | 11.2 | 11.0 | 10.6 |
| 2002 | 12.9 | 12.5 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 10.9 | 12.0 |
| 2003 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 10.5 | 12.4 |
| 2004 | 12.8 | 12.3 | 11.6 | 11.1 | 10.5 | 11.8 |
| 2005 | 12.4 | 13.0 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 9.4 | 11.3 |
| 2006 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 10.2 | 10.1 | 9.1 | 10.5 |
| 2007 | 10.9 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 10.5 |
| 2008 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 13.2 | 13.3 | 13.7 | 12.8 |
| 2009 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 18.5 | 18.1 | 17.5 | 17.6 |
| 2010 | 19.8 | 19.2 | 18.1 | 17.4 | 16.7 | 18.4 |
| 2011 | 18.9 | 18.2 | 16.2 | 15.9 | 15.5 | 17.3 |
| 2012 | 16.8 | 17.0 | 15.5 | 14.8 | 15.2 | 16.2 |
| 2013 | 17.6 | 16.7 | 14.4 | 13.1 | 12.3 | 15.5 |
| 2014 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 12.2 | 11.7 | 11.2 | 13.4 |
| 2015 | 12.9 | 12.2 | 10.6 | 10.4 | 10.1 | 11.6 |
| 2016 | 10.8 | 10.8 | 10.1 | 9.3 | 9.0 | 10.4 |
| 2017 | 10.7 | 10.1 | 8.7 | 9.1 | 8.1 | 9.2 |
| 2018 | 9.9 | 9.2 | 8.0 | 7.7 | 8.0 | 8.6 |
| 2019 | 10.0 | 9.3 |
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-23 provides the BLS estimate of the not-seasonally-adjusted rate of youth unemployment for ages 16 to 24 years from 2001 to 2019. The rate of youth unemployment increased sharply during the global recession of 2008 and 2009 but failed to drop faster to earlier lower levels because of cyclically slower growth of GDP. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E. Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
Chart I-23, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent, NSA, 2001-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-24 provides longer perspective with the rate of youth unemployment in ages 16 to 24 years from 1948 to 2018. The rate of youth unemployment rose to 20 percent during the contractions of the early 1980s and also during the contraction of the global recession in 2008 and 2009. The data illustrate again the argument in this blog that the contractions of the early 1980s are the valid framework for comparison with the global recession of 2008 and 2009 instead of misleading comparisons with the 1930s. During the initial phase of recovery, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years NSA fell from 18.9 percent in Jun 1983 to 14.5 percent in Jun 1984. In contrast, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years was nearly the same during the expansion after IIIQ2009: 17.5 percent in Dec 2009, 16.7 percent in Dec 2010, 15.5 percent in Dec 2011, 15.2 percent in Dec 2012, 17.6 percent in Jan 2013, 16.7 percent in Feb 2013, 15.9 percent in Mar 2013, 15.1 percent in Apr 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 16.4 percent in May 2013, 18.0 percent in Jun 2013, 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and 15.6 percent in Aug 2013. In Sep 2006, the rate of youth unemployment was 10.5 percent, increasing to 14.8 percent in Sep 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 in Oct 2007, increasing to 14.4 percent in Oct 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Nov 2007, increasing to 13.1 percent in Nov 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.7 percent in Dec 2013, increasing to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.9 percent in Jan 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Jan 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Feb 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Feb 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 9.7 percent in Mar 2007, increasing to 14.3 percent in Mar 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 9.7 percent in Apr 2007, increasing to 11.9 percent in Apr 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.2 percent in May 2007, increasing to 13.4 percent in May 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 12.0 percent in Jun 2007, increasing to 15.0 percent in Jun 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.8 percent in Jul 2007, increasing to 14.3 percent in Jul 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.5 percent in Aug 2007, increasing to 13.0 percent in Aug 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 11.0 percent in Sep 2007, increasing to 13.6 percent in Sep 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 12.2 in Oct 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 percent in Nov 2007 to 11.7 percent in Nov 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.7 in Dec 2007 to 11.2 in Dec 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Mar 2007 to 12.3 in Mar 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Apr 2007 to 10.7 in Apr 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.2 in May 2007 to 12.3 in May 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 12.0 in Jun 2007 to 13.7 in Jun 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 12.2 in Jul 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.5 in Aug 2007 to 10.9 in Aug 2015. The rate of youth unemployment decreased from 11.0 in Sep 2007 to 10.9 in Sep 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 10.6 in Oct 2015, decreasing to 10.4 in Nov 2015. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 10.1 in Dec 2015. The rate of youth unemployment stood at 10.8 in Jan 2016, 10.8 in Feb 2016, 10.4 in Mar 2016 and 9.9 in Apr 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 10.6 in May 2016 and 12.3 in Jun 2016. The rate of youth unemployment fell to 11.5 in Jul 2016, decreasing to 10.1 in Aug 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 10.2 in Sep 2016, decreasing to 10.1 in Oct 2016 and 9.3 in Nov 2016. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 9.0 in Dec 2016, increasing to 10.7 in Jan 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell to 10.1 in Feb 2017, decreasing to 8.9 in Mar 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell to 8.5 in Apr 2017, increasing to 8.8 in May 2017. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 10.5 percent in Jun 2017, decreasing to 9.6 in Jul 2017. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 8.8 percent in Aug 2017, increasing to 8.9 percent in Sep 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell to 8.7 percent in Oct 2017, increasing to 9.1 percent in Nov 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell to 8.1 percent in Dec 2017, increasing to 9.9 percent in Jan 2018. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 9.2 percent in Feb 2018, decreasing to 8.2 percent in Mar 2018. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 7.6 percent in Apr 2018. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 8.6 percent in May 2018 and increased to 10.2 percent in Jun 2018. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 9.2 percent in Jul 2018, decreasing to 8.2 percent in Aug 2018. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 8.4 percent in Sep 2018, decreasing to 8.0 percent in Oct 2018. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 7.7 percent in Nov 2018, increasing to 8.0 percent in Dec 2018. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 10.0 percent in Jan 2019, decreasing to 9.3 percent in Feb 2019. The actual rate is higher because of the difficulty in counting those dropping from the labor force because they believe there are no jobs available for them. The difference originates in the vigorous seasonally adjusted annual equivalent average rate of GDP growth of 5.9 percent during the recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992 compared with 2.3 percent on average during the first 37 quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2018. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 38 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the initial estimate of GDP for IVQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-02/gdp4q18_ini_0.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 would have accumulated to 38.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2018 would be $21,814.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3030.0 billion than actual $18,784.6 billion. There are more than two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.2 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html). US GDP in IVQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,784.6 billion in IVQ2018 or 19.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Feb 1919 to Feb 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 152.3255 in Feb 2019. The actual index NSA in Feb 2019 is 103.7365, which is 31.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Feb 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.1303 in Feb 2019. The output of manufacturing at 103.7365 in Feb 2019 is 23.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart I-24, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent NSA, 1948-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
It is more difficult to move to other jobs after a certain age because of fewer available opportunities for mature individuals than for new entrants into the labor force. Middle-aged unemployed are less likely to find another job. Table I-13 provides the unemployment level ages 45 years and over. The number unemployed ages 45 years and over rose from 1.607 million in Oct 2006 to 4.576 million in Oct 2010 or by 184.8 percent. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over declined to 3.800 million in Oct 2012 that is still higher by 136.5 percent than in Oct 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over increased from 1.704 million in Nov 2006 to 3.861 million in Nov 2012, or 126.6 percent. The number unemployed age 45 and over is still higher by 98.5 percent at 3.383 million in Nov 2013 than 1.704 million in Nov 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over jumped from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 4.762 million in Dec 2010 or 165.4 percent. At 3.927 million in Dec 2012, mature unemployment is higher by 2.133 million or 118.9 percent higher than 1.794 million in Dec 2006. The level of unemployment of those aged 45 year or more of 3.632 million in Oct 2013 is higher by 2.025 million than 1.607 million in Oct 2006 or higher by 126.0 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 3.378 million in Nov 2013 or 88.3 percent. The annual number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.848 million in 2006 to 3.719 million in 2013 or 101.2 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 4.394 million in Jan 2013, by 2.618 million or 106.7 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over rose from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 3.508 million in Jan 2014, by 1.382 million or 65.0 percent. The level of unemployed 45 years or older increased 2.051 million or 99.8 percent from 2.056 million in Feb 2006 to 4.107 million in Feb 2013 and at 3.490 million in Feb 2014 is higher by 69.7 percent than in Feb 2006. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased 2.048 million or 108.9 percent from 1.881 million in Mar 2006 to 3.929 million in Mar 2013 and at 3.394 million in Mar 2014 is higher by 80.4 percent than in Mar 2006. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased 1.846 million or 100.2 percent from 1.843 million in Apr 2006 to 3.689 million in Apr 2013 and at 3.006 million in Apr 2014 is higher by 1.163 million or 63.1 percent. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 102.1 percent from 1.784 million in May 2006 to 3.605 million in May 2014 and at 2.913 million in May 2014 is higher by 63.3 percent than in May 2007.
The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 102.1 percent from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 3.648 million in Jun 2013 and at 2.832 million in Jun 2014 is higher by 56.9 percent than in Jun 2007. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 81.5 percent from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 3.727 million in Jul 2013 and at 3.083 million in Jul 2014 is higher by 50.2 percent than in Jul 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 84.4 percent from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 3.607 million in Aug 2013 and at 3.037 million in Aug 2014 is 55.2 percent higher than in Aug 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 90.7 percent from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 3.535 million in Sep 2013 and at 2.640 million in Sep 2014 is 42.4 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.747 million from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 3.632 million in Oct 2013 and at 2.606 million in Oct 2014 is 38.2 percent higher than in Oct 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.458 million from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 3.383 million in Nov 2013 and at 2.829 million in Nov 2014 is 47.0 percent higher than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.258 million from Dec 2007 to Dec 2013 and at 2.667 million in Dec 2014 is 25.8 higher than in Dec 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.353 million from Jan 2007 to Jan 2015 and at 3.077 million in Jan 2015 is 42.8 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.352 million from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 3.490 million in Feb 2014 and at 2.991 million in Feb 2015 is 39.9 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.363 million from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 3.394 million in Mar 2014 and at 2.724 million in Mar 2015 is 34.1 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.871 million in Apr 2007 to 3.006 million in Apr 2014 and at 2.579 million in Apr 2015 is 37.8 higher than in Apr 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.803 million in May 2007 to 2.913 million in Jun 2014 and at 2.457 million in May 2015 is 36.3 percent higher than in May 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 2.832 million in Jun 2014 and at 2.359 million in Jun 2015 is 30.7 percent higher than in Jun 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 3.083 million in Jul 2014 and at 2.666 million in Jul 2015 is 30.0 percent higher than in Jul 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 3.037 million in Aug 2014 and at 2.693 million in Aug 2015 is 37.7 higher than in Aug 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 2.640 million in Sep 2015 and at 2.388 million in Sep 2015 is 28.8 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 years and over increased from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 2.606 million in Oct 2014 and at 2.290 million in Oct 2015 is 21.5 percent higher than in Oct 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 years and over increased from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 2.829 million in Nov 2014 and at 2.349 million in Nov 2015 is 22.0 percent higher than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 years and over increased from 2.120 million in Dec 2007 to 2.667 million in Dec 2014 and at 2.317 million in Dec 2015 is 9.3 percent higher than in Dec 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.155 million in Jan 2007 to 3.077 million in Jan 2015 and at 2.736 million in Jan 2016 is 27.0 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 2.991 million in Feb 2015 and at 2.744 million in Feb 2016 is 28.3 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 2.724 million in Mar 2015 and at 2.747 million in Mar 2016 is 35.3 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.871 million in Apr 2007 to 2.579 million in Apr 2015 and at 2.410 million in Apr 2016 is 28.8 percent higher than in Apr 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.803 million in May 2007 to 2.457 million in May 2015 and at 2.190 million in May 2016 is 21.5 percent higher than in May 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 2.359 million in Jun 2015 and at 2.345 million in Jun 2016 is 29.9 percent higher than in Jun 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 2.666 million in Jul 2015 and at 2.619 million in Jul 2016 is 27.6 percent higher than in Jul 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 2.693 million in Aug 2015 and at 2.565 million in Aug 2016 is 31.1 percent higher than in Aug 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 2.388 million in Sep 2015 and at 2.414 million in Sep 2016 is 30.2 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 2.290 million in Oct 2015 and at 2.337 million in Oct 2016 is 24.0 percent higher than in Oct 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 2.349 million in Nov 2015 and at 2.355 million in Nov 2016 is 22.3 percent higher than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.120 million in Dec 2007 to 2.317 million in Dec 2015 and at 2.360 million in Dec 2016 is 11.3 percent higher than in Dec 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.155 million in Jan 2007 to 2.736 million in Jan 2016 and at 2.585 million in Jan 2017 is 20.0 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 2.744 million in Feb 2016 and at 2.493 million in Feb 2017 is 16.6 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 2.747 million in Mar 2016 and at 2.413 million in Mar 2017 is 18.8 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 2.747 million in Mar 2016 and at 2.413 million in Mar 2017 is 18.8 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.871 million in Apr 2007 to 2.410 million in Apr 2016 and at 2.202 million in Apr 2017 is 17.7 percent higher than in Apr 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.803 million in May 2007 to 2.190 million in May 2016 and at 2.052 million in May 2017 is 13.8 percent higher than in May 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 2.345 million in Jun 2016 and at 2.256 million in Jun 2017 is 25.0 percent higher than in Jun 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 2.619 million in Jul 2016 and at 2.335 million in Jul 2017 is 13.7 percent higher than in Jul 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 2.565 million in Aug 2016 and at 2.444 million in Aug 2017 is 24.9 percent higher than in Aug 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 2.414 million in Sep 2016 and at 2.140 million in Sep 2017 is 15.4 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 2.337 million in Oct 2016 and at 1.899 million in Oct 2017 is 0.7 percent higher than in Oct 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 2.355 million in Nov 2016 and at 1.958 million in Nov 2017 is 1.7 percent higher than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.120 million in Dec 2007 to 2.360 million in Dec 2016 and at 2.079 million in Dec 2017 is 1.9 percent lower than in Dec 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.155 million in Jan 2007 to 2.585 million in Jan 2017 and at 2.300 million in Jan 2018 is 6.7 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 2.493 million in Feb 2017 and at 2.354 million in Feb 2018 is 10.1 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 2.413 million in Mar 2017 and at 2.266 million in Mar 2018 is 11.6 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.871 million in Apr 2007 to 2.202 million in Apr 2017 and at 1.937 million in Apr 2018 is 3.5 percent higher than in Apr 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.803 million in May 2007 to 2.252 million in May 2017 and at 1.174 million in May 2018 is 1.6 percent lower than in May 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 2.256 million in Jun 2017 and at 2.102 million in Jun 2018 is 16.5 percent higher than in Jun 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 2.335 million in Jul 2017 and at 2.235 million in Jul 2018 is 8.9 percent higher than in Jul 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 2.444 million in Aug 2017 and at 2.096 million in Aug 2018 is 7.2 percent higher than in Aug 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 2.140 million in Sep 2017 and at 1.872 million in Sep 2018 is 1.0 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 1.889 million in Oct 2017 and at 1.833 million in Oct 2018 is 2.8 percent lower than in Oct 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 1.958 million in Nov 2017 and at 1.850 million in Nov 2018 is 3.9 percent lower than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over decreased from 2.120 million in Dec 2007 to 2.079 million in Dec 2017 and at 2.026 million in Dec 2018 is 4.4 percent lower than in Dec 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.155 million in Jan 2007 to 2.300 million in Jan 2018 and at 2.393 million in Jan 2019 is 11.0 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 2.354 million in Feb 2018 and at 2.149 million in Feb 2019 is 0.5 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The actual number unemployed is likely much higher because many are not accounted who abandoned job searches in frustration there may not be a job for them. Recent improvements may be illusory. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 38 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the initial estimate of GDP for IVQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-02/gdp4q18_ini_0.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1992, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1992 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2018 would have accumulated to 38.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2018 would be $21,814.6 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $3030.0 billion than actual $18,784.6 billion. There are more than two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.2 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/03/dollar-revaluation-twenty-one-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2019/02/wait-and-see-patient-forecast-dependent.html). US GDP in IVQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,784.6 billion in IVQ2018 or 19.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Feb 1919 to Feb 2019. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 152.3255 in Feb 2019. The actual index NSA in Feb 2019 is 103.7365, which is 31.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Feb 2019. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.1303 in Feb 2019. The output of manufacturing at 103.7365 in Feb 2019 is 23.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-13, US, Unemployment Level 45 Years and Over, NSA
| Year | Jan | Feb | Nov | Dec | Annual |
| 2000 | 1498 | 1392 | 1242 | 1217 | 1249 |
| 2001 | 1572 | 1587 | 1786 | 1901 | 1576 |
| 2002 | 2235 | 2280 | 2013 | 2210 | 2114 |
| 2003 | 2495 | 2415 | 2132 | 2130 | 2253 |
| 2004 | 2453 | 2397 | 2053 | 2086 | 2149 |
| 2005 | 2286 | 2286 | 1920 | 1963 | 2009 |
| 2006 | 2126 | 2056 | 1704 | 1794 | 1848 |
| 2007 | 2155 | 2138 | 1925 | 2120 | 1966 |
| 2008 | 2336 | 2336 | 3078 | 3485 | 2540 |
| 2009 | 4138 | 4380 | 4655 | 4960 | 4500 |
| 2010 | 5314 | 5307 | 4909 | 4762 | 4879 |
| 2011 | 5027 | 4837 | 4195 | 4182 | 4537 |
| 2012 | 4458 | 4472 | 3861 | 3927 | 4133 |
| 2013 | 4394 | 4107 | 3383 | 3378 | 3719 |
| 2014 | 3508 | 3490 | 2829 | 2667 | 3000 |
| 2015 | 3077 | 2991 | 2349 | 2317 | 2574 |
| 2016 | 2736 | 2744 | 2355 | 2360 | 2485 |
| 2017 | 2585 | 2493 | 1958 | 2079 | 2238 |
| 2018 | 2300 | 2354 | 1850 | 2026 | 2054 |
| 2019 | 2393 | 2149 |
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-25 provides the level unemployed ages 45 years and over. There was an increase in the recessions of the 1980s, 1991 and 2001 followed by declines to earlier levels. The current expansion of the economy after IIIQ2009 has not been sufficiently vigorous to reduce significantly middle-age unemployment. Recent improvements could be illusory because many abandoned job searches in frustration that there may not be jobs for them and are not counted as unemployed.
Chart I-25, US, Unemployment Level Ages 45 Years and Over, Thousands, NSA, 1976-2019
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.
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