CMP Associates Regulation Blog

Chart I-1 shows the annual level of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) that collapsed during the global recession after 2007 in contrast with milder decline in the shallow recession of 2001. Nonfarm hiring has not recovered, remaining at a depressed level. The civilian noninstitutional population or those in condition to work increased from 228.815 million in 2006 to 253.538 million in 2016 or by 24.723 million. Hiring has not recovered precession levels while needs of hiring multiplied because of growth of population by more than 24 million.

Chart I-1, US, Level Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2016

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-2 shows the ratio or rate of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) that also fell much more in the recession of 2007 to 2009 than in the shallow recession of 2001. Recovery is weak in the current environment of cyclical slow growth.

Chart I-2, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2016

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Yearly percentage changes of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) are provided in Table I-2. There were much milder declines in 2002 of 6.9 percent and 2.6 percent in 2003 followed by strong rebounds of 5.8 percent in 2004 and 4.7 percent in 2005. In contrast, the contractions of nonfarm hiring in the recession after 2007 were much sharper in percentage points: 2.0 in 2007, 12.0 in 2008 and 15.7 percent in 2009. On a yearly basis, nonfarm hiring grew 5.3 percent in 2010 relative to 2009, 3.3 percent in 2011, 4.1 percent in 2012 and 3.8 percent in 2013. Nonfarm hiring grew 8.0 percent in 2014 and increased 5.8 percent in 2015. Nonfarm hiring grew 1.1 percent in 2016. The relatively large length of 27 quarters of the current expansion reduces the likelihood of significant recovery of hiring levels in the United States because lower rates of growth and hiring in the final phase of expansions.

Table I-2, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual Percentage Change, 2002-2016

Year	Annual ∆%
2002	-6.9
2003	-2.6
2004	5.8
2005	4.7
2006	0.6
2007	-2.0
2008	-12.0
2009	-15.7
2010	5.3
2011	3.3
2012	4.1
2013	3.8
2014	8.0
2015	5.8
2016	1.1

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Total private hiring (HP) 12-month percentage changes of annual data are in Chart I-3. There has been sharp contraction of total private hiring in the US and only milder recovery from 2010 to 2016.

Chart I-5, US, Total Private Hiring, Annual, 2001-2016

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Total private hiring (HP) annual data are in Chart I-5. There has been sharp contraction of total private hiring in the US and only milder recovery from 2010 to 2016.

Chart I-5A, US, Rate Total Private Hiring, Annual, 2001-2016

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table I-3, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in

Total nonfarm hiring (HNF), total private hiring (HP) and their respective rates are in Table I-3 for the month of May in the years from 2001 to 2017. Hiring numbers are in thousands. There is recovery in HNF from 4187 thousand (or 4.2 million) in May 2009 to 4815 thousand in May 2010, 4617 thousand in May 2011, 4968 thousand in May 2012, 5128 thousand in May 2013, 5400 thousand in May 2014, 5732 thousand in May 2015, 5692 thousand in May 2016, and 6032 in May 2017 for cumulative gain of 44.1 percent at average rate of 4.7 percent per year. HP rose from 3908 thousand in May 2009 to 4060 thousand in May 2010, 4347 thousand in May 2011, 4665 thousand in May 2012, 4826 thousand in May 2013, 5068 thousand in May 2014, 5367 in May 2015, 5295 thousand in May 2016, and 5680 thousand in May 2017 for cumulative gain of 45.3 percent at the average yearly rate of 4.8 percent. HNF has increased from 5931 thousand in May 2006 to 6032 thousand in May 2017 or by 1.7 percent. HP has increased from 5546 thousand in May 2006 to 5680 thousand in May 2017 or by 2.4 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working, rose from 228.428 million in May 2006 to 254.767 million in May 2017, by 26.339 million or 11.5 percent. There is often ignored ugly fact that hiring increased by around 2.4 percent while population available for working increased around 11.5 percent. Private hiring of 59.206 million in 2006 was equivalent to 25.9 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, falling to 58.385 million in 2016 or 23.0 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 253.538 million in 2016. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 25.9 percent in 2006 would correspond to 65.666 million of hiring in 2016 (0.259x253.538), which would be 7.281 million higher than actual 58.385 million in 2016. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. Cyclical slow growth over the entire business cycle from IVQ2007 to the present in comparison with earlier cycles and long-term trend (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-rising-yields.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html) explains the fact that there are many million fewer hires in the US than before the global recession. The labor market continues to be fractured, failing to provide an opportunity to exit from unemployment/underemployment or to find an opportunity for advancement away from declining inflation-adjusted earnings.

Thousands and in Percentage of Total Employment Not Seasonally Adjusted

	HNF	Rate RNF	HP	Rate HP
2001 May	5841	4.4	5462	4.9
2002 May	5334	4.1	4978	4.6
2003 May	4999	3.8	4710	4.3
2004 May	5356	4.0	5068	4.6
2005 May	5729	4.3	5406	4.8
2006 May	5931	4.3	5546	4.8
2007 May	5758	4.2	5353	4.6
2008 May	5058	3.7	4730	4.1
2009 May	4187	3.2	3908	3.6
2010 May	4815	3.7	4060	3.8
2011 May	4617	3.5	4347	4.0
2012 May	4968	3.7	4665	4.2
2013 May	5128	3.7	4826	4.2
2014 May	5400	3.9	5068	4.3
2015 May	5732	4.0	5367	4.5
2016 May	5692	3.9	5295	4.3
2017 May	6032	4.1	5680	4.6

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-6 provides total nonfarm hiring monthly from 2001 to 2017. Nonfarm hiring rebounded in early 2010 but then fell and stabilized at a lower level than the early peak not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) of 4815 in May 2010 until it surpassed it with 5006 in Jun 2011 but declined to 3097 in Dec 2012. Nonfarm hiring fell to 2997 in Dec 2011 from 3814 in Nov 2011 and to revised 3627 in Feb 2012, increasing to 4182 in Mar 2012, 3097 in Dec 2012 and 4277 in Jan 2013 and declining to 3692 in Feb 2013. Nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted increased to 4239 in Nov 2013 and 3233 in Dec 2013. Nonfarm hires reached 3729 in Dec 2014, 4057 in Dec 2015 and 3905 in Dec 2016. Nonfarm hires reached 6032 in May 2017. Chart I-6 provides seasonally adjusted (SA) monthly data. The number of seasonally-adjusted hires in Oct 2011 was 4239 thousand, increasing to revised 4419 thousand in Feb 2012, or 4.2 percent, moving to 4360 in Dec 2012 for cumulative increase of 3.0 percent from 4234 in Dec 2011 and 4500 in Dec 2013 for increase of 3.2 percent relative to 4360 in Dec 2012. The number of hires not seasonally adjusted was 5006 in Jun 2011, falling to 2997 in Dec 2011 but increasing to 4140 in Jan 2012 and declining to 3097 in Dec 2012. The number of nonfarm hiring not seasonally adjusted fell by 40.1 percent from 5006 in Jun 2011 to 2997 in Dec 2011 and fell 39.9 percent from 5151 in Jun 2012 to 3097 in Dec 2012 in a yearly-repeated seasonal pattern. The number of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5102 in Jun 2013 to 3233 in Dec 2013, or decline of 36.6 percent, showing strong seasonality. The number of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5520 in Jun 2014 to 3729 in Dec 2014 or 32.4 percent. The level of nonfarm hires fell from 5885 in Jun 2015 to 4057 in Dec 2015 or 31.1 percent. The level of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5922 in Jun 2016 to 3905 in Dec 2016 or 34.1 percent.

Chart I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), 2001-2017 Month SA

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Similar behavior occurs in the rate of nonfarm hiring in Chart I-7. Recovery in early 2010 was followed by decline and stabilization at a lower level but with stability in monthly SA estimates of 3.2 in Aug 2011 to 3.2 in Jan 2012, increasing to 3.3 in May 2012 and stabilizing to 3.3 in Jun 2012. The rate stabilized at 3.2 in Jul 2012, increasing to 3.3 in Aug 2012 but falling to 3.2 in Dec 2012 and 3.3 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.8 in Jun 2011 to 2.2 in Dec 2011, climbing to 3.8 in Jun 2012 but falling to 2.3 in Dec 2012. The rate of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Jun 2013 to 2.3 in Dec 2013. The NSA rate of nonfarm hiring fell from 3.9 in Jun 2014 to 2.6 in Dec 2014. The NSA rate fell from 4.1 in Jun 2015 to 2.8 in Dec 2015. The NSA rate fell from 4.1 in Jun 2016 to 2.7 in Dec 2016. Rates of nonfarm hiring NSA were in the range of 2.7 (Dec) to 4.4 (Jun) in 2006. The rate of nonfarm hiring SA stood at 3.7 in May 2017 and at 4.1 NSA.

Chart I-7, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring, Month SA 2001-2017

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

There is only milder improvement in total private hiring shown in Chart I-8. Hiring private (HP) rose in 2010 with stability and renewed increase in 2011 followed by almost stationary series in 2012. The number of private hiring seasonally adjusted fell from 4043 thousand in Sep 2011 to 3933 in Dec 2011 or by 2.7 percent, decreasing to 4014 in Jan 2012 or decline by 0.7 percent relative to the level in Sep 2011. Private hiring fell to 3959 in Sep 2012 or lower by 2.1 percent relative to Sep 2011, moving to 4063 in Dec 2012 for increase of 1.2 percent relative to 4014 in Jan 2012. The number of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 4626 in Jun 2011 to 2817 in Dec 2011 or by 39.1 percent, reaching 3885 in Jan 2012 or decline of 16.0 percent relative to Jun 2011 and moving to 2918 in Dec 2012 or 38.5 percent lower relative to 4745 in Jun 2012. Hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 4743 in Jun 2013 to 3068 in Dec 2013. The level of private hiring NSA fell from 5101 in Jun 2014 to 3530 in Dec 2014 or 30.8 percent. The level of private hiring fell from 5452 in Jun 2015 to 3828 in Dec 2015 or 29.8 percent. The level of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 5456 in Jun 2016 to 3711 in Dec 2016 or 32.0 percent. Companies reduce hiring in the latter part of the year that explains the high seasonality in year-end employment data. For example, NSA private hiring fell from 5614 in Jun 2006 to 3579 in Dec 2006 or by 36.2 percent. Private hiring NSA data are useful in showing the huge declines from the period before the global recession. Hiring in the nonfarm sector (HNF) has declined from 63.491 million in 2006 to 62.719 million in 2016 or by 0.772 million while hiring in the private sector (HP) has declined from 59.206 million in 2006 to 58.385 million in 2016 or by 0.821 million, as shown in Table I-1. The ratio of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) has fallen from 47.1 in 2005 to 43.5 in 2016 and in the private sector (RHP) from 52.8 in 2005 to 47.8 in 2016. Hiring has not recovered as in previous cyclical expansions because of the low rate of economic growth in the current cyclical expansion. The civilian noninstitutional population or those in condition to work increased from 228.815 million in 2006 to 253.538 million in 2016 or by 24.723 million. Hiring has not recovered prerecession levels while needs of hiring multiplied because of growth of population by more than 24 million. Private hiring of 59.206 million in 2006 was equivalent to 25.9 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, falling to 58.385 million in 2016 or 23.0 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 253.538 million in 2016. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 25.9 percent in 2006 would correspond to 65.666 million of hiring in 2016 (0.259x253.538), which would be 7.281 million higher than actual 58.385 million in 2016.

Chart I-8, US, Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2017

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-9 shows similar behavior in the rate of private hiring. The rate in 2011 in monthly SA data did not rise significantly above the peak in 2010. The rate seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Sep 2011 to 3.5 in Dec 2011 and reached 3.6 in Dec 2012 and 3.7 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted (NSA) fell from 3.7 in Sep 2011 to 2.5 in Dec 2011, increasing to 3.8 in Oct 2012 but falling to 2.6 in Dec 2012 and 3.4 in Mar 2013. The NSA rate of private hiring fell from 4.8 in Jul 2006 to 3.4 in Aug 2009 but recovery was insufficient to only 3.9 in Aug 2012, 2.6 in Dec 2012 and 2.6 in Dec 2013. The NSA rate increased to 3.1 in Dec 2015 and 3.0 in Dec

2016. The rate NSA reached 4.6 in May 2017.

Chart I-9, US, Rate Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2017

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table I-4, US, Total Nonfarm Job Openings and Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands NSA

The JOLTS report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides total nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB), TNF JOB rate and TNF LD (layoffs and discharges) shown in Table I-4 for the month of Apr from 2001 to 2017. The final column provides annual TNF LD for the years from 2001 to 2016. Nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB) increased from a peak of 4564 in May 2007 to 5665 in May 2017 or by 24.1 percent while the rate increased from 3.2 to 3.7. This was mediocre performance because the civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working rose from 231.480 million in May 2007 to 254.767 million in May 2017, by 23.287 million or 10.1 percent. Nonfarm layoffs and discharges (TNF LD) rose from 1648 in Apr 2006 to 2351 in Apr 2009 or by 42.7 percent. The annual data show layoffs and discharges rising from 20.9 million in 2006 to 26.6 million in 2009 or by 27.3 percent. Business pruned payroll jobs to survive the global recession but there has not been hiring because of the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions.

	TNF JOB	TNF JOB Rate	TNF LD	TNF LD Annual
May 2001	4515	3.3	1637	24271
May 2002	3575	2.8	1609	22719
May 2003	3205	2.4	1607	23420
May 2004	3643	2.7	1517	22584
May 2005	3879	2.8	1577	22151
May 2006	4388	3.1	1627	20856
May 2007	4564	3.2	1523	21997
May 2008	3974	2.8	1623	23969
May 2009	2427	1.8	1905	26557
May 2010	2893	2.2	1584	21703
May 2011	3110	2.3	1583	20756
May 2012	3692	2.7	1727	20942
May 2013	3873	2.8	1631	19888
May 2014	4607	3.2	1567	20398
May 2015	5428	3.7	1599	20954
May 2016	5591	3.7	1664	19911
May 2017	5665	3.7	1594

Notes: TNF JOB: Total Nonfarm Job Openings; LD: Layoffs and Discharges

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-10 shows monthly job openings rising from the trough in 2009 to a high in the beginning of 2010. Job openings then stabilized into 2011 but have surpassed the peak of 3220 seasonally adjusted in Apr 2010 with 3570 seasonally adjusted in Dec 2012, which is higher by 10.9 percent relative to Apr 2010 but higher by 1.4 percent relative to 3521 in Nov 2012 and lower by 6.8 percent than 3831 in Mar 2012. Nonfarm job openings increased from 3570 in Dec 2012 to 3742 in Dec 2013 or by 4.8 percent and to 4795 in Dec 2014 or 28.1 percent relative to 2013. The high of job openings not seasonally adjusted was 3408 in Apr 2010 that was surpassed by 3647 in Jul 2011, increasing to 3906 in Oct 2012 but declining to 3213 in Dec 2012 and increasing to 3371 in Dec 2013. The level of job opening NSA increased to 4961 in Dec 2015. The level of job opening NSA increased to 5116 in Dec 2016, reaching 5665 in May 2017. The level of job openings not seasonally adjusted fell to 3213 in Dec 2012 or by 17.5 percent relative to 3893 in Apr 2012. There is here again the strong seasonality of year-end labor data. Job openings fell from 4209 in Apr 2013 to 3371 in Dec 2013 and from 4844 in Apr 2014 to 4398 in Dec 2014, showing strong seasonal effects. The level of nonfarm job openings decreased from 5933 in Apr 2015 to 4961 in Dec 2015 or by 16.4 percent. The level of nonfarm job openings NSA fell from 5951 in Apr 2016 to 5116 in Dec 2016 or 14.0 percent. Nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB) increased from a peak of 4564 in May 2007 to 5665 in May 2017 or by 24.1 percent while the rate increased from 3.2 to 3.7. This was mediocre performance because the civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working rose from 231.480 million in May 2007 to 254.767 million in May 2017, by 23.287 million or 10.1 percent. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 31 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2017. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IQ2017 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2017/pdf/gdp1q17_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[($14,745.9/$14,355.6) -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-rising-yields.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2017 would have accumulated to 31.4 percent. GDP in IQ2017 would be $19,699.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2826.4 billion than actual $16,872.8 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 21.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.0 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IQ2017 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,872.8 billion in IQ2017 or 12.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jun 1919 to Jun 2017. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2393 in Dec 2007 to 144.6580 in Jun 2017. The actual index NSA in Jun 2017 is 105.6126, which is 27.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Jun 2017. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 131.8650 in Jun 2017. The output of manufacturing at 105.6126 in Jun 2017 is 19.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-10, US Job Openings, Thousands NSA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

The rate of job openings in Chart I-11 shows similar behavior. The rate seasonally adjusted increased from 2.2 in Jan 2011 to 2.5 in Dec 2011, 2.6 in Dec 2012, 2.7 in Dec 2013 and 3.3 in Dec 2014. The rate seasonally adjusted stood at 3.6 in Dec 2015 and 3.7 in Dec 2016. The rate seasonally adjusted reached 3.7 in May 2017. The rate not seasonally adjusted rose from the high of 2.6 in Apr 2010 to 3.0 in Apr 2013, easing to 2.4 in Dec 2013. The rate of job openings NSA fell from 3.3 in Jul 2007 to 1.6 in Nov-Dec 2009, recovering to 3.3 in Dec 2015. The rate of job opening NSA stood at 3.4 in Dec 2016, reaching 3.7 in May 2017.

Chart I-11, US, Rate of Job Openings, NSA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Total separations are in Chart I-12. Separations are lower in 2012-17 than before the global recession but hiring has not recovered.

Chart I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Separations, Month Thousands SA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-13 provides annual total separations. Separations fell sharply during the global recession but hiring has not recovered relative to population growth.

Chart I-13, US, Total Separations, Annual, Thousands, 2001-2016

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table I-5 provides total nonfarm total separations from 2001 to 2016. Separations fell from 61.3 million in 2006 to 47.6 million in 2010 or by 13.6 million and 48.2 million in 2011 or by 13.1 million. Total separations increased from 48.2 million in 2011 to 51.9 million in 2013 or by 3.7 million and to 55.6 million in 2014 or by 7.4 million relative to 2011. Total separations increased to 59.3 million in 2015 or by 11.1 million relative to 2011. Total separations increased to 60.419 million in 2016 or 12.2 million relative to 2011.

Table I-5, US, Total Nonfarm Total Separations, Thousands, 2001-2016

Year	Annual Thousands
2001	64560
2002	58942
2003	56961
2004	58224
2005	60633
2006	61284
2007	60984
2008	58209
2009	51358
2010	47649
2011	48214
2012	50131
2013	51932
2014	55587
2015	59275
2016	60419

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Monthly data of layoffs and discharges reach a peak in early 2009, as shown in Chart I-14. Layoffs and discharges dropped sharply with the recovery of the economy in 2010 and 2011 once employers reduced their job count to what was required for cost reductions and loss of business. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth. Growth rates have been unusually low in the expansion of the current economic cycle.

Chart I-14, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Monthly Thousands SA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Layoffs and discharges in Chart I-15 rose sharply to a peak in 2009. There was pronounced drop into 2010 and 2011 with mild increase into 2012 and renewed decline into 2013. There is mild increase into 2014-2015 followed by decline in 2016.

Chart I-15, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Annual, 2001-2016

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Annual layoff and discharges are in Table I-6. Layoffs and discharges increased sharply from 20.856 million in 2006 to 26.557 million in 2009 or 27.3 percent. Layoff and discharges fell to 19.888 million in 2013 or 25.1 percent relative to 2009 and increased to 20.398 million in 2014 or 2.6 percent relative to 2013. Layoffs and discharges increased to 20.954 million in 2015 or 2.7 percent relative to 2014. Layoffs and discharges fell to 19.911 in 2016 or 5.0 percent relative to 2015.

Table I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands, 2001-2016

Year	Annual Thousands
2001	24271
2002	22719
2003	23420
2004	22584
2005	22151
2006	20856
2007	21997
2008	23969
2009	26557
2010	21703
2011	20756
2012	20942
2013	19888
2014	20398
2015	20954
2016	19911

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

IA2 Labor Underutilization. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides alternative measures of labor underutilization shown in Table I-7. The most comprehensive measure is U6 that consists of total unemployed plus total employed part time for economic reasons plus all marginally attached workers as percent of the labor force. U6 not seasonally adjusted has risen from 8.2 percent in 2006 to 8.9 percent in Jun 2017.

Table I-7, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization NSA %

	U1	U2	U3	U4	U5	U6
2017
Jun	1.5	2.1	4.5	4.8	5.4	8.9
May	1.8	1.9	4.1	4.3	5.0	8.1
Apr	1.8	2.1	4.1	4.4	5.0	8.1
Mar	1.9	2.4	4.6	4.8	5.5	8.9
Feb	1.9	2.6	4.9	5.3	6.0	9.5
Jan	2.0	2.7	5.1	5.5	6.2	10.1
2016
Dec	1.9	2.3	4.5	4.8	5.5	9.1
Nov	1.8	2.1	4.4	4.8	5.6	9.0
Oct	1.9	2.1	4.7	5.0	5.7	9.2
Sep	1.9	2.2	4.8	5.1	5.9	9.3
Aug	1.8	2.4	5.0	5.3	6.0	9.7
Jul	1.9	2.4	5.1	5.5	6.3	10.1
Jun	1.9	2.3	5.1	5.4	6.1	9.9
May	2.0	2.1	4.5	4.9	5.6	9.4
Apr	2.2	2.3	4.7	5.0	5.7	9.3
Mar	2.3	2.6	5.1	5.5	6.1	9.9
Feb	2.2	2.7	5.2	5.6	6.3	10.1
Jan	2.1	2.7	5.3	5.7	6.5	10.5
2015
Dec	2.1	2.4	4.8	5.2	5.9	9.8
Nov	2.1	2.3	4.8	5.2	5.8	9.6
Oct	2.1	2.3	4.8	5.2	6.0	9.5
Sep	2.0	2.2	4.9	5.3	6.0	9.6
Aug	2.1	2.5	5.2	5.6	6.3	10.3
Jul	2.0	2.7	5.6	6.0	6.7	10.7
Jun	2.1	2.5	5.5	5.8	6.6	10.8
May	2.4	2.5	5.3	5.6	6.4	10.4
Apr	2.4	2.5	5.1	5.5	6.4	10.4
Mar	2.6	2.9	5.6	6.0	6.8	11.0
Feb	2.7	3.0	5.8	6.3	7.1	11.4
Jan	2.7	3.1	6.1	6.5	7.4	12.0
2014
Dec	2.5	2.8	5.4	5.8	6.7	11.1
Nov	2.7	2.7	5.5	5.9	6.8	11.0
Oct	2.7	2.6	5.5	6.0	6.8	11.1
Sep	2.7	2.7	5.7	6.2	7.1	11.3
Aug	2.8	3.0	6.3	6.7	7.5	12.0
Jul	2.8	3.1	6.5	7.0	7.8	12.6
Jun	2.8	3.0	6.3	6.7	7.5	12.4
May	3.1	3.0	6.1	6.5	7.3	11.7
Apr	3.3	3.2	5.9	6.3	7.2	11.8
Mar	3.7	3.7	6.8	7.2	8.1	12.8
Feb	3.6	3.9	7.0	7.5	8.4	13.1
Jan	3.5	4.0	7.0	7.5	8.6	13.5
2013
Dec	3.5	3.5	6.5	7.0	7.9	13.0
Nov	3.7	3.5	6.6	7.1	7.9	12.7
Oct	3.7	3.6	7.0	7.4	8.3	13.2
Sep	3.7	3.5	7.0	7.5	8.4	13.1
Aug	3.7	3.8	7.3	7.9	8.7	13.6
Jul	3.7	3.8	7.7	8.3	9.1	14.3
Jun	3.9	3.8	7.8	8.4	9.3	14.6
May	4.1	3.7	7.3	7.7	8.5	13.4
Apr	4.3	3.9	7.1	7.6	8.5	13.4
Mar	4.3	4.3	7.6	8.1	9.0	13.9
Feb	4.3	4.6	8.1	8.6	9.6	14.9
Jan	4.3	4.9	8.5	9.0	9.9	15.4
2012
Dec	4.2	4.3	7.6	8.3	9.2	14.4
Nov	4.2	3.9	7.4	7.9	8.8	13.9
Oct	4.3	3.9	7.5	8.0	9.0	13.9
Sep	4.2	4.0	7.6	8.0	9.0	14.2
Aug	4.3	4.4	8.2	8.7	9.7	14.6
Jul	4.3	4.6	8.6	9.1	10.0	15.2
Jun	4.5	4.4	8.4	8.9	9.9	15.1
May	4.7	4.3	7.9	8.4	9.3	14.3
Apr	4.8	4.3	7.7	8.3	9.1	14.1
Mar	4.9	4.8	8.4	8.9	9.7	14.8
Feb	4.9	5.1	8.7	9.3	10.2	15.6
Jan	4.9	5.4	8.8	9.4	10.5	16.2
2011
Dec	4.8	5.0	8.3	8.8	9.8	15.2
Nov	4.9	4.7	8.2	8.9	9.7	15.0
Oct	5.0	4.8	8.5	9.1	10.0	15.3
Sep	5.2	5.0	8.8	9.4	10.2	15.7
Aug	5.2	5.1	9.1	9.6	10.6	16.1
Jul	5.2	5.2	9.3	10.0	10.9	16.3
Jun	5.1	5.1	9.3	9.9	10.9	16.4
May	5.5	5.1	8.7	9.2	10.0	15.4
Apr	5.5	5.2	8.7	9.2	10.1	15.5
Mar	5.7	5.8	9.2	9.7	10.6	16.2
Feb	5.6	6.0	9.5	10.1	11.1	16.7
Jan	5.6	6.2	9.8	10.4	11.4	17.3
Dec 2010	5.4	5.9	9.1	9.9	10.7	16.6
Annual
2016	2.0	2.3	4.9	5.2	5.9	9.6
2015	2.3	2.6	5.3	5.7	6.4	10.4
2014	3.0	3.1	6.2	6.6	7.5	12.0
2013	3.9	3.9	7.4	7.9	8.8	13.8
2012	4.5	4.4	8.1	8.6	9.5	14.7
2011	5.3	5.3	8.9	9.5	10.4	15.9
2010	5.7	6.0	9.6	10.3	11.1	16.7
2009	4.7	5.9	9.3	9.7	10.5	16.2
2008	2.1	3.1	5.8	6.1	6.8	10.5
2007	1.5	2.3	4.6	4.9	5.5	8.3
2006	1.5	2.2	4.6	4.9	5.5	8.2
2005	1.8	2.5	5.1	5.4	6.1	8.9
2004	2.1	2.8	5.5	5.8	6.5	9.6
2003	2.3	3.3	6.0	6.3	7.0	10.1
2002	2.0	3.2	5.8	6.0	6.7	9.6
2001	1.2	2.4	4.7	4.9	5.6	8.1
2000	0.9	1.8	4.0	4.2	4.8	7.0

Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Monthly seasonally adjusted measures of labor underutilization are provided in Table I-8. U6 climbed from 16.1 percent in Aug 2011 to 16.4 percent in Sep 2011 and then fell to 14.5 percent in Mar 2012, reaching 8.6 percent in Jun 2017. Unemployment is an incomplete measure of the stress in US job markets. A different calculation in this blog is provided by using the participation rate in the labor force before the global recession. This calculation shows 21.9 million in job stress of unemployment/underemployment in Jun 2017, not seasonally adjusted, corresponding to 13.0 percent of the labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html).

Table I-8, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization SA %

	U1	U2	U3	U4	U5	U6
Jun 2017	1.6	2.2	4.4	4.7	5.3	8.6
May	1.8	2.1	4.3	4.5	5.2	8.4
Apr	1.7	2.2	4.4	4.7	5.3	8.6
Mar	1.7	2.2	4.5	4.8	5.4	8.9
Feb	1.8	2.3	4.7	5.0	5.7	9.2
Jan	1.9	2.3	4.8	5.1	5.8	9.4
Dec 2016	1.9	2.3	4.7	5.0	5.7	9.2
Nov	1.8	2.2	4.6	5.0	5.8	9.3
Oct	2.0	2.3	4.8	5.1	5.9	9.5
Sep	2.0	2.5	4.9	5.3	6.0	9.7
Aug	1.9	2.4	4.9	5.3	5.9	9.7
Jul	2.0	2.3	4.9	5.2	6.0	9.7
Jun	2.0	2.4	4.9	5.2	6.0	9.6
May	1.9	2.3	4.7	5.0	5.7	9.7
Apr	2.1	2.4	5.0	5.3	6.0	9.7
Mar	2.1	2.4	5.0	5.4	6.0	9.8
Feb	2.1	2.4	4.9	5.3	6.0	9.8
Jan	2.0	2.3	4.9	5.3	6.2	9.9
Dec 2015	2.1	2.4	5.0	5.4	6.1	9.9
Nov	2.1	2.5	5.0	5.4	6.1	9.9
Oct	2.1	2.5	5.0	5.4	6.2	9.8
Sep	2.1	2.4	5.0	5.4	6.2	10.0
Aug	2.2	2.5	5.1	5.5	6.2	10.2
Jul	2.1	2.6	5.2	5.6	6.4	10.3
Jun	2.2	2.6	5.3	5.6	6.4	10.5
May	2.4	2.7	5.5	5.8	6.6	10.7
Apr	2.3	2.6	5.4	5.9	6.7	10.8
Mar	2.4	2.7	5.4	5.9	6.7	10.9
Feb	2.5	2.7	5.5	6.0	6.8	11.0
Jan	2.7	2.7	5.7	6.1	7.0	11.3
Dec 2014	2.6	2.8	5.6	6.0	6.9	11.2
Nov	2.7	2.9	5.8	6.2	7.0	11.4
Oct	2.8	2.8	5.7	6.2	7.0	11.5
Sep	2.8	2.9	5.9	6.3	7.3	11.8
Aug	2.9	3.0	6.2	6.6	7.4	12.0
July	2.9	3.1	6.2	6.6	7.5	12.2
Jun	3.0	3.1	6.1	6.5	7.3	12.0
May	3.1	3.2	6.3	6.7	7.5	12.1
Apr	3.2	3.3	6.2	6.7	7.5	12.3
Mar	3.4	3.5	6.7	7.1	7.9	12.6
Feb	3.4	3.5	6.7	7.1	8.0	12.6
Jan	3.4	3.5	6.6	7.1	8.1	12.7
Dec 2013	3.6	3.5	6.7	7.3	8.1	13.1
Nov	3.7	3.7	6.9	7.4	8.2	13.1
Oct	3.8	4.0	7.2	7.7	8.5	13.6
Sep	3.8	3.8	7.2	7.7	8.6	13.7
Aug	3.9	3.7	7.3	7.8	8.6	13.6
Jul	3.9	3.8	7.3	7.9	8.7	13.8
Jun	4.0	3.9	7.5	8.1	9.0	14.2
May	4.1	3.9	7.5	8.0	8.8	13.8
Apr	4.1	4.1	7.6	8.1	8.9	14.0
Mar	4.1	4.1	7.5	8.0	8.9	13.8
Feb	4.1	4.2	7.7	8.2	9.2	14.4
Jan	4.2	4.3	8.0	8.5	9.4	14.5
Dec 2012	4.3	4.2	7.9	8.5	9.4	14.4
Nov	4.2	4.2	7.7	8.3	9.2	14.4
Oct	4.4	4.2	7.8	8.3	9.2	14.4
Sep	4.4	4.2	7.8	8.3	9.3	14.8
Aug	4.5	4.4	8.1	8.6	9.6	14.6
Jul	4.5	4.6	8.2	8.7	9.6	14.8
Jun	4.7	4.6	8.2	8.7	9.6	14.8
May	4.6	4.5	8.2	8.7	9.6	14.7
Apr	4.6	4.4	8.2	8.8	9.6	14.6
Mar	4.6	4.5	8.2	8.7	9.6	14.5
Feb	4.7	4.6	8.3	8.9	9.8	15.0
Jan	4.8	4.7	8.3	8.9	9.9	15.2
Dec 2011	4.9	4.9	8.5	9.1	10.0	15.2
Nov	5.0	5.0	8.6	9.3	10.1	15.5
Oct	5.1	5.1	8.8	9.4	10.3	15.8
Sep	5.4	5.2	9.0	9.7	10.5	16.4
Aug	5.4	5.2	9.0	9.6	10.5	16.1
Jul	5.3	5.3	9.0	9.6	10.6	15.9
Jun	5.3	5.3	9.1	9.7	10.7	16.1
May	5.3	5.4	9.0	9.5	10.3	15.8
Apr	5.2	5.4	9.1	9.7	10.5	16.1
Mar	5.3	5.4	9.0	9.5	10.4	15.9
Feb	5.3	5.5	9.0	9.6	10.6	16.0
Jan	5.5	5.5	9.1	9.7	10.8	16.2

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-16 provides U6 monthly from 2001 to 2017. There was a steep climb from 2007 into 2009 and then this measure of unemployment and underemployment stabilized at that high level but declined into 2012. The low of U6 SA was 8.0 percent in Mar 2007 and the peak was 17.1 percent in Apr 2010. The low NSA was 7.6 percent in Oct 2006 and the peak was 18.0 percent in Jan 2010.

Chart I-16, US, U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Month, SA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-17 provides the number employed part-time for economic reasons or who cannot find full-time employment. There are sharp declines at the end of 2009, 2010 and 2011 but an increase in 2012 followed by relative stability in 2013-2017.

Chart I-17, US, Working Part-time for Economic Reasons

Thousands, Month SA, 2001-2017

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. There is strong seasonality in US labor markets around the end of the year.

Seasonally adjusted part-time for economic reasons. The number employed part-time for economic reasons because they could not find full-time employment fell from 9.166 million in Sep 2011 to 7.775 million in Mar 2012, seasonally adjusted, or decline of 1.391 million in six months, as shown in Table I-9. The number employed part-time for economic reasons rebounded to 8.671 million in Sep 2012 for increase of 697,000 in one month from Aug to Sep 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons declined to 8.203 million in Oct 2012 or by 468,000 again in one month, further declining to 8.166 million in Nov 2012 for another major one-month decline of 37,000 and 7.943 million in Dec 2012 or fewer 223,000 in just one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 8.074 million in Jan 2013 or 131,000 more than in Dec 2012 and to 8.119 million in Feb 2013, declining to 7.864 million in May 2013 but increasing to 8.096 million in Jun 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.804 million in Aug 2013 for decline of 279,000 in one month from 8.083 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased 207,000 from 7.804 million in Aug 2013 to 8.011 million in Sep 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons rose to 7.995 million in Oct 2013, falling by 265,000 to 7.730 million in Nov 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.792 million in Dec 2013, decreasing to 7.298 million in Jan 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell from 7.298 million in Jan 2014 to 7.262 million in Feb 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.403 million in Mar 2014 and 7.466 million in Apr 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.170 million in May 2014, increasing to 7.469 million in Jun 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.430 million in Jul 2014 and 7.173 million in Aug 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.123 million in Sep 2014, 7.033 million in Oct 2014 and 6.870 million in Nov 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.819 million in Dec 2014, increasing to 6.836 million in Jan 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.664 million in Feb 2015, increasing to 6.646 million in Mar 2015. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.563 million in Apr 2015, increasing to 6.544 million in May 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.463 million in Jun 2015 and 6.292 million in Jul 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.438 million in Aug 2015, declining to 6.031 million in Sep 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.734 million in Oct 2015, increasing to 6.113 million in Nov 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.057 million in Dec 2015, decreasing to 6.035 million in Jan 2016. The level employed part-time for economic reasons decreased to 6.019 million in Feb 2016 and increased to 6.120 million in Mar 2016. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.970 million in Apr 2016 and increased to 6.409 million in May 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.820 million in Jun 2016, increasing to 5.936 million in Jul 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.027 million in Aug 2016, decreasing to 5.874 million in Sep 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons reached 5.850 million in Oct 2016, decreasing to 5.659 million in Nov 2016 and 5.598 million in Dec 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.840 million in Jan 2017, decreasing to 5.704 million in Feb 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.553 million in Mar 2017 and fell to 5.272 million in Apr 2017, decreasing to 5.219 million in May 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.326 million in Jun 2017.
Seasonally adjusted full-time. The number employed full-time increased from 112.923 million in Oct 2011 to 115.024 million in Mar 2012 or 2.101 million but then fell to 114.233 million in May 2012 or 0.791 million fewer full-time employed than in Mar 2012. The number employed full-time increased from 114.736 million in Aug 2012 to 115.570 million in Oct 2012 or increase of 0.834 million full-time jobs in two months and further to 115.724 million in Jan 2013 or increase of 0.988 million more full-time jobs in five months from Aug 2012 to Jan 2013. The number of full time jobs decreased slightly to 115.674 million in Feb 2013, increasing to 116.247 million in May 2013 and 116.126 million in Jun 2013. Then number of full-time jobs increased to 116.155 million in Jul 2013, 116.435 million in Aug 2013 and 116.895 million in Sep 2013. The number of full-time jobs fell to 116.362 million in Oct 2013 and increased to 117.046 in Nov 2013. The level of full-time jobs increased to 117.351 million in Dec 2013, increasing to 117.504 million in Jan 2014 and 117.747 million in Feb 2014. The level of employment full-time increased to 117.941 million in Mar 2014 and 118.516 million in Apr 2014. The level of full-time employment reached 118.816 million in May 2014, decreasing to 118.238 million in Jun 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 118.450 million in Jul 2014 and 118.707 million in Aug 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 119.338 million in Sep 2014, 119.763 million in Oct 2014 and 119.645 million in Nov 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 120.075 million in Dec 2014 and 120.575 million in Jan 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 120.776 million in Feb 2015 and 120.963 million in Mar 2015. The level of full-time jobs decreased to 120.870 million in Apr 2015, increasing to 121.523 million in May 2015 and decreasing to 121.066 million in Jun 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 121.629 million in Jul 2015 and increased to 121.934 million in Aug 2015, decreasing to 121.829 million in Sep 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 122.071 million in Oct 2015 and increased to 122.110 million in Nov 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 122.700 million in Dec 2015 and 123.116 million in Jan 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 123.210 million in Feb 2016 and increased to 123.513 million in Mar 2016. The level of full-time jobs decreased to 123.259 million in Apr 2016 and 123.232 million in May 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 123.618 million in Jun 2016, increasing to 123.888 million in Jul 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 124.256 million in Aug 2016, decreasing to 124.253 million in Sep 2016 and 124.190 million in Oct 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 124.213 million in Nov 2016 and 124.248 million in Dec 2016. The level of full-time jobs increased to 124.705 million in Jan 2017, increasing to 125.031 million in Feb 2017. The level of full-time jobs increased to 125.507 million in Mar 2017 and increased to 125.987 million in Apr 2017, decreasing to 125.620 million in May 2017. The level of full-time jobs increased to 125.975 million in Jun 2017. Adjustments of benchmark and seasonality-factors at the turn of every year could affect comparability of labor market indicators (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html).
Not seasonally adjusted part-time for economic reasons. The number of employed part-time for economic reasons actually increased without seasonal adjustment from 8.271 million in Nov 2011 to 8.428 million in Dec 2011 or by 157,000 and then to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 or by an additional 490,000 for cumulative increase from Nov 2011 to Jan 2012 of 647,000. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons then fell from 8.918 million in Jan 2012 to 7.867 million in Mar 2012 or by 1.051 million and to 7.694 million in Apr 2012 or 1.224 million fewer relative to Jan 2012. In Aug 2012, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.842 million NSA or 148,000 more than in Apr 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased from 7.842 million in Aug 2012 to 8.110 million in Sep 2012 or by 3.4 percent. The number part-time for economic reasons fell from 8.110 million in Sep 2012 to 7.870 million in Oct 2012 or by 240.000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA increased to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 or 758,000 more than in Oct 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.298 million in Feb 2013, which is lower by 330,000 relative to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 but higher by 428,000 relative to 7.870 million in Oct 2012. The number employed part time for economic reasons fell to 7.734 million in Mar 2013 or 564,000 fewer than in Feb 2013 and fell to 7.709 million in Apr 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.618 million in May 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons jumped from 7.618 million in May 2013 to 8.440 million in Jun 2013 or 822,000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.324 million in Jul 2013 and 7.690 million in Aug 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA fell to 7.522 million in Sep 2013, increasing to 7.700 million in Oct 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.563 million in Nov 2013 and increased to 7.990 million in Dec 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.771 million in Jan 2014 and 7.397 million in Feb 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.455 million in Mar 2014 and fell to 7.243 million in Apr 2014. The number of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.960 million in May 2014, increasing to 7.805 million in Jun 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.665 million in Jul 2014 and 7.083 million in Aug 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.711 million in Sep 2014 and increased to 6.787 million in Oct 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons reached 6.713 million in Nov 2014 and 6.970 million in Dec 2014, increasing to 7.269 million in Jan 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.772 million in Feb 2015 and 6.672 million in Mar 2015, falling to 6.356 million in Apr 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.363 million in May 2015 and to 6.776 million in Jun 2015, decreasing to 6.511 million in Jul 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.361 million in Aug 2015 and 5.693 million in Sep 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.536 million in Oct 2015, increasing to 5.967 million in Nov 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.179 million in Dec 2015, increasing to 6.406 million in Jan 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 6.106 million in Feb 2016 and increased to 6.138 million in Mar 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 5.771 million in Apr 2016 and increased to 6.238 million in May 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons decreased to 6.119 million in Jun 2016, increasing to 6.157 million in Jul 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.963 million in Aug 2016, decreasing to 5.550 million in Sep 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 5.648 million in Oct 2016, decreasing to 5.518 million in Nov 2016 and increasing to 5.707 million in Dec 2016. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.226 million in Jan 2017, decreasing to 5.773 million in Feb 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.552 million in Mar 2017, decreasing to 5.058 million in Apr 2017. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 5.038 million in May 2017, increasing to 5.602 million in Jun 2017.
Not seasonally adjusted full-time. The number employed full time without seasonal adjustment fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 113.050 million in Dec 2011 or by 88,000 and fell further to 111.879 in Jan 2012 for cumulative decrease of 1.259 million. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 112.587 million in Feb 2012 or by 551.000 but increased to 116.214 million in Aug 2012 or 3.076 million more full-time jobs than in Nov 2011. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted decreased from 116.214 million in Aug 2012 to 115.678 million in Sep 2012 for loss of 536,000 full-time jobs and rose to 116.045 million in Oct 2012 or by 367,000 full-time jobs in one month relative to Sep 2012. The number employed full-time NSA fell from 116.045 million in Oct 2012 to 115.515 million in Nov 2012 or decline of 530.000 in one month. The number employed full-time fell from 115.515 in Nov 2012 to 115.079 million in Dec 2012 or decline by 436,000 in one month. The number employed full time fell from 115.079 million in Dec 2012 to 113.868 million in Jan 2013 or decline of 1.211 million in one month. The number of full time jobs increased to 114.191 in Feb 2012 or by 323,000 in one month and increased to 114.796 million in Mar 2013 for cumulative increase from Jan by 928,000 full-time jobs but decrease of 283,000 from Dec 2012. The number employed full time reached 117.400 million in Jun 2013 and increased to 117.688 in Jul 2013 or by 288,000. The number employed full-time reached 117.868 million in Aug 2013 for increase of 180,000 in one month relative to Jul 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 117.308 million in Sep 2013 or by 560,000. The number employed full-time fell to 116.798 million in Oct 2013 or decline of 510.000 in one month. The number employed full-time rose to 116.875 million in Nov 2013, falling to 116.661 million in Dec 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 115.744 million in Jan 2014 but increased to 116.323 million in Feb 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 116.985 in Mar 2014 and 118.073 million in Apr 2014. The number of full-time jobs increased to 119.179 million in May 2014, increasing to 119.472 million in Jun 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 119.900 million in Jul 2014. Comparisons over long periods require use of NSA data. The number with full-time jobs fell from a high of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to 108.777 million in Jan 2010 or by 14.442 million. The number with full-time jobs in Jun 2017 is 127.337 million, which is higher by 4.118 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007.
Loss of full-time jobs. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.957 million in Jun 2017 or by 22.999 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The number with full-time jobs in Jun 2017 is 127.337 million, which is higher by 4.118 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 135.382 million full-time jobs with population of 254.957 million in Jun 2017 (0.531 x 254.957) or 8.045 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 127.337 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 20 million. Mediocre GDP growth is the main culprit of the fractured US labor market. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 31 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2017. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IQ2017 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2017/pdf/gdp1q17_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[($14,745.9/$14,355.6) -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-rising-yields.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2017 would have accumulated to 31.4 percent. GDP in IQ2017 would be $19,699.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2826.4 billion than actual $16,872.8 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 21.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.0 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IQ2017 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,872.8 billion in IQ2017 or 12.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jun 1919 to Jun 2017. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2393 in Dec 2007 to 144.6580 in Jun 2017. The actual index NSA in Jun 2017 is 105.6126, which is 27.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Jun 2017. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 131.8650 in Jun 2017. The output of manufacturing at 105.6126 in Jun 2017 is 19.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-9, US, Employed Part-time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, and Full-time, Millions

	Part-time Thousands	Full-time Millions
Seasonally Adjusted
Jun 2017	5,326	125,975
May 2017	5,219	125.620
Apr 2017	5.272	125.987
Mar 2017	5.553	125.507
Feb 2017	5.704	125.031
Jan 2017	5,840	124.705
Dec 2016	5,598	124.248
Nov 2016	5,659	124.213
Oct 2016	5,850	124.190
Sep 2016	5,874	124.253
Aug 2016	6,027	124.256
Jul 2016	5,936	123.888
Jun 2016	5,820	123.618
May 2016	6,409	123.232
Apr 2016	5,970	123.259
Mar 2016	6,120	123.513
Feb 2016	6,019	123.210
Jan 2016	6,035	123.116
Dec 2015	6,057	122.700
Nov 2015	6,113	122.110
Oct 2015	5,734	122.071
Sep 2015	6,031	121.829
Aug 2015	6,438	121.934
Jul 2015	6,292	121.629
Jun 2015	6,463	121.066
May 2015	6,544	121.523
Apr 2015	6,563	120.870
Mar 2015	6,646	120.963
Feb 2015	6,664	120.776
Jan 2015	6,836	120.575
Dec 2014	6,819	120.075
Nov 2014	6,870	119.645
Oct 2014	7,033	119.763
Sep 2014	7,123	119.338
Aug 2014	7,173	118.707
Jul 2014	7,430	118.450
Jun 2014	7,469	118.238
May 2014	7,170	118.816
Apr 2014	7,466	118.516
Mar 2014	7,403	117.941
Feb 2014	7,262	117.747
Jan 2014	7,298	117.504
Dec 2013	7,792	117.351
Nov 2013	7,730	117.046
Oct 2013	7,995	116.362
Sep 2013	8,011	116.895
Aug 2013	7,804	116.435
Jul 2013	8,083	116.155
Jun 2013	8,096	116.126
May 2013	7,864	116.247
Apr 2013	7,936	116.044
Mar 2013	7,658	115.785
Feb 2013	8,119	115.674
Jan 2013	8,074	115.724
Dec 2012	7,943	115.791
Nov 2012	8,166	115.655
Oct 2012	8,203	115.570
Sep 2012	8,671	115.252
Aug 2012	7,974	114.736
Jul 2012	8,082	114.575
Jun 2012	8,072	114.749
May 2012	8,101	114.233
Apr 2012	7,913	114.371
Mar 2012	7,775	115.024
Feb 2012	8,238	114.141
Jan 2012	8,305	113.755
Dec 2011	8,171	113.774
Nov 2011	8,447	113.213
Oct 2011	8,657	112.923
Sep 2011	9,166	112.544
Aug 2011	8,788	112.723
Jul 2011	8,281	112.193
Not Seasonally Adjusted
Jun 2017	5,602	127.337
May 2017	5,038	125.911
Apr 2017	5,058	125.532
Mar 2017	5,552	124.566
Feb 2017	5,773	123.610
Jan 2017	6,226	123.015
Dec 2016	5,707	123.570
Nov 2016	5,518	123.960
Oct 2016	5,648	124.588
Sep 2016	5,550	124.728
Aug 2016	5,963	125.892
Jul 2016	6,157	125.507
Jun 2016	6,119	124.903
May 2016	6,238	123.548
Apr 2016	5,771	122.742
Mar 2016	6,138	122.522
Feb 2016	6,106	121.757
Jan 2016	6,406	121.411
Dec 2015	6,179	122.013
Nov 2015	5,967	121.897
Oct 2015	5,536	122.466
Sep 2015	5,693	122.303
Aug 2015	6,361	123.420
Jul 2015	6,511	123.142
Jun 2015	6,776	122.268
May 2015	6,363	121.863
Apr 2015	6,356	120.402
Mar 2015	6,672	119.981
Feb 2015	6,772	119.313
Jan 2015	7,269	118.840
Dec 2014	6,970	119.394
Nov 2014	6,713	119.441
Oct 2014	6,787	120.176
Sep 2014	6,711	119.791
Aug 2014	7,083	120.110
Jul 2014	7,665	119.900
Jun 2014	7,805	119.472
May 2014	6,960	119.179
Apr 2014	7,243	118.073
Mar 2014	7,455	116.985
Feb 2014	7,397	116.323
Jan 2014	7,771	115.774
Dec 2013	7,990	116.661
Nov 2013	7,563	116.875
Oct 2013	7,700	116.798
Sep 2013	7,522	117.308
Aug 2013	7,690	117.868
Jul 2013	8,324	117.688
Jun 2013	8,440	117.400
May 2013	7,618	116.643
Apr 2013	7,709	115.674
Mar 2013	7,734	114.796
Feb 2013	8,298	114.191
Jan 2013	8,628	113.868
Dec 2012	8,166	115.079
Nov 2012	7,994	115.515
Oct 2012	7,870	116.045
Sep 2012	8,110	115.678
Aug 2012	7,842	116.214
Jul 2012	8,316	116.131
Jun 2012	8,394	116.024
May 2012	7,837	114.634
Apr 2012	7,694	113.999
Mar 2012	7,867	113.916
Feb 2012	8,455	112.587
Jan 2012	8,918	111.879
Dec 2011	8,428	113.050
Nov 2011	8,271	113.138
Oct 2011	8,258	113.456
Sep 2011	8,541	112.980
Aug 2011	8,604	114.286
Jul 2011	8,514	113.759
Jun 2011	8,738	113.255
May 2011	8,270	112.618
Apr 2011	8,425	111.844
Mar 2011	8,737	111.186
Feb 2011	8,749	110.731
Jan 2011	9,187	110.373
Dec 2010	9,205	111.207
Nov 2010	8,670	111.348
Oct 2010	8,408	112.342
Sep 2010	8,628	112.385
Aug 2010	8,628	113.508
Jul 2010	8,737	113.974
Jun 2010	8,867	113.856
May 2010	8,513	112.809
Apr 2010	8,921	111.391
Mar 2010	9,343	109.877
Feb 2010	9,282	109.100
Jan 2010	9,290	108.777 (low)
Dec 2009	9,354 (high)	109.875
Nov 2009	8,894	111.274
Oct 2009	8,474	111.599
Sep 2009	8,255	111.991
Aug 2009	8,835	113.863
Jul 2009	9,103	114.184
Jun 2009	9,301	114.014
May 2009	8,785	113.083
Apr 2009	8,648	112.746
Mar 2009	9,305	112.215
Feb 2009	9,170	112.947
Jan 2009	8,829	113.815
Dec 2008	8,250	116.422
Nov 2008	7,135	118.432
Oct 2008	6,267	120.020
Sep 2008	5,701	120.213
Aug 2008	5,736	121.556
Jul 2008	6,054	122.378
Jun 2008	5,697	121.845
May 2008	5,096	120.809
Apr 2008	5,071	120.027
Mar 2008	5,038	119.875
Feb 2008	5,114	119.452
Jan 2008	5,340	119.332
Dec 2007	4,750	121.042
Nov 2007	4,374	121.846
Oct 2007	4,028	122.006
Sep 2007	4,137	121.728
Aug 2007	4,494	122.870
Jul 2007	4,516	123.219 (high)
Jun 2007	4,469	122.150
May 2007	4,315	120.846
Apr 2007	4,205	119.609
Mar 2007	4,384	119.640
Feb 2007	4,417	119.041
Jan 2007	4,726	119.094
Dec 2006	4,281	120.371
Nov 2006	4,054	120.507
Oct 2006	4,010	121.199
Sep 2006	3,735 (low)	120.780
Aug 2006	4,104	121.979
Jul 2006	4,450	121.951
Jun 2006	4,456	121.070
May 2006	3,968	118.925
Apr 2006	3,787	118.559
Mar 2006	4,097	117.693
Feb 2006	4,403	116.823
Jan 2006	4,597	116.395

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

People lose their marketable job skills after prolonged unemployment and face increasing difficulty in finding another job. Chart I-18 shows the sharp rise in unemployed over 27 weeks and stabilization at an extremely high level.

Chart I-18, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or Over, Thousands SA Month 2001-2017

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Another segment of U6 consists of people marginally attached to the labor force who continue to seek employment but less frequently on the frustration there may not be a job for them. Chart I-19 shows the sharp rise in people marginally attached to the labor force after 2007 and subsequent stabilization.

Chart I-19, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, NSA Month, Thousands, 2001-2017

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-20 provides the level of full-time jobs from 2001 to 2017. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.957 million in Jun 2017 or by 22.999 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The number with full-time jobs in Jun 2017 is 127.337 million, which is higher by 4.118 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 135.382 million full-time jobs with population of 254.957 million in Jun 2017 (0.531 x 254.957) or 8.045 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 127.337 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 20 million. Mediocre GDP growth is the main culprit of the fractured US labor market.

There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:

“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals.

Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets, during cyclical slow growth not secular stagnation, is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.

Chart I-20, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2017

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-20A provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 2001 to 2017. There is clear trend of increase of the population while the number of full-time jobs collapsed after 2008 without sufficient recovery as shown in the preceding Chart I-20.

Chart I-20A, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 2001-2017

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-20B provides number of full-time jobs in the US from 1968 to 2017. There were multiple recessions followed by expansions without contraction of full-time jobs and without recovery as during the period after 2008. The problem is specific of the current cycle and not secular.

Chart I-20B, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 1968-2017

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

Chart I-20C provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 1968 to 2017. Population expanded at a relatively constant rate of increase with the assurance of creation of full-time jobs that has been broken since 2008.

Chart I-20C, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 1968-2017

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

IA4 Theory and Reality of Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment. Table I-9A provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.7 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.2 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.3 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. In contrast, GDP grew 2.5 percent in 2010, 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.7 percent in 2013, 2.4 percent in 2014 and 2.6 percent in 2015. GDP grew 1.6 percent in 2016. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the twenty quarters from 2012 to 2016 is 2.1 percent and 2.1 percent in the four quarters ending in IQ2017. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987, 4.2 percent in 1988 and 3.7 percent in 1989. The forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 2.0 to 2.5 percent in 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20170614.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 1.7 to 2.3 percent in 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20170614.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2017 has been at average 2.1 percent in annual equivalent.

Table I-9A, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%

Year	GDP ∆%	Year	GDP ∆%	Year	GDP ∆%
1930	-8.5	1980	-0.2	2000	4.1
1931	-6.4	1981	2.6	2001	1.0
1932	-12.9	1982	-1.9	2002	1.8
1933	-1.3	1983	4.6	2003	2.8
1934	10.8	1984	7.3	2004	3.8
1935	8.9	1985	4.2	2005	3.3
1936	12.9	1986	3.5	2006	2.7
1937	5.1	1987	3.5	2007	1.8
1938	-3.3	1988	4.2	2008	-0.3
1939	8.0	1989	3.7	2009	-2.8
1940	8.8	1990	1.9	2010	2.5
1941	17.7	1991	-0.1	2011	1.6
1942	18.9	1992	3.6	2012	2.2
1943	17.0	1993	2.7	2013	1.7
1944	8.0	1994	4.0	2014	2.4
1945	-1.0	1995	2.7	2015	2.6
1946	-11.6	1996	3.8	2016	1.6

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are in Table I-9B with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.7 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.2 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-9B, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Percentage Contraction	Average Percentage Rate
IIQ1953 to IIQ1954	3	-2.4	-0.8
IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958	3	-3.0	-1.0
IVQ1973 to IQ1975	5	-3.1	-0.6
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980	2	-2.2	-1.1
IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982	4	-2.5	-0.64
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009	6	-4.2	-0.72

Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-9C shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.1 percent of the US economy in the thirty-one quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2017. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:

5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
5.4 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
5.2 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987
5.0 percent in the first twenty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1987
4.9 percent in the first twenty-first quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1988
4.9 percent in the first twenty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1988
4.8 percent in the first twenty-five quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1989
4.7 percent in the first twenty-six quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1989
4.7 percent in the first twenty-seven quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989
4.5 percent in the first twenty-eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1989
4.5 percent in the first twenty-nine quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1990
4.4 percent in the first thirty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1990
4.3 percent in the first thirty-one quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990

The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill relative to historical experience with annual growth of 2.5 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.6 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.7 percent in 2013, 2.4 percent in 2014, 2.6 percent in 2015 and 1.6 percent in 2016 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988. 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). GDP grew 2.7 percent in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010. GDP growth in the twenty-one quarters from 2012 to 2017 accumulated to 11.1 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.0 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IQ2017 of $16,872.8 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,190.3 billion and compounding by 4/21: {[($16,872.8/$15,190.3)^4/21 -1]100 = 2.0 percent}.

Table I-9C, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Growth ∆%	Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate
IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957	11	12.8	4.5
First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955	4	7.8
IIQ1958 to IIQ1959	5	10.0	7.9
First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959	4	9.2
IIQ1975 to IVQ1976	8	8.3	4.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976	4	6.1
IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983 to IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 IQ1983 to IQ1989 IQ1983 to IIQ1989 IQ1983 to IIIQ1989 IQ1983 to IVQ1989 IQ1983 to IQ1990 IQ1983 to IIQ1990 IQ1983 to III1990	13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	19.9 21.6 22.3 23.1 24.5 25.6 27.7 28.4 30.1 30.9 32.6 34.0 35.0 36.0 36.3 37.8 38.3 38.4	5.7 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983	4	7.8
Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*		7.7
IIIQ2009 to IQ2017	31	17.5	2.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010		2.7

*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table EMP provides the comparison between the labor market in the current whole cycle from 2007 to 2016 and the whole cycle from 1979 to 1989. In the entire cycle from 2007 to 2016, the number employed increased 5.389 million, full-time employed increased 2.670 million, part-time for economic reasons increased 1.542 million and population increased 21.491 million. The number employed increased 3.7 percent, full-time employed increased 2.2 percent, part-time for economic reasons increased 35.0 percent and population increased 9.3 percent. There is sharp contrast with the contractions of the 1980s and with most economic history of the United States. In the whole cycle from 1979 to 1989, the number employed increased 18.518 million, full-time employed increased 14.715 million, part-time for economic reasons increased 1.317 million and population increased 21.530 million. In the entire cycle from 1979 to 1989, the number employed increased 18.7 percent, full-time employed increased 17.8 percent, part-time for economic reasons increased 36.8 percent and population increased 13.1 percent. The difference between the 1980s and the current cycle after 2007 is in the high rate of growth after the contraction that maintained trend growth around 3.0 percent for the entire cycle and per capital growth at 2.0 percent. The evident fact is that current weakness in labor markets originates in cyclical slow growth and not in imaginary secular stagnation.

Table EMP, US, Annual Level of Employed, Full-Time Employed, Employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons and Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Millions

	Employed	Full-Time Employed	Part Time Economic Reasons	Noninstitutional Civilian Population
2000s
2000	136.891	113.846	3.227	212.577
2001	136.933	113.573	3.715	215.092
2002	136.485	112.700	4.213	217.570
2003	137.736	113.324	4.701	221.168
2004	139.252	114.518	4.567	223.357
2005	141.730	117.016	4.350	226.082
2006	144.427	119.688	4.162	228.815
2007	146.047	121.091	4.401	231.867
2008	145.362	120.030	5.875	233.788
2009	139.877	112.634	8.913	235.801
2010	139.064	111.714	8.874	237.830
2011	139.869	112.556	8.560	239.618
2012	142.469	114.809	8.122	243.284
2013	143.929	116.314	7.935	245.679
2014	146.305	118.718	7.213	247.947
2015	148.834	121.492	6.371	250.801
2016	151.436	123.761	5.943	253.538
∆2007-2016	5.389	2.670	1.542	21.671
∆% 2007-2016	3.7	2.2	35.0	9.3
1980s
1979	98.824	82.654	3.577	164.863
1980	99.303	82.562	4.321	167.745
1981	100.397	83.243	4.768	170.130
1982	99.526	81.421	6.170	172.271
1983	100.834	82.322	6.266	174.215
1984	105.005	86.544	5.744	176.383
1985	107.150	88.534	5.590	178.206
1986	109.597	90.529	5.588	180.587
1987	112.440	92.957	5.401	182.753
1988	114.968	95.214	5.206	184.613
1989	117.342	97.369	4.894	186.393
∆1979-1989	18.518	14.715	1.317	21.530
∆% 1979-1989	18.7	17.8	36.8	13.1

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. There are accentuated cyclic factors for both the entire population and the young population of ages 16 to 24 years. Table Summary Total provides the total noninstitutional population (ICP) of the US, full-time employment level (FTE), employment level (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP), employment/population ratio (EPOP) and unemployment level (UNE). Secular stagnation would spread over long periods instead of immediately. All indicators of the labor market weakened sharply during the contraction and did not recover. Population continued to grow but all other variables collapsed and did not recover. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-16). Hansen (1938, 1939) finds secular stagnation in lower growth of an aging population. In the current US economy, Table Summary shows that population is dynamic while the labor market is fractured. There is key explanation in the behavior of the civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and the employment population ratio (EPOP) that collapsed during the global recession with inadequate recovery. Abandoning job searches are difficult to capture in labor statistics but likely explain the decline in the participation of the population in the labor force. Allowing for abandoning job searches, the total number of people unemployed or underemployed is 21.9 million or 13.0 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html).

Table Summary Total, US, Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Millions and Percent

	ICP	FTE	EMP	CLF	CLFP	EPOP	UNE
2006	228.8	119.7	144.4	151.4	66.2	63.1	7.0
2009	235.8	112.6	139.9	154.1	65.4	59.3	14.3
2012	243.3	114.8	142.5	155.0	63.7	58.6	12.5
2013	245.7	116.3	143.9	155.4	63.2	58.6	11.5
2014	247.9	118.7	146.3	155.9	62.9	59.0	9.6
2015	250.8	121.5	148.8	157.1	62.7	59.3	8.3
2016	253.5	123.8	151.4	159.2	62.8	59.7	7.8
12/07	233.2	121.0	146.3	153.7	65.9	62.8	7.4
9/09	236.3	112.0	139.1	153.6	65.0	58.9	14.5
6/17	255.0	127.3	154.1	161.3	63.3	60.4	7.3

ICP: Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population; FT: Full-time Employment Level, EMP: Total Employment Level; CLF: Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

The same situation is present in the labor market for young people in ages 16 to 24 years with data in Table Summary Youth. The youth noninstitutional civilian population (ICP) continued to increase during and after the global recession. There is the same disastrous labor market with decline for young people in employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and employment population ratio (EPOP). There are only increases for unemployment of young people (UNE) and youth unemployment rate (UNER). If aging were a factor of secular stagnation, growth of population of young people would attract a premium in remuneration in labor markets. The sad fact is that young people are also facing tough labor markets. The application of the theory of secular stagnation to the US economy and labor markets is void of reality in the form of key facts, which are best explained by accentuated cyclic factors analyzed by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22).

Table Summary Youth, US, Youth, Ages 16 to 24 Years, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Millions and Percent

	ICP	EMP	CLF	CLFP	EPOP	UNE	UNER
2006	36.9	20.0	22.4	60.6	54.2	2.4	10.5
2009	37.6	17.6	21.4	56.9	46.9	3.8	17.6
2012	38.8	17.8	21.3	54.9	46.0	3.5	16.2
2013	38.8	18.1	21.4	55.0	46.5	3.3	15.5
2014	38.7	18.4	21.3	55.0	47.6	2.9	13.4
2015	38.6	18.8	21.2	55.0	48.6	2.5	11.6
2016	38.4	19.0	21.2	55.2	49.4	2.2	10.4
12/07	37.5	19.4	21.7	57.8	51.6	2.3	10.7
9/09	37.6	17.0	20.7	55.2	45.1	3.8	18.2
6/17	38.2	20.3	22.7	59.5	53.3	2.4	10.5

ICP: Youth Noninstitutional Civilian Population; EMP: Youth Employment Level; CLF: Youth Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Youth Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Youth Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment; UNER: Youth Unemployment Rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

Table I-10, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA

The United States is experiencing high youth unemployment as in European economies. Table I-10 provides the employment level for ages 16 to 24 years of age estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. On an annual basis, youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 17.362 million in 2011 or 2.679 million fewer youth jobs and to 17.834 million in 2012 or 2.207 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.057 million in 2013 or 1.984 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.442 million in 2014 or 1.599 million. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.756 million in 2015 or 1.285 million. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.992 million in 2016 or 1.049 million. The level of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.347 million in Dec 2014 for 1.782 million fewer youth jobs. The level of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.720 million in Dec 2015 or 1.409 million fewer jobs. Youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.830 million in Dec 2016 or 1.299 million. Youth jobs fell from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 to 20.330 million in Jun 2017 or 0.938 million. During the seasonal peak months of youth employment in the summer from Jun to Aug, youth employment has fallen by more than two million jobs relative to 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 18.972 million in Aug 2014 for 2.195 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 20.085 million in Jul 2014 for 1.829 million fewer youth jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 million to 19.421 million in Jun 2014 or 1.847 million fewer youth jobs. The number of jobs ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 18.636 million in Aug 2013 or by 2.531 million. The number of youth jobs fell from 19.604 million in Sep 2006 to 18.043 million in Sep 2013 or 1.561 million fewer youth jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.106 million in Dec 2013 or 2.023 million fewer jobs. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 2.058 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 while jobs for ages 16 to 24 years decreased 1.599 million from 19.538 million in Mar 2007 to 17.939 million in Mar 2014. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased 1.410 million from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.347 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.379 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.128 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.330 million from 37.410 million in Jun 2007 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.847 million from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 to 19.421 million in Jun 2014. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased by 1.292 million from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.632 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.445 million in Aug 2007 to 38.706 million in Aug 2014 or 1.251 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.441 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.500 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.072 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.327 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.782 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.971 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.091 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.960 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.215 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.165 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.060 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.479 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.581 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.548 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.556 million in Aug 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.590 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,498 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.525 million in Sep 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.249 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.444 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.491 million in Oct 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.199 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.392 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.468 million in Nov 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.418 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.341 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.441 million in Dec 2015 while the level of youth jobs 1.409 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.734 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.495 million in Jan 2016 while the level of youth jobs fell 0.844 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.698 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.489 million in Feb 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.726 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,662 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.483 million in Mar 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.711 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.626 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.480 million in Apr 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.895 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.571 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.468 million in May 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.894 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.516 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.459 million in Jun 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.301 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.461 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.450 million in Jul 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.458 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.414 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.422 million in Aug 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.291 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.368 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.395 million in Sep 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.911 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.320 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.367 million in Oct 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.158 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.283 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.359 million in Nov 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.102 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.248 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.348 million in Dec 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.299 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.249 million in Jan 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.692 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.440 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.231 million in Feb 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.578 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.393 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.214 million in Mar 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.377 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.343 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.197 million in Apr 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.458 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.284 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.181 million in May 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.699 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.223 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.166 million in Jun 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.938 million. The hardship does not originate in low growth of population but in underperformance of the economy in the expansion from the business cycle. There are two hardships behind these data. First, young people cannot find employment after finishing high school and college, reducing prospects for achievement in older age. Second, students with more modest means cannot find employment to keep them in college.

Year	Apr	May	Jun	Dec	Annual
2001	19778	19648	21212	19547	20088
2002	19108	19484	20828	19394	19683
2003	18873	19032	20432	19136	19351
2004	19184	19237	20587	19619	19630
2005	19071	19356	20949	19733	19770
2006	19406	19769	21268	20129	20041
2007	19368	19457	21098	19361	19875
2008	19161	19254	20466	18378	19202
2009	17739	17588	18726	16615	17601
2010	16764	17039	17920	16727	17077
2011	16970	17045	18180	17234	17362
2012	17387	17681	18907	17604	17834
2013	17593	17704	19125	18106	18057
2014	18021	18329	19421	18347	18442
2015	18241	18709	19789	18720	18756
2016	18511	18875	19967	18830	18992
2017	18948	19070	20330

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-25 provides the level unemployed ages 45 years and over. There was an increase in the recessions of the 1980s, 1991 and 2001 followed by declines to earlier levels. The current expansion of the economy after IIIQ2009 has not been sufficiently vigorous to reduce significantly middle-age unemployment. Recent improvements could be illusory because many abandoned job searches in frustration that there may not be jobs for them and are not counted as unemployed.

Chart I-21, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-21A provides the US civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted from 2001 to 2017. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 2.058 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 while jobs for ages 16 to 24 years decreased 1.599 million from 19.538 million in Mar 2007 to 17.939 million in Mar 2014. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased 1.410 million from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.347 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.379 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.128 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.330 million from 37.410 million in Jun 2007 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.847 million from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 to 19.421 million in Jun 2014. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased by 1.292 million from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.632 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.445 million in Aug 2007 to 38.706 million in Aug 2014 or 1.251 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.441 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.500 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.072 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.327 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.782 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.971 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.091 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.960 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.215 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.165 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.060 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.479 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.581 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.548 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.556 million in Aug 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.590 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,498 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.525 million in Sep 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.249 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.444 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.491 million in Oct 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.199 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.392 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.468 million in Nov 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.418 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.341 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.441 million in Dec 2015 while the level of youth jobs 1.409 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.734 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.495 million in Jan 2016 while the level of youth jobs fell 0.844 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.698 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.489 million in Feb 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.726 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,662 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.483 million in Mar 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.711 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.626 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.480 million in Apr 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.895 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.571 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.468 million in May 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.894 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.516 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.459 million in Jun 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.301 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.461 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.450 million in Jul 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.458 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.414 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.422 million in Aug 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.291 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.368 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.395 million in Sep 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.911 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.320 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.367 million in Oct 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.158 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.283 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.359 million in Nov 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.102 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.248 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.348 million in Dec 2016 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.299 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.249 million in Jan 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.692 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.440 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.231 million in Feb 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.578 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.393 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.214 million in Mar 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.377 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.343 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.197 million in Apr 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.458 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.284 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.181 million in May 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.699 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.223 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.166 million in Jun 2017 while the number of youth jobs decreased 0.938 million. The hardship does not originate in low growth of population but in underperformance of the economy in the expansion from the business cycle. There are two hardships behind these data. First, young people cannot find employment after finishing high school and college, reducing prospects for achievement in older age. Second, students with more modest means cannot find employment to keep them in college.

Chart I-21A, US, Civilian Noninstitutional Population Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-21B provides the civilian labor force of the US ages 16 to 24 years NSA from 2001 to 2017. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 24.339 million in Jul 2007 to 23.506 million in Jul 2013, by 0.833 million or decline of 3.4 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population NSA increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013, by 1.418 million or 3.8 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 fell from 22.801 million in Aug 2007 to 22.089 million in Aug 2013, by 0.712 million or 3.1 percent, while the noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013, by 1.386 million or 3.7 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.917 million in Sep 2007 to 21.183 million in Sep 2013, by 0.734 million or 3.3 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 by 1.355 million or 3.6 percent. The US civilian labor force fell from 21.821 million in Oct 2007 to 21.003 million in Oct 2013, by 0.818 million or 3.7 percent while the noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013, by 1.324 million or 3.5 percent. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.909 million in Nov 2007 to 20.825 million in Nov 2013, by 1.084 million or 4.9 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.684 million in Dec 2007 to 20.642 million in Dec 2013, by 1.042 million or 4.8 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013, by 1.272 million or 3.4 percent. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell from 21.770 million in Jan 2007 to 20.423 million in Jan 2014, by 1.347 million or 6.2 percent while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014, by 1.488 million or 4.0 percent. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell 1.255 million from 21.645 million in Feb 2007 to 20.390 million in Feb 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 million in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell 0.693 million from 21.634 million in Mar 2007 to 20.941 million in Mar 2014 or 3.2 person while the youth noninstitutional civilian population 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 or 3.9 percent. The US youth civilian labor force fell 981 thousand from 21.442 million in Apr 2007 to 20.461 million in Apr 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 by 1.410 thousand or 3.8 percent. The youth civilian labor force decreased from 21.659 million in May 2007 to 21.160 million in May 2014 by 499 thousand or 2.3 percent while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.739 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2007 or by 2.7 percent. The youth civilian labor force decreased from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.851 million in Jun 2014 by 1.277 million or 5.3 percent while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 by 1.797 million or 4.9 percent. The youth civilian labor force fell from 24.664 million in Jul 2006 to 23.437 million in Jul 2014 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014. The youth civilian labor force fell 1.818 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 21.816 million in Aug 2014 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.706 million in Aug 2914 or 1.698 million. The youth civilian labor force fell 0.942 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.959 million in Sep 2014 while the noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.702 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 21.403 million in Oct 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.111 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 21.034 million in Nov 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.472 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.664 million in Dec 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.831 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.555 million in Jan 2015 while the youth noninstitutional population increased from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 or 1.971 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.864 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.751 million in Feb 2015 while the youth noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.907 million from 21.507 million in Mar 2006 to 20.600 million in Mar 2015 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.082 million from 21.498 million in Apr 2006 to 20.416 million in Apr 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.681 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 21.342 million in May 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.202 million from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.926 million in Jun 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.502 million from 24.664 million in Jul 2007 to 23.162 million in Jul 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.667 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 21.967 million in Aug 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.548 million from 37.008 in Aug 2006 to 38.556 million in Aug 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.290 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.611 in Sep 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.498 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.525 million in Sep 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.228 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 20.877 million in Oct 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.444 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.491 million in Oct 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.513 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 20.632 million in Nov 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.392 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.468 million in Nov 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.301 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.835 million in Dec 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.341 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.441 million in Dec 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.004 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.364 million in Jan 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.734 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.495 million in Jan 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.930 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.685 million in Feb 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.698 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.489 million in Feb 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.767 million from 21.507 million in Mar 2006 to 20.740 million in Mar 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.662 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.483 million in Mar 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.950 million from 21.498 million in Apr 2006 to 20.548 million in Apr 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.626 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.480 million in Apr 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.921 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 21.102 million in May 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.571 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.468 million in May 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.373 million from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.755 million in Jun 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.516 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.459 million in Jun 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.560 million from 24.664 million in Jul 2006 to 23.104 million in Jul 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,461 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.450 million in Jul 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.536 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 22.098 million in Aug 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.414 million from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.422 million in Aug 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.082 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.891 million in Sep 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.368 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.395 million in Sep 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.315 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 20.790 million in Oct 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.320 million from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.367 million in Oct 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.410 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 20.735 million in Nov 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.283 million from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.359 million in Nov 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.447 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.689 million in Dec 2016 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.248 million from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.348 million in Dec 2016. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.861 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.507 million in Jan 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.249 million in Jan 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.918 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.697 million in Feb 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.440 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.231 million in Feb 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.751 million from 21.507 million in Mar 2006 to 20.756 million in Mar 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.393 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.214 million in Mar 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.790 million from 21.498 million in Apr 2006 to 20.708 million in Apr 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.343 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.197 million in Apr 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.124 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 20.899 million in May 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.284 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.181 million in May 2017. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.408 million from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.720 million in Jun 2017 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.223 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.166 million in Jun 2017. Youth in the US abandoned their participation in the labor force because of the frustration that there are no jobs available for them.

Chart I-21B, US, Civilian Labor Force Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-21C provides the ratio of labor force to noninstitutional population or labor force participation of ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted. The US labor force participation rates for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.5 in Jul 2013 because of the frustration of young people who believe there may not be jobs available for them. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 56.9 in Aug 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.1 percent in Sep 2006 to 54.6 percent in Sep 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Oct 2006 to 54.1 in Oct 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Nov 2006 to 53.7 percent in Nov 2013. The US labor force participation rate fell from 57.8 in Dec 2007 to 53.2 in Dec 2013. The youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.4 in Jan 2007 to 52.7 in Jan 2014. The US youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.0 percent in Feb 2007 to 52.6 percent in Feb 2013. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 58.0 in Mar 2007 to 54.0 in Mar 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.4 in Apr 2007 to 52.8 in Apr 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.9 in May 2007 to 54.6 in May 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.0 in Jun 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.5 in Jul 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 56.4 in Aug 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 54.2 in Sep 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 55.4 in Oct 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 54.5 in Nov 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 53.5 in Dec 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 53.1 in Jan 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 53.6 in Feb 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 53.3 in Mar 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 58.7 in Apr 2005 to 52.8 in Apr 2006. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 59.7 in May 2006 to 55.2 in May 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.4 in Jun 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.0 in Jul 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 57.0 in Aug 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 53.5 in Sep 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 54.2 in Oct 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 53.6 in Nov 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 54.2 in Dec 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 52.9 in Jan 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 53.7 in Feb 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 53.9 in Mar 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.3 in Apr 2006 to 53.4 in Apr 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in May 2006 to 54.9 in May 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.2 in Jun 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.1 in Jul 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 57.5 in Aug 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 54.2 in Sep 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 54.2 in Oct 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 54.1 in Nov 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 54.0 in Dec 2016. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 53.6 in Jan 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 54.1 in Feb 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 54.3 in Mar 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 54.3 in Mar 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.3 in Apr 2006 to 54.2 in Apr 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in May 2006 to 54.7 in May 2017. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.5 in Jun 2017. Many young people abandoned searches for employment, dropping from the labor force.

Chart I-21C, US, Labor Force Participation Rate Ages 16 to 24 Years, NSA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

An important measure of the job market is the number of people with jobs relative to population available for work (civilian noninstitutional population) or employment/population ratio. Chart I-21D provides the employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years. The US employment/population ratio NSA for ages 16 to 24 years collapsed from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 50.7 in Jul 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years dropped from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 48.0 in Aug 2013. The employment population ratio for ages to 16 to 24 years declined from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 46.5 in Sep 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 46.3 in Oct 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.7 in Nov 2007 to 46.7 in Nov 2013. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.6 in Dec 2007 to 46.7 in Dec 2013. The US employment population ratio fell from 52.1 in Jan 2007 to 44.8 in Jan 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.0 in Feb 2007 to 44.8 in Feb 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.3 in Mar 2007 to 46.3 in Mar 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.9 in Apr 2007 to 46.5 in Apr 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.1 in May 2007 to 47.3 in May 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 50.1 in Jun 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 50.1 in Jul 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 49.0 in Aug 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 46.8 in Sep 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 48.6 in Oct 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 48.1 in Nov 2014. The employment population ration for ages 16 to 24 fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 47.5 in Dec 2014. The employment population ration for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 46.2 in Jan 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 47.1 in Feb 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.4 in Mar 2006 to 46.7 in Mar 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.7 in Apr 2006 to 47.2 in Apr 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in May 206 to 48.4 in May 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 51.3 in Jun 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 52.7 in Jul 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 50.8 in Aug 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 47.6 in Sep 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 48.5 in Oct 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 48.1 in Nov 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 48.7 in Dec 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 47.2 in Jan 2016. The employment population ration for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 48.0 in Feb 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.4 in Mar 2006 to 48.3 in Mar 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.7 in Apr 2006 to 48.1 in Apr 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in May 2006 to 49.1 in May 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 51.9 in Jun 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 53.2 in Jul 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 51.7 in Aug 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 48.7 in Sep 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 48.7 in Oct 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 49.0 in Nov 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 49.1 in Dec 2016. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 47.9 in Jan 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 48.7 in Feb 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.4 in Mar 2006 to 49.5 in Mar 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.7 in Apr 2006 to 49.6 in Apr 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in May 2006 to 49.9 in May 2017. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 53.3 in Jun 2017. Chart I-21D shows vertical drop during the global recession without recovery.

Chart I-21D, US, Employment Population Ratio Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Table I-11 provides US unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years. The number unemployed ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 3634 thousand in 2011 or by 1.292 million and 3451 thousand in 2012 or by 1.109 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 in 2007 to 3324 thousand in 2013 or by 0.982 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 2853 thousand in 2014 or by 0.511 million. The unemployment level for ages 16 to 24 increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 2467 thousand in 2015, decreasing to 2.211 million in 2016. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years decreased from 2.860 million in Jun 2006 to 2.389 million in Jun 2017 or decrease by 0.471 million. This situation may persist for many years.

Table I-11, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, NSA, Thousands

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Dec	Annual
2001	2250	2258	2253	2095	2171	2775	2412	2371
2002	2754	2731	2822	2515	2568	3167	2374	2683
2003	2748	2740	2601	2572	2838	3542	2248	2746
2004	2767	2631	2588	2387	2684	3191	2294	2638
2005	2661	2787	2520	2398	2619	3010	2055	2521
2006	2366	2433	2216	2092	2254	2860	2007	2353
2007	2363	2230	2096	2074	2203	2883	2323	2342
2008	2633	2480	2347	2196	2952	3450	2928	2830
2009	3278	3457	3371	3321	3851	4653	3532	3760
2010	3983	3888	3748	3803	3854	4481	3352	3857
2011	3851	3696	3520	3365	3628	4248	3161	3634
2012	3416	3507	3294	3175	3438	4180	3153	3451
2013	3674	3449	3261	3129	3478	4198	2536	3324
2014	3051	3033	3002	2440	2831	3429	2317	2853
2015	2644	2529	2524	2175	2633	3138	2114	2467
2016	2205	2229	2160	2037	2227	2789	1859	2211
2017	2195	2093	1842	1759	1829	2389

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-22 provides the unemployment level for ages 16 to 24 from 2001 to 2017. The level rose sharply from 2007 to 2010 with tepid improvement into 2012 and deterioration into 2013-2014 with recent marginal improvement in 2015-17 alternating with deterioration.

Chart I-22, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Table I-12 provides the rate of unemployment of young peoples in ages 16 to 24 years. The annual rate jumped from 10.5 percent in 2007 to 18.4 percent in 2010, 17.3 percent in 2011 and 16.2 percent in 2012. The rate of youth unemployment fell marginally to 15.5 percent in 2013, declining to 13.4 percent in Dec 2014. During the seasonal peak in Jul, the rate of youth unemployed was 18.1 percent in Jul 2011, 17.1 percent in Jul 2012 and 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 compared with 10.8 percent in Jul 2007. The rate of youth unemployment rose from 11.2 percent in Jul 2006 to 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and likely higher if adding those who ceased searching for a job in frustration none may be available. The rate of youth unemployment rose from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 14.3 in Jul 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.1 percent in Dec 2006 to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.9 percent in Jan 2007 to 14.9 percent in Jan and Feb 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 percent in Mar 2007 to 14.3 percent in Mar 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 percent in Apr 2007 to 11.9 percent in Apr 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.2 percent in May 2007 to 13.4 percent in May 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 12.0 percent in Jun 2007 to 15.0 percent in Jun 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 14.3 in Jul 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.5 in Aug 2007 to 13.0 in Aug 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 11.0 in Sep 2007 to 13.6 in Sep 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 12.2 in Oct 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Nov 2007 to 11.7 in Nov 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.7 in Dec 2007 to 11.2 in Dec 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.9 in Jan 2007 to 12.9 in Jan 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 percent in Feb 2007 to 12.2 percent in Feb 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Mar 2007 to 12.3 in Mar 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Apr 2007 to 10.7 in Apr 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.2 in May 2007 to 12.3 in May 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 11.9 in Jun 2006 to 13.7 in Jun 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 12.2 in Jul 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.5 in Aug 2007 to 10.9 in Aug 2015. The rate of youth unemployment decreased from 11.0 in Sep 2007 to 10.9 in Sep 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 10.6 in Oct 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Nov 2007 to 10.4 in Nov 2015. The rate of youth unemployment decreased from 10.7 in Dec 2007 to 10.1 in Dec 2015. The rate of youth unemployment decreased from 10.9 in Jan 2007 to 10.8 in Jan 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Feb 2007 to 10.8 in Feb 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Mar 2007 to 10.4 in Mar 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Apr 2007 to 9.9 in Apr 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.2 in May 2007 to 10.6 in May 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 12.0 in Jun 2007 to 12.3 in Jun 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 11.5 in Jul 2016. The rate of youth unemplopyment fell from 10.5 in Aug 2007 to 10.1 in Aug 2016. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 11.0 in Sep 2007 to 10.2 in Sep 2016. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 10.1 in Oct 2016. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 10.3 in Nov 2007 to 9.3 in Nov 2016. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 10.7 in Dec 2007 to 9.0 in Dec 2016. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 10.9 in Jan 2007 to 10.7 in Jan 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 10.3 in Feb 2007 to 10.1 in Feb 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 9.7 in Mar 2007 to 8.9 in Mar 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 9.7 in Apr 2007 to 8.5 in Apr 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 10.2 in May 2007 to 8.8 in May 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell from 12.0 in Jun 2007 to 10.5 in Jun 2017. The actual rate is higher because of the difficulty in counting those dropping from the labor force because they believe there are no jobs available for them.

Table I-12, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Dec	Annual
2001	10.3	10.3	10.2	9.6	10.0	11.6	10.5	10.7	11.0	10.6
2002	12.9	12.5	12.9	11.6	11.6	13.2	12.4	11.5	10.9	12.0
2003	12.7	12.7	12.2	12.0	13.0	14.8	13.3	11.9	10.5	12.4
2004	12.8	12.3	12.1	11.1	12.2	13.4	12.3	11.1	10.5	11.8
2005	12.4	13.0	11.7	11.2	11.9	12.6	11.0	10.8	9.4	11.3
2006	11.1	11.3	10.3	9.7	10.2	11.9	11.2	10.4	9.1	10.5
2007	10.9	10.3	9.7	9.7	10.2	12.0	10.8	10.5	10.7	10.5
2008	12.3	11.8	11.1	10.3	13.3	14.4	14.0	13.0	13.7	12.8
2009	15.8	16.4	16.1	15.8	18.0	19.9	18.5	18.0	17.5	17.6
2010	19.8	19.2	18.4	18.5	18.4	20.0	19.1	17.8	16.7	18.4
2011	18.9	18.2	17.2	16.5	17.5	18.9	18.1	17.5	15.5	17.3
2012	16.8	17.0	16.0	15.4	16.3	18.1	17.1	16.8	15.2	16.2
2013	17.6	16.7	15.9	15.1	16.4	18.0	16.3	15.6	12.3	15.5
2014	14.9	14.9	14.3	11.9	13.4	15.0	14.3	13.0	11.2	13.4
2015	12.9	12.2	12.3	10.7	12.3	13.7	12.2	10.9	10.1	11.6
2016	10.8	10.8	10.4	9.9	10.6	12.3	11.5	10.1	9.0	10.4
2017	10.7	10.1	8.9	8.5	8.8	10.5

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-23 provides the BLS estimate of the not-seasonally-adjusted rate of youth unemployment for ages 16 to 24 years from 2001 to 2017. The rate of youth unemployment increased sharply during the global recession of 2008 and 2009 but has failed to drop to earlier lower levels because of low growth of GDP. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E. Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.

Chart I-23, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent, NSA, 2001-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-24 provides longer perspective with the rate of youth unemployment in ages 16 to 24 years from 1948 to 2017. The rate of youth unemployment rose to 20 percent during the contractions of the early 1980s and also during the contraction of the global recession in 2008 and 2009. The data illustrate again the argument in this blog that the contractions of the early 1980s are the valid framework for comparison with the global recession of 2008 and 2009 instead of misleading comparisons with the 1930s. During the initial phase of recovery, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years NSA fell from 18.9 percent in Jun 1983 to 14.5 percent in Jun 1984. In contrast, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years was nearly the same during the expansion after IIIQ2009: 17.5 percent in Dec 2009, 16.7 percent in Dec 2010, 15.5 percent in Dec 2011, 15.2 percent in Dec 2012, 17.6 percent in Jan 2013, 16.7 percent in Feb 2013, 15.9 percent in Mar 2013, 15.1 percent in Apr 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 16.4 percent in May 2013, 18.0 percent in Jun 2013, 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and 15.6 percent in Aug 2013. In Sep 2006, the rate of youth unemployment was 10.5 percent, increasing to 14.8 percent in Sep 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 in Oct 2007, increasing to 14.4 percent in Oct 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Nov 2007, increasing to 13.1 percent in Nov 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.7 percent in Dec 2013, increasing to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.9 percent in Jan 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Jan 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Feb 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Feb 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 9.7 percent in Mar 2007, increasing to 14.3 percent in Mar 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 9.7 percent in Apr 2007, increasing to 11.9 percent in Apr 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.2 percent in May 2007, increasing to 13.4 percent in May 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 12.0 percent in Jun 2007, increasing to 15.0 percent in Jun 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.8 percent in Jul 2007, increasing to 14.3 percent in Jul 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.5 percent in Aug 2007, increasing to 13.0 percent in Aug 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 11.0 percent in Sep 2007, increasing to 13.6 percent in Sep 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 12.2 in Oct 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 percent in Nov 2007 to 11.7 percent in Nov 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.7 in Dec 2007 to 11.2 in Dec 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Mar 2007 to 12.3 in Mar 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Apr 2007 to 10.7 in Apr 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.2 in May 2007 to 12.3 in May 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 12.0 in Jun 2007 to 13.7 in Jun 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 12.2 in Jul 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.5 in Aug 2007 to 10.9 in Aug 2015. The rate of youth unemployment decreased from 11.0 in Sep 2007 to 10.9 in Sep 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 10.6 in Oct 2015, decreasing to 10.4 in Nov 2015. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 10.1 in Dec 2015. The rate of youth unemployment stood at 10.8 in Jan 2016, 10.8 in Feb 2016, 10.4 in Mar 2016 and 9.9 in Apr 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 10.6 in May 2016 and 12.3 in Jun 2016. The rate of youth unemployment fell to 11.5 in Jul 2016, decreasing to 10.1 in Aug 2016. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 10.2 in Sep 2016, decreasing to 10.1 in Oct 2016 and 9.3 in Nov 2016. The rate of youth unemployment decreased to 9.0 in Dec 2016, increasing to 10.7 in Jan 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell to 10.1 in Feb 2017, decreasing to 8.9 in Mar 2017. The rate of youth unemployment fell to 8.5 in Apr 2017, increasing to 8.8 in May 2017. The rate of youth unemployment increased to 10.5 percent in Jun 2017. The actual rate is higher because of the difficulty in counting those dropping from the labor force because they believe there are no jobs available for them. The difference originates in the vigorous seasonally adjusted annual equivalent average rate of GDP growth of 5.9 percent during the recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990 compared with 2.1 percent on average during the first 30 quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2016. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 31 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2017. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IQ2017 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2017/pdf/gdp1q17_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[($14,745.9/$14,355.6) -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-rising-yields.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2017 would have accumulated to 31.4 percent. GDP in IQ2017 would be $19,699.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2826.4 billion than actual $16,872.8 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 21.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.0 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IQ2017 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,872.8 billion in IQ2017 or 12.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jun 1919 to Jun 2017. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2393 in Dec 2007 to 144.6580 in Jun 2017. The actual index NSA in Jun 2017 is 105.6126, which is 27.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Jun 2017. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 131.8650 in Jun 2017. The output of manufacturing at 105.6126 in Jun 2017 is 19.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Chart I-24, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent NSA, 1948-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

It is more difficult to move to other jobs after a certain age because of fewer available opportunities for mature individuals than for new entrants into the labor force. Middle-aged unemployed are less likely to find another job. Table I-13 provides the unemployment level ages 45 years and over. The number unemployed ages 45 years and over rose from 1.607 million in Oct 2006 to 4.576 million in Oct 2010 or by 184.8 percent. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over declined to 3.800 million in Oct 2012 that is still higher by 136.5 percent than in Oct 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over increased from 1.704 million in Nov 2006 to 3.861 million in Nov 2012, or 126.6 percent. The number unemployed age 45 and over is still higher by 98.5 percent at 3.383 million in Nov 2013 than 1.704 million in Nov 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over jumped from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 4.762 million in Dec 2010 or 165.4 percent. At 3.927 million in Dec 2012, mature unemployment is higher by 2.133 million or 118.9 percent higher than 1.794 million in Dec 2006. The level of unemployment of those aged 45 year or more of 3.632 million in Oct 2013 is higher by 2.025 million than 1.607 million in Oct 2006 or higher by 126.0 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 3.378 million in Nov 2013 or 88.3 percent. The annual number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.848 million in 2006 to 3.719 million in 2013 or 101.2 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 4.394 million in Jan 2013, by 2.618 million or 106.7 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over rose from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 3.508 million in Jan 2014, by 1.382 million or 65.0 percent. The level of unemployed 45 years or older increased 2.051 million or 99.8 percent from 2.056 million in Feb 2006 to 4.107 million in Feb 2013 and at 3.490 million in Feb 2014 is higher by 69.7 percent than in Feb 2006. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased 2.048 million or 108.9 percent from 1.881 million in Mar 2006 to 3.929 million in Mar 2013 and at 3.394 million in Mar 2014 is higher by 80.4 percent than in Mar 2006. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased 1.846 million or 100.2 percent from 1.843 million in Apr 2006 to 3.689 million in Apr 2013 and at 3.006 million in Apr 2014 is higher by 1.163 million or 63.1 percent. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 102.1 percent from 1.784 million in May 2006 to 3.605 million in May 2014 and at 2.913 million in May 2014 is higher by 63.3 percent than in May 2007.

The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 102.1 percent from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 3.648 million in Jun 2013 and at 2.832 million in Jun 2014 is higher by 56.9 percent than in Jun 2007. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 81.5 percent from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 3.727 million in Jul 2013 and at 3.083 million in Jul 2014 is higher by 50.2 percent than in Jul 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 84.4 percent from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 3.607 million in Aug 2013 and at 3.037 million in Aug 2014 is 55.2 percent higher than in Aug 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 90.7 percent from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 3.535 million in Sep 2013 and at 2.640 million in Sep 2014 is 42.4 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.747 million from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 3.632 million in Oct 2013 and at 2.606 million in Oct 2014 is 38.2 percent higher than in Oct 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.458 million from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 3.383 million in Nov 2013 and at 2.829 million in Nov 2014 is 47.0 percent higher than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.258 million from Dec 2007 to Dec 2013 and at 2.667 million in Dec 2014 is 25.8 higher than in Dec 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.353 million from Jan 2007 to Jan 2015 and at 3.077 million in Jan 2015 is 42.8 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.352 million from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 3.490 million in Feb 2014 and at 2.991 million in Feb 2015 is 39.9 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.363 million from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 3.394 million in Mar 2014 and at 2.724 million in Mar 2015 is 34.1 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.871 million in Apr 2007 to 3.006 million in Apr 2014 and at 2.579 million in Apr 2015 is 37.8 higher than in Apr 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.803 million in May 2007 to 2.913 million in Jun 2014 and at 2.457 million in May 2015 is 36.3 percent higher than in May 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 2.832 million in Jun 2014 and at 2.359 million in Jun 2015 is 30.7 percent higher than in Jun 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 3.083 million in Jul 2014 and at 2.666 million in Jul 2015 is 30.0 percent higher than in Jul 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 3.037 million in Aug 2014 and at 2.693 million in Aug 2015 is 37.7 higher than in Aug 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 2.640 million in Sep 2015 and at 2.388 million in Sep 2015 is 28.8 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 years and over increased from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 2.606 million in Oct 2014 and at 2.290 million in Oct 2015 is 21.5 percent higher than in Oct 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 years and over increased from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 2.829 million in Nov 2014 and at 2.349 million in Nov 2015 is 22.0 percent higher than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 years and over increased from 2.120 million in Dec 2007 to 2.667 million in Dec 2014 and at 2.317 million in Dec 2015 is 9.3 percent higher than in Dec 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.155 million in Jan 2007 to 3.077 million in Jan 2015 and at 2.736 million in Jan 2016 is 27.0 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 2.991 million in Feb 2015 and at 2.744 million in Feb 2016 is 28.3 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 2.724 million in Mar 2015 and at 2.747 million in Mar 2016 is 35.3 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.871 million in Apr 2007 to 2.579 million in Apr 2015 and at 2.410 million in Apr 2016 is 28.8 percent higher than in Apr 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.803 million in May 2007 to 2.457 million in May 2015 and at 2.190 million in May 2016 is 21.5 percent higher than in May 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 2.359 million in Jun 2015 and at 2.345 million in Jun 2016 is 29.9 percent higher than in Jun 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 2.666 million in Jul 2015 and at 2.619 million in Jul 2016 is 27.6 percent higher than in Jul 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 2.693 million in Aug 2015 and at 2.565 million in Aug 2016 is 31.1 percent higher than in Aug 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 2.388 million in Sep 2015 and at 2.414 million in Sep 2016 is 30.2 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 2.290 million in Oct 2015 and at 2.337 million in Oct 2016 is 24.0 percent higher than in Oct 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 2.349 million in Nov 2015 and at 2.355 million in Nov 2016 is 22.3 percent higher than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.120 million in Dec 2007 to 2.317 million in Dec 2015 and at 2.360 million in Dec 2016 is 11.3 percent higher than in Dec 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.155 million in Jan 2007 to 2.736 million in Jan 2016 and at 2.585 million in Jan 2017 is 20.0 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 2.744 million in Feb 2016 and at 2.493 million in Feb 2017 is 16.6 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 2.747 million in Mar 2016 and at 2.413 million in Mar 2017 is 18.8 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 2.747 million in Mar 2016 and at 2.413 million in Mar 2017 is 18.8 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.871 million in Apr 2007 to 2.410 million in Apr 2016 and at 2.202 million in Apr 2017 is 17.7 percent higher than in Apr 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.803 million in May 2007 to 2.190 million in May 2016 and at 2.052 million in May 2017 is 13.8 percent higher than in May 2007. The level of unemployment ages 45 and over increased from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 2.345 million in Jun 2016 and at 2.256 million in Jun 2017 is 25.0 percent higher than in Jun 2007. The actual number unemployed is likely much higher because many are not accounted who abandoned job searches in frustration there may not be a job for them. Recent improvements may be illusory. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 31 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2017. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the third estimate of GDP for IQ2017 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2017/pdf/gdp1q17_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[($14,745.9/$14,355.6) -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-rising-yields.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2017 would have accumulated to 31.4 percent. GDP in IQ2017 would be $19,699.2 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2826.4 billion than actual $16,872.8 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 21.9 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 13.0 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IQ2017 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,872.8 billion in IQ2017 or 12.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jun 1919 to Jun 2017. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2393 in Dec 2007 to 144.6580 in Jun 2017. The actual index NSA in Jun 2017 is 105.6126, which is 27.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Jun 2017. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 131.8650 in Jun 2017. The output of manufacturing at 105.6126 in Jun 2017 is 19.9 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table I-13, US, Unemployment Level 45 Years and Over, Thousands NSA

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Dec	Annual
2000	1498	1392	1291	1062	1074	1163	1217	1249
2001	1572	1587	1533	1421	1259	1371	1901	1576
2002	2235	2280	2138	2101	1999	2190	2210	2114
2003	2495	2415	2485	2287	2112	2212	2130	2253
2004	2453	2397	2354	2160	2025	2182	2086	2149
2005	2286	2286	2126	1939	1844	1868	1963	2009
2006	2126	2056	1881	1843	1784	1813	1794	1848
2007	2155	2138	2031	1871	1803	1805	2120	1966
2008	2336	2336	2326	2104	2095	2211	3485	2540
2009	4138	4380	4518	4172	4175	4505	4960	4500
2010	5314	5307	5194	4770	4565	4564	4762	4879
2011	5027	4837	4748	4373	4356	4559	4182	4537
2012	4458	4472	4390	4037	4083	4084	3927	4133
2013	4394	4107	3929	3689	3605	3648	3378	3719
2014	3508	3490	3394	3006	2913	2832	2667	3000
2015	3077	2991	2724	2579	2457	2359	2317	2574
2016	2736	2744	2747	2410	2190	2345	2360	2485
2017	2585	2493	2413	2202	2052	2256

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-25, US, Unemployment Level Ages 45 Years and Over, Thousands, NSA, 1976-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

IIB Squeeze of Economic Activity by Carry Trades Induced by Zero Interest Rates. Long-term economic growth in Japan significantly improved by increasing competitiveness in world markets. Net trade of exports and imports is an important component of the GDP accounts of Japan. Table VB-3 provides quarterly data for net trade, exports and imports of Japan. Net trade had strong positive contributions to GDP growth in Japan in all quarters from IQ2007 to IIQ2009 with exception of IVQ2008 and IQ2009. The US recession is dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) as beginning in IVQ2007 (Dec) and ending in IIQ2009 (Jun) (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Net trade contributions helped to cushion the economy of Japan from the global recession. Net trade deducted from GDP growth in six of the nine quarters from IVQ2010 to IQ2012. The only strong contribution of net trade was 3.5 percent in IIIQ2011. Net trade added 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2013 but subtracted 0.1 percentage points in IIQ2013, deducting 1.4 percentage points in IIIQ2013 and 2.1 percentage points in IVQ2013. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Net trade added 3.9 percentage points to GDP growth in IIQ2014 and deducted 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2014. Net trade added 1.5 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2014. Net trade contributed 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2015 and deducted 0.8-percentage points in IIQ2015. Net trade deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2015. Net trade contributed 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2015 and added 1.8 percentage points in IQ2016. Net trade deducted 0.2 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2016. Net trade added 1.5 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2016 and contributed 1.5 percentage points in IVQ2016. Net trade contributed 0.6 percentage points to GDP growth in IQ2017. Private consumption assumed the role of driver of Japan’s economic growth but should moderate as in most mature economies.

Table VB-3, Japan, Contributions to Changes in Real GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates (SAAR), %

	Net Trade	Exports	Imports
2017
I	0.6	1.4	-0.8
2016
I	1.8	0.4	1.4
II	-0.2	-1.0	0.8
III	1.5	1.3	0.1
IV	1.5	2.4	-0.9
2015
I	0.2	1.1	-0.8
II	-0.8	-2.9	2.1
III	-0.4	1.6	-1.9
IV	0.1	-0.2	0.3
2014
I	-0.7	3.9	-4.7
II	3.9	0.6	3.3
III	-0.2	1.0	-1.2
IV	1.5	2.4	-0.9
2013
I	1.4	1.7	-0.4
II	-0.1	1.9	-2.0
III	-1.4	-0.1	-1.3
IV	-2.1	-0.1	-2.0
2012
I	0.6	1.8	-1.1
II	-1.9	-0.6	-1.3
III	-2.0	-2.2	0.2
IV	-0.3	-1.9	1.6
2011
I	-1.4	-0.6	-0.8
II	-4.3	-4.6	0.4
III	3.5	5.4	-1.9
IV	-2.7	-1.7	-1.0
2010
I	1.9	3.3	-1.4
II	0.3	2.8	-2.5
III	0.6	1.7	-1.0
IV	0.0	0.2	-0.3
2009
I	-4.8	-16.2	11.4
II	7.5	4.6	2.8
III	2.1	5.2	-3.2
IV	3.0	4.2	-1.3
2008
I	0.8	1.8	-1.0
II	0.4	-1.4	1.9
III	-0.2	0.1	-0.2
IV	-10.3	-9.2	-1.0
2007
I	1.0	1.6	-0.5
II	0.7	1.6	-0.8
III	2.2	1.7	0.5
IV	1.3	2.0	-0.7

Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

There was milder increase in Japan’s export corporate goods price index during the global recession in 2008 but similar sharp decline during the bank balance sheets effect in late 2008, as shown in Chart IV-5 of the Bank of Japan. Japan exports industrial goods whose prices have been less dynamic than those of commodities and raw materials. As a result, the export CGPI on the yen basis in Chart IV-5 trends down with oscillations after a brief rise in the final part of the recession in 2009. The export corporate goods price index on the yen basis fell from 93.9 in Jun 2009 to 84.1 in Jan 2012 or minus 10.4 percent and increased to 93.8 in Jun 2017 for gain of 11.5 percent relative to Jan 2012 and decrease of 0.1 percent relative to Jun 2009. The choice of Jun 2009 is designed to capture the reversal of risk aversion beginning in Sep 2008 with the announcement of toxic assets in banks that would be withdrawn with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). Reversal of risk aversion in the form of flight to the USD and obligations of the US government opened the way to renewed carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets such as commodities. Japan exports industrial products and imports commodities and raw materials. The recovery from the global recession began in the third quarter of 2009.

Chart IV-5, Japan, Export Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Yen Basis, 2008-2017

Source: Bank of Japan

Chart IV-5A provides the export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency. The export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency increased from 105.9 in Jun 2009 to 111.5 in Apr 2012 or 5.3 percent but dropped to 99.2 in Jun 2017 or minus 11.0 percent relative to Apr 2012 and fell 6.3 percent to 99.2 in Jun 2017 relative to Jun 2009.

Chart IV-5A, Japan, Export Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Contract Currency Basis, 2008-2017

Source: Bank of Japan

Japan imports primary commodities and raw materials. As a result, the import corporate goods price index on the yen basis in Chart IV-6 shows an upward trend after declining from the increase during the global recession in 2008 driven by carry trades from fed funds rates. The index increases with carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures and declines during risk aversion from late 2008 into beginning of 2008 originating in doubts about soundness of US bank balance sheets. Measurement that is more careful should show that the terms of trade of Japan, export prices relative to import prices, declined during the commodity shocks originating in unconventional monetary policy. The decline of the terms of trade restricted potential growth of income in Japan (for the relation of terms of trade and growth see Pelaez 1979, 1976a). The import corporate goods price index on the yen basis increased from 82.4 in Jun 2009 to 99.6 in Apr 2012 or 20.9 percent and to 91.2 in Jun 2017 or decline of 8.4 percent relative to Apr 2012 and increase of 10.7 percent relative to Jun 2009.

Chart IV-6, Japan, Import Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Yen Basis, 2008-2017

Source: Bank of Japan

Chart IV-6A provides the import corporate goods price index on the contract currency basis. The import corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency increased from 95.0 in Jun 2009 to 131.6 in Apr 2012 or 38.5 percent and to 97.3 in Jun 2017 or minus 26.1 percent relative to Apr 2012 and increase of 2.4 percent relative to Jun 2009. There is evident deterioration of the terms of trade of Japan: the export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency decreased 6.3 percent from Jun 2009 to Jun 2017 while the import corporate goods price index increased 2.4 percent. Prices of Japan’s exports of corporate goods, mostly industrial products, increased only 5.3 percent from Jun 2009 to Apr 2012, while imports of corporate goods, mostly commodities and raw materials increased 38.5 percent. Unconventional monetary policy induces carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in commodities that squeeze economic activity of industrial countries by increases in prices of imported commodities and raw materials during periods without risk aversion. Reversals of carry trades during periods of risk aversion decrease prices of exported commodities and raw materials that squeeze economic activity in economies exporting commodities and raw materials. Devaluation of the dollar by unconventional monetary policy could increase US competitiveness in world markets but economic activity is squeezed by increases in prices of imported commodities and raw materials. Unconventional monetary policy causes instability worldwide instead of the mission of central banks of promoting financial and economic stability.

Chart IV-6A, Japan, Import Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Contract Currency Basis, 2008-2017

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/index.htm/

Table IV-6B provides the Bank of Japan’s Corporate Goods Price indexes of exports and imports on the yen and contract bases from Jan 2008 to Jun 2017. There are oscillations of the indexes that are shown vividly in the four charts above. For the entire period from Jan 2008 to Jun 2017, the export index on the contract currency basis decreased 7.5 percent and decreased 9.2 percent on the yen basis. For the entire period from Jan 2008 to Jun 2017, the import price index decreased 12.3 percent on the contract currency basis and decreased 13.0 percent on the yen basis. During significant part of the expansion period, prices of Japan’s exports of corporate goods on the contract currency, mostly industrial products, increased only 5.3 percent from Jun 2009 to Apr 2012, while prices of imports of corporate goods on the contract currency, mostly commodities and raw materials, increased 38.5 percent. The charts show sharp deteriorations in relative prices of exports to prices of imports during multiple periods. Price margins of Japan’s producers are subject to periodic squeezes resulting from carry trades from zero interest rates of monetary policy to exposures in commodities.

Table IV-6B, Japan, Exports and Imports Corporate Goods Price Index, Contract Currency Basis and Yen Basis

	X-CC	X-Y	M-CC	M-Y
2008/01	107.3	103.3	110.9	104.8
2008/02	107.9	103.9	112.8	106.2
2008/03	108.7	100.7	115.1	103.4
2008/04	109.9	103.2	121.3	110.3
2008/05	110.7	105	124.9	114.9
2008/06	111.9	108	131.6	123.6
2008/07	113.2	109.2	135	126.8
2008/08	112.1	109.2	135.6	129.5
2008/09	111	105.8	129	120.8
2008/10	108.3	98.1	120.2	107
2008/11	106.6	93.5	107.7	93.2
2008/12	105.9	90	98.4	81.9
2009/01	106	89	94.3	77.9
2009/02	105.4	89.6	94.4	79
2009/03	105.2	93.2	93.8	81.9
2009/04	105.5	94.5	93	81.9
2009/05	105.4	92.9	92.5	80
2009/06	105.9	93.9	95	82.4
2009/07	105.4	92.2	98.3	83.7
2009/08	106.3	93.4	98.7	84.4
2009/09	106.3	91.4	100.2	83.4
2009/10	106	90.5	100.2	82.8
2009/11	106.4	90.2	102.2	83.5
2009/12	106.3	90.1	105.1	85.9
2010/01	107.5	91.4	106.8	88.1
2010/02	107.8	90.9	107.5	87.9
2010/03	107.8	91.1	106.8	87.4
2010/04	108.7	93.6	110	92.1
2010/05	108.9	92.1	112	92.4
2010/06	108.2	90.9	110.2	90.1
2010/07	107.5	88.6	110	87.9
2010/08	107.2	87.1	109.6	85.9
2010/09	107.5	86.8	110.2	85.6
2010/10	108.2	86.3	110.7	84.4
2010/11	108.9	87.1	113	86.5
2010/12	109.4	88	115	88.6
2011/01	110.4	88.2	118.1	90.4
2011/02	111.3	89	120.1	91.9
2011/03	111.9	89.1	123.2	93.6
2011/04	112.6	91	127.7	98.6
2011/05	112.3	89.4	130.9	99
2011/06	112.2	88.8	129.4	97.3
2011/07	112	88	130.3	97.1
2011/08	112	86.4	130.6	95.2
2011/09	112.1	86	128.9	93.6
2011/10	111.4	85.2	128.4	93
2011/11	110.2	84.8	127.1	92.8
2011/12	109.7	84.6	127.9	93.6
2012/01	110.1	84.1	126.7	91.8
2012/02	110.7	85.7	127.6	93.7
2012/03	111.3	88.8	130.3	99.5
2012/04	111.5	88.3	131.6	99.6
2012/05	110.6	86.2	130.1	96.7
2012/06	109.6	85	126.9	94
2012/07	108.8	84.1	123.4	91.2
2012/08	109.1	84.2	123.8	91.3
2012/09	109.2	84.2	126.3	92.7
2012/10	109.3	84.7	125.4	92.7
2012/11	109.1	85.8	124.7	93.8
2012/12	108.9	87.7	124.9	96.5
2013/01	109.2	91.6	125.4	101.7
2013/02	109.7	94.8	126.5	105.9
2013/03	109.5	95.4	126.8	107.5
2013/04	108.3	96.2	125.7	109.1
2013/05	107.7	97.6	124	110.4
2013/06	107.3	94.9	123.4	106.8
2013/07	107.2	96.2	122.9	108.2
2013/08	107	94.9	123.2	106.9
2013/09	107	95.9	124.5	109.2
2013/10	107.3	95.5	124.6	108.3
2013/11	107.2	96.6	124.6	110
2013/12	107.2	98.8	125.4	113.6
2014/01	107.3	99	126	114.6
2014/02	106.9	97.7	125.4	112.5
2014/03	106.6	97.6	124.9	112.2
2014/04	106.3	97.5	124.1	111.8
2014/05	106.2	96.8	123.8	110.9
2014/06	105.9	96.7	123.9	111.2
2014/07	106	96.5	123.9	110.9
2014/08	106.1	97.3	123.7	111.6
2014/09	105.9	99.3	122.8	114
2014/10	105.2	99.1	120.7	112.7
2014/11	104.8	103.4	117.8	115.9
2014/12	103.8	104.1	113.8	114
2015/01	102.2	101.2	108.2	106.6
2015/02	101.2	100.1	102.1	100.7
2015/03	101.3	100.9	103.1	102.6
2015/04	101.1	100.2	102	101
2015/05	101.4	101.4	101.6	101.5
2015/06	101.3	102.9	102.5	104.3
2015/07	100.6	101.7	101.5	102.9
2015/08	99.8	100.9	99	100.4
2015/09	98.6	98.2	96.6	96.2
2015/10	97.9	97.3	95.5	95
2015/11	97.5	98	94.9	95.7
2015/12	97.1	97.3	92.9	93.2
2016/01	96.4	94.7	89.9	88.3
2016/02	95.9	92.7	87.6	84.4
2016/03	96.1	92	87.3	83.2
2016/04	96.5	91	88.2	82.4
2016/05	96.6	90.6	88.6	82.4
2016/06	96.5	88.8	89.9	81.5
2016/07	96.9	88.2	90.8	81.4
2016/08	96.9	87	90.6	79.9
2016/09	97	87.4	91.1	80.7
2016/10	97.5	88.5	91.1	81.6
2016/11	98.2	91.2	93.9	86.4
2016/12	98.7	95.5	93.8	90.7
2017/01	99.3	95.5	96.2	92.3
2017/02	99.7	95.1	97.7	92.7
2017/03	100.2	95.6	98.6	93.5
2017/04	99.8	93.7	98.5	91.6
2017/05	99.4	94.6	98.1	92.7
2017/06	99.2	93.8	97.3	91.2

Note: X-CC: Exports Contract Currency; X-Y: Exports Yen; M-CC: Imports Contract; M-Y: Imports Yen

Source: Bank of Japan

Chart IV-7, Japan, Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, 1970-2017

Source: Bank of Japan

Table IV-7, Japan, Corporate Goods Prices and Selected Components, % Weights, Month and 12 Months ∆%

The producer price index of the US from 1970 to 2017 in Chart IV-8 shows various periods of more rapid or less rapid inflation but no bumps. The major event is the decline in 2008 when risk aversion because of the global recession caused the collapse of oil prices from $148/barrel to less than $80/barrel with most other commodity prices also collapsing. The event had nothing in common with explanations of deflation but rather with the concentration of risk exposures in commodities after the decline of stock market indexes. Eventually, there was a flight to government securities because of the fears of insolvency of banks caused by statements supporting proposals for withdrawal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as explained by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). The bump in 2008 with decline in 2009 is consistent with the view that zero interest rates with subdued risk aversion induce carry trades into commodity futures.

Chart IV-8, US, Producer Price Index Finished Goods, Monthly, 1970-2016

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Further insight into inflation of the corporate goods price index (CGPI) of Japan is in Table IV-7. The increase in the tax on value added of consumption caused sharp increases in prices across all segments. Petroleum and coal with weight of 6.0 percent decreased 0.9 percent in Jun 2017 and increased 11.1 percent in 12 months. Japan exports manufactured products and imports raw materials and commodities such that the country’s terms of trade, or export prices relative to import prices, deteriorate during commodity price increases. In contrast, prices of production machinery, with weight of 4.1 percent, increased 0.3 percent in Jun 2017 and decreased 0.8 percent in 12 months. In general, most manufactured products had been experiencing negative or low increases in prices while inflation rates have been high in 12 months for products originating in raw materials and commodities. The reversal of carry trades in commodity futures caused decrease in prices of commodities and raw materials while prices of manufactures stabilized. Ironically, unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing that intended to increase aggregate demand and GDP growth deteriorated the terms of trade of advanced economies with adverse effects on real income (for analysis of terms of trade and growth see Pelaez (1979, 1976a). There are now inflation effects of the intentional policy of devaluing the yen and recent collapse of commodity prices followed by increases.

Jun 2017	Weight	Month ∆%	12 Month ∆%
Total	1000.0	0.0	2.1
Food, Beverages	141.6	0.0	0.0
Petroleum & Coal	59.5	-0.9	11.1
Production Machinery	41.1	0.3	-0.8
Electronic Components	24.5	0.1	1.7
Electric Power, Gas & Water	67.1	0.7	6.3
Iron & Steel	51.7	0.1	10.8
Chemicals	89.2	-0.1	3.7
Transport Equipment	140.7	0.1	-0.5

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/index.htm/

Percentage point contributions to change of the corporate goods price index (CGPI) in Jun 2017 are in Table IV-8, divided into domestic, export and import segments. In the domestic CGPI, changing 0.0 percent in Jun 2017, the energy shock is evident in the contribution of 0.04 percentage points by electric power, gas and water in renewed carry trades of exposures in commodity futures. The exports CGPI decreased 0.2 percent on the basis of the contract currency with deduction of 0.19 percentage points by chemicals and related products. The imports CGPI decreased 0.8 percent on the contract currency basis. Petroleum, coal and natural gas subtracted 0.78 percentage points. Shocks of risk aversion cause unwinding carry trades that result in declining commodity prices with resulting downward pressure on price indexes. The volatility of inflation adversely affects financial and economic decisions worldwide.

Table IV-8, Japan, Percentage Point Contributions to Change of Corporate Goods Price Index

Groups Jun 2017	Contribution to Change Percentage Points
A. Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index	Monthly Change: 0.0%
Electric Power, Gas & Water	0.04
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery Products	0.03
Production Machinery	0.01
Petroleum & Coal Products	-0.05
Electrical Machinery & Equipment	-0.02
B. Export Price Index	Monthly Change: -0.2% contract currency
Chemicals & Related Products	-0.19
Other Primary Products & Manufactured Goods	-0.06
Electric & Electronic Products	0.03
General Purpose, Production & Business Oriented Machinery	0.01
Transportation Equipment	0.01
C. Import Price Index	Monthly Change: -0.8% contract currency basis
Petroleum, Coal & Natural Gas	-0.78
Chemicals & Related Products	-0.11
Other Primary Products & Manufactured Goods	-0.05
Beverages & Foods and Agriculture Products for Food	-0.03
Metals & Related Products	-0.02
General Purpose, Production & Business Oriented Machinery	0.08
Textiles	0.04

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/index.htm/

There are two categories of responses in the Empire State Manufacturing Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html): current conditions and expectations for the next six months. There are responses in the survey for two types of prices: prices received or inputs of production and prices paid or sales prices of products. Table IV-5 provides indexes for the two categories and within them for the two types of prices from Jan 2011 to Jul 2017. The index of current prices paid or costs of inputs moved from 16.1 in Dec 2012 to 21.3 in Jul 2017 while the index of current prices received or sales prices moved from 1.1 in Dec 2012 to 11.0 in Jul 2017. The farther the index is from the area of no change at zero, the faster the rate of change. Prices paid or costs of inputs at 21.3 in Jul 2017 are expanding at faster pace than prices received or of sales of products at 11.0. The index of future prices paid or expectations of costs of inputs in the next six months fell from 51.6 in Dec 2012 to 30.7 in Jul 2017 while the index of future prices received or expectation of sales prices in the next six months decreased from 25.8 in Dec 2012 to 15.7 in Jun 2017. Prices paid or of inputs at 30.7 in Jul 2017 are expected to increase at a faster pace in the next six months than prices received or prices of sales products at 15.7 in Jul 2017. Prices of sales of finished products are less dynamic than prices of costs of inputs during waves of increases. Prices of costs of costs of inputs fall less rapidly than prices of sales of finished products during waves of price decreases. As a result, margins of prices of sales less costs of inputs oscillate with typical deterioration against producers, forcing companies to manage tightly costs and labor inputs. Instability of sales/costs margins discourages investment and hiring.

Table IV-5, US, FRBNY Empire State Manufacturing Survey, Diffusion Indexes, Prices Paid and Prices Received, SA

1/31/2011	35.8	15.8	60	42.1
2/28/2011	45.8	16.9	55.4	27.7
3/31/2011	53.2	20.8	71.4	36.4
4/30/2011	57.7	26.9	56.4	38.5
5/31/2011	69.9	28	68.8	35.5
6/30/2011	56.1	11.2	55.1	19.4
7/31/2011	43.3	5.6	51.1	30
8/31/2011	28.3	2.2	42.4	15.2
9/30/2011	32.6	8.7	53.3	22.8
10/31/2011	22.5	4.5	40.4	18
11/30/2011	18.3	6.1	36.6	25.6
12/31/2011	24.4	3.5	57	36
1/31/2012	26.4	23.1	53.8	30.8
2/29/2012	25.9	15.3	62.4	34.1
3/31/2012	50.6	13.6	66.7	32.1
4/30/2012	45.8	19.3	50.6	22.9
5/31/2012	37.3	12	57.8	22.9
6/30/2012	19.6	1	34	17.5
7/31/2012	7.4	3.7	35.8	16
8/31/2012	16.5	2.4	31.8	14.1
9/30/2012	19.1	5.3	40.4	23.4
10/31/2012	17.2	4.3	44.1	24.7
11/30/2012	14.6	5.6	39.3	15.7
12/31/2012	16.1	1.1	51.6	25.8
1/31/2013	22.6	10.8	38.7	21.5
2/28/2013	26.3	8.1	44.4	13.1
3/31/2013	25.8	2.2	50.5	23.7
4/30/2013	28.4	5.7	44.3	14.8
5/31/2013	20.5	4.5	29.5	14.8
6/30/2013	21	11.3	45.2	17.7
7/31/2013	17.4	1.1	28.3	12
8/31/2013	20.5	3.6	41	19.3
9/30/2013	21.5	8.6	39.8	24.7
10/31/2013	21.7	2.4	45.8	25.3
11/30/2013	17.1	-3.9	42.1	17.1
12/31/2013	15.7	3.6	48.2	27.7
1/31/2014	36.6	13.4	45.1	23.2
2/28/2014	25	15	40	23.8
3/31/2014	21.2	2.4	43.5	25.9
4/30/2014	22.4	10.2	33.7	14.3
5/31/2014	19.8	6.6	31.9	14.3
6/30/2014	17.2	4.3	36.6	16.1
7/31/2014	25	6.8	37.5	18.2
8/31/2014	27.3	8	42	21.6
9/30/2014	23.9	17.4	43.5	32.6
10/31/2014	11.4	6.8	42	26.1
11/30/2014	10.6	0	41.5	25.5
12/31/2014	10.4	6.3	40.6	32.3
1/31/2015	12.6	12.6	33.7	15.8
2/28/2015	14.6	3.4	27	5.6
3/31/2015	12.4	8.2	32	12.4
4/30/2015	19.1	4.3	38.3	13.8
5/31/2015	9.4	1	26	7.3
6/30/2015	9.6	1	24	5.8
7/31/2015	7.4	5.3	27.7	6.4
8/31/2015	7.3	0.9	34.5	10.9
9/30/2015	4.1	-5.2	28.9	7.2
10/31/2015	0.9	-8.5	27.4	7.5
11/30/2015	4.5	-4.5	29.1	11.8
12/31/2015	4	-4	27.3	20.2
1/31/2016	16	4	31	12
2/29/2016	3	-5	14.9	4
3/31/2016	3	-5.9	19.8	7.9
4/30/2016	19.2	2.9	27.9	5.8
5/31/2016	16.7	-3.1	28.1	6.3
6/30/2016	18.4	-1	29.6	7.1
7/31/2016	18.7	1.1	26.4	7.7
8/31/2016	15.5	2.1	25.8	9.3
9/30/2016	17	1.8	41.1	20.5
10/31/2016	22.6	4.7	35.8	30.2
11/30/2016	15.5	2.7	39.1	20.9
12/31/2016	22.6	3.5	42.6	22.6
1/31/2017	36.1	17.6	50.4	27.7
2/28/2017	37.8	19.4	38.8	25.5
3/31/2017	31	8.8	41.6	19.5
4/30/2017	32.8	12.4	37.2	25.5
5/31/2017	20.9	4.5	38.1	22.4
6/30/2017	20	10.8	33.1	13.8
7/31/2017	21.3	11	30.7	15.7

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

https://www.newyorkfed.org/survey/empire/empiresurvey_overview.html

Price indexes of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Outlook Survey are in Table IV-5A. As in inflation waves throughout the world (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html) indexes of both current and expectations of future prices paid and received were quite high until May 2011. Prices paid, or inputs, were more dynamic, reflecting carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. All indexes softened after May 2011 with even decline of prices received in Aug 2011 during the first round of risk aversion. Current and future price indexes have increased again but not back to the intensity in the beginning of 2011 because of risk aversion frustrating carry trades even induced by zero interest rates. The index of prices paid or prices of inputs moved from 20.6 in Dec 2012 to 19.1 in Dec 2017. The index of current prices received was minus 2.2 in Apr 2013, indicating decrease of prices received. The index of current prices received decreased from 9.1 in Dec 2012 to minus 5.7 in Sep 2015, decreasing to minus 4.8 in Feb 2016. The index of current prices received was 9.0 in Jul 2017. The farther the index is from the area of no change at zero, the faster the rate of change. The index of current prices paid or costs of inputs at 19.1 in Jul 2017 indicates faster expansion than the index of current prices received or sales prices of production in Jul 2017, showing 9.0. Prices paid indicate faster expansion than prices received during most of the history of the index. The index of future prices paid increased to 46.6 in Jul 2017 from 42.1 in Dec 2012 while the index of future prices received increased from 21.7 in Dec 2012 to 29.7 in Jul 2017. Expectations are incorporating faster increases in prices of inputs or costs of production, 46.6 in Jul 2017, than of sales prices of produced goods, 29.7 in Jul 2017, forcing companies to manage tightly costs and labor inputs. Volatility of margins of sales/costs discourages investment and hiring.

Table IV-5A, US, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey, Current and Future Prices Paid and Prices Received, SA

	Current Prices Paid	Current Prices Received	Six Months Prices paid	Six Months Prices Received
Dec-10	42.7	5.3	56.2	24.2
Jan-11	48.2	12.6	59	34.6
Feb-11	61.4	13.7	69.1	31.6
Mar-11	59.2	17.9	61.5	33.5
Apr-11	52.8	22.9	56.4	36.3
May-11	51.2	20.6	54.8	28.4
Jun-11	36	6.4	40.7	6.8
Jul-11	34.1	5.6	47.8	17.3
Aug-11	23.6	-3.4	42.6	22.8
Sep-11	30.1	6.4	38.1	20.4
Oct-11	22.7	1.6	41.3	27.8
Nov-11	21.8	5.2	34.4	26.4
Dec-11	24.9	5.6	42.7	21.1
Jan-12	26.1	9.2	48.1	21.9
Feb-12	33.3	10.4	52.5	26.4
Mar-12	17.6	6.9	38.7	24.8
Apr-12	21.9	9.7	37	25.1
May-12	10.2	1.1	39.9	9
Jun-12	1.2	-5.9	32.7	16.8
Jul-12	8.1	3.3	26.8	20.6
Aug-12	16.3	6.6	34.7	23.9
Sep-12	12.9	2.7	38.1	24.6
Oct-12	17.3	4.6	44.1	15.2
Nov-12	22.2	4.7	45.8	10.7
Dec-12	20.6	9.1	42.1	21.7
Jan-13	13	0.8	35.4	21.8
Feb-13	12.7	0.2	36.9	23.1
Mar-13	13.8	1.3	35.2	20.5
Apr-13	11.7	-2.2	31.2	16.7
May-13	12.6	0.5	34.5	19
Jun-13	17.2	11.8	29.4	23.9
Jul-13	18.9	5.6	39.6	25
Aug-13	17.9	12.6	33.6	23.4
Sep-13	22.1	11.5	37.1	26.8
Oct-13	17.4	8.9	41.4	34.5
Nov-13	23.3	6.5	41	36.3
Dec-13	16.5	8.8	40.6	28.2
Jan-14	20.4	8.6	38.2	13.8
Feb-14	16.1	9.7	31.1	19.6
Mar-14	22.6	7.5	33.9	20.7
Apr-14	21.3	10.8	38.2	21.1
May-14	26.7	17.2	37.7	28.9
Jun-14	26.6	10.5	41.9	29.4
Jul-14	29.8	13.9	35.9	21.8
Aug-14	21.5	5.8	44	28.6
Sep-14	21.7	7.5	38.7	25.3
Oct-14	23.6	16.9	31	21.7
Nov-14	14.2	8	32.7	18.4
Dec-14	14.4	11.1	26.1	20.1
Jan-15	12.3	3	31.6	21.1
Feb-15	6	2.3	37.4	22.3
Mar-15	3.4	-4.6	30.8	10.2
Apr-15	1.7	-2	19.6	13.6
May-15	-14.1	-7.1	22.3	19
Jun-15	10.4	1.4	38	11.5
Jul-15	16.6	0.3	32.9	15.9
Aug-15	2.8	-3.7	33.5	9.9
Sep-15	-2.8	-5.7	24.7	4.1
Oct-15	-1.7	-1.2	17.7	8.7
Nov-15	-7	-3.4	23.6	10.5
Dec-15	-9.5	-6.8	25.5	13.8
Jan-16	-1.2	-2.2	20.4	11.5
Feb-16	-2.8	-4.8	16.4	4.1
Mar-16	1.5	2.9	25.1	15.3
Apr-16	13.7	6.1	35.3	21.4
May-16	13.5	11.5	23.9	12.5
Jun-16	21.2	4.1	34.4	17.1
Jul-16	11.9	1.3	27.4	22.3
Aug-16	18.7	6.6	29.7	15.5
Sep-16	20.8	9.4	39.8	31.2
Oct-16	8.9	-1.9	41.5	27.9
Nov-16	27.6	16.4	38.3	30.6
Dec-16	28.1	8	46.5	29.1
Jan-17	32.5	26.8	49	27.5
Feb-17	29.9	10.6	51.1	23.5
Mar-17	40.7	20.6	55.7	40.2
Apr-17	33.7	16.6	34.7	28.6
May-17	24.2	15.3	42.7	22.9
Jun-17	23.6	20.6	40.9	28.7
Jul-17	19.1	9	46.6	29.7

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Chart IV-1 of the Business Outlook Survey of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Outlook Survey provides the diffusion index of current prices paid or prices of inputs from 2006 to 2017. Recession dates are in shaded areas. In the middle of deep global contraction after IVQ2007, input prices continued to increase in speculative carry trades from central bank policy rates falling toward zero into commodities futures. The index peaked above 70 in the second half of 2008. Inflation of inputs moderated significantly during the shock of risk aversion in late 2008, even falling briefly into contraction territory below zero during several months in 2009 in the flight away from risk financial assets into US government securities (Cochrane and Zingales 2009) that unwound carry trades. Return of risk appetite induced carry trade with significant increase until return of risk aversion in the first round of the European sovereign debt crisis in Apr 2010. Carry trades returned during risk appetite in expectation that the European sovereign debt crisis was resolved. The various inflation waves originating in carry trades induced by zero interest rates with alternating episodes of risk aversion are mirrored in the prices of inputs after 2011, in particular after Aug 2012 with the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions Program of the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). Subsequent risk aversion and flows of capital away from commodities into stocks and high-yield bonds caused sharp decline in the index of prices paid followed by another recent rebound with marginal decline and new increase. The index falls, rebounds and falls again in the final segment but there are no episodes of contraction after 2009 with exception of minus 14.1 in May 2015, minus 2.8 in Sep 2015, minus 1.7 in Oct 2015, minus 7.0 in Nov 2015 and minus 9.5 in Dec 2015. The reading for the index in Jan 2016 is minus 1.2 and minus 2.8 for Feb 2016. The index is 1.5 in Mar 2016 and 13.7 in Apr 2016, increasing at 13.5 in May 2016 and 21.2 in Jun 2016. The index reached 11.9 in Jul 2016, 18.7 in Aug 2016 and 20.8 in Sep 2016. The index was 8.9 in Oct 2016 and 19.1 in Jul 2017

Chart IV-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey Current Prices Paid Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Chart IV-2 of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Outlook Survey provides the diffusion index of current prices received from 2006 to 2017. The significant difference between the index of current prices paid in Chart IV-1 and the index of current prices received in Chart IV-2 is that increases in prices paid are significantly sharper than increases in prices received. There were several periods of negative readings of prices received from 2010 to 2016. Prices paid increased at 3.4 in Mar 2015 while prices received contracted at 4.6. There were several contractions of prices paid: 14.1 in May 2015 with milder contraction of 7.1 of prices received; minus 2.8 for prices paid in Sep 2015 with minus 5.7 for prices received; and minus 1.7 for prices paid in Oct 2015 with minus 1.2 for prices received. The index of prices received fell to minus 7.0 in Nov 2015 with minus 3.4 for prices paid and to minus 9.5 in Dec 2015 with minus 6.8 for prices paid. The index of prices received fell to minus 2.8 in Feb 2016 with minus 4.8 for prices paid. The index of prices received increased at 1.5 in Mar 2016 with 2.9 for prices paid. Prices paid moved to 19.1 in Jun 2017 while prices received moved to 9.0. Prices received relative to prices paid deteriorate most of the time largely because of the carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. Profit margins of business are compressed intermittently by fluctuations of commodity prices induced by unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates, frustrating production, investment and hiring decisions of business, which is precisely the opposite outcome pursued by unconventional monetary policy.

Chart IV-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey Current Prices Received Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Chart IV-2A of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia shows current prices paid and current prices received from Jan 2007 to Mar 2017. Current prices paid jumped ahead of current prices received during the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 through the carry trade from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity derivatives. There is the same behavior during most of the cyclical expansion after IIIQ2009. Rebalancing of financial investment portfolios away from commodities into equities explains the recent weakness of prices paid. There is a new ongoing carry trade into commodity futures.

Chart IV-2A, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey Current Prices Paid and Current Prices Received Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Chart IV-2B of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia shows the six-month forecast and current prices received of the Business Outlook Survey from 2007 to Jun 2017. There is correlation in the direction of the indexes. The six-month forecast is typically above current prices received. There is upward trend in both indexes in the final segment with wide fluctuations.

Chart IV-2B, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey Current Prices Received and Future Prices Received Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Chart IV-2B of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia shows the six-month forecast and current prices received of the Business Outlook Survey from 2007 to Jul 2017. There is correlation in the direction of the indexes. The six-month forecast is typically above current prices received. There is upward trend in both indexes in the final segment with wide fluctuations.

Chart IV-2c, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Outlook Survey Current Prices Received and Future Prices Received Diffusion Index SA

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia