CMP Associates Regulation Blog: Twenty Nine Million Unemployed or Underemployed, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, Stagnating Real Wages, United States International Trade, Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk: Part II

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Twenty Nine Million Unemployed or Underemployed, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, Stagnating Real Wages, United States International Trade, Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk: Part II

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Twenty Nine Million Unemployed or Underemployed, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, Stagnating Real Wages, United States International Trade, Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

Executive Summary

I Twenty Nine Million Unemployed or Underemployed

IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation

IA2 Number of People in Job Stress

IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment

IA4 Job Creation

IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

II Stagnating Real Wages

IIA United States International Trade

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

II Stagnating Real Wages. The wage bill is the product of average weekly hours times the earnings per hour. Table II-1 provides the estimates by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of earnings per hour seasonally adjusted, increasing from $23.50/hour in Jun 2012 to $24.01/hour in Jun 2013, or by 2.2 percent. There has been disappointment about the pace of wage increases because of rising food and energy costs that inhibit consumption and thus sales and similar concern about growth of consumption that accounts for about 71.0 percent of GDP (Table I-10 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Growth of consumption by decreasing savings by means of controlling interest rates in what is called financial repression may not be lasting and sound for personal finances (See Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008c), 81-6, Pelaez (1975), http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html

{[(wage bill in May 2013)/(wage bill in May 2012)]-1}100 =

{[($23.81x34.3)/($23.36x34.3)]-1]}100

= {[($816.68/$801.25)]-1}100 = 1.9%

CPI inflation was 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/) for an inflation-adjusted wage-bill change of 0.5 percent :{[(1.019/1.014)-1]100} (see Table II-5 below for May 2013). The wage bill for Jun 2013 before inflation adjustment increased 4.2 percent relative to the wage bill for Jun 2012:

{[(wage bill in Jun 2013)/(wage bill in Jun 2012)]-1}100 =

{[($23.94x34.9)/($23.30x34.4)]-1]}100

= {[($835.51/$801.52)]-1}100 = 4.2%

Average hourly earnings increased 2.7 percent from Jun 2012 to Jun 2013 {[($23.94/23.30) – 1]100 = 2.0%} while hours worked increased 1.5 percent {[(34.9/34.4) – 1]100 = 1.5%}. The increase of the wage bill is the product of the increase of hourly earnings of 2.7 percent and of hours worked of 1.5 percent {[(1.027x1.015) -1]100 = 4.2%}.

Energy and food price increases are similar to a “silent tax” that is highly regressive, harming the most those with lowest incomes. There are concerns that the wage bill would deteriorate in purchasing power because of renewed raw materials shocks in the form of increases in prices of commodities such as the 31.1 percent steady increase in the DJ-UBS Commodity Index from Jul 2, 2010 to Sep 2, 2011. The charts of four commodity price indexes by Bloomberg show steady increase since Jul 2, 2010 that was interrupted briefly only in Nov 2010 with the sovereign issues in Europe triggered by Ireland; in Mar 2011 by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and in the beginning of May 2011 by the decline in oil prices and sovereign risk difficulties in Europe (http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/commodities/futures/). Renewed risk aversion because of the sovereign risks in Europe had reduced the rate of increase of the DJ UBS commodity index to 5.9 percent on Jun 7, 2013, relative to Jul 2, 2010 (see Table VI-4) but there has been a shift in investor preferences into equities. Inflation has been rising in waves with carry trades driven by zero interest rates to commodity futures during periods of risk appetite with interruptions during risk aversion (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Inflation-adjusted wages fall sharply during carry trades from zero interest rates to long positions in commodity futures during periods of risk appetite

Table II-1, US, Earnings per Hour and Average Weekly Hours SA

Earnings per Hour	Jun 2012	Apr 2013	May 2013	Jun 2013
Total Private	$23.50	$23.89	$23.91	$24.01
Goods Producing	$24.69	$25.02	$24.09	$25.22
Service Providing	$23.21	$23.62	$23.63	$23.73
Average Weekly Earnings
Total Private	$808.40	$824.21	$824.90	$828.35
Goods Producing	$990.07	$1,008.31	$1,013.64	$1,021.41
Service Providing	$772.89	$786.55	$789.24	$792.58
Average Weekly Hours
Total Private	34.4	34.5	34.5	34.5
Goods Producing	40.1	40.3	40.4	40.5
Service Providing	33.3	33.3	33.4	33.4

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Average weekly hours in Table II-2 fell from 35.0 in Dec 2007 at the beginning of the contraction to 33.8 in Jun 2009, which was the last month of the contraction. Average weekly hours rose to 34.4 in Dec 2011 and oscillated to 34.9 in Dec 2012 and 34.9 in Jun 2013.

Table II-2, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, NSA 2006-2013

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
2006			34.2	34.6	34.3	34.6	34.9	34.6	34.5	34.9	34.4	34.6
2007	34.1	34.2	34.3	34.7	34.4	34.7	34.9	34.7	35.0	34.5	34.5	35.0
2008	34.2	34.2	34.8	34.4	34.4	34.9	34.5	34.6	34.4	34.4	34.6	34.1
2009	33.8	34.3	34.0	33.6	33.7	33.8	33.8	34.3	33.7	33.8	34.3	33.9
2010	33.7	33.6	33.8	34.0	34.4	34.1	34.2	34.7	34.1	34.3	34.2	34.2
2011	34.2	34.0	34.1	34.3	34.6	34.4	34.4	34.4	34.4	34.9	34.3	34.4
2012	34.5	34.2	34.3	34.7	34.3	34.4	34.8	34.5	34.9	34.3	34.3	34.9
2013	34.0	34.2	34.3	34.3	34.3	34.9

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart II-1 provides average weekly hours monthly from Mar 2006 to Jun 2013. Average weekly hours remained relatively stable in the period before the contraction and fell sharply during the contraction as business could not support lower production with the same labor input. Average weekly hours rose rapidly during the expansion but have stabilized at a level below that prevailing before the contraction.

Chart II-1, US, Average Weekly Hours of All Employees, SA 2006-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/data/

Calculations using BLS data of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings are in Table II-3. The final column of Table II-3 (“12 Month Real ∆%”) provides inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of all employees in the US. Average hourly earnings rose above inflation throughout the first nine months of 2007 just before the global recession that began in the final quarter of 2007 when average hourly earnings lost to inflation. In contrast, average hourly earnings of all US workers have risen less than inflation in five months in 2010 and in all but the first month in 2011 and the loss accelerated at 1.8 percent in Sep 2011, declining to a real loss of 1.1 percent in Feb 2012 and 0.6 percent in Mar 2012. There was a gain of 0.6 percent in Apr 2012 in inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings but another fall of 0.5 percent in May 2012 followed by increases of 0.3 percent in Jun and 1.0 percent in Jul 2012. Real hourly earnings stagnated in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 with increase of only 0.1 percent and increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real hourly earnings fell 1.3 percent in Oct 2012 and gained 1.1 percent in Dec 2012 but declined 0.2 percent in Jan 2012 and stagnated at change of 0.1 percent in Feb 2013. Real hourly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013 and stagnated at 0.1 percent in Apr 2013, increasing 0.5 percent in May 2013. Real hourly earnings are oscillating in part because of world inflation waves caused by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html) and in part because of the collapse of hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html).

Table II-3, US, Average Hourly Earnings Nominal and Inflation Adjusted, Dollars and % NSA

	AHE ALL	12 Month Nominal ∆%	∆% 12 Month CPI	12 Month Real ∆%
2007
Jan*	$20.70*	4.2*	2.1	2.1*
Feb*	$20.79*	4.1*	2.4	1.7*
Mar	$20.82	3.7	2.8	0.9
Apr	$21.05	3.3	2.6	0.7
May	$20.83	3.7	2.7	1.0
Jun	$20.82	3.8	2.7	1.1
Jul	$20.99	3.4	2.4	1.0
Aug	$20.85	3.5	2.0	1.5
Sep	$21.19	4.1	2.8	1.3
Oct	$21.07	2.7	3.5	-0.8
Nov	$21.13	3.3	4.3	-0.9
Dec	$21.37	3.7	4.1	-0.4
2010
Jan	$22.55	1.9	2.6	-0.7
Feb	$22.61	1.4	2.1	-0.7
Mar	$22.52	1.2	2.3	-1.1
Apr	$22.57	1.8	2.2	-0.4
May	$22.64	2.5	2.0	0.5
Jun	$22.38	1.8	1.1	0.7
Jul	$22.44	1.8	1.2	0.6
Aug	$22.58	1.7	1.1	0.6
Sep	$22.63	1.8	1.1	0.7
Oct	$22.73	1.9	1.2	0.7
Nov	$22.72	1.0	1.1	-0.1
Dec	$22.79	1.7	1.5	0.2
2011
Jan	$23.20	2.9	1.6	1.3
Feb	$23.03	1.9	2.1	-0.2
Mar	$22.93	1.8	2.7	-0.9
Apr	$22.99	1.9	3.2	-1.3
May	$23.09	2.0	3.6	-1.5
Jun	$22.84	2.1	3.6	-1.4
Jul	$22.97	2.4	3.6	-1.2
Aug	$22.88	1.3	3.8	-2.4
Sep	$23.08	2.0	3.9	-1.8
Oct	$23.33	2.6	3.5	-0.9
Nov	$23.18	2.0	3.4	-1.4
Dec	$23.25	2.0	3.0	-1.0
2012
Jan	$23.59	1.7	2.9	-1.2
Feb	$23.44	1.8	2.9	-1.1
Mar	$23.42	2.1	2.7	-0.6
Apr	$23.65	2.9	2.3	0.6
May	$23.36	1.2	1.7	-0.5
Jun	$23.30	2.0	1.7	0.3
Jul	$23.52	2.4	1.4	1.0
Aug	$23.30	1.8	1.7	0.1
Sep	$23.70	2.7	2.0	0.7
Oct	$23.55	0.9	2.2	-1.3
Nov	$23.62	1.9	1.8	0.1
Dec	$23.89	2.8	1.7	1.1
2013
Jan	$23.92	1.4	1.6	-0.2
Feb	$23.94	2.1	2.0	0.1
Mar	$23.86	1.9	1.5	0.4
Apr	$23.94	1.2	1.1	0.1
May	$23.81	1.9	1.4	0.5
Jun	$23.94	2.7

Note: AHE ALL: average hourly earnings of all employees; CPI: consumer price index; Real: adjusted by CPI inflation; NA: not available

*AHE of production and nonsupervisory employees because of unavailability of data for all employees for Jan-Feb 2006

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Average hourly earnings of all US employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984 from the dataset of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are provided in Table II-4. Average hourly earnings fell 0.5 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Mar 2012 and gained 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2011 but then lost 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2012 with a gain of 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2012 and 1.0 percent in Jul 2012 followed by 0.1 percent in Aug 2012 and 0.7 percent in Sep 2012. Average hourly earnings adjusted by inflation fell 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2012. Average hourly earnings adjusted by inflation increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2012 and 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012 but fell 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 and stagnated with gain of 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013. Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013. Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. Table II-4 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average hourly earnings in 2011 and into 2012 with 12-month percentage declines in three of the first four months of 2012 (-1.1 percent in Jan, -1.1 percent in Feb and -0.5 percent in Mar), declines of 0.6 percent in May and 1.2 percent in Oct and increase in five (0.6 percent in Apr, 0.3 percent in Jun, 1.0 percent in Jul, 0.7 percent in Sep and 1.1 percent in Dec) and stagnation in two (0.1 percent in Aug and 0.1 percent in Nov). Average hourly earnings adjusted for inflation fell 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013, stagnated with gain of 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013 and gained 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending Mar 2013. Real average hourly earnings increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013 and 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. Annual data are revealing: -0.7 percent in 2008 during carry trades into commodity futures in a global recession, 3.2 percent in 2009 with reversal of carry trades, no change in 2010 and 2012 and decline by 1.1 percent in 2011. Annual average hourly earnings of all employees in the United States adjusted for inflation increased 1.4 percent from 2007 to 2012 at the yearly average rate of 0.3 percent (from $10.11 in 2007 to $10.25 in 2012 in dollars of 1982-1984 using data in http://www.bls.gov/data/). Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer goods than a year earlier and savings in bank deposits do not pay anything because of financial repression (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html).

Table II-4, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Dec
2006			10.05	10.11	9.92	10.21
2007	10.23	10.22	10.14	10.18	10.02	10.17
2008	10.11	10.12	10.11	10.00	9.91	10.47
2009	10.48	10.50	10.47	10.40	10.32	10.38
2010	10.41	10.43	10.35	10.35	10.38	10.40
2011	10.53	10.41	10.26	10.22	10.22	10.30
2012	10.41	10.30	10.21	10.28	10.16	10.41
∆% 12 M 2012	-1.1	-1.1	-0.5	0.6	-0.6	1.1
2013	10.39	10.31	10.25	10.30	10.22	NA
∆% 12 M 2013	-0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.6

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart II-2 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics plots average hourly earnings of all US employees in constant 1982-1984 dollars with evident decline from annual earnings of $10.36 in 2009 and $10.36 again in 2010 to $10.25 in 2011 and $10.25 again in 2012 or loss of 1.1 percent (data in http://www.bls.gov/data/).

Chart II-2, US, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart II-3 provides 12-month percentage changes of average hourly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984, that is, adjusted for inflation. There was sharp contraction of inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings of US employees during parts of 2007 and 2008. Rates of change in 12 months became positive in parts of 2009 and 2010 but then became negative again in 2011 and into 2012 with temporary increase in Apr 2012 that was reversed in May with another gain in Jun and Jul 2012 followed by stagnation in Aug 2012 and marginal gain in Sep 2012 with sharp decline in Oct 2012, stagnation in Nov 2012, increase in Dec 2012 and renewed decrease in Jan 2013 with near stagnation in Feb 2013 followed by mild increase in Mar-Apr 2013. Hourly earnings adjusted for inflation increased in Jun 2013.

Chart II-3, Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees NSA 12-Month Percent Change, 1982-1984 Dollars, NSA 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Average weekly earnings of all US employees in the US in constant dollars of 1982-1984 from the dataset of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are provided in Table II-5. Average weekly earnings fell 3.2 percent after adjusting for inflation in the 12 months ending in Aug 2011, decreased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2011, increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2011, fell 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2011 and 0.3 in the 12 months ending in Dec 2011, declining 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 and 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars were virtually flat in Mar 2012 relative to Mar 2011, increasing 0.1 percent. Average weekly earnings in constant dollars increased 1.7 percent in Apr 2012 relative to Apr 2011 but fell 1.4 percent in May 2012 relative to May 2011, increasing 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun and 2.1 percent in Jul 2012. Real weekly earnings increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2012 and 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2012 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2012 and 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2012. Real weekly earnings fell 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 and virtually stagnated with gain of 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013, increasing 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013. Real weekly earnings fell 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013 and increased 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013. Table II-5 confirms the trend of deterioration of purchasing power of average weekly earnings in 2011 and into 2012 with oscillations according to carry trades causing world inflation waves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). On an annual basis, average weekly earnings in constant 1982-1984 dollars increased from $349.78 in 2007 to $353.66 in 2012, by 1.1 percent or at the average rate of 0.2 percent per year (data in http://www.bls.gov/data/). Annual average weekly earnings in constant dollars of $353.50 in 2010 were virtually unchanged at $353.66 in 2012. Those who still work bring back home a paycheck that buys fewer high-quality goods than a year earlier. The fractured US job market does not provide an opportunity for advancement as in past booms following recessions (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html).

Table II-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, NSA 2007-2013

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Dec
2006			343.71	349.95	340.12	353.37
2007	348.72	349.40	347.76	353.41	344.58	356.11
2008	345.92	346.21	351.70	344.13	340.93	357.17
2009	354.10	360.31	355.81	349.33	347.94	351.95
2010	350.71	350.51	349.76	351.99	356.97	355.61
2011	360.29	353.81	349.90	350.62	353.56	354.41
2012	359.06	352.12	350.19	356.68	348.65	363.13
∆% 12 M 2012	-0.3	-0.5	0.1	1.7	-1.4	2.5
2013	353.17	352.66	351.59	353.13	350.59	NA
∆% 12 M 2013	-1.6	0.2	0.4	-1.0	0.6

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart II-4 provides average weekly earnings of all employees in constant dollars of 1982-1984. The same pattern emerges of sharp decline during the contraction, followed by recovery in the expansion and continuing fall with oscillations caused by carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures from 2010 to 2011 and into 2012 and 2013.

Chart II-4, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984, SA 2006-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart II-5, US, Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees NSA in Constant Dollars of 1982-1984 12-Month Percent Change, NSA 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

II United States International Trade. Table IIA-1 provides the trade balance of the US and monthly growth of exports and imports seasonally adjusted with the latest release and revisions (http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/). Because of heavy dependence on imported oil, fluctuations in the US trade account originate largely in fluctuations of commodity futures prices caused by carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures exposures in a process similar to world inflation waves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Data for 2012 have been revised. The US trade balance deteriorated from deficit of $40,149 million in Apr 2013 to deficit of $45,027 million in May 2013. Exports decreased 0.3 percent in May 2013 while imports increased 1.9 percent. The trade balance deteriorated from cumulative deficit of $499,379 million in Jan-Dec 2010 to deficit of $556,838 million in Jan-Dec 2011 and modest improvement to deficit of $534,656 million in Jan-Dec 2012.

Table IIA-1, US, Trade Balance of Goods and Services Seasonally Adjusted Millions of Dollars and ∆%

	Trade Balance	Exports	Month ∆%	Imports	Month ∆%
May 2013	-45,027	187,059	-0.3	232,086	1.9
Apr	-40,149	187,562	1.3	227,711	2.4
Mar	-37,132	185,208	-1.0	222,340	-3.7
Feb	-43,836	187,130	0.2	230,966	0.7
Jan	-42,690	186,680	-1.1	229,370	1.0
Dec 2012	-38,307	188,686	1.9	226,994	-2.0
Nov	-46,422	185,220	1.4	231,641	2.8
Oct	-42,650	182,655	-2.2	225,304	-1.4
Sep	-41,570	186,829	2.6	228,400	1.0
Aug	-44,007	182,071	-0.7	226,078	-0.3
Jul	-43,451	183,375	-1.0	226,826	-0.4
Jun	-42,430	185,218	0.5	227,648	-1.2
May	-46,247	184,217	0.0	230,464	-0.2
Apr	-46,625	184,267	-1.2	230,892	-1.5
Mar	-47,790	186,505	2.4	234,295	3.7
Feb	-43,763	182,064	1.4	225,827	-2.2
Jan	-51,393	179,477	0.2	230,871	0.2
Jan-Dec 2012	-534,656	2,210,585		2,745,240
Jan-Dec 2011	-556,838	2,112,825		2,669,663
Jan-Dec 2010	-499,379	1,844,468		2,343,847

Note: Trade Balance of Goods and Services = Exports of Goods and Services less Imports of Goods and Services. Trade balance may not add exactly because of errors of rounding and seasonality. Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Table IIA-2 provides the US international trade balance, exports and imports on an annual basis from 1992 to 2012. The trade balance deteriorated sharply over the long term. The US has a large deficit in goods or exports less imports of goods but it has a surplus in services that helps to reduce the trade account deficit or exports less imports of goods and services. The current account deficit of the US decreased from $100.4 billion in IQ2012, or 3.1 percent of GDP to $83.2 billion in IQ2013, or 2.7 percent of GDP (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million_16.html). The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP has stabilized around 3 percent of GDP compared with much higher percentages before the recession (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). The last row of Table IIA-2 shows marginal improvement of the trade deficit from $556,838 million in 2011 to lower $534,656 million in 2012 with exports growing 4.6 percent and imports 2.8 percent. Growth and commodity shocks under alternating inflation waves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html) have deteriorated the trade deficit from the low of $383,657 million in 2009.

Table IIA-2, US, International Trade Balance, Exports and Imports SA, Millions of Dollars and ∆%

	Balance	Exports	Imports
1960	3,508	25,940	22,432
1961	4,195	26,403	22,208
1962	3,370	27,722	24,352
1963	4,210	29,620	25,410
1964	6,022	33,341	27,319
1965	4,664	35,285	30,621
1966	2,939	38,926	35,987
1967	2,604	41,333	38,729
1968	250	45,543	45,293
1969	91	49,220	49,129
1970	2,254	56,640	54,386
1971	-1,302	59,677	60,979
1972	-5,443	67,222	72,665
1973	1,900	91,242	89,342
1974	-4,293	120,897	125,190
1975	12,404	132,585	120,181
1976	-6,082	142,716	148,798
1977	-27,246	152,301	179,547
1978	-29,763	178,428	208,191
1979	-24,565	224,131	248,696
1980	-19,407	271,834	291,241
1981	-16,172	294,398	310,570
1982	-24,156	275,236	299,391
1983	-57,767	266,106	323,874
1984	-109,072	291,094	400,166
1985	-121,880	289,070	410,950
1986	-138,538	310,033	448,572
1987	-151,684	348,869	500,552
1988	-114,566	431,149	545,715
1989	-93,141	487,003	580,144
1990	-80,864	535,233	616,097
1991	-31,135	578,344	609,479
1992	-39,212	616,882	656,094
1993	-70,311	642,863	713,174
1994	-98,493	703,254	801,747
1995	-96,384	794,387	890,771
1996	-104,065	851,602	955,667
1997	-108,273	934,453	1,042,726
1998	-166,140	933,174	1,099,314
1999	-263,755	967,008	1,230,764
2000	-377,337	1,072,782	1,450,119
2001	-362,339	1,007,725	1,370,065
2002	-418,165	980,879	1,399,044
2003	-490,545	1,023,937	1,514,482
2004	-604,897	1,163,724	1,768,622
2005	-707,914	1,288,257	1,996,171
2006	-752,399	1,460,792	2,213,191
2007	-699,065	1,652,859	2,351,925
2008	-702,302	1,840,332	2,542,634
2009	-383,657	1,578,187	1,961,844
2010	-499,379	1,844,468	2,343,847
2011	-556,838	2,112,825	2,669,663
2012	-534,656	2,210,585	2,745,240

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Chart IIA-1 of the US Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce shows that the trade deficit (gap between exports and imports) fell during the economic contraction after 2007 but has grown again during the expansion. The low average rate of growth of GDP of 2.1 percent during the expansion beginning in IIIQ2009 does not deteriorate further the trade balance. Higher rates of growth may cause sharper deterioration.

Chart IIA-1, US, International Trade Balance, Exports and Imports of Goods and Services USD Billions

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/briefrm/esbr/www/esbr042.html

Chart IIA-2 of the US Census Bureau provides the US trade account in goods and services SA from Jan 1992 to May 2013. There is long-term trend of deterioration of the US trade deficit shown vividly by Chart IIA-2. The trend of deterioration was reversed by the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Deterioration resumed together with incomplete recovery and was influenced significantly by the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures (these arguments are elaborated in Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html). Earlier research focused on the long-term external imbalance of the US in the form of trade and current account deficits (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b) 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). US external imbalances have not been fully resolved and tend to widen together with improving world economic activity and commodity price shocks.

Chart IIA-2, US, Balance of Trade SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-May 2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Chart IIA-3 of the US Census Bureau provides US exports SA from Jan 1992 to May 2013. There was sharp acceleration from 2003 to 2007 during worldwide economic boom and increasing inflation. Exports fell sharply during the financial crisis and global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. Growth picked up again together with world trade and inflation but stalled in the final segment with less rapid global growth and inflation.

Chart IIA-3, US, Exports SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars Jan 1992-May 2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

Chart IIA-4 of the US Census Bureau provides US imports SA from Jan 1992 to May 2013. Growth was stronger between 2003 and 2007 with worldwide economic boom and inflation. There was sharp drop during the financial crisis and global recession. There is stalling import levels in the final segment resulting from weaker world economic growth and diminishing inflation because of risk aversion.

Chart IIA-4, US, Imports SA, Monthly, Millions of Dollars Jan 1992-May 2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

The balance of international trade in goods of the US seasonally adjusted is shown in Table IIA-3. The US has a dynamic surplus in services that reduces the large deficit in goods for a still very sizeable deficit in international trade of goods and services. The balance in international trade of goods increased from $63.3 billion in May 2012 to $63.4 billion in May 2013. The relative stability of the goods balance in May 2013 relative to May 2012 occurred mostly in the petroleum balance, exports less imports of petroleum, in the magnitude of decreasing the deficit by $4017 million, while there was deterioration in the nonpetroleum balance, exports less imports of nonpetroleum goods, in the magnitude of increasing the deficit by $4435 million. US terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, and the US trade account fluctuate in accordance with the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures, especially oil futures. Exports increased 0.1 percent with nonpetroleum exports decreasing 0.1 percent. Total imports increased 0.1 percent with petroleum imports declining 11.2 percent and nonpetroleum imports increasing 2.6 percent.

Table IIA-3, US, International Trade in Goods Balance, Exports and Imports $ Millions and ∆% SA

	May 2013	May 2012	∆%
Total Balance	-63,443	-63,386
Petroleum	-20,768	-24,785
Non Petroleum	-41,850	-37,415
Total Exports	130,254	130,175	0.1
Petroleum	10,170	10,068	1.0
Non Petroleum	118,887	119,029	-0.1
Total Imports	193,698	193,562	0.1
Petroleum	30,938	34,853	-11.2
Non Petroleum	160,468	156,445	2.6

Details may not add because of rounding and seasonal adjustment

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

US exports and imports of goods not seasonally adjusted in Jan-May 2013 and Jan-May 2012 are shown in Table IIA-4. The rate of growth of exports was 0.9 percent and minus 1.7 percent for imports. The US has partial hedge of commodity price increases in exports of agricultural commodities that increased 1.8 percent and of mineral fuels that decreased 1.3 percent both because higher prices of raw materials and commodities increase and fall recurrently as a result of shocks of risk aversion. The US exports an insignificant amount of crude oil. US exports and imports consist mostly of manufactured products, with less rapidly increasing prices. US manufactured exports rose 1.0 percent while manufactured imports rose 1.2 percent. Significant part of the US trade imbalance originates in imports of mineral fuels decreasing 14.6 percent and petroleum decreasing 15.6 percent with wide oscillations in oil prices. The limited hedge in exports of agricultural commodities and mineral fuels compared with substantial imports of mineral fuels and crude oil results in waves of deterioration of the terms of trade of the US, or export prices relative to import prices, originating in commodity price increases caused by carry trades from zero interest rates. These waves are similar to those in worldwide inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html).

Table IIA-4, US, Exports and Imports of Goods, Not Seasonally Adjusted Millions of Dollars and %

	Jan-May 2013 $ Millions	Jan-May 2012 $ Millions	∆%
Exports	646,146	640,427	0.9
Manufactured	486,244	481,365	1.0
Agricultural Commodities	58,117	57,089	1.8
Mineral Fuels	55,141	55,859	-1.3
Petroleum	45,020	45,226	-0.5
Imports	924,523	940,485	-1.7
Manufactured	741,956	733,289	1.2
Agricultural Commodities	45,689	44,665	2.3
Mineral Fuels	159,317	186,534	-14.6
Petroleum	151,885	179,988	-15.6

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/

The G7 meeting in Washington on Apr 21 2006 of finance ministers and heads of central bank governors of the G7 established the “doctrine of shared responsibility” (G7 2006Apr):

“We, Ministers and Governors, reviewed a strategy for addressing global imbalances. We recognized that global imbalances are the product of a wide array of macroeconomic and microeconomic forces throughout the world economy that affect public and private sector saving and investment decisions. We reaffirmed our view that the adjustment of global imbalances:

Is shared responsibility and requires participation by all regions in this global process;
Will importantly entail the medium-term evolution of private saving and investment across countries as well as counterpart shifts in global capital flows; and
Is best accomplished in a way that maximizes sustained growth, which requires strengthening policies and removing distortions to the adjustment process.

In this light, we reaffirmed our commitment to take vigorous action to address imbalances. We agreed that progress has been, and is being, made. The policies listed below not only would be helpful in addressing imbalances, but are more generally important to foster economic growth.

In the United States, further action is needed to boost national saving by continuing fiscal consolidation, addressing entitlement spending, and raising private saving.
In Europe, further action is needed to implement structural reforms for labor market, product, and services market flexibility, and to encourage domestic demand led growth.
In Japan, further action is needed to ensure the recovery with fiscal soundness and long-term growth through structural reforms.

Others will play a critical role as part of the multilateral adjustment process.

In emerging Asia, particularly China, greater flexibility in exchange rates is critical to allow necessary appreciations, as is strengthening domestic demand, lessening reliance on export-led growth strategies, and actions to strengthen financial sectors.

In oil-producing countries, accelerated investment in capacity, increased economic diversification, enhanced exchange rate flexibility in some cases.

Other current account surplus countries should encourage domestic consumption and investment, increase micro-economic flexibility and improve investment climates.

We recognized the important contribution that the IMF can make to multilateral surveillance.”

The concern at that time was that fiscal and current account global imbalances could result in disorderly correction with sharp devaluation of the dollar after an increase in premiums on yields of US Treasury debt (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). The IMF was entrusted with monitoring and coordinating action to resolve global imbalances. The G7 was eventually broadened to the formal G20 in the effort to coordinate policies of countries with external surpluses and deficits.

The database of the WEO (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx) is used to contract Table IIA-5 with fiscal and current account imbalances projected for 2013 and 2015. The WEO finds the need to rebalance external and domestic demand (IMF 2011WEOSep xvii):

“Progress on this front has become even more important to sustain global growth. Some emerging market economies are contributing more domestic demand than is desirable (for example, several economies in Latin America); others are not contributing enough (for example, key economies in emerging Asia). The first set needs to restrain strong domestic demand by considerably reducing structural fiscal deficits and, in some cases, by further removing monetary accommodation. The second set of economies needs significant currency appreciation alongside structural reforms to reduce high surpluses of savings over investment. Such policies would help improve their resilience to shocks originating in the advanced economies as well as their medium-term growth potential.”

The IMF (2012WEOApr, XVII) explains decreasing importance of the issue of global imbalances as follows:

“The latest developments suggest that global current account imbalances are no longer expected to widen again, following their sharp reduction during the Great Recession. This is largely because the excessive consumption growth that characterized economies that ran large external deficits prior to the crisis has been wrung out and has not been offset by stronger consumption in surplus economies. Accordingly, the global economy has experienced a loss of demand and growth in all regions relative to the boom years just before the crisis. Rebalancing activity in key surplus economies toward higher consumption, supported by more market-determined exchange rates, would help strengthen their prospects as well as those of the rest of the world.”

Table IIA-5, Fiscal Deficit, Current Account Deficit and Government Debt as % of GDP and 2011 Dollar GDP

	GDP $B 2012	FD %GDP 2013	CAD %GDP 2013	Debt %GDP 2013	FD%GDP 2015	CAD%GDP 2015	Debt %GDP 2015
US	15685	-7.3	-3.1	80.3	-2.3	-3.2	88.3
Japan	5964	-9.1	2.0	126.6	-5.8	2.4	155.0
UK	2441	-5.8	-1.9	78.3	-0.8	-0.4	88.1
Euro	12198	-1.6	0.3	68.4	1.1	1.2	71.3
Ger	3401	0.7	5.7	56.1	1.4	4.3	52.4
France	2609	-2.9	-2.2	80.4	0.3	-0.8	83.8
Italy	2014	0.8	-3.2	99.6	4.4	-1.6	101.5
Can	1819	-4.1	-2.8	33.3	-1.1	-2.5	37.4
China	8227	-1.2	2.7	25.8	-0.1	3.4	14.8
Brazil	2396	3.3	-2.4	33.6	3.1	-3.3	30.8

Note: GER = Germany; Can = Canada; FD = fiscal deficit; CAD = current account deficit

FD is primary except total for China; Debt is net except gross for China

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx

The current account of the US balance of payments is provided in Table IIA-6 for IQ2012 and IQ2013. The US has a large deficit in goods or exports less imports of goods but it has a surplus in services that helps to reduce the trade account deficit or exports less imports of goods and services. The current account deficit of the US decreased from $100.4 billion in IQ2012, or 3.1 percent of GDP, to $83.2 billion in IQ2013, or 2.7 percent of GDP. The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP has stabilized around 3 percent of GDP compared with much higher percentages before the recession but is combined now with much higher imbalance in the Treasury budget (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71).

Table IIA-6, US, Balance of Payments, Millions of Dollars NSA

	IQ2012	IQ2013	Difference
Goods Balance	-174,091	-157,503	16,588
X Goods	385,589	385,955	0.1 ∆%
M Goods	-559,679	-543,459	-2.9 ∆%
Services Balance	51,893	56,222	4,329
X Services	157,061	164,383	4.7 ∆%
M Services	-105,169	-108,161	2.8 ∆%
Balance Goods and Services	-122,198	-101,281	20,917
Balance Income	55,315	53,030	-2,285
Unilateral Transfers	-33,546	-34,968	-1,422
Current Account Balance	-100,429	-83,219	17,210
% GDP	IQ2012	IQ2013	IVQ2012
	3.1	2.7	2.6

X: exports; M: imports

Balance on Current Account = Balance on Goods and Services + Balance on Income + Unilateral Transfers

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

The alternative fiscal scenario of the CBO (2012NovCDR) resembles an economic world in which eventually the placement of debt reaches a limit of what is proportionately desired of US debt in investment portfolios. This unpleasant environment is occurring in various European countries.

The current real value of government debt plus monetary liabilities depends on the expected discounted values of future primary surpluses or difference between tax revenue and government expenditure excluding interest payments (Cochrane 2011Jan, 27, equation (16)). There is a point when adverse expectations about the capacity of the government to generate primary surpluses to honor its obligations can result in increases in interest rates on government debt.

This analysis suggests that there may be a point of saturation of demand for United States financial liabilities without an increase in interest rates on Treasury securities. A risk premium may develop on US debt. Such premium is not apparent currently because of distressed conditions in the world economy and international financial system. Risk premiums are observed in the spread of bonds of highly indebted countries in Europe relative to bonds of the government of Germany.

The issue of global imbalances centered on the possibility of a disorderly correction (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b) 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). Such a correction has not occurred historically but there is no argument proving that it could not occur. The need for a correction would originate in unsustainable large and growing United States current account deficits (CAD) and net international investment position (NIIP) or excess of financial liabilities of the US held by foreigners net relative to financial liabilities of foreigners held by US residents. The IMF estimated that the US could maintain a CAD of two to three percent of GDP without major problems (Rajan 2004). The threat of disorderly correction is summarized by Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 15):

“It is possible that foreigners may be unwilling to increase their positions in US financial assets at prevailing interest rates. An exit out of the dollar could cause major devaluation of the dollar. The depreciation of the dollar would cause inflation in the US, leading to increases in American interest rates. There would be an increase in mortgage rates followed by deterioration of real estate values. The IMF has simulated that such an adjustment would cause a decline in the rate of growth of US GDP to 0.5 percent over several years. The decline of demand in the US by four percentage points over several years would result in a world recession because the weakness in Europe and Japan could not compensate for the collapse of American demand. The probability of occurrence of an abrupt adjustment is unknown. However, the adverse effects are quite high, at least hypothetically, to warrant concern.”

The United States could be moving toward a situation typical of heavily indebted countries, requiring fiscal adjustment and increases in productivity to become more competitive internationally. The CAD and NIIP of the United States are not observed in full deterioration because the economy is well below potential. There are two complications in the current environment relative to the concern with disorderly correction in the first half of the past decade. In the release of Jun 14, 2013, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2013/pdf/trans113.pdf) informs of revisions of US data on US international transactions since 1999:

“The statistics of the U.S. international transactions accounts released today have been revised for the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2012 to incorporate newly available and revised source data, updated seasonal adjustments, changes in definitions and classifications, and improved estimating methodologies.”

Table IIA-7 provides data on the US fiscal and balance of payments imbalances. In 2007, the federal deficit of the US was $161 billion corresponding to 1.2 percent of GDP while the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2012NovCDR) estimates the federal deficit in 2012 at $1089 billion or 7.0 percent of GDP (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). The combined record federal deficits of the US from 2009 to 2012 are $5092 billion or 33 percent of the estimate of GDP of $15,549 billion for fiscal year 2012 by the CBO (http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43905 CBO (2013BEOFeb5)). The deficits from 2009 to 2012 exceed one trillion dollars per year, adding to $5.090 trillion in four years, using the fiscal year deficit of $1087 billion for fiscal year 2012, which is the worst fiscal performance since World War II. Federal debt in 2007 was $5035 billion, less than the combined deficits from 2009 to 2012 of $5.090 billion. Federal debt in 2011 was 67.8 percent of GDP and is estimated to reach 72.6 percent of GDP in 2012 (CBO2012AugBEO, CBO2012NovCDR, CBO2013BEOFeb5). This situation may worsen in the future (CBO 2012LTBO):

“The budget outlook is much bleaker under the extended alternative fiscal scenario, which maintains what some analysts might consider “current policies,” as opposed to current laws. Federal debt would grow rapidly from its already high level, exceeding 90 percent of GDP in 2022. After that, the growing imbalance between revenues and spending, combined with spiraling interest payments, would swiftly push debt to higher and higher levels. Debt as a share of GDP would exceed its historical peak of 109 percent by 2026, and it would approach 200 percent in 2037.

The changes under this scenario would result in much lower revenues than would occur under the extended baseline scenario because almost all expiring tax provisions are assumed to be extended through 2022 (with the exception of the current reduction in the payroll tax rate for Social Security). After 2022, revenues under this scenario are assumed to remain at their 2022 level of 18.5 percent of GDP, just above the average of the past 40 years.

Outlays would be much higher than under the other scenario. This scenario incorporates assumptions that through 2022, lawmakers will act to prevent Medicare’s payment rates for physicians from declining; that after 2022, lawmakers will not allow various restraints on the growth of Medicare costs and health insurance subsidies to exert their full effect; and that the automatic reductions in spending required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 will not occur (although the original caps on discretionary appropriations in that law are assumed to remain in place). Finally, under this scenario, federal spending as a percentage of GDP for activities other than Social Security, the major health care programs, and interest payments is assumed to return to its average level during the past two decades, rather than fall significantly below that level, as it does under the extended baseline scenario.”

Table IIA-7, US, Current Account, NIIP, Fiscal Balance, Nominal GDP, Federal Debt and Direct Investment, Dollar Billions and %

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Goods & Services	-699	-702	-384	-499	-557	-535
Income	101	146	124	178	233	224
UT	-115	-125	-122	-128	-134	-130
Current Account	-713	-681	-382	-449	-458	-440
NGDP	14028	14291	13974	14499	15076	15684
Current Account % GDP	-5.1	-4.8	-2.7	-3.1	-3.1	-2.8
NIIP	-1796	-3260	-2321	-2474	-4030	-4416
US Owned Assets Abroad	18400	19464	18512	20298	21132	20760
Foreign Owned Assets in US	20196	22724	20833	22772	25162	25176
NIIP % GDP	-12.8	-22.8	-16.6	-17.1	-26.7	-28.2
Exports Goods Services Income	2487	2654	2185	2523	2874	2987
NIIP % Exports Goods Services Income	-72	-123	-106	-98	-140	-148
DIA MV	5274	3102	4287	4767	4499	5191
DIUS MV	3551	2486	2995	3397	3509	3931
Fiscal Balance	-161	-459	-1413	-1294	-1296	-1087
Fiscal Balance % GDP	-1.2	-3.2	-10.1	-9.0	-8.7	-7.0
Federal Debt	5035	5803	7545	9019	10128	11281
Federal Debt % GDP	36.3	40.5	54.0	62.9	67.8	72.6
Federal Outlays	2729	2983	3518	3456	3598	3537
∆%	2.8	9.3	17.9	-1.8	4.1	-1.7
% GDP	19.7	20.8	25.2	24.1	24.1	22.7
Federal Revenue	2568	2524	2105	2162	2302	2450
∆%	6.7	-1.7	-16.6	2.7	6.5	6.4
% GDP	18.5	17.6	15.1	15.1	15.4	15.8

Notes: UT: unilateral transfers; NGDP: nominal GDP or in current dollars; NIIP: Net International Investment Position; DIA MV: US Direct Investment Abroad at Market Value; DIUS MV: Direct Investment in the US at Market Value. There are minor discrepancies in the decimal point of percentages of GDP between the balance of payments data and federal debt, outlays, revenue and deficits in which the original number of the CBO source is maintained. These discrepancies do not alter conclusions.

Sources: http://www.cbo.gov/ budget http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop Balance of Payments and NIIP, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)

Gross Domestic Product, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-5 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows the US balance on current account from 1960 to 2012. The sharp devaluation of the dollar resulting from unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and elimination of auctions of 30-year Treasury bonds did not adjust the US balance of payments. Partial adjustment only occurred after the contraction of economic activity during the global recession.

Chart IIA-5, US, Balance on Current Account, 1960-2012, Millions of Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm

Chart IIA-6 provides the quarterly balance of current account of the United States in millions of dollars from 1995 to IQ2013. The global recession appeared to be adjusting the current account deficit that rises to lower dollar values. Recovery of the economy worsened again the current account deficit. Growth at trend worsens the external imbalance of the US that combines now with unsustainable Treasury deficits/debt.

Chart IIA-6, US, Balance on Current Account, Quarterly 1979-2013, Millions of Dollars, SA

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_ita.cfm

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

III World Financial Turbulence. Financial markets are being shocked by multiple factors including:

(1) world economic slowdown; (2) slowing growth in China with political development and slowing growth in Japan and world trade; (3) slow growth propelled by savings/investment reduction in the US with high unemployment/underemployment, falling wages, hiring collapse, contraction of real private fixed investment, decline of wealth of households over the business cycle by 5.2 percent adjusted for inflation while growing 651.8 percent adjusted for inflation from IVQ1945 to IVQ2012 and unsustainable fiscal deficit/debt threatening prosperity that can cause risk premium on Treasury debt with Himalayan interest rate hikes; and (4) the outcome of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

This section provides current data and analysis. Subsection IIIA Financial Risks provides analysis of the evolution of valuations of risk financial assets during the week. There are various appendixes for convenience of reference of material related to the debt crisis of the euro area. Some of this material is updated in Subsection IIIA when new data are available and then maintained in the appendixes for future reference until updated again in Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies discusses arguments and measures of currency intervention and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact provides analysis of the restructuring of the fiscal affairs of the European Union in the agreement of European leaders reached on Dec 9, 2011 and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort considers the policies of the European Central Bank and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Appendix IIIE Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the threats to survival of the European Monetary Union and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation provides more technical analysis and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis provides analysis of proposals to finance growth with budget deficits together with experience of the economic history of Brazil and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment.

IIIA Financial Risks. Financial turbulence, attaining unusual magnitude in recent months, characterized the expansion from the global recession since IIIQ2009. Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Fri Jun 28 and daily values throughout the week ending on Jul 5, 2013 of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at 5 PM. The first column provides the value on Fri Jun 28 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Jun 28, 2013”, first row “USD/EUR 1.3010 0.9%,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) appreciated 0.9 percent to USD 1.3010/EUR in the week ending on Fri Jun 28 relative to the exchange rate on Fri Jun 21. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. The most important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf).

The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per one euro EUR, USD 1.3010/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Fri Jun 28, depreciating to USD 1.3082/EUR on Mon Jul 1, 2013, or by 0.4 percent. The dollar depreciated because more dollars, $1.3063, were required on Mon Jul 1 to buy one euro than $1.3010 on Jun 28. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the exchange rate at 5 PM New York time, such as USD 1.3010/EUR on Jun 28; the second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Fri Jun 28, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Fri Jul 5, such as appreciation to USD 1.2832/EUR by Jul 5; and the third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 1.4 percent from the rate of USD 1.3010/EUR on Fri Jun 28 to the rate of USD 1.2832/EUR on Fri Jul 5 {[(1.2832/1.3010) – 1]100 = -1.4%} and appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 0.6 percent from the rate of USD 1.2914 on Thu Jul 4 (with US markets closed for Independence Day) to USD 1.2832/EUR on Fri Jul 5 {[(1.2832/1.2914) -1]100 = -0.6%}. Other factors constant, appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro is caused by increasing risk aversion, with rising uncertainty on European sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. Funds move away from higher yielding risk assets to the safety of dollar-denominated assets during risk aversion and return to higher yielding risk assets during risk appetite.

III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Assets Jul 1 to Jul 5, 2013

Fri Jun 28, 2013

M 1

Tue 2

W 3

Thu 4

Fri 5

USD/EUR

1.3010

0.9%

1.3063

-0.4%

1.2979

0.2%

0.6%

1.3009

0.0%

-0.2%

1.2914

0.7%

1.2832

1.4%

0.6%

JPY/ USD

99.15

-1.3%

99.67

-0.5%

100.63

-1.5%

-1.0%

99.92

-0.8%

0.7%

100.04

-0.9%

-0.1%

101.19

2.1%

-1.1%

CHF/ USD

0.9448

-1.1%

0.9453

-0.1%

0.9506

-0.6%

0.9465

-0.2%

0.4%

0.9566

-1.2%

-1.1%

0.9637

-2.0%

-0.7%

CHF/ EUR

1.2292

0.3%

1.2348

-0.5%

1.2338

-0.4%

0.1%

1.2318

-0.2%

0.2%

1.2352

-0.5%

-0.3%

1.2366

-0.6%

-0.1%

USD/ AUD

0.9140

1.0941

-0.9%

0.9239

1.0824

1.1%

0.9148

1.0931

0.1%

-1.0%

0.9088

1.1004

-0.6%

-0.7%

0.9145

1.0935

0.1%

0.6%

0.9067

1.1029

-0.8%

-0.9%

10 Year T Note

2.486

2.47

2.467

2.506

2.734

2 Year T Note

0.357

0.353

0.349

0.361

0.397

German Bond

2Y 0.19 10Y 1.73

2Y 0.19 10Y 1.72

2Y 0.17 10Y 1.70

2Y 0.16 10Y 1.66

2Y 0.11 10Y 1.65

2Y 0.11 10Y 1.72

DJIA

14909.60

0.7%

14974.96

0.4%

14932.41

0.2%

-0.3%

14988.55

0.5%

0.4%

14988.55

0.5%

0.0%

15135.84

1.5%

1.0%

DJ Global

2109.36

1.1%

2124.19

0.7%

2122.38

0.6%

-0.1%

2110.15

0.0%

-0.6%

2110.15

0.0%

2126.15

0.8%

DJ Asia Pacific

1332.03

1.8%

1336.91

0.4%

1344.57

0.9%

0.6%

1332.05

0.0%

-0.9%

1332.05

0.0%

1343.01

0.8%

Nikkei

13677.32

3.4%

13852.50

1.3%

14098.74

3.1%

1.8%

14055.56

2.8%

-0.3%

14018.93

2.5%

-0.3%

14309.97

4.6%

2.1%

Shanghai

1979.21

-4.5%

1995.24

0.8%

2006.56

1.4%

0.6%

1994.27

0.8%

-0.6%

2006.10

1.4%

0.6%

2007.20

1.4%

0.1%

DAX

7959.22

2.2%

7983.92

0.3%

7910.77

-0.6%

-0.9%

7829.32

-1.6%

-1.0%

7994.31

0.4%

2.1%

7806.00

-1.9%

-2.4%

DJ UBS

Comm.

124.47

-2.2%

125.39

0.7%

125.98

1.2%

0.5%

126.80

1.9%

0.6%

126.80

1.9%

0.0%

125.54

0.9%

-1.0%

WTI $ B

96.56

2.9%

98.02

1.5%

99.56

3.1%

1.6%

101.21

4.8%

1.7%

101.12

4.7%

-0.1%

103.44

7.1%

2.3%

Brent $/B

101.99

1.0%

103.04

1.0%

103.95

1.9%

0.9%

105.78

3.7%

1.8%

105.52

3.5%

-0.2%

107.70

5.6%

2.1%

Gold $/OZ

1234.8

-4.6%

1251.9

1.4%

1242.5

0.6%

-0.8%

1252.1

1.4%

0.8%

1249.7

1.2%

-0.2%

1222.1

-1.0%

-2.2%

Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss

Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce

Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

There is initial discussion of current and recent risk-determining events followed below by analysis of risk-measuring yields of the US and Germany and the USD/EUR rate.

First, risk determining events. Prior risk determining events are in an appendix below following Table III-1A. Current focus is on “tapering” quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “tapering” of outright purchases of $85 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jun 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130619a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent” (emphasis added).

The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi explained the indefinite period of low policy rates during the press conference following the meeting on Jul 4, 2013 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130704.en.html):

“Yes, that is why I said you haven’t listened carefully. The Governing Council has taken the unprecedented step of giving forward guidance in a rather more specific way than it ever has done in the past. In my statement, I said “The Governing Council expects the key…” – i.e. all interest rates – “…ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.” It is the first time that the Governing Council has said something like this. And, by the way, what Mark Carney [Governor of the Bank of England] said in London is just a coincidence.”

The statement of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England on Jul 4, 2013, may be leading toward the same forward guidance (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/007.aspx):

“At its meeting today, the Committee noted that the incoming data over the past couple of months had been broadly consistent with the central outlook for output growth and inflation contained in the May Report. The significant upward movement in market interest rates would, however, weigh on that outlook; in the Committee’s view, the implied rise in the expected future path of Bank Rate was not warranted by the recent developments in the domestic economy.”

A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 15,135.84

on Fri Jul 5, 2013, which is higher by 6.9 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 6.6 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs.

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Second, Risk-Measuring Yields and Exchange Rate. The ten-year government bond of Spain was quoted at 6.868 percent on Aug 10, 2012, declining to 6.447 percent on Aug 17 and 6.403 percent on Aug 24, 2012, and the ten-year government bond of Italy fell from 5.894 percent on Aug 10, 2012 to 5.709 percent on Aug 17 and 5.618 percent on Aug 24, 2012. The yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain traded at 4.621 percent on Jul 5, 2013, and that of the ten-year sovereign bond of Italy at 4.426 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Diminishing aversion is captured by increase of the yield of the two- and ten-year Treasury notes and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table III-1A provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.459 percent on Jul 20, 2012, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.17 percent. In the week of Jul 5, 2013, the yield of the two-year Treasury rose to 0.397 percent and that of the ten-year Treasury to 2.734 percent while the two-year bond of Germany decreased to 0.11 percent and the ten-year decreased to 1.72 percent; and the dollar appreciated to USD 1.2832/EUR. The zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, induce carry trades that ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield is higher than consumer price inflation of 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury. The lower part of Table III-1A provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.

Table III-1A, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate

	US 2Y	US 10Y	DE 2Y	DE 10Y	USD/ EUR
7/5/13	0.397	2.734	0.11	1.72	1.2832
6/28/13	0.357	2.486	0.19	1.73	1.3010
6/21/13	0.366	2.542	0.26	1.72	1.3122
6/14/13	0.276	2.125	0.12	1.51	1.3345
6/7/13	0.304	2.174	0.18	1.54	1.3219
5/31/13	0.299	2.132	0.06	1.50	1.2996
5/24/13	0.249	2.009	0.00	1.43	1.2932
5/17/13	0.248	1.952	-0.03	1.32	1.2837
5/10/13	0.239	1.896	0.05	1.38	1.2992
5/3/13	0.22	1.742	0.00	1.24	1.3115
4/26/13	0.209	1.663	0.00	1.21	1.3028
4/19/13	0.232	1.702	0.02	1.25	1.3052
4/12/13	0.228	1.719	0.02	1.26	1.3111
4/5/13	0.228	1.706	0.01	1.21	1.2995
3/29/13	0.244	1.847	-0.02	1.29	1.2818
3/22/13	0.242	1.931	0.03	1.38	1.2988
3/15/13	0.246	1.992	0.05	1.46	1.3076
3/8/13	0.256	2.056	0.09	1.53	1.3003
3/1/13	0.236	1.842	0.03	1.41	1.3020
2/22/13	0.252	1.967	0.13	1.57	1.3190
2/15/13	0.268	2.007	0.19	1.65	1.3362
2/8/13	0.252	1.949	0.18	1.61	1.3365
2/1/13	0.26	2.024	0.25	1.67	1.3642
1/25/13	0.278	1.947	0.26	1.64	1.3459
1/18/13	0.252	1.84	0.18	1.56	1.3321
1/11/13	0.247	1.862	0.13	1.58	1.3343
1/4/13	0.262	1.898	0.08	1.54	1.3069
12/28/12	0.252	1.699	-0.01	1.31	1.3218
12/21/12	0.272	1.77	-0.01	1.38	1.3189
12/14/12	0.232	1.704	-0.04	1.35	1.3162
12/7/12	0.256	1.625	-0.08	1.30	1.2926
11/30/12	0.248	1.612	0.01	1.39	1.2987
11/23/12	0.273	1.691	0.00	1.44	1.2975
11/16/12	0.24	1.584	-0.03	1.33	1.2743
11/9/12	0.256	1.614	-0.03	1.35	1.2711
11/2/12	0.274	1.715	0.01	1.45	1.2838
10/26/12	0.299	1.748	0.05	1.54	1.2942
10/19/12	0.296	1.766	0.11	1.59	1.3023
10/12/12	0.264	1.663	0.04	1.45	1.2953
10/5/12	0.26	1.737	0.06	1.52	1.3036
9/28/12	0.236	1.631	0.02	1.44	1.2859
9/21/12	0.26	1.753	0.04	1.60	1.2981
9/14/12	0.252	1.863	0.10	1.71	1.3130
9/7/12	0.252	1.668	0.03	1.52	1.2816
8/31/12	0.225	1.543	-0.03	1.33	1.2575
8/24/12	0.266	1.684	-0.01	1.35	1.2512
8/17/12	0.288	1.814	-0.04	1.50	1.2335
8/10/12	0.267	1.658	-0.07	1.38	1.2290
8/3/12	0.242	1.569	-0.02	1.42	1.2387
7/27/12	0.244	1.544	-0.03	1.40	1.2320
7/20/12	0.207	1.459	-0.07	1.17	1.2158
7/13/12	0.24	1.49	-0.04	1.26	1.2248
7/6/12	0.272	1.548	-0.01	1.33	1.2288
6/29/12	0.305	1.648	0.12	1.58	1.2661
6/22/12	0.309	1.676	0.14	1.58	1.2570
6/15/12	0.272	1.584	0.07	1.44	1.2640
6/8/12	0.268	1.635	0.04	1.33	1.2517
6/1/12	0.248	1.454	0.01	1.17	1.2435
5/25/12	0.291	1.738	0.05	1.37	1.2518
5/18/12	0.292	1.714	0.05	1.43	1.2780
5/11/12	0.248	1.845	0.09	1.52	1.2917
5/4/12	0.256	1.876	0.08	1.58	1.3084
4/6/12	0.31	2.058	0.14	1.74	1.3096
3/30/12	0.335	2.214	0.21	1.79	1.3340
3/2/12	0.29	1.977	0.16	1.80	1.3190
2/24/12	0.307	1.977	0.24	1.88	1.3449
1/6/12	0.256	1.957	0.17	1.85	1.2720
12/30/11	0.239	1.871	0.14	1.83	1.2944
8/26/11	0.20	2.202	0.65	2.16	1.450
8/19/11	0.192	2.066	0.65	2.11	1.4390
6/7/10	0.74	3.17	0.49	2.56	1.192
3/5/09	0.89	2.83	1.19	3.01	1.254
12/17/08	0.73	2.20	1.94	3.00	1.442
10/27/08	1.57	3.79	2.61	3.76	1.246
7/14/08	2.47	3.88	4.38	4.40	1.5914
6/26/03	1.41	3.55	NA	3.62	1.1423

Note: DE: Germany

Source:

http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm

Appendix: Prior Risk Determining Events. Current risk analysis concentrates on deciphering what the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may decide on quantitative easing. The week of May 24 was dominated by the testimony of Chairman Bernanke to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress on May 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm), followed by questions and answers and the release on May 22, 2013 of the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from Apr 30 to May 1, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm). Monetary policy emphasizes communication of policy intentions to avoid that expectations reverse outcomes in reality (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “In bid for clarity, Fed delivers opacity,” on May 23, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath), analyzes discrepancies in communication by the Fed. The annotated chart of values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) during trading on May 23, 2013 provided by Hinselrath, links the prepared testimony of Chairman Bernanke at 10:AM, following questions and answers and the release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM. Financial markets strengthened between 10 and 10:30AM on May 23, 2013, perhaps because of the statement by Chairman Bernanke in prepared testimony (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm):

“A premature tightening of monetary policy could lead interest rates to rise temporarily but would also carry a substantial risk of slowing or ending the economic recovery and causing inflation to fall further. Such outcomes tend to be associated with extended periods of lower, not higher, interest rates, as well as poor returns on other assets. Moreover, renewed economic weakness would pose its own risks to financial stability.”

In that testimony, Chairman Bernanke (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm) also analyzes current weakness of labor markets:

“Despite this improvement, the job market remains weak overall: The unemployment rate is still well above its longer-run normal level, rates of long-term unemployment are historically high, and the labor force participation rate has continued to move down. Moreover, nearly 8 million people are working part time even though they would prefer full-time work. High rates of unemployment and underemployment are extraordinarily costly: Not only do they impose hardships on the affected individuals and their families, they also damage the productive potential of the economy as a whole by eroding workers' skills and--particularly relevant during this commencement season--by preventing many young people from gaining workplace skills and experience in the first place. The loss of output and earnings associated with high unemployment also reduces government revenues and increases spending on income-support programs, thereby leading to larger budget deficits and higher levels of public debt than would otherwise occur.”

Hilsenrath (op. cit. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath) analyzes the subsequent decline of the market from 10:30AM to 10:40AM as Chairman Bernanke responded questions with the statement that withdrawal of stimulus would be determined by data but that it could begin in one of the “next few meetings.” The DJIA recovered part of the losses between 10:40AM and 2PM. The minutes of the FOMC released at 2PM on May 23, 2013, contained a phrase that troubled market participants (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm): “A number of participants expressed willingness to adjust the flow of purchases downward as early as the June meeting if the economic information received by that time showed evidence of sufficiently strong and sustained growth; however, views differed about what evidence would be necessary and the likelihood of that outcome.” The DJIA closed at 15,387.58 on May 21, 2013 and fell to 15,307.17 at the close on May 22, 2013, with the loss of 0.5 percent occurring after release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM when the DJIA stood at around 15,400. The concern about exist of the Fed from stimulus affected markets worldwide as shown in declines of equity indexes in Table III-1 with delays because of differences in trading hours. This behavior shows the trap of unconventional monetary policy with no exit from zero interest rates without risking financial crash and likely adverse repercussions on economic activity.

Financial markets worldwide were affected by the reduction of policy rates of the European Central Bank (ECB) on May 2, 2013. (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130502.en.html):

“2 May 2013 - Monetary policy decisions

At today’s meeting, which was held in Bratislava, the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:

The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.50%, starting from the operation to be settled on 8 May 2013.
The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 50 basis points to 1.00%, with effect from 8 May 2013.
The interest rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html ), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.

The European sovereign debt crisis continues to shake financial markets and the world economy. Debt resolution within the international financial architecture requires that a country be capable of borrowing on its own from the private sector. Mechanisms of debt resolution have included participation of the private sector (PSI), or “bail in,” that has been voluntary, almost coercive, agreed and outright coercive (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture: G7, IMF, BIS, Creditors and Debtors (2005), Chapter 4, 187-202). Private sector involvement requires losses by the private sector in bailouts of highly indebted countries. The essence of successful private sector involvement is to recover private-sector credit of the highly indebted country. Mary Watkins, writing on “Bank bailouts reshuffle risk hierarchy,” published on Mar 19, 2013, in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7666546a-9095-11e2-a456-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OSpbvCn8) analyzes the impact of the bailout or resolution of Cyprus banks on the hierarchy of risks of bank liabilities. Cyprus banks depend mostly on deposits with less reliance on debt, raising concerns in creditors of fixed-income debt and equity holders in banks in the euro area. Uncertainty remains as to the dimensions and structure of losses in private sector involvement or “bail in” in other rescue programs in the euro area. Alkman Granitsas, writing on “Central bank details losses at Bank of Cyprus,” on Mar 30, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324000704578392502889560768.html), analyzes the impact of the agreement with the €10 billion agreement with IMF and the European Union on the banks of Cyprus. The recapitalization plan provides for immediate conversion of 37.5 percent of all deposits in excess of €100,000 to shares of special class of the bank. An additional 22.5 percent will be frozen without interest until the plan is completed. The overwhelming risk factor is the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

An important risk event is the reduction of growth prospects in the euro zone discussed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in “Introductory statement to the press conference,” on Dec 6, 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is121206.en.html):

“This assessment is reflected in the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP growth in a range between -0.6% and -0.4% for 2012, between -0.9% and 0.3% for 2013 and between 0.2% and 2.2% for 2014. Compared with the September 2012 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges for 2012 and 2013 have been revised downwards.

The Governing Council continues to see downside risks to the economic outlook for the euro area. These are mainly related to uncertainties about the resolution of sovereign debt and governance issues in the euro area, geopolitical issues and fiscal policy decisions in the United States possibly dampening sentiment for longer than currently assumed and delaying further the recovery of private investment, employment and consumption.”

Reuters, writing on “Bundesbank cuts German growth forecast,” on Dec 7, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e845114-4045-11e2-8f90-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EMQxzs3u), informs that the central bank of Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank reduced its forecast of growth for the economy of Germany to 0.7 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.0 percent in Jun and to 0.4 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.6 percent while the forecast for 2014 is at 1.9 percent.

The major risk event during earlier weeks was sharp decline of sovereign yields with the yield on the ten-year bond of Spain falling to 5.309 percent and that of the ten-year bond of Italy falling to 4.473 percent on Fri Nov 30, 2012 and 5.366 percent for the ten-year of Spain and 4.527 percent for the ten-year of Italy on Fri Nov 14, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Vanessa Mock and Frances Robinson, writing on “EU approves Spanish bank’s restructuring plans,” on Nov 28, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146520774638316.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the European Union regulators approved restructuring of four Spanish banks (Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia), which helped to calm sovereign debt markets. Harriet Torry and James Angelo, writing on “Germany approves Greek aid,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578150532603095790.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the German parliament approved the plan to provide Greece a tranche of €44 billion in promised financial support, which is subject to sustainability analysis of the bond repurchase program later in Dec 2012. A hurdle for sustainability of repurchasing debt is that Greece’s sovereign bonds have appreciated significantly from around 24 percent for the bond maturing in 21 years and 20 percent for the bond maturing in 31 years in Aug 2012 to around 17 percent for the 21-year maturity and 15 percent for the 31-year maturing in Nov 2012. Declining years are equivalent to increasing prices, making the repurchase more expensive. Debt repurchase is intended to reduce bonds in circulation, turning Greek debt more manageable. Ben McLannahan, writing on “Japan unveils $11bn stimulus package,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/adc0569a-3aa5-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), informs that the cabinet in Japan approved another stimulus program of $11 billion, which is twice larger than another stimulus plan in late Oct and close to elections in Dec. Henry Sender, writing on “Tokyo faces weak yen and high bond yields,” published on Nov 29, 2012 in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a7178d0-393d-11e2-afa8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), analyzes concerns of regulators on duration of bond holdings in an environment of likelihood of increasing yields and yen depreciation.

First, Risk-Determining Events. The European Council statement on Nov 23, 2012 asked the President of the European Commission “to continue the work and pursue consultations in the coming weeks to find a consensus among the 27 over the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf) Discussions will continue in the effort to reach agreement on a budget: “A European budget is important for the cohesion of the Union and for jobs and growth in all our countries” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf). There is disagreement between the group of countries requiring financial assistance and those providing bailout funds. Gabrielle Steinhauser and Costas Paris, writing on “Greek bond rally puts buyback in doubt,” on Nov 23, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578136362599130992.html?mg=reno64-wsj) find a new hurdle in rising prices of Greek sovereign debt that may make more difficult buybacks of debt held by investors. European finance ministers continue their efforts to reach an agreement for Greece that meets with approval of the European Central Bank and the IMF. The European Council (2012Oct19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf ) reached conclusions on strengthening the euro area and providing unified financial supervision:

“The European Council called for work to proceed on the proposals on the Single Supervisory Mechanism as a matter of priority with the objective of agreeing on the legislative framework by 1st January 2013 and agreed on a number of orientations to that end. It also took note of issues relating to the integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks and democratic legitimacy and accountability which should be further explored. It agreed that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the EU's institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards non-euro area Member States and respect for the integrity of the Single Market. It looked forward to a specific and time-bound roadmap to be presented at its December 2012 meeting, so that it can move ahead on all essential building blocks on which a genuine EMU should be based.”

Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. The Bank of Spain released new data on doubtful debtors in Spain’s credit institutions (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/Agenda/Datos_de_credit_a6cd708c59cf931.html). In 2006, the value of doubtful credits reached €10,859 million or 0.7 percent of total credit of €1,508,626 million. In Aug 2012, doubtful credit reached €178,579 million or 10.5 percent of total credit of €1,698,714 million.

There are three critical factors influencing world financial markets. (1) Spain could request formal bailout from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that may also affect Italy’s international borrowing. David Roman and Jonathan House, writing on “Spain risks backlash with budget plan,” on Sep 27, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578021692765950384.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) analyze Spain’s proposal of reducing government expenditures by €13 billion, or around $16.7 billion, increasing taxes in 2013, establishing limits on early retirement and cutting the deficit by €65 billion through 2014. Banco de España, Bank of Spain, contracted consulting company Oliver Wyman to conduct rigorous stress tests of the resilience of its banking system. (Stress tests and their use are analyzed by Pelaez and Pelaez Globalization and the State Vol. I (2008b), 95-100, International Financial Architecture (2005) 112-6, 123-4, 130-3).) The results are available from Banco de España (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/infointeres/reestructuracion/ http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). The assumptions of the adverse scenario used by Oliver Wyman are quite tough for the three-year period from 2012 to 2014: “6.5 percent cumulative decline of GDP, unemployment rising to 27.2 percent and further declines of 25 percent of house prices and 60 percent of land prices (http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). Fourteen banks were stress tested with capital needs estimates of seven banks totaling €59.3 billion. The three largest banks of Spain, Banco Santander (http://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite/CFWCSancomQP01/es_ES/Corporativo.html), BBVA (http://www.bbva.com/TLBB/tlbb/jsp/ing/home/index.jsp) and Caixabank (http://www.caixabank.com/index_en.html), with 43 percent of exposure under analysis, have excess capital of €37 billion in the adverse scenario in contradiction with theories that large, international banks are necessarily riskier. Jonathan House, writing on “Spain expects wider deficit on bank aid,” on Sep 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444138104578028484168511130.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyzes the 2013 budget plan of Spain that will increase the deficit of 7.4 percent of GDP in 2012, which is above the target of 6.3 percent under commitment with the European Union. The ratio of debt to GDP will increase to 85.3 percent in 2012 and 90.5 percent in 2013 while the 27 members of the European Union have an average debt/GDP ratio of 83 percent at the end of IIQ2012. (2) Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even after the economy grows again at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now apparently open ended in perpetuity as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):

“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is the concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation.

(2) The European Central Bank (ECB) approved a new program of bond purchases under the name “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT). The ECB will purchase sovereign bonds of euro zone member countries that have a program of conditionality under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that is converting into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These programs provide enhancing the solvency of member countries in a transition period of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment. The purchase of bonds by the ECB would maintain debt costs of sovereigns at sufficiently low levels to permit adjustment under the EFSF/ESM programs. Purchases of bonds are not limited quantitatively with discretion by the ECB as to how much is necessary to support countries with adjustment programs. Another feature of the OMT of the ECB is sterilization of bond purchases: funds injected to pay for the bonds would be withdrawn or sterilized by ECB transactions. The statement by the European Central Bank on the program of OTM is as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html):

“6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions

As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework:

Conditionality

A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme.

The Governing Council will consider Outright Monetary Transactions to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme.

Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate.

Coverage

Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access.

Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.

No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.

Creditor treatment

The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.

Sterilisation

The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.

Transparency

Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis.

Securities Markets Programme

Following today’s decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be held to maturity.”

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed sets stage for stimulus,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577623220212805132.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the essay presented by Chairman Bernanke at the Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers, as defending past stimulus with unconventional measures of monetary policy that could be used to reduce extremely high unemployment. Chairman Bernanke (2012JHAug31, 18-9) does support further unconventional monetary policy impulses if required by economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm):

“Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”

Professor John H Cochrane (2012Aug31), at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, writing on “The Federal Reserve: from central bank to central planner,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577609384030304936.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_opinion), analyzes that the departure of central banks from open market operations into purchase of assets with risks to taxpayers and direct allocation of credit subject to political influence has caused them to abandon their political independence and accountability. Cochrane (2012Aug31) finds a return to the proposition of Milton Friedman in the 1960s that central banks can cause inflation and macroeconomic instability.

Mario Draghi (2012Aug29), President of the European Central Bank, also reiterated the need of exceptional and unconventional central bank policies (http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html):

“Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.

The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.”

Buiter (2011Oct31) analyzes that the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would need a “bigger bazooka” to bail out euro members in difficulties that could possibly be provided by the ECB. Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. Table III-7 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides the combined GDP in 2012 of the highly indebted euro zone members estimated in the latest World Economic Outlook of the IMF at $4167 billion or 33.1 percent of total euro zone GDP of $12,586 billion. Using the WEO of the IMF, Table III-8 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides debt of the highly indebted euro zone members at $3927.8 billion in 2012 that increases to $5809.9 billion when adding Germany’s debt, corresponding to 167.0 percent of Germany’s GDP. There are additional sources of debt in bailing out banks. The dimensions of the problem may require more firepower than a bazooka perhaps that of the largest conventional bomb of all times of 44,000 pounds experimentally detonated only once by the US in 1948 (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar-apr/coker.html).

Chart III-1A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the ten-year, two-year, one-month Treasury constant maturity yields together with the overnight fed funds rate, and the yield of the corporate bond with Moody’s rating of Baa. The riskier yield of the Baa corporate bond exceeds the relatively riskless yields of the Treasury securities. The beginning yields in Chart III-1A for July 31, 2001, are 3.67 percent for one month, 3.79 percent for two years, 5.07 percent for ten years, 3.82 percent for the fed funds rate and 7.85 percent for the Baa corporate bond. On July 30, 2007, yields inverted with the one month at 4.95 percent, the two-year at 4.59 percent and the ten year at 5.82 percent with the yield of the Baa corporate bond at 6.70 percent. Another interesting point is for Oct 31, 2008, with the yield of the Baa jumping to 9.54 percent and the Treasury yields declining: one month 0.12 percent, two years 1.56 percent and ten years 4.01 percent during a flight to the dollar and government securities analyzed by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). Another spike in the series is for Apr 4, 2006 with the yield of the corporate Baa bond at 8.63 and the Treasury yields of 0.12 percent for one month, 0.94 for two years and 2.95 percent for ten years. During the beginning of the flight from risk financial assets to US government securities (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009), the one-month yield was 0.07 percent, the two-year yield 1.64 percent and the ten-year yield 3.41. The combination of zero fed funds rate and quantitative easing caused sharp decline of the yields from 2008 and 2009. Yield declines have also occurred during periods of financial risk aversion, including the current one of stress of financial markets in Europe. The final point of Chart III1-A is for Jul 3, 2013, with the one-month yield at 0.03 percent, the two-year at 0.36 percent, the ten-year at 2.52 percent, the fed funds rate at 0.10 percent and the corporate Baa bond at 5.29 percent. There is an evident increase in the yields of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity and the Moody’s Baa corporate bond.

Chart III-1A, US, Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Overnight Fed Funds Rate and Yield of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond, Jul 31, 2001-Jul 3, 2013

Note: US Recessions in shaded areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. Future company cash flows derive from investment projects. Real private fixed investment fell from $2,111.5 billion in IVQ2007 to $1920.4 billion in IQ2013 or by 9.1 percent compared with growth of 24.1 percent of gross private domestic investment from IQ1980 to IVQ1985 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Undistributed profits of US corporations swelled 306.9 percent from $118.0 billion IQ2007 to $480.2 billion in IQ2013 and changed signs from minus $22.1 billion in IVQ2007 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment fell $27.8 billion relative to IVQ2012 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp1q13_3rd.pdf), from $2013.0 billion in IVQ2012 to $1985.2 billion in IQ2013 at the quarterly rate of minus 1.4 percent. Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment. The investment decision of US business is fractured. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

Where R_τ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; C_τ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

declines.

There was recovering performance in equity indexes with several indexes in Table III-1 increasing in the week ending on Jul 5, 2013, after wide swings caused by reallocations of investment portfolios worldwide. Stagnating revenues, corporate cash hoarding and declining investment are causing reevaluation of discounted net earnings with deteriorating views on the world economy and United States fiscal sustainability but investors have been driving indexes higher. DJIA increased 1.0 percent on Jul 5, increasing 1.5 percent in the week. Germany’s Dax decreased 2.4 percent on Fri Jul 5 and decreased 1.9 percent in the week. Dow Global increased 0.8 percent on Jul 5 and increased 0.8 percent in the week. Japan’s Nikkei Average increased 2.1 percent on Fri Jul 5 and increased 4.6 percent in the week as the yen continues to be oscillating but relatively weaker and the stock market gains in expectations of fiscal stimulus by a new administration and monetary stimulus by a new board of the Bank of Japan. Dow Asia Pacific TSM increased 0.8 percent on Jul 5 and increased 0.8 percent in the week. Shanghai Composite that decreased 0.2 percent on Mar 8 and decreased 1.7 percent in the week of Mar 8, falling below 2000 to close at 1980.13 on Fri Nov 30 but closing at 2007.20 on Fri Jul 5 for increase of 0.1 percent and increase of 1.4 percent in the week of Jul 5. There is evident trend of deceleration of the world economy that could affect corporate revenue and equity valuations, causing oscillation in equity markets with increases during favorable risk appetite.

Commodities were mixed in the week of Jul 5, 2013. The DJ UBS Commodities Index decreased 1.0 percent on Fri Jul 5 and increased 0.9 percent in the week, as shown in Table III-1. WTI increased 7.1 percent in the week of Jul 5 while Brent increased 5.6 percent in the week with concerns about oil transportation in the Suez Canal. Gold decreased 2.2 percent on Fri Jul 5 and decreased 1.0 percent in the week.

Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €879,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €822,689 million on Jun 28, 2013 with some repayment of loans already occurring. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has reached €1,432,142 million in the statement of Jun 28, 2013, with marginal reduction. There is high credit risk in these transactions with capital of only €90,392 million as analyzed by Cochrane (2012Aug31).

Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR

	Dec 31, 2010	Dec 28, 2011	Jun 28, 2013
1 Gold and other Receivables	367,402	419,822	319,968
2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency	223,995	236,826	247,607
3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency	26,941	95,355	27,541
4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro	22,592	25,982	18,070
5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro	546,747	879,130	822,689
6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro	45,654	94,989	92,068
7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro	457,427	610,629	609,453
8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro	34,954	33,928	28,408
9 Other Assets	278,719	336,574	264,619
TOTAL ASSETS	2,004, 432	2,733,235	2,430,423
Memo Items
Sum of 5 and 7	1,004,174	1,489,759	1,432,142
Capital and Reserves	78,143	85,748	90,392

Source: European Central Bank

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2013/html/fs130703.en.html

Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. Growth of the Italian economy would ensure that success. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15) argue that 55 percent of the exports of Italy are to countries outside the euro area such that devaluation of 15 percent would be effective in increasing export revenue. Newly available data in Table III-3 providing Italy’s trade with regions and countries supports the argument of Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15). Italy’s exports to the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, are only 40.5 percent of the total. Exports to the non-European Union area with share of 46.3 percent in Italy’s total exports are growing at 5.3 percent in Jan-Apr 2013 relative to Jan-Apr 2012 while those to EMU are growing at minus 3.8 percent.

Table III-3, Italy, Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, % Share and 12-Month ∆%

Apr 2013	Exports % Share	∆% Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012	Imports % Share	∆% Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012
EU	53.7	-3.2	52.9	-2.2
EMU 17	40.5	-3.8	42.7	-2.1
France	11.1	-2.1	8.3	-4.5
Germany	12.5	-4.6	14.6	-6.0
Spain	4.7	-9.0	4.4	-1.2
UK	4.9	-0.2	2.5	-0.9
Non EU	46.3	5.3	47.1	-10.8
Europe non EU	13.9	3.0	11.3	8.0
USA	6.8	0.3	3.3	-21.0
China	2.3	3.4	6.5	-5.7
OPEC	5.7	14.7	10.8	-23.8
Total	100.0	0.5	100.0	-6.3

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/93481

Table III-4 provides Italy’s trade balance by regions and countries. Italy had trade deficit of €570 million with the 17 countries of the euro zone (EMU 17) in Apr 2013 and cumulative deficit of €1726 million in Jan-Apr 2013. Depreciation to parity could permit greater competitiveness in improving the trade surplus of €1948 million in Jan-Apr 2013 with Europe non European Union, the trade surplus of €4443 million with the US and trade surplus with non-European Union of €2521 million in Jan-Apr 2013. There is significant rigidity in the trade deficits in Jan-Apr 2013 of €4705 million with China and €3619 million with members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Higher exports could drive economic growth in the economy of Italy that would permit less onerous adjustment of the country’s fiscal imbalances, raising the country’s credit rating.

Table III-4, Italy, Trade Balance by Regions and Countries, Millions of Euro

Regions and Countries	Trade Balance Apr 2013 Millions of Euro	Trade Balance Cumulative Jan-Apr 2013 Millions of Euro
EU	441	2,105
EMU 17	-570	-1,726
France	853	3,973
Germany	-282	-1,708
Spain	8	316
UK	805	2,836
Non EU	1,466	2,521
Europe non EU	780	1,948
USA	1,213	4,443
China	-913	-4,705
OPEC	-520	-3,619
Total	1,907	4,626

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/93481

Growth rates of Italy’s trade and major products are in Table III-5 for the period Jan-Apr 2013 relative to Jan-Apr 2012. Growth rates of cumulative imports relative to a year earlier are negative for energy with minus 18.5 percent and minus 10.9 percent for durable goods. The higher rate of growth of exports of 0.5 percent in Jan-Apr 2013/Jan-Apr 2012 relative to imports of minus 6.3 percent may reflect weak demand in Italy with GDP declining during seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 through IQ2013 together with softening commodity prices.

Table III-5, Italy, Exports and Imports % Share of Products in Total and ∆%

	Exports Share %	Exports ∆% Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012	Imports Share %	Imports ∆% Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012
Consumer Goods	29.3	7.2	25.6	0.9
Durable	5.8	2.0	2.9	-10.9
Non-Durable	23.5	8.5	22.7	2.4
Capital Goods	31.6	0.4	19.5	-6.5
Inter- mediate Goods	33.6	-2.2	32.6	-2.8
Energy	5.5	-16.3	22.3	-18.5
Total ex Energy	94.5	1.5	77.7	-2.6
Total	100.0	0.5	100.0	-6.3

Note: % Share for 2012 total trade.

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/93481

Table III-6 provides Italy’s trade balance by product categories in Apr 2013 and cumulative Jan-Apr 2013. Italy’s trade balance excluding energy generated surplus of €6467 million in Apr 2013 and €23,446 million cumulative in Jan-Apr 2013 but the energy trade balance created deficit of €4559 million in Apr 2013 and cumulative €18,820 million in Jan-Apr 2013. The overall surplus in Apr 2013 was €1907 million with cumulative surplus of €4626 million in Jan-Apr 2013. Italy has significant competitiveness in various economic activities in contrast with some other countries with debt difficulties.

Table III-6, Italy, Trade Balance by Product Categories, € Millions

	Apr 2013	Cumulative Jan-Apr 2013
Consumer Goods	1,483	6,530
Durable	1,003	4,044
Nondurable	480	2,487
Capital Goods	4,385	15,274
Intermediate Goods	599	1,642
Energy	-4,559	-18,820
Total ex Energy	6,467	23,446
Total	1,907	4,626

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/93481

Brazil faced in the debt crisis of 1982 a more complex policy mix. Between 1977 and 1983, Brazil’s terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated 47 percent and 36 percent excluding oil (Pelaez 1987, 176-79; Pelaez 1986, 37-66; see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 178-87). Brazil had accumulated unsustainable foreign debt by borrowing to finance balance of payments deficits during the 1970s. Foreign lending virtually stopped. The German mark devalued strongly relative to the dollar such that Brazil’s products lost competitiveness in Germany and in multiple markets in competition with Germany. The resolution of the crisis was devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent relative to the dollar and subsequent maintenance of parity by monthly devaluation equal to inflation and indexing that resulted in financial stability by parity in external and internal interest rates avoiding capital flight. With a combination of declining imports, domestic import substitution and export growth, Brazil followed rapid growth in the US and grew out of the crisis with surprising GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 1984.

The euro zone faces a critical survival risk because several of its members may default on their sovereign obligations if not bailed out by the other members. The valuation equation of bonds is essential to understanding the stability of the euro area. An explanation is provided in this paragraph and readers interested in technical details are referred to the Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. Contrary to the Wriston doctrine, investing in sovereign obligations is a credit decision. The value of a bond today is equal to the discounted value of future obligations of interest and principal until maturity. On Dec 30, 2011, the yield of the 2-year bond of the government of Greece was quoted around 100 percent. In contrast, the 2-year US Treasury note traded at 0.239 percent and the 10-year at 2.871 percent while the comparable 2-year government bond of Germany traded at 0.14 percent and the 10-year government bond of Germany traded at 1.83 percent. There is no need for sovereign ratings: the perceptions of investors are of relatively higher probability of default by Greece, defying Wriston (1982), and nil probability of default of the US Treasury and the German government. The essence of the sovereign credit decision is whether the sovereign will be able to finance new debt and refinance existing debt without interrupting service of interest and principal. Prices of sovereign bonds incorporate multiple anticipations such as inflation and liquidity premiums of long-term relative to short-term debt but also risk premiums on whether the sovereign’s debt can be managed as it increases without bound. The austerity measures of Italy are designed to increase the primary surplus, or government revenues less expenditures excluding interest, to ensure investors that Italy will have the fiscal strength to manage its debt exceeding 100 percent of GDP, which is the third largest in the world after the US and Japan. Appendix IIIE links the expectations on the primary surplus to the real current value of government monetary and fiscal obligations. As Blanchard (2011SepWEO) analyzes, fiscal consolidation to increase the primary surplus is facilitated by growth of the economy. Italy and the other indebted sovereigns in Europe face the dual challenge of increasing primary surpluses while maintaining growth of the economy (for the experience of Brazil in the debt crisis of 1982 see Pelaez 1986, 1987).

Much of the analysis and concern over the euro zone centers on the lack of credibility of the debt of a few countries while there is credibility of the debt of the euro zone as a whole. In practice, there is convergence in valuations and concerns toward the fact that there may not be credibility of the euro zone as a whole. The fluctuations of financial risk assets of members of the euro zone move together with risk aversion toward the countries with lack of debt credibility. This movement raises the need to consider analytically sovereign debt valuation of the euro zone as a whole in the essential analysis of whether the single-currency will survive without major changes.

Welfare economics considers the desirability of alternative states, which in this case would be evaluating the “value” of Germany (1) within and (2) outside the euro zone. Is the sum of the wealth of euro zone countries outside of the euro zone higher than the wealth of these countries maintaining the euro zone? On the choice of indicator of welfare, Hicks (1975, 324) argues:

“Partly as a result of the Keynesian revolution, but more (perhaps) because of statistical labours that were initially quite independent of it, the Social Product has now come right back into its old place. Modern economics—especially modern applied economics—is centered upon the Social Product, the Wealth of Nations, as it was in the days of Smith and Ricardo, but as it was not in the time that came between. So if modern theory is to be effective, if it is to deal with the questions which we in our time want to have answered, the size and growth of the Social Product are among the chief things with which it must concern itself. It is of course the objective Social Product on which attention must be fixed. We have indexes of production; we do not have—it is clear we cannot have—an Index of Welfare.”

If the burden of the debt of the euro zone falls on Germany and France or only on Germany, is the wealth of Germany and France or only Germany higher after breakup of the euro zone or if maintaining the euro zone? In practice, political realities will determine the decision through elections.

The prospects of survival of the euro zone are dire. Table III-7 is constructed with IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx) for GDP in USD billions, primary net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP and general government debt as percent of GDP for selected regions and countries in 2013.

Table III-7, World and Selected Regional and Country GDP and Fiscal Situation

	GDP 2013 USD Billions	Primary Net Lending Borrowing % GDP 2013	General Government Net Debt % GDP 2013
World	74,172
Euro Zone	12,752	-0.04	73.9
Portugal	218	-1.4	115.0
Ireland	222	-3.2	106.2
Greece	244	--	155.4
Spain	1,388	-3.5	79.1
Major Advanced Economies G7	34,068	-3.8	91.5
United States	16,238	-4.6	89.0
UK	2,423	-5.0	86.1
Germany	3,598	1.8	54.1
France	2,739	-1.4	86.5
Japan	5,150	-9.0	143.4
Canada	1,844	-2.4	35.9
Italy	2,076	2.7	102.3
China	9,020	-2.1*	21.3**

*Net Lending/borrowing**Gross Debt

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx

The data in Table III-7 are used for some very simple calculations in Table III-8. The column “Net Debt USD Billions” in Table III-8 is generated by applying the percentage in Table III-7 column “General Government Net Debt % GDP 2013” to the column “GDP USD Billions.” The total debt of France and Germany in 2013 is $4315.7 billion, as shown in row “B+C” in column “Net Debt USD Billions” The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is $4087.3 billion, adding rows D+E+F+G+H in column “Net Debt USD billions.” There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic” in the two final columns of Table III-8. Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is shown in column “Debt as % of Germany plus France GDP” to reach $8403.0 billion, which would be equivalent to 132.6 percent of their combined GDP in 2013. Under this arrangement, the entire debt of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. The final column provides “Debt as % of Germany GDP” that would exceed 233.5 percent if including debt of France and 167.7 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Wriston (1982) would prove to be wrong again that countries do not bankrupt but would have a consolation prize that similar to LBOs the sum of the individual values of euro zone members outside the current agreement exceeds the value of the whole euro zone. Internal rescues of French and German banks may be less costly than bailing out other euro zone countries so that they do not default on French and German banks.

Table III-8, Guarantees of Debt of Sovereigns in Euro Area as Percent of GDP of Germany and France, USD Billions and %

	Net Debt USD Billions	Debt as % of Germany Plus France GDP	Debt as % of Germany GDP
A Euro Area	9,423.7
B Germany	1,946.5		$8403.0 as % of $3598 =233.5% $6033.8 as % of $3598 =167.7%
C France	2,369.2
B+C	4,315.7	GDP $6,337.0 Total Debt $8403.0 Debt/GDP: 132.6%
D Italy	2,123.7
E Spain	1,097.9
F Portugal	250.7
G Greece	379.2
H Ireland	235.8
Subtotal D+E+F+G+H	4,087.3

Source: calculation with IMF data IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx

There is extremely important information in Table III-9 for the current sovereign risk crisis in the euro zone. Table III-9 provides the structure of regional and country relations of Germany’s exports and imports with newly available data for Apr 2013. German exports to other European Union (EU) members are 55.9 percent of total exports in Apr 2013 and 57.4 percent in cumulative Jan-Apr 2013. Exports to the euro area are 34.5 percent in Apr and 37.6 percent cumulative in Jan-Apr. Exports to third countries are 41.7 percent of the total in Apr and 42.6 percent cumulative in Jan-Apr. There is similar distribution for imports. Exports to non-euro countries are increasing 5.6 percent in Apr 2013, increasing 1.7 percent cumulative in Jan-Apr 2013 while exports to the euro area are increasing 4.3 percent in Apr 2013, and decreasing 2.0 percent cumulative in Jan-Apr 2013. Exports to third countries, accounting for 44.1 percent of the total in Apr 2013, are increasing 13.6 percent in Apr 2013 and increasing 3.1 percent cumulative in Jan-Apr 2013, accounting for 42.6 percent of the cumulative total in Jan-Apr 2013. Price competitiveness through devaluation could improve export performance and growth. Economic performance in Germany is closely related to its high competitiveness in world markets. Weakness in the euro zone and the European Union in general could affect the German economy. This may be the major reason for choosing the “fiscal abuse” of the European Central Bank considered by Buiter (2011Oct31) over the breakdown of the euro zone. There is a tough analytical, empirical and forecasting doubt of growth and trade in the euro zone and the world with or without maintenance of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro zone. Germany could benefit from depreciation of the euro because of high share in its exports to countries not in the euro zone but breakdown of the euro zone raises doubts on the region’s economic growth that could affect German exports to other member states.

Table III-9, Germany, Structure of Exports and Imports by Region, € Billions and ∆%

	Apr 2013 € Billions	Apr 12-Month ∆%	Cumulative Jan-Apr 2012 € Billions	Cumulative Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012 ∆%
Total Exports	94.5	8.5	366.3	0.2
A. EU Members	52.8 % 55.9	4.7	210.1 % 57.4	-0.8
Euro Area	34.5 % 36.5	4.3	137.7 % 37.6	-2.0
Non-euro Area	18.4 % 19.5	5.6	72.3 % 19.7	1.7
B. Third Countries	41.7 % 44.1	13.6	156.2 % 42.6	3.1
Total Imports	76.4	5.2	298.9	-1.4
C. EU Members	49.4 % 64.7	6.8	193.0 % 64.6	0.5
Euro Area	34.5 % 45.2	5.4	134.4 % 44.9	-0.7
Non-euro Area	14.9 % 19.5	10.1	58.6 % 19.6	3.5
D. Third Countries	27.1 % 35.5	2.4	105.9 % 35.4	-4.8

Notes: Total Exports = A+B; Total Imports = C+D

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/06/PE13_189_51.html

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. There are two approaches to government finance and their implications: (1) simple unpleasant monetarist arithmetic; and (2) simple unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Both approaches illustrate how sovereign debt can be perceived riskier under profligacy.

First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:

D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)

Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,

{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:

N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)

The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:

B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)

On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.

Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:

(M_t + B_t)/P_t = E_t∫(1/R_t_{, t+τ})s_t_+τdτ (4)

Equation (4) expresses the monetary, M_t, and debt, B_t, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, P_t, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, R_t_{, t+τ}, of the future primary surpluses s_t_+τ, which are equal to T_t_+τ – G_t_+τ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post R_t_{, t+τ}. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:

M_tV(i_t, ·) = P_tY_t (5)

Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):

“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”

An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.

There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:

(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress

(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality

(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.

IV Global Inflation. There is inflation everywhere in the world economy, with slow growth and persistently high unemployment in advanced economies. Table IV-1, updated with every blog comment, provides the latest annual data for GDP, consumer price index (CPI) inflation, producer price index (PPI) inflation and unemployment (UNE) for the advanced economies, China and the highly indebted European countries with sovereign risk issues. The table now includes the Netherlands and Finland that with Germany make up the set of northern countries in the euro zone that hold key votes in the enhancement of the mechanism for solution of sovereign risk issues (Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, “Europe: Northern Exposures,” Financial Times, Mar 9, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55eaf350-4a8b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz1gAlaswcW). Newly available data on inflation is considered below in this section. Data in Table IV-1 for the euro zone and its members are updated from information provided by Eurostat but individual country information is provided in this section as soon as available, following Table IV-1. Data for other countries in Table IV-1 are also updated with reports from their statistical agencies. Economic data for major regions and countries is considered in Section V World Economic Slowdown following with individual country and regional data tables.

Table IV-1, GDP Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in Selected Countries, Percentage Annual Rates

	GDP	CPI	PPI	UNE
US	1.6	1.4	1.7	7.6
Japan	0.4	-0.3	0.6	4.1
China	7.7	2.1	-2.6
UK	0.3	2.7* CPIH 2.5	1.2 output 0.8** input 2.2	7.8
Euro Zone	-1.1	1.4	-0.1	12.1
Germany	-0.3	1.6	0.2	5.3
France	-0.4	0.9	-0.2	10.4
Nether-lands	-1.4	3.1	-1.2	6.6
Finland	-2.2	2.5	0.7	8.4
Belgium	-0.6	1.1	0.8	8.6
Portugal	-4.0	0.9	0.9	17.6
Ireland	NA	0.5	0.7	13.6
Italy	-2.4	1.3	-1.1	12.2
Greece	-5.6	-0.3	-0.9	NA
Spain	-2.0	1.8	0.8	26.9

Notes: GDP: rate of growth of GDP; CPI: change in consumer price inflation; PPI: producer price inflation; UNE: rate of unemployment; all rates relative to year earlier

*Office for National Statistics http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/consumer-price-indices/may-2013/index.html **Core

PPI http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ppi2/producer-price-index/may-2013/index.html

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/; country statistical sources http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table IV-1 shows the simultaneous occurrence of low growth, inflation and unemployment in advanced economies. The US grew at 1.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 (Table 8 in http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp1q13_3rd.pdf http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). Japan’s GDP grew 0.1 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 and 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s grew at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 4.1 percent in IQQ2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). The UK grew at 0.3 percent in IQ2013 relative to IVQ2012 and GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 (Section VH and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html). The Euro Zone grew at minus 0.3 percent in IQ2013 and minus 1.1 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 (Section VD and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html ). These are stagnating or “growth recession” rates, which are positive or about nil growth rates with some contractions that are insufficient to recover employment. The rates of unemployment are quite high: 7.6 percent in the US but 17.7 percent for unemployment/underemployment or job stress of 28.7million (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html), 4.1 percent for Japan (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html), 7.8 percent for the UK with high rates of unemployment for young people (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). Twelve-month rates of inflation have been quite high, even when some are moderating at the margin: 1.4 percent in the US, -0.3 percent for Japan, 2.1 percent for China, 1.4 percent for the Euro Zone and 2.7 percent for the UK. Stagflation is still an unknown event but the risk is sufficiently high to be worthy of consideration (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html). The analysis of stagflation also permits the identification of important policy issues in solving vulnerabilities that have high impact on global financial risks. There are six key interrelated vulnerabilities in the world economy that have been causing global financial turbulence: (1) sovereign risk issues in Europe resulting from countries in need of fiscal consolidation and enhancement of their sovereign risk ratings (see Section III and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). (2) The tradeoff of growth and inflation in China now with change in growth strategy to domestic consumption instead of investment and political developments in a decennial transition. (3) Slow growth by repression of savings with de facto interest rate controls (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html), weak hiring with the loss of 10 million full-time jobs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/recovery-without-hiring-collapse-of.html) and continuing job stress of 24 to 30 million people in the US and stagnant wages in a fractured job market (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html

In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These projections and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.

Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):

“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.

Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.

The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”

Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:

“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at around 1.8 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 15 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). The average of 7.8 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 3.2 percent obtained by diving GDP of $13,103.5 billion in IIIQ2010 by GDP of $12,701.0 billion in IIQ2009 {[$13.103.5/$12,701.0 -1]100 = 3.2%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.htmll). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html). Zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not provided the impulse for growth and were not required in past successful cyclical expansions.

First, total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 195,000 in Jun 2013 and private payroll employment rose 202,000. The average number of nonfarm jobs created in Jan-Jun 2012 was 185,167 while the average number of nonfarm jobs created in Jan-Jun 2013 was 201,833, or increase by 9.0 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US in Jan-Jun 2012 was 191,000 while the average in Jan-Jun 2013 was 205,667, or increase by 7.7 percent. The US labor force increased from 153.617 million in 2011 to 154.975 million in 2012 by 1.358 million or 113,167 per month. The average increase of nonfarm jobs in the five months from Jan to Jun 2013 was 201,833, which is a rate of job creation inadequate to reduce significantly unemployment and underemployment in the United States because of 113,167 new entrants in the labor force per month with 28.7 million unemployed or underemployed. The difference between the average increase of 201,833 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Jan to Jun 2013 and the 113,167 average monthly increase in the labor force from 2011 to 2012 is 88,666 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 28.7 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 88,666 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 324 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (28.736 million divided by 88,666) or 27 years (324 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Jun 2013 not seasonally adjusted stood at 157.089 million with 12.248 million unemployed or effectively 17.714 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 162.555 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 0.9 years (1 million divided by product of 88,666 by 12, which is 1,063,992). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.854 million (0.05 times labor force of 157.089 million) for new net job creation of 4.394 million (12.248 million unemployed minus 7.854 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 4.1 years (4.394 million divided by 1.063992). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 17.714 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 162.555 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 9.586 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 9.0 years (17.714 million minus 0.05(162.555 million) = 9.586 million divided by 1.063992, using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in the US fell from 147.315 million in Jul 2007 to 144.841 million in Jun 2013, by 2.474 million, or decline of 1.7 percent, while the noninstitutional population increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 245.552 million in Jun 2013, by 13.594 million or increase of 5.9 percent, using not seasonally adjusted data. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Second, the economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as decelerating from mediocre growth of 2.4 percent on an annual basis in 2010 and 1.8 percent in 2011 to 2.2 percent in 2012. Calculations below show that actual growth is around 1.8 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). United States real GDP grew at the rate of 3.2 percent between 1929 and 2012 and at 3.2 percent between 1947 and 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). Growth is not only mediocre but also sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 28.6 million people corresponding to 17.6 percent of the effective labor force of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). In the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, US real GDP grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (IQ2011), 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, revised 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012, 0.4 percent in IVQ2012 and revised 1.8 percent in IQ2013. The annual equivalent rate of growth of GDP for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent, obtained as follows. Discounting 0.1 percent to one quarter is 0.025 percent {[(1.001)^1/4 -1]100 = 0.025}; discounting 2.5 percent to one quarter is 0.62 percent {[(1.025)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 4.1 percent to one quarter is 1.0 percent {[(1.04)^1/4 -1]100; discounting 2.0 percent to one quarter is 0.50 percent {[(1.020)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 -1]100}; discounting 3.1 percent to one quarter is 0.77 {[(1.031)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 0.4 percent to one quarter is 0.1 percent {[(1.004)^1/4 – 1]100}; and discounting 1.8 percent to one quarter is 0.44 percent {[(1.018)^1/4 -1}100}. Real GDP growth in the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 accumulated to 4.3 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0044) - 1]100 = 4.2%}. This is equivalent to growth from IQ2011 to IQ2013 obtained by dividing the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of IQ2013 of $13,725.7 billion by the SAAR of IVQ2010 of $13,181.2 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 and Table I-6 below) and expressing as percentage {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2) - 1]100 = 4.1%}. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.8 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0044)^4/9 -1]100 = 1.8%], or {[($13,725.7/$13,181.2)]^4/9-1]100 = 1.8%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table I-6 below, obtaining the average for nine quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. Growth in the four quarters of 2012 accumulates to 1.7 percent {[(1.02)^1/4(1.013)^1/4(1.031)^1/4(1.004)^1/4 -1]100 = 1.7%}. This is equivalent to dividing the SAAR of $13,665.4 billion for IVQ2012 in Table I-6 by the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 except for a rounding discrepancy to obtain 1.7 percent {[($13,665.4/$13,441.0) – 1]100 = 1.7%}. The US economy is still close to a standstill especially considering the GDP report in detail.

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QE→∞ cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.

The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm) practically unchanged in the statement at the conclusion of its meeting on Jan 30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130130a.htm) and at its meeting on Jun 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130619a.htm):

“Release Date: June 19, 2013

For immediate release

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in May suggests that economic activity has been expanding at a moderate pace. Labor market conditions have shown further improvement in recent months, on balance, but the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has strengthened further, but fiscal policy is restraining economic growth. Partly reflecting transitory influences, inflation has been running below the Committee's longer-run objective, but longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with appropriate policy accommodation, economic growth will proceed at a moderate pace and the unemployment rate will gradually decline toward levels the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee sees the downside risks to the outlook for the economy and the labor market as having diminished since the fall. The Committee also anticipates that inflation over the medium term likely will run at or below its 2 percent objective.

To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these actions should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months. The Committee will continue its purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until the outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability. The Committee is prepared to increase or reduce the pace of its purchases to maintain appropriate policy accommodation as the outlook for the labor market or inflation changes. In determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will continue to take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases as well as the extent of progress toward its economic objectives.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Charles L. Evans; Jerome H. Powell; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Eric S. Rosengren; Jeremy C. Stein; Daniel K. Tarullo; and Janet L. Yellen. Voting against the action was James Bullard, who believed that the Committee should signal more strongly its willingness to defend its inflation goal in light of recent low inflation readings, and Esther L. George, who was concerned that the continued high level of monetary accommodation increased the risks of future economic and financial imbalances and, over time, could cause an increase in long-term inflation expectations.“

There are several important issues in this statement.

Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

Open-ended Quantitative Easing or QE_∞. Earlier programs are continued with an additional open-ended $85 billion of bond purchases per month: “To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month.”

Advance Guidance on “6 ¼ 2 ½ “Rule. Policy will be accommodative even after the economy recovers satisfactorily: “To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

Monitoring and Policy Focus on Jobs. The FOMC reconsiders its policy continuously in accordance with available information: “In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.”
Increase or Reduction of Asset Purchases. Market participants focused on slightly different wording about increasing asset purchases: “The Committee is prepared to increase or reduce the pace of its purchases to maintain appropriate policy accommodation as the outlook for the labor market or inflation changes. In determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will continue to take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases as well as the extent of progress toward its economic objectives.”

Current focus is on tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases of $85 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jun 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130619a.htm):

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness.

Table IV-2 provides economic projections of governors of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and regional presidents of Federal Reserve Banks released at the meeting of Mar 20, 2013. The Fed releases the data with careful explanations (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf). Columns “∆% GDP,” “∆% PCE Inflation” and “∆% Core PCE Inflation” are changes “from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated.” The GDP report for IQ2013 is analyzed in Section I (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html) and the PCE inflation data from the report on personal income and outlays in Section IV (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides the third estimate of IQ2013 GDP with the first estimate for IIQ2013 to be released on Jul 31 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm See Section I (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). PCE inflation is the index of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) of the report of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on “Personal Income and Outlays” (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm), which is analyzed in Section IV (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). The next report on “Personal Income and Outlays” for Jun will be released at 8:30 AM on Aug 2, 2013 with revisions from 1959 to May 2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm). PCE core inflation consists of PCE inflation excluding food and energy. Column “UNEMP %” is the rate of unemployment measured as the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the Employment Situation Report with the civilian unemployment rate in the first Friday of every month, which is analyzed in this blog. The report for Jun 2013 was released on Jul 5 and analyzed in this blog (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html). “Longer term projections represent each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf).

It is instructive to focus on 2013 as 2014, 2015 and longer term are too far away, and there is not much information even on what will happen in 2013 and beyond. The central tendency should provide reasonable approximation of the view of the majority of members of the FOMC but the second block of numbers provides the range of projections by FOMC participants. The first row for each year shows the projection introduced after the meeting of Mar 20, 2013 and the second row “PR” the projection of the Jun 19, 2013 meeting. There are three major changes in the view.

1. Growth “∆% GDP.” The FOMC has reduced the forecast of GDP growth in 2013 from 2.3 to 2.8 percent at the meeting in Mar 2013 to 2.3 to 2.6 percent at the meeting on Jun 20, 2013. The FOMC increased GDP growth in 2014 from 2.9 to 3.4 percent at the meeting in Mar 2013 to 3.0 to 3.5 percent at the meeting in Jun 2013.

2. Rate of Unemployment “UNEM%.” The FOMC reduced the forecast of the rate of unemployment from 7.3 to 7.5 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2013 to 7.2 to 7.3 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2013. The projection for 2014 decreased to the range of 6.5 to 6.8 in Jun 2013 from 6.7 to 7.0 in Mar 2013. Projections of the rate of unemployment are moving closer to the desire 6.5 percent or lower with 5.8 to 6.2 percent in 2015 after the meeting on Jun 19, 2013.

3. Inflation “∆% PCE Inflation.” The FOMC changed the forecast of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation from 1.3 to 1.7 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2012 to 0.8 to 1.2 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2013. There are no projections exceeding 2.0 percent.

4. Core Inflation “∆% Core PCE Inflation.” Core inflation is PCE inflation excluding food and energy. There is again not much of a difference of the projection that changed from 1.5 to 1.6 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2013 to 1.2 to 1.3 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2013.

Table IV-2, US, Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in FOMC, Mar 2013 and Jun 19, 2013

	∆% GDP	UNEM %	∆% PCE Inflation	∆% Core PCE Inflation
Central Tendency
2013 Mar PR	2.3 to 2.6 2.3 to 2.8	7.2 to 7.3 7.3 to 7.5	0.8 to 1.2 1.3 to 1.7	1.2 to 1.3 1.5 to 1.6
2014 Mar PR	3.0 to 3.5 2.9 to 3.4	6.5 to 6.8 6.7 to 7.0	1.4 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.0	1.5 to 1.8 1.7 to 2.0
2015 Mar PR	2.9 to 3.6 2.9 to 3.7	5.8 to 6.2 6.0 to 6.5	1.6 to 2.0 1.7 to 2.0	1.7 to 2.0 1.8 to 2.1
Longer Run Mar PR	2.3 to 2.5 2.3 to 2.5	5.2 to 6.0 5.2 to 6.0	2.0 2.0
Range
2013 Mar PR	2.0 to 2.6 2.0 to 3.0	6.9 to 7.5 6.9 to 7.6	0.8 to 1.5 1.3 to 2.0	1.1 to 1.5 1.5 to 2.0
2014 Mar PR	2.2 to 3.6 2.6 to 3.8	6.2 to 6.9 6.1 to 7.1	1.4 to 2.0 1.4 to 2.1	1.5 to 2.1 1.5 to 2.1
2015 Mar PR	2.3 to 3.8 2.5 to 3.8	5.7 to 6.4 5.7 to 6.5	1.6 to 2.3 1.6 to 2.6	1.7 to 2.3 1.7 to 2.6
Longer Run Mar PR	2.0 to 3.0 2.0 to 3.0	5.0 to 6.0 5.0 to 6.0	2.0 2.0

Notes: UEM: unemployment; PR: Projection

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130619.pdf

Another important decision at the FOMC meeting on Jan 25, 2012, is formal specification of the goal of inflation of 2 percent per year but without specific goal for unemployment (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm):

“Following careful deliberations at its recent meetings, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reached broad agreement on the following principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. The Committee intends to reaffirm these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January.

The FOMC is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.

Inflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee's policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals.

The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.

The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the corresponding interval several years earlier.

In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary. However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. ”

The probable intention of this specific inflation goal is to “anchor” inflationary expectations. Massive doses of monetary policy of promoting growth to reduce unemployment could conflict with inflation control. Economic agents could incorporate inflationary expectations in their decisions. As a result, the rate of unemployment could remain the same but with much higher rate of inflation (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html See Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-116). Strong commitment to maintaining inflation at 2 percent could control expectations of inflation.

The FOMC continues its efforts of increasing transparency that can improve the credibility of its firmness in implementing its dual mandate. Table IV-3 provides the views by participants of the FOMC of the levels at which they expect the fed funds rate in 2013, 2014, 2015 and the in the longer term. Table IV-3 is inferred from a chart provided by the FOMC with the number of participants expecting the target of fed funds rate (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf). There are 18 participants expecting the rate to remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2013 and one to be higher in the interval below 1.0 percent. The rate would still remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2014 for 15 participants with three expecting the rate to be in the range of 0.5 to 1.0 percent and one participant expecting rates at 1.0 to 1.5 percent. This table is consistent with the guidance statement of the FOMC that rates will remain at low levels until late in 2014. For 2015, six participants expect rates to be below or at 1.0 percent while nine expect rates from 1.0 to 1.5 percent and four expecting rates in excess of 2.0 percent. In the long term, all 19 participants expect the fed funds rate in the range of 3.0 to 4.5 percent.

Table IV-3, US, Views of Target Federal Funds Rate at Year-End of Federal Reserve Board

Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Jun 19, 2013

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130619.pdf

Additional information is provided in Table IV-4 with the number of participants expecting increasing interest rates in the years from 2013 to 2015. It is evident from Table IV-4 that the prevailing view of the FOMC is for interest rates to continue at low levels in future years. This view is consistent with the economic projections of low economic growth, relatively high unemployment and subdued inflation provided in Table IV-2. The FOMC states that rates will continue to be low even after return of the economy to potential growth.

Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal

Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, June 19, 2013

Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Fed Funds Rate	Number of Participants
2013	1
2014	3
2015	14
2016	1

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130619.pdf

The producer price index of the euro zone decreased 0.2 percent in Dec 2012 and decreased 0.2 percent in Nov 2012 but increased 0.4 percent in Jan 2013 and 0.2 percent in Feb 2013, falling 0.2 percent in Mar 2013, 0.6 percent in Apr 2013 and 0.3 percent in May 2013, as shown in Table IV-5. In Jan-Mar 2012, producer prices increased cumulatively 2.0 percent or at annual equivalent rate of 8.3 percent. Energy inflation has oscillated with the shocks of risk aversion that cause unwinding of carry trade positions from zero interest rates to commodity futures. Energy prices fell 0.8 percent in Dec 2012 but increased 0.4 percent in Feb 2013 and 0.9 percent in Jan 2013. Energy prices fell 0.8 percent in Dec 2012, 0.5 percent in Nov 2012 and fell 0.4 percent in Oct 2012 after -0.1 percent in Sep 2012, increased 2.4 percent in Aug, and 1.4 percent in Jul 2012 or at the annual equivalent rate of 16.2 percent in the quarter Jul-Sep 2012 and at 25.3 percent in Jul-Aug 2012. Energy prices increased 5.2 percent cumulatively in Jan-Mar 2012 or at the annual equivalent rate of 22.5 percent. During periods of relaxed risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity exposures drive high inflation waves. Prices of capital goods have barely moved. Prices of durable consumer goods accelerated at annual equivalent rate of 3.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2012 but were flat in every month from Apr to Jun 2012, increasing 0.1 percent in both Aug and Jul 2012 but then remained unchanged in Sep 2012, increasing at 0.1 percent in Oct 2012 and increasing 0.2 percent in Jan 2013 and 0.1 percent in Feb-Apr 2013. Prices of durable consumer goods did not change in May 2013. Purchasing managers’ indexes worldwide reflect increasing prices of inputs for business while sales prices are stagnant or declining, squeezing economic activity (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Unconventional monetary policy causes uncertainty in business decisions with shocks of declining net revenue margins during worldwide inflation waves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html).

Table IV-5, Euro Area, Industrial Producer Prices Month ∆%

	May 2013	Apr 2013	Mar 2013	Feb 2013	Jan 2013	Dec 2012
Industry ex Construction	-0.3	-0.6	-0.2	0.2	0.4	-0.2
Industry ex Construction & Energy	-0.1	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0
Intermediate Goods	-0.2	-0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Energy	-0.8	-1.7	-0.7	0.4	0.9	-0.8
Capital Goods	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0
Durable Consumer Goods	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	-0.1
Nondurable Consumer Goods	0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1

Source: EUROSTAT

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

Twelve-month percentage changes of industrial prices in the euro zone have moderated significantly, as shown in Table IV-6. The 12-month percentage change of industrial prices excluding construction fell from 4.5 percent in Dec 2011 to 2.0 percent in Jul 2012 but increased to 3.0 percent in Aug and 2.9 percent in Sep 2012, falling to 2.7 percent in Oct 2012, 2.3 percent in Nov 2012, 2.3 percent in Dec 2012, 1.7 percent in Jan 2013 and 1.3 percent in Feb 2013. The 12-month rate of increase of euro zone producer prices in Mar 2013 was 0.6 percent, minus 0.2 percent in Apr 2013 and minus 0.1 percent in May 2013. Energy prices increased 9.7 percent in Dec 2011 and Jan 2011 but the rate fell to 4.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2012, increasing to 7.5 percent in Aug 2012 and 6.4 percent in Sep 2012 but falling to 5.2 percent in Oct 2012, 3.9 percent in Nov 2012, 3.6 percent in Dec 2012, 2.2 percent in Jan 2013 and 1.6 percent in Feb 2013. Energy prices fell 0.3 in the 12 months ending in Mar 2013, minus 2.0 percent in Apr 2013 and minus 1.8 percent in May 2013. There is major vulnerability in producer price inflation that can return together with long positions in commodity futures with carry trades from zero interest during relaxation of risk aversion. Business net revenue or prices of sold goods less costs of inputs suffers wide oscillation preventing sound calculation of risk/returns and capital budgeting (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html).

Table IV-6 Euro Area, Industrial Producer Prices 12-Month ∆%

	May 2013	Apr 2013	Mar 2013	Feb 2013	Jan 2013	Dec 2012
Industry ex Construction	-0.1	-0.2	0.6	1.3	1.7	2.3
Industry ex Construction & Energy	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.7
Intermediate Goods	-0.5	-0.3	0.4	0.8	1.3	1.6
Energy	-1.8	-2.1	-0.3	1.6	2.2	3.6
Capital Goods	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9
Durable Consumer Goods	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.0
Nondurable Consumer Goods	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.6

Source: EUROSTAT

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

Industrial producer prices in the euro area are following similar inflation waves as in the rest of the world (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html), as shown in Table IV-7. In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011, annual equivalent producer price inflation was 11.4 percent driven by carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures. In the second wave in May-Jun 2011, annual equivalent producer price inflation declined at minus 0.6 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent inflation increased at 2.8 percent. In the third wave in Oct-Dec 2011, risk aversion originating in the European sovereign debt crisis interrupted commodity carry trades, resulting in annual equivalent inflation of only 0.4 percent. In the fifth wave in Jan-Mar 2012, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 8.3 percent with a high annual equivalent rate of 9.4 percent in Jan-Feb 2012. In the sixth wave, risk aversion from the European sovereign debt event caused reversal of commodity carry trades with equivalent annual inflation of minus 2.0 percent in Apr-Jun 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 7.4 percent in Jul-Aug 2012 while energy prices driven by carry trades increased at the annual equivalent rate of 25.3 percent. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation retreated to 0.6 percent in Sep-Oct 2012. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Nov-Dec 2012. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent in Jan-Feb 2013. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.3 percent in Mar-May 2013. The bottom part of Table IV-7 provides 12-month percentage changes from 1999 to 2010. The final row of Table IV-7 provides the average annual rate of producer-price inflation in the euro area at 2.5 percent in Dec from 1999 to 2012.

Table IV-7, Euro Area, Industrial Producer Prices Excluding Construction, Month and 12-Month ∆%

	Month ∆%	12-Month ∆%
May 2013	-0.3	-0.1
Apr	-0.6	-0.2
Mar	-0.2	0.6
AE ∆% Mar-May	-4.3
Feb	0.2	1.3
Jan	0.4	1.7
AE ∆% Jan-Feb	3.7
Dec 2012	-0.2	2.3
Nov	-0.2	2.3
AE ∆% Nov-Dec	-2.4
Oct	0.0	2.7
Sep	0.1	2.9
AE ∆% Sep-Oct	0.6
Aug	0.9	3.0
Jul	0.3	2.0
AE ∆% Jul-Aug	7.4
Jun	-0.4	2.3
May	-0.3	2.8
Apr	0.2	3.0
AE ∆% Apr-Jun	-2.0
Mar	0.5	3.9
Feb	0.6	4.1
Jan	0.9	4.2
AE ∆% Jan-Mar	8.3
Dec 2011	-0.2	4.5
Nov	0.2	5.5
Oct	0.1	5.7
AE ∆% Oct-Dec	0.4
Sep	0.2	5.7
Aug	-0.1	5.8
Jul	0.6	6.0
AE ∆% Jul-Sep	2.8
Jun	0.0	5.7
May	-0.1	6.1
AE ∆% May-Jun	-0.6
Apr	1.0	6.5
Mar	0.7	6.4
Feb	0.7	6.2
Jan	1.2	5.6
AE ∆% Jan-Apr	11.4
Dec 2012		2.3
Dec 2011		4.5
Dec 2010		5.1
Dec 2009		-3.0
Dec 2008		1.5
Dec 2007		4.4
Dec 2006		3.8
Dec 2005		4.5
Dec 2004		3.7
Dec 2003		1.0
Dec 2002		1.5
Dec 2001		-0.5
Dec 2000		4.7
Dec 1999		2.6
Average ∆% 1999-2012		2.5

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

Longer Run