Recovery without Hiring, Tapering Quantitative Easing Policy and Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, IMF View of World Economy and Finance, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk: Part II

 

Recovery without Hiring, Tapering Quantitative Easing Policy and Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, IMF View of World Economy and Finance, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

Executive Summary

I Recovery without Hiring

IA1 Hiring Collapse

IA2 Labor Underutilization

IA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Job

IA4 Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment

IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

II IMF View of World Economy and Finance

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

III World Financial Turbulence. Financial markets are being shocked by multiple factors including:

(1) world economic slowdown; (2) slowing growth in China with political development and slowing growth in Japan and world trade; (3) slow growth propelled by savings/investment reduction in the US with high unemployment/underemployment, falling wages, hiring collapse, contraction of real private fixed investment, decline of wealth of households over the business cycle by 5.2 percent adjusted for inflation while growing 651.8 percent adjusted for inflation from IVQ1945 to IVQ2012 and unsustainable fiscal deficit/debt threatening prosperity that can cause risk premium on Treasury debt with Himalayan interest rate hikes; and (4) the outcome of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

This section provides current data and analysis. Subsection IIIA Financial Risks provides analysis of the evolution of valuations of risk financial assets during the week. There are various appendixes for convenience of reference of material related to the debt crisis of the euro area. Some of this material is updated in Subsection IIIA when new data are available and then maintained in the appendixes for future reference until updated again in Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies discusses arguments and measures of currency intervention and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact provides analysis of the restructuring of the fiscal affairs of the European Union in the agreement of European leaders reached on Dec 9, 2011 and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort considers the policies of the European Central Bank and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Appendix IIIE Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the threats to survival of the European Monetary Union and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation provides more technical analysis and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis provides analysis of proposals to finance growth with budget deficits together with experience of the economic history of Brazil and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment.

IIIA Financial Risks. Financial turbulence, attaining unusual magnitude in recent months, characterized the expansion from the global recession since IIIQ2009. Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Fri Jul 5 and daily values throughout the week ending on Jul 12, 2013 of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at 5 PM. The first column provides the value on Fri Jul 5 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Jul 5, 2013”, first row “USD/EUR 1.2832 1.4%,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) appreciated 1.4 percent to USD 1.2832/EUR in the week ending on Fri Jul 5 relative to the exchange rate on Fri Jun 28. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. The most important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf).

The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per one euro EUR, USD 1.2832/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Fri Jul 5, depreciating to USD 1.2870/EUR on Mon Jul 8, 2013, or by 0.3 percent. The dollar depreciated because more dollars, $1.2870, were required on Mon Jul 8 to buy one euro than $1.2832 on Jul 5. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the exchange rate at 5 PM New York time, such as USD 1.2832/EUR on Jul 5; the second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Fri Jul 5, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Fri Jul 12, such as depreciation to USD 1.3068/EUR by Jul 12; and the third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD depreciated (denoted by negative sign) by 1.8 percent from the rate of USD 1.2832/EUR on Fri Jul 5 to the rate of USD 1.3068/EUR on Fri Jul 12 {[(1.3068/1.2832) – 1]100 = 1.8%} and appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 0.2 percent from the rate of USD 1.3097 on Thu Jul 11 to USD 1.3068/EUR on Fri Jul 12 {[(1.3068/1.3097) -1]100 = -0.2%}. Other factors constant, appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro is caused by increasing risk aversion, with rising uncertainty on European sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. Funds move away from higher yielding risk assets to the safety of dollar-denominated assets during risk aversion and return to higher yielding risk assets during risk appetite.

III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Assets Jul 8 to Jul 12, 2013

Fri Jul 5, 2013	M 8	Tue 9	Wed 10	Thu 11	Fri 12
USD/EUR 1.2832 1.4%	1.2870 -0.3% -0.3%	1.2781 0.4% 0.7%	1.2976 -1.1% -1.5%	1.3097 -2.1% -0.9%	1.3068 -1.8% 0.2%
JPY/  USD 101.19 2.1%	100.97 0.2% 0.2%	101.15 0.0% -0.2%	99.66 1.5% 1.5%	98.96 2.2% 0.7%	99.22 1.9% -0.3%
CHF/  USD 0.9637 -2.0%	0.9636 0.0% 0.0%	0.9730 -1.0% -1.0%	0.9584 0.6% 1.5%	0.9470 1.7% 1.2%	0.9463 1.8% 0.1%
CHF/ EUR 1.2366 -0.6%	1.2399 -0.3% -0.3%	1.2430 -0.5% -0.3%	1.2438 -0.6% -0.1%	1.2397 -0.3% 0.3%	1.2368 0.0% 0.2%
USD/  AUD 0.9067 1.1029 -0.8%	0.9132 1.0951 0.7% 0.7%	0.9176 1.0898 1.2% 0.5%	0.9171 1.0904 1.1% -0.1%	0.9188 1.0884 1.3% 0.2%	0.9048 1.1052 -0.2% -1.5%
10 Year  T Note 2.734	2.644	2.637	2.678	2.57	2.585
2 Year     T Note 0.397	0.361	0.369	0.371	0.329	0.345
German Bond 2Y 0.11 10Y 1.72	2Y 0.09 10Y 1.70	2Y 0.08 10Y 1.65	2Y 0.10 10Y 1.66	2Y 0.12 10Y 1.62	2Y 0.10 10Y 1.56
DJIA 15135.84 1.5%	15224.69 0.6% 0.6%	15300.34 1.1% 0.5%	15291.66 1.0% -0.1%	15460.92 2.1% 1.1%	15464.30 2.2% 0.0%
DJ Global 2126.15 0.8%	2136.02 0.5% 0.5%	2152.39 1.2% 0.8%	2160.01 1.6% 0.4%	2198.42 3.4% 1.8%	2201.13 3.5% 0.1%
DJ Asia Pacific 1343.01 0.8%	1324.69 -1.4% -1.4%	1344.01 0.1% 1.5%	1353.22 0.8% 0.7%	1379.66 2.7% 1.9%	1377.78 2.6% -0.1%
Nikkei 14309.97 4.6%	14109.34 -1.4% -1.4%	14472.90 1.1% 2.6%	14416.60 0.7% -0.4%	14472.58 1.1% 0.4%	14506.25 1.4% 0.2%
Shanghai 2007.20 1.4%	1958.27 -2.4% -2.4%	1965.45 -2.1% 0.4%	2008.13 0.0% 2.2%	2072.99 3.3% 3.2%	2039.49 1.6% -1.6%
DAX 7806.00 -1.9%	7968.54 2.1% 2.1%	8057.75 3.2% 1.1%	8048.76 3.1% -0.1%	8158.80 4.5% 1.4%	8212.77 5.2% 0.7%
DJ UBS Comm. 125.54 0.9%	126.93 1.1% 1.1%	127.27 1.4% 0.3%	128.30 2.2% 0.8%	128.61 2.4% 0.2%	128.45 2.3% -0.1%
WTI $ B 103.44 7.1%	102.94 -0.5% -0.5%	104.29 0.8% 1.3%	106.11 2.6% 1.7%	104.82 1.3% -1.2%	105.95 2.4% 1.1%
Brent    $/B 107.70 5.6%	107.08 -0.6% -0.6%	107.96 0.2% 0.8%	108.03 0.3% 0.1%	107.58 -0.1% -0.4%	108.81 1.0% 1.1%
Gold  $/OZ 1222.1 -1.0%	1235.1 1.1% 1.1%	1248.9 2.2% 1.1%	1251.3 2.4% 0.2%	1283.8 5.0% 2.6%	1277.8 4.6% -0.5%

Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss

Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce

Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

There is initial discussion of current and recent risk-determining events followed below by analysis of risk-measuring yields of the US and Germany and the USD/EUR rate.

First, risk determining events. Prior risk determining events are in an appendix below following Table III-1A. Current focus is on “tapering” quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “tapering” of outright purchases of $85 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jun 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130619a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent” (emphasis added).

The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi explained the indefinite period of low policy rates during the press conference following the meeting on Jul 4, 2013 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130704.en.html):

“Yes, that is why I said you haven’t listened carefully. The Governing Council has taken the unprecedented step of giving forward guidance in a rather more specific way than it ever has done in the past. In my statement, I said “The Governing Council expects the key…” – i.e. all interest rates – “…ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.” It is the first time that the Governing Council has said something like this. And, by the way, what Mark Carney [Governor of the Bank of England] said in London is just a coincidence.”

The statement of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England on Jul 4, 2013, may be leading toward the same forward guidance (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/007.aspx):

“At its meeting today, the Committee noted that the incoming data over the past couple of months had been broadly consistent with the central outlook for output growth and inflation contained in the May Report.  The significant upward movement in market interest rates would, however, weigh on that outlook; in the Committee’s view, the implied rise in the expected future path of Bank Rate was not warranted by the recent developments in the domestic economy.”

A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 15,464.30

on Fri Jul 5, 2013, which is higher by 9.2 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 8.9 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs.

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Second, Risk-Measuring Yields and Exchange Rate. The ten-year government bond of Spain was quoted at 6.868 percent on Aug 10, 2012, declining to 6.447 percent on Aug 17 and 6.403 percent on Aug 24, 2012, and the ten-year government bond of Italy fell from 5.894 percent on Aug 10, 2012 to 5.709 percent on Aug 17 and 5.618 percent on Aug 24, 2012. The yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain traded at 4.741 percent on Jul 12, 2013, and that of the ten-year sovereign bond of Italy at 4.482 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Diminishing aversion is captured by increase of the yield of the two- and ten-year Treasury notes and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table III-1A provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.459 percent on Jul 20, 2012, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.17 percent. In the week of Jul 12, 2013, the yield of the two-year Treasury fell to 0.345 percent and that of the ten-year Treasury to 2.585 percent while the two-year bond of Germany decreased to 0.10 percent and the ten-year decreased to 1.56 percent; and the dollar depreciated to USD 1.3068/EUR. The zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, induce carry trades that ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield is higher than consumer price inflation of 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury. The lower part of Table III-1A provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.

Table III-1A, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate

	US 2Y	US 10Y	DE 2Y	DE 10Y	USD/ EUR
7/12/13	0.345	2.585	0.10	1.56	1.3068
7/5/13	0.397	2.734	0.11	1.72	1.2832
6/28/13	0.357	2.486	0.19	1.73	1.3010
6/21/13	0.366	2.542	0.26	1.72	1.3122
6/14/13	0.276	2.125	0.12	1.51	1.3345
6/7/13	0.304	2.174	0.18	1.54	1.3219
5/31/13	0.299	2.132	0.06	1.50	1.2996
5/24/13	0.249	2.009	0.00	1.43	1.2932
5/17/13	0.248	1.952	-0.03	1.32	1.2837
5/10/13	0.239	1.896	0.05	1.38	1.2992
5/3/13	0.22	1.742	0.00	1.24	1.3115
4/26/13	0.209	1.663	0.00	1.21	1.3028
4/19/13	0.232	1.702	0.02	1.25	1.3052
4/12/13	0.228	1.719	0.02	1.26	1.3111
4/5/13	0.228	1.706	0.01	1.21	1.2995
3/29/13	0.244	1.847	-0.02	1.29	1.2818
3/22/13	0.242	1.931	0.03	1.38	1.2988
3/15/13	0.246	1.992	0.05	1.46	1.3076
3/8/13	0.256	2.056	0.09	1.53	1.3003
3/1/13	0.236	1.842	0.03	1.41	1.3020
2/22/13	0.252	1.967	0.13	1.57	1.3190
2/15/13	0.268	2.007	0.19	1.65	1.3362
2/8/13	0.252	1.949	0.18	1.61	1.3365
2/1/13	0.26	2.024	0.25	1.67	1.3642
1/25/13	0.278	1.947	0.26	1.64	1.3459
1/18/13	0.252	1.84	0.18	1.56	1.3321
1/11/13	0.247	1.862	0.13	1.58	1.3343
1/4/13	0.262	1.898	0.08	1.54	1.3069
12/28/12	0.252	1.699	-0.01	1.31	1.3218
12/21/12	0.272	1.77	-0.01	1.38	1.3189
12/14/12	0.232	1.704	-0.04	1.35	1.3162
12/7/12	0.256	1.625	-0.08	1.30	1.2926
11/30/12	0.248	1.612	0.01	1.39	1.2987
11/23/12	0.273	1.691	0.00	1.44	1.2975
11/16/12	0.24	1.584	-0.03	1.33	1.2743
11/9/12	0.256	1.614	-0.03	1.35	1.2711
11/2/12	0.274	1.715	0.01	1.45	1.2838
10/26/12	0.299	1.748	0.05	1.54	1.2942
10/19/12	0.296	1.766	0.11	1.59	1.3023
10/12/12	0.264	1.663	0.04	1.45	1.2953
10/5/12	0.26	1.737	0.06	1.52	1.3036
9/28/12	0.236	1.631	0.02	1.44	1.2859
9/21/12	0.26	1.753	0.04	1.60	1.2981
9/14/12	0.252	1.863	0.10	1.71	1.3130
9/7/12	0.252	1.668	0.03	1.52	1.2816
8/31/12	0.225	1.543	-0.03	1.33	1.2575
8/24/12	0.266	1.684	-0.01	1.35	1.2512
8/17/12	0.288	1.814	-0.04	1.50	1.2335
8/10/12	0.267	1.658	-0.07	1.38	1.2290
8/3/12	0.242	1.569	-0.02	1.42	1.2387
7/27/12	0.244	1.544	-0.03	1.40	1.2320
7/20/12	0.207	1.459	-0.07	1.17	1.2158
7/13/12	0.24	1.49	-0.04	1.26	1.2248
7/6/12	0.272	1.548	-0.01	1.33	1.2288
6/29/12	0.305	1.648	0.12	1.58	1.2661
6/22/12	0.309	1.676	0.14	1.58	1.2570
6/15/12	0.272	1.584	0.07	1.44	1.2640
6/8/12	0.268	1.635	0.04	1.33	1.2517
6/1/12	0.248	1.454	0.01	1.17	1.2435
5/25/12	0.291	1.738	0.05	1.37	1.2518
5/18/12	0.292	1.714	0.05	1.43	1.2780
5/11/12	0.248	1.845	0.09	1.52	1.2917
5/4/12	0.256	1.876	0.08	1.58	1.3084
4/6/12	0.31	2.058	0.14	1.74	1.3096
3/30/12	0.335	2.214	0.21	1.79	1.3340
3/2/12	0.29	1.977	0.16	1.80	1.3190
2/24/12	0.307	1.977	0.24	1.88	1.3449
1/6/12	0.256	1.957	0.17	1.85	1.2720
12/30/11	0.239	1.871	0.14	1.83	1.2944
8/26/11	0.20	2.202	0.65	2.16	1.450
8/19/11	0.192	2.066	0.65	2.11	1.4390
6/7/10	0.74	3.17	0.49	2.56	1.192
3/5/09	0.89	2.83	1.19	3.01	1.254
12/17/08	0.73	2.20	1.94	3.00	1.442
10/27/08	1.57	3.79	2.61	3.76	1.246
7/14/08	2.47	3.88	4.38	4.40	1.5914
6/26/03	1.41	3.55	NA	3.62	1.1423

Note: DE: Germany

Source:

http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm

Appendix: Prior Risk Determining Events. Current risk analysis concentrates on deciphering what the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may decide on quantitative easing. The week of May 24 was dominated by the testimony of Chairman Bernanke to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress on May 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm), followed by questions and answers and the release on May 22, 2013 of the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from Apr 30 to May 1, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm). Monetary policy emphasizes communication of policy intentions to avoid that expectations reverse outcomes in reality (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “In bid for clarity, Fed delivers opacity,” on May 23, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath), analyzes discrepancies in communication by the Fed. The annotated chart of values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) during trading on May 23, 2013 provided by Hinselrath, links the prepared testimony of Chairman Bernanke at 10:AM, following questions and answers and the release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM. Financial markets strengthened between 10 and 10:30AM on May 23, 2013, perhaps because of the statement by Chairman Bernanke in prepared testimony (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm):

“A premature tightening of monetary policy could lead interest rates to rise temporarily but would also carry a substantial risk of slowing or ending the economic recovery and causing inflation to fall further. Such outcomes tend to be associated with extended periods of lower, not higher, interest rates, as well as poor returns on other assets. Moreover, renewed economic weakness would pose its own risks to financial stability.”

In that testimony, Chairman Bernanke (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm) also analyzes current weakness of labor markets:

“Despite this improvement, the job market remains weak overall: The unemployment rate is still well above its longer-run normal level, rates of long-term unemployment are historically high, and the labor force participation rate has continued to move down. Moreover, nearly 8 million people are working part time even though they would prefer full-time work. High rates of unemployment and underemployment are extraordinarily costly: Not only do they impose hardships on the affected individuals and their families, they also damage the productive potential of the economy as a whole by eroding workers' skills and--particularly relevant during this commencement season--by preventing many young people from gaining workplace skills and experience in the first place. The loss of output and earnings associated with high unemployment also reduces government revenues and increases spending on income-support programs, thereby leading to larger budget deficits and higher levels of public debt than would otherwise occur.”

Hilsenrath (op. cit. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath) analyzes the subsequent decline of the market from 10:30AM to 10:40AM as Chairman Bernanke responded questions with the statement that withdrawal of stimulus would be determined by data but that it could begin in one of the “next few meetings.” The DJIA recovered part of the losses between 10:40AM and 2PM. The minutes of the FOMC released at 2PM on May 23, 2013, contained a phrase that troubled market participants (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm): “A number of participants expressed willingness to adjust the flow of purchases downward as early as the June meeting if the economic information received by that time showed evidence of sufficiently strong and sustained growth; however, views differed about what evidence would be necessary and the likelihood of that outcome.” The DJIA closed at 15,387.58 on May 21, 2013 and fell to 15,307.17 at the close on May 22, 2013, with the loss of 0.5 percent occurring after release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM when the DJIA stood at around 15,400. The concern about exist of the Fed from stimulus affected markets worldwide as shown in declines of equity indexes in Table III-1 with delays because of differences in trading hours. This behavior shows the trap of unconventional monetary policy with no exit from zero interest rates without risking financial crash and likely adverse repercussions on economic activity.

Financial markets worldwide were affected by the reduction of policy rates of the European Central Bank (ECB) on May 2, 2013. (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130502.en.html):

“2 May 2013 - Monetary policy decisions

At today’s meeting, which was held in Bratislava, the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:

1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.50%, starting from the operation to be settled on 8 May 2013.
2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 50 basis points to 1.00%, with effect from 8 May 2013.
3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

1. Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
2. Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html ), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
3. Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
4. Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.

The European sovereign debt crisis continues to shake financial markets and the world economy. Debt resolution within the international financial architecture requires that a country be capable of borrowing on its own from the private sector. Mechanisms of debt resolution have included participation of the private sector (PSI), or “bail in,” that has been voluntary, almost coercive, agreed and outright coercive (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture: G7, IMF, BIS, Creditors and Debtors (2005), Chapter 4, 187-202). Private sector involvement requires losses by the private sector in bailouts of highly indebted countries. The essence of successful private sector involvement is to recover private-sector credit of the highly indebted country. Mary Watkins, writing on “Bank bailouts reshuffle risk hierarchy,” published on Mar 19, 2013, in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7666546a-9095-11e2-a456-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OSpbvCn8) analyzes the impact of the bailout or resolution of Cyprus banks on the hierarchy of risks of bank liabilities. Cyprus banks depend mostly on deposits with less reliance on debt, raising concerns in creditors of fixed-income debt and equity holders in banks in the euro area. Uncertainty remains as to the dimensions and structure of losses in private sector involvement or “bail in” in other rescue programs in the euro area. Alkman Granitsas, writing on “Central bank details losses at Bank of Cyprus,” on Mar 30, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324000704578392502889560768.html), analyzes the impact of the agreement with the €10 billion agreement with IMF and the European Union on the banks of Cyprus. The recapitalization plan provides for immediate conversion of 37.5 percent of all deposits in excess of €100,000 to shares of special class of the bank. An additional 22.5 percent will be frozen without interest until the plan is completed. The overwhelming risk factor is the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans.

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

An important risk event is the reduction of growth prospects in the euro zone discussed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in “Introductory statement to the press conference,” on Dec 6, 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is121206.en.html):

“This assessment is reflected in the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP growth in a range between -0.6% and -0.4% for 2012, between -0.9% and 0.3% for 2013 and between 0.2% and 2.2% for 2014. Compared with the September 2012 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges for 2012 and 2013 have been revised downwards.

The Governing Council continues to see downside risks to the economic outlook for the euro area. These are mainly related to uncertainties about the resolution of sovereign debt and governance issues in the euro area, geopolitical issues and fiscal policy decisions in the United States possibly dampening sentiment for longer than currently assumed and delaying further the recovery of private investment, employment and consumption.”

Reuters, writing on “Bundesbank cuts German growth forecast,” on Dec 7, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e845114-4045-11e2-8f90-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EMQxzs3u), informs that the central bank of Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank reduced its forecast of growth for the economy of Germany to 0.7 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.0 percent in Jun and to 0.4 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.6 percent while the forecast for 2014 is at 1.9 percent.

The major risk event during earlier weeks was sharp decline of sovereign yields with the yield on the ten-year bond of Spain falling to 5.309 percent and that of the ten-year bond of Italy falling to 4.473 percent on Fri Nov 30, 2012 and 5.366 percent for the ten-year of Spain and 4.527 percent for the ten-year of Italy on Fri Nov 14, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Vanessa Mock and Frances Robinson, writing on “EU approves Spanish bank’s restructuring plans,” on Nov 28, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146520774638316.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the European Union regulators approved restructuring of four Spanish banks (Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia), which helped to calm sovereign debt markets. Harriet Torry and James Angelo, writing on “Germany approves Greek aid,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578150532603095790.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the German parliament approved the plan to provide Greece a tranche of €44 billion in promised financial support, which is subject to sustainability analysis of the bond repurchase program later in Dec 2012. A hurdle for sustainability of repurchasing debt is that Greece’s sovereign bonds have appreciated significantly from around 24 percent for the bond maturing in 21 years and 20 percent for the bond maturing in 31 years in Aug 2012 to around 17 percent for the 21-year maturity and 15 percent for the 31-year maturing in Nov 2012. Declining years are equivalent to increasing prices, making the repurchase more expensive. Debt repurchase is intended to reduce bonds in circulation, turning Greek debt more manageable. Ben McLannahan, writing on “Japan unveils $11bn stimulus package,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/adc0569a-3aa5-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), informs that the cabinet in Japan approved another stimulus program of $11 billion, which is twice larger than another stimulus plan in late Oct and close to elections in Dec. Henry Sender, writing on “Tokyo faces weak yen and high bond yields,” published on Nov 29, 2012 in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a7178d0-393d-11e2-afa8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), analyzes concerns of regulators on duration of bond holdings in an environment of likelihood of increasing yields and yen depreciation.

First, Risk-Determining Events. The European Council statement on Nov 23, 2012 asked the President of the European Commission “to continue the work and pursue consultations in the coming weeks to find a consensus among the 27 over the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf) Discussions will continue in the effort to reach agreement on a budget: “A European budget is important for the cohesion of the Union and for jobs and growth in all our countries” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf). There is disagreement between the group of countries requiring financial assistance and those providing bailout funds. Gabrielle Steinhauser and Costas Paris, writing on “Greek bond rally puts buyback in doubt,” on Nov 23, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578136362599130992.html?mg=reno64-wsj) find a new hurdle in rising prices of Greek sovereign debt that may make more difficult buybacks of debt held by investors. European finance ministers continue their efforts to reach an agreement for Greece that meets with approval of the European Central Bank and the IMF. The European Council (2012Oct19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf ) reached conclusions on strengthening the euro area and providing unified financial supervision:

“The European Council called for work to proceed on the proposals on the Single Supervisory Mechanism as a matter of priority with the objective of agreeing on the legislative framework by 1st January 2013 and agreed on a number of orientations to that end. It also took note of issues relating to the integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks and democratic legitimacy and accountability which should be further explored. It agreed that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the EU's institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards non-euro area Member States and respect for the integrity of the Single Market. It looked forward to a specific and time-bound roadmap to be presented at its December 2012 meeting, so that it can move ahead on all essential building blocks on which a genuine EMU should be based.”

Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. The Bank of Spain released new data on doubtful debtors in Spain’s credit institutions (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/Agenda/Datos_de_credit_a6cd708c59cf931.html). In 2006, the value of doubtful credits reached €10,859 million or 0.7 percent of total credit of €1,508,626 million. In Aug 2012, doubtful credit reached €178,579 million or 10.5 percent of total credit of €1,698,714 million.

There are three critical factors influencing world financial markets. (1) Spain could request formal bailout from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that may also affect Italy’s international borrowing. David Roman and Jonathan House, writing on “Spain risks backlash with budget plan,” on Sep 27, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578021692765950384.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) analyze Spain’s proposal of reducing government expenditures by €13 billion, or around $16.7 billion, increasing taxes in 2013, establishing limits on early retirement and cutting the deficit by €65 billion through 2014. Banco de España, Bank of Spain, contracted consulting company Oliver Wyman to conduct rigorous stress tests of the resilience of its banking system. (Stress tests and their use are analyzed by Pelaez and Pelaez Globalization and the State Vol. I (2008b), 95-100, International Financial Architecture (2005) 112-6, 123-4, 130-3).) The results are available from Banco de España (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/infointeres/reestructuracion/ http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). The assumptions of the adverse scenario used by Oliver Wyman are quite tough for the three-year period from 2012 to 2014: “6.5 percent cumulative decline of GDP, unemployment rising to 27.2 percent and further declines of 25 percent of house prices and 60 percent of land prices (http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). Fourteen banks were stress tested with capital needs estimates of seven banks totaling €59.3 billion. The three largest banks of Spain, Banco Santander (http://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite/CFWCSancomQP01/es_ES/Corporativo.html), BBVA (http://www.bbva.com/TLBB/tlbb/jsp/ing/home/index.jsp) and Caixabank (http://www.caixabank.com/index_en.html), with 43 percent of exposure under analysis, have excess capital of €37 billion in the adverse scenario in contradiction with theories that large, international banks are necessarily riskier. Jonathan House, writing on “Spain expects wider deficit on bank aid,” on Sep 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444138104578028484168511130.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyzes the 2013 budget plan of Spain that will increase the deficit of 7.4 percent of GDP in 2012, which is above the target of 6.3 percent under commitment with the European Union. The ratio of debt to GDP will increase to 85.3 percent in 2012 and 90.5 percent in 2013 while the 27 members of the European Union have an average debt/GDP ratio of 83 percent at the end of IIQ2012. (2) Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even after the economy grows again at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now apparently open ended in perpetuity as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):

“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is the concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation.

(2) The European Central Bank (ECB) approved a new program of bond purchases under the name “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT). The ECB will purchase sovereign bonds of euro zone member countries that have a program of conditionality under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that is converting into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These programs provide enhancing the solvency of member countries in a transition period of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment. The purchase of bonds by the ECB would maintain debt costs of sovereigns at sufficiently low levels to permit adjustment under the EFSF/ESM programs. Purchases of bonds are not limited quantitatively with discretion by the ECB as to how much is necessary to support countries with adjustment programs. Another feature of the OMT of the ECB is sterilization of bond purchases: funds injected to pay for the bonds would be withdrawn or sterilized by ECB transactions. The statement by the European Central Bank on the program of OTM is as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html):

“6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions

As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework:

Conditionality

A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme.

The Governing Council will consider Outright Monetary Transactions to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme.

Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate.

Coverage

Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access.

Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.

No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.

Creditor treatment

The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.

Sterilisation

The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.

Transparency

Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis.

Securities Markets Programme

Following today’s decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be held to maturity.”

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed sets stage for stimulus,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577623220212805132.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the essay presented by Chairman Bernanke at the Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers, as defending past stimulus with unconventional measures of monetary policy that could be used to reduce extremely high unemployment. Chairman Bernanke (2012JHAug31, 18-9) does support further unconventional monetary policy impulses if required by economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm):

“Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”

Professor John H Cochrane (2012Aug31), at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, writing on “The Federal Reserve: from central bank to central planner,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577609384030304936.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_opinion), analyzes that the departure of central banks from open market operations into purchase of assets with risks to taxpayers and direct allocation of credit subject to political influence has caused them to abandon their political independence and accountability. Cochrane (2012Aug31) finds a return to the proposition of Milton Friedman in the 1960s that central banks can cause inflation and macroeconomic instability.

Mario Draghi (2012Aug29), President of the European Central Bank, also reiterated the need of exceptional and unconventional central bank policies (http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html):

“Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.

The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.”

Buiter (2011Oct31) analyzes that the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would need a “bigger bazooka” to bail out euro members in difficulties that could possibly be provided by the ECB. Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. Table III-7 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides the combined GDP in 2012 of the highly indebted euro zone members estimated in the latest World Economic Outlook of the IMF at $4167 billion or 33.1 percent of total euro zone GDP of $12,586 billion. Using the WEO of the IMF, Table III-8 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides debt of the highly indebted euro zone members at $3927.8 billion in 2012 that increases to $5809.9 billion when adding Germany’s debt, corresponding to 167.0 percent of Germany’s GDP. There are additional sources of debt in bailing out banks. The dimensions of the problem may require more firepower than a bazooka perhaps that of the largest conventional bomb of all times of 44,000 pounds experimentally detonated only once by the US in 1948 (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar-apr/coker.html).

Chart III-1A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the ten-year, two-year, one-month Treasury constant maturity yields together with the overnight fed funds rate, and the yield of the corporate bond with Moody’s rating of Baa. The riskier yield of the Baa corporate bond exceeds the relatively riskless yields of the Treasury securities. The beginning yields in Chart III-1A for July 31, 2001, are 3.67 percent for one month, 3.79 percent for two years, 5.07 percent for ten years, 3.82 percent for the fed funds rate and 7.85 percent for the Baa corporate bond. On July 30, 2007, yields inverted with the one month at 4.95 percent, the two-year at 4.59 percent and the ten year at 5.82 percent with the yield of the Baa corporate bond at 6.70 percent. Another interesting point is for Oct 31, 2008, with the yield of the Baa jumping to 9.54 percent and the Treasury yields declining: one month 0.12 percent, two years 1.56 percent and ten years 4.01 percent during a flight to the dollar and government securities analyzed by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). Another spike in the series is for Apr 4, 2006 with the yield of the corporate Baa bond at 8.63 and the Treasury yields of 0.12 percent for one month, 0.94 for two years and 2.95 percent for ten years. During the beginning of the flight from risk financial assets to US government securities (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009), the one-month yield was 0.07 percent, the two-year yield 1.64 percent and the ten-year yield 3.41. The combination of zero fed funds rate and quantitative easing caused sharp decline of the yields from 2008 and 2009. Yield declines have also occurred during periods of financial risk aversion, including the current one of stress of financial markets in Europe. The final point of Chart III1-A is for Jul 11, 2013, with the one-month yield at 0.02 percent, the two-year at 0.34 percent, the ten-year at 2.60 percent, the fed funds rate at 0.09 percent and the corporate Baa bond at 5.37 percent. There is an evident increase in the yields of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity and the Moody’s Baa corporate bond.

Chart III-1A, US, Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Overnight Fed Funds Rate and Yield of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond, Jul 31, 2001-Jul 11, 2013

Note: US Recessions in shaded areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. Future company cash flows derive from investment projects. Real private fixed investment fell from $2,111.5 billion in IVQ2007 to $1920.4 billion in IQ2013 or by 9.1 percent compared with growth of 24.1 percent of gross private domestic investment from IQ1980 to IVQ1985 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Undistributed profits of US corporations swelled 306.9 percent from $118.0 billion IQ2007 to $480.2 billion in IQ2013 and changed signs from minus $22.1 billion in IVQ2007 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment fell $27.8 billion relative to IVQ2012 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp1q13_3rd.pdf), from $2013.0 billion in IVQ2012 to $1985.2 billion in IQ2013 at the quarterly rate of minus 1.4 percent. Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment. The investment decision of US business is fractured. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

Where R_τ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; C_τ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

declines.

There was recovering performance in equity indexes with several indexes in Table III-1 increasing in the week ending on Jul 12, 2013, after wide swings caused by reallocations of investment portfolios worldwide. Stagnating revenues, corporate cash hoarding and declining investment are causing reevaluation of discounted net earnings with deteriorating views on the world economy and United States fiscal sustainability but investors have been driving indexes higher. DJIA increased 0.0 percent on Jul 12, increasing 2.2 percent in the week. Germany’s Dax increased 0.7 percent on Fri Jul 12 and increased 5.7 percent in the week. Dow Global increased 0.1 percent on Jul 12 and increased 3.5 percent in the week. Japan’s Nikkei Average increased 0.2 percent on Fri Jul 12 and increased 1.4 percent in the week as the yen continues to be oscillating but relatively weaker and the stock market gains in expectations of fiscal stimulus by a new administration and monetary stimulus by a new board of the Bank of Japan. Dow Asia Pacific TSM decreased 0.1 percent on Jul 12 and increased 2.6 percent in the week. Shanghai Composite that decreased 0.2 percent on Mar 8 and decreased 1.7 percent in the week of Mar 8, falling below 2000 to close at 1980.13 on Fri Nov 30 but closing at 2039.49 on Fri Jul 12 for decrease of 1.6 percent and increase of 1.6 percent in the week of Jul 12. There is evident trend of deceleration of the world economy that could affect corporate revenue and equity valuations, causing oscillation in equity markets with increases during favorable risk appetite.

Commodities were mostly stronger in the week of Jul 12, 2013. The DJ UBS Commodities Index decreased 0.1 percent on Fri Jul 12 and increased 2.3 percent in the week, as shown in Table III-1. WTI increased 2.4 percent in the week of Jul 12 while Brent increased 1.0 percent in the week with concerns about oil transportation in the Suez Canal. Gold decreased 0.5 percent on Fri Jul 12 and decreased 4.6 percent in the week.

Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €879,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €811,424 million on Jul 5, 2013 with some repayment of loans already occurring. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has reached €1,419,831 million in the statement of Jul 5, 2013, with marginal reduction. There is high credit risk in these transactions with capital of only €90,392 million as analyzed by Cochrane (2012Aug31).

Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR

	Dec 31, 2010	Dec 28, 2011	Jul 5, 2013
1 Gold and other Receivables	367,402	419,822	319,967
2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency	223,995	236,826	248,016
3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency	26,941	95,355	26,422
4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro	22,592	25,982	20,424
5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro	546,747	879,130	811,424
6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro	45,654	94,989	91,841
7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro	457,427	610,629	608,407
8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro	34,954	33,928	28,356
9 Other Assets	278,719	336,574	265,489
TOTAL ASSETS	2,004, 432	2,733,235	2,420,347
Memo Items
Sum of 5 and  7	1,004,174	1,489,759	1,419,831
Capital and Reserves	78,143	81,481	90,395

Source: European Central Bank

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2013/html/fs130709.en.html

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk. Resolution of the European sovereign debt crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. That success would be assured with growth of the Italian economy. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness. Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. Growth of the Italian economy would ensure that success. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. Growth of the Italian economy would ensure that success. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15) argue that 55 percent of the exports of Italy are to countries outside the euro area such that devaluation of 15 percent would be effective in increasing export revenue. Newly available data in Table III-3 providing Italy’s trade with regions and countries supports the argument of Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15). Italy’s exports to the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, are only 40.5 percent of the total. Exports to the non-European Union area with share of 46.3 percent in Italy’s total exports are growing at 5.3 percent in Jan-Apr 2013 relative to Jan-Apr 2012 while those to EMU are growing at minus 3.8 percent.

Table III-3, Italy, Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, % Share and 12-Month ∆%

Apr 2013	Exports % Share	∆% Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012	Imports % Share	∆% Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012
EU	53.7	-3.2	52.9	-2.2
EMU 17	40.5	-3.8	42.7	-2.1
France	11.1	-2.1	8.3	-4.5
Germany	12.5	-4.6	14.6	-6.0
Spain	4.7	-9.0	4.4	-1.2
UK	4.9	-0.2	2.5	-0.9
Non EU	46.3	5.3	47.1	-10.8
Europe non EU	13.9	3.0	11.3	8.0
USA	6.8	0.3	3.3	-21.0
China	2.3	3.4	6.5	-5.7
OPEC	5.7	14.7	10.8	-23.8
Total	100.0	0.5	100.0	-6.3

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/93481

Table III-4 provides Italy’s trade balance by regions and countries. Italy had trade deficit of €570 million with the 17 countries of the euro zone (EMU 17) in Apr 2013 and cumulative deficit of €1726 million in Jan-Apr 2013. Depreciation to parity could permit greater competitiveness in improving the trade surplus of €1948 million in Jan-Apr 2013 with Europe non European Union, the trade surplus of €4443 million with the US and trade surplus with non-European Union of €2521 million in Jan-Apr 2013. There is significant rigidity in the trade deficits in Jan-Apr 2013 of €4705 million with China and €3619 million with members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Higher exports could drive economic growth in the economy of Italy that would permit less onerous adjustment of the country’s fiscal imbalances, raising the country’s credit rating.

Table III-4, Italy, Trade Balance by Regions and Countries, Millions of Euro 

Regions and Countries	Trade Balance Apr 2013 Millions of Euro	Trade Balance Cumulative Jan-Apr 2013 Millions of Euro
EU	441	2,105
EMU 17	-570	-1,726
France	853	3,973
Germany	-282	-1,708
Spain	8	316
UK	805	2,836
Non EU	1,466	2,521
Europe non EU	780	1,948
USA	1,213	4,443
China	-913	-4,705
OPEC	-520	-3,619
Total	1,907	4,626

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/93481

Growth rates of Italy’s trade and major products are in Table III-5 for the period Jan-Apr 2013 relative to Jan-Apr 2012. Growth rates of cumulative imports relative to a year earlier are negative for energy with minus 18.5 percent and minus 10.9 percent for durable goods. The higher rate of growth of exports of 0.5 percent in Jan-Apr 2013/Jan-Apr 2012 relative to imports of minus 6.3 percent may reflect weak demand in Italy with GDP declining during seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 through IQ2013 together with softening commodity prices.

Table III-5, Italy, Exports and Imports % Share of Products in Total and ∆%

	Exports Share %	Exports ∆% Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012	Imports Share %	Imports ∆% Jan-Apr 2013/ Jan-Apr 2012
Consumer Goods	29.3	7.2	25.6	0.9
Durable	5.8	2.0	2.9	-10.9
Non-Durable	23.5	8.5	22.7	2.4
Capital Goods	31.6	0.4	19.5	-6.5
Inter- mediate Goods	33.6	-2.2	32.6	-2.8
Energy	5.5	-16.3	22.3	-18.5
Total ex Energy	94.5	1.5	77.7	-2.6
Total	100.0	0.5	100.0	-6.3

Note: % Share for 2012 total trade.

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/93481

Table III-6 provides Italy’s trade balance by product categories in Apr 2013 and cumulative Jan-Apr 2013. Italy’s trade balance excluding energy-generated surplus of €6467 million in Apr 2013 and €23,446 million cumulative in Jan-Apr 2013 but the energy trade balance created deficit of €4559 million in Apr 2013 and cumulative €18,820 million in Jan-Apr 2013. The overall surplus in Apr 2013 was €1907 million with cumulative surplus of €4626 million in Jan-Apr 2013. Italy has significant competitiveness in various economic activities in contrast with some other countries with debt difficulties.

Table III-6, Italy, Trade Balance by Product Categories, € Millions

	Apr 2013	Cumulative Jan-Apr 2013
Consumer Goods	1,483	6,530
Durable	1,003	4,044
Nondurable	480	2,487
Capital Goods	4,385	15,274
Intermediate Goods	599	1,642
Energy	-4,559	-18,820
Total ex Energy	6,467	23,446
Total	1,907	4,626

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/93481

Brazil faced in the debt crisis of 1982 a more complex policy mix. Between 1977 and 1983, Brazil’s terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated 47 percent and 36 percent excluding oil (Pelaez 1987, 176-79; Pelaez 1986, 37-66; see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 178-87). Brazil had accumulated unsustainable foreign debt by borrowing to finance balance of payments deficits during the 1970s. Foreign lending virtually stopped. The German mark devalued strongly relative to the dollar such that Brazil’s products lost competitiveness in Germany and in multiple markets in competition with Germany. The resolution of the crisis was devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent relative to the dollar and subsequent maintenance of parity by monthly devaluation equal to inflation and indexing that resulted in financial stability by parity in external and internal interest rates avoiding capital flight. With a combination of declining imports, domestic import substitution and export growth, Brazil followed rapid growth in the US and grew out of the crisis with surprising GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 1984.

The euro zone faces a critical survival risk because several of its members may default on their sovereign obligations if not bailed out by the other members. The valuation equation of bonds is essential to understanding the stability of the euro area. An explanation is provided in this paragraph and readers interested in technical details are referred to the Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. Contrary to the Wriston doctrine, investing in sovereign obligations is a credit decision. The value of a bond today is equal to the discounted value of future obligations of interest and principal until maturity. On Dec 30, 2011, the yield of the 2-year bond of the government of Greece was quoted around 100 percent. In contrast, the 2-year US Treasury note traded at 0.239 percent and the 10-year at 2.871 percent while the comparable 2-year government bond of Germany traded at 0.14 percent and the 10-year government bond of Germany traded at 1.83 percent. There is no need for sovereign ratings: the perceptions of investors are of relatively higher probability of default by Greece, defying Wriston (1982), and nil probability of default of the US Treasury and the German government. The essence of the sovereign credit decision is whether the sovereign will be able to finance new debt and refinance existing debt without interrupting service of interest and principal. Prices of sovereign bonds incorporate multiple anticipations such as inflation and liquidity premiums of long-term relative to short-term debt but also risk premiums on whether the sovereign’s debt can be managed as it increases without bound. The austerity measures of Italy are designed to increase the primary surplus, or government revenues less expenditures excluding interest, to ensure investors that Italy will have the fiscal strength to manage its debt exceeding 100 percent of GDP, which is the third largest in the world after the US and Japan. Appendix IIIE links the expectations on the primary surplus to the real current value of government monetary and fiscal obligations. As Blanchard (2011SepWEO) analyzes, fiscal consolidation to increase the primary surplus is facilitated by growth of the economy. Italy and the other indebted sovereigns in Europe face the dual challenge of increasing primary surpluses while maintaining growth of the economy (for the experience of Brazil in the debt crisis of 1982 see Pelaez 1986, 1987).

Much of the analysis and concern over the euro zone centers on the lack of credibility of the debt of a few countries while there is credibility of the debt of the euro zone as a whole. In practice, there is convergence in valuations and concerns toward the fact that there may not be credibility of the euro zone as a whole. The fluctuations of financial risk assets of members of the euro zone move together with risk aversion toward the countries with lack of debt credibility. This movement raises the need to consider analytically sovereign debt valuation of the euro zone as a whole in the essential analysis of whether the single-currency will survive without major changes.

Welfare economics considers the desirability of alternative states, which in this case would be evaluating the “value” of Germany (1) within and (2) outside the euro zone. Is the sum of the wealth of euro zone countries outside of the euro zone higher than the wealth of these countries maintaining the euro zone? On the choice of indicator of welfare, Hicks (1975, 324) argues:

“Partly as a result of the Keynesian revolution, but more (perhaps) because of statistical labours that were initially quite independent of it, the Social Product has now come right back into its old place. Modern economics—especially modern applied economics—is centered upon the Social Product, the Wealth of Nations, as it was in the days of Smith and Ricardo, but as it was not in the time that came between. So if modern theory is to be effective, if it is to deal with the questions which we in our time want to have answered, the size and growth of the Social Product are among the chief things with which it must concern itself. It is of course the objective Social Product on which attention must be fixed. We have indexes of production; we do not have—it is clear we cannot have—an Index of Welfare.”

If the burden of the debt of the euro zone falls on Germany and France or only on Germany, is the wealth of Germany and France or only Germany higher after breakup of the euro zone or if maintaining the euro zone? In practice, political realities will determine the decision through elections.

The prospects of survival of the euro zone are dire. Table III-7 is constructed with IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx) for GDP in USD billions, primary net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP and general government debt as percent of GDP for selected regions and countries in 2013.

Table III-7, World and Selected Regional and Country GDP and Fiscal Situation

	GDP 2013 USD Billions	Primary Net Lending Borrowing % GDP 2013	General Government Net Debt % GDP 2013
World	74,172
Euro Zone	12,752	-0.04	73.9
Portugal	218	-1.4	115.0
Ireland	222	-3.2	106.2
Greece	244	--	155.4
Spain	1,388	-3.5	79.1
Major Advanced Economies G7	34,068	-3.8	91.5
United States	16,238	-4.6	89.0
UK	2,423	-5.0	86.1
Germany	3,598	1.8	54.1
France	2,739	-1.4	86.5
Japan	5,150	-9.0	143.4
Canada	1,844	-2.4	35.9
Italy	2,076	2.7	102.3
China	9,020	-2.1*	21.3**

*Net Lending/borrowing**Gross Debt

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx

The data in Table III-7 are used for some very simple calculations in Table III-8. The column “Net Debt USD Billions” in Table III-8 is generated by applying the percentage in Table III-7 column “General Government Net Debt % GDP 2013” to the column “GDP USD Billions.” The total debt of France and Germany in 2013 is $4315.7 billion, as shown in row “B+C” in column “Net Debt USD Billions” The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is $4087.3 billion, adding rows D+E+F+G+H in column “Net Debt USD billions.” There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic” in the two final columns of Table III-8. Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is shown in column “Debt as % of Germany plus France GDP” to reach $8403.0 billion, which would be equivalent to 132.6 percent of their combined GDP in 2013. Under this arrangement, the entire debt of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. The final column provides “Debt as % of Germany GDP” that would exceed 233.5 percent if including debt of France and 167.7 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Wriston (1982) would prove to be wrong again that countries do not bankrupt but would have a consolation prize that similar to LBOs the sum of the individual values of euro zone members outside the current agreement exceeds the value of the whole euro zone. Internal rescues of French and German banks may be less costly than bailing out other euro zone countries so that they do not default on French and German banks.

Table III-8, Guarantees of Debt of Sovereigns in Euro Area as Percent of GDP of Germany and France, USD Billions and %

	Net Debt USD Billions	Debt as % of Germany Plus France GDP	Debt as % of Germany GDP
A Euro Area	9,423.7
B Germany	1,946.5		$8403.0 as % of $3598 =233.5% $6033.8 as % of $3598 =167.7%
C France	2,369.2
B+C	4,315.7	GDP $6,337.0 Total Debt $8403.0 Debt/GDP: 132.6%
D Italy	2,123.7
E Spain	1,097.9
F Portugal	250.7
G Greece	379.2
H Ireland	235.8
Subtotal D+E+F+G+H	4,087.3

Source: calculation with IMF data IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx

There is extremely important information in Table III-9 for the current sovereign risk crisis in the euro zone. Table III-9 provides the structure of regional and country relations of Germany’s exports and imports with newly available data for May 2013. German exports to other European Union (EU) members are 56.7 percent of total exports in May 2013 and 57.2 percent in cumulative Jan-May 2013. Exports to the euro area are 36.6 percent in May and 37.4 percent cumulative in Jan-May. Exports to third countries are 43.3 percent of the total in May and 42.8 percent cumulative in Jan-May. There is similar distribution for imports. Exports to non-euro countries are decreasing 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013, increasing 0.9 percent cumulative in Jan-May 2013 while exports to the euro area are decreasing 9.6 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013, and decreasing 3.6 percent cumulative in Jan-May 2013. Exports to third countries, accounting for 43.3 percent of the total in May 2013, are decreasing 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013 and increasing 2.2 percent cumulative in Jan-May 2013, accounting for 42.8 percent of the cumulative total in Jan-May 2013. Price competitiveness through devaluation could improve export performance and growth. Economic performance in Germany is closely related to its high competitiveness in world markets. Weakness in the euro zone and the European Union in general could affect the German economy. This may be the major reason for choosing the “fiscal abuse” of the European Central Bank considered by Buiter (2011Oct31) over the breakdown of the euro zone. There is a tough analytical, empirical and forecasting doubt of growth and trade in the euro zone and the world with or without maintenance of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro zone. Germany could benefit from depreciation of the euro because of high share in its exports to countries not in the euro zone but breakdown of the euro zone raises doubts on the region’s economic growth that could affect German exports to other member states.

Table III-9, Germany, Structure of Exports and Imports by Region, € Billions and ∆%

	May 2013  € Billions	May 12-Month ∆%	Cumulative Jan-May 2012 € Billions	Cumulative Jan-May 2013/ Jan-May 2012 ∆%
Total Exports	88.2	-4.8	454.3	-0.3
A. EU Members	50.0 % 56.7	-7.1	259.9 % 57.2	-2.1
Euro Area	32.3 % 36.6	-9.6	169.8 % 37.4	-3.6
Non-euro Area	17.7 % 20.1	-2.4	90.1 % 19.8	0.9
B. Third Countries	38.2 % 43.3	-1.6	194.4 % 42.8	2.2
Total Imports	75.2	-2.6	374.0	-1.7
C. EU Members	49.1 % 65.3	-0.7	242.0 % 64.7	0.3
Euro Area	34.6 % 46.0	-0.5	169.0 % 45.2	-0.7
Non-euro Area	14.4 % 19.1	-1.3	73.1 % 19.5	2.5
D. Third Countries	26.1 % 34.7	-5.9	132.0 % 35.3	-5.0

Notes: Total Exports = A+B; Total Imports = C+D

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/07/PE13_224_51.html

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. There are two approaches to government finance and their implications: (1) simple unpleasant monetarist arithmetic; and (2) simple unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Both approaches illustrate how sovereign debt can be perceived riskier under profligacy.

First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:

D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)

Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,

{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:

N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)

The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:

B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)

On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.

Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:

(M_t + B_t)/P_t = E_t∫(1/R_{t, t+τ})s_t+τdτ (4)

Equation (4) expresses the monetary, M_t, and debt, B_t, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, P_t, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, R_{t, t+τ}, of the future primary surpluses s_t+τ, which are equal to T_t+τ – G_t+τ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post R_{t, t+τ}. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:

M_tV(i_t, ·) = P_tY_t (5)

Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):

“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”

An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.

There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:

(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress

(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality

(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.

IV Global Inflation. There is inflation everywhere in the world economy, with slow growth and persistently high unemployment in advanced economies. Table IV-1, updated with every blog comment, provides the latest annual data for GDP, consumer price index (CPI) inflation, producer price index (PPI) inflation and unemployment (UNE) for the advanced economies, China and the highly indebted European countries with sovereign risk issues. The table now includes the Netherlands and Finland that with Germany make up the set of northern countries in the euro zone that hold key votes in the enhancement of the mechanism for solution of sovereign risk issues (Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, “Europe: Northern Exposures,” Financial Times, Mar 9, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55eaf350-4a8b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz1gAlaswcW). Newly available data on inflation is considered below in this section. Data in Table IV-1 for the euro zone and its members are updated from information provided by Eurostat but individual country information is provided in this section  as soon as available, following Table IV-1. Data for other countries in Table IV-1 are also updated with reports from their statistical agencies. Economic data for major regions and countries is considered in Section V World Economic Slowdown following with individual country and regional data tables.

Table IV-1, GDP Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in Selected Countries, Percentage Annual Rates

	GDP	CPI	PPI	UNE
US	1.6	1.4	2.5	7.6
Japan	0.4	-0.3	1.2	4.1
China	7.7	2.7	-2.7
UK	0.3	2.7* CPIH 2.5	1.2 output 0.8** input 2.2	7.8
Euro Zone	-1.1	1.4	-0.1	12.1
Germany	-0.3	1.6	0.2	5.3
France	-0.4	0.9	-0.2	10.4
Nether-lands	-1.4	3.1	-1.2	6.6
Finland	-2.2	2.5	0.7	8.4
Belgium	-0.6	1.1	0.8	8.6
Portugal	-4.0	0.9	0.9	17.6
Ireland	NA	0.5	0.7	13.6
Italy	-2.4	1.3	-1.1	12.2
Greece	-5.6	-0.3	-0.9	NA
Spain	-2.0	1.8	0.8	26.9

Notes: GDP: rate of growth of GDP; CPI: change in consumer price inflation; PPI: producer price inflation; UNE: rate of unemployment; all rates relative to year earlier

*Office for National Statistics http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/consumer-price-indices/may-2013/index.html **Core

PPI http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ppi2/producer-price-index/may-2013/index.html

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/; country statistical sources http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table IV-1 shows the simultaneous occurrence of low growth, inflation and unemployment in advanced economies. The US grew at 1.6 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 (Table 8 in http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp1q13_3rd.pdf http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). Japan’s GDP grew 0.1 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 and 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s grew at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 4.1 percent in IQQ2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). The UK grew at 0.3 percent in IQ2013 relative to IVQ2012 and GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html). The Euro Zone grew at minus 0.3 percent in IQ2013 and minus 1.1 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html). These are stagnating or “growth recession” rates, which are positive or about nil growth rates with some contractions that are insufficient to recover employment. The rates of unemployment are quite high: 7.6 percent in the US but 17.7 percent for unemployment/underemployment or job stress of 28.7 million (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html), 4.1 percent for Japan (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html), 7.8 percent for the UK with high rates of unemployment for young people (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). Twelve-month rates of inflation have been quite high, even when some are moderating at the margin: 1.4 percent in the US, -0.3 percent for Japan, 2.7 percent for China, 1.4 percent for the Euro Zone and 2.7 percent for the UK. Stagflation is still an unknown event but the risk is sufficiently high to be worthy of consideration (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html). The analysis of stagflation also permits the identification of important policy issues in solving vulnerabilities that have high impact on global financial risks. There are six key interrelated vulnerabilities in the world economy that have been causing global financial turbulence: (1) sovereign risk issues in Europe resulting from countries in need of fiscal consolidation and enhancement of their sovereign risk ratings (see Section III and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). (2) The tradeoff of growth and inflation in China now with change in growth strategy to domestic consumption instead of investment and political developments in a decennial transition. (3) Slow growth by repression of savings with de facto interest rate controls (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html), weak hiring with the loss of 10 million full-time jobs (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/recovery-without-hiring-seven-million.html) and continuing job stress of 24 to 30 million people in the US and stagnant wages in a fractured job market (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html); (4) The timing, dose, impact and instruments of normalizing monetary and fiscal policies (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/united-states-gdp-growth-standstill.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/global-financial-risks-and-fed.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/policy-inflation-growth-unemployment.html) in advanced and emerging economies. (5) The Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 that had repercussions throughout the world economy because of Japan’s share of about 9 percent in world output, role as entry point for business in Asia, key supplier of advanced components and other inputs as well as major role in finance and multiple economic activities (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216950927404360.html?mod=WSJ_business_AsiaNewsBucket&mg=reno-wsj); and (6) geopolitical events in the Middle East.

In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These projections and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.

Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):

“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.

Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.

The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”

Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:

“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at around 1.8 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 15 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). The average of 7.8 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 3.2 percent obtained by diving GDP of $13,103.5 billion in IIIQ2010 by GDP of $12,701.0 billion in IIQ2009 {[$13.103.5/$12,701.0 -1]100 = 3.2%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rate (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). Zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not provided the impulse for growth and were not required in past successful cyclical expansions.

First, total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 195,000 in Jun 2013 and private payroll employment rose 202,000. The average number of nonfarm jobs created in Jan-Jun 2012 was 185,167 while the average number of nonfarm jobs created in Jan-Jun 2013 was 201,833, or increase by 9.0 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US in Jan-Jun 2012 was 191,000 while the average in Jan-Jun 2013 was 205,667, or increase by 7.7 percent. The US labor force increased from 153.617 million in 2011 to 154.975 million in 2012 by 1.358 million or 113,167 per month. The average increase of nonfarm jobs in the five months from Jan to Jun 2013 was 201,833, which is a rate of job creation inadequate to reduce significantly unemployment and underemployment in the United States because of 113,167 new entrants in the labor force per month with 28.7 million unemployed or underemployed. The difference between the average increase of 201,833 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Jan to Jun 2013 and the 113,167 average monthly increase in the labor force from 2011 to 2012 is 88,666 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 28.7 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 88,666 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 324 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (28.736 million divided by 88,666) or 27 years (324 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Jun 2013 not seasonally adjusted stood at 157.089 million with 12.248 million unemployed or effectively 17.714 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 162.555 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 0.9 years (1 million divided by product of 88,666 by 12, which is 1,063,992). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.854 million (0.05 times labor force of 157.089 million) for new net job creation of 4.394 million (12.248 million unemployed minus 7.854 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 4.1 years (4.394 million divided by 1.063992). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 17.714 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 162.555 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 9.586 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 9.0 years (17.714 million minus 0.05(162.555 million) = 9.586 million divided by 1.063992, using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in the US fell from 147.315 million in Jul 2007 to 144.841 million in Jun 2013, by 2.474 million, or decline of 1.7 percent, while the noninstitutional population increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 245.552 million in Jun 2013, by 13.594 million or increase of 5.9 percent, using not seasonally adjusted data. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Second, the economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as decelerating from mediocre growth of 2.4 percent on an annual basis in 2010 and 1.8 percent in 2011 to 2.2 percent in 2012. Calculations below show that actual growth is around 1.8 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). United States real GDP grew at the rate of 3.2 percent between 1929 and 2012 and at 3.2 percent between 1947 and 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). Growth is not only mediocre but also sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 28.6 million people corresponding to 17.6 percent of the effective labor force of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). In the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, US real GDP grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (IQ2011), 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, revised 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012, 0.4 percent in IVQ2012 and revised 1.8 percent in IQ2013. The annual equivalent rate of growth of GDP for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent, obtained as follows. Discounting 0.1 percent to one quarter is 0.025 percent {[(1.001)^1/4 -1]100 = 0.025}; discounting 2.5 percent to one quarter is 0.62 percent {[(1.025)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 4.1 percent to one quarter is 1.0 percent {[(1.04)^1/4 -1]100; discounting 2.0 percent to one quarter is 0.50 percent {[(1.020)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 -1]100}; discounting 3.1 percent to one quarter is 0.77 {[(1.031)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 0.4 percent to one quarter is 0.1 percent {[(1.004)^1/4 – 1]100}; and discounting 1.8 percent to one quarter is 0.44 percent {[(1.018)^1/4 -1}100}. Real GDP growth in the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 accumulated to 4.3 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0044) - 1]100 = 4.2%}. This is equivalent to growth from IQ2011 to IQ2013 obtained by dividing the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of IQ2013 of $13,725.7 billion by the SAAR of IVQ2010 of $13,181.2 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 and Table I-6 below) and expressing as percentage {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2) - 1]100 = 4.1%}. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.8 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0044)^4/9 -1]100 = 1.8%], or {[($13,725.7/$13,181.2)]^4/9-1]100 = 1.8%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table I-6 below, obtaining the average for nine quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. Growth in the four quarters of 2012 accumulates to 1.7 percent {[(1.02)^1/4(1.013)^1/4(1.031)^1/4(1.004)^1/4 -1]100 = 1.7%}. This is equivalent to dividing the SAAR of $13,665.4 billion for IVQ2012 in Table I-6 by the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 except for a rounding discrepancy to obtain 1.7 percent {[($13,665.4/$13,441.0) – 1]100 = 1.7%}. The US economy is still close to a standstill especially considering the GDP report in detail.

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QE→∞ cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.

The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm) practically unchanged in the statement at the conclusion of its meeting on Jan 30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130130a.htm) and at its meeting on Jun 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130619a.htm):

“Release Date: June 19, 2013

For immediate release

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in May suggests that economic activity has been expanding at a moderate pace. Labor market conditions have shown further improvement in recent months, on balance, but the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has strengthened further, but fiscal policy is restraining economic growth. Partly reflecting transitory influences, inflation has been running below the Committee's longer-run objective, but longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with appropriate policy accommodation, economic growth will proceed at a moderate pace and the unemployment rate will gradually decline toward levels the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee sees the downside risks to the outlook for the economy and the labor market as having diminished since the fall. The Committee also anticipates that inflation over the medium term likely will run at or below its 2 percent objective.

To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these actions should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months. The Committee will continue its purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until the outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability. The Committee is prepared to increase or reduce the pace of its purchases to maintain appropriate policy accommodation as the outlook for the labor market or inflation changes. In determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will continue to take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases as well as the extent of progress toward its economic objectives.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Charles L. Evans; Jerome H. Powell; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Eric S. Rosengren; Jeremy C. Stein; Daniel K. Tarullo; and Janet L. Yellen. Voting against the action was James Bullard, who believed that the Committee should signal more strongly its willingness to defend its inflation goal in light of recent low inflation readings, and Esther L. George, who was concerned that the continued high level of monetary accommodation increased the risks of future economic and financial imbalances and, over time, could cause an increase in long-term inflation expectations.“

There are several important issues in this statement.

1. Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

1. Open-ended Quantitative Easing or QE_∞. Earlier programs are continued with an additional open-ended $85 billion of bond purchases per month: “To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month.”

1. Advance Guidance on “6 ¼ 2 ½ “Rule. Policy will be accommodative even after the economy recovers satisfactorily: “To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

1. Monitoring and Policy Focus on Jobs. The FOMC reconsiders its policy continuously in accordance with available information: “In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.”
2. Increase or Reduction of Asset Purchases. Market participants focused on slightly different wording about increasing asset purchases: “The Committee is prepared to increase or reduce the pace of its purchases to maintain appropriate policy accommodation as the outlook for the labor market or inflation changes. In determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will continue to take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases as well as the extent of progress toward its economic objectives.”

Current focus is on tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases of $85 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jun 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130619a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent” (emphasis added).

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness.

Table IV-2 provides economic projections of governors of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and regional presidents of Federal Reserve Banks released at the meeting of Mar 20, 2013. The Fed releases the data with careful explanations (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf). Columns “∆% GDP,” “∆% PCE Inflation” and “∆% Core PCE Inflation” are changes “from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated.” The GDP report for IQ2013 is analyzed in Section I (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html) and the PCE inflation data from the report on personal income and outlays in Section IV (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides the third estimate of IQ2013 GDP with the first estimate for IIQ2013 to be released on Jul 31 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm See Section I (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). PCE inflation is the index of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) of the report of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on “Personal Income and Outlays” (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm), which is analyzed in Section IV (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). The next report on “Personal Income and Outlays” for Jun will be released at 8:30 AM on Aug 2, 2013 with revisions from 1959 to May 2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm). PCE core inflation consists of PCE inflation excluding food and energy. Column “UNEMP %” is the rate of unemployment measured as the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the Employment Situation Report with the civilian unemployment rate in the first Friday of every month, which is analyzed in this blog. The report for Jun 2013 was released on Jul 5 and analyzed in this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html). “Longer term projections represent each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf).

It is instructive to focus on 2013 as 2014, 2015 and longer term are too far away, and there is not much information even on what will happen in 2013 and beyond. The central tendency should provide reasonable approximation of the view of the majority of members of the FOMC but the second block of numbers provides the range of projections by FOMC participants. The first row for each year shows the projection introduced after the meeting of Mar 20, 2013 and the second row “PR” the projection of the Jun 19, 2013 meeting. There are three major changes in the view.

1. Growth “∆% GDP.” The FOMC has reduced the forecast of GDP growth in 2013 from 2.3 to 2.8 percent at the meeting in Mar 2013 to 2.3 to 2.6 percent at the meeting on Jun 20, 2013. The FOMC increased GDP growth in 2014 from 2.9 to 3.4 percent at the meeting in Mar 2013 to 3.0 to 3.5 percent at the meeting in Jun 2013.

2. Rate of Unemployment “UNEM%.” The FOMC reduced the forecast of the rate of unemployment from 7.3 to 7.5 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2013 to 7.2 to 7.3 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2013. The projection for 2014 decreased to the range of 6.5 to 6.8 in Jun 2013 from 6.7 to 7.0 in Mar 2013. Projections of the rate of unemployment are moving closer to the desire 6.5 percent or lower with 5.8 to 6.2 percent in 2015 after the meeting on Jun 19, 2013.

3. Inflation “∆% PCE Inflation.” The FOMC changed the forecast of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation from 1.3 to 1.7 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2012 to 0.8 to 1.2 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2013. There are no projections exceeding 2.0 percent.

4. Core Inflation “∆% Core PCE Inflation.” Core inflation is PCE inflation excluding food and energy. There is again not much of a difference of the projection that changed from 1.5 to 1.6 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2013 to 1.2 to 1.3 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2013.

Table IV-2, US, Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in FOMC, Mar 2013 and Jun 19, 2013 

	∆% GDP	UNEM %	∆% PCE Inflation	∆% Core PCE Inflation
Central Tendency
2013  Mar PR	2.3 to 2.6 2.3 to 2.8	7.2 to 7.3 7.3 to 7.5	0.8 to 1.2 1.3 to 1.7	1.2 to 1.3 1.5 to 1.6
2014  Mar PR	3.0 to 3.5 2.9 to 3.4	6.5 to 6.8 6.7 to 7.0	1.4 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.0	1.5 to 1.8 1.7 to 2.0
2015 Mar PR	2.9 to 3.6 2.9 to 3.7	5.8 to 6.2 6.0 to 6.5	1.6 to 2.0 1.7 to 2.0	1.7 to 2.0 1.8 to 2.1
Longer Run Mar PR	2.3 to 2.5 2.3 to 2.5	5.2 to 6.0 5.2 to 6.0	2.0 2.0
Range
2013 Mar PR	2.0 to 2.6 2.0 to 3.0	6.9 to 7.5 6.9 to 7.6	0.8 to 1.5 1.3 to 2.0	1.1 to 1.5 1.5 to 2.0
2014 Mar PR	2.2 to 3.6 2.6 to 3.8	6.2 to 6.9 6.1 to 7.1	1.4 to 2.0 1.4 to 2.1	1.5 to 2.1 1.5 to 2.1
2015 Mar PR	2.3 to 3.8 2.5 to 3.8	5.7 to 6.4 5.7 to 6.5	1.6 to 2.3 1.6 to 2.6	1.7 to 2.3 1.7 to 2.6
Longer Run Mar PR	2.0 to 3.0 2.0 to 3.0	5.0 to 6.0 5.0 to 6.0	2.0 2.0

Notes: UEM: unemployment; PR: Projection

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130619.pdf

goal of inflation of 2 percent per year but without specific goal for unemployment (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm):

“Following careful deliberations at its recent meetings, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reached broad agreement on the following principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. The Committee intends to reaffirm these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January.

The FOMC is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.

Inflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee's policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals.

The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.

The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the corresponding interval several years earlier.

In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary.  However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. ”

The probable intention of this specific inflation goal is to “anchor” inflationary expectations. Massive doses of monetary policy of promoting growth to reduce unemployment could conflict with inflation control. Economic agents could incorporate inflationary expectations in their decisions. As a result, the rate of unemployment could remain the same but with much higher rate of inflation (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html See Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-116). Strong commitment to maintaining inflation at 2 percent could control expectations of inflation.

The FOMC continues its efforts of increasing transparency that can improve the credibility of its firmness in implementing its dual mandate. Table IV-3 provides the views by participants of the FOMC of the levels at which they expect the fed funds rate in 2013, 2014, 2015 and the in the longer term. Table IV-3 is inferred from a chart provided by the FOMC with the number of participants expecting the target of fed funds rate (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf). There are 18 participants expecting the rate to remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2013 and one to be higher in the interval below 1.0 percent. The rate would still remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2014 for 15 participants with three expecting the rate to be in the range of 0.5 to 1.0 percent and one participant expecting rates at 1.0 to 1.5 percent. This table is consistent with the guidance statement of the FOMC that rates will remain at low levels until late in 2014. For 2015, six participants expect rates to be below or at 1.0 percent while nine expect rates from 1.0 to 1.5 percent and four expecting rates in excess of 2.0 percent. In the long term, all 19 participants expect the fed funds rate in the range of 3.0 to 4.5 percent.

Table IV-3, US, Views of Target Federal Funds Rate at Year-End of Federal Reserve Board

Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Jun 19, 2013

	0 to 0.25	0.5 to 1.0	1.0 to 1.5	1.0 to 2.0	2.0 to 3.0	3.0 to 4.5
2013	18	1
2014	15	3	1
2015	1	5	9	1	3
Longer Run						19

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130619.pdf

Additional information is provided in Table IV-4 with the number of participants expecting increasing interest rates in the years from 2013 to 2015. It is evident from Table IV-4 that the prevailing view of the FOMC is for interest rates to continue at low levels in future years. This view is consistent with the economic projections of low economic growth, relatively high unemployment and subdued inflation provided in Table IV-2. The FOMC states that rates will continue to be low even after return of the economy to potential growth.

Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal

Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, June 19, 2013

Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Fed Funds Rate	Number of Participants
2013	1
2014	3
2015	14
2016	1

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130619.pdf

The producer price index of the US from 1947 to 2013 in Chart IV-1 shows various periods of more rapid or less rapid inflation but no bumps. The major event is the decline in 2008 when risk aversion because of the global recession caused the collapse of oil prices from $148/barrel to less than $80/barrel with most other commodity prices also collapsing. The event had nothing in common with explanations of deflation but rather with the concentration of risk exposures in commodities after the decline of stock market indexes. Eventually, there was a flight to government securities because of the fears of insolvency of banks caused by statements supporting proposals for withdrawal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as explained by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). The bump in 2008 with decline in 2009 is consistent with the view that zero interest rates with subdued risk aversion induce carry trades into commodity futures.

Chart IV-1, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, NSA, 1947-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Chart IV-2 provides 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index from 1948 to 2013. The distinguishing event in Chart I-7 is the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The shape of the two-hump Bactrian camel of the 1970s resembles the double hump from 2007 to 2013.

Chart IV-2, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1948-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Annual percentage changes of the producer price index from 1948 to 2012 are shown in Table IV-5. The producer price index fell 2.8 percent in 1949 following the adjustment to World War II and fell 0.6 percent in 1952 and 1.0 percent in 1953 around the Korean War. There are two other mild decline of 0.3 percent in 1959 and 0.3 percent in 1963. There are only few subsequent and isolated declines of the producer price index of 1.4 percent in 1986, 0.8 percent in 1998, 1.3 percent in 2002 and 2.6 percent in 2009. The decline of 2009 was caused by unwinding of carry trades in 2008 that had lifted oil prices to $140/barrel during deep global recession because of the panic of probable toxic assets in banks that would be removed with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There is no evidence in this history of 65 years of the US producer price index suggesting that there is frequent and persistent deflation shock requiring aggressive unconventional monetary policy. The design of such anti-deflation policy could provoke price and financial instability because of lags in effect of monetary policy, model errors, inaccurate forecasts and misleading analysis of current economic conditions.

Table IV-5, US, Annual PPI Inflation ∆% 1948-2012

Year	Annual
1948	8.0
1949	-2.8
1950	1.8
1951	9.2
1952	-0.6
1953	-1.0
1954	0.3
1955	0.3
1956	2.6
1957	3.8
1958	2.2
1959	-0.3
1960	0.9
1961	0.0
1962	0.3
1963	-0.3
1964	0.3
1965	1.8
1966	3.2
1967	1.1
1968	2.8
1969	3.8
1970	3.4
1971	3.1
1972	3.2
1973	9.1
1974	15.4
1975	10.6
1976	4.5
1977	6.4
1978	7.9
1979	11.2
1980	13.4
1981	9.2
1982	4.1
1983	1.6
1984	2.1
1985	1.0
1986	-1.4
1987	2.1
1988	2.5
1989	5.2
1990	4.9
1991	2.1
1992	1.2
1993	1.2
1994	0.6
1995	1.9
1996	2.7
1997	0.4
1998	-0.8
1999	1.8
2000	3.8
2001	2.0
2002	-1.3
2003	3.2
2004	3.6
2005	4.8
2006	3.0
2007	3.9
2008	6.3
2009	-2.6
2010	4.2
2011	6.0
2012	1.9

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

The producer price index excluding food and energy from 1973 to 2013, the first historical date of availability in the dataset of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), shows similarly dynamic behavior as the overall index, as shown in Chart IV-3. There is no evidence of persistent deflation in the US PPI.

Chart IV-3, US Producer Price Index, Finished Goods Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1973-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Chart IV-4 provides 12-month percentage rates of change of the finished goods index excluding food and energy. The dominating characteristic is the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The double hump illustrates how inflation may appear to be subdued and then returns with strength.

Chart IV-4, US Producer Price Index, Finished Goods Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1974-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

The producer price index of energy goods from 1974 to 2013 is provided in Chart IV-5. The first jump occurred during the Great Inflation of the 1970s analyzed in various comments of this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html) and in Appendix I. There is relative stability of producer prices after 1986 with another jump and decline in the late 1990s into the early 2000s. The episode of commodity price increases during a global recession in 2008 could only have occurred with interest rates dropping toward zero, which stimulated the carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in commodity futures. Commodity futures exposures were dropped in the flight to government securities after Sep 2008. Commodity future exposures were created again when risk aversion diminished around Mar 2011 after the finding that US bank balance sheets did not have the toxic assets that were mentioned in proposing TARP in Congress (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009). Fluctuations in commodity prices and other risk financial assets originate in carry trade when risk aversion ameliorates.

Chart IV-5, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Energy Goods, NSA, 1974-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Chart IV-6 shows 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index of finished energy goods from 1975 to 2013. This index is only available after 1974 and captures only one of the humps of energy prices during the Great Inflation. Fluctuations in energy prices have occurred throughout history in the US but without provoking deflation. Two cases are the decline of oil prices in 2001 to 2002 that has been analyzed by Barsky and Kilian (2004) and the collapse of oil prices from over $140/barrel with shock of risk aversion to the carry trade in Sep 2008.

Chart IV-6, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Energy Goods, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1974-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi

Headline and core producer price indexes are in Table IV-6. The headline PPI SA increased 0.8 percent in Jun 2013 and increased 2.5 percent NSA in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013. The core PPI SA increased 0.2 percent in Jun 2013 and rose 1.7 percent in 12 months. Analysis of annual equivalent rates of change shows inflation waves similar to those worldwide. In the first wave, the absence of risk aversion from the sovereign risk crisis in Europe motivated the carry trade from zero interest rates into commodity futures that caused the average equivalent rate of 10.0 percent in the headline PPI in Jan-Apr 2011 and 4.0 percent in the core PPI. In the second wave, commodity futures prices collapsed in Jun 2011 with the return of risk aversion originating in the sovereign risk crisis of Europe. The annual equivalent rate of headline PPI inflation collapsed to 1.8 percent in May-Jun 2011 but the core annual equivalent inflation rate was higher at 2.4 percent. In the third wave, headline PPI inflation resuscitated with annual equivalent at 4.9 percent in Jul-Sep 2011 and core PPI inflation at 3.7 percent. Core PPI inflation was persistent throughout 2011, jumping from annual equivalent at 1.5 percent in the first four months of 2010 to 3.0 percent in 12 months ending in Dec 2011. Unconventional monetary policy is based on the proposition that core rates reflect more fundamental inflation and are thus better predictors of the future. In practice, the relation of core and headline inflation is as difficult to predict as future inflation (see IIID Supply Shocks in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html). In the fourth wave, risk aversion originating in the lack of resolution of the European debt crisis caused unwinding of carry trades with annual equivalent headline PPI inflation of 0.6 percent in Oct-Nov 2011 and 1.8 percent in the core annual equivalent. In the fifth wave from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012, annual equivalent inflation was 0.0 percent for the headline index but 4.3 percent for the core index excluding food and energy. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Feb-Mar 2012 was 2.4 percent for the headline PPI and 2.4 percent for the core. In the seventh wave, renewed risk aversion caused reversal of carry trades into commodity exposures with annual equivalent headline inflation of minus 4.7 percent in Apr-May 2012 while core PPI inflation was at annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 3.0 percent in Jun-Jul 2012 and 4.3 percent for the core index. In the ninth wave, relaxed risk aversion because of the announcement of the impaired bond buying program or Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) of the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html) induced carry trades that drove annual equivalent inflation of producer prices of the United States at 12.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 0.6 percent in the core index. In the tenth wave, renewed risk aversion caused annual equivalent inflation of minus 3.2 percent in Oct-Dec in the headline index and 1.2 percent in the core index. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 5.5 percent in the headline index in Jan-Feb 2013 and 1.8 percent in the core index. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent was minus 7.5 percent in Mar-Apr 2012 and 1.8 percent for the core index. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 8.1 percent in May-Jun 2013 and 1.8 percent in the core index. It is almost impossible to forecast PPI inflation and its relation to CPI inflation. “Inflation surprise” by monetary policy could be proposed to climb along a downward sloping Phillips curve, resulting in higher inflation but lower unemployment (see Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro and Gordon 1983 and past comments of this blog http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). The architects of monetary policy would require superior inflation forecasting ability compared to forecasting naivety by everybody else. In practice, we are all naïve in forecasting inflation and other economic variables and events.

Table IV-6, US, Headline and Core PPI Inflation Monthly SA and 12-Month NSA ∆%

	Finished Goods SA Month	Finished Goods NSA 12 months	Finished Core SA Month	Finished Core NSA 12 months
Jun	0.8	2.5	0.2	1.7
May	0.5	1.7	0.1	1.7
AE ∆%  May-Jun	8.1		1.8
Apr	-0.7	0.6	0.1	1.7
Mar	-0.6	1.1	0.2	1.7
AE ∆%  Mar-Apr	-7.5		1.8
Feb	0.7	1.8	0.1	1.8
Jan	0.2	1.5	0.2	1.8
AE ∆%  Jan-Feb	5.5		1.8
Dec 2012	-0.1	1.4	0.2	2.1
Nov	-0.5	1.5	0.1	2.2
Oct	-0.2	2.3	0.0	2.2
AE ∆%  Oct-Dec	-3.2		1.2
Sep	1.0	2.1	0.1	2.4
Aug	1.0	1.9	0.0	2.6
AE ∆% Aug-Sep	12.7		0.6
Jul	0.4	0.5	0.5	2.6
Jun	0.1	0.7	0.2	2.6
AE ∆% Jun-Jul	3.0		4.3
May	-0.6	0.6	0.1	2.7
Apr	-0.2	1.8	0.1	2.7
AE ∆% Apr-May	-4.7		1.2
Mar	0.1	2.8	0.2	2.9
Feb	0.3	3.4	0.2	3.1
AE ∆% Feb-Mar	2.4		2.4
Jan	0.1	4.1	0.4	3.1
Dec 2011	-0.1	4.7	0.3	3.0
AE ∆% Dec-Jan	0.0		4.3
Nov	0.4	5.6	0.1	3.0
Oct	-0.3	5.8	0.2	2.9
AE ∆% Oct-Nov	0.6		1.8
Sep	0.9	7.0	0.3	2.8
Aug	-0.3	6.6	0.1	2.7
Jul	0.6	7.1	0.5	2.7
AE ∆% Jul-Sep	4.9		3.7
Jun	-0.1	6.9	0.3	2.3
May	0.4	7.1	0.1	2.1
AE ∆%  May-Jun	1.8		2.4
Apr	0.7	6.6	0.3	2.3
Mar	0.7	5.6	0.3	2.0
Feb	1.1	5.4	0.3	1.8
Jan	0.7	3.6	0.4	1.6
AE ∆%  Jan-Apr	10.0		4.0
Dec 2010	0.9	3.8	0.2	1.4
Nov	0.6	3.4	0.0	1.2
Oct	0.7	4.3	-0.1	1.6
Sep	0.4	3.9	0.2	1.6
Aug	0.4	3.3	0.1	1.3
Jul	0.3	4.1	0.1	1.5
Jun	-0.3	2.7	0.1	1.1
May	0.0	5.1	0.3	1.3
Apr	-0.2	5.4	0.0	0.9
Mar	0.7	5.9	0.2	0.9
Feb	-0.7	4.2	0.0	1.0
Jan	1.0	4.5	0.3	1.0

Note: Core: excluding food and energy; AE: annual equivalent

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

The US producer price index NSA from 2000 to 2013 is shown in Chart IV-7. There are two episodes of decline of the PPI during recessions in 2001 and in 2008. Barsky and Kilian (2004) consider the 2001 episode as one in which real oil prices were declining when recession began. Recession and the fall of commodity prices instead of generalized deflation explain the behavior of US inflation in 2008.

Chart IV-7, US, Producer Price Index, NSA, 2000-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Twelve-month percentage changes of the PPI NSA from 2000 to 2013 are shown in Chart IV-8. It may be possible to forecast trends a few months in the future under adaptive expectations but turning points are almost impossible to anticipate especially when related to fluctuations of commodity prices in response to risk aversion. In a sense, monetary policy has been tied to behavior of the PPI in the negative 12-month rates in 2001 to 2003 and then again in 2009 to 2010. Monetary policy following deflation fears caused by commodity price fluctuations would introduce significant volatility and risks in financial markets and eventually in consumption and investment.

Chart IV-8, US, Producer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Change NSA, 2000-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

The US PPI excluding food and energy from 2000 to 2013 is shown in Chart IV-9. There is here again a smooth trend of inflation instead of prolonged deflation as in Japan.

Chart IV-9, US, Producer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 2000-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Twelve-month percentage changes of the producer price index excluding food and energy are shown in Chart IV-10. Fluctuations replicate those in the headline PPI. There is an evident trend of increase of 12 months rates of core PPI inflation in 2011 but lower rates in 2012-2013.

Chart IV-10, US, Producer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2000-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

The US producer price index of energy goods from 2000 to 2013 is in Chart IV-11 There is a clear upward trend with fluctuations that would not occur under persistent deflation.

Chart IV-11, US, Producer Price Index Finished Energy Goods, NSA, 2000-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Chart IV-12 provides 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index of energy goods from 2000 to 2013. The episode of declining prices of energy goods in 2001 to 2002 is related to the analysis of decline of real oil prices by Barsky and Kilian (2004). Interest rates dropping to zero during the global recession in 2008 induced carry trades that explain the rise of the PPI of energy goods toward 30 percent. Bouts of risk aversion with policy interest rates held close to zero explain the fluctuations in the 12-month rates of the PPI of energy goods in the expansion phase of the economy. Symmetric inflation targets induce significant instability in inflation and interest rates with adverse effects on financial markets and the overall economy.

Chart IV-12, US, Producer Price Index Energy Goods, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 2000-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Inflation in advanced economies has been fluctuating in waves at the production level with alternating surges and moderation of commodity price shocks. Table IV-7 provides month and 12-month percentage rates of inflation of Japan’s corporate goods price index (CGPI). Inflation measured by the CGPI increased 0.1 percent in Jun 2013 and 1.2 percent in 12 months. Measured by 12-month rates, CGPI inflation increased from minus 0.2 percent in Jul 2010 to a high of 2.2 percent in Jul-Aug 2011 and declined to 1.2 percent in Jun 2013. Calendar-year inflation for 2012 is minus 0.9 percent and 1.5 percent for 2011, which is the highest after declines in 2009 and 2010 but lower than 4.6 percent in the commodity shock driven by zero interest rates during the global recession in 2008. Inflation of the corporate goods prices follows waves similar to those in other indices around the world (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation reached 5.9 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, driven by commodity price shocks of the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures. In the second wave, carry trades were unwound because of risk aversion caused by the European debt crisis, resulting in average annual equivalent inflation of minus 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2011. In the third wave, renewed risk aversion caused annual equivalent decline of the CGPI of minus 2.2 percent in Jul-Nov 2011. In the fourth wave, continuing risk aversion resulted in annual equivalent inflation of minus 0.6 percent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, renewed risk appetite resulted in annual equivalent inflation of 2.0 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation dropped to minus 5.8 percent in May-Jul 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 3.0 percent in Aug-Sep 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2012 in a new round of risk aversion. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 2.9 percent in Dec 2012-Jun 2013. Unconventional monetary policies of zero interest rates and quantitative easing have created a difficult environment for economic and financial decisions with significant inflation volatility.

Table IV-7, Japan, Corporate Goods Price Index (CGPI) ∆%

	Month	Year
Jun 2013	0.1	1.2
May	0.0	0.5
Apr	0.4	0.1
Mar	0.1	-0.5
Feb	0.5	-0.1
Jan	0.2	-0.4
Dec 2012	0.4	-0.7
AE ∆% Dec-Jun	2.9
Nov	-0.1	-1.1
Oct	-0.4	-1.1
AE ∆% Oct-Nov	-3.0
Sep	0.3	-1.5
Aug	0.2	-2.0
AE ∆% Aug-Sep	3.0
Jul	-0.5	-2.3
Jun	-0.6	-1.5
May	-0.4	-0.9
AE ∆% May-Jul	-5.8
Apr	-0.2	-0.7
Mar	0.5	0.3
Feb	0.2	0.4
AE ∆% Feb-Apr	2.0
Jan	-0.1	0.3
Dec 2011	0.0	0.8
AE ∆% Dec-Jan	-0.6
Nov	-0.1	1.3
Oct	-0.8	1.3
Sep	-0.2	2.0
Aug	-0.1	2.2
Jul	0.3	2.2
AE ∆% Jul-Nov	-2.2
Jun	0.0	1.9
May	-0.2	1.6
AE ∆% May-Jun	-1.2
Apr	0.8	1.8
Mar	0.6	1.3
Feb	0.1	0.7
Jan	0.4	0.6
AE ∆% Jan-Apr	5.9
Dec 2010	0.5	1.2
Nov	-0.1	0.9
Oct	-0.1	0.9
Sep	0.0	-0.1
Aug	-0.1	0.0
Jul	0.0	-0.2
Calendar Year
2012		-0.9
2011		1.5
2010		-0.1
2009		-5.3
2008		4.6

AE: annual equivalent

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/

Chart IV-13 of the Bank of Japan provides year-on-year percentage changes of the domestic and services Corporate Goods Price Index (CGPI) of Japan from 1970 to 2013. Percentage changes of inflation of services are not as sharp as for goods. Japan had the same sharp waves of inflation during the 1970s as in the US (see Table IV-7 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real_09.html). Behavior of the CGPI of Japan in the 1970s mirrors the Great Inflation episode in the United States with waves of inflation rising to two digits. Both political pressures and errors abounded in the unhappy stagflation of the 1970s also known as the US Great Inflation (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). Inflation also collapsed in the beginning of the 1980s because of tight monetary policy in the US with focus on inflation instead of on the gap of actual relative to potential output. The areas in shade correspond to the dates of cyclical recessions. The salient event is the sharp rise of inflation of the domestic goods CGPI in 2008 during the global recession that was mostly the result of carry trades from fed funds rates collapsing to zero to long positions in commodity futures in an environment of relaxed financial risk appetite. The panic of toxic assets in banks to be withdrawn by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Cochrane and Zingales 2009) drove unusual risk aversion with unwinding of carry trades of exposures in commodities and other risk financial assets. Carry trades returned once TARP was clarified as providing capital to financial institutions and stress tests verified the soundness of US banks. The return of carry trades explains the rise of CGPI inflation after mid-2009. Inflation of the CGPI fluctuated with zero interest rates in alternating episodes of risk aversion and risk appetite.

Chart IV-13, Japan, Domestic Corporate Goods Price and Services Index, Year-on-Year Percentage Change, 1970-2013

Notes: Blue: Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index All Commodities; Red: Corporate Price Services Index

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/pi/cgpi_2010/index.htm/

There is similar behavior of year-on-year percentage changes of the US producer price index from 1970 to 2013 in Chart IV-14 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics as in Chart IV-1 with the domestic goods CGPI. The behavior of the CGPI of Japan in the 1970s is quite similar to that of the US PPI. The US producer price index increased together with the CGPI driven by the period of one percent fed funds rates from 2003 to 2004 inducing carry trades into commodity futures and other risk financial assets and the slow adjustment in increments of 25 basis points at every FOMC meeting from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006. There is also the same increase in inflation in 2008 during the global recession followed by collapse because of unwinding positions during risk aversion and new rise of inflation during risk appetite.

Chart IV-14, US, Producer Price Index Finished Goods, Year-on-Year Percentage Change, 1970-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Finer detail is provided by Chart IV-15 of the domestic CGPI from 2008 to 2013. The CGPI rose almost vertically in 2008 as the collapse of fed funds rates toward zero drove exposures in commodities and other risk financial assets because of risk appetite originating in the belief that the financial crisis was restricted to structured financial products and not to contracts negotiated in commodities and other exchanges. The panic with toxic assets in banks to be removed by TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009) caused unwinding carry trades in flight to US government obligations that drove down commodity prices and price indexes worldwide. Apparent resolution of the European debt crisis of 2010 drove risk appetite in 2011 with new carry trades from zero fed funds rates into commodity futures and other risk financial assets. Domestic CGPI inflation returned in waves with upward slopes during risk appetite and downward slopes during risk aversion.

Chart IV-15, Japan, Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, 2008-2013

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

There is similar behavior of the US producer price index from 2008 to 2013 in Chart IV-4 as in the domestic CGPI in Chart IV-16. A major difference is the strong long-term trend in the US producer price index with oscillations originating mostly in bouts of risk aversion such as the downward slope in the final segment in Chart IV-16 followed by increasing slope during periods of risk appetite. Carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures and other risk financial assets drive the upward trend of the US producer price index while oscillations originate in alternating episodes of risk aversion and risk appetite.

Chart IV-16, US, Producer Price Index Finished Goods, Monthly, 2008-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

There was milder increase in Japan’s export corporate goods price index during the global recession in 2008 but similar sharp decline during the bank balance sheets effect in late 2008, as shown in Chart IV-17 of the Bank of Japan. Japan exports industrial goods whose prices have been less dynamic than those of commodities and raw materials. As a result, the export CGPI on the yen basis in Chart IV-17 trends down with oscillations after a brief rise in the final part of the recession in 2009. The export corporate goods price index on the yen basis fell from 104.9 in Jun 2009 to 94.0 in Jan 2012 or minus 10.4 percent and increased to 106.1 in Jun 2013 for a gain of 12.9 percent relative to Jan 2012 and 1.1 percent relative to Jun 2009. The choice of Jun 2009 is designed to capture the reversal of risk aversion beginning in Sep 2008 with the announcement of toxic assets in banks that would be withdrawn with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). Reversal of risk aversion in the form of flight to the USD and obligations of the US government opened the way to renewed carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets such as commodities. Japan exports industrial products and imports commodities and raw materials.

Chart IV-17, Japan, Export Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Yen Basis, 2008-2013

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

Chart IV-17A provides the export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency. The export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency increased from 97.9 in Jun 2009 to 103.1 in Apr 2012 or 5.3 percent but dropped to 100.2 in Apr 2013 or minus 2.8 percent relative to Apr 2012 and gained 1.3 percent to 99.2 in Jun 2013 relative to Jun 2009.

Chart IV-17A, Japan, Export Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Contract Currency Basis, 2008-2013

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

Japan imports primary commodities and raw materials. As a result, the import corporate goods price index on the yen basis in Chart IV-18 shows an upward trend after declining from the increase during the global recession in 2008 driven by carry trades from fed funds rates collapsing to zero into commodity futures and decline during risk aversion from late 2008 into beginning of 2008 originating in doubts about soundness of US bank balance sheets. More careful measurement should show that the terms of trade of Japan, export prices relative to import prices, declined during the commodity shocks originating in unconventional monetary policy. The decline of the terms of trade restricted potential growth of income in Japan. The import corporate goods price index on the yen basis increased from 93.5 in Jun 2009 to 113.1 in Apr 2012 or 21.0 percent and to 121.4 in Jun 2013 or gain of 7.3 percent relative to Apr 2012 and 29.8 percent relative to Jun 2009.

Chart IV-18, Japan, Import Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Yen Basis, 2008-2013

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

Chart IV-18A provides the import corporate goods price index on the contract currency basis. The import corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency increased from 86.2 in Jun 2009 to 119.5 in Apr 2012 or 38.6 percent and to 112.2 in Jun 2013 or minus 6.1 percent relative to Apr 2012 and gain of 30.2 percent relative to Jun 2009. There is evident deterioration of the terms of trade of Japan: the export corporate goods price index on the basis of the contract currency increased 5.3 percent from Jun 2009 to Apr 2012 while the import corporate goods price index increased 38.6 percent. Prices of Japan’s exports of corporate goods, mostly industrial products, increased only 5.3 percent from Jun 2009 to Apr 2012, while imports of corporate goods, mostly commodities and raw materials increased 38.6 percent. Unconventional monetary policy induces carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in commodities that squeeze economic activity of industrial countries by increases in prices of imported commodities and raw materials during periods without risk aversion. Reversals of carry trades during periods of risk aversion decrease prices of exported commodities and raw materials that squeeze economic activity in economies exporting commodities and raw materials. Devaluation of the dollar by unconventional monetary policy could increase US competitiveness in world markets but economic activity is squeezed by increases in prices of imported commodities and raw materials. Unconventional monetary policy causes instability worldwide instead of the mission of central banks of promoting financial and economic stability.

Chart IV-18A, Japan, Import Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, Contract Currency Basis, 2008-2013

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

Table IV-8 provides the Bank of Japan’s Corporate Goods Price indexes of exports and imports on the yen and contract bases from Jan 2008 to Jun 2013. There are oscillations of the indexes that are shown vividly in the four charts above. For the entire period from Jan 2008 to Jun 2013, the export index on the contract currency basis increased 0.0 percent and decreased 8.1 percent on the yen basis. For the entire period from Jan 2008 to Jun 2013, the import index increased 11.4 percent on the contract currency basis and increased 2.0 percent on the yen basis. The charts show sharp deteriorations in relative prices of exports to prices of imports during multiple periods. Price margins of Japan’s producers are subject to periodic squeezes resulting from carry trades from zero interest rates of monetary policy to exposures in commodities.

Table IV-8, Japan, Exports and Imports Corporate Goods Price Index, Contract Currency Basis and Yen Basis

Month	Exports Contract Currency	Exports Yen	Imports Contract Currency	Imports Yen
2008/01	99.2	115.5	100.7	119.0
2008/02	99.8	116.1	102.4	120.6
2008/03	100.5	112.6	104.5	117.4
2008/04	101.6	115.3	110.1	125.2
2008/05	102.4	117.4	113.4	130.4
2008/06	103.5	120.7	119.5	140.3
2008/07	104.7	122.1	122.6	143.9
2008/08	103.7	122.1	123.1	147.0
2008/09	102.7	118.3	117.1	137.1
2008/10	100.2	109.6	109.1	121.5
2008/11	98.6	104.5	97.8	105.8
2008/12	97.9	100.6	89.3	93.0
2009/01	98.0	99.5	85.6	88.4
2009/02	97.5	100.1	85.7	89.7
2009/03	97.3	104.2	85.2	93.0
2009/04	97.6	105.6	84.4	93.0
2009/05	97.5	103.8	84.0	90.8
2009/06	97.9	104.9	86.2	93.5
2009/07	97.5	103.1	89.2	95.0
2009/08	98.3	104.4	89.6	95.8
2009/09	98.3	102.1	91.0	94.7
2009/10	98.0	101.2	91.0	94.0
2009/11	98.4	100.8	92.8	94.8
2009/12	98.3	100.7	95.4	97.5
2010/01	99.4	102.2	97.0	100.0
2010/02	99.7	101.6	97.6	99.8
2010/03	99.7	101.8	97.0	99.2
2010/04	100.5	104.6	99.9	104.6
2010/05	100.7	102.9	101.7	104.9
2010/06	100.1	101.6	100.0	102.3
2010/07	99.4	99.0	99.9	99.8
2010/08	99.1	97.3	99.5	97.5
2010/09	99.4	97.0	100.0	97.2
2010/10	100.1	96.4	100.5	95.8
2010/11	100.7	97.4	102.6	98.2
2010/12	101.2	98.3	104.4	100.6
2011/01	102.1	98.6	107.2	102.6
2011/02	102.9	99.5	109.0	104.3
2011/03	103.5	99.6	111.8	106.3
2011/04	104.1	101.7	115.9	111.9
2011/05	103.9	99.9	118.8	112.4
2011/06	103.8	99.3	117.5	110.5
2011/07	103.6	98.3	118.3	110.2
2011/08	103.6	96.6	118.6	108.1
2011/09	103.7	96.1	117.0	106.2
2011/10	103.0	95.2	116.6	105.6
2011/11	101.9	94.8	115.4	105.4
2011/12	101.5	94.5	116.1	106.2
2012/01	101.8	94.0	115.0	104.2
2012/02	102.4	95.8	115.8	106.4
2012/03	102.9	99.2	118.3	112.9
2012/04	103.1	98.7	119.5	113.1
2012/05	102.2	96.3	118.1	109.9
2012/06	101.4	95.0	115.2	106.7
2012/07	100.6	94.0	112.0	103.6
2012/08	100.8	94.1	112.4	103.6
2012/09	100.9	94.0	114.7	105.2
2012/10	101.0	94.7	113.8	105.2
2012/11	100.9	95.9	113.3	106.6
2012/12	100.7	98.0	113.6	109.7
2013/01	101.0	102.5	114.0	115.5
2013/02	101.5	105.9	114.9	120.4
2013/03	101.3	106.7	115.2	122.2
2013/04	100.2	107.5	114.3	124.0
2013/05	99.6	109.1	112.7	125.4
2013/06	99.2	106.1	112.2	121.4

Source: Bank of Japan http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/pi/cgpi_2010/index.htm/

Chart IV-19 provides the monthly corporate goods price index (CGPI) of Japan from 1970 to 2013. Japan also experienced sharp increase in inflation during the 1970s as in the episode of the Great Inflation in the US. Monetary policy focused on accommodating higher inflation, with emphasis solely on the mandate of promoting employment, has been blamed as deliberate or because of model error or imperfect measurement for creating the Great Inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). A remarkable similarity with US experience is the sharp rise of the CGPI of Japan in 2008 driven by carry trades from interest rapidly falling to zero to exposures in commodity futures during a global recession. Japan had the same sharp waves of consumer price inflation during the 1970s as in the US (see Table IV-7 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real_09.html).

Chart IV-19, Japan, Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, 1970-2013

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html

The producer price index of the US from 1970 to 2013 in Chart IV-20 shows various periods of more rapid or less rapid inflation but no bumps. The major event is the decline in 2008 when risk aversion because of the global recession caused the collapse of oil prices from $148/barrel to less than $80/barrel with most other commodity prices also collapsing. The event had nothing in common with explanations of deflation but rather with the concentration of risk exposures in commodities after the decline of stock market indexes. Eventually, there was a flight to government securities because of the fears of insolvency of banks caused by statements supporting proposals for withdrawal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as explained by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). The bump in 2008 with decline in 2009 is consistent with the view that zero interest rates with subdued risk aversion induce carry trades into commodity futures.

Chart IV-20, US, Producer Price Index Finished Goods, Monthly, 1970-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Further insight into inflation of the corporate goods price index (CGPI) of Japan is provided in Table IV-10. Petroleum and coal with weight of 5.7 percent increased 0.7 percent in Jun 2013 and increased 8.6 percent in 12 months. Japan exports manufactured products and imports raw materials and commodities such that the country’s terms of trade, or export prices relative to import prices, deteriorate during commodity price increases. In contrast, prices of production machinery, with weight of 3.1 percent, increased 0.2 percent in Jun 2013 and decreased 0.6 percent in 12 months. In general, most manufactured products have been experiencing negative or low increases in prices while inflation rates have been high in 12 months for products originating in raw materials and commodities. Ironically, unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing that intended to increase aggregate demand and GDP growth deteriorated the terms of trade of advanced economies with adverse effects on real income.

Table IV-10, Japan, Corporate Goods Prices and Selected Components, % Weights, Month and 12 Months ∆%

Jun 2013	Weight	Month ∆%	12 Month ∆%
Total	1000.0	0.1	1.2
Food, Beverages, Tobacco, Feedstuffs	137.5	0.2	1.0
Petroleum & Coal	57.4	0.7	8.6
Production Machinery	30.8	0.2	-0.6
Electronic Components	31.0	0.1	-1.0
Electric Power, Gas & Water	52.7	1.8	9.4
Iron & Steel	56.6	0.1	-3.5
Chemicals	92.1	-0.3	3.2
Transport Equipment	136.4	-0.1	-1.3

Source: Bank of Japan http://www.boj.or.jp/en/ http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/pi/cgpi_release/cgpi1306.pdf

Percentage point contributions to change of the corporate goods price index (CGPI) in Jun 2013 are provided in Table IV-11 divided into domestic, export and import segments. In the domestic CGPI, increasing 0.1 percent in Jun 2013, the energy shock is evident in the contribution of 0.12 percentage points by electric power, gas and water in new carry trades of exposures in commodity futures. The exports CGPI decreased 0.4 percent on the basis of the contract currency with deduction of 0.22 percentage points by metals and related products. The imports CGPI decreased 0.4 percent on the contract currency basis. Petroleum, coal & natural gas deducted 0.16 percentage points because of reversals of carry trades into energy commodity exposures. Shocks of risk aversion cause unwinding carry trades that result in declining commodity prices with resulting downward pressure on price indexes. The volatility of inflation adversely affects financial and economic decisions worldwide.

Table IV-11, Japan, Percentage Point Contributions to Change of Corporate Goods Price Index

Groups Jun 2013	Contribution to Change Percentage Points
A. Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index	Monthly Change:  0.1%
Electric Power, Gas & Water	0.12
Petroleum & Coal Products	0.05
Business Oriented Machinery	0.02
Food, Beverages, Tobacco & Feedstuff	0.02
Nonferrous Metals	-0.08
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery Products	-0.03
Chemicals & Related Products	-0.03%
B. Export Price Index	Monthly Change:  -0.4% contract currency
Metals & Related Products	-0.22
Electric & Electronic Products	-0.05
Chemicals & Related Products	-0.04
Transportation Equipment	-0.03
C. Import Price Index	Monthly Change: -0.4 % contract currency basis
Petroleum, Coal & Natural Gas	-0.16
Metals & Related Products	-0.12
Foodstuffs & Feedstuffs	-0.11
Other Primary Products & Manufactured Goods	0.01

Source: Bank of Japan http://www.boj.or.jp/en/ http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/pi/cgpi_release/cgpi1306.pdf

China is experiencing similar inflation behavior as the advanced economies in several prior months in the form of declining commodity prices but differs in decreasing inflation of producer prices relative to a year earlier. As shown in Table IV-12, inflation of the price indexes for industry in Jun 2013 is minus 0.6 percent; 12-month inflation is minus 2.7 percent in Jun; and cumulative inflation in Jan-Jun 2013 relative to Jan-Jun 2012 is minus 2.2 percent. Inflation of segments in Jun 2013 in China is provided in Table IV-12 in column “Month Jun 2013 ∆%.” There were decreases of prices of mining & quarrying of 1.9 percent in Jun and decrease of 8.5 percent in 12 months. Prices of consumer goods decreased 0.2 percent in Jun and increased 0.0 percent in 12 months. Prices of inputs in the purchaser price index decreased 0.5 percent in Jun and declined 2.4 percent in 12 months. Fuel and power decreased 0.9 percent in Jun and declined 4.0 percent in 12 months. An important category of inputs for exports is textile raw materials, changing 0.0 percent in Jun and declining 0.0 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-12, China, Price Indexes for Industry ∆%

	Month     Jun 2013 ∆%	12-Month Jun 2013 ∆%	Jan-Jun 2013/Jan-Jun 2012 ∆%
I Producer Price Indexes	-0.6	-2.7	-2.2
Means of Production	-0.7	-3.5	-3.0
Mining & Quarrying	-1.9	-8.5	-6.9
Raw Materials	-0.8	-4.2	-3.7
Processing	-0.5	-2.7	-2.4
Consumer Goods	-0.2	0.0	0.4
Food	-0.2	0.4	0.9
Clothing	0.0	1.0	1.3
Daily Use Articles	-0.1	-0.5	0.2
Durable Consumer Goods	-0.1	-0.8	-0.8
II Purchaser Price Indexes	-0.5	-2.6	-2.4
Fuel and Power	-0.9	-4.9	-4.0
Ferrous Metals	-1.6	-6.3	-5.7
Nonferrous Metals	-0.6	-4.5	-3.7
Raw Chemical Materials	-0.5	-3.0	-3.3
Wood & Pulp	-0.1	-0.8	-0.6
Building Materials	-0.1	-1.5	-1.7
Other Industrial Raw Materials	-0.2	-1.0	-0.9
Agricultural	0.8	1.5	1.7
Textile Raw Materials	0.0	0.0	-0.6

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

China’s producer price inflation follows waves similar to those around the world but with declining trend since May 2012, as shown in Table IV-13. In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation was 6.4 percent in Jan-Jun 2011, driven by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. In the second wave, risk aversion unwound carry trades, resulting in annual equivalent inflation of minus 3.1 percent in Jul-Nov 2011. In the third wave, renewed risk aversion resulted in annual equivalent inflation of minus 2.4 percent in Dec 2011-Jan 2012. In the fourth wave, new carry trades resulted in annual equivalent inflation of 2.4 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation is minus 5.8 percent in May-Sep 2012. There are declining producer prices in China in Aug-Sep 2012 in contrast with increases worldwide. In a sixth wave, producer prices increased 0.2 percent in Oct 2012, which is equivalent to 2.4 percent in a year. In an eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in Nov-Dec 2012. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Jan-Feb 2013 is 2.4 percent. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 5.3 percent in Mar-Jun 2013.

Table IV-13, China, Month and 12-Month Rate of Change of Producer Price Index, ∆%

	12-Month ∆%	Month ∆%
Jun 2013	-2.7	-0.6
May	-2.9	-0.6
Apr	-2.6	-0.6
Mar	-1.9	0.0
AE ∆% Mar-Jun		-5.3
Feb	-1.6	0.2
Jan	-1.6	0.2
AE ∆% Jan-Feb		2.4
Dec 2012	-1.9	-0.1
Nov	-2.2	-0.1
AE ∆% Nov-Dec		-1.2
Oct	-2.8	0.2
AE ∆% Oct		2.4
Sep	-3.6	-0.1
Aug	-3.5	-0.5
Jul	-2.9	-0.8
Jun	-2.1	-0.7
May	-1.4	-0.4
AE ∆% May-Sep		-5.8
Apr	-0.7	0.2
Mar	-0.3	0.3
Feb	0.0	0.1
AE ∆% Feb-Apr		2.4
Jan	0.7	-0.1
Dec 2011	1.7	-0.3
AE ∆% Dec-Jan		-2.4
Nov	2.7	-0.7
Oct	5.0	-0.7
Sep	6.5	0.0
Aug	7.3	0.1
Jul	7.5	0.0
AE ∆% Jul-Nov		-3.1
Jun	7.1	0.0
May	6.8	0.3
Apr	6.8	0.5
Mar	7.3	0.6
Feb	7.2	0.8
Jan	6.6	0.9
AE ∆% Jan-Jun		6.4
Dec 2010	5.9	0.7

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart IV-21 of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides monthly and 12-month rates of inflation of the price indexes for the industrial sector. Negative monthly rates in Oct, Nov, Dec 2011, Jan, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Nov and Dec 2012 pulled down the 12-month rates to 5.0 percent in Oct 2011, 2.7 percent in Nov, 1.7 percent in Dec, 0.7 percent in Jan 2012, 0.0 percent in Feb, minus 0.3 percent in Mar, minus 0.7 percent in Apr, minus 1.4 percent in May, 2.1 in Jun, minus 2.9 percent in Jul, minus 3.5 percent in Aug, minus 3.6 percent in Sep. The increase of 0.2 percent in Oct 2012 pulled up the 12-month rate to minus 2.8 percent and the rate eased to minus 2.2 percent in Nov 2012 and minus 1.9 percent in Dec 2012. Increases of 0.2 percent in Jan and Feb 2013 pulled the 12-month rate to minus 1.6 percent while no change in Mar 2013 brought down the 12-month rate to minus 1.9 percent. Declines of prices of 0.6 percent in Apr, May and Jun 2013 pushed the 12-month rate to minus 2.7 percent.

Chart IV-21, China, Producer Prices for the Industrial Sector Month and 12 months ∆%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart IV-22 of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides monthly and 12-month inflation of the purchaser product indices for the industrial sector. Decreasing monthly inflation with four successive contractions from Oct 2011 to Jan 2012 and May-Aug 2012 pulled down the 12-month rate to minus 4.1 percent in Aug and Sep. Consecutive increases of 0.1 percent in Sep and Oct 2012 raised the 12-month rate to minus 3.3 percent in Oct 2012. The rate eased to minus 2.8 in Nov 2012 with decrease of 0.2 percent in Nov 2012 and minus 2.4 percent in Dec 2012 with monthly decrease of 0.1 percent. Increase of 0.3 percent in Jan 2013 and 0.2 in Feb 2013 pulled the 12-month rate to minus 1.9 percent. Decrease of prices of 0.1 percent in Mar 2013 brought down the 12-month rate to minus 2.0 percent. Declining prices of 0.6 percent in Apr and May 2013 and 0.5 percent in Jun 2013 pushed down the 12-month rate to minus 2.6 percent.

Chart IV-14, China, Purchaser Product Indices for Industrial Sector, Month and 12 months ∆%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

China is highly conscious of food price inflation because of its high weight in the basket of consumption of the population. Consumer price inflation in China in Jun 2013 was 0.0 percent and 2.7 percent in 12 months, as shown in Table IV-11. Food prices increased 0.0 percent in Jun 2013, increasing 4.9 percent in 12 months because of inclement winter weather in prior months. Adjustment occurred in May with decline of food prices by 1.6 percent and increase of 3.8 percent in 12 months and 3.8 percent in Jan-May 2013 relative to a year earlier. Another area of concern is housing inflation, which was 0.1 in Jun but increased 3.1 percent in 12 months. Prices of services increased 0.2 percent in Jun and gained 2.7 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-11, China, Consumer Price Index

2013	Jun 2013 Month   ∆%	Jun 2013 12-Month  ∆%	Jan-Jun 2013   ∆%/ Jan-Jun 2012
Consumer Prices	0.0	2.7	2.4
Urban	0.0	2.6	2.4
Rural	0.1	2.8	2.5
Food	0.0	4.9	4.0
Non-food	0.0	1.6	1.7
Consumer Goods	-0.1	2.6	2.3
Services	0.2	2.7	2.8
Commodity Categories:
Food	0.0	4.9	4.0
Tobacco, Liquor	-0.1	0.3	0.8
Clothing	-0.3	2.3	2.4
Household	0.1	1.5	1.6
Healthcare & Personal Articles	0.0	1.4	1.6
Transportation & Communication	0.0	-0.7	-0.6
Recreation, Education, Culture & Services	0.0	1.4	1.4
Residence	0.1	3.1	2.9

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Month and 12-month rates of change of consumer prices are provided in Table IV-12. There are waves of consumer price inflation in China similar to those around the world (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). In the first wave, consumer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 8.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2011, driven by commodity price increases resulting from unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates. In the second wave, risk aversion unwound carry trades with annual equivalent inflation falling to the rate of 2.0 percent in Apr-Jun 2011. In the third wave, inflation returned at 2.9 percent with renewed interest in commodity exposures in Jul-Nov 2011. In the fourth wave, inflation returned at a high 5.8 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Mar 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.9 percent in Apr to Jun 2012. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 4.1 percent in Jul-Sep 2012. In the seventh wave, inflation was minus 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Oct 2012 and 0.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 12.2 percent in Dec 2012-Feb 2013 primarily because of winter weather that caused increases in food prices. In the ninth wave, collapse of food prices resulted in annual equivalent inflation of minus 10.3 percent in Mar 2013. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 2.4 percent in Apr 2013. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.6 percent in May-Jun 2013. Inflation volatility originating in unconventional monetary policy clouds investment and consumption decisions by business and households.

Table IV-15, China, Month and 12-Month Rates of Change of Consumer Price Index ∆%

	Month ∆%	12-Month ∆%
Jun 2013	0.0	2.7
May	-0.6	2.1
AE ∆% May-Jun	-3.6
Apr	0.2	2.4
AE ∆% Apr	2.4
Mar 2013	-0.9	2.1
AE ∆% Mar	-10.3
Feb	1.1	3.2
Jan	1.0	2.0
Dec 2012	0.8	2.5
AE ∆% Dec-Feb	12.2
Nov	0.1	2.0
Oct	-0.1	1.7
AE ∆% Oct-Nov	0.0
Sep	0.3	1.9
Aug	0.6	2.0
Jul	0.1	1.8
AE ∆% Jul-Sep	4.1
Jun	-0.6	2.2
May	-0.3	3.0
Apr	-0.1	3.4
AE ∆% Apr to Jun	-3.9
Mar	0.2	3.6
Feb	-0.1	3.2
Jan	1.5	4.5
Dec 2011	0.3	4.1
AE ∆% Dec to Mar	5.8
Nov	-0.2	4.2
Oct	0.1	5.5
Sep	0.5	6.1
Aug	0.3	6.2
Jul	0.5	6.5
AE ∆% Jul to Nov	2.9
Jun	0.3	6.4
May	0.1	5.5
Apr	0.1	5.3
AE ∆% Apr to Jun	2.0	2.0
Mar	-0.2	5.4
Feb	1.2	4.9
Jan	1.0	4.9
AE ∆% Jan to Mar	8.3
Dec 2010	0.5	4.6

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart IV-11 of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides monthly and 12-month rates of consumer price inflation. In contrast with producer prices, consumer prices had not moderated at the monthly marginal rates. Consumer prices fell 0.2 percent in Nov 2011 after increasing only 0.1 percent in Oct but increased 0.3 percent in Dec and a high 1.5 percent in Jan 2012, declining 0.1 percent in Feb, rising 0.2 percent in Mar and declining 0.1 percent in Apr, 0.3 percent in May and 0.6 percent in Jun 2012 but increasing 0.1 percent in Jul, 0.6 percent in Aug 2012 and 0.3 percent in Sep 2012. Consumer prices fell 0.1 percent in Oct 2012. The decline of 0.1 percent in Feb 2012 pulled down the 12-month rate to 3.2 percent, which bounced back to 3.6 percent in Mar with the monthly increase of 0.2 percent and fell to 2.2 percent in Jun with increasing pace of monthly decline from Apr to Jun 2012. Even with increase of 0.1 percent in Jul 2012, consumer price inflation in 12 months fell to 1.8 percent in Jul 2012 but bounced back to 2.0 percent with increase of 0.6 percent in Aug. In Sep, increase of 0.3 percent still maintained 12-month inflation at 1.9 percent. The decline of 0.1 percent in Oct 2012 pulled down the 12-month rate to 1.7 percent, which is the lowest in Chart IV-3. Increase of 0.1 percent in Nov 2012 pulled up the 12-month rate to 2.0 percent. Abnormal increase of 0.8 percent in Dec 2012 because of winter weather pulled up the 12-month rate to 2.5 percent. Even with increase of 1.0 percent in Jan 2013 12-month inflation fell to 2.0 percent. Inflation of 1.1 percent in Feb 2013 pulled the 12-month rate to 3.2 percent. Collapse of food prices with decline of consumer prices by 0.9 percent in Mar 2013 brought down the 12-month rate to 2.1 percent. Renewed inflation of 0.2 percent in Apr 2013 raised the 12-month rate to 2.4 percent. Decline of inflation by 0.6 percent in May reduced 12-month inflation to 2.1 percent. Inflation rose to 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 with unchanged monthly inflation.

Chart IV-23, China, Consumer Prices ∆% Month and 12 Months

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

The estimate of consumer price inflation in Germany in Table IV-16 is 1.8 percent in 12 months ending in Jun 2013, 0.1 percent NSA (not seasonally adjusted) in Jun 2013 relative to May 2013 and 0.3 percent CSA (calendar and seasonally adjusted) in Jun 2013 relative to May 2013. There are waves of consumer price inflation in Germany similar to those worldwide (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html), as shown in Table IV-16. In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.0 percent in Feb-Apr 2011 NSA and 2.4 percent SA during risk appetite in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. In the second wave, annual equivalent consumer price inflation collapsed to 0.6 percent NSA and 3.0 percent SA in May-Jun 2011 because of risk aversion caused by European sovereign debt event. In the third wave, annual equivalent consumer price inflation was 1.7 percent NSA and 1.9 percent SA in Jul-Nov 2011 because of relaxed risk aversion. In the fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 0.6 percent NSA and 1.8 percent SA in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 4.5 percent NSA and 2.4 percent SA in Feb-Apr 2012 during another energy-commodity carry trade shock. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation in May-Jun 2012 is minus 1.2 percent NSA and 0.6 percent SA. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation NSA is 4.9 percent in Jul-Aug 2012 and 3.7 percent SA. In the eighth wave in Sep-Dec 2012, annual equivalent inflation is 1.5 percent NSA and 1.5 percent SA. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell to minus 5.8 percent NSA in Jan 2013 and minus 1.2 percent SA. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 6.8 percent NSA in Feb-Mar 2013 and 1.2 percent CSA. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Apr fell to minus 5.8 percent NSA and minus 0.0 percent SA in reversal of carry trades into commodity futures. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 3.0 percent in May-Jun 2013 NSA and 4.3 percent SA. Under unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing inflation becomes highly volatile during alternative shocks of risk aversion and risk appetite, preventing sound investment and consumption decisions.

Table IV-16, Germany, Consumer Price Index ∆%

	12-Month ∆%	Month ∆% NSA	Month ∆% CSA
Jun 2013	1.8	0.1	0.3
May	1.5	0.4	0.4
AE ∆% May-Jun		3.0	4.3
Apr	1.2	-0.5	0.0
AE ∆% Apr		-5.8	0.0
Mar	1.4	0.5	0.1
Feb	1.5	0.6	0.1
AE ∆% Feb-Mar		6.8	1.2
Jan	1.7	-0.5	-0.1
AE ∆% Jan		-5.8	-1.2
Dec 2012	2.0	0.3	0.2
Nov	1.9	0.1	0.1
Oct	2.0	0.0	0.1
Sep	2.0	0.1	0.1
AE ∆% Sep-Dec		1.5	1.5
Aug	2.2	0.4	0.3
Jul	1.9	0.4	0.3
AE ∆% Jul-Aug		4.9	3.7
Jun	1.7	-0.2	0.0
May	2.0	0.0	0.1
AE ∆% May-Jun		-1.2	0.6
Apr	2.0	-0.2	0.2
Mar	2.2	0.6	0.2
Feb	2.2	0.7	0.2
AE ∆% Feb-Apr		4.5	2.4
Jan	2.1	-0.1	0.3
Dec 2011	2.0	0.2	0.0
AE ∆% Dec-Jan		0.6	1.8
Nov	2.4	0.2	0.2
Oct	2.3	0.0	0.1
Sep	2.4	0.2	0.3
Aug	2.1	0.1	0.1
Jul	2.1	0.2	0.1
AE ∆% Jul-Nov		1.7	1.9
Jun	2.1	0.1	0.3
May	2.0	0.0	0.2
AE ∆% May-Jun		0.6	3.0
Apr	1.9	0.0	0.2
Mar	2.0	0.6	0.2
Feb	1.9	0.6	0.2
Jan	1.7	-0.2	0.2
AE ∆% Feb-Apr		3.0	2.4
Dec 2010	1.3	0.6	0.2
Nov	1.5	0.1	0.2
Oct	1.3	0.1	0.2
Sep	1.2	-0.1	0.1
Aug	1.0	0.1	0.1
Annual Average ∆%
2012	2.0
2011	2.1
2010	1.1
2009	0.4
2008	2.6
Dec 2009	0.8
Dec 2008	1.1
Dec 2007	3.2
Dec 2006	1.4
Dec 2005	1.4
Dec 2004	2.2
Dec 2003	1.1
Dec 2002	1.1
Dec 2001	1.6

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Chart IV-24 of the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, or federal statistical office of Germany, provides the unadjusted consumer price index of Germany from 2005 to 2013. There is evident acceleration in the form of sharper slope in the first months of 2011 and then a flattening in subsequent months with renewed strength in Dec 2011, decline in Jan 2012 and another upward spike from Feb to Apr 2012, new drop in May-Jun 2012 and increases in Jul and Aug 2012 relaxed in Sep-Nov 2012. Inflation returned in Dec 2012 and fell in Jan 2013, rebounding in Feb-Mar 2013. Inflation fell in Apr 2013 and rebounded in May 2013. Reversals of commodity exposures caused the decline in Apr 2013 followed by increases in May-Jun 2013. If risk aversion declines, new carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures could again result in higher inflation.

Chart IV-24, Germany, Consumer Price Index, Unadjusted, 2005=100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Chart IV-24A provides the consumer price index NSA of the US from 2005 to 2013. The salient similarity is the hump in 2008 caused by commodity carry trades driven by the movement to zero interest rates. Inflation communicated worldwide through carry trade from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity futures, creating instability in financial and economic decisions.

Chart IV-24A, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, NSA, 2005-2013

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-25, of the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, or Federal Statistical Agency of Germany, provides the unadjusted consumer price index and trend of Germany from 2009 to 2013. Chart IV-12 captures inflation waves with alternation of periods of positive and negative slopes resulting from zero interest rates with shocks of risk appetite and risk aversion. For example, the negative slope of decline of inflation by 0.2 percent in Jun 2012 and 0.0 percent in May 2012 follows an upward slope of price increases in Feb-Apr 2012 after decline of inflation by 0.1 percent in Jan 2012. The final segment shows another positive slope caused by inflation of 0.4 percent in Jul 2012, which is followed by 0.4 percent in Aug 2012 and flattening segment as inflation remains almost unchanged with 0.1 percent in Sep and 0.0 percent in Oct 2012, increasing 0.1 percent in Nov 2012 and increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2012. Inflation fell 0.5 percent in Jan 2013 and jumped 0.6 percent in Feb 2013 and 0.5 percent in Mar 2013. The final declining segment indicates the decline of 0.5 percent in Apr 2013 followed by the increases in May-Jun 2013. The waves occur around an upward trend of prices, disproving the proposition of fear of deflation.

Chart IV-25, Germany, Consumer Price Index, Unadjusted and Trend, 2005=100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Table IV-17 provides the monthly and 12-month rate of inflation for segments of the consumer price index of Germany in Jun 2013. Inflation excluding energy increased 0.1 percent in Jun 2013 and rose 1.7 percent in 12 months. Excluding household energy inflation was 0.2 percent in Jun 2013 and rose 1.7 percent in 12 months. Food prices increased 0.4 percent in Jun 2013 and increased 5.4 percent in 12 months. There were differences in inflation of energy-related prices. Heating oil fell 2.4 percent in 12 months and decreased 0.7 percent in Jun in reversal of carry trades. Motor fuels decreased 0.0 percent in Jun and decreased 0.8 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-17, Germany, Consumer Price Index ∆%

Jun 2013	Weight	12- Month ∆%	Month   ∆%
Total	1,000.00	1.8	0.1
Excluding heating oil and motor fuels	950.52	2.0	0.1
Excluding household energy	931.81	1.7	0.2
Excluding Energy	893.44	1.7	0.1
Total Goods	479.77	2.3	-0.1
Nondurable Consumer Goods	307.89	3.0	0.2
Medium-Term Life Consumer Goods	91.05	1.8	-0.8
Durable Consumer Goods	80.83	-0.7	-0.3
Services	520.23	1.6	0.4
Energy Components
Motor Fuels	38.37	-0.8	0.0
Household Energy	68.19	5.1	-0.1
Heating Oil	11.11	-2.4	-0.7
Food	90.52	5.4	0.4

Source: Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/07/PE13_231_46241.html

Table IV-18 provides monthly and 12 months consumer price inflation in France. There are the same waves as in inflation worldwide (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html). In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation in Jan-Apr 2011 was 4.3 percent driven by the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures positions in an environment of risk appetite. In the second wave, risk aversion caused the reversal of carry trades into commodity futures, resulting in the fall of the annual equivalent inflation rate to minus 1.2 percent in May-Jul 2011. In the third wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 3.0 percent in Aug-Nov 2011 with alternations of risk aversion and risk appetite. In the fourth wave, risk aversion originating in the European debt crisis caused annual equivalent inflation of 0.0 percent from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 5.3 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in May-Jul 2012 during another bout of risk aversion causing reversal of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity price futures exposures. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 8.7 percent in Aug 2012, 3.0 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 2.8 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Nov 2012 and minus 1.6 percent in Nov 2012 to Jan 2013. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 6.8 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in Apr because of reversal of commodity carry trades. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.8 percent in May-Jun 2013.

Table IV-18, France, Consumer Price Index, Month and 12-Month ∆%

	Month ∆%	12-Month ∆%
Jun 2013	0.2	0.9
May	0.1	0.8
AE ∆% May-Jun	1.8
Apr	-0.1	0.7
AE ∆% Apr	-1.2
Mar	0.8	1.0
Feb	0.3	1.0
AE ∆% Feb-Mar	6.8
Jan	-0.5	1.2
Dec 2012	0.3	1.3
Nov	-0.2	1.4
AE ∆% Nov-Jan	-1.6
Oct	0.2	1.9
Sep	-0.2	1.9
Aug	0.7	2.1
AE ∆% Aug-Oct	2.8
Jul	-0.5	1.9
Jun	0.0	1.9
May	-0.1	2.0
AE ∆% May-Jul	-2.4
Apr	0.1	2.1
Mar	0.8	2.3
Feb	0.4	2.3
AE ∆% Feb-Apr	5.3
Jan	-0.4	2.4
Dec 2011	0.4	2.5
AE ∆% Dec-Jan	0.0
Nov	0.3	2.5
Oct	0.3	2.4
Sep	-0.1	2.2
Aug	0.5	2.2
AE ∆% Aug-Nov	3.0
Jul	-0.5	1.9
Jun	0.1	2.1
May	0.1	2.0
AE ∆% May-Jul	-1.2
Apr	0.3	2.1
Mar	0.8	2.0
Feb	0.5	1.6
Jan	-0.2	1.8
AE ∆% Jan-Apr	4.3
Dec 2010	0.4	1.8
Annual
2012		2.0
2011		2.1
2010		1.5
2009		0.1
2008		2.8
2007		1.5
2006		1.6
2005		1.8
2004		2.1
2003		2.1
2002		1.9
2001		1.7
2000		1.7
1999		0.5
1998		0.7
1997		1.2
1996		2.0
1995		1.8
1994		1.6
1993		2.1
1992		2.4
1991		3.2

AE: Annual Equivalent Metropolitan France

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=29&date=20130711

Chart IV-26 of Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques provides the consumer price index in France since Jan 1998. There is the same jump and decline of inflation during the global recession from 2008 to 2009 caused by carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity exposures. The index also captures the waves of inflation around an upward trend.

Chart IV-26, France, Consumer Price Index, Jan 1998-May 2013, 1998=100

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=29&date=20130711

Table IV-19 provides consumer price inflation in France and of various items in Jun 2013 and in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013. Inflation of all items was 0.2 percent in Jun 2013 and 0.9 percent in 12 months. Energy prices changed 0.0 percent in Jun 2013 and increased 1.7 percent in 12 months. Transport and communications increased 0.4 percent in Jun 2013 and fell 5.8 percent in 12 months. Food and rentals and dwellings show higher 12-month increases of 1.8 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively, with energy increasing 1.7 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-19, France, Consumer Price Index, Month and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Index and Components, ∆%

Jun 2013	Weights	Month ∆%	12-Month ∆%
All Items	10000	0.2	0.9
Food	1658	0.4	1.8
Manufactured Products	2738	0.0	-0.4
Energy	822	0.0	1.7
Petroleum Products	495	0.1	-0.9
Services	4576	0.2	1.0
Rentals, Dwellings	748	0.1	1.7
Transport and Communications	506	0.4	-5.8

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=29&date=20130711

Chart IV-27 of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) of France shows headline and core consumer price inflation of France. Inflation rose during the commodity price shock of unconventional monetary policy. Risk aversion in late 2008 and beginning of 2009 caused collapse of valuation of commodity futures with resulting decline in inflation. The current downward trend of inflation originates in concentration of carry trades in equities and high-yield bonds with reversal of exposures in commodities.

Chart IV-27, France, Consumer Price Index (IPC) and Core Consumer Price Index (ISJ) 12 Months Rates of Change

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=29&date=20130711

The first wave of commodity price increases in the first four months of Jan-Apr 2011 also influenced the surge of consumer price inflation in Italy shown in Table IV-13. Annual equivalent inflation in the first four months of 2011 was 4.9 percent. The crisis of confidence or risk aversion resulted in reversal of carry trades on commodity positions. Consumer price inflation in Italy was subdued in the second wave in Jun and May 2011 at 0.1 percent for annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent inflation increased to 2.4 percent. In the fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 jumped again at 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the fifth wave from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 at annual equivalent 4.3 percent. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 5.7 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 3.0 percent in Jul-Aug 2012. In the ninth wave, inflation collapsed to zero in Sep-Oct 2012 and was minus 0.8 percent in annual equivalent in Sep-Nov 2012. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Dec 2012 to Jun 2013 was 1.7 percent. There are worldwide shocks to economies by intermittent waves of inflation originating in combination of zero interest rates and quantitative easing with alternation of risk appetite and risk aversion (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html).

Table IV-20, Italy, Consumer Price Index

	Month	12 Months
Jun 2013	0.3	1.2
May	0.0	1.1
Apr	0.0	1.1
Mar	0.2	1.6
Feb	0.1	1.9
Jan	0.2	2.2
Dec 2012	0.2	2.3
AE ∆% Dec 2012-Jun 2013	1.7
Nov 2012	-0.2	2.5
Oct	0.0	2.6
Sep	0.0	3.2
AE ∆% Sep-Nov	-0.8
Aug	0.4	3.2
Jul	0.1	3.1
AE ∆% Jul-Aug	3.0
June	0.2	3.3
May	0.0	3.2
AE ∆% May-Jun	1.2
Apr	0.5	3.3
Mar	0.5	3.3
Feb	0.4	3.3
AE ∆% Feb-Apr	5.7
Jan	0.3	3.2
Dec 2011	0.4	3.3
AE ∆% Dec-Jan	4.3
Nov	-0.1	3.3
Oct	0.6	3.4
AE ∆% Oct-Nov	3.0
Sep	0.0	3.0
Aug	0.3	2.8
Jul	0.3	2.7
AE ∆% Jul-Sep	2.4
Jun	0.1	2.7
May	0.1	2.6
AE ∆% May-Jun	1.2
Apr	0.5	2.6
Mar	0.4	2.5
Feb	0.3	2.4
Jan	0.4	2.1
AE ∆% Jan-Apr	4.9
Dec 2010	0.4	1.9
Annual
2012		3.0
2011		2.8
2010		1.5
2009		0.8
2008		3.3
2007		1.8
2006		2.1

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/95553

Consumer price inflation in Italy by segments in the estimate by ISTAT for Jun 2013 is provided in Table IV-21. Total consumer price inflation in Jun 2013 was 0.3 percent and 1.2 percent in 12 months. Inflation of goods was 0.2 percent in Jun 2013 and 0.9 percent in 12 months. Prices of durable goods decreased 0.5 percent in Jun and decreased 0.8 percent in 12 months, as typical in most countries. Prices of energy increased 0.3 percent in Jun and decreased 0.5 percent in 12 months. Food prices increased 0.6 percent in Jun and increased 2.8 percent in 12 months. Prices of services increased 0.3 percent in Jun and rose 1.6 percent in 12 months. Transport prices, also influenced by commodity prices, increased 0.7 percent in Jun and increased 3.0 percent in 12 months. Carry trades from zero interest rates to positions in commodity futures cause increases in commodity prices. Waves of inflation originate in periods when there is no risk aversion and commodity prices decline during periods of risk aversion (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/paring-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html).

Table IV-21, Italy, Consumer Price Index and Segments, Month and 12-Month ∆%

Jun 2013	Weights	Month ∆%	12-Month ∆%
General Index	1,000,000	0.3	1.2
I Goods	559,402	0.2	0.9
Food	168,499	0.6	2.8
Energy	94,758	0.3	-0.5
Durable	89,934	-0.5	-0.8
Nondurable	71,031	0.0	1.4
II Services	440,598	0.3	1.6
Housing	71,158	0.2	2.1
Communications	20,227	-0.3	-3.4
Transport	81,266	0.7	3.0

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/95553

Chart IV-17 of the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica shows moderation in 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index of Italy with marginal increase followed by decline to 2.5 percent in Nov 2012, 2.3 percent in Dec 2012, 2.2 percent in Jan 2013, 1.9 percent in Feb 2013 and 1.6 percent in Mar 2013. Consumer prices increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr-May 2013 and 1.2 percent in Jun 2013.

Chart, IV-28, Italy, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Changes

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/en/

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013