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FOMC Policy Rate Unchanged, Competitive Currency Devaluation, Twenty Million Unemployed or Underemployed with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Stagnating Real Wages, Revision of United States National Accounts since 1929, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income, World Financial Turbulence, World Cyclical Slow Growth, Government Intervention in Globalization, and Global Recession Risk
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
I Twenty Million Unemployed or Underemployed
IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation
IA2 Number of People in Job Stress
IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment
IA4 Job Creation
II Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures
IIB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures
IB2 Financial Repression
III World Financial Turbulence
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
I IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides important revisions and enhancements of data on personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). There are waves of changes in personal income and expenditures in Table IB-1 that correspond somewhat to inflation waves observed worldwide (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm) because of the influence through price indexes. There are wide fluctuations in Nov and Dec 2012 by the rush to realize income of all forms in anticipation of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. There is major distortion in Jan 2013 because of higher contributions in payrolls to government social insurance that caused sharp reduction in personal income and disposable personal income. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) explains as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):
“The February and January [2013] changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December [2012] in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”
The BEA provides the annual update of the national income and product account (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html): “Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts
The estimates released today reflect the results of the annual update of the national income and
product accounts (NIPAs) in conjunction with preliminary estimates for June 2017. The update covers the most recent 3 years and the first 5 months of 2017. For more information, see information on the “2017 Annual Update” on BEA’s website. Additionally, the August Survey of Current Business will contain an article that describes the results in detail.”
The BEA provides “Comprehensive Update of the National Income and Product Accounts” on Jul 31, 2018 with revisions since 1929 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html): “The estimates released today also reflect the results of the 15th comprehensive update of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The updated estimates reflect previously announced improvements (https://www.bea.gov/scb/2018/04-april/0418-preview-2018-comprehensive-nipa-update.htm), and include the introduction of new not seasonally adjusted estimates for GDP, GDI and their major components. For more information, see the Technical Note. Revised NIPA table stubs, initial results, and background materials are available on the BEA Web site (https://www.bea.gov/index.htm).”
In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011 with relaxed risk aversion, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 7.4 percent, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 4.6 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 5.8 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 0.3 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) rose at annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the second wave in May-Aug 2011 under risk aversion, NPI rose at annual equivalent 4.0 percent, NPDI at 4.0 percent and NPCE at 3.0 percent. RDPI increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 1.2 percent annual equivalent. With mixed shocks of risk aversion in the third wave from Sep to Dec 2011, NPI rose at 3.6 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 4.3 percent and NPCE at 2.1 percent. RDPI increased at 2.7 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 0.9 percent annual equivalent. In the fourth wave from Jan to Mar 2012, NPI increased at 9.2 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 10.0 percent and NPCE at 6.6 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) is more dynamic in the revisions, growing at 7.0 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 3.7 percent. The policy of repressing savings with zero interest rates stimulated growth of nominal consumption (NPCE) at the annual equivalent rate of 6.6 percent and real consumption (RPCE) at 3.7 percent. In the fifth wave in Apr-Jul 2012, NPI increased at annual equivalent 0.0 percent, NDPI at minus 0.6 percent and RDPI at minus 0.3 percent. Financial repression failed to stimulate consumption with NPCE growing at 0.9 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 0.6 percent. In the sixth wave in Aug-Oct 2012, in another wave of carry trades into commodity futures, NPI increased at 7.9 percent annual equivalent and NDPI increased at 7.4 percent while real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 3.6 percent annual equivalent. NPCE increased at 4.1 percent and RPCE changed at 0.8 percent. Data for Nov-Dec 2012 have illusory increases: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). In the seventh wave, anticipations of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused exceptional income gains that increased personal income to annual equivalent 26.8 percent in Nov-Dec 2012, nominal disposable income at 25.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 26.1 percent with likely effects on nominal personal consumption that increased at 1.8 percent and real personal consumption at 2.4 percent with subdued prices. The numbers in parentheses show that without the exceptional effects NDPI (nominal disposable personal income) increased at 5.5 percent and RDPI (real disposable personal income) at 8.7 percent. In the eighth wave, nominal personal income fell 4.7 percent in Jan 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 43.9 percent; nominal disposable personal income fell 5.6 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 49.9 percent; real disposable income fell 5.8 percent or at the annual rate of decline of 51.2 percent; nominal personal consumption expenditures increased 0.6 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 7.4 percent; and real personal consumption expenditures increased 0.4 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. The savings rate fell significantly from 12.0 percent in Dec 2012 to 6.3 percent in Jan 2013. The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as follows (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf 3):
“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income -- increased $126.7 billion in January, compared with an increase of $6.3 billion in December. The
January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.8 billion to January. As noted above, employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, so the total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.8 billion”
Further explanation is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3):
“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The
January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion. The January change in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates. Excluding these special factors and others, which are discussed more fully below, DPI increased $46.8 billion in February, or 0.4 percent, after increasing $15.8 billion, or 0.1 percent, in January.”
The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). In the ninth wave in Feb-Mar 2013, nominal personal income changed at 0.0 percent and nominal disposable income fell at 0.6 percent annual equivalent, while real disposable income decreased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 0.0 percent annual equivalent. The savings rate collapsed from 8.8 percent in Oct 2012, 9.7 percent in Nov 2012 and 12.0 percent in Dec 2012 to 6.3 percent in Jan 2013, 5.8 percent in Feb 2013 and 5.9 percent in Mar 2013. In the tenth wave from Apr to Sep 2013, personal income grew at 3.9 percent annual equivalent, nominal disposable income increased at annual equivalent 4.1 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. Real disposable income grew at 3.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 1.4 percent. In the eleventh wave, nominal personal income fell at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Oct 2013, nominal disposable income fell at 1.2 percent and real disposable income fell at 3.5 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.7 percent. In the twelfth wave, nominal personal income increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2013, nominal disposable income at 6.2 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 7.4 percent. Real disposable income increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 4.9 percent. In the thirteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 7.4 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2013 and nominal disposable income at 6.2 percent while real disposable income increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent and 1.2 percent for real personal consumption expenditures. In the fourteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 9.6 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Mar 2014, nominal disposable income at 9.2 percent and nominal consumption expenditures at 4.9 percent. Real disposable personal income increased at 7.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 2.8 percent. In the fifteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.7 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014 and nominal disposable income at 5.9 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.4 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014. Nominal personal consumption increased at 6.4 percent annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014 and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.7 percent. In the sixteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.6 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Dec 2014, nominal disposable income at 4.9 percent and nominal personal consumption at 2.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at 5.2 percent in Sep-Dec 2014 and real personal consumption expenditure at 4.0 percent. In the seventeenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2015 and nominal disposable income increased at 3.0 percent while nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.9 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.0 percent. In the eighteenth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 5.3 percent and nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) increased at 4.5 percent annual equivalent in Mar-Jun 2015. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 2.4 percent. Nominal consumption expenditures (NPCE) increased at 6.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) increased at 3.7 percent. In the nineteenth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 4.1 percent in Jun-Aug 2015 and nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 4.9 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 3.2 percent, nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 4.1 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) at 2.8 percent. In the twentieth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Dec 2015, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 0.3 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 2.1 percent. Real disposable personal income grew at 0.9 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 2.1 percent. In the twenty-first wave, nominal personal income increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2016. Nominal disposable personal income increased at 3.0 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. Real disposable personal income increased at 3.0 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. In the twenty-second wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.0 percent in Mar-Apr 2016. Nominal disposable income increased at 2.4 percent and real disposable income fell at 0.6 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 4.9 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-third wave, nominal personal income increased at 2.8 percent in May-Jul 2016 and nominal disposable income at 2.8 percent while nominal consumption expenditures increased at 4.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 0.8 percent and real consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. In the twenty-fourth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.1 percent in Aug-Oct 2016 and nominal disposable income at 4.9 percent while nominal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real disposable income increased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.8 percent. In the twenty-fifth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.3 percent and nominal disposable income increased at 4.3 percent in Nov-Dec 2016. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real personal disposable income decreased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.0 percent. In the twenty-sixth wave, nominal personal income increased at annual equivalent 7.4 percent in Jan-Feb 2017, nominal disposable income at 8.1 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 1.8 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.9 percent and real personal consumption expenditures fell at 0.6 percent. In the twenty-seventh wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.2 percent in Mar-May 2017 and nominal disposable income at 3.2 percent while nominal personal consumption increased at 4.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 2.8 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.1 percent. In the twenty-eighth wave, nominal personal income increased at 1.2 percent in Jun 2017 and nominal disposable income changed at 0.0 percent while nominal personal consumption increased at 3.7 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 1.2 percent and real consumption expenditures increased at 2.4 percent. In the twenty-ninth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.9 percent in Jul-Aug 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 2.4 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.0 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirtieth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent in Sep-Oct 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 5.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.0 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 7.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. In the thirty-first wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.7 percent in Nov 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 8.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 6.2 percent. In the thirty-second wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent in Dec 2017-Jan 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 8.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.0 percent. Real disposable income increased at 5.5 percent and real personal consumption expenditures changed at 0.0 percent. In the thirty-third wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.1 percent in Feb-Apr 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 4.1 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.8 percent. In the thirty-fourth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.9 percent in May-Jun 2018 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 4.9 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 5.5 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.0 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent.
There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:
- Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP two trillion dollars below trend (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.2 percent per year from 1929 to 2017, with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.5 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2017. GDP in IIQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent
- Private fixed investment stagnating initially followed by cumulative increase of 26.0 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2018 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html)
- Twenty million or 11.7 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with stagnating or declining real wages (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
- Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)
- Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-rising.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/impact-of-monetary-policy-on-exchange.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
- Productivity growth fell from 2.1 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2017 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.2 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2017, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/collateral-effects-of-unwinding.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/ii-rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)
- Output of manufacturing in Jun 2018 at 28.8 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 21.1 percent below trend since 1986 https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html
and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)
- Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Worldwide waves of inflation (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
- Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/continuing-gradual-increases-in-fed.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/united-states-inflation-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier) (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
- Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/stronger-dollar-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
- 43 million in poverty and 29 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1999 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 27.7 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2018 when it would have grown over 36.7 percent at trend of 3.1 percent per year in real terms from IVQ1945 to IQ2018 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/destruction-of-household-nonfinancial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html). Financial assets increased $27.6 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $5.9 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation increased 2.0 percent.
The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 36 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/gdp2q18_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.8 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $15,557.3 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $15,134.1 billion in IIQ2009 {[($15,557.3/$15,134.1) -1]100 = 2.8%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.1 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.6 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991, 3.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1991 and at 7.9 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/revision-of-united-states-national.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2018 would have accumulated to 36.4 percent. GDP in IIQ2018 would be $21,499.4 billion (in constant dollars of 2012) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2992.2 billion than actual $18,507.2 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 20.0 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 11.7 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/07/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/06/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IIQ2018 is 13.9 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $15,762.0 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $18,507.2 billion in IIQ2018 or 17.4 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jun 1919 to Jun 2018. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 149.2564 in Jun 2018. The actual index NSA in Jun 2018 is 106.2562, which is 28.8 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.1 percent between Dec 1986 and Jun 2018. Using trend growth of 2.1 percent per year, the index would increase to 134.7372 in Jun 2018. The output of manufacturing at 106.2562 in Jun 2018 is 21.1 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table IB-1, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month Seasonally Adjusted of Personal Income, Disposable Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures %
| NPI | NDPI | RDPI | NPCE | RPCE | |
| Jun 2018 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| May | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% May-Jun | 4.9 | 4.9 | 3.0 | 5.5 | 3.7 |
| Apr | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| Mar | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Feb | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | -0.1 | -0.3 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Apr | 4.1 | 4.1 | 2.4 | 4.5 | 2.8 |
| Jan | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| Dec 2017 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Dec-Jan | 5.5 | 8.7 | 5.5 | 3.0 | 0.0 |
| Nov | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Nov | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.2 | 8.7 | 6.2 |
| Oct | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Sep | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Oct | 5.5 | 5.5 | 3.0 | 7.4 | 4.9 |
| Aug | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| Jul | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Jul-Aug | 4.9 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 1.2 |
| Jun | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jun | 1.2 | 0.0 | -1.2 | 3.7 | 2.4 |
| May | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Apr | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Mar | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| AE ∆% Mar-May | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 4.5 | 4.1 |
| Feb | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| Jan | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Feb | 7.4 | 8.1 | 4.9 | 1.8 | -0.6 |
| Dec 2016 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Nov | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Nov-Dec | 4.3 | 4.3 | 2.4 | 4.9 | 3.0 |
| Oct | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Sep | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Aug | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Oct | 4.1 | 4.9 | 2.4 | 4.9 | 2.8 |
| Jul | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Jun | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| May | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% May-Jul | 2.8 | 2.8 | 0.8 | 4.5 | 2.4 |
| Apr | 0.2 | 0.1 | -0.2 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
| Mar | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Mar-Apr | 3.0 | 2.4 | -0.6 | 4.9 | 1.2 |
| Feb | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| Jan | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Feb | 1.2 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| 2015 | |||||
| Dec | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Nov | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Oct | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Sep | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Dec | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 |
| Aug | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Jul | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Jun | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Jun-Aug | 4.1 | 4.9 | 3.2 | 4.1 | 2.8 |
| May | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| Apr | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Mar | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.2 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Mar-Jun | 5.3 | 4.5 | 2.4 | 6.2 | 3.7 |
| Feb | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Jan | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.5 | -0.1 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Feb | 4.9 | 3.0 | 4.9 | 1.2 | 3.0 |
| 2014 | |||||
| Dec | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Nov | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Oct | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| Sep | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Dec | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 2.7 | 4.0 |
| Aug | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Jul | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| Jun | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| May | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| Apr | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Apr-Aug | 5.7 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 6.4 | 4.7 |
| Mar | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| Feb | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Jan | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.0 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Mar | 9.6 | 9.2 | 7.4 | 4.9 | 2.8 |
| 2013 | |||||
| Dec | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 7.4 | 6.2 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.2 |
| Nov | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Nov | 6.2 | 6.2 | 3.7 | 7.4 | 4.9 |
| Oct | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Oct | -1.2 | -1.2 | -3.5 | 6.2 | 3.7 |
| Sep | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Aug | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Jul | -0.1 | 0.0 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| Jun | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| May | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Apr | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | -0.2 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Apr-Sep | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 1.4 |
| Mar | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | -0.1 | 0.0 |
| Feb | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Mar | 0.0 | -0.6 | -1.8 | 1.2 | 0.0 |
| Jan | -4.7 | -5.6 (0.1)a | -5.8 | 0.6 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -43.9 | -49.9 (3.7)a | -51.2 | 7.4 | 4.9 |
| 2012 | |||||
| ∆% Jan-Dec 2012*** | 8.3 | 8.3 | 6.5 | 3.4 | 1.7 |
| Dec | 2.6 | 2.5 (0.3)* | 2.5 (0.5)* | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nov | 1.4 | 1.3 (0.6)* | 1.4 (0.9)* | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Nov-Dec | 26.8 | 25.3 (5.5)* | 26.1 (8.7)* | 1.8 | 2.4 |
| Oct | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Sep | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Aug | 0.0 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Oct | 7.9 | 7.4 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 0.8 |
| Jul | -0.6 | -0.7 | -0.7 | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| Jun | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | -0.2 | -0.1 |
| May | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 |
| Apr | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Apr-Jul | 0.0 | -0.6 | -0.3 | 0.9 | 0.6 |
| Mar | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.0 | -0.2 |
| Feb | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 |
| Jan | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Mar | 9.2 | 10.0 | 7.0 | 6.6 | 3.7 |
| 2011 | |||||
| ∆% Jan-Dec 2011* | 5.2 | 4.3 | 1.6 | 3.7 | 1.0 |
| Dec | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Nov | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 | -0.1 |
| Oct | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Sep | 0.0 | 0.0 | -0.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Dec | 3.6 | 4.3 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 0.9 |
| Aug | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Jul | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| Jun | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| May | 0.2 | 0.2 | -0.1 | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% May-Aug | 4.0 | 4.0 | 1.8 | 3.0 | 1.2 |
| Apr | 0.2 | 0.2 | -0.2 | 0.4 | -0.1 |
| Mar | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.3 | 0.8 | 0.4 |
| Feb | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| Jan | 1.6 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 7.4 | 4.6 | 0.3 | 5.8 | 1.2 |
| 2010 | |||||
| ∆% Jan-Dec 2010** | 5.8 | 5.0 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 2.6 |
| Dec | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| Nov | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Oct | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| IVQ2010∆% | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 0.6 |
| IVQ2010 AE ∆% | 7.4 | 7.0 | 4.1 | 5.7 | 2.4 |
Notes: *Excluding exceptional income gains in Nov and Dec 2012 because of anticipated tax increases in Jan 2013 ((page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). a Excluding employee contributions for government social insurance (pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf )Excluding NPI: current dollars personal income; NDPI: current dollars disposable personal income; RDPI: chained (2005) dollars DPI; NPCE: current dollars personal consumption expenditures; RPCE: chained (2005) dollars PCE; AE: annual equivalent; IVQ2010: fourth quarter 2010; A: annual equivalent
Percentage change month to month seasonally adjusted
*∆% Dec 2011/Dec 2010 **∆% Dec 2010/Dec 2009 *** ∆% Dec 2012/Dec 2011
Source: US Bureau of Economic http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
The 12-month rate of increase of real disposable income fell to minus 1.0 percent in Oct 2013 and minus 2.1 percent in Nov 2013 partly because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of incomes to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income fell 4.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 primarily because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of income to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income increased 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014, partly because of the low level in Jan 2013 after anticipation of incomes in late 2012 in avoiding the fiscal cliff episode. Real disposable income increased 3.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2018.
RPCE growth decelerated less sharply from close to 3 percent in IVQ2010 to 2.8 percent in Jun 2018. Subdued growth of RPCE could affect revenues of business. Growth rates of personal consumption have weakened in oscillations. Goods and especially durable goods have been driving growth of PCE as shown by the much higher 12-month rates of growth of real goods PCE (RPCEG) and durable goods real PCE (RPCEGD) than services real PCE (RPCES). Growth of consumption of goods and, in particular, of consumer durable goods drives the faster expansion of the economy while growth of consumption of services is much more moderate. The 12-month rates of growth of RPCEGD have fallen from around 10 percent and even higher in several months from Sep 2010 to Feb 2011 to the range of 5.4 to 9.3 percent from Jun 2017 to Jun 2018. RPCEG growth rates have fallen from around 5 percent late in 2010 and early Jan-Feb 2011 to the range of 3.1 to 5.3 percent from Jun 2017 to Jun 2018. In Jun 2018, RPCEG increased 3.9 percent in 12 months and RPCEGD 6.6 percent while RPCES increased 2.2 percent. There are limits to sustained growth based on financial repression in an environment of weak labor markets and real labor remuneration.
Table IB-2, Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
Percentage Change from the Same Month a Year Earlier %
| RDPI | RPCE | RPCEG | RPCEGD | RPCES | |
| 2018 | |||||
| Jun | 3.1 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 6.6 | 2.2 |
| May | 2.7 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 6.8 | 1.9 |
| Apr | 2.9 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 6.9 | 1.9 |
| Mar | 2.6 | 2.2 | 3.9 | 6.9 | 1.5 |
| Feb | 2.7 | 2.4 | 4.0 | 6.5 | 1.7 |
| Jan | 3.0 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 6.4 | 1.9 |
| 2017 | |||||
| Dec | 2.7 | 2.7 | 4.3 | 6.5 | 1.9 |
| Nov | 2.7 | 2.8 | 5.3 | 9.3 | 1.8 |
| Oct | 2.9 | 2.6 | 4.2 | 7.2 | 1.8 |
| Sep | 2.8 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 7.0 | 1.7 |
| Aug | 3.0 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 5.4 | 1.8 |
| Jul | 2.9 | 2.4 | 3.4 | 6.5 | 2.0 |
| Jun | 2.9 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 6.4 | 2.0 |
| May | 2.9 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 7.2 | 2.1 |
| Apr | 2.4 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 7.3 | 2.1 |
| Mar | 2.4 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 7.1 | 2.7 |
| Feb | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 4.7 | 2.0 |
| Jan | 1.7 | 2.8 | 3.7 | 7.5 | 2.4 |
| 2016 | |||||
| Dec | 1.6 | 2.8 | 3.7 | 7.7 | 2.4 |
| Nov | 1.8 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 5.2 | 2.6 |
| Oct | 1.3 | 2.7 | 3.9 | 7.4 | 2.2 |
| Sep | 1.1 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 6.8 | 2.5 |
| Aug | 1.0 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 4.9 | 2.3 |
| Jul | 1.2 | 2.7 | 3.5 | 5.5 | 2.3 |
| Jun | 1.3 | 2.9 | 4.1 | 5.3 | 2.4 |
| May | 1.5 | 2.6 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 2.2 |
| Apr | 2.0 | 2.7 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 2.3 |
| Mar | 2.7 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 2.3 |
| Feb | 2.3 | 3.1 | 4.7 | 7.2 | 2.3 |
| Jan | 2.6 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 4.7 | 2.2 |
| 2015 | |||||
| Dec | 2.7 | 2.9 | 4.0 | 5.6 | 2.4 |
| Nov | 3.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 6.4 | 2.5 |
| Oct | 3.7 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 2.8 |
| Sep | 4.0 | 3.5 | 4.7 | 6.1 | 2.9 |
| Aug | 4.1 | 3.5 | 4.6 | 7.7 | 2.9 |
| Jul | 4.3 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 8.0 | 3.4 |
| Jun | 4.3 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 7.0 | 3.4 |
| May | 4.5 | 4.2 | 5.1 | 8.0 | 3.7 |
| Apr | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 8.6 | 3.8 |
| Mar | 4.2 | 4.1 | 5.2 | 8.2 | 3.6 |
| Feb | 5.0 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 8.2 | 3.9 |
| Jan | 5.4 | 4.5 | 6.3 | 11.7 | 3.6 |
| 2014 | |||||
| Dec | 5.4 | 3.8 | 5.3 | 10.1 | 3.2 |
| Nov | 5.1 | 3.6 | 4.8 | 8.8 | 3.1 |
| Oct | 5.0 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 8.7 | 3.3 |
| Sep | 4.3 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 9.1 | 3.1 |
| Aug | 4.4 | 3.7 | 5.1 | 8.4 | 3.1 |
| Jul | 4.2 | 3.1 | 4.1 | 7.3 | 2.7 |
| Jun | 3.7 | 3.1 | 4.5 | 8.2 | 2.4 |
| May | 3.4 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 7.1 | 2.1 |
| Apr | 3.7 | 2.6 | 4.2 | 6.3 | 1.8 |
| Mar | 3.8 | 2.2 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 1.4 |
| Feb | 3.4 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 3.4 | 1.4 |
| Jan | 2.2 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.4 |
| 2013 | |||||
| Dec | -4.2 | 1.9 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 1.3 |
| Nov | -2.1 | 1.9 | 3.5 | 5.1 | 1.1 |
| Oct | -1.0 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 6.6 | 0.9 |
| Sep | 0.0 | 1.6 | 3.3 | 5.2 | 0.7 |
| Aug | 0.0 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 6.5 | 0.8 |
| Jul | -0.6 | 1.3 | 3.6 | 7.0 | 0.2 |
| Jun | -1.1 | 1.4 | 3.3 | 7.0 | 0.5 |
| May | -1.2 | 1.2 | 3.1 | 7.0 | 0.3 |
| Apr | -1.6 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 6.1 | 0.2 |
| Mar | -1.7 | 1.2 | 2.6 | 5.8 | 0.6 |
| Feb | -1.5 | 1.0 | 2.4 | 6.1 | 0.3 |
| Jan | -0.4 | 1.6 | 3.6 | 7.5 | 0.7 |
| 2012 | |||||
| Dec | 6.5 | 1.7 | 2.9 | 7.6 | 1.2 |
| Nov | 4.8 | 1.8 | 2.7 | 7.3 | 1.3 |
| Oct | 3.3 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 4.2 | 1.0 |
| Sep | 2.7 | 1.3 | 2.3 | 6.3 | 0.8 |
| Aug | 2.1 | 1.3 | 2.8 | 6.8 | 0.5 |
| Jul | 2.3 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 6.3 | 0.9 |
| Jun | 3.4 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 6.7 | 1.0 |
| May | 3.8 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 6.1 | 1.3 |
| Apr | 3.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 5.4 | 1.6 |
| Mar | 3.0 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 4.5 | 1.4 |
| Feb | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 6.3 | 1.8 |
| Jan | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 4.5 | 1.5 |
| Dec 2011 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 3.6 | 1.1 |
| Dec 2010 | 3.6 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 8.3 | 1.8 |
Notes: RDPI: real disposable personal income; RPCE: real personal consumption expenditures (PCE); RPCEG: real PCE goods; RPCEGD: RPCEG durable goods; RPCES: RPCE services
Numbers are percentage changes from the same month a year earlier
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IB-1 shows US real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) between 1999 and 2018. There is an evident drop in RPCE during the global recession in 2007 to 2009 but the slope is flatter during the current recovery than in the period before 2007.
Chart IB-1, US, Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1999-2018
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Percent changes from the prior period in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent quarterly rates (SAAR) of real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) are in Chart IB-2 from 1995 to 2018. The average rate could be visualized as a horizontal line. Although there are not yet sufficient observations, it appears from Chart IB-2 that the average rate of growth of RPCE was higher before the recession than during the past thirty-one quarters of expansion that began in IIIQ2009.
Chart IB-2, Percent Change from Prior Period in Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2018
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Personal income and its disposition are in Table IB-3. The latest estimates and revisions have changed movements in nine forms. (1) Increase in Jun 2018 of personal income by 71.7 billion or 0.4 percent and increase of disposable income of $65.3 billion or 0.4 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 0.4 percent. (2) Increase of personal income of $749.9 billion from Dec 2016 to Dec 2017 or 4.6 percent and increase of disposable income of $664.6 billion or 4.6 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 4.6 percent. (3) Increase of personal income of $515.8 billion or 3.2 percent from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 and increase of disposable income of $476.8 billion or 3.4 percent. Wages and salaries increased $277.2 billion or 3.5 percent. (4) Increase of personal income of $532.9 billion from Dec 2014 to Dec 2015 or 3.5 percent and increase of disposable income of $419.7 billion or 3.1 percent. Wages and salaries increased $308.7 billion or 4.0 percent. (5) Increase of personal income of $931.4 billion from Dec 2013 to Dec 2014 or 6.5 percent while disposable income increased $801.3 billion or 6.3 percent. Wages and salaries increased $419.1 billion or 5.8 percent. (6) Decrease of personal income of $266.5 billion from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or by 1.8 percent and decrease of disposable income of $372.3 billion or by 2.8 percent. Wages and salaries increased $55.9 billion from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or by 0.8 percent. Large part of these declines occurred because of the comparison of high levels in late 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in 2013. (7) In 2012, personal income increased $128.7 billion or 8.3 percent while wages and salaries increased 7.6 percent and disposable income 8.3 percent. Significant part of these gains occurred in Dec 2012 in anticipation of incomes because of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. (8) Increase of $672.2 billion of personal income in 2011 or by 5.2 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 2.7 percent and disposable income of 4.3 percent. (9) Increase of the rate of savings as percent of disposable income from 7.1 percent in Dec 2010 to 7.8 percent in Dec 2011 and 12.0 percent in Dec 2012, decreasing to 6.4 percent in Dec 2013. The savings rate increased to 7.6 percent in Dec 2014, decreasing to 7.3 percent in Dec 2015, 6.3 percent in Dec 2016, 6.2 percent in Dec 2017 and increasing to 6.8 percent in May 2018. The savings ratio stabilized to 6.8 percent in Jun 2018.
Table IB-3, US, Personal Income and its Disposition, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates USD Billions
| Personal | Wages & | Personal | DPI | Savings | |
| Jun 2018 | 17,572.4 | 8,834.9 | 2,052.0 | 15,520.4 | 6.8 |
| May 2018 | 17,500.7 | 8,803.4 | 2,045.6 | 15,455.1 | 6.8 |
| Change Jun 2018/ May 2018 | 71.7 ∆% 0.4 | 31.5 ∆% 0.4 | 6.4 ∆% 0.3 | 65.3 ∆% 0.4 | |
| Dec 2017 | 17,164.6 | 8,626.0 | 2,080.9 | 15,083.7 | 6.2 |
| Change Dec 2017/ Dec 2016 | 749.9 ∆% 4.6 | 378.6 ∆% 4.6 | 85.3 ∆% 4.3 | 664.6 ∆% 4.6 | |
| Dec 2016 | 16,414.7 | 8,247.4 | 1,995.6 | 14,419.1 | 6.3 |
| Dec 2015 | 15,898.9 | 7,970.2 | 1,956.6 | 13,942.3 | 7.3 |
| Change Dec 2016/ Dec 2015 | 515.8 ∆% 3.2 | 277.2 ∆% 3.5 | 39.0 ∆% 2.0 | 476.8 ∆% 3.4 | |
| Dec 2015 | 15,898.9 | 7,970.2 | 1,956.6 | 13,942.3 | 7.3 |
| Change Dec 2015/Dec 2014 | 532.9 ∆% 3.5 | 308.7 ∆% 4.0 | 113.2 ∆% 6.1 | 419.7∆% 3.1 | |
| Dec 2014 | 15,366.0 | 7,661.5 | 1,843.4 | 13,522.6 | 7.6 |
| Change Dec 2014/Dec 2013 | 931.4 ∆% 6.5 | 419.1 ∆% 5.8 | 130.1 ∆% 7.6 | 801.3 ∆% 6.3 | |
| Dec 2013 | 14,434.6 | 7,242.4 | 1,713.3 | 12,721.3 | 6.4 |
| Dec 2012 | 14,701.1 | 7,186.5 | 1,607.6 | 13,093.6 | 12.0 |
| Change Dec 2013/ Dec 2012 | -266.5 ∆% -1.8 | 55.9 ∆% 0.8 | 105.7 ∆% 6.6 | -372.3 ∆% -2.8 | |
| Change Dec 2012/ Dec 2011 | 1128.7 ∆% 8.3 | 508.9 ∆% 7.6 | 128.8 ∆% 8.7 | 1000.0 ∆% 8.3 | |
| Dec 2011 | 13,572.4 | 6,677.6 | 1,478.8 | 12,093.6 | 7.8 |
| Dec 2010 | 12,900.2 | 6,500.6 | 1,299.8 | 11,600.4 | 7.1 |
| Change Dec 2011/ Dec 2010 | 672.2 ∆% 5.2 | 177.0 ∆% 2.7 | 179.0 ∆% 13.8 | 493.2 ∆% 4.3 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
US personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table IB-4 provides growth rates of real disposable income and real disposable income per capita in the long-term and selected periods. Real disposable income consists of after-tax income adjusted for inflation. Real disposable income per capita is income per person after taxes and inflation. There is remarkable long-term trend of growth of real disposable income of 3.2 percent per year on average from 1929 to 2017 and 2.0 percent in real disposable income per capita. Real disposable income increased at the average yearly rate of 3.7 percent from 1947 to 1999 and real disposable income per capita at 2.3 percent. These rates of increase broadly accompany rates of growth of GDP. Institutional arrangements in the United States provided the environment for growth of output and income after taxes, inflation and population growth. There is significant break of growth by much lower 2.4 percent for real disposable income on average from 1999 to 2017 and 1.6 percent in real disposable per capita income. Real disposable income grew at 3.5 percent from 1980 to 1989 and real disposable per capita income at 2.6 percent. In contrast, real disposable income grew at only 2.0 percent on average from 2006 to 2017 and real disposable income per capita at 1.2 percent. Real disposable income grew at 1.9 percent from 2007 to 2017 and real disposable income per capita at 1.2 percent. The United States has interrupted its long-term and cyclical dynamism of output, income and employment growth. Recovery of this dynamism could prove to be a major challenge. Cyclical uncommonly slow growth explains weakness in the current whole cycle instead of the allegation of secular stagnation.
Table IB-4, Average Annual Growth Rates of Real Disposable Income (RDPI) and Real Disposable Income per Capita (RDPIPC), Percent per Year
| RDPI Average ∆% | |
| 1929-2017 | 3.2 |
| 1947-1999 | 3.7 |
| 1999-2017 | 2.4 |
| 1999-2006 | 3.2 |
| 1980-1989 | 3.5 |
| 2006-2017 | 2.0 |
| 2007-2017 | 1.9 |
| RDPIPC Average ∆% | |
| 1929-2017 | 2.0 |
| 1947-1999 | 2.3 |
| 1999-2017 | 1.6 |
| 1999-2006 | 2.2 |
| 1980-1989 | 2.6 |
| 2006-2017 | 1.2 |
| 2007-2017 | 1.2 |
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018.
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