CMP Associates Regulation Blog: Twenty-Four Million Unemployed or Underemployed in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Dollar Devaluation and Decline of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, Number of People in Job Stress, Job Creation, Cyclically Stagnating Real Wages, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income per Capita, Financial Repression, Decline of United States Homeownership, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part II

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Twenty-Four Million Unemployed or Underemployed in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Dollar Devaluation and Decline of Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, Number of People in Job Stress, Job Creation, Cyclically Stagnating Real Wages, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income per Capita, Financial Repression, Decline of United States Homeownership, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

I Twenty-Four Million Unemployed or Underemployed

IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation

IA2 Number of People in Job Stress

IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment

IA4 Job Creation

IB Stagnating Real Wages

I Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB2 Financial Repression

IIC Decline of United States Homeownership

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

I IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides important revisions and enhancements of data on personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). There are waves of changes in personal income and expenditures in Table IB-1 that correspond somewhat to inflation waves observed worldwide (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html) because of the influence through price indexes. There are wide fluctuations in Nov and Dec 2012 by the rush to realize income of all forms in anticipation of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. There is major distortion in Jan 2013 because of higher contributions in payrolls to government social insurance that caused sharp reduction in personal income and disposable personal income. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) explains as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January [2013] changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December [2012] in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

The BEA provides the annual update of the national income and product account (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with_30.html): “Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts

The estimates released today reflect the results of the annual update of the national income and

product accounts (NIPAs) in conjunction with preliminary estimates for June 2017. The update covers the most recent 3 years and the first 5 months of 2017. For more information, see information on the “2017 Annual Update” on BEA’s website. Additionally, the August Survey of Current Business will contain an article that describes the results in detail.”

In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011 with relaxed risk aversion, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 7.7 percent, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 5.2 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 5.9 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) rose at annual equivalent 1.5 percent. In the second wave in May-Aug 2011 under risk aversion, NPI rose at annual equivalent 4.9 percent, NPDI at 4.9 percent and NPCE at 3.7 percent. RDPI increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 0.9 percent annual equivalent. With mixed shocks of risk aversion in the third wave from Sep to Dec 2011, NPI rose at 2.4 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 2.4 percent and NPCE at 2.1 percent. RDPI increased at 1.5 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 1.5 percent annual equivalent. In the fourth wave from Jan to Mar 2012, NPI increased at 8.3 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 9.6 percent and NPCE at 4.3 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) is more dynamic in the revisions, growing at 4.9 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 2.1 percent. The policy of repressing savings with zero interest rates stimulated growth of nominal consumption (NPCE) at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent and real consumption (RPCE) at 2.1 percent. In the fifth wave in Apr-Jul 2012, NPI increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent, NDPI at 1.2 percent and RDPI at 0.9 percent. Financial repression failed to stimulate consumption with NPCE growing at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 0.9 percent. In the sixth wave in Aug-Oct 2012, in another wave of carry trades into commodity futures, NPI increased at 8.3 percent annual equivalent and NDPI increased at 7.9 percent while real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent. NPCE increased at 4.1 percent and RPCE changed at 0.0 percent. Data for Nov-Dec 2012 have illusory increases: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). In the seventh wave, anticipations of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused exceptional income gains that increased personal income to annual equivalent 25.3 percent in Nov-Dec 2012, nominal disposable income at 25.3 percent and real disposable personal income at 26.0 percent with likely effects on nominal personal consumption that increased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption at 3.0 percent with subdued prices. The numbers in parentheses show that without the exceptional effects NDPI (nominal disposable personal income) increased at 5.5 percent and RDPI (real disposable personal income) at 8.7 percent. In the eighth wave, nominal personal income fell 5.2 percent in Jan 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 47.3 percent; nominal disposable personal income fell 6.1 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 53.0 percent; real disposable income fell 6.2 percent or at the annual rate of decline of 53.6 percent; nominal personal consumption expenditures increased 0.3 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 3.7 percent; and real personal consumption expenditures increased 0.2 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent. The savings rate fell significantly from 11.0 percent in Dec 2012 to 4.9 percent in Jan 2013. The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as follows (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf 3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income -- increased $126.7 billion in January, compared with an increase of $6.3 billion in December. The

Further explanation is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion. The January change in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates. Excluding these special factors and others, which are discussed more fully below, DPI increased $46.8 billion in February, or 0.4 percent, after increasing $15.8 billion, or 0.1 percent, in January.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). In the ninth wave in Feb-Mar 2013, nominal personal income increased at 3.0 percent and nominal disposable income at 2.4 percent annual equivalent, while real disposable income increased at 0.6 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 1.8 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 0.0 percent annual equivalent. The savings rate collapsed from 7.8 percent in Oct 2012, 8.8 percent in Nov 2012 and 11.0 percent in Dec 2012 to 4.9 percent in Jan 2013, 4.7 percent in Feb 2013 and 4.8 percent in Mar 2013. In the tenth wave from Apr to Sep 2013, personal income grew at 4.1 percent annual equivalent, nominal disposable income increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 2.8 percent. Real disposable income grew at 2.6 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 2.0 percent. In the eleventh wave, nominal personal income fell at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Oct 2013, nominal disposable income at 1.2 percent and real disposable income at 3.5 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. In the twelfth wave, nominal personal income increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2013, nominal disposable income at 4.9 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 8.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 6.2 percent. In the thirteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2013 and nominal disposable income at 3.7 percent while real disposable income increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent and 0.0 percent for real personal consumption expenditures. In the fourteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 8.3 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Mar 2014, nominal disposable income at 8.3 percent and nominal consumption expenditures at 5.3 percent. Real disposable personal income increased at 6.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.2 percent. In the fifteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.9 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014 and nominal disposable income at 5.9 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.7 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014. Nominal personal consumption increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Apr-Aug 2014 and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.9 percent. In the sixteenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Dec 2014, nominal disposable income at 5.2 percent and nominal personal consumption at 3.3 percent. Real disposable income increased at 6.2 percent in Sep-Dec 2014 and real personal consumption expenditure at 4.0 percent. In the seventeenth wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.3 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2015 and nominal disposable income increased at 2.4 percent while nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. Real disposable income increased at 4.3 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.7 percent. In the eighteenth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 5.3 percent and nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) increased at 5.3 percent annual equivalent in Mar-Jun 2015. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal consumption expenditures (NPCE) increased at 6.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) increased at 4.1 percent. In the nineteenth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 2.8 percent in Jun-Aug 2015 and nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 2.8 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 1.6 percent, nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 3.7 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) at 2.4 percent. In the twentieth wave, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Dec 2015, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 2.8 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 4.5 percent. Real disposable personal income grew at 2.4 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.0 percent. In the twenty-first wave, nominal personal income fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2016. Nominal disposable personal income changed at 0.0 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.4 percent. Real disposable personal income decreased at 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.8 percent. In the twenty-second wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent in Mar-Apr 2016. Nominal disposable income increased at 4.9 percent and real disposable income grew at 2.4 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 5.5 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.0 percent. In the twenty-third wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.7 percent in May-Jul 2016 and nominal disposable income at 3.7 percent while nominal consumption expenditures increased at 3.7 percent. Real disposable income increased at 1.6 percent and real consumption expenditures at 3.2 percent. In the twenty-fourth wave, nominal personal income increased at 0.8 percent in Aug-Oct 2016 and nominal disposable income at 0.4 percent while nominal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 1.6 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 2.8 percent. In the twenty-fifth wave, nominal personal income changed at 0.0 percent and nominal disposable income increased at 0.6 percent in Nov-Dec 2016. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent. Real personal disposable income decreased at 2.4 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.3 percent. In the twenty-sixth wave, nominal personal income increased at annual equivalent 8.7 percent in Jan-Feb 2017, nominal disposable income at 8.7 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. Real disposable income increased at 5.5 percent and real personal consumption expenditures fell at 0.6 percent. In the twenty-seventh wave, nominal personal income increased at 2.4 percent in Mar-May 2017 and nominal disposable income at 3.7 percent while nominal personal consumption increased at 4.1 percent. Real disposable income increased at 3.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.5 percent. In the twenty-eighth wave, nominal personal income changed at 0.0 percent in Jun 2017 and nominal disposable income changed at 0.0 percent while nominal personal consumption increased at 1.2 percent. Real disposable income decreased at 1.2 percent and real consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-ninth wave, nominal personal income increased at 3.0 percent in Jul-Aug 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 1.8 percent. Real disposable income changed at 0.0 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 3.0 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent. In the thirtieth wave, nominal personal income increased at 5.5 percent in Sep-Oct 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 4.3 percent. Real disposable income increased at 1.2 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 8.1 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.3 percent. In the thirty-first wave, nominal personal income increased at 4.3 percent in Nov-Dec 2017 while nominal disposable personal income increased at 3.7 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 7.4 percent. Real disposable income increased at 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent.

There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:

Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP two trillion dollars below trend (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/continuing-dollar-devaluation-mediocre.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.2 percent per year from 1929 to 2017, with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions, but only at 1.4 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2017. GDP in IVQ2017 is 14.3 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent
Private fixed investment stagnating at cumulative increase of 14.9 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2017 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/continuing-dollar-devaluation-mediocre.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html)
Twenty-Three million or 13.3 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with stagnating or declining real wages (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (Section II and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)

Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-rising.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/increasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rate-uncertainty-and-valuation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/contraction-of-united-states-corporate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/subdued-foreign-growth-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-volatile_17.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-policy-conundrum-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/impact-of-monetary-policy-on-exchange.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
Productivity growth fell from 2.1 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2016 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.2 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2016, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/ii-rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_40.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/flattening-us-treasury-yield-curve.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_14.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/increasing-interest-rates-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/considerable-uncertainty-about-economic.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-fed-funds-rate-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)

Output of manufacturing in Dec 2017 at 29.6 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 21.6 percent below trend since 1986 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier) (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/exchange-rate-and-financial-asset.html

Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/mediocre-cyclical-economic-growth-with.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
Worldwide waves of inflation (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/fomc-increases-interest-rates-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/dollar-devaluation-and-decline-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/dollar-devaluation-and-increasing.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-lost-economic-cycle-of-global_25.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/world-inflation-waves-long-term-and.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/monetary-policy-of-reducing-central.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/fluctuating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/dollar-devaluation-and-valuation-of.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/fomc-interest-rate-increase-planned.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/dollar-devaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/fomc-increases-interest-rates-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/imf-view-of-world-economy-and-finance.html and earlier) (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html
Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (Section II and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/11/unchanged-fomc-policy-rate-gradual.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/09/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/08/data-dependent-monetary-policy-with.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/07/rising-yields-twenty-two-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/05/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/04/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/closely-monitoring-global-economic-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/dollar-revaluation-and-decreasing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
43 million in poverty and 29 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1999 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-imf.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 24.1 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2017 when it would have grown over 34.7 percent at trend of 3.1 percent per year in real terms from IVQ1945 to IIIQ2017 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/dollar-devaluation-cyclically.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/10/destruction-of-household-nonfinancial.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/06/united-states-commercial-banks-united.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/the-economic-outlook-is-inherently.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/of-course-considerable-uncertainty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-fluctuations-of_13.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html). Financial assets increased $26.0 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $5.4 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation increased 0.4 percent.

The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 34 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2017. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2017 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/gdp4q17_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[($14,745.9/$14,355.6) -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/continuing-dollar-devaluation-mediocre.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/continuing-dollar-devaluation-mediocre.html and earlier (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_23.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2017 would have accumulated to 34.4 percent. GDP in IVQ2017 would be $20,149.0 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2876.5 billion than actual $17,272.5 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.3 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IVQ2017 is 14.3 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,272.5 billion in IVQ2017 or 15.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Dec 1919 to Dec 2017. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2393 in Dec 2007 to 146.8830 in Dec 2017. The actual index NSA in Dec 2017 is 103.381, which is 29.6 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2017. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 131.9431 in Dec 2017. The output of manufacturing at 103.381 in Dec 2017 is 21.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

Table IB-1, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month Seasonally Adjusted of Personal Income, Disposable Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures %

	NPI	NDPI	RDPI	NPCE	RPCE
Dec 2017	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3
Nov	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.5
AE ∆% Nov-Dec	4.3	3.7	1.2	7.4	4.9
Oct	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1
Sep	0.5	0.4	0.0	1.0	0.6
AE ∆% Sep-Oct	5.5	4.3	1.2	8.1	4.3
Aug	0.2	0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.0
Jul	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2
AE ∆% Jul-Aug	3.0	1.8	0.0	3.0	1.2
Jun	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.1	0.1
AE ∆% Jun	0.0	0.0	-1.2	1.2	1.2
May	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.3
Apr	0.1	0.2	-0.1	0.3	0.1
Mar	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.7
AE ∆% Mar-May	2.4	3.7	3.2	4.1	4.5
Feb	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.0
Jan	0.9	0.9	0.5	0.3	-0.1
AE ∆% Jan-Feb	8.7	8.7	5.5	2.4	-0.6
Dec 2016	0.1	0.0	-0.2	0.5	0.4
Nov	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	0.3	0.3
AE ∆% Nov-Dec	0.0	0.6	-2.4	4.9	4.3
Oct	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.3	0.1
Sep	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.6	0.5
Aug	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.3	0.1
AE ∆% Aug-Oct	0.8	0.4	-1.6	4.9	2.8
Jul	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Jun	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.4
May	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.2
AE ∆% May-Jul	3.7	3.7	1.6	3.7	3.2
Apr	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.8	0.5
Mar	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0
AE ∆% Mar-Apr	5.5	4.9	2.4	5.5	3.0
Feb	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.4	0.4
Jan	-0.2	0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
AE ∆% Jan-Feb	-2.4	0.0	-1.2	2.4	1.8
2015
Dec	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.3
Nov	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.3
Oct	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1
Sep	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
AE ∆% Sep-Dec	3.0	2.8	2.4	4.5	3.0
Aug	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Jul	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.3
Jun	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.0
AE ∆% Jun-Aug	2.8	2.8	1.6	3.7	2.4
May	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.4
Apr	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.1
Mar	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.7	0.5
AE ∆% Mar-Jun	5.3	5.3	3.7	6.2	4.1
Feb	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2
Jan	0.2	-0.1	0.3	-0.1	0.4
AE ∆% Jan-Feb	4.3	2.4	4.3	1.2	3.7
2014
Dec	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.2
Nov	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5
Oct	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Sep	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.0
AE ∆% Sep-Dec	5.5	5.2	6.2	3.3	4.0
Aug	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7
Jul	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Jun	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4
May	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2
Apr	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.1
AE ∆% Apr-Aug	5.9	5.9	4.7	4.9	3.9
Mar	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.6
Feb	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4
Jan	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.1	-0.2
AE ∆% Jan-Mar	8.3	8.3	6.2	5.3	3.2
2013
Dec	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.0
AE ∆% Dec	4.9	3.7	1.2	2.4	0.0
Nov	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.5
AE ∆% Nov	6.2	4.9	3.7	8.7	6.2
Oct	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	0.4	0.2
AE ∆% Oct	-1.2	-1.2	-3.5	4.9	2.4
Sep	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.4
Aug	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1
Jul	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.2	0.1
Jun	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2
May	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.2
Apr	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0
AE ∆% Apr-Sep	4.1	3.7	2.6	2.8	2.0
Mar	0.1	0.0	0.1	-0.2	-0.1
Feb	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.1
AE ∆% Feb-Mar	3.0	2.4	0.6	1.8	0.0
Jan	-5.2	-6.1 (0.1)^a	-6.2	0.3	0.2
AE ∆% Jan	-47.3	-53.0 (3.7)^a	-53.6	3.7	2.4
2012
∆% Jan-Dec 2012***	8.5	8.6	6.8	3.3	2.3
Dec	2.6	2.6 (0.3)*	2.6 (0.5)*	0.2	0.2
Nov	1.2	1.2 (0.6)*	1.3 (0.9)*	0.2	0.3
AE ∆% Nov-Dec	25.3	25.3 (5.5)*	26.0 (8.7)*	2.4	3.0
Oct	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.1	-0.2
Sep	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.4
Aug	0.2	0.2	-0.2	0.2	-0.2
AE ∆% Aug-Oct	8.3	7.9	3.7	4.1	0.0
Jul	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3	0.3	0.3
Jun	0.2	0.2	0.2	-0.1	-0.1
May	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0
Apr	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.1
AE ∆% Apr-Jul	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.2	0.9
Mar	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.1	-0.1
Feb	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.4
Jan	0.7	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.4
AE ∆% Jan-Mar	8.3	9.6	4.9	4.3	2.1
2011
∆% Jan-Dec 2011*	5.1	4.1	1.6	3.7	1.8
Dec	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0
Nov	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
Oct	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3
Sep	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	0.4	0.3
AE ∆% Sep-Dec	2.4	2.4	1.5	2.1	1.5
Aug	0.2	0.2	-0.1	0.2	-0.1
Jul	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.3
Jun	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.2
May	0.3	0.3	-0.1	0.3	-0.1
AE ∆% May-Aug	4.9	4.9	1.8	3.7	0.9
Apr	0.2	0.2	-0.3	0.4	0.0
Mar	0.2	0.2	-0.1	0.7	0.3
Feb	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.1
Jan	1.6	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.1
AE ∆% Jan-Apr	7.7	5.2	1.2	5.9	1.5
2010
∆% Jan-Dec 2010**	5.2	4.3	2.9	4.4	2.9
Dec	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.3	0.1
Nov	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.4
Oct	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.7	0.5
IVQ2010∆%	1.9	1.9	1.2	1.5	1.0
IVQ2010 AE ∆%	7.9	7.9	4.9	6.2	4.1

Notes: *Excluding exceptional income gains in Nov and Dec 2012 because of anticipated tax increases in Jan 2013 ((page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). ^aExcluding employee contributions for government social insurance (pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf )Excluding NPI: current dollars personal income; NDPI: current dollars disposable personal income; RDPI: chained (2005) dollars DPI; NPCE: current dollars personal consumption expenditures; RPCE: chained (2005) dollars PCE; AE: annual equivalent; IVQ2010: fourth quarter 2010; A: annual equivalent

Percentage change month to month seasonally adjusted

*∆% Dec 2011/Dec 2010 **∆% Dec 2010/Dec 2009 *** ∆% Dec 2012/Dec 2011

Source: US Bureau of Economic http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IB-2 provides 12-month rates of growth of real disposable personal income (RDPI), real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE), real personal consumption expenditures in goods (RPCEG), real personal consumption expenditures in durable goods (RPCEGD) and real personal consumption expenditures of services (RPCES). The rates of growth of real disposable income decline in the final quarter of 2013 because of the increases in the last two months of 2012 in anticipation of the tax increases of the “fiscal cliff” episode. The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf).

The 12-month rate of increase of real disposable income fell to minus 1.3 percent in Oct 2013 and minus 2.4 percent in Nov 2013 partly because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of incomes to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income fell 4.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 primarily because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of income to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014, partly because of the low level in Jan 2013 after anticipation of incomes in late 2012 in avoiding the fiscal cliff episode. Real disposable income increased 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017.

RPCE growth decelerated less sharply from close to 3 percent in IVQ2010 to 2.7 percent in Nov 2017. Subdued growth of RPCE could affect revenues of business. Growth rates of personal consumption have weakened in oscillations. Goods and especially durable goods have been driving growth of PCE as shown by the much higher 12-month rates of growth of real goods PCE (RPCEG) and durable goods real PCE (RPCEGD) than services real PCE (RPCES). Growth of consumption of goods and, in particular, of consumer durable goods drives the faster expansion of the economy while growth of consumption of services is much more moderate. The 12-month rates of growth of RPCEGD have fallen from around 10 percent and even higher in several months from Sep 2010 to Feb 2011 to the range of 5.6 to 8.2 percent from Dec 2016 to Dec 2017. RPCEG growth rates have fallen from around 5 percent late in 2010 and early Jan-Feb 2011 to the range of 3.1 to 4.6 percent from Dec 2016 to Dec 2017. In Dec 2017, RPCEG increased 4.6 percent in 12 months and RPCEGD 7.3 percent while RPCES increased 2.0 percent. There are limits to sustained growth based on financial repression in an environment of weak labor markets and real labor remuneration.

Table IB-2, Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Personal Consumption Expenditures

Percentage Change from the Same Month a Year Earlier %

	RDPI	RPCE	RPCEG	RPCEGD	RPCES
2017
Dec	2.1	2.8	4.6	7.3	2.0
Nov	1.8	2.9	5.1	8.2	1.9
Oct	1.5	2.6	4.2	6.8	1.9
Sep	1.2	2.6	4.3	7.4	1.8
Aug	1.0	2.5	3.6	5.6	2.0
Jul	1.0	2.6	3.5	5.8	2.2
Jun	1.1	2.6	3.1	6.1	2.3
May	1.3	2.8	3.7	6.6	2.4
Apr	1.0	2.8	3.6	6.7	2.4
Mar	1.3	3.2	4.0	6.9	2.9
Feb	0.9	2.5	3.1	6.3	2.2
Jan	0.5	2.9	3.8	6.9	2.4
2016
Dec	0.0	2.9	3.9	7.3	2.4
Nov	0.3	2.8	3.7	5.9	2.4
Oct	0.5	2.8	4.3	7.7	2.1
Sep	1.1	2.8	3.5	6.1	2.5
Aug	1.4	2.7	3.2	4.6	2.4
Jul	1.8	2.8	3.8	6.4	2.4
Jun	1.6	3.0	4.2	5.6	2.4
May	1.6	2.6	3.4	3.7	2.2
Apr	1.9	2.7	3.8	4.6	2.2
Mar	2.3	2.3	2.8	3.5	2.1
Feb	1.9	2.8	4.3	5.9	2.1
Jan	2.4	2.6	3.3	4.6	2.2
2015
Dec	2.8	3.1	4.2	6.5	2.5
Nov	3.2	2.9	3.8	6.2	2.5
Oct	3.7	3.1	3.9	6.5	2.7
Sep	3.9	3.7	5.1	7.9	3.0
Aug	3.9	3.3	4.1	6.5	3.0
Jul	4.2	3.8	4.9	7.8	3.3
Jun	4.3	3.7	4.5	7.0	3.4
May	4.7	4.1	5.2	8.8	3.6
Apr	4.7	3.9	4.5	8.5	3.6
Mar	4.4	3.9	4.9	8.0	3.4
Feb	5.1	4.0	4.5	8.4	3.7
Jan	5.3	4.2	6.0	11.5	3.3
2014
Dec	5.3	3.7	4.9	9.6	3.1
Nov	4.9	3.5	4.7	8.5	2.9
Oct	4.6	3.6	4.4	7.9	3.1
Sep	3.7	3.2	3.8	7.8	2.8
Aug	3.7	3.5	5.2	8.7	2.7
Jul	3.5	2.9	3.7	6.9	2.4
Jun	3.3	2.8	3.9	7.2	2.2
May	3.0	2.6	3.7	7.3	2.1
Apr	3.3	2.6	4.0	6.2	1.9
Mar	3.0	2.5	4.2	7.9	1.7
Feb	2.5	1.9	2.3	3.3	1.6
Jan	1.9	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.7
2013
Dec	-4.8	1.9	2.9	3.1	1.4
Nov	-2.4	2.2	3.8	5.8	1.3
Oct	-1.3	1.9	3.7	6.8	1.0
Sep	-0.5	1.5	2.9	4.5	0.8
Aug	-0.3	1.5	2.8	6.6	0.9
Jul	-0.8	1.3	3.4	6.9	0.2
Jun	-1.0	1.5	3.5	7.5	0.5
May	-1.0	1.2	3.0	6.5	0.3
Apr	-1.5	1.0	2.5	6.1	0.2
Mar	-1.2	1.1	2.4	5.6	0.5
Feb	-1.1	1.1	3.0	7.2	0.1
Jan	-0.5	1.4	3.4	7.8	0.3
2012
Dec	6.8	1.6	3.6	8.7	0.6
Nov	4.9	1.4	2.8	7.7	0.7
Oct	3.4	1.0	1.9	5.2	0.5
Sep	2.9	1.4	3.4	8.5	0.4
Aug	2.1	1.3	3.4	8.5	0.3
Jul	2.2	1.4	2.8	7.5	0.7
Jun	2.9	1.4	2.5	8.3	0.8
May	3.1	1.7	3.1	7.9	1.0
Apr	3.0	1.6	2.5	7.0	1.2
Mar	2.4	1.4	2.3	5.9	1.0
Feb	2.0	1.8	2.5	7.1	1.5
Jan	1.8	1.5	1.9	5.9	1.3
Dec 2011	1.6	1.2	1.4	5.0	1.1
Dec 2010	2.9	2.9	4.7	8.4	2.1

Notes: RDPI: real disposable personal income; RPCE: real personal consumption expenditures (PCE); RPCEG: real PCE goods; RPCEGD: RPCEG durable goods; RPCES: RPCE services

Numbers are percentage changes from the same month a year earlier

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-1 shows US real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) between 1999 and 2017. There is an evident drop in RPCE during the global recession in 2007 to 2009 but the slope is flatter during the current recovery than in the period before 2007.

Chart IB-1, US, Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1999-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

	Personal Income	Wages & Salaries	Personal Taxes	DPI	Savings Rate %
Dec 2017	16,686.7	8,493.0	2,097.8	14,589.0	2.4
Nov 2017	16,628.0	8,454.4	2,087.0	14,541.0	2.5
Change Dec 2017/ Nov 2017	58.7 ∆% 0.4	38.6 ∆% 0.5	10.8 ∆% 0.5	57.0 ∆% 0.4
Dec 2016	16,027.3	8,099.4	1,982.5	14,044.8	3.2
Dec 2015	15,779.5	8,034.9	1,978.0	13,801.5	5.8
Change Dec 2016/ Dec 2015	247.8 ∆% 1.6	64.5 ∆% 0.8	4.5 ∆% 0.2	243.3 ∆% 1.8
Dec 2015	15,779.5	8,034.9	1,978.0	13,801.5	5.8
Change Dec 2015/Dec 2014	575.6 ∆% 3.8	369.9 ∆% 4.8	131.9 ∆% 7.1	443.7 ∆% 3.3
Dec 2014	15,203.9	7,665.0	1,846.1	13,357.8	6.1
Change Dec 2014/Dec 2013	910.0 ∆% 6.4	419.7 ∆% 5.8	128.5 ∆% 7.5	781.5 ∆% 6.2
Dec 2013	14,293.9	7,245.3	1,717.6	12,576.3	4.7
Dec 2012	14,622.9	7,184.6	1,604.1	13,018.8	11.0
Change Dec 2013/ Dec 2012	-329.0 ∆% -2.2	60.7 ∆% 0.8	113.5 ∆% 7.3	-442.5 ∆% -3.4
Change Dec 2012/ Dec 2011	1150.5 ∆% 8.5	501.7 ∆% 7.5	120.3 ∆% 8.1	1030.2 ∆% 8.6
Dec 2011	13,472.4	6,682.9	1,483.8	11,988.6	6.4
Dec 2010	12,816.4	6,506.0	1,301.9	11,514.5	5.9
Change Dec 2011/ Dec 2010	656.0 ∆% 5.1	176.9 ∆% 2.7	181.9 ∆% 14.0	474.1 ∆% 4.1

RDPI Average ∆%
1929-2017	3.1
1947-1999	3.7
1999-2017	2.3
1999-2006	3.2
1980-1989	3.5
2006-2017	1.7
2007-2017	1.7
RDPIPC Average ∆%
1929-2017	2.0
1947-1999	2.3
1999-2017	1.4
1999-2006	2.2
1980-1989	2.6
2006-2017	0.9
2007-2017	0.9

Month	RDPI-PC ∆% 12/79	RDPI-PC ∆% YOY	Month	RDPI-PC ∆% 12/07	RDPI-PC ∆% YOY
11/1982	2.4	0.7	6/2009	-0.6	-2.4
12/1982	2.9	1.3	9/2009	-1.3	-0.6
12/1983	7.8	4.8	6/2010	-0.4	0.2
12/1987	20.4	2.7	6/2014	4.2	2.5
1/1988	20.6	2.6	7/2014	4.3	2.7
2/1988	21.2	2.6	8/2014	4.8	3.0
3/1988	21.6	2.9	9/2014	5.0	3.0
4/1988	21.9	7.4	10/2014	5.5	3.8
5/1988	22.0	3.3	11/2014	6.0	4.1
6/1988	22.3	3.9	12/2014	6.5	4.5
7/1988	22.7	4.0	1/2015	6.8	4.6
8/1988	23.0	3.8	2/2015	7.1	4.3
9/1988	23.1	4.0	3/2015	7.0	3.6
10/1988	23.6	3.9	4/2015	7.5	3.9
11/1988	23.6	3.5	5/2015	7.9	3.9
12/1988	24.2	3.2	6/2015	8.0	3.6
1/1989	24.7	3.4	7/2015	7.9	3.4
2/1989	25.0	3.2	8/2015	8.1	3.1
3/1989	25.6	3.3	9/2015	8.3	3.1
4/1989	24.8	2.4	10/2015	8.6	3.0
5/1989	24.1	1.8	11/2015	8.6	2.4
6/1989	24.4	1.6	12/2015	8.6	2.0
7/1989	24.7	1.6	1/2016	8.5	1.6
8/1989	24.9	1.6	2/2016	8.4	1.2
9/1989	25.1	1.7	3/2016	8.6	1.5
10/1989	25.6	1.6	4/2016	8.8	1.1
11/1989	25.6	1.6	5/2016	8.8	0.9
12/1989	25.6	1.1	6/2016	8.9	0.9
1/1990	26.3	1.3	7/2016	9.0	1.1
2/1990	26.5	1.2	8/2016	8.8	0.7
3/1990	26.4	0.6	9/2016	8.6	0.4
4/1990	27.0	1.7	10/216	8.4	-0.3
5/1990	26.6	1.9	11/2016	8.1	-0.5
6/1990	26.7	1.9	12/2016	7.9	-0.7
7/1990	27.0	1.8	1/2017	8.3	-0.2
8/1990	26.1	0.9	2/2017	8.6	0.2
9/1990	25.9	0.6	3/2017	9.2	0.5
10/1990	24.8	-0.7	4/2017	9.0	0.2
11/1990	24.7	-0.8	5/2017	9.4	0.5
12/1990	25.2	-0.3	06/2017	9.3	0.4
1/1991	24.7	-1.2	07/2017	9.3	0.3
2/1991	24.8	-1.4	08/2017	9.1	0.3
3/1991	24.9	-1.2	09/2017	9.1	0.4
4/1991	25.2	-1.4	10/2017	9.2	0.8
5/1991	25.0	-1.2	11/2017	9.2	1.0
06/1991	25.5	0.9	12/2017	9.4	1.4

Month	RDPI ∆% 12/07	RDPI ∆% Month	RDPI ∆% YOY	RDPI-PC ∆% 12/07	RDPI-PC ∆% Month	RDPI-PC ∆% YOY
6/09	0.8	-1.7	-1.5	-0.6	-1.8	-2.4
9/09	0.3	0.1	0.3	-1.3	0.1	-0.6
6/10	1.8	0.0	1.0	-0.4	0.0	0.2
12/10	3.3	0.7	2.9	0.7	0.6	2.1
6/11	4.1	0.4	2.3	1.2	0.4	1.5
12/11	5.0	0.8	1.6	1.6	0.7	0.8
6/12	7.2	0.2	2.9	3.4	0.2	2.2
10/12	7.9	0.6	3.4	3.7	0.5	2.7
11/12	9.3	1.3	4.9	5.1	1.3	4.1
12/12	12.1	2.6	6.8	7.7	2.6	6.1
6/13	6.2	0.2	-1.0	1.7	0.2	-1.7
12/13	6.8	0.1	-4.8	1.9	0.1	-5.4
1/14	7.1	0.3	1.9	2.1	0.2	1.1
2/14	7.8	0.6	2.5	2.7	0.6	1.8
3/14	8.4	0.6	3.0	3.3	0.5	2.3
4/14	8.7	0.3	3.3	3.5	0.2	2.5
5/14	9.1	0.4	3.0	3.8	0.3	2.3
6/14	9.6	0.5	3.3	4.2	0.4	2.5
7/14	9.8	0.2	3.5	4.3	0.1	2.7
8/14	10.4	0.5	3.7	4.8	0.5	3.0
9/14	10.7	0.3	3.7	5.0	0.2	3.0
10/14	11.3	0.6	4.6	5.5	0.5	3.8
11/14	11.9	0.6	4.9	6.0	0.5	4.1
12/14	12.5	0.5	5.3	6.5	0.4	4.5
1/15	12.8	0.3	5.3	6.8	0.3	4.6
2/15	13.3	0.4	5.1	7.1	0.3	4.3
3/15	13.2	-0.1	4.4	7.0	-0.1	3.6
4/15	13.8	0.6	4.7	7.5	0.5	3.9
5/15	14.2	0.4	4.7	7.9	0.3	3.9
6/15	14.4	0.1	4.3	8.0	0.1	3.6
7/15	14.4	0.0	4.2	7.9	-0.1	3.4
8/15	14.7	0.3	3.9	8.1	0.2	3.1
9/15	15.0	0.3	3.9	8.3	0.2	3.1
10/15	15.5	0.4	3.7	8.6	0.4	3.0
11/15	15.5	0.0	3.2	8.7	0.0	2.4
12/15	15.6	0.1	2.8	8.6	0.1	2.0
1/16	15.5	-0.1	2.4	8.5	-0.1	1.6
2/16	15.5	-0.1	1.9	8.4	-0.1	1.2
3/16	15.7	0.2	2.3	8.6	0.2	1.5
4/16	16.0	0.2	1.9	8.8	0.2	1.1
5/16	16.1	0.1	1.6	8.8	0.1	0.9
6/16	16.3	0.1	1.6	8.9	0.1	0.9
7/16	16.4	0.2	1.8	9.0	0.1	1.1
8/16	16.3	-0.1	1.4	8.8	-0.2	0.7
9/16	16.2	-0.1	1.1	8.6	-0.1	0.4
10/16	16.0	-0.2	0.5	8.4	-0.3	-0.3
11/16	15.8	-0.2	0.3	8.1	-0.2	-0.5
12/16	15.6	-0.2	0.0	7.9	-0.2	-0.7
1/17	16.1	0.5	0.5	8.3	0.4	-0.2
2/17	16.5	0.4	0.9	8.6	0.3	0.2
3/17	17.2	0.5	1.3	9.2	0.5	0.5
4/17	17.1	-0.1	1.0	9.0	-0.1	0.2
5/17	17.6	0.4	1.3	9.4	0.4	0.5
6/17	17.5	-0.1	1.1	9.3	-0.1	0.4
7/17	17.6	0.1	1.0	9.3	0.0	0.3
8/17	17.5	-0.1	1.0	9.1	-0.1	0.3
9/17	17.6	0.0	1.2	9.1	0.0	0.4
10/17	17.8	0.2	1.5	9.2	0.1	0.8
11/17	17.8	0.0	1.8	9.2	0.0	1.0
12/17	18.1	0.2	2.1	9.4	0.2	1.4

	Personal Savings as Percent of Disposable Personal Income	Annual Change of Real Disposable Personal Income
1930	4.4	-6.3
1933	-0.8	-2.9
1944	27.9	3.1
1947	6.3	-4.1
1954	10.3	1.4
1958	11.4	1.1
1960	10.0	2.6
1970	12.6	4.6
1975	13.0	2.5
1982	11.5	2.1
1989	7.8	3.0
1992	8.9	4.3
2002	5.0	3.1
2003	4.8	2.7
2004	4.5	3.6
2005	2.6	1.5
2006	3.3	4.0
2007	2.9	2.1
2008	4.9	1.5
2009	6.1	-0.4
2010	5.6	1.0
2011	6.0	2.5
2012	7.6	3.2
2013	5.0	-1.4
2014	5.7	3.6
2015	6.1	4.2
2016	4.9	1.4
2017	3.4	1.2
Average Savings Ratio
1980-1989	9.3
2007-2017	5.3
Average Yearly ∆% Real Disposable Income
1980-1989		3.2
2007-2017		1.7

	Personal Saving as % Disposable Income	RDPI ∆% 12/07	RDPI ∆% Month	RDPI ∆% YOY
May 2008	7.9	5.1	4.8	5.7
May 2009	8.1	2.5	1.6	-2.5
Jun 2010	5.9	1.8	0.0	1.0
Nov 2011	5.6	4.2	-0.1	1.5
Jun 2012	7.6	7.2	0.2	2.9
Aug 2012	7.1	6.7	-0.2	2.1
Dec 2012	11.0	12.1	2.6	6.8
Jan 2013	4.9	5.2	-6.2	-0.5
Feb 2013	4.7	5.1	0.0	-1.1
Mar 2013	4.8	5.2	0.1	-1.2
Apr 2013	4.9	5.3	0.0	-1.5
May 2013	5.3	5.9	0.6	-1.0
Jun 2013	5.4	6.2	0.2	-1.0
Jul 2013	5.2	6.1	-0.1	-0.8
Aug 2013	5.4	6.4	0.3	-0.3
Sep 2013	5.3	6.7	0.3	-0.5
Oct 2013	4.8	6.4	-0.3	-1.3
Nov 2013	4.6	6.7	0.3	-2.4
Dec 2013	4.7	6.8	0.1	-4.8
Jan 2014	5.1	7.1	0.3	1.9
Feb 2014	5.4	7.8	0.6	2.5
Mar 2014	5.4	8.4	0.6	3.0
Apr 2014	5.5	8.7	0.3	3.3
May 2014	5.7	9.1	0.4	3.0
Jun 2014	5.9	9.6	0.5	3.3
Jul 2014	5.8	9.8	0.2	3.5
Aug 2014	5.6	10.4	0.5	3.7
Sep 2014	5.8	10.7	0.3	3.7
Oct 2014	5.8	11.3	0.6	4.6
Nov 2014	5.8	11.9	0.6	4.9
Dec 2014	6.1	12.5	0.5	5.3
Jan 2015	6.1	12.8	0.3	5.3
Feb 2015	6.3	13.3	0.4	5.1
Mar 2015	5.8	13.2	-0.1	4.4
Apr 2015	6.2	13.8	0.6	4.7
May 2015	6.2	14.2	0.4	4.7
Jun 2015	6.3	14.4	0.1	4.3
Jul 2015	6.0	14.4	0.0	4.2
Aug 2015	6.0	14.7	0.3	3.9
Sep 2015	6.0	15.0	0.3	3.9
Oct 2015	6.3	15.5	0.4	3.7
Nov 2015	6.1	15.5	0.0	3.2
Dec 2015	5.8	15.6	0.1	2.8
Jan 2016	5.9	15.5	-0.1	2.4
Feb 2016	5.5	15.5	-0.1	1.9
Mar 2016	5.7	15.7	0.2	2.3
Apr 2016	5.5	16.0	0.2	1.9
May 2016	5.4	16.1	0.1	1.6
Jun 2016	5.1	16.3	0.1	1.6
Jul 2016	5.1	16.4	0.2	1.8
Aug 2016	4.9	16.3	-0.1	1.4
Sep 2016	4.5	16.2	-0.1	1.1
Oct 2016	4.1	16.0	-0.2	0.5
Nov 2016	3.7	15.8	-0.2	0.3
Dec 2016	3.2	15.6	-0.2	0.0
Jan 2017	3.7	16.1	0.5	0.5
Feb 2017	4.1	16.5	0.4	0.9
Mar 2017	3.9	17.2	0.5	1.3
Apr 2017	3.7	17.1	-0.1	1.0
May 2017	3.8	17.6	0.4	1.3
Jun 2017	3.6	17.5	-0.1	1.1
Jul 2017	3.5	17.6	0.1	1.0
Aug 2017	3.5	17.5	-0.1	1.0
Sep 2017	3.0	17.6	0.0	1.2
Oct 2017	3.0	17.8	0.2	1.5
Nov 2017	2.5	17.8	0.0	1.8
Dec 2017	2.4	18.1	0.2	2.1

Year	1st Quarter	2nd Quarter	3rd Quarter	4th Quarter
1956	NA	NA	NA	NA
1957	NA	NA	NA	NA
1958	NA	NA	NA	NA
1959	NA	NA	NA	NA
1960	NA	NA	NA	NA
1961	NA	NA	NA	NA
1962	NA	NA	NA	NA
1963	NA	NA	NA	NA
1964	NA	NA	NA	NA
1965	62.9	62.9	62.9	63.4
1966	63.5	63.2	63.3	63.8
1967	63.3	63.9	63.8	63.5
1968	63.6	64.1	64.1	63.6
1969	64.1	64.4	64.4	64.4
1970	64.3	64	64.4	64
1971	64	64.1	64.4	64.5
1972	64.3	64.5	64.3	64.4
1973	64.9	64.4	64.4	64.4
1974	64.8	64.8	64.6	64.4
1975	64.4	64.9	64.6	64.5
1976	64.6	64.6	64.9	64.8
1977	64.8	64.5	65	64.9
1978	64.8	64.4	65.2	65.4
1979	64.8	64.9	65.8	65.4
1980	65.5	65.5	65.8	65.5
1981	65.6	65.3	65.6	65.2
1982	64.8	64.9	64.9	64.5
1983	64.7	64.7	64.8	64.4
1984	64.6	64.6	64.6	64.1
1985	64.1	64.1	63.9	63.5
1986	63.6	63.8	63.8	63.9
1987	63.8	63.8	64.2	64.1
1988	63.7	63.7	64	63.8
1989	63.9	63.8	64.1	63.8
1990	64	63.7	64	64.1
1991	63.9	63.9	64.2	64.2
1992	64	63.9	64.3	64.4
1993	64.2	64.4	64.7	64.6
1994	63.8	63.8	64.1	64.2
1995	64.2	64.7	65	65.1
1996	65.1	65.4	65.6	65.4
1997	65.4	65.7	66	65.7
1998	65.9	66	66.8	66.4
1999	66.7	66.6	67	66.9
2000	67.1	67.2	67.7	67.5
2001	67.5	67.7	68.1	68
2002	67.8	67.6	68	68.3
2003	68	68	68.4	68.6
2004	68.6	69.2	69	69.2
2005	69.1	68.6	68.8	69
2006	68.5	68.7	69	68.9
2007	68.4	68.2	68.2	67.8
2008	67.8	68.1	67.9	67.5
2009	67.3	67.4	67.6	67.2
2010	67.1	66.9	66.9	66.5
2011	66.4	65.9	66.3	66
2012	65.4	65.5	65.5	65.4
2013	65	65	65.3	65.2
2014	64.8	64.7	64.4	64
2015	63.7	63.4	63.7	63.8
2016	63.5	62.9	63.5	63.7
2017	63.6	63.7	63.9	64.2

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