Monday, September 1, 2014

Geopolitical and Financial Risks, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend, Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures, Financial Repression, United States Housing Collapse, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part IV

 

Geopolitical and Financial Risks, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend, Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures, Financial Repression, United States Housing Collapse, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

I Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment

IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits

IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB2 Financial Repression

II United States Housing Collapse

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

IV Global Inflation. There is inflation everywhere in the world economy, with slow growth and persistently high unemployment in advanced economies. Table IV-1, updated with every blog comment, provides the latest annual data for GDP, consumer price index (CPI) inflation, producer price index (PPI) inflation and unemployment (UNE) for the advanced economies, China and the highly indebted European countries with sovereign risk issues. The table now includes the Netherlands and Finland that with Germany make up the set of northern countries in the euro zone that hold key votes in the enhancement of the mechanism for solution of sovereign risk issues (Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, “Europe: Northern Exposures,” Financial Times, Mar 9, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55eaf350-4a8b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz1gAlaswcW). Newly available data on inflation is considered below in this section. Data in Table IV-1 for the euro zone and its members are updated from information provided by Eurostat but individual country information is provided in this section  as soon as available, following Table IV-1. Data for other countries in Table IV-1 are also updated with reports from their statistical agencies. Economic data for major regions and countries is considered in Section V World Economic Slowdown following with individual country and regional data tables.

Table IV-1, GDP Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in Selected Countries, Percentage Annual Rates

 

GDP

CPI

PPI

UNE

US

2.5

2.0

2.9

FD 1.7

6.2

Japan

-0.1

3.4

4.3

3.8

China

7.5

2.3

-0.9

 

UK

3.2

1.6*

CPIH 1.5

-0.1 output
0.9**
input
-7.3

6.4

Euro Zone

0.7

0.4

-0.8

11.5

Germany

1.3

0.8

-0.7

4.9

France

0.1

0.6

0.4

10.3

Nether-lands

0.9

0.3

-1.2

6.7

Finland

-0.1

1.0

-0.6

8.7

Belgium

1.0

0.6

-4.5

8.5

Portugal

0.8

-0.7

-0.5

14.0

Ireland

NA

0.5

0.3

11.5

Italy

-0.3

0.0

-1.9

12.6

Greece

-0.2

-0.8

1.6

27.2

Spain

1.2

-0.4

0.4

24.5

Notes: GDP: rate of growth of GDP; CPI: change in consumer price inflation; PPI: producer price inflation; UNE: rate of unemployment; all rates relative to year earlier

*Office for National Statistics http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/consumer-price-indices/july-2014/index.html**Core

PPI http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ppi2/producer-price-index/july-2014/index.html Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/; country statistical sources http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table IV-1 shows the simultaneous occurrence of low growth, inflation and unemployment in advanced economies. The US grew at 2.5 percent in IIQ2014 relative to IIQ2013 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-instability-mediocre-cyclical.html, Table 8 in http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp2q14_2nd.pdf). Japan’s GDP fell 1.7 percent in IIQ2014 relative to IQ2014 and fell 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP grew at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of minus 6.8 percent in IIQ2014 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/05/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). The UK grew at 0.8 percent in IIQ2014 relative to IVQ2013 and GDP increased 3.2 percent in IIQ2014 relative to IIQ2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html). The Euro Zone grew at 0.0 percent in IIQ2014 and 0.7 percent in IIQ2014 relative to IIQ2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-valuations-twenty-seven.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-risks-rules-discretionary.html). These are stagnating or “growth recession” rates, which are positive or about nil growth rates with some contractions that are insufficient to recover employment. The rates of unemployment are quite high: 6.2 percent in the US but 16.3 percent for unemployment/underemployment or job stress of 27.8 million (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-valuations-twentyseven.html), 3.8 percent for Japan (Section VB and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html

and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html), 6.4 percent for the UK with high rates of unemployment for young people (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html). Twelve-month rates of inflation have been quite high, even when some are moderating at the margin: 2.0 percent in the US, 3.4 percent for Japan, 2.3 percent for China, 0.4 percent for the Euro Zone and 1.6 percent for the UK. Stagflation is still an unknown event but the risk is sufficiently high to be worthy of consideration (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html). The analysis of stagflation also permits the identification of important policy issues in solving vulnerabilities that have high impact on global financial risks. Six key interrelated vulnerabilities in the world economy have been causing global financial turbulence. (1) Sovereign risk issues in Europe resulting from countries in need of fiscal consolidation and enhancement of their sovereign risk ratings (see Section III and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html). (2) The tradeoff of growth and inflation in China now with change in growth strategy to domestic consumption instead of investment, high debt and political developments in a decennial transition. (3) Slow growth by repression of savings with de facto interest rate controls (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html), weak hiring with the loss of 10 million full-time jobs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-risk-recovery-without-hiring.html) and continuing job stress of 24 to 30 million people in the US and stagnant wages in a fractured job market (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-valuations-twenty-seven.html) (4) The timing, dose, impact and instruments of normalizing monetary and fiscal policies (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/united-states-gdp-growth-standstill.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/global-financial-risks-and-fed.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/policy-inflation-growth-unemployment.html) in advanced and emerging economies. (5) The Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 had repercussions throughout the world economy. Japan has share of about 9 percent in world output, role as entry point for business in Asia, key supplier of advanced components and other inputs as well as major role in finance and multiple economic activities (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216950927404360.html?mod=WSJ_business_AsiaNewsBucket&mg=reno-wsj); and (6) geopolitical events in the Middle East.

In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These policies and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.

Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):

“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.

Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.

The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”

Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:

“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.”

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at around 2.0 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 20 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2014. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IIQ2014 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp2q14_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2014 would have accumulated to 22.1 percent. GDP in IIQ2014 would be $18,305.0 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,310.7 billion than actual $15,994.3 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 26.8 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 16.3 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-valuations-twenty-seven.html). US GDP in IIQ2014 is 12.6 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,994.3 billion in IIQ2014 or 6.7 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. The long-term trend is growth at average 3.3 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jul 2014. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 99.2392 in Dec 2007 to 122.8881 in Jul 2014. The actual index NSA in Jul 2014 is 98.4978, which is 19.8 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2013, raising the index at trend to 115.2650 in Jul 2014. The output of manufacturing at 98.4978 in Jul 2014 is 14.5 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

First, total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 209,000 in Jul 2014 and private payroll employment increased 198,000. The average monthly number of nonfarm jobs created from Jul 2012 to Jul 2013 was 193,583 using seasonally adjusted data, while the average number of nonfarm jobs created from Jul 2013 to Jul 2014 was 214,167, or increase by 10.6 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US from Jul 2012 to Jul 2013 was 200,250, using seasonally adjusted data, while the average from Jul 2013 to Jul 2014 was 206,583, or increase by 3.2 percent. This blog calculates the effective labor force of the US at 162.690 million in Jul 2013 and 164.191 million in Jul 2014 (Table I-4), for growth of 1.501 million at average 125,083 per month. The difference between the average increase of 206,583 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Jul 2013 to Jul 2014 and the 125,083 average monthly increase in the labor force from Jul 2013 to Jul 2014 is 81,500 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 26.768 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 81,500 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 328 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (26.768 million divided by 81,500) or 27 years (328 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Jul 2014 not seasonally adjusted stood at 157.573 million with 10.307 million unemployed or effectively 16.925 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 164.191 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 1.1 years (1 million divided by product of 81,500 by 12, which is 978,000). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.879 million (0.05 times labor force of 157.573 million) for new net job creation of 2.437 million (10.307 million unemployed minus 7.870 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 2.5 years (2.437 million divided by 0.978000). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 16.925 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 164.191 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 11.257 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 8.9 years (16.925 million minus 0.05(164.191 million) = 8.715 million divided by 0.978000, using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in Jul 2014 was 147.265 million (NSA) or 0.050 million fewer people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 248.023 million in Jul 2014 or by 16.065 million. The number employed fell 0.03 percent from Jul 2007 to Jul 2014 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 6.9 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employment as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Jul 2014 would result in 157.495 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 248.023 million). There are effectively 10.230 million fewer jobs in Jul 2014 than in Jul 2007, or 157.495 million minus 147.265 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:

“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-risk-recovery-without-hiring.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financialgeopolitical-risks-recovery.html).

Second, long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 20 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2014. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IIQ2014 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp2q14_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2014 would have accumulated to 22.1 percent. GDP in IIQ2014 would be $18,305.0 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,310.7 billion than actual $15,994.3 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 26.8 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 16.3 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-valuations-twenty-seven.html). US GDP in IIQ2014 is 12.6 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,994.3 billion in IIQ2014 or 6.7 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. The long-term trend is growth at average 3.3 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jul 2014. Growth at 3.3 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 99.2392 in Dec 2007 to 122.8881 in Jul 2014. The actual index NSA in Jul 2014 is 98.4978, which is 19.8 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.3 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2013, raising the index at trend to 115.2650 in Jul 2014. The output of manufacturing at 98.4978 in Jul 2014 is 14.5 percent below trend under this alternative calculation. The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as fluctuating from mediocre growth of 2.5 percent on an annual basis in 2010 to 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.3 percent in 2012 and 2.2 percent in 2013. The following calculations show that actual growth is around 2.1 to 2.5 percent per year. The rate of growth of 0.9 percent in the entire cycle from 2007 to 2013 is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which the economy of the US always attained for entire cycles in expansions after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.

Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita

 

GDP

 

Long-Term

   

1929-2013

3.3

 

1947-2013

3.2

 

Whole Cycles

   

1980-1989

3.5

 

2006-2013

1.0

 

2007-2013

0.9

 

Cyclical Contractions ∆%

   

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

-4.7

 

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

-4.2

 

Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆%

   

IQ1983 to IVQ1985

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

IQ1983-IIIQ1987

IQ1983 to IVQ1987

5.9

5.7

5.4

5.2

5.0

5.0

4.9

5.0

 

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

7.8

 

IIIQ2009 to IIQ2014

2.2

 

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

2.7

 
 

Real Disposable Income

Real Disposable Income per Capita

Long-Term

   

1929-2013

3.2

2.0

1947-1999

3.7

2.3

Whole Cycles

   

1980-1989

3.5

2.6

2006-2013

1.4

0.5

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace from 2.1 to 2.5 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.

1. Average Annual Growth in the Past Eight Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013 and the first two quarters of 2014 accumulated to 5.3 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.1 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IIQ2014 of $15,994.3 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,190.3 billion and compounding by 4/10: {[($15,994.3/$15,190.3)4/10 -1]100 = 2.1 percent.

2. Average Annual Growth in the Past Four Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of IIQ2013 to IIQ2014 accumulated to 2.5 percent that is equivalent to 2.5 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IIQ2014 of $15,994.3 billion by GDP in IIQ2013 of $15,606.6 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($15,994.3/$15,606.6)4/4 -1]100 = 2.5%}. The US economy grew 2.4 percent in IIQ2014 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IIQ2013. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is in the borderline of contraction, and negative in IQ2014. US GDP fell 0.5 percent in IQ2014. The rate of growth of GDP in the revision of IIIQ2013 is 4.5 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR). Inventory accumulation contributed 1.49 percentage points to this rate of growth. The actual rate without this impulse of unsold inventories would have been 3.0 percent, or 0.74 percent in IIIQ2013, such that annual equivalent growth in 2013 is closer to 2.8 percent {[(1.007)(1.004)(1.0074)(1.009)4/4-1]100 = 2.8%}, compounding the quarterly rates and converting into annual equivalent. Inventory divestment deducted 1.16 percentage points from GDP growth in IQ2014. Without this deduction of inventory divestment, GDP growth would have been minus 0.9 percent in IQ2014, such that the actual growth rates in the four quarters ending in IQ2014 is closer to 2.2 percent {[(1.004)(1.011)(1.009)(0.9977)]4/4 -1]100 = 2.2%}.

Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real GDP, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

14,991.8

NA

NA

1.9

IVQ2011

15,190.3

1.3

1.1

1.7

IQ2012

15,275.0

1.9

0.6

2.6

IIQ2012

15,336.7

2.3

0.4

2.3

IIIQ2012

15,431.3

2.9

0.6

2.7

IVQ2012

15,433.7

2.9

0.0

1.6

IQ2013

15,538.4

3.6

0.7

1.7

IIQ2013

15,606.6

4.1

0.4

1.8

IIIQ2013

15,779.9

5.3

1.1

2.3

IVQ2013

15,916.2

6.2

0.9

3.1

IQ2014

15,831.7

5.6

-0.5

1.9

IIQ2014

15,994.3

6.7

1.0

2.5

Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IQ2014

5.3

 

5.3

 

Annual Equivalent ∆%

2.1

 

2.1

 

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QEcannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.

The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm) practically unchanged in the statement at its meeting on Jul 30, 2014 with symbolic reduction of purchases of securities for the Fed’s balance sheet (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140730a.htm):

Press Release

Release Date: July 30, 2014

For immediate release

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June indicates that growth in economic activity rebounded in the second quarter. Labor market conditions improved, with the unemployment rate declining further. However, a range of labor market indicators suggests that there remains significant underutilization of labor resources. Household spending appears to be rising moderately and business fixed investment is advancing, while the recovery in the housing sector remains slow. Fiscal policy is restraining economic growth, although the extent of restraint is diminishing. Inflation has moved somewhat closer to the Committee's longer-run objective. Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with appropriate policy accommodation, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, with labor market indicators and inflation moving toward levels the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee sees the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as nearly balanced and judges that the likelihood of inflation running persistently below 2 percent has diminished somewhat.

The Committee currently judges that there is sufficient underlying strength in the broader economy to support ongoing improvement in labor market conditions. In light of the cumulative progress toward maximum employment and the improvement in the outlook for labor market conditions since the inception of the current asset purchase program, the Committee decided to make a further measured reduction in the pace of its asset purchases. Beginning in August, the Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $10 billion per month rather than $15 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $15 billion per month rather than $20 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee's sizable and still-increasing holdings of longer-term securities should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative, which in turn should promote a stronger economic recovery and help to ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with the Committee's dual mandate.

The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months and will continue its purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until the outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability. If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. However, asset purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on the Committee's outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate. In determining how long to maintain the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess progress--both realized and expected--toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.

When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent. The Committee currently anticipates that, even after employment and inflation are near mandate-consistent levels, economic conditions may, for some time, warrant keeping the target federal funds rate below levels the Committee views as normal in the longer run.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Stanley Fischer; Richard W. Fisher; Narayana Kocherlakota; Loretta J. Mester; Jerome H. Powell; and Daniel K. Tarullo. Voting against was Charles I. Plosser who objected to the guidance indicating that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for "a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends," because such language is time dependent and does not reflect the considerable economic progress that has been made toward the Committee's goals.”

There are several important issues in this statement.

  1. Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

  1. Open-ended Quantitative Easing or QE with Symbolic Tapering. Earlier programs are continued with an additional lower open-ended $25 billion of bond purchases per month, increasing the stock of $4,136,776 million securities held outright and bank reserves deposited at the Fed of $2,785,792 million (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1): “The Committee currently judges that there is sufficient underlying strength in the broader economy to support ongoing improvement in labor market conditions. In light of the cumulative progress toward maximum employment and the improvement in the outlook for labor market conditions since the inception of the current asset purchase program, the Committee decided to make a further measured reduction in the pace of its asset purchases. Beginning in August, the Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $10 billion per month rather than $15 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $15 billion per month rather than $20 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee's sizable and still-increasing holdings of longer-term securities should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative, which in turn should promote a stronger economic recovery and help to ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with the Committee's dual mandate.”
  2. New Advance Guidance. Policy will be accommodative even after the economy recovers satisfactorily: “To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate. In determining how long to maintain the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess progress--both realized and expected--toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored” (emphasis added).
  3. Policy Commitment with Unemployment Rate. The emphasis of policy is in maintaining full employment: “When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent. The Committee currently anticipates that, even after employment and inflation are near mandate-consistent levels, economic conditions may, for some time, warrant keeping the target federal funds rate below levels the Committee views as normal in the longer run.”

Current focus is on tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases to $25 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Jul 30, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140730a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate. In determining how long to maintain the current 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess progress--both realized and expected--toward its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored” (emphasis added).

How long is “considerable time”? At the press conference following the meeting on Mar 19, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question of Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal explaining “In particular, the Committee has endorsed the view that it anticipates that will be a considerable period after the asset purchase program ends before it will be appropriate to begin to raise rates. And of course on our present path, well, that's not utterly preset. We would be looking at next, next fall. So, I think that's important guidance” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140319.pdf). Many focused on “next fall,” ignoring that the path of increasing rates is not “utterly preset.”

At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):

“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.

Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.

Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) provides comprehensive review of the theory and measurement of labor markets. Monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

Yellen (2014Aug22) finds that the unemployment rate is not sufficient in determining slack:

“One convenient way to summarize the information contained in a large number of indicators is through the use of so-called factor models. Following this methodology, Federal Reserve Board staff developed a labor market conditions index from 19 labor market indicators, including four I just discussed. This broadly based metric supports the conclusion that the labor market has improved significantly over the past year, but it also suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) restates that the FOMC determines monetary policy on newly available information and interpretation of labor markets and inflation and does not follow a preset path:

“But if progress in the labor market continues to be more rapid than anticipated by the Committee or if inflation moves up more rapidly than anticipated, resulting in faster convergence toward our dual objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target could come sooner than the Committee currently expects and could be more rapid thereafter. Of course, if economic performance turns out to be disappointing and progress toward our goals proceeds more slowly than we expect, then the future path of interest rates likely would be more accommodative than we currently anticipate. As I have noted many times, monetary policy is not on a preset path. The Committee will be closely monitoring incoming information on the labor market and inflation in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”

Chair Yellen analyzes the view of inflation (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140416a.htm):

“Inflation, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, has slowed from an annual rate of about 2-1/2 percent in early 2012 to less than 1 percent in February of this year. This rate is well below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective. Many advanced economies are observing a similar softness in inflation.

To some extent, the low rate of inflation seems due to influences that are likely to be temporary, including a deceleration in consumer energy prices and outright declines in core import prices in recent quarters. Longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably steady, however. We anticipate that, as the effects of transitory factors subside and as labor market gains continue, inflation will gradually move back toward 2 percent.”

There is a critical phrase in the statement of Sep 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm): “but mortgage rates have risen further.” Did the increase of mortgage rates influence the decision of the FOMC not to taper? Is FOMC “communication” and “guidance” successful? Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?

A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html).

Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 17,098.45 on Fr Aug 29, 2014, which is higher by 20.7 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 20.4 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs. Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):

So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).

In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):

“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”

Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:

“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).

Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:

“Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).

Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Professor Raguram G Rajan, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation. Rajan (2005) anticipated the risks of the world financial crisis. Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor (1993, 1998LB, 1999, 1998LB, 1999, 2007JH, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012JMCB, 2014Jan3) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html).

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):

“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability.  If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.  In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that it does not run persistently above or below that level (emphasis added).”

At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:

“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.

For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”

In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm):

“The economy has continued to recover from the steep recession of 2008 and 2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth stepped up to an average annual rate of about 3-1/4 percent over the second half of last year, a faster pace than in the first half and during the preceding two years. Although real GDP growth is currently estimated to have paused in the first quarter of this year, I see that pause as mostly reflecting transitory factors, including the effects of the unusually cold and snowy winter weather. With the harsh winter behind us, many recent indicators suggest that a rebound in spending and production is already under way, putting the overall economy on track for solid growth in the current quarter. One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.

Conditions in the labor market have continued to improve. The unemployment rate was 6.3 percent in April, about 1-1/4 percentage points below where it was a year ago. Moreover, gains in payroll employment averaged nearly 200,000 jobs per month over the past year. During the economic recovery so far, payroll employment has increased by about 8-1/2 million jobs since its low point, and the unemployment rate has declined about 3-3/4 percentage points since its peak.

While conditions in the labor market have improved appreciably, they are still far from satisfactory. Even with recent declines in the unemployment rate, it continues to be elevated. Moreover, both the share of the labor force that has been unemployed for more than six months and the number of individuals who work part time but would prefer a full-time job are at historically high levels. In addition, most measures of labor compensation have been rising slowly--another signal that a substantial amount of slack remains in the labor market.

Inflation has been quite low even as the economy has continued to expand. Some of the factors contributing to the softness in inflation over the past year, such as the declines seen in non-oil import prices, will probably be transitory. Importantly, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained stable. That said, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recognizes that inflation persistently below 2 percent--the rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its dual mandate--could pose risks to economic performance, and we are monitoring inflation developments closely.

Looking ahead, I expect that economic activity will expand at a somewhat faster pace this year than it did last year, that the unemployment rate will continue to decline gradually, and that inflation will begin to move up toward 2 percent. A faster rate of economic growth this year should be supported by reduced restraint from changes in fiscal policy, gains in household net worth from increases in home prices and equity values, a firming in foreign economic growth, and further improvements in household and business confidence as the economy continues to strengthen. Moreover, U.S. financial conditions remain supportive of growth in economic activity and employment.”

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (10

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:

“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.

The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”

Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-irrational-exuberance.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html).

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) is that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This is a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.

In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Professor Raguram G Rajan, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation.

Professor Ronald I. McKinnon (2013Oct27), writing on “Tapering without tears—how to end QE3,” on Oct 27, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579153693500945608?KEYWORDS=Ronald+I+McKinnon), finds that the major central banks of the world have fallen into a “near-zero-interest-rate trap.” World economic conditions are weak such that exit from the zero interest rate trap could have adverse effects on production, investment and employment. The maintenance of interest rates near zero creates long-term near stagnation. The proposal of Professor McKinnon is credible, coordinated increase of policy interest rates toward 2 percent. Professor John B. Taylor at Stanford University, writing on “Economic failures cause political polarization,” on Oct 28, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303442004579121010753999086?KEYWORDS=John+B+Taylor), analyzes that excessive risks induced by near zero interest rates in 2003-2004 caused the financial crash. Monetary policy continued in similar paths during and after the global recession with resulting political polarization worldwide.

Table IV-2 provides economic projections of governors of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and regional presidents of Federal Reserve Banks released at the meeting of Jun 18, 2014. The Fed releases the data with careful explanations (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20131218.pdf). Columns “∆% GDP,” “∆% PCE Inflation” and “∆% Core PCE Inflation” are changes “from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated.” The GDP report for IQ2014 is analyzed in Section I (and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html) and the PCE inflation data from the report on personal income and outlays in Section IV (and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html). The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the estimate of IIQ2014 GDP (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html). PCE inflation is the index of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) of the report of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on “Personal Income and Outlays” (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm), which is analyzed in Section IV (and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html). The report on “Personal Income and Outlays” was released on Aug 29, 2014 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html). PCE core inflation consists of PCE inflation excluding food and energy. Column “UNEMP %” is the rate of unemployment measured as the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the Employment Situation Report with the civilian unemployment rate in the first Friday of every month, which is analyzed in this blog. The report for Jul 2014 was released on Aug 1, 2014 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/fluctuating-financial-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/financial-valuations-twenty-seven.html). “The longer-run projections are the rates of growth, unemployment, and inflation to which a policymaker expects the economy to converge over time—maybe in five or six years—in the absence of further shocks and under appropriate monetary policy” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20131218.pdf).

It is instructive to focus on 2014 and 2015 because 2016 and longer term are too far away, and there is not much information even on what will happen in 2014-2015 and beyond. The central tendency should provide reasonable approximation of the view of the majority of members of the FOMC but the second block of numbers provides the range of projections by FOMC participants. The first row for each year shows the projection introduced after the meeting of Jun 18, 2014 and the second row “PR” the projection of the Mar 19, 2014 meeting. There are three changes in the view.

1. Growth “∆% GDP.” The FOMC has changed the forecast of GDP growth in 2014. The FOMC decreased GDP growth in 2014 from 2.8 to 3.0 percent at the meeting in Mar 2014 to 2.1 to 2.3 percent at the meeting in Jun 2014.

2. Rate of Unemployment “UNEM%.” The FOMC reduced the forecast of the rate of unemployment for 2014 from 6.1 to 6.3 percent at the meeting on Mar 19, 2014 to 6.0 to 6.1 percent at the meeting on Jun 18, 2014. The projection for 2015 decreased to the range of 5.4 to 5.7 in Jun 2014 from 5.6 to 5.9 in Mar 2014. Projections of the rate of unemployment are moving closer to the desire 6.5 percent or lower with 5.1 to 5.5 percent in 2016 after the meeting on Jun 18, 2014.

3. Inflation “∆% PCE Inflation.” The FOMC changed the forecast of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation for 2014 from 1.5 to 1.6 percent at the meeting on Mar 19, 2014 to 1.5 to 1.7 percent at the meeting on Jun 18, 2014. There are no projections exceeding 2.0 percent in the central tendency but some in the range reach 2.4 percent in 2015. The longer run projection is at 2.0 percent.

4. Core Inflation “∆% Core PCE Inflation.” Core inflation is PCE inflation excluding food and energy. There is again not much of a difference of the projection for 2014, not changing significantly from 1.4 to 1.6 percent at the meeting on Mar 19, 20134 to 1.5 to 1.6 percent at the meeting Jun 18, 2014. In 2015, there is minor change in the projection from 1.7 to 2.0 percent at the meeting on Mar 19, 2014 to 1.6 to 2.0 percent on Jun 18, 2014. The rate of change of the core PCE is below 2.0 percent in the central tendency with 2.4 percent at the top of the range in 2015.

Table IV-2, US, Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in FOMC, Mar 19, 2013 and Jun 18, 2014 

 

∆% GDP

UNEM %

∆% PCE Inflation

∆% Core PCE Inflation

Central
Tendency

       

2014 
Mar PR

2.1 to 2.3
2.8 to 3.0

6.0 to 6.1
6.1 to 6.3

1.5 to 1.7
1.5 to 1.6

1.5 to 1.6
1.4 to 1.6

2015

Mar PR

3.0 to 3.2

3.0 to 3.2

5.4 to 5.7

5.6 to 5.9

1.5 to 2.0

1.5 to 2.0

1.6 to 2.0

1.7 to 2.0

2016

Mar PR

2.5 to 3.0

2.5 to 3.0

5.1 to 5.5

5.2 to 5.6

1.6 to 2.0

1.7 to 2.0

1.7 to 2.0

1.8 to 2.0

Longer Run

Mar PR

2.1 to 2.3

2.2 to 2.3

5.2 to 5.5

5.2 to 5.6

2.0

2.0

 

Range

       

2014
Mar PR

1.9 to 2.4
2.1 to 3.0

5.8 to 6.2
6.0 to 6.5

1.4 to 2.0
1.3 to 1.8

1.4 to 1.8
1.3 to 1.8

2015

Mar PR

2.2 to 3.6

2.2 to 3.5

5.2 to 5.9

5.4 to 5.9

1.4 to 2.4

1.5 to 2.4

1.5 to 2.4

1.5 to 2.4

2016

Mar PR

2.2 to 3.2

2.2 to 3.4

5.0 to 5.6

5.1 to 5.8

1.5 to 2.0

1.6 to 2.0

1.6 to 2.0

1.6 to 2.2

Longer Run

Mar PR

1.8 to 2.5

1.8 to 2.4

5.0 to 6.0

5.2 to 6.0

2.0

2.0

 

Notes: UEM: unemployment; PR: Projection

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140618b.htm

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20140618.pdf

Another important decision at the FOMC meeting on Jan 25, 2012, is formal specification of the goal of inflation of 2 percent per year but without specific goal for unemployment (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm):

“Following careful deliberations at its recent meetings, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reached broad agreement on the following principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. The Committee intends to reaffirm these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January.

The FOMC is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.

Inflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee's policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals.

The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.

The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the corresponding interval several years earlier.

In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary.  However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. ”

The probable intention of this specific inflation goal is to “anchor” inflationary expectations. Massive doses of monetary policy of promoting growth to reduce unemployment could conflict with inflation control. Economic agents could incorporate inflationary expectations in their decisions. As a result, the rate of unemployment could remain the same but with much higher rate of inflation (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html See Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-116). Strong commitment to maintaining inflation at 2 percent could control expectations of inflation.

The FOMC continues its efforts of increasing transparency that can improve the credibility of its firmness in implementing its dual mandate. Table IV-3 provides the views by participants of the FOMC of the levels at which they expect the fed funds rate in 2014, 2015, 2016 and the in the longer term. Table IV-3 is inferred from a chart provided by the FOMC with the number of participants expecting the target of fed funds rate (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20140618.pdf). The rate would still remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2014 for 15 participants with one expecting the rate to be in the range of 0.5 to 1.0. This table is consistent with the guidance statement of the FOMC that rates will remain at low levels. For 2015, 8 participants expect the rate to remain between 0.5 and 1.0 percent, 6 to be between 1.0 and 1.5 percent, 9 between 1 and 2 percent and 3 between 2 and 3 percent. For 2016, 2 participant expects the rate between 0.5 and 1 percent, 2 between 1 and 2 percent, 9 between 2 and 3 percent and 6 between 3 and 4.5 percent. In the long term, all 16 participants expect the fed funds rate in the range of 3.0 to 4.5 percent.

Table IV-3, US, Views of Target Federal Funds Rate at Year-End of Federal Reserve Board

Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Jun 18, 2014

 

0 to 0.25

0.5 to 1.0

1.0 to 1.5

1.0 to 2.0

2.0 to 3.0

3.0 to 4.5

2014

15

1

       

2015

 

8

6

9

3

 

2016

 

2

 

2

9

6

Longer Run

         

16

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140618b.htm

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20140618.pdf

Additional information is provided in Table IV-4 with the number of participants expecting increasing interest rates in the years from 2014 to 2016. It is evident from Table IV-4 that the prevailing view of the FOMC is for interest rates to continue at low levels until 2015. This view is consistent with the economic projections of low economic growth, relatively high unemployment and subdued inflation provided in Table IV-2. The FOMC states that rates will continue to be low even after return of the economy to potential growth.

Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Mar 19, 2014

Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Fed Funds Rate

Number of Participants

2014

1

2015

12

2016

3

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140618b.htm

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20140618.pdf

The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing indexes of prices of personal consumption. There are waves of inflation similar to those worldwide (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html) in inflation of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) in Table IV-5. These waves are in part determined by commodity price shocks originating in the carry trade from zero interest rates to positions in risk financial assets, in particular in commodity futures, which increase the prices of food and energy when there is relaxed risk aversion. Return of risk aversion causes collapse in prices. Resulting fluctuations of prices confuse risk/return decisions, inducing financial instability with adverse financial and economic consequences. The first wave is in Jan-Apr 2011 when headline PCE inflation increased at the average annual equivalent rate of 4.0 percent and PCE inflation excluding food and energy (PCEX) at 1.8 percent. The drivers of inflation were increases in food prices (PCEF) at the annual equivalent rate of 7.8 percent and of energy prices (PCEE) at 30.1 percent. This behavior will prevail under zero interest rates and relaxed risk aversion because of carry trades from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in commodity futures. The second wave occurred in May-Jun 2011 when risk aversion from the European sovereign risk crisis interrupted the carry trade. PCE prices increased 1.8 percent in annual equivalent and 1.8 percent excluding food and energy. The third wave is captured by the annual equivalent rates in Jul-Sep 2011 of headline PCE inflation of 2.4 percent with subdued PCE inflation excluding food and energy of 2.0 percent while PCE food rose at 6.2 percent and PCE energy increased at 5.3 percent. In the fourth wave in Oct-Dec 2011, increased risk aversion explains the fall of the annual equivalent rate of inflation to 0.8 percent for headline PCE inflation and 1.6 percent for PCEX excluding food and energy. PCEF of prices of food rose at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent in Oct-Dec 2011 while PCEE of prices of energy fell at the annual equivalent rate of 10.3 percent. In the fifth wave in Jan-Mar 2012, headline PCE in annual equivalent was 2.8 percent and 2.0 percent excluding food and energy (PCEX). Energy prices of personal consumption (PCEE) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 12.2 percent because of the jump of 1.6 percent in Feb 2012 followed by 0.7 percent in Mar 2012. In the sixth wave, renewed risk aversion caused reversal of carry trades with headline PCE inflation at the annual equivalent rate of 0.6 percent in Apr-May 2012 while PCE inflation excluding food and energy increased at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent. In the seventh wave, further shocks of risk aversion resulted in headline PCE annual equivalent inflation at 0.0 percent in Jun-Jul 2012 with core PCE excluding food and energy at 1.8 percent. In the eighth wave, temporarily relaxed risk aversion with zero interest rates resulted in central PCE inflation at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Aug-Sep 2012 with PCEX excluding food and energy at 0.6 percent while PCEE energy jumped at 63.8 percent annual equivalent. The program of outright monetary transactions (OTM) of the European Central Bank induced relaxed risk aversion (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). In the ninth wave, prices collapsed with reversal of carry trade positions in a new episode of risk aversion with central PCE at annual equivalent 0.6 percent in Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 and PCEX at 1.5 percent while energy prices fell at minus 13.6 percent. In the tenth wave, central PCE increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Feb 2013, PCEX at 1.2 percent and PCEE at 63.8 percent. In the eleventh wave, renewed risk aversion resulted in decline in annual equivalent of general PCE prices at 1.2 percent in Mar-Apr 2013 while PCEX increased at 0.6 percent and energy prices fell at 29.3 percent. In the twelfth wave, central PCE increased at 1.6 percent annual equivalent in May-Nov 2013 with PCEX increasing at 1.4 percent, food PCEF increasing at 0.2 percent and energy PCEE increasing at 2.6 percent with the jump of 1.9 percent in Jun 2013. In the thirteenth wave, central PCE increased at annual equivalent 1.8 percent in Dec 2013-Mar 2014 and PCEX at 1.2 percent. PCEE increased at 5.5 percent annual equivalent. In the fourteenth wave, central PCE inflation was 2.1 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Jul 2014 with PCEX at 1.8 percent and energy prices at 7.7 percent. Commodity prices have moderated with reallocation of financial investments to carry trades in equities.

Table IV-5, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month of Prices of Personal Consumption

Expenditures, Seasonally Adjusted Monthly ∆%

 

PCE

PCEG

PCEG
-D

PCES

PCEX

PCEF

PCEE

2014

             

Jul

0.1

0.0

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.3

-0.4

Jun

0.2

0.5

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.0

1.7

May

0.2

0.2

-0.3

0.3

0.2

0.6

0.8

Apr

0.2

0.3

0.0

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.4

∆% AE Apr-Jun

2.1

3.0

-1.2

2.1

1.8

3.7

7.7

Mar

0.2

-0.2

-0.3

0.3

0.1

0.5

-0.1

Feb

0.1

-0.1

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.3

-0.5

Jan

0.1

0.0

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.4

2013

             

Dec

0.2

0.1

-0.4

0.2

0.1

0.1

1.7

∆% AE Dec-Mar

1.8

-0.6

-3.0

2.7

1.2

2.7

4.6

Nov

0.1

-0.2

-0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

-0.4

Oct

0.1

-0.2

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.0

-0.9

Sep

0.1

-0.1

-0.1

0.2

0.1

-0.1

0.2

Aug

0.1

0.0

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

-0.4

Jul

0.1

0.1

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.3

Jun

0.3

0.4

-0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

1.9

May

0.1

-0.1

-0.1

0.2

0.1

-0.2

0.8

∆% AE May-Nov

1.6

-0.2

-2.4

2.1

1.4

0.2

2.6

Apr

-0.1

-0.5

-0.3

0.1

0.0

0.1

-2.4

Mar

-0.1

-0.6

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

-3.3

∆% AE Mar-Apr

-1.2

-6.4

-3.0

1.8

0.6

1.2

-29.3

Feb

0.3

0.7

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.1

4.2

∆% AE Feb

3.7

8.7

0.0

2.4

1.2

1.2

63.8

Jan

0.1

-0.1

0.0

0.2

0.2

0.0

-0.9

2012

             

Dec

0.0

-0.4

-0.2

0.2

0.0

0.2

-1.4

Nov

-0.1

-0.6

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.3

-3.3

Oct

0.2

0.2

-0.1

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.8

∆% AE Oct-Jan

0.6

-2.7

-1.2

2.7

1.5

2.1

-13.6

Sep

0.3

0.6

-0.2

0.1

0.1

-0.1

3.8

Aug

0.3

0.6

-0.2

0.1

0.0

0.0

4.6

∆% AE Aug-Sep

3.7

7.4

-2.4

1.2

0.6

-0.6

63.8

Jul

0.0

-0.1

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0

-1.1

Jun

0.0

-0.3

-0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

-2.1

∆% AE Jun-Jul

0.0

-2.4

-2.4

2.4

1.8

1.2

-17.6

May

0.0

-0.5

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.0

-2.8

Apr

0.1

0.0

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0

∆% AE Apr- May

0.6

-3.0

-1.8

2.4

1.2

0.6

-15.7

Mar

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.7

Feb

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.0

1.6

Jan

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.6

∆% AE Jan- Mar

2.8

3.7

-0.4

2.0

2.0

1.6

12.2

2011

             

Dec

0.0

-0.2

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

-1.7

Nov

0.1

0.1

-0.2

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.1

Oct

0.1

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.1

-1.1

∆% AE Oct- Dec

0.8

-0.8

-1.6

2.0

1.6

1.2

-10.3

Sep

0.2

0.2

-0.4

0.2

0.1

0.5

1.0

Aug

0.2

0.2

-0.2

0.2

0.2

0.6

0.1

Jul

0.2

0.2

-0.1

0.2

0.2

0.4

0.2

∆% AE Jul-Sep

2.4

2.4

-2.8

2.4

2.0

6.2

5.3

Jun

0.0

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.2

-1.6

May

0.3

0.5

0.1

0.3

0.2

0.5

1.4

∆% AE May-Jun

1.8

2.4

1.2

2.4

1.8

4.3

-1.3

Apr

0.4

0.8

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.4

3.3

Mar

0.4

0.7

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.9

3.2

Feb

0.3

0.4

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.6

1.3

Jan

0.2

0.4

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.6

1.1

∆% AE Jan-Apr

4.0

7.1

1.2

2.4

1.8

7.8

30.1

2010

             

Dec

0.2

0.6

-0.3

0.1

0.0

0.1

4.1

Nov

0.2

0.2

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.2

1.1

Oct

0.2

0.4

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

3.1

Sep

0.1

0.2

-0.1

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.6

Aug

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.0

Jul

0.1

0.1

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.2

Jun

0.1

-0.1

-0.4

0.1

0.1

-0.1

-0.5

May

0.0

-0.2

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

-1.2

Apr

0.0

-0.3

-0.2

0.1

0.0

0.1

-0.8

Mar

0.1

-0.1

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.2

-0.5

Feb

0.0

-0.2

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

-1.2

Jan

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.7

Notes: percentage changes in price index relative to the same month a year earlier of PCE: personal consumption expenditures; PCEG: PCE goods; PCEG-D: PCE durable goods; PCES: PCE services; PCEX: PCE excluding food and energy; PCEF: PCE food; PCEE: PCE energy goods and services. AE: annual equivalent.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The charts of PCE inflation are also instructive. Chart IV-1 provides the monthly change of headline PCE price index. There is significant volatility in the monthly changes but excluding outliers fluctuations have been in a tight range between 1999 and 2014 around 0.2 percent per month.

clip_image001

Chart IV-1, US, Percentage Change of PCE Price Index from Prior Month, 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

There is much less volatility in the PCE index excluding food and energy shown in Chart IV-2 with monthly percentage changes from 1999 to 2014. With the exception of 2001, there are no negative changes and again changes around 0.2 percent when excluding outliers.

clip_image002

Chart IV-2, US, Percentage Change of PCE Price Index Excluding Food and Energy from Prior Month, 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Fluctuations in the PCE index of food are much wider as shown in Chart IV-3 by monthly percentage changes from 1999 to 2014. There are also multiple negative changes and positive changes even exceeding 1.0 percent in three months.

clip_image003

Chart IV-3, US, Percentage Change of PCE Price Index Food from Prior Month, 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The band of fluctuation of the PCE price index of energy in Chart IV-4 is much wider. An interesting feature is the abundance of negative changes and large percentages.

clip_image004

Chart IV-4, US, Percentage Change of PCE Price Index Energy from Prior Month, 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IV-6 provides 12-month rates of PCE inflation from Jan 2012 to Jul 2014, annual inflation rates from 2000 to 2013 and average yearly rates of PCE inflation for various periods since 1929. Headline 12-month PCE inflation decreased from 2.5 percent in in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 to 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014. PCE inflation excluding food and energy (PCEX), used as indicator in monetary policy, decreased from 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 to 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014, which is still below or at the tolerable maximum of 2.0-2.5 percent in monetary policy. The unintended effect of shocks of commodity prices from zero interest rates captured by PCE food prices (PCEF) and energy (PCEE) in the absence of risk aversion should be weighed in design and implementation of monetary policy. Annual PCE inflation in the second part of Table IV-6 shows significant fluctuations. Headline PCE inflation rose during the period of 1 percent interest rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2005, reaching 2.9 percent in 2005. PCEE rose at very high two-digit rates after 2003. Headline PCE inflation increased 3.1 percent in 2008 while PCEE energy increased 14.3 percent in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity derivatives during deep global recession. Flight away from risk financial assets to US government obligations fueled by proposals of TARP in Congress (Cochrane and Zingales 2009) caused decline of PCEE of 19.0 percent in 2009 and minus 0.1 percent in headline PCE. There is no deflation in the US economy. Carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity exposures mixed with portfolio reallocations among risk financial assets caused wide recent oscillations. Headline PCE inflation increased at the average rate of 2.9 percent from 1929 to 2013, as shown in Table IV-6 using the revisions by the BEA. PCE inflation was 6.1 percent on average during the Great Inflation episode from 1965 to 1981 (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). PCE inflation was 3.2 percent on average from 1947 to 2013 and 3.2 percent on average for PCEX. The long-term charts of PCEE and PCEX show almost identical behavior.

Table IV-6, US, Percentage Change in 12 Months of Prices of Personal Consumption

Expenditures ∆%

 

PCE

PCEG

PCEG
-D

PCES

PCEX

PCEF

PCEE

2014

             

Jul

1.6

0.3

-2.3

2.2

1.5

2.0

2.4

Jun

1.6

0.3

-2.5

2.2

1.5

1.8

3.1

May

1.7

0.3

-2.5

2.3

1.5

2.0

3.3

Apr

1.5

0.1

-2.3

2.3

1.4

1.2

3.3

Mar

1.2

-0.8

-2.6

2.2

1.3

1.0

0.4

Feb

1.0

-1.2

-2.5

2.1

1.2

0.7

-2.8

Jan

1.2

-0.5

-2.3

2.1

1.2

0.6

1.8

2013

             

Dec

1.2

-0.5

-2.2

2.1

1.3

0.6

0.5

Nov

1.0

-1.0

-2.0

2.1

1.3

0.7

-2.6

Oct

0.9

-1.4

-1.9

2.0

1.3

1.0

-5.4

Sep

1.0

-1.0

-1.8

2.1

1.3

1.2

-3.8

Aug

1.2

-0.4

-1.9

2.0

1.3

1.2

-0.3

Jul

1.5

0.3

-1.8

2.0

1.3

1.2

4.7

Jun

1.4

0.1

-1.7

2.0

1.3

1.0

3.2

May

1.1

-0.6

-1.8

2.0

1.3

1.0

-0.8

Apr

1.0

-1.0

-1.8

2.0

1.3

1.2

-4.3

Mar

1.2

-0.5

-1.7

2.1

1.4

1.1

-1.9

Feb

1.5

0.4

-1.6

2.1

1.5

1.2

2.1

Jan

1.4

0.0

-1.7

2.1

1.5

1.0

-0.5

2012

             

Dec

1.5

0.4

-1.6

2.1

1.6

1.3

1.1

Nov

1.6

0.5

-1.6

2.1

1.6

1.3

0.9

Oct

1.8

1.3

-1.6

2.1

1.7

1.0

4.4

Sep

1.6

1.0

-1.5

2.0

1.7

0.9

2.4

Aug

1.5

0.6

-1.7

2.0

1.6

1.5

-0.3

Jul

1.5

0.1

-1.7

2.1

1.8

2.0

-4.6

Jun

1.6

0.4

-1.6

2.2

1.9

2.4

-3.3

May

1.6

0.7

-1.3

2.1

1.9

2.4

-2.9

Apr

2.0

1.6

-1.1

2.2

2.0

2.9

1.3

Mar

2.3

2.4

-0.6

2.2

2.1

3.3

4.6

Feb

2.5

2.8

-0.6

2.3

2.0

3.9

7.3

Jan

2.5

3.0

-0.4

2.3

2.1

4.6

7.0

Annual ∆%

             

2013

1.2

-0.5

-1.8

2.1

1.3

1.0

-0.8

2012

1.8

1.2

-1.3

2.1

1.8

2.3

1.4

2011

2.5

3.7

-0.9

1.8

1.5

4.0

16.0

2010

1.7

1.6

-1.4

1.7

1.3

0.3

10.1

2009

-0.1

-2.3

-1.7

1.1

1.2

1.2

-19.0

2008

3.1

3.0

-1.9

3.1

2.1

6.1

14.3

2007

2.5

1.1

-2.0

3.2

2.2

3.9

6.0

2006

2.7

1.4

-1.6

3.4

2.2

1.7

11.3

2005

2.9

2.0

-1.0

3.3

2.2

1.7

17.3

2004

2.4

1.4

-1.9

3.0

1.9

3.1

11.3

2003

2.0

-0.1

-3.6

3.1

1.5

1.9

12.6

2002

1.3

-0.9

-2.5

2.6

1.7

1.5

-5.8

2001

1.9

-0.1

-2.0

3.1

1.8

2.9

2.5

2000

2.5

2.0

-1.8

2.8

1.7

2.3

18.3

Average ∆%

             

2000-2013

2.0

0.9

-21.3*

2.6

1.7

2.4

5.5

1929-2013

2.9

2.3

1.4

3.3

2.8

2.9

3.3

1947-2013

3.2

2.3

1.1

3.9

3.2

3.0

4.2

1965-1981

6.1

5.6

4.3

6.5

5.7

6.3

9.3

*Percentage change from 2000 to 2012.

Notes: percentage changes in price index relative to the same month a year earlier of PCE: personal consumption expenditures; PCEG: PCE goods; PCEG-D: PCE durable goods; PCES: PCE services; PCEX: PCE excluding food and energy; PCEF: PCE food; PCEE: PCE energy goods and services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The headline PCE index is shown in Chart IV-5 from 1999 to 2014. There is an evident upward trend with the carry-trade bump in 2008-2009 during the global recession.

clip_image005

Chart IV-5, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The consumer price index in Chart IV-6 mirrors the behavior of the PCE price index in Chart IV-6. There is the same upward trend with the carry-trade bump in 2008 during the global recession.

clip_image006

Chart IV-6, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-7 provides the PCE price index excluding food and energy. There is milder upward trend with fewer oscillations.

clip_image007

Chart IV-7, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The core consumer price index, excluding food and energy, is shown in Chart IV-8. There is also an upward trend but with fluctuations.

clip_image008

Chart IV-8, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

The PCE price index of food is shown in Chart IV-9. There is a more pronounced upward trend and sharper fluctuations.

clip_image009

Chart IV-9, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Food 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

There is similar behavior in the consumer price index of food in Chart IV-10. There is an upward trend from 1999 to 2011 with a major bump in 2009 when commodity futures positions were unwound. Zero interest rates with bouts of risk aversion dominate the trend into 2011. Risk aversion softens the trend toward the end of 2011 and in 2012-2014.

clip_image010

Chart IV-10, US, Consumer Price Index, Food, NSA, 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The most pronounced trend of PCE price indexes is that of energy in Chart IV-11. It is impossible to explain the hump in 2008 in the middle of the global recession without the carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in commodity futures. Risk aversion after Sep 2008 caused flight to the safe haven of government obligations. Cochrane and Zingales (2009) explain the flight by public allegations of toxic assets in banks during the request of funding from Congress for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The return of risk appetite with zero interest rates caused a first wave of carry trades with another upward trend interrupted by the first European sovereign risk crisis in Apr-Jul 2010. Zero interest rates with risk appetite caused another sharp upward trend of commodity prices interrupted by risk aversion from the second sovereign crisis. In the absence of risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to positions in risk financial assets will continue to cause distortions such as commodity price trends and fluctuations.

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Chart IV-11, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Energy Goods and Services 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IV-12 provides the consumer price index of energy commodities. Unconventional monetary policy of zero or near zero interest rates causes upward trends in commodity prices reflected in (1) increase from 2003 to 2007; (2) sharp increase during the global contraction in 2008; (3) collapse from 2008 into 2009 as positions in commodity futures were unwound in a flight to government obligations; (4) new upward trend after 2010; and (5) episodes of decline during risk aversion shocks such as the more recent segment during the worsening European debt crisis in Nov and Dec of 2011 and with new strength of commodity prices in the beginning of 2012 followed by softness in another episode of risk aversion and increases during risk appetite.

clip_image012

Chart IV-12, US, Consumer Price Index, Energy, NSA, 1999-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-13 of the US Energy Information Administration provides prices of the crude oil futures contract. Unconventional monetary policy of very low interest rates and quantitative easing with suspension of the 30-year bond to lower mortgage rates caused a sharp upward trend of oil prices. There is no explanation for the jump of oil prices to $149/barrel in 2008 during a sharp global recession other than carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. The peak in Chart IV-13 is $145.18 on Jul 14, 2008, in the midst of deep global recession, falling to $33.87/barrel on Dec 19, 2008 (data from the US Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RCLC1&f=D). Prices collapsed in the flight to government obligations caused by proposals for withdrawing “toxic assets” in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as analyzed by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). Risk appetite with zero interest rates after stress tests of US banks resulted in another upward trend of commodity prices after 2009 with fluctuations during periods of risk aversion. All price indexes are affected by unconventional monetary policy.

clip_image013

Chart IV-13, US, Crude Oil Futures Contract

Source: US Energy Information Administration

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RCLC1&f=D

Table IV-14 provides the annual PCE price index from the revised and enhanced dataset of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The annual PCEE index increased at the average rate of 2.9 percent from 1929 to 2013. There is no support for fear of deflation.

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Chart IV-14, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IV-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the consumer price index from 1915 to 2014. There is long-term inflation and no evidence in support of fear of deflation.

clip_image015

Chart IV-15, US, Consumer Price Index, Annual, 1915-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 provides the BEA annual index of PCE prices excluding food and energy. The average rate of increase from 1929 to 2013 is 2.8 percent.

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Chart IV-16, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IV-17 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the annual consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1957 to 2013. There is long-term, fluctuating inflation.

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Chart IV-17, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, Annual, 1957-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-18 provides annual percentage changes of the index of prices of personal consumption expenditures. With the exception of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the index was negative only after World War II high inflation and the speculative carry trades on commodities induced by zero interest rates in 2008. Deflation fear does not have support in reality.

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Chart IV-18, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures, Annual Percentage Changes 1930-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IV-19 provides annual percentage changes of the US consumer price index since 1914. Besides the Great Depression, the index of consumer prices all items fell only after World War II, the Korean War and the episode of speculative carry trades induced by zero interest rates during the global recession in 2008.

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Chart IV-19, US, Consumer Price Index, Annual Percentage Changes, 1915-2013

Source: US bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-20 provides annual percentage changes of the price index of personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy since 1930. Besides the episode of the Great Depression, there are no negative changes with the lowest reading after fast inflation during World War II.

clip_image020

Chart IV-20, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy, Annual Percentage Changes, 1930-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

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Chart IV-21, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, Annual Percentage Changes, 1958-2013

Source: US bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing has been used in Japan and now also in the US. Table IV-7 provides the consumer price index of Japan, with inflation of 3.4 percent in 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and change of 0.0 percent NSA (not-seasonally-adjusted) in Jul 2014. The increase of the tax on value added of consumption on Apr 1, 2014, was the driver of CPI inflation in Japan in Apr-May 2014. Inflation of consumer prices in the first three months of 2013 annualizes at 0.0 percent NSA. Inflation in Mar-Dec 2013 not seasonally adjusted annualizes at 1.9 percent. There are negative percentage changes in most of the 12-month rates in 2011 with the exception of Jul and Aug both with 0.2 percent and stability in Sep. All 12-month rates of inflation in the first five months of 2013 are negative. Inflation in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013 was 0.2 percent and 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013. Inflation increased to 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013 and 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013. Inflation was 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013 and 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013. Inflation was 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 and 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. Inflation was 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014 and 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014. Inflation was 3.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014 and 3.7 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014, mostly because of the increase in the sales tax. Inflation in 12 months ending in Jul 2014 was 3.4 percent. There are ten years of deflation, three of zero inflation and only six of inflation in the annual rate of inflation from 1995 to 2013. This experience is entirely different from that of the US that shows long-term inflation. There is only one annual negative change of the CPI all items of the US in Table IV-5, minus 0.4 percent in 2009 but following 3.8 percent in 2008 because of carry trades from policy rates moving to zero in 2008 during a global contraction that were reversed because of risk aversion in late 2008 and early 2009, causing decreasing commodity prices. Both the US and Japan experienced high rates of inflation during the US Great Inflation of the 1970s (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). It is difficult to justify unconventional monetary policy because of risks of deflation similar to that experienced in Japan. Fear of deflation as had occurred during the Great Depression and in Japan was used as an argument for the first round of unconventional monetary policy with 1 percent interest rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. The 1 percent interest rate combined with quantitative easing in the form of withdrawal of supply of 30-year securities by suspension of the auction of 30-year Treasury bonds with the intention of reducing mortgage rates. For fear of deflation, see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, and Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95. The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html

Table IV-7, Japan, Consumer Price Index, All Items ∆%

 

∆% Month  NSA

∆% 12-Month NSA

Jul 2014

0.0

3.4

Jun

-0.1

3.6

May

0.4

3.7

Apr

2.1

3.4

Mar

0.3

1.6

Feb

0.0

1.5

Jan

-0.2

1.4

Dec 2013

0.1

1.6

Nov

0.0

1.5

Oct

0.1

1.1

Sep

0.3

1.1

Aug

0.3

0.9

Jul

0.2

0.7

Jun

0.0

0.2

May

0.1

-0.3

Apr

0.3

-0.7

Mar

0.2

-0.9

Feb

-0.2

-0.7

Jan

0.0

-0.3

Dec 2012

0.0

-0.1

Nov

-0.4

-0.2

Oct

0.0

-0.4

Sep

0.1

-0.3

Aug

0.1

-0.4

Jul

-0.3

-0.4

Jun

-0.5

-0.2

May

-0.3

0.2

Apr

0.1

0.4

Mar

0.5

0.5

Feb

0.2

0.3

Jan

0.2

0.1

Dec 2011

0.0

-0.2

Nov

-0.6

-0.5

Oct

0.1

-0.2

Sep

0.0

0.0

Aug

0.1

0.2

Jul

0.0

0.2

Jun

-0.2

-0.4 

May

0.0

-0.4 

Apr

0.1

-0.4

Mar

0.3

-0.5

Feb

0.0

-0.5

Jan

-0.1

-0.6

Dec 2010

–0.3

0.0

 

CPI All Items USA

CPI All Items Japan

Annual

   

2013

1.5

0.4

2012

2.1

0.0

2011

3.2

-0.3

2010

1.6

-0.7

2009

-0.4

-1.4

2008

3.8

1.4

2007

2.8

0.0

2006

3.2

0.3

2005

3.4

-0.3

2004

2.7

0.0

2003

2.3

-0.3

2002

1.6

-0.9

2001

2.8

-0.7

2000

3.4

-0.7

1999

2.2

-0.3

1998

1.6

0.6

1997

2.3

1.8

1996

3.0

0.1

1995

2.8

-0.1

1994

2.6

0.7

1993

3.0

1.3

1992

3.0

1.6

1991

4.2

3.3

1990

5.4

3.1

1989

4.8

2.3

1988

4.1

0.7

1987

3.6

0.1

1986

1.9

0.6

1985

3.6

2.0

1984

4.3

2.3

1983

3.2

1.9

1982

6.2

2.8

1981

10.3

4.9

1980

13.5

7.7

1979

11.3

3.7

1978

7.6

4.2

1977

6.5

8.1

1976

5.8

9.4

1975

9.1

11.7

1974

11.0

23.2

1973

6.2

11.7

1972

3.2

4.9

1971

4.4

6.3

Source: Japan, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm

Chart IV-22 of Japan’s Statistics Bureau at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications provides the major consumer price indexes of Japan on an annual basis. There is inflexion of the trend of decline of the index of all items and the index of all items excluding fresh food in 2012 and 2013.

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Chart IV-22, Japan, Consumer Price Index All Items, Consumer Price Index All Items Less Fresh Food and Consumer Price Index All Items Less Food, Alcoholic Beverages and Energy, Annual, 2001-2013

Sources: Japan, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm

Chart IV-23 of Japan’s Statistics Bureau at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications provides annual percentage changes of the consumer price index all items, excluding fresh food and excluding food, alcoholic beverages and energy. The indexes of all items and excluding fresh food increased in 2013.

clip_image023

Chart IV-23, Japan, Japan, Consumer Price Index, Percentage Changes Relative to Prior Year, 2001-2013

Sources: Japan, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm

Japan’s Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications provides the consumer price index for all items and regions of Japan monthly from 1971 to 2013 with 2010=100, shown in Chart IV-24. There was inflation in Japan during the 1970s and 1980s similar to other countries and regions. The index shows stability after the 1990s with sporadic cases of deflation. Slower growth with sporadic inflation has been characterized as a “lost decade” in Japan (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 82-115).

clip_image024

clip_image025

Chart IV-24, Japan, Consumer Price Index All Items, All Japan, Index 2010=100, Monthly, 1970-2013

Source: Japan, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm

Chart IV-25 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the US consumer price index NSA from 1915 to 2014. The dominating characteristic is the increase in slope during the Great Inflation from the middle of the 1960s through the 1970s. There is long-term inflation in the US and no evidence of deflation risks.

clip_image026

Chart IV-25, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, NSA, 1915-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Chart IV-26 of the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index for all items and regions of Japan monthly from 1971 to 2013. Japan experienced the same inflation waves of the United States during the Great Inflation of the 1970s followed by similar low inflation after the inflation-control increase of interest rates in the early 1980s. Numerous cases of negative inflation or deflation are observed after the 1990s.

clip_image027

Chart IV-26, Japan, CPI All Items, All Japan, 12-Month ∆%, 1971-2013

Sources: Japan, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm

Chart IV-27 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 12-month percentage changes of the US consumer price index from 1914 to 2014. There are actually three waves of inflation in the second half of the 1960s, in the mid 1970s and again in the late 1970s. Table IV-7 provides similar inflation waves in the economy of Japan with 11.7 percent in 1973, 23.1 percent in 1974 and 11.7 percent in 1975. The Great Inflation of the 1970s is analyzed in various comments of this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and in Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). Inflation rates then stabilized in the US in a range with only two episodes above 5 percent. There are isolated cases of deflation concentrated over extended periods only during the 1930s. There is no case in United States economic history for unconventional monetary policy because of fear of deflation. There are cases of long-term deflation without lost decades or depressions.

Delfim Netto (1958) partly reprinted in Pelaez (1973) conducted two classical nonparametric tests (Mann 1945, Wallis and Moore 1941; see Kendall and Stuart 1968) with coffee-price data in the period of free markets from 1857 to 1906 with the following conclusions (Pelaez, 1976a, 280):

“First, the null hypothesis of no trend was accepted with high confidence; secondly, the null hypothesis of no oscillation was rejected also with high confidence. Consequently, in the nineteenth century international prices of coffee fluctuated but without long-run trend. This statistical fact refutes the extreme argument of structural weakness of the coffee trade.”

The conventional theory that the terms of trade of Brazil deteriorated over the long term is without reality (Pelaez 1976a, 280-281):

“Moreover, physical exports of coffee by Brazil increased at the high average rate of 3.5 per cent per year. Brazil's exchange receipts from coffee-exporting in sterling increased at the average rate of 3.5 per cent per year and receipts in domestic currency at 4.5 per cent per year. Great Britain supplied nearly all the imports of the coffee economy. In the period of the free coffee market, British export prices declined at the rate of 0.5 per cent per year. Thus, the income terms of trade of the coffee economy improved at the relatively satisfactory average rate of 4.0 per cent per year. This is only a lower bound of the rate of improvement of the terms of trade. While the quality of coffee remained relatively constant, the quality of manufactured products improved significantly during the fifty-year period considered. The trade data and the non-parametric tests refute conclusively the long-run hypothesis. The valid historical fact is that the tropical export economy of Brazil experienced an opportunity of absorbing rapidly increasing quantities of manufactures from the "workshop" countries. Therefore, the coffee trade constituted a golden opportunity for modernization in nineteenth-century Brazil.”

Imlah (1958) provides decline of British export prices at 0.5 percent in the nineteenth century and there were no lost decades, depressions or unconventional monetary policies in the highly dynamic economy of England that provided the world’s growth impulse. The experience of the United Kingdom with deflation and economic growth is relevant and rich. Yearly percentage changes of the composite index of prices of the United Kingdom of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) provide strong evidence. There are 73 declines of inflation in the 145 years from 1751 to 1896. Prices declined in 50.3 percent of 145 years. Some price declines were quite sharp and many occurred over several years. O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) also provide inflation data for the UK from 1929 to 1934. Deflation was much sharper in continuous years in earlier periods than during the Great Depression. The United Kingdom could not have led the world in modern economic growth if there were meaningful causality from deflation to depression.

clip_image028

Chart IV-27, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, NSA, 12-Month Percentage Change 1915-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Chart IV-28 provides the US consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1957 (when it first becomes available) to 2014. There is long-term inflation in the US without episodes of deflation that would justify symmetric inflation targets to increase inflation from low levels.

clip_image029

Chart IV-28, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1957-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

Chart IV-29 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1958 (when it first becomes available) to 2014. There are three waves of inflation in the 1970s during the Great Inflation. There is no episode of deflation.

clip_image030

Chart IV-29, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1958-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/

More detail on the consumer price index of Japan in Jun 2014 is in Table IV-8. Items rich in commodities, such as 7.2 percent in fuel, light and water charges in 12 months with decrease of 0.1 percent in the month, have driven inflation in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014. There are now effects of the increase in the tax on the value added of consumption throughout most segments. Fiscal and monetary policies promoting devaluation of the yen are causing inflation in Japan. There is similar behavior in the preliminary estimate in Aug for the Ku Area of Tokyo with decrease of 0.3 percent of fuel, light and water charges and increase of 5.0 percent in 12 months. There is 12-month increase of 3.8 percent of CPI transport and communications. The CPI excluding fresh food, which is the inflation indicator of the Bank of Japan, increased 3.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014. There is mild inflation in the CPI excluding food, alcoholic beverages and energy with 2.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and change of 0.0 percent in Jul 2014. The CPI excluding imputed rent increased 0.1 percent in Jul 2014 and increased 4.1 percent in 12 months. The all-items CPI estimate for Aug 2014 of the Ku-Area of Tokyo shows increase of 0.2 percent in Aug 2014 and increase of 2.8 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-8, Japan, Consumer Price Index, ∆%

2014

Jul 2014/Jun 2014 ∆%

Year ∆%

CPI All Items

0.0

3.4

CPI Excluding Fresh Food

0.1

3.3

CPI Excluding Food, Alcoholic Beverages and Energy

0.0

2.3

CPI Goods

-0.2

5.1

CPI Services

0.3

1.8

CPI Excluding Imputed Rent

0.1

4.1

CPI Fuel, Light, Water Charges

-0.1

7.2

CPI Transport & Communications

0.8

3.8

CPI Ku-Area Tokyo All Items

0.2

2.8

Fuel, Light, Water Charges Ku Area Tokyo

-0.3

5.0

Note: Ku-area Tokyo CPI data preliminary for Aug 2014

Sources: Japan, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/index.htm

There are waves of inflation of producer prices in France as everywhere in the world economy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html), as shown in Table IV-9. There was a first wave of sharply increasing inflation in the first four months of 2011 originating in the surge of commodity prices driven by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures risk positions. Producer price inflation in the first four months of 2011 was at the annual equivalent rate of 10.4 percent. In the second wave, producer prices fell 0.2 percent in May and another 0.1 percent in Jun for annual equivalent inflation in May-Jun 2011 of minus 1.8 percent. In the third wave from Jul to Sep 2011, annual equivalent producer price inflation was 3.7 percent. In the fourth wave Oct-Dec 2011, annual equivalent producer price inflation was 2.8 percent. In the fifth wave in Jan-Mar 2012, average annual inflation rose to 6.2 percent during carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. In the sixth wave in Apr-Jun 2012, annual equivalent inflation fell at the rate of 4.3 percent during unwinding of carry trades because of increasing risk aversion. In the seventh wave, carry trades returned under more relaxed risk aversion with producer price inflation in France at 7.4 percent in annual equivalent in Jul-Oct 2012. In the eighth wave, return of risk aversion caused unwinding carry trade and annual equivalent inflation of minus 4.1 percent in Nov-Dec 2012. In the ninth wave, inflation returned with annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Jan-Mar 2013. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 10.7 percent in Apr-Jun 2013. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 8.7 percent in Jul 2013 and 4.5 percent in Jul-Sep 2013. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Oct 2013 was minus 2.4 percent. In the thirteenth wave, inflation in Nov 2013 was 0.6 percent, primarily because of increases in electricity rates (http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=25&date=20131227), which is 7.4 percent in annual equivalent and 4.9 percent in annual equivalent in Nov-Dec 2013. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation decreased at 3.0 percent in Jan-Jul 2014. The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) of France explains: “In January, French producer prices in industry for French market decreased (-0,6%, after +0.1% in December), driven down by the fall in prices for refined petroleum products (1.9%) and for electricity and gas (-2.9%), while prices for manufactured products were almost unchanged” (http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=25&date=20140228). The bottom part of Table IV-9 shows producer price inflation at 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2005 and again at 4.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2007. Producer prices fell 2.9 percent in 2009 during the global contraction and decline of commodity prices but returned at 4.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2010.

Table IV-9, France, Producer Price Index for the French Market, ∆%

 

Month

12 Months

Jul 2014

-0.3

-0.6

Jun

0.0

0.4

May

-0.4

0.1

Apr

-0.2

-0.7

Mar

-0.3

-1.8

Feb

-0.1

-1.5

Jan

-0.5

-0.9

AE ∆% Jan-Jul

-3.0

 

Dec 2013

0.2

0.2

Nov

0.6

-0.5

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

4.9

 

Oct

-0.2

-1.3

AE ∆% Oct

-2.4

 

Sep

0.4

-0.6

Aug

0.0

-0.7

Jul

0.7

0.3

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

4.5

 

Jun

-0.3

0.1

May

-1.2

-0.2

Apr

-1.3

0.4

AE ∆% Apr-Jun

-10.7

 

Mar

0.1

1.8

Feb

0.5

2.1

Jan

0.6

2.1

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

4.9

 

Dec 2012

-0.5

2.0

Nov

-0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

-4.1

 

Oct

0.5

2.8

Sep

0.3

2.8

Aug

1.0

2.8

Jul

0.6

1.8

AE ∆% Jul-Oct

7.4

 

Jun

-0.6

1.8

May

-0.6

2.3

Apr

0.1

2.8

AE ∆% Apr-Jun

-4.3

 

Mar

0.5

3.6

Feb

0.5

4.0

Jan

0.5

4.2

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

6.2

 

Dec 2011

-0.2

4.5

Nov

0.4

5.2

Oct

0.5

5.3

AE ∆% Oct-Dec

2.8

 

Sep

0.3

5.4

Aug

0.0

5.6

Jul

0.6

5.7

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

3.7

 

Jun

-0.1

5.4

May

-0.2

5.7

AE ∆% May-Jun

-1.8

 

Apr

1.0

6.0

Mar

0.8

5.7

Feb

0.7

5.2

Jan

0.8

4.6

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

10.4

 

Dec 2010

 

4.3

Dec 2009

 

-2.9

Dec 2008

 

0.8

Dec 2007

 

4.6

Dec 2006

 

2.6

Dec 2005

 

3.2

Dec 2004

 

3.0

Dec 2003

 

0.3

Dec 2002

 

1.2

Dec 2001

 

-0.7

Dec 2000

 

3.9

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=25&date=20140829

Chart IV-30 of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques of France provides the producer price index for the internal market in France from Jan 1999 to Jul 2014. The index also captures the low price environment of the early 2000s that was used as an argument of fear of deflation. For fear of deflation, see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, and Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95. During the first round of unconventional monetary policy of low interest rates and withdrawal of duration in bond markets by suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury bond, inflation accelerated from 2004 to 2007. When policy interest rates were moved toward zero in 2008, carry trades during a global recession caused sharp increases in commodity prices and price indexes worldwide. Inflation collapsed in the risk panic from the latter part of 2008 into the first part of 2009. Carry trades induced by zero interest rates have caused a trend of inflation with oscillations during period of risk aversion (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html).

clip_image031

Chart IV-30, France, Producer Prices for the Internal Market, Jan 1999-Jul 2014, 2010=100

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=25&date=20140829

France’s producer price index for the domestic market is shown in Table IV-10 for Jul 2014. The segment mining includes electricity and decreased 1.2 percent in Jul 2014 and decreased 0.9 percent in 12 months. The segment of prices of coke and refined petroleum decreased 0.5 percent in Jul 2014 and decreased 4.2 percent in 12 months. Manufacturing prices, with the highest weight in the index, changed 0.0 percent in Jul and decreased 0.8 percent in 12 months. Waves of inflation originating in carry trades from unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html) tend to deteriorate sales prices of productive activities relative to prices of inputs and commodities with adverse impact on operational margins and thus on production, investment and hiring.

Table IV-10, France, Producer Price Index for the Domestic Market, %

Jul 2014

Weight

Month ∆%

12 Months ∆%

Total

1000

-0.3

-0.6

Mining

226

-1.2

-0.9

Mfg

774

0.0

-0.8

Food Products, Beverages, Tobacco

196

0.0

-1.3

Coke and Refined Petroleum

49

-0.5

-4.2

Electrical, Electronic

53

0.0

-0.8

Transport

80

0.0

0.2

Other Mfg

396

0.0

-0.2

Source:  Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=25&date=20140829

Chart IV-31 of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques of France provides the PPI for all markets, imports, foreign markets and the domestic market. All indexes decline in 2014.

clip_image032

Chart IV-31, France, Producer Price Indexes

Source:  Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=25&date=20140829

The first wave of commodity price increases in the first four months of Jan-Apr 2011 also influenced the surge of consumer price inflation in Italy shown in Table IV-11. Annual equivalent inflation in the first four months of 2011 from Jan to Apr was 4.9 percent. The crisis of confidence or risk aversion resulted in reversal of carry trades on commodity positions. Consumer price inflation in Italy was subdued in the second wave in Jun and May 2011 at 0.1 percent for annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent inflation increased to 2.4 percent. In the fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 jumped again at 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the fifth wave from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 at annual equivalent 4.3 percent. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 5.7 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 3.0 percent in Jul-Aug 2012. In the ninth wave, inflation collapsed to zero in Sep-Oct 2012 and was minus 0.8 percent in annual equivalent in Sep-Nov 2012. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Dec 2012 to Aug 2013 was 2.0 percent. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.2 percent in Sep-Nov 2013 during reallocations of investment portfolios away from commodity futures. In the thirteenth wave, inflation returned in annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Dec 2013-Jan 2014. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 1.2 percent in Feb 2014. In the fifteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.8 percent in Mar-Apr 2014. In the sixteen wave, annual inflation was minus 1.2 percent in May 2014. In the seventeenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Jun 2014. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in Jul 2014. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Aug 2014. There are worldwide shocks to economies by intermittent waves of inflation originating in combination of zero interest rates and quantitative easing with alternation of risk appetite and risk aversion (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html).

Table IV-11, Italy, Consumer Price Index

 

Month

12 Months

Aug 2014

0.2

-0.1

AE ∆% Aug

2.4

 

Jul

-0.1

0.1

AE ∆% Jul

-1.2

 

Jun

0.1

0.3

AE ∆% Jun

1.2

 

May

-0.1

0.5

AE ∆% May

-1.2

 

Apr

0.2

0.6

Mar

0.1

0.4

AE ∆% Mar-Apr

1.8

 

Feb

-0.1

0.5

AE ∆% Feb

-1.2

 

Jan

0.2

0.7

Dec 2013

0.2

0.7

AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014

2.4

 

Nov

-0.3

0.7

Oct

-0.2

0.8

Sep

-0.3

0.9

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

-3.2

 

Aug

0.4

1.2

Jul

0.1

1.2

Jun

0.3

1.2

May

0.0

1.1

Apr

0.0

1.1

Mar

0.2

1.6

Feb

0.1

1.9

Jan

0.2

2.2

Dec 2012

0.2

2.3

AE ∆% Dec 2012-Aug 2013

2.0

 

Nov

-0.2

2.5

Oct

0.0

2.6

Sep

0.0

3.2

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

-0.8

 

Aug

0.4

3.2

Jul

0.1

3.1

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

3.0

 

June

0.2

3.3

May

0.0

3.2

AE ∆% May-Jun

1.2

 

Apr

0.5

3.3

Mar

0.5

3.3

Feb

0.4

3.3

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

5.7

 

Jan

0.3

3.2

Dec 2011

0.4

3.3

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

4.3

 

Nov

-0.1

3.3

Oct

0.6

3.4

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

3.0

 

Sep

0.0

3.0

Aug

0.3

2.8

Jul

0.3

2.7

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

2.4

 

Jun

0.1

2.7

May

0.1

2.6

AE ∆% May-Jun

1.2

 

Apr

0.5

2.6

Mar

0.4

2.5

Feb

0.3

2.4

Jan

0.4

2.1

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

4.9

 

Dec 2010

0.4

1.9

Annual

   

2013

 

1.2

2012

 

3.0

2011

 

2.8

2010

 

1.5

2009

 

0.8

2008

 

3.3

2007

 

1.8

2006

 

2.1

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/en/archive/130496

Consumer price inflation in Italy by segments in the estimate by ISTAT for Aug 2014 is provided in Table IV-12. Total consumer price inflation in Aug 2014 was 0.2 percent and minus 0.1 percent in 12 months. Inflation of goods was minus 0.1 percent in Aug 2014 and minus 0.6 percent in 12 months. Prices of durable goods decreased 0.2 percent in Aug and decreased 0.4 percent in 12 months, as typical in most countries. Prices of energy decreased 0.4 percent in Aug and decreased 3.7 percent in 12 months. Food prices changed 0.0 percent in Aug and fell 0.3 percent in 12 months. Prices of services increased 0.7 percent in Aug and rose 0.6 percent in 12 months. Transport prices, also influenced by commodity prices, increased 3.8 percent in Aug and increased 0.4 percent in 12 months. Carry trades from zero interest rates to positions in commodity futures cause increases in commodity prices. Waves of inflation originate in periods when there is no risk aversion and commodity prices decline during periods of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html).

Table IV-12, Italy, Consumer Price Index and Segments, Month and 12-Month ∆%

Aug 2014

Weights

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

General Index All Items

1,000,000

0.2

-0.1

I Goods

546,724

-0.1

-0.6

Food

173,611

0.0

-0.3

Energy

85,796

-0.4

-3.7

Durable

80,901

-0.2

-0.4

Nondurable

74,391

0.1

0.4

II Services

453,276

0.7

0.6

Housing

77,009

0.0

2.0

Communications

18,206

0.1

-6.7

Transport

81,924

3.8

0.4

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/en/archive/130496

Chart IV-24 of the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica shows moderation in 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index of Italy with marginal increase followed by decline to 2.5 percent in Nov 2012, 2.3 percent in Dec 2012, 2.2 percent in Jan 2013, 1.9 percent in Feb 2013 and 1.6 percent in Mar 2013. Consumer prices increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr-May 2013 and 1.2 percent in Jun-Jul 2013. In Aug 2013, consumer prices increased 1.2 percent in 12 months. Consumer prices increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013 and 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013. Consumer price inflation increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Consumer prices increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014 and 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014 and 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014.

clip_image033

Chart, IV-32, Italy, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Changes

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica 

http://www.istat.it/en/

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014.

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