Monday, March 3, 2014

Financial Risks, Slow Cyclical United States Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend, United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities, United States Housing, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part II

 

Financial Risks, Slow Cyclical United States Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend, United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities, United States Housing, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

Executive Summary

I Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment

IIA United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities

IIA1 Transmission of Monetary Policy

IIB1 Functions of Banks

IIC United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities

IID Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

IIB United States Housing Collapse

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend. The US is experiencing the first expansion from a recession after World War II with stressing socioeconomic conditions:

Valuations of risk financial assets approach historical highs. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,107.4 billion than actual $15,932.9 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,932.9 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as decelerating from mediocre growth of 2.5 percent on an annual basis in 2010 to 1.8 percent in 2011 to 2.8 percent in 2012. The following calculations show that actual growth is around 2.2 to 2.5 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which the economy of the US always attained for entire cycles in expansions after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.

  1. Long-term. US GDP grew at the average yearly rate of 3.3 percent from 1929 to 2013 and at 3.2 percent from 1947 to 2013. There were periodic contractions or recessions in this period but the economy grew at faster rates in the subsequent expansions, maintaining long-term economic growth at trend.
  2. Cycles. The combined contraction of GDP in the two almost consecutive recessions in the early 1980s is 4.7 percent. The contraction of US GDP from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 during the global recession was 4.3 percent. The critical difference in the expansion is growth at average 7.8 percent in annual equivalent in the first four quarters of recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The average rate of growth of GDP in four cyclical expansions in the postwar period is 7.7 percent. In contrast, the rate of growth in the first four quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 was only 2.7 percent. Average annual equivalent growth in the expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was 5.9 percent and 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987. In contrast, average annual equivalent growth in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 was only 2.3 percent. The US appears to have lost its dynamism of income growth and employment creation.

Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita

 

GDP

 

Long-Term

   

1929-2013

3.3

 

1947-2013

3.2

 

Cyclical Contractions ∆%

   

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

-4.7

 

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

-4.3

 

Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆%

   

IQ1983 to IVQ1985

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

5.9

5.7

5.4

5.2

5.0

5.0

 

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

7.8

 

IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013

2.3

 

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

2.7

 
 

Real Disposable Income

Real Disposable Income per Capita

Long-Term

   

1929-2013

3.2

2.0

1947-1999

3.7

2.3

Whole Cycles

   

1980-1989

3.5

2.6

2006-2013

1.3

0.5

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace from 2.2 to 2.5 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.

1. Average Annual Growth in the Past Eight Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and the four quarters of 2013 accumulated to 4.5 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.2 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2013 of $15,932.9 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,242.1 billion and compounding by 4/8: {[($15,932.9/$15,242.1)4/8 -1]100 = 2.2 percent.

2. Average Annual Growth in the Four Quarters of 2013. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2013 accumulated to 2.5 percent that is equivalent to 2.5 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2013 of $15,932.9 billion by GDP in IVQ2012 of $15,539.6 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($15,932.9/$15,539.6)4/4 -1]100 = 2.5%}. The US economy grew 2.5 percent in IVQ2013 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IVQ2012. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is just at the borderline of contraction. The rate of growth of GDP in the third estimate of IIIQ2013 is 4.1 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR). Inventory accumulation contributed 1.67 percentage points to this rate of growth. The actual rate without this impulse of unsold inventories would have been 2.43 percent, or 0.6 percent in IIIQ2013, such that annual equivalent growth in 2013 is closer to 2.1 percent {[(1.003)(1.006)(1.006)(1.0064/4-1]100 = 2.1%}, compounding the quarterly rates and converting into annual equivalent.

Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real GDP, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

14,996.1

NA

NA

1.9

IVQ2011

15,242.1

1.6

1.2

2.0

IQ2012

15,381.6

2.6

0.9

3.3

IIQ2012

15,427.7

2.9

0.3

2.8

IIIQ2012

15,534.0

3.6

0.7

3.1

IVQ2012

15,539.6

3.6

0.0

2.0

IQ2013

15,583.9

3.9

0.3

1.3

IIQ2013

15,679.7

4.6

0.6

1.6

IIIQ2013

15,839.3

5.6

1.0

2.0

IVQ2013

15,932.9

6.2

0.6

2.5

Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IVQ2013

4.5

 

4.5

 

Annual Equivalent ∆%

2.2

 

2.2

 

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The objective of this section is analyzing US economic growth in the current cyclical expansion. There is initial discussion of the conventional explanation of the current recovery as being weak because of the depth of the contraction and the financial crisis and brief discussion of the concept of “slow-growth recession.” Analysis that is more complete is in IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, which is updated with release of more information on the United States economic cycle (IX Conclusion and extended analysis at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html). The bulk of the section consists of comparison of the current growth experience of the US with earlier expansions after past deep contractions and consideration of recent performance.

This blog has analyzed systematically the weakness of United States recovery in the current business cycle from IIIQ2009 to the present in comparison with the recovery from the two recessions in the 1980s from IQ1983 to IVQ1986. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,107.4 billion than actual $15,932.9 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,932.9 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.

The conventional explanation is that the recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (Jun) was so profound that it caused subsequent weak recovery and that historically growth after recessions with financial crises has been weaker. Michael D. Bordo (2012Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) provide evidence contradicting the conventional explanation: recovery is much stronger on average after profound contractions and much stronger after recessions with financial crises than after recessions without financial crises. Insistence on the conventional explanation prevents finding policies that can accelerate growth, employment and prosperity.

A monumental effort of data gathering, calculation and analysis by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff is highly relevant to banking crises, financial crash, debt crises and economic growth (Reinhart 2010CB; Reinhart and Rogoff 2011AF, 2011Jul14, 2011EJ, 2011CEPR, 2010FCDC, 2010GTD, 2009TD, 2009AFC, 2008TDPV; see also Reinhart and Reinhart 2011Feb, 2010AF and Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011). See http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html The dataset of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 1) is quite unique in breadth of countries and over time periods:

“Our results incorporate data on 44 countries spanning about 200 years. Taken together, the data incorporate over 3,700 annual observations covering a wide range of political systems, institutions, exchange rate and monetary arrangements and historic circumstances. We also employ more recent data on external debt, including debt owed by government and by private entities.”

Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 2011CEPR) classify the dataset of 2317 observations into 20 advanced economies and 24 emerging market economies. In each of the advanced and emerging categories, the data for countries is divided into buckets according to the ratio of gross central government debt to GDP: below 30, 30 to 60, 60 to 90 and higher than 90 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010GTD, Table 1, 4). Median and average yearly percentage growth rates of GDP are calculated for each of the buckets for advanced economies. There does not appear to be any relation for debt/GDP ratios below 90. The highest growth rates are for debt/GDP ratios below 30: 3.7 percent for the average and 3.9 for the median. Growth is significantly lower for debt/GDP ratios above 90: 1.7 for the average and 1.9 percent for the median. GDP growth rates for the intermediate buckets are in a range around 3 percent: the highest 3.4 percent average is for the bucket 60 to 90 and 3.1 percent median for 30 to 60. There is even sharper contrast for the United States: 4.0 percent growth for debt/GDP ratio below 30; 3.4 percent growth for debt/GDP ratio of 30 to 60; 3.3 percent growth for debt/GDP ratio of 60 to 90; and minus 1.8 percent, contraction, of GDP for debt/GDP ratio above 90.

For the five countries with systemic financial crises—Iceland, Ireland, UK, Spain and the US—real average debt levels have increased by 75 percent between 2007 and 2009 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010GTD, Figure 1). The cumulative increase in public debt in the three years after systemic banking crisis in a group of episodes after World War II is 86 percent (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011CEPR, Figure 2, 10).

An important concept is “this time is different syndrome,” which “is rooted in the firmly-held belief that financial crises are something that happens to other people in other countries at other times; crises do not happen here and now to us” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010FCDC, 9). There is both an arrogance and ignorance in “this time is different” syndrome, as explained by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010FCDC, 34):

“The ignorance, of course, stems from the belief that financial crises happen to other people at other time in other places. Outside a small number of experts, few people fully appreciate the universality of financial crises. The arrogance is of those who believe they have figured out how to do things better and smarter so that the boom can long continue without a crisis.”

There is sober warning by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011CEPR, 42) on the basis of the momentous effort of their scholarly data gathering, calculation and analysis:

“Despite considerable deleveraging by the private financial sector, total debt remains near its historic high in 2008. Total public sector debt during the first quarter of 2010 is 117 percent of GDP. It has only been higher during a one-year sting at 119 percent in 1945. Perhaps soaring US debt levels will not prove to be a drag on growth in the decades to come. However, if history is any guide, that is a risky proposition and over-reliance on US exceptionalism may only be one more example of the “This Time is Different” syndrome.”

As both sides of the Atlantic economy maneuver around defaults, the experience on debt and growth deserves significant emphasis in research and policy. The world economy is slowing with high levels of unemployment in advanced economies. Countries do not grow themselves out of unsustainable debts but rather through de facto defaults by means of financial repression and in some cases through inflation. This time is not different.

Professor Michael D. Bordo (2012Sep27), at Rutgers University, is providing clear thought on the correct comparison of the current business cycles in the United States with those in United States history. There are two issues raised by Professor Bordo: (1) incomplete conclusions by lumping together countries with different institutions, economic policies and financial systems; and (2) the erroneous contention that growth is mediocre after financial crises and deep recessions, which is repeated daily in the media, but that Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) persuasively demonstrate to be inconsistent with United States experience.

Depriving economic history of institutions is perilous as is illustrated by the economic history of Brazil. Douglass C. North (1994) emphasized the key role of institutions in explaining economic history. Rondo E. Cameron (1961, 1967, 1972) applied institutional analysis to banking history. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) analyzed the relation of money, income and prices in the business cycle and related the monetary policy of an important institution, the Federal Reserve System, to the Great Depression. Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (1995) analyze the counterfactual of what would have been economic performance if the Fed had used during the Great Depression the Friedman (1960) monetary policy rule of constant growth of money (for analysis of the Great Depression see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 198-217). Alan Meltzer (2004, 2010a,b) analyzed the Federal Reserve System over its history. The reader would be intrigued by Figure 5 in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010FCDC, 15) in which Brazil is classified in external default for seven years between 1828 and 1834 but not again until 64 years later in 1989, above the 50 years of incidence for serial default. William R. Summerhill, Jr. (2007SC, 2007IR) has filled this void in scholarly research on nineteenth-century Brazil. There are important conclusions by Summerhill on the exceptional sample of institutional change or actually lack of change, public finance and financial repression in Brazil between 1822 and 1899, combining tools of economics, political science and history. During seven continuous decades, Brazil did not miss a single interest payment with government borrowing without repudiation of debt or default. What is surprising is that Brazil borrowed by means of long-term bonds and, even more surprising, interest rates fell over time. The external debt of Brazil in 1870 was ₤41,275,961 and the domestic debt in the internal market was ₤25,708,711, or 62.3 percent of the total (Summerhill 2007IR, 73).

The experience of Brazil differed from that of Latin America (Summerhill 2007IR). During the six decades when Brazil borrowed without difficulty, Latin American countries becoming independent after 1820 engaged in total defaults, suffering hardship in borrowing abroad. The countries that borrowed again fell again in default during the nineteenth century. Venezuela defaulted in four occasions. Mexico defaulted in 1827, rescheduling its debt eight different times and servicing the debt sporadically. About 44 percent of Latin America’s sovereign debt was in default in 1855 and approximately 86 percent of total government loans defaulted in London originated in Spanish American borrowing countries.

External economies of commitment to secure private rights in sovereign credit would encourage development of private financial institutions, as postulated in classic work by North and Weingast (1989), Summerhill 2007IR, 22). This is how banking institutions critical to the Industrial Revolution were developed in England (Cameron 1967). The obstacle in Brazil found by Summerhill (2007IR) is that sovereign debt credibility combined with financial repression. There was a break in Brazil of the chain of effects from protecting public borrowing, as in North and Weingast (1989), to development of private financial institutions.

Nicia Villela Luz and Carlos Manuel Peláez (1972, 276) find that:

“The lack of interest on historical moments by economists may explain their emphasis on secular trends in their research on the past instead of changes in the historical process. This may be the origin of why they fill gaps in documentation with their extrapolations.”

Vilela Luz (1961) provides classic analysis of industrialization in Brazil. According to Pelaez 1976, 283) following Cameron (1971, 1967):

“The banking law of 1860 placed severe restrictions on two basic modern economic institutions—the corporation and the commercial bank. The growth of the volume of bank credit was one of the most significant factors of financial intermediation and economic growth in the major trading countries of the gold standard group. But Brazil placed strong restrictions on the development of banking and intermediation functions, preventing the channeling of coffee savings into domestic industry at an earlier date.”

Brazil actually abandoned the gold standard during multiple financial crises in the nineteenth century, as it should have to protect domestic economic activity. Pelaez (1975, 447) finds similar experience in the first half of nineteenth-century Brazil:

“Brazil’s experience is particularly interesting in that in the period 1808-1851 there were three types of monetary systems. Between 1808 and 1829, there was only one government-related Bank of Brazil, enjoying a perfect monopoly of banking services. No new banks were established in the 1830s after the liquidation of the Bank of Brazil in 1829. During the coffee boom in the late 1830s and 1840s, a system of banks of issue, patterned after similar institutions in the industrial countries, supplied the financial services required in the first stage of modernization of the export economy.”

Financial crises in the advanced economies transmitted to nineteenth-century Brazil by the arrival of a ship (Pelaez and Suzigan 1981). The explanation of those crises and the economy of Brazil requires knowledge and roles of institutions, economic policies and the financial system chosen by Brazil, in agreement with Bordo (2012Sep27).

The departing theoretical framework of Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) is the plucking model of Friedman (1964, 1988). Friedman (1988, 1) recalls, “I was led to the model in the course of investigating the direction of influence between money and income. Did the common cyclical fluctuation in money and income reflect primarily the influence of money on income or of income on money?” Friedman (1964, 1988) finds useful for this purpose to analyze the relation between expansions and contractions. Analyzing the business cycle in the United States between 1870 and 1961, Friedman (1964, 15) found that “a large contraction in output tends to be followed on the average by a large business expansion; a mild contraction, by a mild expansion.” The depth of the contraction opens up more room in the movement toward full employment (Friedman 1964, 17):

“Output is viewed as bumping along the ceiling of maximum feasible output except that every now and then it is plucked down by a cyclical contraction. Given institutional rigidities and prices, the contraction takes in considerable measure the form of a decline in output. Since there is no physical limit to the decline short of zero output, the size of the decline in output can vary widely. When subsequent recovery sets in, it tends to return output to the ceiling; it cannot go beyond, so there is an upper limit to output and the amplitude of the expansion tends to be correlated with the amplitude of the contraction.”

Kim and Nelson (1999) test the asymmetric plucking model of Friedman (1964, 1988) relative to a symmetric model using reference cycles of the NBER, finding evidence supporting the Friedman model. Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) analyze 27 cycles beginning in 1872, using various measures of financial crises while considering different regulatory and monetary regimes. The revealing conclusion of Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR, 2) is that:

“Our analysis of the data shows that steep expansions tend to follow deep contractions, though this depends heavily on when the recovery is measured. In contrast to much conventional wisdom, the stylized fact that deep contractions breed strong recoveries is particularly true when there is a financial crisis. In fact, on average, it is cycles without a financial crisis that show the weakest relation between contraction depth and recovery strength. For many configurations, the evidence for a robust bounce-back is stronger for cycles with financial crises than those without.”

The average rate of growth of real GDP in expansions after recessions with financial crises was 8 percent but only 6.9 percent on average for recessions without financial crises (Bordo 2012Sep27). Real GDP declined 12 percent in the Panic of 1907 and increased 13 percent in the recovery, consistent with the plucking model of Friedman (Bordo 2012Sep27). The comparison of recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 is appropriate even when considering financial crises. There was significant financial turmoil during the 1980s. Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR, 11) identify a financial crisis in the United States starting in 1981. Benston and Kaufman (1997, 139) find that there was failure of 1150 US commercial and savings banks between 1983 and 1990, or about 8 percent of the industry in 1980, which is nearly twice more than between the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1934 through 1983. More than 900 savings and loans associations, representing 25 percent of the industry, were closed, merged or placed in conservatorships (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 74-7). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) that received $150 billion of taxpayer funds to resolve insolvent savings and loans. The GDP of the US in 1989 was $5657.7 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the partial cost to taxpayers of that bailout was around 2.65 percent of GDP in a year. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates GDP in 2012 at $16,244.6 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the bailout would be equivalent to cost to taxpayers of about $430.5 billion in current GDP terms. A major difference with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for private-sector banks is that most of the costs were recovered with interest gains whereas in the case of savings and loans there was no recovery. Money center banks were under extraordinary pressure from the default of sovereign debt by various emerging nations that represented a large share of their net worth (see Pelaez 1986).

Bordo (2012Sep27) finds two probable explanations for the weak recovery during the current economic cycle: (1) collapse of United States housing; and (2) uncertainty originating in fiscal policy, regulation and structural changes. There are serious doubts if monetary policy is adequate to recover the economy under these conditions.

The concept of growth recession was popular during the stagflation from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. The economy of the US underperformed with several recession episodes in “stop and go” fashion of policy and economic activity while the rate of inflation rose to the highest in a peacetime period (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/global-inflation-seigniorage-monetary.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html Appendix I; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1999, 1998LB, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012FP, 2012JMCB). A growth recession could be defined as a period in which economic growth is insufficient to move the economy toward full employment of humans, equipment and other productive resources. The US is experiencing a dramatic slow growth recession with 30.295 million people in job stress, consisting of an effective number of unemployed of 19.932 million, 7.771 million employed part-time because they cannot find full employment and 2.592 million marginally attached to the labor force for 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). The discussion of the growth recession issue in the 1970s by two recognized economists of the twentieth century, James Tobin and Paul A. Samuelson, is worth recalling.

In analysis of the design of monetary policy in 1974, Tobin (1974, 219) finds that the forecast of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was also the target such that monetary policy would have to be designed and implemented to attain that target. The concern was with maintaining full employment as provided in the Employment Law of 1946 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/1021.html http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/15C21.txt http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED164974.pdf) see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html), which also created the CEA. Tobin (1974, 219) describes the forecast/target of the CEA for 1974:

“The expected and approved path appears to be quarter-to-quarter rates of growth of real gross national product in 1974 of roughly -0.5, 0.1, and 1 percent, with unemployment rising to about 5.6 percent in the second quarter and remaining there the rest of the year. The rate of price inflation would fall shortly in the second quarter, but rise slightly toward the end of the year.”

Referring to monetary policy design, Tobin (1974, 221) states: “if interest rates remain stable or rise during the current (growth) recession and recovery, this will be a unique episode in business cycle annals.” Subpar economic growth is often called a “growth recession.” The critically important concept is that economic growth is not sufficient to move the economy toward full employment, creating the social and economic adverse outcome of idle capacity and unemployed and underemployed workers, much the same as currently.

Samuelson considers the unexpected incidence of inflation surprises during growth recessions (1974, 76):

“Indeed, if there were in Las Vegas or New York a continuous casino on the money GNP of 1974’s fourth quarter, it would be absurd to think that the best economic forecasters could improve upon the guess posted there. Whatever knowledge and analytical skill they possess would already have been fed into the bidding. It is a manifest contradiction to think that most economists can be expected to do better than their own best performance. I am saying that the best forecasters have been poor in predicting the general price level’s movements and level even a year ahead. By Valentine’s Day 1973 the best forecasters were beginning to talk of the growth recession that we now know did set in at the end of the first quarter. Aside from their end-of-1972 forecasts, the fashionable crowd has little to blame itself for when it comes to their 1973 real GNP projections. But, of course, they did not foresee the upward surge of food and decontrolled industrial prices. This has been a recurring pattern: surprise during the event at the virulence of inflation, wisdom after the event in demonstrating that it did, after all, fit with past patterns of experience.”

Economists are known for their forecasts being second only to those of astrologers. Accurate forecasts are typically realized for the wrong reasons. In contrast with meteorologists, economists do not even agree on what happened. There is not even agreement on what caused the global recession and why the economy has reached a perilous standstill.

There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:

“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). Youth workers would obtain employment at a premium in an economy with declining population. In fact, there is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages. This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.

In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share si of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate yi of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):

Y = ∑isiyi (1)

This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):

Y = ∑isiy*i + ∑iyis*i (2)

The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆si multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*i , or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆yi, multiplied by the average share of the group s*i, or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:

“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”

The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. There are accentuated cyclic factors for both the entire population and the young population of ages 16 to 24 years. Table Summary provides the total noninstitutional population (ICP) of the US, full-time employment level (FTE), employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP), employment/population ratio (EPOP) and unemployment level (UNE). Secular stagnation would not be secular but immediate. All indicators of the labor market weakened sharply during the contraction and did not recover. Population continued to grow but all other variables collapsed and did not recover. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-6). Hansen (1938, 1939) finds secular stagnation in lower growth of an aging population. In the current US economy, Table Summary shows that population is dynamic while the labor market is fractured. There is key explanation in the behavior of the civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and the employment population ratio (EPOP) that collapsed during the global recession with inadequate recovery. Abandoning job searches are difficult to capture in labor statistics but likely explain the decline in the participation of the population in the labor force. Allowing for abandoning job searches, the total number of people unemployed or underemployed is 30.3 million or 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html).

Table Summary Total, US, Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Thousands and Percent

 

ICP

FTE

EMP

CLF

CLFP

EPOP

UNE

2006

228.8

119.7

144.4

151.4

66.2

63.1

7.0

2009

235.8

112.6

139.9

154.1

65.4

59.3

14.3

2012

243.3

114.8

142.5

155.0

63.7

58.6

12.5

2013

245.7

116.3

143.9

155.4

63.2

58.6

11.5

12/07

233.2

121.0

146.3

153.7

65.9

62.8

7.4

9/09

236.3

112.0

139.1

153.6

65.0

58.9

14.5

1/14

246.9

115.8

143.5

154.4

62.5

58.1

10.9

ICP: Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population; FT: Full-time Employment Level, EMP: Total Employment Level; CLF: Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

The same situation is present in the labor market for young people in ages 16 to 24 years with data in Table Summary Youth. The youth noninstitutional civilian population (ICP) continued to increase during and after the global recession. There is the same disastrous labor market with decline for young people in employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and employment population ratio (EPOP). There are only increases for unemployment of young people (UNE) and youth unemployment rate (UNER). If aging were a factor of secular stagnation, growth of population of young people would attract a premium in remuneration in labor markets. The sad fact is that young people are also facing tough labor markets. The application of the theory of secular stagnation to the US economy and labor markets is void of reality in the form of key facts.

Table Summary Youth, US, Youth, Ages 16 to 24 Years, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Thousands and Percent

 

ICP

EMP

CLF

CLFP

EPOP

UNE

UNER

2006

36.9

20.0

22.4

60.6

54.2

2.4

10.5

2009

37.6

17.6

21.4

56.9

46.9

3.8

17.6

2012

38.7

17.8

21.3

54.9

46.0

3.5

16.2

2013

38.8

18.1

21.4

55.0

46.5

3.3

15.5

12/07

37.5

19.4

21.7

57.8

51.6

2.3

10.7

9/09

37.6

17.0

20.7

55.2

45.1

3.8

18.2

1/14

38.8

17.4

20.4

52.7

44.8

3.1

14.9

ICP: Youth Noninstitutional Civilian Population; EMP: Youth Employment Level; CLF: Youth Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Youth Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Youth Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment; UNER: Youth Unemployment Rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

Table EMP provides the comparison between the labor market in the current whole cycle from 2007 to 2013 and the whole cycle from 1979 to 1986. In the entire cycle from 2007 to 2013, the number employed fell 2.118 million, full-time employed fell 4.777 million, part-time for economic reasons increased 3.534 and population increased 13.812 million. The number employed fell 1.5 percent, full-time employed fell 3.9 percent, part-time for economic reasons increased 80.3 percent and population increased 6.0 percent. There is sharp contrast with the contractions of the 1980s and with most economic history of the United States. In the whole cycle from 1979 to 1986, the number employed increased 10.773 million, full-time employed increased 7.875 million, part-time for economic reasons 2.011 million and population 15.724 million. In the entire cycle from 1979 to 1986, the number employed increased 10.9 percent, full-time employed 9.5 percent, part-time for economic reasons 56.2 percent and population 9.5 million. The difference between the 1980s and the current cycle after 2007 is in the high rate of growth after the contraction that maintained trend growth around 3.0 percent for the entire cycle and per capital growth at 2.0 percent. The evident fact is that current weakness in labor markets originates in cyclical slow growth and not in imaginary secular stagnation.

Table EMP, US, Annual Level of Employed, Full-Time Employed, Employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons and Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Millions

 

Employed

Full-Time Employed

Part Time Economic Reasons

Noninstitutional Civilian Population

2000s

       

2000

136.891

113.846

3.227

212.577

2001

136.933

113.573

3.715

215.092

2002

136.485

112.700

4.213

217.570

2003

137.736

113.324

4.701

221.168

2004

139.252

114.518

4.567

223.357

2005

141.730

117.016

4.350

226.082

2006

144.427

119.688

4.162

228.815

2007

146.047

121.091

4.401

231.867

2008

145.362

120.030

5.875

233.788

2009

139.877

112.634

8.913

235.801

2010

139.064

111.714

8.874

237.830

2011

139.869

112.556

8.560

239.618

2012

142.469

114.809

8.122

243.284

2013

143.929

116.314

7.935

245.679

∆2007-2013

-2.118

-4.777

3.534

13.812

∆% 2007-2013

-1.5

-3.9

80.3

6.0

1980s

       

1979

98.824

82.654

3.577

164.863

1980

99.303

82.562

4.321

167.745

1981

100.397

83.243

4.768

170.130

1982

99.526

81.421

6.170

172.271

1983

100.834

82.322

6.266

174.215

1984

105.005

86.544

5.744

176.383

1985

107.150

88.534

5.590

178.206

1986

109.597

90.529

5.588

180.587

1987

112.440

92.957

5.401

182.753

1988

114.968

95.214

5.206

184.613

1989

117.342

97.369

4.894

186.393

∆1979-1986

10.773

7.875

2.011

15.724

∆% 1979-86

10.9

9.5

56.2

9.5

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

Historical parallels are instructive but have all the limitations of empirical research in economics. The more instructive comparisons are not with the Great Depression of the 1930s but rather with the recessions in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s. The growth rates and job creation in the expansion of the economy away from recession are subpar in the current expansion compared to others in the past. Four recessions are initially considered, following the reference dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html ): IIQ1953-IIQ1954, IIIQ1957-IIQ1958, IIIQ1973-IQ1975 and IQ1980-IIIQ1980. The data for the earlier contractions illustrate that the growth rate and job creation in the current expansion are inferior. The sharp contractions of the 1950s and 1970s are considered in Table I-1, showing the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) quarter-to-quarter, seasonally adjusted (SA), yearly-equivalent growth rates of GDP. The recovery from the recession of 1953 consisted of four consecutive quarters of high percentage growth rates from IIIQ1954 to IIIQ1955: 4.6, 8.0, 11.9 and 6.7. The recession of 1957 was followed by four consecutive high percentage growth rates from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959: 9.6, 9.7, 7.7 and 10.1. The recession of 1973-1975 was followed by high percentage growth rates from IIQ1975 to IQ1976: 3.1, 6.8, 5.5 and 9.3. The disaster of the Great Inflation and Unemployment of the 1970s, which made stagflation notorious, is even better in growth rates during the expansion phase in comparison with the current slow-growth recession.

Table I-1, US, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Percentage Growth Rates in Annual Equivalent of GDP in Cyclical Recessions and Following Four Quarter Expansions ∆%

 

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IV

R IIQ1953-IIQ1954

       

1953

   

-2.2

-5.9

1954

-1.9

     

E IIIQ1954-IIQ1955

       

1954

   

4.6

8.0

1955

11.9

6.7

   

R IIIQ1957-IIQ1958

       

1957

     

-4.1

1958

-10.0

     

E IIIQ1958-IIQ1959

       

1958

   

9.6

9.7

1959

7.7

10.1

   

R IVQ1969-IV1970

       

1969

     

-1.7

1970

-0.7

     

E IIQ1970-IQ1971

       

1970

 

0.7

3.6

-4.1

1971

11.2

     

R IVQ1973-IQ1975

       

1973

     

3.8

1974

-3.3

1.0

-3.8

-1.6

1975

-4.7

     

E IIQ1975-IQ1976

       

1975

 

3.1

6.8

5.5

1976

9.3

     

R IQ1980-IIIQ1980

       

1980

1.3

-7.9

-0.6

 

R IQ1981-IVQ1982

       

1981

8.5

-2.9

4.7

-4.6

1982

-6.5

2.2

-1.4

0.4

E IQ1983-IVQ1983

       

1983

5.3

9.4

8.1

8.5

R IVQ2007-IIQ2009

       

2008

-2.7

2.0

-2.0

-8.3

2009

-5.4

-0.4

   

E IIIQ2009-IIQ2010

       

2009

   

1.3

3.9

2010

1.6

3.9

   

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The NBER dates another recession in 1980 that lasted about half a year. If the two recessions from IQ1980s to IIIQ1980 and IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 are combined, the impact of lost GDP of 4.7 percent is more comparable to the latest revised 4.3 percent drop of the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table I-2 provides the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) quarterly growth rates of GDP in SA yearly equivalents for the recessions of 1981 to 1982 and 2007 to 2009, using the latest major revision published on July 31, 2013 and the second estimate for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf), which are available in the dataset of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). There were four quarters of contraction in 1981-1982 ranging in rate from -1.4 percent to -6.5 percent and five quarters of contraction in 2007-2009 ranging in rate from -0.4 percent to -8.3 percent. The striking difference is that in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, shown in Table I-2 in relief, GDP grew at the high quarterly percentage growth rates of 5.3, 9.4, 8.1, 8.5, 8.2, 7.2, 4.0, 3.2, 4.0, 3.7, 6.4, 3.0, 3.8, 1.9, 4.1, 2.1, 2.8 and 4.6. In contrast, the percentage growth rates in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 shown in relief in Table I-2 were mediocre: 1.3, 3.9, 1.6, 3.9, 2.8, 2.8, -1.3, 3.2, 1.4, 4.9, 3.7, 1.2, 2.8, 0.1, 1.1, 2.5, 4.1 and 2.4. Inventory accumulation contributed 2.73 percentage points to the rate of growth of 4.9 percent in IVQ2011, which is the only relatively high rate from IQ2011 to IIIQ2012, 0.60 percentage points to the rate of 2.8 percent in IIIQ2012 and 1.67 percentage points to the rate of 4.1 percent in IIIQ2013. Economic growth and employment creation decelerated rapidly during 2012 and in 2013 while much stronger growth would be required in movement to full employment.

Table I-2, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of GDP, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q

1981

1982

1983

1984

2008

2009

2010

I

8.5

-6.5

5.3

8.2

-2.7

-5.4

1.6

II

-2.9

2.2

9.4

7.2

2.0

-0.4

3.9

III

4.7

-1.4

8.1

4.0

-2.0

1.3

2.8

IV

-4.6

0.4

8.5

3.2

-8.3

3.9

2.8

       

1985

   

2011

I

     

4.0

   

-1.3

II

     

3.7

   

3.2

III

     

6.4

   

1.4

IV

     

3.0

   

4.9

       

1986

   

2012

I

     

3.8

   

3.7

II

     

1.9

   

1.2

III

     

4.1

   

2.8

IV

     

2.1

   

0.1

       

1987

   

2013

I

     

2.8

   

1.1

II

     

4.6

   

2.5

III

     

3.7

   

4.1

IV

     

6.8

   

2.4

       

1988

   

2014

I

     

2.3

     

II

     

5.4

     

III

     

2.3

     

IV

     

5.4

     

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides strong growth of real GDP in the US between 1929 and 1999 at the yearly average rate of 3.5 percent. There is an evident acceleration of the rate of GDP growth in the 1990s as shown by a much sharper slope of the growth curve. Cobet and Wilson (2002) define labor productivity as the value of manufacturing output produced per unit of labor input used (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). Between 1950 and 2000, labor productivity in the US grew less rapidly than in Germany and Japan. The major part of the increase in productivity in Germany and Japan occurred between 1950 and 1973 while the rate of productivity growth in the US was relatively subdued in several periods. While Germany and Japan reached their highest growth rates of productivity before 1973, the US accelerated its rate of productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s. Between 1950 and 2000, the rate of productivity growth in the US of 2.9 percent per year was much lower than 6.3 percent in Japan and 4.7 percent in Germany. Between 1995 and 2000, the rate of productivity growth of the US of 4.6 percent exceeded that of Japan of 3.9 percent and the rate of Germany of 2.6 percent.

clip_image001

Chart I-1, US, Real GDP 1929-1999

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-1A provides real GDP annually from 1929 to 2013. Growth after the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has not been sufficiently high to compensate for the contraction as it had occurred in past economic cycles. GDP is about two trillion lower than trend GDP, explaining 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed. There is dramatic decline of productivity growth in the whole cycle from 2.2 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2013 to 1.6 percent per year on average from 2007 and 2013. There is profound drop in the average rate of output growth from 3.4 percent on average from 1947 to 2013 to 1.2 percent from 2007 to 2013. Real hourly compensation collapsed from average 1.6 percent per year from 1947 to 2013 to 0.3 percent per year from 2007 to 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). The antithesis of secular stagnation is cyclical slow growth. The policy design deserves consideration of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) to induce productivity growth for future progress.

clip_image002

Chart I-1A, US, Real GDP 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-2 provides the growth of real quarterly GDP in the US between 1947 and 2012. The drop of output in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has been followed by anemic recovery compared with return to trend at 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May) and a standstill that can lead to growth recession, or low rates of economic growth. The expansion is relatively long compared to earlier expansion and there could be even another contraction or conventional recession in the future. The average rate of growth from 1947 to 2013 is 3.2 percent. The average growth rate from IV2007 to IVQ2013 is only 1.0 percent with 2.8 percent annual equivalent from the end of the recession in IVQ2001 to the end of the expansion in IVQ2007.

clip_image003

Chart I-2, US, Real GDP, Quarterly, 1947-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-3 provides real GDP percentage change on the quarter a year earlier for 1983-1984. The objective is simply to compare expansion in two recoveries from sharp contractions as shown in Table I-2. Growth rates in the early phase of the recovery in 1983 and 1984 were very high, which is the opportunity to reduce unemployment that has characterized cyclical expansion in the postwar US economy.

clip_image004

Chart I-3, Real GDP Percentage Change on Quarter a Year Earlier 1983-1987

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In contrast, growth rates in the comparable first eighteen quarters of expansion from 2009 to 2013 in Chart I-4 have been mediocre. As a result, growth has not provided the exit from unemployment and underemployment as in other cyclical expansions in the postwar period. Growth rates did not rise in V shape as in earlier expansions and then declined close to the standstill of growth recessions.

clip_image005

Chart I-4, US, Real GDP Percentage Change on Quarter a Year Earlier 2009-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-3 provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.7 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.3 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first three years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.3 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while GDP grew, 2.5 percent in 2010, 1.8 percent in 2011, 2.8 percent in 2012 and 1.9 percent in 2013. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and first four quarters of 2013 is 2.3 percent and 2.7 percent in the four quarters of 2013 but only 2.3 percent discounting contribution of 1.67 percentage points of inventory accumulation to growth in IIIQ2013. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while the forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 2.2 to 2.3 percent in 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20131218.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 2.8 to 3.2 percent in 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20131218.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 has been at average 2.3 percent in annual equivalent.

Table I-3, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

1930

-8.5

1980

-0.2

2000

4.1

1931

-6.4

1981

2.6

2001

1.0

1932

-12.9

1982

-1.9

2002

1.8

1933

-1.3

1983

4.6

2003

2.8

1934

10.8

1984

7.3

2004

3.8

1935

8.9

1985

4.2

2005

3.4

1936

12.9

1986

3.5

2006

2.7

1937

5.1

1987

3.5

2007

1.8

1938

-3.3

1988

4.2

2008

-0.3

1930

8.0

1989

3.7

2009

-2.8

1940

8.8

1990

1.9

2010

2.5

1941

17.7

1991

-0.1

2011

1.8

1942

18.9

1992

3.6

2012

2.8

1943

17.0

1993

2.7

2013

1.9

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-5 provides percentage change of GDP in the US during the 1930s. There is vast literature analyzing the Great Depression (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009), 198-217). Cole and Ohanian (1999) find that US real per capita output was lower by 11 percent in 1939 than in 1929 while the typical expansion of real per capita output in the US during a decade is 31 percent. Private hours worked in the US were 25 percent lower in 1939 relative to 1929.

clip_image006

Chart I-5, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In contrast, Chart I-6 shows rapid recovery from the recessions in the 1980s. High growth rates in the initial quarters of expansion eliminated the unemployment and underemployment created during the contraction. The economy then returned to grow at the trend of expansion, interrupted by another contraction in 1991.

clip_image007

Chart I-6, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1980s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-7 provides the rates of growth during the 2000s. Growth rates in the initial eighteen quarters of expansion have been relatively lower than during recessions after World War II. As a result, unemployment and underemployment continue at the rate of 18.5 percent of the US labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html) with weak hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html).

clip_image008

Chart I-7, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 2000s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-4 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.7 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.3 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-4, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions   

 

Number of Quarters

Cumulative Percentage Contraction

Average Percentage Rate

IIQ1953 to IIQ1954

3

-2.4

-0.8

IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958

3

-3.0

-1.0

IVQ1973 to IQ1975

5

-3.1

-0.6

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980

2

-2.2

-1.1

IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

4

-2.5

-0.64

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

6

-4.3

-0.72

Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-5 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.3 percent of the US economy in the eighteen quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was: 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986, 5.4 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and 5.0 percent in the eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987. The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.4 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.8 percent annual growth in 2011 and 2.8 percent in 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and 2013 accumulated to 4.5 percent that is equivalent to 2.2 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2013 of $15,932.9 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,242.1 billion and compounding by 4/8: {[($15,932.9/$15,242.1)4/8 -1]100 = 2.2%}. The US economy grew 2.5 percent in IVQ2013 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IVQ2012. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is just at the borderline of contraction. The rate of growth of GDP in the third estimate of IIIQ2013 is 4.1 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR). Inventory accumulation contributed 1.67 percentage points to this rate of growth. The actual rate without this impulse of unsold inventories would have been 2.43 percent, or 0.6 percent in IIIQ2013, such that annual equivalent growth in 2013 is closer to 2.1 percent {[(1.003)(1.006)(1.006)(1.0064/4-1]100 = 2.1%}, compounding the quarterly rates and converting into annual equivalent.

Table I-5, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

 

Number
of
Quarters

Cumulative Growth

∆%

Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate

IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957

11

12.8

4.5

First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955

4

7.8

 

IIQ1958 to IIQ1959

5

10.0

7.9

First Four Quarters

IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959

4

9.2

 

IIQ1975 to IVQ1976

8

8.3

4.1

First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976

4

6.1

 

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

13

15

16

17

18

19.9

21.6

22.3

23.1

24.5

5.7

5.4

5.2

5.0

5.0

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

4

7.8

 

Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*

 

7.7

 

IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013

18

11.0

2.3

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

 

2.7

 

*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IIQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-8 shows US real quarterly GDP growth from 1980 to 1989. The economy contracted during the recession and then expanded vigorously throughout the 1980s, rapidly eliminating the unemployment caused by the contraction.

clip_image009

Chart I-8, US, Real GDP, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-9 shows the entirely different situation of real quarterly GDP in the US between 2007 and 2012. The economy has underperformed during the first sixteen quarters of expansion for the first time in the comparable contractions since the 1950s. The US economy is now in a perilous standstill.

clip_image010

Chart I-9, US, Real GDP, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

As shown in Tables I-4 and I-5 above the loss of real GDP in the US during the contraction was 4.3 percent but the gain in the cyclical expansion has been only 11.0 percent (first to the last row in Table I-5), using all latest revisions. As a result, the level of real GDP in IVQ2013 with the second estimate and revisions is only higher by 6.2 percent than the level of real GDP in IVQ2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,932.9 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,107.4 billion higher than actual $15,932.9 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The contraction actually concentrated in two quarters: decline of 2.2 percent in IVQ2008 relative to the prior quarter and decline of 1.4 percent in IQ2009 relative to IVQ2008. The combined fall of GDP in IVQ2008 and IQ2009 was 3.6 percent {[(1-0.022) x (1-0.014) -1]100 = -3.6%}, or {[(IQ2009 $14,372.1)/(IIIQ2008 $14,895.1) – 1]100 = -3.5%} except for rounding. Those two quarters coincided with the worst effects of the financial crisis. GDP fell 0.1 percent in IIQ2009 but grew 0.3 percent in IIIQ2009, which is the beginning of recovery in the cyclical dates of the NBER. Most of the recovery occurred in five successive quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2010 of growth of 1.0 percent in IVQ2009, 0.4 percent in IQ2010, 0.9 percent in IIQ2010 and equal growth at 0.7 percent in IIIQ2010 and 0.7 percent in IVQ2010 for cumulative growth in those five quarters of 3.8 percent, obtained by accumulating the quarterly rates {[(1.01 x 1.004 x 1.009 x 1.007 x 1.007) – 1]100 = 3.8%} or {[(IVQ2010 $14,942.4)/(IIIQ2009 $14,402.5) – 1]100 = 3.7%} with minor rounding difference. The economy then stalled during the first half of 2011 with decline of 0.3 percent in IQ2011 and growth of 0.8 percent in IIQ2011 for combined annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent {(0.997 x 1.008)2}. The economy grew 0.3 percent in IIIQ2011 for annual equivalent growth of 1.1 percent in the first three quarters {[(0.997 x 1.008 x 1.003)4/3 -1]100 = 1.1%}. Growth picked up in IVQ2011 with 1.2 percent relative to IIIQ2011. Growth in a quarter relative to a year earlier in Table I-6 slows from over 2.7 percent during three consecutive quarters from IIQ2010 to IVQ2010 to 2.0 percent in IQ2011, 1.9 percent in IIQ2011, 1.5 percent in IIIQ2011 and 2.0 percent in IVQ2011. As shown below, growth of 1.2 percent in IVQ2011 was partly driven by inventory accumulation. In IQ2012, GDP grew 0.9 percent relative to IVQ2011 and 3.3 percent relative to IQ2011, decelerating to 0.3 percent in IIQ2012 and 2.8 percent relative to IIQ2011 and 0.7 percent in IIIQ2012 and 3.1 percent relative to IIIQ2011 largely because of inventory accumulation and national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.0 percent in IVQ2012 with 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier but mostly because of deduction of 2.00 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.22 percentage points of reduction of one-time national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.3 percent in IQ2013 and 1.3 percent relative to IQ2012 in large part because of burning savings to consume caused by financial repression of zero interest rates. There is similar growth of 0.6 percent in IIQ2013 and 1.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2013, GDP grew 1.0 percent relative to the prior quarter and 2.0 percent relative to the same quarter a year earlier with inventory accumulation contributing 1.67 percentage points to growth at 4.1 percent SAAR in IIIQ2013. GDP increased 0.6 percent in IVQ2013 and 2.5 percent relative to a year earlier. Rates of a quarter relative to the prior quarter capture better deceleration of the economy than rates on a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. The critical question for which there is not yet definitive solution is whether what lies ahead is continuing growth recession with the economy crawling and unemployment/underemployment at extremely high levels or another contraction or conventional recession. Forecasts of various sources continued to maintain high growth in 2011 without taking into consideration the continuous slowing of the economy in late 2010 and the first half of 2011. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is one of the common sources of doubts on the rate and direction of economic growth in the US but there is weak internal demand in the US with almost no investment and spikes of consumption driven by burning saving because of financial repression forever in the form of zero interest rates.

Table I-6, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real GDP, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

14,996.1

NA

NA

1.9

IQ2008

14,895.4

-0.7

-0.7

1.1

IIQ2008

14,969.2

-0.2

0.5

0.9

IIIQ2008

14,895.1

-0.7

-0.5

-0.3

IVQ2008

14,574.6

-2.8

-2.2

-2.8

IQ2009

14,372.1

-4.2

-1.4

-3.5

IIQ2009

14,356.9

-4.3

-0.1

-4.1

IIIQ2009

14,402.5

-4.0

0.3

-3.3

IV2009

14,540.2

-3.0

1.0

-0.2

IQ2010

14,597.7

-2.7

0.4

1.6

IIQ2010

14,738.0

-1.7

0.9

2.7

IIIQ2010

14,839.3

-1.0

0.7

3.0

IVQ2010

14,942.4

-0.4

0.7

2.8

IQ2011

14,894.0

-0.7

-0.3

2.0

IIQ2011

15,011.3

0.1

0.8

1.9

IIIQ2011

15,062.1

0.4

0.3

1.5

IVQ2011

15,242.1

1.6

1.2

2.0

IQ2012

15,381.6

2.6

0.9

3.3

IIQ2012

15,427.7

2.9

0.3

2.8

IIIQ2012

15,534.0

3.6

0.7

3.1

IVQ2012

15,539.6

3.6

0.0

2.0

IQ2013

15,583.9

3.9

0.3

1.3

IIQ2013

15,679.7

4.6

0.6

1.6

IIIQ2013

15,839.3

5.6

1.0

2.0

IVQ2013

15,932.9

6.2

0.6

2.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-10 provides the percentage change of real GDP from the same quarter a year earlier from 1980 to 1989. There were two contractions almost in succession in 1980 and from 1981 to 1983. The expansion was marked by initial high rates of growth as in other recession in the postwar US period during which employment lost in the contraction was recovered. Growth rates continued to be high after the initial phase of expansion.

clip_image011

Chart I-10, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Quarter a Year Earlier 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The experience of recovery after 2009 is not as complete as during the 1980s. Chart I-11 shows the much lower rates of growth in the early phase of the current expansion and sharp decline from an early peak. The US missed the initial high growth rates in cyclical expansions that eliminate unemployment and underemployment.

clip_image012

Chart I-11, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Quarter a Year Earlier 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-12 provides growth rates from a quarter relative to the prior quarter during the 1980s. There is the same strong initial growth followed by a long period of sustained growth.

clip_image013

Chart I-12, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Prior Quarter 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-13 provides growth rates in a quarter relative to the prior quarter from 2007 to 2013. Growth in the current expansion after IIIQ2009 has not been as strong as in other postwar cyclical expansions.

clip_image014

Chart I-13, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Prior Quarter 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revised estimates and earlier estimates from IQ2008 to IQ2012 in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rates are shown in Table I-7. The strongest revision is for IVQ2008 for which the contraction of GDP is revised from minus 6.8 percent to minus 8.9 percent and minus 8.3 percent. IQ2009 is also revised from contraction of minus 4.9 percent to minus 6.7 percent but then lowered to contraction of 5.3 percent and 5.4 percent. There is only minor revision in IIIQ2008 of the contraction of minus 4.0 percent to minus 3.7 percent and minus 2.0 percent. Growth of 5.0 percent in IV2009 is revised to 3.8 percent and then increased to 4.0 percent but lowered to 3.9 percent. Growth in IQ2010 is lowered from 3.9 percent to 2.3 percent and 1.6 percent. Growth in IIQ2010 is upwardly revised to 3.8 percent but then lowered to 2.2 percent. The final revision increased growth in IIQ2010 to 3.9 percent. Revisions lowered growth of 1.9 percent in IQ2011 to minus 1.3 percent. The revisions lowered growth of 1.8 percent in IQ2013 to 1.1 percent but increased growth of 2.0 percent in IQ2012 to 3.7 percent. The revisions do not alter the conclusion that the current expansion is much weaker than historical sharp contractions since the 1950s and is now changing into slow growth recession with higher risks of contraction and continuing underperformance.

Table I-7, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of GDP, % Annual Equivalent SA, Revised and Earlier Estimates

Quarters

Revised Estimate Jul 31, 2013

Revised Estimate

Jul 27, 2012

Revised Estimate

Jul 29, 2011

Earlier Estimate

2008

       

I

-2.7

 

-1.8

-0.7

II

2.0

 

1.3

0.6

III

-2.0

 

-3.7

-4.0

IV

-8.3

 

-8.9

-6.8

2009

       

I

-5.4

-5.3

-6.7

-4.9

II

-0.4

-0.3

-0.7

-0.7

III

1.3

1.4

1.7

1.6

IV

3.9

4.0

3.8

5.0

2010

       

I

1.6

2.3

3.9

3.7

II

3.9

2.2

3.8

1.7

III

2.8

2.6

2.5

2.6

IV

2.8

2.4

2.3

3.1

2011

       

I

-1.3

0.1

0.4

1.9

II

3.2

2.5

   

III

1.4

1.3

   

IV

4.9

4.1

   

2012

       

I

3.7

2.0

   

II

1.2

1.3

   

III

2.8

3.1

   

IV

0.1

0.4

   

2013

       

I

1.1

1.8

   

II

2.5

     

III

4.1

     

IV

2.4

     

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Aggregate demand, personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and gross private domestic investment (GDI) were much stronger during the expansion phase from IQ1983 to IQ1987 than from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013, as shown in Table I-8. GDI provided the impulse of growth in 1983 and 1984, which has not been the case from 2009 to 2013. The investment decision in the US economy has been frustrated in the current cyclical expansion. Growth of GDP in IIIQ2013 at seasonally adjusted annual rate of 4.1 percent consisted of positive contribution of 1.36 percentage points of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) plus positive contribution of 2.56 percentage points of gross private domestic investment (GDI) of which 1.67 percentage points of inventory investment (∆PI), contribution of net exports (trade or exports less imports) of 0.14 percentage points and 0.08 percentage points of government consumption expenditures and gross investment (GOV) partly because of one-time reduction of national defense expenditures of 0.02 percentage points. Growth at 2.4 percent in IVQ2013 had strongest contributions of 1.73 percentage points of PCE and 0.99 percentage points of trade. The economy of the United States has lost the dynamic growth impulse of earlier cyclical expansions with mediocre growth resulting from consumption forced by one-time effects of financial repression, national defense expenditures and inventory accumulation.

Table I-8, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of GDP in Percentage Points

 

GDP

PCE

GDI

∆ PI

Trade

GOV

2013

           

I

1.1

1.54

0.71

0.93

-0.28

-0.82

II

2.5

1.24

1.38

0.41

-0.07

-0.07

III

4.1

1.36

2.56

1.67

0.14

0.08

IV

2.4

1.73

0.72

0.14

0.99

-1.05

2012

           

I

3.7

1.98

1.57

0.36

0.44

-0.28

II

1.2

1.28

-0.23

-0.91

0.10

0.05

III

2.8

1.15

0.99

0.60

-0.03

0.67

IV

0.1

1.13

-0.36

-2.00

0.68

-1.31

2011

           

I

-1.3

1.42

-1.11

-1.06

0.01

-1.61

II

3.2

1.03

1.88

0.72

0.53

-0.25

III

1.4

1.42

0.36

-1.60

0.10

-0.52

IV

4.9

1.65

4.13

2.73

-0.60

-0.31

2010

           

I

1.6

1.42

1.77

1.66

-0.96

-0.63

II

3.9

2.21

2.86

1.09

-1.77

0.61

III

2.8

1.87

1.86

1.90

-0.88

-0.07

IV

2.8

2.86

-0.51

-1.64

1.32

-0.87

2009

           

I

-5.4

-0.83

-7.02

-2.26

2.25

0.15

II

-0.4

-1.13

-3.25

-1.12

2.40

1.56

III

1.3

1.73

-0.40

-0.38

-0.53

0.48

IV

3.9

0.05

4.05

4.40

-0.05

-0.17

1982

           

I

-6.5

1.61

-7.60

-5.34

-0.49

-0.05

II

2.2

0.89

-0.06

2.26

0.81

0.56

III

-1.4

1.88

-0.62

1.11

-3.22

0.53

IV

0.4

4.51

-5.37

-5.33

-0.10

1.35

1983

           

I

5.3

2.45

2.36

0.92

-0.29

0.82

II

9.4

5.06

5.96

3.43

-2.46

0.89

III

8.1

4.50

4.40

0.57

-2.25

1.42

IV

8.5

4.06

6.94

3.01

-1.13

-1.36

1984

           

I

8.2

2.26

7.23

4.94

-2.31

1.01

II

7.2

3.64

2.57

-0.29

-0.87

1.87

III

4.0

1.95

1.69

0.21

-0.35

0.70

IV

3.2

3.29

-1.08

-2.44

-0.56

1.58

1985

           

I

4.0

4.23

-2.14

-2.86

0.94

1.01

II

3.7

2.35

1.34

0.35

-1.90

1.93

III

6.4

4.82

-0.43

-0.15

-0.01

1.98

IV

3.0

0.62

2.80

1.40

-0.66

0.27

1986

           

I

3.8

2.10

0.04

-0.17

0.92

0.70

II

1.9

2.77

-1.30

-1.30

-1.33

1.70

III

4.1

4.55

-1.97

-1.62

-0.45

1.95

IV

2.1

1.62

0.24

-0.29

0.71

-0.48

1987

           

I

2.8

0.05

1.98

3.28

0.23

0.57

II

4.6

3.54

0.08

-0.99

0.14

0.81

III

3.7

2.97

0.03

-1.19

0.45

0.23

IV

6.8

0.57

4.94

4.95

0.18

1.08

Note: PCE: personal consumption expenditures; GDI: gross private domestic investment; ∆ PI: change in private inventories; Trade: net exports of goods and services; GOV: government consumption expenditures and gross investment; – is negative and no sign positive

GDP: percent change at annual rate; percentage points at annual rates

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (pages 1-2 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf ) explains growth of GDP in IVQ2013 as follows:

“Real gross domestic product -- the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States -- increased at an annual rate of 2.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2013 (that is, from the third quarter to the fourth quarter), according to the "second" estimate released by the

Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the third quarter, real GDP increased 4.1 percent.

The GDP estimate released today is based on more complete source data than were available for the "advance" estimate issued last month. In the advance estimate, the increase in real GDP was 3.2 percent. With this second estimate for the fourth quarter, an increase in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) was smaller than previously estimated (see "Revisions" on page 3).

The increase in real GDP in the fourth quarter primarily reflected positive contributions from

PCE, exports, nonresidential fixed investment, and private inventory investment that were partly offset by negative contributions from federal government spending, residential fixed investment, and state and local government spending. Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, increased.

The deceleration in real GDP growth in the fourth quarter reflected a deceleration in private inventory investment, a larger decrease in federal government spending, and downturns in residential fixed investment and in state and local government spending that were partly offset by accelerations in exports, in PCE, and in nonresidential fixed investment and a deceleration in imports.“

There are positive contributions to growth in IVQ2013 shown in Table I-9:

  • Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) growing at 2.6 percent with consumption of durable goods growing at 2.5 percent
  • Nonresidential fixed investment growing at 7.3 percent
  • Private inventory investment contributing 0.14 percentage points
  • Growth of exports at 9.4 percent, which is higher than imports at 1.5 percent

There were negative contributions in IVQ2013:

  • Federal government expenditures declining at 12.8 percent partly because of decrease of national defense expenditures at 14.4 percent that deducted 0.70 percentage points from GDP growth
  • State and local government expenditures declining at 0.5 percent
  • Contraction of residential fixed investment at 9.8 percent
  • Growth of imports, which are deduction to growth, at 1.5 percent

The BEA explains deceleration in real GDP growth in IVQ2013 by:

  • Deceleration of inventory investment contributing 0.14 percentage points in IVQ2013 that is lower than 1.67 percentage points in IIIQ2013
  • Contraction of state and local expenditures at 0.5 percent in IVQ2013 compared with growth at 1.7 percent in IIIQ2013
  • Contraction of residential fixed investment at 8.7 percent in IVQ2013 compared with growth at 10.3 percent in IIIQ2013
  • Contraction of federal government expenditures at 12.8 percent in IVQ2013 compared with contraction at 1.5 percent in IIIQ2013

The BEA finds offsetting accelerating factors:

· Growth of exports at 9.4 percent in IVQ2013 compared with 3.9 percent in IIIQ2013

· Decline of growth of imports from 2.4 percent in IIIQ2013 to 1.5 percent in IVQ2013

· Growth of personal consumption expenditures at 2.6 percent in IVQ2013 compared with 2.0 percent in IIIQ2013

An important aspect of growth in the US is the decline in growth of real disposable personal income, or what is left after taxes and inflation, which increased at the rate of 1.8 percent in IIIQ2013 compared with a year earlier. Contraction of real disposable income of 0.2 percent in IVQ2013 relative to a year earlier is largely due to comparison with an artificially higher level in anticipations of income in Nov and Dec 2012 to avoid increases in taxes in 2013, an episode known as “fiscal cliff.” The effects of financial repression, or zero interest, are vividly shown in the decline of the savings rate, or personal saving as percent of disposable income from 6.6 percent in IVQ2012 to 4.9 percent in IIIQ2013 and 4.5 percent in IVQ2013. Anticipation of income in IVQ2012 to avoid higher taxes in 2013 caused increases in income and savings while higher payroll taxes in 2013 restricted income growth and savings in IQ2013. Zero interest rates induce risky investments with high leverage and can contract balance sheets of families, business and financial institutions when interest rates inevitably increase in the future. There is a tradeoff of weaker economy in the future when interest rates increase by meager growth in the present with forced consumption by zero interest rates.

Table I-9, US, Percentage Seasonally Adjusted Annual Equivalent Quarterly Rates of Increase, %

 

IVQ 

2012

IQ 

2013

IIQ 2013

IIIQ 2012

IVQ    

2013

GDP

0.1

1.1

2.5

4.1

2.4

PCE

1.7

2.3

1.8

2.0

2.6

Durable Goods

10.5

5.8

6.2

7.9

2.5

NRFI

9.8

-4.6

4.7

4.8

7.3

RFI

19.8

12.5

14.2

10.3

-8.7

Exports

1.1

-1.3

8.0

3.9

9.4

Imports

-3.1

0.6

6.9

2.4

1.5

GOV

-6.5

-4.2

-0.4

0.4

-5.6

Federal GOV

-13.9

-8.4

-1.6

-1.5

-12.8

National Defense

-21.6

-11.2

-0.6

-0.5

-14.4

Cont to GDP Growth % Points

-1.22

-0.57

-0.03

-0.02

-0.70

State/Local GOV

-1.0

-1.3

0.4

1.7

-0.5

∆ PI (PP)

-2.00

0.93

0.41

1.67

0.14

Final Sales of Domestic Product

2.2

0.2

2.1

2.5

2.3

Gross Domestic Purchases

-0.5

1.4

2.5

3.9

1.4

Prices Gross
Domestic Purchases

1.6

1.2

0.2

1.8

1.4

Prices of GDP

1.1

1.3

0.6

2.0

1.6

Prices of GDP Excluding Food and Energy

1.4

1.6

0.9

1.9

1.9

Prices of PCE

1.6

1.1

-0.1

1.9

1.0

Prices of PCE Excluding Food and Energy

1.3

1.4

0.6

1.4

1.3

Prices of Market Based PCE

1.4

1.3

-0.3

2.0

0.8

Prices of Market Based PCE Excluding Food and Energy

0.9

1.6

0.5

1.4

1.0

Real Disposable Personal Income*

3.6

0.4

0.9

1.8

-0.2

Personal Savings As % Disposable Income

6.6

4.1

4.7

4.9

4.5

Note: PCE: personal consumption expenditures; NRFI: nonresidential fixed investment; RFI: residential fixed investment; GOV: government consumption expenditures and gross investment; ∆ PI: change in

private inventories; GDP - ∆ PI: final sales of domestic product; PP: percentage points; Personal savings rate: savings as percent of disposable income

*Percent change from quarter one year ago

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percentage shares of GDP are shown in Table I-10. PCE is equivalent to 68.2 percent of GDP and is under pressure with stagnant real disposable income, high levels of unemployment and underemployment and higher savings rates than before the global recession, temporarily interrupted by financial repression in the form of zero interest rates. Gross private domestic investment is also growing slowly even with about two trillion dollars in cash holdings by companies. In a slowing world economy, it may prove more difficult to grow exports faster than imports to generate higher growth. Bouts of risk aversion revalue the dollar relative to most currencies in the world as investors increase their holdings of dollar-denominated assets.

Table I-10, US, Percentage Shares of GDP, %

 

IVQ2013

GDP

100.0

PCE

68.2

   Goods

23.0

            Durable

7.5

            Nondurable

15.6

   Services

45.1

Gross Private Domestic Investment

16.3

    Fixed Investment

15.4

        NRFI

12.3

            Structures

2.8

            Equipment & Software

5.6

            Intellectual Property

3.9

        RFI

3.1

     Change in Private
      Inventories

0.9

Net Exports of Goods and Services

-2.7

       Exports

13.6

                    Goods

9.5

                    Services

4.1

       Imports

16.3

                     Goods

13.5

                     Services

2.7

Government

18.2

        Federal

7.2

           National Defense

4.4

           Nondefense

2.8

        State and Local

11.1

PCE: personal consumption expenditures; NRFI: nonresidential fixed investment; RFI: residential fixed investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-11 shows percentage point (PP) contributions to the annual levels of GDP growth in the earlier recessions 1958-1959, 1975-1976, 1982-1983 and 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. The data incorporate the new revisions released by the BEA on Jul 31, 2013. The most striking contrast is in the rates of growth of annual GDP in the expansion phases of 6.9 percent in 1959, 5.4 percent in 1976, and 4.6 percent in 1983 followed by 7.3 percent in 1984 and 4.2 percent in 1985. In contrast, GDP grew 2.5 percent in 2010 after six consecutive quarters of growth, 1.8 percent in 2011 after ten consecutive quarters of expansion, 2.8 percent in 2012 after 14 quarters of expansion and 1.9 percent in 2013 after 18 consecutive quarters of expansion. Annual levels also show much stronger growth of PCEs in the expansions after the earlier contractions than in the expansion after the global recession of 2007. Gross domestic investment was much stronger in the earlier expansions than in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013.

Table I-11, US, Percentage Point Contributions to the Annual Growth Rate of GDP

 

GDP

PCE

GDI

∆ PI

Trade

GOV

1958

-0.7

0.52

-1.16

-0.17

-0.87

0.77

1959

6.9

3.49

2.82

0.83

0.00

0.59

1975

-0.2

1.36

-2.90

-1.23

0.86

0.49

1976

5.4

3.41

2.91

1.37

-1.05

0.12

1982

-1.9

0.86

-2.55

-1.30

-0.59

0.38

1983

4.6

3.54

1.60

0.28

-1.32

0.81

1984

7.3

3.32

4.73

1.90

-1.54

0.76

1985

4.2

3.25

-0.01

-1.03

-0.39

1.38

2009

-2.8

-1.06

-3.52

-0.76

1.14

0.64

2010

2.5

1.34

1.66

1.45

-0.51

0.02

2011

1.8

1.74

0.69

-0.16

0.10

-0.68

2012

2.8

1.52

1.36

0.20

0.10

-0.20

2013

1.9

1.33

0.84

0.17

0.12

-0.44

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-12 provides more detail of the contributions to growth of GDP from 2009 to 2013 using annual-level data. PCEs contributed 1.34 PPs to GDP growth in 2010 of which 0.77 percentage points (PP) in goods and 0.57 PP in services. Gross private domestic investment (GPDI) deducted 3.52 PPs of GDP growth in 2009 of which -2.77 PPs by fixed investment and -0.76 PPs of inventory change (∆PI) and added 1.66 PPs of GPDI in 2010 of which 0.21 PPs of fixed investment and 1.45 PPs of inventory accumulation (∆PI). Trade, or exports of goods and services net of imports, contributed 1.14 PPs in 2009 of which exports deducted 1.10 PPs and imports added 2.24 PPs. In 2010, trade deducted 0.51 PPs with exports contributing 1.28 PPs and imports deducting 1.79 PPs likely benefitting from dollar revaluation. In 2009, government added 0.64 PP of which 0.44 PPs by the federal government and 0.20 PPs by state and local government; in 2010, government added 0.02 PPs of which 0.37 PPs by the federal government with state and local government deducting 0.35 PPs. Table I-12 provides the estimates for 2011, 2012 and 2013. PCE contributed 1.74 PPs in 2011 after 1.34 PPs in 2010. The contribution of PCE fell to 1.52 points in 2012 and 1.33 PPs in 2013. The breakdown into goods and services is similar but with contributions in 2012 of 0.77 PPs of goods and 0.74 PPs of services. In 2013, goods contributed 0.82 PPs and services 0.52 PPs. Gross private domestic investment contributed 1.66 PPs in 2010 with 1.45 PPs of change of private inventories but the contribution of gross private domestic investment was only 0.69 PPs in 2011. The contribution of GDI in 2012 increased to 1.36 PPs with fixed investment increasing its contribution to 1.17 PPs and residential investment contributing 0.32 PPs for the first time since 2009. GDI contributed 0.84 PPs with 0.67 PPs from fixed investment and 0.17 PPs from inventory change. Net exports of goods and services contributed marginally in 2011 with 0.10 PPs and 0.10 PPs in 2012. Net trade contributed 0.12 PPs in 2013. The contribution of exports fell from 1.28 PPs in 2010 and 0.89 PPs in 2011 to only 0.48 PPs in 2012 and 0.36 PPs in 2013. Government deducted 0.68 PPs in 2011, 0.20 PPs in 2012 and 0.44 PPs in 2013. Demand weakened in 2013 with lower contribution of personal consumption expenditures of 1.33 PPs and of gross domestic investment of 0.84 PPs. Net trade contributed only 0.12 PPs. The expansion since IIIQ2009 has been characterized by weak contributions of aggregate demand, which is the sum of personal consumption expenditures plus gross private domestic investment. The US did not recover strongly from the global recessions as typical in past cyclical expansions. Recoveries tend to be more sluggish as expansions mature. At the margin in IVQ2011, the acceleration of expansion was driven by inventory accumulation instead of aggregate demand of consumption and investment. Growth of PCE was partly the result of burning savings because of financial repression, which may not be sustainable in the future while creating multiple distortions of resource allocation and growth restraint.

Table I-12, US, Contributions to Growth of Gross Domestic Product in Percentage Points

 

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

GDP Growth ∆%

-2.8

2.5

1.8

2.8

1.9

Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE)

-1.06

1.34

1.74

1.52

1.33

  Goods

-0.68

0.77

0.76

0.77

0.82

     Durable

-0.41

0.43

0.46

0.56

0.50

     Nondurable

-0.27

0.34

0.30

0.22

0.31

  Services

-0.38

0.57

0.98

0.74

0.52

Gross Private Domestic Investment (GPDI)

-3.52

1.66

0.69

1.36

0.84

Fixed Investment

-2.77

0.21

0.85

1.17

0.67

    Nonresidential

-2.04

0.28

0.84

0.85

0.34

      Structures

-0.70

-0.49

0.05

0.31

0.04

     Equipment, software

-1.29

0.70

0.62

0.41

0.17

      Intellectual Property

-0.05

0.07

0.17

0.13

0.13

    Residential

-0.73

-0.07

0.01

0.32

0.33

Change Private Inventories

-0.76

1.45

-0.16

0.20

0.17

Net Exports of Goods and Services

1.14

-0.51

0.10

0.10

0.12

   Exports

-1.10

1.28

0.89

0.48

0.36

      Goods

-1.02

1.08

0.63

0.36

0.22

      Services

-0.08

0.20

0.27

0.12

0.14

   Imports

2.24

-1.79

-0.79

-0.38

-0.24

      Goods

2.15

-1.72

-0.70

-0.30

-0.17

      Services

0.08

-0.07

-0.09

-0.07

-0.07

Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment

0.64

0.02

-0.68

-0.20

-0.44

  Federal

0.44

0.37

-0.23

-0.12

-0.41

    National Defense

0.27

0.18

-0.13

-0.17

-0.35

    Nondefense

0.17

0.19

-0.10

0.05

-0.06

  State and Local

0.20

-0.35

-0.46

-0.08

-0.03

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Manufacturing jobs increased 9,000 in Dec 2013 relative to Nov 2013, seasonally adjusted. Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted increased 89,000 from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or at the average monthly rate of 7,417. There are effects of the weaker economy and international trade together with the yearly adjustment of labor statistics. Industrial production decreased 0.3 percent in Jan 2014 after increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2013 and increasing 0.7 percent in Nov 2013, with all data seasonally adjusted. The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm):

“Industrial production decreased 0.3 percent in January after having risen 0.3 percent in December. In January, manufacturing output fell 0.8 percent, partly because of the severe weather that curtailed production in some regions of the country. Additionally, manufacturing production is now reported to have been lower in the fourth quarter; the index is now estimated to have advanced at an annual rate of 4.6 percent in the fourth quarter rather than 6.2 percent. The output of utilities rose 4.1 percent in January, as demand for heating was boosted by unseasonably cold temperatures. The production at mines declined 0.9 percent following a gain of 1.8 percent in December. At 101.0 percent of its 2007 average, total industrial production in January was 2.9 percent above its level of a year earlier. The capacity utilization rate for total industry decreased in January to 78.5 percent, a rate that is 1.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2013) average.”

In the six months ending in Jan 2014, United States national industrial production accumulated increase of 2.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent, which is higher than growth of 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. Excluding growth of -0.3 percent in Jan 2014, growth in the remaining five months from Aug to Dec 2013 accumulated to 2.4 percent or 5.9 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production fell in one of the past six months. Business equipment accumulated growth of 0.6 percent in the six months from Aug 2013 to Jan 2014 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent, which is lower than growth of 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “The capacity utilization rate for total industry decreased in January to 78.5 percent, a rate that is 1.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2013) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate with possible acceleration in the past few months.

Manufacturing decreased 0.8 percent in Jan 2014 after increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2013 and increasing 0.3 percent in Nov 2013 seasonally adjusted, increasing 1.3 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months ending in Jan 2014. Manufacturing grew cumulatively 1.2 percent in the six months ending in Jan 2014 or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent. Excluding the decrease of 0.3 percent in Jan 2014, manufacturing accumulated growth of 2.0 percent from Aug 2013 to Dec 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 into more recent months as shown by 12 months rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily in the past six months with some strength at the margin. Manufacturing increased 21.9 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased by 19.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2013. Manufacturing grew 17.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jan 2014. Manufacturing output in Jan 2013 is 8.5 percent below the peak in Jun 2007.

Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 86.8 percent in IIIQ2013. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Jan 2014, there were 135.396 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 113.712 million NSA in Jan 2014 accounted for 84.0 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 135.396 million, of which 11.965 million, or 10.5 percent of total private jobs and 8.8 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-producing jobs were 95.339 million NSA in Jan 2014, or 70.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.8 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 10.8 percent in US national income in IIIQ2013, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

 

SAAR
IIQ2013

% Total

SAAR IIIQ2013

% Total

National Income WCCA

14,495.5

100.0

14,642.3

100.0

Domestic Industries

14,248.7

98.3

14,379.4

98.2

Private Industries

12,568.6

86.7

12,704.3

86.8

    Agriculture

220.3

1.5

224.2

1.5

    Mining

254.3

1.8

253.3

1.7

    Utilities

216.5

1.5

221.4

1.5

    Construction

629.0

4.3

638.7

4.4

    Manufacturing

1558.9

10.8

1575.6

10.8

       Durable Goods

888.1

6.1

910.6

6.2

       Nondurable Goods

670.1

4.6

665.0

4.5

    Wholesale Trade

874.4

6.0

884.6

6.0

     Retail Trade

995.8

6.9

998.0

6.8

     Transportation & WH

436.3

3.0

442.3

3.0

     Information

507.2

3.5

498.9

3.4

     Finance, Insurance, RE

2448.1

16.9

2517.6

17.2

     Professional & Business Services

2004.7

13.8

2008.0

13.7

     Education, Health Care

1438.9

9.9

1445.7

9.8

     Arts, Entertainment

577.1

4.0

585.6

4.0

     Other Services

409.7

2.8

410.4

2.8

Government

1680.1

11.6

1675.1

11.4

Rest of the World

246.8

1.7

262.9

1.8

Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IA1. Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment. The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions. US economic growth has been at only 2.3 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,107.4 billion than actual $15,932.9 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,932.9 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.

Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. Table IA1-1 provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of growth of private fixed investment for the recessions of the 1980s and the current economic cycle. In the cyclical expansion beginning in IQ1983 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html), real private fixed investment in the United States grew at the average annual rate of 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. Growth rates fell to an average of 2.2 percent in the following eight quarters from IQ1985 to IVQ1986. There were only two quarters of contraction of private fixed investment from IQ1983 to IVQ1986. There is quite different behavior of private fixed investment in the eighteen quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013. The average annual growth rate in the first eight quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2011 was 3.3 percent, which is significantly lower than 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. There is only strong growth of private fixed investment in the four quarters of expansion from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 at the average annual rate of 10.5 percent. Growth has fallen from the SAAR of 14.8 percent in IIIQ2011 to 2.7 percent in IIIQ2012, recovering to 11.6 percent in IVQ2012 and falling to minus 1.5 percent in IQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment rose to 6.5 percent in IIQ2013 and fell to 5.9 percent in IIIQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment fell to 3.8 percent in IVQ2013. Sudeep Reddy and Scott Thurm, writing on “Investment falls off a cliff,” on Nov 18, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123593211825394.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories) analyze the decline of private investment in the US and inform that a review by the Wall Street Journal of filing and conference calls finds that 40 of the largest publicly traded corporations in the US have announced intentions to reduce capital expenditures in 2012.

Table IA1-1, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of Real Private Fixed Investment, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q

1981

1982

1983

1984

2008

2009

2010

I

3.8

-12.2

9.4

13.1

-7.1

-27.4

0.8

II

3.2

-12.1

16.0

16.6

-5.5

-14.2

13.6

III

0.1

-9.3

24.4

8.2

-12.1

-0.5

-0.4

IV

-1.5

0.2

24.3

7.3

-23.9

-2.8

8.5

       

1985

   

2011

I

     

3.7

   

-0.5

II

     

5.2

   

8.6

III

     

-1.6

   

14.8

IV

     

7.8

   

10.0

       

1986

   

2012

I

     

1.1

   

8.6

II

     

0.1

   

4.7

III

     

-1.8

   

2.7

IV

     

3.1

   

11.6

       

1987

   

2013

I

     

-6.7

   

-1.5

II

     

6.3

   

6.5

III

     

7.1

   

5.9

IV

     

-0.2

   

3.8

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-1 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth of real private fixed investment from 1981 to 1986. Growth rates recovered sharply during the first eight quarters, which was essential in returning the economy to trend growth and eliminating unemployment and underemployment accumulated during the contractions.

clip_image015

Chart IA1-1, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 1981-1987

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Weak behavior of real private fixed investment from 2007 to 2013 is shown in Chart IA1-2. Growth rates of real private fixed investment were much lower during the initial phase of expansion in the current economic cycle and have entered sharp trend of decline.

clip_image016

Chart IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-2 provides real private fixed investment at seasonally adjusted annual rates from IVQ2007 to IVQ2013 or for the complete economic cycle. The first column provides the quarter, the second column percentage change relative to IVQ2007, the third column the quarter percentage change in the quarter relative to the prior quarter and the final column percentage change in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IQ1980, gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of 2009 dollars, growing to $1,173.8 billion in IQ1987 or 23.4 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 2.0 percent from $2,605.2 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,656.2 billion in IVQ2013. As shown in Table IAI-2, real private fixed investment fell 2.7 percent from $2,586.3 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,517.5 billion in IVQ2013. Growth of real private investment in Table IA1-2 is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012.

Table IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real PFI, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

2586.3

NA

-1.2

-1.4

IQ2008

2539.1

-1.8

-1.8

-3.0

IIQ2008

2503.4

-3.2

-1.4

-4.6

IIIQ2008

2424.1

-6.3

-3.2

-7.1

IV2008

2263.8

-12.5

-6.6

-12.5

IQ2009

2089.3

-19.2

-7.7

-17.7

IIQ2009

2011.0

-22.2

-3.7

-19.7

IIIQ2009

2008.4

-22.3

-0.1

-17.1

IVQ2009

1994.1

-22.9

-0.7

-11.9

IQ2010

1997.9

-22.8

0.2

-4.4

IIQ2010

2062.8

-20.2

3.2

2.6

IIIQ2010

2060.8

-20.3

-0.1

2.6

IVQ2010

2103.1

-18.7

2.1

5.5

IQ2011

2100.7

-18.8

-0.1

5.1

IIQ2011

2144.4

-17.1

2.1

4.0

IIIQ2011

2219.8

-14.2

3.5

7.7

IVQ2011

2273.4

-12.1

2.4

8.1

IQ2012

2320.8

-10.3

2.1

10.5

IIQ2012

2347.9

-9.2

1.2

9.5

IIIQ2012

2363.5

-8.6

0.7

6.5

IVQ2012

2429.1

-6.1

2.8

6.8

IQ2013

2420.0

-6.4

-0.4

4.3

IIQ2013

2458.4

-4.9

1.6

4.7

IIIQ2013

2,494.0

-3.6

1.4

5.5

IVQ2013

2,517.5

-2.7

0.9

3.6

PFI: Private Fixed Investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-3 provides real private fixed investment in billions of chained 2009 dollars from IQ2007 to IIIQ2013. Real private fixed investment has not recovered, stabilizing at a level in IVQ2013 that is 2.7 percent below the level in IVQ2007.

clip_image017

Chart IA1-3, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, IQ2007 to IVQ2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-4 provides real gross private domestic investment in chained dollars of 2009 from 1980 to 1986. Real gross private domestic investment climbed 23.4 percent to $1174.4 billion of 2009 dollars in IIQ1987 above the level of $951.6 billion in IQ1980.

clip_image018

Chart IA1-4, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 1980-1987

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-5 provides real gross private domestic investment in the United States in billions of dollars of 2009 from 2006 to 2013. Gross private domestic investment reached a level of $2656.2 in IVQ2013, which was 2.0 percent higher than the level of $2605.2 billion in IVQ2007 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image019

Chart IA1-5, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-3 provides percentage shares in GDP of gross private domestic investment and its components in IVQ2013, IVQ2006 and IVQ2000. The share of gross private domestic investment in GDP has fallen from 19.7 percent in IVQ2000 and 18.8 percent in IVQ2006 to 16.3 percent in IVQ2013. There are declines in percentage shares in GDP of all components with sharp reduction of residential investment from 4.7 percent in IVQ2000 and 5.6 percent in IVQ2006 to 3.1 percent in IVQ2013. The share of fixed investment in GDP fell from 19.2 percent in IVQ2000 and 18.8 percent in IVQ2006 to 15.4 percent in IVQ2013.

Table IA1-3, Percentage Shares of Gross Private Domestic Investment and Components in Gross Domestic Product, % of GDP, IQ2013

 

IVQ2013

IVQ2006

IVQ2000

Gross Private Domestic Investment

16.3

18.8

19.7

  Fixed Investment

15.4

18.5

19.2

     Nonresidential

12.3

12.9

14.5

          Structures

2.8

3.1

3.2

          Equipment

          and Software

5.6

6.1

7.3

          Intellectual
           Property

3.9

3.7

4.0

     Residential

3.1

5.6

4.7

   Change in Private Inventories

0.9

0.3

0.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Broader perspective is provided in Chart IA1-6 with the percentage share of gross private domestic investment in GDP in annual data from 1929 to 2013. There was sharp drop during the current economic cycle with almost no recovery in contrast with sharp recovery after the recessions of the 1980s.

clip_image020

Chart IA1-6, US, Percentage Share of Gross Private Domestic Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-7 provides percentage shares of private fixed investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2013. The sharp contraction after the recessions of the 1980s was followed by sustained recovery while the sharp drop in the current economic cycle has not been recovered.

clip_image021

Chart IA1-7, US, Percentage Share of Private Fixed Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-8 provides percentage shares in GDP of nonresidential investment from 1929 to 2013. There is again recovery from sharp contraction in the 1980s but inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

clip_image022

Chart IA1-8, US, Percentage Share of Nonresidential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-9 provides percentage shares of business equipment and software in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2013. There is again inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

clip_image023

Chart IA1-9, US, Percentage Share of Business Equipment and Software in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-10 provides percentage shares of residential investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2013. The salient characteristic of Chart IA1-10 is the vertical increase of the share of residential investment in GDP up to 2006 and subsequent collapse.

clip_image024

Chart IA1-10, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Finer detail is provided by the quarterly share of residential investment in GDP from 1979 to 2013 in Chart IA1-11. There was protracted growth of that share, accelerating sharply into 2006 followed with nearly vertical drop. The explanation of the sharp contraction of United States housing can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ingersoll 1987, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

clip_image025

Chart IA1-11, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-12 provides the share of intellectual property products investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2013. This is an important addition in the revision and enhancement of GDP provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The share rose sharply over time but stabilized at a lower level in the past decade.

clip_image026

Chart IA1-12, US, Percentage Share of Intellectual Property Products Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-13 provides the percentage share of intellectual property investment in GDP on a quarterly basis from 1979 to 2013. The share stabilized in the 2000s.

clip_image027

Chart IA1-13, US, Percentage Share of Intellectual Property Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-4 provides the seasonally adjusted annual rate of real GDP percentage change and contributions in percentage points in annual equivalent rate of gross domestic investment (GDI), real private fixed investment (PFI), nonresidential investment (NRES), business equipment and software (BES), residential investment (RES), intellectual property products (IPP) and change in inventories (∆INV) for the cyclical expansions from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013. GDI provided strong percentage points contributions to GDP growth in the critical first year of expansion in 1983 and also in several quarters in 1984 and 1985 while it has been muted in the cyclical expansion since IIIQ2009 with contributions largely only from IQ2010 to IVQ2011. Gross domestic investment added 0.72 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2013. Nonresidential investment added 0.87 percentage points while residential investment subtracted 0.29 percentage points. Inventory investment contributed 0.14 percentage points. Gross domestic investment added 2.56 percentage points to GDP growth of 4.1 percent in IIIQ2013 partly because of change of inventories of 1.67 percentage points with PFI adding 0.89 percentage points. Nonresidential investment added 0.58 percentage points and residential investment added 0.31 percentage points to GDP growth of 4.1 percent in IIIQ2013. GDI added 1.38 percentage points to GDP growth of 2.5 percent in IIQ2013 with 0.41 percentage points from inventory change while nonresidential investment added 0.56 percentage points and residential investment 0.40 percentage points. GDI added 0.71 percentage points in IQ2013 mostly because of 0.93 percentage points of inventory investment while private fixed investment deducted 0.23 percentage points. Nonresidential investment deducted 0.57 percentage points. Business equipment and software added 0.09 percentage points and residential investment 0.34 percentage points. Intellectual property products (IPP) added 0.14 percentage points in IQ2013, deducted 0.06 percentage points in IIQ2013 and added 0.22 percentage points in IIIQ2013. Intellectual property products added 0.30 percentage points in IVQ2013. Much of the strong performance of GDI in the cyclical expansion after IQ1983 originated in contributions by real private fixed investment (PFI). Nonresidential investment also contributed strongly to growth in the expansion of the 1980s but has been muted in the current expansion. The contribution of business equipment and software collapsed to negative 0.22 percentage points in IIIQ2012 as business scales down investment but rebounded with 0.47 percentage points in IVQ2012, 0.09 percentage points in IQ2013 and 0.18 percentage points in IIQ2013. Business equipment and software contributed 0.02 percentage points in IIIQ2013 and 0.56 percentage points in IVQ2013. Residential investment (RES) was relatively strong in 1983 but was muted in following quarters. Residential investment only contributed significantly to growth of GDP in the four quarters of 2012, IQ2013, IIQ2013 and IIIQ2013.

Table IA1-4, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of Real GDP in Percentage Points

 

GDP

GDI

PFI

NRES

BES

IPP

RES

∆INV

2013

               

I

1.1

0.71

-0.23

-0.57

0.09

0.14

0.34

0.93

II

2.5

1.38

0.96

0.56

0.18

-0.06

0.40

0.41

III

4.1

2.56

0.89

0.58

0.02

0.22

0.31

1.67

IV

2.4

0.72

0.58

0.87

0.56

0.30

-0.29

0.14

2012

               

I

3.7

1.57

1.21

0.68

0.45

0.05

0.53

0.36

II

1.2

-0.23

0.68

0.53

0.29

0.07

0.15

-0.91

III

2.8

0.99

0.39

0.04

-0.22

0.11

0.35

0.60

IV

0.1

-0.36

1.63

1.13

0.47

0.21

0.50

-2.00

2011

               

I

-1.3

-1.11

-0.05

-0.09

0.59

0.14

0.04

-1.06

II

3.2

1.88

1.16

1.09

0.23

0.18

0.07

0.72

III

1.4

0.36

1.96

1.81

0.99

0.20

0.15

-1.60

IV

4.9

4.13

1.39

1.10

0.54

0.21

0.29

2.73

2010

               

I

1.6

1.77

0.11

0.46

1.25

-0.07

-0.35

1.66

II

3.9

2.86

1.77

1.21

1.02

-0.08

0.56

1.09

III

2.8

1.86

-0.04

0.90

0.83

0.22

-0.94

1.90

IV

2.8

-0.51

1.13

0.94

0.57

0.19

0.19

-1.64

2009

               

I

-5.4

-7.02

-4.75

-3.58

-2.25

-0.23

-1.17

-2.26

II

-0.4

-3.25

-2.13

-1.46

-0.60

0.16

-0.66

-1.12

III

1.3

-0.40

-0.02

-0.54

0.25

0.04

0.52

-0.38

IV

3.9

4.05

-0.36

-0.37

0.36

0.25

0.01

4.40

1982

               

I

-6.5

-7.60

-2.26

-1.45

-0.83

0.14

-0.81

-5.34

II

2.2

-0.06

-2.32

-1.89

-1.20

0.08

-0.44

2.26

III

-1.4

-0.62

-1.73

-1.71

-0.55

0.06

-0.02

1.11

IV

0.4

-5.37

-0.03

-1.05

-0.57

0.00

1.01

-5.33

1983

               

I

5.3

2.36

1.44

-0.92

-0.27

0.16

2.36

0.92

II

9.4

5.96

2.53

0.67

1.24

0.29

1.86

3.43

III

8.1

4.40

3.82

2.13

1.43

0.31

1.70

0.57

IV

8.5

6.94

3.93

3.14

2.32

0.35

0.79

3.01

1984

               

I

8.2

7.23

2.29

1.71

0.46

0.30

0.58

4.94

II

7.2

2.57

2.86

2.52

1.36

0.29

0.34

-0.29

III

4.0

1.69

1.48

1.70

0.88

0.25

-0.22

0.21

IV

3.2

-1.08

1.36

1.34

0.86

0.29

0.02

-2.44

1985

               

I

4.0

-2.14

0.72

0.67

-0.23

0.14

0.05

-2.86

II

3.7

1.34

0.99

0.83

0.64

0.20

0.16

0.35

III

6.4

-0.43

-0.28

-0.62

-0.38

0.13

0.34

-0.15

IV

3.0

2.80

1.40

1.00

0.53

0.26

0.40

1.40

1986

               

I

3.8

0.04

0.21

-0.55

-0.28

0.17

0.76

-0.17

II

1.9

-1.30

0.00

-1.12

0.34

0.15

1.12

-1.30

III

4.1

-1.97

-0.34

-0.63

-0.17

0.10

0.28

-1.62

IV

2.1

0.24

0.53

0.48

0.30

0.10

0.05

-0.29

GDP: Gross Domestic Product; GDI: Gross Domestic Investment; PFI: Private Fixed Investment; NRES: Nonresidential; BES: Business Equipment and Software; IPP: Intellectual Property Products; RES: Residential; ∆INV: Change in Private Inventories.

GDI = PFI + ∆INV, may not add exactly because of errors of rounding.

GDP: Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate of growth in a quarter; components: percentage points at annual rate.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

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