United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities, United States Housing, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk
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© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
IIA United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
IA Transmission of Monetary Policy
IB Functions of Banking
IC United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
ID Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation
IIB United States Housing Collapse
II IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
III World Financial Turbulence. Financial markets are being shocked by multiple factors including:
(1) World economic slowdown
(2) Slowing growth in China with political development and slowing growth in Japan and world trade
(3) Slow growth propelled by savings/investment reduction in the US with high unemployment/underemployment, falling wages, hiring collapse, contraction of real private fixed investment and loss of ten million full-time jobs. Wealth of households increased over the business cycle by total 18.1 percent adjusted for inflation from IVQ2007 to IIIQ2016, while growing at 3.1 percent per year adjusted for inflation from IVQ1945 to IIIQ2016 with unsustainable fiscal deficit/debt threatening prosperity that can cause risk premium on Treasury debt with Himalayan interest rate hikes. Growth of inflation-adjusted wealth at historical trend would have been 30.6 percent between 2007 and IIIQ2016, which is much higher than actual 18.1 percent
(4) Outcome of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe with complex financial, economic and political effects of the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union or BREXIT after the referendum on Jun 23, 2016 (https://next.ft.com/eu-referendum for extensive coverage by the Financial Times).
This section provides current data and analysis. Subsection IIIA Financial Risks provides analysis of the evolution of valuations of risk financial assets during the week. There are various appendixes for convenience of reference of material related to the debt crisis of the euro area. Some of this material is updated in Subsection IIIA when new data are available and then maintained in the appendixes for future reference until updated again in Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies discusses arguments and measures of currency intervention and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact provides analysis of the restructuring of the fiscal affairs of the European Union in the agreement of European leaders reached on Dec 9, 2011 and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort considers the policies of the European Central Bank and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Appendix IIIE Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the threats to survival of the European Monetary Union and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation provides more technical analysis and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis provides analysis of proposals to finance growth with budget deficits together with experience of the economic history of Brazil and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment.
IIIA Financial Risks. Financial turbulence, attaining unusual magnitude in recent months, characterized the expansion from the global recession since IIIQ2009. Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Feb 17 and daily values throughout the week ending on Feb 24, 2017, of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at the close of business. The first column provides the value on Fri Feb 17 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Feb 17, 2016”, first row “USD/EUR 1.0615 0.3% 0.5%,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) appreciated 0.3 percent to USD 1.0615/EUR in the week ending on Fri Feb 17 relative to the exchange rate on Fri Feb 10 and appreciated 0.5 percent relative to Thu Feb 16. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. An important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf). There are complex economic, financial and political effects of the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union or BREXIT after the referendum on Jun 23, 2016 (https://next.ft.com/eu-referendum for extensive coverage by the Financial Times).The most important source of financial turbulence is shifting toward fluctuating interest rates. The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per one euro EUR, USD 1.0615/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Fri Feb 17, appreciating to USD 1.0537/EUR on Tue Feb 21, 2017, or by 0.7 percent. The dollar appreciated because fewer dollars, 1.0537, were required on Tue Feb 21 to buy one euro than $1.0615 on Fri Feb 17. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the exchange rate at 5 PM New York time, such as USD 1.0615/EUR on Feb 17. The second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Fri Feb 17, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Feb 24, such as appreciation of 0.5 percent to USD 1.0562/EUR by Feb 24. The third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 0.5 percent from the rate of USD 1.0615/EUR on Fri Feb 17 to the rate of USD 1.0562/EUR on Feb 24 {[(1.0562/1.0615) - 1]100 = -0.5%}. The dollar appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 0.2 percent from the rate of USD 1.0583 on
Thu Feb 23 to USD 1.0562/EUR on Fri Feb 24 {[(1.0562/1.0583) -1]100 = -0.2%}. Other factors constant, increasing risk aversion causes appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro, with rising uncertainty on European and global sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. Funds move away from higher yielding risk assets to the safety of dollar-denominated assets.
Table III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Assets Feb 20 to Feb 24, 2017
| Fri 17 | Mon 20 | Tue 21 | Wed 22 | Thu 23 | Fri 24 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0615 0.3% 0.5% | 1.0614 0.0% 0.0% | 1.0537 0.7% 0.7% | 1.0561 0.5% -0.2% | 1.0583 0.3% -0.2% | 1.0562 0.5% 0.2% |
| JPY/ USD 112.82 0.3% 0.4% | 113.11 -0.3% -0.3% | 113.69 -0.8% -0.5% | 113.31 -0.4% 0.3% | 112.62 0.2% 0.6% | 112.14 0.6% 0.4% |
| CHF/ USD 1.0028 0.0% -0.6% | 1.0028 0.0% 0.0% | 1.0099 -0.7% -0.7% | 1.0103 -0.7% 0.0% | 1.0065 -0.4% 0.4% | 1.0076 -0.5% -0.1% |
| CHF/ EUR 1.0644 0.2% 0.0% | 1.0643 0.0% 0.0% | 1.0641 0.0% 0.0% | 1.0669 -0.2% -0.3% | 1.0651 -0.1% 0.2% | 1.0642 0.0% 0.1% |
| USD/ AUD 0.7664 1.3048 -0.1% -0.4% | 0.7686 1.3011 0.3% 0.3% | 0.7676 1.3028 0.2% -0.1% | 0.7702 1.2984 0.5% 0.3% | 0.7716 1.2960 0.7% 0.2% | 0.7672 1.3034 0.1% -0.6% |
| 10Y Note 2.425 | 2.448 | 2.425 | 2.417 | 2.388 | 2.314 |
| 2Y Note 1.203 | 1.206 | 1.215 | 1.220 | 1.192 | 1.157 |
| German Bond 2Y -0.81 10Y 0.31 | 2Y -0.85 10Y 0.30 | 2Y -0.86 10Y 0.30 | 2Y -0.90 10Y 0.28 | 2Y -0.91 10Y 0.24 | 2Y -0.95 10Y 0.19 |
| DJIA 20624.05 1.7% 0.0% | 20624.05 0.0% 0.0% | 20743.00 0.6% 0.6% | 20775.60 0.7% 0.2% | 20810.32 0.9% 0.2% | 20821.76 1.0% 0.1% |
| Dow Global 2654.77 1.2% -0.2% | 2654.77 0.0% 0.0% | 2668.02 0.5% 0.5% | 2670.43 0.6% 0.1% | 2673.89 0.7% 0.1% | 2660.60 0.2% -0.5% |
| DJ Asia Pacific 1526.66 0.9% -0.2% | 1526.66 0.0% 0.0% | 1529.10 0.2% 0.2% | 1536.87 0.7% 0.5% | 1542.13 1.0% 0.3% | 1535.64 0.6% -0.4% |
| Nikkei 19234.62 -0.7% -0.6% | 19251.08 0.1% 0.1% | 19381.44 0.8% 0.7% | 19379.87 0.8% 0.0% | 19371.46 0.7% 0.0% | 19283.54 0.3% -0.5% |
| Shanghai 3202.08 0.2% -0.9% | 3239.96 1.2% 1.2% | 3253.33 1.6% 0.4% | 3261.22 1.8% 0.2% | 3251.38 1.5% -0.3% | 3253.43 1.6% 0.1% |
| DAX 11757.02 0.8% 0.0% | 11827.62 0.6% 0.6% | 11967.49 1.8% 1.2% | 11998.59 2.1% 0.3% | 11947.83 1.6% -0.4% | 11804.03 0.4% -1.2% |
| DJ UBS Comm. NA | NA | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| WTI $/B 53.40 -0.9% 0.1% | 53.40 0.0% 0.0% | 54.06 1.2% 1.2% | 53.59 0.4% -0.9% | 54.45 2.0% 1.6% | 53.99 1.1% -0.8% |
| Brent $/B 55.81 -1.6% 0.3% | 55.81 0.0% 0.0% | 56.66 1.5% 1.5% | 55.84 0.1% -1.4% | 56.58 1.4% 1.3% | 55.99 0.3% -1.0% |
| 44Gold 1237.6 0.3% -0.2% | 1237.6 0.0% 0.0% | 1237.5 0.0% 0.0% | 1232.0 -0.5% -0.4% | 1250.2 1.0% 1.5% | 1256.9 1.6% 0.5% |
Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss
Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce
Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
There is initial discussion of current and recent risk-determining events followed below by analysis of risk-measuring yields of the US and Germany and the USD/EUR rate.
1 First, risk determining events. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) is that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This is a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.
In the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress on Feb 24, 2015, Chair Yellen analyzes the timing of interest rate increases (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150224a.htm):
“The FOMC's assessment that it can be patient in beginning to normalize policy means that the Committee considers it unlikely that economic conditions will warrant an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate for at least the next couple of FOMC meetings. If economic conditions continue to improve, as the Committee anticipates, the Committee will at some point begin considering an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate on a meeting-by-meeting basis. Before then, the Committee will change its forward guidance. However, it is important to emphasize that a modification of the forward guidance should not be read as indicating that the Committee will necessarily increase the target range in a couple of meetings. Instead the modification should be understood as reflecting the Committee's judgment that conditions have improved to the point where it will soon be the case that a change in the target range could be warranted at any meeting. Provided that labor market conditions continue to improve and further improvement is expected, the Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate when, on the basis of incoming data, the Committee is reasonably confident that inflation will move back over the medium term toward our 2 percent objective.”
In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):
“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability. If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases. In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that it does not run persistently above or below that level (emphasis added).”
The minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 16-17, 2014, reveal concern with global economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20140917.htm):
“Most viewed the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as broadly balanced. However, a number of participants noted that economic growth over the medium term might be slower than they expected if foreign economic growth came in weaker than anticipated, structural productivity continued to increase only slowly, or the recovery in residential construction continued to lag.”
There is similar concern in the minutes of the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16-17, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20141217.htm):
“In their discussion of the foreign economic outlook, participants noted that the implications of the drop in crude oil prices would differ across regions, especially if the price declines affected inflation expectations and financial markets; a few participants said that the effect on overseas employment and output as a whole was likely to be positive. While some participants had lowered their assessments of the prospects for global economic growth, several noted that the likelihood of further responses by policymakers abroad had increased. Several participants indicated that they expected slower economic growth abroad to negatively affect the U.S. economy, principally through lower net exports, but the net effect of lower oil prices on U.S. economic activity was anticipated to be positive.”
Prior risk determining events are in an appendix below following Table III-1A. Focus is shifting from tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Markets overreacted to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases to $25 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at ½ to ¾ percent with gradual consideration of further rate increases (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20170201a.htm): “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added).
There is concern at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) with the world economy and financial markets (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20160127a.htm): “The Committee is closely monitoring global economic and financial developments and is assessing their implications for the labor market and inflation, and for the balance of risks to the outlook” (emphasis added). This concern should include the effects on dollar revaluation of competitive easing by other central banks such as quantitative and qualitative easing with negative nominal interest rates (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf).
At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:
“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.
For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”
There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at ½ to ¾ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Focus is shifting from tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Markets overreacted to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases to $25 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed.
Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):
So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).
How long is “considerable time”? At the press conference following the meeting on Mar 19, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question of Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal explaining “In particular, the Committee has endorsed the view that it anticipates that will be a considerable period after the asset purchase program ends before it will be appropriate to begin to raise rates. And of course on our present path, well, that's not utterly preset. We would be looking at next, next fall. So, I think that's important guidance” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140319.pdf). Many focused on “next fall,” ignoring that the path of increasing rates is not “utterly preset.”
At the press conference following the meeting on Dec 17, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question by Jon Hilseranth of the Wall Street Journal explaining “patience” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20141217.pdf):
“So I did say that this statement that the committee can be patient should be interpreted as meaning that it is unlikely to begin the normalization process, for at least the next couple of meetings. Now that doesn't point to any preset or predetermined time at which normalization is -- will begin. There are a range of views on the committee, and it will be dependent on how incoming data bears on the progress, the economy is making. First of all, I want to emphasize that no meeting is completely off the table in the sense that if we do see faster progress toward our objectives than we currently expect, then it is possible that the process of normalization would occur sooner than we now anticipated. And of course the converse is also true. So at this point, we think it unlikely that it will be appropriate, that we will see conditions for at least the next couple of meetings that will make it appropriate for us to decide to begin normalization. A number of committee participants have indicated that in their view, conditions could be appropriate by the middle of next year. But there is no preset time.”
At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):
“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.
Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.
Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) provides comprehensive review of the theory and measurement of labor markets. Monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):
“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”
Yellen (2014Aug22) finds that the unemployment rate is not sufficient in determining slack:
“One convenient way to summarize the information contained in a large number of indicators is through the use of so-called factor models. Following this methodology, Federal Reserve Board staff developed a labor market conditions index from 19 labor market indicators, including four I just discussed. This broadly based metric supports the conclusion that the labor market has improved significantly over the past year, but it also suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) restates that the FOMC determines monetary policy on newly available information and interpretation of labor markets and inflation and does not follow a preset path:
“But if progress in the labor market continues to be more rapid than anticipated by the Committee or if inflation moves up more rapidly than anticipated, resulting in faster convergence toward our dual objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target could come sooner than the Committee currently expects and could be more rapid thereafter. Of course, if economic performance turns out to be disappointing and progress toward our goals proceeds more slowly than we expect, then the future path of interest rates likely would be more accommodative than we currently anticipate. As I have noted many times, monetary policy is not on a preset path. The Committee will be closely monitoring incoming information on the labor market and inflation in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”
In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):
“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability. If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases. In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that
Another critical concern in the statement of the FOMC on Sep 18, 2013, is on the effects of tapering expectations on interest rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm):
“Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has been strengthening, but mortgage rates have risen further and fiscal policy is restraining economic growth” (emphasis added).
Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?
Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):
So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).
In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):
“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”
Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:
“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).
Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:
“Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).
Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
The Communiqué of the Istanbul meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on February 10, 2015, sanctions the need of unconventional monetary policy with warning on collateral effects (http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/150210-finance.html):
“We agree that consistent with central banks' mandates, current economic conditions require accommodative monetary policies in some economies. In this regard, we welcome that central banks take appropriate monetary policy action. The recent policy decision by the ECB aims at fulfilling its price stability mandate, and will further support the recovery in the euro area. We also note that some advanced economies with stronger growth prospects are moving closer to conditions that would allow for policy normalization. In an environment of diverging monetary policy settings and rising financial market volatility, policy settings should be carefully calibrated and clearly communicated to minimize negative spillovers.”
Professor Raguram G Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation. Rajan (2005) anticipated the risks of the world financial crisis.
Professor John B. Taylor (2016Dec 7, 2016Dec20), in Testimony to the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade Committee on Financial Services, on Dec 7, 2016, analyzes the adverse effects of unconventional monetary policy:
“My research and that of others over the years shows that these policies were not effective, and may have been counterproductive. Economic growth was consistently below the Fed’s forecasts with the policies, and was much weaker than in earlier U.S. recoveries from deep recessions. Job growth has been insufficient to raise the percentage of the population that is working above pre-recession levels. There is a growing consensus that the extra low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy have reached diminishing or negative returns. Many have argued that these policies widen the income distribution, adversely affect savers, and increase the volatility of the dollar exchange rate. Experienced market participants have expressed concerns about bubbles, imbalances, and distortions caused by the policies. The unconventional policies have also raised public policy concerns about the Fed being transformed into a multipurpose institution, intervening in particular sectors and allocating credit, areas where Congress may have a role, but not a limited-purpose independent agency of government.”
Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor 2007, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2015, 2012 Oct 25; 2013Oct28, 2014 Jan01, 2014Jan3, 2014Jun26, 2014Jul15, 2015, 2016Dec7, 2016Dec20 http://www.johnbtaylor.com/) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2014, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm):
“The economy has continued to recover from the steep recession of 2008 and 2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth stepped up to an average annual rate of about 3-1/4 percent over the second half of last year, a faster pace than in the first half and during the preceding two years. Although real GDP growth is currently estimated to have paused in the first quarter of this year, I see that pause as mostly reflecting transitory factors, including the effects of the unusually cold and snowy winter weather. With the harsh winter behind us, many recent indicators suggest that a rebound in spending and production is already under way, putting the overall economy on track for solid growth in the current quarter. One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.
Conditions in the labor market have continued to improve. The unemployment rate was 6.3 percent in April, about 1-1/4 percentage points below where it was a year ago. Moreover, gains in payroll employment averaged nearly 200,000 jobs per month over the past year. During the economic recovery so far, payroll employment has increased by about 8-1/2 million jobs since its low point, and the unemployment rate has declined about 3-3/4 percentage points since its peak.
While conditions in the labor market have improved appreciably, they are still far from satisfactory. Even with recent declines in the unemployment rate, it continues to be elevated. Moreover, both the share of the labor force that has been unemployed for more than six months and the number of individuals who work part time but would prefer a full-time job are at historically high levels. In addition, most measures of labor compensation have been rising slowly--another signal that a substantial amount of slack remains in the labor market.
Inflation has been quite low even as the economy has continued to expand. Some of the factors contributing to the softness in inflation over the past year, such as the declines seen in non-oil import prices, will probably be transitory. Importantly, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained stable. That said, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recognizes that inflation persistently below 2 percent--the rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its dual mandate--could pose risks to economic performance, and we are monitoring inflation developments closely.
Looking ahead, I expect that economic activity will expand at a somewhat faster pace this year than it did last year, that the unemployment rate will continue to decline gradually, and that inflation will begin to move up toward 2 percent. A faster rate of economic growth this year should be supported by reduced restraint from changes in fiscal policy, gains in household net worth from increases in home prices and equity values, a firming in foreign economic growth, and further improvements in household and business confidence as the economy continues to strengthen. Moreover, U.S. financial conditions remain supportive of growth in economic activity and employment.”
In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):
“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”
Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:
W = Y/r (10
Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.
In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:
“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.
The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”
Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced on Jan 15, 2015, the termination of its peg of the exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the euro (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):
“The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has decided to discontinue the minimum exchange rate of
CHF 1.20 per euro with immediate effect and to cease foreign currency purchases associated with enforcing it.”
The SNB also lowered interest rates to nominal negative percentages (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):
“At the same time as discontinuing the minimum exchange rate, the SNB will be lowering the interest rate for balances held on sight deposit accounts to –0.75% from 22 January. The exemption thresholds remain unchanged. Further lowering the interest rate makes Swiss-franc investments considerably less attractive and will mitigate the effects of the decision to discontinue the minimum exchange rate. The target range for the three-month Libor is being lowered by 0.5 percentage points to between –1.25% and –0.25%.”
The Swiss franc rate relative to the euro (CHF/EUR) appreciated 18.7 percent on Jan 15, 2015. The Swiss franc rate relative to the dollar (CHF/USD) appreciated 17.7 percent. Central banks are taking measures in anticipation of the quantitative easing program of the European Central Bank.
On Jan 22, 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to implement an “expanded asset purchase program” with combined asset purchases of €60 billion per month “until at least Sep 2016 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html). The objective of the program is that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html):
“Asset purchases provide monetary stimulus to the economy in a context where key 3ECB interest rates are at their lower bound. They further ease monetary and financial conditions, making access to finance cheaper for firms and households. This tends to support investment and consumption, and ultimately contributes to a return of inflation rates towards 2%.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, explains the coordination of asset purchases with NCBs (National Central Banks) of the euro area and risk sharing (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“In March 2015 the Eurosystem will start to purchase euro-denominated investment-grade securities issued by euro area governments and agencies and European institutions in the secondary market. The purchases of securities issued by euro area governments and agencies will be based on the Eurosystem NCBs’ shares in the ECB’s capital key. Some additional eligibility criteria will be applied in the case of countries under an EU/IMF adjustment programme. As regards the additional asset purchases, the Governing Council retains control over all the design features of the programme and the ECB will coordinate the purchases, thereby safeguarding the singleness of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Eurosystem will make use of decentralised implementation to mobilise its resources. With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, rejected the possibility of seigniorage in the new asset purchase program, or central bank financing of fiscal expansion (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“As I just said, it would be a big mistake if countries were to consider that the presence of this programme might be an incentive to fiscal expansion. They would undermine the confidence, so it’s not directed to monetary financing at all. Actually, it’s been designed as to avoid any monetary financing.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, does not find effects of monetary policy in inflating asset prices (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“On the first question, we monitor closely any potential instance of risk to financial stability. So we're very alert to that risk. So far we don't see bubbles. There may be some local episodes of certain specific markets where prices are going up fast. But to have a bubble, besides having that, one should also identify, detect an increase, dramatic increase in leverage or in bank credit, and we don't see that now. However, we, as I said, we are alert. If bubbles are of a local nature, they should be addressed by local instruments, namely macro-prudential instruments rather than by monetary policy.”
The DAX index of German equities increased 1.3 percent on Jan 22, 2015 and 2.1 percent on Jan 23, 2015. The euro depreciated from EUR 1.1611/USD (EUR 0.8613/USD) on Wed Jan 21, 2015, to EUR 1.1206/USD (EUR 0.8924/USD) on Fri Jan 23, 2015, or 3.6 percent. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar.
Dan Strumpf and Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, writing on “Fed’s Yellen: Stock Valuations ‘Generally are Quite High,’” on May 6, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-cites-progress-on-bank-regulation-1430918155?tesla=y ), quote Chair Yellen at open conversation with Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, finding “equity-market valuations” as “quite high” with “potential dangers” in bond valuations. The DJIA fell 0.5 percent on May 6, 2015, after the comments and then increased 0.5 percent on May 7, 2015 and 1.5 percent on May 8, 2015.
| Fri May 1 | Mon 4 | Tue 5 | Wed 6 | Thu 7 | Fri 8 |
| DJIA 18024.06 -0.3% 1.0% | 18070.40 0.3% 0.3% | 17928.20 -0.5% -0.8% | 17841.98 -1.0% -0.5% | 17924.06 -0.6% 0.5% | 18191.11 0.9% 1.5% |
There are two approaches in theory considered by Bordo (2012Nov20) and Bordo and Lane (2013). The first approach is in the classical works of Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963a, 1987) and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (1973). There is a similar approach in Tobin (1969). Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 66) trace the effects of expansionary monetary policy into increasing initially financial asset prices: “It seems plausible that both nonbank and bank holders of redundant balances will turn first to securities comparable to those they have sold, say, fixed-interest coupon, low-risk obligations. But as they seek to purchase these they will tend to bid up the prices of those issues. Hence they, and also other holders not involved in the initial central bank open-market transactions, will look farther afield: the banks, to their loans; the nonbank holders, to other categories of securities-higher risk fixed-coupon obligations, equities, real property, and so forth.”
The second approach is by the Austrian School arguing that increases in asset prices can become bubbles if monetary policy allows their financing with bank credit. Professor Michael D. Bordo provides clear thought and empirical evidence on the role of “expansionary monetary policy” in inflating asset prices (Bordo2012Nov20, Bordo and Lane 2013). Bordo and Lane (2013) provide revealing narrative of historical episodes of expansionary monetary policy. Bordo and Lane (2013) conclude that policies of depressing interest rates below the target rate or growth of money above the target influences higher asset prices, using a panel of 18 OECD countries from 1920 to 2011. Bordo (2012Nov20) concludes: “that expansionary money is a significant trigger” and “central banks should follow stable monetary policies…based on well understood and credible monetary rules.” Taylor (2007, 2009) explains the housing boom and financial crisis in terms of expansionary monetary policy. Professor Martin Feldstein (2016), at Harvard University, writing on “A Federal Reserve oblivious to its effects on financial markets,” on Jan 13, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-federal-reserve-oblivious-to-its-effect-on-financial-markets-1452729166), analyzes how unconventional monetary policy drove values of risk financial assets to high levels. Quantitative easing and zero interest rates distorted calculation of risks with resulting vulnerabilities in financial markets.
Another hurdle of exit from zero interest rates is “competitive easing” that Professor Raghuram Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, characterizes as disguised “competitive devaluation” (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). The fed has been considering increasing interest rates. The European Central Bank (ECB) announced, on Mar 5, 2015, the beginning on Mar 9, 2015 of its quantitative easing program denominated as Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP), consisting of “combined monthly purchases of EUR 60 bn [billion] in public and private sector securities” (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/pspp.en.html). Expectation of increasing interest rates in the US together with euro rates close to zero or negative cause revaluation of the dollar (or devaluation of the euro and of most currencies worldwide). US corporations suffer currency translation losses of their foreign transactions and investments (http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Pronouncement_C/SummaryPage&cid=900000010318) while the US becomes less competitive in world trade (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c)). The DJIA fell 1.5 percent on Mar 6, 2015 and the dollar revalued 2.2 percent from Mar 5 to Mar 6, 2015. The euro has devalued 50.5 percent relative to the dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Feb 24, 2017.
| Fri 27 Feb | Mon 3/2 | Tue 3/3 | Wed 3/4 | Thu 3/5 | Fri 3/6 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1197 1.6% 0.0% | 1.1185 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1176 0.2% 0.1% | 1.1081 1.0% 0.9% | 1.1030 1.5% 0.5% | 1.0843 3.2% 1.7% |
Chair Yellen explained the removal of the word “patience” from the advanced guidance at the press conference following the FOMC meeting on Mar 18, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150318.pdf):
“In other words, just because we removed the word “patient” from the statement doesn’t mean we are going to be impatient. Moreover, even after the initial increase in the target funds rate, our policy is likely to remain highly accommodative to support continued progress toward our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”
Exchange rate volatility is increasing in response of “impatience” in financial markets with monetary policy guidance and measures:
| Fri Mar 6 | Mon 9 | Tue 10 | Wed 11 | Thu 12 | Fri 13 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0843 3.2% 1.7% | 1.0853 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.0700 1.3% 1.4% | 1.0548 2.7% 1.4% | 1.0637 1.9% -0.8% | 1.0497 3.2% 1.3% |
| Fri Mar 13 | Mon 16 | Tue 17 | Wed 18 | Thu 19 | Fri 20 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0497 3.2% 1.3% | 1.0570 -0.7% -0.7% | 1.0598 -1.0% -0.3% | 1.0864 -3.5% -2.5% | 1.0661 -1.6% 1.9% | 1.0821 -3.1% -1.5% |
| Fri Apr 24 | Mon 27 | Tue 28 | Wed 29 | Thu 30 | May Fri 1 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0874 -0.6% -0.4% | 1.0891 -0.2% -0.2% | 1.0983 -1.0% -0.8% | 1.1130 -2.4% -1.3% | 1.1223 -3.2% -0.8% | 1.1199 -3.0% 0.2% |
In a speech at Brown University on May 22, 2015, Chair Yellen stated (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150522a.htm):
“For this reason, if the economy continues to improve as I expect, I think it will be appropriate at some point this year to take the initial step to raise the federal funds rate target and begin the process of normalizing monetary policy. To support taking this step, however, I will need to see continued improvement in labor market conditions, and I will need to be reasonably confident that inflation will move back to 2 percent over the medium term. After we begin raising the federal funds rate, I anticipate that the pace of normalization is likely to be gradual. The various headwinds that are still restraining the economy, as I said, will likely take some time to fully abate, and the pace of that improvement is highly uncertain.”
The US dollar appreciated 3.8 percent relative to the euro in the week of May 22, 2015:
| Fri May 15 | Mon 18 | Tue 19 | Wed 20 | Thu 21 | Fri 22 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1449 -2.2% -0.3% | 1.1317 1.2% 1.2% | 1.1150 2.6% 1.5% | 1.1096 3.1% 0.5% | 1.1113 2.9% -0.2% | 1.1015 3.8% 0.9% |
The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, warned on Jun 4, 2015, that: (http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2015/06/04/u-s-economy-returning-to-growth-but-pockets-of-vulnerability/):
“The Fed’s first rate increase in almost 9 years is being carefully prepared and telegraphed. Nevertheless, regardless of the timing, higher US policy rates could still result in significant market volatility with financial stability consequences that go well beyond US borders. I weighing these risks, we think there is a case for waiting to raise rates until there are more tangible signs of wage or price inflation than are currently evident. Even after the first rate increase, a gradual rise in the federal fund rates will likely be appropriate.”
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, warned on Jun 3, 2015 that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150603.en.html):
“But certainly one lesson is that we should get used to periods of higher volatility. At very low levels of interest rates, asset prices tend to show higher volatility…the Governing Council was unanimous in its assessment that we should look through these developments and maintain a steady monetary policy stance.”
The Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet L. Yellen, stated on Jul 10, 2015 that (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150710a.htm):
“Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or accelerate this first step. I currently anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.”
There is essentially the same view in the Testimony of Chair Yellen in delivering the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jul 15, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150715a.htm).
At the press conference after the meeting of the FOMC on Sep 17, 2015, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150917.pdf 4):
“The outlook abroad appears to have become more uncertain of late, and heightened concerns about growth in China and other emerging market economies have led to notable volatility in financial markets. Developments since our July meeting, including the drop in equity prices, the further appreciation of the dollar, and a widening in risk spreads, have tightened overall financial conditions to some extent. These developments may restrain U.S. economic activity somewhat and are likely to put further downward pressure on inflation in the near term. Given the significant economic and financial interconnections between the United States and the rest of the world, the situation abroad bears close watching.”
Some equity markets fell on Fri Sep 18, 2015:
| Fri Sep 11 | Mon 14 | Tue 15 | Wed 16 | Thu 17 | Fri 18 |
| DJIA 16433.09 2.1% 0.6% | 16370.96 -0.4% -0.4% | 16599.85 1.0% 1.4% | 16739.95 1.9% 0.8% | 16674.74 1.5% -0.4% | 16384.58 -0.3% -1.7% |
| Nikkei 225 18264.22 2.7% -0.2% | 17965.70 -1.6% -1.6% | 18026.48 -1.3% 0.3% | 18171.60 -0.5% 0.8% | 18432.27 0.9% 1.4% | 18070.21 -1.1% -2.0% |
| DAX 10123.56 0.9% -0.9% | 10131.74 0.1% 0.1% | 10188.13 0.6% 0.6% | 10227.21 1.0% 0.4% | 10229.58 1.0% 0.0% | 9916.16 -2.0% -3.1% |
Frank H. Knight (1963, 233), in Risk, uncertainty and profit, distinguishes between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty. Chair Yellen, in a lecture on “Inflation dynamics and monetary policy,” on Sep 24, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm), states that (emphasis added):
· “The economic outlook, of course, is highly uncertain”
· “Considerable uncertainties also surround the outlook for economic activity”
· “Given the highly uncertain nature of the outlook…”
Is there a “science” or even “art” of central banking under this extreme uncertainty in which policy does not generate higher volatility of money, income, prices and values of financial assets?
Lingling Wei, writing on Oct 23, 2015, on China’s central bank moves to spur economic growth,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-central-bank-cuts-rates-1445601495), analyzes the reduction by the People’s Bank of China (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/ http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130437/index.html) of borrowing and lending rates of banks by 50 basis points and reserve requirements of banks by 50 basis points. Paul Vigna, writing on Oct 23, 2015, on “Stocks rally out of correction territory on latest central bank boost,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/10/23/stocks-rally-out-of-correction-territory-on-latest-central-bank-boost/), analyzes the rally in financial markets following the statement on Oct 22, 2015, by the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi of consideration of new quantitative measures in Dec 2015 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0814riKW25k&rel=0) and the reduction of bank lending/deposit rates and reserve requirements of banks by the People’s Bank of China on Oct 23, 2015. The dollar revalued 2.8 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23, 2015, following the intended easing of the European Central Bank. The DJIA rose 2.8 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23 and the DAX index of German equities rose 5.4 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23, 2015.
| Fri Oct 16 | Mon 19 | Tue 20 | Wed 21 | Thu 22 | Fri 23 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1350 0.1% 0.3% | 1.1327 0.2% 0.2% | 1.1348 0.0% -0.2% | 1.1340 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1110 2.1% 2.0% | 1.1018 2.9% 0.8% |
| DJIA 17215.97 0.8% 0.4% | 17230.54 0.1% 0.1% | 17217.11 0.0% -0.1% | 17168.61 -0.3% -0.3% | 17489.16 1.6% 1.9% | 17646.70 2.5% 0.9% |
| Dow Global 2421.58 0.3% 0.6% | 2414.33 -0.3% -0.3% | 2411.03 -0.4% -0.1% | 2411.27 -0.4% 0.0% | 2434.79 0.5% 1.0% | 2458.13 1.5% 1.0% |
| DJ Asia Pacific 1402.31 1.1% 0.3% | 1398.80 -0.3% -0.3% | 1395.06 -0.5% -0.3% | 1402.68 0.0% 0.5% | 1396.03 -0.4% -0.5% | 1415.50 0.9% 1.4% |
| Nikkei 225 18291.80 -0.8% 1.1% | 18131.23 -0.9% -0.9% | 18207.15 -0.5% 0.4% | 18554.28 1.4% 1.9% | 18435.87 0.8% -0.6% | 18825.30 2.9% 2.1% |
| Shanghai 3391.35 6.5% 1.6% | 3386.70 -0.1% -0.1% | 3425.33 1.0% 1.1% | 3320.68 -2.1% -3.1% | 3368.74 -0.7% 1.4% | 3412.43 0.6% 1.3% |
| DAX 10104.43 0.1% 0.4% | 10164.31 0.6% 0.6% | 10147.68 0.4% -0.2% | 10238.10 1.3% 0.9% | 10491.97 3.8% 2.5% | 10794.54 6.8% 2.9% |
Ben Leubsdorf, writing on “Fed’s Yellen: December is “Live Possibility” for First Rate Increase,” on Nov 4, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-december-is-live-possibility-for-first-rate-increase-1446654282) quotes Chair Yellen that a rate increase in “December would be a live possibility.” The remark of Chair Yellen was during a hearing on supervision and regulation before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20151104a.htm) and a day before the release of the employment situation report for Oct 2015 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html). The dollar revalued 2.4 percent during the week. The euro has devalued 50.5 percent relative to the dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Feb 24, 2017.
| Fri Oct 30 | Mon 2 | Tue 3 | Wed 4 | Thu 5 | Fri 6 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1007 0.1% -0.3% | 1.1016 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.0965 0.4% 0.5% | 1.0867 1.3% 0.9% | 1.0884 1.1% -0.2% | 1.0742 2.4% 1.3% |
The release on Nov 18, 2015 of the minutes of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) meeting held on Oct 28, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20151028.htm) states:
“Most participants anticipated that, based on their assessment of the current economic situation and their outlook for economic activity, the labor market, and inflation, these conditions [for interest rate increase] could well be met by the time of the next meeting. Nonetheless, they emphasized that the actual decision would depend on the implications for the medium-term economic outlook of the data received over the upcoming intermeeting period… It was noted that beginning the normalization process relatively soon would make it more likely that the policy trajectory after liftoff could be shallow.”
Markets could have interpreted a symbolic increase in the fed funds rate at the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 15-16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm) followed by “shallow” increases, explaining the sharp increase in stock market values and appreciation of the dollar after the release of the minutes on Nov 18, 2015:
| Fri Nov 13 | Mon 16 | Tue 17 | Wed 18 | Thu 19 | Fri 20 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0774 -0.3% 0.4% | 1.0686 0.8% 0.8% | 1.0644 1.2% 0.4% | 1.0660 1.1% -0.2% | 1.0735 0.4% -0.7% | 1.0647 1.2% 0.8% |
| DJIA 17245.24 -3.7% -1.2% | 17483.01 1.4% 1.4% | 17489.50 1.4% 0.0% | 17737.16 2.9% 1.4% | 17732.75 2.8% 0.0% | 17823.81 3.4% 0.5% |
| DAX 10708.40 -2.5% -0.7% | 10713.23 0.0% 0.0% | 10971.04 2.5% 2.4% | 10959.95 2.3% -0.1% | 11085.44 3.5% 1.1% | 11119.83 3.8% 0.3% |
In testimony before The Joint Economic Committee of Congress on Dec 3, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20151203a.htm), Chair Yellen reiterated that the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) “anticipates that even after employment and inflation are near mandate-consistent levels, economic condition may, for some time, warrant keeping the target federal funds rate below the Committee views as normal in the longer run.” Todd Buell and Katy Burne, writing on “Draghi says ECB could step up stimulus efforts if necessary,” on Dec 4, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/draghi-says-ecb-could-step-up-stimulus-efforts-if-necessary-1449252934), analyze that the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, reassured financial markets that the ECB will increase stimulus if required to raise inflation the euro area to targets. The USD depreciated 3.1 percent on Thu Dec 3, 2015 after weaker than expected measures by the European Central Bank. DJIA fell 1.4 percent on Dec 3 and increased 2.1 percent on Dec 4. DAX fell 3.6 percent on Dec 3.
| Fri Nov 27 | Mon 30 | Tue 1 | Wed 2 | Thu 3 | Fri 4 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0594 0.5% 0.2% | 1.0565 0.3% 0.3% | 1.0634 -0.4% -0.7% | 1.0616 -0.2% 0.2% | 1.0941 -3.3% -3.1% | 1.0885 -2.7% 0.5% |
| DJIA 17798.49 -0.1% -0.1% | 17719.92 -0.4% -0.4% | 17888.35 0.5% 1.0% | 17729.68 -0.4% -0.9% | 17477.67 -1.8% -1.4% | 17847.63 0.3% 2.1% |
| DAX 11293.76 1.6% -0.2% | 11382.23 0.8% 0.8% | 11261.24 -0.3% -1.1% | 11190.02 -0.9% -0.6% | 10789.24 -4.5% -3.6% | 10752.10 -4.8% -0.3% |
At the press conference following the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16, 2015, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20151216.pdf page 8):
“And we recognize that monetary policy operates with lags. We would like to be able to move in a prudent, and as we've emphasized, gradual manner. It's been a long time since the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates, and I think it's prudent to be able to watch what the impact is on financial conditions and spending in the economy and moving in a timely fashion enables us to do this.”
The implication of this statement is that the state of the art is not accurate in analyzing the effects of monetary policy on financial markets and economic activity. The US dollar appreciated and equities fluctuated:
| Fri Dec 11 | Mon 14 | Tue 15 | Wed 16 | Thu 17 | Fri 18 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0991 -1.0% -0.4% | 1.0993 0.0% 0.0% | 1.0932 0.5% 0.6% | 1.0913 0.7% 0.2% | 1.0827 1.5% 0.8% | 1.0868 1.1% -0.4% |
| DJIA 17265.21 -3.3% -1.8% | 17368.50 0.6% 0.6% | 17524.91 1.5% 0.9% | 17749.09 2.8% 1.3% | 17495.84 1.3% -1.4% | 17128.55 -0.8% -2.1% |
| DAX 10340.06 -3.8% -2.4% | 10139.34 -1.9% -1.9% | 10450.38 -1.1% 3.1% | 10469.26 1.2% 0.2% | 10738.12 3.8% 2.6% | 10608.19 2.6% -1.2% |
The Bank of Japan decided on Jan 29, 2016 to determine “a negative interest rate of minus 0.1 percent to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank” and “will cut the interest rate further into negative territory if judged as necessary” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129b.pdf). The new policy is quantitative and qualitative (QQE) with a negative interest rate “designed to enable the Bank to pursue additional monetary easing in terms of three dimensions, combining a negative interest rate with quantity and quality” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129b.pdf). The yen devalued sharply relative to the dollar and world equity markets soared after the new policy announced on Jan 29, 2016:
| Fri 22 | Mon 25 | Tue 26 | Wed 27 | Thu 28 | Fri 29 |
| JPY/ USD 118.77 -1.5% -0.9% | 118.30 0.4% 0.4% | 118.42 0.3% -0.1% | 118.68 0.1% -0.2% | 118.82 0.0% -0.1% | 121.13 -2.0% -1.9% |
| DJIA 16093.51 0.7% 1.3% | 15885.22 -1.3% -1.3% | 16167.23 0.5% 1.8% | 15944.46 -0.9% -1.4% | 16069.64 -0.1% 0.8% | 16466.30 2.3% 2.5% |
| Nikkei 16958.53 -1.1% 5.9% | 17110.91 0.9% 0.9% | 16708.90 -1.5% -2.3% | 17163.92 1.2% 2.7% | 17041.45 0.5% -0.7% | 17518.30 3.3% 2.8% |
| Shanghai 2916.56 0.5% 1.3 | 2938.51 0.8% 0.8% | 2749.79 -5.7% -6.4% | 2735.56 -6.2% -0.5% | 2655.66 -8.9% -2.9% | 2737.60 -6.1% 3.1% |
| DAX 9764.88 2.3% 2.0% | 9736.15 -0.3% -0.3% | 9822.75 0.6% 0.9% | 9880.82 1.2% 0.6% | 9639.59 -1.3% -2.4% | 9798.11 0.3% 1.6% |
In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Feb 10-11, 2016, Chair Yellen (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20160210a.htm) states: “U.S. real gross domestic product is estimated to have increased about 1-3/4 percent in 2015. Over the course of the year, subdued foreign growth and the appreciation of the dollar restrained net exports. In the fourth quarter of last year, growth in the gross domestic product is reported to have slowed more sharply, to an annual rate of just 3/4 percent; again, growth was held back by weak net exports as well as by a negative contribution from inventory investment.”
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Yellen Says Fed Should Be Prepared to Use Negative Rates if Needed,” on Feb 11, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-reiterates-concerns-about-risks-to-economy-in-senate-testimony-1455203865), analyzes the statement of Chair Yellen in Congress that the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) is considering negative interest rates on bank reserves. The Wall Street Journal provides yields of two and ten-year sovereign bonds with negative interest rates on shorter maturities where central banks pay negative interest rates on excess bank reserves:
| Sovereign Yields 2/12/16 | Japan | Germany | USA |
| 2 Year | -0.168 | -0.498 | 0.694 |
| 10 Year | 0.076 | 0.262 | 1.744 |
On Sep 4, 2014, the European Central Bank lowered policy rates (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140904.en.html):
On Mar 10, 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced (1) reduction of the refinancing rate by 5 basis points to 0.00 percent; decrease the marginal lending rate to 0.25 percent; reduction of the deposit facility rate to 0,40 percent; increase of the monthly purchase of assets to €80 billion; include nonbank corporate bonds in assets eligible for purchases; and new long-term refinancing operations (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310.en.html). The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, stated in the press conference (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2016/html/is160310.en.html): “How low can we go? Let me say that rates will stay low, very low, for a long period of time, and well past the horizon of our purchases…We don’t anticipate that it will be necessary to reduce rates further. Of course, new facts can change the situation and the outlook.”
The dollar devalued relative to the euro and open stock markets traded lower after the announcement on Mar 10, 2016, but stocks rebounded on Mar 11:
| Fri 4 | Mon 7 | Tue 8 | Wed 9 | Thu10 | Fri 11 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1006 -0.7% -0.4% | 1.1012 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.1013 -0.1% 0.0% | 1.0999 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1182 -1.6% -1.7% | 1.1151 -1.3% 0.3% |
| DJIA 17006.77 2.2% 0.4% | 17073.95 0.4% 0.4% | 16964.10 -0.3% -0.6% | 17000.36 0.0% 0.2% | 16995.13 -0.1% 0.0% | 17213.31 1.2% 1.3% |
| DAX 9824.17 3.3% 0.7% | 9778.93 -0.5% 0.5% | 9692.82 -1.3% -0.9% | 9723.09 -1.0% 0.3% | 9498.15 -3.3% -2.3% | 9831.13 0.1% 3.5% |
At the press conference after the FOMC meeting on Sep 21, 2016, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20160921.pdf ): “However, the economic outlook is inherently uncertain.” In the address to the Jackson Hole symposium on Aug 26, 2016, Chair Yellen states: “I believe the case for an increase in in federal funds rate has strengthened in recent months…And, as ever, the economic outlook is uncertain, and so monetary policy is not on a preset course” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160826a.htm). In a speech at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, on Jun 6, 2016 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160606a.htm), Chair Yellen finds that “there is considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook.” There are fifteen references to this uncertainty in the text of 18 pages double-spaced. In the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jun 21, 2016, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20160621a.htm), “Of course, considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook remains.” Frank H. Knight (1963, 233), in Risk, uncertainty and profit, distinguishes between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty. Is there a “science” or even “art” of central banking under this extreme uncertainty in which policy does not generate higher volatility of money, income, prices and values of financial assets?
“4 September 2014 - Monetary policy decisions
At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:
- The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 10 basis points to 0.05%, starting from the operation to be settled on 10 September 2014.
- The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 10 basis points to 0.30%, with effect from 10 September 2014.
- The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 10 basis points to -0.20%, with effect from 10 September 2014.”
The President of the European Central Bank announced on Sep 4, 2014, the decision to expand the balance sheet by purchases of asset-backed securities (ABS) in a new ABS Purchase Program (ABSPP) and covered bonds (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140904.en.html):
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, the Governing Council decided today to lower the interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem by 10 basis points to 0.05% and the rate on the marginal lending facility by 10 basis points to 0.30%. The rate on the deposit facility was lowered by 10 basis points to -0.20%. In addition, the Governing Council decided to start purchasing non-financial private sector assets. The Eurosystem will purchase a broad portfolio of simple and transparent asset-backed securities (ABSs) with underlying assets consisting of claims against the euro area non-financial private sector under an ABS purchase programme (ABSPP). This reflects the role of the ABS market in facilitating new credit flows to the economy and follows the intensification of preparatory work on this matter, as decided by the Governing Council in June. In parallel, the Eurosystem will also purchase a broad portfolio of euro-denominated covered bonds issued by MFIs domiciled in the euro area under a new covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3). Interventions under these programmes will start in October 2014. The detailed modalities of these programmes will be announced after the Governing Council meeting of 2 October 2014. The newly decided measures, together with the targeted longer-term refinancing operations which will be conducted in two weeks, will have a sizeable impact on our balance sheet.”
In a speech on “Monetary Policy in the Euro Area,” on Nov 21, 2014, the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, advised of the determination to bring inflation back to normal levels by aggressive holding of securities in the balance sheet (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp141121.en.html):
“In short, there is a combination of policies that will work to bring growth and inflation back on a sound path, and we all have to meet our responsibilities in achieving that. For our part, we will continue to meet our responsibility – we will do what we must to raise inflation and inflation expectations as fast as possible, as our price stability mandate requires of us.
If on its current trajectory our policy is not effective enough to achieve this, or further risks to the inflation outlook materialise, we would step up the pressure and broaden even more the channels through which we intervene, by altering accordingly the size, pace and composition of our purchases.”
On Jun 5, 2014, the European Central Bank introduced cuts in interest rates and a negative rate paid on deposits of banks (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605.en.html):
“5 June 2014 - Monetary policy decisions
At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:
- The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 10 basis points to 0.15%, starting from the operation to be settled on 11 June 2014.
- The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 35 basis points to 0.40%, with effect from 11 June 2014.
- The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 10 basis points to -0.10%, with effect from 11 June 2014. A separate press release to be published at 3.30 p.m. CET today will provide details on the implementation of the negative deposit facility rate.”
The ECB also introduced new measures of monetary policy on Jun 5, 2014 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605_2.en.html):
“5 June 2014 - ECB announces monetary policy measures to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism
In pursuing its price stability mandate, the Governing Council of the ECB has today announced measures to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism by supporting lending to the real economy. In particular, the Governing Council has decided:
- To conduct a series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) aimed at improving bank lending to the euro area non-financial private sector [1], excluding loans to households for house purchase, over a window of two years.
- To intensify preparatory work related to outright purchases of asset-backed securities (ABS).”
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi analyzed the measures at a press conference (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140605.en.html).
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi reaffirmed the policy stance at the press conference following the meeting on Feb 6, 2014 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140206.en.html): “As I have said several times we are willing to act and we stand ready to act. We confirmed our forward guidance, so interest rates will stay at the present or lower levels for an extended period of time.”
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi explained the indefinite period of low policy rates during the press conference following the meeting on Jul 4, 2013 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130704.en.html):
“Yes, that is why I said you haven’t listened carefully. The Governing Council has taken the unprecedented step of giving forward guidance in a rather more specific way than it ever has done in the past. In my statement, I said “The Governing Council expects the key…” – i.e. all interest rates – “…ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.” It is the first time that the Governing Council has said something like this. And, by the way, what Mark Carney [Governor of the Bank of England] said in London is just a coincidence.”
The European Central Bank (ECB) lowered the policy rates on Nov 7, 2013 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr131107.en.html):
“PRESS RELEASE
7 November 2013 - Monetary policy decisions
At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:
- The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.25%, starting from the operation to be settled on 13 November 2013.
- The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.75%, with effect from 13 November 2013.
- The interest rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 2.30 p.m. CET today.”
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, explained as follows (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2013/html/is131107.en.html):
“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to lower the interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem by 25 basis points to 0.25% and the rate on the marginal lending facility by 25 basis points to 0.75%. The rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%. These decisions are in line with our forward guidance of July 2013, given the latest indications of further diminishing underlying price pressures in the euro area over the medium term, starting from currently low annual inflation rates of below 1%. In keeping with this picture, monetary and, in particular, credit dynamics remain subdued. At the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. Such a constellation suggests that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2% later on. Accordingly, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. It will thereby also continue to assist the gradual economic recovery as reflected in confidence indicators up to October.”
The ECB decision together with the employment situation report on Fri Nov 8, 2013, influenced revaluation of the dollar. Market expectations were of relatively easier monetary policy in the euro area.
The statement of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England on Jul 4, 2013, may be leading toward the same forward guidance (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/007.aspx):
“At its meeting today, the Committee noted that the incoming data over the past couple of months had been broadly consistent with the central outlook for output growth and inflation contained in the May Report. The significant upward movement in market interest rates would, however, weigh on that outlook; in the Committee’s view, the implied rise in the expected future path of Bank Rate was not warranted by the recent
developments in the domestic economy.”
A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/peaking-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 20,821.66 on Feb 24, 2017, which is higher by 47.0 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 46.7 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial assets have been approaching or exceeding historical highs. Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):
So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).
In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):
“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”
Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:
“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).
Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:
“Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).
Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
Professor Raguram G Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation. Rajan (2005) anticipated the risks of the world financial crisis. Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor 2007, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2015, 2012 Oct 25; 2013Oct28, 2014 Jan01, 2014Jan3, 2014Jun26, 2014Jul15, 2015, 2016Dec7, 2016Dec20 http://www.johnbtaylor.com/) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows.
Banking was important in facilitating economic growth in historical periods (Cameron 1961, 1967, 1972; Cameron et al. 1992). Banking is also important currently because small- and medium-size business may have no other form of financing than banks in contrast with many options for larger and more mature companies that have access to capital markets. Calomiris and Haber (2014) find that broad voting rights and institutions restricting coalitions of bankers and populists ensure stable banking systems and access to credit. Summerhill (2015) finds compelling evidence that sovereign credibility is insufficient to develop financial intermediation required for economic growth in the presence of inadequate political institutions.
Professor Ronald I. McKinnon (2013Oct27), writing on “Tapering without tears—how to end QE3,” on Oct 27, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579153693500945608?KEYWORDS=Ronald+I+McKinnon), finds that the major central banks of the world have fallen into a “near-zero-interest-rate trap.” World economic conditions are weak such that exit from the zero interest rate trap could have adverse effects on production, investment and employment. The maintenance of interest rates near zero creates long-term near stagnation. The proposal of Professor McKinnon is credible, coordinated increase of policy interest rates toward 2 percent. Professor John B. Taylor at Stanford University, writing on “Economic failures cause political polarization,” on Oct 28, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303442004579121010753999086?KEYWORDS=John+B+Taylor), analyzes that excessive risks induced by near zero interest rates in 2003-2004 caused the financial crash. Monetary policy continued in similar paths during and after the global recession with resulting political polarization worldwide.
Second, Risk-Measuring Yields and Exchange Rate. The ten-year government bond of Spain was quoted at 6.868 percent on Aug 17, 2012, declining to 6.447 percent on Aug 17 and 6.403 percent on Aug 24, 2012, and the ten-year government bond of Italy fell from 5.894 percent on Aug 10, 2012 to 5.709 percent on Aug 17 and 5.618 percent on Aug 24, 2012. The yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain traded at 1.599 percent on Feb 24, 2017 compared with 1.628 percent a year earlier, and that of the ten-year sovereign bond of Italy at 2.175 percent compared with 1.533 percent a year earlier (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Diminishing aversion is captured by increase of the yield of the two- and ten-year Treasury notes and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table III-1A provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.459 percent on Jul 20, 2012, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.17 percent. In the week of Feb 24, 2017, the yield of the two-year Treasury decreased to 1.157 percent and that of the ten-year Treasury decreased to 2.314 percent while the yield of the two-year bond of Germany decreased at minus 0.95 percent and the ten-year yield decreased at 0.19 percent; and the dollar appreciated at USD 1.0562/EUR. The zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, induce carry trades that ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield of 2.314 percent is lower than consumer price inflation of 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/of-course-economic-outlook-is-highly.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/dollar-revaluation-world-inflation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-volatility-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/interest-rate-policy-uncertainty-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/fomc-projections-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/most-fomc-participants-judged-that-if.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/contracting-united-states-industrial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/monetary-policy-and-competitive.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/uncertainty-of-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/12/liftoff-of-interest-rates-with-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/interest-rate-liftoff-followed-by.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/interest-rate-policy-quagmire-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-increase-on-hold-because.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/global-decline-of-values-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. The one-year Treasury yield of 0.779 percent (http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_bonds.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3002) is lower than the 12-month consumer price inflation of 2.5 percent, which appears to be temporary. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury. The lower part of Table III-1A provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.
Table III-1A, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate
| US 2Y | US 10Y | DE 2Y | DE 10Y | USD/ EUR | |
| 02/24/17 | 1.157 | 2.314 | -0.95 | 0.19 | 1.0562 |
| 02/17/17 | 1.203 | 2.425 | -0.81 | 0.31 | 1.0615 |
| 02/10/17 | 1.198 | 2.408 | -0.80 | 0.32 | 1.0642 |
| 02/03/17 | 1.201 | 2.488 | -0.74 | 0.42 | 1.0786 |
| 01/27/17 | 1.224 | 2.479 | -0.66 | 0.46 | 1.0699 |
| 01/20/17 | 1.189 | 2.466 | -0.68 | 0.43 | 1.0703 |
| 01/13/17 | 1.189 | 2.381 | -0.72 | 0.34 | 1.0645 |
| 01/06/17 | 1.226 | 2.416 | -0.73 | 0.30 | 1.0533 |
| 12/30/16 | 1.210 | 2.447 | -0.79 | 0.21 | 1.0520 |
| 12/23/16 | 1.202 | 2.542 | -0.79 | 0.26 | 1.0456 |
| 12/16/16 | 1.269 | 2.597 | -0.80 | 0.32 | 1.0451 |
| 12/09/16 | 1.129 | 2.466 | -0.76 | 0.37 | 1.0563 |
| 12/02/16 | 1.120 | 2.389 | -0.73 | 0.28 | 1.0668 |
| 11/25/16 | 1.115 | 2.358 | -0.74 | 0.24 | 1.0591 |
| 11/18/16 | 1.052 | 2.340 | -0.66 | 0.28 | 1.0591 |
| 11/11/16 | 0.919 | 2.152 | -0.60 | 0.31 | 1.0857 |
| 11/04/16 | 0.810 | 1.784 | -0.64 | 0.14 | 1.1141 |
| 10/28/16 | 0.861 | 1.843 | -0.62 | 0.17 | 1.0987 |
| 10/21/16 | 0.844 | 1.738 | -0.66 | 0.01 | 1.0884 |
| 10/14/16 | 0.835 | 1.791 | -0.66 | 0.06 | 1.0972 |
| 10/07/16 | 0.834 | 1.732 | -0.66 | -0.02 | 1.1203 |
| 09/30/16 | 0.766 | 1.602 | -0.68 | -0.12 | 1.1240 |
| 09/23/16 | 0.758 | 1.614 | -0.67 | -0.08 | 1.1228 |
| 09/16/16 | 0.774 | 1.699 | -0.65 | 0.01 | 1.1157 |
| 09/09/16 | 0.790 | 1.675 | -0.63 | -0.01 | 1.1234 |
| 09/02/16 | 0.798 | 1.597 | -0.63 | -0.04 | 1.1156 |
| 08/26/16 | 0.845 | 1.635 | -0.61 | -0.07 | 1.1197 |
| 08/19/16 | 0.742 | 1.580 | -0.61 | -0.03 | 1.1326 |
| 08/12/16 | 0.722 | 1.514 | -0.63 | -0.11 | 1.1163 |
| 08/05/16 | 0.722 | 1.583 | -0.62 | -0.06 | 1.1088 |
| 07/29/16 | 0.671 | 1.458 | -0.63 | -0.12 | 1.1176 |
| 07/22/16 | 0.703 | 1.567 | -0.61 | -0.03 | 1.0980 |
| 07/15/16 | 0.706 | 1.595 | -0.65 | 0.01 | 1.1037 |
| 07/08/16 | 0.613 | 1.366 | -0.69 | -0.19 | 1.1052 |
| 07/01/16 | 0.597 | 1.443 | -0.65 | -0.12 | 1.1140 |
| 06/24/16 | 0.641 | 1.575 | -0.64 | -0.04 | 1.1117 |
| 06/17/16 | 0.697 | 1.618 | -0.59 | 0.02 | 1.1277 |
| 06/10/16 | 0.751 | 1.638 | -0.54 | 0.02 | 1.1252 |
| 06/03/16 | 0.784 | 1.704 | -0.53 | 0.07 | 1.1364 |
| 05/27/16 | 0.915 | 1.851 | -0.50 | 0.14 | 1.1115 |
| 05/20/16 | 0.893 | 1.849 | -0.50 | 0.17 | 1.1226 |
| 05/13/16 | 0.746 | 1.706 | -0.51 | 0.13 | 1.1309 |
| 05/06/16 | 0.738 | 1.780 | -0.51 | 0.15 | 1.1405 |
| 04/29/16 | 0.774 | 1.820 | -0.47 | 0.27 | 1.1450 |
| 04/22/17 | 0.826 | 1.886 | -0.50 | 0.23 | 1.1227 |
| 04/15/17 | 0.734 | 1.752 | -0.51 | 0.13 | 1.1285 |
| 04/08/16 | 0.707 | 1.722 | -0.51 | 0.10 | 1.1399 |
| 03/25/16 | 0.885 | 1.900 | -0.48 | 0.18 | 1.1168 |
| 03/18/16 | 0.843 | 1.871 | -0.47 | 0.21 | 1.1270 |
| 03/11/16 | 0.960 | 1.977 | -0.46 | 0.27 | 1.1151 |
| 03/04/16 | 0.878 | 1.884 | -0.52 | 0.24 | 1.1006 |
| 02/26/16 | 0.793 | 1.766 | -0.52 | 0.15 | 1.0933 |
| 02/19/16 | 0.746 | 1.748 | -0.52 | 0.21 | 1.1131 |
| 02/12/16 | 0.694 | 1.744 | -0.50 | 0.26 | 1.1256 |
| 02/05/16 | 0.726 | 1.848 | -0.49 | 0.30 | 1.1158 |
| 01/29/16 | 0.778 | 1.923 | -0.48 | 0.33 | 1.0833 |
| 01/22/16 | 0.881 | 2.048 | -0.44 | 0.42 | 1.0799 |
| 01/15/16 | 0.858 | 2.036 | -0.38 | 0.48 | 1.0917 |
| 01/08/16 | 0.948 | 2.135 | -0.39 | 0.52 | 1.0926 |
| 01/01/16 | 1.060 | 2.269 | -0.34 | 0.63 | 1.0861 |
| 12/25/15 | 0.998 | 2.242 | -0.33 | 0.63 | 1.0965 |
| 12/18/15 | 0.944 | 2.197 | -0.35 | 0.55 | 1.0868 |
| 12/11/15 | 0.903 | 2.134 | -0.34 | 0.54 | 1.0991 |
| 12/04/15 | 0.951 | 2.276 | -0.29 | 0.68 | 1.0885 |
| 11/27/15 | 0.922 | 2.223 | -0.42 | 0.46 | 1.0594 |
| 11/20/15 | 0.905 | 2.260 | -0.39 | 0.48 | 1.0647 |
| 11/13/15 | 0.855 | 2.278 | -0.37 | 0.56 | 1.0774 |
| 11/06/15 | 0.890 | 2.332 | -0.27 | 0.70 | 1.0742 |
| 10/30/15 | 0.736 | 2.150 | -0.33 | 0.52 | 1.1007 |
| 10/23/15 | 0.645 | 2.083 | -0.31 | 0.52 | 1.1018 |
| 10/16/15 | 0.605 | 2.024 | -0.26 | 0.55 | 1.1350 |
| 10/09/15 | 0.641 | 2.096 | -0.24 | 0.62 | 1.1359 |
| 10/02/15 | 0.578 | 1.998 | -0.27 | 0.51 | 1.1214 |
| 09/25/15 | 0.688 | 2.168 | -0.24 | 0.65 | 1.1199 |
| 09/18/15 | 0.678 | 2.131 | -0.24 | 0.67 | 1.1303 |
| 09/11/15 | 0.701 | 2.181 | -0.25 | 0.66 | 1.1338 |
| 09/04/15 | 0.709 | 2.127 | -0.23 | 0.67 | 1.1153 |
| 08/28/15 | 0.716 | 2.182 | -0.21 | 0.75 | 1.1185 |
| 08/21/15 | 0.633 | 2.052 | -0.25 | 0.57 | 1.1389 |
| 08/14/15 | 0.738 | 2.196 | -0.27 | 0.66 | 1.1109 |
| 08/07/15 | 0.729 | 2.164 | -0.25 | 0.62 | 1.0967 |
| 07/31/15 | 0.669 | 2.207 | -0.23 | 0.61 | 1.0984 |
| 07/24/15 | 0.682 | 2.268 | -0.21 | 0.65 | 1.0985 |
| 07/17/15 | 0.666 | 2.346 | -0.22 | 0.74 | 1.0831 |
| 07/10/15 | 0.653 | 2.414 | -0.21 | 0.90 | 1.1156 |
| 07/03/15 | 0.629 | 2.383 | -0.25 | 0.80 | 1.1115 |
| 06/26/15 | 0.704 | 2.473 | -0.18 | 0.93 | 1.1167 |
| 06/19/15 | 0.629 | 2.270 | -0.20 | 0.76 | 1.1352 |
| 06/12/15 | 0.726 | 2.388 | -0.18 | 0.83 | 1.1268 |
| 06/05/15 | 0.733 | 2.400 | -0.17 | 0.85 | 1.1166 |
| 05/29/15 | 0.605 | 2.092 | -0.22 | 0.49 | 1.0993 |
| 05/22/15 | 0.618 | 2.211 | -0.22 | 0.61 | 1.1015 |
| 05/15/15 | 0.544 | 2.136 | -0.20 | 0.63 | 1.1449 |
| 05/08/15 | 0.580 | 2.153 | -0.21 | 0.55 | 1.1202 |
| 05/01/15 | 0.607 | 2.118 | -0.21 | 0.37 | 1.1199 |
| 04/24/15 | 0.512 | 1.917 | -0.25 | 0.16 | 1.0874 |
| 04/17/15 | 0.512 | 1.864 | -0.28 | 0.08 | 1.0807 |
| 04/10/15 | 0.560 | 1.950 | -0.28 | 0.16 | 1.0603 |
| 04/02/15 | 0.544 | 1.911 | -0.26 | 0.17 | 1.0973 |
| 03/27/15 | 0.590 | 1.951 | -0.25 | 0.18 | 1.0890 |
| 03/20/15 | 0.589 | 1.927 | -0.24 | 0.15 | 1.0821 |
| 03/13/15 | 0.660 | 2.103 | -0.24 | 0.22 | 1.0497 |
| 03/06/15 | 0.723 | 2.238 | -0.21 | 0.35 | 1.0843 |
| 02/27/15 | 0.634 | 2.016 | -0.23 | 0.28 | 1.1197 |
| 02/20/15 | 0.642 | 2.119 | -0.23 | 0.33 | 1.1381 |
| 02/13/15 | 0.640 | 2.043 | -0.23 | 0.31 | 1.1391 |
| 02/06/15 | 0.640 | 1.941 | -0.21 | 0.34 | 1.1316 |
| 01/30/15 | 0.450 | 1.683 | -0.19 | 0.27 | 1.1291 |
| 01/23/15 | 0.495 | 1.804 | -0.18 | 0.39 | 1.1206 |
| 01/16/15 | 0.488 | 1.826 | -0.17 | 0.41 | 1.1567 |
| 01/09/15 | 0.577 | 1.973 | -0.12 | 0.49 | 1.1843 |
| 01/02/15 | 0.670 | 2.126 | -0.12 | 0.50 | 1.2003 |
| 12/26/14 | 0.739 | 2.248 | -0.10 | 0.59 | 1.2182 |
| 12/19/14 | 0.654 | 2.185 | -0.09 | 0.59 | 1.2229 |
| 12/12/14 | 0.546 | 2.086 | -0.05 | 0.62 | 1.2464 |
| 12/05/14 | 0.641 | 2.306 | -0.02 | 1.04 | 1.2285 |
| 11/28/14 | 0.470 | 2.165 | -0.04 | 0.70 | 1.2452 |
| 11/21/14 | 0.507 | 2.307 | -0.04 | 0.77 | 1.2390 |
| 11/14/21 | 0.510 | 2.319 | -0.04 | 0.78 | 1.2525 |
| 11/7/14 | 0.501 | 2.302 | -0.06 | 0.82 | 1.2455 |
| 10/31/14 | 0.495 | 2.332 | -0.06 | 0.84 | 1.2773 |
| 10/24/14 | 0.380 | 2.263 | -0.04 | 0.89 | 1.2671 |
| 10/17/14 | 0.373 | 2.197 | -0.06 | 0.86 | 1.2760 |
| 10/10/14 | 0.434 | 2.292 | -0.06 | 0.89 | 1.2629 |
| 10/03/14 | 0.562 | 2.437 | -0.07 | 0.92 | 1.2514 |
| 09/26/14 | 0.581 | 2.527 | -0.07 | 0.97 | 1.2683 |
| 09/19/14 | 0.567 | 2.576 | -0.07 | 1.04 | 1.2829 |
| 09/12/14 | 0.562 | 2.606 | -0.06 | 1.08 | 1.2965 |
| 09/05/14 | 0.510 | 2.457 | -0.08 | 0.93 | 1.2952 |
| 08/29/14 | 0.490 | 2.342 | -0.04 | 0.89 | 1.3133 |
| 08/22/14 | 0.490 | 2.399 | 0.00 | 0.98 | 1.3242 |
| 08/15/14 | 0.405 | 2.341 | -0.02 | 0.95 | 1.3400 |
| 08/08/14 | 0.446 | 2.420 | 0.00 | 1.05 | 1.3411 |
| 08/01/14 | 0.470 | 2.497 | 0.02 | 1.13 | 1.3430 |
| 07/25/14 | 0.494 | 2.464 | 0.02 | 1.15 | 1.3431 |
| 07/18/14 | 0.478 | 2.484 | 0.02 | 1.15 | 1.3525 |
| 07/11/14 | 0.446 | 2.516 | 0.01 | 1.20 | 1.3608 |
| 07/04/14 | 0.502 | 2.641 | 0.02 | 1.26 | 1.3595 |
| 06/27/14 | 0.463 | 2.536 | 0.03 | 1.26 | 1.3649 |
| 06/20/14 | 0.458 | 2.609 | 0.03 | 1.34 | 1.3600 |
| 06/13/14 | 0.451 | 2.605 | 0.02 | 1.36 | 1.3540 |
| 06/06/14 | 0.405 | 2.598 | 0.05 | 1.35 | 1.3643 |
| 05/30/14 | 0.373 | 2.473 | 0.06 | 1.36 | 1.3632 |
| 05/23/14 | 0.345 | 2.532 | 0.06 | 1.41 | 1.3630 |
| 05/16/14 | 0.357 | 2.520 | 0.09 | 1.33 | 1.3694 |
| 05/09/14 | 0.385 | 2.624 | 0.13 | 1.45 | 1.3760 |
| 05/02/14 | 0.421 | 2.583 | 0.12 | 1.45 | 1.3873 |
| 04/25/14 | 0.432 | 2.668 | 0.17 | 1.48 | 1.3833 |
| 04/18/14 | 0.401 | 2.724 | 0.17 | 1.51 | 1.3813 |
| 04/11/14 | 0.357 | 2.628 | 0.16 | 1.50 | 1.3885 |
| 04/04/14 | 0.413 | 2.724 | 0.16 | 1.55 | 1.3704 |
| 03/28/14 | 0.448 | 2.721 | 0.14 | 1.55 | 1.3752 |
| 03/21/14 | 0.431 | 2.743 | 0.20 | 1.63 | 1.3793 |
| 03/14/14 | 0.340 | 2.654 | 0.15 | 1.54 | 1.3912 |
| 03/07/14 | 0.367 | 2.792 | 0.17 | 1.65 | 1.3877 |
| 02/28/14 | 0.323 | 2.655 | 0.13 | 1.62 | 1.3801 |
| 02/21/14 | 0.316 | 2.730 | 0.12 | 1.66 | 1.3739 |
| 02/14/14 | 0.313 | 2.743 | 0.11 | 1.68 | 1.3693 |
| 02/07/14 | 0.305 | 2.681 | 0.09 | 1.66 | 1.3635 |
| 1/31/14 | 0.330 | 2.645 | 0.07 | 1.66 | 1.3488 |
| 1/24/14 | 0.342 | 2.720 | 0.12 | 1.66 | 1.3677 |
| 1/17/14 | 0.373 | 2.818 | 0.17 | 1.75 | 1.3541 |
| 1/10/14 | 0.372 | 2.858 | 0.18 | 1.84 | 1.3670 |
| 1/3/14 | 0.398 | 2.999 | 0.20 | 1.94 | 1.3588 |
| 12/27/13 | 0.393 | 3.004 | 0.24 | 1.95 | 1.3746 |
| 12/20/13 | 0.377 | 2.891 | 0.22 | 1.87 | 1.3673 |
| 12/13/13 | 0.328 | 2.865 | 0.24 | 1.83 | 1.3742 |
| 12/6/13 | 0.304 | 2.858 | 0.21 | 1.84 | 1.3705 |
| 11/29/13 | 0.283 | 2.743 | 0.11 | 1.69 | 1.3592 |
| 11/22/13 | 0.280 | 2.746 | 0.13 | 1.74 | 1.3557 |
| 11/15/13 | 0.292 | 2.704 | 0.10 | 1.70 | 1.3497 |
| 11/8/13 | 0.316 | 2.750 | 0.10 | 1.76 | 1.3369 |
| 11/1/13 | 0.311 | 2.622 | 0.11 | 1.69 | 1.3488 |
| 10/25/13 | 0.305 | 2.507 | 0.18 | 1.75 | 1.3804 |
| 10/18/13 | 0.321 | 2.588 | 0.17 | 1.83 | 1.3686 |
| 10/11/13 | 0.344 | 2.688 | 0.18 | 1.86 | 1.3543 |
| 10/4/13 | 0.335 | 2.645 | 0.17 | 1.84 | 1.3557 |
| 9/27/13 | 0.335 | 2.626 | 0.16 | 1.78 | 1.3523 |
| 9/20/13 | 0.333 | 2.734 | 0.21 | 1.94 | 1.3526 |
| 9/13/13 | 0.433 | 2.890 | 0.22 | 1.97 | 1.3297 |
| 9/6/13 | 0.461 | 2.941 | 0.26 | 1.95 | 1.3179 |
| 8/23/13 | 0.401 | 2.784 | 0.23 | 1.85 | 1.3221 |
| 8/23/13 | 0.374 | 2.818 | 0.28 | 1.93 | 1.3380 |
| 8/16/13 | 0.341 | 2.829 | 0.22 | 1.88 | 1.3328 |
| 8/9/13 | 0.30 | 2.579 | 0.16 | 1.68 | 1.3342 |
| 8/2/13 | 0.299 | 2.597 | 0.15 | 1.65 | 1.3281 |
| 7/26/13 | 0.315 | 2.565 | 0.15 | 1.66 | 1.3279 |
| 7/19/13 | 0.300 | 2.480 | 0.08 | 1.52 | 1.3141 |
| 7/12/13 | 0.345 | 2.585 | 0.10 | 1.56 | 1.3068 |
| 7/5/13 | 0.397 | 2.734 | 0.11 | 1.72 | 1.2832 |
| 6/28/13 | 0.357 | 2.486 | 0.19 | 1.73 | 1.3010 |
| 6/21/13 | 0.366 | 2.542 | 0.26 | 1.72 | 1.3122 |
| 6/14/13 | 0.276 | 2.125 | 0.12 | 1.51 | 1.3345 |
| 6/7/13 | 0.304 | 2.174 | 0.18 | 1.54 | 1.3219 |
| 5/31/13 | 0.299 | 2.132 | 0.06 | 1.50 | 1.2996 |
| 5/24/13 | 0.249 | 2.009 | 0.00 | 1.43 | 1.2932 |
| 5/17/13 | 0.248 | 1.952 | -0.03 | 1.32 | 1.2837 |
| 5/10/13 | 0.239 | 1.896 | 0.05 | 1.38 | 1.2992 |
| 5/3/13 | 0.22 | 1.742 | 0.00 | 1.24 | 1.3115 |
| 4/26/13 | 0.209 | 1.663 | 0.00 | 1.21 | 1.3028 |
| 4/19/13 | 0.232 | 1.702 | 0.02 | 1.25 | 1.3052 |
| 4/12/13 | 0.228 | 1.719 | 0.02 | 1.26 | 1.3111 |
| 4/5/13 | 0.228 | 1.706 | 0.01 | 1.21 | 1.2995 |
| 3/29/13 | 0.244 | 1.847 | -0.02 | 1.29 | 1.2818 |
| 3/22/13 | 0.242 | 1.931 | 0.03 | 1.38 | 1.2988 |
| 3/15/13 | 0.246 | 1.992 | 0.05 | 1.46 | 1.3076 |
| 3/8/13 | 0.256 | 2.056 | 0.09 | 1.53 | 1.3003 |
| 3/1/13 | 0.236 | 1.842 | 0.03 | 1.41 | 1.3020 |
| 2/22/13 | 0.252 | 1.967 | 0.13 | 1.57 | 1.3190 |
| 2/15/13 | 0.268 | 2.007 | 0.19 | 1.65 | 1.3362 |
| 2/8/13 | 0.252 | 1.949 | 0.18 | 1.61 | 1.3365 |
| 2/1/13 | 0.26 | 2.024 | 0.25 | 1.67 | 1.3642 |
| 1/25/13 | 0.278 | 1.947 | 0.26 | 1.64 | 1.3459 |
| 1/18/13 | 0.252 | 1.84 | 0.18 | 1.56 | 1.3321 |
| 1/11/13 | 0.247 | 1.862 | 0.13 | 1.58 | 1.3343 |
| 1/4/13 | 0.262 | 1.898 | 0.08 | 1.54 | 1.3069 |
| 12/28/12 | 0.252 | 1.699 | -0.01 | 1.31 | 1.3218 |
| 12/21/12 | 0.272 | 1.77 | -0.01 | 1.38 | 1.3189 |
| 12/14/12 | 90.232 | 1.704 | -0.04 | 1.35 | 1.3162 |
| 12/7/12 | 0.256 | 1.625 | -0.08 | 1.30 | 1.2926 |
| 11/30/12 | 0.248 | 1.612 | 0.01 | 1.39 | 1.2987 |
| 11/23/12 | 0.273 | 1.691 | 0.00 | 1.44 | 1.2975 |
| 11/16/12 | 0.24 | 1.584 | -0.03 | 1.33 | 1.2743 |
| 11/9/12 | 0.256 | 1.614 | -0.03 | 1.35 | 1.2711 |
| 11/2/12 | 0.274 | 1.715 | 0.01 | 1.45 | 1.2838 |
| 10/26/12 | 0.299 | 1.748 | 0.05 | 1.54 | 1.2942 |
| 10/19/12 | 0.296 | 1.766 | 0.11 | 1.59 | 1.3023 |
| 10/12/12 | 0.264 | 1.663 | 0.04 | 1.45 | 1.2953 |
| 10/5/12 | 0.26 | 1.737 | 0.06 | 1.52 | 1.3036 |
| 9/28/12 | 0.236 | 1.631 | 0.02 | 1.44 | 1.2859 |
| 9/21/12 | 0.26 | 1.753 | 0.04 | 1.60 | 1.2981 |
| 9/14/12 | 0.252 | 1.863 | 0.10 | 1.71 | 1.3130 |
| 9/7/12 | 0.252 | 1.668 | 0.03 | 1.52 | 1.2816 |
| 8/31/12 | 0.225 | 1.543 | -0.03 | 1.33 | 1.2575 |
| 8/24/12 | 0.266 | 1.684 | -0.01 | 1.35 | 1.2512 |
| 8/17/12 | 0.288 | 1.814 | -0.04 | 1.50 | 1.2335 |
| 8/10/12 | 0.267 | 1.658 | -0.07 | 1.38 | 1.2290 |
| 8/3/12 | 0.242 | 1.569 | -0.02 | 1.42 | 1.2387 |
| 7/27/12 | 0.244 | 1.544 | -0.03 | 1.40 | 1.2320 |
| 7/20/12 | 0.207 | 1.459 | -0.07 | 1.17 | 1.2158 |
| 7/13/12 | 0.24 | 1.49 | -0.04 | 1.26 | 1.2248 |
| 7/6/12 | 0.272 | 1.548 | -0.01 | 1.33 | 1.2288 |
| 6/29/12 | 0.305 | 1.648 | 0.12 | 1.58 | 1.2661 |
| 6/22/12 | 0.309 | 1.676 | 0.14 | 1.58 | 1.2570 |
| 6/15/12 | 0.272 | 1.584 | 0.07 | 1.44 | 1.2640 |
| 6/8/12 | 0.268 | 1.635 | 0.04 | 1.33 | 1.2517 |
| 6/1/12 | 0.248 | 1.454 | 0.01 | 1.17 | 1.2435 |
| 5/25/12 | 0.291 | 1.738 | 0.05 | 1.37 | 1.2518 |
| 5/18/12 | 0.292 | 1.714 | 0.05 | 1.43 | 1.2780 |
| 5/11/12 | 0.248 | 1.845 | 0.09 | 1.52 | 1.2917 |
| 5/4/12 | 0.256 | 1.876 | 0.08 | 1.58 | 1.3084 |
| 4/6/12 | 0.31 | 2.058 | 0.14 | 1.74 | 1.3096 |
| 3/30/12 | 0.335 | 2.214 | 0.21 | 1.79 | 1.3340 |
| 3/2/12 | 0.29 | 1.977 | 0.16 | 1.80 | 1.3190 |
| 2/24/12 | 0.307 | 1.977 | 0.24 | 1.88 | 1.3449 |
| 1/6/12 | 0.256 | 1.957 | 0.17 | 1.85 | 1.2720 |
| 12/30/11 | 0.239 | 1.871 | 0.14 | 1.83 | 1.2944 |
| 8/26/11 | 0.20 | 2.202 | 0.65 | 2.16 | 1.450 |
| 8/19/11 | 0.192 | 2.066 | 0.65 | 2.11 | 1.4390 |
| 6/7/10 | 0.74 | 3.17 | 0.49 | 2.56 | 1.192 |
| 3/5/09 | 0.89 | 2.83 | 1.19 | 3.01 | 1.254 |
| 12/17/08 | 0.73 | 2.20 | 1.94 | 3.00 | 1.442 |
| 10/27/08 | 1.57 | 3.79 | 2.61 | 3.76 | 1.246 |
| 7/14/08 | 2.47 | 3.88 | 4.38 | 4.40 | 1.5914 |
| 6/26/03 | 1.41 | 3.55 | NA | 3.62 | 1.1423 |
Note: DE: Germany
Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15
Appendix: Prior Risk Determining Events. Current risk analysis concentrates on deciphering what the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may decide on quantitative easing. The week of May 24 was dominated by the testimony of Chairman Bernanke to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress on May 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm), followed by questions and answers and the release on May 22, 2013 of the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from Apr 30 to May 1, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm). Monetary policy emphasizes communication of policy intentions to avoid that expectations reverse outcomes in reality (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “In bid for clarity, Fed delivers opacity,” on May 23, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath), analyzes discrepancies in communication by the Fed. The annotated chart of values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) during trading on May 23, 2013 provided by Hinselrath, links the prepared testimony of Chairman Bernanke at 10:AM, following questions and answers and the release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM. Financial markets strengthened between 10 and 10:30AM on May 23, 2013, perhaps because of the statement by Chairman Bernanke in prepared testimony (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm):
“A premature tightening of monetary policy could lead interest rates to rise temporarily but would also carry a substantial risk of slowing or ending the economic recovery and causing inflation to fall further. Such outcomes tend to be associated with extended periods of lower, not higher, interest rates, as well as poor returns on other assets. Moreover, renewed economic weakness would pose its own risks to financial stability.”
In that testimony, Chairman Bernanke (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm) also analyzes current weakness of labor markets:
“Despite this improvement, the job market remains weak overall: The unemployment rate is still well above its longer-run normal level, rates of long-term unemployment are historically high, and the labor force participation rate has continued to move down. Moreover, nearly 8 million people are working part time even though they would prefer full-time work. High rates of unemployment and underemployment are extraordinarily costly: Not only do they impose hardships on the affected individuals and their families, they also damage the productive potential of the economy as a whole by eroding workers' skills and--particularly relevant during this commencement season--by preventing many young people from gaining workplace skills and experience in the first place. The loss of output and earnings associated with high unemployment also reduces government revenues and increases spending on income-support programs, thereby leading to larger budget deficits and higher levels of public debt than would otherwise occur.”
Hilsenrath (op. cit. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath) analyzes the subsequent decline of the market from 10:30AM to 10:40AM as Chairman Bernanke responded questions with the statement that withdrawal of stimulus would be determined by data but that it could begin in one of the “next few meetings.” The DJIA recovered part of the losses between 10:40AM and 2PM. The minutes of the FOMC released at 2PM on May 23, 2013, contained a phrase that troubled market participants (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm): “A number of participants expressed willingness to adjust the flow of purchases downward as early as the June meeting if the economic information received by that time showed evidence of sufficiently strong and sustained growth; however, views differed about what evidence would be necessary and the likelihood of that outcome.” The DJIA closed at 15,387.58 on May 21, 2013 and fell to 15,307.17 at the close on May 22, 2013, with the loss of 0.5 percent occurring after release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM when the DJIA stood at around 15,400. The concern about exist of the Fed from stimulus affected markets worldwide as shown in declines of equity indexes in Table III-1 with delays because of differences in trading hours. This behavior shows the trap of unconventional monetary policy with no exit from zero interest rates without risking financial crash and likely adverse repercussions on economic activity.
Financial markets worldwide were affected by the reduction of policy rates of the European Central Bank (ECB) on May 2, 2013. (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130502.en.html):
“2 May 2013 - Monetary policy decisions
At today’s meeting, which was held in Bratislava, the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:
- The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.50%, starting from the operation to be settled on 8 May 2013.
- The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 50 basis points to 1.00%, with effect from 8 May 2013.
- The interest rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%.”
Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:
- Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
- Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
The European sovereign debt crisis continues to shake financial markets and the world economy. Debt resolution within the international financial architecture requires that a country be capable of borrowing on its own from the private sector. Mechanisms of debt resolution have included participation of the private sector (PSI), or “bail in,” that has been voluntary, almost coercive, agreed and outright coercive (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture: G7, IMF, BIS, Creditors and Debtors (2005), Chapter 4, 187-202). Private sector involvement requires losses by the private sector in bailouts of highly indebted countries. The essence of successful private sector involvement is to recover private-sector credit of the highly indebted country. Mary Watkins, writing on “Bank bailouts reshuffle risk hierarchy,” published on Mar 19, 2013, in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7666546a-9095-11e2-a456-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OSpbvCn8) analyzes the impact of the bailout or resolution of Cyprus banks on the hierarchy of risks of bank liabilities. Cyprus banks depend mostly on deposits with less reliance on debt, raising concerns in creditors of fixed-income debt and equity holders in banks in the euro area. Uncertainty remains as to the dimensions and structure of losses in private sector involvement or “bail in” in other rescue programs in the euro area. Alkman Granitsas, writing on “Central bank details losses at Bank of Cyprus,” on Mar 30, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324000704578392502889560768.html), analyzes the impact of the agreement with the €10 billion agreement with IMF and the European Union on the banks of Cyprus. The recapitalization plan provides for immediate conversion of 37.5 percent of all deposits in excess of €100,000 to shares of special class of the bank. An additional 22.5 percent will be frozen without interest until the plan is completed. The overwhelming risk factor is the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):
“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans.
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.
An important risk event is the reduction of growth prospects in the euro zone discussed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in “Introductory statement to the press conference,” on Dec 6, 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is121206.en.html):
“This assessment is reflected in the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP growth in a range between -0.6% and -0.4% for 2012, between -0.9% and 0.3% for 2013 and between 0.2% and 2.2% for 2014. Compared with the September 2012 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges for 2012 and 2013 have been revised downwards.
The Governing Council continues to see downside risks to the economic outlook for the euro area. These are mainly related to uncertainties about the resolution of sovereign debt and governance issues in the euro area, geopolitical issues and fiscal policy decisions in the United States possibly dampening sentiment for longer than currently assumed and delaying further the recovery of private investment, employment and consumption.”
Reuters, writing on “Bundesbank cuts German growth forecast,” on Dec 7, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e845114-4045-11e2-8f90-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EMQxzs3u), informs that the central bank of Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank reduced its forecast of growth for the economy of Germany to 0.7 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.0 percent in Jun and to 0.4 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.6 percent while the forecast for 2014 is at 1.9 percent.
The major risk event during earlier weeks was sharp decline of sovereign yields with the yield on the ten-year bond of Spain falling to 5.309 percent and that of the ten-year bond of Italy falling to 4.473 percent on Fri Nov 30, 2012 and 5.366 percent for the ten-year of Spain and 4.527 percent for the ten-year of Italy on Fri Nov 14, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Vanessa Mock and Frances Robinson, writing on “EU approves Spanish bank’s restructuring plans,” on Nov 28, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146520774638316.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the European Union regulators approved restructuring of four Spanish banks (Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia), which helped to calm sovereign debt markets. Harriet Torry and James Angelo, writing on “Germany approves Greek aid,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578150532603095790.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the German parliament approved the plan to provide Greece a tranche of €44 billion in promised financial support, which is subject to sustainability analysis of the bond repurchase program later in Dec 2012. A hurdle for sustainability of repurchasing debt is that Greece’s sovereign bonds have appreciated significantly from around 24 percent for the bond maturing in 21 years and 20 percent for the bond maturing in 31 years in Aug 2012 to around 17 percent for the 21-year maturity and 15 percent for the 31-year maturing in Nov 2012. Declining years are equivalent to increasing prices, making the repurchase more expensive. Debt repurchase is intended to reduce bonds in circulation, turning Greek debt more manageable. Ben McLannahan, writing on “Japan unveils $11bn stimulus package,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/adc0569a-3aa5-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), informs that the cabinet in Japan approved another stimulus program of $11 billion, which is twice larger than another stimulus plan in late Oct and close to elections in Dec. Henry Sender, writing on “Tokyo faces weak yen and high bond yields,” published on Nov 29, 2012 in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a7178d0-393d-11e2-afa8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), analyzes concerns of regulators on duration of bond holdings in an environment of likelihood of increasing yields and yen depreciation.
First, Risk-Determining Events. The European Council statement on Nov 23, 2012 asked the President of the European Commission “to continue the work and pursue consultations in the coming weeks to find a consensus among the 27 over the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf) Discussions will continue in the effort to reach agreement on a budget: “A European budget is important for the cohesion of the Union and for jobs and growth in all our countries” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf). There is disagreement between the group of countries requiring financial assistance and those providing bailout funds. Gabrielle Steinhauser and Costas Paris, writing on “Greek bond rally puts buyback in doubt,” on Nov 23, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578136362599130992.html?mg=reno64-wsj) find a new hurdle in rising prices of Greek sovereign debt that may make more difficult buybacks of debt held by investors. European finance ministers continue their efforts to reach an agreement for Greece that meets with approval of the European Central Bank and the IMF. The European Council (2012Oct19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf ) reached conclusions on strengthening the euro area and providing unified financial supervision:
“The European Council called for work to proceed on the proposals on the Single Supervisory Mechanism as a matter of priority with the objective of agreeing on the legislative framework by 1st January 2013 and agreed on a number of orientations to that end. It also took note of issues relating to the integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks and democratic legitimacy and accountability which should be further explored. It agreed that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the EU's institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards non-euro area Member States and respect for the integrity of the Single Market. It looked forward to a specific and time-bound roadmap to be presented at its December 2012 meeting, so that it can move ahead on all essential building blocks on which a genuine EMU should be based.”
Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. The Bank of Spain released new data on doubtful debtors in Spain’s credit institutions (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/Agenda/Datos_de_credit_a6cd708c59cf931.html). In 2006, the value of doubtful credits reached €10,859 million or 0.7 percent of total credit of €1,508,626 million. In Aug 2012, doubtful credit reached €178,579 million or 10.5 percent of total credit of €1,698,714 million.
There are three critical factors influencing world financial markets. (1) Spain could request formal bailout from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that may also affect Italy’s international borrowing. David Roman and Jonathan House, writing on “Spain risks backlash with budget plan,” on Sep 27, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578021692765950384.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) analyze Spain’s proposal of reducing government expenditures by €13 billion, or around $16.7 billion, increasing taxes in 2013, establishing limits on early retirement and cutting the deficit by €65 billion through 2014. Banco de España, Bank of Spain, contracted consulting company Oliver Wyman to conduct rigorous stress tests of the resilience of its banking system. (Stress tests and their use are analyzed by Pelaez and Pelaez Globalization and the State Vol. I (2008b), 95-100, International Financial Architecture (2005) 112-6, 123-4, 130-3).) The results are available from Banco de España (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/infointeres/reestructuracion/ http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). The assumptions of the adverse scenario used by Oliver Wyman are quite tough for the three-year period from 2012 to 2014: “6.5 percent cumulative decline of GDP, unemployment rising to 27.2 percent and further declines of 25 percent of house prices and 60 percent of land prices (http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). Fourteen banks were stress tested with capital needs estimates of seven banks totaling €59.3 billion. The three largest banks of Spain, Banco Santander (http://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite/CFWCSancomQP01/es_ES/Corporativo.html), BBVA (http://www.bbva.com/TLBB/tlbb/jsp/ing/home/index.jsp) and Caixabank (http://www.caixabank.com/index_en.html), with 43 percent of exposure under analysis, have excess capital of €37 billion in the adverse scenario in contradiction with theories that large, international banks are necessarily riskier. Jonathan House, writing on “Spain expects wider deficit on bank aid,” on Sep 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444138104578028484168511130.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyzes the 2013 budget plan of Spain that will increase the deficit of 7.4 percent of GDP in 2012, which is above the target of 6.3 percent under commitment with the European Union. The ratio of debt to GDP will increase to 85.3 percent in 2012 and 90.5 percent in 2013 while the 27 members of the European Union have an average debt/GDP ratio of 83 percent at the end of IIQ2012. (2) Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even after the economy grows again at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now apparently open ended in perpetuity as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):
“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”
In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is the concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation.
(2) The European Central Bank (ECB) approved a new program of bond purchases under the name “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT). The ECB will purchase sovereign bonds of euro zone member countries that have a program of conditionality under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that is converting into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These programs provide enhancing the solvency of member countries in a transition period of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment. The purchase of bonds by the ECB would maintain debt costs of sovereigns at sufficiently low levels to permit adjustment under the EFSF/ESM programs. Purchases of bonds are not limited quantitatively with discretion by the ECB as to how much is necessary to support countries with adjustment programs. Another feature of the OMT of the ECB is sterilization of bond purchases: funds injected to pay for the bonds would be withdrawn or sterilized by ECB transactions. The statement by the European Central Bank on the program of OTM is as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html):
“6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions
As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework:
Conditionality
A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme.
The Governing Council will consider Outright Monetary Transactions to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme.
Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate.
Coverage
Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access.
Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.
No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.
Creditor treatment
The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.
Sterilisation
The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.
Transparency
Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis.
Securities Markets Programme
Following today’s decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be held to maturity.”
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed sets stage for stimulus,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577623220212805132.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the essay presented by Chairman Bernanke at the Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers, as defending past stimulus with unconventional measures of monetary policy that could be used to reduce extremely high unemployment. Chairman Bernanke (2012JHAug31, 18-9) does support further unconventional monetary policy impulses if required by economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm):
“Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”
Professor John H Cochrane (2012Aug31), at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, writing on “The Federal Reserve: from central bank to central planner,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577609384030304936.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_opinion), analyzes that the departure of central banks from open market operations into purchase of assets with risks to taxpayers and direct allocation of credit subject to political influence has caused them to abandon their political independence and accountability. Cochrane (2012Aug31) finds a return to the proposition of Milton Friedman in the 1960s that central banks can cause inflation and macroeconomic instability.
Mario Draghi (2012Aug29), President of the European Central Bank, also reiterated the need of exceptional and unconventional central bank policies (http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html):
“Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.
The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.”
Buiter (2011Oct31) analyzes that the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would need a “bigger bazooka” to bail out euro members in difficulties that could possibly be provided by the ECB. Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. Table III-7 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides the combined GDP in 2012 of the highly indebted euro zone members estimated in the latest World Economic Outlook of the IMF at $4167 billion or 33.1 percent of total euro zone GDP of $12,586 billion. Using the WEO of the IMF, Table III-8 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides debt of the highly indebted euro zone members at $3927.8 billion in 2012 that increases to $5809.9 billion when adding Germany’s debt, corresponding to 167.0 percent of Germany’s GDP. There are additional sources of debt in bailing out banks. The dimensions of the problem may require more firepower than a bazooka perhaps that of the largest conventional bomb of all times of 44,000 pounds experimentally detonated only once by the US in 1948 (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar-apr/coker.html).
Chart III-1A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the ten-year, two-year and one-month Treasury constant maturity yields together with the overnight fed funds rate, and the yield of the corporate bond with Moody’s rating of Baa. The riskier yield of the Baa corporate bond exceeds the relatively riskless yields of the Treasury securities. The beginning yields in Chart III-1A for Jan 2, 1962, are 2.75 percent for the fed fund rates and 4.06 percent for the ten-year Treasury constant maturity. On July 31, 2001, the yields in Chart III-1A are 3.67 percent for one month, 3.79 percent for two years, 5.07 percent for ten years, 3.82 percent for the fed funds rate and 7.85 percent for the Baa corporate bond. On July 30, 2007, yields inverted with the one-month at 4.95 percent, the two-year at 4.59 percent and the ten-year at 5.82 percent with the yield of the Baa corporate bond at 6.70 percent. Another interesting point is for Oct 31, 2008, with the yield of the Baa jumping to 9.54 percent and the Treasury yields declining: one month 0.12 percent, two years 1.56 percent and ten years 4.01 percent during a flight to the dollar and government securities analyzed by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). Another spike in the series is for Apr 4, 2006 with the yield of the corporate Baa bond at 8.63 and the Treasury yields of 0.12 percent for one month, 0.94 for two years and 2.95 percent for ten years. During the beginning of the flight from risk financial assets to US government securities (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009), the one-month yield was 0.07 percent, the two-year yield 1.64 percent and the ten-year yield 3.41. The combination of zero fed funds rate and quantitative easing caused sharp decline of the yields from 2008 and 2009. Yield declines have also occurred during periods of financial risk aversion, including the current one of stress of financial markets in Europe. The final point of Chart III1-A is for Jul 7, 2016, with the one-month yield at 0.27 percent, the two-year at 0.58 percent, the ten-year at 1.40 percent, the fed funds rate at 0.40 percent and the corporate Baa bond at 4.19 percent.
Chart III-1A, Yield of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond and US Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields and Overnight Fed Funds Rate, Jan 2, 1962-Jul 21, 2016
Note: US Recessions in shaded areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/
Chart III-1B provides the same data as Chart III-1A from Jan 3, 2001 to Oct 6, 2016. The final point of Chart III1-A is for Oct 6, 2016, with the one-month yield at 0.26 percent, the two-year at 0.86 percent, the ten-year at 1.75 percent, the fed funds rate at 0.40 percent and the corporate Baa bond at 4.36 percent.
Chart III-1B, Yield of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond and US Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields and Overnight Fed Funds Rate, Jan 1, 2001-Oct 6, 2016
Note: US Recessions in shaded areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/
Chart III-1C provides the yields of the ten-year, two-year, one-month Treasury Constant Maturity, and the overnight Fed funds rate from Jan 2, 1962 to Feb 23, 2017. The final data point is for Feb 23, 2017 with the Fed funds rate at 0.66 percent, the one-month Treasury constant maturity at 0.39 percent, the two-year at 1.18 percent and the ten-year at 2.38 percent.
Chart III-1C, Yield US Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields and Overnight Fed Funds Rate, Jan 2, 1962-Feb 16, 2017
Note: US Recessions in shaded areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/
Sharp and continuing strengthening of the dollar is affecting balance sheets of US corporations with foreign operations (http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Pronouncement_C/SummaryPage&cid=900000010318). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is following “financial and international developments” as part of the process of framing interest rate policy (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20150128a.htm). Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Corporate profits set to shrink for fourth consecutive quarter,” on Jul 17, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-profits-set-to-shrink-for-fourth-consecutive-quarter-1468799278), quotes forecasts of Thomson Reuters of 4.7 decline of adjusted earnings per share in the S&P 500 index in IIQ2016 relative to a year earlier. That would be the fourth consecutive quarterly decline. Theo Francis and Kate Linebaugh, writing on “US corporate profits on pace for third straight decline,” on Apr 28, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-corporate-profits-on-pace-for-third-straight-decline-1461872242), analyze three consecutive quarters of decline of corporate earnings and revenue in companies in S&P 500. They quote Thomson Reuters on expected decline of earnings of 6.1 percent in IQ2016 based on 55 percent of reporting companies. Weakness of economic activity shows in decline of revenues in IQ2016 of 1.4 percent, increasing 1.7 percent excluding energy, and contraction of profits of 0.5 percent. Justin Lahart, writing on “S&P 500 Earnings: far worse than advertised,” on Feb 24, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/s-p-500-earnings-far-worse-than-advertised-1456344483), analyzes S&P 500 earnings in 2015. Under data provided by companies, earnings increased 0.4 percent in 2015 relative to 2014 but under GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), earnings fell 12.7 percent, which is the worst decrease since 2008. Theo Francis e Kate Linebaugh, writing on Oct 25, 2015, on “US Companies Warn of Slowing Economy, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-companies-warn-of-slowing-economy-1445818298) analyze the first contraction of earnings and revenue of big US companies. Production, sales and employment are slowing in a large variety of companies with some contracting. Corporate profits also suffer from revaluation of the dollar that constrains translation of foreign profits into dollar balance sheets. Francis and Linebaugh quote Thomson Reuters that analysts expect decline of earnings per share of 2.8 percent in IIIQ2015 relative to IIIQ2014 based on reports by one third of companies in the S&P 500. Sales would decline 4.0% in a third quarter for the first joint decline of earnings per share and revenue in the same quarter since IIIQ2009. Dollar revaluation also constrains corporate results.
Inyoung Hwang, writing on “Fed optimism spurs record bets against stock volatility,” on Aug 21, 2014, published in Bloomberg.com (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-21/fed-optimism-spurs-record-bets-against-stock-voalitlity.html), informs that the S&P 500 is trading at 16.6 times estimated earnings, which is higher than the five-year average of 14.3 Tom Lauricella, writing on Mar 31, 2014, on “Stock investors see hints of a stronger quarter,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304157204579473513864900656?mod=WSJ_smq0314_LeadStory&mg=reno64-wsj), finds views of stronger earnings among many money managers with positive factors for equity markets in continuing low interest rates and US economic growth. There is important information in the Quarterly Markets review of the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/public/page/quarterly-markets-review-03312014.html) for IQ2014. Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. Future company cash flows derive from investment projects. In IQ1980, real gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of chained 2009 dollars, growing to $1,270.4 billion in IIQ1990 or 33.5 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 10.4 percent from $2605.2 billion in IVQ2007 to $2,877.0 billion in IVQ2016. Real private fixed investment increased 8.6 percent from $2,586.3 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,807.9 billion in IVQ2016. Private fixed investment fell relative to IVQ2007 in all quarters preceding IQ2014 and changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2016, declining 0.3 percent in IIQ2016 and falling 0.2 percent in IQ2016. Private fixed investment changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2016 and increased 1.0 percent in IVQ2016. Growth of real private investment is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012. The investment decision of United States corporations is fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash. There are three aspects. First, there is fluctuation in corporate profits. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA decreased at $127.9 billion in IVQ2015 and increased at $66.0 billion in IQ2016. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell at $12.5 billion in IIQ2016 and increased at $117.8 billion in IIIQ2016. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA fell at $172.7 billion in IVQ2015 and increased at $113.4 billion in IQ2016. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA fell at $28.9 billion in IIQ2016 and increased at $98.3 billion in IIIQ2016. Net dividends fell at $20.8 billion in IVQ2015 and increased at $7.3 billion in IQ2016. Net dividends fell at $9.3 billion in IIQ2016. Net dividends increased at $18.5 billion in IIIQ2016. Undistributed corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell at $152.0 billion in IVQ2015. Undistributed profits with IVA and CCA increased at $106.1 billion in IQ2016. Undistributed corporate profits fell at $19.6 billion in IIQ2016. Undistributed corporate profits increased at $79.8 billion in IIIQ2016. Undistributed corporate profits swelled 238.8 percent from $107.7 billion in IQ2007 to $364.9 billion in IIIQ2016 and changed signs from minus $55.9 billion in current dollars in IVQ2007. Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment. Second, sharp and continuing strengthening of the dollar is affecting balance sheets of US corporations with foreign operations (http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Pronouncement_C/SummaryPage&cid=900000010318) and the overall US economy. The bottom part of Table IA1-9 provides the breakdown of corporate profits with IVA and CCA in domestic industries and the rest of the world. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell at $127.9 billion in IVQ2015 with decrease of domestic industries at $149.8 billion, mostly because of decrease of nonfinancial business at $131.7 billion, and increase of profits from operations in the rest of the world at $22.0 billion. Receipts from the rest of the world fell at $19.9 billion. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased at $66.0 billion in IQ2016 with increase of domestic industries at $92.9 billion. Profits from operations from the rest of the world fell at $26.9 billion and payments to the rest of the world increased at $35.6 billion. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA decreased at $12.5 billion in IIQ2016. Profits from domestic industries fell at $50.5 billion and profits from nonfinancial business fell at $56.1 billion. Profits from the rest of the world increased at $38.0 billion. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased at $117.8 billion in IIIQ2016. Profits from domestic industries increased at $116.5 billion and profits from nonfinancial business increased at $66.4 billion. Profits from the rest of the world increased at $1.3 billion. Total corporate profits with IVA and CCA were $2138.8 billion in IIIQ2016 of which $1729.9 billion from domestic industries, or 80.9 percent of the total, and $408.9 billion, or 19.1 percent, from the rest of the world. Nonfinancial corporate profits of $1236.9 billion account for 57.8 percent of the total. Third, there is reduction in the use of corporate cash for investment. Vipal Monga, David Benoit and Theo Francis, writing on “Companies send more cash back to shareholders,” published on May 26, 2015 in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-shareholders-1432693805?tesla=y), use data of a study by Capital IQ conducted for the Wall Street Journal. This study shows that companies in the S&P 500 reduced investment in plant and equipment to median 29 percent of operating cash flow in 2013 from 33 percent in 2003 while increasing dividends and buybacks to median 36 percent in 2013 from 18 percent in 2003. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:
Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or
declines. Equally, decline in expected revenue from the stock or project, Rτ, causes decline in valuation.
There is mixed performance in equity indexes with several indexes in Table III-1 increasing in the week ending on Feb 24, 2017, after wide swings caused by reallocations of investment portfolios worldwide. Stagnating revenues, corporate cash hoarding, effects of currency oscillations on corporate earnings and declining investment are causing reevaluation of discounted net earnings with deteriorating views on the world economy and United States fiscal sustainability but investors have been driving indexes higher. There are complex economic, financial and political effects of the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union or BREXIT after the referendum on Jun 23, 2016 (https://next.ft.com/eu-referendum for extensive coverage by the Financial Times). DJIA increased 0.1 percent on Feb 24, increasing 1.0 percent in the week. Germany’s DAX decreased 1.2 percent on Feb 24 and increased 0.4 percent in the week. Dow Global decreased 0.5 percent on Feb 24 and increased 0.2 percent in the week. Japan’s Nikkei Average decreased 0.5 percent on Feb 24 and increased 0.3 percent in the week as the yen continues oscillating but relatively weaker and the stock market gains in expectations of success of fiscal stimulus by a new administration and monetary stimulus by a new board of the Bank of Japan. Dow Asia Pacific TSM decreased 0.4 percent on Feb 24 and increased 0.6 percent in the week. Shanghai Composite that decreased 1.0 percent on Mar 8 and decreased 1.7 percent in the week of Mar 8, falling below 2000 at 1974.38 on Mar 12, 2014 but closing at 3253.43 on Feb 24, 2017, for increase of 0.1 percent and increasing 1.6 percent in the week. The Shanghai Composite increased 64.8 percent from March 12, 2014 to Feb 24, 2017. There is deceleration with oscillations of the world economy that could affect corporate revenue and equity valuations, causing fluctuations in equity markets with increases during favorable risk appetite. The global hunt for yield induced by central bank policy rates of near zero percent motivates wide portfolio reshufflings among classes of risk financial assets.
Commodities were mixed in the week of Feb 24, 2017. Table III-1 shows that WTI increased 1.1 percent in the week of Feb 24 while Brent decreased 0.3 percent in the week with turmoil in oil producing regions but oscillating action by OPEC. Gold increased 0.5 percent on Feb 24 and increased 1.6 percent in the week.
Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €879,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €583,124 million on Feb 17, 2017, with decrease of loans from €584,683 million in the prior week of Feb 10, 2017. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has reached €2,684,885 million in the statement of Feb 17, 2017, with decrease from €2,668,620 million in the prior week of Feb 10. There is high credit risk in these transactions with capital of only €100,013 million as analyzed by Cochrane (2012Aug31).
Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR
| Dec 31, 2010 | Dec 28, 2011 | Feb 17, 2017 | |
| 1 Gold and other Receivables | 367,402 | 419,822 | 382,061 |
| 2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 223,995 | 236,826 | 324,735 |
| 3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 26,941 | 95,355 | 34,660 |
| 4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 22,592 | 25,982 | 19,024 |
| 5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro | 546,747 | 879,130 | 583,124 03/10/17: 584,683 02/03/17: 586,310 01/27/17: 588,671 01/20/17: 588,996 01/13/17: 589,065 01/06/17: 590,825 |
| 6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro | 45,654 | 94,989 | 80,972 |
| 7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 457,427 | 610,629 | 2,101,761 02/10/17: 2,083,937 02/03/17: 2,064,015 01/27/17: 2,049,756 01/20/17: 2,030,431 01/13/17: 2,010,352 |
| 8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro | 34,954 | 33,928 | 26,410 |
| 9 Other Assets | 278,719 | 336,574 | 235,146 |
| TOTAL ASSETS | 2,004, 432 | 2,733,235 | 3,787,893 |
| Memo Items | |||
| Sum of 5 and 7 | 1,004,174 | 1,489,759 | 2,684,885 02/10/10: 2,668,620 02/03/17: 2,650,325 02/27/17: 2,638,427 02/20/17: 2,619,427 01/13/17: 2,599,417 01/06/17: 2,577,801 12/30/16: 2,570,772 12/23/16: 2,572,140 |
| Capital and Reserves | 78,143 | 81,481 | 100,013 |
Source: European Central Bank
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/wfs/2017/html/fs170221.en.html
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk. Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. Growth of the Italian economy would ensure that success. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15) argue that 55 percent of the exports of Italy are to countries outside the euro area such that devaluation of 15 percent would be effective in increasing export revenue. Newly available data in Table III-3 providing Italy’s trade with regions and countries supports the argument of Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15). Italy’s exports to the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, are only 40.0 percent of the total in Jan-Dec 2016. Exports to the non-European Union area with share of 45.2 percent in Italy’s total exports are decreasing at 1.2 percent in Jan-Dec 2016 relative to Jan-Dec 2015 while those to EMU are growing at 3.5 percent.
Table III-3, Italy, Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, % Share and 12-Month ∆%
| Dec 2016 | Exports | ∆% Jan-Dec 2016/ Jan-Dec 2015 | Imports | ∆% Jan-Dec 2016/ Jan-Dec 2015 |
| EU | 54.8 | 3.0 | 58.7 | 1.7 |
| EMU 19 | 40.0 | 3.5 | 46.4 | 1.5 |
| France | 10.3 | 2.9 | 8.7 | 1.1 |
| Germany | 12.3 | 3.8 | 15.5 | 3.2 |
| Spain | 4.8 | 6.1 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| UK | 5.4 | 0.5 | 2.9 | 0.9 |
| Non EU | 45.2 | -1.2 | 41.3 | -5.8 |
| Europe non EU | 10.8 | -2.4 | 10.5 | -8.9 |
| USA | 8.7 | 2.6 | 3.8 | -2.0 |
| China | 2.5 | 6.4 | 7.6 | -3.4 |
| OPEC | 5.5 | -7.3 | 4.9 | 1.9 |
| Total | 100.0 | 1.1 | 100.0 | -1.4 |
Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/196917
Table III-4 provides Italy’s trade balance by regions and countries. Italy had trade deficit of €1,093 million with the 19 countries of the euro zone (EMU 19) in Dec 2016 and cumulative deficit of €3,565 million in Jan-Dec 2016. Depreciation to parity could permit greater competitiveness in improving the trade surplus of €8,094 million in Jan-Dec 2016 with Europe non-European Union, the trade surplus of €23,013 million with the US and the trade surplus with non-European Union of €39,868 million in Jan-Dec 2016. There is significant rigidity in the trade deficit in Jan-Dec 2016 of €16,205 million with China. There is a trade surplus of €2,354 million in Jan-Dec 2016 with members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Higher exports could drive economic growth in the economy of Italy that would permit less onerous adjustment of the country’s fiscal imbalances, raising the country’s credit rating.
Table III-4, Italy, Trade Balance by Regions and Countries, Millions of Euro
| Regions and Countries | Trade Balance Dec 2016 Millions of Euro | Trade Balance Cumulative Jan-Dec 2016 Millions of Euro |
| EU | 124 | 11,698 |
| EMU 19 | -1,093 | -3,565 |
| France | 772 | 11,378 |
| Germany | -1,015 | -6,720 |
| Spain | 120 | 1,440 |
| UK | 930 | 11,481 |
| Non EU | 5,673 | 39,868 |
| Europe non EU | 670 | 8,094 |
| USA | 2,316 | 23,013 |
| China | -894 | -16,205 |
| OPEC | 247 | 2,354 |
| Total | 5,798 | 51,566 |
Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/196917
Growth rates of Italy’s trade and major products are in Table III-5 for the period Jan-Dec 2016 relative to Jan-Dec 2015. Growth rates of cumulative imports relative to a year earlier are negative for energy with minus 21.2 percent. Exports of durable goods decreased 2.1 percent and exports of capital goods increased 1.9 percent. The rate of growth of exports of 1.1 percent in Jan-Dec 2016/Jan-Dec 2015 relative to that of imports of minus 1.4 percent may partly reflect weak demand in Italy with GDP declining during seven consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 through IQ2013 together with softening commodity prices. GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2013, decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2013, changed 0.0 percent in IQ2014 and increased 0.1 percent in IIQ2014. Italy’s GDP changed 0.0 percent in IIIQ2014 and decreased 0.1 percent in IVQ2014. Italy’s GDP increased 0.3 percent in IQ2015 and increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2015. Italy’s GDP increased 0.1 percent in IIIQ2015 and increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2015. GDP increased 0.4 percent in IQ2016. The GDP of Italy increased 0.1 percent in IIQ2016 and increased 0.3 percent in IIIQ2016. GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2016.
Table III-5, Italy, Exports and Imports % Share of Products in Total and ∆%
| Exports | Exports | Imports | Imports | |
| Consumer | 31.7 | 2.7 | 29.4 | 1.2 |
| Durable | 6.2 | -2.1 | 3.5 | 2.6 |
| Non-Durable | 25.5 | 3.8 | 25.9 | 1.0 |
| Capital Goods | 33.9 | 1.9 | 24.5 | 7.5 |
| Inter- | 31.2 | 0.6 | 33.4 | -2.6 |
| Energy | 3.2 | -18.2 | 12.7 | -21.2 |
| Total ex Energy | 96.8 | 1.8 | 87.3 | 1.5 |
| Total | 100.0 | 1.1 | 100.0 | -1.4 |
Note: % Share for 2014 total trade.
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/196917
Table III-6 provides Italy’s trade balance by product categories in Nov and cumulative Jan-Nov 2016. Italy’s trade balance excluding energy, generated surplus of €6,478 million in Nov 2016 and €69,532 million cumulative in Jan-Nov 2016 but the energy trade balance created deficit of €2,275 million in Nov 2015 and cumulative deficit of €23,751 million in Jan-Nov 2016. The overall surplus in Nov 2016 was €4,203 million with cumulative surplus of €45,781 million in Jan-Nov 2016. Italy has significant competitiveness in various economic activities in contrast with some other countries with debt difficulties.
Table III-6, Italy, Trade Balance by Product Categories, € Millions
| Dec 2016 | Cumulative Jan-Dec 2016 | |
| Consumer Goods | 2,303 | 23,905 |
| Durable | 1,152 | 11,476 |
| Nondurable | 1,151 | 12,429 |
| Capital Goods | 4,635 | 45,076 |
| Intermediate Goods | 1,495 | 8,999 |
| Energy | -2,635 | -26,415 |
| Total ex Energy | 8,433 | 77,981 |
| Total | 5,798 | 51,566 |
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/196917
Brazil faced in the debt crisis of 1982 a more complex policy mix. Between 1977 and 1983, Brazil’s terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated 47 percent and 36 percent excluding oil (Pelaez 1987, 176-79; Pelaez 1986, 37-66; see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 178-87). Brazil had accumulated unsustainable foreign debt by borrowing to finance balance of payments deficits during the 1970s. Foreign lending virtually stopped. The German mark devalued strongly relative to the dollar such that Brazil’s products lost competitiveness in Germany and in multiple markets in competition with Germany. The resolution of the crisis was devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent relative to the dollar and subsequent maintenance of parity by monthly devaluation equal to inflation and indexing that resulted in financial stability by parity in external and internal interest rates avoiding capital flight. With a combination of declining imports, domestic import substitution and export growth, Brazil followed rapid growth in the US and grew out of the crisis with surprising GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 1984.
The euro zone faces a critical survival risk because several of its members may default on their sovereign obligations if not bailed out by the other members. The valuation equation of bonds is essential to understanding the stability of the euro area. An explanation is provided in this paragraph and readers interested in technical details are referred to the Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. Contrary to the Wriston doctrine, investing in sovereign obligations is a credit decision. The value of a bond today is equal to the discounted value of future obligations of interest and principal until maturity. On Dec 30, 2011, the yield of the 2-year bond of the government of Greece was quoted around 100 percent. In contrast, the 2-year US Treasury note traded at 0.239 percent and the 10-year at 2.871 percent while the comparable 2-year government bond of Germany traded at 0.14 percent and the 10-year government bond of Germany traded at 1.83 percent. There is no need for sovereign ratings: the perceptions of investors are of relatively higher probability of default by Greece, defying Wriston (1982), and nil probability of default of the US Treasury and the German government. The essence of the sovereign credit decision is whether the sovereign will be able to finance new debt and refinance existing debt without interrupting service of interest and principal. Prices of sovereign bonds incorporate multiple anticipations such as inflation and liquidity premiums of long-term relative to short-term debt but also risk premiums on whether the sovereign’s debt can be managed as it increases without bound. The austerity measures of Italy are designed to increase the primary surplus, or government revenues less expenditures excluding interest, to ensure investors that Italy will have the fiscal strength to manage its debt exceeding 100 percent of GDP, which is the third largest in the world after the US and Japan. Appendix IIIE links the expectations on the primary surplus to the real current value of government monetary and fiscal obligations. As Blanchard (2011SepWEO) analyzes, fiscal consolidation to increase the primary surplus is facilitated by growth of the economy. Italy and the other indebted sovereigns in Europe face the dual challenge of increasing primary surpluses while maintaining growth of the economy (for the experience of Brazil in the debt crisis of 1982 see Pelaez 1986, 1987).
Much of the analysis and concern over the euro zone centers on the lack of credibility of the debt of a few countries while there is credibility of the debt of the euro zone as a whole. In practice, there is convergence in valuations and concerns toward the fact that there may not be credibility of the euro zone as a whole. The fluctuations of financial risk assets of members of the euro zone move together with risk aversion toward the countries with lack of debt credibility. This movement raises the need to consider analytically sovereign debt valuation of the euro zone as a whole in the essential analysis of whether the single-currency will survive without major changes.
Welfare economics considers the desirability of alternative states, which in this case would be evaluating the “value” of Germany (1) within and (2) outside the euro zone. Is the sum of the wealth of euro zone countries outside of the euro zone higher than the wealth of these countries maintaining the euro zone? On the choice of indicator of welfare, Hicks (1975, 324) argues:
“Partly as a result of the Keynesian revolution, but more (perhaps) because of statistical labours that were initially quite independent of it, the Social Product has now come right back into its old place. Modern economics—especially modern applied economics—is centered upon the Social Product, the Wealth of Nations, as it was in the days of Smith and Ricardo, but as it was not in the time that came between. So if modern theory is to be effective, if it is to deal with the questions which we in our time want to have answered, the size and growth of the Social Product are among the chief things with which it must concern itself. It is of course the objective Social Product on which attention must be fixed. We have indexes of production; we do not have—it is clear we cannot have—an Index of Welfare.”
If the burden of the debt of the euro zone falls on Germany and France or only on Germany, is the wealth of Germany and France or only Germany higher after breakup of the euro zone or if maintaining the euro zone? In practice, political realities will determine the decision through elections.
The prospects of survival of the euro zone are dire. Table III-7 is constructed with IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx) for GDP in USD billions, primary net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP and general government debt as percent of GDP for selected regions and countries in 2016.
Table III-7, World and Selected Regional and Country GDP and Fiscal Situation
| GDP 2016 | Primary Net Lending Borrowing | General Government Net Debt | |
| World | 75,213 | ||
| Euro Zone | 11,991 | -0.1 | 67.4 |
| Portugal | 206 | 1.3 | 121.9 |
| Ireland | 308 | 1.3 | 63.8 |
| Greece | 195 | -3.4 | 183.4** |
| Spain | 1,252 | -2.0 | 81.4 |
| Major Advanced Economies G7 | 35,310 | -1.9 | 84.3 |
| United States | 18,562 | -2.1 | 82.2 |
| UK | 2,650 | -1.6 | 80.5 |
| Germany | 3,495 | 1.2 | 45.4 |
| France | 2,488 | -1.5 | 89.2 |
| Japan | 4,730 | -5.2 | 127.9 |
| Canada | 1,532 | -2.0 | 26.9 |
| Italy | 1,852 | 1.3 | 113.8 |
| China | 11,392 | -2.2 | 46.3*** |
*Net Lending/borrowing**Gross Debt
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx
The data in Table III-7 are used for some very simple calculations in Table III-8. The column “Net Debt USD Billions 2016” in Table III-8 is generated by applying the percentage in Table I-8 column “General Government Net Debt % GDP 2016” to the column “GDP 2016 USD Billions.” The total debt of France and Germany in 2016 is $3806.0 billion, as shown in row “B+C” in column “Net Debt USD Billions 2016.” The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is $3391.9 billion, adding rows D+E+F+G+H in column “Net Debt USD billions 2016.” There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic” in the two final columns of Table I-9. Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is shown in column “Debt as % of Germany plus France GDP” to reach $7197.9 billion, which would be equivalent to 120.3 percent of their combined GDP in 2016. Under this arrangement, the entire debt of selected members of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. The final column provides “Debt as % of Germany GDP” that would exceed 205.9 percent if including debt of France and 142.4 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Wriston (1982) would prove to be wrong again that countries do not bankrupt but would have a consolation prize that similar to LBOs the sum of the individual values of euro zone members outside the current agreement exceeds the value of the whole euro zone. Internal rescues of French and German banks may be less costly than bailing out other euro zone countries so that they do not default on French and German banks. Analysis of fiscal stress is quite difficult without including another global recession in an economic cycle that is already mature by historical experience.
Table III-8, Guarantees of Debt of Sovereigns in Euro Area as Percent of GDP of Germany and France, USD Billions and %
| Net Debt USD Billions 2016 | Debt as % of Germany Plus France GDP | Debt as % of Germany GDP | |
| A Euro Area | 8,081.9 | ||
| B Germany | 1,586.7 | $7197.9 as % of $3495 =205.9% $4978.6 as % of $3495 =142.4% | |
| C France | 2,219.3 | ||
| B+C | 3,806.0 | GDP $5983 Total Debt $7,197.9 Debt/GDP: 120.3% | |
| D Italy | 2,107.6 | ||
| E Spain | 1,019.1 | ||
| F Portugal | 251.1 | ||
| G Greece | 357.6 | ||
| H Ireland | 196.5 | ||
| Subtotal D+E+F+G+H | 3,391.9 |
Source: calculation with IMF data IMF World Economic Outlook databank
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/weodata/index.aspx
There is extremely important information in Table III-9 for the current sovereign risk crisis in the euro zone. Table III-9 provides the structure of regional and country relations of Germany’s exports and imports with newly available data for Dec 2016. German exports to other European Union (EU) members are 55.5 percent of total exports in Dec 2016 and 58.6 percent in cumulative Jan-Dec 2016. Exports to the euro area are 35.2 percent of the total in Dec and 36.6 percent cumulative in Jan-Dec. Exports to third countries are 44.5 percent of the total in Dec and 41.4 percent cumulative in Jan-Dec. There is similar distribution for imports. Exports to non-euro countries are increasing 2.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016, increasing 2.8 percent cumulative in Jan-Dec 2016 relative to a year earlier while exports to the euro area are increasing 6.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016 and increasing 1.8 percent cumulative in Jan-Dec 2016. Exports to third countries, accounting for 44.5 percent of the total in Dec 2016, are increasing 7.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016 and decreasing 0.2 percent cumulative in Jan-Dec 2016, accounting for 41.4 percent of the cumulative total in Jan-Dec 2016. Price competitiveness through devaluation could improve export performance and growth. Economic performance in Germany is closely related to Germany’s high competitiveness in world markets. Weakness in the euro zone and the European Union in general could affect the German economy. This may be the major reason for choosing the “fiscal abuse” of the European Central Bank considered by Buiter (2011Oct31) over the breakdown of the euro zone. There is a tough analytical, empirical and forecasting doubt of growth and trade in the euro zone and the world with or without maintenance of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro zone. Germany could benefit from depreciation of the euro because of high share in its exports to countries not in the euro zone but breakdown of the euro zone raises doubts on the region’s economic growth that could affect German exports to other member states.
Table III-9, Germany, Structure of Exports and Imports by Region, € Billions and ∆%
| Dec 2016 | Dec 12-Month | Cumulative Jan-Dec 2016 € Billions | Cumulative Jan-Dec 2016/ | |
| Total | 97.4 | 6.3 | 1,207.5 | 1.2 |
| A. EU | 54.1 % 55.5 | 5.2 | 707.9 % 58.6 | 2.2 |
| Euro Area | 34.3 % 35.2 | 6.6 | 441.8 % 36.6 | 1.8 |
| Non-euro Area | 19.8 % 20.3 | 2.8 | 266.1 % 22.0 | 2.8 |
| B. Third Countries | 43.3 % 44.5 | 7.7 | 499.6 % 41.4 | -0.2 |
| Total Imports | 78.7 | 7.4 | 954.6 | 0.6 |
| C EU Members | 51.6 % 65.6 | 7.6 | 632.5 % 66.3 | 1.8 |
| Euro Area | 35.2 % 44.7 | 7.1 | 428.9 % 44.9 | 0.7 |
| Non-euro Area | 16.4 % 20.8 | 8.6 | 203.6 % 21.3 | 4.1 |
| D Third Countries | 27.0 % 34.3 | 7.1 | 322.1 % 33.7 | -1.7 |
Notes: Total Exports = A+B; Total Imports = C+D
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland
https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2017/02/PE17_045_51.html
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. There are two approaches to government finance and their implications: (1) simple unpleasant monetarist arithmetic; and (2) simple unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Both approaches illustrate how sovereign debt can be perceived riskier under profligacy.
First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:
D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)
Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,
{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:
N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)
The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:
B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)
On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.
Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:
(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+τ)st+τdτ (4)
Equation (4) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+τ, of the future primary surpluses st+τ, which are equal to Tt+τ – Gt+τ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+τ. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:
MtV(it, ·) = PtYt (5)
Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):
“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”
An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.
There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:
(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress
(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality
(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.
IV Global Inflation. There is oscillating inflation everywhere in the world economy, with slow growth and persistently high unemployment in advanced economies. Table IV-1, updated with every blog comment, provides the latest annual data for GDP, consumer price index (CPI) inflation, producer price index (PPI) inflation and unemployment (UNE) for the advanced economies, China and the highly indebted European countries with sovereign risk issues. The table now includes the Netherlands and Finland that with Germany make up the set of northern countries in the euro zone that hold key votes in the enhancement of the mechanism for solution of sovereign risk issues (Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, “Europe: Northern Exposures,” Financial Times, Mar 9, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55eaf350-4a8b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz1gAlaswcW). Newly available data on inflation is considered below in this section. Data in Table IV-1 for the euro zone and its members are updated from information provided by Eurostat but individual country information is provided in this section as soon as available, following Table IV-1. Data for other countries in Table IV-1 are also updated with reports from their statistical agencies. Economic data for major regions and countries is considered in Section V World Economic Slowdown following with individual country and regional data tables.
Table IV-1, GDP Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in Selected Countries, Percentage Annual Rates
| GDP | CPI | PPI | UNE | |
| US | 1.9 | 2.5 | 3.0 FD 1.6 | 4.8 |
| Japan | 1.7 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 3.1 |
| China | 6.8 | 2.5 | 6.9 | |
| UK | 2.0 | 1.8* CPIH 2.0 | 3.5 output | 4.8 |
| Euro Zone | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 9.6 |
| Germany | 1.8 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 3.9 |
| France | 1.1 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 9.6 |
| Nether-lands | 2.5 | 1.6 | 5.5 | 5.4 |
| Finland | 0.3 | 0.9 | 2.1 | 8.7 |
| Belgium | 1.1 | 3.1 | 8.0 | 7.6 |
| Portugal | 1.9 | 1.3 | 3.5 | 10.2 |
| Ireland | NA | 0.2 | 0.3 | 7.2 |
| Italy | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 12.0 |
| Greece | 0.3 | 1.5 | 3.0 | 23.0 |
| Spain | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 18.4 |
Notes: GDP: rate of growth of GDP; CPI: change in consumer price inflation; PPI: producer price inflation; UNE: rate of unemployment; all rates relative to year earlier
*Office for National Statistics
**Core
CPI https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpriceinflation/jan2017
PPI https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/producerpriceinflation/jan2017
EUROSTAT http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat National Statistical Offices: http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm
Table IV-1 shows the simultaneous occurrence of low growth, low inflation of consumer prices, decline of producer prices and unemployment in advanced economies. US GDP grew at 1.9 percent in seasonally adjusted rate (SAAR) in IVQ2016 and increased 1.9 percent in IVQ2016 relative to IVQ2015 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html Table 8 in https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2017/pdf/gdp4q16_adv.pdf). Japan’s GDP increased at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 1.3 percent in IIIQ2016 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html). The UK grew at 0.7 percent in IVQ2016 relative to IIIQ2016 and GDP increased 2.0 percent in IVQ2016 relative to IVQ2015 (Section VH and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-rising-yields-and.html). The Euro Zone grew at 0.4 percent in IVQ2016 and 1.7 percent in IVQ2016 relative to IVQ2015 (Section VDand earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/interest-rate-increase-could-well.html). These are stagnating or “growth recession” rates, which are positive or about nil growth rates with some contractions that are insufficient to recover employment. The rates of unemployment are quite high:
- 4.8 percent in the US but 15.3 percent for unemployment/underemployment or job stress of 25.7 million (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html)
- 3.1 percent for Japan (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html)
- 4.8 percent for the UK with high rates of unemployment for young people (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html).
- Twelve-month rates of inflation had been quite high, even when some are moderating at the margin: 2.5 percent in the US, 0.3 percent for Japan, 2.5 percent for China, 1.8 percent for the Euro Zone and 1.8 percent for the UK. Stagflation is still an unknown event but the risk is sufficiently high to be worthy of consideration (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html). The analysis of stagflation also permits the identification of important policy issues in solving vulnerabilities that have high impact on global financial risks. Six key interrelated vulnerabilities in the world economy have been causing global financial turbulence. Sovereign risk issues in Europe resulting from countries in need of fiscal consolidation and enhancement of their sovereign risk ratings (Section III and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html).
- The tradeoff of growth and inflation in China now with change in growth strategy to domestic consumption instead of investment, high debt and political developments in a decennial transition. The National People’s Congress of China in Mar 2016 is reducing the GDP growth target to the range of 6.5 percent to 7.0 percent in guiding stable market expectations (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2016-03/05/c_135157171.htm).
- Slow growth by repression of savings with de facto interest rate controls (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/the-case-for-increase-in-federal-funds.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/10/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/09/interest-rates-and-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/08/global-competitive-easing-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/financial-asset-values-rebound-from.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/06/financial-turbulence-twenty-four.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-monetary.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/03/twenty-five-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/02/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets-in.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-with-exchange-rate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/dollar-revaluation-constraining.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/11/live-possibility-of-interest-rates.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/10/labor-market-uncertainty-and-interest.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/interest-rate-policy-dependent-on-what.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html), weak hiring with the loss of 10 million full-time jobs (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html) and continuing job stress of 24 to 30 million people in the US and stagnant wages in a fractured job market (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html).
- The timing, dose, impact and instruments of normalizing monetary and fiscal policies (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/07/unresolved-us-balance-of-payments.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/04/proceeding-cautiously-in-reducing.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/weakening-equities-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/09/monetary-policy-designed-on-measurable.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/geopolitics-monetary-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/weakening-world-economic-growth.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/united-states-gdp-growth-standstill.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/global-financial-risks-and-fed.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/policy-inflation-growth-unemployment.html) in advanced and emerging economies.
- The Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 had repercussions throughout the world economy. Japan has share of about 9 percent in world output, role as entry point for business in Asia, key supplier of advanced components and other inputs as well as major role in finance and multiple economic activities (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216950927404360.html?mod=WSJ_business_AsiaNewsBucket&mg=reno-wsj); and (6) geopolitical events in the Middle East.
In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These policies and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.
Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):
“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.
Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.
The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”
Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:
“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”
Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):
“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.”
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.
Unconventional monetary policy, or reinvestment of principal in securities and issue of bank reserves to maintain policy interest rates near zero, will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at around 2.0 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 30 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2016. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2016 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2017/pdf/gdp4q16_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2016 would have accumulated to 30.5 percent. GDP in IVQ2016 would be $19,564.3 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2759.5 billion than actual $16,804.8 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 25.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 15.3 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP in IVQ2016 is 14.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,804.8 billion in IVQ2016 or 12.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jan 2017. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.7575 in Jan 2017. The actual index NSA in Jan 2017 is 101.5620, which is 28.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Jan 2017. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 129.5532 in Jan 2017. The output of manufacturing at 101.5620 in Jan 2017 is 21.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
First, total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 227,000 in Jan 2017 and private payroll employment increased 237,000. The average monthly number of nonfarm jobs created from Jan 2015 to Jan 2016 was 217,083 using seasonally adjusted data, while the average number of nonfarm jobs created from Jan 2016 to Jan 2017 was 195,250, or decrease by 10.1 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US from Jan 2015 to Jan 2016 was 203,667, using seasonally adjusted data, while the average from Jan 2016 to Jan 2017 was 181,750, or decrease by 10.8 percent. This blog calculates the effective labor force of the US at 168.202 million in Jan 2017 and 167,087 million in Jan 2016 (Table I-4), for growth of 1.115 million at average 92,917 per month. The difference between the average increase of 181,750 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Jan 2016 to Jan 2017 and the 92,917 average monthly increase in the labor force from Jan 2016 to Jan 2017 is 88,833 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 25.653 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 88,833 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 289 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (25.653 million divided by 88,833) or 24 years (289 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Jan 2017 not seasonally adjusted stood at 158.676 million with 8.149 million unemployed or effectively 17.675 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 168.202 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 0.9 years (1 million divided by product of 88,833 by 12, which is 1,065,996). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.934 million (0.05 times labor force of 158.676 million). New net job creation would be minus 0.215 million (8.149 million unemployed minus 7.934 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 0.0 years (0.215 million divided by 1,065.996). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 17.675 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 168.202 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 9.265 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 8.7 years (17.675 million minus 0.05(168.202 million) = 9.265 million divided by 1,065,996 using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in Jan 2017 was 150.527 million (NSA) or 3.212 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 254.082 million in Jan 2016 or by 22.124 million. The number employed increased 2.2 percent from Jul 2007 to Jan 2017 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 9.5 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employment as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Jan 2017 would result in 161.342 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 254.082 million). There are effectively 10.815 million fewer jobs in Jan 2017 than in Jul 2007, or 161.342 million minus 150.527 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.
There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:
“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-values-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/11/dollar-revaluation-and-valuations-of.html).
Second, Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 30 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2016. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2016 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2017/pdf/gdp4q16_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IVQ2016 would have accumulated to 30.5 percent. GDP in IVQ2016 would be $19,564.3 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2759.5 billion than actual $16,804.8 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 25.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 15.3 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/rising-yields-and-dollar-revaluation.html). US GDP in IVQ2016 is 14.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,804.8 billion in IVQ2016 or 12.1 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.3 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.1 percent per year from Jan 1919 to Jan 2017. Growth at 3.1 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.2316 in Dec 2007 to 142.7575 in Jan 2017. The actual index NSA in Jan 2017 is 101.5620, which is 28.9 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Jan 2017. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 129.5532 in Jan 2017. The output of manufacturing at 101.5620 in Jan 2017 is 21.6 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as fluctuating from mediocre growth of 2.5 percent on an annual basis in 2010 to 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.7 percent in 2013, 2.4 percent in 2014 and 2.6 percent in 2015. GDP growth was 1.6 percent in 2016. The following calculations show that actual growth is around 2.1 percent per year. The rate of growth of 1.3 percent in the entire cycle from 2007 to 2016 is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which the economy of the US always attained for entire cycles in expansions after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.
Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita
| GDP | ||
| Long-Term | ||
| 1929-2016 | 3.2 | |
| 1947-2016 | 3.2 | |
| Whole Cycles | ||
| 1980-1989 | 3.5 | |
| 2006-2016 | 1.3 | |
| 2007-2016 | 1.3 | |
| Cyclical Contractions ∆% | ||
| IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | -4.7 | |
| IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | -4.2 | |
| Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆% | ||
| IQ1983 to IVQ1985 IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983-IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 IQ1983 to IQ1989 IQ1983 to IIQ1989 IQ1983 to IIIQ1989 IQ1983 to IVQ1989 IQ1983 to IQ1990 IQ1983 to IIQ1990 | 5.9 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4 | |
| First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983 | 7.8 | |
| IIIQ2009 to IVQ2016 | 2.1 | |
| First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 | 2.7 | |
| Real Disposable Income | Real Disposable Income per Capita | |
| Long-Term | ||
| 1929-2015 | 3.2 | 2.0 |
| 1947-1999 | 3.7 | 2.3 |
| Whole Cycles | ||
| 1980-1989 | 3.5 | 2.6 |
| 2006-2015 | 1.6 | 0.8 |
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace around 2.1 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.
1. Average Annual Growth in the Past Nineteen Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013, the four quarters of 2014, the four quarters of Q2015 and the four quarters of 2016 accumulated to 10.6 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.0 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2016 of $16,804.8 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,190.3 billion and compounding by 4/20: {[($16,804.8/$15,190.3)4/20 -1]100 = 2.0 percent}.
2. Average Annual Growth in the Past Four Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of IVQ2015 to IVQ2016 accumulated to 1.9 percent that is equivalent to 1.9 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2016 of $16,804.8 billion by GDP in IVQ2015 of $16,490.7 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($16,804.8.0/$16,490.7)4/4 -1]100 = 1.9%}. The US economy grew 1.9 percent in IVQ2016 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IVQ2015. Growth was at annual equivalent 4.0 percent in IIQ2014 and 5.0 percent IIIQ2014 and only at 2.3 percent in IVQ2014. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.0 percent in IQ2015, 2.6 percent in IIQ2015, 2.0 percent in IIIQ2015 and 0.9 percent in IVQ2015. GDP grew at annual equivalent 0.8 percent in IQ2016 and at 1.4 percent annual equivalent in IIQ2016. GDP increased at 3.5 percent annual equivalent in IIIQ2016 and at 1.9 percent in IVQ2016. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is in the borderline of contraction, and negative in IQ2014. US GDP fell 0.3 percent in IQ2014. The rate of growth of GDP in the revision of IIIQ2013 is 3.1 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR).
Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%
| Real GDP, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars | ∆% Relative to IVQ2007 | ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter | ∆% | |
| IVQ2007 | 14,991.8 | NA | 0.4 | 1.9 |
| IVQ2011 | 15,190.3 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.7 |
| IQ2012 | 15,291.0 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 2.8 |
| IIQ2012 | 15,362.4 | 2.5 | 0.5 | 2.5 |
| IIIQ2012 | 15,380.8 | 2.6 | 0.1 | 2.4 |
| IVQ2012 | 15,384.3 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 1.3 |
| IQ2013 | 15,491.9 | 3.3 | 0.7 | 1.3 |
| IIQ2013 | 15,521.6 | 3.5 | 0.2 | 1.0 |
| IIIQ2013 | 15,641.3 | 4.3 | 0.8 | 1.7 |
| IVQ2013 | 15,793.9 | 5.4 | 1.0 | 2.7 |
| IQ2014 | 15,747.0 | 5.0 | -0.3 | 1.6 |
| IIQ2014 | 15,900.8 | 6.1 | 1.0 | 2.4 |
| IIIQ2014 | 16,094.5 | 7.4 | 1.2 | 2.9 |
| IVQ2014 | 16,186.7 | 8.0 | 0.6 | 2.5 |
| IQ2015 | 16,269.0 | 8.5 | 0.5 | 3.3 |
| IIQ2015 | 16,374.2 | 9.2 | 0.6 | 3.0 |
| IIIQ2015 | 16,454.9 | 9.8 | 0.5 | 2.2 |
| IVQ2015 | 16,490.7 | 10.0 | 0.2 | 1.9 |
| IQ2016 | 16,525.0 | 10.2 | 0.2 | 1.6 |
| IIQ2016 | 16,583.1 | 10.6 | 0.4 | 1.3 |
| IIIQ2016 | 16,727.0 | 11.6 | 0.9 | 1.7 |
| IVQ2016 | 16,804.8 | 12.1 | 0.5 | 1.9 |
| Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IVQ2016 | 10.6 | 10.8 | ||
| Annual Equivalent ∆% | 2.0 | 2.1 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart GDP of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the rates of growth of GDP at SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the 16 quarters from IVQ2012 to IIIQ2016. Growth has been fluctuating.
Chart GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Rates of Growth of United States GDP, ∆%
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdp_glance.htm
In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QE→∞, or reinvestment of principal in securities and issue of bank reserves to maintain interest rates at zero, cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.
The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm). The FOMC updated in the statement at its meeting on Dec 16, 2015 with maintenance of the current level of the balance sheet and liftoff of interest rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm) followed by the statement of the meeting on Feb 1, 2017 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20170201a.htm):
“Press Release
Release Date: February 1, 2017
For release at 2:00 p.m. EST
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has continued to expand at a moderate pace. Job gains remained solid and the unemployment rate stayed near its recent low. Household spending has continued to rise moderately while business fixed investment has remained soft. Measures of consumer and business sentiment have improved of late. Inflation increased in recent quarters but is still below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective. Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; most survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further, and inflation will rise to 2 percent over the medium term. Near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced. The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments.
In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1/2 to 3/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation.
In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.
The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee's holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Charles L. Evans; Stanley Fischer; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Neel Kashkari; Jerome H. Powell; and Daniel K. Tarullo.
Implementation Note issued February 1, 2017”
There are several important issues in this statement.
- Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):
“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”
- Open-ended Quantitative Easing or QE∞ with End of Bond Purchases and Continuing Reinvestment of Principal in Securities. Earlier programs are continued with reinvestment of principal in securities and bank reserves at $2,328.1 billion on Feb 1, 2017 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1): “The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee's holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions.”
- Increase of interest rates: “In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1/2 to 3/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation.”
- New Advance Guidance. “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added).
- Policy Commitment with Maximum Employment. The emphasis of policy is in maintaining full employment: “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”
- World Financial and Economic Conditions. There is concern with the world economy and financial markets: “The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments.” (emphasis added).
Focus is shifting from tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at ¼ to ½ percent and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Markets overreacted to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases to $25 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at ½ to ¾ percent with gradual consideration of further rate increases (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20170201a.htm): “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added).
How long is “considerable time”? At the press conference following the meeting on Mar 19, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question of Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal explaining “In particular, the Committee has endorsed the view that it anticipates that will be a considerable period after the asset purchase program ends before it will be appropriate to begin to raise rates. And of course on our present path, well, that's not utterly preset. We would be looking at next, next fall. So, I think that's important guidance” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140319.pdf). Many focused on “next fall,” ignoring that the path of increasing rates is not “utterly preset.”
At the press conference following the meeting on Dec 17, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question by Jon Hilseranth of the Wall Street Journal explaining “patience” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20141217.pdf):
“So I did say that this statement that the committee can be patient should be interpreted as meaning that it is unlikely to begin the normalization process, for at least the next couple of meetings. Now that doesn't point to any preset or predetermined time at which normalization is -- will begin. There are a range of views on the committee, and it will be dependent on how incoming data bears on the progress, the economy is making. First of all, I want to emphasize that no meeting is completely off the table in the sense that if we do see faster progress toward our objectives than we currently expect, then it is possible that the process of normalization would occur sooner than we now anticipated. And of course the converse is also true. So at this point, we think it unlikely that it will be appropriate, that we will see conditions for at least the next couple of meetings that will make it appropriate for us to decide to begin normalization. A number of committee participants have indicated that in their view, conditions could be appropriate by the middle of next year. But there is no preset time.”
Chair Yellen explained the removal of the word “patience” from the advanced guidance at the press conference following the FOMC meeting on Mar 18, 2015(http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150318.pdf):
“In other words, just because we removed the word “patient” from the statement doesn’t mean we are going to be impatient. Moreover, even after the initial increase in the target funds rate, our policy is likely to remain highly accommodative to support continued progress toward our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”
At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):
“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.
Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.
Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) provides comprehensive review of the theory and measurement of labor markets. Monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):
“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”
Yellen (2014Aug22) finds that the unemployment rate is not sufficient in determining slack:
“One convenient way to summarize the information contained in a large number of indicators is through the use of so-called factor models. Following this methodology, Federal Reserve Board staff developed a labor market conditions index from 19 labor market indicators, including four I just discussed. This broadly based metric supports the conclusion that the labor market has improved significantly over the past year, but it also suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) restates that the FOMC determines monetary policy on newly available information and interpretation of labor markets and inflation and does not follow a preset path:
“But if progress in the labor market continues to be more rapid than anticipated by the Committee or if inflation moves up more rapidly than anticipated, resulting in faster convergence toward our dual objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target could come sooner than the Committee currently expects and could be more rapid thereafter. Of course, if economic performance turns out to be disappointing and progress toward our goals proceeds more slowly than we expect, then the future path of interest rates likely would be more accommodative than we currently anticipate. As I have noted many times, monetary policy is not on a preset path. The Committee will be closely monitoring incoming information on the labor market and inflation in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy.”
Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”
The minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 16-17, 2014, reveal concern with global economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20140917.htm):
“Most viewed the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as broadly balanced. However, a number of participants noted that economic growth over the medium term might be slower than they expected if foreign economic growth came in weaker than anticipated, structural productivity continued to increase only slowly, or the recovery in residential construction continued to lag.”
There is similar concern in the minutes of the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16-17, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20141217.htm):
“In their discussion of the foreign economic outlook, participants noted that the implications of the drop in crude oil prices would differ across regions, especially if the price declines affected inflation expectations and financial markets; a few participants said that the effect on overseas employment and output as a whole was likely to be positive. While some participants had lowered their assessments of the prospects for global economic growth, several noted that the likelihood of further responses by policymakers abroad had increased. Several participants indicated that they expected slower economic growth abroad to negatively affect the U.S. economy, principally through lower net exports, but the net effect of lower oil prices on U.S. economic activity was anticipated to be positive.”
Chair Yellen analyzes the view of inflation (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140416a.htm):
“Inflation, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, has slowed from an annual rate of about 2-1/2 percent in early 2012 to less than 1 percent in February of this year. This rate is well below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective. Many advanced economies are observing a similar softness in inflation.
To some extent, the low rate of inflation seems due to influences that are likely to be temporary, including a deceleration in consumer energy prices and outright declines in core import prices in recent quarters. Longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably steady, however. We anticipate that, as the effects of transitory factors subside and as labor market gains continue, inflation will gradually move back toward 2 percent.”
There is a critical phrase in the statement of Sep 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm): “but mortgage rates have risen further.” Did the increase of mortgage rates influence the decision of the FOMC not to taper? Is FOMC “communication” and “guidance” successful? Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?
A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/peaking-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 20,821.66 on Feb 24, 2017, which is higher by 47.0 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 46.7 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial assets have been approaching or exceeding historical highs. Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):
So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).
In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):
“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”
Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:
“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).
Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:
“Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).
Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
The Communiqué of the Istanbul meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on February 10, 2015, sanctions the need of unconventional monetary policy with warning on collateral effects (http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/150210-finance.html):
“We agree that consistent with central banks' mandates, current economic conditions require accommodative monetary policies in some economies. In this regard, we welcome that central banks take appropriate monetary policy action. The recent policy decision by the ECB aims at fulfilling its price stability mandate, and will further support the recovery in the euro area. We also note that some advanced economies with stronger growth prospects are moving closer to conditions that would allow for policy normalization. In an environment of diverging monetary policy settings and rising financial market volatility, policy settings should be carefully calibrated and clearly communicated to minimize negative spillovers.”
Professor Raguram G Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation. Rajan (2005) anticipated the risks of the world financial crisis. Professor John B. Taylor (2016Dec 7, 2016Dec20), in Testimony to the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade Committee on Financial Services, on Dec 7, 2016, analyzes the adverse effects of unconventional monetary policy:
“My research and that of others over the years shows that these policies were not effective, and may have been counterproductive. Economic growth was consistently below the Fed’s forecasts with the policies, and was much weaker than in earlier U.S. recoveries from deep recessions. Job growth has been insufficient to raise the percentage of the population that is working above pre-recession levels. There is a growing consensus that the extra low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy have reached diminishing or negative returns. Many have argued that these policies widen the income distribution, adversely affect savers, and increase the volatility of the dollar exchange rate. Experienced market participants have expressed concerns about bubbles, imbalances, and distortions caused by the policies. The unconventional policies have also raised public policy concerns about the Fed being transformed into a multipurpose institution, intervening in particular sectors and allocating credit, areas where Congress may have a role, but not a limited-purpose independent agency of government.”
Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor 2007, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2015, 2012 Oct 25; 2013Oct28, 2014 Jan01, 2014Jan3, 2014Jun26, 2014Jul15, 2015, 2016Dec7, 2016Dec20 http://www.johnbtaylor.com/) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between ½ and ¾ percent. Accelerated increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
The FOMC provides guidelines on the process of normalization of monetary policy at the meeting on Dec 16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a1.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has made the following decisions to implement the monetary policy stance announced by the Federal Open Market Committee in its statement on December 16, 2015:
- The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to raise the interest rate paid on required and excess reserve balances to 0.50 percent, effective December 17, 2015.
- As part of its policy decision, the Federal Open Market Committee voted to authorize and direct the Open Market Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the System Open Market Account in accordance with the following domestic policy directive:1
"Effective December 17, 2015, the Federal Open Market Committee directs the Desk to undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the federal funds rate in a target range of 1/4 to 1/2 percent, including: (1) overnight reverse repurchase operations (and reverse repurchase operations with maturities of more than one day when necessary to accommodate weekend, holiday, or similar trading conventions) at an offering rate of 0.25 percent, in amounts limited only by the value of Treasury securities held outright in the System Open Market Account that are available for such operations and by a per-counterparty limit of $30 billion per day; and (2) term reverse repurchase operations to the extent approved in the resolution on term RRP operations approved by the Committee at its March 17-18, 2015, meeting.
The Committee directs the Desk to continue rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction and to continue reinvesting principal payments on all agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. The Committee also directs the Desk to engage in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve's agency mortgage-backed securities transactions."
More information regarding open market operations may be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's website.
- In a related action, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to approve a 1/4 percentage point increase in the discount rate (the primary credit rate) to 1.00 percent, effective December 17, 2015. In taking this action, the Board approved requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco.
This information will be updated as appropriate to reflect decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Board of Governors regarding details of the Federal Reserve's operational tools and approach used to implement monetary policy.”
In the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress on Feb 24, 2015, Chair Yellen analyzes the timing of interest rate increases (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150224a.htm):
“The FOMC's assessment that it can be patient in beginning to normalize policy means that the Committee considers it unlikely that economic conditions will warrant an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate for at least the next couple of FOMC meetings. If economic conditions continue to improve, as the Committee anticipates, the Committee will at some point begin considering an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate on a meeting-by-meeting basis. Before then, the Committee will change its forward guidance. However, it is important to emphasize that a modification of the forward guidance should not be read as indicating that the Committee will necessarily increase the target range in a couple of meetings. Instead the modification should be understood as reflecting the Committee's judgment that conditions have improved to the point where it will soon be the case that a change in the target range could be warranted at any meeting. Provided that labor market conditions continue to improve and further improvement is expected, the Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate when, on the basis of incoming data, the Committee is reasonably confident that inflation will move back over the medium term toward our 2 percent objective.”
In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):
“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability. If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases. In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that it does not run persistently above or below that level (emphasis added).”
At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:
“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.
For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”
In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm):
“The economy has continued to recover from the steep recession of 2008 and 2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth stepped up to an average annual rate of about 3-1/4 percent over the second half of last year, a faster pace than in the first half and during the preceding two years. Although real GDP growth is currently estimated to have paused in the first quarter of this year, I see that pause as mostly reflecting transitory factors, including the effects of the unusually cold and snowy winter weather. With the harsh winter behind us, many recent indicators suggest that a rebound in spending and production is already under way, putting the overall economy on track for solid growth in the current quarter. One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.
Conditions in the labor market have continued to improve. The unemployment rate was 6.3 percent in April, about 1-1/4 percentage points below where it was a year ago. Moreover, gains in payroll employment averaged nearly 200,000 jobs per month over the past year. During the economic recovery so far, payroll employment has increased by about 8-1/2 million jobs since its low point, and the unemployment rate has declined about 3-3/4 percentage points since its peak.
While conditions in the labor market have improved appreciably, they are still far from satisfactory. Even with recent declines in the unemployment rate, it continues to be elevated. Moreover, both the share of the labor force that has been unemployed for more than six months and the number of individuals who work part time but would prefer a full-time job are at historically high levels. In addition, most measures of labor compensation have been rising slowly--another signal that a substantial amount of slack remains in the labor market.
Inflation has been quite low even as the economy has continued to expand. Some of the factors contributing to the softness in inflation over the past year, such as the declines seen in non-oil import prices, will probably be transitory. Importantly, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained stable. That said, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recognizes that inflation persistently below 2 percent--the rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its dual mandate--could pose risks to economic performance, and we are monitoring inflation developments closely.
Looking ahead, I expect that economic activity will expand at a somewhat faster pace this year than it did last year, that the unemployment rate will continue to decline gradually, and that inflation will begin to move up toward 2 percent. A faster rate of economic growth this year should be supported by reduced restraint from changes in fiscal policy, gains in household net worth from increases in home prices and equity values, a firming in foreign economic growth, and further improvements in household and business confidence as the economy continues to strengthen. Moreover, U.S. financial conditions remain supportive of growth in economic activity and employment.”
In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):
“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”
Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:
W = Y/r (10
Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.
In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:
“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.
The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”
Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).
The key policy is maintaining the fed funds rate between ½ and ¾ percent with gradual increases. Accelerated increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) is that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This is a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.
In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Professor Raguram G Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation.
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced on Jan 15, 2015, the termination of its peg of the exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the euro (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):
“The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has decided to discontinue the minimum exchange rate of
CHF 1.20 per euro with immediate effect and to cease foreign currency purchases associated with enforcing it.”
The SNB also lowered interest rates to nominal negative percentages (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):
“At the same time as discontinuing the minimum exchange rate, the SNB will be lowering the interest rate for balances held on sight deposit accounts to –0.75% from 22 January. The exemption thresholds remain unchanged. Further lowering the interest rate makes Swiss-franc investments considerably less attractive and will mitigate the effects of the decision to discontinue the minimum exchange rate. The target range for the three-month Libor is being lowered by 0.5 percentage points to between –1.25% and –0.25%.”
The Swiss franc rate relative to the euro (CHF/EUR) appreciated 18.7 percent on Jan 15, 2015. The Swiss franc rate relative to the dollar (CHF/USD) appreciated 17.7 percent. Central banks are taking measures in anticipation of the quantitative easing by the European Central Bank.
On Jan 22, 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to implement an “expanded asset purchase program” with combined asset purchases of €60 billion per month “until at least Sep 2016 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html). The objective of the program is that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html):
“Asset purchases provide monetary stimulus to the economy in a context where key ECB interest rates are at their lower bound. They further ease monetary and financial conditions, making access to finance cheaper for firms and households. This tends to support investment and consumption, and ultimately contributes to a return of inflation rates towards 2%.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, explains the coordination of asset purchases with NCBs (National Central Banks) of the euro area and risk sharing (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“In March 2015 the Eurosystem will start to purchase euro-denominated investment-grade securities issued by euro area governments and agencies and European institutions in the secondary market. The purchases of securities issued by euro area governments and agencies will be based on the Eurosystem NCBs’ shares in the ECB’s capital key. Some additional eligibility criteria will be applied in the case of countries under an EU/IMF adjustment programme. As regards the additional asset purchases, the Governing Council retains control over all the design features of the programme and the ECB will coordinate the purchases, thereby safeguarding the singleness of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Eurosystem will make use of decentralised implementation to mobilise its resources. With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, rejected the possibility of seigniorage in the new asset purchase program, or central bank financing of fiscal expansion (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“As I just said, it would be a big mistake if countries were to consider that the presence of this programme might be an incentive to fiscal expansion. They would undermine the confidence, so it’s not directed to monetary financing at all. Actually, it’s been designed as to avoid any monetary financing.”
The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, does not find effects of monetary policy in inflating asset prices (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):
“On the first question, we monitor closely any potential instance of risk to financial stability. So we're very alert to that risk. So far we don't see bubbles. There may be some local episodes of certain specific markets where prices are going up fast. But to have a bubble, besides having that, one should also identify, detect an increase, dramatic increase in leverage or in bank credit, and we don't see that now. However, we, as I said, we are alert. If bubbles are of a local nature, they should be addressed by local instruments, namely macro-prudential instruments rather than by monetary policy.”
The DAX index of German equities increased 1.3 percent on Jan 22, 2015 and 2.1 percent on Jan 23, 2015. The euro depreciated from EUR 1.1611/USD (EUR 0.8613/USD) on Wed Jan 21, 2015, to EUR 1.1206/USD (EUR 0.8924/USD) on Fri Jan 23, 2015, or 3.6 percent. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar.
Dan Strumpf and Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, writing on “Fed’s Yellen: Stock Valuations ‘Generally are Quite High,’” on May 6, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-cites-progress-on-bank-regulation-1430918155?tesla=y ), quote Chair Yellen at open conversation with Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, finding “equity-market valuations” as “quite high” with “potential dangers” in bond valuations. The DJIA fell 0.5 percent on May 6, 2015, after the comments and then increased 0.5 percent on May 7, 2015 and 1.5 percent on May 8, 2015.
| Fri May 1 | Mon 4 | Tue 5 | Wed 6 | Thu 7 | Fri 8 |
| DJIA 18024.06 -0.3% 1.0% | 18070.40 0.3% 0.3% | 17928.20 -0.5% -0.8% | 17841.98 -1.0% -0.5% | 17924.06 -0.6% 0.5% | 18191.11 0.9% 1.5% |
There are two approaches in theory considered by Bordo (2012Nov20) and Bordo and Lane (2013). The first approach is in the classical works of Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963a, 1987) and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (1973). There is a similar approach in Tobin (1969). Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 66) trace the effects of expansionary monetary policy into increasing initially financial asset prices: “It seems plausible that both nonbank and bank holders of redundant balances will turn first to securities comparable to those they have sold, say, fixed-interest coupon, low-risk obligations. But as they seek to purchase these they will tend to bid up the prices of those issues. Hence they, and also other holders not involved in the initial central bank open-market transactions, will look farther afield: the banks, to their loans; the nonbank holders, to other categories of securities-higher risk fixed-coupon obligations, equities, real property, and so forth.”
The second approach is by the Austrian School arguing that increases in asset prices can become bubbles if monetary policy allows their financing with bank credit. Professor Michael D. Bordo provides clear thought and empirical evidence on the role of “expansionary monetary policy” in inflating asset prices (Bordo2012Nov20, Bordo and Lane 2013). Bordo and Lane (2013) provide revealing narrative of historical episodes of expansionary monetary policy. Bordo and Lane (2013) conclude that policies of depressing interest rates below the target rate or growth of money above the target influences higher asset prices, using a panel of 18 OECD countries from 1920 to 2011. Bordo (2012Nov20) concludes: “that expansionary money is a significant trigger” and “central banks should follow stable monetary policies…based on well understood and credible monetary rules.” Taylor (2007, 2009) explains the housing boom and financial crisis in terms of expansionary monetary policy. Professor Martin Feldstein (2016), at Harvard University, writing on “A Federal Reserve oblivious to its effects on financial markets,” on Jan 13, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-federal-reserve-oblivious-to-its-effect-on-financial-markets-1452729166), analyzes how unconventional monetary policy drove values of risk financial assets to high levels. Quantitative easing and zero interest rates distorted calculation of risks with resulting vulnerabilities in financial markets.
Another hurdle of exit from zero interest rates is “competitive easing” that Professor Raghuram Rajan, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, characterizes as disguised “competitive devaluation” (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). The fed has been considering increasing interest rates. The European Central Bank (ECB) announced, on Mar 5, 2015, the beginning on Mar 9, 2015 of its quantitative easing program denominated as Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP), consisting of “combined monthly purchases of EUR 60 bn [billion] in public and private sector securities” (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/pspp.en.html). Expectation of increasing interest rates in the US together with euro rates close to zero or negative cause revaluation of the dollar (or devaluation of the euro and of most currencies worldwide). US corporations suffer currency translation losses of their foreign transactions and investments (http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Pronouncement_C/SummaryPage&cid=900000010318) while the US becomes less competitive in world trade (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c)). The DJIA fell 1.5 percent on Mar 6, 2015 and the dollar revalued 2.2 percent from Mar 5 to Mar 6, 2015. The euro has devalued 50.5 percent relative to the dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Feb 24, 2017.
| Fri 27 Feb | Mon 3/2 | Tue 3/3 | Wed 3/4 | Thu 3/5 | Fri 3/6 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1197 1.6% 0.0% | 1.1185 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1176 0.2% 0.1% | 1.1081 1.0% 0.9% | 1.1030 1.5% 0.5% | 1.0843 3.2% 1.7% |
Chair Yellen explained the removal of the word “patience” from the advanced guidance at the press conference following the FOMC meeting on Mar 18, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150318.pdf):
“In other words, just because we removed the word “patient” from the statement doesn’t mean we are going to be impatient. Moreover, even after the initial increase in the target funds rate, our policy is likely to remain highly accommodative to support continued progress toward our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”
Exchange rate volatility is increasing in response of “impatience” in financial markets with monetary policy guidance and measures:
| Fri Mar 6 | Mon 9 | Tue 10 | Wed 11 | Thu 12 | Fri 13 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0843 3.2% 1.7% | 1.0853 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.0700 1.3% 1.4% | 1.0548 2.7% 1.4% | 1.0637 1.9% -0.8% | 1.0497 3.2% 1.3% |
| Fri Mar 13 | Mon 16 | Tue 17 | Wed 18 | Thu 19 | Fri 20 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0497 3.2% 1.3% | 1.0570 -0.7% -0.7% | 1.0598 -1.0% -0.3% | 1.0864 -3.5% -2.5% | 1.0661 -1.6% 1.9% | 1.0821 -3.1% -1.5% |
| Fri Apr 24 | Mon 27 | Tue 28 | Wed 29 | Thu 30 | May Fri 1 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0874 -0.6% -0.4% | 1.0891 -0.2% -0.2% | 1.0983 -1.0% -0.8% | 1.1130 -2.4% -1.3% | 1.1223 -3.2% -0.8% | 1.1199 -3.0% 0.2% |
In a speech at Brown University on May 22, 2015, Chair Yellen stated (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150522a.htm):
“For this reason, if the economy continues to improve as I expect, I think it will be appropriate at some point this year to take the initial step to raise the federal funds rate target and begin the process of normalizing monetary policy. To support taking this step, however, I will need to see continued improvement in labor market conditions, and I will need to be reasonably confident that inflation will move back to 2 percent over the medium term. After we begin raising the federal funds rate, I anticipate that the pace of normalization is likely to be gradual. The various headwinds that are still restraining the economy, as I said, will likely take some time to fully abate, and the pace of that improvement is highly uncertain.”
The US dollar appreciated 3.8 percent relative to the euro in the week of May 22, 2015:
| Fri May 15 | Mon 18 | Tue 19 | Wed 20 | Thu 21 | Fri 22 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1449 -2.2% -0.3% | 1.1317 1.2% 1.2% | 1.1150 2.6% 1.5% | 1.1096 3.1% 0.5% | 1.1113 2.9% -0.2% | 1.1015 3.8% 0.9% |
The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, warned on Jun 4, 2015, that: (http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2015/06/04/u-s-economy-returning-to-growth-but-pockets-of-vulnerability/):
“The Fed’s first rate increase in almost 9 years is being carefully prepared and telegraphed. Nevertheless, regardless of the timing, higher US policy rates could still result in significant market volatility with financial stability consequences that go well beyond US borders. I weighing these risks, we think there is a case for waiting to raise rates until there are more tangible signs of wage or price inflation than are currently evident. Even after the first rate increase, a gradual rise in the federal fund rates will likely be appropriate.”
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, warned on Jun 3, 2015 that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150603.en.html):
“But certainly one lesson is that we should get used to periods of higher volatility. At very low levels of interest rates, asset prices tend to show higher volatility…the Governing Council was unanimous in its assessment that we should look through these developments and maintain a steady monetary policy stance.”
The Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet L. Yellen, stated on Jul 10, 2015 that (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150710a.htm):
“Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or accelerate this first step. I currently anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.”
There is essentially the same view in the Testimony of Chair Yellen in delivering the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jul 15, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150715a.htm).
At the press conference after the meeting of the FOMC on Sep 17, 2015, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150917.pdf 4):
“The outlook abroad appears to have become more uncertain of late, and heightened concerns about growth in China and other emerging market economies have led to notable volatility in financial markets. Developments since our July meeting, including the drop in equity prices, the further appreciation of the dollar, and a widening in risk spreads, have tightened overall financial conditions to some extent. These developments may restrain U.S. economic activity somewhat and are likely to put further downward pressure on inflation in the near term. Given the significant economic and financial interconnections between the United States and the rest of the world, the situation abroad bears close watching.”
Some equity markets fell on Fri Sep 18, 2015:
| Fri Sep 11 | Mon 14 | Tue 15 | Wed 16 | Thu 17 | Fri 18 |
| DJIA 16433.09 2.1% 0.6% | 16370.96 -0.4% -0.4% | 16599.85 1.0% 1.4% | 16739.95 1.9% 0.8% | 16674.74 1.5% -0.4% | 16384.58 -0.3% -1.7% |
| Nikkei 225 18264.22 2.7% -0.2% | 17965.70 -1.6% -1.6% | 18026.48 -1.3% 0.3% | 18171.60 -0.5% 0.8% | 18432.27 0.9% 1.4% | 18070.21 -1.1% -2.0% |
| DAX 10123.56 0.9% -0.9% | 10131.74 0.1% 0.1% | 10188.13 0.6% 0.6% | 10227.21 1.0% 0.4% | 10229.58 1.0% 0.0% | 9916.16 -2.0% -3.1% |
Frank H. Knight (1963, 233), in Risk, uncertainty and profit, distinguishes between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty. Chair Yellen, in a lecture on “Inflation dynamics and monetary policy,” on Sep 24, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm), states that (emphasis added):
· “The economic outlook, of course, is highly uncertain”
· “Considerable uncertainties also surround the outlook for economic activity”
· “Given the highly uncertain nature of the outlook…”
Is there a “science” or even “art” of central banking under this extreme uncertainty in which policy does not generate higher volatility of money, income, prices and values of financial assets?
Lingling Wei, writing on Oct 23, 2015, on China’s central bank moves to spur economic growth,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-central-bank-cuts-rates-1445601495), analyzes the reduction by the People’s Bank of China (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/ http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130437/index.html) of borrowing and lending rates of banks by 50 basis points and reserve requirements of banks by 50 basis points. Paul Vigna, writing on Oct 23, 2015, on “Stocks rally out of correction territory on latest central bank boost,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/10/23/stocks-rally-out-of-correction-territory-on-latest-central-bank-boost/), analyzes the rally in financial markets following the statement on Oct 22, 2015, by the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi of consideration of new quantitative measures in Dec 2015 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0814riKW25k&rel=0) and the reduction of bank lending/deposit rates and reserve requirements of banks by the People’s Bank of China on Oct 23, 2015. The dollar revalued 2.8 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23, 2015, following the intended easing of the European Central Bank. The DJIA rose 2.8 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23 and the DAX index of German equities rose 5.4 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23, 2015.
| Fri Oct 16 | Mon 19 | Tue 20 | Wed 21 | Thu 22 | Fri 23 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1350 0.1% 0.3% | 1.1327 0.2% 0.2% | 1.1348 0.0% -0.2% | 1.1340 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1110 2.1% 2.0% | 1.1018 2.9% 0.8% |
| DJIA 17215.97 0.8% 0.4% | 17230.54 0.1% 0.1% | 17217.11 0.0% -0.1% | 17168.61 -0.3% -0.3% | 17489.16 1.6% 1.9% | 17646.70 2.5% 0.9% |
| Dow Global 2421.58 0.3% 0.6% | 2414.33 -0.3% -0.3% | 2411.03 -0.4% -0.1% | 2411.27 -0.4% 0.0% | 2434.79 0.5% 1.0% | 2458.13 1.5% 1.0% |
| DJ Asia Pacific 1402.31 1.1% 0.3% | 1398.80 -0.3% -0.3% | 1395.06 -0.5% -0.3% | 1402.68 0.0% 0.5% | 1396.03 -0.4% -0.5% | 1415.50 0.9% 1.4% |
| Nikkei 225 18291.80 -0.8% 1.1% | 18131.23 -0.9% -0.9% | 18207.15 -0.5% 0.4% | 18554.28 1.4% 1.9% | 18435.87 0.8% -0.6% | 18825.30 2.9% 2.1% |
| Shanghai 3391.35 6.5% 1.6% | 3386.70 -0.1% -0.1% | 3425.33 1.0% 1.1% | 3320.68 -2.1% -3.1% | 3368.74 -0.7% 1.4% | 3412.43 0.6% 1.3% |
| DAX 10104.43 0.1% 0.4% | 10164.31 0.6% 0.6% | 10147.68 0.4% -0.2% | 10238.10 1.3% 0.9% | 10491.97 3.8% 2.5% | 10794.54 6.8% 2.9% |
Ben Leubsdorf, writing on “Fed’s Yellen: December is “Live Possibility” for First Rate Increase,” on Nov 4, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-december-is-live-possibility-for-first-rate-increase-1446654282) quotes Chair Yellen that a rate increase in “December would be a live possibility.” The remark of Chair Yellen was during a hearing on supervision and regulation before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20151104a.htm) and a day before the release of the employment situation report for Oct 2015 (Section I). The dollar revalued 2.4 percent during the week. The euro has devalued 50.5 percent relative to the dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Dec 24, 2017.
| Fri Oct 30 | Mon 2 | Tue 3 | Wed 4 | Thu 5 | Fri 6 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1007 0.1% -0.3% | 1.1016 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.0965 0.4% 0.5% | 1.0867 1.3% 0.9% | 1.0884 1.1% -0.2% | 1.0742 2.4% 1.3% |
The release on Nov 18, 2015 of the minutes of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) meeting held on Oct 28, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20151028.htm) states:
“Most participants anticipated that, based on their assessment of the current economic situation and their outlook for economic activity, the labor market, and inflation, these conditions [for interest rate increase] could well be met by the time of the next meeting. Nonetheless, they emphasized that the actual decision would depend on the implications for the medium-term economic outlook of the data received over the upcoming intermeeting period… It was noted that beginning the normalization process relatively soon would make it more likely that the policy trajectory after liftoff could be shallow.”
Markets could have interpreted a symbolic increase in the fed funds rate at the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 15-16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm) followed by “shallow” increases, explaining the sharp increase in stock market values and appreciation of the dollar after the release of the minutes on Nov 18, 2015:
| Fri Nov 13 | Mon 16 | Tue 17 | Wed 18 | Thu 19 | Fri 20 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0774 -0.3% 0.4% | 1.0686 0.8% 0.8% | 1.0644 1.2% 0.4% | 1.0660 1.1% -0.2% | 1.0735 0.4% -0.7% | 1.0647 1.2% 0.8% |
| DJIA 17245.24 -3.7% -1.2% | 17483.01 1.4% 1.4% | 17489.50 1.4% 0.0% | 17737.16 2.9% 1.4% | 17732.75 2.8% 0.0% | 17823.81 3.4% 0.5% |
| DAX 10708.40 -2.5% -0.7% | 10713.23 0.0% 0.0% | 10971.04 2.5% 2.4% | 10959.95 2.3% -0.1% | 11085.44 3.5% 1.1% | 11119.83 3.8% 0.3% |
In testimony before The Joint Economic Committee of Congress on Dec 3, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20151203a.htm), Chair Yellen reiterated that the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) “anticipates that even after employment and inflation are near mandate-consistent levels, economic condition may, for some time, warrant keeping the target federal funds rate below the Committee views as normal in the longer run.” Todd Buell and Katy Burne, writing on “Draghi says ECB could step up stimulus efforts if necessary,” on Dec 4, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/draghi-says-ecb-could-step-up-stimulus-efforts-if-necessary-1449252934), analyze that the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, reassured financial markets that the ECB will increase stimulus if required to raise inflation the euro area to targets. The USD depreciated 3.1 percent on Thu Dec 3, 2015 after weaker than expected measures by the European Central Bank. DJIA fell 1.4 percent on Dec 3 and increased 2.1 percent on Dec 4. DAX fell 3.6 percent on Dec 3.
| Fri Nov 27 | Mon 30 | Tue 1 | Wed 2 | Thu 3 | Fri 4 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0594 0.5% 0.2% | 1.0565 0.3% 0.3% | 1.0634 -0.4% -0.7% | 1.0616 -0.2% 0.2% | 1.0941 -3.3% -3.1% | 1.0885 -2.7% 0.5% |
| DJIA 17798.49 -0.1% -0.1% | 17719.92 -0.4% -0.4% | 17888.35 0.5% 1.0% | 17729.68 -0.4% -0.9% | 17477.67 -1.8% -1.4% | 17847.63 0.3% 2.1% |
| DAX 11293.76 1.6% -0.2% | 11382.23 0.8% 0.8% | 11261.24 -0.3% -1.1% | 11190.02 -0.9% -0.6% | 10789.24 -4.5% -3.6% | 10752.10 -4.8% -0.3% |
At the press conference following the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16, 2015, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20151216.pdf page 8):
“And we recognize that monetary policy operates with lags. We would like to be able to move in a prudent, and as we've emphasized, gradual manner. It's been a long time since the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates, and I think it's prudent to be able to watch what the impact is on financial conditions and spending in the economy and moving in a timely fashion enables us to do this.”
The implication of this statement is that the state of the art is not accurate in analyzing the effects of monetary policy on financial markets and economic activity. The US dollar appreciated and equities fluctuated:
| Fri Dec 11 | Mon 14 | Tue 15 | Wed 16 | Thu 17 | Fri 18 |
| USD/ EUR 1.0991 -1.0% -0.4% | 1.0993 0.0% 0.0% | 1.0932 0.5% 0.6% | 1.0913 0.7% 0.2% | 1.0827 1.5% 0.8% | 1.0868 1.1% -0.4% |
| DJIA 17265.21 -3.3% -1.8% | 17368.50 0.6% 0.6% | 17524.91 1.5% 0.9% | 17749.09 2.8% 1.3% | 17495.84 1.3% -1.4% | 17128.55 -0.8% -2.1% |
| DAX 10340.06 -3.8% -2.4% | 10139.34 -1.9% -1.9% | 10450.38 -1.1% 3.1% | 10469.26 1.2% 0.2% | 10738.12 3.8% 2.6% | 10608.19 2.6% -1.2% |
On January 29, 2016, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan introduced a new policy to attain the “price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf). The new framework consists of three dimensions: quantity, quality and interest rate. The interest rate dimension consists of rates paid to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank of Japan of three tiers zero, positive and minus 0.1 percent. The quantitative dimension consists of increasing the monetary base at the annual rate of 80 trillion yen. The qualitative dimension consists of purchases by the Bank of Japan of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITS). The yen devalued sharply relative to the dollar and world equity markets soared after the new policy announced on Jan 29, 2016:
| Fri 22 | Mon 25 | Tue 26 | Wed 27 | Thu 28 | Fri 29 |
| JPY/ USD 118.77 -1.5% -0.9% | 118.30 0.4% 0.4% | 118.42 0.3% -0.1% | 118.68 0.1% -0.2% | 118.82 0.0% -0.1% | 121.13 -2.0% -1.9% |
| DJIA 16093.51 0.7% 1.3% | 15885.22 -1.3% -1.3% | 16167.23 0.5% 1.8% | 15944.46 -0.9% -1.4% | 16069.64 -0.1% 0.8% | 16466.30 2.3% 2.5% |
| Nikkei 16958.53 -1.1% 5.9% | 17110.91 0.9% 0.9% | 16708.90 -1.5% -2.3% | 17163.92 1.2% 2.7% | 17041.45 0.5% -0.7% | 17518.30 3.3% 2.8% |
| Shanghai 2916.56 0.5% 1.3 | 2938.51 0.8% 0.8% | 2749.79 -5.7% -6.4% | 2735.56 -6.2% -0.5% | 2655.66 -8.9% -2.9% | 2737.60 -6.1% 3.1% |
| DAX 9764.88 2.3% 2.0% | 9736.15 -0.3% -0.3% | 9822.75 0.6% 0.9% | 9880.82 1.2% 0.6% | 9639.59 -1.3% -2.4% | 9798.11 0.3% 1.6% |
In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Feb 10-11, 2016, Chair Yellen (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20160210a.htm) states: “U.S. real gross domestic product is estimated to have increased about 1-3/4 percent in 2015. Over the course of the year, subdued foreign growth and the appreciation of the dollar restrained net exports. In the fourth quarter of last year, growth in the gross domestic product is reported to have slowed more sharply, to an annual rate of just 3/4 percent; again, growth was held back by weak net exports as well as by a negative contribution from inventory investment.”
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Yellen Says Fed Should Be Prepared to Use Negative Rates if Needed,” on Feb 11, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-reiterates-concerns-about-risks-to-economy-in-senate-testimony-1455203865), analyzes the statement of Chair Yellen in Congress that the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) is considering negative interest rates on bank reserves. The Wall Street Journal provides yields of two and ten-year sovereign bonds with negative interest rates on shorter maturities where central banks pay negative interest rates on excess bank reserves:
| Sovereign Yields 2/12/16 | Japan | Germany | USA |
| 2 Year | -0.168 | -0.498 | 0.694 |
| 10 Year | 0.076 | 0.262 | 1.744 |
On Mar 10, 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced (1) reduction of the refinancing rate by 5 basis points to 0.00 percent; decrease the marginal lending rate to 0.25 percent; reduction of the deposit facility rate to 0,40 percent; increase of the monthly purchase of assets to €80 billion; include nonbank corporate bonds in assets eligible for purchases; and new long-term refinancing operations (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310.en.html). The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, stated in the press conference (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2016/html/is160310.en.html): “How low can we go? Let me say that rates will stay low, very low, for a long period of time, and well past the horizon of our purchases…We don’t anticipate that it will be necessary to reduce rates further. Of course, new facts can change the situation and the outlook.”
The dollar devalued relative to the euro and open stock markets traded lower after the announcement on Mar 10, 2016, but stocks rebounded on Mar 11:
| Fri 4 | Mon 7 | Tue 8 | Wed 9 | Thu10 | Fri 11 |
| USD/ EUR 1.1006 -0.7% -0.4% | 1.1012 -0.1% -0.1% | 1.1013 -0.1% 0.0% | 1.0999 0.1% 0.1% | 1.1182 -1.6% -1.7% | 1.1151 -1.3% 0.3% |
| DJIA 17006.77 2.2% 0.4% | 17073.95 0.4% 0.4% | 16964.10 -0.3% -0.6% | 17000.36 0.0% 0.2% | 16995.13 -0.1% 0.0% | 17213.31 1.2% 1.3% |
| DAX 9824.17 3.3% 0.7% | 9778.93 -0.5% 0.5% | 9692.82 -1.3% -0.9% | 9723.09 -1.0% 0.3% | 9498.15 -3.3% -2.3% | 9831.13 0.1% 3.5% |
At the press conference after the FOMC meeting on Sep 21, 2016, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20160921.pdf ): “However, the economic outlook is inherently uncertain.” In the address to the Jackson Hole symposium on Aug 26, 2016, Chair Yellen states: “I believe the case for an increase in in federal funds rate has strengthened in recent months…And, as ever, the economic outlook is uncertain, and so monetary policy is not on a preset course” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160826a.htm). In a speech at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, on Jun 6, 2016 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160606a.htm), Chair Yellen finds that “there is considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook.” There are fifteen references to this uncertainty in the text of 18 pages double-spaced. In the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jun 21, 2016, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20160621a.htm), “Of course, considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook remains.” Frank H. Knight (1963, 233), in Risk, uncertainty and profit, distinguishes between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty. Is there a “science” or even “art” of central banking under this extreme uncertainty in which policy does not generate higher volatility of money, income, prices and values of financial assets?
Professor Ronald I. McKinnon (2013Oct27), writing on “Tapering without tears—how to end QE3,” on Oct 27, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579153693500945608?KEYWORDS=Ronald+I+McKinnon), finds that the major central banks of the world have fallen into a “near-zero-interest-rate trap.” World economic conditions are weak such that exit from the zero interest rate trap could have adverse effects on production, investment and employment. The maintenance of interest rates near zero creates long-term near stagnation. The proposal of Professor McKinnon is credible, coordinated increase of policy interest rates toward 2 percent. Professor John B. Taylor at Stanford University, writing on “Economic failures cause political polarization,” on Oct 28, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303442004579121010753999086?KEYWORDS=John+B+Taylor), analyzes that excessive risks induced by near zero interest rates in 2003-2004 caused the financial crash. Monetary policy continued in similar paths during and after the global recession with resulting political polarization worldwide.
Table IV-2 provides economic projections of governors of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and regional presidents of Federal Reserve Banks released at the meeting of Dec 14, 2016. The Fed releases the data with careful explanations (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20160921.pdf). Columns “∆% GDP,” “∆% PCE Inflation” and “∆% Core PCE Inflation” are changes “from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated.” The GDP report for IVQ2016 is analyzed in (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html) and the PCE inflation data from the report on personal income and outlays in Section IV (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html). The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the estimate of IVQ2016 GDP (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rising-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/12/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). PCE inflation is the index of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) of the report of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on “Personal Income and Outlays” (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm), which is analyzed in Section IV (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html). The report on “Personal Income and Outlays” was released on Jan 30, 2017 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html). PCE core inflation consists of PCE inflation excluding food and energy. Column “UNEMP %” is the rate of unemployment measured as the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the Employment Situation Report with the civilian unemployment rate in the first Friday of every month, which is analyzed in this blog. The report for Dec was released on Feb 3, 2017 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/twenty-six-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/twenty-four-million-unemployed-or.html). “The longer-run projections are the rates of growth, unemployment, and inflation to which a policymaker expects the economy to converge over time—maybe in five or six years—in the absence of further shocks and under appropriate monetary policy” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20131218.pdf).
It is instructive to focus on 2016 and 2017 because 2018 and longer term are too far away. There is not much information even on what will happen in 2016-2017 and beyond. The central tendency should provide reasonable approximation of the view of the majority of members of the FOMC but the second block of numbers provides the range of projections by FOMC participants. The first row for each year shows the projection introduced after the meeting of Dec 14, 2016 and the second row “PR” the projection of the Sep 21, 2016 meeting. The projections for 2014 are those released in the Sep 2014 and Dec 2014 meetings. There are three changes in the view.
1. Growth “∆% GDP.” The FOMC decreases the forecast of GDP growth in 2016. The FOMC projects GDP growth in 2016 from 1.7 to 1.9 percent at the meeting in Sep 2016, increasing to 1.8 to 1.9 percent at the meeting in Dec 2016. The FOMC projects GDP growth in 2017 at 1.9 to 2.2 percent in the Sep 2016 meeting and 1.9 to 2.3 percent in the Dec 14, 2016, meeting.
2. Rate of Unemployment “UNEM%.” The FOMC changed the forecast of the rate of unemployment for 2016 from 4.7 to 4.9 percent at the meeting on Sep 21, 2016 to 4.7 to 4.8 percent at the meeting on Dec 14, 2016. Projections of the rate of unemployment are moving closer to around 5 percent or lower with 4.3 to 4.7 percent in 2018 after the meeting on Dec 14, 2016.
3. Inflation “∆% PCE Inflation.” The FOMC increased the forecast prices of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation for 2017 to 1.7 to 2.0 percent at the meeting on Dec 14, 2016. There are no projections exceeding 2.0 percent in the central tendency except for 2.0 to 2.1 percent in 2019. The longer run projection is at 2.0 percent.
4. Core Inflation “∆% Core PCE Inflation.” Core inflation is PCE inflation excluding food and energy. There is similar mild inflation in the projection for 2016 to 1.7 to 1.8 percent at the meeting on Dec 14, 2016. In 2017, there is change in the projection from 1.7 to 1.9 percent at the meeting on Sep 21, 2016 to 1.8 to 1.9 percent at the meeting on Dec 14, 2015. The rate of change of the core PCE is at or below 2.0 percent in the central tendency.
Table IV-2, US, Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in FOMC, Sep 21, 2016 and Dec 14, 2016
| ∆% GDP | UNEM % | ∆% PCE Inflation | ∆% Core PCE Inflation | |
| Central | ||||
| 2014 | 2.3 to 2.4 | 5.8 | 1.2 to 1.3 | 1.5 to 1.6 |
| 2015 Sep PR | 2.1 2.0 to 2.3 | 5.0 5.0 to 5.1 | 0.4 0.3 to 0.5 | 1.3 1.3 to 1.4 |
| 2016 Sep PR | 1.8 to 1.9 1.7 to 1.9 | 4.7 to 4.8 4.7 to 4.9 | 1.5 1.2 to 1.4 | 1.7 to 1.8 1.6 to 1.8 |
| 2017 Sep PR | 1.9 to 2.3 1.9 to 2.2 | 4.5 to 4.6 4.5 to 4.7 | 1.7 to 2.0 1.7 to 1.9 | 1.8 to 1.9 1.7 to 1.9 |
| 2018 Sep PR | 1.8 to 2.2 1.8 to 2.1 | 4.3 to 4.7 4.4 to 4.7 | 1.9 to 2.0 1.8 to 2.0 | 1.9 to 2.0 1.9 to 2.0 |
| 2019 Sep PR | 1.8 to 2.0 1.7 to 2.0 | 4.3 to 4.8 4.4 to 4.8 | 2.0 to 2.1 1.9 to 2.0 | 2.0 2.0 |
| Longer Run Sep PR | 1.8 to 2.0 1.7 to 2.0 | 4.7 to 5.0 4.7 to 5.0 | 2.0 2.0 | |
| Range | ||||
| 2014 | NA | 5.7 to 5.8 | 1.2 to 1.6 | 1.5 to 1.6 |
| 2015 Sep PR | 2.0 to 2.2 1.9 to 2.5 | 5.0 4.9 to 5.2 | 0.3 to 0.5 0.3 to 1.0 | 1.2 to 1.4 1.2 to 1.7 |
| 2016 Sep PR | 1.8 to 2.0 1.7 to 2.0 | 4.7 to 4.8 4.7 to 4.9 | 1.5 to 1.6 1.1 to 1.7 | 1.6 to 1.8 1.5 to 2.0 |
| 2017 Sep PR | 1.7 to 2.4 1.6 to 2.5 | 4.4 to 4.7 4.4 to 4.8 | 1.7 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.0 | 1.7 to 2.0 1.6 to 2.0 |
| 2018 Sep PR | 1.7 to 2.3 1.5 to 2.3 | 4.2 to 4.7 4.3 to 4.9 | 1.8 to 2.2 1.8 to 2.0 | 1.8 to 2.2 1.8 to 2.0 |
| 2019 Sep PR | 1.5 to 2.2 1.6 to 2.2 | 4.1 to 4.8 4.2 to 5.0 | 1.8 to 2.2 1.8 to 2.1 | 1.8 to 2.2 1.8 to 2.1 |
| Longer Run Sep PR | 1.6 to 2.2 1.6 to 2.2 | 4.5 to 5.0 4.5 to 5.0 | 2.0 2.0 |
Notes: UEM: unemployment; PR: Projection
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20160615.htm
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20140917.pdf
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20141217.pdf
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150318.pdf
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150617.pdf
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150917.pdf
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20151216.pdf
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20160316.pdf
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20160921.pdf
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20160921.htm
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20161214.pdf
Another important decision at the FOMC meeting on Jan 25, 2012, is formal specification of the goal of inflation of 2 percent per year but without specific goal for unemployment (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm):
“Following careful deliberations at its recent meetings, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reached broad agreement on the following principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. The Committee intends to reaffirm these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January.
The FOMC is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.
Inflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee's policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals.
The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.
The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the corresponding interval several years earlier.
In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary. However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. ”
The probable intention of this specific inflation goal is to “anchor” inflationary expectations. Massive doses of monetary policy of promoting growth to reduce unemployment could conflict with inflation control. Economic agents could incorporate inflationary expectations in their decisions. As a result, the rate of unemployment could remain the same but with much higher rate of inflation (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html See Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-116). Strong commitment to maintaining inflation at 2 percent could control expectations of inflation.
The FOMC continues its efforts of increasing transparency that can improve the credibility of its firmness in implementing its dual mandate. Table IV-3 provides the views by participants of the FOMC of the levels at which they expect the fed funds rate in 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and the in the longer term. Table IV-3 is inferred from a chart provided by the FOMC with the number of participants expecting the target of fed funds rate (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20161214.pdf) and in accessible material (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20161214.htm). This table is consistent with the guidance statement of the FOMC that rates will remain at low levels. For 2017, 10 participants expect the rate between 1.0 and 1.5 percent, 2 participants between 0.5 and 1.0 percent and 5 participants above 1.5 percent. In the long term, most participants expect the fed funds rate in the range of 3.0 to 4.0 percent.
Table IV-3, US, Views of Target Federal Funds Rate at Year-End of Federal Reserve Board
Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Dec 14, 2016
| 0.25 to 0.50 | 0.5 to 1.0 | 1.0 to 1.5 | 1.5 to 2.0 | 2.0 to 3.0 | 3.0 to 4.0 | |
| 2016 | 17 | |||||
| 2017 | 2 | 10 | 4 | 1 | ||
| 2018 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 3 | ||
| 2019 | 1 | 10 | 7 | |||
| Longer Run | 14 | 9 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20161214.pdf
Additional information is provided in Table IV-4 with the number of participants expecting increasing interest rates in the years from 2015 to 2017. It is evident from Table IV-4 that the prevailing view of the FOMC is for interest rates to continue at low levels until 2015 but with some increase. This view is consistent with the economic projections of low economic growth, relatively high unemployment and subdued inflation provided in Table IV-2. The FOMC states that rates will continue to be low even after return of the economy to potential growth.
Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Sep 17, 2015
| Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Fed Funds Rate | Number of Participants |
| 2015 | 13 |
| 2016 | 3 |
| 2017 | 1 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150917.pdf
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm
The harmonized index of consumer prices of the euro area in Table IV-5 has similar inflation waves as in most countries (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html). In the first wave, consumer prices in the euro area increased at the annual equivalent rate of 5.2 percent in Jan-Apr 2011. In the second wave, risk aversion caused unwinding of commodity carry trades with inflation decreasing at the annual equivalent rate of minus 2.4 percent in May-Jul 2011. In the third wave, improved risk appetite resulted in annual equivalent inflation in Aug-Nov 2011 at 4.3 percent. In the fourth wave, return of risk aversion caused decline of consumer prices at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, improved attitudes toward risk aversion resulted in higher consumer price inflation at the high annual equivalent rate of 9.6 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell to minus 2.8 percent in May-Jul 2012. In the seventh wave, increasing risk appetite caused new carry trade exposures that resulted in annual equivalent inflation of 6.8 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 5.3 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. In the eighth wave, annual-equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Nov 2012. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 4.9 percent in Dec 2012. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 11.4 percent in Jan 2013. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 10.0 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in Apr 2013. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2013. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 5.8 percent in Jul 2013. In the fifteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent in Aug-Sep 2013. In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Oct-Nov 2013. In the seventeenth wave, annual inflation returned at 4.9 percent in Dec 2013. In the eighteenth wave, inflation fell at annual equivalent 12.4 percent in Jan 2014. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 5.3 percent in Feb-Apr 2014. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in May 2014. Inflation volatility around the world is confusing the information required in investment and consumption decisions. In the twenty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Jun 2014. In the twenty-second wave, annual equivalent inflation was at minus 7.0 percent in Jul 2014. In the twenty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.0 percent in Aug-Sep 2014. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 5.6 percent in Oct 2014-Jan 2015. In the twenty-fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 6.5 percent in Feb-May 2015. In the twenty-sixth wave, prices changed at 0.0 percent in Jun 2015. In the twenty-seventh wave, prices fell at annual equivalent 3.5 percent in Jul 2015. In the twenty-eighth wave, consumer prices increased at annual equivalent 1.8 percent in Sep-Oct 2015. In the twenty-ninth wave, consumer prices fell at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in Nov-Dec 2015. In the thirtieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 15.6 percent in Jan 2016. In the thirty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 8.7 percent in Feb-Mar 2016. In the thirty-second wave, prices changed at 0.0 percent in Apr 2016. In the thirty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 3.7 percent in May-Jun 2016. In the thirty-fourth wave, consumer prices fell at annual equivalent 7.0 percent in Jul 2016. In the thirty-fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Aug 2016. In the thirty-sixth wave, consumer prices increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Sep-Oct. In the thirty-seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was at minus 1.2 percent in Nov 2016. In the thirty-eighth wave, consumer prices increased at annual equivalent rate of 6.2 percent in Dec 2016. In the thirty-ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 9.2 percent in Jan 2017. The bottom part of Table IV-11 provides annual inflation in the euro area from 1999 to 2016. HICP inflation was 3.3 percent in 2008 mostly because of carry trades from interest rates falling to zero into commodity futures. Exposures in commodity futures were reversed in the flight to US government obligations with resulting inflation of 0.3 percent in 2009. Reallocations of portfolios of financial investors according to risk aversion caused high volatility of inflation in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.
Table IV-5, Euro Area Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices Month and 12 Months ∆%
| Month ∆% | 12 Months ∆% | |
| Jan 2017 | -0.8 | 1.8 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -9.2 | |
| Dec 2016 | 0.5 | 1.1 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 6.2 | |
| Nov | -0.1 | 0.6 |
| AE ∆% Nov | -1.2 | |
| Oct | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| Sep | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Oct | 3.7 | |
| Aug | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Aug | 1.2 | |
| Jul | -0.6 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jul | -7.0 | |
| Jun | 0.2 | 0.1 |
| May | 0.4 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% May-Jun | 3.7 | |
| Apr | 0.0 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Apr | 0.0 | |
| Mar | 1.2 | 0.0 |
| Feb | 0.2 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Mar | 8.7 | |
| Jan | -1.4 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -15.6 | |
| Dec 2015 | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| Nov | -0.1 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Nov-Dec | -0.6 | |
| Oct | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Sep | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Oct | 1.8 | |
| Aug | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Jul | -0.6 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jul-Aug | -3.5 | |
| Jun | 0.0 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jun | 0.0 | |
| May | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Apr | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Mar | 1.1 | -0.1 |
| Feb | 0.6 | -0.3 |
| AE ∆% Feb-May | 6.5 | |
| Jan | -1.5 | -0.6 |
| Dec 2014 | -0.1 | -0.2 |
| Nov | -0.2 | 0.3 |
| Oct | -0.1 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Jan | -5.6 | |
| Sep | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Aug | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Sep | 3.0 | |
| Jul | -0.6 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Jul | -7.0 | |
| Jun | 0.1 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Jun | 1.2 | |
| May | -0.1 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% May | -1.2 | |
| Apr | 0.1 | 0.7 |
| Mar | 0.9 | 0.5 |
| Feb | 0.3 | 0.7 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Apr | 5.3 | |
| Jan | -1.1 | 0.8 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -12.4 | |
| Dec 2013 | 0.4 | 0.8 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 4.9 | |
| Nov | -0.1 | 0.8 |
| Oct | -0.1 | 0.7 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Nov | -2.4 | |
| Sep | 0.5 | 1.1 |
| Aug | 0.1 | 1.3 |
| AE ∆% Aug- Sep | 3.7 | |
| Jul | -0.5 | 1.6 |
| AE ∆% Jul | -5.8 | |
| Jun | 0.1 | 1.6 |
| May | 0.1 | 1.4 |
| AE ∆% May-Jun | 1.2 | |
| Apr | -0.1 | 1.2 |
| AE ∆% Apr | -1.2 | |
| Mar | 1.2 | 1.7 |
| Feb | 0.4 | 1.8 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Mar | 10.0 | |
| Jan | -1.0 | 2.0 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -11.4 | |
| Dec 2012 | 0.4 | 2.2 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 4.9 | |
| Nov | -0.2 | 2.2 |
| AE ∆% Nov | -2.4 | |
| Oct | 0.2 | 2.5 |
| Sep | 0.7 | 2.6 |
| Aug | 0.4 | 2.6 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Oct | 5.3 | |
| Jul 2012 | -0.5 | 2.4 |
| Jun | -0.1 | 2.4 |
| May | -0.1 | 2.4 |
| AE ∆% May-Jul | -2.8 | |
| Apr | 0.5 | 2.6 |
| Mar | 1.3 | 2.7 |
| Feb | 0.5 | 2.7 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Apr | 9.6 | |
| Jan | -0.8 | 2.7 |
| Dec 2011 | 0.3 | 2.8 |
| AE ∆% Dec-Jan | -3.0 | |
| Nov | 0.1 | 3.0 |
| Oct | 0.4 | 3.0 |
| Sep | 0.7 | 3.0 |
| Aug | 0.2 | 2.6 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Nov | 4.3 | |
| Jul | -0.6 | 2.6 |
| Jun | 0.0 | 2.7 |
| May | 0.0 | 2.7 |
| AE ∆% May-Jul | -2.4 | |
| Apr | 0.6 | 2.8 |
| Mar | 1.4 | 2.7 |
| Feb | 0.4 | 2.4 |
| Jan | -0.7 | 2.3 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 5.2 | |
| Dec 2010 | 0.6 | 2.2 |
| Annual ∆% | 1.7 | |
| 2016 | 0.2 | |
| 2015 | 0.0 | |
| 2014 | 0.4 | |
| 2013 | 1.3 | |
| 2012 | 2.5 | |
| 2011 | 2.7 | |
| 2010 | 1.6 | |
| 2009 | 0.3 | |
| 2008 | 3.3 | |
| 2007 | 2.2 | |
| 2006 | 2.2 | |
| 2005 | 2.2 | |
| 2004 | 2.2 | |
| 2003 | 2.1 | |
| 2002 | 2.3 | |
| 2001 | 2.4 | |
| 2000 | 2.2 | |
| 1999 | 1.2 |
AE: annual equivalent Source: EUROSTAT
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
Table IV-6 provides weights and inflation of selected components of the HICP of the euro area. Inflation of all items excluding energy increased 1.1 percent in Jan 2016 relative to Jan 2016. Prices of non-energy industrial goods increased 0.5 percent in Jan 2017 relative to a year earlier. Inflation of services was 1.2 percent in Jan 2017 relative to a year earlier.
Table IV-6, Euro Area, HICP Inflation and Selected Components, ∆%
| Weight 2017 | Jan 2017/ Jan 2016 | Dec 2016/Dec 2015 | ∆% Nov 2016/Nov 2015 | |
| All Items | 1000.0 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| All Items ex Energy | 904.7 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.8 |
| All Items ex Energy, Food, Alcohol & Tobacco | 708.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 |
| All Items ex Energy & Unprocessed Food | 829.5 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 |
| All Items ex Energy & Seasonal Food | 864.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 |
| All Items ex Tobacco | 976.3 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.5 |
| Energy | 95.3 | 8.1 | 2.6 | -1.1 |
| Food, Alcohol & Tobacco | 195.9 | 1.8 | 1.2 | 0.7 |
| Non-energy Industrial Goods | 263.1 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Services | 445.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 |
AE: annual equivalent
Source: EUROSTAT
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
Table IV-7 provides monthly and 12 months consumer price inflation in France. There are the same waves as in inflation worldwide (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html). In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation in Jan-Apr 2011 was 4.3 percent driven by the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures positions in an environment of risk appetite. In the second wave, risk aversion caused the reversal of carry trades into commodity futures, resulting in the fall of the annual equivalent inflation rate to minus 1.2 percent in May-Jul 2011. In the third wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 2.7 percent in Aug-Nov 2011 with alternations of risk aversion and risk appetite. In the fourth wave, risk aversion originating in the European debt crisis caused annual equivalent inflation of 0.0 percent from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 5.3 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in May-Jul 2012 during another bout of risk aversion causing reversal of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity price futures exposures. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 8.7 percent in Aug 2012, 3.0 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 2.8 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Nov 2012 and minus 1.6 percent in Nov 2012 to Jan 2013. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 6.8 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Apr 2013 because of reversal of commodity carry trades. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.8 percent in May-Jun 2013. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.5 percent in Jul 2013. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 6.2 percent in Aug 2013. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.6 percent in Sep-Nov 2013. In the fifteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent in Dec 2013. In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 7.0 percent in Jan 2014. In the seventeenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 6.8 percent in Feb-Mar 2014. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 0.0 percent in Apr-Jun 2014. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.5 percent in Jul 2014. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 6.2 percent in Aug 2014. In the twenty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Sep-Nov 2014. In the twenty-second wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Dec 2014. In the twenty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 11.4 percent in Jan 2015. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 5.2 percent in Feb-May 2015. In the twenty-fifth wave, consumer prices fell at 3.0 percent annual equivalent in Jun-Jul 2015. In the twenty-sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent in Aug 2015. In the twenty-seventh wave, consumer prices fell at 4.7 percent annual equivalent in Sep 2015. In the twenty-eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Oct 2015. In the twenty-ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Nov 2015. In the thirtieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Dec 2015. In the thirty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 11.4 percent in Jan 2016. In the thirty-second wave, annual equivalent inflation was 4.6 percent in Feb-May 2016. In the thirty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Jun 2016. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.7 percent in Jul 2016. In the thirty-fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent in Aug 2016. In the thirty-sixth wave, consumer prices fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Sep 2016. In the thirty-seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 0.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2016. In the thirty-eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent in Dec 2016. In the thirty-ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.5 percent in Jan 2017.
Table IV-7, France, Consumer Price Index, Month and 12-Month ∆%
| Month ∆% | 12-Month ∆% | |
| Jan 2017 | -0.3 | 1.4 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -3.5 | |
| Dec 2016 | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 3.7 | |
| Nov | 0.0 | 0.6 |
| Oct | 0.0 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Nov | 0.0 | |
| Sep | -0.2 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Sep | -2.4 | |
| Aug | 0.3 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Aug | 3.7 | |
| Jul | -0.4 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jul | -4.7 | |
| Jun | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jun | 1.2 | |
| May | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| Apr | 0.1 | -0.2 |
| Mar | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Feb | 0.3 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Feb-May | 4.6 | |
| Jan | -1.0 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -11.4 | |
| Dec 2015 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 2.4 | |
| Nov | -0.2 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Nov | -2.4 | |
| Oct | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Oct | 1.2 | |
| Sep | -0.4 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Sep | -4.7 | |
| Aug | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Aug | 3.7 | |
| Jul | -0.4 | 0.2 |
| Jun | -0.1 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Jun-Jul | -3.0 | |
| May | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Apr | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Mar | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Feb | 0.7 | -0.3 |
| AE ∆% Feb-May | 5.2 | |
| Jan | -1.0 | -0.4 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -11.4 | |
| Dec 2014 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 1.2 | |
| Nov 2014 | -0.2 | 0.3 |
| Oct | 0.0 | 0.5 |
| Sep | -0.4 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Nov | -2.4 | |
| Aug | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Aug | 6.2 | |
| Jul | -0.3 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Jul | -3.5 | |
| Jun | 0.0 | 0.5 |
| May | 0.0 | 0.7 |
| Apr | 0.0 | 0.7 |
| AE ∆% Apr-Jun | 0.0 | |
| Mar | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| Feb | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Mar | 6.8 | |
| Jan | -0.6 | 0.6 |
| AE ∆% Jan | -7.0 | |
| Dec 2013 | 0.3 | 0.7 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 3.7 | |
| Nov | -0.1 | 0.7 |
| Oct | -0.1 | 0.6 |
| Sep | -0.2 | 0.9 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Nov | -1.6 | |
| Aug | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| AE ∆% Aug | 6.2 | |
| Jul | -0.3 | 1.1 |
| AE ∆% Jul | -3.5 | |
| Jun | 0.2 | 0.9 |
| May | 0.1 | 0.8 |
| AE ∆% May-Jun | 1.8 | |
| Apr | -0.2 | 0.7 |
| AE ∆% Apr | -2.4 | |
| Mar | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| Feb | 0.3 | 1.0 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Mar | 6.8 | |
| Jan | -0.5 | 1.2 |
| Dec 2012 | 0.3 | 1.3 |
| Nov | -0.2 | 1.4 |
| AE ∆% Nov-Jan | -1.6 | |
| Oct | 0.2 | 1.9 |
| Sep | -0.2 | 1.9 |
| Aug | 0.7 | 2.1 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Oct | 2.8 | |
| Jul | -0.5 | 1.9 |
| Jun | 0.0 | 1.9 |
| May | -0.1 | 2.0 |
| AE ∆% May-Jul | -2.4 | |
| Apr | 0.1 | 2.1 |
| Mar | 0.8 | 2.3 |
| Feb | 0.4 | 2.3 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Apr | 5.3 | |
| Jan | -0.4 | 2.4 |
| Dec 2011 | 0.4 | 2.5 |
| AE ∆% Dec-Jan | 0.0 | |
| Nov | 0.3 | 2.5 |
| Oct | 0.2 | 2.3 |
| Sep | -0.1 | 2.2 |
| Aug | 0.5 | 2.2 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Nov | 2.7 | |
| Jul | -0.5 | 1.9 |
| Jun | 0.1 | 2.1 |
| May | 0.1 | 2.0 |
| AE ∆% May-Jul | -1.2 | |
| Apr | 0.3 | 2.0 |
| Mar | 0.8 | 2.0 |
| Feb | 0.5 | 1.6 |
| Jan | -0.3 | 1.8 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 4.3 | |
| Dec 2010 | 0.4 | 1.7 |
| Annual | ||
| 2016 | 0.2 | |
| 2015 | 0.0 | |
| 2014 | 0.5 | |
| 2013 | 0.9 | |
| 2012 | 2.0 | |
| 2011 | 2.1 | |
| 2010 | 1.5 | |
| 2009 | 0.1 | |
| 2008 | 2.8 | |
| 2007 | 1.5 | |
| 2006 | 1.7 | |
| 2005 | 1.7 | |
| 2004 | 2.2 | |
| 2003 | 2.1 | |
| 2002 | 1.9 | |
| 2001 | 1.6 | |
| 2000 | 1.7 | |
| 1999 | 0.5 | |
| 1998 | 0.6 | |
| 1997 | 1.2 | |
| 1996 | 2.0 | |
| 1995 | 1.8 | |
| 1994 | 1.6 | |
| 1993 | 2.1 | |
| 1992 | 2.4 | |
| 1991 | 3.2 |
AE: Annual Equivalent Metropolitan France
Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2590362
Chart IV-1 provides the consumer price index of France. There is the hump caused by speculative carry trades in 2008 from zero interest rates into derivatives of commodities and reversal of exposures during flight to the dollar and obligations of the US government (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). Inflation oscillated in waves along an upward trend and stabilized in current reversal of exposures in commodities in reallocations of portfolios among classes of risk financial assets.
Chart IV-1, France, Consumer Price Index, Jan 1998-Jan 2017, 1998=100
Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2590362
Table IV-8 provides consumer price inflation in France and of various items in Jan 2017 and in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017. Inflation of all items was minus 0.2 percent in Jan 2017 and 1.3 percent in 12 months. Energy prices increased 4.5 percent in Jan 2017 and increased 10.3 percent in 12 months. Transport prices decreased 3.5 percent in Jan 2017 and increased 1.2 percent in 12 months. Prices of communications decreased 3.4 percent in Jan 2017 and decreased 1.1 percent in 12 months. Rentals and dwellings show 12-month increase of 0.3 percent. Services decreased 0.1 percent in Jan 2017 and increased 0.9 percent in 12 months.
Table IV-8, France, Consumer Price Index, Month and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Index and Components, ∆%
| Jan 2017 | Weights | Month ∆% | 12-Month ∆% |
| All Items | 10000 | -0.2 | 1.3 |
| Food | 1627 | 0.4 | 1.3 |
| Manufactured Products | 2617 | -2.4 | -0.3 |
| Energy | 748 | 4.5 | 10.3 |
| Petroleum Products | 378 | 7.5 | 19.9 |
| Services | 4820 | -0.1 | 0.9 |
| Rentals, Dwellings | 779 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| Transport | 282 | -3.5 | 1.2 |
| Communications | 242 | -3.4 | -1.1 |
Note: Data for France excluding Mayotte
Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2590362
Chart IV-2 of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques provides headline and core consumer prices in France. Consumer prices have oscillated recently with mixed increase in the final segment.
Chart IV-2, France, Consumer Price Index and Core Consumer Price Index
Note: CPI Headline Consumer Price Index; ISJ: Core Consumer Price Index
Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2590362
The index of producer prices for industrial products of Germany increased 0.7 percent in Jan 2017, not seasonally adjusted (NSA), increased 0.8 percent calendar and seasonally adjusted (CSA) in Jan 2017 and increased 2.4 percent not seasonally adjusted (NSA) in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017, as shown in Table IV-9. The producer price index of Germany has similar waves of inflation as in many other countries (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html). In the first wave from Jan to Apr 2011, the annual equivalent rate of producer price inflation was 10.4 percent NSA and 6.2 percent CSA, propelled by carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity futures in a mood of risk appetite. In the second wave in May and Jun 2011, the annual equivalent rate of producer price inflation was only 0.6 percent NSA because of the collapse of the carry trade in fear of risks of European sovereign debt but 3.7 percent CSA. In the third wave from Jul to Sep 2011, annual-equivalent producer price inflation in Germany was 2.4 percent NSA and 3.2 percent CSA with fluctuations in commodity prices resulting from perceptions of the sovereign risk crisis in Europe. In the fourth wave from Oct to Nov 2011, annual equivalent inflation was 0.6 percent NSA and 1.8 percent CSA. In the fifth wave from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012, annual equivalent inflation was at 0.0 percent NSA and minus 0.6 percent CSA in return of risk aversion. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 6.2 percent in Feb-Mar 2012 NSA and 4.9 percent in Feb-Apr and 2.0 percent CSA. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.8 percent in May-Jul 2012 NSA and minus 0.4 percent CSA. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 4.3 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 NSA and 2.4 percent CSA. In the ninth wave, renewed risk aversion resulted in annual equivalent inflation NSA of minus 0.8 percent in Oct-Dec 2012 and 0.8 percent CSA. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 7.4 percent NSA and 2.4 percent CSA in Jan 2013. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation NSA was minus 2.4 percent in Feb-Apr 2013 and minus 2.0 percent CSA. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.8 percent in May-Aug 2013 and minus 1.2 percent CSA. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent NSA and 0.0 CSA in Sep 2013. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.8 percent in Oct-Nov 2013 NSA and minus 1.2 percent CSA. In the fifteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 NSA in Dec 2013 and 2.4 percent SA. In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent was minus 1.2 percent in Jan-Sep 2014 NSA and minus 1.3 percent CSA. In the seventeenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.4 percent NSA and minus 2.4 percent CSA in Oct 2014-Jan 2015. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Feb-Apr 2015 and minus 0.4 percent CSA. In the nineteenth wave, the producer price index of Germany fell at annual equivalent 0.4 percent NSA in May-Jul 2015 and fell at 2.8 percent SA. In the twentieth wave, producer prices fell at annual equivalent 5.1 percent NSA in Aug-Oct 2015 and fell at 3.9 percent SA annual equivalent. In the twenty-first wave, producer prices fell at annual equivalent 2.4 percent NSA in Nov 2015 and fell at 3.5 percent annual equivalent SA. In the twenty-second wave, producer prices fell at 6.6 percent NSA in Dec 2015-Feb 2016 and fell at 3.5 percent CSA. In the twenty-third wave, the producer price index changed at 0.0 percent NSA in Mar 2016 in annual equivalent and fell at 2.4 percent CSA. In the twenty-fourth wave, the producer price index increased at 1.2 percent NSA in Apr 2016 and fell at 1.2 percent CSA. In the twenty-fifth wave, producer prices increased at 4.1 percent annual equivalent in May-Jul 2016 and at 1.2 percent CSA. In the twenty-sixth wave, producer prices fell at 1.8 percent in Aug-Sep 2016 and increased at 1.8 percent CSA. In the twenty-seventh wave, producer prices increased at 6.5 percent in Oct 2016-Jan 2017 2017 and at 6.8 percent CSA.
Table IV-9, Germany, Index of Producer Prices for Industrial Products ∆%
| 12 Months ∆% NSA | Month ∆% NSA | Month ∆% Calendar and SA | |
| Jan 2017 | 2.4 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| Dec | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Nov | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Oct | -0.4 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Jan | 6.5 | 6.8 | |
| Sep | -1.4 | -0.2 | 0.1 |
| Aug | -1.6 | -0.1 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Sep | -1.8 | 1.8 | |
| Jul | -2.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Jun | -2.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| May | -2.7 | 0.4 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% May-Jul | 4.1 | 1.2 | |
| Apr | -3.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Apr | 1.2 | -1.2 | |
| Mar | -3.1 | 0.0 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Mar | 0.0 | -2.4 | |
| Feb | -3.0 | -0.5 | -0.3 |
| Jan | -2.4 | -0.7 | -0.4 |
| Dec 2015 | -2.3 | -0.5 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Dec-Feb | -6.6 | -3.5 | |
| Nov | -2.5 | -0.2 | -0.3 |
| AE ∆% Nov | -2.4 | -3.5 | |
| Oct | -2.3 | -0.4 | -0.4 |
| Sep | -2.1 | -0.4 | -0.3 |
| Aug | -1.7 | -0.5 | -0.3 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Oct | -5.1 | -3.9 | |
| Jul | -1.3 | 0.0 | -0.2 |
| Jun | -1.4 | -0.1 | -0.3 |
| May | -1.3 | 0.0 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% May-Jul | -0.4 | -2.8 | |
| Apr | -1.5 | 0.1 | -0.1 |
| Mar | -1.7 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Feb | -2.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Apr | 1.2 | -0.4 | |
| Jan | -2.2 | -0.6 | -0.2 |
| Dec 2014 | -1.7 | -0.7 | -0.4 |
| Nov | -0.9 | 0.0 | -0.1 |
| Oct | -1.0 | -0.2 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Jan | -4.4 | -2.4 | |
| Sep | -1.0 | 0.0 | -0.1 |
| Aug | -0.8 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| Jul | -0.8 | -0.1 | -0.2 |
| Jun | -0.7 | 0.0 | -0.1 |
| May | -0.8 | -0.2 | -0.1 |
| Apr | -0.9 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| Mar | -0.9 | -0.3 | -0.2 |
| Feb | -0.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Jan | -1.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Sep | -1.2 | -1.3 | |
| Dec 2013 | -0.5 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Dec | 1.2 | 2.4 | |
| Nov | -0.8 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| Oct | -0.7 | -0.2 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Nov | -1.8 | -1.2 | |
| Sep | -0.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% Sep | 3.7 | 0.0 | |
| Aug | -0.5 | -0.1 | -0.2 |
| Jul | 0.0 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| Jun | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 |
| May | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% May-Aug | -1.8 | -1.2 | |
| Apr | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| Mar | 0.1 | -0.3 | -0.2 |
| Feb | 0.9 | -0.2 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Apr | -2.4 | -2.0 | |
| Jan | 1.5 | 0.6 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jan | 7.4 | 2.4 | |
| Dec 2012 | 1.4 | -0.3 | 0.0 |
| Nov | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Oct | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Dec | -0.8 | 0.8 | |
| Sep | 1.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| Aug | 1.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Aug-Sep | 4.3 | 2.4 | |
| Jul | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Jun | 1.1 | -0.4 | -0.1 |
| May | 1.6 | -0.3 | 0.0 |
| AE ∆% May-Jul | -2.8 | -0.4 | |
| Apr | 1.9 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Mar | 2.6 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| Feb | 2.6 | 0.4 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Apr | 4.9 | 2.0 | |
| Jan | 2.9 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| Dec 2011 | 3.5 | -0.5 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Dec-Jan | 0.0 | -0.6 | |
| Nov | 4.6 | -0.1 | 0.1 |
| Oct | 4.9 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Nov | 0.6 | 1.8 | |
| Sep | 5.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Aug | 5.2 | -0.2 | 0.1 |
| Jul | 5.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Jul-Sep | 2.4 | 3.2 | |
| Jun | 5.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| May | 5.6 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% May-Jun | 0.6 | 3.7 | |
| Apr | 6.1 | 0.9 | 0.5 |
| Mar | 6.2 | 0.6 | 0.3 |
| Feb | 6.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| Jan | 5.3 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 10.4 | 6.2 |
Source:
Federal Statistical Agency of Germany (Statistiche Bundesamt Deutschland)
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html
Chart IV-3 of the Federal Statistical Agency of Germany Statistiche Bundesamt Deutschland provides the producer price index of Germany from 2008 to 2017. Producer price inflation peaked in 2008 with the rise of commodity prices induced by the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures during a global contraction. Prices then declined with the flight away from risk financial assets to government obligations after the financial panic in Sep 2008. With zero interest rates and no risk aversion, the carry trade pushed commodity futures prices upwardly resulting in new rising trend of the producer price index. The right-hand side of the chart shows moderation and even decline in prices because of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations across financial risk assets frustrating carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures.
Chart IV-3, Germany, Index of Producer Prices for Industrial Products, 2010=100
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html
Chart IV-3A of the Federal Statistical Agency of Germany Statistiche Bundesamt Deutschland provides the unadjusted producer price index, trend and trend ends. There is a clear upward trend of prices after the end of risk aversion with zero interest rates in 2009. Oscillations of the actual curve relative to trend originate in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. The final segment shows declining trend in reallocation of carry trades toward stocks and high-yield bonds and away from commodities.
Chart IV-3A, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, NSA, 2008-2017
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart IV-4 of the Federal Statistical Agency of Germany Statistiche Bundesamt Deutschland provides the unadjusted producer price index, trend and trend ends. There is a clear upward trend of prices after the end of risk aversion with zero interest rates in 2009. Oscillations of the actual curve relative to trend originate in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. The final segment shows declining trend in reallocation of carry trades toward stocks and high-yield bonds and away from commodities.
Chart IV-4, Germany, Index of Producer Prices for Industrial Products, Non-adjusted Value and Trend, 2010=100
Source: Statistiche Bundesamt Deutschland
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html
The first wave of commodity price increases in the first four months of Jan-Apr 2011 also influenced the surge of consumer price inflation in Italy shown in Table IV-10. Annual equivalent inflation in the first four months of 2011 from Jan to Apr was 4.9 percent. The crisis of confidence or risk aversion resulted in reversal of carry trades on commodity positions. Consumer price inflation in Italy was subdued in the second wave in Jun and May 2011 at 0.1 percent for annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent inflation increased to 2.4 percent. In the fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 jumped again at 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the fifth wave from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 at annual equivalent 4.3 percent. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 5.7 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 3.0 percent in Jul-Aug 2012. In the ninth wave, inflation collapsed to zero in Sep-Oct 2012 and was minus 0.8 percent in annual equivalent in Sep-Nov 2012. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Dec 2012 to Aug 2013 was 2.0 percent. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.2 percent in Sep-Nov 2013 during reallocations of investment portfolios away from commodity futures. In the twelfth wave, inflation returned in annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Dec 2013-Jan 2014. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 1.2 percent in Feb 2014. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.8 percent in Mar-Apr 2014. In the fifteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in May 2014. In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Jun 2014. In the seventeenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in Jul 2014. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Aug 2014. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.7 percent in Sep 2014. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 1.2 percent in Oct 2014. In the twenty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 2.4 percent in Nov 2014-Jan 2015. In the twenty-second wave, annual equivalent rose to 2.4 percent in Feb-Jun 2015. In the twenty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 1.2 percent in Jul 2015. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Aug 2015. In the twenty-fifth wave, consumer prices fell at 4.7 percent annual equivalent in Sep 2015. In the twenty-sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Oct 2015. In the twenty-seventh wave, consumer prices fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov-Dec 2015. In the twenty-eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 2.4 percent in Jan-Feb 2016. In the twenty-ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 2.4 percent in Mar 2016. In the thirtieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in Apr 2016. In the thirty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in May-Jun 2016. In the thirty-second wave, consumer prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Jul-Aug 2016. In the thirty-third wave, consumer prices fell at annual equivalent 1.6 percent in Sep-Nov 2016. In the thirty-fourth wave, consumer prices increased at annual equivalent 4.3 percent in Dec 2016-Jan 2017. There are worldwide shocks to economies by intermittent waves of inflation originating in combination of zero interest rates and quantitative easing with alternation of risk appetite and risk aversion (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html).
Table IV-10, Italy, Consumer Price Index
| Month | 12 Months | |
| Jan 2017 | 0.3 | 1.0 |
| Dec 2016 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Dec-Jan | 4.3 | |
| Nov | -0.1 | 0.1 |
| Oct | -0.1 | -0.2 |
| Sep | -0.2 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Nov | -1.6 | |
| Aug | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| Jul | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| Jul | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Jul-Aug | 2.4 | |
| Jun | 0.1 | -0.4 |
| May | 0.3 | -0.3 |
| AE ∆% May-Jun | 2.4 | |
| Apr | -0.1 | -0.5 |
| AE ∆% Apr | -1.2 | |
| Mar | 0.2 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Mar | 2.4 | |
| Feb | -0.2 | -0.3 |
| Jan | -0.2 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Feb | -2.4 | |
| Dec 2015 | 0.0 | 0.1 |
| Nov | -0.4 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Nov-Dec | -2.4 | |
| Oct | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Oct | 2.4 | |
| Sep | -0.4 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Sep | -4.7 | |
| Aug | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Aug | 2.4 | |
| Jul | -0.1 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Jul | -1.2 | |
| Jun | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| May | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Apr | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| Mar | 0.1 | -0.1 |
| Feb | 0.4 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Jun | 2.4 | |
| Jan | -0.4 | -0.6 |
| Dec 2014 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Nov | -0.2 | 0.2 |
| AE ∆% Nov-Jan | -2.4 | |
| Oct | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Oct | 1.2 | |
| Sep | -0.4 | -0.2 |
| AE ∆% Sep | -4.7 | |
| Aug | 0.2 | -0.1 |
| AE ∆% Aug | 2.4 | |
| Jul | -0.1 | 0.1 |
| AE ∆% Jul | -1.2 | |
| Jun | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| AE ∆% Jun | 1.2 | |
| May | -0.1 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% May | -1.2 | |
| Apr | 0.2 | 0.6 |
| Mar | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| AE ∆% Mar-Apr | 1.8 | |
| Feb | -0.1 | 0.5 |
| AE ∆% Feb | -1.2 | |
| Jan | 0.2 | 0.7 |
| Dec 2013 | 0.2 | 0.7 |
| AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014 | 2.4 | |
| Nov | -0.3 | 0.7 |
| Oct | -0.2 | 0.8 |
| Sep | -0.3 | 0.9 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Nov | -3.2 | |
| Aug | 0.4 | 1.2 |
| Jul | 0.1 | 1.2 |
| Jun | 0.3 | 1.2 |
| May | 0.0 | 1.1 |
| Apr | 0.0 | 1.1 |
| Mar | 0.2 | 1.6 |
| Feb | 0.1 | 1.9 |
| Jan | 0.2 | 2.2 |
| Dec 2012 | 0.2 | 2.3 |
| AE ∆% Dec 2012-Aug 2013 | 2.0 | |
| Nov | -0.2 | 2.5 |
| Oct | 0.0 | 2.6 |
| Sep | 0.0 | 3.2 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Nov | -0.8 | |
| Aug | 0.4 | 3.2 |
| Jul | 0.1 | 3.1 |
| AE ∆% Jul-Aug | 3.0 | |
| June | 0.2 | 3.3 |
| May | 0.0 | 3.2 |
| AE ∆% May-Jun | 1.2 | |
| Apr | 0.5 | 3.3 |
| Mar | 0.5 | 3.3 |
| Feb | 0.4 | 3.3 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Apr | 5.7 | |
| Jan | 0.3 | 3.2 |
| Dec 2011 | 0.4 | 3.3 |
| AE ∆% Dec-Jan | 4.3 | |
| Nov | -0.1 | 3.3 |
| Oct | 0.6 | 3.4 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Nov | 3.0 | |
| Sep | 0.0 | 3.0 |
| Aug | 0.3 | 2.8 |
| Jul | 0.3 | 2.7 |
| AE ∆% Jul-Sep | 2.4 | |
| Jun | 0.1 | 2.7 |
| May | 0.1 | 2.6 |
| AE ∆% May-Jun | 1.2 | |
| Apr | 0.5 | 2.6 |
| Mar | 0.4 | 2.5 |
| Feb | 0.3 | 2.4 |
| Jan | 0.4 | 2.1 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 4.9 | |
| Dec 2010 | 0.4 | 1.9 |
| Annual | ||
| 2016 | -0.1 | |
| 2015 | 0.1 | |
| 2014 | 0.2 | |
| 2013 | 1.2 | |
| 2012 | 3.0 | |
| 2011 | 2.8 | |
| 2010 | 1.5 | |
| 2009 | 0.8 | |
| 2008 | 3.3 | |
| 2007 | 1.8 | |
| 2006 | 2.1 |
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/197131
Chart IV-5 of the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica shows moderation in 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index of Italy with marginal increase followed by decline to 2.5 percent in Nov 2012, 2.3 percent in Dec 2012, 2.2 percent in Jan 2013, 1.9 percent in Feb 2013 and 1.6 percent in Mar 2013. Consumer prices increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr-May 2013 and 1.2 percent in Jun-Jul 2013. In Aug 2013, consumer prices increased 1.2 percent in 12 months. Consumer prices increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013 and 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013. Consumer price inflation increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Consumer prices increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014 and 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014 and 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Consumer prices fell 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014 and changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. Consumer prices fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015 and decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015. Consumer prices fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015 and decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016 and fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2016. Consumer prices fell 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016 and fell 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016. Consumer prices fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016 and fell 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016. Consumer prices fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016 and fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016 and fell 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016 and increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016. Consumer prices increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017.
Chart IV-5, Italy, Consumer Price Index 12-Month Percentage Changes
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
Table IV-11 provides month and 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price of Italy by segments. Total consumer price inflation in Jan 2017 was 0.3 percent and increased 1.0 percent in 12 months. Inflation of goods was 0.7 percent in Jan 2017 and 1.2 percent in 12 months. Prices of durable goods decreased 0.1 percent in Jan and decreased 0.5 percent in 12 months, different from inflation in several countries. Prices of energy increased 2.2 percent in Jan and increased 2.7 percent in 12 months. Food prices increased 1.2 percent in Jan and increased 2.1 percent in 12 months. Prices of services decreased 0.3 percent in Jan and rose 0.7 percent in 12 months. Transport prices, also influenced by commodity prices, decreased 1.7 percent in Jan and increased 1.0 percent in 12 months. Carry trades from zero interest rates to positions in commodity futures cause increases in commodity prices. Waves of inflation originate in periods when there is no risk aversion and commodity prices decline during periods of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html).
Table IV-11, Italy, Consumer Price Index and Segments, Month and 12-Month ∆%
| Jan 2017 | Weights | Month ∆% | 12-Month ∆% |
| General Index All Items | 1,000,000 | 0.3 | 1.0 |
| I Goods | 536,080 | 0.7 | 1.2 |
| Food | 175,273 | 1.2 | 2.1 |
| Energy | 84,456 | 2.2 | 2.7 |
| Durable | 84,846 | -0.1 | -0.5 |
| Nondurable | 66,173 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| II Services | 463,920 | -0.2 | 0.7 |
| Housing | 77,003 | 0.2 | 0.7 |
| Communications | 19,445 | 0.2 | -2.1 |
| Recreation, Culture and Health | 176,824 | -0.2 | 0.9 |
| Transport | 76,089 | -1.7 | 1.0 |
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/197131
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
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