Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation, Recovery without Hiring, United States Budget Quagmire, United States Industrial Production, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Executive Summary
I Recovery without Hiring
IA1 Hiring Collapse
IA2 Labor Underutilization
ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs
IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment
IIA United States Budget Quagmire
IIB United States Industrial Production
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
I Recovery without Hiring. Professor Edward P. Lazear (2012Jan19) at Stanford University finds that recovery of hiring in the US to peaks attained in 2007 requires an increase of hiring by 30 percent while hiring levels have increased by only 4 percent since Jan 2009. The high level of unemployment with low level of hiring reduces the statistical probability that the unemployed will find a job. According to Lazear (2012Jan19), the probability of finding a new job currently is about one third of the probability of finding a job in 2007. Improvements in labor markets have not increased the probability of finding a new job. Lazear (2012Jan19) quotes an essay coauthored with James R. Spletzer in the American Economic Review (Lazear and Spletzer 2012Mar, 2012May) on the concept of churn. A dynamic labor market occurs when a similar amount of workers is hired as those who are separated. This replacement of separated workers is called churn, which explains about two-thirds of total hiring. Typically, wage increases received in a new job are higher by 8 percent. Lazear (2012Jan19) argues that churn has declined 35 percent from the level before the recession in IVQ2007. Because of the collapse of churn, there are no opportunities in escaping falling real wages by moving to another job. As this blog argues, there are meager chances of escaping unemployment because of the collapse of hiring and those employed cannot escape falling real wages by moving to another job (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/capital-flows-exchange-rates-and.htm). Lazear and Spletzer (2012Mar, 1) argue that reductions of churn reduce the operational effectiveness of labor markets. Churn is part of the allocation of resources or in this case labor to occupations of higher marginal returns. The decline in churn can harm static and dynamic economic efficiency. Losses from decline of churn during recessions can affect an economy over the long-term by preventing optimal growth trajectories because resources are not used in the occupations where they provide highest marginal returns. Lazear and Spletzer (2012Mar 7-8) conclude that: “under a number of assumptions, we estimate that the loss in output during the recession [of 2007 to 2009] and its aftermath resulting from reduced churn equaled $208 billion. On an annual basis, this amounts to about .4% of GDP for a period of 3½ years.”
There are two additional facts discussed below: (1) there are about ten million fewer full-time jobs currently than before the recession of 2008 and 2009; and (2) the extremely high and rigid rate of youth unemployment is denying an early start to young people ages 16 to 24 years while unemployment of ages 45 years or over has swelled. There are four subsections. IA1 Hiring Collapse provides the data and analysis on the weakness of hiring in the United States economy. IA2 Labor Underutilization provides the measures of labor underutilization of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Statistics on the decline of full-time employment are in IA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment provides the data on high unemployment of ages 16 to 24 years and of ages 45 years or over.
IA1 Hiring Collapse. An important characteristic of the current fractured labor market of the US is the closing of the avenue for exiting unemployment and underemployment normally available through dynamic hiring. Another avenue that is closed is the opportunity for advancement in moving to new jobs that pay better salaries and benefits again because of the collapse of hiring in the United States. Those who are unemployed or underemployed cannot find a new job even accepting lower wages and no benefits. The employed cannot escape declining inflation-adjusted earnings because there is no hiring. The objective of this section is to analyze hiring and labor underutilization in the United States.
Blanchard and Katz (1997, 53 consider an appropriate measure of job stress:
“The right measure of the state of the labor market is the exit rate from unemployment, defined as the number of hires divided by the number unemployed, rather than the unemployment rate itself. What matters to the unemployed is not how many of them there are, but how many of them there are in relation to the number of hires by firms.”
The natural rate of unemployment and the similar NAIRU are quite difficult to estimate in practice (Ibid; see Ball and Mankiw 2002).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) created the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) with the purpose that (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/jltover.htm#purpose):
“These data serve as demand-side indicators of labor shortages at the national level. Prior to JOLTS, there was no economic indicator of the unmet demand for labor with which to assess the presence or extent of labor shortages in the United States. The availability of unfilled jobs—the jobs opening rate—is an important measure of tightness of job markets, parallel to existing measures of unemployment.”
The BLS collects data from about 16,000 US business establishments in nonagricultural industries through the 50 states and DC. The data are released monthly and constitute an important complement to other data provided by the BLS (see also Lazear and Spletzer 2012Mar, 6-7).
Hiring in the nonfarm sector (HNF) has declined from 63.8 million in 2006 to 52.0 million in 2012 or by 11.8 million while hiring in the private sector (HP) has declined from 59.5 million in 2006 to 48.5 million in 2012 or by 11.0 million, as shown in Table I-1. The ratio of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) has fallen from 47.2 in 2005 to 38.9 in 2012 and in the private sector (RHP) from 53.1 in 2005 to 43.4 in 2012. Hiring has not recovered as in previous cyclical expansions because of the low rate of economic growth in the current cyclical expansion. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective underutilization rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.
Table I-1, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in Thousands and Percentage of Total Employment
HNF | Rate RNF | HP | Rate HP | |
2001 | 62,948 | 47.8 | 58,825 | 53.1 |
2002 | 58,583 | 44.9 | 54,759 | 50.3 |
2003 | 56,451 | 43.4 | 53,056 | 48.9 |
2004 | 60,367 | 45.9 | 56,617 | 51.6 |
2005 | 63,150 | 47.2 | 59,372 | 53.1 |
2006 | 63,773 | 46.9 | 59,494 | 52.1 |
2007 | 62,421 | 45.4 | 58,035 | 50.3 |
2008 | 55,128 | 40.3 | 51,591 | 45.1 |
2009 | 46,357 | 35.4 | 43,031 | 39.8 |
2010 | 48,607 | 37.4 | 44,788 | 41.7 |
2011 | 49,675 | 37.8 | 46,552 | 42.5 |
2012 | 51,991 | 38.9 | 48,493 | 43.4 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-1 shows the annual level of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) that collapsed during the global recession after 2007 in contrast with milder decline in the shallow recession of 2001. Nonfarm hiring has not recovered, remaining at a depressed level.
Chart I-1, US, Level Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-2 shows the ratio or rate of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) that also fell much more in the recession of 2007 to 2009 than in the shallow recession of 2001. Recovery is weak in the current environment of cyclical slow growth.
Chart I-2, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Yearly percentage changes of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) are provided in Table I-2. There were much milder declines in 2002 of 6.9 percent and 3.6 percent in 2003 followed by strong rebounds of 6.9 percent in 2004 and 4.6 percent in 2005. In contrast, the contractions of nonfarm hiring in the recession after 2007 were much sharper in percentage points: 2.1 in 2007, 11.7 in 2008 and 15.9 percent in 2009. On a yearly basis, nonfarm hiring grew 4.9 percent in 2010 relative to 2009, 2.2 percent in 2011 and 4.7 percent in 2012.
Table I-2, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual Percentage Change, 2002-2012
Year | Annual ∆% |
2002 | -6.9 |
2003 | -3.6 |
2004 | 6.9 |
2005 | 4.6 |
2006 | 1.0 |
2007 | -2.1 |
2008 | -11.7 |
2009 | -15.9 |
2010 | 4.9 |
2011 | 2.2 |
2012 | 4.7 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total private hiring (HP) yearly data are provided in Chart I-4. There has been sharp contraction of total private hiring in the US and only milder recovery from 2010 to 2012.
Chart I-4, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring Level, Annual, 12-Month ∆%, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-5 plots the rate of total private hiring relative to employment (RHP). The rate collapsed during the global recession after 2007 with insufficient recovery.
Chart I-5, US, Total Private Hiring, Annual, 2001-2013
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-5A plots the rate of total private hiring relative to employment (RHP). The rate collapsed during the global recession after 2007 with insufficient recovery.
Chart I-5A, US, Rate Total Private Hiring Level, Annual, 2001-2012
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total nonfarm hiring (HNF), total private hiring (HP) and their respective rates are provided for the month of Dec in the years from 2001 to 2013 in Table I-3. Hiring numbers are in thousands. There is moderate recovery in HNF from 2744 thousand (or 2.7 million) in Dec 2009 to 2948 thousand in Dec 2010, 2990 thousand in Dec 2011, 3013 thousand in Dec 2012 and 4169 thousand in Dec 2013 for cumulative gain of 15.5 percent. HP rose from 2600 thousand in Dec 2009 to 2782 thousand in Dec 2010, 2809 thousand in Dec 2011, 2842 thousand in Dec 2012 and 3005 thousand in Dec 2013 for cumulative gain of 15.6 percent. HNF has fallen from 3835 thousand in Dec 2006 to 3169 thousand in Dec 2013 or by 17.4 percent. HP has fallen from 3635 thousand in Dec 2006 to 3005 thousand in Dec 2013 or by 17.3 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or individuals in condition to work, rose from 228.815 million in 2006 to 245.679 million in 2013 or by 16.864 million and the civilian labor force from 151.428 million in 2006 to 155.389 million in 2013 or by 3.961 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The number of nonfarm hires in the US fell from 63.773 million in 2006 to 51.991 million in 2012 or by 11.782 million and the number of private hires fell from 59.494 million in 2006 to 48.493 million in 2012 or by 11 million (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/). Private hiring of 63,773 million in 2006 was equivalent to 27.9 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, falling to 48.493 million in 2012 or 19.9 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 243.284 million in 2012. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 27.9 percent in 2006 would correspond to 67.876 million of hiring in 2012, which would be 19.383 million higher than actual 48.493 million in 2012. Cyclical slow growth over the entire business cycle from IVQ2007 to the present in comparison with earlier cycles and long-term trend (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html) explains the fact that there are many million fewer hires in the US than before the global recession. The labor market continues to be fractured, failing to provide an opportunity to exit from unemployment/underemployment or to find an opportunity for advancement away from declining inflation-adjusted earnings.
Table I-3, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in
Thousands and in Percentage of Total Employment Not Seasonally Adjusted
HNF | Rate RNF | HP | Rate HP | |
2001 Dec | 3541 | 2.7 | 3317 | 3.0 |
2002 Dec | 3698 | 2.8 | 3493 | 3.2 |
2003 Dec | 3697 | 2.8 | 3490 | 3.2 |
2004 Dec | 3859 | 2.9 | 3643 | 3.3 |
2005 Dec | 3777 | 2.8 | 3568 | 3.1 |
2006 Dec | 3835 | 2.8 | 3635 | 3.2 |
2007 Dec | 3610 | 2.6 | 3393 | 2.9 |
2008 Dec | 2997 | 2.2 | 2836 | 2.5 |
2009 Dec | 2744 | 2.1 | 2600 | 2.4 |
2010 Dec | 2948 | 2.2 | 2782 | 2.6 |
2011 Dec | 2990 | 2.2 | 2809 | 2.5 |
2012 Dec | 3013 | 2.2 | 2842 | 2.5 |
2013 Dec | 3169 | 2.3 | 3005 | 2.6 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/jlt/
Chart I-6 provides total nonfarm hiring on a monthly basis from 2001 to 2013. Nonfarm hiring rebounded in early 2010 but then fell and stabilized at a lower level than the early peak not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) of 4774 in May 2010 until it surpassed it with 4883 in Jun 2011 but declined to 3013 in Dec 2012. Nonfarm hiring fell to 2990 in Dec 2011 from 3827 in Nov and to revised 3683 in Feb 2012, increasing to 4210 in Mar 2012, 3013 in Dec 2012 and 4128 in Jan 2013 and declining to 3661 in Feb 2013. Nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted increased to 4137 in Nov 2013 and 3169 in Dec 2013. Chart I-6 provides seasonally adjusted (SA) monthly data. The number of seasonally-adjusted hires in Oct 2011 was 4159 thousand, increasing to revised 4489 thousand in Feb 2012, or 7.9 percent, moving to 4195 in Dec 2012 for cumulative increase of 0.5 percent from 4174 in Dec 2011 and 4437 in Dec 2013 for increase of 5.8 percent relative to 4195 in Dec 2012. The number of hires not seasonally adjusted was 4883 in Jun 2011, falling to 2990 in Dec 2011 but increasing to 4013 in Jan 2012 and declining to 3013 in Dec 2012. The number of nonfarm hiring not seasonally adjusted fell by 38.8 percent from 4883 in Jun 2011 to 2990 in Dec 2011 and fell 41.3 percent from 5130 in Jun 2012 to 3013 in Dec 2012 in a yearly-repeated seasonal pattern. The number of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5087 in Jun 2013 to 3169 in Dec 2013, or decline of 37.7 percent, showing strong seasonality.
Chart I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), 2001-2013 Month SA
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Similar behavior occurs in the rate of nonfarm hiring in Chart I-7. Recovery in early 2010 was followed by decline and stabilization at a lower level but with stability in monthly SA estimates of 3.2 in Aug 2011 to 3.2 in Jan 2012, increasing to 3.4 in May 2012 and falling to 3.3 in Jun 2012. The rate fell to 3.1 in Jul 2012, increasing to 3.3 in Aug 2012 but falling to 3.1 in Dec 2012 and 3.2 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Jun 2011 to 2.2 in Dec 2011, climbing to 3.8 in Jun 2012 but falling to 2.2 in Dec 2012. The rate of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Jun 2013 to 2.3 in Dec 2013. Rates of nonfarm hiring NSA were in the range of 2.8 (Dec) to 4.5 (Jun) in 2006.
Chart I-7, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring, Month SA 2001-2013
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
There is only milder improvement in total private hiring shown in Chart I-8. Hiring private (HP) rose in 2010 with stability and renewed increase in 2011 followed by almost stationary series in 2012. The number of private hiring seasonally adjusted fell from 4026 thousand in Sep 2011 to 3876 in Dec 2011 or by 3.7 percent, decreasing to 3915 in Jan 2012 or decline by 2.8 percent relative to the level in Sep 2011. The rate fell to 3934 in Sep 2012 or lower by 2.3 percent relative to Sep 2011, decreasing to 3915 in Dec 2012 for change of 0.0 percent relative to 3915 in Jan 2012. The number of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 4504 in Jun 2011 to 2809 in Dec 2011 or by 37.6 percent, reaching 3749 in Jan 2012 or decline of 16.8 percent relative to Jun 2011 and moving to 2842 in Dec 2012 or 39.8 percent lower relative to 4724 in Jun 2012. Hires fell from 4692 in Jun 2013 to 3005 in Dec 2013. Companies do not hire in the latter part of the year that explains the high seasonality in year-end employment data. For example, NSA private hiring fell from 5661 in Jun 2006 to 3635 in Dec 2006 or by 35.8 percent. Private hiring NSA data are useful in showing the huge declines from the period before the global recession. In Jul 2006, private hiring NSA was 5555, declining to 4245 in Jul 2011 or by 23.6 percent and to 4277 in Jul 2012 or lower by 23.0 percent relative to Jul 2006. Private hiring NSA fell from 3635 in Dec 2006 to 2842 in Dec 2012 or 21.8 percent and declined to 3005 in Dec 2013 or lower by 17.3 percent relative to Dec 2006. Private hiring fell from 5555 in Jul 2006 to 4633 in Jun 2013 or 16.6 percent. The conclusion is that private hiring in the US is around 20 percent below the hiring before the global recession while the noninstitutional population of the United States has grown from 228.815 million in 2006 to 245.679 million in 2013, by 16.864 million or 7.4 percent. The main problem in recovery of the US labor market has been the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
Chart I-8, US, Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2013
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-9 shows similar behavior in the rate of private hiring. The rate in 2011 in monthly SA data did not rise significantly above the peak in 2010. The rate seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Sep 2011 to 3.5 in Dec 2011 and reached 3.5 in Dec 2012 and 3.6 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted (NSA) fell from 3.7 in Sep 2011 to 2.5 in Dec 2011, increasing to 3.8 in Oct 2012 but falling to 2.5 in Dec 2012 and 3.4 in Mar 2013. The NSA rate of private hiring fell from 4.8 in Jul 2006 to 3.4 in Aug 2009 but recovery was insufficient to only 3.8 in Aug 2012, 2.5 in Dec 2012 and 2.6 in Dec 2013. The rate of private hires fell from 4.8 in Jul 2006 to 4.0 in Jul 2013. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective underutilization rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.
Chart I-9, US, Rate Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2013
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The JOLTS report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides total nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB), TNF JOB rate and TNF LD (layoffs and discharges) shown in Table I-4 for the month of Dec from 2001 to 2013. The final column provides annual TNF LD for the years from 2001 to 2012. Nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB) fell from a peak of 4036 in Dec 2006 to 3414 in Dec 2013 or by 15.4 percent while the rate dropped from 2.8 to 2.4. Nonfarm layoffs and discharges (TNF LD) rose from 1939 in Dec 2005 to 2782 in Dec 2008 or by 43.5 percent. The annual data show layoffs and discharges rising from 21.2 million in 2006 to 26.8 million in 2009 or by 26.4 percent. Business pruned payroll jobs to survive the global recession but there has not been hiring because of the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective underutilization rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.
Table I-4, US, Total Nonfarm Job Openings and Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands NSA
TNF JOB | TNF JOB | TNF LD | TNF LD | |
Dec 2001 | 3012 | 2.2 | 2030 | 24499 |
Dec 2002 | 2629 | 2.0 | 2169 | 22922 |
Dec 2003 | 2790 | 2.1 | 2186 | 23294 |
Dec 2004 | 3312 | 2.4 | 2180 | 22802 |
Dec 2005 | 3762 | 2.7 | 1939 | 22185 |
Dec 2006 | 4036 | 2.8 | 1973 | 21157 |
Dec 2007 | 3793 | 2.7 | 2012 | 22142 |
Dec 2008 | 2649 | 1.9 | 2782 | 24181 |
Dec 2009 | 2170 | 1.6 | 2296 | 26784 |
Dec 2010 | 2569 | 1.9 | 2064 | 21773 |
Dec 2011 | 2926 | 2.1 | 1910 | 20401 |
Dec 2012 | 3103 | 2.2 | 1786 | 20546 |
Dec 2013 | 3414 | 2.4 | 1802 |
Notes: TNF JOB: Total Nonfarm Job Openings; LD: Layoffs and Discharges
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/jlt/
Chart I-10 shows monthly job openings rising from the trough in 2009 to a high in the beginning of 2010. Job openings then stabilized into 2011 but have surpassed the peak of 3142 seasonally adjusted in Apr 2010 with 3612 seasonally adjusted in Dec 2012, which is higher by 15.0 percent relative to Apr 2010 but lower by 4.7 percent relative to 3789 in Nov 2012 and lower by 6.1 percent than 3848 in Mar 2012. Nonfarm job openings increased from 3612 in Dec 2012 to 3990 in Dec 2013 or by 10.5 percent. The high of job openings not seasonally adjusted was 3396 in Apr 2010 that was surpassed by 3554 in Jul 2011, increasing to 3896 in Oct 2012 but declining to 3103 in Dec 2012 and decreasing to 3414 in Dec 2013. The level of job openings not seasonally adjusted fell to 3103 in Dec 2012 or by 19.0 percent relative to 3831 in Apr 2012. There is here again the strong seasonality of year-end labor data. Job openings fell from 4130 in Apr 2013 to 3414 in Dec 2013, showing strong seasonal effects. The level of job openings of 3414 in Dec 2013 NSA is lower by 15.4 percent relative to 4036 in Dec 2006. The main problem in recovery of the US labor market has been the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
Chart I-10, US Job Openings, Thousands NSA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of job openings in Chart I-11 shows similar behavior. The rate seasonally adjusted rose from 2.2 percent in Jan 2011 to 2.5 percent in Dec 2011, 2.6 in Dec 2012 and 2.8 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted rose from the high of 2.6 in Apr 2010 to 3.0 in Apr 2013 and 2.5 in Nov 2013. The rate of job openings NSA fell from 3.4 in Jul 2007 to 1.6 in Nov-Dec 2009, recovering insufficiently to 2.4 in Dec 2013. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective underutilization rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.
Chart I-11, US, Rate of Job Openings, NSA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total separations are shown in Chart I-12. Separations are much lower in 2012-13 than before the global recession but hiring has not recovered.
Chart I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Separations, Month Thousands SA, 2001-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Annual total separations are shown in Chart I-13. Separations are much lower in 2011-2012 than before the global recession but without recovery in hiring.
Chart I-13, US, Total Separations, Annual, Thousands, 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-5 provides total nonfarm total separations from 2001 to 2012. Separations fell from 61.6 million in 2006 to 47.6 million in 2010 or by 14.0 million and 47.6 million in 2011 or by 14.0 million. Total separations increased from 47.6 million in 2011 to 49.7 million in 2012 or by 2.1 million.
Table I-5, US, Total Nonfarm Total Separations, Thousands, 2001-2012
Year | Annual |
2001 | 64765 |
2002 | 59190 |
2003 | 56487 |
2004 | 58340 |
2005 | 60733 |
2006 | 61565 |
2007 | 61162 |
2008 | 58627 |
2009 | 51532 |
2010 | 47646 |
2011 | 47626 |
2012 | 49676 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Monthly data of layoffs and discharges reach a peak in early 2009, as shown in Chart I-14. Layoffs and discharges dropped sharply with the recovery of the economy in 2010 and 2011 once employers reduced their job count to what was required for cost reductions and loss of business. Weak rates of growth of GDP (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html) frustrated employment recovery. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective underutilization rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.
Chart I-14, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Monthly Thousands SA, 2011-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Layoffs and discharges in Chart I-15 rose sharply to a peak in 2009. There was pronounced drop into 2010 and 2011 with mild increase into 2012.
Chart I-15, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Annual, 2001-2012
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-6 provides annual nonfarm layoffs and discharges from 2001 to 2012. Layoffs and discharges peaked at 26.8 million in 2009 and then fell to 20.4 million in 2011, by 6.4 million, or 23.9 percent. Total nonfarm layoffs and discharges increased mildly to 20.5 million in 2012.
Table I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands, 2001-2012
Year Annual
2001 24499
2002 22922
2003 23294
2004 22802
2005 22185
2006 21157
2007 22142
2008 24181
2009 26784
2010 21773
2011 20401
2012 20546
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
IA2 Labor Underutilization. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides alternative measures of labor underutilization shown in Table I-7. The most comprehensive measure is U6 that consists of total unemployed plus total employed part time for economic reasons plus all marginally attached workers as percent of the labor force. U6 not seasonally annualized has risen from 8.2 percent in 2006 to 13.5 percent in Jan 2014.
Table I-7, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization NSA %
U1 | U2 | U3 | U4 | U5 | U6 | |
2014 | ||||||
Jan | 3.5 | 4.0 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.6 | 13.5 |
2013 | ||||||
Dec | 3.5 | 3.5 | 6.5 | 7.0 | 7.9 | 13.0 |
Nov | 3.7 | 3.5 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 12.7 |
Oct | 3.7 | 3.6 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 8.3 | 13.2 |
Sep | 3.7 | 3.5 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.4 | 13.1 |
Aug | 3.7 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 13.6 |
Jul | 3.7 | 3.8 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.1 | 14.3 |
Jun | 3.9 | 3.8 | 7.8 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 14.6 |
May | 4.1 | 3.7 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 8.5 | 13.4 |
Apr | 4.3 | 3.9 | 7.1 | 7.6 | 8.5 | 13.4 |
Mar | 4.3 | 4.3 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 9.0 | 13.9 |
Feb | 4.3 | 4.6 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 14.9 |
Jan | 4.3 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 9.0 | 9.9 | 15.4 |
2012 | ||||||
Dec | 4.2 | 4.3 | 7.6 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
Nov | 4.2 | 3.9 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 13.9 |
Oct | 4.3 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 13.9 |
Sep | 4.2 | 4.0 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 14.2 |
Aug | 4.3 | 4.4 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.7 | 14.6 |
Jul | 4.3 | 4.6 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 15.2 |
Jun | 4.5 | 4.4 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 9.9 | 15.1 |
May | 4.7 | 4.3 | 7.9 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 14.3 |
Apr | 4.8 | 4.3 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.1 | 14.1 |
Mar | 4.9 | 4.8 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 9.7 | 14.8 |
Feb | 4.9 | 5.1 | 8.7 | 9.3 | 10.2 | 15.6 |
Jan | 4.9 | 5.4 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.5 | 16.2 |
2011 | ||||||
Dec | 4.8 | 5.0 | 8.3 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 15.2 |
Nov | 4.9 | 4.7 | 8.2 | 8.9 | 9.7 | 15.0 |
Oct | 5.0 | 4.8 | 8.5 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 15.3 |
Sep | 5.2 | 5.0 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.2 | 15.7 |
Aug | 5.2 | 5.1 | 9.1 | 9.6 | 10.6 | 16.1 |
Jul | 5.2 | 5.2 | 9.3 | 10.0 | 10.9 | 16.3 |
Jun | 5.1 | 5.1 | 9.3 | 9.9 | 10.9 | 16.4 |
May | 5.5 | 5.1 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 10.0 | 15.4 |
Apr | 5.5 | 5.2 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 15.5 |
Mar | 5.7 | 5.8 | 9.2 | 9.7 | 10.6 | 16.2 |
Feb | 5.6 | 6.0 | 9.5 | 10.1 | 11.1 | 16.7 |
Jan | 5.6 | 6.2 | 9.8 | 10.4 | 11.4 | 17.3 |
Dec 2010 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 9.1 | 9.9 | 10.7 | 16.6 |
Annual | ||||||
2013 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 13.8 |
2012 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.5 | 14.7 |
2011 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 8.9 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 15.9 |
2010 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 9.6 | 10.3 | 11.1 | 16.7 |
2009 | 4.7 | 5.9 | 9.3 | 9.7 | 10.5 | 16.2 |
2008 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.8 | 10.5 |
2007 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 8.3 |
2006 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 8.2 |
2005 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 8.9 |
2004 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.5 | 9.6 |
2003 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 7.0 | 10.1 |
2002 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.7 | 9.6 |
2001 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 8.1 |
2000 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 7.0 |
Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Monthly seasonally adjusted measures of labor underutilization are provided in Table I-8. U6 climbed from 16.1 percent in Aug 2011 to 16.3 percent in Sep 2011 and then fell to 14.5 percent in Mar 2012, reaching 13.1 percent in Jan 2014. Unemployment is an incomplete measure of the stress in US job markets. A different calculation in this blog is provided by using the participation rate in the labor force before the global recession. This calculation shows 30.3 million in job stress of unemployment/underemployment in Dec 2013, not seasonally adjusted, corresponding to 18.5 percent of the labor force (Table I-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html).
Table I-8, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization SA %
U1 | U2 | U3 | U4 | U5 | U6 | |
Jan 2014 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 8.1 | 13.1 |
Dec 2013 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 13.1 |
Nov | 3.7 | 3.7 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 8.2 | 13.1 |
Oct | 3.8 | 4.0 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 13.7 |
Sep | 3.8 | 3.7 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 13.6 |
Aug | 3.8 | 3.8 | 7.2 | 7.8 | 8.6 | 13.6 |
Jul | 3.9 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 13.9 |
Jun | 4.0 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.1 | 9.0 | 14.2 |
May | 4.0 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 8.8 | 13.8 |
Apr | 4.1 | 4.1 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 8.9 | 13.9 |
Mar | 4.1 | 4.1 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 8.9 | 13.8 |
Feb | 4.2 | 4.2 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.3 | 14.3 |
Jan | 4.2 | 4.3 | 7.9 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 14.4 |
Dec 2012 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 9.4 | 14.4 |
Nov | 4.2 | 4.1 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
Oct | 4.4 | 4.2 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
Sep | 4.3 | 4.2 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 9.3 | 14.7 |
Aug | 4.4 | 4.5 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 14.7 |
Jul | 4.5 | 4.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.7 | 14.9 |
Jun | 4.6 | 4.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.8 |
May | 4.6 | 4.5 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.8 |
Apr | 4.6 | 4.4 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.5 | 14.6 |
Mar | 4.7 | 4.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.5 |
Feb | 4.8 | 4.6 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 9.8 | 15.0 |
Jan | 4.8 | 4.7 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 15.1 |
Dec 2011 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 15.2 |
Nov | 5.0 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 9.3 | 10.2 | 15.6 |
Oct | 5.1 | 5.1 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.3 | 15.9 |
Sep | 5.4 | 5.2 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.5 | 16.3 |
Aug | 5.3 | 5.2 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.5 | 16.1 |
Jul | 5.3 | 5.3 | 9.0 | 9.7 | 10.6 | 16.0 |
Jun | 5.3 | 5.3 | 9.1 | 9.7 | 10.7 | 16.1 |
May | 5.3 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 10.3 | 15.8 |
Apr | 5.2 | 5.4 | 9.1 | 9.7 | 10.5 | 16.1 |
Mar | 5.3 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 15.9 |
Feb | 5.4 | 5.5 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.6 | 16.0 |
Jan | 5.5 | 5.5 | 9.1 | 9.7 | 10.7 | 16.1 |
Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-16 provides U6 on a monthly basis from 2001 to 2014. There was a steep climb from 2007 into 2009 and then this measure of unemployment and underemployment stabilized at that high level but declined into 2012. The low of U6 SA was 8.0 percent in Mar 2007 and the peak was 17.1 percent in Apr 2010. The low NSA was 7.6 percent in Oct 2006 and the peak was 18.0 percent in Jan 2010.
Chart I-16, US, U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Month, SA, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-17 provides the number employed part-time for economic reasons or who cannot find full-time employment. There are sharp declines at the end of 2009, 2010 and 2011 but an increase in 2012 followed by stability in 2013.
Chart I-17, US, Working Part-time for Economic Reasons
Thousands, Month SA 2001-2014
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. There is strong seasonality in US labor markets around the end of the year. The number employed part-time for economic reasons because they could not find full-time employment fell from 9.068 million in Sep 2011 to 7.780 million in Mar 2012, seasonally adjusted, or decline of 1.288 million in six months, as shown in Table I-9. The number employed part-time for economic reasons rebounded to 8.572 million in Sep 2012 for increase of 527,000 in one month from Aug to Sep 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons declined to 8.231 million in Oct 2012 or by 341,000 again in one month, further declining to 8.164 million in Nov 2012 for another major one-month decline of 67,000 and 7.929 million in Dec 2012 or fewer 235,000 in just one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.983 million in Jan 2013 or 54,000 more than in Dec 2012 and to 7,991 million in Feb 2013, declining to 7.917 million in May 2013 but increasing to 8.194 million in Jun 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.898 million in Aug 2013 for decline of 282,000 in one month from 8.180 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased 16,000 from 7.898 million in Aug 2013 to 7.914 million in Sep 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons rose to 8.016 million in Oct 2013, falling by 293,000 to 7.723 million in Nov 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.771 million in Dec 2013, decreasing to 7.257 million in Jan 2014. There is an increase of 186,000 in part-time for economic reasons from Aug 2012 to Oct 2012 and of 119,000 from Aug 2012 to Nov 2012. The number employed full-time increased from 112.906 million in Oct 2011 to 115.114 million in Mar 2012 or 2.208 million but then fell to 114.279 million in May 2012 or 0.835 million fewer full-time employed than in Mar 2012. The number employed full-time increased from 114.626 million in Aug 2012 to 115.531 million in Oct 2012 or increase of 0.905 million full-time jobs in two months and further to 115.821 million in Jan 2013 or increase of 1.195 million more full-time jobs in five months from Aug 2012 to Jan 2013. The number of full time jobs decreased slightly to 115.785 million in Feb 2013, increasing to 116.288 million in May 2013 and 116.087 million in Jun 2013. Then number of full-time jobs increased to 116.156 million in Jul 2013, 116.301 million in Aug 2013 and 116.883 million in Sep 2013. The number of full-time jobs fell to 116.306 million in Oct 2013 and increased to 116.951 in Nov 2013. The level of full-time jobs fell to 117.278 million in Dec 2013, increasing to 117.656 million in Jan 2014. Benchmark and seasonality-factors adjustments at the turn of every year could affect comparability of labor market indicators (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The number of employed part-time for economic reasons actually increased without seasonal adjustment from 8.271 million in Nov 2011 to 8.428 million in Dec 2011 or by 157,000 and then to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 or by an additional 490,000 for cumulative increase from Nov 2011 to Jan 2012 of 647,000. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons then fell from 8.918 million in Jan 2012 to 7.867 million in Mar 2012 or by 1.051 million and to 7.694 million in Apr 2012 or 1.224 million fewer relative to Jan 2012. In Aug 2012, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.842 million NSA or 148,000 more than in Apr 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased from 7.842 million in Aug 2012 to 8.110 million in Sep 2012 or by 3.4 percent. The number part-time for economic reasons fell from 8.110 million in Sep 2012 to 7.870 million in Oct 2012 or by 240.000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA increased to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 or 758,000 more than in Oct 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.298 million in Feb 2013, which is lower by 330,000 relative to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 but higher by 428,000 relative to 7.870 million in Oct 2012. The number employed part time for economic reasons fell to 7.734 million in Mar 2013 or 564,000 less than in Feb 2013 and fell to 7.709 million in Apr 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.618 million in May 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons jumped from 7.618 million in May 2013 to 8.440 million in Jun 2013 or 822,000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.324 million in Jul 2013 and 7.690 million in Aug 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA fell to 7.522 million in Sep 2013, increasing to 7.700 million in Oct 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.563 million in Nov 2013 and increased to 7.990 million in Dec 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.771 million in Jan 2014. The number employed full time without seasonal adjustment fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 113.050 million in Dec 2011 or by 88,000 and fell further to 111.879 in Jan 2012 for cumulative decrease of 1.259 million. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 112.587 million in Feb 2012 or by 551.000 but increased to 116.214 million in Aug 2012 or 3.076 million more full-time jobs than in Nov 2011. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted decreased from 116.214 million in Aug 2012 to 115.678 million in Sep 2012 for loss of 536,000 full-time jobs and rose to 116.045 million in Oct 2012 or by 367,000 full-time jobs in one month relative to Sep 2012. The number employed full-time NSA fell from 116.045 million in Oct 2012 to 115.515 million in Nov 2012 or decline of 530.000 in one month. The number employed full-time fell from 115.515 in Nov 2012 to 115.079 million in Dec 2012 or decline by 436,000 in one month. The number employed full time fell from 115.079 million in Dec 2012 to 113.868 million in Jan 2013 or decline of 1.211 million in one month. The number of full time jobs increased to 114.191 in Feb 2012 or by 323,000 in one month and increased to 114.796 million in Mar 2013 for cumulative increase from Jan by 928,000 full-time jobs but decrease of 283,000 from Dec 2012. The number employed full time reached 117.400 million in Jun 2013 and increased to 117.688 in Jul 2013 or by 288,000. The number employed full-time reached 117.868 million in Aug 2013 for increase of 180,000 in one month relative to Jul 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 117.308 million in Sep 2013 or by 560,000. The number employed full-time fell to 116.798 million in Oct 2013 or decline of 510.000 in one month. The number employed full-time rose to 116.875 million in Nov 2013, falling to 116.661 million in Dec 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 115.744 million in Jan 2014. Comparisons over long periods require use of NSA data. The number with full-time jobs fell from a high of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to 108.777 million in Jan 2010 or by 14.442 million. The number with full-time jobs in Jan 2014 is 115.774 million, which is lower by 7.475 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 246.915 million in Jan 2014 or by 14.957 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/) while in the same period the number of full-time jobs fell 7.475 million. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 131.112 million full-time jobs with population of 246.915 million in Jan 2014 or 15.368 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 115.744 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 14 million. Mediocre GDP growth is the main culprit of the fractured US labor market. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective underutilization rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.
Table I-9, US, Employed Part-time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, and Full-time, Millions
Part-time Thousands | Full-time Millions | |
Seasonally Adjusted | ||
Jan 2014 | 7,257 | 117,656 |
Dec 2013 | 7,771 | 117.278 |
Nov 2013 | 7,723 | 116.951 |
Oct 2013 | 8,016 | 116.306 |
Sep 2013 | 7,914 | 116.883 |
Aug 2013 | 7,898 | 116.301 |
Jul 2013 | 8,180 | 116.156 |
Jun 2013 | 8,194 | 116.087 |
May 2013 | 7,917 | 116.288 |
Apr 2013 | 7,929 | 116.062 |
Mar 2013 | 7,663 | 115.901 |
Feb 2013 | 7,991 | 115.785 |
Jan 2013 | 7,983 | 115.821 |
Dec 2012 | 7,929 | 115.735 |
Nov 2012 | 8,164 | 115.581 |
Oct 2012 | 8,231 | 115.531 |
Sep 2012 | 8,572 | 115.229 |
Aug 2012 | 8,045 | 114.626 |
Jul 2012 | 8,163 | 114.589 |
Jun 2012 | 8,154 | 114.728 |
May 2012 | 8,138 | 114.279 |
Apr 2012 | 7,913 | 114.398 |
Mar 2012 | 7,780 | 115.114 |
Feb 2012 | 8,133 | 114.210 |
Jan 2012 | 8,228 | 113.790 |
Dec 2011 | 8,177 | 113.740 |
Nov 2011 | 8,457 | 113.158 |
Oct 2011 | 8,675 | 112.906 |
Sep 2011 | 9,068 | 112.523 |
Aug 2011 | 8,820 | 112.643 |
Jul 2011 | 8,342 | 112.209 |
Not Seasonally Adjusted | ||
Jan 2014 | 7,771 | 115.744 |
Dec 2013 | 7,990 | 116.661 |
Nov 2013 | 7,563 | 116.875 |
Oct 2013 | 7,700 | 116.798 |
Sep 2013 | 7,522 | 117.308 |
Aug 2013 | 7,690 | 117.868 |
Jul 2013 | 8,324 | 117.688 |
Jun 2013 | 8,440 | 117.400 |
May 2013 | 7,618 | 116.643 |
Apr 2013 | 7,709 | 115.674 |
Mar 2013 | 7,734 | 114.796 |
Feb 2013 | 8,298 | 114.191 |
Jan 2013 | 8,628 | 113.868 |
Dec 2012 | 8,166 | 115.079 |
Nov 2012 | 7,994 | 115.515 |
Oct 2012 | 7,870 | 116.045 |
Sep 2012 | 8,110 | 115.678 |
Aug 2012 | 7,842 | 116.214 |
Jul 2012 | 8,316 | 116.131 |
Jun 2012 | 8,394 | 116.024 |
May 2012 | 7,837 | 114.634 |
Apr 2012 | 7,694 | 113.999 |
Mar 2012 | 7,867 | 113.916 |
Feb 2012 | 8,455 | 112.587 |
Jan 2012 | 8,918 | 111.879 |
Dec 2011 | 8,428 | 113.050 |
Nov 2011 | 8,271 | 113.138 |
Oct 2011 | 8,258 | 113.456 |
Sep 2011 | 8,541 | 112.980 |
Aug 2011 | 8,604 | 114.286 |
Jul 2011 | 8,514 | 113.759 |
Jun 2011 | 8,738 | 113.255 |
May 2011 | 8,270 | 112.618 |
Apr 2011 | 8,425 | 111.844 |
Mar 2011 | 8,737 | 111.186 |
Feb 2011 | 8,749 | 110.731 |
Jan 2011 | 9,187 | 110.373 |
Dec 2010 | 9,205 | 111.207 |
Nov 2010 | 8,670 | 111.348 |
Oct 2010 | 8,408 | 112.342 |
Sep 2010 | 8,628 | 112.385 |
Aug 2010 | 8,628 | 113.508 |
Jul 2010 | 8,737 | 113.974 |
Jun 2010 | 8,867 | 113.856 |
May 2010 | 8,513 | 112.809 |
Apr 2010 | 8,921 | 111.391 |
Mar 2010 | 9,343 | 109.877 |
Feb 2010 | 9,282 | 109.100 |
Jan 2010 | 9,290 | 108.777 (low) |
Dec 2009 | 9,354 (high) | 109.875 |
Nov 2009 | 8,894 | 111.274 |
Oct 2009 | 8,474 | 111.599 |
Sep 2009 | 8,255 | 111.991 |
Aug 2009 | 8,835 | 113.863 |
Jul 2009 | 9,103 | 114.184 |
Jun 2009 | 9,301 | 114.014 |
May 2009 | 8,785 | 113.083 |
Apr 2009 | 8,648 | 112.746 |
Mar 2009 | 9,305 | 112.215 |
Feb 2009 | 9,170 | 112.947 |
Jan 2009 | 8,829 | 113.815 |
Dec 2008 | 8,250 | 116.422 |
Nov 2008 | 7,135 | 118.432 |
Oct 2008 | 6,267 | 120.020 |
Sep 2008 | 5,701 | 120.213 |
Aug 2008 | 5,736 | 121.556 |
Jul 2008 | 6,054 | 122.378 |
Jun 2008 | 5,697 | 121.845 |
May 2008 | 5,096 | 120.809 |
Apr 2008 | 5,071 | 120.027 |
Mar 2008 | 5,038 | 119.875 |
Feb 2008 | 5,114 | 119.452 |
Jan 2008 | 5,340 | 119.332 |
Dec 2007 | 4,750 | 121.042 |
Nov 2007 | 4,374 | 121.846 |
Oct 2007 | 4,028 | 122.006 |
Sep 2007 | 4,137 | 121.728 |
Aug 2007 | 4,494 | 122.870 |
Jul 2007 | 4,516 | 123.219 (high) |
Jun 2007 | 4,469 | 122.150 |
May 2007 | 4,315 | 120.846 |
Apr 2007 | 4,205 | 119.609 |
Mar 2007 | 4,384 | 119.640 |
Feb 2007 | 4,417 | 119.041 |
Jan 2007 | 4,726 | 119.094 |
Dec 2006 | 4,281 | 120.371 |
Nov 2006 | 4,054 | 120.507 |
Oct 2006 | 4,010 | 121.199 |
Sep 2006 | 3,735 (low) | 120.780 |
Aug 2006 | 4,104 | 121.979 |
Jul 2006 | 4,450 | 121.951 |
Jun 2006 | 4,456 | 121.070 |
May 2006 | 3,968 | 118.925 |
Apr 2006 | 3,787 | 118.559 |
Mar 2006 | 4,097 | 117.693 |
Feb 2006 | 4,403 | 116.823 |
Jan 2006 | 4,597 | 116.395 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
People lose their marketable job skills after prolonged unemployment and face increasing difficulty in finding another job. Chart I-18 shows the sharp rise in unemployed over 27 weeks and stabilization at an extremely high level.
Chart I-18, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or Over, Thousands SA Month 2001-2014
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Another segment of U6 consists of people marginally attached to the labor force who continue to seek employment but less frequently on the frustration there may not be a job for them. Chart I-19 shows the sharp rise in people marginally attached to the labor force after 2007 and subsequent stabilization.
Chart I-19, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, NSA Month, Thousands, 2001-2014
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number of workers with full-time jobs not-seasonally-adjusted rose with fluctuations from 2002 to a peak in 2007, collapsing during the global recession, as shown in Chart I-20. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 246.915 million in Jan 2014 or by 14.957 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/) while in the same period the number of full-time jobs fell 7.475 million. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 131.112 million full-time jobs with population of 246.915 million in Jan 2014 or 15.368 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 115.744 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 14 million. There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:
“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals.
Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets, during cyclical slow growth not secular stagnation, is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.
Chart I-20, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2014
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20A provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 2001 to 2013. There is clear trend of increase of the population while the number of full-time jobs collapsed after 2008 without sufficient recovery as shown in the preceding Chart I-20.
Chart I-20A, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 2001-2014
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20B provides number of full-time jobs in the US from 1968 to 2013. There were multiple recessions followed by expansions without contraction of full-time jobs and without recovery as during the period after 2008.
Chart I-20B, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 1968-2014
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20C provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 1968 to 2013. Population expanded at a relatively constant rate of increase with the assurance of creation of full-time jobs that has been broken since 2008.
Chart I-20C, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 1968-2013
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
IA4 Theory and Reality of Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment. Three tables support the argument that the proper comparison of the business cycle is between the recessions of the 1980s and the global recession after IVQ2007 and not as argued erroneously with the Great Depression of the 1930s. Table I-GDP provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.7 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.3 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first three years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.3 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while GDP grew, 2.5 percent in 2010, 1.8 percent in 2011, 2.8 percent in 2012 and 1.9 percent in 2013. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and first four quarters of 2013 is 2.3 percent and 2.7 percent in the four quarters of 2013 but only 2.3 percent discounting contribution of 1.67 percentage points of inventory accumulation to growth in IIIQ2013. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while the forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 2.2 to 2.3 percent in 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20131218.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 2.8 to 3.2 percent in 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20131218.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 has been at average 2.4 percent in annual equivalent.
Table I-GDP, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%
Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% |
1930 | -8.5 | 1980 | -0.2 | 2000 | 4.1 |
1931 | -6.4 | 1981 | 2.6 | 2001 | 1.0 |
1932 | -12.9 | 1982 | -1.9 | 2002 | 1.8 |
1933 | -1.3 | 1983 | 4.6 | 2003 | 2.8 |
1934 | 10.8 | 1984 | 7.3 | 2004 | 3.8 |
1935 | 8.9 | 1985 | 4.2 | 2005 | 3.4 |
1936 | 12.9 | 1986 | 3.5 | 2006 | 2.7 |
1937 | 5.1 | 1987 | 3.5 | 2007 | 1.8 |
1938 | -3.3 | 1988 | 4.2 | 2008 | -0.3 |
1930 | 8.0 | 1989 | 3.7 | 2009 | -2.8 |
1940 | 8.8 | 1990 | 1.9 | 2010 | 2.5 |
1941 | 17.7 | 1991 | -0.1 | 2011 | 1.8 |
1942 | 18.9 | 1992 | 3.6 | 2012 | 2.8 |
1943 | 17.0 | 1993 | 2.7 | 2013 | 1.9 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-GDPA with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.7 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.3 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.
Table I-GDPA, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions
Number of Quarters | Cumulative Percentage Contraction | Average Percentage Rate | |
IIQ1953 to IIQ1954 | 3 | -2.4 | -0.8 |
IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958 | 3 | -3.0 | -1.0 |
IVQ1973 to IQ1975 | 5 | -3.1 | -0.6 |
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 | 2 | -2.2 | -1.1 |
IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | 4 | -2.5 | -0.64 |
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | 6 | -4.3 | -0.72 |
Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table I-GDPB shows the extraordinary contrast between the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.4 percent of the US economy in the eighteen quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 and the average of 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986, 5.4 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and 5.0 percent in the eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987. The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.4 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.8 percent annual growth in 2011 and 2.8 percent in 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and 2013 accumulated to 4.7 percent that is equivalent to 2.3 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2013 of $15,965.6 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,242.1 billion and compounding by 4/8: {[($15,965.6/$15,242.1)4/8 -1]100 = 2.3%}. The US economy grew 2.7 percent in IVQ2013 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IVQ2012. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is just at the borderline of contraction. The rate of growth of GDP in the third estimate of IIIQ2013 is 4.1 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR). Inventory accumulation contributed 1.67 percentage points to this rate of growth. The actual rate without this impulse of unsold inventories would have been 2.43 percent, or 0.6 percent in IIIQ2013, such that annual equivalent growth in 2013 is closer to 2.3 percent {[(1.003)(1.006)(1.006)(1.0084/4-1]100 = 2.3%}, compounding the quarterly rates and converting into annual equivalent.
Table I-7, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions
Number | Cumulative Growth ∆% | Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate | |
IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957 | 11 | 12.8 | 4.5 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955 | 4 | 7.8 | |
IIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 5 | 10.0 | 7.9 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 4 | 9.2 | |
IIQ1975 to IVQ1976 | 8 | 8.3 | 4.1 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 | 4 | 6.1 | |
IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 | 13 15 16 17 18 | 19.9 21.6 22.3 23.1 24.5 | 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 |
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983 | 4 | 7.8 | |
Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions* | 7.7 | ||
IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 | 18 | 11.2 | 2.4 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 | 2.7 |
*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IIQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table EMP provides the comparison between the labor market in the current whole cycle from 2007 to 2013 and the whole cycle from 1979 to 1986. In the entire cycle from 2007 to 2013, the number employed fell 2.118 million, full-time employed fell 4.777 million, part-time for economic reasons increased 3.534 and population increased 13.812 million. The number employed fell 1.5 percent, full-time employed fell 3.9 percent, part-time for economic reasons increased 80.3 percent and population increased 6.0 percent. There is sharp contrast with the contractions of the 1980s and with most economic history of the United States. In the whole cycle from 1979 to 1986, the number employed increased 10.773 million, full-time employed increased 7.875 million, part-time for economic reasons 2.011 million and population 15.724 million. In the entire cycle from 1979 to 1986, the number employed increased 10.9 percent, full-time employed 9.5 percent, part-time for economic reasons 56.2 percent and population 9.5 million. The difference between the 1980s and the current cycle after 2007 is in the high rate of growth after the contraction that maintained trend growth around 3.0 percent for the entire cycle and per capital growth at 2.0 percent. The evident fact is that current weakness in labor markets originates in cyclical slow growth and not in imaginary secular stagnation.
Table EMP, US, Annual Level of Employed, Full-Time Employed, Employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons and Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Millions
Employed | Full-Time Employed | Part Time Economic Reasons | Noninstitutional Civilian Population | |
2000s | ||||
2000 | 136.891 | 113.846 | 3.227 | 212.577 |
2001 | 136.933 | 113.573 | 3.715 | 215.092 |
2002 | 136.485 | 112.700 | 4.213 | 217.570 |
2003 | 137.736 | 113.324 | 4.701 | 221.168 |
2004 | 139.252 | 114.518 | 4.567 | 223.357 |
2005 | 141.730 | 117.016 | 4.350 | 226.082 |
2006 | 144.427 | 119.688 | 4.162 | 228.815 |
2007 | 146.047 | 121.091 | 4.401 | 231.867 |
2008 | 145.362 | 120.030 | 5.875 | 233.788 |
2009 | 139.877 | 112.634 | 8.913 | 235.801 |
2010 | 139.064 | 111.714 | 8.874 | 237.830 |
2011 | 139.869 | 112.556 | 8.560 | 239.618 |
2012 | 142.469 | 114.809 | 8.122 | 243.284 |
2013 | 143.929 | 116.314 | 7.935 | 245.679 |
∆2007-2013 | -2.118 | -4.777 | 3.534 | 13.812 |
∆% 2007-2013 | -1.5 | -3.9 | 80.3 | 6.0 |
1980s | ||||
1979 | 98.824 | 82.654 | 3.577 | 164.863 |
1980 | 99.303 | 82.562 | 4.321 | 167.745 |
1981 | 100.397 | 83.243 | 4.768 | 170.130 |
1982 | 99.526 | 81.421 | 6.170 | 172.271 |
1983 | 100.834 | 82.322 | 6.266 | 174.215 |
1984 | 105.005 | 86.544 | 5.744 | 176.383 |
1985 | 107.150 | 88.534 | 5.590 | 178.206 |
1986 | 109.597 | 90.529 | 5.588 | 180.587 |
1987 | 112.440 | 92.957 | 5.401 | 182.753 |
1988 | 114.968 | 95.214 | 5.206 | 184.613 |
1989 | 117.342 | 97.369 | 4.894 | 186.393 |
∆1979-1986 | 10.773 | 7.875 | 2.011 | 15.724 |
∆% 1979-86 | 10.9 | 9.5 | 56.2 | 9.5 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:
“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). Youth workers would obtain employment at a premium in an economy with declining population. In fact, there is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages. This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.
In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share si of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate yi of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):
Y = ∑isiyi (1)
This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):
∆Y = ∑i∆siy*i + ∑i∆yis*i (2)
The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆si multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*i , or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆yi, multiplied by the average share of the group s*i, or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:
“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”
The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. There are accentuated cyclic factors for both the entire population and the young population of ages 16 to 24 years. Table Summary provides the total noninstitutional population (ICP) of the US, full-time employment level (FTE), employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP), employment/population ratio (EPOP) and unemployment level (UNE). Secular stagnation would not be secular but immediate. All indicators of the labor market weakened sharply during the contraction and did not recover. Population continued to grow but all other variables collapsed and did not recover. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-6). Hansen (1938, 1939) finds secular stagnation in lower growth of an aging population. In the current US economy, Table Summary shows that population is dynamic while the labor market is fractured. There is key explanation in the behavior of the civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and the employment population ratio (EPOP) that collapsed during the global recession with inadequate recovery. Abandoning job searches are difficult to capture in labor statistics but likely explain the decline in the participation of the population in the labor force. Allowing for abandoning job searches, the total number of people unemployed or underemployed is 30.3 million or 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html).
Table Summary Total, US, Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Thousands and Percent
ICP | FTE | EMP | CLF | CLFP | EPOP | UNE | |
2006 | 228.8 | 119.7 | 144.4 | 151.4 | 66.2 | 63.1 | 7.0 |
2009 | 235.8 | 112.6 | 139.9 | 154.1 | 65.4 | 59.3 | 14.3 |
2012 | 243.3 | 114.8 | 142.5 | 155.0 | 63.7 | 58.6 | 12.5 |
2013 | 245.7 | 116.3 | 143.9 | 155.4 | 63.2 | 58.6 | 11.5 |
12/07 | 233.2 | 121.0 | 146.3 | 153.7 | 65.9 | 62.8 | 7.4 |
9/09 | 236.3 | 112.0 | 139.1 | 153.6 | 65.0 | 58.9 | 14.5 |
1/14 | 246.9 | 115.8 | 143.5 | 154.4 | 62.5 | 58.1 | 10.9 |
ICP: Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population; FT: Full-time Employment Level, EMP: Total Employment Level; CLF: Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The same situation is present in the labor market for young people in ages 16 to 24 years with data in Table Summary Youth. The youth noninstitutional civilian population (ICP) continued to increase during and after the global recession. There is the same disastrous labor market with decline for young people in employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and employment population ratio (EPOP). There are only increases for unemployment of young people (UNE) and youth unemployment rate (UNER). If aging were a factor of secular stagnation, growth of population of young people would attract a premium in remuneration in labor markets. The sad fact is that young people are also facing tough labor markets. The application of the theory of secular stagnation to the US economy and labor markets is void of reality in the form of key facts.
Table Summary Youth, US, Youth, Ages 16 to 24 Years, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Thousands and Percent
ICP | EMP | CLF | CLFP | EPOP | UNE | UNER | |
2006 | 36.9 | 20.0 | 22.4 | 60.6 | 54.2 | 2.4 | 10.5 |
2009 | 37.6 | 17.6 | 21.4 | 56.9 | 46.9 | 3.8 | 17.6 |
2012 | 38.7 | 17.8 | 21.3 | 54.9 | 46.0 | 3.5 | 16.2 |
2013 | 38.8 | 18.1 | 21.4 | 55.0 | 46.5 | 3.3 | 15.5 |
12/07 | 37.5 | 19.4 | 21.7 | 57.8 | 51.6 | 2.3 | 10.7 |
9/09 | 37.6 | 17.0 | 20.7 | 55.2 | 45.1 | 3.8 | 18.2 |
1/14 | 38.8 | 17.4 | 20.4 | 52.7 | 44.8 | 3.1 | 14.9 |
ICP: Youth Noninstitutional Civilian Population; EMP: Youth Employment Level; CLF: Youth Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Youth Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Youth Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment; UNER: Youth Unemployment Rate
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The United States is experiencing high youth unemployment as in European economies. Table I-10 provides the employment level for ages 16 to 24 years of age estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. On an annual basis, youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 17.362 million in 2011 or 2.679 million fewer youth jobs and to 17.834 million in 2012 or 2.207 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.057 million in 2013 or 1.984 million fewer jobs. During the seasonal peak months of youth employment in the summer from Jun to Aug, youth employment has fallen by more than two million jobs relative to 21.914 million in Jul 2006 with 19.684 million in Jul 2013 for 2.230 million fewer youth jobs. The number of jobs ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 18.636 million in Aug 2013 or by 2.531 million. The number of youth jobs fell from 19.604 million in Sep 2006 to 18.043 million in Sep 2013 or 1.561 million fewer youth jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.106 million in Dec 2013 or 2.023 million fewer jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 19.407 million in Jan 2007 to 17.372 million in Jan 2014 or 2.035 million fewer youth jobs. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The hardship does not originate in low growth of population but in underperformance of the economy in the expansion from the business cycle. There are two hardships behind these data. First, young people cannot find employment after finishing high school and college, reducing prospects for achievement in older age. Second, students with more modest means cannot find employment to keep them in college.
Table I-10, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA
Year | Jan | Feb | Oct | Nov | Dec |
2001 | 19678 | 19745 | 19694 | 19675 | 19547 |
2002 | 18653 | 19074 | 19542 | 19397 | 19394 |
2003 | 18811 | 18880 | 19139 | 19163 | 19136 |
2004 | 18852 | 18841 | 19609 | 19615 | 19619 |
2005 | 18858 | 18670 | 19794 | 19750 | 19733 |
2006 | 19003 | 19182 | 19853 | 19903 | 20129 |
2007 | 19407 | 19415 | 19564 | 19660 | 19361 |
2008 | 18724 | 18546 | 18757 | 18454 | 18378 |
2009 | 17467 | 17606 | 16671 | 16689 | 16615 |
2010 | 16166 | 16412 | 16867 | 16946 | 16727 |
2011 | 16512 | 16638 | 17532 | 17402 | 17234 |
2012 | 16944 | 17150 | 17842 | 17877 | 17604 |
2013 | 17183 | 17257 | 17976 | 18104 | 18106 |
2014 | 17372 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-21 provides US employment level ages 16 to 24 years from 2002 to 2014. Employment level is sharply lower in Jan 2014 relative to the peak in 2007.
Chart I-21, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21A provides the US civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted from 2001 to 2014. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million.
Chart I-21A, US, Civilian Noninstitutional Population Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21B provides the civilian labor force of the US ages 16 to 24 years NSA from 2001 to 2014. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 24.339 million in Jul 2007 to 23.506 million in Jul 2013, by 0.833 million or decline of 3.4 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population NSA increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013, by 1.418 million or 3.8 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 fell from 22.801 million in Aug 2007 to 22.089 million in Aug 2013, by 0.712 million or 3.1 percent, while the noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013, by 1.386 million or 3.7 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.917 million in Sep 2007 to 21.183 million in Sep 2013, by 0.734 million or 3.3 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 by 1.355 million or 3.6 percent. The US civilian labor force fell from 21.821 million in Oct 2007 to 21.003 million in Oct 2013, by 0.818 million or 3.7 percent while the noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013, by 1.324 million or 3.5 percent. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.909 million in Nov 2007 to 20.825 million in Nov 2013, by 1.084 million or 4.9 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.684 million in Dec 2007 to 20.642 million in Dec 2013, by 1.042 million or 4.8 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013, by 1.272 million or 3.4 percent. The yough civilian labor force of the US fell from 21.770 million in Jan 2007 to 20.423 million in Jan2014, by 1.347 million or 6.2 percent while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014, by 1.488 million or 4.0 percent. Youth in the US abandoned their participation in the labor force because of the frustration that there are no jobs available for them.
Chart I-21B, US, Civilian Labor Force Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21C provides the ratio of labor force to noninstitutional population or labor force participation of ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted. The US labor force participation rates for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.5 in Jul 2013 because of the frustration of young people who believe there may not be jobs available for them. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 56.9 in Aug 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.1 percent in Sep 2006 to 54.6 percent in Sep 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Oct 2006 to 54.1 in Oct 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Nov 2006 to 53.7 percent in Nov 2013. The US labor force participation rate fell from 57.8 in Dec 2007 to 53.2 in Dec 2013. The youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.4 in Jan 2007 to 52.7 in Jan 2014. Many young people abandoned searches for employment, dropping from the labor force.
Chart I-21C, US, Labor Force Participation Rate Ages 16 to 24 Years, NSA, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
An important measure of the job market is the number of people with jobs relative to population available for work or civilian noninstitutional population or employment/population ratio. Chart I-21D provides the employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years. The US employment/population ratio NSA for ages 16 to 24 years collapsed from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 50.7 in Jul 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years dropped from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 48.0 in Aug 2013. The employment population ratio for ages to 16 to 24 years declined from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 46.5 in Sep 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 46.3 in Oct 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.7 in Nov 2007 to 46.7 in Nov 2013. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.6 in Dec 2007 to 46.7 in Dec 2013. The US employment population ratio fell from 52.1 in Jan 2007 to 44.8 in Jan 2014. Chart I-21D shows vertical drop during the global recession without recovery.
Chart I-21D, US, Employment Population Ratio Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table I-11 provides US unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years. The number unemployed ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 3634 thousand in 2011 or by 1.292 million and 3451 thousand in 2012 or by 1.109 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 23 years increased from 2342 in 2007 to 3324 thousand in 2013 or by 0.982 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years rose from 2.363 million in Jan 2007 to 3.051 million in Jan 2014 or by 0.688 million. This situation may persist for many years.
Table I-11, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, NSA, Thousands
Year | Jan | Feb | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual |
2001 | 2250 | 2258 | 2301 | 2424 | 2470 | 2412 | 2371 |
2002 | 2754 | 2731 | 2506 | 2468 | 2570 | 2374 | 2683 |
2003 | 2748 | 2740 | 2698 | 2522 | 2522 | 2248 | 2746 |
2004 | 2767 | 2631 | 2493 | 2572 | 2448 | 2294 | 2638 |
2005 | 2661 | 2787 | 2339 | 2285 | 2369 | 2055 | 2521 |
2006 | 2366 | 2433 | 2297 | 2252 | 2242 | 2007 | 2353 |
2007 | 2363 | 2230 | 2419 | 2258 | 2250 | 2323 | 2342 |
2008 | 2633 | 2480 | 2904 | 2842 | 2833 | 2928 | 2830 |
2009 | 3278 | 3457 | 3774 | 3789 | 3699 | 3532 | 3760 |
2010 | 3983 | 3888 | 3604 | 3731 | 3561 | 3352 | 3857 |
2011 | 3851 | 3696 | 3541 | 3386 | 3287 | 3161 | 3634 |
2012 | 3416 | 3507 | 3174 | 3285 | 3102 | 3153 | 3451 |
2013 | 3674 | 3449 | 3139 | 3028 | 2721 | 2536 | 3324 |
2014 | 3051 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-22 provides the unemployment level for ages 16 to 24 from 2001 to 2014. The level rose sharply from 2007 to 2010 with tepid improvement into 2012 and deterioration into 2013 with recent marginal improvement alternating with deterioration.
Chart I-22, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table I-12 provides the rate of unemployment of young peoples in ages 16 to 24 years. The annual rate jumped from 10.5 percent in 2007 to 18.4 percent in 2010, 17.3 percent in 2011 and 16.2 percent in 2012. The rate of youth unemployment fell marginally to 15.5 percent in Dec 2013. During the seasonal peak in Jul, the rate of youth unemployed was 18.1 percent in Jul 2011, 17.1 percent in Jul 2012 and 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 compared with 10.8 percent in Jul 2007. The rate of youth unemployment rose from 11.2 in Jul 2006 to 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and likely higher if adding those who ceased searching for a job in frustration none may be available. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.1 percent in Dec 2006 to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.9 percent in Jan 2007 to 14.9 percent in Jan 2014. The actual rate is higher because of the difficulty in counting those dropping from the labor force because they believe there are no jobs available for them.
Table I-12, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA
Year | Jan | Feb | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual |
2001 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.5 | 10.7 | 10.5 | 11.0 | 11.2 | 11.0 | 10.6 |
2002 | 12.9 | 12.5 | 12.4 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 10.9 | 12.0 |
2003 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 13.3 | 11.9 | 12.5 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 10.5 | 12.4 |
2004 | 12.8 | 12.3 | 12.3 | 11.1 | 11.5 | 11.6 | 11.1 | 10.5 | 11.8 |
2005 | 12.4 | 13.0 | 11.0 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 9.4 | 11.3 |
2006 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 11.2 | 10.4 | 10.5 | 10.2 | 10.1 | 9.1 | 10.5 |
2007 | 10.9 | 10.3 | 10.8 | 10.5 | 11.0 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 10.5 |
2008 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 14.0 | 13.0 | 13.4 | 13.2 | 13.3 | 13.7 | 12.8 |
2009 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 18.5 | 18.0 | 18.2 | 18.5 | 18.1 | 17.5 | 17.6 |
2010 | 19.8 | 19.2 | 19.1 | 17.8 | 17.6 | 18.1 | 17.4 | 16.7 | 18.4 |
2011 | 18.9 | 18.2 | 18.1 | 17.5 | 17.0 | 16.2 | 15.9 | 15.5 | 17.3 |
2012 | 16.8 | 17.0 | 17.1 | 16.8 | 15.2 | 15.5 | 14.8 | 15.2 | 16.2 |
2013 | 17.6 | 16.7 | 16.3 | 15.6 | 14.8 | 14.4 | 13.1 | 12.3 | 15.5 |
2014 | 14.9 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-23 provides the BLS estimate of the not-seasonally-adjusted rate of youth unemployment for ages 16 to 24 years from 2001 to 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased sharply during the global recession of 2008 and 2009 but has failed to drop to earlier lower levels because of low growth of GDP. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
Chart I-23, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent, NSA, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-24 provides longer perspective with the rate of youth unemployment in ages 16 to 24 years from 1948 to 2014. The rate of youth unemployment rose to 20 percent during the contractions of the early 1980s and also during the contraction of the global recession in 2008 and 2009. The data illustrate again the argument in this blog that the contractions of the early 1980s are the valid framework for comparison with the global recession of 2008 and 2009 instead of misleading comparisons with the 1930s. During the initial phase of recovery, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years NSA fell from 18.9 percent in Jun 1983 to 14.5 percent in Jun 1984. In contrast, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years was nearly the same during the expansion after IIIQ2009: 17.5 percent in Dec 2009, 16.7 percent in Dec 2010, 15.5 percent in Dec 2011, 15.2 percent in Dec 2012, 17.6 percent in Jan 2013, 16.7 percent in Feb 2013, 15.9 percent in Mar 2013, 15.1 percent in Apr 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 16.4 percent in May 2013, 18.0 percent in Jun 2013, 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and 15.6 percent in Aug 2013. In Sep 2006, the rate of youth unemployment was 10.5 percent, increasing to 14.8 percent in Sep 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 in Oct 2007, increasing to 14.4 percent in Oct 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Nov 2007, increasing to 13.1 percent in Nov 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.7 percent in Dec 2013, increasing to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.9 percent in Jan 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Jan 2014. The difference originates in the vigorous seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent average rate of GDP growth of 5.7 percent during the recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986 compared with 2.4 percent on average during the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html).US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective underutilization rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.5 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.
Chart I-24, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent NSA, 1948-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
It is more difficult to move to other jobs after a certain age because of fewer available opportunities for mature individuals than for new entrants into the labor force. Middle-aged unemployed are less likely to find another job. Table I-13 provides the unemployment level ages 45 years and over. The number unemployed ages 45 years and over rose from 1.607 million in Oct 2006 to 4.576 million in Oct 2010 or by 184.8 percent. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over declined to 3.800 million in Oct 2012 that is still higher by 136.5 percent than in Oct 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over increased from 1.704 million in Nov 2006 to 3.861 million in Nov 2012, or 126.6 percent. The number unemployed age 45 and over is still higher by 98.5 percent at 3.383 million in Nov 2013 than 1.704 million in Nov 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over jumped from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 4.762 million in Dec 2010 or 165.4 percent. At 3.927 million in Dec 2012, mature unemployment is higher by 2.133 million or 118.9 percent higher than 1.794 million in Dec 2006. The level of unemployment of those aged 45 year or more of 3.632 million in Oct 2013 is higher by 2.025 million than 1.607 million in Sep 2006 or higher by 126.0 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 3.378 million in Nov 2013 or 88.3 percent. The annual number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.848 million 2006 to 3.719 million in 2013 or 101.2 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 4.394 million in Jan 2013, by 2.618 million or 106.7 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over rose from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 3.508 million in Jan 2014, by 1.382 million or 65.0 percent. The actual number unemployed is likely much higher because many are not accounted who abandoned job searches in frustration there may not be a job for them. Recent improvements may be illusory.
Table I-13, US, Unemployment Level 45 Years and Over, Thousands NSA
Year | Jan | Feb | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual |
2000 | 1498 | 1392 | 1339 | 1254 | 1202 | 1242 | 1217 | 1249 |
2001 | 1572 | 1587 | 1640 | 1586 | 1722 | 1786 | 1901 | 1576 |
2002 | 2235 | 2280 | 2114 | 1966 | 1945 | 2013 | 2210 | 2114 |
2003 | 2495 | 2415 | 2301 | 2157 | 2032 | 2132 | 2130 | 2253 |
2004 | 2453 | 2397 | 2082 | 1951 | 1931 | 2053 | 2086 | 2149 |
2005 | 2286 | 2286 | 1895 | 1992 | 1875 | 1920 | 1963 | 2009 |
2006 | 2126 | 2056 | 1869 | 1710 | 1607 | 1704 | 1794 | 1848 |
2007 | 2155 | 2138 | 1956 | 1854 | 1885 | 1925 | 2120 | 1966 |
2008 | 2336 | 2336 | 2695 | 2595 | 2728 | 3078 | 3485 | 2540 |
2009 | 4138 | 4380 | 4683 | 4560 | 4492 | 4655 | 4960 | 4500 |
2010 | 5314 | 5307 | 5128 | 4640 | 4576 | 4909 | 4762 | 4879 |
2011 | 5027 | 4837 | 4592 | 4426 | 4375 | 4195 | 4182 | 4537 |
2012 | 4458 | 4472 | 4179 | 3899 | 3800 | 3861 | 3927 | 4133 |
2013 | 4394 | 4107 | 3607 | 3535 | 3632 | 3383 | 3378 | 3719 |
2014 | 3508 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-25 provides the level unemployed ages 45 years and over. There was an increase in the recessions of the 1980s, 1991 and 2001 followed by declines to earlier levels. The current expansion of the economy after IIIQ2009 has not been sufficiently vigorous to reduce significantly middle-age unemployment. Recent improvements could be illusory because many abandoned job searches in frustration that there may not be jobs for them and are not counted as unemployed.
Chart I-25, US, Unemployment Level Ages 45 Years and Over, Thousands, NSA, 1976-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
The analysis by Kydland (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/kydland-bio.html) and Prescott (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/prescott-bio.html) (1977, 447-80, equation 5) uses the “expectation augmented” Phillips curve with the natural rate of unemployment of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), which in the notation of Barro and Gordon (1983, 592, equation 1) is:
Ut = Unt – α(πt – πe) α > 0 (1)
Where Ut is the rate of unemployment at current time t, Unt is the natural rate of unemployment, πt is the current rate of inflation and πe is the expected rate of inflation by economic agents based on current information. Equation (1) expresses unemployment net of the natural rate of unemployment as a decreasing function of the gap between actual and expected rates of inflation. The system is completed by a social objective function, W, depending on inflation, π, and unemployment, U:
W = W(πt, Ut) (2)
The policymaker maximizes the preferences of the public, (2), subject to the constraint of the tradeoff of inflation and unemployment, (1). The total differential of W set equal to zero provides an indifference map in the Cartesian plane with ordered pairs (πt, Ut - Un) such that the consistent equilibrium is found at the tangency of an indifference curve and the Phillips curve in (1). The indifference curves are concave to the origin. The consistent policy is not optimal. Policymakers without discretionary powers following a rule of price stability would attain equilibrium with unemployment not higher than with the consistent policy. The optimal outcome is obtained by the rule of price stability, or zero inflation, and no more unemployment than under the consistent policy with nonzero inflation and the same unemployment. Taylor (1998LB) attributes the sustained boom of the US economy after the stagflation of the 1970s to following a monetary policy rule instead of discretion (see Taylor 1993, 1999). It is not uncommon for effects of regulation differing from those intended by policy. Professors Edward C. Prescott and Lee E. Ohanian (2014Feb), writing on “US productivity growth has taken a dive,” on Feb 3, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303942404579362462611843696?KEYWORDS=Prescott), argue that impressive productivity growth over the long-term constructed US prosperity and wellbeing. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) measure US productivity growth at 2.5 percent per year since 1948. Average US productivity growth has been only 1.1 percent on average since 2011. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) argue that living standards in the US increased at 28 percent in a decade but with current slow growth of productivity will only increase 12 percent by 2024. There may be collateral effects on productivity growth from policy design similar to those in Kydland and Prescott (1977). The Bureau of Labor Statistics important report on productivity and costs released on Feb 6, 2014 (http://www.bls.gov/lpc/) supports the argument of decline of productivity in the US analyzed by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb). Table VA-3 provides the annual percentage changes of productivity, real hourly compensation and unit labor costs for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2013. The data confirm the argument of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb): productivity increased cumulatively 2.6 percent from 2011 to 2013 at the average annual rate of 0.9 percent. The situation is direr by excluding growth of 1.5 percent in 2012, which leaves an average of 0.55 percent for 2011 and 2013. Average productivity growth for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2013 is only 1.6 percent. The argument by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is proper in choosing the tail of the business cycle because the increase in productivity in 2009 of 3.2 percent and 3.3 percent in 2010 consisted on reducing labor hours.
Table VA-3, US, Revised Nonfarm Business Sector Productivity and Costs Annual Average, ∆% Annual Average
2013 ∆% | 2012 ∆% | 2011 ∆% | 2010 ∆% | 2009 ∆% | 2008 ∆% | 2007 ∆% | |
Productivity | 0.6 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 0.8 | 1.6 |
Real Hourly Compensation | 0.2 | 0.5 | -0.7 | 0.4 | 1.5 | -1.1 | 1.4 |
Unit Labor Costs | 1.0 | 1.2 | 2.0 | -1.2 | -2.0 | 2.0 | 2.6 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 3) of secular stagnation, economic progress consists of growth of real income per person driven by growth of productivity. The “constituent elements” of economic progress are “(a) inventions, (b) the discovery and development of new territory and new resources, and (c) the growth of population” (Hansen 1939, 3). Secular stagnation originates in decline of population growth and discouragement of inventions. According to Hansen (1939, 2), US population grew by 16 million in the 1920s but grew by one half or about 8 million in the 1930s with forecasts at the time of Hansen’s writing in 1938 of growth of around 5.3 million in the 1940s. Hansen (1939, 2) characterized demography in the US as “a drastic decline in the rate of population growth. Hansen’s plea was to adapt economic policy to stagnation of population in ensuring full employment. In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 8), population caused half of the growth of US GDP per year. Growth of output per person in the US and Europe was caused by “changes in techniques and to the exploitation of new natural resources.” In this analysis, population caused 60 percent of the growth of capital formation in the US. Declining population growth would reduce growth of capital formation. Residential construction provided an important share of growth of capital formation. Hansen (1939, 12) argues that market power of imperfect competition discourages innovation with prolonged use of obsolete capital equipment. Trade unions would oppose labor-savings innovations. The combination of stagnating and aging population with reduced innovation caused secular stagnation. Hansen (1939, 12) concludes that there is role for public investments to compensate for lack of dynamism of private investment but with tough tax/debt issues.
The current application of Hansen’s (1938, 1939, 1941) proposition argues that secular stagnation occurs because full employment equilibrium can be attained only with negative real interest rates between minus 2 and minus 3 percent. Professor Lawrence H. Summers (2013Nov8) finds that “a set of older ideas that went under the phrase secular stagnation are not profoundly important in understanding Japan’s experience in the 1990s and may not be without relevance to America’s experience today” (emphasis added). Summers (2013Nov8) argues there could be an explanation in “that the short-term real interest rate that was consistent with full employment had fallen to -2% or -3% sometime in the middle of the last decade. Then, even with artificial stimulus to demand coming from all this financial imprudence, you wouldn’t see any excess demand. And even with a relative resumption of normal credit conditions, you’d have a lot of difficulty getting back to full employment.” The US economy could be in a situation where negative real rates of interest with fed funds rates close to zero as determined by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) do not move the economy to full employment or full utilization of productive resources. Summers (2013Oct8) finds need of new thinking on “how we manage an economy in which the zero nominal interest rates is a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economy activity holding our economies back to their potential.”
Former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (2014Jan8) finds three major risks in prolonged unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing: (1) incentive of delaying action by political leaders; (2) “financial moral hazard” in inducing excessive exposures pursuing higher yields of risker credit classes; and (3) major risks in exiting unconventional policy. Rubin (2014Jan8) proposes reduction of deficits by structural reforms that could promote recovery by improving confidence of business attained with sound fiscal discipline.
Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) provides clear thought on the lack of relevance of Hansen’s contention of secular stagnation to current economic conditions. The application of secular stagnation argues that the economy of the US has attained full-employment equilibrium since around 2000 only with negative real rates of interest of minus 2 to minus 3 percent. At low levels of inflation, the so-called full-employment equilibrium of negative interest rates of minus 2 to minus 3 percent cannot be attained and the economy stagnates. Taylor (2014Jan01) analyzes multiple contradictions with current reality in this application of the theory of secular stagnation:
- Secular stagnation would predict idle capacity, in particular in residential investment when fed fund rates were fixed at 1 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. Taylor (2014Jan01) finds unemployment at 4.4 percent with house prices jumping 7 percent from 2002 to 2003 and 14 percent from 2004 to 2005 before dropping from 2006 to 2007. GDP prices doubled from 1.7 percent to 3.4 percent when interest rates were low from 2003 to 2005.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the application of secular stagnation based on low interest rates because of savings glut and lack of investment opportunities. Taylor (2009) shows that there was no savings glut. The savings rate of the US in the past decade is significantly lower than in the 1980s.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the low ratio of investment to GDP currently and reduced investment and hiring by US business firms.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the financial crisis and global recession were caused by weak implementation of existing regulation and departure from rules-based policies.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the recovery from the global recession was constrained by a change in the regime of regulation and fiscal/monetary policies.
Professors Edward C. Prescott and Lee E. Ohanian (2014Feb), writing on “US productivity growth has taken a dive,” on Feb 3, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303942404579362462611843696?KEYWORDS=Prescott), argue that impressive productivity growth over the long-term constructed US prosperity and wellbeing. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) measure US productivity growth at 2.5 percent per year since 1948. Average US productivity growth has been only 1.1 percent on average since 2011. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) argue that living standards in the US increased at 28 percent in a decade but with current slow growth of productivity will only increase 12 percent by 2024. There may be collateral effects on productivity growth from policy design similar to those analyzed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). The Bureau of Labor Statistics important report on productivity and costs released on Feb 6, 2014 (http://www.bls.gov/lpc/) supports the argument of decline of productivity in the US analyzed by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb). Table VA-3 provides the annual percentage changes of productivity, real hourly compensation and unit labor costs for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2013. The data confirm the argument of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb): productivity increased cumulatively 2.6 percent from 2011 to 2013 at the average annual rate of 0.9 percent. The situation is direr by excluding growth of 1.5 percent in 2012, which leaves an average of 0.55 percent for 2011 and 2013. Average productivity growth for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2013 is only 1.6 percent. The argument by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is proper in choosing the tail of the business cycle because the increase in productivity in 2009 of 3.2 percent and 3.3 percent in 2010 consisted on reducing labor hours.
In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share si of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate yi of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):
Y = ∑isiyi (1)
This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):
∆Y = ∑i∆siy*i + ∑i∆yis*i (2)
The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆si multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*i , or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆yi, multiplied by the average share of the group s*i, or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:
“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”
The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-6). Simon Kuznets (1971) analyzes modern economic growth in his Lecture in Memory of Alfred Nobel:
“The major breakthroughs in the advance of human knowledge, those that constituted dominant sources of sustained growth over long periods and spread to a substantial part of the world, may be termed epochal innovations. And the changing course of economic history can perhaps be subdivided into economic epochs, each identified by the epochal innovation with the distinctive characteristics of growth that it generated. Without considering the feasibility of identifying and dating such economic epochs, we may proceed on the working assumption that modern economic growth represents such a distinct epoch - growth dating back to the late eighteenth century and limited (except in significant partial effects) to economically developed countries. These countries, so classified because they have managed to take adequate advantage of the potential of modern technology, include most of Europe, the overseas offshoots of Western Europe, and Japan—barely one quarter of world population.”
Chart VA-20 provides nonfarm-business labor productivity, measured by output per hour, from 1947 to 2013. The rate of productivity increase continued in the early part of the 2000s but then softened and fell during the global recession. The interruption of productivity increases occurred exclusively in the current business cycle. Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) find “primarily cyclic” factors in explaining the frustration of currently depressed labor markets in the United States. Stagnation of productivity is another cyclic event and not secular trend. The theory and application of secular stagnation to current US economic conditions is void of reality.
Chart VA-20, US, Nonfarm Business Labor Productivity, Output per Hour, 1947-2013, Index 2005=100
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Table VA-3A expands Table VA-3 providing more complete measurements of the Productivity and Cost research of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The proper emphasis of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is on the low productivity increases from 2011 to 2013. Labor productivity increased 3.3 percent in 2010 and 3.2 percent in 2009. There is much stronger yet not sustained performance in 2010 with productivity growing 3.3 percent because of growth of output of 3.2 percent with decline of hours worked of 0.1 percent. Productivity growth of 3.2 percent in 2009 consists of decline of output by 4.3 percent while hours worked collapsed 7.2 percent, which is not a desirable route to progress. The expansion phase of the economic cycle concentrated in one year, 2010, with underperformance in the remainder of the expansion from 2011 to 2013 of productivity growth at average 0.9 percent per year.
VA-3A, US, Productivity and Costs, Annual Percentage Changes 2007-2013
2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | |
Productivity | 0.6 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 0.8 | 1.6 |
Output | 2.3 | 3.7 | 2.5 | 3.2 | -4.3 | -1.3 | 2.3 |
Hours Worked | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.0 | -0.1 | -7.2 | -2.0 | 0.7 |
Employment | 1.8 | 2.0 | 1.5 | -1.2 | -5.7 | -1.5 | 0.9 |
Average Weekly Hours Worked | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.1 | -1.6 | -0.5 | -0.2 |
Hourly Compensation | 1.6 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 2.7 | 4.3 |
Consumer Price Inflation | 1.5 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 1.6 | -0.4 | 3.8 | 2.8 |
Real Hourly Compensation | 0.2 | 0.5 | -0.7 | 0.4 | 1.4 | -1.1 | 1.4 |
Non-labor Payments | 3.9 | 6.5 | 4.0 | 7.3 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 3.4 |
Output per Job | 0.5 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 4.4 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 1.4 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Productivity growth can bring about prosperity while productivity regression can jeopardize progress. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in USD fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in Japan and France within the G7 in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Table V-3B provide average growth rates of indicators in the research of productivity and growth of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. There is dramatic decline of productivity growth in the whole cycle from 2.2 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2013 to 1.6 percent per year on average from 2007 and 2013. There is profound drop in the average rate of output growth from 3.4 percent on average from 1947 to 2013 to 1.2 percent from 2007 to 2013. Real hourly compensation collapsed from average 1.6 percent per year from 1947 to 2013 to 0.3 percent per year from 2007 to 2013. The antithesis of secular stagnation is cyclical slow growth. The policy design deserves consideration of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) to induce productivity growth for future progress.
Table V-3B, US, Productivity and Costs, Average Annual Percentage Changes 2007-2013 and 1947-2013
Average Annual Percentage Rate 2007-2013 | Average Annual Percentage Rate 1947-2013 | |
Productivity | 1.6 | 2.2 |
Output | 1.2 | 3.4 |
Hours | 0.0 | 1.2 |
Employment | 0.0 | 1.4 |
Average Weekly Hours | 0.0 | NA |
Hourly Compensation | 2.4 | 5.1 |
Consumer Price Inflation | 2.1 | 3.6 |
Real Hourly Compensation | 0.3 | 1.6 |
Non-labor Payments | 3.5 | 3.4 |
Output per Job | 1.5 | 2.0 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
IIA United States Budget Quagmire. Table IIA1-1 of the CBO (2012NovMBR, 2013BEOFeb5, 2013HBDFFeb5, 2013MEFFeb5, 2013Aug12, CBO, Feb 2014) shows the significant worsening of United States fiscal affairs from 2007-2008 to 2009-2012 with marginal improvement in 2013 but with much higher debt relative to GDP. The deficit of $1.1 trillion in fiscal year 2012 was the fourth consecutive federal deficit exceeding one trillion dollars. All four deficits are the highest in share of GDP since 1946 (CBO 2012MBR, 2013HBDFeb5, 2013Aug12, 2013AugHBD).
Table IAI-1, US, Budget Fiscal Year Totals, Billions of Dollars and % GDP
2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | |
Receipts | 2568 | 2524 | 2105 | 2163 | 2304 | 2450 | 2774 |
Outlays | 2729 | 2983 | 3518 | 3457 | 3603 | 3537 | 3454 |
Deficit | -161 | -459 | 1413 | 1294 | 1300 | 1087 | 680 |
% GDP | -1.1 | -3.1 | -9.8 | -8.8 | -8.4 | -6.8 | -4.1 |
Source: CBO (2012NovMBR), CBO (2013BEOFeb5), CBO (2013HBDFeb5), CBO (2013Aug12). CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb.
Table IIA1-2 provides additional information required for understanding the deficit/debt situation of the United States. The table is divided into three parts: federal fiscal data for the years from 2009 to 2012; federal fiscal data for the years from 2005 to 2008; and Treasury debt held by the public from 2005 to 2012. There are also receipts, outlays, deficit and debt for fiscal year 2013. Total revenues of the US from 2009 to 2012 accumulate to $9021 billion, or $9.0 trillion, while expenditures or outlays accumulate to $14,109 billion, or $14.1 trillion, with the deficit accumulating to $5090 billion, or $5.1 trillion. Revenues decreased 6.5 percent from $9653 billion in the four years from 2005 to 2008 to $9021 billion in the years from 2009 to 2012. Decreasing revenues were caused by the global recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (Jun) and also by growth of only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013. In contrast, the expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). Because of mediocre GDP growth, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). Weakness of growth and employment creation is analyzed in IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/world-inflation-waves-interest-rate.html). In contrast with the decline of revenue, outlays or expenditures increased 30.2 percent from $10,839 billion, or $10.8 trillion, in the four years from 2005 to 2008, to $14,109 billion, or $14.1 trillion, in the four years from 2009 to 2012. Increase in expenditures by 30.2 percent while revenue declined by 6.5 percent caused the increase in the federal deficit from $1186 billion in 2005-2008 to $5090 billion in 2009-2012. Federal revenue was 14.9 percent of GDP on average in the years from 2009 to 2012, which is well below 17.4 percent of GDP on average from 1973 to 2012. Federal outlays were 23.3 percent of GDP on average from 2009 to 2012, which is well above 20.4 percent of GDP on average from 1973 to 2012. The lower part of Table I-2 shows that debt held by the public swelled from $5803 billion in 2008 to $11,982 billion in 2013, by $5478 billion or 106.5 percent. Debt held by the public as percent of GDP or economic activity jumped from 39.3 percent in 2008 to 72.1 percent in 2013, which is well above the average of 38.0 percent from 1973 to 2012. The United States faces tough adjustment because growth is unlikely to recover, creating limits on what can be obtained by increasing revenues, while continuing stress of social programs restricts what can be obtained by reducing expenditures.
Table IIA1-2, US, Treasury Budget and Debt Held by the Public, Billions of Dollars and Percent of GDP
Receipts | Outlays | Deficit (-), Surplus (+) | |
$ Billions | |||
Fiscal Year 2013 | 2,774 | 3,454 | -680 |
% GDP | 16.7 | 20.8 | -4.1 |
Fiscal Year 2012 | 2,450 | 3,537 | -1,087 |
% GDP | 15.2 | 22.0 | -6.8 |
Fiscal Year 2011 | 2,304 | 3,603 | -1,300 |
% GDP | 15.0 | 23.4 | -8.4 |
Fiscal Year 2010 | 2,163 | 3,457 | -1,294 |
% GDP | 14.6 | 23.4 | -8.8 |
Fiscal Year 2009 | 2,105 | 3,518 | -1,413 |
% GDP | 14.6 | 24.4 | -9.8 |
Total 2009-2012 | 9,021 | 14,109 | -5,090 |
Average % GDP 2009-2012 | 14.9 | 23.3 | -8.4 |
Fiscal Year 2008 | 2,524 | 2,983 | -459 |
% GDP | 17.1 | 20.2 | -3.1 |
Fiscal Year 2007 | 2,568 | 2,729 | -161 |
% GDP | 17.9 | 19.0 | -1.1 |
Fiscal Year 2006 | 2,407 | 2,655 | -248 |
% GDP | 17.6 | 19.4 | -1.8 |
Fiscal Year 2005 | 2,154 | 2,472 | -318 |
% GDP | 16.7 | 19.2 | -2.5 |
Total 2005-2008 | 9,653 | 10,839 | -1,186 |
Average % GDP 2005-2008 | 17.3 | 19.5 | -2.1 |
Debt Held by the Public | Billions of Dollars | Percent of GDP | |
2005 | 4,592 | 35.6 | |
2006 | 4,829 | 35.3 | |
2007 | 5,035 | 35.1 | |
2008 | 5,803 | 39.3 | |
2009 | 7,545 | 52.3 | |
2010 | 9,019 | 61.0 | |
2011 | 10,128 | 65.8 | |
2012 | 11,281 | 70.1 | |
2013 | 11,982 | 72.1 |
Source: http://www.fms.treas.gov/mts/index.html CBO (2012NovMBR). CBO (2011AugBEO); Office of Management and Budget 2011. Historical Tables. Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: OMB; CBO. 2011JanBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Jan. CBO. 2012AugBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Aug 22. CBO. 2012Jan31. Historical budget data. Washington, DC, Jan 31. CBO. 2012NovCDR. Choices for deficit reduction. Washington, DC. Nov. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO (2013Aug12). 2013AugHBD. Historical budget data—August 2013. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Aug. CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb.
Unusually low economic growth of average 2.4 percent of GDP in the current expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 and 2.7 percent in the first four quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html) has had adverse impact on revenue generation. The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.8 percent in the first four quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). Because of mediocre GDP growth, there are 30.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 18.5 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). The impact of low growth on employment creation and labor market hiring is discussed in Subsection IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/world-inflation-waves-interest-rate.html). Table IIAI-3 provides total United States federal receipts from 2010 to 2013. Individual income taxes of $1132 billion, or $1.1 trillion, increased 25.9 percent from 2010 to 2012 and account for 46.2 percent of US total receipts in 2012. Individual income taxes increased 16.3 percent from $1132 billion in 2012 to $1316 billion in 2013, contributing 47.4 percent of total receipts. Total receipts stood at 15.2 percent of GDP in 2012, which is lower than 17.4 percent in the past 40 years (CBO 2013Aug12Av). Total receipts increased to 16.7 percent of GDP in 2013.
Table IIA1-3, United States, Total Receipts, Billions of Dollars and ∆%
Major Source | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | ∆% 2012-2013 |
Individual Income Taxes | 899 | 1092 | 1132 | 1316 | 16.3 |
Corporate Income Taxes | 191 | 181 | 242 | 274 | 13.2 |
Social Insurance | 865 | 819 | 845 | 948 | 12.2 |
Other | 208 | 212 | 231 | 236 | 10.0 |
Total | 2163 | 2304 | 2450 | 2774 | 13.2 |
% of GDP | 14.6 | 15.0 | 15.2 | 16.7 | NA |
Source: CBO (2012NovMBR), CBO (2013BEOFeb5), CBO 2013HBDFeb5), CBO (2013Aug12). CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb.
Total outlays of the federal government of the United States have grown to extremely high levels. Table IIA1-4 of the CBO (2014Feb) provides total outlays in 2006 and 2013. Total outlays of $3454.3 billion in 2013, or $3.5 trillion, are higher by $799.2 billion, or $0.8 trillion, relative to $2655.1 billion in 2006, or $2.7 trillion. Outlays have grown from 19.4 percent of GDP in 2007 to 20.8 percent of GDP in 2013. Outlays as percent of GDP were on average 20.4 percent from 1973 to 2012 and receipts as percent of GDP were on average 17.4 percent of GDP. It has proved extremely difficult to increase receipts above 19 percent of GDP. Mandatory outlays increased from $1411.8 billion in 2006 to $2031.8 billion in 2013, by $620 billion. The first to the final row shows that the total of social security, Medicare, Medicaid, Income Security, net interest and defense absorbs 82.4 percent of US total outlays, which is equal to 17.1 percent of GDP. There has been no meaningful constraint of spending, which is quite difficult because of the rigid structure of social programs.
Table IIA1-4, US, Central Government Total Revenue and Outlays, Billions of Dollars and Percent
2006 | % Total | 2013 | % Total | |
I TOTAL REVENUE $B | 2406.9 | 100.0 | 2774 | 100.0 |
% GDP | 17.6 | 16.7 | ||
Individual Income Taxes $B | 1043.9 | 1316.4 | ||
% GDP | 7.6 | 7.9 | ||
Corporate Income Taxes $B | 353.9 | 273.5 | ||
% GDP | 2.6 | 5.7 | ||
Social Insurance Taxes | 837.8 | 947.5 | ||
% GDP | 6.1 | 1.6 | ||
II TOTAL OUTLAYS | 2655.1 | 3454.3 | ||
% GDP | 19.4 | 20.8 | ||
Discretionary | 1016.6 | 1201.2 | ||
% GDP | 7.4 | 7.2 | ||
Defense | 520.0 | 624.9 | ||
% GDP | 3.8 | 3.8 | ||
Nondefense | 496.7 | 576.3 | ||
% GDP | 3.6 | 3.5 | ||
Mandatory | 1411.8 | 2031.8 | ||
% GDP | 10.3 | 12.2 | ||
Social Security | 543.9 | 807.8 | ||
% GDP | 4.0 | 4.9 | ||
Medicare | 376.8 | 585.3 | ||
% GDP | 2.8 | 3.5 | ||
Medicaid | 180.6 | 265.4 | ||
% GDP | 1.3 | 1.6 | ||
Income Security | 200.0 | 339.9 | ||
% GDP | 1.5 | 2.0 | ||
Offsetting Receipts | -144.3 | -306.1 | ||
% GDP | -1.1 | -1.8 | ||
Net Interest | 226.6 | 221.3 | ||
% GDP | 1.7 | 1.3 | ||
Defense +Medicare | 2048.0 | 77.1* | 2844.6 | 82.4* |
% GDP | 15.1 | 17.1 |
*Percent of Total Outlays
Source: CBO (2013Aug12). 2013AugHBD. Historical budget data—August 2013. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Aug. CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb.
The US is facing a major fiscal challenge. Table IIA1-5 provides federal revenues, expenditures, deficit and debt as percent of GDP and the yearly change in GDP in the more than eight decades from 1930 to 2013. The most recent period of debt exceeding 90 percent of GDP based on yearly observations in Table IIA1-5 is between 1944 and 1948. The data in Table IIA-15 use the earlier GDP estimates of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) until 1972 for the ratios to GDP of revenue, expenditures, deficit and debt and the revised CBO (2013Aug12) after 1973 that incorporate the new BEA GDP estimates (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The percentage change of GDP is based on the new BEA estimates for all years. The debt/GDP ratio actually rose to 106.2 percent of GDP in 1945 and to 108.7 percent of GDP in 1946. GDP fell revised 11.6 percent in 1946, which is only matched in Table I-5 by the decline of revised 12.9 percent in 1932. Part of the decline is explained by the bloated US economy during World War II, growing at revised 17.7 percent in 1941, 18.9 percent in 1942 and 17.0 percent in 1943. Expenditures as a share of GDP rose to their highest in the series: 43.6 percent in 1943, 43.6 percent in 1944 and 41.9 percent in 1945. The repetition of 43.6 percent in 1943 and 1944 is in the original source of Table IIA1-5. During the Truman administration from Apr 1945 to Jan 1953, the federal debt held by the public fell systematically from the peak of 108.7 percent of GDP in 1946 to 61.6 percent of GDP in 1952. During the Eisenhower administration from Jan 1953 to Jan 1961, the federal debt held by the public fell from 58.6 percent of GDP in 1953 to 45.6 percent of GDP in 1960. The Truman and Eisenhower debt reductions were facilitated by diverse factors such as low interest rates, lower expenditure/GDP ratios that could be attained again after lowering war outlays and less rigid structure of mandatory expenditures than currently. There is no subsequent jump of debt as the one from revised 39.3 percent of GDP in 2008 to 65.8 percent of GDP in 2011, 70.1 percent in 2012 and 72.1 percent in 2013.
Table IIA1-5, United States Central Government Revenue, Expenditure, Deficit, Debt and GDP Growth 1930-2011
Rev | Exp | Deficit | Debt | GDP | |
1930 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 0.8 | -8.5 | |
1931 | 3.7 | 4.3 | -0.6 | -6.4 | |
1932 | 2.8 | 6.9 | -4.0 | -12.9 | |
1933 | 3.5 | 8.0 | -4.5 | -1.3 | |
1934 | 4.8 | 10.7 | -5.9 | 10.8 | |
1935 | 5.2 | 9.2 | -4.0 | 8.9 | |
1936 | 5.0 | 10.5 | -5.5 | 12.9 | |
1937 | 6.1 | 8.6 | -2.5 | 5.1 | |
1938 | 7.6 | 7.7 | -0.1 | -3.3 | |
1939 | 7.1 | 10.3 | -3.2 | 8.0 | |
1940s | |||||
1940 | 6.8 | 9.8 | -3.0 | 44.2 | 8.8 |
1941 | 7.6 | 12.0 | -4.3 | 42.3 | 17.7 |
1942 | 10.1 | 24.3 | -14.2 | 47.0 | 18.9 |
1943 | 13.3 | 43.6 | -30.3 | 70.9 | 17.0 |
1944 | 20.9 | 43.6 | -22.7 | 88.3 | 8.0 |
1945 | 20.4 | 41.9 | -21.5 | 106.2 | -1.0 |
1946 | 17.7 | 24.8 | -7.2 | 108.7 | -11.6 |
1947 | 16.5 | 14.8 | 1.7 | 96.2 | -1.1 |
1948 | 16.2 | 11.6 | 4.6 | 84.3 | 4.1 |
1949 | 14.5 | 14.3 | 0.2 | 79.0 | -0.5 |
1950s | |||||
1950 | 14.4 | 15.6 | -1.1 | 80.2 | 8.7 |
1951 | 16.1 | 14.2 | 1.9 | 66.9 | 8.1 |
1952 | 19.0 | 19.4 | -0.4 | 61.6 | 4.1 |
1953 | 18.7 | 20.4 | -1.7 | 58.6 | 4.7 |
1954 | 18.5 | 18.8 | -0.3 | 59.5 | -0.6 |
1955 | 16.5 | 17.3 | -0.8 | 57.2 | 7.1 |
1956 | 17.5 | 16.5 | 0.9 | 52.0 | 2.1 |
1957 | 17.7 | 17.0 | 0.8 | 48.6 | 2.1 |
1958 | 17.3 | 17.9 | -0.6 | 49.2 | -0.7 |
1959 | 16.2 | 18.8 | -2.6 | 47.9 | 6.9 |
1960s | |||||
1960 | 17.8 | 17.8 | 0.1 | 45.6 | 2.6 |
1961 | 17.8 | 18.4 | -0.6 | 45.0 | 2.6 |
1962 | 17.6 | 18.8 | -1.3 | 43.7 | 6.1 |
1963 | 17.8 | 18.6 | -0.8 | 42.4 | 4.4 |
1964 | 17.6 | 18.5 | -0.9 | 40.0 | 5.8 |
1965 | 17.0 | 17.2 | -0.2 | 37.9 | 6.5 |
1966 | 17.3 | 17.8 | -0.5 | 34.9 | 6.6 |
1967 | 18.4 | 19.4 | -1.1 | 32.9 | 2.7 |
1968 | 17.6 | 20.5 | -2.9 | 33.9 | 4.9 |
1969 | 19.7 | 19.4 | 0.3 | 29.3 | 3.1 |
1970s | |||||
1970 | 19.0 | 19.3 | -0.3 | 28.0 | 0.2 |
1971 | 17.3 | 19.5 | -2.1 | 28.1 | 3.3 |
1972 | 17.6 | 19.6 | -2.0 | 27.4 | 5.2 |
1973 | 17.0 | 18.1 | -1.1 | 25.1 | 5.6 |
1974 | 17.7 | 18.1 | -0.4 | 23.1 | -0.5 |
1975 | 17.3 | 20.6 | -3.3 | 24.5 | -0.2 |
1976 | 16.6 | 20.8 | -4.1 | 26.7 | 5.4 |
1977 | 17.5 | 20.2 | -2.6 | 27.1 | 4.6 |
1978 | 17.5 | 20.1 | -2.6 | 26.6 | 5.6 |
1979 | 18.0 | 19.6 | -1.6 | 24.9 | 3.2 |
1980s | |||||
1980 | 18.5 | 21.1 | -2.6 | 25.5 | -0.2 |
1981 | 19.1 | 21.6 | -2.5 | 25.2 | 2.6 |
1982 | 18.6 | 22.5 | -3.9 | 27.9 | -1.9 |
1983 | 17.0 | 22.8 | -5.9 | 32.1 | 4.6 |
1984 | 16.9 | 21.5 | -4.7 | 33.1 | 7.3 |
1985 | 17.2 | 22.2 | -5.0 | 35.3 | 4.2 |
1986 | 17.0 | 21.8 | -4.9 | 38.4 | 3.5 |
1987 | 17.9 | 21.0 | -3.1 | 39.5 | 3.5 |
1988 | 17.6 | 20.6 | -3.0 | 39.8 | 4.2 |
1989 | 17.8 | 20.5 | -2.7 | 39.3 | 3.7 |
1990s | |||||
1990 | 17.4 | 21.2 | -3.7 | 40.8 | 1.9 |
1991 | 17.3 | 21.7 | -4.4 | 44.0 | -0.1 |
1992 | 17.0 | 21.5 | -4.5 | 46.6 | 3.6 |
1993 | 17.0 | 20.7 | -3.8 | 47.8 | 2.7 |
1994 | 17.5 | 20.3 | -2.8 | 47.7 | 4.0 |
1995 | 17.8 | 20.0 | -2.2 | 47.5 | 2.7 |
1996 | 18.2 | 19.6 | -1.3 | 46.8 | 3.8 |
1997 | 18.6 | 18.9 | -0.3 | 44.5 | 4.5 |
1998 | 19.2 | 18.5 | 0.8 | 41.6 | 4.4 |
1999 | 19.2 | 17.9 | 1.3 | 38.2 | 4.8 |
2000s | |||||
2000 | 19.9 | 17.6 | 2.3 | 33.6 | 4.1 |
2001 | 18.8 | 17.6 | 1.2 | 31.4 | 1.0 |
2002 | 17.0 | 18.5 | -1.5 | 32.5 | 1.8 |
2003 | 15.7 | 19.1 | -3.3 | 34.5 | 2.8 |
2004 | 15.6 | 19.0 | -3.4 | 35.5 | 3.8 |
2005 | 16.7 | 19.2 | -2.5 | 35.6 | 3.4 |
2006 | 17.6 | 19.4 | -1.8 | 35.3 | 2.7 |
2007 | 17.9 | 19.0 | -1.1 | 35.1 | 1.8 |
2008 | 17.1 | 20.2 | -3.1 | 39.3 | -0.3 |
2009 | 14.6 | 24.4 | -9.8 | 52.3 | -2.8 |
2010s | |||||
2010 | 14.6 | 23.4 | -8.8 | 61.0 | 2.5 |
2011 | 15.0 | 23.4 | -8.4 | 65.8 | 1.8 |
2012 | 15.2 | 22.0 | -6.8 | 70.1 | 2.8 |
2013 | 16.7 | 20.8 | -4.1 | 72.1 | 1.9 |
Sources:
Office of Management and Budget. 2011. Historical Tables. Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: OMB. CBO (2012JanBEO). CBO (2012Jan31). CBO (2012AugBEO). CBO (2013BEOFeb5). CBO2013HBDFeb5), CBO (2013Aug12). CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb.
Table IIA1-6 provides 40-year average ratios of fiscal variables to GDP before and after the revision by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in Aug 2013 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The ratios are equal or slightly higher because of the addition of intellectual property to GDP estimates. There are no major changes.
Table IIA1-6, US, Congressional Budget Office, 40-Year Averages of Revenues and Outlays Before and After Update of the US National Income Accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, % of GDP
Before Update | After Update | |
Revenues | ||
Individual Income Taxes | 8.2 | 7.9 |
Social Insurance Taxes | 6.2 | 6.0 |
Corporate Income Taxes | 1.9 | 1.9 |
Other | 1.6 | 1.6 |
Total Revenues | 17.9 | 17.4 |
Outlays | ||
Mandatory | 10.2 | 9.9 |
Discretionary | 8.6 | 8.4 |
Net Interest | 2.2 | 2.2 |
Total Outlays | 21.0 | 20.4 |
Deficit | -3.1 | -3.0 |
Debt Held by the Public | 39.2 | 38.0 |
Source: CBO (2013Aug12Av). Kim Kowaleski and Amber Marcellino.
The capital budgeting decision of business requires the calculation of present value of projects. This calculation consists of a projection toward the horizon of planning of revenues net of costs, which are discounted to present value by the weighted average cost of capital. Business invests in the projects with highest net present value. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides a similar service. Congress and the administration send budget proposals and legislation for evaluation by the CBO of their effects on federal government revenues, expenditures, deficit or surpluses and debt. The CBO does not provide its own policy proposals but analyzes alternative policies. The CBO uses state of the art knowledge but significant uncertainty remains because of the hurdle of projecting financial and economic variables to the future.
Table IIA1-7 provides the latest exercise by the CBO (2013BEOFeb5, 2012AugBEO, CBO2012NovCDR, 2013Sep11, CBO Feb2014) of projecting the fiscal accounts of the US. Table IIA1-7 extends data back to 1995 with the projections of the CBO from 2014 to 2024, using the new estimates of the Bureau of Economic Analysis of US GDP (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Budget analysis in the US uses a ten-year horizon. The significant event in the data before 2011 is the budget surpluses from 1998 to 2001, from 0.8 percent of GDP in 1998 to 2.3 percent of GDP in 2000 and 1.2 percent of GDP in 2001. Debt held by the public fell from 47.5 percent of GDP in 1995 to 31.4 percent of GDP in 2001.
Table IIA1-7, US, CBO Baseline Budget Outlook 2014-2024
Out | Out | Deficit | Deficit | Debt | Debt | |
1995 | 1,516 | 20.0 | -164 | -2.2 | 3,604 | 47.5 |
1996 | 1,560 | 19.6 | -107 | -1.3 | 3,734 | 46.8 |
1997 | 1,601 | 18.9 | -22 | -0.3 | 3,772 | 44.5 |
1998 | 1,652 | 18.5 | +69 | +0.8 | 3,721 | 41.6 |
1999 | 1,702 | 17.9 | +126 | +1.3 | 3,632 | 38.2 |
2000 | 1,789 | 17.6 | +236 | +2.3 | 3,410 | 33.6 |
2001 | 1,863 | 17.6 | +128 | +1.2 | 3,320 | 31.4 |
2002 | 2,011 | 18.5 | -158 | -1.5 | 3,540 | 32.5 |
2003 | 2,159 | 19.1 | -378 | -3.3 | 3,913 | 34.5 |
2004 | 2,293 | 19.0 | -413 | -3.4 | 4,295 | 35.5 |
2005 | 2,472 | 19.2 | -318 | -2.5 | 4,592 | 35.6 |
2006 | 2,655 | 19.4 | -248 | -1.8 | 4,829 | 35.3 |
2007 | 2,729 | 19.0 | -161 | -1.1 | 5,035 | 35.1 |
2008 | 2,983 | 20.2 | -459 | -3.1 | 5,803 | 39.3 |
2009 | 3,518 | 24.4 | -1,413 | -9.8 | 7,545 | 52.3 |
2010 | 3,457 | 23.4 | -1,294 | -8.7 | 9,019 | 61.0 |
2011 | 3,603 | 23.4 | -1,300 | -8.4 | 10,128 | 65.8 |
2012 | 3,537 | 22.0 | -1,087 | -6.8 | 11,281 | 70.1 |
2013 | 3,454 | 20.8 | -680 | -4.1 | 11,982 | 72.1 |
2014 | 3,543 | 20.5 | -514 | -3.0 | 12,717 | 73.6 |
2015 | 3,783 | 20.9 | -478 | -2.6 | 13,263 | 73.2 |
2016 | 4,020 | 21.1 | -539 | -2.8 | 13,861 | 72.6 |
2017 | 4,212 | 21.0 | -581 | -2.9 | 14,507 | 72.3 |
2018 | 4,425 | 21.1 | -655 | -3.1 | 15,218 | 72.6 |
2019 | 4,684 | 21.4 | -752 | -3.4 | 16,028 | 73.3 |
2020 | 4,939 | 21.7 | -836 | -3.7 | 16,925 | 74.2 |
2021 | 5,200 | 21.9 | -912 | -3.8 | 17,899 | 75.3 |
2022 | 5,522 | 22.3 | -1,031 | -4.2 | 19,001 | 76.8 |
2023 | 5,749 | 22.3 | -1,047 | -4.1 | 20,115 | 78.0 |
2024 | 6,000 | 22.4 | -1,074 | -4.0 | 21,260 | 79.2 |
2015 to 2019 | 21,124 | 21.1 | -3,005 | -3.0 | NA | NA |
2014 | 48,534 | 21.7 | -7,904 | -3.5 | NA | NA |
Note: Out = outlays
Sources: CBO (2011AugBEO); Office of Management and Budget. 2011. Historical Tables. Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: OMB; CBO. 2011JanBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Jan. CBO. 2012AugBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Aug 22. CBO. 2012Jan31. Historical budget data. Washington, DC, Jan 31. CBO. 2012NovCDR. Choices for deficit reduction. Washington, DC. Nov. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO. 2013HBDFeb5. Historical budget data—February 2013 baseline projections. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 5. CBO (2013Sep11). CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb. CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook 2014 to 2024. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 2014.
Chart IIA1-1 of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides the deficits of the US as percent of GDP from 1974 to 2013 followed on the right with the projections of the CBO in Feb 2014. Large deficits from 2009 to 2013, all above the average from 1974 to 2013, doubled the debt held by the public. Fiscal adjustment is now more challenging with rigidities in revenues and expenditures. The projections of the CBO in Feb 2014 for the years from 2014 to 2024 show lower deficits in proportion of GDP in the initial years that eventually become larger than the average in the second half of the ten-year window.
Chart IIA1-1, US, Total Federal Deficits and Surpluses
Source: Congressional Budget Office
The Budget and Economic Outlook 2014 to 2024. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 2014.
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/45073
Table IIA1-8 provides baseline CBO projections of federal revenues, outlays, deficit and debt as percent of GDP. The adjustment depends on increasing revenues from 15.0 percent of GDP in 2011 and 16.7 percent in 2013 to 18.4 percent of GDP in 2024, which is above the 40-year average of 17.4 percent of GDP. Outlays fall from 23.4 percent of GDP in 2011 and 20.8 percent of GDP in 2013 to 22.4 percent of GDP in 2024. The last row of Table IIA1-8 provides the CBO estimates of averages for 1973 to 2012 of 17.4 percent for revenues/GDP, 20.4 percent for outlays/GDP and 38.0 percent for debt/GDP. The debt/GDP ratio increases to 79.2 percent of GDP. The United States faces tough adjustment of its fiscal accounts. There is an additional source of pressure on financing the current account deficit of the balance of payments (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html).
Table IIA1-8, US, Baseline CBO Projections of Federal Government Revenues, Outlays, Deficit and Debt as Percent of GDP
Revenues | Outlays | Deficit | Debt | |
2011 | 15.0 | 23.4 | -8.4 | 65.8 |
2012 | 15.2 | 22.0 | -6.8 | 70.1 |
2013 | 16.7 | 20.8 | -4.1 | 72.1 |
2014 | 17.5 | 20.5 | -3.0 | 73.6 |
2015 | 18.2 | 20.9 | -2.6 | 73.2 |
2016 | 18.2 | 21.1 | -2.8 | 72.6 |
2017 | 18.1 | 21.0 | -2.9 | 72.3 |
2018 | 18.0 | 21.1 | -3.1 | 72.6 |
2019 | 18.0 | 21.4 | -3.4 | 73.3 |
2020 | 18.0 | 21.7 | -3.7 | 74.2 |
2021 | 18.1 | 21.9 | -3.8 | 75.3 |
2022 | 18.1 | 22.3 | -4.2 | 76.8 |
2023 | 18.2 | 22.3 | -4.1 | 78.0 |
2024 | 18.4 | 22.4 | -4.0 | 79.2 |
Total 2015-2019 | 18.1 | 21.1 | -3.0 | NA |
Total 2015-2024 | 18.1 | 21.7 | -3.5 | NA |
Average | 17.4 | 20.4 | -3.0 | 38.0 |
Source: CBO (2012AugBEO). CBO (2012NovCDR). CBO (2013BEOFeb5). CBO 2013HBDFeb5), CBO (2013Sep11), CBO (2013Aug12Av). Kim Kowaleski and Amber Marcellino. CBO, Historical Budget Data—February 2014, Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb. CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook 2014 to 2024. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 2014.
Chart IIA1-2 of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides the actual federal debt as percent of GDP from 1940 to 2013 and the projected path by the CBO from 2014 to 2024. The federal debt exceeded 100 percent of GDP because of the war effort during World War II. Adjustment was swift and continuous during rapid economic growth in large part because of less rigid structures of expenditures and revenues. The jump of the federal debt from 35.1 percent of GDP in 2007 to 72.1 percent of GDP in 2013 with CBO projection of 79.2 percent of GDP in 2024 poses a major challenge of fiscal adjustment.
Chart IIA1-2, US, Federal Debt Held by the Public
Source: Congressional Budget Office
The Budget and Economic Outlook 2014 to 2024. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Feb 2014.
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/45073
Table IIA1-9 provides the long-term budget outlook of the CBO for 2013, 2023 and 2038. Revenues increase from 17.0 percent of GDP in 2013 to 19.7 percent in 2038. The growing stock of debt raises net interest spending from 1.3 percent of GDP in 2013 to 3.1 percent in 2023 and 4.9 percent 2038. Total spending increases from 20.8 percent of GDP in 2013 to 26.2 percent in 2038. Federal debt held by the public rises to 100.0 percent of GDP in 2038. US fiscal affairs are in an unsustainable path with tough rigidities in spending and revenues.
Table IIA1-9, Congressional Budget Office, Long-term Budget Outlook, % of GDP
2013 | 2023 | 2038 | |
Revenues | 17.0 | 18.5 | 19.7 |
Total Noninterest Spending | 19.5 | 18.8 | 21.3 |
Social Security | 4.9 | 5.3 | 6.2 |
Medicare | 3.0 | 3.3 | 4.9 |
Medicaid, CHIP and Exchange Subsidies | 1.7 | 2.6 | 3.2 |
Other | 10.0 | 7.6 | 7.1 |
Net Interest | 1.3 | 3.1 | 4.9 |
Total Spending | 20.8 | 21.8 | 26.2 |
Revenues Minus Total Noninterest Spending | -2.5 | -0.3 | -1.6 |
Revenues Minus Total Spending | -3.9 | -3.3 | -6.4 |
Federal Debt Held by the Public | 73.0 | 71.0 | 100.0 |
Source: CBO (2013Sep17). The 2013 long-term budget outlook. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Sep 17.
Chart IIA1-3 provides actual federal debt held by the public as percent of GDP from 1790 to 2012 and projected by the CBO (2013Sep17) from 2013 to 2038. The ratio of debt to GDP climbed from 42.3 percent in 1941 to a peak of 108.7 percent in 1946 because of the Second World War. The ratio of debt to GDP declined to 80.2 percent in 1950 and 66.9 percent in 1951 because of unwinding war effort, economy growing to capacity and less rigid mandatory expenditures. The ratio of debt to GDP of 70.1 percent in 2012 is the highest in the United States since 1950. The CBO (2013BEOFeb5) projects the ratio of debt of GDP of the United States to reach 100.0 percent in 2038, which will be more than double the average ratio of 38.0 percent in 1973-2012. The misleading debate on the so-called “fiscal cliff” has disguised the unsustainable path of United States fiscal affairs.
Chart IIA1-3, Congressional Budget Office, Federal Debt Held by the Public, Extended Baseline Projection, % of GDP
Source: CBO. 2013Sep17. The 2013 long-term budget outlook. Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, Sep 17.
IIB United States Industrial Production. Industrial production decreased 0.3 percent in Jan 2014 after increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2013 and increasing 0.7 percent in Nov 2013, as shown in Table I-1, with all data seasonally adjusted. The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm):
“Industrial production decreased 0.3 percent in January after having risen 0.3 percent in December. In January, manufacturing output fell 0.8 percent, partly because of the severe weather that curtailed production in some regions of the country. Additionally, manufacturing production is now reported to have been lower in the fourth quarter; the index is now estimated to have advanced at an annual rate of 4.6 percent in the fourth quarter rather than 6.2 percent. The output of utilities rose 4.1 percent in January, as demand for heating was boosted by unseasonably cold temperatures. The production at mines declined 0.9 percent following a gain of 1.8 percent in December. At 101.0 percent of its 2007 average, total industrial production in January was 2.9 percent above its level of a year earlier. The capacity utilization rate for total industry decreased in January to 78.5 percent, a rate that is 1.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2013) average.”
In the six months ending in Jan 2014, United States national industrial production accumulated increase of 2.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent, which is higher than growth of 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. Excluding growth of -0.3 percent in Jan 2014, growth in the remaining five months from Aug to Dec 2013 accumulated to 2.4 percent or 5.9 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production fell in one of the past six months. Business equipment accumulated growth of 0.6 percent in the six months from Aug 2013 to Jan 2014 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent, which is lower than growth of 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “The capacity utilization rate for total industry decreased in January to 78.5 percent, a rate that is 1.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2013) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate with possible acceleration in the past few months.
Table I-1, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, SA, ∆%
2012-2013 | Jan 14 | Dec 13 | Nov 13 | Oct 13 | Sep 13 | Aug 13 | Jan 14/ Jan 13 |
Total | -0.3 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 2.9 |
Market | |||||||
Final Products | -0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 2.5 |
Consumer Goods | -0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 2.7 |
Business Equipment | -0.1 | -0.7 | -0.4 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 2.4 |
Non | -0.3 | -0.1 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 2.4 |
Construction | -1.0 | -0.6 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 1.7 |
Materials | -0.3 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 3.4 |
Industry Groups | |||||||
Manufacturing | -0.8 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 1.3 |
Mining | -0.9 | 1.8 | 0.9 | -1.5 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 6.7 |
Utilities | 4.1 | -1.4 | 2.9 | 1.0 | 3.2 | -1.0 | 9.3 |
Capacity | 78.5 | 78.9 | 78.8 | 78.4 | 78.4 | 78.0 | 1.9 |
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Manufacturing decreased 0.8 percent in Jan 2014 after increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2013 and increasing 0.3 percent in Nov 2013 seasonally adjusted, increasing 1.3 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months ending in Jan 2014, as shown in Table I-2. Manufacturing grew cumulatively 1.2 percent in the six months ending in Jan 2014 or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent. Excluding the decrease of 0.3 percent in Jan 2014, manufacturing accumulated growth of 2.0 percent from Aug 2013 to Dec 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. Table I-2 provides a longer perspective of manufacturing in the US. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 into more recent months as shown by 12 months rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily in the past six months with some strength at the margin. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Mar 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. Measured from fourth quarter to fourth quarter, total IP is now reported to have increased 0.7 percentage point less in 2011 than was previously published. The revisions to IP for other years were smaller: Compared to the previous estimates, industrial production fell slightly less in 2008 and 2009 and increased slightly less in 2010 and 2012. At 97.7 percent of its 2007 average, the index in the fourth quarter of 2012 now stands 0.4 percent below its previous estimate. With these revisions, IP is still estimated to have advanced about 6 percent in 2010, the first full year following the trough in June 2009 of the most recent recession, but it is now estimated to have risen about 3 percent both in 2011 and in 2012. Since the trough of the recession, total IP has reversed about 90 percent of its peak-to-trough decline.”
The bottom part of Table I-2 shows decline of manufacturing by 21.9 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increase by 19.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2013. Manufacturing grew 17.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jan 2014. Manufacturing output in Jan 2014 is 8.5 percent below the peak in Jun 2007.
Table I-2, US, Monhly and 12-Month Rates of Growth of Manufacturing ∆%
Month SA ∆% | 12-Month NSA ∆% | |
Jan 2014 | -0.8 | 1.3 |
Dec 2013 | 0.3 | 2.0 |
Nov | 0.3 | 2.7 |
Oct | 0.4 | 3.8 |
Sep | 0.2 | 2.6 |
Aug | 0.8 | 2.6 |
Jul | -0.5 | 1.4 |
Jun | 0.3 | 1.8 |
May | 0.3 | 1.8 |
Apr | -0.3 | 2.2 |
Mar | -0.2 | 1.8 |
Feb | 0.6 | 1.9 |
Jan | -0.1 | 2.4 |
Dec 2012 | 0.9 | 3.0 |
Nov | 1.4 | 3.3 |
Oct | -0.4 | 2.1 |
Sep | 0.1 | 3.1 |
Aug | -0.7 | 3.5 |
Jul | 0.2 | 4.0 |
Jun | 0.3 | 5.0 |
May | -0.3 | 4.8 |
Apr | 0.6 | 5.1 |
Mar | -0.5 | 3.9 |
Feb | 0.6 | 5.3 |
Jan | 1.0 | 4.2 |
Dec 2011 | 1.0 | 3.8 |
Nov | 0.0 | 3.2 |
Oct | 0.6 | 3.1 |
Sep | 0.4 | 3.0 |
Aug | 0.4 | 2.4 |
Jul | 0.7 | 2.5 |
Jun | 0.1 | 2.1 |
May | 0.3 | 1.9 |
Apr | -0.7 | 3.1 |
Mar | 0.7 | 4.9 |
Feb | 0.0 | 5.4 |
Jan | 0.2 | 5.6 |
Dec 2010 | 0.6 | 6.2 |
Nov | 0.2 | 5.3 |
Oct | 0.1 | 6.6 |
Sep | 0.1 | 7.0 |
Aug | 0.1 | 7.4 |
Jul | 0.7 | 7.8 |
Jun | 0.0 | 9.3 |
May | 1.4 | 8.9 |
Apr | 0.9 | 7.1 |
Mar | 1.3 | 4.9 |
Feb | 0.0 | 1.3 |
Jan | 1.0 | 1.2 |
Dec 2009 | 0.0 | -3.1 |
Nov | 1.1 | -6.1 |
Oct | 0.1 | -9.1 |
Sep | 0.8 | -10.6 |
Aug | 1.1 | -13.6 |
Jul | 1.2 | -15.2 |
Jun | -0.3 | -17.6 |
May | -1.1 | -17.6 |
Apr | -0.8 | -18.2 |
Mar | -1.9 | -17.3 |
Feb | -0.2 | -16.1 |
Jan | -2.9 | -16.4 |
Dec 2008 | -3.4 | -14.0 |
Nov | -2.2 | -11.3 |
Oct | -0.6 | -9.0 |
Sep | -3.4 | -8.6 |
Aug | -1.3 | -5.1 |
Jul | -1.1 | -3.5 |
Jun | -0.5 | -3.1 |
May | -0.5 | -2.4 |
Apr | -1.1 | -1.1 |
Mar | -0.3 | -0.5 |
Feb | -0.6 | 0.9 |
Jan | -0.4 | 2.3 |
Dec 2007 | 0.2 | 2.0 |
Nov | 0.5 | 3.4 |
Oct | -0.4 | 2.8 |
Sep | 0.5 | 3.0 |
Aug | -0.4 | 2.6 |
Jul | 0.1 | 3.4 |
Jun | 0.3 | 2.9 |
May | -0.1 | 3.1 |
Apr | 0.7 | 3.6 |
Mar | 0.7 | 2.4 |
Feb | 0.4 | 1.6 |
Jan | -0.5 | 1.3 |
Dec 2006 | 2.7 | |
Dec 2005 | 3.4 | |
Dec 2004 | 4.0 | |
Dec 2003 | 1.7 | |
Dec 2002 | 2.4 | |
Dec 2001 | -5.5 | |
Dec 2000 | 0.4 | |
Dec 1999 | 5.4 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2013 | 2.3 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2012 | 2.3 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 1999 | 4.3 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2006 | 1.3 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2013 | 0.5 | |
∆% Peak 103.0005 in 06/2007 to 95.8087 in 12/2013 | -7.0 | |
∆% Peak 103.0005 in 06/2007 to Trough 80.4617 in 4/2009 | -21.9 | |
∆% Trough 80.4617 in 04/2009 to 95.8087 in 12/2013 | 19.1 | |
∆% Trough 80.4617 in 04/2009 to 94.2907 in 12/2013 | 17.2 | |
∆% Peak 103.0005 on 06/2007 to 94.2907 in 1/2014 | -8.5 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/default.htm
Chart I-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides industrial production, manufacturing and capacity since the 1970s. There was acceleration of growth of industrial production, manufacturing and capacity in the 1990s because of rapid growth of productivity in the US (Cobet and Wilson (2002); see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). The slopes of the curves flatten in the 2000s. Production and capacity have not recovered to the levels before the global recession.
Chart I-1, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg1.gif
The modern industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is captured in Chart I-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (for the literature on M&A and corporate control see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009a), 143-56, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 49-59, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 46-49). The slope of the curve of total industrial production accelerates in the 1990s to a much higher rate of growth than the curve excluding high-technology industries. Growth rates decelerate into the 2000s and output and capacity utilization have not recovered fully from the strong impact of the global recession. Growth in the current cyclical expansion has been more subdued than in the prior comparably deep contractions in the 1970s and 1980s. Chart II-2 shows that the past recessions after World War II are the relevant ones for comparison with the recession after 2007 instead of common comparisons with the Great Depression (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/mediocre-cyclical-united-states.html). The bottom left-hand part of Chart II-2 shows the strong growth of output of communication equipment, computers and semiconductor that continued from the 1990s into the 2000s. Output of semiconductors has already surpassed the level before the global recession.
Chart I-2, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization of High Technology Industries
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg3.gif
Additional detail on industrial production and capacity utilization is provided in Chart I-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Production of consumer durable goods fell sharply during the global recession by more than 30 percent and is still around the level before the contraction. Output of nondurable consumer goods fell around 10 percent and is some 5 percent below the level before the contraction. Output of business equipment fell sharply during the contraction of 2001 but began rapid growth again after 2004. An important characteristic is rapid growth of output of business equipment in the cyclical expansion after sharp contraction in the global recession. Output of defense and space only suffered reduction in the rate of growth during the global recession and surged ahead of the level before the contraction. Output of construction supplies collapsed during the global recession and is well below the level before the contraction. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but has recovered sharply above the level before the contraction.
Chart I-3, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg2.gif
United States manufacturing output from 1919 to 2012 on a monthly basis is in Chart I-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The second industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is quite evident in the acceleration of the rate of growth of output given by the sharper slope in the 1980s and 1990s. Growth was robust after the shallow recession of 2001 but dropped sharply during the global recession after IVQ2007. Manufacturing output recovered sharply but has not reached earlier levels and is losing momentum at the margin.
Chart I-4, US, Manufacturing Output, 1919-2014
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Manufacturing jobs increased 9,000 in Dec 2013 relative to Nov 2013, seasonally adjusted. Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted increased 89,000 from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or at the average monthly rate of 7,417. There are effects of the weaker economy and international trade together with the yearly adjustment of labor statistics. Industrial production decreased 0.3 percent in Jan 2014 after increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2013 and increasing 0.7 percent in Nov 2013, with all data seasonally adjusted. The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm):
“Industrial production decreased 0.3 percent in January after having risen 0.3 percent in December. In January, manufacturing output fell 0.8 percent, partly because of the severe weather that curtailed production in some regions of the country. Additionally, manufacturing production is now reported to have been lower in the fourth quarter; the index is now estimated to have advanced at an annual rate of 4.6 percent in the fourth quarter rather than 6.2 percent. The output of utilities rose 4.1 percent in January, as demand for heating was boosted by unseasonably cold temperatures. The production at mines declined 0.9 percent following a gain of 1.8 percent in December. At 101.0 percent of its 2007 average, total industrial production in January was 2.9 percent above its level of a year earlier. The capacity utilization rate for total industry decreased in January to 78.5 percent, a rate that is 1.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2013) average.”
In the six months ending in Jan 2014, United States national industrial production accumulated increase of 2.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent, which is higher than growth of 2.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. Excluding growth of -0.3 percent in Jan 2014, growth in the remaining five months from Aug to Dec 2013 accumulated to 2.4 percent or 5.9 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production fell in one of the past six months. Business equipment accumulated growth of 0.6 percent in the six months from Aug 2013 to Jan 2014 at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent, which is lower than growth of 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “The capacity utilization rate for total industry decreased in January to 78.5 percent, a rate that is 1.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2013) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate with possible acceleration in the past few months.
Manufacturing decreased 0.8 percent in Jan 2014 after increasing 0.3 percent in Dec 2013 and increasing 0.3 percent in Nov 2013 seasonally adjusted, increasing 1.3 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months ending in Jan 2014. Manufacturing grew cumulatively 1.2 percent in the six months ending in Jan 2014 or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent. Excluding the decrease of 0.3 percent in Jan 2014, manufacturing accumulated growth of 2.0 percent from Aug 2013 to Dec 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.9 percent. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 into more recent months as shown by 12 months rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily in the past six months with some strength at the margin. Manufacturing increased 21.9 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased by 19.1 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2013. Manufacturing grew 17.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jan 2014. Manufacturing output in Jan 2013 is 8.5 percent below the peak in Jun 2007.
Table I-3 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 86.8 percent in IIIQ2013. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Dec 2013, there were 137.753 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 113.712 million NSA in Jan 2014 accounted for 84.0 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 135.396 million, of which 11.965 million, or 10.5 percent of total private jobs and 8.8 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-producing jobs were 95.339 million NSA in Jan 2014, or 70.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.8 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 10.8 percent in US national income in IIIQ2013, as shown in Table I-3. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.
Table I-3, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total
SAAR | % Total | SAAR IIIQ2013 | % Total | |
National Income WCCA | 14,495.5 | 100.0 | 14,643.3 | 100.0 |
Domestic Industries | 14,248.7 | 98.3 | 14,380.3 | 98.2 |
Private Industries | 12,568.6 | 86.7 | 12,705.2 | 86.8 |
Agriculture | 220.3 | 1.5 | 225.2 | 1.5 |
Mining | 254.3 | 1.8 | 256.4 | 1.8 |
Utilities | 216.5 | 1.5 | 221.2 | 1.5 |
Construction | 629.0 | 4.3 | 639.1 | 4.4 |
Manufacturing | 1558.9 | 10.8 | 1577.7 | 10.8 |
Durable Goods | 888.1 | 6.1 | 910.1 | 6.2 |
Nondurable Goods | 670.1 | 4.6 | 667.6 | 4.6 |
Wholesale Trade | 874.4 | 6.0 | 884.0 | 6.0 |
Retail Trade | 995.8 | 6.9 | 1000.2 | 6.8 |
Transportation & WH | 436.3 | 3.0 | 443.6 | 3.0 |
Information | 507.2 | 3.5 | 497.5 | 3.4 |
Finance, Insurance, RE | 2448.1 | 16.9 | 2521.0 | 17.2 |
Professional, BS | 2004.7 | 13.8 | 2004.0 | 13.7 |
Education, Health Care | 1438.9 | 9.9 | 1439.2 | 9.8 |
Arts, Entertainment | 577.1 | 4.0 | 585.2 | 4.0 |
Other Services | 409.7 | 2.8 | 410.8 | 2.8 |
Government | 1680.1 | 11.6 | 1675.1 | 11.4 |
Rest of the World | 246.8 | 1.7 | 262.9 | 1.8 |
Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Motor vehicle sales and production in the US have been in long-term structural change. Table VA-7 provides the data on new motor vehicle sales and domestic car production in the US from 1990 to 2010. New motor vehicle sales grew from 14,137 thousand in 1990 to the peak of 17,806 thousand in 2000 or 29.5 percent. In that same period, domestic car production fell from 6,231 thousand in 1990 to 5,542 thousand in 2000 or -11.1 percent. New motor vehicle sales fell from 17,445 thousand in 2005 to 11,772 in 2010 or 32.5 percent while domestic car production fell from 4,321 thousand in 2005 to 2,840 thousand in 2010 or 34.3 percent. In Jan 2014, light vehicle sales accumulated to 1,012,582, which is lower by 3.1 percent relative to 1,044,655 a year earlier (http://motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html). The seasonally adjusted annual rate of light vehicle sales in the US reached 15.24 million in Jan 2014, lower than 15.40 million in Dec 2013 and higher than 15.23 million in Jan 2013 (http://motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html).
Table VA-7, US, New Motor Vehicle Sales and Car Production, Thousand Units
New Motor Vehicle Sales | New Car Sales and Leases | New Truck Sales and Leases | Domestic Car Production | |
1990 | 14,137 | 9,300 | 4,837 | 6,231 |
1991 | 12,725 | 8,589 | 4,136 | 5,454 |
1992 | 13,093 | 8,215 | 4,878 | 5,979 |
1993 | 14,172 | 8,518 | 5,654 | 5,979 |
1994 | 15,397 | 8,990 | 6,407 | 6,614 |
1995 | 15,106 | 8,536 | 6,470 | 6,340 |
1996 | 15,449 | 8,527 | 6,922 | 6,081 |
1997 | 15,490 | 8,273 | 7,218 | 5,934 |
1998 | 15,958 | 8,142 | 7,816 | 5,554 |
1999 | 17,401 | 8,697 | 8,704 | 5,638 |
2000 | 17,806 | 8,852 | 8,954 | 5,542 |
2001 | 17,468 | 8,422 | 9,046 | 4,878 |
2002 | 17,144 | 8,109 | 9,036 | 5,019 |
2003 | 16,968 | 7,611 | 9,357 | 4,510 |
2004 | 17,298 | 7,545 | 9,753 | 4,230 |
2005 | 17,445 | 7,720 | 9,725 | 4,321 |
2006 | 17,049 | 7,821 | 9,228 | 4,367 |
2007 | 16,460 | 7,618 | 8,683 | 3,924 |
2008 | 13,494 | 6,814 | 6.680 | 3,777 |
2009 | 10,601 | 5,456 | 5,154 | 2,247 |
2010 | 11,772 | 5,729 | 6,044 | 2,840 |
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/wholesale_retail_trade/motor_vehicle_sales.html
Chart I-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve provides output of motor vehicles and parts in the United States from 1972 to 2013. Output has stagnated since the late 1990s.
Chart I-5, US, Motor Vehicles and Parts Output, 1972-2014
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides output of computers and electronic products in the United States from 1972 to 2013. Output accelerated sharply in the 1990s and 2000s and has surpassed the level before the global recession beginning in IVQ2007.
Chart I-6, US, Output of Computers and Electronic Products, 1972-2014
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shows that output of durable manufacturing accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s with slower growth in the 2000s perhaps because processes matured. Growth was robust after the major drop during the global recession but appears to vacillate in the final segment.
Chart I-7, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 1972-2014
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides output of aerospace and miscellaneous transportation equipment from 1972 to 2013. There is long-term upward trend with oscillations around the trend and cycles of large amplitude.
Chart I-8, US, Output of Aerospace and Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment, 1972-2014
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
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