Monday, February 3, 2014

Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend, Financial Turmoil, Stagnating Real Disposable Income, United States Housing Collapse, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk: Part II

 

Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend, Financial Turmoil, Stagnating Real Disposable Income, United States Housing Collapse, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

Executive Summary

I Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars Below Trend

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment

IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB2 Financial Repression

II United States Housing Collapse

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

IA1. Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment. The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions.

Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 29.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 18.0 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-mediocre.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion higher than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 29.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.0 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline.

Table IA1-1 provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of growth of private fixed investment for the recessions of the 1980s and the current economic cycle. In the cyclical expansion beginning in IQ1983 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html), real private fixed investment in the United States grew at the average annual rate of 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. Growth rates fell to an average of 2.2 percent in the following eight quarters from IQ1985 to IVQ1986. There were only two quarters of contraction of private fixed investment from IQ1983 to IVQ1986. There is quite different behavior of private fixed investment in the eighteen quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013. The average annual growth rate in the first eight quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2011 was 3.3 percent, which is significantly lower than 14.7 percent in the first eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. There is only strong growth of private fixed investment in the four quarters of expansion from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 at the average annual rate of 10.5 percent. Growth has fallen from the SAAR of 14.8 percent in IIIQ2011 to 2.7 percent in IIIQ2012, recovering to 11.6 percent in IVQ2012 and falling to minus 1.5 percent in IQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment rose to 6.5 percent in IIQ2013 and fell to 5.9 percent in IIIQ2013. The SAAR of fixed investment fell to 0.9 percent in IVQ2013. Sudeep Reddy and Scott Thurm, writing on “Investment falls off a cliff,” on Nov 18, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123593211825394.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories) analyze the decline of private investment in the US and inform that a review by the Wall Street Journal of filing and conference calls finds that 40 of the largest publicly traded corporations in the US have announced intentions to reduce capital expenditures in 2012. The SAAR of real private fixed investment jumped to 11.6 percent in IVQ2012 but declined to minus 1.5 percent in IQ2013, recovering to 6.5 percent in IIQ2013 and falling to 5.9 percent in IIIQ2013 and 0.9 percent in IVQ2013.

Table IA1-1, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of Real Private Fixed Investment, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q

1981

1982

1983

1984

2008

2009

2010

I

3.8

-12.2

9.4

13.1

-7.1

-27.4

0.8

II

3.2

-12.1

16.0

16.6

-5.5

-14.2

13.6

III

0.1

-9.3

24.4

8.2

-12.1

-0.5

-0.4

IV

-1.5

0.2

24.3

7.3

-23.9

-2.8

8.5

       

1985

   

2011

I

     

3.7

   

-0.5

II

     

5.2

   

8.6

III

     

-1.6

   

14.8

IV

     

7.8

   

10.0

       

1986

   

2012

I

     

1.1

   

8.6

II

     

0.1

   

4.7

III

     

-1.8

   

2.7

IV

     

3.1

   

11.6

       

1987

   

2013

I

     

-6.7

   

-1.5

II

     

6.3

   

6.5

III

     

7.1

   

5.9

IV

     

-0.2

   

0.9

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-1 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth of real private fixed investment from 1981 to 1986. Growth rates recovered sharply during the first eight quarters, which was essential in returning the economy to trend growth and eliminating unemployment and underemployment accumulated during the contractions.

clip_image001

Chart IA1-1, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 1981-1987

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Weak behavior of real private fixed investment from 2007 to 2013 is shown in Chart IA1-2. Growth rates of real private fixed investment were much lower during the initial phase of expansion in the current economic cycle and have entered sharp trend of decline.

clip_image002

Chart IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-2 provides real private fixed investment at seasonally adjusted annual rates from IVQ2007 to IVQ2013 or for the complete economic cycle. The first column provides the quarter, the second column percentage change relative to IVQ2007, the third column the quarter percentage change in the quarter relative to the prior quarter and the final column percentage change in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IQ1980, gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of 2009 dollars, growing to $1,173.8 billion in IQ1987 or 23.4 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 1.7 percent from $2,605.2 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,649.4 billion in IVQ2013. As shown in Table IAI-2, real private fixed investment fell 3.4 percent from $2,586.3 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,499.6 billion in IIIQ2013. Growth of real private investment in Table IA1-2 is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012.

Table IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars and ∆%

 

Real PFI, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

2586.3

NA

-1.2

-1.4

IQ2008

2539.1

-1.8

-1.8

-3.0

IIQ2008

2503.4

-3.2

-1.4

-4.6

IIIQ2008

2424.1

-6.3

-3.2

-7.1

IV2008

2263.8

-12.5

-6.6

-12.5

IQ2009

2089.3

-19.2

-7.7

-17.7

IIQ2009

2011.0

-22.2

-3.7

-19.7

IIIQ2009

2008.4

-22.3

-0.1

-17.1

IVQ2009

1994.1

-22.9

-0.7

-11.9

IQ2010

1997.9

-22.8

0.2

-4.4

IIQ2010

2062.8

-20.2

3.2

2.6

IIIQ2010

2060.8

-20.3

-0.1

2.6

IVQ2010

2103.1

-18.7

2.1

5.5

IQ2011

2100.7

-18.8

-0.1

5.1

IIQ2011

2144.4

-17.1

2.1

4.0

IIIQ2011

2219.8

-14.2

3.5

7.7

IVQ2011

2273.4

-12.1

2.4

8.1

IQ2012

2320.8

-10.3

2.1

10.5

IIQ2012

2347.9

-9.2

1.2

9.5

IIIQ2012

2363.5

-8.6

0.7

6.5

IVQ2012

2429.1

-6.1

2.8

6.8

IQ2013

2420.0

-6.4

-0.4

4.3

IIQ2013

2458.4

-4.9

1.6

4.7

IIIQ2013

2,494.0

-3.6

1.4

5.5

IVQ2013

2,499.6

-3.4

0.2

2.9

PFI: Private Fixed Investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-3 provides real private fixed investment in billions of chained 2009 dollars from IQ2007 to IIIQ2013. Real private fixed investment has not recovered, stabilizing at a level in IVQ2013 that is 3.4 percent below the level in IVQ2007.

clip_image003

Chart IA1-3, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, IQ2007 to IIIQ2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-4 provides real gross private domestic investment in chained dollars of 2009 from 1980 to 1986. Real gross private domestic investment climbed 23.4 percent to $1173.8 billion of 2009 dollars in IQ1987 above the level of $951.6 billion in IQ1980.

clip_image004

Chart IA1-4, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 1980-1987

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-5 provides real gross private domestic investment in the United States in billions of dollars of 2009 from 2006 to 2013. Gross private domestic investment reached a level of $2649.4 in IVQ2013, which was 1.7 percent higher than the level of $2605.2 billion in IVQ2007 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

clip_image005

Chart IA1-5, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-3 provides percentage shares in GDP of gross private domestic investment and its components in IVQ2013, IVQ2006 and IVQ2000. The share of gross private domestic investment in GDP has fallen from 19.7 percent in IVQ2000 and 18.8 percent in IVQ2006 to 16.2 percent in IVQ2013. There are declines in percentage shares in GDP of all components with sharp reduction of residential investment from 4.7 percent in IVQ2000 and 5.6 percent in IVQ2006 to 3.1 percent in IVQ2013. The share of fixed investment in GDP fell from 19.2 percent in IVQ2000 and 18.8 percent in IVQ2006 to 15.3 percent in IVQ2013.

Table IA1-3, Percentage Shares of Gross Private Domestic Investment and Components in Gross Domestic Product, % of GDP, IQ2013

 

IVQ2013

IVQ2006

IVQ2000

Gross Private Domestic Investment

16.2

18.8

19.7

  Fixed Investment

15.3

18.5

19.2

     Nonresidential

12.2

12.9

14.5

          Structures

2.8

3.1

3.2

          Equipment

          and Software

5.6

6.1

7.3

          Intellectual
           Property

3.9

3.7

4.0

     Residential

3.1

5.6

4.7

   Change in Private Inventories

0.9

0.3

0.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Broader perspective is provided in Chart IA1-6 with the percentage share of gross private domestic investment in GDP in annual data from 1929 to 2013. There was sharp drop during the current economic cycle with almost no recovery in contrast with sharp recovery after the recessions of the 1980s.

clip_image006

Chart IA1-6, US, Percentage Share of Gross Private Domestic Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-7 provides percentage shares of private fixed investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2013. The sharp contraction after the recessions of the 1980s was followed by sustained recovery while the sharp drop in the current economic cycle has not been recovered.

clip_image007

Chart IA1-7, US, Percentage Share of Private Fixed Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-8 provides percentage shares in GDP of nonresidential investment from 1929 to 2013. There is again recovery from sharp contraction in the 1980s but inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

clip_image008

Chart IA1-8, US, Percentage Share of Nonresidential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-9 provides percentage shares of business equipment and software in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2013. There is again inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

clip_image009

Chart IA1-9, US, Percentage Share of Business Equipment and Software in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-10 provides percentage shares of residential investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2013. The salient characteristic of Chart IA1-10 is the vertical increase of the share of residential investment in GDP up to 2006 and subsequent collapse.

clip_image010

Chart IA1-10, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Finer detail is provided by the quarterly share of residential investment in GDP from 1979 to 2013 in Chart IA1-11. There was protracted growth of that share, accelerating sharply into 2006 followed with nearly vertical drop. The explanation of the sharp contraction of United States housing can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ingersoll 1987, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

clip_image011

Chart IA1-11, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-12 provides the share of intellectual property products investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2013. This is an important addition in the revision and enhancement of GDP provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The share rose sharply over time but stabilized at a lower level in the past decade.

clip_image012

Chart IA1-12, US, Percentage Share of Intellectual Property Products Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-13 provides the percentage share of intellectual property investment in GDP on a quarterly basis from 1979 to 2013. The share stabilized in the 2000s.

clip_image013

Chart IA1-13, US, Percentage Share of Intellectual Property Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-4 provides the seasonally adjusted annual rate of real GDP percentage change and contributions in percentage points in annual equivalent rate of gross domestic investment (GDI), real private fixed investment (PFI), nonresidential investment (NRES), business equipment and software (BES), residential investment (RES), intellectual property products (IPP) and change in inventories (∆INV) for the cyclical expansions from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013. GDI provided strong percentage points contributions to GDP growth in the critical first year of expansion in 1983 and also in several quarters in 1984 and 1985 while it has been muted in the cyclical expansion since IIIQ2009 with contributions largely only from IQ2010 to IVQ2011. Gross domestic investment added 0.56 percentage points to GDP growth in IVQ2013. Nonresidential investment added 0.46 percentage points while residential investment subtracted 0.32 percentage points. Inventory investment contributed 0.42 percentage points. Gross domestic investment added 2.56 percentage points to GDP growth of 4.1 percent in IIIQ2013 partly because of change of inventories of 1.67 percentage points with PFI adding 0.81 percentage points. Nonresidential investment added 0.58 percentage points and residential investment added 0.31 percentage points to GDP growth of 4.1 percent in IIIQ2013. GDI added 1.38 percentage points to GDP growth of 2.5 percent in IIQ2013 with 0.41 percentage points from inventory change while nonresidential investment added 0.56 percentage points and residential investment 0.40 percentage points. GDI added 0.71 percentage points in IQ2013 mostly because of 0.93 percentage points of inventory investment while private fixed investment deducted 0.23 percentage points. Nonresidential investment deducted 0.57 percentage points. Business equipment and software added 0.09 percentage points and residential investment 0.34 percentage points. Intellectual property products (IPP) added 0.14 percentage points in IQ2013, deducted 0.06 percentage points in IIQ2013 and added 0.22 percentage points in IIIQ2013. Much of the strong performance of GDI in the cyclical expansion after IQ1983 originated in contributions by real private fixed investment (PFI). Nonresidential investment also contributed strongly to growth in the expansion of the 1980s but has been muted in the current expansion. The contribution of business equipment and software collapsed to negative 0.22 percentage points in IIIQ2012 as business scales down investment but rebounded with 0.47 percentage points in IVQ2012, 0.09 percentage points in IQ2013 and 0.18 percentage points in IIQ2013. Business equipment and software contributed 0.2 percentage points in IIIQ2013 and 0.38 percentage points in IVQ2013. Residential investment (RES) was relatively strong in 1983 but was muted in following quarters. Residential investment only contributed significantly to growth of GDP in the four quarters of 2012, IQ2013, IIQ2013 and IIIQ2013.

Table IA1-4, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of Real GDP in Percentage Points

 

GDP

GDI

PFI

NRES

BES

IPP

RES

∆INV

2013

               

I

1.1

0.71

-0.23

-0.57

0.09

0.14

0.34

0.93

II

2.5

1.38

0.96

0.56

0.18

-0.06

0.40

0.41

III

4.1

2.56

0.89

0.58

0.02

0.22

0.31

1.67

IV

3.2

0.56

0.14

0.46

0.38

0.12

-0.32

0.42

2012

               

I

3.7

1.57

1.21

0.68

0.45

0.05

0.53

0.36

II

1.2

-0.23

0.68

0.53

0.29

0.07

0.15

-0.91

III

2.8

0.99

0.39

0.04

-0.22

0.11

0.35

0.60

IV

0.1

-0.36

1.63

1.13

0.47

0.21

0.50

-2.00

2011

               

I

-1.3

-1.11

-0.05

-0.09

0.59

0.14

0.04

-1.06

II

3.2

1.88

1.16

1.09

0.23

0.18

0.07

0.72

III

1.4

0.36

1.96

1.81

0.99

0.20

0.15

-1.60

IV

4.9

4.13

1.39

1.10

0.54

0.21

0.29

2.73

2010

               

I

1.6

1.77

0.11

0.46

1.25

-0.07

-0.35

1.66

II

3.9

2.86

1.77

1.21

1.02

-0.08

0.56

1.09

III

2.8

1.86

-0.04

0.90

0.83

0.22

-0.94

1.90

IV

2.8

-0.51

1.13

0.94

0.57

0.19

0.19

-1.64

2009

               

I

-5.4

-7.02

-4.75

-3.58

-2.25

-0.23

-1.17

-2.26

II

-0.4

-3.25

-2.13

-1.46

-0.60

0.16

-0.66

-1.12

III

1.3

-0.40

-0.02

-0.54

0.25

0.04

0.52

-0.38

IV

3.9

4.05

-0.36

-0.37

0.36

0.25

0.01

4.40

1982

               

I

-6.5

-7.60

-2.26

-1.45

-0.83

0.14

-0.81

-5.34

II

2.2

-0.06

-2.32

-1.89

-1.20

0.08

-0.44

2.26

III

-1.4

-0.62

-1.73

-1.71

-0.55

0.06

-0.02

1.11

IV

0.4

-5.37

-0.03

-1.05

-0.57

0.00

1.01

-5.33

1983

               

I

5.3

2.36

1.44

-0.92

-0.27

0.16

2.36

0.92

II

9.4

5.96

2.53

0.67

1.24

0.29

1.86

3.43

III

8.1

4.40

3.82

2.13

1.43

0.31

1.70

0.57

IV

8.5

6.94

3.93

3.14

2.32

0.35

0.79

3.01

1984

               

I

8.2

7.23

2.29

1.71

0.46

0.30

0.58

4.94

II

7.2

2.57

2.86

2.52

1.36

0.29

0.34

-0.29

III

4.0

1.69

1.48

1.70

0.88

0.25

-0.22

0.21

IV

3.2

-1.08

1.36

1.34

0.86

0.29

0.02

-2.44

1985

               

I

4.0

-2.14

0.72

0.67

-0.23

0.14

0.05

-2.86

II

3.7

1.34

0.99

0.83

0.64

0.20

0.16

0.35

III

6.4

-0.43

-0.28

-0.62

-0.38

0.13

0.34

-0.15

IV

3.0

2.80

1.40

1.00

0.53

0.26

0.40

1.40

1986

               

I

3.8

0.04

0.21

-0.55

-0.28

0.17

0.76

-0.17

II

1.9

-1.30

0.00

-1.12

0.34

0.15

1.12

-1.30

III

4.1

-1.97

-0.34

-0.63

-0.17

0.10

0.28

-1.62

IV

2.1

0.24

0.53

0.48

0.30

0.10

0.05

-0.29

GDP: Gross Domestic Product; GDI: Gross Domestic Investment; PFI: Private Fixed Investment; NRES: Nonresidential; BES: Business Equipment and Software; IPP: Intellectual Property Products; RES: Residential; ∆INV: Change in Private Inventories.

GDI = PFI + ∆INV, may not add exactly because of errors of rounding.

GDP: Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate of growth in a quarter; components: percentage points at annual rate.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

I Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides important revisions and enhancements of data on personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). There are waves of changes in personal income and expenditures in Table IB-1 that correspond somewhat to inflation waves observed worldwide (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/world-inflation-waves-interest-rate.html) because of the influence through price indexes. Data are distorted in Nov and Dec 2012 by the rush to realize income of all forms in anticipation of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. There is major distortion in Jan 2013 because of higher contributions in payrolls to government social insurance that caused sharp reduction in personal income and disposable personal income. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) explains as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January [2013] changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December [2012] in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011 with relaxed risk aversion, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 8.1 percent, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 5.2 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 5.5 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) rose at annual equivalent 2.1 percent. In the second wave in May-Aug 2011 under risk aversion, NPI rose at annual equivalent 4.3 percent, NPDI at 4.3 percent and NPCE at 4.0 percent. RDPI increased at 1.8 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 1.5 percent annual equivalent. With mixed shocks of risk aversion in the third wave from Sep to Dec 2011, NPI rose at 1.5 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 1.5 percent and NPCE at 3.3 percent. RDPI increased at 0.3 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 2.1 percent annual equivalent. In the fourth wave from Jan to Mar 2012, NPI increased at 8.3 percent annual equivalent and NDPI at 7.0 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) is more dynamic in the revisions, growing at 3.7 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 3.7 percent. The policy of repressing savings with zero interest rates stimulated growth of nominal consumption (NPCE) at the annual equivalent rate of 6.6 percent and real consumption (RPCE) at 3.7 percent. In the fifth wave in Apr-Jul 2012, NPI increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent, NDPI at 1.2 percent and RDPI at 0.6 percent. Financial repression failed to stimulate consumption with NPCE growing at 2.1 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 2.1 percent. In the sixth wave in Aug-Oct 2012, in another wave of carry trades into commodity futures, NPI increased at 4.5 percent annual equivalent and NDPI increased at 3.7 percent while real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 0.4 percent annual equivalent. Data for Nov-Dec 2012 have illusory increases: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). In the seventh wave, anticipations of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused exceptional income gains that increased personal income to annual equivalent 29.0 percent in Nov-Dec 2012, nominal disposable income at 29.0 percent and real disposable personal income at 29.8 percent with likely effects on nominal personal consumption that increased at 1.8 percent and real personal consumption at 2.4 percent with subdued prices. The numbers in parentheses show that without the exceptional effects NDPI (nominal disposable personal income) increased at 5.5 percent and RDPI (real disposable personal income) at 8.7 percent. In the eighth wave, nominal personal income fell 4.4 percent in Jan 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 41.7 percent; nominal disposable personal income fell 5.1 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 46.6 percent; real disposable income fell 5.1 percent or at the annual rate of decline of 46.6 percent; nominal personal consumption expenditures increased 0.2 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent; and real personal consumption expenditures increased 0.1 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent. The savings rate fell significantly from 8.7 percent in Dec 2012 to 3.6 percent in Jan 2013. The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as follows (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf 3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income -- increased $126.7 billion in January, compared with an increase of $6.3 billion in December. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.8 billion to January. As noted above, employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, so the total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.8 billion”

Further explanation is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion. The January change in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates. Excluding these special factors and others, which are discussed more fully below, DPI increased $46.8 billion in February, or 0.4 percent, after increasing $15.8 billion, or 0.1 percent, in January.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). In the ninth wave in Feb-Mar 2013, nominal personal income increased at 10.0 percent and nominal disposable income at 10.0 percent annual equivalent, while real disposable income increased at 8.1 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 5.5 annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 3.7 percent annual equivalent. The savings rate collapsed from 5.0 percent in Oct 2012, 5.9 percent in Nov 2012 and 8.7 percent in Dec 2012 to 3.6 percent in Jan 2013, 4.2 percent in Feb 2013 and 4.3 percent in Mar 2013. In the tenth wave from Apr to Sep 2013, personal income grew at 3.9 percent annual equivalent, nominal disposable income increased at annual equivalent 4.3 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 2.8 percent. Real disposable income grew at 3.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 1.6 percent. In the eleventh wave, nominal personal income fell at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Oct 2013, nominal disposable income at 2.4 percent and real disposable income at 2.4 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 1.2 percent. In the twelfth wave, nominal personal income increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2013, nominal disposable income at 1.2 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 7.4 percent. Real disposable income increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent and real personal consumption expenditures at 7.4 percent. In the thirteenth wave, nominal personal income and nominal disposable income changed 0.0 percent in Dec 2013 while real disposable income fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent and 2.4 percent for real personal consumption expenditures.

The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions.

Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). As a result, there are 29.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 18.0 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/risks-of-zero-interest-rates-mediocre.html). The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US GDP grew 6.5 percent from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,965.6 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.5 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,074.7 billion higher than actual $15,965.6 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 29.3 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 18.0 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline.

RDPI stagnated in Jan-Dec 2011 at 1.2 percent with the latest revised data compared with growth of 2.8 percent in Jan-Dec 2010 but grew at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Jan-Mar 2012 and 0.6 percent in Apr-Jul 2012. The salient deceleration is the decline of the annual equivalent rate of NPCE (nominal personal consumption expenditures) to 2.1 percent annual equivalent in Apr-Jul 2012 and of RPCE (real personal consumption expenditures) to 2.1 percent. A bump occurred in Aug 2012 with increases of commodity prices by the carry trade from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity futures and other risk financial assets. Real disposable income fell 0.3 percent in Aug 2012 or at annual equivalent minus 3.5 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased 0.2 percent in Aug 2012 or at annual equivalent 2.4 percent but declined 0.1 percent in real terms. Nominal personal income increased 0.1 percent in Aug 2012 or 1.2 percent annual equivalent while nominal disposable income was flat at 0.0 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased 0.2 percent in Oct 2012 while real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) decreased 0.1 percent. RDPI increased 1.3 percent in Nov 2012 and 3.1 percent in Dec 2012 because of realization of incomes in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2013 while RPCE increased 0.3 percent in Nov 2012 and 0.1 percent in Dec 2012. In Jan-Dec 2012, RDPI increased 5.9 percent and RPCE 2.2 percent. NPI contracted 4.4 percent in Jan 2013, NDPI 5.1 percent and RDPI 5.1 percent but NPCE increased 0.2 percent and RPCE 0.1 percent, probably by drawing on savings. There is strong recovery in Feb-Mar 2013 and renewed weakness in Apr 2013. While NPI increased at 3.9 percent and NDPI at 4.3 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Sep 2013 and RDPI at 3.2 percent, NPCE stagnated in Apr-May 2013 and RPCE increased at 1.6 percent annual equivalent in Apr-Sep 2013.

Table IB-1, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month Seasonally Adjusted of Personal Income, Disposable Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures %

 

NPI

NDPI

RDPI

NPCE

RPCE

2013

         

Dec

0.0

0.0

-0.2

0.4

0.2

AE ∆% Dec

0.0

0.0

-2.4

4.9

2.4

Nov

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.6

0.6

AE ∆% Nov

2.4

1.2

1.2

7.4

7.4

Oct

-0.1

-0.2

-0.2

0.1

0.1

AE ∆% Oct

-1.2

-2.4

-2.4

1.2

1.2

Sep

0.4

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

Aug

0.5

0.6

0.5

0.3

0.2

Jul

0.1

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.1

Jun

0.4

0.3

-0.1

0.6

0.2

May

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

Apr

0.1

0.0

0.3

-0.2

0.0

AE ∆% Apr-Sep

3.9

4.3

3.2

2.8

1.6

Mar

0.3

0.3

0.4

0.2

0.3

Feb

1.3

1.3

0.9

0.7

0.3

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

10.0

10.0

8.1

5.5

3.7

Jan

-4.4

-5.1 (0.1)a

-5.1

0.2

0.1

AE ∆% Jan

-41.7

-46.6 (3.7)a

-46.6

2.4

1.2

2012

         

∆% Jan-Dec 2012***

7.9

7.5

5.9

3.8

2.2

Dec

3.1

3.1 (0.3)*

3.1 (0.5)*

0.1

0.1

Nov

1.2

1.2 (0.6)*

1.3 (0.9)*

0.2

0.3

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

29.0

29.0 (5.5)*

29.8 (8.7)*

1.8

2.4

Oct

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.1

-0.1

Sep

0.6

0.5

0.2

0.7

0.4

Aug

0.1

0.0

-0.3

0.2

-0.1

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

4.5

3.7

0.4

4.1

0.8

Jul

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

0.4

0.4

Jun

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.0

May

0.0

0.0

0.0

-0.1

0.0

Apr

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.3

AE ∆% Apr-Jul

1.2

1.2

0.6

2.1

2.1

Mar

0.4

0.3

0.1

0.2

0.0

Feb

0.7

0.6

0.3

0.8

0.5

Jan

0.9

0.8

0.5

0.6

0.4

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

8.3

7.0

3.7

6.6

3.7

2011

         

∆% Jan-Dec 2011*

4.6

3.6

1.2

4.3

1.8

Dec

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.0

0.0

Nov

-0.1

-0.1

-0.2

0.2

0.0

Oct

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.4

0.4

Sep

-0.1

-0.1

-0.3

0.5

0.3

AE ∆% Sep-Dec

1.5

1.5

0.3

3.3

2.1

Aug

0.1

0.1

-0.1

0.2

0.0

Jul

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.5

0.3

Jun

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

May

0.3

0.3

0.0

0.3

0.0

AE ∆% May-Aug

4.3

4.3

1.8

4.0

1.5

Apr

0.2

0.2

-0.1

0.4

0.0

Mar

0.2

0.2

-0.2

0.7

0.4

Feb

0.6

0.5

0.3

0.4

0.2

Jan

1.6

0.8

0.6

0.3

0.1

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

8.1

5.2

1.8

5.5

2.1

2010

         

∆% Jan-Dec 2010**

4.8

4.2

2.8

4.4

2.9

Dec

0.9

0.9

0.7

0.3

0.1

Nov

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.6

0.4

Oct

0.5

0.5

0.2

0.8

0.5

IVQ2010∆%

1.9

1.8

1.2

1.7

1.0

IVQ2010 AE ∆%

7.9

7.4

4.9

7.0

4.1

Notes: *Excluding exceptional income gains in Nov and Dec 2012 because of anticipated tax increases in Jan 2013 ((page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). a Excluding employee contributions for government social insurance (pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf )Excluding NPI: current dollars personal income; NDPI: current dollars disposable personal income; RDPI: chained (2005) dollars DPI; NPCE: current dollars personal consumption expenditures; RPCE: chained (2005) dollars PCE; AE: annual equivalent; IVQ2010: fourth quarter 2010; A: annual equivalent

Percentage change month to month seasonally adjusted

*∆% Dec 2011/Dec 2010 **∆% Dec 2010/Dec 2009 *** ∆% Dec 2012/Dec 2011

Source: US Bureau of Economic http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf)

The rates of growth of real disposable income decline in the final quarter of 2013 because of the increases in the last two months of 2012 in anticipation of the tax increases of the “fiscal cliff” episode. The 12-month rate of increase of real disposable income fell to 1.8 percent in Oct 2013 and 0.6 percent in Nov 2013 partly because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of incomes to avoid increases in taxes in 2013. Real disposable income fell 2.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 primarily because of the much higher level in late 2012 in anticipation of income to avoid increases in taxes in 2013.

RPCE growth decelerated less sharply from close to 3 percent in IVQ 2010 to 2.1 percent in Mar 2012, 1.8 percent in Oct 2012, 2.1 percent in Nov 2012, 2.2 percent in Dec 2012 perhaps also with some effects of anticipations of tax increases in Jan 2013, 2.0 percent in Jan 2013 by burning savings, 1.7 percent in Feb 2013 and 2.0 percent in Mar 2013. RPCE increased 1.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013, 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2013 and 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2013. RPCE increased 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013 and 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013. RPCE increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013. RPCE increased 2.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and 2.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 because anticipations of income in late 2012 did not affect consumption sharply. Subdued growth of RPCE could affect revenues of business. Growth rates of personal consumption have weakened. Goods and especially durable goods have been driving growth of PCE as shown by the much higher 12-month rates of growth of real goods PCE (RPCEG) and durable goods real PCE (RPCEGD) than services real PCE (RPCES). Growth of consumption of goods and, in particular, of consumer durable goods drives the faster expansion of the economy while growth of consumption of services is much more moderate. The 12-month rates of growth of RPCEGD have fallen from around 10 percent and even higher in several months from Sep 2010 to Feb 2011 to the range of 4.8 to 9.1 percent from Jan 2012 to Dec 2013. RPCEG growth rates have fallen from around 5 percent late in 2010 and early Jan-Feb 2011 to the range of 2.8 to 4.1 percent from Jan 2012 to Dec 2013. Growth rates in 12 months of goods and durable goods increased again toward the end of 2012 with strength continuing into 2013. In Dec 2013, RPCEG increased 4.1 percent in 12 months and RPCEGD 4.8 percent while RPCES increased only 1.7 percent. There are limits to sustained growth based on financial repression in an environment of weak labor markets and real labor remuneration.

Table IB-2, Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Personal Consumption Expenditures

Percentage Change from the Same Month a Year Earlier %

 

RDPI

RPCE

RPCEG

RPCEGD

RPCES

2013

         

Dec

-2.7

2.5

4.1

4.8

1.7

Nov

0.6

2.4

4.2

7.3

1.5

Oct

1.8

2.1

3.9

7.3

1.2

Sep

2.2

1.9

3.5

5.9

1.1

Aug

2.0

2.1

3.9

8.9

1.2

Jul

1.3

1.8

3.9

8.0

0.7

Jun

0.9

2.0

4.1

8.3

1.0

May

1.1

1.8

3.6

7.7

0.9

Apr

0.8

1.7

3.0

7.1

1.1

Mar

0.8

2.0

3.1

6.3

1.4

Feb

0.5

1.7

3.2

6.6

0.9

Jan

-0.1

2.0

3.7

7.7

1.1

2012

         

Dec

5.9

2.2

4.2

9.0

1.2

Nov

3.2

2.1

3.6

8.4

1.4

Oct

1.7

1.8

2.8

6.1

1.3

Sep

1.6

2.3

4.1

8.8

1.4

Aug

1.1

2.1

4.0

9.1

1.2

Jul

1.2

2.2

3.4

7.9

1.6

Jun

1.7

2.2

3.2

8.9

1.7

May

1.9

2.4

3.5

7.7

1.8

Apr

1.8

2.4

3.0

6.7

2.1

Mar

1.5

2.1

2.9

6.5

1.7

Feb

1.2

2.5

3.0

7.5

2.2

Jan

1.1

2.1

2.3

6.4

1.9

Dec 2011

1.2

1.8

1.9

5.8

1.7

Dec 2010

2.8

2.9

4.7

8.4

2.1

Notes: RDPI: real disposable personal income; RPCE: real personal consumption expenditures (PCE); RPCEG: real PCE goods; RPCEGD: RPCEG durable goods; RPCES: RPCE services

Numbers are percentage changes from the same month a year earlier

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-1 shows US real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) between 1995 and 2013. There is an evident drop in RPCE during the global recession in 2007 to 2009 but the slope is flatter during the current recovery than in the period before 2007.

clip_image014

Chart IB-1, US, Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1999-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percent changes from the prior period in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent quarterly rates (SAAR) of real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) are provided in Chart IB-2 from 1995 to 2013. The average rate could be visualized as a horizontal line. Although there are not yet sufficient observations, it appears from Chart II-2 that the average rate of growth of RPCE was higher before the recession than during the past eighteen quarters of expansion that began in IIIQ2009.

clip_image015

Chart IB-2, Percent Change from Prior Period in Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Personal income and its disposition are shown in Table IB-3. The latest estimates and revisions have changed movements in four forms. (1) Increase in Dec 2013 of personal income by $2.3 billion or 0.0 percent and decline of disposable income of $3.8 billion or 0.0 percent with increase of wages and salaries of 0.0 percent. (2) Decrease of personal income of $628.5 billion from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or by 4.4 percent and decrease of disposable income of $650.5 billion or by 5.1 percent. Wages and salaries decreased $199.3 billion from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 or by 1.4 percent. Large part of these declines occurred because of the comparison of high levels in late 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in 2013. In 2012, personal income increased $1060.8 billion or 7.9 percent while salaries increased 7.6 percent and disposable income 7.5 percent. Significant part of these gains occurred in Dec 2012 in anticipation of incomes because of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. (3) Increase of $591.6 billion of personal income in 2011 or by 4.6 percent with increase of salaries of 2.8 percent and disposable income of 3.6 percent. (4) Decline of the rate of savings as percent of disposable income from 5.8 percent in Dec 2010 to 5.4 percent in Dec 2011 and 3.9 percent in Dec 2013.

Table IB-3, US, Personal Income and its Disposition, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates USD Billions

 

Personal
Income

Wages &
Salaries

Personal
Taxes

DPI

Savings
Rate %

Dec        2013

14,307.1

7,242.6

1,690.7

12,616.4

3.9

Nov         2013

14,304.8

7,241.0

1,684.7

12,620.2

4.3

Change     Dec 2013/     

Nov 2013

2.3 ∆% 0.0

1.6 ∆%

0.0

6.0 ∆% 0.4

-3.8 ∆% 0.0

 

Jan 2013

13,791.7

7,001.5

1,612.9

12,178.7

3.6

Dec 2012

14,420.2

7,200.8

1,591.0

12,829.2

8.7

Change Dec 2013/ Dec 2012

-628.5 ∆% -4.4

-199.3 ∆% -2.8

21.9 ∆%

1.4

-650.5 ∆% -5.1

 

Change Dec 2012/ Dec 2011

1060.8 ∆% 7.9

510.7 ∆% 7.6

163.3 ∆% 11.4

897.6 ∆% 7.5

 

Dec 2011

13,359.4

6,690.1

1,427.7

11,931.6

5.4

Dec 2010

12,767.8

6,506.0

1,254.2

11,513.7

5.8

Change Dec 2011/ Dec 2010

591.6 ∆%

4.6

184.1   ∆% 2.8

173.5     ∆% 13.8

417.9    ∆% 3.6

 

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides a wealth of revisions and enhancements of US personal income and outlays since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Table IB-4 provides growth rates of real disposable income and real disposable income per capita in the long-term and selected periods. Real disposable income consists of after-tax income adjusted for inflation. Real disposable income per capita is income per person after taxes and inflation. There is remarkable long-term trend of real disposable income of 3.2 percent per year on average from 1929 to 2013 and 2.0 percent in real disposable income per capita. Real disposable income increased at the average yearly rate of 3.7 percent from 1947 to 1999 and real disposable income per capita at 2.3 percent. These rates of increase broadly accompany rates of growth of GDP. Institutional arrangements in the United States provided the environment for growth of output and income after taxes, inflation and population growth. There is significant break of growth by much lower 2.3 percent for real disposable income on average from 1999 to 2013 and 1.4 percent in real disposable per capita income. Real disposable income grew at 3.5 percent from 1980 to 1989 and real disposable per capita income at 2.6 percent. In contrast, real disposable income grew at only 1.3 percent on average from 2006 to 2013 and real disposable income at 0.5 percent. The United States has interrupted its long-term and cyclical dynamism of output, income and employment growth. Recovery of this dynamism could prove to be a major challenge.

Table IB-4, Average Annual Growth Rates of Real Disposable Income (RDPI) and Real Disposable Income per Capita (RDPIPC), Percent per Year 

RDPI Average ∆%

 

     1929-2013

3.2

     1947-1999

3.7

     1999-2013

2.3

     1999-2006

3.2

     1980-1989

3.5

     2006-2013

1.3

RDPIPC Average ∆%

 

     1929-2013

2.0

     1947-1999

2.3

     1999-2013

1.4

     1999-2006

2.2

     1980-1989

2.6

     2006-2013

0.5

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-3 provides personal income in the US between 1980 and 1989. These data are not adjusted for inflation that was still high in the 1980s in the exit from the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s. Personal income grew steadily during the 1980s after recovery from two recessions from Jan IQ1980 to Jul IIIQ1980 and from Jul IIIQ1981 to Nov IVQ1982.

clip_image016

Chart IB-3, US, Personal Income, Billion Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

A different evolution of personal income is shown in Chart IB-4. Personal income also fell during the recession from Dec IVQ2007 to Jun IIQ2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). Growth of personal income during the expansion has been tepid even with the new revisions. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 10.7 percent and real disposable personal income at 9.0 percent http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2014/pdf/pi1213.pdf Table 6), which the BEA explains as: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf).

In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 4.1 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 7.2 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 7.9 percent (Table 6 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1113.pdf). The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In IIQ2013, personal income grew at 4.7 percent, real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at 5.6 percent and real disposable income at 4.1 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2014/pdf/pi1213.pdf). In IIIQ2013, personal income grew at 4.0 percent, real personal income excluding current transfers at 2.0 percent and real disposable income at 3.0 percent (Table 6 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2014/pdf/pi1213.pdf). In IVQ2013, personal income grew at 2.0 percent and real disposable income at 0.8 percent.

clip_image017

Chart IB-4, US, Personal Income, Current Billions of Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Real or inflation-adjusted disposable personal income is provided in Chart IB-5 from 1980 to 1989. Real disposable income after allowing for taxes and inflation grew steadily at high rates during the entire decade.

clip_image018

Chart IB-5, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 4.1 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 7.2 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 7.9 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2014/pdf/pi1213.pdf). The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

This is the explanation for the decline in IQ2013 in Chart IB-6. In IIQ2013, personal income increased at 4.7 percent, real disposable income excluding current transfer receipts at 5.6 percent and real disposable income at 4.1 percent. In IIIQ2013, personal income increased at 4.0 percent, real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at 2.0 percent and real disposable income at 3.0 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2014/pdf/pi1213.pdf). In IVQ2013, personal income increased at 2.0 percent, real personal income excluding current transfers at 1.4 percent and real disposable personal income at 0.8 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2014/pdf/pi1213.pdf).

clip_image019

Chart IB-6, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2013

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-7 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally adjusted annual rates from 1980 to 1989. Rates of changes were high during the decade with few negative changes.

clip_image020

Chart IB-7, US, Real Disposable Income Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Quarterly Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-8 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally adjusted annual rates from 2007 to 2013. There has been a period of positive rates followed by decline of rates and then negative and low rates in 2011. Recovery in 2012 has not reproduced the dynamism of the brief early phase of expansion. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 10.7 percent and real disposable personal income at 9.0 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2014/pdf/pi1213.pdf), which the BEA explains as: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

Personal income fell at 4.1 percent in IQ2013, nominal disposable personal income fell at 7.0 percent while real disposable income fell at 7.2 percent. In IIQ2013, personal income increased at 4.7 percent, real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at 5.6 percent and real disposable income at 4.1 percent. In IIIQ2013, personal income increased at 4.0 percent, real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at 2.0 percent and real disposable income at 3.0 percent. In IVQ2013, nominal personal income increased at 2.0 percent, nominal disposable income at 1.5 percent, real personal income excluding current transfers at 1.4 percent and real disposable income at 0.8 percent.

Chart IB-8 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income

clip_image021

Chart, IB-8, US, Real Disposable Income, Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates US personal income in Dec 2013 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate of $14,307.1 billion, as shown in Table IB-3 above (see Table 1 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2014/pdf/pi1213.pdf). The major portion of personal income is compensation of employees of $8,980.5 billion, or 62.8 percent of the total. Wages and salaries are $7,242.6 billion, of which $6,043.6 billion by private industries and supplements to wages and salaries of $1,737.9 billion (employer contributions to pension and insurance funds are $1,200.8 billion and contributions to social insurance are $537.1 billion). In Dec 1985, US personal income was $3,626.8 billion at SAAR (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Compensation of employees was $2,479.8 billion, or 68.4 percent of the total. Wages and salaries were $2,056.3 billion of which $1671.0 billion by private industries. Supplements to wages and salaries were $423.5 billion with employer contributions to pension and insurance funds of $270.7 billion and $152.9 billion to government social insurance. Chart IB-9 provides US wages and salaries by private industries in the 1980s. Growth was robust after the interruption of the recessions.

clip_image022

Chart IB-9, US, Wages and Salaries, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates Billions of Dollars, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-10 shows US wages and salaries of private industries from 2007 to 2013. There is a drop during the contraction followed by initial recovery in 2010 and then the current much weaker relative performance in 2011, 2012 and 2013.

clip_image023

Chart IB-10, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-11 provides finer detail with monthly wages and salaries of private industries from 2007 to 2013. Total wages and salaries decreased 2.8 percent from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013, as shown in Table IB-3. Anticipations of income in late 2012 to avoid tax increases in 2013 cloud comparisons.

clip_image024

Chart IB-11, US, Wages and Salaries, Private Industries, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-12 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 1980 to 1989. This is the ultimate measure of wellbeing in receiving income by obtaining the value per inhabitant. The measure cannot adjust for the distribution of income. Real disposable personal income per capita grew rapidly during the expansion after 1983 and continued growing during the rest of the decade.

clip_image025

Chart IB-12, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Chained 2009 Dollars 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-13 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 2007 to 2013. There was initial recovery from the drop during the global recession followed by stagnation. Real per capita disposable income increased 1.2 percent from $36,580 in chained dollars of 2009 in Oct 2012 to $37,030 in Nov 2012 and 3.1 percent to $38,170 in Dec 2012 for cumulative increase of 4.3 percent from Oct 2012 to Dec 2012. Real per capita disposable income fell 5.2 percent from $38,170 in Dec 2012 to $36,190 in Jan 2013, increasing marginally 0.8 percent to $36,497 in Feb 2013 for cumulative change of minus 0.2 percent from Oct 2012 (data at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). This increase is shown in a jump in the final segment in Chart II-13 with Nov-Dec 2012, decline in Jan 2013 and recovery in Feb 2013. Real per capita disposable income increased 0.4 percent from $36,497 in Feb 2013 in chained dollars of 2009 to $36,626 in Mar 2013 for cumulative increase of 0.1 percent relative to Oct 2012. Real per capita disposable income increased to $36,786 in May 2013 for gain of 0.2 percent relative to $36,708 in Apr 2013 and 0.6 percent from Oct 2012. Real disposable per capita income eased to $36,736 in Jun 2013 for decrease of 0.1 percent relative to May 2013 and increase of 0.4 percent relative to Oct 2012. Real disposable income per capita increased 0.2 percent from $36,736 in Jun 2013 to $36,800 in Jul 2013 and 0.6 percent relative to $36,580 in Oct 2013. Real per capita disposable income increased to $36,957 in Aug 2013 or 0.4 percent higher than in Jul 2013 and 1.0 percent above Oct 2012. Real per capita disposable income increased 0.3 percent from $36,957 in Aug 2013 to $37,073 in Sep 2013 and increased 1.3 percent relative to $36,580 in Oct 2012. Real per capita disposable income decreased 0.3 percent from $37,073 in Sep 2013 to $36,970 in Oct 2013 and increased 1.1 percent relative to $36,580 in Oct 2012. Real per capita disposable income changed 0.0 percent from $36,970 in Oct 2013 to $36,984 in Nov 2013 and increased 1.1 percent relative to $36,580 in Oct 2012. Real per capita income fell 0.2 percent in Dec 2013 to $36,877 and increased 0.8 percent from $36,580 in Oct 2012. Real disposable income fell 3.4 percent from $38,170 in Dec 2012 to $36,877 in Dec 2013, largely because of anticipations of income in late 2012. BEA explains as: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf).

The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

clip_image026

Chart IB-13, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Chained 2009 Dollars 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IA2 Financial Repression. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1974) argue that legal restrictions on financial institutions can be detrimental to economic development. “Financial repression” is the term used in the economic literature for these restrictions (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 81-6; for historical analysis see Pelaez 1975). Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. The Banking Act of 1933 imposed prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q.

Most regulatory actions trigger compensatory measures by the private sector that result in outcomes that are different from those intended by regulation (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Banks offered services to their customers and loans at rates lower than market rates to compensate for the prohibition to pay interest on demand deposits (Friedman 1970, 24). The prohibition of interest on demand deposits was eventually lifted in recent times. In the second half of the 1960s, already in the beginning of the Great Inflation (DeLong 1997), market rates rose above the ceilings of Regulation Q because of higher inflation. Nobody desires savings allocated to time or savings deposits that pay less than expected inflation. This is a fact currently with zero interest rates and consumer price inflation of 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/) but rising during waves of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). Funding problems motivated compensatory measures by banks. Money-center banks developed the large certificate of deposit (CD) to accommodate increasing volumes of loan demand by customers. As Friedman (1970, 25) finds:

“Large negotiable CD’s were particularly hard hit by the interest rate ceiling because they are deposits of financially sophisticated individuals and institutions who have many alternatives. As already noted, they declined from a peak of $24 billion in mid-December, 1968, to less than $12 billion in early October, 1969.”

Banks created different liabilities to compensate for the decline in CDs. As Friedman (1970, 25; 1969) explains:

“The most important single replacement was almost surely ‘liabilities of US banks to foreign branches.’ Prevented from paying a market interest rate on liabilities of home offices in the United States (except to foreign official institutions that are exempt from Regulation Q), the major US banks discovered that they could do so by using the Euro-dollar market. Their European branches could accept time deposits, either on book account or as negotiable CD’s at whatever rate was required to attract them and match them on the asset side of their balance sheet with ‘due from head office.’ The head office could substitute the liability ‘due to foreign branches’ for the liability ‘due on CDs.”

Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:

“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”

In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:

“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.”

Chart IB-14 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides quarterly savings as percent of disposable income or the US savings rate from 1980 to 2013. There was a long-term downward sloping trend from 12 percent in the early 1980s to 2.0 percent in Jul 2005. The savings rate then rose during the contraction and in the expansion. In 2011 and into 2012 the savings rate declined as consumption is financed with savings in part because of the disincentive or frustration of receiving a few pennies for every $10,000 of deposits in a bank. The savings rate increased in the final segment of Chart IB-14 in 2012 followed by another decline because of the pain of the opportunity cost of zero remuneration for hard-earned savings. Swelling realization of income in Oct-Dec 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2012 caused the jump of the savings rate to 8.7 percent in Dec 2012. The BEA explains as: Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). The savings rate then collapsed to 3.6 percent in Jan 2013 in part because of the decline of 5.1 percent in real disposable personal income and to 4.2 percent with increase of real disposable income by 0.9 percent in Feb 2013. The savings rate increased to 4.3 percent in Mar 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.4 percent and at 4.6 percent in Apr 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.3 percent. The savings rate rose to 4.8 percent in May 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.3 percent. The savings rate fell to 4.6 percent in Jun 2013 with decline of real disposable personal income by 0.1 percent. The savings rate increased to 4.7 percent in Jul 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.2 percent. In Aug 2013, real disposable income increased 0.5 percent and the savings rate increased to 4.9 percent. In Sep 2013, the savings rate increased to 5.1 percent with increase of real disposable income of 0.4 percent. The savings rate fell to 4.8 percent in Oct 2013 with decrease of real disposable income by 0.2 percent. The savings rate fell to 4.3 percent in Nov 2013 with increase of real disposable income of 0.1 percent. In Dec 2013, the savings rate fell to 3.9 percent with decrease of real disposable income by 0.2 percent. The decline of personal income was caused by increasing contributions to government social insurance (page 1 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf). The objective of monetary policy is to reduce borrowing rates to induce consumption but it has collateral disincentive of reducing savings and misallocating resources away from their best uses. The zero interest rate of monetary policy is a tax on saving. This tax is highly regressive, meaning that it affects the most people with lower income or wealth and retirees. The long-term decline of savings rates in the US has created a dependence on foreign savings to finance the deficits in the federal budget and the balance of payments (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html).

clip_image027

Chart IB-14, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Quarterly, 1980-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IB-15 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides personal savings as percent of personal disposable income, or savings ratio, from Jan 2007 to Nov 2013. The uncertainties caused by the global recession resulted in sharp increase in the savings ratio that peaked at 8.0 percent in May 2008 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The second peak occurred at 8.1 percent in May 2009. There was another rising trend until 5.9 percent in Jun 2010 and then steady downward trend until 4.8 percent in Nov 2011. This was followed by an upward trend with 5.6 percent in Jun 2012 but decline to 4.9 percent in Aug 2012 followed by jump to 8.7 percent in Dec 2012. Swelling realization of income in Oct-Dec 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused the jump of the savings rate to 8.7 percent in Dec 2012. The BEA explains as: Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). There was a reverse effect in Jan 2013 with decline of the savings rate to 3.6 percent. Real disposable personal income fell 5.1 percent and real disposable per capita income fell from $38,170 in Dec 2012 to $36,190 in Jan 2013 or by 5.2 percent, which is explained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9billion.”

The savings rate then collapsed to 3.6 percent in Jan 2013 in part because of the decline of 5.1 percent in real disposable personal income and to 4.2 percent with increase of real disposable income by 0.9 percent in Feb 2013. The savings rate increased to 4.3 percent in Mar 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.4 percent and at 4.6 percent in Apr 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.3 percent. The savings rate rose to 4.8 percent in May 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.3 percent. The savings rate fell to 4.6 percent in Jun 2013 with decline of real disposable personal income by 0.1 percent. The savings rate increased to 4.7 percent in Jul 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.2 percent. In Aug 2013, real disposable income increased 0.5 percent and the savings rate increased to 4.9 percent. In Sep 2013, the savings rate increased to 5.1 percent with increase of real disposable income of 0.4 percent. The savings rate fell to 4.5 percent in Oct 2013 with decrease of real disposable income by 0.2 percent. The savings rate fell to 4.3 percent in Nov 2013 with increase of real disposable income of 0.1 percent. In Dec 2013, the savings rate fell to 3.9 percent with decrease of real disposable income by 0.2 percent. The decline of personal income was caused by increasing contributions to government social insurance (page 1 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf). Permanent manipulation of the entire spectrum of interest rates with monetary policy measures distorts the compass of resource allocation with inferior outcomes of future growth, employment and prosperity and dubious redistribution of income and wealth worsening the most the personal welfare of people without vast capital and financial relations to manage their savings.

clip_image028

Chart IB-15, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Income, Monthly 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

II United States Housing Collapse. The objective of this section is to provide the latest data and analysis of US housing. Subsection IIB1 United New House Sales analyzes the collapse of US new house sales. Subsection IIB2 United States House Prices considers the latest available data on house prices. Subsection IIB3 Factors of US Housing Collapse provides the analysis of the causes of the housing crisis of the US. IIB4 US Housing Prices provides the prices of houses.

IIB1 United States New House Sales. Data and other information continue to provide depressed conditions in the US housing market in a longer perspective, with recent improvement at the margin. Table IIB-1 shows sales of new houses in the US at seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate (SAAR). House sales fell in eighteen of thirty-six months from Jan 2011 to Dec 2013 but mostly concentrated in Jan-Feb 2011 and May-Aug 2011. In Jan-Apr 2012, house sales increased at the annual equivalent rate of 10.3 percent and at 23.5 percent in May-Sep 2012. There was significant strength in Sep-Dec 2011 with annual equivalent rate of 48.4 percent. Sales of new houses fell 0.5 percent in Dec 2012 and 4.9 percent in Oct 2012 with increase of 9.0 percent in Nov 2012. Sales of new houses rebounded 15.7 percent in Jan 2013 with annual equivalent rate of 69.9 percent from Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 because of the increase of 15.7 percent in Jan 2013. New house sales fell at annual equivalent 17.7 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. New house sales weakened, decreasing at 8.6 percent in annual equivalent from Apr to Dec 2013 with significant volatility illustrated by decline of 17.1 percent in Jul 2013 and increase of 14.9 percent in Oct 2013. House sales fell 7.0 percent in Dec 2013. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), analyze how builders have provided financial assistance to home buyers, including those short of cash and with weaker credit background, explaining the rise in new home sales and the highest gap between prices of new and existing houses. The 30-year conventional mortgage rate increased from 3.40 on Apr 25, 2013 to 4.58 percent on Aug 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm), which could also be a factor in recent weakness with improvement after the rate fell to 4.26 in Nov 2013. The conventional mortgage rate rose to 4.48 percent on Dec 26, 2013 and fell to 4.32 percent on Jan 30, 2014. The conventional mortgage rate measured in a survey by Freddie Mac (http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/release.html) is the “contract interest rate on commitments for fixed-rate first mortgages” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm).

Table IIB-1, US, Sales of New Houses at Seasonally-Adjusted (SA) Annual Equivalent Rate, Thousands and % 

 

SA Annual Rate
Thousands

∆%

Dec 2013

414

-7.0

Nov

445

-3.9

Oct

463

14.9

Sep

403

3.9

Aug

388

4.0

Jul

373

-17.1

Jun

450

4.9

May

429

-3.8

Apr

446

0.7

AE ∆% Apr-Dec

 

-8.6

Mar

443

-0.4

Feb

445

-2.8

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

 

-17.7

Jan

458

15.7

Dec 2012

396

-0.5

Nov

398

9.0

Oct

365

-4.9

AE ∆% Oct-Jan

 

69.9

Sep

384

2.7

Aug

374

1.4

Jul

369

2.5

Jun

360

-2.4

May

369

4.8

AE ∆% May-Sep

 

23.5

Apr

352

0.9

Mar

349

-4.6

Feb

366

8.3

Jan

338

-0.9

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

 

10.3

Dec 2011

341

4.0

Nov

328

3.8

Oct

316

3.9

Sep

304

1.7

AE ∆% Sep-Dec

 

48.4

Aug

299

-1.7

Jul

296

-2.3

Jun

301

-1.3

May

305

-1.6

AE ∆% May-Aug

 

-18.9

Apr

310

3.3

Mar

300

11.1

Feb

270

-12.1

Jan

307

-5.8

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

 

-14.2

Dec 2010

326

13.6

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

There is additional information of the report of new house sales in Table IIB-2. The stock of unsold houses stabilized in Apr-Aug 2011 at average 6.6 monthly equivalent sales at current sales rates and then dropped to 4.6 in Jul-Aug 2012, increasing to 4.8 in Oct 2012, 4.5 in Nov 2012 and 4.5 percent in Dec 2012. Inventories dropped to 3.9 in Jan 2013 and 4.1 in Feb 2013. Inventories stabilized at 4.2-4.5 in Mar-Jun 2013 and increased to 5.5 in Jul 2013. Inventories fell to 5.4 in Aug 2013 and 5.4 in Sep 2013 but fell to 4.6 in Oct 2013. Inventories stood at 4.7 in Nov 2013 and 5.0 in Dec 2013. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), find that inventories of houses have declined as investors acquire distressed houses of higher quality. Median and average house prices oscillate. In Dec 2013, median prices of new houses sold not seasonally adjusted (NSA) increased 0.6 percent after increasing 3.2 percent in Nov 2013. Average prices decreased 6.9 percent in Dec 2013 and increased 2.2 percent in Nov 2013. Between Dec 2010 and Dec 2013 median prices increased 12.0 percent and average prices increased 6.8 percent. Between Dec 2010 and Dec 2012, median prices increased 7.1 percent and average prices increased 2.6 percent. Price increases concentrated in 2012 with increase of median prices of 18.2 percent from Dec 2011 to Dec 2012 and of average prices of 13.8 percent. Median prices increased 4.6 percent from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013 while average prices increased 4.1 percent. Robbie Williams, writing on “New homes hit record as builders cap supply,” on May 24, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323475304578500973445311276.html?mod=WSJ_economy_LeftTopHighlights), finds that homebuilders are continuing to restrict the number of new homes for sale. Restriction of available new homes for sale increases prices paid by buyers.

Table IIB-2, US, New House Stocks and Median and Average New Homes Sales Price

 

Unsold*
Stocks in Equiv.
Months
of Sales
SA %

Median
New House Sales Price USD
NSA

Month
∆%

Average New House Sales Price USD
NSA

Month
∆%

Dec 2013

5.0

270,200

0.6

311,400

-6.9

Nov

4.7

268,500

3.2

334,600

2.2

Oct

4.6

260,300

-3.5

327,400

1.9

Sep

5.4

269,800

5.7

321,400

3.4

Aug

5.4

255,300

-2.6

310,800

-5.8

Jul

5.5

262,200

0.9

329,900

7.8

Jun

4.3

259,800

-1.5

306,100

-2.5

May

4.5

263,700

-5.6

314,000

-6.8

Apr

4.3

279,300

8.5

337,000

12.3

Mar

4.2

257,500

-2.9

300,200

-3.9

Feb

4.1

265,100

5.4

312,500

1.8

Jan

3.9

251,500

-2.6

306,900

2.6

Dec 2012

4.5

258,300

5.4

299,200

2.9

Nov

4.5

245,000

-0.9

290,700

1.9

Oct

4.8

247,200

-2.9

285,400

-4.1

Sep

4.5

254,600

0.6

297,700

-2.6

Aug

4.6

253,200

6.7

305,500

8.2

Jul

4.6

237,400

2.1

282,300

3.9

Jun

4.8

232,600

-2.8

271,800

-3.2

May

4.7

239,200

1.2

280,900

-2.4

Apr

4.9

236,400

-1.4

287,900

1.5

Mar

5.0

239,800

0.0

283,600

3.5

Feb

4.8

239,900

8.2

274,000

3.1

Jan

5.3

221,700

1.4

265,700

1.1

Dec 2011

5.3

218,600

2.0

262,900

5.2

Nov

5.7

214,300

-4.7

250,000

-3.2

Oct

6.0

224,800

3.6

258,300

1.1

Sep

6.3

217,000

-1.2

255,400

-1.5

Aug

6.5

219,600

-4.5

259,300

-4.1

Jul

6.7

229,900

-4.3

270,300

-1.0

Jun

6.6

240,200

8.2

273,100

3.9

May

6.6

222,000

-1.2

262,700

-2.3

Apr

6.7

224,700

1.9

268,900

3.1

Mar

7.2

220,500

0.2

260,800

-0.8

Feb

8.1

220,100

-8.3

262,800

-4.7

Jan

7.3

240,100

-0.5

275,700

-5.5

Dec 2010

7.0

241,200

9.8

291,700

3.5

*Percent of new houses for sale relative to houses sold

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

The depressed level of residential construction and new house sales in the US is evident in Table IIB-3 providing new house sales not seasonally adjusted in Jan-Dec of various years. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2013 are substantially lower than in any year between 1963 and 2013 with the exception of the years from 2009 to 2012. There are only four increases of 16.4 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2012, 39.9 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2011, 32.5 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2010 and 14.1 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2009. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2013 are lower by 11.8 percent relative to Jan-Dec 2008, 44.8 percent relative to 2007, 59.3 percent relative to 2006 and 66.6 percent relative to 2005. The housing boom peaked in 2005 and 2006 when increases in fed funds rates to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 from 1.0 percent in Jun 2004 affected subprime mortgages that were programmed for refinancing in two or three years on the expectation that price increases forever would raise home equity. Higher home equity would permit refinancing under feasible mortgages incorporating full payment of principal and interest (Gorton 2009EFM; see other references in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2013 relative to the same period in 2004 fell 64.4 percent and 60.6 percent relative to the same period in 2003. Similar percentage declines are also observed for 2013 relative to years from 2000 to 2004. Sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2013 fell 35.8 per cent relative to the same period in 1995. The population of the US was 179.3 million in 1960 and 281.4 million in 2000 (Hobbs and Stoops 2002, 16). Detailed historical census reports are available from the US Census Bureau at (http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscendata.html). The US population reached 308.7 million in 2010 (http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/). The US population increased by 129.4 million from 1960 to 2010 or 72.2 percent. The final row of Table IIB-3 reveals catastrophic data: sales of new houses in Jan-Dec 2013 of 428 thousand units are lower by 23.6 percent relative to 560 thousand units of houses sold in Jan-Dec 1963, the first year when data become available. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 123.360 million in Dec 1963 to 246.745 million in Dec 2013, or 100.0 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”

Table IIB-3, US, Sales of New Houses Not Seasonally Adjusted, Thousands and %

 

Not Seasonally Adjusted Thousands

Jan-Dec 2013

428

Jan-Dec 2012

368

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/Jan-Dec 2012

16.4*

Jan-Dec 2011

306

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/Jan-Dec 2011

39.9

Jan-Dec 2010

323

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/ 
Jan-Dec 2010

32.5

Jan-Dec 2009

375

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/ 
Jan-Dec 2009

14.1

Jan-Dec 2008

485

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/ 
Jan-Dec 2008

-11.8

Jan-Dec 2007

776

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/
Jan-Dec 2007

-44.8

Jan-Dec 2006

1,051

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/Jan-Dec 2006

-59.3

Jan-Dec 2005

1,283

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/Jan-Dec 2005

-66.6

Jan-Dec 2004

1,203

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/Jan-Dec 2004

-64.4

Jan-Dec 2003

1,086

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/
Jan-Dec  2003

-60.6

Jan-Dec 2002

973

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/
Jan-Dec 2002

-56.0

Jan-Dec 2001

908

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/
Jan-Dec 2001

-52.9

Jan-Dec 2000

877

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/
Jan-Dec 2000

-51.2

Jan-Dec 1995

667

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/
Jan-Dec 1995

-35.8

Jan-Dec 1963

560

∆% Jan-Dec 2013/
Jan-Dec 1963

-23.6

*Computed using unrounded data

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Table IIB-4 provides the entire available annual series of new house sales from 1963 to 2013. The revised level of 306 thousand new houses sold in 2011 is the lowest since 560 thousand in 1963 in the 48 years of available data while the level of 368 thousand in 2012 is only higher than 323 thousand in 2010. The level of sales of new houses of 428 thousand in 2013 is the lowest from 1963 to 2009 with exception of 412 thousand in 1982. The population of the US increased 129.4 million from 179.3 million in 1960 to 308.7 million in 2010, or 72.2 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US increased from 122.416 million in 1963 to 245.679 million in 2013 or 100.7 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”

The civilian noninstitutional population is the universe of the labor force. In fact, there is no year from 1963 to 2013 in Table IIA-4 with sales of new houses below 400 thousand with the exception of the immediately preceding years of 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

Table IIB-4, US, New Houses Sold, NSA Thousands

Year

Houses Sold Thousands

1963

560

1964

565

1965

575

1966

461

1967

487

1968

490

1969

448

1970

485

1971

656

1972

718

1973

634

1974

519

1975

549

1976

646

1977

819

1978

817

1979

709

1980

545

1981

436

1982

412

1983

623

1984

639

1985

688

1986

750

1987

671

1988

676

1989

650

1990

534

1991

509

1992

610

1993

666

1994

670

1995

667

1996

757

1997

804

1998

886

1999

880

2000

877

2001

908

2002

973

2003

1,086

2004

1,203

2005

1,283

2006

1,051

2007

776

2008

485

2009

375

2010

323

2011

306

2012

368

2013

428

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-1 of the US Bureau of the Census shows the sharp decline of sales of new houses in the US. Sales rose temporarily until about mid 2010 but then declined to a lower plateau followed by increase and stability.

clip_image030

Chart IIB-1, US, New One-Family Houses Sold in the US, SAAR (Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate) 

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/briefrm/esbr/www/esbr051.html

Percentage changes and average rates of growth of new house sales for selected periods are shown in Table IIB-5. The percentage change of new house sales from 1963 to 2013 is minus 23.6 percent. Between 1991 and 2001, sales of new houses rose 78.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 5.9 percent. Between 1995 and 2005 sales of new houses increased 92.4 percent at the yearly rate of 6.8 percent. There are similar rates in all years from 2000 to 2005. The boom in housing construction and sales began in the 1980s and 1990s. The collapse of real estate culminated several decades of housing subsidies and policies to lower mortgage rates and borrowing terms (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009b), 42-8). Sales of new houses sold in 2013 fell 35.8 percent relative to the same period in 1995 and 66.6 percent relative to 2005.

Table IIB-5, US, Percentage Change and Average Yearly Rate of Growth of Sales of New One-Family Houses

 

∆%

Average Yearly % Rate

1963-2013

-23.6

NA

1991-2001

78.4

6.0

1995-2005

92.4

6.8

2000-2005

46.3

7.9

1995-2013

-35.8

NA

2000-2013

-51.2

NA

2005-2013

-66.6

NA

NA: Not Applicable

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-2 of the US Bureau of the Census provides the entire monthly sample of new houses sold in the US between Jan 1963 and Dec 2013 without seasonal adjustment. The series is almost stationary until the 1990s. There is sharp upward trend from the early 1990s to 2005-2006 after which new single-family houses sold collapse to levels below those in the beginning of the series in the 1960s.

clip_image031

Chart IIB-2, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 1963-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

The available historical annual data of median and average prices of new houses sold in the US between 1963 and 2012 is provided in Table IIB-6. On a yearly basis, median and average prices reached a peak in 2007 and then fell substantially.

Table IIB-6, US, Median and Average Prices of New Houses Sold, Annual Data

Period

Median

Average

1963

$18,000

$19,300

1964

$18,900

$20,500

1965

$20,000

$21,500

1966

$21,400

$23,300

1967

$22,700

$24,600

1968

$24,700

$26,600

1969

$25,600

$27,900

1970

$23,400

$26,600

1971

$25,200

$28,300

1972

$27,600

$30,500

1973

$32,500

$35,500

1974

$35,900

$38,900

1975

$39,300

$42,600

1976

$44,200

$48,000

1977

$48,800

$54,200

1978

$55,700

$62,500

1979

$62,900

$71,800

1980

$64,600

$76,400

1981

$68,900

$83,000

1982

$69,300

$83,900

1983

$75,300

$89,800

1984

$79,900

$97,600

1985

$84,300

$100,800

1986

$92,000

$111,900

1987

$104,500

$127,200

1988

$112,500

$138,300

1989

$120,000

$148,800

1990

$122,900

$149,800

1991

$120,000

$147,200

1992

$121,500

$144,100

1993

$126,500

$147,700

1994

$130,000

$154,500

1995

$133,900

$158,700

1996

$140,000

$166,400

1997

$146,000

$176,200

1998

$152,500

$181,900

1999

$161,000

$195,600

2000

$169,000

$207,000

2001

$175,200

$213,200

2002

$187,600

$228,700

2003

$195,000

$246,300

2004

$221,000

$274,500

2005

$240,900

$297,000

2006

$246,500

$305,900

2007

$247,900

$313,600

2008

$232,100

$292,600

2009

$216,700

$270,900

2010

$221,800

$272,900

2011

$227,200

$267,900

2012

$245,200

$292,200

2013

$265,800

$320,900

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Percentage changes of median and average prices of new houses sold in selected years are shown in Table IIB-7. Prices rose sharply between 2000 and 2005. In fact, prices in 2013 are higher than in 2000. Between 2006 and 2013, median prices of new houses sold increased 7.8 percent and average prices increased 4.9 percent. Between 2012 and 2013, median prices increased 8.4 percent and average prices increased 9.8 percent.

Table IIB-7, US, Percentage Change of New Houses Median and Average Prices, NSA, ∆%

 

Median New 
Home Sales Prices ∆%

Average New Home Sales Prices ∆%

∆% 2000 to 2003

15.4

18.9

∆% 2000 to 2005

42.5

43.5

∆% 2000 to 2013

57.3

55.0

∆% 2005 to 2013

10.4

8.0

∆% 2000 to 2006

45.9

47.8

∆% 2006 to 2013

7.8

4.9

∆% 2009 to 2013

22.7

18.5

∆% 2010 to 2013

19.8

17.6

∆% 2011 to 2013

17.0

19.8

∆% 2012 to 2013

8.4

9.8

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-3 of the US Census Bureau provides the entire series of new single-family sales median prices from Jan 1963 to Dec 2013. There is long-term sharp upward trend with few declines until the current collapse. Median prices increased sharply during the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s and paused during the savings and loans crisis of the late 1980s and the recession of 1991. Housing subsidies throughout the 1990s caused sharp upward trend of median new house prices that accelerated after the fed funds rate of 1 percent from 2003 to 2004. There was sharp reduction of prices after 2006 with recovery recently toward earlier prices.

clip_image032

Chart IIB-3, US, Median Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 1963-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-4 of the US Census Bureau provides average prices of new houses sold from the mid-1970s to Dec 2013. There is similar behavior as with median prices of new houses sold in Chart IIB-3. The only stress occurred in price pauses during the savings and loans crisis of the late 1980s and the collapse after 2006 with recent recovery.

clip_image033

Chart IIB-4, US, Average Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 1975-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/

Chart IIB-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate for the 30-year conventional mortgage, the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond and the rate of the overnight federal funds rate, monthly, from 1971 to 2013. All rates decline throughout the period from the Great Inflation of the 1970s through the following Great Moderation and until currently. In Apr 1971, the fed funds rate was 4.15 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 7.31 percent. In November 2012, the fed funds rate was 0.16 percent, the yield of the 30-year Treasury 2.80 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 3.35. The final segment shows an increase in the yield of the 30-year Treasury to 3.61 percent in July 2013 with the fed funds rate at 0.09 percent and the conventional mortgage at 4.37 percent. The final data point shows increase of the conventional mortgage rate to 4.46 percent in Dec 2012 with the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond at 3.89 percent and overnight rate on fed funds at 0.09 percent. The recent increase in interest rates if sustained could affect the US real estate market.

clip_image034

Chart IIB-5, US, Thirty-year Conventional Mortgage, Thirty-year Treasury Bond and Overnight Federal Funds Rate, Monthly, 1971-2013

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm

Table IIB-8 provides the monthly data in Chart IIB-5 from Dec 2012 to Dec 2013. While the fed funds rate fell from 0.16 percent in Dec 2012 to 0.09 percent in Dec 2013, the yield of the constant maturity 30-year Treasury bond rose from 2.88 percent in Dec 2012 to 3.89 percent in Dec 2013 and the conventional mortgage rate increased from 3.35 percent in Dec 2012 to 4.46 percent in Dec 2013.

Table IIB-8, US, Fed Funds Rate, Thirty Year Treasury Bond and Conventional Mortgage Rate, Monthly, Percent Per Year, Dec 2012 to Dec 2013

Year-Month

Fed Funds Rate

Thirty-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yield

Conventional Mortgage Rate

2012-12

0.16

2.88

3.35

2013-01

0.14

3.08

3.41

2013-02

0.15

3.17

3.53

2013-03

0.14

3.16

3.57

2013-04

0.15

2.93

3.45

2013-05

0.11

3.11

3.54

2013-06

0.09

3.4

4.07

2013-07

0.09

3.61

4.37

2013-08

0.08

3.76

4.46

2013-09

0.08

3.79

4.49

2013-10

0.09

3.68

4.19

2013-11

0.08

3.8

4.26

2013-12

0.09

3.89

4.46

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm

IIB4 United States House Prices. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, provides the FHFA House Price Index (HPI) that “is calculated using home sales price information from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-acquired mortgages” (http://fhfa.gov/webfiles/24216/q22012hpi.pdf 1). Table IIA2-1 provides the FHFA HPI for purchases only, which shows behavior similar to that of the Case-Shiller index but with lower magnitudes. House prices catapulted from 2000 to 2003, 2005 and 2006. From IIIQ2000 to IIIQ2006, the index for the US as a whole rose 57.4 percent, with 68.4 percent for New England, 75.5 percent for Middle Atlantic, 72.1 percent for South Atlantic but only by 32.6 percent for East South Central. Prices fell relative to 2013 for all years from 2005 and from 2006. Prices for the US increased 8.5 percent in IIIQ2013 relative to IIIQ2012 and 12.9 percent from IIIQ2011 to IIIQ2013. From IIIQ2000 to IIIQ2013, prices rose for the US and the four regions in Table IIA2-1.

Table IIA2-1, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only NSA ∆%

 

United States

New England

Middle Atlantic

South Atlantic

East South Central

IIIQ2000
to
IIIQ2003

23.5

40.4

35.3

25.1

10.7

IIIQ2000
to
IIIQ2005

50.2

69.5

68.7

60.8

23.7

IIIQ2000 to
IIIQ2006

57.4

68.4

75.5

72.1

32.5

IIIQ2005 t0
IIIQ2013

-3.9

-9.7

-1.9

-9.0

7.2

IIIQ2006
to
IIIQ2013

-8.3

-9.2

-5.8

-15.0

0.1

IIIQ2007 to
IIIQ2013

-8.1

-7.6

-6.6

-14.8

-3.1

IIIQ2011 to
IIIQ2013

12.9

5.0

3.5

13.9

6.9

IIIQ2012 to
IIIQ2013

8.5

5.0

3.8

8.7

4.8

IIIQ2000 to
IIIQ2013

44.3

53.0

65.4

46.3

32.6

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14

Data of the FHFA HPI for the remaining US regions are in Table IIA2-2. Behavior is not very different from that in Table IIA2-1 with the exception of East North Central. House prices in the Pacific region doubled between 2000 and 2006. Although prices of houses declined sharply from 2005 and 2006 to 2013 with exception of South Central, there was still appreciation relative to 2000.

Table IIA2-2, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only NSA ∆%

 

West South Central

West North Central

East North Central

Mountain

Pacific

IIIQ2000
to
IIIQ2003

11.6

18.4

14.5

18.4

42.5

IIIQ2000
to
IIIQ2005

22.9

31.3

24.4

55.3

109.5

IIIQ2000 to IIIQ2006

31.4

35.8

26.0

69.3

118.0

IIIQ2005 to
IIIQ2013

21.7

3.0

-7.8

-5.3

-19.3

IIIQ2006
to
IIIQ2013

13.8

-0.4

-8.9

-13.1

-22.5

IIIQ2007 to
IIIQ2013

8.6

-1.3

-7.1

-14.1

-18

IIIQ2011 to
IIIQ2013

11.5

9.5

9.2

24.0

26.7

IIIQ2012 to
IIIQ2013

6.0

6.1

6.3

12.3

19.2

IIIQ2000 to  IIIQ2013

49.5

35.2

14.6

47.0

69.2

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14

Chart IIA2-1 of the Federal Housing Finance Agency shows the Housing Price Index four-quarter price change from IIIQ2003 to IIIQ2013. House prices appreciated sharply from 1998 to 2005 and then fell rapidly. Recovery began already after IIQ2008 but there was another decline after IIIQ2010. The rate of decline improved in the second half of 2011 and into 2012 with movement into positive territory in successive quarter from IIQ2012 to IIIQ2013.

clip_image035

Chart IIA2-1, US, Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index Four Quarter Price Change

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14

Monthly and 12-month percentage changes of the FHFA House Price Index are in Table IIA2-3. Percentage monthly increases of the FHFA index were positive from Apr to Jul 2011 with exception of declines in May and Aug 2011 while 12 months percentage changes improved steadily from around minus 6 percent in Mar to May 2011 to minus 4.4 percent in Jun 2011. The FHFA house price index fell 0.6 percent in Oct 2011 and fell 3.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct. There was significant recovery in Nov 2012 with increase in the house price index of 0.5 percent and reduction of the 12-month rate of decline to 2.2 percent. The house price index rose 0.4 percent in Dec 2011 and the 12-month percentage change improved to minus 1.2 percent. There was further improvement with revised decline of 0.2 percent in Jan 2012 and decline of the 12-month percentage change to minus 1.0 percent. The index improved to positive change of 0.5 percent in Feb 2012 and increase of 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. There was strong improvement in Mar 2012 with gain in prices of 0.9 percent and 2.3 percent in 12 months. The house price index of FHFA increased 0.7 percent in Apr 2012 and 3.0 percent in 12 months and improvement continued with increase of 0.6 percent in May 2012 and 3.8 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2012. Improvement consolidated with increase of 0.4 percent in Jun 2012 and 3.8 percent in 12 months. In Jul 2012, the house price index increased 0.1 percent and 3.7 percent in 12 months. Strong increase of 0.5 percent in Aug 2012 pulled the 12-month change to 4.4 percent. There was another increase of 0.7 percent in Oct and 5.6 percent in 12 months followed by increase of 0.5 percent in Nov 2012 and 5.6 percent in 12 months. The FHFA house price index increased 0.6 percent in Jan 2013 and 6.6 percent in 12 months. Improvement continued with increase of 0.4 percent in Apr 2013 and 7.3 percent in 12 months. In May 2013, the house price indexed increased 1.0 percent and 7.7 percent in 12 months. The FHFA house price index increased 0.7 percent in Jun 2013 and 8.0 percent in 12 months. In Jul 2013, the FHFA house price index increased 0.7 percent and 8.7 percent in 12 months. Improvement continued with increase of 0.4 percent in Aug 2013 and 8.5 percent in 12 months. In Sep 2013, the house price index increased 0.2 percent and 8.4 percent in 12 months. The house price index increased 0.5 percent in Oct 2013 and 8.0 percent in 12 months. In Nov 2013, the house price index increased 0.1 percent and 7.6 percent in 12 months.

Table IIA2-3, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only SA. Month and NSA 12-Month ∆%

 

Month ∆% SA

12 Month ∆% NSA

Nov 2013

0.1

7.6

Oct

0.5

8.0

Sep

0.2

8.4

Aug

0.4

8.5

Jul

0.7

8.7

Jun

0.7

8.0

May

1.0

7.7

Apr

0.4

7.3

Mar

1.4

7.6

Feb

0.9

7.0

Jan

0.6

6.6

Dec 2012

0.5

5.8

Nov

0.5

5.6

Oct

0.7

5.6

Sep

0.3

4.3

Aug

0.5

4.4

Jul

0.1

3.7

Jun

0.4

3.8

May

0.6

3.8

Apr

0.7

3.0

Mar

0.9

2.3

Feb

0.5

0.4

Jan

-0.2

-1.0

Dec 2011

0.4

-1.2

Nov 2011

0.5

-2.2

Oct 2011

-0.6

-3.0

Sep 2011

0.5

-2.3

Aug 2011

-0.3

-3.7

Jul 2011

0.3

-3.4

Jun 2011

0.4

-4.4

May 2011

-0.1

-5.9

Apr 2011

0.1

-5.8

Mar 2011

-0.9

-5.9

Feb 2011

-1.0

-5.1

Jan 2011

-0.5

-4.6

Dec 2010

 

-3.8

Dec 2009

 

-2.0

Dec 2008

 

-10.0

Dec 2007

 

-3.2

Dec 2006

 

2.5

Dec 2005

 

9.8

Dec 2004

 

10.2

Dec 2003

 

8.0

Dec 2002

 

7.8

Dec 2001

 

6.7

Dec 2000

 

7.2

Dec 1999

 

6.2

Dec 1998

 

5.9

Dec 1997

 

3.4

Dec 1996

 

2.8

Dec 1995

 

3.0

Dec 1994

 

2.6

Dec 1993

 

3.1

Dec 1992

 

2.4

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14

The bottom part of Table IIA2-3 provides 12-month percentage changes of the FHFA house price index since 1992 when data become available for 1991. Table IIA2-4 provides percentage changes and average rates of percent change per year for various periods. Between 1992 and 2012, the FHFA house price index increased 84.4 percent at the yearly average rate of 3.1 percent. In the period 1992-2000, the FHFA house price index increased 39.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 4.2 percent. The average yearly rate of price increase accelerated to 7.5 percent in the period 2000-2003 and to 8.5 percent in 2000-2005 and 7.5 percent in 2000-2006. At the margin, the average rate jumped to 10.0 percent in 2003-2005 and 7.5 percent in 2003-2006. House prices measured by the FHFA house price index declined 14.2 percent between 2006 and 2012 and 12.0 percent between 2005 and 2012.

Table IIA2-4, US, FHFA House Price Index, Percentage Change and Average Rate of Percentage Change per Year, Selected Dates 1992-2012

Dec

∆%

Average ∆% per Year

1992-2012

84.4

3.1

1992-2000

39.4

4.2

2000-2003

24.2

7.5

2000-2005

50.4

8.5

2003-2005

21.1

10.0

2005-2012

-12.0

NA

2000-2006

54.2

7.5

2003-2006

24.1

7.5

2006-2012

-14.2

NA

Source: Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency

http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14

Table I-4 shows the euphoria of prices during the housing boom and the subsequent decline. House prices rose 96.1 percent in the 10-city composite of the Case-Shiller home price index and 81.4 percent in the 20-city composite between Nov 2000 and Nov 2005. Prices rose around 100 percent from Nov 2000 to Nov 2006, increasing 98.9 percent for the 10-city composite and 84.7 percent for the 20-city composite. House prices rose 38.4 percent between Nov 2003 and Nov 2005 for the 10-city composite and 34.7 percent for the 20-city composite propelled by low fed funds rates of 1.0 percent between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004. Fed funds rates increased by 0.25 basis points at every meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from Jun 2004 until Jun 2006, reaching 5.25 percent. Simultaneously, the suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury bond caused decline of yields of mortgage-backed securities with intended decrease in mortgage rates. Similarly, between Nov 2003 and Nov 2006, the 10-city index gained 40.4 percent and the 20-city index increased 37.1 percent. House prices have fallen from Nov 2006 to Nov 2013 by 19.6 percent for the 10-city composite and 19.0 percent for the 20-city composite. Measuring house prices is quite difficult because of the lack of homogeneity that is typical of standardized commodities. In the 12 months ending in Nov 2013, house prices increased 13.8 percent in the 10-city composite and increased 13.7 percent in the 20-city composite. Table I-4 also shows that house prices increased 60.0 percent between Nov 2000 and Nov 2013 for the 10-city composite and increased 49.6 percent for the 20-city composite. House prices are close to the lowest level since peaks during the boom before the financial crisis and global recession. The 10-city composite fell 20.4 percent from the peak in Jun 2006 to Nov 2013 and the 20-city composite fell 19.7 percent from the peak in Jul 2006 to Nov 2013. The final part of Table I-4 provides average annual percentage rates of growth of the house price indexes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller. The average annual growth rate between Dec 1987 and Dec 2012 for the 10-city composite was 3.3 percent. Data for the 20-city composite are available only beginning in Jan 2000. House prices accelerated in the 1990s with the average rate of the 10-city composite of 5.0 percent between Dec 1992 and Dec 2000 while the average rate for the period Dec 1987 to Dec 2000 was 3.8 percent. Although the global recession affecting the US between IVQ2007 (Dec) and IIQ2009 (Jun) caused decline of house prices of slightly above 30 percent, the average annual growth rate of the 10-city composite between Dec 2000 and Dec 2012 was 2.8 percent while the rate of the 20-city composite was 2.3 percent.

Table I-4, US, Percentage Changes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%

 

10-City Composite

20-City Composite

∆% Nov 2000 to Nov 2003

41.7

34.7

∆% Nov 2000 to Nov 2005

96.1

81.4

∆% Nov 2003 to Nov 2005

38.4

34.7

∆% Nov 2000 to Nov 2006

98.9

84.7

∆% Nov 2003 to Nov 2006

40.4

37.1

∆% Nov 2005 to Nov 2013

-18.4

-17.5

∆% Nov 2006 to Nov 2013

-19.6

-19.0

∆% Nov 2009 to Nov 2013

13.8

13.4

∆% Nov 2010 to Nov 2013

14.4

15.3

∆% Nov 2011 to Nov 2013

19.0

20.0

∆% Nov 2012 to Nov 2013

13.8

13.7

∆% Nov 2000 to Nov 2013

60.0

49.6

∆% Peak Jun 2006 Nov 2013

-20.4

 

∆% Peak Jul 2006 Nov 2013

 

-19.7

Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2012

3.3

NA

Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2000

3.8

NA

Average ∆% Dec 1992-Dec 2000

5.0

NA

Average ∆% Dec 2000-Dec 2012

2.8

2.3

Source: http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller

Monthly house prices increased sharply from Feb to Nov 2013 for both the 10- and 20-city composites. In Nov 2013, the seasonally adjusted 10-city composite increased 1.0 percent and the 20-city 1.0 percent while the 10-city not seasonally adjusted decreased 0.1 percent and the 20-city decreased 0.1 percent. House prices increased at high monthly percentage rates from Feb to Oct 2013. With the exception of Feb through Apr 2012, house prices seasonally adjusted declined in every month for both the 10-city and 20-city Case-Shiller composites from Dec 2010 to Jan 2012, as shown in Table I-5. The most important seasonal factor in house prices is school changes for wealthier homeowners with more expensive houses. Without seasonal adjustment, house prices fell from Dec 2010 throughout Mar 2011 and then increased in every month from Apr to Aug 2011 but fell in every month from Sep 2011 to Feb 2012. The not seasonally adjusted index registers decline in Mar 2012 of 0.1 percent for the 10-city composite and is flat for the 20-city composite. Not seasonally adjusted house prices increased 1.4 percent in Apr 2012 and at high monthly percentage rates until Sep 2012. House prices not seasonally adjusted stalled from Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 and surged from Feb to Sep 2013, decelerating in Oct 2013. Declining house prices cause multiple adverse effects of which two are quite evident. (1) There is a disincentive to buy houses in continuing price declines. (2) More mortgages could be losing fair market value relative to mortgage debt. Another possibility is a wealth effect that consumers restrain purchases because of the decline of their net worth in houses.

Table I-5, US, Monthly Percentage Change of S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, Seasonally Adjusted and Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%

 

10-City Composite SA

10-City Composite NSA

20-City Composite SA

20-City Composite NSA

Nov 2013

0.9

-0.1

0.9

-0.1

Oct

1.0

0.2

1.1

0.2

Sep

0.9

0.7

1.0

0.7

Aug

0.9

1.3

1.0

1.3

Jul

0.7

1.9

0.7

1.8

Jun

1.0

2.2

0.9

2.2

May

1.0

2.5

0.9

2.5

Apr

1.8

2.6

1.7

2.6

Mar

1.8

1.3

1.8

1.3

Feb

1.3

0.3

1.2

0.2

Jan

0.8

0.0

0.9

0.0

Dec 2012

0.9

0.2

0.9

0.2

Nov

0.7

-0.3

0.8

-0.2

Oct

0.7

-0.2

0.7

-0.1

Sep

0.5

0.3

0.6

0.3

Aug

0.4

0.8

0.5

0.9

Jul

0.3

1.5

0.4

1.6

Jun

1.0

2.1

1.0

2.3

May

0.8

2.2

0.8

2.4

Apr

0.5

1.4

0.6

1.4

Mar

0.5

-0.1

0.5

0.0

Feb

0.0

-0.9

0.1

-0.8

Jan

-0.3

-1.1

-0.2

-1.0

Dec 2011

-0.5

-1.2

-0.4

-1.1

Nov

-0.5

-1.4

-0.5

-1.3

Oct

-0.6

-1.3

-0.5

-1.4

Sep

-0.4

-0.6

-0.5

-0.7

Aug

-0.3

0.1

-0.3

0.1

Jul

-0.2

0.9

-0.2

1.0

Jun

-0.1

1.0

-0.1

1.2

May

-0.3

1.0

-0.4

1.0

Apr

-0.2

0.6

-0.2

0.6

Mar

-0.4

-1.0

-0.5

-1.0

Feb

-0.4

-1.3

-0.3

-1.2

Jan

-0.3

-1.1

-0.3

-1.1

Dec 2010

-0.2

-0.9

-0.2

-1.0

Source: http://us.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller

III World Financial Turbulence. Financial markets are being shocked by multiple factors including:

(1) World economic slowdown

(2) Slowing growth in China with political development and slowing growth in Japan and world trade

(3) Slow growth propelled by savings/investment reduction in the US with high unemployment/underemployment, falling wages, hiring collapse, contraction of real private fixed investment, decline of wealth of households over the business cycle by 1.9 percent adjusted for inflation while growing 635.2 percent adjusted for inflation from IVQ1945 to IVQ2012 and unsustainable fiscal deficit/debt threatening prosperity that can cause risk premium on Treasury debt with Himalayan interest rate hikes

(4) Outcome of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

This section provides current data and analysis. Subsection IIIA Financial Risks provides analysis of the evolution of valuations of risk financial assets during the week. There are various appendixes for convenience of reference of material related to the debt crisis of the euro area. Some of this material is updated in Subsection IIIA when new data are available and then maintained in the appendixes for future reference until updated again in Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies discusses arguments and measures of currency intervention and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact provides analysis of the restructuring of the fiscal affairs of the European Union in the agreement of European leaders reached on Dec 9, 2011 and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort considers the policies of the European Central Bank and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Appendix IIIE Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the threats to survival of the European Monetary Union and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation provides more technical analysis and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis provides analysis of proposals to finance growth with budget deficits together with experience of the economic history of Brazil and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment.

IIIA Financial Risks. Financial turbulence, attaining unusual magnitude in recent months, characterized the expansion from the global recession since IIIQ2009. Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Fri Jan 24 and daily values throughout the week ending on Jan 31, 2014 of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at 5 PM. The first column provides the value on Fri Jan 24 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Jan 24, 2014”, first row “USD/EUR 1.3677 -1.0% 0.1 %,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) depreciated 1.0 percent to USD 1.3677/EUR in the week ending on Fri Jan 24 relative to the exchange rate on Fri Jan 17 and appreciated 0.1 percent relative to Thu Jan 23. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. An important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf). The most important source of financial turbulence is shifting toward increasing interest rates. The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per one euro EUR, USD 1.3677/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Fri Jan 24, appreciating to USD 1.3670/EUR on Tue Jan 28, 2014, or by 0.1 percent. The dollar appreciated because fewer dollars, $1.3670, were required on Tue Jan 28 to buy one euro than $1.3677 on Fri Jan 24. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the exchange rate at 5 PM New York time, such as USD 1.3677/EUR on Jan 24. The second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Fri Jan 24, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Fri Jan 31, such as appreciation of 1.4 percent to USD 1.3488/EUR by Jan 31. The third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 1.4 percent from the rate of USD 1.3677/EUR on Fri Jan 24 to the rate of USD 1.3488/EUR on Fri Jan 31 {[(1.3488/1.3677) – 1]100 = -1.4%}. The dollar appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 0.5 percent from the rate of USD 1.3555 on Thu Jan 30 to USD 1.3488/EUR on Fri Jan 31 {[(1.3488/1.3555) -1]100 = -0.5%}. Other factors constant, appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro is caused by increasing risk aversion, with rising uncertainty on European sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. Funds move away from higher yielding risk assets to the safety of dollar-denominated assets during risk aversion and return to higher yielding risk assets during risk appetite.

Table III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Assets to Jan 27 to Jan 31, 2014

Fri Jan 24 2014

Mon 27

Tue 28

Wed 29

Thu 30

Fri 31

USD/ EUR

1.3677

-1.0%

0.1%

1.3673

0.0%

0.0%

1.3670

0.1%

0.0%

1.3664

0.1%

0.0%

1.3555

0.9%

0.8%

1.3488

1.4%

0.5%

JPY/ USD

102.30

1.9%

0.9%

102.55

-0.2%

-0.2%

102.94

-0.6%

-0.4%

102.27

0.0%

0.7%

102.72

-0.4%

-0.4%

102.04

0.3%

0.7%

CHF/ USD

0.8943

1.7%

0.3%

0.8963

-0.2%

-0.2%

0.8973

-0.3%

-0.1%

0.8945

0.0%

0.3%

0.9027

-0.9%

-0.9%

0.9062

-1.3%

-0.4%

CHF/ EUR

1.2235

0.7%

0.4%

1.2255

-0.2%

-0.2%

1.2268

-0.3%

-0.1%

1.2222

0.1%

0.4%

1.2236

0.0%

-0.1%

1.2224

0.1%

0.1%

USD/ AUD

0.8684

1.1515

-1.1%

-1.0%

0.8739

1.1443

0.6%

0.6%

0.8779

1.1391

1.1%

0.5%

0.8739

1.1443

0.6%

-0.5%

0.8794

1.1371

1.3%

0.6%

0.8756

1.1421

0.8%

-0.4%

10Y Note

2.720

2.760

2.750

2.68

2.695

2.645

2Y Note

0.342

0.346

0.342

0.350

0.345

0.330

German Bond

2Y 0.12 10Y 1.66

2Y 0.13 10Y 1.66

2Y 0.12 10Y 1.68

2Y 0.11 10Y 1.74

2Y 0.09 10Y 1.72

2Y 0.07 10Y 1.66

DJIA

15879.11

-3.5%

-2.0%

15837.88

-0.3%

-0.3%

15928.56

0.3%

0.6%

15738.79

-0.9%

-1.2%

15848.61

-0.2%

0.7%

15698.85

-1.1%

-0.9%

Dow Global

2422.47

-2.6%

-1.9%

2399.73

-0.9%

-0.9%

2411.03

-0.5%

0.5%

2400.48

-0.9%

-0.4%

2406.42

-0.7%

0.2%

2389.92

-1.3%

-0.7%

DJ Asia Pacific

1417.94

-1.4%

-0.8%

1388.24

-2.1%

-2.1%

1384.96

-2.3%

-0.2%

1409.70

-0.6%

1.8%

1388.99

-2.0%

-1.5%

1390.91

-1.9%

0.1%

Nikkei

15391.56

-2.2%

-1.9%

15005.73

-2.5%

-2.5%

14980.16

-2.7%

-0.2%

15383.91

0.0%

2.7%

15007.06

-2.5%

-2.4%

14914.53

-3.1%

-0.6%

Shanghai

2054.39

2.5%

0.6%

2033.30

-1.0%

-1.0%

2038.51

-0.8%

0.3%

2049.91

-0.2%

0.6%

2049.91

-0.2%

0.0%

2049.91

-0.2%

0.0%

DAX

9392.02

-3.6%

-2.5%

9349.22

-0.5%

-0.5%

9406.91

0.2%

0.6%

9336.73

-0.6%

-0.7%

9373.48

-0.2%

0.4%

9306.48

-0.9%

-0.7%

DJ UBS Comm.

127.00

1.5%

0.8%

125.51

-1.2%

-1.2%

126.38

-0.5%

0.7%

127.59

0.5%

1.0%

126.33

-0.5%

-1.0%

126.12

-0.7%

-0.2%

WTI $/B

96.64

2.7%

0.3%

95.72

-1.0%

-1.0%

97.41

0.8%

1.8%

97.36

0.7%

-0.1%

98.23

1.6%

0.9%

97.49

0.9%

-0.8%

Brent $/B

107.88

1.3%

0.3%

106.69

-1.1%

-1.1%

107.41

-0.4%

0.7%

107.85

0.0%

0.4%

107.95

0.1%

0.1%

106.40

-1.4%

-1.4%

Gold $/OZ

1264.5

1.0%

0.2%

1263.6

0.0%

0.0%

1251.0

-1.1%

-1.0%

1262.2

-0.2%

0.9%

1242.2

-1.8%

-1.6%

1240.1

-1.9%

-0.2%

Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss

Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce

Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

There is initial discussion of current and recent risk-determining events followed below by analysis of risk-measuring yields of the US and Germany and the USD/EUR rate.

1 First, risk determining events. Prior risk determining events are in an appendix below following Table III-1A. Current focus is on “tapering” quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). At the meeting on Dec 29, 2013, the FOMC decided additional tapering monthly bond purchases. Earlier programs are continued with an additional lower open-ended $65 billion of bond purchases per month, increasing the stock of $3,830,311 million securities held outright and bank reserves deposited at the Fed of $2,525,773 million (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140129a.htm):

“Taking into account the extent of federal fiscal retrenchment since the inception of its current asset purchase program, the Committee continues to see the improvement in economic activity and labor market conditions over that period as consistent with growing underlying strength in the broader economy. In light of the cumulative progress toward maximum employment and the improvement in the outlook for labor market conditions, the Committee decided to make a further measured reduction in the pace of its asset purchases. Beginning in February, the Committee will add to its holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $30 billion per month rather than $35 billion per month, and will add to its holdings of longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $35 billion per month rather than $40 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee's sizable and still-increasing holdings of longer-term securities should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative, which in turn should promote a stronger economic recovery and help to ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with the Committee's dual mandate.”

At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:

“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.

For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”

There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “tapering” of outright purchases of $85 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight. What really matters in the statement of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Jan 29, 2014, is interest rates of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for the foreseeable future, even with paring of purchases of longer term bonds for the portfolio of the Fed (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140129a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. The Committee also reaffirmed its expectation that the current exceptionally low target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. The Committee continues to anticipate, based on its assessment of these factors, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent” (emphasis added).

Another critical concern in the statement of the FOMC on Sep 18, 2013, is on the effects of tapering expectations on interest rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm):

“Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has been strengthening, but mortgage rates have risen further and fiscal policy is restraining economic growth” (emphasis added).

Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differfrom each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (10

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:

“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.

The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”

Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities).

The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi explained the indefinite period of low policy rates during the press conference following the meeting on Jul 4, 2013 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130704.en.html):

“Yes, that is why I said you haven’t listened carefully. The Governing Council has taken the unprecedented step of giving forward guidance in a rather more specific way than it ever has done in the past. In my statement, I said “The Governing Council expects the key…” – i.e. all interest rates – “…ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.” It is the first time that the Governing Council has said something like this. And, by the way, what Mark Carney [Governor of the Bank of England] said in London is just a coincidence.”

The European Central Bank (ECB) lowered the policy rates on Nov 7, 2013 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr131107.en.html):

PRESS RELEASE

7 November 2013 - Monetary policy decisions

At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:

  1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.25%, starting from the operation to be settled on 13 November 2013.
  2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.75%, with effect from 13 November 2013.
  3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%.

The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 2.30 p.m. CET today.”

Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, explained as follows (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2013/html/is131107.en.html):

“Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to lower the interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem by 25 basis points to 0.25% and the rate on the marginal lending facility by 25 basis points to 0.75%. The rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%. These decisions are in line with our forward guidance of July 2013, given the latest indications of further diminishing underlying price pressures in the euro area over the medium term, starting from currently low annual inflation rates of below 1%. In keeping with this picture, monetary and, in particular, credit dynamics remain subdued. At the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. Such a constellation suggests that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2% later on. Accordingly, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. It will thereby also continue to assist the gradual economic recovery as reflected in confidence indicators up to October.”

The ECB decision together with the employment situation report on Fri Nov 8, 2013, influenced revaluation of the dollar. Market expectations were of relatively easier monetary policy in the euro area.

The statement of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England on Jul 4, 2013, may be leading toward the same forward guidance (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/007.aspx):

“At its meeting today, the Committee noted that the incoming data over the past couple of months had been broadly consistent with the central outlook for output growth and inflation contained in the May Report.  The significant upward movement in market interest rates would, however, weigh on that outlook; in the Committee’s view, the implied rise in the expected future path of Bank Rate was not warranted by the recent developments in the domestic economy.”

A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 15,698.85 on Fri Jan 31, 2014, which is higher by 10.8 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 10.6 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs.

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows.

Professor Ronald I. McKinnon (2013Oct27), writing on “Tapering without tears—how to end QE3,” on Oct 27, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579153693500945608?KEYWORDS=Ronald+I+McKinnon), finds that the major central banks of the world have fallen into a “near-zero-interest-rate trap.” World economic conditions are weak such that exit from the zero interest rate trap could have adverse effects on production, investment and employment. The maintenance of interest rates near zero creates long-term near stagnation. The proposal of Professor McKinnon is credible, coordinated increase of policy interest rates toward 2 percent. Professor John B. Taylor at Stanford University, writing on “Economic failures cause political polarization,” on Oct 28, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303442004579121010753999086?KEYWORDS=John+B+Taylor), analyzes that excessive risks induced by near zero interest rates in 2003-2004 caused the financial crash. Monetary policy continued in similar paths during and after the global recession with resulting political polarization worldwide.

Second, Risk-Measuring Yields and Exchange Rate. The ten-year government bond of Spain was quoted at 6.868 percent on Aug 10, 2012, declining to 6.447 percent on Aug 17 and 6.403 percent on Aug 24, 2012, and the ten-year government bond of Italy fell from 5.894 percent on Aug 10, 2012 to 5.709 percent on Aug 17 and 5.618 percent on Aug 24, 2012. The yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain traded at 3.676 percent on Jan 31, 2014, and that of the ten-year sovereign bond of Italy at 3.774 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Diminishing aversion is captured by increase of the yield of the two- and ten-year Treasury notes and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table III-1A provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.459 percent on Jul 20, 2012, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.17 percent. In the week of Jan 31, 2014, the yield of the two-year Treasury decreased to 0.330 percent and that of the ten-year Treasury decreased to 2.645 percent while the two-year bond of Germany decreased to 0.07 percent and the ten-year to 1.66 percent; and the dollar appreciated to USD 1.3488/EUR. The zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, induce carry trades that ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield of 2.645 percent is higher than consumer price inflation of 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/world-inflation-waves-interest-rate.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. The one-year Treasury yield of 0.091 percent (http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_bonds.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3002) is well below the 12-month consumer price inflation of 1.5 percent. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury. The lower part of Table III-1A provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.

Table III-1A, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate

 

US 2Y

US 10Y

DE 2Y

DE 10Y

USD/ EUR

1/31/14

0.330

2.645

0.07

1.66

1.3488

1/24/14

0.342

2.720

0.12

1.66

1.3677

1/17/14

0.373

2.818

0.17

1.75

1.3541

1/10/14

0.372

2.858

0.18

1.84

1.3670

1/3/14

0.398

2.999

0.20

1.94

1.3588

12/27/13

0.393

3.004

0.24

1.95

1.3746

12/20/13

0.377

2.891

0.22

1.87

1.3673

12/13/13

0.328

2.865

0.24

1.83

1.3742

12/6/13

0.304

2.858

0.21

1.84

1.3705

11/29/13

0.283

2.743

0.11

1.69

1.3592

11/22/13

0.280

2.746

0.13

1.74

1.3557

11/15/13

0.292

2.704

0.10

1.70

1.3497

11/8/13

0.316

2.750

0.10

1.76

1.3369

11/1/13

0.311

2.622

0.11

1.69

1.3488

10/25/13

0.305

2.507

0.18

1.75

1.3804

10/18/13

0.321

2.588

0.17

1.83

1.3686

10/11/13

0.344

2.688

0.18

1.86

1.3543

10/4/13

0.335

2.645

0.17

1.84

1.3557

9/27/13

0.335

2.626

0.16

1.78

1.3523

9/20/13

0.333

2.734

0.21

1.94

1.3526

9/13/13

0.433

2.890

0.22

1.97

1.3297

9/6/13

0.461

2.941

0.26

1.95

1.3179

8/23/13

0.401

2.784

0.23

1.85

1.3221

8/23/13

0.374

2.818

0.28

1.93

1.3380

8/16/13

0.341

2.829

0.22

1.88

1.3328

8/9/13

0.30

2.579

0.16

1.68

1.3342

8/2/13

0.299

2.597

0.15

1.65

1.3281

7/26/13

0.315

2.565

0.15

1.66

1.3279

7/19/13

0.300

2.480

0.08

1.52

1.3141

7/12/13

0.345

2.585

0.10

1.56

1.3068

7/5/13

0.397

2.734

0.11

1.72

1.2832

6/28/13

0.357

2.486

0.19

1.73

1.3010

6/21/13

0.366

2.542

0.26

1.72

1.3122

6/14/13

0.276

2.125

0.12

1.51

1.3345

6/7/13

0.304

2.174

0.18

1.54

1.3219

5/31/13

0.299

2.132

0.06

1.50

1.2996

5/24/13

0.249

2.009

0.00

1.43

1.2932

5/17/13

0.248

1.952

-0.03

1.32

1.2837

5/10/13

0.239

1.896

0.05

1.38

1.2992

5/3/13

0.22

1.742

0.00

1.24

1.3115

4/26/13

0.209

1.663

0.00

1.21

1.3028

4/19/13

0.232

1.702

0.02

1.25

1.3052

4/12/13

0.228

1.719

0.02

1.26

1.3111

4/5/13

0.228

1.706

0.01

1.21

1.2995

3/29/13

0.244

1.847

-0.02

1.29

1.2818

3/22/13

0.242

1.931

0.03

1.38

1.2988

3/15/13

0.246

1.992

0.05

1.46

1.3076

3/8/13

0.256

2.056

0.09

1.53

1.3003

3/1/13

0.236

1.842

0.03

1.41

1.3020

2/22/13

0.252

1.967

0.13

1.57

1.3190

2/15/13

0.268

2.007

0.19

1.65

1.3362

2/8/13

0.252

1.949

0.18

1.61

1.3365

2/1/13

0.26

2.024

0.25

1.67

1.3642

1/25/13

0.278

1.947

0.26

1.64

1.3459

1/18/13

0.252

1.84

0.18

1.56

1.3321

1/11/13

0.247

1.862

0.13

1.58

1.3343

1/4/13

0.262

1.898

0.08

1.54

1.3069

12/28/12

0.252

1.699

-0.01

1.31

1.3218

12/21/12

0.272

1.77

-0.01

1.38

1.3189

12/14/12

0.232

1.704

-0.04

1.35

1.3162

12/7/12

0.256

1.625

-0.08

1.30

1.2926

11/30/12

0.248

1.612

0.01

1.39

1.2987

11/23/12

0.273

1.691

0.00

1.44

1.2975

11/16/12

0.24

1.584

-0.03

1.33

1.2743

11/9/12

0.256

1.614

-0.03

1.35

1.2711

11/2/12

0.274

1.715

0.01

1.45

1.2838

10/26/12

0.299

1.748

0.05

1.54

1.2942

10/19/12

0.296

1.766

0.11

1.59

1.3023

10/12/12

0.264

1.663

0.04

1.45

1.2953

10/5/12

0.26

1.737

0.06

1.52

1.3036

9/28/12

0.236

1.631

0.02

1.44

1.2859

9/21/12

0.26

1.753

0.04

1.60

1.2981

9/14/12

0.252

1.863

0.10

1.71

1.3130

9/7/12

0.252

1.668

0.03

1.52

1.2816

8/31/12

0.225

1.543

-0.03

1.33

1.2575

8/24/12

0.266

1.684

-0.01

1.35

1.2512

8/17/12

0.288

1.814

-0.04

1.50

1.2335

8/10/12

0.267

1.658

-0.07

1.38

1.2290

8/3/12

0.242

1.569

-0.02

1.42

1.2387

7/27/12

0.244

1.544

-0.03

1.40

1.2320

7/20/12

0.207

1.459

-0.07

1.17

1.2158

7/13/12

0.24

1.49

-0.04

1.26

1.2248

7/6/12

0.272

1.548

-0.01

1.33

1.2288

6/29/12

0.305

1.648

0.12

1.58

1.2661

6/22/12

0.309

1.676

0.14

1.58

1.2570

6/15/12

0.272

1.584

0.07

1.44

1.2640

6/8/12

0.268

1.635

0.04

1.33

1.2517

6/1/12

0.248

1.454

0.01

1.17

1.2435

5/25/12

0.291

1.738

0.05

1.37

1.2518

5/18/12

0.292

1.714

0.05

1.43

1.2780

5/11/12

0.248

1.845

0.09

1.52

1.2917

5/4/12

0.256

1.876

0.08

1.58

1.3084

4/6/12

0.31

2.058

0.14

1.74

1.3096

3/30/12

0.335

2.214

0.21

1.79

1.3340

3/2/12

0.29

1.977

0.16

1.80

1.3190

2/24/12

0.307

1.977

0.24

1.88

1.3449

1/6/12

0.256

1.957

0.17

1.85

1.2720

12/30/11

0.239

1.871

0.14

1.83

1.2944

8/26/11

0.20

2.202

0.65

2.16

1.450

8/19/11

0.192

2.066

0.65

2.11

1.4390

6/7/10

0.74

3.17

0.49

2.56

1.192

3/5/09

0.89

2.83

1.19

3.01

1.254

12/17/08

0.73

2.20

1.94

3.00

1.442

10/27/08

1.57

3.79

2.61

3.76

1.246

7/14/08

2.47

3.88

4.38

4.40

1.5914

6/26/03

1.41

3.55

NA

3.62

1.1423

Note: DE: Germany

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/

Appendix: Prior Risk Determining Events. Current risk analysis concentrates on deciphering what the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may decide on quantitative easing. The week of May 24 was dominated by the testimony of Chairman Bernanke to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress on May 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm), followed by questions and answers and the release on May 22, 2013 of the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from Apr 30 to May 1, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm). Monetary policy emphasizes communication of policy intentions to avoid that expectations reverse outcomes in reality (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “In bid for clarity, Fed delivers opacity,” on May 23, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath), analyzes discrepancies in communication by the Fed. The annotated chart of values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) during trading on May 23, 2013 provided by Hinselrath, links the prepared testimony of Chairman Bernanke at 10:AM, following questions and answers and the release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM. Financial markets strengthened between 10 and 10:30AM on May 23, 2013, perhaps because of the statement by Chairman Bernanke in prepared testimony (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm):

“A premature tightening of monetary policy could lead interest rates to rise temporarily but would also carry a substantial risk of slowing or ending the economic recovery and causing inflation to fall further. Such outcomes tend to be associated with extended periods of lower, not higher, interest rates, as well as poor returns on other assets. Moreover, renewed economic weakness would pose its own risks to financial stability.”

In that testimony, Chairman Bernanke (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm) also analyzes current weakness of labor markets:

“Despite this improvement, the job market remains weak overall: The unemployment rate is still well above its longer-run normal level, rates of long-term unemployment are historically high, and the labor force participation rate has continued to move down. Moreover, nearly 8 million people are working part time even though they would prefer full-time work. High rates of unemployment and underemployment are extraordinarily costly: Not only do they impose hardships on the affected individuals and their families, they also damage the productive potential of the economy as a whole by eroding workers' skills and--particularly relevant during this commencement season--by preventing many young people from gaining workplace skills and experience in the first place. The loss of output and earnings associated with high unemployment also reduces government revenues and increases spending on income-support programs, thereby leading to larger budget deficits and higher levels of public debt than would otherwise occur.”

Hilsenrath (op. cit. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath) analyzes the subsequent decline of the market from 10:30AM to 10:40AM as Chairman Bernanke responded questions with the statement that withdrawal of stimulus would be determined by data but that it could begin in one of the “next few meetings.” The DJIA recovered part of the losses between 10:40AM and 2PM. The minutes of the FOMC released at 2PM on May 23, 2013, contained a phrase that troubled market participants (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm): “A number of participants expressed willingness to adjust the flow of purchases downward as early as the June meeting if the economic information received by that time showed evidence of sufficiently strong and sustained growth; however, views differed about what evidence would be necessary and the likelihood of that outcome.” The DJIA closed at 15,387.58 on May 21, 2013 and fell to 15,307.17 at the close on May 22, 2013, with the loss of 0.5 percent occurring after release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM when the DJIA stood at around 15,400. The concern about exist of the Fed from stimulus affected markets worldwide as shown in declines of equity indexes in Table III-1 with delays because of differences in trading hours. This behavior shows the trap of unconventional monetary policy with no exit from zero interest rates without risking financial crash and likely adverse repercussions on economic activity.

Financial markets worldwide were affected by the reduction of policy rates of the European Central Bank (ECB) on May 2, 2013. (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130502.en.html):

“2 May 2013 - Monetary policy decisions

At today’s meeting, which was held in Bratislava, the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:

  1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.50%, starting from the operation to be settled on 8 May 2013.
  2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 50 basis points to 1.00%, with effect from 8 May 2013.
  3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

  1. Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  2. Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html ), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
  3. Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  4. Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.

The European sovereign debt crisis continues to shake financial markets and the world economy. Debt resolution within the international financial architecture requires that a country be capable of borrowing on its own from the private sector. Mechanisms of debt resolution have included participation of the private sector (PSI), or “bail in,” that has been voluntary, almost coercive, agreed and outright coercive (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture: G7, IMF, BIS, Creditors and Debtors (2005), Chapter 4, 187-202). Private sector involvement requires losses by the private sector in bailouts of highly indebted countries. The essence of successful private sector involvement is to recover private-sector credit of the highly indebted country. Mary Watkins, writing on “Bank bailouts reshuffle risk hierarchy,” published on Mar 19, 2013, in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7666546a-9095-11e2-a456-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OSpbvCn8) analyzes the impact of the bailout or resolution of Cyprus banks on the hierarchy of risks of bank liabilities. Cyprus banks depend mostly on deposits with less reliance on debt, raising concerns in creditors of fixed-income debt and equity holders in banks in the euro area. Uncertainty remains as to the dimensions and structure of losses in private sector involvement or “bail in” in other rescue programs in the euro area. Alkman Granitsas, writing on “Central bank details losses at Bank of Cyprus,” on Mar 30, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324000704578392502889560768.html), analyzes the impact of the agreement with the €10 billion agreement with IMF and the European Union on the banks of Cyprus. The recapitalization plan provides for immediate conversion of 37.5 percent of all deposits in excess of €100,000 to shares of special class of the bank. An additional 22.5 percent will be frozen without interest until the plan is completed. The overwhelming risk factor is the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans.

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

An important risk event is the reduction of growth prospects in the euro zone discussed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in “Introductory statement to the press conference,” on Dec 6, 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is121206.en.html):

“This assessment is reflected in the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP growth in a range between -0.6% and -0.4% for 2012, between -0.9% and 0.3% for 2013 and between 0.2% and 2.2% for 2014. Compared with the September 2012 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges for 2012 and 2013 have been revised downwards.

The Governing Council continues to see downside risks to the economic outlook for the euro area. These are mainly related to uncertainties about the resolution of sovereign debt and governance issues in the euro area, geopolitical issues and fiscal policy decisions in the United States possibly dampening sentiment for longer than currently assumed and delaying further the recovery of private investment, employment and consumption.”

Reuters, writing on “Bundesbank cuts German growth forecast,” on Dec 7, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e845114-4045-11e2-8f90-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EMQxzs3u), informs that the central bank of Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank reduced its forecast of growth for the economy of Germany to 0.7 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.0 percent in Jun and to 0.4 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.6 percent while the forecast for 2014 is at 1.9 percent.

The major risk event during earlier weeks was sharp decline of sovereign yields with the yield on the ten-year bond of Spain falling to 5.309 percent and that of the ten-year bond of Italy falling to 4.473 percent on Fri Nov 30, 2012 and 5.366 percent for the ten-year of Spain and 4.527 percent for the ten-year of Italy on Fri Nov 14, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Vanessa Mock and Frances Robinson, writing on “EU approves Spanish bank’s restructuring plans,” on Nov 28, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146520774638316.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the European Union regulators approved restructuring of four Spanish banks (Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia), which helped to calm sovereign debt markets. Harriet Torry and James Angelo, writing on “Germany approves Greek aid,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578150532603095790.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the German parliament approved the plan to provide Greece a tranche of €44 billion in promised financial support, which is subject to sustainability analysis of the bond repurchase program later in Dec 2012. A hurdle for sustainability of repurchasing debt is that Greece’s sovereign bonds have appreciated significantly from around 24 percent for the bond maturing in 21 years and 20 percent for the bond maturing in 31 years in Aug 2012 to around 17 percent for the 21-year maturity and 15 percent for the 31-year maturing in Nov 2012. Declining years are equivalent to increasing prices, making the repurchase more expensive. Debt repurchase is intended to reduce bonds in circulation, turning Greek debt more manageable. Ben McLannahan, writing on “Japan unveils $11bn stimulus package,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/adc0569a-3aa5-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), informs that the cabinet in Japan approved another stimulus program of $11 billion, which is twice larger than another stimulus plan in late Oct and close to elections in Dec. Henry Sender, writing on “Tokyo faces weak yen and high bond yields,” published on Nov 29, 2012 in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a7178d0-393d-11e2-afa8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), analyzes concerns of regulators on duration of bond holdings in an environment of likelihood of increasing yields and yen depreciation.

First, Risk-Determining Events. The European Council statement on Nov 23, 2012 asked the President of the European Commission “to continue the work and pursue consultations in the coming weeks to find a consensus among the 27 over the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf) Discussions will continue in the effort to reach agreement on a budget: “A European budget is important for the cohesion of the Union and for jobs and growth in all our countries” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf). There is disagreement between the group of countries requiring financial assistance and those providing bailout funds. Gabrielle Steinhauser and Costas Paris, writing on “Greek bond rally puts buyback in doubt,” on Nov 23, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578136362599130992.html?mg=reno64-wsj) find a new hurdle in rising prices of Greek sovereign debt that may make more difficult buybacks of debt held by investors. European finance ministers continue their efforts to reach an agreement for Greece that meets with approval of the European Central Bank and the IMF. The European Council (2012Oct19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf ) reached conclusions on strengthening the euro area and providing unified financial supervision:

“The European Council called for work to proceed on the proposals on the Single Supervisory Mechanism as a matter of priority with the objective of agreeing on the legislative framework by 1st January 2013 and agreed on a number of orientations to that end. It also took note of issues relating to the integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks and democratic legitimacy and accountability which should be further explored. It agreed that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the EU's institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards non-euro area Member States and respect for the integrity of the Single Market. It looked forward to a specific and time-bound roadmap to be presented at its December 2012 meeting, so that it can move ahead on all essential building blocks on which a genuine EMU should be based.”

Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. The Bank of Spain released new data on doubtful debtors in Spain’s credit institutions (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/Agenda/Datos_de_credit_a6cd708c59cf931.html). In 2006, the value of doubtful credits reached €10,859 million or 0.7 percent of total credit of €1,508,626 million. In Aug 2012, doubtful credit reached €178,579 million or 10.5 percent of total credit of €1,698,714 million.

There are three critical factors influencing world financial markets. (1) Spain could request formal bailout from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that may also affect Italy’s international borrowing. David Roman and Jonathan House, writing on “Spain risks backlash with budget plan,” on Sep 27, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578021692765950384.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) analyze Spain’s proposal of reducing government expenditures by €13 billion, or around $16.7 billion, increasing taxes in 2013, establishing limits on early retirement and cutting the deficit by €65 billion through 2014. Banco de España, Bank of Spain, contracted consulting company Oliver Wyman to conduct rigorous stress tests of the resilience of its banking system. (Stress tests and their use are analyzed by Pelaez and Pelaez Globalization and the State Vol. I (2008b), 95-100, International Financial Architecture (2005) 112-6, 123-4, 130-3).) The results are available from Banco de España (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/infointeres/reestructuracion/ http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). The assumptions of the adverse scenario used by Oliver Wyman are quite tough for the three-year period from 2012 to 2014: “6.5 percent cumulative decline of GDP, unemployment rising to 27.2 percent and further declines of 25 percent of house prices and 60 percent of land prices (http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). Fourteen banks were stress tested with capital needs estimates of seven banks totaling €59.3 billion. The three largest banks of Spain, Banco Santander (http://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite/CFWCSancomQP01/es_ES/Corporativo.html), BBVA (http://www.bbva.com/TLBB/tlbb/jsp/ing/home/index.jsp) and Caixabank (http://www.caixabank.com/index_en.html), with 43 percent of exposure under analysis, have excess capital of €37 billion in the adverse scenario in contradiction with theories that large, international banks are necessarily riskier. Jonathan House, writing on “Spain expects wider deficit on bank aid,” on Sep 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444138104578028484168511130.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyzes the 2013 budget plan of Spain that will increase the deficit of 7.4 percent of GDP in 2012, which is above the target of 6.3 percent under commitment with the European Union. The ratio of debt to GDP will increase to 85.3 percent in 2012 and 90.5 percent in 2013 while the 27 members of the European Union have an average debt/GDP ratio of 83 percent at the end of IIQ2012. (2) Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even after the economy grows again at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now apparently open ended in perpetuity as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):

“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is the concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation.

(2) The European Central Bank (ECB) approved a new program of bond purchases under the name “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT). The ECB will purchase sovereign bonds of euro zone member countries that have a program of conditionality under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that is converting into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These programs provide enhancing the solvency of member countries in a transition period of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment. The purchase of bonds by the ECB would maintain debt costs of sovereigns at sufficiently low levels to permit adjustment under the EFSF/ESM programs. Purchases of bonds are not limited quantitatively with discretion by the ECB as to how much is necessary to support countries with adjustment programs. Another feature of the OMT of the ECB is sterilization of bond purchases: funds injected to pay for the bonds would be withdrawn or sterilized by ECB transactions. The statement by the European Central Bank on the program of OTM is as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html):

“6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions

As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework:

Conditionality

A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme.

The Governing Council will consider Outright Monetary Transactions to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme.

Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate.

Coverage

Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access.

Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.

No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.

Creditor treatment

The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.

Sterilisation

The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.

Transparency

Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis.

Securities Markets Programme

Following today’s decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be held to maturity.”

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed sets stage for stimulus,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577623220212805132.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the essay presented by Chairman Bernanke at the Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers, as defending past stimulus with unconventional measures of monetary policy that could be used to reduce extremely high unemployment. Chairman Bernanke (2012JHAug31, 18-9) does support further unconventional monetary policy impulses if required by economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm):

“Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”

Professor John H Cochrane (2012Aug31), at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, writing on “The Federal Reserve: from central bank to central planner,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577609384030304936.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_opinion), analyzes that the departure of central banks from open market operations into purchase of assets with risks to taxpayers and direct allocation of credit subject to political influence has caused them to abandon their political independence and accountability. Cochrane (2012Aug31) finds a return to the proposition of Milton Friedman in the 1960s that central banks can cause inflation and macroeconomic instability.

Mario Draghi (2012Aug29), President of the European Central Bank, also reiterated the need of exceptional and unconventional central bank policies (http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html):

“Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.

The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.”

Buiter (2011Oct31) analyzes that the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would need a “bigger bazooka” to bail out euro members in difficulties that could possibly be provided by the ECB. Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. Table III-7 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides the combined GDP in 2012 of the highly indebted euro zone members estimated in the latest World Economic Outlook of the IMF at $4167 billion or 33.1 percent of total euro zone GDP of $12,586 billion. Using the WEO of the IMF, Table III-8 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides debt of the highly indebted euro zone members at $3927.8 billion in 2012 that increases to $5809.9 billion when adding Germany’s debt, corresponding to 167.0 percent of Germany’s GDP. There are additional sources of debt in bailing out banks. The dimensions of the problem may require more firepower than a bazooka perhaps that of the largest conventional bomb of all times of 44,000 pounds experimentally detonated only once by the US in 1948 (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar-apr/coker.html).

Chart III-1A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the ten-year, two-year and one-month Treasury constant maturity yields together with the overnight fed funds rate, and the yield of the corporate bond with Moody’s rating of Baa. The riskier yield of the Baa corporate bond exceeds the relatively riskless yields of the Treasury securities. The beginning yields in Chart III-1A for Jan 2, 1962, are 2.75 percent for the fed fund rates and 4.06 percent for the ten-year Treasury constant maturity. On July 31, 2001, the yields in Chart III-1A are 3.67 percent for one month, 3.79 percent for two years, 5.07 percent for ten years, 3.82 percent for the fed funds rate and 7.85 percent for the Baa corporate bond. On July 30, 2007, yields inverted with the one-month at 4.95 percent, the two-year at 4.59 percent and the ten-year at 5.82 percent with the yield of the Baa corporate bond at 6.70 percent. Another interesting point is for Oct 31, 2008, with the yield of the Baa jumping to 9.54 percent and the Treasury yields declining: one month 0.12 percent, two years 1.56 percent and ten years 4.01 percent during a flight to the dollar and government securities analyzed by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). Another spike in the series is for Apr 4, 2006 with the yield of the corporate Baa bond at 8.63 and the Treasury yields of 0.12 percent for one month, 0.94 for two years and 2.95 percent for ten years. During the beginning of the flight from risk financial assets to US government securities (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009), the one-month yield was 0.07 percent, the two-year yield 1.64 percent and the ten-year yield 3.41. The combination of zero fed funds rate and quantitative easing caused sharp decline of the yields from 2008 and 2009. Yield declines have also occurred during periods of financial risk aversion, including the current one of stress of financial markets in Europe. The final point of Chart III1-A is for Jan 30, 2014, with the one-month yield at 0.04 percent, the two-year at 0.36 percent, the ten-year at 2.72 percent, the fed funds rate at 0.07 percent and the corporate Baa bond at 5.08 percent. There is an evident increase in the yields of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity and the Moody’s Baa corporate bond with reduction in wide swings of portfolio reallocations.

clip_image036

Chart III-1A, US, Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Overnight Fed Funds Rate and Yield of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond, Jan 2, 1962-Jan 30, 2014

Note: US Recessions in shaded areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15

Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. Future company cash flows derive from investment projects. In IQ1980, gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of 2009 dollars, growing to $1,143.0 billion in IVQ1986 or 20.1 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US increased 0.8 percent from $2,605.2 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,627.2 billion in IIIQ2013. As shown in Table IAI-2, real private fixed investment fell 3.6 percent from $2,586.3 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,494.0 billion in IIIQ2013. Growth of real private investment is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html). The investment decision of United States corporations has been fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell $26.6 billion in IQ2013 after increasing $34.9 billion in IVQ2012 and $13.9 billion in IIIQ2012. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA rebounded with $66.8 billion in IIQ2013 and $39.2 billion in IIIQ2013. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA fell $1.7 billion in IQ2013 after increasing $40.8 billion in IVQ2012 and $4.5 billion in IIIQ2012. In IIQ2013, profits after tax with IVA and CCA increased $56.9 billion and $39.5 billion in IIIQ2013. Anticipation of higher taxes in the “fiscal cliff” episode caused increase of $120.9 billion in net dividends in IVQ2012 followed with adjustment in the form of decrease of net dividends by $103.8 billion in IQ2013, rebounding with $273.5 billion in IIQ2013. Net dividends fell at $179.0 billion in IIIQ2013. There is similar decrease of $80.1 billion in undistributed profits with IVA and CCA in IVQ2012 followed by increase of $102.1 billion in IQ2013 and decline of $216.6 billion in IIQ2013. Undistributed profits with IVA and CCA rose at $218.6 billion in IIIQ2013. Undistributed profits of US corporations swelled 382.4 percent from $107.7 billion IQ2007 to $519.5 billion in IIIQ2013 and changed signs from minus $55.9 billion in billion in IVQ2007 (Section IA2). In IQ2013, corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment fell $26.6 billion relative to IVQ2012, from $2047.2 billion to $2020.6 billion at the quarterly rate of minus 1.3 percent. In IIQ2013, corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $66.8 billion from $2020.6 billion in IQ2013 to $2087.4 billion at the quarterly rate of 3.3 percent. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $39.2 billion from $2087.4 billion in IIQ2013 to $2126.6 billion in IIIQ2013 at the annual rate of 1.9 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp3q13_3rd.pdf). Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment. Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment. The investment decision of US business is fractured. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

declines.

There is mostly weaker performance in equity indexes with several indexes in Table III-1 decreasing in the week ending on Jan 31, 2014, after wide swings caused by reallocations of investment portfolios worldwide. Stagnating revenues, corporate cash hoarding and declining investment are causing reevaluation of discounted net earnings with deteriorating views on the world economy and United States fiscal sustainability but investors have been driving indexes higher. DJIA decreased 0.9 percent on Jan 31, decreasing 1.1 percent in the week. Germany’s Dax decreased 0.7 percent on Fri Jan 31 and decreased 0.9 percent in the week. Dow Global decreased 0.7 percent on Jan 31 and decreased 1.3 percent in the week. Japan’s Nikkei Average decreased 0.6 percent on Jan 31 and decreased 3.1 percent in the week as the yen continues oscillating but relatively weaker and the stock market gains in expectations of success of fiscal stimulus by a new administration and monetary stimulus by a new board of the Bank of Japan. Dow Asia Pacific TSM increased 0.1 percent on Jan 31 and decreased 1.9 percent in the week. Shanghai Composite that decreased 0.2 percent on Mar 8 and decreased 1.7 percent in the week of Mar 8, falling below 2000 to close at 1980.13 on Fri Nov 30 but closing at 2049.91 on Jan 31 for change of 0.0 percent and decrease of 0.2 percent in the holiday week of Jan 31. There is deceleration with oscillations of the world economy that could affect corporate revenue and equity valuations, causing fluctuations in equity markets with increases during favorable risk appetite.

Commodities were mostly weaker in the week of Jan 31, 2014. The DJ UBS Commodities Index decreased 0.2 percent on Fri Jan 31 and decreased 0.7 percent in the week, as shown in Table III-1. WTI increased 0.9 percent in the week of Jan 31 while Brent decreased 1.4 percent in the week. Gold decreased 0.2 percent on Fri Jan 31 and decreased 1.9 percent in the week.

Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €879,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €693,177 million on Jan 24, 2014, with some repayment of loans already occurring. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has reached €1,282,441 million in the statement of Jan 24, 2014, with marginal reduction. There is high credit risk in these transactions with capital of only €90,548 million as analyzed by Cochrane (2012Aug31).

Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR

 

Dec 31, 2010

Dec 28, 2011

Jan 24, 2014

1 Gold and other Receivables

367,402

419,822

303,157

2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency

223,995

236,826

243,861

3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency

26,941

95,355

23,296

4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro

22,592

25,982

21,114

5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro

546,747

879,130

693,177

6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro

45,654

94,989

74,670

7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro

457,427

610,629

589,264

8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro

34,954

33,928

28,287

9 Other Assets

278,719

336,574

244,470

TOTAL ASSETS

2,004, 432

2,733,235

2,221,296

Memo Items

     

Sum of 5 and  7

1,004,174

1,489,759

1,282,441

Capital and Reserves

78,143

81,481

90,548

Source: European Central Bank

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html

http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/wfs/2014/html/fs140128.en.html

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk. Resolution of the European sovereign debt crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. Growth of the Italian economy would assure that success. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness.

Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. Growth of the Italian economy would ensure that success. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15) argue that 55 percent of the exports of Italy are to countries outside the euro area such that devaluation of 15 percent would be effective in increasing export revenue. Newly available data in Table III-3 providing Italy’s trade with regions and countries supports the argument of Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15). Italy’s exports to the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, are only 40.6 percent of the total in Jan-Nov 2013. Exports to the non-European Union area with share of 45.7 percent in Italy’s total exports are growing at 1.2 percent in Jan-Nov 2013 relative to Jan-Nov 2012 while those to EMU are growing at minus 2.9 percent.

Table III-3, Italy, Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, % Share and 12-Month ∆%

Nov 2013

Exports
% Share

∆% Jan-Nov 2013/ Jan-Nov 2012

Imports
% Share

∆% Jan-Nov 2013/ Jan-Nov 2012

EU

54.3

-1.9

53.3

-2.2

EMU 17

40.6

-2.9

42.7

-2.3

France

11.1

-3.0

8.3

-4.3

Germany

12.5

-1.7

14.5

-4.3

Spain

4.7

-6.9

4.5

-4.1

UK

4.9

2.3

2.6

-1.9

Non EU

45.7

1.2

46.7

-10.3

Europe non EU

13.4

-3.0

10.9

3.5

USA

6.8

0.2

3.3

-10.8

China

2.3

9.5

6.6

-8.7

OPEC

5.7

6.4

10.8

-28.5

Total

100.0

-0.5

100.0

-6.0

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/109933

Table III-4 provides Italy’s trade balance by regions and countries. Italy had trade deficit of €577 million with the 17 countries of the euro zone (EMU 17) in Nov 2013 and cumulative deficit of €3642 million in Jan-Nov 2013. Depreciation to parity could permit greater competitiveness in improving the trade surplus of €7231 million in Jan-Nov 2013 with Europe non-European Union, the trade surplus of €14,046 million with the US and trade surplus with non-European Union of €16,585 million in Jan-Nov 2013. There is significant rigidity in the trade deficits in Jan-Nov 2013 of €12,428 million with China and €6090 million with members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Higher exports could drive economic growth in the economy of Italy that would permit less onerous adjustment of the country’s fiscal imbalances, raising the country’s credit rating.

Table III-4, Italy, Trade Balance by Regions and Countries, Millions of Euro 

Regions and Countries

Trade Balance Nov 2013 Millions of Euro

Trade Balance Cumulative Jan-Nov 2013 Millions of Euro

EU

712

10,208

EMU 17

-577

-3,642

France

913

11,148

Germany

-422

-3,877

Spain

102

869

UK

857

9,240

Non EU

2,379

16,585

Europe non EU

566

7,231

USA

1,289

14,046

China

-774

-12,428

OPEC

71

-6,090

Total

3,091

26,793

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/109933

Growth rates of Italy’s trade and major products are in Table III-5 for the period Jan-Nov 2013 relative to Jan-Nov 2012. Growth rates of cumulative imports relative to a year earlier are negative for energy with minus 16.2 percent. Exports of durable goods grew 1.7 percent and exports of capital goods increased 1.5 percent. The higher rate of growth of exports of minus 0.5 percent in Jan-Nov 2013/Jan-Nov 2012 relative to imports of minus 6.0 percent may reflect weak demand in Italy with GDP declining during nine consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 through IIIQ2013 together with softening commodity prices.

Table III-5, Italy, Exports and Imports % Share of Products in Total and ∆%

 

Exports
Share %

Exports
∆% Jan-Nov 2013/ Jan-Nov 2012

Imports
Share %

Imports
∆% Jan-Nov 2013/ Jan-Nov 2012

Consumer
Goods

29.3

5.7

25.6

0.4

Durable

5.8

1.7

2.9

-8.8

Non-Durable

23.5

6.7

22.6

1.6

Capital Goods

31.6

1.5

19.8

-3.2

Inter-
mediate Goods

33.6

-4.3

32.4

-5.7

Energy

5.5

-21.9

22.2

-16.2

Total ex Energy

94.5

0.7

77.8

-3.0

Total

100.0

-0.5

100.0

-6.0

Note: % Share for 2012 total trade.

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/109933

Table III-6 provides Italy’s trade balance by product categories in Nov 2013 and cumulative Jan-Nov 2013. Italy’s trade balance excluding energy generated surplus of €7732 million in Nov 2013 and €76,872 million cumulative in Jan-Nov2013 but the energy trade balance created deficit of €4141 million in Nov 2013 and cumulative €50,080 million in Jan-Nov 2013. The overall surplus in Nov 2013 was €3091 million with cumulative surplus of €26,793 million in Jan-Nov 2013. Italy has significant competitiveness in various economic activities in contrast with some other countries with debt difficulties.

Table III-6, Italy, Trade Balance by Product Categories, € Millions

 

Nov 2013

Cumulative Jan-Nov 2013

Consumer Goods

2,331

20,946

  Durable

1,126

11,808

  Nondurable

1,205

9,137

Capital Goods

4,132

47,797

Intermediate Goods

769

8,130

Energy

-4,141

-50,080

Total ex Energy

7,732

76,872

Total

3,091

26,793

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/109933

Brazil faced in the debt crisis of 1982 a more complex policy mix. Between 1977 and 1983, Brazil’s terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated 47 percent and 36 percent excluding oil (Pelaez 1987, 176-79; Pelaez 1986, 37-66; see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 178-87). Brazil had accumulated unsustainable foreign debt by borrowing to finance balance of payments deficits during the 1970s. Foreign lending virtually stopped. The German mark devalued strongly relative to the dollar such that Brazil’s products lost competitiveness in Germany and in multiple markets in competition with Germany. The resolution of the crisis was devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent relative to the dollar and subsequent maintenance of parity by monthly devaluation equal to inflation and indexing that resulted in financial stability by parity in external and internal interest rates avoiding capital flight. With a combination of declining imports, domestic import substitution and export growth, Brazil followed rapid growth in the US and grew out of the crisis with surprising GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 1984.

The euro zone faces a critical survival risk because several of its members may default on their sovereign obligations if not bailed out by the other members. The valuation equation of bonds is essential to understanding the stability of the euro area. An explanation is provided in this paragraph and readers interested in technical details are referred to the Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. Contrary to the Wriston doctrine, investing in sovereign obligations is a credit decision. The value of a bond today is equal to the discounted value of future obligations of interest and principal until maturity. On Dec 30, 2011, the yield of the 2-year bond of the government of Greece was quoted around 100 percent. In contrast, the 2-year US Treasury note traded at 0.239 percent and the 10-year at 2.871 percent while the comparable 2-year government bond of Germany traded at 0.14 percent and the 10-year government bond of Germany traded at 1.83 percent. There is no need for sovereign ratings: the perceptions of investors are of relatively higher probability of default by Greece, defying Wriston (1982), and nil probability of default of the US Treasury and the German government. The essence of the sovereign credit decision is whether the sovereign will be able to finance new debt and refinance existing debt without interrupting service of interest and principal. Prices of sovereign bonds incorporate multiple anticipations such as inflation and liquidity premiums of long-term relative to short-term debt but also risk premiums on whether the sovereign’s debt can be managed as it increases without bound. The austerity measures of Italy are designed to increase the primary surplus, or government revenues less expenditures excluding interest, to ensure investors that Italy will have the fiscal strength to manage its debt exceeding 100 percent of GDP, which is the third largest in the world after the US and Japan. Appendix IIIE links the expectations on the primary surplus to the real current value of government monetary and fiscal obligations. As Blanchard (2011SepWEO) analyzes, fiscal consolidation to increase the primary surplus is facilitated by growth of the economy. Italy and the other indebted sovereigns in Europe face the dual challenge of increasing primary surpluses while maintaining growth of the economy (for the experience of Brazil in the debt crisis of 1982 see Pelaez 1986, 1987).

Much of the analysis and concern over the euro zone centers on the lack of credibility of the debt of a few countries while there is credibility of the debt of the euro zone as a whole. In practice, there is convergence in valuations and concerns toward the fact that there may not be credibility of the euro zone as a whole. The fluctuations of financial risk assets of members of the euro zone move together with risk aversion toward the countries with lack of debt credibility. This movement raises the need to consider analytically sovereign debt valuation of the euro zone as a whole in the essential analysis of whether the single-currency will survive without major changes.

Welfare economics considers the desirability of alternative states, which in this case would be evaluating the “value” of Germany (1) within and (2) outside the euro zone. Is the sum of the wealth of euro zone countries outside of the euro zone higher than the wealth of these countries maintaining the euro zone? On the choice of indicator of welfare, Hicks (1975, 324) argues:

“Partly as a result of the Keynesian revolution, but more (perhaps) because of statistical labours that were initially quite independent of it, the Social Product has now come right back into its old place. Modern economics—especially modern applied economics—is centered upon the Social Product, the Wealth of Nations, as it was in the days of Smith and Ricardo, but as it was not in the time that came between. So if modern theory is to be effective, if it is to deal with the questions which we in our time want to have answered, the size and growth of the Social Product are among the chief things with which it must concern itself. It is of course the objective Social Product on which attention must be fixed. We have indexes of production; we do not have—it is clear we cannot have—an Index of Welfare.”

If the burden of the debt of the euro zone falls on Germany and France or only on Germany, is the wealth of Germany and France or only Germany higher after breakup of the euro zone or if maintaining the euro zone? In practice, political realities will determine the decision through elections.

The prospects of survival of the euro zone are dire. Table III-7 is constructed with IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx) for GDP in USD billions, primary net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP and general government debt as percent of GDP for selected regions and countries in 2013.

Table III-7, World and Selected Regional and Country GDP and Fiscal Situation

 

GDP 2013
USD Billions

Primary Net Lending Borrowing
% GDP 2013

General Government Net Debt
% GDP 2013

World

73,454

   

Euro Zone

12,685

-0.4

74.9

Portugal

219

0.1

119.3

Ireland

221

-3.3

105.5

Greece

243

--

172.6

Spain

1,356

-3.7

80.7

Major Advanced Economies G7

34,068

-3.8

91.5

United States

16,724

-3.6

87.4

UK

2,490

-4.7

84.8

Germany

3,593

1.7

56.3

France

2,739

-2.0

87.2

Japan

5,007

-8.8

139.9

Canada

1,825

-2.8

36.5

Italy

2,068

2.0

110.5

China

8,939

-2.5*

22.9**

*Net Lending/borrowing**Gross Debt

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx

The data in Table III-7 are used for some very simple calculations in Table III-8. The column “Net Debt USD Billions” in Table III-8 is generated by applying the percentage in Table III-7 column “General Government Net Debt % GDP 2013” to the column “GDP USD Billions.” The total debt of France and Germany in 2013 is $4411.3 billion, as shown in row “B+C” in column “Net Debt USD Billions” The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is $4293.3 billion, adding rows D+E+F+G+H in column “Net Debt USD billions.” There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic” in the two final columns of Table III-8. Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is shown in column “Debt as % of Germany plus France GDP” to reach $8704.6 billion, which would be equivalent to 137.5 percent of their combined GDP in 2013. Under this arrangement, the entire debt of selected members of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. The final column provides “Debt as % of Germany GDP” that would exceed 242.3 percent if including debt of France and 175.8 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Wriston (1982) would prove to be wrong again that countries do not bankrupt but would have a consolation prize that similar to LBOs the sum of the individual values of euro zone members outside the current agreement exceeds the value of the whole euro zone. Internal rescues of French and German banks may be less costly than bailing

Table III-8, Guarantees of Debt of Sovereigns in Euro Area as Percent of GDP of Germany and France, USD Billions and %

 

Net Debt USD Billions

Debt as % of Germany Plus France GDP

Debt as % of Germany GDP

A Euro Area

9,501.1

   

B Germany

2,022.9

 

$8704.6 as % of $3593 =242.3%

$6316.2 as % of $3593 =175.8%

C France

2,388.4

   

B+C

4,411.3

GDP $6,332.0

Total Debt

$8704.6

Debt/GDP: 137.5%

 

D Italy

2,285.1

   

E Spain

1,094.3

   

F Portugal

261.3

   

G Greece

419.4

   

H Ireland

233.2

   

Subtotal D+E+F+G+H

4,293.3

   

Source: calculation with IMF data IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx

There is extremely important information in Table III-9 for the current sovereign risk crisis in the euro zone. Table III-9 provides the structure of regional and country relations of Germany’s exports and imports with newly available data for Nov 2013. German exports to other European Union (EU) members are 56.4 percent of total exports in Nov 2013 and 57.0 percent in cumulative Jan-Nov 2013. Exports to the euro area are 36.3 percent of the total in Nov and 36.8 percent cumulative in Jan-Nov. Exports to third countries are 43.6 percent of the total in Nov and 42.9 percent cumulative in Jan-Nov. There is similar distribution for imports. Exports to non-euro countries are increasing 4.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013, increasing 2.0 percent cumulative in Jan-Nov 2013 while exports to the euro area are increasing 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and decreasing 1.6 percent cumulative in Jan-Nov 2013. Exports to third countries, accounting for 43.6 percent of the total in Nov 2013, are changing 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and decreasing 0.8 percent cumulative in Jan-Nov 2013, accounting for 42.9 percent of the cumulative total in Jan-Nov 2013. Price competitiveness through devaluation could improve export performance and growth. Economic performance in Germany is closely related to Germany’s high competitiveness in world markets. Weakness in the euro zone and the European Union in general could affect the German economy. This may be the major reason for choosing the “fiscal abuse” of the European Central Bank considered by Buiter (2011Oct31) over the breakdown of the euro zone. There is a tough analytical, empirical and forecasting doubt of growth and trade in the euro zone and the world with or without maintenance of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro zone. Germany could benefit from depreciation of the euro because of high share in its exports to countries not in the euro zone but breakdown of the euro zone raises doubts on the region’s economic growth that could affect German exports to other member states.

Table III-9, Germany, Structure of Exports and Imports by Region, € Billions and ∆%

 

Nov 2013 
€ Billions

Nov 12-Month
∆%

Cumulative Jan-Nov 2012 € Billions

Cumulative

Jan-Nov 2013/
Jan-Nov 2012 ∆%

Total
Exports

94.6

1.0

1,011.7

-0.5

A. EU
Members

53.4

% 56.4

1.8

576.9

% 57.0

-0.4

Euro Area

34.3

% 36.3

0.1

371.9

% 36.8

-1.6

Non-euro Area

19.1

% 20.2

4.9

205.0

% 20.3

2.0

B. Third Countries

41.2

% 43.6

0.0

434.7

% 42.9

-0.8

Total Imports

76.5

-0.4

828.0

-1.3

C. EU Members

49.8

% 65.1

0.0

533.8

% 64.5

0.5

Euro Area

34.1

% 44.6

-1.0

370.9

% 44.8

-0.4

Non-euro Area

15.7

% 20.5

2.1

162.9

% 19.7

2.6

D. Third Countries

26.7

% 34.9

-1.0

294.2

% 35.5

-4.5

Notes: Total Exports = A+B; Total Imports = C+D

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/01/PE14_006_51.html

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. There are two approaches to government finance and their implications: (1) simple unpleasant monetarist arithmetic; and (2) simple unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Both approaches illustrate how sovereign debt can be perceived riskier under profligacy.

First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:

D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)

Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,

{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:

N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)

The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:

B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)

On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.

Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:

(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+τ)stdτ (4)

Equation (4) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+τ, of the future primary surpluses st, which are equal to TtGt or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+τ. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:

MtV(it, ·) = PtYt (5)

Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):

“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”

An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.

There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:

(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress

(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality

(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

No comments:

Post a Comment