Sunday, June 3, 2018

Stronger Dollar, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Cyclically Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment, Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits, Financial Repression, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part IV

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Stronger Dollar, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Cyclically Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment, Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits, Financial Repression, Cyclically Stagnating Real Disposable Income, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018

I Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth with GDP Two Trillion Dollars below Trend

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment

IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits

II Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IIB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IB2 Financial Repression

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IV Global Inflation. There is oscillating inflation everywhere in the world economy, with slow growth and persistently high unemployment in advanced economies. Table IV-1, updated with every blog comment, provides the latest annual data for GDP, consumer price index (CPI) inflation, producer price index (PPI) inflation and unemployment (UNE) for the advanced economies, China and the highly indebted European countries with sovereign risk issues. The table now includes the Netherlands and Finland that with Germany make up the set of northern countries in the euro zone that hold key votes in the enhancement of the mechanism for solution of sovereign risk issues (Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, “Europe: Northern Exposures,” Financial Times, Mar 9, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55eaf350-4a8b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz1gAlaswcW). Newly available data on inflation is considered below in this section. Data in Table IV-1 for the euro zone and its members are updated from information provided by Eurostat but individual country information is provided in this section as soon as available, following Table IV-1. Data for other countries in Table IV-1 are also updated with reports from their statistical agencies. Economic data for major regions and countries is considered in Section V World Economic Slowdown following with individual country and regional data tables.

Table IV-1, GDP Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in Selected Countries, Percentage Annual Rates

GDP

CPI

PPI

UNE

US

2.8

2.5

2.4

FD 2.6

3.9

Japan

0.9

0.6

2.0

2.5

China

6.8

1.8

3.4

UK

1.2

2.4*

CPIH 2.2

2.7 output
2.4**
input
5.3

4.2

Euro Zone

2.5

1.2

2.1

8.5

Germany

2.3

1.4

2.0

3.4

France

2.1

1.8

2.5

9.2

Nether-lands

3.0

0.7

1.2

3.9

Finland

2.7

0.8

2.9

8.1

Belgium

1.6

1.6

3.8

6.3

Portugal

2.1

0.3

0.4

7.4

Ireland

7.8

-0.1

-1.6

5.9

Italy

1.4

0.6

2.4

11.2

Greece

1.9

0.5

-0.2

20.8

Spain

2.9

1.1

1.3

15.9

Sources: Country statistical agencies

Notes: GDP: rate of growth of GDP; CPI: change in consumer price inflation; PPI: producer price inflation; UNE: rate of unemployment; all rates relative to year earlier

*Office for National Statistics

**Core

CPI

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpriceinflation/april2018

PPI

https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/producerpriceinflation/april2018

EUROSTAT http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat National Statistical Offices: http://www.bls.gov/bls/other.htm

Table IV-1 shows the simultaneous occurrence of low growth, low inflation of consumer prices, decline of producer prices and unemployment in advanced economies. US GDP grew at 2.2 percent in seasonally adjusted rate (SAAR) in IQ2018 and increased 2.8 percent in IQ2018 relative to IQ2017 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html). Japan’s GDP decreased at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 0.6 percent in IQ2018 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/02/united-states-inflation-trend-or.html). The UK grew at 0.1 percent in IQ2018 relative to IVQ2017 and GDP increased 1.2 percent in IQ2018 relative to IQ2017 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The Euro Zone grew at 0.4 percent in IQ2018 and 2.5 percent in IQ2018 relative to IQ2017 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-revaluation-united-states_24.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html). These are stagnating or “growth recession” rates, which are positive or about nil growth rates with some contractions that are insufficient to recover employment. The rates of unemployment are quite high:

In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These policies and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.

Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):

“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.

Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.

The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”

Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:

“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.”

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

Unconventional monetary policy, or reinvestment of principal in securities and issue of bank reserves to maintain policy interest rates below what would be without central bank intervention, will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” The FOMC is implementing gradual reduction of the portfolio of government securities in the balance sheet of the Fed beginning in Oct 2017. There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at around 2.0 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 35 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/gdp1q18_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[($14,745.9/$14,355.6) -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2018 would have accumulated to 35.4 percent. GDP in IQ2018 would be $20,298.9 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2919.2 billion than actual $17,379.7 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 21.1 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.4 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IQ2018 is 14.4 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,379.7 billion in IQ2018 or 15.9 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Apr 1919 to Apr 2018. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 154.7937 in Apr 2018. The actual index NSA in Apr 2018 is 104.3625, which is 32.6 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Apr 2018. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.5768 in Apr 2018. The output of manufacturing at 104.3625 in Apr 2018 is 23.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

First, total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 164,000 in Apr 2018 and private payroll employment increased 168,000. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm): “Our analysis suggests that the net effect of these hurricanes [Harvey and Irma] was to reduce the estimate of total nonfarm payroll employment for September. There was no discernible effect on the national unemployment rate. No changes were made to either the establishment or household survey estimation procedures for the September figures.” The average monthly number of nonfarm jobs created from Apr 2016 to Apr 2017 was 190,167 using seasonally adjusted data, while the average number of nonfarm jobs created from Apr 2017 to Apr 2018 was 190,000 or decrease by 0.1 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US from Apr 2016 to Apr 2017 was 178,667, using seasonally adjusted data, while the average from Apr 2017 to Apr 2018 was 189,750 or increase by 6.2 percent. This blog calculates the effective labor force of the US at 170.314 million in Apr 2018 and 168.537 million in Apr 2017 (Table I-4), for growth of 1.777 million at average 148,083 per month. The difference between the average increase of 187,750 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Apr 2017 to Apr 2018 and the 148,083-average monthly increase in the labor force from Apr 2017 to Apr 2018 is 41,667 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 21.062 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 41,667 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 505 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (21.062 million divided by 41,667) or 42 years (505 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Apr 2018 not seasonally adjusted stood at 161.280 million with 5.932 million unemployed or effectively 14.966 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 170.314 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 2.000 years (1 million divided by product of 41,667 by 12, which is 500,004). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 8.064 million (0.05 times labor force of 161.280 million). New net job creation would be minus 2.132 million (5,932 million unemployed minus 8.064 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 0.0 years (-2,132 million divided by 0.500). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 14.966 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 170.314 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 6.450 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 12.9 years (14.966 million minus 0.05

(170.314 million) = 6.450 million divided by 0.500004 using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in Apr 2018 was 155.348 million (NSA) or 8.033 million more people with jobs relative to the peak of 147.315 million in Jul 2007 while the civilian noninstitutional population of ages 16 years and over increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 257.272 million in Apr 2018 or by 25.314 million. The number employed increased 5.5 percent from Jul 2007 to Apr 2018 while the noninstitutional civilian population of ages of 16 years and over, or those available for work, increased 10.9 percent. The ratio of employment to population in Jul 2007 was 63.5 percent (147.315 million employed as percent of population of 231.958 million). The same ratio in Apr 2018 would result in 163.368 million jobs (0.635 multiplied by noninstitutional civilian population of 257.272 million). There are effectively 8.020 million fewer jobs in Apr 2018 than in Jul 2007, or 163.368 million minus 155.348 million. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:

“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). There is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html).

Second, long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 35 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2018. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IQ2018 (https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2018/pdf/gdp1q18_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by dividing GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[($14,745.9/$14,355.6) -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1989, 4.7 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1989, 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1989. 4.5 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1990, 4.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1990, 4.3 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1990, 4.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1990, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1991, 3.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1991 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html). The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dates a contraction of the US from IQ1990 (Jul) to IQ1991 (Mar) (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). The expansion lasted until another contraction beginning in IQ2001 (Mar). US GDP contracted 1.3 percent from the pre-recession peak of $8983.9 billion of chained 2009 dollars in IIIQ1990 to the trough of $8865.6 billion in IQ1991 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2018 would have accumulated to 35.4 percent. GDP in IQ2018 would be $20,298.9 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2919.2 billion than actual $17,379.7 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 21.1 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 12.4 percent of the effective labor force (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). US GDP in IQ2018 is 14.4 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $17,379.7 billion in IQ2018 or 15.9 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent. Professor John H. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. Cochrane (2016May02) measures GDP growth in the US at average 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 2000 and only at 1.76 percent per year from 2000 to 2015 with only at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in the current expansion. Cochrane (2016May02) proposes drastic changes in regulation and legal obstacles to private economic activity. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Apr 1919 to Apr 2018. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 108.3221 in Dec 2007 to 154.7937 in Apr 2018. The actual index NSA in Apr 2018 is 104.3625, which is 32.6 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.0 percent between Dec 1986 and Apr 2018. Using trend growth of 2.0 percent per year, the index would increase to 135.5768 in Apr 2018. The output of manufacturing at 104.3625 in Apr 2018 is 23.0 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.

The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as fluctuating from mediocre growth of 2.5 percent on an annual basis in 2010 to 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.7 percent in 2013, 2.6 percent in 2014 and 2.9 percent in 2015. GDP growth was 1.5 percent in 2016 and 2.3 percent in 2017. The following calculations show that actual growth is around 2.2 percent per year. The rate of growth of 1.4 percent in the entire cycle from 2007 to 2017 is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which the economy of the US always attained for entire cycles in expansions after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) provides valuable information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.

Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita

GDP

Long-Term

1929-2017

3.2

1947-2017

3.2

Whole Cycles

1980-1989

3.5

2006-2017

1.4

2007-2017

1.4

Cyclical Contractions ∆%

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

-4.7

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

-4.2

Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆%

IQ1983 to IVQ1985

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

IQ1983-IIIQ1987

IQ1983 to IVQ1987

IQ1983 to IQ1988

IQ1983 to IIQ1988

IQ1983 to IIIQ1988

IQ1983 to IVQ1988

IQ1983 to IQ1989

IQ1983 to IIQ1989

IQ1983 to IIIQ1989

IQ1983 to IVQ1989

IQ1983 to IQ1990

IQ1983 to IIQ1990

IQ1983 to IIIQ1990

IQ1983 to IVQ1990

5.9

5.7

5.4

5.2

5.0

5.0

4.9

5.0

4.9

4.9

4.8

4.8

4.8

4.7

4.7

4.5

4.5

4.4

4.3

4.0

IQ1983 to IQ1991

IQ1983 to IIQ1991

IQ1983 to IIIQ1991

3.8

3.8

3.8

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

7.8

IIIQ2009 to IQ2018

2.2

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

2.7

Real Disposable Income

Real Disposable Income per Capita

Long-Term

1929-2017

3.1

2.0

1947-1999

3.7

2.3

Whole Cycles

1980-1989

3.5

2.6

2006-2017

1.7

0.9

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace around 2.2 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.

1. Average Annual Growth in the Past Twenty-Five Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013, the four quarters of 2014, the four quarters of 2015, the four quarters of 2016, the four quarters of 2017 and the first quarter of 2018 accumulated to 14.5 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.2 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IQ2018 of $17,379.7 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,190.3 billion and compounding by 4/25: {[($17,379.7/$15,190.3)4/25 -1]100 = 2.2 percent}.

Average Annual Growth in the Past Four Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters from IQ2017 to IQ2018 accumulated to 2.8 percent that is equivalent to 2.8 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IQ2018 of $17,379.7 billion by GDP in IQ2017 of $16,903.2 billion and compounding by 4/4: {[($17,379.7/$16,903.2)4/4 -1]100 = 2.8%}. The US economy grew 2.8 percent in IQ2018 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IQ2017. Growth was at annual equivalent 4.6 percent in IIQ2014 and 5.2 percent IIIQ2014 and only at 2.0 percent in IVQ2014. GDP grew at annual equivalent 3.2 percent in IQ2015, 2.7 percent in IIQ2015, 1.6 percent in IIIQ2015 and 0.5 percent in IVQ2015. GDP grew at annual equivalent 0.6 percent in IQ2016 and at 2.2 percent annual equivalent in IIQ2016. GDP increased at 2.8 percent annual equivalent in IIIQ2016 and at 1.8 percent in IVQ2016. GDP grew at annual equivalent 1.2 percent in IQ2017 and at annual equivalent 3.1 percent in IIQ2017. GDP grew at annual equivalent 3.2 percent in IIIQ2017. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.9 percent in IVQ2017. GDP grew at annual equivalent 2.2 percent in IQ2018. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is in the borderline of contraction, and negative in IQ2014. US GDP fell 0.2 percent in IQ2014. The rate of growth of GDP in the revision of IIIQ2013 is 3.1 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR).

Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars and ∆%

Real GDP, Billions Chained 2009 Dollars

∆% Relative to IVQ2007

∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

∆%
over
Year Earlier

IVQ2007

14,991.8

NA

0.4

1.9

IVQ2011

15,190.3

1.3

1.1

1.7

IQ2012

15,291.0

2.0

0.7

2.8

IIQ2012

15,362.4

2.5

0.5

2.5

IIIQ2012

15,380.8

2.6

0.1

2.4

IVQ2012

15,384.3

2.6

0.0

1.3

IQ2013

15,491.9

3.3

0.7

1.3

IIQ2013

15,521.6

3.5

0.2

1.0

IIIQ2013

15,641.3

4.3

0.8

1.7

IVQ2013

15,793.9

5.4

1.0

2.7

IQ2014

15,757.6

5.1

-0.2

1.7

IIQ2014

15,935.8

6.3

1.1

2.7

IIIQ2014

16,139.5

7.7

1.3

3.2

IVQ2014

16,220.2

8.2

0.5

2.7

IQ2015

16,350.0

9.1

0.8

3.8

IIQ2015

16,460.9

9.8

0.7

3.3

IIIQ2015

16,527.6

10.2

0.4

2.4

IVQ2015

16,547.6

10.4

0.1

2.0

IQ2016

16,571.6

10.5

0.1

1.4

IIQ2016

16,663.5

11.2

0.6

1.2

IIIQ2016

16,778.1

11.9

0.7

1.5

IVQ2016

16,851.4

12.4

0.4

1.8

IQ2017

16,903.2

12.7

0.3

2.0

IIQ2017

17,031.1

13.6

0.8

2.2

IIIQ2017

17,163.9

14.5

0.8

2.3

IVQ2017

17,286.5

15.3

0.7

2.6

IQ2018

17,379.7

15.9

0.5

2.8

Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IVQ2017

14.4

14.5

Annual Equivalent ∆%

2.2

2.2

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart GDP of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the rates of growth of GDP at SAAR (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the 16 quarters from IIQ2014 to I8Q2017. Growth has been fluctuating.

Chart GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Rates of Growth of United States GDP, ∆%

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdp_glance.htm

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QE→∞, or reinvestment of principal in securities and issue of bank reserves to maintain interest rates below what would be without central bank intervention, cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The FOMC is implementing gradual reduction of the portfolio of government securities in the balance sheet of the Fed. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.

The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm). The FOMC updated in the statement at its meeting on Dec 16, 2015 with maintenance of the current level of the balance sheet and liftoff of interest rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a.htm) followed by the statement of the meeting on May 2, 2018 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180502a.htm):

May 2, 2018

Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement

For release at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in March indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising at a moderate rate. Job gains have been strong, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has stayed low. Recent data suggest that growth of household spending moderated from its strong fourth-quarter pace, while business fixed investment continued to grow strongly. On a 12-month basis, both overall inflation and inflation for items other than food and energy have moved close to 2 percent. Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with further gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace in the medium term and labor market conditions will remain strong. Inflation on a 12-month basis is expected to run near the Committee's symmetric 2 percent objective over the medium term. Risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced.

In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1-1/2 to 1-3/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting strong labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation.

In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant further gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Thomas I. Barkin; Raphael W. Bostic; Lael Brainard; Loretta J. Mester; Randal K. Quarles; and John C. Williams.

Implementation Note issued May 2, 2018

There are several important issues in this statement.

1. Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm): “Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”

2. Unchanged Policy Interest Rates: “In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1-1/2 to 1-3/4 percent. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting strong labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation.”

3. New Advance Guidance. “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant further gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added).

4. Policy Commitment with Maximum Employment. “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”

5. Concern with Inflation and Symmetric Inflation Goal. “The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal” (emphasis added).

6. All Measures Depend on Data. “However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added).

Focus is shifting from tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds now currently at 1½ to 1¾ percent and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Markets overreacted to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases to $25 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 1½ to 1¾ percent with gradual consideration of further rate increases with all measures depending on “incoming data” (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180502a.htm): “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant further gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added). The FOMC is initiating the “normalization” or reduction of the balance sheet of securities held outright for monetary policy.

How long is “considerable time”? At the press conference following the meeting on Mar 19, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question of Jon Hilsenrath of the Wall Street Journal explaining “In particular, the Committee has endorsed the view that it anticipates that will be a considerable period after the asset purchase program ends before it will be appropriate to begin to raise rates. And of course on our present path, well, that's not utterly preset. We would be looking at next, next fall. So, I think that's important guidance” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140319.pdf). Many focused on “next fall,” ignoring that the path of increasing rates is not “utterly preset.”

At the press conference following the meeting on Dec 17, 2014, Chair Yellen answered a question by Jon Hilseranth of the Wall Street Journal explaining “patience” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20141217.pdf):

“So I did say that this statement that the committee can be patient should be interpreted as meaning that it is unlikely to begin the normalization process, for at least the next couple of meetings. Now that doesn't point to any preset or predetermined time at which normalization is -- will begin. There are a range of views on the committee, and it will be dependent on how incoming data bears on the progress, the economy is making. First of all, I want to emphasize that no meeting is completely off the table in the sense that if we do see faster progress toward our objectives than we currently expect, then it is possible that the process of normalization would occur sooner than we now anticipated. And of course the converse is also true. So at this point, we think it unlikely that it will be appropriate, that we will see conditions for at least the next couple of meetings that will make it appropriate for us to decide to begin normalization. A number of committee participants have indicated that in their view, conditions could be appropriate by the middle of next year. But there is no preset time.”

Chair Yellen explained the removal of the word “patience” from the advanced guidance at the press conference following the FOMC meeting on Mar 18, 2015(http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150318.pdf):

“In other words, just because we removed the word “patient” from the statement doesn’t mean we are going to be impatient. Moreover, even after the initial increase in the target funds rate, our policy is likely to remain highly accommodative to support continued progress toward our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”

At a speech on Mar 31, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed labor market conditions as follows (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140331a.htm):

“And based on the evidence available, it is clear to me that the U.S. economy is still considerably short of the two goals assigned to the Federal Reserve by the Congress. The first of those goals is maximum sustainable employment, the highest level of employment that can be sustained while maintaining a stable inflation rate. Most of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee and I estimate that the unemployment rate consistent with maximum sustainable employment is now between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent, well below the 6.7 percent rate in February.

Let me explain what I mean by that word "slack" and why it is so important.

Slack means that there are significantly more people willing and capable of filling a job than there are jobs for them to fill. During a period of little or no slack, there still may be vacant jobs and people who want to work, but a large share of those willing to work lack the skills or are otherwise not well suited for the jobs that are available. With 6.7 percent unemployment, it might seem that there must be a lot of slack in the U.S. economy, but there are reasons why that may not be true.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) provides comprehensive review of the theory and measurement of labor markets. Monetary policy pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

Yellen (2014Aug22) finds that the unemployment rate is not sufficient in determining slack:

“One convenient way to summarize the information contained in a large number of indicators is through the use of so-called factor models. Following this methodology, Federal Reserve Board staff developed a labor market conditions index from 19 labor market indicators, including four I just discussed. This broadly based metric supports the conclusion that the labor market has improved significantly over the past year, but it also suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) restates that the FOMC determines monetary policy on newly available information and interpretation of labor markets and inflation and does not follow a preset path:

“But if progress in the labor market continues to be more rapid than anticipated by the Committee or if inflation moves up more rapidly than anticipated, resulting in faster convergence toward our dual objectives, then increases in the federal funds rate target could come sooner than the Committee currently expects and could be more rapid thereafter. Of course, if economic performance turns out to be disappointing and progress toward our goals proceeds more slowly than we expect, then the future path of interest rates likely would be more accommodative than we currently anticipate. As I have noted many times, monetary policy is not on a preset path. The Committee will be closely monitoring incoming information on the labor market and inflation in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”

The minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 16-17, 2014, reveal concern with global economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20140917.htm):

“Most viewed the risks to the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as broadly balanced. However, a number of participants noted that economic growth over the medium term might be slower than they expected if foreign economic growth came in weaker than anticipated, structural productivity continued to increase only slowly, or the recovery in residential construction continued to lag.”

There is similar concern in the minutes of the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16-17, 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20141217.htm):

“In their discussion of the foreign economic outlook, participants noted that the implications of the drop in crude oil prices would differ across regions, especially if the price declines affected inflation expectations and financial markets; a few participants said that the effect on overseas employment and output as a whole was likely to be positive. While some participants had lowered their assessments of the prospects for global economic growth, several noted that the likelihood of further responses by policymakers abroad had increased. Several participants indicated that they expected slower economic growth abroad to negatively affect the U.S. economy, principally through lower net exports, but the net effect of lower oil prices on U.S. economic activity was anticipated to be positive.”

Chair Yellen analyzes the view of inflation (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140416a.htm):

“Inflation, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, has slowed from an annual rate of about 2-1/2 percent in early 2012 to less than 1 percent in February of this year. This rate is well below the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective. Many advanced economies are observing a similar softness in inflation.

To some extent, the low rate of inflation seems due to influences that are likely to be temporary, including a deceleration in consumer energy prices and outright declines in core import prices in recent quarters. Longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably steady, however. We anticipate that, as the effects of transitory factors subside and as labor market gains continue, inflation will gradually move back toward 2 percent.”

There is a critical phrase in the statement of Sep 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm): “but mortgage rates have risen further.” Did the increase of mortgage rates influence the decision of the FOMC not to taper? Is FOMC “communication” and “guidance” successful? Will the FOMC increase purchases of mortgage-backed securities if mortgage rates increase?

A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/twenty-three-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2016/01/unconventional-monetary-policy-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/peaking-valuations-of-risk-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/theory-and-reality-of-secular.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on “Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 24,635.21 on Jun 1, 2018, which is higher by 73.9 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 73.5 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial assets have been approaching or exceeding historical highs.

Perhaps one of the most critical statements on policy is the answer to a question of Peter Barnes by Chair Janet Yellen at the press conference following the meeting on Jun 18, 2014 (page 19 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf):

So I don't have a sense--the committee doesn't try to gauge what is the right level of equity prices. But we do certainly monitor a number of different metrics that give us a feeling for where valuations are relative to things like earnings or dividends, and look at where these metrics stand in comparison with previous history to get a sense of whether or not we're moving to valuation levels that are outside of historical norms, and I still don't see that. I still don't see that for equity prices broadly” (emphasis added).

In a speech at the IMF on Jul 2, 2014, Chair Yellen analyzed the link between monetary policy and financial risks (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20140702a.htm):

“Monetary policy has powerful effects on risk taking. Indeed, the accommodative policy stance of recent years has supported the recovery, in part, by providing increased incentives for households and businesses to take on the risk of potentially productive investments. But such risk-taking can go too far, thereby contributing to fragility in the financial system. This possibility does not obviate the need for monetary policy to focus primarily on price stability and full employment--the costs to society in terms of deviations from price stability and full employment that would arise would likely be significant. In the private sector, key vulnerabilities included high levels of leverage, excessive dependence on unstable short-term funding, weak underwriting of loans, deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management, and the use of exotic financial instruments that redistributed risk in nontransparent ways.”

Yellen (2014Jul14) warned again at the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on Jul 15, 2014:

“The Committee recognizes that low interest rates may provide incentives for some investors to “reach for yield,” and those actions could increase vulnerabilities in the financial system to adverse events. While prices of real estate, equities, and corporate bonds have risen appreciably and valuation metrics have increased, they remain generally in line with historical norms. In some sectors, such as lower-rated corporate debt, valuations appear stretched and issuance has been brisk. Accordingly, we are closely monitoring developments in the leveraged loan market and are working to enhance the effectiveness of our supervisory guidance. More broadly, the financial sector has continued to become more resilient, as banks have continued to boost their capital and liquidity positions, and growth in wholesale short-term funding in financial markets has been modest” (emphasis added).

Greenspan (1996) made similar warnings:

“Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, jobs, and price stability. Indeed, the sharp stock market break of 1987 had few negative consequences for the economy. But we should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of asset markets and the economy. Thus, evaluating shifts in balance sheets generally, and in asset prices particularly, must be an integral part of the development of monetary policy” (emphasis added).

Bernanke (2010WP) and Yellen (2011AS) reveal the emphasis of monetary policy on the impact of the rise of stock market valuations in stimulating consumption by wealth effects on household confidence. What is the success in evaluating deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from “historical norms”? What are the consequences on economic activity and employment of deviations of valuations of risk financial assets from those “historical norms”? What are the policy tools and their effectiveness in returning valuations of risk financial assets to their “historical norms”?

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

The Communiqué of the Istanbul meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on February 10, 2015, sanctions the need of unconventional monetary policy with warning on collateral effects (http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/150210-finance.html):

“We agree that consistent with central banks' mandates, current economic conditions require accommodative monetary policies in some economies. In this regard, we welcome that central banks take appropriate monetary policy action. The recent policy decision by the ECB aims at fulfilling its price stability mandate, and will further support the recovery in the euro area. We also note that some advanced economies with stronger growth prospects are moving closer to conditions that would allow for policy normalization. In an environment of diverging monetary policy settings and rising financial market volatility, policy settings should be carefully calibrated and clearly communicated to minimize negative spillovers.”

Professor Raguram G Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation. Rajan (2005) anticipated the risks of the world financial crisis. Professor John B. Taylor (2016Dec 7, 2016Dec20), in Testimony to the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade Committee on Financial Services, on Dec 7, 2016, analyzes the adverse effects of unconventional monetary policy:

“My research and that of others over the years shows that these policies were not effective, and may have been counterproductive. Economic growth was consistently below the Fed’s forecasts with the policies, and was much weaker than in earlier U.S. recoveries from deep recessions. Job growth has been insufficient to raise the percentage of the population that is working above pre-recession levels. There is a growing consensus that the extra low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy have reached diminishing or negative returns. Many have argued that these policies widen the income distribution, adversely affect savers, and increase the volatility of the dollar exchange rate. Experienced market participants have expressed concerns about bubbles, imbalances, and distortions caused by the policies. The unconventional policies have also raised public policy concerns about the Fed being transformed into a multipurpose institution, intervening in particular sectors and allocating credit, areas where Congress may have a role, but not a limited-purpose independent agency of government.”

Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jul15, 2014Jun26) building on advanced research (Taylor 2007, 2008Nov, 2009, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB, 2015, 2012 Oct 25; 2013Oct28, 2014 Jan01, 2014Jan3, 2014Jun26, 2014Jul15, 2015, 2016Dec7, 2016Dec20 http://www.johnbtaylor.com/) finds that a monetary policy rule would function best in promoting an environment of low inflation and strong economic growth with stability of financial markets. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).

The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 1½ and 1¾ percent. Accelerated increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

The FOMC provides guidelines on the process of normalization of monetary policy at the meeting on Dec 16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151216a1.htm):

“The Federal Reserve has made the following decisions to implement the monetary policy stance announced by the Federal Open Market Committee in its statement on December 16, 2015:

  • The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to raise the interest rate paid on required and excess reserve balances to 0.50 percent, effective December 17, 2015.
  • As part of its policy decision, the Federal Open Market Committee voted to authorize and direct the Open Market Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the System Open Market Account in accordance with the following domestic policy directive:1

"Effective December 17, 2015, the Federal Open Market Committee directs the Desk to undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the federal funds rate in a target range of 1/4 to 1/2 percent, including: (1) overnight reverse repurchase operations (and reverse repurchase operations with maturities of more than one day when necessary to accommodate weekend, holiday, or similar trading conventions) at an offering rate of 0.25 percent, in amounts limited only by the value of Treasury securities held outright in the System Open Market Account that are available for such operations and by a per-counterparty limit of $30 billion per day; and (2) term reverse repurchase operations to the extent approved in the resolution on term RRP operations approved by the Committee at its March 17-18, 2015, meeting.

The Committee directs the Desk to continue rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction and to continue reinvesting principal payments on all agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. The Committee also directs the Desk to engage in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve's agency mortgage-backed securities transactions."

More information regarding open market operations may be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's website.

  • In a related action, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to approve a 1/4 percentage point increase in the discount rate (the primary credit rate) to 1.00 percent, effective December 17, 2015. In taking this action, the Board approved requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco.

This information will be updated as appropriate to reflect decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Board of Governors regarding details of the Federal Reserve's operational tools and approach used to implement monetary policy.”

In the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress on Feb 24, 2015, Chair Yellen analyzes the timing of interest rate increases (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150224a.htm):

“The FOMC's assessment that it can be patient in beginning to normalize policy means that the Committee considers it unlikely that economic conditions will warrant an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate for at least the next couple of FOMC meetings. If economic conditions continue to improve, as the Committee anticipates, the Committee will at some point begin considering an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate on a meeting-by-meeting basis. Before then, the Committee will change its forward guidance. However, it is important to emphasize that a modification of the forward guidance should not be read as indicating that the Committee will necessarily increase the target range in a couple of meetings. Instead the modification should be understood as reflecting the Committee's judgment that conditions have improved to the point where it will soon be the case that a change in the target range could be warranted at any meeting. Provided that labor market conditions continue to improve and further improvement is expected, the Committee anticipates that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate when, on the basis of incoming data, the Committee is reasonably confident that inflation will move back over the medium term toward our 2 percent objective.”

In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on Feb 11, 2014, Chair Janet Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140211a.htm):

“Turning to monetary policy, let me emphasize that I expect a great deal of continuity in the FOMC's approach to monetary policy. I served on the Committee as we formulated our current policy strategy and I strongly support that strategy, which is designed to fulfill the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate of maximum employment and price stability.  If incoming information broadly supports the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective, the Committee will likely reduce the pace of asset purchases in further measured steps at future meetings. That said, purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on its outlook for the labor market and inflation as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.  In December of last year and again this January, the Committee said that its current expectation--based on its assessment of a broad range of measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments--is that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate well past the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6-1/2 percent, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the 2 percent goal. I am committed to achieving both parts of our dual mandate: helping the economy return to full employment and returning inflation to 2 percent while ensuring that it does not run persistently above or below that level (emphasis added).”

At the confirmation hearing on nomination for Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Vice Chair Yellen (2013Nov14 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20131114a.htm), states needs and intentions of policy:

“We have made good progress, but we have farther to go to regain the ground lost in the crisis and the recession. Unemployment is down from a peak of 10 percent, but at 7.3 percent in October, it is still too high, reflecting a labor market and economy performing far short of their potential. At the same time, inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve's goal of 2 percent and is expected to continue to do so for some time.

For these reasons, the Federal Reserve is using its monetary policy tools to promote a more robust recovery. A strong recovery will ultimately enable the Fed to reduce its monetary accommodation and reliance on unconventional policy tools such as asset purchases. I believe that supporting the recovery today is the surest path to returning to a more normal approach to monetary policy.”

In testimony before the Committee on the Budget of the US Senate on May 8, 2004, Chair Yellen provides analysis of the current economic situation and outlook (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20140507a.htm):

“The economy has continued to recover from the steep recession of 2008 and 2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth stepped up to an average annual rate of about 3-1/4 percent over the second half of last year, a faster pace than in the first half and during the preceding two years. Although real GDP growth is currently estimated to have paused in the first quarter of this year, I see that pause as mostly reflecting transitory factors, including the effects of the unusually cold and snowy winter weather. With the harsh winter behind us, many recent indicators suggest that a rebound in spending and production is already under way, putting the overall economy on track for solid growth in the current quarter. One cautionary note, though, is that readings on housing activity--a sector that has been recovering since 2011--have remained disappointing so far this year and will bear watching.

Conditions in the labor market have continued to improve. The unemployment rate was 6.3 percent in April, about 1-1/4 percentage points below where it was a year ago. Moreover, gains in payroll employment averaged nearly 200,000 jobs per month over the past year. During the economic recovery so far, payroll employment has increased by about 8-1/2 million jobs since its low point, and the unemployment rate has declined about 3-3/4 percentage points since its peak.

While conditions in the labor market have improved appreciably, they are still far from satisfactory. Even with recent declines in the unemployment rate, it continues to be elevated. Moreover, both the share of the labor force that has been unemployed for more than six months and the number of individuals who work part time but would prefer a full-time job are at historically high levels. In addition, most measures of labor compensation have been rising slowly--another signal that a substantial amount of slack remains in the labor market.

Inflation has been quite low even as the economy has continued to expand. Some of the factors contributing to the softness in inflation over the past year, such as the declines seen in non-oil import prices, will probably be transitory. Importantly, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have remained stable. That said, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recognizes that inflation persistently below 2 percent--the rate that the Committee judges to be most consistent with its dual mandate--could pose risks to economic performance, and we are monitoring inflation developments closely.

Looking ahead, I expect that economic activity will expand at a somewhat faster pace this year than it did last year, that the unemployment rate will continue to decline gradually, and that inflation will begin to move up toward 2 percent. A faster rate of economic growth this year should be supported by reduced restraint from changes in fiscal policy, gains in household net worth from increases in home prices and equity values, a firming in foreign economic growth, and further improvements in household and business confidence as the economy continues to strengthen. Moreover, U.S. financial conditions remain supportive of growth in economic activity and employment.”

In his classic restatement of the Keynesian demand function in terms of “liquidity preference as behavior toward risk,” James Tobin (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1981/tobin-bio.html) identifies the risks of low interest rates in terms of portfolio allocation (Tobin 1958, 86):

“The assumption that investors expect on balance no change in the rate of interest has been adopted for the theoretical reasons explained in section 2.6 rather than for reasons of realism. Clearly investors do form expectations of changes in interest rates and differ from each other in their expectations. For the purposes of dynamic theory and of analysis of specific market situations, the theories of sections 2 and 3 are complementary rather than competitive. The formal apparatus of section 3 will serve just as well for a non-zero expected capital gain or loss as for a zero expected value of g. Stickiness of interest rate expectations would mean that the expected value of g is a function of the rate of interest r, going down when r goes down and rising when r goes up. In addition to the rotation of the opportunity locus due to a change in r itself, there would be a further rotation in the same direction due to the accompanying change in the expected capital gain or loss. At low interest rates expectation of capital loss may push the opportunity locus into the negative quadrant, so that the optimal position is clearly no consols, all cash. At the other extreme, expectation of capital gain at high interest rates would increase sharply the slope of the opportunity locus and the frequency of no cash, all consols positions, like that of Figure 3.3. The stickier the investor's expectations, the more sensitive his demand for cash will be to changes in the rate of interest (emphasis added).”

Tobin (1969) provides more elegant, complete analysis of portfolio allocation in a general equilibrium model. The major point is equally clear in a portfolio consisting of only cash balances and a perpetuity or consol. Let g be the capital gain, r the rate of interest on the consol and re the expected rate of interest. The rates are expressed as proportions. The price of the consol is the inverse of the interest rate, (1+re). Thus, g = [(r/re) – 1]. The critical analysis of Tobin is that at extremely low interest rates there is only expectation of interest rate increases, that is, dre>0, such that there is expectation of capital losses on the consol, dg<0. Investors move into positions combining only cash and no consols. Valuations of risk financial assets would collapse in reversal of long positions in carry trades with short exposures in a flight to cash. There is no exit from a central bank created liquidity trap without risks of financial crash and another global recession. The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent statement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (10

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r→0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Unconventional monetary policy lowers interest rates to increase the present value of cash flows derived from projects of firms, creating the impression of long-term increase in net worth. An attempt to reverse unconventional monetary policy necessarily causes increases in interest rates, creating the opposite perception of declining net worth. As r→∞, W = Y/r →0. There is no exit from unconventional monetary policy without increasing interest rates with resulting pain of financial crisis and adverse effects on production, investment and employment.

In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:

“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.

The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”

Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html).

The key policy is maintaining the fed funds rate between 1 and 1¼ percent with gradual increases. Accelerated increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.

Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). The transcripts of the Fed meetings in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm) analyzed by Jon Hilsenrath demonstrate that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) is that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This is a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.

In remarkable anticipation in 2005, Professor Raghuram G. Rajan (2005) warned of low liquidity and high risks of central bank policy rates approaching the zero bound (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 218-9). Professor Rajan excelled in a distinguished career as an academic economist in finance and was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shefali Anand and Jon Hilsenrath, writing on Oct 13, 2013, on “India’s central banker lobbies Fed,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579133530766149484?KEYWORDS=Rajan), interviewed Raghuram G Rajan, who is the current Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AboutusDisplay.aspx). In this interview, Rajan argues that central banks should avoid unintended consequences on emerging market economies of inflows and outflows of capital triggered by monetary policy. Portfolio reallocations induced by combination of zero interest rates and risk events stimulate carry trades that generate wide swings in world capital flows. Professor Rajan, in an interview with Kartik Goyal of Bloomberg (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-30/rajan-warns-of-global-policy-breakdown-as-emerging-markets-slide.html), warns of breakdown of global policy coordination. Professor Raguram G Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, which is India’s central bank, warned about risks in high valuations of asset prices in an interview with Christopher Jeffery of Central Banking Journal on Aug 6, 2014 (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). Professor Rajan demystifies in the interview “competitive easing” by major central banks as equivalent to competitive devaluation.

The Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced on Jan 15, 2015, the termination of its peg of the exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the euro (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):

“The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has decided to discontinue the minimum exchange rate of

CHF 1.20 per euro with immediate effect and to cease foreign currency purchases associated with enforcing it.”

The SNB also lowered interest rates to nominal negative percentages (http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20150115_tjn/source/ref_20150115_tjn.en.pdf):

“At the same time as discontinuing the minimum exchange rate, the SNB will be lowering the interest rate for balances held on sight deposit accounts to –0.75% from 22 January. The exemption thresholds remain unchanged. Further lowering the interest rate makes Swiss-franc investments considerably less attractive and will mitigate the effects of the decision to discontinue the minimum exchange rate. The target range for the three-month Libor is being lowered by 0.5 percentage points to between –1.25% and –0.25%.”

The Swiss franc rate relative to the euro (CHF/EUR) appreciated 18.7 percent on Jan 15, 2015. The Swiss franc rate relative to the dollar (CHF/USD) appreciated 17.7 percent. Central banks are taking measures in anticipation of the quantitative easing by the European Central Bank.

On Jan 22, 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to implement an “expanded asset purchase program” with combined asset purchases of €60 billion per month “until at least Sep 2016 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html). The objective of the program is that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html):

“Asset purchases provide monetary stimulus to the economy in a context where key ECB interest rates are at their lower bound. They further ease monetary and financial conditions, making access to finance cheaper for firms and households. This tends to support investment and consumption, and ultimately contributes to a return of inflation rates towards 2%.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, explains the coordination of asset purchases with NCBs (National Central Banks) of the euro area and risk sharing (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“In March 2015 the Eurosystem will start to purchase euro-denominated investment-grade securities issued by euro area governments and agencies and European institutions in the secondary market. The purchases of securities issued by euro area governments and agencies will be based on the Eurosystem NCBs’ shares in the ECB’s capital key. Some additional eligibility criteria will be applied in the case of countries under an EU/IMF adjustment programme. As regards the additional asset purchases, the Governing Council retains control over all the design features of the programme and the ECB will coordinate the purchases, thereby safeguarding the singleness of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The Eurosystem will make use of decentralised implementation to mobilise its resources. With regard to the sharing of hypothetical losses, the Governing Council decided that purchases of securities of European institutions (which will be 12% of the additional asset purchases, and which will be purchased by NCBs) will be subject to loss sharing. The rest of the NCBs’ additional asset purchases will not be subject to loss sharing. The ECB will hold 8% of the additional asset purchases. This implies that 20% of the additional asset purchases will be subject to a regime of risk sharing.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, rejected the possibility of seigniorage in the new asset purchase program, or central bank financing of fiscal expansion (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“As I just said, it would be a big mistake if countries were to consider that the presence of this programme might be an incentive to fiscal expansion. They would undermine the confidence, so it’s not directed to monetary financing at all. Actually, it’s been designed as to avoid any monetary financing.”

The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, does not find effects of monetary policy in inflating asset prices (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html):

“On the first question, we monitor closely any potential instance of risk to financial stability. So we're very alert to that risk. So far we don't see bubbles. There may be some local episodes of certain specific markets where prices are going up fast. But to have a bubble, besides having that, one should also identify, detect an increase, dramatic increase in leverage or in bank credit, and we don't see that now. However, we, as I said, we are alert. If bubbles are of a local nature, they should be addressed by local instruments, namely macro-prudential instruments rather than by monetary policy.”

The DAX index of German equities increased 1.3 percent on Jan 22, 2015 and 2.1 percent on Jan 23, 2015. The euro depreciated from EUR 1.1611/USD (EUR 0.8613/USD) on Wed Jan 21, 2015, to EUR 1.1206/USD (EUR 0.8924/USD) on Fri Jan 23, 2015, or 3.6 percent. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar.

Dan Strumpf and Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, writing on “Fed’s Yellen: Stock Valuations ‘Generally are Quite High,’” on May 6, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-cites-progress-on-bank-regulation-1430918155?tesla=y ), quote Chair Yellen at open conversation with Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, finding “equity-market valuations” as “quite high” with “potential dangers” in bond valuations. The DJIA fell 0.5 percent on May 6, 2015, after the comments and then increased 0.5 percent on May 7, 2015 and 1.5 percent on May 8, 2015.

Fri May 1

Mon 4

Tue 5

Wed 6

Thu 7

Fri 8

DJIA

18024.06

-0.3%

1.0%

18070.40

0.3%

0.3%

17928.20

-0.5%

-0.8%

17841.98

-1.0%

-0.5%

17924.06

-0.6%

0.5%

18191.11

0.9%

1.5%

There are two approaches in theory considered by Bordo (2012Nov20) and Bordo and Lane (2013). The first approach is in the classical works of Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (1963a, 1987) and Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer (1973). There is a similar approach in Tobin (1969). Friedman and Schwartz (1963a, 66) trace the effects of expansionary monetary policy into increasing initially financial asset prices: “It seems plausible that both nonbank and bank holders of redundant balances will turn first to securities comparable to those they have sold, say, fixed-interest coupon, low-risk obligations. But as they seek to purchase these they will tend to bid up the prices of those issues. Hence they, and also other holders not involved in the initial central bank open-market transactions, will look farther afield: the banks, to their loans; the nonbank holders, to other categories of securities-higher risk fixed-coupon obligations, equities, real property, and so forth.”

The second approach is by the Austrian School arguing that increases in asset prices can become bubbles if monetary policy allows their financing with bank credit. Professor Michael D. Bordo provides clear thought and empirical evidence on the role of “expansionary monetary policy” in inflating asset prices (Bordo2012Nov20, Bordo and Lane 2013). Bordo and Lane (2013) provide revealing narrative of historical episodes of expansionary monetary policy. Bordo and Lane (2013) conclude that policies of depressing interest rates below the target rate or growth of money above the target influences higher asset prices, using a panel of 18 OECD countries from 1920 to 2011. Bordo (2012Nov20) concludes: “that expansionary money is a significant trigger” and “central banks should follow stable monetary policies…based on well understood and credible monetary rules.” Taylor (2007, 2009) explains the housing boom and financial crisis in terms of expansionary monetary policy. Professor Martin Feldstein (2016), at Harvard University, writing on “A Federal Reserve oblivious to its effects on financial markets,” on Jan 13, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-federal-reserve-oblivious-to-its-effect-on-financial-markets-1452729166), analyzes how unconventional monetary policy drove values of risk financial assets to high levels. Quantitative easing and zero interest rates distorted calculation of risks with resulting vulnerabilities in financial markets.

Another hurdle of exit from zero interest rates is “competitive easing” that Professor Raghuram Rajan, governor of the Reserve Bank of India, characterizes as disguised “competitive devaluation” (http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/interview/2358995/raghuram-rajan-on-the-dangers-of-asset-prices-policy-spillovers-and-finance-in-india). The fed has been considering increasing interest rates. The European Central Bank (ECB) announced, on Mar 5, 2015, the beginning on Mar 9, 2015 of its quantitative easing program denominated as Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP), consisting of “combined monthly purchases of EUR 60 bn [billion] in public and private sector securities” (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/liq/html/pspp.en.html). Expectation of increasing interest rates in the US together with euro rates close to zero or negative cause revaluation of the dollar (or devaluation of the euro and of most currencies worldwide). US corporations suffer currency translation losses of their foreign transactions and investments (http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Pronouncement_C/SummaryPage&cid=900000010318) while the US becomes less competitive in world trade (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c)). The DJIA fell 1.5 percent on Mar 6, 2015 and the dollar revalued 2.2 percent from Mar 5 to Mar 6, 2015. The euro has devalued 36.4 percent relative to the dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Jun 1, 2018.

Fri 27 Feb

Mon 3/2

Tue 3/3

Wed 3/4

Thu 3/5

Fri 3/6

USD/ EUR

1.1197

1.6%

0.0%

1.1185

0.1%

0.1%

1.1176

0.2%

0.1%

1.1081

1.0%

0.9%

1.1030

1.5%

0.5%

1.0843

3.2%

1.7%

Chair Yellen explained the removal of the word “patience” from the advanced guidance at the press conference following the FOMC meeting on Mar 18, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150318.pdf):

“In other words, just because we removed the word “patient” from the statement doesn’t mean we are going to be impatient. Moreover, even after the initial increase in the target funds rate, our policy is likely to remain highly accommodative to support continued progress toward our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.”

Exchange rate volatility is increasing in response of “impatience” in financial markets with monetary policy guidance and measures:

Fri Mar 6

Mon 9

Tue 10

Wed 11

Thu 12

Fri 13

USD/ EUR

1.0843

3.2%

1.7%

1.0853

-0.1%

-0.1%

1.0700

1.3%

1.4%

1.0548

2.7%

1.4%

1.0637

1.9%

-0.8%

1.0497

3.2%

1.3%

Fri Mar 13

Mon 16

Tue 17

Wed 18

Thu 19

Fri 20

USD/ EUR

1.0497

3.2%

1.3%

1.0570

-0.7%

-0.7%

1.0598

-1.0%

-0.3%

1.0864

-3.5%

-2.5%

1.0661

-1.6%

1.9%

1.0821

-3.1%

-1.5%

Fri Apr 24

Mon 27

Tue 28

Wed 29

Thu 30

May Fri 1

USD/ EUR

1.0874

-0.6%

-0.4%

1.0891

-0.2%

-0.2%

1.0983

-1.0%

-0.8%

1.1130

-2.4%

-1.3%

1.1223

-3.2%

-0.8%

1.1199

-3.0%

0.2%

In a speech at Brown University on May 22, 2015, Chair Yellen stated (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150522a.htm):

“For this reason, if the economy continues to improve as I expect, I think it will be appropriate at some point this year to take the initial step to raise the federal funds rate target and begin the process of normalizing monetary policy. To support taking this step, however, I will need to see continued improvement in labor market conditions, and I will need to be reasonably confident that inflation will move back to 2 percent over the medium term. After we begin raising the federal funds rate, I anticipate that the pace of normalization is likely to be gradual. The various headwinds that are still restraining the economy, as I said, will likely take some time to fully abate, and the pace of that improvement is highly uncertain.”

The US dollar appreciated 3.8 percent relative to the euro in the week of May 22, 2015:

Fri May 15

Mon 18

Tue 19

Wed 20

Thu 21

Fri 22

USD/ EUR

1.1449

-2.2%

-0.3%

1.1317

1.2%

1.2%

1.1150

2.6%

1.5%

1.1096

3.1%

0.5%

1.1113

2.9%

-0.2%

1.1015

3.8%

0.9%

The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Christine Lagarde, warned on Jun 4, 2015, that: (http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2015/06/04/u-s-economy-returning-to-growth-but-pockets-of-vulnerability/):

“The Fed’s first rate increase in almost 9 years is being carefully prepared and telegraphed. Nevertheless, regardless of the timing, higher US policy rates could still result in significant market volatility with financial stability consequences that go well beyond US borders. I weighing these risks, we think there is a case for waiting to raise rates until there are more tangible signs of wage or price inflation than are currently evident. Even after the first rate increase, a gradual rise in the federal fund rates will likely be appropriate.”

The President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, warned on Jun 3, 2015 that (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150603.en.html):

“But certainly one lesson is that we should get used to periods of higher volatility. At very low levels of interest rates, asset prices tend to show higher volatility…the Governing Council was unanimous in its assessment that we should look through these developments and maintain a steady monetary policy stance.”

The Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet L. Yellen, stated on Jul 10, 2015 that (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150710a.htm):

“Based on my outlook, I expect that it will be appropriate at some point later this year to take the first step to raise the federal funds rate and thus begin normalizing monetary policy. But I want to emphasize that the course of the economy and inflation remains highly uncertain, and unanticipated developments could delay or accelerate this first step. I currently anticipate that the appropriate pace of normalization will be gradual, and that monetary policy will need to be highly supportive of economic activity for quite some time. The projections of most of my FOMC colleagues indicate that they have similar expectations for the likely path of the federal funds rate. But, again, both the course of the economy and inflation are uncertain. If progress toward our employment and inflation goals is more rapid than expected, it may be appropriate to remove monetary policy accommodation more quickly. However, if progress toward our goals is slower than anticipated, then the Committee may move more slowly in normalizing policy.”

There is essentially the same view in the Testimony of Chair Yellen in delivering the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jul 15, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20150715a.htm).

At the press conference after the meeting of the FOMC on Sep 17, 2015, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20150917.pdf 4):

“The outlook abroad appears to have become more uncertain of late, and heightened concerns about growth in China and other emerging market economies have led to notable volatility in financial markets. Developments since our July meeting, including the drop in equity prices, the further appreciation of the dollar, and a widening in risk spreads, have tightened overall financial conditions to some extent. These developments may restrain U.S. economic activity somewhat and are likely to put further downward pressure on inflation in the near term. Given the significant economic and financial interconnections between the United States and the rest of the world, the situation abroad bears close watching.”

Some equity markets fell on Fri Sep 18, 2015:

Fri Sep 11

Mon 14

Tue 15

Wed 16

Thu 17

Fri 18

DJIA

16433.09

2.1%

0.6%

16370.96

-0.4%

-0.4%

16599.85

1.0%

1.4%

16739.95

1.9%

0.8%

16674.74

1.5%

-0.4%

16384.58

-0.3%

-1.7%

Nikkei 225

18264.22

2.7%

-0.2%

17965.70

-1.6%

-1.6%

18026.48

-1.3%

0.3%

18171.60

-0.5%

0.8%

18432.27

0.9%

1.4%

18070.21

-1.1%

-2.0%

DAX

10123.56

0.9%

-0.9%

10131.74

0.1%

0.1%

10188.13

0.6%

0.6%

10227.21

1.0%

0.4%

10229.58

1.0%

0.0%

9916.16

-2.0%

-3.1%

Frank H. Knight (1963, 233), in Risk, uncertainty and profit, distinguishes between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty. Chair Yellen, in a lecture on “Inflation dynamics and monetary policy,” on Sep 24, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm), states that (emphasis added):

· “The economic outlook, of course, is highly uncertain”

· “Considerable uncertainties also surround the outlook for economic activity”

· “Given the highly uncertain nature of the outlook…”

Is there a “science” or even “art” of central banking under this extreme uncertainty in which policy does not generate higher volatility of money, income, prices and values of financial assets?

Lingling Wei, writing on Oct 23, 2015, on China’s central bank moves to spur economic growth,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-central-bank-cuts-rates-1445601495), analyzes the reduction by the People’s Bank of China (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/ http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130437/index.html) of borrowing and lending rates of banks by 50 basis points and reserve requirements of banks by 50 basis points. Paul Vigna, writing on Oct 23, 2015, on “Stocks rally out of correction territory on latest central bank boost,” published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/10/23/stocks-rally-out-of-correction-territory-on-latest-central-bank-boost/), analyzes the rally in financial markets following the statement on Oct 22, 2015, by the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi of consideration of new quantitative measures in Dec 2015 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0814riKW25k&rel=0) and the reduction of bank lending/deposit rates and reserve requirements of banks by the People’s Bank of China on Oct 23, 2015. The dollar revalued 2.8 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23, 2015, following the intended easing of the European Central Bank. The DJIA rose 2.8 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23 and the DAX index of German equities rose 5.4 percent from Oct 21 to Oct 23, 2015.

Fri Oct 16

Mon 19

Tue 20

Wed 21

Thu 22

Fri 23

USD/ EUR

1.1350

0.1%

0.3%

1.1327

0.2%

0.2%

1.1348

0.0%

-0.2%

1.1340

0.1%

0.1%

1.1110

2.1%

2.0%

1.1018

2.9%

0.8%

DJIA

17215.97

0.8%

0.4%

17230.54

0.1%

0.1%

17217.11

0.0%

-0.1%

17168.61

-0.3%

-0.3%

17489.16

1.6%

1.9%

17646.70

2.5%

0.9%

Dow Global

2421.58

0.3%

0.6%

2414.33

-0.3%

-0.3%

2411.03

-0.4%

-0.1%

2411.27

-0.4%

0.0%

2434.79

0.5%

1.0%

2458.13

1.5%

1.0%

DJ Asia Pacific

1402.31

1.1%

0.3%

1398.80

-0.3%

-0.3%

1395.06

-0.5%

-0.3%

1402.68

0.0%

0.5%

1396.03

-0.4%

-0.5%

1415.50

0.9%

1.4%

Nikkei 225

18291.80

-0.8%

1.1%

18131.23

-0.9%

-0.9%

18207.15

-0.5%

0.4%

18554.28

1.4%

1.9%

18435.87

0.8%

-0.6%

18825.30

2.9%

2.1%

Shanghai

3391.35

6.5%

1.6%

3386.70

-0.1%

-0.1%

3425.33

1.0%

1.1%

3320.68

-2.1%

-3.1%

3368.74

-0.7%

1.4%

3412.43

0.6%

1.3%

DAX

10104.43

0.1%

0.4%

10164.31

0.6%

0.6%

10147.68

0.4%

-0.2%

10238.10

1.3%

0.9%

10491.97

3.8%

2.5%

10794.54

6.8%

2.9%

Ben Leubsdorf, writing on “Fed’s Yellen: December is “Live Possibility” for First Rate Increase,” on Nov 4, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-december-is-live-possibility-for-first-rate-increase-1446654282) quotes Chair Yellen that a rate increase in “December would be a live possibility.” The remark of Chair Yellen was during a hearing on supervision and regulation before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20151104a.htm) and a day before the release of the employment situation report for Oct 2015 (Section I). The dollar revalued 2.4 percent during the week. The euro has devalued 36.4 percent relative to the dollar from the high on Jul 15, 2008 to Jun 1, 2018.

Fri Oct 30

Mon 2

Tue 3

Wed 4

Thu 5

Fri 6

USD/ EUR

1.1007

0.1%

-0.3%

1.1016

-0.1%

-0.1%

1.0965

0.4%

0.5%

1.0867

1.3%

0.9%

1.0884

1.1%

-0.2%

1.0742

2.4%

1.3%

The release on Nov 18, 2015 of the minutes of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) meeting held on Oct 28, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20151028.htm) states:

“Most participants anticipated that, based on their assessment of the current economic situation and their outlook for economic activity, the labor market, and inflation, these conditions [for interest rate increase] could well be met by the time of the next meeting. Nonetheless, they emphasized that the actual decision would depend on the implications for the medium-term economic outlook of the data received over the upcoming intermeeting period… It was noted that beginning the normalization process relatively soon would make it more likely that the policy trajectory after liftoff could be shallow.”

Markets could have interpreted a symbolic increase in the fed funds rate at the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 15-16, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm) followed by “shallow” increases, explaining the sharp increase in stock market values and appreciation of the dollar after the release of the minutes on Nov 18, 2015:

Fri Nov 13

Mon 16

Tue 17

Wed 18

Thu 19

Fri 20

USD/ EUR

1.0774

-0.3%

0.4%

1.0686

0.8%

0.8%

1.0644

1.2%

0.4%

1.0660

1.1%

-0.2%

1.0735

0.4%

-0.7%

1.0647

1.2%

0.8%

DJIA

17245.24

-3.7%

-1.2%

17483.01

1.4%

1.4%

17489.50

1.4%

0.0%

17737.16

2.9%

1.4%

17732.75

2.8%

0.0%

17823.81

3.4%

0.5%

DAX

10708.40

-2.5%

-0.7%

10713.23

0.0%

0.0%

10971.04

2.5%

2.4%

10959.95

2.3%

-0.1%

11085.44

3.5%

1.1%

11119.83

3.8%

0.3%

In testimony before The Joint Economic Committee of Congress on Dec 3, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20151203a.htm), Chair Yellen reiterated that the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) “anticipates that even after employment and inflation are near mandate-consistent levels, economic condition may, for some time, warrant keeping the target federal funds rate below the Committee views as normal in the longer run.” Todd Buell and Katy Burne, writing on “Draghi says ECB could step up stimulus efforts if necessary,” on Dec 4, 2015, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/draghi-says-ecb-could-step-up-stimulus-efforts-if-necessary-1449252934), analyze that the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, reassured financial markets that the ECB will increase stimulus if required to raise inflation the euro area to targets. The USD depreciated 3.1 percent on Thu Dec 3, 2015 after weaker than expected measures by the European Central Bank. DJIA fell 1.4 percent on Dec 3 and increased 2.1 percent on Dec 4. DAX fell 3.6 percent on Dec 3.

Fri Nov 27

Mon 30

Tue 1

Wed 2

Thu 3

Fri 4

USD/ EUR

1.0594

0.5%

0.2%

1.0565

0.3%

0.3%

1.0634

-0.4%

-0.7%

1.0616

-0.2%

0.2%

1.0941

-3.3%

-3.1%

1.0885

-2.7%

0.5%

DJIA

17798.49

-0.1%

-0.1%

17719.92

-0.4%

-0.4%

17888.35

0.5%

1.0%

17729.68

-0.4%

-0.9%

17477.67

-1.8%

-1.4%

17847.63

0.3%

2.1%

DAX

11293.76

1.6%

-0.2%

11382.23

0.8%

0.8%

11261.24

-0.3%

-1.1%

11190.02

-0.9%

-0.6%

10789.24

-4.5%

-3.6%

10752.10

-4.8%

-0.3%

At the press conference following the meeting of the FOMC on Dec 16, 2015, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20151216.pdf page 8):

“And we recognize that monetary policy operates with lags. We would like to be able to move in a prudent, and as we've emphasized, gradual manner. It's been a long time since the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates, and I think it's prudent to be able to watch what the impact is on financial conditions and spending in the economy and moving in a timely fashion enables us to do this.”

The implication of this statement is that the state of the art is not accurate in analyzing the effects of monetary policy on financial markets and economic activity. The US dollar appreciated and equities fluctuated:

Fri Dec 11

Mon 14

Tue 15

Wed 16

Thu 17

Fri 18

USD/ EUR

1.0991

-1.0%

-0.4%

1.0993

0.0%

0.0%

1.0932

0.5%

0.6%

1.0913

0.7%

0.2%

1.0827

1.5%

0.8%

1.0868

1.1%

-0.4%

DJIA

17265.21

-3.3%

-1.8%

17368.50

0.6%

0.6%

17524.91

1.5%

0.9%

17749.09

2.8%

1.3%

17495.84

1.3%

-1.4%

17128.55

-0.8%

-2.1%

DAX

10340.06

-3.8%

-2.4%

10139.34

-1.9%

-1.9%

10450.38

-1.1%

3.1%

10469.26

1.2%

0.2%

10738.12

3.8%

2.6%

10608.19

2.6%

-1.2%

On January 29, 2016, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan introduced a new policy to attain the “price stability target of 2 percent at the earliest possible time” (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf). The new framework consists of three dimensions: quantity, quality and interest rate. The interest rate dimension consists of rates paid to current accounts that financial institutions hold at the Bank of Japan of three tiers zero, positive and minus 0.1 percent. The quantitative dimension consists of increasing the monetary base at the annual rate of 80 trillion yen. The qualitative dimension consists of purchases by the Bank of Japan of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), exchange traded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITS). The yen devalued sharply relative to the dollar and world equity markets soared after the new policy announced on Jan 29, 2016:

Fri 22

Mon 25

Tue 26

Wed 27

Thu 28

Fri 29

JPY/ USD

118.77

-1.5%

-0.9%

118.30

0.4%

0.4%

118.42

0.3%

-0.1%

118.68

0.1%

-0.2%

118.82

0.0%

-0.1%

121.13

-2.0%

-1.9%

DJIA

16093.51

0.7%

1.3%

15885.22

-1.3%

-1.3%

16167.23

0.5%

1.8%

15944.46

-0.9%

-1.4%

16069.64

-0.1%

0.8%

16466.30

2.3%

2.5%

Nikkei

16958.53

-1.1%

5.9%

17110.91

0.9%

0.9%

16708.90

-1.5%

-2.3%

17163.92

1.2%

2.7%

17041.45

0.5%

-0.7%

17518.30

3.3%

2.8%

Shanghai

2916.56

0.5%

1.3

2938.51

0.8%

0.8%

2749.79

-5.7%

-6.4%

2735.56

-6.2%

-0.5%

2655.66

-8.9%

-2.9%

2737.60

-6.1%

3.1%

DAX

9764.88

2.3%

2.0%

9736.15

-0.3%

-0.3%

9822.75

0.6%

0.9%

9880.82

1.2%

0.6%

9639.59

-1.3%

-2.4%

9798.11

0.3%

1.6%

In testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Feb 10-11, 2016, Chair Yellen (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20160210a.htm) states: “U.S. real gross domestic product is estimated to have increased about 1-3/4 percent in 2015. Over the course of the year, subdued foreign growth and the appreciation of the dollar restrained net exports. In the fourth quarter of last year, growth in the gross domestic product is reported to have slowed more sharply, to an annual rate of just 3/4 percent; again, growth was held back by weak net exports as well as by a negative contribution from inventory investment.”

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Yellen Says Fed Should Be Prepared to Use Negative Rates if Needed,” on Feb 11, 2016, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-reiterates-concerns-about-risks-to-economy-in-senate-testimony-1455203865), analyzes the statement of Chair Yellen in Congress that the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) is considering negative interest rates on bank reserves. The Wall Street Journal provides yields of two and ten-year sovereign bonds with negative interest rates on shorter maturities where central banks pay negative interest rates on excess bank reserves:

Sovereign Yields 2/12/16

Japan

Germany

USA

2 Year

-0.168

-0.498

0.694

10 Year

0.076

0.262

1.744

On Mar 10, 2016, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced (1) reduction of the refinancing rate by 5 basis points to 0.00 percent; decrease the marginal lending rate to 0.25 percent; reduction of the deposit facility rate to 0,40 percent; increase of the monthly purchase of assets to €80 billion; include nonbank corporate bonds in assets eligible for purchases; and new long-term refinancing operations (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160310.en.html). The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, stated in the press conference (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2016/html/is160310.en.html): “How low can we go? Let me say that rates will stay low, very low, for a long period of time, and well past the horizon of our purchases…We don’t anticipate that it will be necessary to reduce rates further. Of course, new facts can change the situation and the outlook.”

The dollar devalued relative to the euro and open stock markets traded lower after the announcement on Mar 10, 2016, but stocks rebounded on Mar 11:

Fri 4

Mon 7

Tue 8

Wed 9

Thu10

Fri 11

USD/ EUR

1.1006

-0.7%

-0.4%

1.1012

-0.1%

-0.1%

1.1013

-0.1%

0.0%

1.0999

0.1%

0.1%

1.1182

-1.6%

-1.7%

1.1151

-1.3%

0.3%

DJIA

17006.77

2.2%

0.4%

17073.95

0.4%

0.4%

16964.10

-0.3%

-0.6%

17000.36

0.0%

0.2%

16995.13

-0.1%

0.0%

17213.31

1.2%

1.3%

DAX

9824.17

3.3%

0.7%

9778.93

-0.5%

0.5%

9692.82

-1.3%

-0.9%

9723.09

-1.0%

0.3%

9498.15

-3.3%

-2.3%

9831.13

0.1%

3.5%

At the press conference after the FOMC meeting on Sep 21, 2016, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20160921.pdf ): “However, the economic outlook is inherently uncertain.” In the address to the Jackson Hole symposium on Aug 26, 2016, Chair Yellen states: “I believe the case for an increase in in federal funds rate has strengthened in recent months…And, as ever, the economic outlook is uncertain, and so monetary policy is not on a preset course” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160826a.htm). In a speech at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, on Jun 6, 2016 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20160606a.htm), Chair Yellen finds that “there is considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook.” There are fifteen references to this uncertainty in the text of 18 pages double-spaced. In the Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress on Jun 21, 2016, Chair Yellen states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20160621a.htm), “Of course, considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook remains.” Frank H. Knight (1963, 233), in Risk, uncertainty and profit, distinguishes between measurable risk and unmeasurable uncertainty. Is there a “science” or even “art” of central banking under this extreme uncertainty in which policy does not generate higher volatility of money, income, prices and values of financial assets?

What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 1½ to 1¾ percent with gradual consideration of further rate increases with all measures depending on “incoming data” (https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20180502a.htm): “In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant further gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data” (emphasis added). The FOMC is initiating the “normalization” or reduction of the balance sheet of securities held outright for monetary policy.

The decisions of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) depend on incoming data. There are unexpected swings in valuations of risk financial assets by “carry trades” from interest rates below inflation to exposures in stocks, commodities and their derivatives. Another issue is the unexpected “data surprises” such as the sharp decline in 12 months rates of increase of real disposable income, or what is left after taxes and inflation, and the price indicator of the FOMC, prices of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) excluding food and energy. There is no science or art of monetary policy that can deal with this uncertainty.

Real Disposable Personal Income

Real Personal Consumption Expenditures

Prices of Personal Consumption Expenditures

PCE Prices Excluding Food and Energy

∆%12M

∆%12M

∆%12M

∆%12M

6/2017

6/2017

6/2017

6/2017

1.2

2.4

1.4

1.5

Professor Ronald I. McKinnon (2013Oct27), writing on “Tapering without tears—how to end QE3,” on Oct 27, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304799404579153693500945608?KEYWORDS=Ronald+I+McKinnon), finds that the major central banks of the world have fallen into a “near-zero-interest-rate trap.” World economic conditions are weak such that exit from the zero interest rate trap could have adverse effects on production, investment and employment. The maintenance of interest rates near zero creates long-term near stagnation. The proposal of Professor McKinnon is credible, coordinated increase of policy interest rates toward 2 percent. Professor John B. Taylor at Stanford University, writing on “Economic failures cause political polarization,” on Oct 28, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303442004579121010753999086?KEYWORDS=John+B+Taylor), analyzes that excessive risks induced by near zero interest rates in 2003-2004 caused the financial crash. Monetary policy continued in similar paths during and after the global recession with resulting political polarization worldwide.

Table IV-2 provides economic projections of governors of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and regional presidents of Federal Reserve Banks released at the meeting of Mar 21, 2018. The Fed releases the data with careful explanations (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20160921.pdf). Columns “∆% GDP,” “∆% PCE Inflation” and “∆% Core PCE Inflation” are changes “from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated.” The GDP report for IQ2018 is analyzed in (Section I and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html) and the PCE inflation data from the report on personal income and outlays in Section IV (Section IV https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the estimate of IQ2018 GDP (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/dollar-appreciation-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/mediocre-cyclical-united-states_31.html). PCE inflation is the index of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) of the report of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on “Personal Income and Outlays” http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm), which is analyzed in Section IV (Section IV https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The report on “Personal Income and Outlays” was released May 31, 2018 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). PCE core inflation consists of PCE inflation excluding food and energy. Column “UNEMP %” is the rate of unemployment measured as the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the Employment Situation Report with the civilian unemployment rate in the first Friday of every month, which is analyzed in this blog. The report for Apr was released on May 4, 2018 (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/twenty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/twenty-two-million-unemployed-or.html). “The longer-run projections are the rates of growth, unemployment, and inflation to which a policymaker expects the economy to converge over time—maybe in five or six years—in the absence of further shocks and under appropriate monetary policy” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20131218.pdf).

It is instructive to focus on 2018 and 2019 because 2020 and longer term are too far away. There is not much information even on what will happen in 2018-2019 and beyond. The central tendency should provide reasonable approximation of the view of the majority of members of the FOMC but the second block of numbers provides the range of projections by FOMC participants. The first row for each year 2018-2020 shows the projection introduced after the meeting of Mar 21, 2018 and the second row “PR” the projection of the Dec 13, 2017 meeting. The projections for 2014 are those released in the Sep 2014 and Dec 2014 meetings. The projections for 2016 are those released in the Dec 2016 and Sep 2016 meetings. There are three changes in the view.

1. Growth “∆% GDP.” The FOMC projects growth in 2018 at 2.2 to 2.6 percent in the Dec 13 meeting and at 2.6 to 3.0 in the Mar 21 meeting. The FOMC projects growth in 2019 at 1.9 to 2.3 percent in the Dec 13 meeting and at 2.2 to 2.6 percent in the Mar 21 meeting. The FOMC projects growth at 1.7 to 2.0 percent in the Dec 13 meeting and at 1.8 to 2.0 percent in the Mar 21 meeting.

2. Rate of Unemployment “UNEM%.” The FOMC changed the forecast of the rate of unemployment for 2016 from 4.7 to 4.9 percent at the meeting on Sep 21, 2016 to 4.7 to 4.8 percent at the meeting on Dec 14, 2016. Projections of the rate of unemployment are moving closer to around 5 percent or lower with 4.3 to 4.6 percent in 2018 after the meeting on Mar 15, 2017, decreasing to 4.0 to 4.3 at the Jun 14, 2017 meeting and 4.0 to 4.2 at the Sep 20, 2017 meeting. The FOMC projects the rate of unemployment in 2017 at 4.2 to 4.3 in the Sep 20, 2017 meeting and at 4.1 percent in the Dec 13, 2017 meeting. The FOMC projects the rate of unemployment at 4.0 to 4.2 in 2018 in the Sep 20, 2017 meeting and at 3.7 to 4.0 in the Dec 13, 2017 meeting. The FOMC projects the rate of unemployment at 3.9 to 4.4 in 2019 in the Sep 20, 2017 meeting and at 3.6 to 4.0 in the Dec 13, 2017 meeting. The FOMC projects the rate of unemployment in 2018 at 3.7 to 4.0 in the Dec 13 meeting and at 3.6 to 3.8 in the Mar 21 meeting. The FOMC projects the rate of unemployment in 2019 at 3.6 to 4.0 in the Dec 13 meeting and at 3.4 to 3.7 in the Mar 21 meeting. The FOMC projects the rate of unemployment in 2020 at 3.6 to 4.2 in the Dec 13 meeting and at 3.5 to 3.8 in the Mar 21 meeting.

3. Inflation “∆% PCE Inflation.” The FOMC decreased the forecast prices of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation for 2018 to 1.8 to 2.0 percent at the meeting on Mar 21, 2017. There are projections exceeding 2.0 percent in the central tendency: 2.0 to 2.2 in 2019 at the Mar 21 meeting and 2.1 to 2.2 in the Mar 21 meeting.

4. Core Inflation “∆% Core PCE Inflation.” Core inflation is PCE inflation excluding food and energy. There is similar mild inflation in the projection for 2016 to 1.7 to 1.8 percent at the meeting on Dec 14, 2016. In 2017, there is decrease in the projection from 1.8 to 1.9 percent at the meeting on Mar 15, 2017 to 1.6 to 1.7 percent at the meeting on Jun 14, 2017 and 1.5 to 1.6 percent at the meeting on Sep 20, 2017. The projection for 2018 in the Dec 13, 2017 meeting is 1.7 to 1.9 percent, increasing to 1.8 to 2.0 at the Mar 21 meeting. The rate of change of the core PCE in 2019 is at 2.0 to 2.2 in the central tendency in the Mar 21 meeting and at 2.1 to 2.2 in 2020 at the Mar 21 meeting.

Table IV-2, US, Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in FOMC, Dec 13, 2017 and Mar 21, 2018

∆% GDP

UNEM %

∆% PCE Inflation

∆% Core PCE Inflation

Central
Tendency

2014 
Sep PR

2.3 to 2.4
2.0 to 2.2

5.8
5.9 to 6.0

1.2 to 1.3
1.5 to 1.7

1.5 to 1.6
1.5 to 1.6

2015

Sep PR

2.1

2.0 to 2.3

5.0

5.0 to 5.1

0.4

0.3 to 0.5

1.3

1.3 to 1.4

2016

Sep PR

1.8 to 1.9

1.7 to 1.9

4.7 to 4.8

4.7 to 4.9

1.5

1.2 to 1.4

1.7 to 1.8

1.6 to 1.8

2017

Sep PR**

2.4 to 2.5

2.2 to 2.5

4.1

4.2 to 4.3

1.6 to 1.7

1.5 to 1.6

1.5

1.5 to 1.6

2018*

Dec PR**

2.6 to 3.0

2.2 to 2.6

3.6 to 3.8

3.7 to 4.0

1.8 to 2.0

1.7 to 1.9

1.8 to 2.0

1.7 to 1.9

2019*

De PR**

2.2 to 2.6

1.9 to 2.3

3.4 to 3.7

3.6 to 4.0

2.0 to 2.2

2.0

2.0 to 2.2

2.0

2020*

Dec PR**

1.8 to 2.0

1.7 to 2.0

3.5. to 3.8

3.6 to 4.2

2.1 to 2.2

2.0 to 2.1

2.1 to 2.2

2.0 to 2.1

Longer Run

Dec PR**

1.8 to 2.0

1.8 to 1.9

4.3 to 4.7

4.4 to 4.7

2.0

2.0

NA

Range

2014
Sep PR

NA
1.8 to 2.3

5.7 to 5.8
5.7 to 6.1

1.2 to 1.6
1.5 to 1.8

1.5 to 1.6
1.5 to 1.8

2015

Sep PR

2.0 to 2.2

1.9 to 2.5

5.0

4.9 to 5.2

0.3 to 0.5

0.3 to 1.0

1.2 to 1.4

1.2 to 1.7

2016

Sep PR

1.8 to 2.0

1.7 to 2.0

4.7 to 4.8

4.7 to 4.9

1.5 to 1.6

1.1 to 1.7

1.6 to 1.8

1.5 to 2.0

2017

Sep PR**

2.4 to 2.6

2.2 to 2.7

4.1

4.2 to 4.5

1.5 to 1.7

1.5 to 1.7

1.4 to 1.5

1.4 to 1.7

2018*

Dec PR**

2.5 to 3.0

2.2 to 2.8

3.6 to 4.0

3.6 to 4.0

1.8 to 2.1

1.7 to 2.1

1.8 to 2.1

1.7 to 2.0

2019*

Dec PR**

2.0 to 2.8

1.7 to 2.4

3.3 to 4.2

3.5 to 4.2

1.9 to 2.3

1.8 to 2.3

1.9 to 2.3

1.8 to 2.3

2020*

Dec PR**

1.5 to 2.3

1.1 to 2.2

3.3 to 4.4

3.5 to 4.5

2.0 to 2.3

1.9 to 2.2

2.0 to 2.3

1.9 to 2.3

Longer Run

Dec PR**

1.7 to 2.2

1.7 to 2.2

4.2 to 4.8

4.3 to 5.0

2.0

2.0

NA

Notes: UEM: unemployment; PR: Projection; *PR Mar 2018; **PR Dec 2017

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20160615.htm

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20140917.pdf

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20141217.pdf

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150318.pdf

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150617.pdf

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150917.pdf

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20151216.pdf

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20160316.pdf

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20160921.pdf

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20160921.htm

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20161214.pdf

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20170315.pdf

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20170315.htm

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20170614.pdf

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20170920.pdf

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20171213.pdf

https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20180321.pdf

Another important decision at the FOMC meeting on Jan 25, 2012, is formal specification of the goal of inflation of 2 percent per year but without specific goal for unemployment (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm):

“Following careful deliberations at its recent meetings, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reached broad agreement on the following principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. The Committee intends to reaffirm these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January.

The FOMC is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.

Inflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee's policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals.

The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.

The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the corresponding interval several years earlier.

In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary.  However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. ”

The probable intention of this specific inflation goal is to “anchor” inflationary expectations. Massive doses of monetary policy of promoting growth to reduce unemployment could conflict with inflation control. Economic agents could incorporate inflationary expectations in their decisions. As a result, the rate of unemployment could remain the same but with much higher rate of inflation (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html See Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-116). Strong commitment to maintaining inflation at 2 percent could control expectations of inflation.

The FOMC continues its efforts of increasing transparency that can improve the credibility of its firmness in implementing its dual mandate. Table IV-3 provides the views by participants of the FOMC of the levels at which they expect the fed funds rate in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and the in the longer term. Table IV-3 is also in a chart provided by the FOMC with the number of participants expecting the target of fed funds rate (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20180321.pdf) and in accessible material (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20180321.htm). This table is consistent with the guidance statement of the FOMC that rates will remain at low levels. Most participants find appropriate rates above 2.250 percent in the long-run.

Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Mar 21, 2018

Midpoint of Target Range or Target Level

2017

2018

2019

2020

Longer-run

1.125

2

1.375

14

1.625

2

1

1

1.875

2.125

6

1

2.250

1

2.375

6

2.500

1

2.625

1

1

2

1

2.750

1

4

2.875

5

3.000

5

3.125

2

1

3.250

1

1

3.375

3

5

3.500

1

1

3.625

2

3.750

3.875

1

4.000

4.125

1

4.250

4.375

4.500

4.625

4.750

4.875

1

5.000

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20180321.pdf https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20180321.htm

Additional information is provided in Table IV-4 with the number of participants expecting increasing interest rates in the years from 2015 to 2017. It is evident from Table IV-4 that the prevailing view of the FOMC is for interest rates to continue at low levels until 2015 but with some increase. This view is consistent with the economic projections of low economic growth, relatively high unemployment and subdued inflation provided in Table IV-2. The FOMC states that rates will continue to be low even after return of the economy to potential growth.

Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Sep 17, 2015

Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Fed Funds Rate

Number of Participants

2015

13

2016

3

2017

1

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC

http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150917.pdf

The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) also provide critical information in assessing indexes of prices of personal consumption. There are waves of inflation similar to those worldwide (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html) in inflation of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) in Table IV-5. These waves are in part determined by commodity price shocks originating in the carry trade from zero interest rates to positions in risk financial assets, in particular in commodity futures, which increase the prices of food and energy when there is relaxed risk aversion. Return of risk aversion causes collapse in prices. Resulting fluctuations of prices confuse risk/return decisions, inducing financial instability with adverse financial and economic consequences. The first wave is in Jan-Apr 2011 when headline PCE inflation increased at the average annual equivalent rate of 4.0 percent and PCE inflation excluding food and energy (PCEX) at 1.8 percent. The drivers of inflation were increases in food prices (PCEF) at the annual equivalent rate of 7.8 percent and of energy prices (PCEE) at 30.1 percent. This behavior will prevail under zero interest rates and relaxed risk aversion because of carry trades from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in commodity futures. Portfolio reallocations toward equities or other financial assets cause reversals of exposures in commodities, lowering inflation. The second wave occurred in May-Jun 2011 when risk aversion from the European sovereign risk crisis interrupted the carry trade. PCE prices increased 1.8 percent in annual equivalent and 1.8 percent excluding food and energy. The third wave is captured by the annual equivalent rates in Jul-Sep 2011 of headline PCE inflation of 2.4 percent with subdued PCE inflation excluding food and energy of 2.0 percent while PCE food rose at 6.2 percent and PCE energy increased at 5.3 percent. In the fourth wave in Oct-Dec 2011, increased risk aversion explains the fall of the annual equivalent rate of inflation to 0.8 percent for headline PCE inflation and 1.6 percent for PCEX excluding food and energy. PCEF of prices of food rose at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent in Oct-Dec 2011 while PCEE of prices of energy fell at the annual equivalent rate of 10.3 percent. In the fifth wave in Jan-Mar 2012, headline PCE in annual equivalent was 2.8 percent and 2.4 percent excluding food and energy (PCEX). Energy prices of personal consumption (PCEE) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 14.0 percent because of the jump of 1.9 percent in Feb 2012 followed by 0.8 percent in Mar 2012. In the sixth wave, renewed risk aversion caused reversal of carry trades with headline PCE inflation at the annual equivalent rate of 0.0 percent in Apr-May 2012 while PCE inflation excluding food and energy increased at the annual equivalent rate of 1.8 percent. In the seventh wave, further shocks of risk aversion resulted in headline PCE annual equivalent inflation at 0.0 percent in Jun-Jul 2012 with core PCE excluding food and energy at 1.2 percent. In the eighth wave, temporarily relaxed risk aversion with zero interest rates resulted in central PCE inflation at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Aug-Sep 2012 with PCEX excluding food and energy at 1.2 percent while PCEE energy jumped at 69.5 percent annual equivalent. The program of outright monetary transactions (OTM) of the European Central Bank induced relaxed risk aversion (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html). In the ninth wave, prices collapsed with reversal of carry trade positions in a new episode of risk aversion with central PCE at annual equivalent 1.2 percent in Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 and PCEX at 1.8 percent while energy prices fell at minus 12.1 percent. In the tenth wave, central PCE increased at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Feb 2013, PCEX at 1.2 percent and PCEE at 73.5 percent. In the eleventh wave, renewed risk aversion resulted in decline in annual equivalent of general PCE prices at 1.2 percent in Mar-Apr 2013 while PCEX increased at 1.2 percent and energy prices fell at 31.5 percent. In the twelfth wave, headline PCE increased at 1.4 percent annual equivalent in May-Nov 2013 with PCEX increasing at 1.6 percent, food PCEF decreasing at 0.2 percent and energy PCEE increasing at 4.5 percent. In the thirteenth wave, general PCE increased at annual equivalent 2.1 percent in Dec 2013-Mar 2014 and PCEX at 1.5 percent. PCEE increased at 8.3 percent annual equivalent. In the fourteenth wave, central PCE inflation was 1.8 percent in annual equivalent in Apr-Jul 2014 with PCEX at 2.1 percent and energy prices decreasing at 2.7 percent. In the fifteenth wave, general PCE increased at annual equivalent 0.4 percent in Aug-Oct 2014 while PCEX increased at 1.2 percent. PCEF increased at 2.0 percent while PCEE fell at 15.9 percent. In the sixteenth wave, PCE prices fell at annual equivalent 1.8 percent in Nov-Dec 2014 while PCEX increased at 1.2 percent and energy prices fell at 41.0 percent. In the seventeenth wave, PCE prices fell at 4.7 percent annual equivalent in Jan 2015 while PCEX changed at 0.0 percent. Prices of goods, PCEG, fell at 15.6 percent annual equivalent. Energy prices PCEE fell at 67.3 percent annual equivalent and prices of food PCEF fell at 1.2 percent. In the eighteenth wave in Feb-Apr 2015, annual equivalent inflation was 1.6 percent for central PCE and 1.6 percent excluding food and energy with energy prices increasing at 4.8 percent and food prices decreasing at 1.6 percent. In the nineteenth wave, central PCE increased at 2.0 percent in May-Jul 2015 with PCEX increasing at 1.2 percent and PCEG at 2.4 percent while energy PCEE increased at 17.2 percent. In the twentieth wave, prices of PCE changed at 0.0 percent in Aug-Sep 2015 with PCEX increasing at 1.8 percent annual equivalent and energy prices decreasing at 34.4 percent annual equivalent. In the twenty-first wave, central PCE increased at annual equivalent 0.6 percent in Oct-Nov 2015 while PCEX increased at 0.6 percent. PCEE decreased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent and PCEF decreased at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-second wave, central PCE fell at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2015 while PCEX increased at 1.2 percent. PCEE energy fell at 33.1 percent annual equivalent and PCEG goods fell at 5.8 percent. PCEF food fell at 3.5 percent annual equivalent. In the twenty-third wave, central PCE increased at 2.4 percent in Jan 2016 while core PCEX increased at 3.7 percent. PCEE energy fell at 17.6 percent and PCEG goods fell at 1.2 percent. In the twenty-fourth wave, central PCE changed at 0.0 percent annual equivalent in Feb 2016 while core PCE increased at 2.4 percent. PCEG fell at 5.8 percent while PCEF increased at 1.2 percent with PCEE decreasing at 48.6 percent. In the twenty-fifth wave, central PCE increased at 2.1 percent in Mar-Jun 2016 with PCEX increasing at 1.8 percent. PCEG increased at 0.6 percent and PCEF fell at 3.0 percent. PCEE increased at 21.7 percent. In the twenty-sixth wave, central PCE increased at 1.2 percent in Jul 2016 while core PCE increased at 2.4 percent. PCEE energy prices fell at 14.5 percent and PCEF decreased at 1.2 percent. PCEG fell at 2.4 percent with PCEDG decreasing at 2.4 percent. In the twenty-seventh wave, central PCE increased at 2.4 percent in Aug-Oct 2016 with core PCEX increasing at 1.6 percent. PCEF fell at 0.8 percent and PCEE energy increased at 23.3 percent. PCEDG durable goods decreased at 2.4 percent and PCEG goods increased at 2.0 percent. PCES services increased at 2.4 percent. In the twenty-eighth wave, central PCE increased at 1.8 annual equivalent in Nov-Dec 2016 and core PCE increased at 0.6 percent. PCEE energy increased at 16.1 percent while PCEF food fell at 1.8 percent. PCEG goods fell at 0.6 percent and PCEDG durable goods fell at 3.5 percent. PCES services increased at 2.4 percent. In the twenty-ninth wave, PCE prices increased at 4.9 percent annual equivalent in Jan 2017 with PCEX increasing at 3.7 percent. PCEE energy increased at 65.7 percent while PCEF food changed at 0.0 percent. PCEG goods increased at 11.4 percent and PCEDG durable goods increased at 8.7 percent. In the thirtieth wave, central PCE decreased at 0.6 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Mar 2017 with core PCEX changing at 0.0 percent. PCEF food increased at 3.0 percent while PCEE energy fell at 24.9 percent. PCEG goods fell at 4.1 percent and PCEGD durable goods fell at 3.5 percent. PCES services increased at 0.6 percent. In the thirty-first wave, PCE prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Apr 2017 while core PCEX prices increased at 2.4 percent. PCEF increased at 3.7 percent and PCEE increased at 12.7 percent. PCEG changed at 0.0 percent and PCEDG fell at 2.4 percent. PCES increased at 3.7 percent. In the thirty-second wave, central PCE changed at 0.0 percent annual equivalent in May-Jul 2017 while core PCEX increased at 1.2 percent. PCEG goods fell at annual equivalent 2.8 percent and PCEDG durable goods fell at 3.2 percent. PCEF foods increased at 0.4 percent while PCEE energy fell at 18.0 percent annual equivalent. In the thirty-third wave, central PCE increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent in Aug-Sep 2017 while PCEX increased at 1.8 percent. PCEF changed at 0.0 percent and PCEE energy increased at 79.2 percent annual equivalent. PCEG increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent while PCEDG fell at 2.4 percent. PCES increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent. In the thirty-fourth wave, central PCE increased at 2.0 percent annual equivalent in Oct-Dec 2017 while PCEX increased at 2.0 percent. PCEF increased at 0.4 percent and PCEE energy increased at 7.6 percent annual equivalent. PCEG decreased at 0.4 percent annual equivalent while PCEDG decreased at 2.0 percent. In the thirty-fifth wave, central PCE increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent in Jan-Feb 2018 while PCEX increased at 3.0 percent. PCEF changed at 0.0 percent and PCEE energy increased at 19.4 percent annual equivalent. PCEG increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent while PCEDG decreased at 1.2 percent. PCES increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent. In the thirty-sixth wave, central PCE increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Mar-Apr 2018 while PCEX increased at 2.4 percent. PCEF increased at 2.0 percent and PCEE energy decreased at 7.8 percent annual equivalent. PCEG decreased at 0.6 percent annual equivalent while PCEDG decreased at 1.8 percent. PCES increased at 3.0 percent annual equivalent. Oscillating commodity prices have moderated with reallocation of financial investments to carry trades in equities.

Table IV-5, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month of Prices of Personal Consumption

Expenditures, Seasonally Adjusted Monthly ∆%

PCE

PCEG

PCEG
-D

PCES

PCEX

PCEF

PCEE

2018

Apr

0.2

0.4

0.0

0.2

0.2

0.3

1.5

Mar

0.0

-0.5

-0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

-2.8

AE Mar-Apr

1.2

-0.6

-1.8

3.0

2.4

2.0

-7.8

Feb

0.1

-0.1

-0.3

0.3

0.2

-0.1

-0.1

Jan

0.4

0.7

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.1

3.1

AE Jan-Feb

3.0

3.7

-1.2

3.0

3.0

0.0

19.4

2017

Dec

0.1

-0.1

-0.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

-0.2

Nov

0.2

0.2

-0.3

0.2

0.1

-0.1

3.6

Oct

0.2

-0.2

0.0

0.3

0.2

0.1

-1.5

AE Oct-Dec

2.0

-0.4

-2.0

2.8

2.0

0.4

7.6

Sep

0.4

0.7

-0.3

0.3

0.2

0.0

6.9

Aug

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.0

3.1

AE Aug-Sep

3.7

6.2

-2.4

3.0

1.8

0.0

79.2

Jul

0.1

0.1

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.2

-0.1

Jun

0.0

-0.2

-0.3

0.2

0.1

-0.1

-1.7

May

-0.1

-0.6

-0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

-3.1

AE May-Jul

0.0

-2.8

-3.2

2.0

1.2

0.4

-18.0

Apr

0.2

0.0

-0.2

0.3

0.2

0.3

1.0

AE Apr

2.4

0.0

-2.4

3.7

2.4

3.7

12.7

Mar

-0.2

-0.6

-0.6

-0.1

-0.2

0.4

-3.4

Feb

0.1

-0.1

0.0

0.2

0.2

0.1

-1.3

AE Feb-Mar

-0.6

-4.1

-3.5

0.6

0.0

3.0

-24.9

Jan

0.4

0.9

0.7

0.2

0.3

0.0

4.3

AE Jan

4.9

11.4

8.7

2.4

3.7

0.0

65.7

2016

Dec

0.2

0.1

-0.1

0.2

0.1

-0.1

1.5

Nov

0.1

-0.2

-0.5

0.2

0.0

-0.2

1.0

AE Nov-Dec

1.8

-0.6

-3.5

2.4

0.6

-1.8

16.1

Oct

0.2

0.2

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.0

2.8

Sep

0.2

0.2

-0.4

0.2

0.1

-0.1

2.6

Aug

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.2

-0.1

-0.1

AE Aug-Oct

2.4

2.0

-2.4

2.4

1.6

-0.8

23.3

Jul

0.1

-0.2

-0.2

0.3

0.2

-0.1

-1.3

AE Jul

1.2

-2.4

-2.4

3.7

2.4

-1.2

-14.5

Jun

0.1

0.0

-0.6

0.2

0.1

-0.2

1.5

May

0.2

-0.1

-0.3

0.3

0.2

-0.5

0.9

Apr

0.3

0.4

0.0

0.3

0.2

0.1

3.0

Mar

0.1

-0.1

-0.3

0.2

0.1

-0.4

1.2

AE Mar-Jun

2.1

0.6

-3.5

3.0

1.8

-3.0

21.7

Feb

0.0

-0.5

-0.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

-5.4

AE Feb

0.0

-5.8

-2.4

2.4

2.4

1.2

-48.6

Jan

0.2

-0.1

0.2

0.3

0.3

-0.1

-1.6

AE Jan

2.4

-1.2

2.4

3.7

3.7

-1.2

-17.6

2015

Dec

-0.1

-0.5

-0.2

0.2

0.1

-0.3

-3.3

AE Dec

-1.2

-5.8

-2.4

2.4

1.2

-3.5

-33.1

Nov

0.1

-0.1

-0.3

0.2

0.1

-0.3

0.0

Oct

0.0

-0.1

-0.3

0.1

0.0

0.1

-0.4

AE Oct-Nov

0.6

-1.2

-3.5

1.8

0.6

-1.2

-2.4

Sep

0.0

-0.5

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.1

-4.7

Aug

0.0

-0.3

-0.3

0.2

0.1

0.1

-2.2

AE Aug-Sep

0.0

-4.7

-1.2

2.4

1.8

1.2

-34.4

Jul

0.1

0.1

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.5

Jun

0.2

0.1

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.3

0.8

May

0.2

0.4

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.0

2.7

AE May-Jul

2.0

2.4

-2.4

2.4

1.2

2.0

17.2

Apr

0.0

-0.2

0.1

0.2

0.1

-0.2

-1.6

Mar

0.2

0.1

-0.2

0.2

0.2

-0.2

1.0

Feb

0.2

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0

1.8

AE Feb-Apr

1.6

0.8

0.4

2.0

1.6

-1.6

4.8

Jan

-0.4

-1.4

-0.2

0.1

0.0

-0.1

-8.9

AE Jan

-4.7

-15.6

-2.4

1.2

0.0

-1.2

-67.3

2014

Dec

-0.2

-0.9

-0.5

0.2

0.1

0.3

-5.5

Nov

-0.1

-0.6

-0.5

0.2

0.1

0.2

-3.1

AE Nov-Dec

-1.8

-8.6

-5.8

2.4

1.2

3.0

-41.0

Oct

0.0

-0.2

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.0

-1.7

Sep

0.1

0.0

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

-0.7

Aug

0.0

-0.3

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.3

-1.9

∆% AE Aug-Sep

0.4

-2.0

-2.0

1.6

1.2

2.0

-15.9

Jul

0.2

0.1

-0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

Jun

0.1

0.1

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.0

-0.2

May

0.1

-0.1

-0.3

0.3

0.2

0.5

-0.9

Apr

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.1

∆% AE Apr-Jul

1.8

1.2

-1.8

2.1

2.1

3.0

-2.7

Mar

0.2

-0.2

-0.2

0.4

0.2

0.4

-0.6

Feb

0.1

-0.1

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.1

Jan

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.1

1.9

2013

Dec

0.2

0.1

-0.3

0.2

0.1

0.1

1.3

∆% AE Dec-Mar

2.1

0.3

-2.7

2.7

1.5

2.4

8.3

Nov

0.2

0.0

-0.2

0.2

0.2

-0.1

0.3

Oct

0.1

-0.1

-0.1

0.2

0.2

0.0

-0.2

Sep

0.1

0.0

-0.1

0.2

0.1

-0.1

0.6

Aug

0.1

0.1

-0.3

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.6

Jul

0.1

0.0

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.2

Jun

0.2

0.1

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.2

0.5

May

0.0

-0.3

-0.1

0.2

0.1

-0.3

0.6

∆% AE May-Nov

1.4

-0.3

-2.0

2.3

1.6

-0.2

4.5

Apr

-0.1

-0.6

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

-2.6

Mar

-0.1

-0.7

-0.3

0.2

0.1

0.1

-3.6

∆% AE Mar-Apr

-1.2

-7.5

-3.5

1.8

1.2

1.2

-31.5

Feb

0.4

0.7

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.2

4.7

∆% AE Feb

4.9

8.7

-1.2

2.4

1.2

2.4

73.5

Jan

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.2

0.1

-0.3

2012

Dec

0.0

-0.4

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

-1.4

Nov

-0.1

-0.7

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.2

-3.6

Oct

0.3

0.3

-0.1

0.3

0.2

0.2

1.1

∆% AE Oct-Jan

1.2

-2.1

-1.2

2.7

1.8

2.1

-12.1

Sep

0.3

0.6

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.0

3.8

Aug

0.3

0.7

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

5.2

∆% AE Aug-Sep

3.7

8.1

-2.4

1.8

1.2

0.6

69.5

Jul

0.0

-0.2

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0

-1.0

Jun

0.0

-0.4

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

-2.6

∆% AE Jun-Jul

0.0

-3.5

-2.4

1.8

1.2

1.2

-19.6

May

-0.1

-0.5

-0.1

0.2

0.1

-0.1

-2.9

Apr

0.1

0.0

-0.2

0.2

0.2

0.1

-0.4

∆% AE Apr- May

0.0

-3.0

-1.8

2.4

1.8

0.0

-18.2

Mar

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.8

Feb

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.0

1.9

Jan

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.3

0.3

0.3

0.6

∆% AE Jan- Mar

2.8

3.7

-0.4

2.8

2.4

2.0

14.0

2011

Dec

0.0

-0.2

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.2

-1.7

Nov

0.1

0.1

-0.2

0.2

0.2

0.0

0.1

Oct

0.1

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.1

-1.1

∆% AE Oct- Dec

0.8

-0.8

-1.6

2.0

1.6

1.2

-10.3

Sep

0.2

0.2

-0.4

0.2

0.1

0.5

1.0

Aug

0.2

0.2

-0.2

0.2

0.2

0.6

0.1

Jul

0.2

0.2

-0.1

0.2

0.2

0.4

0.2

∆% AE Jul-Sep

2.4

2.4

-2.8

2.4

2.0

6.2

5.3

Jun

0.0

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.2

-1.6

May

0.3

0.5

0.1

0.3

0.2

0.5

1.4

∆% AE May-Jun

1.8

2.4

1.2

2.4

1.8

4.3

-1.3

Apr

0.4

0.8

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.4

3.3

Mar

0.4

0.7

-0.1

0.2

0.1

0.9

3.2

Feb

0.3

0.4

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.6

1.3

Jan

0.2

0.4

0.0

0.1

0.1

0.6

1.1

∆% AE Jan-Apr

4.0

7.1

1.2

2.4

1.8

7.8

30.1

2010

Dec

0.2

0.6

-0.3

0.1

0.0

0.1

4.1

Nov

0.2

0.2

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.2

1.1

Oct

0.2

0.4

-0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1

3.1

Sep

0.1

0.2

-0.1

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.6

Aug

0.1

0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.0

Jul

0.1

0.1

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.2

Jun

0.1

-0.1

-0.4

0.1

0.1

-0.1

-0.5

May

0.0

-0.2

-0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

-1.2

Apr

0.0

-0.3

-0.2

0.1

0.0

0.1

-0.8

Mar

0.1

-0.1

0.0

0.2

0.1

0.2

-0.5

Feb

0.0

-0.2

-0.3

0.1

0.1

0.1

-1.2

Jan

0.2

0.3

-0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

1.7

Notes: percentage changes in price index relative to the same month a year earlier of PCE: personal consumption expenditures; PCEG: PCE goods; PCEG-D: PCE durable goods; PCES: PCE services; PCEX: PCE excluding food and energy; PCEF: PCE food; PCEE: PCE energy goods and services. AE: annual equivalent.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart VI-1 provides monthly percentage changes of the headline PCE price index from 1999 to 2018. There is significant volatility in the monthly changes but excluding outliers, fluctuations have been in a tight range between 1999 and 2018 around 0.2 percent per month. The energy shock is causing decline of PCEE prices in the final segment similar to that after reversal of carry trades in 2008-2009 with oscillations in portfolio reallocations.

Chart IV-1, US, Percentage Change of PCE Price Index from Prior Month, 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

There is much less volatility in the PCE index excluding food and energy shown in Chart IV-2 with monthly percentage changes from 1999 to 2018. Except for 2001, there are no negative changes and again changes around 0.2 percent when excluding outliers.

Chart IV-2, US, Percentage Change of PCE Price Index Excluding Food and Energy from Prior Month, 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Fluctuations in the PCE index of food are much wider as shown in Chart IV-3 by monthly percentage changes from 1999 to 2018. There are also multiple negative changes and positive changes even exceeding 1.0 percent in three months.

Chart IV-3, US, Percentage Change of PCE Price Index Food from Prior Month, 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The band of fluctuation of the PCE price index of energy in Chart IV-4 is much wider. An interesting feature is the abundance of negative changes and large percentages. The final segment shows the sharp decline of energy prices during reversal of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures similar to 2008-2009.

Chart IV-4, US, Percentage Change of PCE Price Index Energy from Prior Month, 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IV-6 provides twelve-month inflation rates, annual rates from 2000 to 2018 and average yearly rates of PCE inflation for various periods since 1929. Headline 12-month PCE inflation decreased from 2.6 percent in in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 to 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2018. PCE inflation excluding food and energy (PCEX), used as indicator in monetary policy, decreased from 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 to 1.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2018, which is still below or at the tolerable maximum of 2.0-2.5 percent in monetary policy. The unintended effect of shocks of commodity prices from zero interest rates captured by PCE food prices (PCEF) and energy (PCEE) in the absence of risk aversion should be weighed in design and implementation of monetary policy. Annual PCE inflation in the second part of Table IV-6 shows significant fluctuations. Headline PCE inflation rose during the period of 1 percent interest rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2005, reaching 2.9 percent in 2005. PCEE rose at very high two-digit rates after 2003. Headline PCE inflation increased 3.1 percent in 2008 while PCEE energy increased 14.3 percent in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity derivatives during deep global recession. Flight away from risk financial assets to US government obligations fueled by proposals of TARP in Congress (Cochrane and Zingales 2009) caused decline of PCEE of 19.0 percent in 2009 and minus 0.1 percent in headline PCE. There is no deflation in the US economy. Carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity exposures mixed with portfolio reallocations among risk financial assets caused wide recent oscillations. Headline PCE inflation increased at the average rate of 2.8 percent from 1929 to 2017, as shown in Table IV-6 using the revisions by the BEA. PCE inflation was 6.1 percent on average during the Great Inflation episode from 1965 to 1981 (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1998LB, 1999, 2012FP, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012JMCB and http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2017/01/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/06/rules-versus-discretionary-authorities.html). PCE inflation was 3.1 percent on average from 1947 to 2017 and 3.1 percent on average for PCEX. The long-term charts of PCE and PCEX show almost identical behavior.

Table IV-6, US, Percentage Change in 12 Months of Prices of Personal Consumption

Expenditures ∆%

PCE

PCEG

PCEG
-D

PCES

PCEX

PCEF

PCEE

2018

Apr

2.0

0.6

-2.1

2.6

1.8

0.5

8.4

Mar

2.0

0.3

-2.4

2.8

1.8

0.4

7.9

Feb

1.7

0.1

-2.6

2.4

1.5

0.6

7.2

Jan

1.6

0.1

-2.3

2.4

1.5

0.9

6.0

2017

Dec

1.7

0.3

-1.8

2.3

1.5

0.9

7.3

Nov

1.7

0.6

-1.7

2.3

1.5

0.7

9.2

Oct

1.6

0.2

-1.9

2.3

1.5

0.5

6.5

Sep

1.7

0.6

-2.0

2.2

1.4

0.4

11.1

Aug

1.4

0.1

-2.2

2.1

1.3

0.3

6.7

Jul

1.4

0.0

-2.1

2.1

1.4

0.2

3.3

Jun

1.4

-0.4

-2.1

2.3

1.5

-0.1

2.1

May

1.5

-0.2

-2.4

2.3

1.5

-0.1

5.4

Apr

1.7

0.3

-2.5

2.4

1.6

-0.6

9.8

Mar

1.8

0.7

-2.3

2.4

1.6

-0.7

12.0

Feb

2.2

1.2

-2.0

2.6

1.9

-1.5

17.3

Jan

2.0

0.8

-2.2

2.6

1.9

-1.5

12.3

2016

Dec

1.8

-0.2

-2.7

2.7

1.9

-1.6

5.9

Nov

1.5

-0.9

-2.8

2.7

1.8

-1.7

0.9

Oct

1.6

-0.8

-2.6

2.7

1.9

-1.8

-0.1

Sep

1.4

-1.2

-2.7

2.6

1.8

-1.7

-3.2

Aug

1.1

-1.9

-2.2

2.6

1.9

-1.4

-10.1

Jul

1.0

-2.3

-2.4

2.6

1.8

-1.2

-11.9

Jun

1.0

-2.0

-2.3

2.5

1.7

-0.9

-10.4

May

1.0

-1.9

-2.0

2.5

1.8

-0.4

-11.0

Apr

1.1

-1.4

-1.8

2.4

1.7

0.0

-9.4

Mar

0.8

-2.0

-1.7

2.2

1.6

-0.3

-13.5

Feb

0.9

-1.8

-1.7

2.2

1.7

-0.1

-13.7

Jan

1.1

-0.9

-1.3

2.1

1.6

-0.2

-7.1

2015

Dec

0.5

-2.2

-1.6

1.9

1.4

-0.2

-13.9

Nov

0.4

-2.6

-1.9

1.9

1.3

0.3

-15.9

Oct

0.2

-3.1

-2.1

1.9

1.3

0.8

-18.6

Sep

0.2

-3.2

-1.9

1.9

1.3

0.7

-19.6

Aug

0.3

-2.7

-2.3

1.9

1.3

0.8

-16.2

Jul

0.3

-2.7

-2.2

1.8

1.3

0.9

-16.0

Jun

0.3

-2.8

-2.1

1.9

1.3

1.0

-16.3

May

0.3

-2.8

-2.0

1.8

1.3

0.7

-17.1

Apr

0.2

-3.2

-2.2

1.9

1.3

1.3

-20.0

Mar

0.3

-2.8

-2.3

1.9

1.4

1.7

-18.6

Feb

0.3

-3.2

-2.3

2.1

1.4

2.4

-19.9

Jan

0.2

-3.5

-2.7

2.1

1.4

2.6

-21.2

2014

Dec

0.9

-1.9

-2.6

2.3

1.5

2.9

-11.9

Nov

1.3

-0.9

-2.5

2.3

1.5

2.7

-5.5

Oct

1.5

-0.2

-2.1

2.3

1.6

2.4

-2.1

Sep

1.6

-0.1

-2.1

2.5

1.7

2.3

-0.6

Aug

1.7

-0.1

-2.1

2.5

1.7

2.1

0.6

Jul

1.8

0.3

-2.2

2.6

1.7

1.9

3.1

Jun

1.8

0.3

-2.4

2.5

1.7

1.7

3.3

May

1.8

0.4

-2.4

2.6

1.7

2.0

4.0

Apr

1.7

0.2

-2.2

2.5

1.6

1.2

4.3

Mar

1.5

-0.6

-2.4

2.5

1.5

1.0

1.4

Feb

1.2

-1.0

-2.5

2.3

1.4

0.6

-1.6

Jan

1.5

-0.3

-2.3

2.4

1.5

0.6

3.0

2013

Dec

1.4

-0.5

-2.2

2.4

1.5

0.5

0.7

Nov

1.2

-0.9

-2.1

2.3

1.5

0.6

-2.0

Oct

1.0

-1.6

-2.0

2.3

1.4

1.0

-5.9

Sep

1.1

-1.3

-1.9

2.3

1.5

1.2

-4.7

Aug

1.3

-0.6

-2.0

2.3

1.5

1.3

-1.6

Jul

1.5

0.0

-1.9

2.3

1.4

1.2

2.9

Jun

1.4

-0.2

-1.8

2.3

1.4

1.1

1.6

May

1.2

-0.8

-1.9

2.3

1.4

1.1

-1.5

Apr

1.1

-1.0

-1.9

2.2

1.4

1.3

-3.8

Mar

1.3

-0.5

-1.8

2.3

1.6

1.2

-1.6

Feb

1.7

0.6

-1.7

2.3

1.7

1.3

2.9

Jan

1.5

0.2

-1.6

2.2

1.7

1.2

0.2

2012

Dec

1.7

0.4

-1.6

2.3

1.7

1.3

1.1

Nov

1.7

0.5

-1.6

2.3

1.8

1.3

0.9

Oct

1.9

1.3

-1.7

2.3

1.8

1.0

4.8

Sep

1.7

0.9

-1.6

2.1

1.7

0.9

2.5

Aug

1.5

0.5

-1.8

2.1

1.7

1.5

-0.3

Jul

1.4

0.0

-1.8

2.2

1.8

2.0

-5.1

Jun

1.6

0.3

-1.7

2.3

1.9

2.4

-3.9

May

1.7

0.7

-1.4

2.2

1.9

2.4

-3.0

Apr

2.1

1.7

-1.2

2.3

2.0

3.0

1.3

Mar

2.4

2.5

-0.7

2.3

2.1

3.3

5.1

Feb

2.5

2.9

-0.7

2.3

2.1

4.0

7.6

Jan

2.6

3.0

-0.4

2.3

2.1

4.7

7.0

Annual ∆%

2017

1.7

0.3

-2.1

2.3

1.5

-0.1

8.5

2016

1.2

-1.4

-2.2

2.5

1.8

-0.9

-7.1

2015

0.3

-2.9

-2.1

1.9

1.3

1.1

-17.8

2014

1.5

-0.3

-2.3

2.5

1.6

1.8

-0.2

2013

1.3

-0.5

-1.9

2.3

1.5

1.1

-1.1

2012

1.9

1.2

-1.3

2.2

1.9

2.3

1.4

2011

2.5

3.7

-0.9

1.8

1.5

4.0

16.0

2010

1.7

1.6

-1.4

1.7

1.3

0.3

10.1

2009

-0.1

-2.3

-1.7

1.1

1.2

1.2

-19.0

2008

3.1

3.0

-1.9

3.1

2.1

6.1

14.3

2007

2.5

1.1

-2.0

3.2

2.2

3.9

6.0

2006

2.7

1.4

-1.6

3.4

2.2

1.7

11.3

2005

2.9

2.0

-1.0

3.3

2.2

1.7

17.3

2004

2.4

1.4

-1.9

3.0

1.9

3.1

11.3

2003

2.0

-0.1

-3.6

3.1

1.5

1.9

12.6

2002

1.3

-0.9

-2.5

2.6

1.7

1.5

-5.8

2001

1.9

-0.1

-2.0

3.1

1.8

2.9

2.5

2000

2.5

2.0

-1.8

2.8

1.7

2.3

18.3

Average ∆%

2000-2017

1.8

0.4

-28.0*

2.5

1.7

2.0

3.0

1929-2017

2.8

2.1

1.2

3.2

2.8

2.7

3.0

1947-2017

3.1

2.1

0.9

3.8

3.1

2.9

3.6

1965-1981

6.1

5.6

4.3

6.5

5.7

6.3

9.3

*Percentage change from 2000 to 2012.

Notes: percentage changes in price index relative to the same month a year earlier of PCE: personal consumption expenditures; PCEG: PCE goods; PCEG-D: PCE durable goods; PCES: PCE services; PCEX: PCE excluding food and energy; PCEF: PCE food; PCEE: PCE energy goods and services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The headline PCE index is in Chart IV-5 from 1999 to 2018. There is an evident upward trend with the carry-trade bump in 2008-2009 during the global recession.

Chart IV-5, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The consumer price index in Chart IV-6 mirrors the behavior of the PCE price index in Chart IV-6. There is the same upward trend with the carry-trade bump in 2008 during the global recession.

Chart IV-6, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-7 provides the PCE price index excluding food and energy. There is milder upward trend with fewer oscillations.

Chart IV-7, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The core consumer price index, excluding food and energy, is in Chart IV-8. There is also an upward trend but with fluctuations.

Chart IV-8, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, NSA, 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

The PCE price index of food is in Chart IV-9. There is a more pronounced upward trend and sharper fluctuations.

Chart IV-9, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Food 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

There is similar behavior in the consumer price index of food in Chart IV-10. There is an upward trend from 1999 to 2011 with a major bump in 2009 when commodity futures positions were unwound. Zero interest rates with bouts of risk aversion dominate the trend into 2011. Risk aversion softens the trend toward the end of 2011 and in 2012-2018.

Chart IV-10, US, Consumer Price Index, Food, NSA, 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The most pronounced trend of PCE price indexes is that of energy in Chart IV-11. It is impossible to explain the hump in 2008 in the middle of the global recession without the carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in commodity futures. Risk aversion after Sep 2008 caused flight to the safe haven of government obligations. Cochrane and Zingales (2009) explain the flight by public allegations of toxic assets in banks during the request of funding from Congress for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The return of risk appetite with zero interest rates caused a first wave of carry trades with another upward trend interrupted by the first European sovereign risk crisis in Apr-Jul 2010. Zero interest rates with risk appetite caused another sharp upward trend of commodity prices interrupted by risk aversion from the second sovereign crisis. In the absence of risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to positions in risk financial assets will continue to cause distortions such as commodity price trends and fluctuations.

Chart IV-11, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Energy Goods and Services 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IV-12 provides the consumer price index of energy commodities. Unconventional monetary policy of zero or near zero interest rates causes upward trends in commodity prices reflected in: (1) increase from 2003 to 2007; (2) sharp increase during the global contraction in 2008; (3) collapse from 2008 into 2009 as positions in commodity futures were unwound in a flight to government obligations; (4) new upward trend after 2010; and (5) episodes of decline during risk aversion shocks such as the more recent segment during the worsening European debt crisis in Nov and Dec of 2011 and with new strength of commodity prices in the beginning of 2012 followed by softness in another episode of risk aversion and increases during risk appetite.

Chart IV-12, US, Consumer Price Index, Energy, NSA, 1999-2018

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-13 of the US Energy Information Administration provides prices of the crude oil futures contract. Unconventional monetary policy of very low interest rates and quantitative easing with suspension of the 30-year bond to lower mortgage rates caused a sharp upward trend of oil prices. There is no explanation for the jump of oil prices to $149/barrel in 2008 during a sharp global recession other than carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. The peak in Chart IV-13 is $145.18 on Jul 14, 2008, in the midst of deep global recession, falling to $33.87/barrel on Dec 19, 2008 (data from the US Energy Information Administration (http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RCLC1&f=D). Prices collapsed in the flight to government obligations caused by proposals for withdrawing “toxic assets” in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as analyzed by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). Risk appetite with zero interest rates after stress tests of US banks resulted in another upward trend of commodity prices after 2009 with fluctuations during periods of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy affects all price indexes.

Chart IV-13, US, Crude Oil Futures Contract

Source: US Energy Information Administration

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RCLC1&f=D

Chart IV-14 provides the annual PCE price index from the revised and enhanced dataset of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The annual PCE index increased at the average rate of 2.8 percent from 1929 to 2017. There is no support for fear of deflation.

Chart IV-14, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures, Annual, 1929-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IV-15 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the consumer price index from 1917 to 2017. There is long-term inflation and no evidence in support of fear of deflation.

Chart IV-15, US, Consumer Price Index, Annual, 1917-2017

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-16 provides the BEA annual index of PCE prices excluding food and energy. The average rate of increase from 1929 to 2017 is 2.8 percent.

Chart IV-16, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy, Annual, 1929-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IV-17 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the annual consumer price index excluding food and energy from 1957 to 2017. There is long-term, fluctuating inflation.

Chart IV-17, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, Annual, 1957-2016

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-18 provides annual percentage changes of prices of personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Negative percentage changes concentrate in the Great Depression with decreases of 4.2 percent in 1930, 10.7 percent in 1931, 11.8 percent in 1932 and 3.6 percent in 1933. PCE prices fell 2.3 percent in 1938 and fell 1.0 percent in 1939. There is another decline of 0.8 percent in 1949 after high increases of 7.0 percent in 1946, 10.1 percent in 1947 and 5.7 percent in 1948 with earlier high increases during World War II. The only other decline is 0.1 percent in 2009 after reversal of carry trades that caused increase of 3.1 percent in 2008. There is no evidence of systematic decrease of prices of PCE or deflation during the entire availability of data.

Chart IV-18, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures, Annual Percentage Changes 1930-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IV-19 provides annual percentage changes of United States consumer price inflation from 1918 to 2017. There have been only cases of annual declines of the CPI after wars:

  • World War I minus 10.5 percent in 1921 and minus 6.1 percent in 1922 following cumulative increases of 83.5 percent in four years from 1917 to 1920 at the average of 16.4 percent per year
  • World War II: minus 1.2 percent in 1949 following cumulative 33.9 percent in three years from 1946 to 1948 at average 10.2 percent per year
  • Minus 0.4 percent in 1955 two years after the end of the Korean War
  • Minus 0.4 percent in 2009.
  • The decline of 0.4 percent in 2009 followed increase of 3.8 percent in 2008 and is explained by the reversal of speculative carry trades into commodity futures that were created in 2008 as monetary policy rates were driven to zero. The reversal occurred after misleading statement on toxic assets in banks in the proposal for TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009).

There were declines of 1.7 percent in both 1927 and 1928 during the episode of revival of rules of the gold standard. The only persistent deflationary period since 1914 was during the Great Depression in the years from 1930 to 1933 and again in 1938-1939. Consumer prices increased only 0.1 percent in 2015 because of the collapse of commodity prices from artificially high levels induced by zero interest rates. Consumer prices increased 1.3 percent in 2016, increasing at 2.1 percent in 2017. Fear of deflation based on that experience does not justify unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates that has failed to stop deflation in Japan. Financial repression causes far more adverse effects on allocation of resources by distorting the calculus of risk/returns than alleged employment-creating effects or there would not be current recovery without jobs and hiring after zero interest rates since Dec 2008 and intended now forever in a self-imposed forecast growth and employment mandate of monetary policy. Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). If there were an infallible science of central banking, models and forecasts would provide accurate information to policymakers on the future course of the economy in advance. Such forewarning is essential to central bank science because of the long lag between the actual impulse of monetary policy and the actual full effects on income and prices many months and even years ahead (Romer and Romer 2004, Friedman 1961, 1953, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “New view into Fed’s response to crisis,” on Feb 21, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303775504579396803024281322?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzed 1865 pages of transcripts of eight formal and six emergency policy meetings at the Fed in 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomchistorical2008.htm). Jon Hilsenrath demonstrates that Fed policymakers frequently did not understand the current state of the US economy in 2008 and much less the direction of income and prices. The conclusion of Friedman (1953) that monetary impulses increase financial and economic instability because of lags in anticipating needs of policy, taking policy decisions and effects of decisions. This a fortiori true when untested unconventional monetary policy in gargantuan doses shocks the economy and financial markets.

Chart IV-19, US, Consumer Price Index, Annual Percentage Changes, 1918-2017

Source: US bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

Chart IV-20 provides annual percentage changes of the price index of personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy since 1930. Besides the episode of the Great Depression, there are no negative changes with the lowest reading after fast inflation during World War II.

Chart IV-20, US, Price Index of Personal Consumption Expenditures Excluding Food and Energy, Annual Percentage Changes, 1930-2017

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

CPI inflation of all goods and CPI inflation excluding food and energy for the past six decades does not show even one negative change, as shown in Chart IV-21.

Chart IV-21, US, Consumer Price Index Excluding Food and Energy, Annual Percentage Changes, 1958-2017

Source: US bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm

There are waves of inflation of producer prices in France as everywhere in the world economy (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm), as shown in Table IV-8FR. There was a first wave of sharply increasing inflation in the first four months of 2011 originating in the surge of commodity prices driven by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures risk positions. Producer price inflation in the first four months of 2011 was at the annual equivalent rate of 10.4 percent. In the second wave, producer prices fell 0.2 percent in May and another 0.1 percent in Jun for annual equivalent inflation in May-Jun 2011 of minus 1.8 percent. In the third wave from Jul to Sep 2011, annual equivalent producer price inflation was 3.7 percent. In the fourth wave Oct-Dec 2011, annual equivalent producer price inflation was 2.8 percent. In the fifth wave Jan-Mar 2012, average annual inflation rose to 6.2 percent during carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. In the sixth wave in Apr-Jun 2012, annual equivalent inflation fell at the rate of 4.3 percent during unwinding of carry trades because of increasing risk aversion. In the seventh wave, carry trades returned under more relaxed risk aversion with producer price inflation in France at 7.4 percent in annual equivalent in Jul-Oct 2012. In the eighth wave, return of risk aversion caused unwinding carry trade and annual equivalent inflation of minus 4.1 percent in Nov-Dec 2012. In the ninth wave, inflation returned with annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Jan-Mar 2013. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 10.7 percent in Apr-Jun 2013. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 8.7 percent in Jul 2013 and 4.5 percent in Jul-Sep 2013. In the twelfth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Oct 2013 was minus 2.4 percent. In the thirteenth wave, inflation in Nov 2013 was 0.6 percent, primarily because of increases in electricity rates (http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=25&date=20131227), which is 7.4 percent in annual equivalent and 4.9 percent in annual equivalent in Nov-Dec 2013. In the fourteenth wave, inflation was minus 4.0 percent in annual equivalent in Jan-Aug 2014. In the fifteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 7.4 percent in Sep 2014. In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 7.0 percent in Oct 2014-Jan 2015. In the seventeenth wave, inflation was 6.8 percent in annual equivalent in Feb-Mar 2015. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.1 percent in Apr-May 2015. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 0.6 percent in Jun-Jul 2015. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 12.4 percent in Aug 2015. In the twenty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Sep-Nov 2015. In the twenty-second wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 12.4 percent in Dec 2015-Jan 2016. In the twenty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.7 percent in Feb 2016. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Mar 2016. In twenty-fifth wave, producer prices decreased at 7.0 percent annual equivalent in Apr 2016. In the twenty-sixth wave, producer prices increased at 5.5 percent in May-Jun 2016. In the twenty-seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation in Jul-Aug 2015 was 0.0 percent. In the twenty-eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent in Sep 2016. In the twenty-ninth wave, producer prices increased at 9.4 percent annual equivalent in Oct 2016-Jan 2017. In the thirtieth wave, producer prices fell at 4.1 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Mar 2017. In the thirty-first wave, annual equivalent producer price inflation was at minus 4.7 percent in Apr-Jun 2017. In the thirty-second wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 1.2 percent in Jul 2017. In the thirty-third wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 4.5 percent in Aug-Oct 2017. In the thirty-fourth wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 22.4 percent in Nov 2017. In the thirty-fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased at 1.8 percent in Dec 2017-Jan 2018. In the thirty-sixth wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 3.7 percent in Feb-Mar 2018. In the thirty-seventh wave, producer prices fell at annual equivalent 8.1 percent in Apr 2018. Insee measures decline of 16.5 percent of prices of refined petroleum products in Dec 2015 (http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=25&date=20160129). The bottom part of Table IV-8FR shows producer price inflation at 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2005 and again at 4.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2007. Producer prices fell in 2009 during the global contraction and decline of commodity prices but returned at 4.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2010.

Table IV-8FR, France, Producer Price Index for the French Market, ∆%

Month

12 Months

Apr 2018

-0.7

2.2

AE ∆% Apr

-8.1

Mar

0.4

2.6

Feb

0.2

1.7

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

3.7

Jan

0.0

1.3

Dec 2017

0.3

2.2

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

1.8

Nov

1.7

2.7

AE ∆% Nov

22.4

Oct

0.2

1.6

Sep

0.4

2.1

Aug

0.5

2.1

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

4.5

Jul

0.1

1.4

AE ∆% Jul

1.2

Jun

-0.3

1.4

May

-0.6

2.2

Apr

-0.3

3.3

AE ∆% Apr-Jun

-4.7

Mar

-0.5

3.0

Feb

-0.2

3.7

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

-4.1

Jan

0.9

3.5

Dec 2016

0.8

1.4

Nov

0.6

-0.5

Oct

0.7

-1.0

AE ∆% Oct-Jan

9.4

Sep

0.3

-1.5

AE ∆% Sep

3.7

Aug

-0.1

-1.8

Jul

0.1

-2.8

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

0.0

Jun

0.4

-3.1

May

0.5

-3.4

AE ∆% May-Jun

5.5

Apr

-0.6

-4.3

AE ∆% Apr

-7.0

Mar

0.2

-4.0

AE ∆% Mar

2.4

Feb

-0.4

-4.1

AE ∆% Feb

-4.7

Jan

-1.1

-2.7

Dec 2015

-1.1

-2.7

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

-12.4

Nov

0.1

-2.4

Oct

0.2

-2.6

Sep

0.0

-2.6

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

1.2

Aug

-1.1

-2.1

AE ∆% Aug

-12.4

Jul

-0.2

-1.4

Jun

0.1

-1.5

AE ∆% Jun-Jul

-0.6

May

-0.4

-1.6

Apr

-0.3

-1.6

AE ∆% Apr-May

-4.1

Mar

0.1

-1.9

Feb

1.0

-2.2

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

6.8

Jan

-1.0

-3.4

Dec 2014

-0.9

-2.8

Nov

0.0

-1.7

Oct

0.1

-1.1

AE ∆% Oct-Jan

-7.0

Sep

0.6

-1.4

AE ∆% Sep

7.4

Aug

-0.4

-1.6

Jul

-0.3

-1.2

Jun

0.1

-0.2

May

-0.5

-0.6

Apr

-0.6

-1.3

Mar

-0.3

-1.9

Feb

-0.2

-1.5

Jan

-0.5

-0.9

AE ∆% Jan-Aug

-4.0

Dec 2013

0.2

0.2

Nov

0.6

-0.5

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

4.9

Oct

-0.2

-1.3

AE ∆% Oct

-2.4

Sep

0.4

-0.6

Aug

0.0

-0.7

Jul

0.7

0.3

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

4.5

Jun

-0.3

0.1

May

-1.2

-0.2

Apr

-1.3

0.4

AE ∆% Apr-Jun

-10.7

Mar

0.1

1.8

Feb

0.5

2.1

Jan

0.6

2.1

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

4.9

Dec 2012

-0.5

2.0

Nov

-0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

-4.1

Oct

0.5

2.8

Sep

0.3

2.8

Aug

1.0

2.8

Jul

0.6

1.8

AE ∆% Jul-Oct

7.4

Jun

-0.6

1.8

May

-0.6

2.3

Apr

0.1

2.8

AE ∆% Apr-Jun

-4.3

Mar

0.5

3.6

Feb

0.5

4.0

Jan

0.5

4.2

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

6.2

Dec 2011

-0.2

4.5

Nov

0.4

5.2

Oct

0.5

5.3

AE ∆% Oct-Dec

2.8

Sep

0.3

5.4

Aug

0.0

5.6

Jul

0.6

5.7

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

3.7

Jun

-0.1

5.4

May

-0.2

5.7

AE ∆% May-Jun

-1.8

Apr

1.0

6.0

Mar

0.8

5.7

Feb

0.7

5.2

Jan

0.8

4.6

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

10.4

Dec 2010

4.3

Dec 2009

-2.9

Dec 2008

0.8

Dec 2007

4.6

Dec 2006

2.6

Dec 2005

3.2

Dec 2004

3.0

Dec 2003

0.3

Dec 2002

1.2

Dec 2001

-0.7

Dec 2000

3.9

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3552973

Chart IV-1FR of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques of France provides the producer price index for the internal market in France from Jan 1999 to Apr 2017. The index also captures the low-price environment of the early 2000s that was used as an argument of fear of deflation. For fear of deflation, see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, and Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95. During the first round of unconventional monetary policy of low interest rates and withdrawal of duration in bond markets by suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury bond, inflation accelerated from 2004 to 2007. When central banks moved policy interest rates toward zero in 2008, carry trades during a global recession caused sharp increases in commodity prices and price indexes worldwide. Inflation collapsed in the risk panic from the latter part of 2008 into the first part of 2009. Carry trades induced by zero interest rates have caused a trend of inflation with oscillations during period of risk aversion (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm).

Chart IV-1FR, France, Producer Prices for the Internal Market, Jan 1999-

Apr 2017, 2010=100

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3129077

France’s producer price index for the domestic market is in Table IV-9FR for Apr 2018. The segment mining, including electricity, decreased 5.0 percent in Apr 2018 and increased 4.3 percent in 12 months. The segment of prices of coke and refined petroleum increased 9.4 percent in Apr 2018 and increased 16.3 percent in 12 months. Manufacturing prices, with the highest weight in the index, increased 0.7 percent in Apr and increased 1.9 percent in 12 months. Waves of inflation originating in carry trades from unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html) tend to deteriorate sales prices of productive activities relative to prices of inputs and commodities with adverse impact on operational margins and thus on production, investment and hiring.

Table IV-9FR, France, Producer Price Index for the Domestic Market, %

Apr 2018

Weight

Month ∆%

12 Month ∆%

Total

1000

-0.7

2.3

Mining, Energy, Water

222

-5.0

4.3

Manufactured

778

0.7

1.9

Food Products, Beverages, Tobacco

201

-0.2

0.0

Coke and Refined Petroleum

47

9.4

16.3

Electrical, Electronic

71

0.2

0.8

Transport

96

-0.1

0.3

Other Mfg

363

0.1

1.5

Source:  Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3552973

Chart IV-2FR of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques of France provides the behavior of the producer price index of France for the various segments: import prices, foreign markets, domestic market and all markets. All the components rose to the peak in 2008 driven by carry trades from zero interest rates of unconventional monetary policy that was of such an impulse as to drive increases in commodity prices during the global recession. Prices collapsed with the flight out of financial risk assets such as commodity positions to government obligations. Commodity price increases returned with zero interest rates and subdued risk aversion. The shock of confidence of the current European sovereign risk moderated exposures to financial risk that influenced the flatter curve of France’s producer prices followed by another mild trend of increase and moderation in Dec 2011 and then renewed inflation in the first quarter of 2012 with a new pause in Apr 2012, decline in May-Jun 2012, the jump in Jul-Oct 2012 and the decline in Nov-Dec 2012 followed by increase in Jan-Feb 2013. Prices stabilized in Mar 2013 and collapsed in Apr-Jun 2013. Inflation returned in Jul 2013 with sharp increase in energy prices and in Aug-Sep 2013. Prices fell in Oct 2013 with reversals of exposures in commodities and increased in Nov 2013 because of increases in electricity rates. Similar increases in electricity rates drive price increases in Nov 2015. Sharp declines of refined petroleum products influenced the decline of producer prices in Dec 2015-Feb 2016 with increases in Mar 2016. Prices of mining, including electricity, fell in Apr 2016 with decrease of producer prices for the internal market. Increases in petroleum prices influenced the increase in producer prices in May-Jun 2016. Prices stabilized in Jul 2016 with decrease of prices of coke and refined petroleum. Prices did not change in Aug 2016 and increased in Sep-Dec 2016. Prices increased in Jan 2017, decreasing in Feb-Jun 2017. Prices increased in Jul-Nov 2017, stabilizing in Dec 2017. Prices stabilized in Jan 2018, increasing in Feb-Mar 2018. Prices fell in Apr 2018. There is downward trend with oscillations in the commodity price shock and recent upward trend followed with renewed downward trend. There is new upward trend with oscillations.

Chart IV-2FR, France, Producer Price Indexes

Source:  Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/3552973

Table IV-10IT provides monthly and 12 months rates of change of producer prices in Italy. The annual equivalent producer price inflation in the first wave Jan-Apr 2011, annual equivalent inflation was 10.7 percent, which was driven by increases in commodity prices resulting from the carry trades from zero interest rates to risk financial assets, in particular, leveraged positions in commodities. In the second wave, producer price inflation was 1.8 percent in annual equivalent rate in May-Jun 2011. In the third wave, annual equivalent inflation was 4.9 percent in Jul-Sep 2011. With the return of risk aversion in the fourth wave coinciding with the worsening sovereign debt crisis in Europe, annual equivalent inflation was 2.0 percent in Oct-Dec 2011. Inflation accelerated in the fifth wave in Jan and Feb 2012 to annual equivalent 8.1 percent. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Mar-Apr 2012 was at 6.8 percent. In the seventh wave, risk aversion originating in world economic slowdown and financial turbulence softened carry trades with annual equivalent inflation falling to minus 0.6 percent in May-Jun 2012. In the eighth wave, more aggressive carry trades into commodity futures exposures resulted in increase of inflation at annual equivalent 9.4 percent in Jul-Aug 2012. In the ninth wave, risk aversion caused unwinding carry trades with annual equivalent inflation of minus 5.2 percent in Sep 2012-Jan 2013. Inflation returned in the tenth wave at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Feb-Mar 2013. In the eleventh wave, industrial prices fell at annual equivalent 3.5 percent in Apr-May 2013. In the twelfth wave, inflation returned at annual equivalent 4.9 percent in Jun 2013 and 0.3 percent in Jun-Sep 2013. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.7 percent in Oct-2013 to May 2014. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Jun 2014. In the fifteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.5 percent in Jul-Aug 2014.  In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 1.2 percent in Sep 2014. In the seventeenth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 3.5 percent in Oct-Nov 2014. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 14.0 percent in Dec 2014-Jan 2015. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased at 3.7 percent in Feb-Mar 2015. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 2.4 percent in Apr 2015. In the twenty-first wave, annual equivalent increased at 3.7 percent in May 2015. In the twenty-second wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 4.4 percent in Jun-Sep 2015. In the twenty-third wave, producer prices fell at annual equivalent 4.7 percent in Oct-Nov 2015. In the twenty-fourth wave, producer prices fell at annual equivalent 7.3 percent in Dec 2015-Feb 2016. In the twenty-fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Mar 2016. In the twenty-sixth wave, producer prices fell at annual equivalent 9.2 percent in Apr 2016. In the twenty-seventh wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 11.8 percent in May-Jul 2016. In the twenty-eighth wave, producer prices fell at annual equivalent 2.0 percent in Aug-Oct 2016. In the twenty-ninth wave, producer prices fell at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Nov 2016. In the thirtieth wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 8.3 percent in Dec 2016-Feb 2017. In the thirty-first wave, producer prices fell at 2.4 percent in Mar 2017. In the thirty-second wave, producer prices increased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Apr 2017. In the thirty-third wave, producer prices fell at 3.5 percent annual equivalent in May 2017. In the thirty-fourth wave, producer prices decreased at 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Jun-Jul 2017. In the thirty-fifth wave, producer prices increased at 6.2 percent annual equivalent in Aug 2017. In the thirty-sixth wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 3.2 percent in Sep-Nov2017. In the thirty-seventh wave, producer prices changed at annual equivalent 0.0 percent in Dec 2017. In the thirty-eighth wave, producer prices increased at annual equivalent 5.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2018. In the thirty-ninth wave, producer prices fell at 8.1 percent annual equivalent.

Table IV-10IT, Italy, Industrial Prices, Internal Market

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

Apr 2018

-0.7

1.4

AE ∆% Apr

-8.1

Mar

0.2

2.2

Feb

0.3

1.8

Jan

0.8

1.8

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

5.3

Dec 2017

0.0

2.2

AE ∆% Dec

0.0

Nov

0.4

2.7

Oct

0.4

2.2

Sep

0.0

1.6

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

3.2

Aug

0.5

1.6

AE ∆% Aug

6.2

Jul

0.0

0.8

Jun

-0.2

2.5

AE ∆% Jun-Jul

-1.2

May

-0.3

3.2

AE ∆% May

-3.5

Apr

0.1

4.3

AE ∆% Apr

1.2

Mar

-0.2

3.3

AE ∆% Mar

-2.4

Feb

0.3

3.7

Jan

1.2

2.9

Dec 2016

0.5

0.8

AE ∆% Dec-Feb

8.3

Nov

-0.1

-0.3

AE ∆% Nov

-1.2

Oct

-0.2

-0.7

Sep

0.0

-0.7

Aug

-0.3

-1.0

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

-2.0

Jul

1.6

-1.3

Jun

0.5

-3.4

May

0.7

-4.1

AE ∆% May-Jul

11.8

Apr

-0.8

-4.5

AE ∆% Apr

-9.2

Mar

0.2

-3.9

AE ∆% Mar

2.4

Feb

-0.5

-4.1

Jan

-0.8

-3.0

Dec 2015

-0.6

-3.9

AE ∆% Dec-Feb

-7.3

Nov

-0.5

-4.1

Oct

-0.3

-3.7

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

-4.7

Sep

-0.3

-3.9

Aug

-0.6

-3.5

Jul

-0.5

-3.0

Jun

-0.2

-3.0

AE ∆% Jun-Sep

-4.4

May

0.3

-2.6

AE ∆% May

3.7

Apr

-0.2

-3.0

AE ∆% Apr

-2.4

Mar

0.0

-3.0

Feb

0.6

-3.2

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

3.7

Jan

-1.7

-3.8

Dec 2014

-0.8

-2.1

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

-14.0

Nov

-0.1

-1.5

Oct

-0.5

-1.5

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

-3.5

Sep

0.1

-2.0

AE ∆% Sep

1.2

Aug

-0.1

-2.1

Jul

-0.5

-1.9

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

-3.5

Jun

0.2

-1.8

AE ∆% Jun

2.4

May

-0.1

-1.7

Apr

-0.2

-1.7

Mar

-0.2

-1.9

Feb

-0.1

-1.7

Jan

0.0

-1.5

Dec 2013

-0.1

-2.1

Nov

-0.1

-2.3

Oct

-1.0

-2.5

AE ∆% Oct-May

-2.7

Sep

0.0

-2.2

Aug

0.1

-2.4

Jul

-0.4

-1.5

Jun

0.4

-0.7

AE ∆% Jun-Sep

0.3

May

-0.1

-1.1

Apr

-0.5

-1.1

AE ∆% Apr-May

-3.5

Mar

0.0

0.0

Feb

0.2

0.5

AE ∆% Feb-Mar

1.2

Jan

-0.6

0.7

Dec 2012

-0.3

2.4

Nov

-0.3

2.8

Oct

-0.7

3.5

Sep

-0.3

4.2

AE ∆% Sep-Jan

-5.2

Aug

1.1

4.5

Jul

0.4

3.8

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

9.4

Jun

0.0

4.2

May

-0.1

4.4

AE ∆% May-Jun

-0.6

Apr

0.6

4.6

Mar

0.5

4.8

AE ∆% Mar-Apr

6.8

Feb

0.5

5.2

Jan

0.8

5.2

AE ∆% Jan-Feb

8.1

Dec 2011

0.1

5.5

Nov

0.4

6.0

Oct

0.0

6.1

AE ∆% Oct-Dec

2.0

Sep

0.0

5.3

Aug

0.4

5.4

Jul

0.8

5.2

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

4.9

Jun

0.2

4.6

May

0.1

4.6

AE ∆% May-Jun

1.8

Apr

0.9

5.1

Mar

0.9

5.0

Feb

0.4

4.5

Jan

1.2

5.3

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

10.7

Year

2017

2.6

2016

-2.2

2015

-3.4

2014

-1.8

2013

-1.2

2012

4.1

2011

5.1

2010

3.1

2009

-5.4

2008

5.8

2007

3.4

2006

5.2

2005

4.1

2004

2.7

2003

1.6

2002

0.1

2001

1.9

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/215789

Chart IV-3IT of the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica provides 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index of Italy.  Rates of change in 12 months stabilized from Jul to Nov 2011 and then fell to 3.5 percent in Oct 2012 with increases of 0.7 percent in the month of Jan 2013 and 0.5 percent in Feb 2013 followed by stability in Mar 2013. Inflation turned negative in Apr-May 2013 with marginal increase in Jun 2013 followed by decline in Jul-Dec 2013. Inflation in 12 months fell in Jan-Mar 2014 and at lower rate in Apr-May 2014. Mild inflation returned in Jun 2014 followed by decline in Jul 2014, increase in Oct 2014 and decline in Nov-Dec 2014. There is continuing decline of inflation in Jan 2015 followed by increase in Feb 2015, decrease in Mar-Apr 2015 and increase in May 2015. Prices fell in Jun 2015-Feb 2016 and increased in Mar 2016. Prices fell in Apr 2016 and increased in May-Jul 2016. Prices fell in Aug-Nov 2016 and increased in Dec 2016. Prices increased in Jan-Feb 2017 and fell in Mar 2017, increasing in Apr 2017. Prices fell in May 2017 and decreased in Jun 2017, stabilizing in Jul 2017. Prices increased in Aug-Nov 2017, stabilizing in Dec 2017. Prices increased in Jan-Mar 2018, decreasing in Apr 2018.

Chart IV-3IT, Italy, Producer Price Index 12-Month Percentage Changes

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/en/

Table IV-11IT provides monthly and 12-month inflation of producer prices in Italy by segments. Durable goods prices increased 0.1 percent in Apr 2018 and decreased 0.2 percent in 12 months. Nondurable goods prices decreased 0.1 percent in Apr and increased 0.9 percent in 12 months. Energy prices decreased 2.0 percent in Apr and increased 2.1 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-11IT, Italy, Producer Price Index for the Internal Market, ∆%

Apr 18/Mar 18

Apr 18/ Apr 17

Consumer Goods

-0.1

0.7

   Durable

0.1

-0.2

   Nondurable

-0.1

0.9

Capital Goods

0.1

0.5

Intermediate Goods

0.1

1.8

Energy

-2.0

2.1

Total Ex Energy

0.0

1.1

Total

-0.7

1.4

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/215789

The first wave of commodity price increases in the first four months of Jan-Apr 2011 also influenced the surge of consumer price inflation in Italy shown in Table IV-12IT. Annual equivalent inflation in the first four months of 2011 from Jan to Apr was 4.9 percent. The crisis of confidence or risk aversion resulted in reversal of carry trades on commodity positions. Consumer price inflation in Italy was subdued in the second wave in Jun and May 2011 at 0.1 percent for annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent inflation increased to 2.4 percent. In the fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 jumped again at 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the fifth wave from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 at annual equivalent 4.3 percent. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 5.7 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 3.0 percent in Jul-Aug 2012. In the ninth wave, inflation collapsed to zero in Sep-Oct 2012 and was minus 0.8 percent in annual equivalent in Sep-Nov 2012. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Dec 2012 to Aug 2013 was 2.0 percent. In the eleventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.2 percent in Sep-Nov 2013 during reallocations of investment portfolios away from commodity futures. In the twelfth wave, inflation returned in annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Dec 2013-Jan 2014. In the thirteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 1.2 percent in Feb 2014. In the fourteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.8 percent in Mar-Apr 2014. In the fifteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in May 2014. In the sixteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in Jun 2014. In the seventeenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in Jul 2014. In the eighteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Aug 2014. In the nineteenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 4.7 percent in Sep 2014. In the twentieth wave, annual equivalent inflation returned at 1.2 percent in Oct 2014. In the twenty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 2.4 percent in Nov 2014-Jan 2015. In the twenty-second wave, annual equivalent rose to 2.4 percent in Feb-Jun 2015. In the twenty-third wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 1.2 percent in Jul 2015. In the twenty-fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Aug 2015. In the twenty-fifth wave, consumer prices fell at 4.7 percent annual equivalent in Sep 2015. In the twenty-sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in Oct 2015. In the twenty-seventh wave, consumer prices fell at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Nov-Dec 2015. In the twenty-eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation fell at 2.4 percent in Jan-Feb 2016. In the twenty-ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was at 2.4 percent in Mar 2016. In the thirtieth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.2 percent in Apr 2016. In the thirty-first wave, annual equivalent inflation was 2.4 percent in May-Jun 2016. In the thirty-second wave, consumer prices increased at 2.4 percent annual equivalent in Jul-Aug 2016. In the thirty-third wave, consumer prices fell at annual equivalent 1.6 percent in Sep-Nov 2016. In the thirty-fourth wave, consumer prices increased at annual equivalent 4.5 percent in Dec 2016-Feb 2017. In the thirty-fifth wave, consumer prices changed at 0.0 percent annual equivalent in Mar 2017. In the thirty-sixth wave, consumer prices increased at 4.9 percent in Apr 2017. In the thirty-seventh wave, consumer prices fell at 1.8 percent annual equivalent in May-Jun 2017. In the thirty-eighth wave, consumer prices increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Jul-Aug 2017. In the thirty-ninth wave, consumer prices fell at annual equivalent 2.8 percent in Sep-Nov 2017. In the fortieth wave, consumer prices increased at 4.3 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2017-Jan 2018. In the forty-first wave, consumer prices increased at annual equivalent 2.4 percent in Feb-May 2018. There are worldwide shocks to economies by intermittent waves of inflation originating in combination of zero interest rates and quantitative easing with alternation of risk appetite and risk aversion (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/05/dollar-strengthening-world-inflation.htm and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html).

Table IV-12IT, Italy, Consumer Price Index

Month

12 Months

May 2018

0.4

1.1

Apr

0.1

0.5

Mar

0.3

0.8

Feb

0.0

0.5

AE ∆% Feb-May

2.4

Jan

0.3

0.9

Dec 2017

0.4

0.9

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

4.3

Nov

-0.2

0.9

Oct

-0.2

1.0

Sep

-0.3

1.1

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

-2.8

Aug

0.3

1.2

Jul

0.1

1.1

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

2.4

Jun

-0.1

1.2

May

-0.2

1.4

AE ∆% May-Jun

-1.8

Apr

0.4

1.9

AE ∆% Apr

4.9

Mar

0.0

1.4

AE ∆% Mar

0.0

Feb

0.4

1.6

Jan

0.3

1.0

Dec 2016

0.4

0.5

AE ∆% Dec-Feb

4.5

Nov

-0.1

0.1

Oct

-0.1

-0.2

Sep

-0.2

0.1

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

-1.6

Aug

0.2

-0.1

Jul

0.2

-0.1

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

2.4

Jun

0.1

-0.4

May

0.3

-0.3

AE ∆% May-Jun

2.4

Apr

-0.1

-0.5

AE ∆% Apr

-1.2

Mar

0.2

-0.2

AE ∆% Mar

2.4

Feb

-0.2

-0.3

Jan

-0.2

0.3

AE ∆% Jan-Feb

-2.4

Dec 2015

0.0

0.1

Nov

-0.4

0.1

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

-2.4

Oct

0.2

0.3

AE ∆% Oct

2.4

Sep

-0.4

0.2

AE ∆% Sep

-4.7

Aug

0.2

0.2

AE ∆% Aug

2.4

Jul

-0.1

0.2

AE ∆% Jul

-1.2

Jun

0.2

0.2

May

0.1

0.1

Apr

0.2

-0.1

Mar

0.1

-0.1

Feb

0.4

-0.1

AE ∆% Feb-Jun

2.4

Jan

-0.4

-0.6

Dec 2014

0.0

0.0

Nov

-0.2

0.2

AE ∆% Nov-Jan

-2.4

Oct

0.1

0.1

AE ∆% Oct

1.2

Sep

-0.4

-0.2

AE ∆% Sep

-4.7

Aug

0.2

-0.1

AE ∆% Aug

2.4

Jul

-0.1

0.1

AE ∆% Jul

-1.2

Jun

0.1

0.3

AE ∆% Jun

1.2

May

-0.1

0.5

AE ∆% May

-1.2

Apr

0.2

0.6

Mar

0.1

0.4

AE ∆% Mar-Apr

1.8

Feb

-0.1

0.5

AE ∆% Feb

-1.2

Jan

0.2

0.7

Dec 2013

0.2

0.7

AE ∆% Dec 2013-Jan 2014

2.4

Nov

-0.3

0.7

Oct

-0.2

0.8

Sep

-0.3

0.9

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

-3.2

Aug

0.4

1.2

Jul

0.1

1.2

Jun

0.3

1.2

May

0.0

1.1

Apr

0.0

1.1

Mar

0.2

1.6

Feb

0.1

1.9

Jan

0.2

2.2

Dec 2012

0.2

2.3

AE ∆% Dec 2012-Aug 2013

2.0

Nov

-0.2

2.5

Oct

0.0

2.6

Sep

0.0

3.2

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

-0.8

Aug

0.4

3.2

Jul

0.1

3.1

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

3.0

June

0.2

3.3

May

0.0

3.2

AE ∆% May-Jun

1.2

Apr

0.5

3.3

Mar

0.5

3.3

Feb

0.4

3.3

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

5.7

Jan

0.3

3.2

Dec 2011

0.4

3.3

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

4.3

Nov

-0.1

3.3

Oct

0.6

3.4

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

3.0

Sep

0.0

3.0

Aug

0.3

2.8

Jul

0.3

2.7

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

2.4

Jun

0.1

2.7

May

0.1

2.6

AE ∆% May-Jun

1.2

Apr

0.5

2.6

Mar

0.4

2.5

Feb

0.3

2.4

Jan

0.4

2.1

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

4.9

Dec 2010

0.4

1.9

Annual

2017

1.2

2016

-0.1

2015

0.1

2014

0.2

2013

1.2

2012

3.0

2011

2.8

2010

1.5

2009

0.8

2008

3.3

2007

1.8

2006

2.1

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/216077

Chart IV-7IT of the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica shows moderation in 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index of Italy with marginal increase followed by decline to 2.5 percent in Nov 2012, 2.3 percent in Dec 2012, 2.2 percent in Jan 2013, 1.9 percent in Feb 2013 and 1.6 percent in Mar 2013. Consumer prices increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr-May 2013 and 1.2 percent in Jun-Jul 2013. In Aug 2013, consumer prices increased 1.2 percent in 12 months. Consumer prices increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2013 and 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2013. Consumer price inflation increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2013 and 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2013. Consumer prices increased 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2014 and 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2014 and 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2014 and 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2014 and fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2014. Consumer prices fell 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2014 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2014. Consumer prices increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2014 and changed 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2014. Consumer prices fell 0.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2015 and decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2015. Consumer prices fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2015 and decreased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2015 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015 and increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2015 and increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2015 and increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2015. Consumer prices increased 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2016 and fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2016. Consumer prices fell 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2016 and fell 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2016. Consumer prices fell 0.3 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2016 and fell 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2016. Consumer prices fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2016 and fell 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2016. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2016 and fell 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2016. Consumer prices increased 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2016 and increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2016. Consumer prices increased 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2017 and increased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2017. Consumer prices increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2017 and increased 1.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2017. Consumer prices increased 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2017 and increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2017. Consumer prices increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2017. Consumer prices increased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2017 and increased 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep 2017, increasing 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2017. Consumer prices increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2017. Consumer prices increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Dec 2017 and increased 0.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2018. Consumer prices increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2018 and increased 0.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2018. Consumer prices increased 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2018, increasing 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2018.

Chart IV-7IT, Italy, Consumer Price Index 12-Month Percentage Changes

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/en/

Table IV-13IT provides month and 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price of Italy by segments. Total consumer price inflation in May 2018 was 0.4 percent and increased 1.1 percent in 12 months. Inflation of goods was 0.5 percent in May 2018 and 1.1 percent in 12 months. Prices of durable goods decreased 0.2 percent in May and decreased 0.3 percent in 12 months, different from inflation in several countries. Prices of energy increased 1.1 percent in May and increased 2.1 percent in 12 months. Food prices increased 1.0 percent in May and increased 2.2 percent in 12 months. Prices of services increased 0.3 percent in May and rose 0.9 percent in 12 months. Transport prices, also influenced by commodity prices, increased 0.2 percent in May and increased 1.7 percent in 12 months. Carry trades from zero interest rates to positions in commodity futures cause increases in commodity prices. Waves of inflation originate in periods when there is no risk aversion and commodity prices decline during periods of risk aversion and portfolio reallocations (https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/04/rising-yields-world-inflation-waves.html and earlier https://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2018/03/decreasing-valuations-of-risk-financial.html).

Table IV-13IT, Italy, Consumer Price Index and Segments, Month and 12-Month ∆%

May 2018

Weights

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

General Index All Items

1,000,000

0.4

1.1

I Goods

539,827

0.5

1.1

Food

175,233

1.0

2.2

Energy

88,748

1.1

2.1

Durable

88,207

-0.2

-0.3

Nondurable

64,568

0.0

-0.4

II Services

460,173

0.3

0.9

Housing

74,769

0.0

0.5

Communications

19,222

-0.2

-0.5

Recreation, Culture and Health

178,091

0.7

1.4

Transport

77,036

0.2

1.7

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/216077

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018.

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