Mediocre United States Economic Growth, Stagnating Real Disposable Income, Financial Repression, Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits, Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk: Part I

 

Mediocre United States Economic Growth, Stagnating Real Disposable Income, Financial Repression, Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits, Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

Executive Summary

I Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth

IA Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth

IA1 Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment

IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits

II Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IIA1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IIA2 Financial Repression

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

Executive Summary

ESI Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth. The US is experiencing the first expansion from a recession after World War II without growth, jobs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html) and hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/recovery-without-hiring-collapse-of.html), unsustainable government deficit/debt (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html), waves of inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html) and deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates

(http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html) while valuations of risk financial assets approach historical highs. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 15 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). The average of 7.8 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 3.2 percent obtained by diving GDP of $13,103.5 billion in IIIQ2010 by GDP of $12,701.0 billion in IIQ2009 {[$13.103.5/$12,701.0 -1]100 = 3.2%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html). As a result, there are 28.6 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 17.6 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html).

The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as decelerating from mediocre growth of 2.4 percent on an annual basis in 2010 and 1.8 percent in 2011 to 2.2 percent in 2012. Calculations below show that actual growth is around 1.9 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). United States real GDP grew at the rate of 3.2 percent between 1929 and 2012 and at 3.2 percent between 1947 and 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). Growth is not only mediocre but also sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 28.6 million people corresponding to 17.6 percent of the effective labor force of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). In the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, US real GDP grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (IQ2011), 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, revised 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012, 0.4 percent in IVQ2012 and revised 2.4 percent in IQ2013. The annual equivalent rate of growth of GDP for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent, obtained as follows. Discounting 0.1 percent to one quarter is 0.025 percent {[(1.001)^1/4 -1]100 = 0.025}; discounting 2.5 percent to one quarter is 0.62 percent {[(1.025)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 4.1 percent to one quarter is 1.0 {[(1.04)^1/4 -1]100; discounting 2.0 percent to one quarter is 0.50 percent {[(1.020)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 -1]100}; discounting 3.1 percent to one quarter is 0.77 {[(1.031)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 0.4 percent to one quarter is 0.1 percent {[(1.004)^1/4 – 1]100}; and discounting 2.4 percent to one quarter is 0.59 percent {[(1.024)^1/4 -1}100}. Real GDP growth in the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 accumulated to 4.3 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0059) - 1]100 = 4.3%}. This is equivalent to growth from IQ2011 to IQ2013 obtained by dividing the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of IQ2013 of $13,746.2 billion by the SAAR of IVQ2010 of $13,181.2 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 and Table I-6 below) and expressing as percentage {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2) - 1]100 = 4.3%}. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0059)^4/9 -1]100 = 1.9%], or {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2)]^4/9-1]100 = 1.9%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table I-6 below, obtaining the average for nine quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. Growth in the four quarters of 2012 accumulates to 1.7 percent {[(1.02)^1/4(1.013)^1/4(1.031)^1/4(1.004)^1/4 -1]100 = 1.7%}. This is equivalent to dividing the SAAR of $13,665.4 billion for IVQ2012 in Table I-6 by the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 except for a rounding discrepancy to obtain 1.7 percent {[($13,665.4/$13,441.0) – 1]100 = 1.7%}. The US economy is still close to a standstill especially considering the GDP report in detail.

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-4 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.8 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.7 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.7 percent cumulatively and fell 45.6 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-4, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions   

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Percentage Contraction	Average Percentage Rate
IIQ1953 to IIQ1954	4	-2.5	-0.64
IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958	3	-3.1	-1.1
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980	2	-2.2	-1.1
IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982	4	-2.6	-0.67
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009	6	-4.7	-0.80

Sources: Business Cycle Reference Dates; US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-5 shows the extraordinary contrast between the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.1 percent of the US economy in the fifteen quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013 and the average of 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 and 5.3 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986. The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.8 percent with 7.9 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.5 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). Table I-5 provides an average of 7.8 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions while the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 is only 3.2 percent obtained by diving GDP of $13,103.5 billion in IIIQ2010 by GDP of $12,701.0 billion in IIQ2009 {[$13.103.5/$12,701.0 -1]100 = 3.2%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates. As a result, there are 28.6 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 17.6 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.4 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.8 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and cumulative 1.7 percent in the four quarters of 2012 {[(1.02)^1/4(1.013)^1/4(1.031)^1/4(1.004)^1/4 – 1]100 = 1.7%} with minor rounding discrepancy using the SSAR of $13,665.4 billion in IVQ2012 relative to the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 {[($13665.4/$13441.00-1]100 = 1.7%}. %}. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0059)^4/9 -1]100 = 1.9%], or {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2)]^4/9-1]100 = 1.9%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table I-6 below, obtaining the average for nine quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983.

Table I-5, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Growth ∆%	Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate
IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957	11	12.6	4.4
First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955	4	7.9
IIQ1958 to IIQ1959	5	10.2	8.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959	4	9.5
IIQ1975 to IVQ1976	8	9.5	4.6
First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976	4	6.1
IQ1983 to IQ1986 IQ1983 to IIIQ1986	13 15	19.6 21.3	5.7 5.3
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983	4	7.7
Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*		7.8
IIIQ2009 to IQ2013	15	8.2	2.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2010		3.2

*First Four Quarters: 7.9% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.6% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IIQ1976; 7.7% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Sources: Business Cycle Reference Dates: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-8 shows US real quarterly GDP growth from 1980 to 1989. The economy contracted during the recession and then expanded vigorously throughout the 1980s, rapidly eliminating the unemployment caused by the contraction.

Chart I-8, US, Real GDP, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-9 shows the entirely different situation of real quarterly GDP in the US between 2007 and 2012. The economy has underperformed during the first fifteen quarters of expansion for the first time in the comparable contractions since the 1950s. The US economy is now in a perilous standstill.

Chart I-9, US, Real GDP, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

As shown in Tables I-4 and I-5 above the loss of real GDP in the US during the contraction was 4.7 percent but the gain in the cyclical expansion has been only 8.2 percent (last row in Table I-5), using all latest revisions. As a result, the level of real GDP in IQ2013 with the second estimate and revisions is only higher by 3.2 percent than the level of real GDP in IVQ2007. Table I-6 provides in the second column real GDP in billions of chained 2005 dollars. The third column provides the percentage change of the quarter relative to IVQ2007; the fourth column provides the percentage change relative to the prior quarter; and the final fifth column provides the percentage change relative to the same quarter a year earlier. The contraction actually concentrated in two quarters: decline of 2.3 percent in IVQ2008 relative to the prior quarter and decline of 1.3 percent in IQ2009 relative to IVQ2008. The combined fall of GDP in IVQ2008 and IQ2009 was 3.6 percent {[(1-0.023) x (1-0.013) -1]100 = -3.6%}, or {[(IQ2009 $12,711.0)/(IIIQ2008 $13,186.9) – 1]100 = -3.6%}. Those two quarters coincided with the worst effects of the financial crisis. GDP fell 0.1 percent in IIQ2009 but grew 0.4 percent in IIIQ2009, which is the beginning of recovery in the cyclical dates of the NBER. Most of the recovery occurred in five successive quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2010 of growth of 1.0 percent in IVQ2009 and equal growth at 0.6 percent in IQ2010, IIQ2010, IIIQ2010 and IVQ2010 for cumulative growth in those five quarters of 3.4 percent, obtained by accumulating the quarterly rates {[(1.01 x 1.006 x 1.006 x 1.006 x 1.006) – 1]100 = 3.4%} or {[(IVQ2010 $13,181.2)/(IIIQ2009 $12,746.7) – 1]100 = 3.4%}. The economy lost momentum already in 2010 growing at 0.6 percent in each quarter, or annual equivalent 2.4 per cent {[(1.006)⁴ – 1]100 = 2.4%}, compared with annual equivalent 4.1 percent in IV2009 {[(1.01)⁴ – 1]100 = 4.1%}. The economy then stalled during the first half of 2011 with growth of 0.0025 percent in IQ2011 and 0.6 percent in IIQ2011 for combined annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent {(1.00025 x 1.006)²}. The economy grew 0.3 percent in IIIQ2011 for annual equivalent growth of 1.2 percent in the first three quarters {[(1.00025 x 1.006 x 1.003)^4/3 -1]100 = 1.2%}. Growth picked up in IVQ2011 with 1.0 percent relative to IIIQ2011. Growth in a quarter relative to a year earlier in Table I-6 slows from over 2.4 percent during three consecutive quarters from IIQ2010 to IVQ2010 to 1.8 percent in IQ2011, 1.9 percent in IIQ2011, 1.6 percent in IIIQ2011 and 2.0 percent in IVQ2011. As shown below, growth of 1.0 percent in IVQ2011 was partly driven by inventory accumulation. In IQ2012, GDP grew 0.5 percent relative to IVQ2011 and 2.4 percent relative to IQ2011, decelerating to 0.3 percent in IIQ2012 and 2.1 percent relative to IIQ2011 and 0.8 percent in IIIQ2012 and 2.6 percent relative to IIIQ2011 largely because of inventory accumulation and national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.1 percent in IVQ2012 with 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier but mostly because of 1.52 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of reduction of one-time national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.6 percent in IQ2013 and 1.8 percent relative to IQ2012 in large part because of burning savings to consume caused by financial repression of zero interest rates. Rates of a quarter relative to the prior quarter capture better deceleration of the economy than rates on a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. The critical question for which there is not yet definitive solution is whether what lies ahead is continuing growth recession with the economy crawling and unemployment/underemployment at extremely high levels or another contraction or conventional recession. Forecasts of various sources continued to maintain high growth in 2011 without taking into consideration the continuous slowing of the economy in late 2010 and the first half of 2011. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is one of the common sources of doubts on the rate and direction of economic growth in the US but there is weak internal demand in the US with almost no investment and spikes of consumption driven by burning saving because of financial repression forever in the form of zero interest rates.

Table I-6, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%

	Real GDP, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars	∆% Relative to IVQ2007	∆% Relative to Prior Quarter	∆% over Year Earlier
IVQ2007	13,326.0	NA	NA	2.2
IQ2008	13,266.8	-0.4	-0.4	1.6
IIQ2008	13,310.5	-0.1	0.3	1.0
IIIQ2008	13,186.9	-1.0	-0.9	-0.6
IVQ2008	12,883.5	-3.3	-2.3	-3.3
IQ2009	12,711.0	-4.6	-1.3	-4.2
IIQ2009	12,701.0	-4.7	-0.1	-4.6
IIIQ2009	12,746.7	-4.3	0.4	-3.3
IV2009	12,873.1	-3.4	1.0	-0.1
IQ2010	12,947.6	-2.8	0.6	1.9
IIQ2010	13,019.6	-2.3	0.6	2.5
IIIQ2010	13,103.5	-1.7	0.6	2.8
IVQ2010	13,181.2	-1.1	0.6	2.4
IQ2011	13,183.8	-1.1	0.0	1.8
IIQ2011	13,264.7	-0.5	0.6	1.9
IIIQ2011	13,306.9	-0.1	0.3	1.6
IV2011	13,441.0	0.9	1.0	2.0
IQ2012	13,506.4	1.4	0.5	2.4
IIQ2012	13,548.5	1.7	0.3	2.1
IIIQ2012	13,652.5	2.5	0.8	2.6
IVQ2012	13,665.4	2.5	0.1	1.7
IQ2013	13,746.2	3.2	0.6	1.8

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

ESII Contracting Fixed Private Investment. Table IA1-2 provides real private fixed investment at seasonally adjusted annual rates from IVQ2007 to IQ2013 or for the complete economic cycle. The first column provides the quarter, the second column percentage change relative to IVQ2007, the third column the quarter percentage change in the quarter relative to the prior quarter and the final column percentage change in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IQ1980, gross private domestic investment in the US was $778.3 billion of 2005 dollars, growing to $965.9 billion in IVQ1985 or 24.1 percent, as shown in Table IB-2 of IB Collapse of Dynamism of United States Income Growth and Employment Creation (IX Conclusion and extended analysis at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html). Gross private domestic investment in the US decreased 8.8 percent from $2,111.5 billion of 2005 dollars in IVQ2007 to $1,925.6 billion in IQ2013. As shown in Table IAI-2, real private fixed investment fell 8.8 percent from $2111.5 billion of 2005 dollars in IVQ2007 to $1925.6 billion in IQ2014. Growth of real private investment in Table IA1-2 is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012.

Table IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%

	Real PFI, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars	∆% Relative to IVQ2007	∆% Relative to Prior Quarter	∆% over Year Earlier
IVQ2007	2111.5	NA	-1.2	-1.0
IQ2008	2066.4	-2.1	-2.1	-2.9
IIQ2008	2039.1	-3.4	-1.3	-5.0
IIIQ2008	1973.5	-6.5	-3.2	-7.7
IV2008	1835.4	-13.1	-7.0	-13.1
IQ2009	1677.3	-20.6	-8.6	-18.8
IIQ2009	1593.7	-24.5	-5.0	-21.8
IIIQ2009	1581.2	-25.1	-0.8	-19.9
IVQ2009	1556.8	-26.3	-1.5	-15.2
IQ2010	1553.1	-26.4	-0.2	-7.4
IIQ2010	1606.5	-23.9	3.4	0.8
IIIQ2010	1602.7	-24.1	-0.2	1.4
IVQ2010	1632.3	-22.7	1.8	4.8
IQ2011	1627.0	-22.9	-0.3	4.8
IIQ2011	1675.4	-20.7	3.0	4.3
IIIQ2011	1736.8	-17.7	3.7	8.4
IVQ2011	1778.7	-15.8	2.4	9.0
IQ2012	1820.6	-13.8	2.4	11.9
IIQ2012	1840.6	-12.8	1.1	9.9
IIIQ2012	1844.8	-12.6	0.2	6.2
IVQ2012	1906.3	-9.7	3.3	7.2
IQ2013	1925.6	-8.8	1.0	5.8

PFI: Private Fixed Investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-3 provides real private fixed investment in billions of chained 2005 dollars from IV2007 to IQ2013. Real private fixed investment has not recovered, stabilizing at a level in IQ2013 that is 8.8 percent below the level in IVQ2007.

Chart IA1-3, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars, IQ2007 to IQ2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-4 provides real gross private domestic investment in chained dollars of 2005 from 1980 to 1986. Real gross private domestic investment climbed 24.1 percent in IVQ1985 above the level in IQ1980.

Chart IA1-4, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 1980-1986

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-5 provides real gross private domestic investment in the United States in billions of dollars of 2005 from 2006 to 2013. Gross private domestic investment reached a level in IQ2013 that was 6.9 percent lower than the level in IVQ2007 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IA1-5, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

ESIII Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits. Table IA1-5 provides value added of corporate business, dividends and corporate profits in billions of current dollars at seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) in IVQ2007 and IQ2013 together with percentage changes. The last three rows of Table IA1-5 provide gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business, consumption of fixed capital and net value added in billions of chained 2005 dollars at SAARs. Deductions from gross value added of corporate profits down the rows of Table IA1-5 end with undistributed corporate profits. Profits after taxes with inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment (CCA) increased by 50.2 percent in nominal terms from IVQ2007 to IQ2013 while net dividends decreased 1.1 percent and undistributed corporate profits swelled 205 percent from $118.0 billion in IQ2007 to $359.9 billion in IQ2013 from minus $22.1 billion in current dollars in IVQ2007. The investment decision of United States corporations has been fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash. Gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business adjusted for inflation increased 4.2 percent from IVQ2007 to IQ2013, which is much lower than nominal increase of 12.4 percent in the same period for gross value added of total corporate business.

Table IA1-5, US, Value Added of Corporate Business, Corporate Profits and Dividends, IVQ2007-IQ2013

	IVQ2007	IQ2013	∆%
Current Billions of Dollars Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates (SAAR)
Gross Value Added of Corporate Business	7,975.6	9,103.0	14.1
Consumption of Fixed Capital	988.0	1,135.1	14.9
Net Value Added	6,987.6	7,967.8	14.0
Compensation of Employees	5,020.7	5,392.0	7.4
Taxes on Production and Imports Less Subsidies	659.7	715.7	8.5
Net Operating Surplus	1,307.2	1,860.1	42.3
Net Interest and Misc	202.4	187.6	-7.3
Business Current Transfer Payment Net	73.1	122.7	67.8
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustments	1,031.6	1,549.8	50.2
Taxes on Corporate Income	408.8	434.4	6.3
Profits after Tax with IVA and CCA Adjustment	622.9	1,115.4	79.1
Net Dividends	645.0	638.0	-1.1
Undistributed Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustment	-22.1	477.4	NA
Billions of Chained USD 2005 SAAR
Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporate Business	6,642.5	6,918.7	4.2
Consumption of Fixed Capital	801.6	859.9	7.3
Net Value Added	5,840.9	6,058.7	3.7

IVA: Inventory Valuation Adjustment; CCA: Capital Consumption Adjustment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-6 provides comparable United States value added of corporate business, corporate profits and dividends from IQ1980 to IVQ1985. There is significant difference both in nominal and inflation-adjusted data. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA increased 140.3 percent with dividends growing 112.7 percent and undistributed profits jumping 169.7 percent. There was much higher inflation in the 1980s than in the current cycle. For example, the consumer price index for all items not seasonally adjusted increased 36.5 percent between Mar 1980 and Dec 1985 but only 9.3 percent between Dec 2007 and Dec 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm). The comparison is still valid in terms of inflation-adjusted data: gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business adjusted for inflation increased 21.2 percent between IQ1980 and IVQ1985 but only 4.2 percent between IVQ2007 and IQ2013 while net value added adjusted for inflation increased 20.6 percent between IQ1980 and IVQ1985 but only 3.7 percent between IVQ2007 and IQ2013.

Table IA1-6, US, Value Added of Corporate Business, Corporate Profits and Dividends, IQ1980-IVQ1985

	IQ1980	IVQ1985	∆%
Current Billions of Dollars Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates (SAAR)
Gross Value Added of Corporate Business	1,619.3	2,576.1	59.1
Consumption of Fixed Capital	169.9	278.9	64.2
Net Value Added	1,449.4	2,297.1	58.5
Compensation of Employees	1,090.6	1,667.0	52.9
Taxes on Production and Imports Less Subsidies	121.5	213.3	75.6
Net Operating Surplus	237.3	416.9	75.7
Net Interest and Misc	49.0	96.8	97.6
Business Current Transfer Payment Net	12.1	30.0	147.9
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustments	176.3	290.0	64.5
Taxes on Corporate Income	97.0	99.7	2.8
Profits after Tax with IVA and CCA Adjustment	79.2	190.3	140.3
Net Dividends	40.9	87.0	112.7
Undistributed Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustment	38.3	103.3	169.7
Billions of Chained USD 2005 SAAR
Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporate Business	2,642.8	3,203.9	21.2
Consumption of Fixed Capital	223.2	286.6	28.4
Net Value Added	2,419.6	2,917.3	20.6

IVA: Inventory Valuation Adjustment; CCA: Capital Consumption Adjustment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-12 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides quarterly corporate profits after tax and undistributed profits with IVA and CCA from 1979 to 2012. There is tightness between the series of quarterly corporate profits and undistributed profits in the 1980s with significant gap developing from 1988 and to the present with the closest approximation peaking in IVQ2005 and surrounding quarters. These gaps widened during all recessions including in 1991 and 2001 and recovered in expansions with exceptionally weak performance in the current expansion.

Chart IA1-12, US, Corporate Profits after Tax and Undistributed Profits with Inventory Valuation Adjustment and Capital Consumption Adjustment, Quarterly, 1979-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-7 provides price, costs and profit per unit of gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate income for IVQ2007 and IQ2013 in the upper block and for IQ1980 and IVQ1985 in the lower block. Compensation of employees or labor costs per unit of gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate income hardly changed from 0.667 in IVQ2007 to 0.693 in IQ2013 in a fractured labor market but increased from 0.386 in IQ1980 to 0.480 in IVQ1985 in a more vibrant labor market. Unit nonlabor costs increased mildly from 0.271 per unit of gross value added in IVQ2007 to 0.287 in IQ2013 but increased from 0.127 in IQ1980 to 0.175 in IVQ1985 in an economy closer to full employment of resources. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA per unit of gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate income increased from 0.076 in IVQ2007 to 0.114 in IQ2013 and from 0.025 in IQ1980 to 0.053 in IVQ1985.

Table IA1-7, US, Price, Costs and Profit per Unit of Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Domestic Corporate Income

	IVQ2007	IQ2013
Price per Unit of Real Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporate Business	1.056	1.140
Compensation of Employees (Unit Labor Cost)	0.667	0.693
Unit Nonlabor Cost	0.271	0.287
Consumption of Fixed Capital	0.128	0.138
Taxes on Production and Imports less Subsidies plus Business Current Transfer Payments (net)	0.103	0.110
Net Interest and Misc. Payments	0.040	0.039
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustment (Unit Profits from Current Production)	0.118	0.159
Taxes on Corporate Income	0.043	0.045
Profits after Tax with IVA and CCA Adjustment	0.076	0.114
	IQ1980	IVQ1985
Price per Unit of Real Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporate Business	0.566	0.730
Compensation of Employees (Unit Labor Cost)	0.386	0.480
Unit Nonlabor Cost	0.127	0.175
Consumption of Fixed Capital	0.060	0.078
Taxes on Production and Imports less Subsidies plus Business Current Transfer Payments (net)	0.047	0.068
Net Interest and Misc. Payments	0.020	0.029
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustment (Unit Profits from Current Production)	0.054	0.075
Taxes on Corporate Income	0.029	0.022
Profits after Tax with IVA and CCA Adjustment	0.025	0.053

IVA: Inventory Valuation Adjustment; CCA: Capital Consumption Adjustment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-13 provides quarterly profits after tax with IVA and CCA per unit of gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate income from 1980 to 2013. In an environment of idle labor and other productive resources nonfinancial corporate income increased after tax profits with IVA and CCA per unit of gross value added at a faster pace in the weak economy from IVQ2007 to IQ2013 than in the vibrant expansion of the cyclical contractions of the 1980s. Part of the profits was distributed as dividends and significant part was retained as undistributed profits in the current economic cycle with frustrated investment decision.

Chart IA1-13, US, Profits after Tax with Inventory Valuation Adjustment and Capital Consumption Adjustment per Unit of Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Domestic Corporate Income, 1980-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

ESIV Stagnating Real Per Capita Disposable Income. Chart IIA-12 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 1980 to 1989. This is the ultimate measure of wellbeing in receiving income by obtaining the value per inhabitant. The measure cannot adjust for the distribution of income. Real disposable personal income per capita grew rapidly during the expansion after 1983 and continued growing during the rest of the decade.

Chart IIA-12, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-13 provides monthly real disposable personal per capita income from 2007 to 2013. There was initial recovery from the drop during the global recession followed by stagnation. Real per capita disposable income increased 1.4 percent from $32,703 in chained dollars of 2005 in Oct 2012 to $33,172 in Nov 2012 and 3.0 percent to $34,174 in Dec 2012 for cumulative increase of 4.5 percent from Oct 2012 to Dec 2012. Real per capita disposable income fell 5.3 percent from $34,174 in Dec 2012 to $32,378 in Jan 2013, increasing marginally 0.8 percent to $32,621 in Feb 2013 for cumulative change of minus 0.3 percent from Oct 2012 (data at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). This increase is shown in a jump in the final segment in Chart IIA-13 with Nov-Dec 2012, decline in Jan 2013 and recovery in Feb 2013. Real per capita disposable income increased 0.3 percent from $32,621 in Feb 2013 in chained dollars of 2005 to $32,710 in Mar 2013 for cumulative gain of 0.0 percent relative to Oct 2012. Real per capital disposable income increased to $32,729 in Apr 2013 for gain of 0.1 percent relative to Feb 2013 and 0.1 percent from Oct 2012. BEA explains as: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf).

The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

Chart IIA-13, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

ESV Financial Repression. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1974) argue that legal restrictions on financial institutions can be detrimental to economic development. “Financial repression” is the term used in the economic literature for these restrictions (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 81-6). Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. Prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits were imposed by the Banking Act of 1933. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q.

Most regulatory actions trigger compensatory measures by the private sector that result in outcomes that are different from those intended by regulation (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Banks offered services to their customers and loans at rates lower than market rates to compensate for the prohibition to pay interest on demand deposits (Friedman 1970, 24). The prohibition of interest on demand deposits was eventually lifted in recent times. In the second half of the 1960s, already in the beginning of the Great Inflation (DeLong 1997), market rates rose above the ceilings of Regulation Q because of higher inflation. Nobody desires savings allocated to time or savings deposits that pay less than expected inflation. This is a fact currently with zero interest rates and consumer price inflation of 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/) but rising during waves of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html). Funding problems motivated compensatory measures by banks. Money-center banks developed the large certificate of deposit (CD) to accommodate increasing volumes of loan demand by customers. As Friedman (1970, 25) finds:

“Large negotiable CD’s were particularly hard hit by the interest rate ceiling because they are deposits of financially sophisticated individuals and institutions who have many alternatives. As already noted, they declined from a peak of $24 billion in mid-December, 1968, to less than $12 billion in early October, 1969.”

Banks created different liabilities to compensate for the decline in CDs. As Friedman (1970, 25; 1969) explains:

“The most important single replacement was almost surely ‘liabilities of US banks to foreign branches.’ Prevented from paying a market interest rate on liabilities of home offices in the United States (except to foreign official institutions that are exempt from Regulation Q), the major US banks discovered that they could do so by using the Euro-dollar market. Their European branches could accept time deposits, either on book account or as negotiable CD’s at whatever rate was required to attract them and match them on the asset side of their balance sheet with ‘due from head office.’ The head office could substitute the liability ‘due to foreign branches’ for the liability ‘due on CDs.”

Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:

“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”

In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:

“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.”

Chart IIA-14 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides quarterly savings as percent of disposable income or the US savings rate from 1980 to 2013. There was a long-term downward sloping trend from 12 percent in the early 1980s to less than 2 percent in 2005-2006. The savings rate then rose during the contraction and also in the expansion. In 2011 and into 2012 the savings rate declined as consumption is financed with savings in part because of the disincentive or frustration of receiving a few pennies for every $10,000 of deposits in a bank. The savings rate increased in the final segment of Chart IIA-14 in 2012 followed by another decline because of the pain of the opportunity cost of zero remuneration for hard-earned savings. Swelling realization of income in Oct-Dec 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2012 caused the jump of the savings rate to 7.4 percent in Dec 2012. The BEA explains as: Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). The savings rate then collapsed to 2.1 percent in Jan 2013 in part because of the decline of 5.3 percent in real disposable personal income and to 2.4 percent with increase of real disposable income by 0.7 percent in Feb 2013. The savings rate remained at 2.5 percent in Mar 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.3 percent and at 2.5 percent in Apr 2013 with increase of per capita real disposable income by 0.1 percent. The decline of personal income was caused by increasing contributions to government social insurance (page 1 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf). The objective of monetary policy is to reduce borrowing rates to induce consumption but it has collateral disincentive of reducing savings and misallocating resources away from their best uses. The zero interest rate of monetary policy is a tax on saving. This tax is highly regressive, meaning that it affects the most people with lower income or wealth and retirees. The long-term decline of savings rates in the US has created a dependence on foreign savings to finance the deficits in the federal budget and the balance of payments.

Chart IIA-14, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Quarterly, 1980-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-15 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides personal savings as percent of personal disposable income, or savings ratio, from Jan 2007 to Mar 2013. The uncertainties caused by the global recession resulted in sharp increase in the savings ratio that peaked at 8.3 percent in May 2008 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The second highest ratio occurred at 6.7 percent in May 2009. There was another rising trend until 5.8 percent in Jun 2010 and then steady downward trend until trough of 3.2 percent in Nov 2011. This was followed by an upward trend with 4.1 percent in Jun 2012 but decline to 3.7 percent in Aug 2012, 3.3 percent in Sep 2012, 3.7 percent in Oct and increase to 4.7 percent in Nov 2012 followed by jump to 7.4 percent in Dec 2012. Swelling realization of income in Oct-Dec 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2012 caused the jump of the savings rate to 7.4 percent in Dec 2012. The BEA explains as: Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). There was a reverse effect in Jan 2013 with decline of the savings rate to 2.1 percent. Real disposable personal income fell 5.2 percent and real disposable per capita income fell from $34,174 in Dec 2012 to $32,378 in Jan 2013 or by 5.3 percent, which is explained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions forgovernment social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9billion.”

Consumption was maintained by burning savings because of the drain of decline of real disposable personal income by 5.2 percent and 5.3 percent in per capita terms. The savings rate rose to 2.4 percent in Feb 2013 with increase of real per capita income by 0.8 percent and remained at 2.5 percent in Mar 2013 with further increase of real per capita disposable income by 0.3 percent. The savings ratio remained at 2.5 percent in Apr 2013 with increase of real per capita disposable income by 0.1 percent. Permanent manipulation of the entire spectrum of interest rates with monetary policy measures distorts the compass of resource allocation with inferior outcomes of future growth, employment and prosperity and dubious redistribution of income and wealth worsening the most the personal welfare of people without vast capital and financial relations to manage their savings.

Chart IIA-15, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Income, Monthly 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

ESVI Global Financial and Economic Risk. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides an international safety net for prevention and resolution of international financial crises. The IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) provides analysis of the economic and financial sectors of countries (see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 101-62, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008), 114-23). Relating economic and financial sectors is a challenging task both for theory and measurement. The IMF (2012WEOOct) provides surveillance of the world economy with its Global Economic Outlook (WEO) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/index.htm), of the world financial system with its Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) (IMF 2012GFSROct) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/02/index.htm) and of fiscal affairs with the Fiscal Monitor (IMF 2012FMOct) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2012/02/fmindex.htm). There appears to be a moment of transition in global economic and financial variables that may prove of difficult analysis and measurement. It is useful to consider a summary of global economic and financial risks, which are analyzed in detail in the comments of this blog in Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets, Table VI-4.

Economic risks include the following:

1. China’s Economic Growth. China is lowering its growth target to 7.5 percent per year. China’s GDP growth decelerated significantly from annual equivalent 9.9 percent in IIQ2011 to 7.4 percent in IVQ2011 and 6.6 percent in IQ2012, rebounding to 7.8 percent in IIQ2012, 8.7 percent in IIIQ2012 and 8.2 percent in IVQ2012. Annual equivalent growth in IQ2013 fell to 6.6 percent. (See Subsection VC and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/world-inflation-waves-stagnating-united_21.html).
2. United States Economic Growth, Labor Markets and Budget/Debt Quagmire. The US is growing slowly with 28.6 million in job stress, fewer 10 million full-time jobs, high youth unemployment, historically low hiring and declining real wages.
3. Economic Growth and Labor Markets in Advanced Economies. Advanced economies are growing slowly. There is still high unemployment in advanced economies.
4. World Inflation Waves. Inflation continues in repetitive waves globally (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.htmland earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html).

A list of financial uncertainties includes:

1. Euro Area Survival Risk. The resilience of the euro to fiscal and financial doubts on larger member countries is still an unknown risk.
2. Foreign Exchange Wars. Exchange rate struggles continue as zero interest rates in advanced economies induce devaluation of their currencies.
3. Valuation of Risk Financial Assets. Valuations of risk financial assets have reached extremely high levels in markets with lower volumes.
4. Duration Trap of the Zero Bound. The yield of the US 10-year Treasury rose from 2.031 percent on Mar 9, 2012, to 2.294 percent on Mar 16, 2012. Considering a 10-year Treasury with coupon of 2.625 percent and maturity in exactly 10 years, the price would fall from 105.3512 corresponding to yield of 2.031 percent to 102.9428 corresponding to yield of 2.294 percent, for loss in a week of 2.3 percent but far more in a position with leverage of 10:1. Min Zeng, writing on “Treasurys fall, ending brutal quarter,” published on Mar 30, 2012, in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577313400029412564.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_markets), informs that Treasury bonds maturing in more than 20 years lost 5.52 percent in the first quarter of 2012.
5. Credibility and Commitment of Central Bank Policy. There is a credibility issue of the commitment of monetary policy (Sargent and Silber 2012Mar20).
6. Carry Trades. Commodity prices driven by zero interest rates have resumed their increasing path with fluctuations caused by intermittent risk aversion

A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 15,115.57

on Fri May 31, 2013, which is higher by 6.7 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 6.5 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs.

The carry trade from zero interest rates to leveraged positions in risk financial assets had proved strongest for commodity exposures but US equities have regained leadership. The DJIA has increased 56.0 percent since the trough of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe on Jul 2, 2010 to May 31, 2013, S&P 500 has gained 59.5 percent and DAX 47.2 percent. Before the current round of risk aversion, almost all assets in the column “∆% Trough to 5/31/13” had double digit gains relative to the trough around Jul 2, 2010 followed by negative performance but now some valuations of equity indexes show varying behavior: China’s Shanghai Composite is 3.5 percent below the trough; Japan’s Nikkei Average is 56.1 percent above the trough; DJ Asia Pacific TSM is 20.9 percent above the trough; Dow Global is 28.3 percent above the trough; STOXX 50 of 50 blue-chip European equities (http://www.stoxx.com/indices/index_information.html?symbol=sx5E) is 19.4 percent above the trough; and NYSE Financial Index is 36.1 percent above the trough. DJ UBS Commodities is 5.4 percent above the trough. DAX index of German equities (http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/DAX:IND) is 47.2 percent above the trough. Japan’s Nikkei Average is 56.1 percent above the trough on Aug 31, 2010 and 20.9 percent above the peak on Apr 5, 2010. The Nikkei Average closed at 13,774.54

on Fri May 31, 2013 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata), which is 34.3 percent higher than 10,254.43 on Mar 11, 2011, on the date of the Tōhoku or Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami. Global risk aversion erased the earlier gains of the Nikkei. The dollar depreciated by 9.0 percent relative to the euro and even higher before the new bout of sovereign risk issues in Europe. The column “∆% week to 5/31/13” in Table VI-4 shows increase of 0.5 percent for China’s Shanghai Composite in the week. DJ Asia Pacific decreased 2.3 percent. NYSE Financial decreased 0.5 percent in the week. DJ UBS Commodities decreased 0.9 percent. Dow Global decreased 1.0 percent in the week of May 31, 2013. The DJIA decreased 1.2 percent and S&P 500 decreased 1.1 percent. DAX of Germany increased 0.5 percent. STOXX 50 decreased 1.3 percent. The USD depreciated 0.5 percent. There are still high uncertainties on European sovereign risks and banking soundness, US and world growth slowdown and China’s growth tradeoffs. Sovereign problems in the “periphery” of Europe and fears of slower growth in Asia and the US cause risk aversion with trading caution instead of more aggressive risk exposures. There is a fundamental change in Table VI-4 from the relatively upward trend with oscillations since the sovereign risk event of Apr-Jul 2010. Performance is best assessed in the column “∆% Peak to 5/31/13” that provides the percentage change from the peak in Apr 2010 before the sovereign risk event to May 31, 2013. Most risk financial assets had gained not only relative to the trough as shown in column “∆% Trough to 5/31/13” but also relative to the peak in column “∆% Peak to 5/31/13.” There are now several equity indexes above the peak in Table VI-4: DJIA 34.9 percent, S&P 500 34.0 percent, DAX 31.8 percent, Dow Global 4.7 percent, DJ Asia Pacific 5.8 percent, NYSE Financial Index (http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/nykid.shtml) 8.4 percent, Nikkei Average 20.9 percent and STOXX 50 1.1 percent. There is only one equity index below the peak: Shanghai Composite by 27.3 percent. DJ UBS Commodities Index is now 9.9 percent below the peak. The US dollar strengthened 14.1 percent relative to the peak. The factors of risk aversion have adversely affected the performance of risk financial assets. The performance relative to the peak in Apr 2010 is more important than the performance relative to the trough around early Jul 2010 because improvement could signal that conditions have returned to normal levels before European sovereign doubts in Apr 2010. Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. It may be quite painful to exit QE→∞ or use of the balance sheet of the central together with zero interest rates forever. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

Where R_τ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; C_τ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

declines. Equally, decline in expected revenue from the stock or project, R_τ, causes decline in valuation. An intriguing issue is the difference in performance of valuations of risk financial assets and economic growth and employment. Paul A. Samuelson (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1970/samuelson-bio.html) popularized the view of the elusive relation between stock markets and economic activity in an often-quoted phrase “the stock market has predicted nine of the last five recessions.” In the presence of zero interest rates forever, valuations of risk financial assets are likely to differ from the performance of the overall economy. The interrelations of financial and economic variables prove difficult to analyze and measure.

Table VI-4, Stock Indexes, Commodities, Dollar and 10-Year Treasury  

	Peak	Trough	∆% to Trough	∆% Peak to 5/31/ /13	∆% Week 5/31/13	∆% Trough to 5/31/ 13
DJIA	4/26/ 10	7/2/10	-13.6	34.9	-1.2	56.0
S&P 500	4/23/ 10	7/20/ 10	-16.0	34.0	-1.1	59.5
NYSE Finance	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-20.3	8.4	-0.5	36.1
Dow Global	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-18.4	4.7	-1.0	28.3
Asia Pacific	4/15/ 10	7/2/10	-12.5	5.8	-2.3	20.9
Japan Nikkei Aver.	4/05/ 10	8/31/ 10	-22.5	20.9	-5.7	56.1
China Shang.	4/15/ 10	7/02 /10	-24.7	-27.3	0.5	-3.5
STOXX 50	4/15/10	7/2/10	-15.3	1.1	-1.3	19.4
DAX	4/26/ 10	5/25/ 10	-10.5	31.8	0.5	47.2
Dollar Euro	11/25 2009	6/7 2010	21.2	14.1	-0.5	-9.0
DJ UBS Comm.	1/6/ 10	7/2/10	-14.5	-9.9	-0.9	5.4
10-Year T Note	4/5/ 10	4/6/10	3.986	2.132

T: trough; Dollar: positive sign appreciation relative to euro (less dollars paid per euro), negative sign depreciation relative to euro (more dollars paid per euro)

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

IA Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth. The US is experiencing the first expansion from a recession after World War II without growth, jobs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html) and hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/recovery-without-hiring-collapse-of.html), unsustainable government deficit/debt (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html), waves of inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html) and deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates

(http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html) while valuations of risk financial assets approach historical highs. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 15 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). The average of 7.8 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 3.2 percent obtained by diving GDP of $13,103.5 billion in IIIQ2010 by GDP of $12,701.0 billion in IIQ2009 {[$13.103.5/$12,701.0 -1]100 = 3.2%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html). As a result, there are 28.6 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 17.6 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html).

The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as decelerating from mediocre growth of 2.4 percent on an annual basis in 2010 and 1.8 percent in 2011 to 2.2 percent in 2012. Calculations below show that actual growth is around 1.9 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). United States real GDP grew at the rate of 3.2 percent between 1929 and 2012 and at 3.2 percent between 1947 and 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). Growth is not only mediocre but also sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 28.6 million people corresponding to 17.6 percent of the effective labor force of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). In the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, US real GDP grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (IQ2011), 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, revised 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012, 0.4 percent in IVQ2012 and revised 2.4 percent in IQ2013. The annual equivalent rate of growth of GDP for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent, obtained as follows. Discounting 0.1 percent to one quarter is 0.025 percent {[(1.001)^1/4 -1]100 = 0.025}; discounting 2.5 percent to one quarter is 0.62 percent {[(1.025)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 4.1 percent to one quarter is 1.0 {[(1.04)^1/4 -1]100; discounting 2.0 percent to one quarter is 0.50 percent {[(1.020)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 -1]100}; discounting 3.1 percent to one quarter is 0.77 {[(1.031)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 0.4 percent to one quarter is 0.1 percent {[(1.004)^1/4 – 1]100}; and discounting 2.4 percent to one quarter is 0.59 percent {[(1.024)^1/4 -1}100}. Real GDP growth in the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 accumulated to 4.3 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0059) - 1]100 = 4.3%}. This is equivalent to growth from IQ2011 to IQ2013 obtained by dividing the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of IQ2013 of $13,746.2 billion by the SAAR of IVQ2010 of $13,181.2 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 and Table I-6 below) and expressing as percentage {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2) - 1]100 = 4.3%}. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0059)^4/9 -1]100 = 1.9%], or {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2)]^4/9-1]100 = 1.9%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table I-6 below, obtaining the average for nine quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. Growth in the four quarters of 2012 accumulates to 1.7 percent {[(1.02)^1/4(1.013)^1/4(1.031)^1/4(1.004)^1/4 -1]100 = 1.7%}. This is equivalent to dividing the SAAR of $13,665.4 billion for IVQ2012 in Table I-6 by the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 except for a rounding discrepancy to obtain 1.7 percent {[($13,665.4/$13,441.0) – 1]100 = 1.7%}. The US economy is still close to a standstill especially considering the GDP report in detail.

The objective of this section is analyzing US economic growth in the current cyclical expansion. There is initial discussion of the conventional explanation of the current recovery as being weak because of the depth of the contraction and the financial crisis and brief discussion of the concept of “slow-growth recession.” Analysis that is more complete is in IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, which is updated with release of more information on the United States economic cycle (IX Conclusion and extended analysis at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html). The bulk of the section consists of comparison of the current growth experience of the US with earlier expansions after past deep contractions and consideration of recent performance.

This blog has analyzed systematically the weakness of the United States recovery in the current business cycle from IIIQ2009 to the present in comparison with the recovery from the two recessions in the 1980s from IQ1983 to IVQ1985. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 15 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). The average of 7.8 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 3.2 percent obtained by diving GDP of $13,103.5 billion in IIIQ2010 by GDP of $12,701.0 billion in IIQ2009 {[$13.103.5/$12,701.0 -1]100 = 3.2%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html). As a result, there are 28.6 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 17.6 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html).

The conventional explanation is that the recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (Jun) was so profound that it caused subsequent weak recovery and that historically growth after recessions with financial crises has been weaker. Michael D. Bordo (2012Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) provide evidence contradicting the conventional explanation: recovery is much stronger on average after profound contractions and also much stronger after recessions with financial crises than after recessions without financial crises. Insistence on the conventional explanation prevents finding policies that can accelerate growth, employment and prosperity.

A monumental effort of data gathering, calculation and analysis by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff is highly relevant to banking crises, financial crash, debt crises and economic growth (Reinhart 2010CB; Reinhart and Rogoff 2011AF, 2011Jul14, 2011EJ, 2011CEPR, 2010FCDC, 2010GTD, 2009TD, 2009AFC, 2008TDPV; see also Reinhart and Reinhart 2011Feb, 2010AF and Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011). See http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html The dataset of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 1) is quite unique in breadth of countries and over time periods:

“Our results incorporate data on 44 countries spanning about 200 years. Taken together, the data incorporate over 3,700 annual observations covering a wide range of political systems, institutions, exchange rate and monetary arrangements and historic circumstances. We also employ more recent data on external debt, including debt owed by government and by private entities.”

Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 2011CEPR) classify the dataset of 2317 observations into 20 advanced economies and 24 emerging market economies. In each of the advanced and emerging categories, the data for countries is divided into buckets according to the ratio of gross central government debt to GDP: below 30, 30 to 60, 60 to 90 and higher than 90 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010GTD, Table 1, 4). Median and average yearly percentage growth rates of GDP are calculated for each of the buckets for advanced economies. There does not appear to be any relation for debt/GDP ratios below 90. The highest growth rates are for debt/GDP ratios below 30: 3.7 percent for the average and 3.9 for the median. Growth is significantly lower for debt/GDP ratios above 90: 1.7 for the average and 1.9 percent for the median. GDP growth rates for the intermediate buckets are in a range around 3 percent: the highest 3.4 percent average is for the bucket 60 to 90 and 3.1 percent median for 30 to 60. There is even sharper contrast for the United States: 4.0 percent growth for debt/GDP ratio below 30; 3.4 percent growth for debt/GDP ratio of 30 to 60; 3.3 percent growth for debt/GDP ratio of 60 to 90; and minus 1.8 percent, contraction, of GDP for debt/GDP ratio above 90.

For the five countries with systemic financial crises—Iceland, Ireland, UK, Spain and the US—real average debt levels have increased by 75 percent between 2007 and 2009 (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010GTD, Figure 1). The cumulative increase in public debt in the three years after systemic banking crisis in a group of episodes after World War II is 86 percent (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011CEPR, Figure 2, 10).

An important concept is “this time is different syndrome,” which “is rooted in the firmly-held belief that financial crises are something that happens to other people in other countries at other times; crises do not happen here and now to us” (Reinhart and Rogoff 2010FCDC, 9). There is both an arrogance and ignorance in “this time is different” syndrome, as explained by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010FCDC, 34):

“The ignorance, of course, stems from the belief that financial crises happen to other people at other time in other places. Outside a small number of experts, few people fully appreciate the universality of financial crises. The arrogance is of those who believe they have figured out how to do things better and smarter so that the boom can long continue without a crisis.”

There is sober warning by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011CEPR, 42) on the basis of the momentous effort of their scholarly data gathering, calculation and analysis:

“Despite considerable deleveraging by the private financial sector, total debt remains near its historic high in 2008. Total public sector debt during the first quarter of 2010 is 117 percent of GDP. It has only been higher during a one-year sting at 119 percent in 1945. Perhaps soaring US debt levels will not prove to be a drag on growth in the decades to come. However, if history is any guide, that is a risky proposition and over-reliance on US exceptionalism may only be one more example of the “This Time is Different” syndrome.”

As both sides of the Atlantic economy maneuver around defaults the experience on debt and growth deserves significant emphasis in research and policy. The world economy is slowing with high levels of unemployment in advanced economies. Countries do not grow themselves out of unsustainable debts but rather through de facto defaults by means of financial repression and in some cases through inflation. This time is not different.

Professor Michael D. Bordo (2012Sep27), at Rutgers University, is providing clear thought on the correct comparison of the current business cycles in the United States with those in United States history. There are two issues raised by Professor Bordo: (1) incomplete conclusions by lumping together countries with different institutions, economic policies and financial systems; and (2) the erroneous contention that growth is mediocre after financial crises and deep recessions, which is repeated daily in the media, but that Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) persuasively demonstrate to be inconsistent with United States experience.

Depriving economic history of institutions is perilous as is illustrated by the economic history of Brazil. Douglass C. North (1994) emphasized the key role of institutions in explaining economic history. Rondo E. Cameron (1961, 1967, 1972) applied institutional analysis to banking history. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) analyzed the relation of money, income and prices in the business cycle and related the monetary policy of an important institution, the Federal Reserve System, to the Great Depression. Bordo, Choudhri and Schwartz (1995) analyze the counterfactual of what would have been economic performance if the Fed had used during the Great Depression the Friedman (1960) monetary policy rule of constant growth of money (for analysis of the Great Depression see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 198-217). Alan Meltzer (2004, 2010a,b) analyzed the Federal Reserve System over its history. The reader would be intrigued by Figure 5 in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010FCDC, 15) in which Brazil is classified in external default for seven years between 1828 and 1834 but not again until 64 years later in 1989, above the 50 years of incidence for serial default. This void has been filled in scholarly research on nineteenth-century Brazil by William R. Summerhill, Jr. (2007SC, 2007IR). There are important conclusions by Summerhill on the exceptional sample of institutional change or actually lack of change, public finance and financial repression in Brazil between 1822 and 1899, combining tools of economics, political science and history. During seven continuous decades, Brazil did not miss a single interest payment with government borrowing without repudiation of debt or default. What is surprising is that Brazil borrowed by means of long-term bonds and, even more surprising, interest rates fell over time. The external debt of Brazil in 1870 was ₤41,275,961 and the domestic debt in the internal market was ₤25,708,711, or 62.3 percent of the total (Summerhill 2007IR, 73).

The experience of Brazil differed from that of Latin America (Summerhill 2007IR). During the six decades when Brazil borrowed without difficulty, Latin American countries becoming independent after 1820 engaged in total defaults, suffering hardship in borrowing abroad. The countries that borrowed again fell again in default during the nineteenth century. Venezuela defaulted in four occasions. Mexico defaulted in 1827, rescheduling its debt eight different times and servicing the debt sporadically. About 44 percent of Latin America’s sovereign debt was in default in 1855 and approximately 86 percent of total government loans defaulted in London originated in Spanish American borrowing countries.

External economies of commitment to secure private rights in sovereign credit would encourage development of private financial institutions, as postulated in classic work by North and Weingast (1989), Summerhill 2007IR, 22). This is how banking institutions critical to the Industrial Revolution were developed in England (Cameron 1967). The obstacle in Brazil found by Summerhill (2007IR) is that sovereign debt credibility was combined with financial repression. There was a break in Brazil of the chain of effects from protecting public borrowing, as in North and Weingast (1989), to development of private financial institutions.

Nicia Villela Luz and Carlos Manuel Peláez (1972, 276) find that:

“The lack of interest on historical moments by economists may explain their emphasis on secular trends in their research on the past instead of changes in the historical process. This may be the origin of why they fill gaps in documentation with their extrapolations.”

According to Pelaez 1976, 283) following Cameron (1971, 1967):

“The banking law of 1860 placed severe restrictions on two basic modern economic institutions—the corporation and the commercial bank. The growth of the volume of bank credit was one of the most significant factors of financial intermediation and economic growth in the major trading countries of the gold standard group. But Brazil placed strong restrictions on the development of banking and intermediation functions, preventing the channeling of coffee savings into domestic industry at an earlier date.”

Brazil actually abandoned the gold standard during multiple financial crises in the nineteenth century, as it should have to protect domestic economic activity. Pelaez (1975, 447) finds similar experience in the first half of nineteenth-century Brazil:

“Brazil’s experience is particularly interesting in that in the period 1808-1851 there were three types of monetary systems. Between 1808 and 1829, there was only one government-related Bank of Brazil, enjoying a perfect monopoly of banking services. No new banks were established in the 1830s after the liquidation of the Bank of Brazil in 1829. During the coffee boom in the late 1830s and 1840s, a system of banks of issue, patterned after similar institutions in the industrial countries, supplied the financial services required in the first stage of modernization of the export economy.”

Financial crises in the advanced economies were transmitted to nineteenth-century Brazil by the arrival of a ship (Pelaez and Suzigan 1981). The explanation of those crises and the economy of Brazil requires knowledge and roles of institutions, economic policies and the financial system chosen by Brazil, in agreement with Bordo (2012Sep27).

The departing theoretical framework of Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) is the plucking model of Friedman (1964, 1988). Friedman (1988, 1) recalls “I was led to the model in the course of investigating the direction of influence between money and income. Did the common cyclical fluctuation in money and income reflect primarily the influence of money on income or of income on money?” Friedman (1964, 1988) finds useful for this purpose to analyze the relation between expansions and contractions. Analyzing the business cycle in the United States between 1870 and 1961, Friedman (1964, 15) found that “a large contraction in output tends to be followed on the average by a large business expansion; a mild contraction, by a mild expansion.” The depth of the contraction opens up more room in the movement toward full employment (Friedman 1964, 17):

“Output is viewed as bumping along the ceiling of maximum feasible output except that every now and then it is plucked down by a cyclical contraction. Given institutional rigidities and prices, the contraction takes in considerable measure the form of a decline in output. Since there is no physical limit to the decline short of zero output, the size of the decline in output can vary widely. When subsequent recovery sets in, it tends to return output to the ceiling; it cannot go beyond, so there is an upper limit to output and the amplitude of the expansion tends to be correlated with the amplitude of the contraction.”

Kim and Nelson (1999) test the asymmetric plucking model of Friedman (1964, 1988) relative to a symmetric model using reference cycles of the NBER, finding evidence supporting the Friedman model. Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) analyze 27 cycles beginning in 1872, using various measures of financial crises while considering different regulatory and monetary regimes. The revealing conclusion of Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR, 2) is that:

“Our analysis of the data shows that steep expansions tend to follow deep contractions, though this depends heavily on when the recovery is measured. In contrast to much conventional wisdom, the stylized fact that deep contractions breed strong recoveries is particularly true when there is a financial crisis. In fact, on average, it is cycles without a financial crisis that show the weakest relation between contraction depth and recovery strength. For many configurations, the evidence for a robust bounce-back is stronger for cycles with financial crises than those without.”

The average rate of growth of real GDP in expansions after recessions with financial crises was 8 percent but only 6.9 percent on average for recessions without financial crises (Bordo 2012Sep27). Real GDP declined 12 percent in the Panic of 1907 and increased 13 percent in the recovery, consistent with the plucking model of Friedman (Bordo 2012Sep27). The comparison of recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 is appropriate even when considering financial crises. There was significant financial turmoil during the 1980s. Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR, 11) identify a financial crisis in the United States starting in 1981. Benston and Kaufman (1997, 139) find that there was failure of 1150 US commercial and savings banks between 1983 and 1990, or about 8 percent of the industry in 1980, which is nearly twice more than between the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1934 through 1983. More than 900 savings and loans associations, representing 25 percent of the industry, were closed, merged or placed in conservatorships (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 74-7). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) that received $150 billion of taxpayer funds to resolve insolvent savings and loans. The GDP of the US in 1989 was $5482.1 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the partial cost to taxpayers of that bailout was around 2.74 percent of GDP in a year. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates GDP in 2012 at $15,684.8 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the bailout would be equivalent to cost to taxpayers of about $429.8 billion in current GDP terms. A major difference with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for private-sector banks is that most of the costs were recovered with interest gains whereas in the case of savings and loans there was no recovery. Money center banks were under extraordinary pressure from the default of sovereign debt by various emerging nations that represented a large share of their net worth (see Pelaez 1986).

Bordo (2012Sep27) finds two probable explanations for the weak recovery during the current economic cycle: (1) collapse of United States housing; and (2) uncertainty originating in fiscal policy, regulation and structural changes. There are serious doubts if monetary policy is adequate to recover the economy under these conditions.

The concept of growth recession was popular during the stagflation from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. The economy of the US underperformed with several recession episodes in “stop and go” fashion of policy and economic activity while the rate of inflation rose to the highest in a peacetime period (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/global-inflation-seigniorage-monetary.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html Appendix I; see Taylor 1993, 1997, 1999, 1998LB, 2012Mar27, 2012Mar28, 2012FP, 2012JMCB). A growth recession could be defined as a period in which economic growth is insufficient to move the economy toward full employment of humans, equipment and other productive resources. The US is experiencing a dramatic slow growth recession with 28.637 million people in job stress, consisting of an effective number of unemployed of 18.581 million, 7.709 million employed part-time because they cannot find full employment and 2.347 million marginally attached to the labor force (see Table I-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The discussion of the growth recession issue in the 1970s by two recognized economists of the twentieth century, James Tobin and Paul A. Samuelson, is worth recalling.

In analysis of the design of monetary policy in 1974, Tobin (1974, 219) finds that the forecast of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was also the target such that monetary policy would have to be designed and implemented to attain that target. The concern was with maintaining full employment as provided in the Employment Law of 1946 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/1021.html http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/15C21.txt http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED164974.pdf) see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html), which also created the CEA. Tobin (1974, 219) describes the forecast/target of the CEA for 1974:

“The expected and approved path appears to be quarter-to-quarter rates of growth of real gross national product in 1974 of roughly -0.5, 0.1, and 1 percent, with unemployment rising to about 5.6 percent in the second quarter and remaining there the rest of the year. The rate of price inflation would fall shortly in the second quarter, but rise slightly toward the end of the year.”

Referring to monetary policy design, Tobin (1974, 221) states: “if interest rates remain stable or rise during the current (growth) recession and recovery, this will be a unique episode in business cycle annals.” Subpar economic growth is often called a “growth recession.” The critically important concept is that economic growth is not sufficient to move the economy toward full employment, creating the social and economic adverse outcome of idle capacity and unemployed and underemployed workers, much the same as currently.

The unexpected incidence of inflation surprises during growth recessions is considered by Samuelson (1974, 76):

“Indeed, if there were in Las Vegas or New York a continuous casino on the money GNP of 1974’s fourth quarter, it would be absurd to think that the best economic forecasters could improve upon the guess posted there. Whatever knowledge and analytical skill they possess would already have been fed into the bidding. It is a manifest contradiction to think that most economists can be expected to do better than their own best performance. I am saying that the best forecasters have been poor in predicting the general price level’s movements and level even a year ahead. By Valentine’s Day 1973 the best forecasters were beginning to talk of the growth recession that we now know did set in at the end of the first quarter. Aside from their end-of-1972 forecasts, the fashionable crowd has little to blame itself for when it comes to their 1973 real GNP projections. But, of course, they did not foresee the upward surge of food and decontrolled industrial prices. This has been a recurring pattern: surprise during the event at the virulence of inflation, wisdom after the event in demonstrating that it did, after all, fit with past patterns of experience.”

Economists are known for their forecasts being second only to those of astrologers. Accurate forecasts are typically realized for the wrong reasons. In contrast with meteorologists, economists do not even agree on what happened. There is not even agreement on what caused the global recession and why the economy has reached a perilous standstill.

Historical parallels are instructive but have all the limitations of empirical research in economics. The more instructive comparisons are not with the Great Depression of the 1930s but rather with the recessions in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s. The growth rates and job creation in the expansion of the economy away from recession are subpar in the current expansion compared to others in the past. Four recessions are initially considered, following the reference dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html ): IIQ1953-IIQ1954, IIIQ1957-IIQ1958, IIIQ1973-IQ1975 and IQ1980-IIIQ1980. The data for the earlier contractions illustrate that the growth rate and job creation in the current expansion are inferior. The sharp contractions of the 1950s and 1970s are considered in Table I-1, showing the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) quarter-to-quarter, seasonally adjusted (SA), yearly-equivalent growth rates of GDP. The recovery from the recession of 1953 consisted of four consecutive quarters of high percentage growth rates from IIIQ1954 to IIIQ1955: 4.6, 8.3, 12.0, 6.8 and 5.5. The recession of 1957 was followed by four consecutive high percentage growth rates from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959: 9.7, 9.7, 8.3 and 10.5. The recession of 1973-1975 was followed by high percentage growth rates from IIQ1975 to IIQ1976: 6.9, 5.3, 9.4 and 3.0. The disaster of the Great Inflation and Unemployment of the 1970s, which made stagflation notorious, is even better in growth rates during the expansion phase in comparison with the current slow-growth recession.

Table I-1, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of GDP, % Annual Equivalent SA

	IQ	IIQ	IIIQ	IVQ
1953	7.7	3.1	-2.4	-6.2
1954	-1.9	0.5	4.6	8.3
1955	12.0	6.8	5.5	2.2
1957	2.5	-1.0	3.9	-4.1
1958	-10.4	2.5	9.7	9.7
1959	8.3	10.5	-0.5	1.4
1973	10.6	4.7	-2.1	3.9
1974	-3.5	1.0	-3.9	-1.6
1975	-4.8	3.1	6.9	5.3
1976	9.4	3.0	2.0	2.9
1979	0.7	0.4	2.9	1.1
1980	1.3	-7.9	-0.7	7.6

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The NBER dates another recession in 1980 that lasted about half a year. If the two recessions from IQ1980s to IIIQ1980 and IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 are combined, the impact of lost GDP of 4.8 percent is more comparable to the latest revised 4.7 percent drop of the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.5 percent cumulatively and fell 45.6 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7). Table I-2 provides the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) quarterly growth rates of GDP in SA yearly equivalents for the recessions of 1981 to 1982 and 2007 to 2009, using the latest major revision published on Jul 29, 2011 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2011/pdf/gdp2q11_adv.pdf) and the revision back to 2009 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2012/pdf/gdp2q12_adv.pdf) and the second estimate for IQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp1q13_2nd.pdf), which are available in the dataset of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). There were four quarters of contraction in 1981-1982 ranging in rate from -1.5 percent to -6.4 percent and five quarters of contraction in 2007-2009 ranging in rate from -0.3 percent to -8.9 percent. The striking difference is that in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, shown in Table I-2 in relief, GDP grew at the high quarterly percentage growth rates of 5.1, 9.3, 8.1, 8.5, 8.0, 7.1, 3.9, 3.3, 3.8, 3.4, 6.4, 3.1, 3.9, 1.6 and 3.9 while the percentage growth rates in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012, shown in relief in Table I-2, were mediocre: 1.4, 4.0, 2.3, 2.2, 2.6, 2.4, 0.1, 2.5, 1.3, 4.1, 2.0, 1.3, 3.1, 0.4 and 2.4. Asterisks denote the estimates that have been revised by the BEA in the first round of Jul 29, 2011 and double asterisks the revisions released on Jul 27, 2012. During the four quarters of 2011 GDP grew at annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in IQ2011, 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011 and 4.1 percent in IVQ2011. The rate of growth of the US economy decelerated from seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent of 4.1 percent in IVQ2011 to 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012, which is more like 1.73 percent without contributions of 0.73 percentage points by inventory change and 0.64 percentage points by one-time expenditures in national defense and 0.4 percent in IVQ2012, which is more like 3.2 percent without deductions of 1.52 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percent of reductions of one-time national defense expenditures. Inventory change contributed to initial growth but was rapidly replaced by growth in investment and demand in 1983. Inventory accumulation contributed 2.53 percentage points to the rate of growth of 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, which is the only relatively high rate from IQ2011 to IIIQ2012, and 0.73 percentage points to the rate of 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012. Economic growth and employment creation decelerated rapidly during 2012 and in 2013 as would be required from movement to full employment.

Table I-2, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of GDP, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q	1981	1982	1983	1984	2008	2009	2010
I	8.6	-6.4	5.1	8.0	-1.8*	-5.3**	2.3**
II	-3.2	2.2	9.3	7.1	1.3*	-0.3**	2.2**
III	4.9	-1.5	8.1	3.9	-3.7*	1.4**	2.6**
IV	-4.9	0.3	8.5	3.3	-8.9*	4.0**	2.4**
				1985			2011
I				3.8			0.1**
II				3.4			2.5**
III				6.4			1.3**
IV				3.1			4.1**
				1986			2012
I				3.9			2.0**
II				1.6			1.3
III				3.9			3.1
IV				1.9			0.4
				1987			2013
I				2.2			2.4
II				4.3
III				3.5
IV				7.0

*Revision of Jul 29, 2011 **Revision of Jul 27, 2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-1 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides strong growth of real GDP in the US between 1947 and 1999 at the yearly average rate of 3.5 percent. There is an evident acceleration of the rate of GDP growth in the 1990s as shown by a much sharper slope of the growth curve. Cobet and Wilson (2002) define labor productivity as the value of manufacturing output produced per unit of labor input used (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). Between 1950 and 2000, labor productivity in the US grew less rapidly than in Germany and Japan. The major part of the increase in productivity in Germany and Japan occurred between 1950 and 1973 while the rate of productivity growth in the US was relatively subdued in several periods. While Germany and Japan reached their highest growth rates of productivity before 1973, the US accelerated its rate of productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s. Between 1950 and 2000, the rate of productivity growth in the US of 2.9 percent per year was much lower than 6.3 percent in Japan and 4.7 percent in Germany. Between 1995 and 2000, the rate of productivity growth of the US of 4.6 percent exceeded that of Japan of 3.9 percent and the rate of Germany of 2.6 percent.

Chart I-1, US, Real GDP 1947-1999

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-2 provides the growth of real quarterly GDP in the US between 1947 and 2012. The drop of output in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 has been followed by anemic recovery compared with return to trend at 3.0 percent from 1870 to 2010 after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May) and a standstill that can lead to growth recession, or low rates of economic growth, but perhaps even another contraction or conventional recession. The average rate of growth from 1947 to 2012 is 3.2 percent. The average growth rate from 2000 to 2012 is only 1.6 percent with 2.7 percent annual equivalent from the end of the recession in IVQ2001 to the end of the expansion in IVQ2007.

Chart I-2, US, Real GDP 1947-2012

Source:

US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-3 provides real GDP percentage change on the quarter a year earlier for 1983-1984. The objective is simply to compare expansion in two recoveries from sharp contractions as shown in Table II-2. Growth rates in the early phase of the recovery in 1983 and 1984 were very high, which is the opportunity to reduce unemployment that has characterized cyclical expansion in the postwar US economy.

Chart I-3, Real GDP Percentage Change on Quarter a Year Earlier 1983-1985

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In contrast, growth rates in the comparable first fourteen quarters of expansion from 2009 to 2012 in Chart I-4 have been mediocre. As a result, growth has not provided the exit from unemployment and underemployment as in other cyclical expansions in the postwar period. Growth rates did not rise in V shape as in earlier expansions and then declined close to the standstill of growth recessions.

Chart I-4, US, Real GDP Percentage Change on Quarter a Year Earlier 2009-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table II-3 provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.7 percent cumulatively and fell 45.6 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.8 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.7 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first three years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.5 percent in 1983, 7.2 percent in 1984 and 4.1 percent in 1985 while GDP grew, 2.4 percent in 2010, 1.8 percent in 2011 and 2.2 percent in 2012. Actual cumulative GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 is 1.7 percent. GDP grew at 4.1 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while the forecasts of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 2.3 to 2.8 percent in 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf).

Table I-3, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%

Year	GDP ∆%	Year	GDP ∆%	Year	GDP ∆%
1930	-8.6	1980	-0.3	2000	4.1
1931	-6.5	1981	2.5	2001	1.1
1932	-13.1	1982	-1.9	2002	1.8
1933	-1.3	1983	4.5	2003	2.5
1934	10.9	1984	7.2	2004	3.5
1935	8.9	1985	4.1	2005	3.1
1936	13.1	1986	3.5	2006	2.7
1937	5.1	1987	3.2	2007	1.9
1938	-3.4	1988	4.1	2008	-0.3
1930	8.1	1989	3.6	2009	-3.1
1940	8.8	1990	1.9	2010	2.4
1941	17.1	1991	-0.2	2011	1.8
1942	18.5	1992	3.4	2012	2.2

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-5 provides percentage change of GDP in the US during the 1930s. There is vast literature analyzing the Great Depression (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009), 198-217). Cole and Ohanian (1999) find that US real per capita output was 11 percent lower in 1939 than in 1929 while the typical expansion of real per capita output in the US during a decade is 31 percent. Private hours worked in the US were 25 percent lower in 1939 relative to 1929.

Chart I-5, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In contrast, Chart I-6 shows rapid recovery from the recessions in the 1980s. High growth rates in the initial quarters of expansion eliminated the unemployment and underemployment created during the contraction. The economy then returned to grow at the trend of expansion, interrupted by another contraction in 1991.

Chart I-6, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1980s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-7 provides the rates of growth during the 2000s. Growth rates in the initial fifteen quarters of expansion have been relatively lower than during recessions after World War II. As a result, unemployment and underemployment continue at the rate of 17.8 percent of the US labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html) with weak hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/recovery-without-hiring-collapse-of.html).

Chart I-7, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 2000s

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-4 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.8 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.7 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.7 percent cumulatively and fell 45.6 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-4, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions   

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Percentage Contraction	Average Percentage Rate
IIQ1953 to IIQ1954	4	-2.5	-0.64
IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958	3	-3.1	-1.1
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980	2	-2.2	-1.1
IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982	4	-2.6	-0.67
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009	6	-4.7	-0.80

Sources: Business Cycle Reference Dates; US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-5 shows the extraordinary contrast between the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.1 percent of the US economy in the fifteen quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013 and the average of 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 and 5.3 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986. The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.8 percent with 7.9 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.5 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). Table I-5 provides an average of 7.8 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions while the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 is only 3.2 percent obtained by diving GDP of $13,103.5 billion in IIIQ2010 by GDP of $12,701.0 billion in IIQ2009 {[$13.103.5/$12,701.0 -1]100 = 3.2%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates. As a result, there are 28.6 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 17.6 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.4 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.8 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and cumulative 1.7 percent in the four quarters of 2012 {[(1.02)^1/4(1.013)^1/4(1.031)^1/4(1.004)^1/4 – 1]100 = 1.7%} with minor rounding discrepancy using the SSAR of $13,665.4 billion in IVQ2012 relative to the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 {[($13665.4/$13441.00-1]100 = 1.7%}. %}. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0059)^4/9 -1]100 = 1.9%], or {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2)]^4/9-1]100 = 1.9%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table I-6 below, obtaining the average for nine quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.7 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983.

Table I-5, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

	Number of Quarters	Cumulative Growth ∆%	Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate
IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957	11	12.6	4.4
First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955	4	7.9
IIQ1958 to IIQ1959	5	10.2	8.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959	4	9.5
IIQ1975 to IVQ1976	8	9.5	4.6
First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976	4	6.1
IQ1983 to IQ1986 IQ1983 to IIIQ1986	13 15	19.6 21.3	5.7 5.3
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983	4	7.7
Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*		7.8
IIIQ2009 to IQ2013	15	8.2	2.1
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2010		3.2

*First Four Quarters: 7.9% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.6% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IIQ1976; 7.7% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Sources: Business Cycle Reference Dates: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-8 shows US real quarterly GDP growth from 1980 to 1989. The economy contracted during the recession and then expanded vigorously throughout the 1980s, rapidly eliminating the unemployment caused by the contraction.

Chart I-8, US, Real GDP, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-9 shows the entirely different situation of real quarterly GDP in the US between 2007 and 2012. The economy has underperformed during the first fifteen quarters of expansion for the first time in the comparable contractions since the 1950s. The US economy is now in a perilous standstill.

Chart I-9, US, Real GDP, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

As shown in Tables I-4 and I-5 above the loss of real GDP in the US during the contraction was 4.7 percent but the gain in the cyclical expansion has been only 8.2 percent (last row in Table I-5), using all latest revisions. As a result, the level of real GDP in IQ2013 with the second estimate and revisions is only higher by 3.2 percent than the level of real GDP in IVQ2007. Table I-6 provides in the second column real GDP in billions of chained 2005 dollars. The third column provides the percentage change of the quarter relative to IVQ2007; the fourth column provides the percentage change relative to the prior quarter; and the final fifth column provides the percentage change relative to the same quarter a year earlier. The contraction actually concentrated in two quarters: decline of 2.3 percent in IVQ2008 relative to the prior quarter and decline of 1.3 percent in IQ2009 relative to IVQ2008. The combined fall of GDP in IVQ2008 and IQ2009 was 3.6 percent {[(1-0.023) x (1-0.013) -1]100 = -3.6%}, or {[(IQ2009 $12,711.0)/(IIIQ2008 $13,186.9) – 1]100 = -3.6%}. Those two quarters coincided with the worst effects of the financial crisis. GDP fell 0.1 percent in IIQ2009 but grew 0.4 percent in IIIQ2009, which is the beginning of recovery in the cyclical dates of the NBER. Most of the recovery occurred in five successive quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2010 of growth of 1.0 percent in IVQ2009 and equal growth at 0.6 percent in IQ2010, IIQ2010, IIIQ2010 and IVQ2010 for cumulative growth in those five quarters of 3.4 percent, obtained by accumulating the quarterly rates {[(1.01 x 1.006 x 1.006 x 1.006 x 1.006) – 1]100 = 3.4%} or {[(IVQ2010 $13,181.2)/(IIIQ2009 $12,746.7) – 1]100 = 3.4%}. The economy lost momentum already in 2010 growing at 0.6 percent in each quarter, or annual equivalent 2.4 per cent {[(1.006)⁴ – 1]100 = 2.4%}, compared with annual equivalent 4.1 percent in IV2009 {[(1.01)⁴ – 1]100 = 4.1%}. The economy then stalled during the first half of 2011 with growth of 0.0025 percent in IQ2011 and 0.6 percent in IIQ2011 for combined annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent {(1.00025 x 1.006)²}. The economy grew 0.3 percent in IIIQ2011 for annual equivalent growth of 1.2 percent in the first three quarters {[(1.00025 x 1.006 x 1.003)^4/3 -1]100 = 1.2%}. Growth picked up in IVQ2011 with 1.0 percent relative to IIIQ2011. Growth in a quarter relative to a year earlier in Table I-6 slows from over 2.4 percent during three consecutive quarters from IIQ2010 to IVQ2010 to 1.8 percent in IQ2011, 1.9 percent in IIQ2011, 1.6 percent in IIIQ2011 and 2.0 percent in IVQ2011. As shown below, growth of 1.0 percent in IVQ2011 was partly driven by inventory accumulation. In IQ2012, GDP grew 0.5 percent relative to IVQ2011 and 2.4 percent relative to IQ2011, decelerating to 0.3 percent in IIQ2012 and 2.1 percent relative to IIQ2011 and 0.8 percent in IIIQ2012 and 2.6 percent relative to IIIQ2011 largely because of inventory accumulation and national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.1 percent in IVQ2012 with 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier but mostly because of 1.52 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of reduction of one-time national defense expenditures. Growth was 0.6 percent in IQ2013 and 1.8 percent relative to IQ2012 in large part because of burning savings to consume caused by financial repression of zero interest rates. Rates of a quarter relative to the prior quarter capture better deceleration of the economy than rates on a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. The critical question for which there is not yet definitive solution is whether what lies ahead is continuing growth recession with the economy crawling and unemployment/underemployment at extremely high levels or another contraction or conventional recession. Forecasts of various sources continued to maintain high growth in 2011 without taking into consideration the continuous slowing of the economy in late 2010 and the first half of 2011. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area is one of the common sources of doubts on the rate and direction of economic growth in the US but there is weak internal demand in the US with almost no investment and spikes of consumption driven by burning saving because of financial repression forever in the form of zero interest rates.

Table I-6, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%

	Real GDP, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars	∆% Relative to IVQ2007	∆% Relative to Prior Quarter	∆% over Year Earlier
IVQ2007	13,326.0	NA	NA	2.2
IQ2008	13,266.8	-0.4	-0.4	1.6
IIQ2008	13,310.5	-0.1	0.3	1.0
IIIQ2008	13,186.9	-1.0	-0.9	-0.6
IVQ2008	12,883.5	-3.3	-2.3	-3.3
IQ2009	12,711.0	-4.6	-1.3	-4.2
IIQ2009	12,701.0	-4.7	-0.1	-4.6
IIIQ2009	12,746.7	-4.3	0.4	-3.3
IV2009	12,873.1	-3.4	1.0	-0.1
IQ2010	12,947.6	-2.8	0.6	1.9
IIQ2010	13,019.6	-2.3	0.6	2.5
IIIQ2010	13,103.5	-1.7	0.6	2.8
IVQ2010	13,181.2	-1.1	0.6	2.4
IQ2011	13,183.8	-1.1	0.0	1.8
IIQ2011	13,264.7	-0.5	0.6	1.9
IIIQ2011	13,306.9	-0.1	0.3	1.6
IV2011	13,441.0	0.9	1.0	2.0
IQ2012	13,506.4	1.4	0.5	2.4
IIQ2012	13,548.5	1.7	0.3	2.1
IIIQ2012	13,652.5	2.5	0.8	2.6
IVQ2012	13,665.4	2.5	0.1	1.7
IQ2013	13,746.2	3.2	0.6	1.8

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-10 provides the percentage change of real GDP from the same quarter a year earlier from 1980 to 1989. There were two contractions almost in succession in 1980 and from 1981 to 1983. The expansion was marked by initial high rates of growth as in other recession in the postwar US period during which employment lost in the contraction was recovered. Growth rates continued to be high after the initial phase of expansion.

Chart I-10, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Quarter a Year Earlier 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The experience of recovery after 2009 is not as complete as during the 1980s. Chart I-11 shows the much lower rates of growth in the early phase of the current expansion and how they have sharply declined from an early peak. The US missed the initial high growth rates in cyclical expansions during which unemployment and underemployment are eliminated.

Chart I-11, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Quarter a Year Earlier 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-12 provides growth rates from a quarter relative to the prior quarter during the 1980s. There is the same strong initial growth followed by a long period of sustained growth.

Chart I-12, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Prior Quarter 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart I-13 provides growth rates in a quarter relative to the prior quarter from 2007 to 2013. Growth in the current expansion after IIIQ2009 has not been as strong as in other postwar cyclical expansions.

Chart I-13, Percentage Change of Real Gross Domestic Product from Prior Quarter 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The revised estimates and earlier estimates from IQ2008 to IQ2012 in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rates are shown in Table I-7. The strongest revision is for IVQ2008 for which the contraction of GDP is revised from minus 6.8 percent to minus 8.9 percent. IQ2009 is also revised from contraction of minus 4.9 percent to minus 6.7 percent but then lowered to contraction of 5.3 percent. There is only minor revision in IIIQ2008 of the contraction of minus 4.0 percent to minus 3.7 percent. Growth of 5.0 percent in IV2009 is revised to 3.8 percent and then increased to 4.0 percent. Growth in IQ2010 is lowered from 3.9 percent to 2.3 percent. Growth in IIQ2010 is upwardly revised to 3.8 percent but then lowered to 2.2 percent. The revisions do not alter the conclusion that the current expansion is much weaker than historical sharp contractions since the 1950s and is now changing into slow growth recession with higher risks of contraction.

Table I-7, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of GDP, % Annual Equivalent SA, Revised and Earlier Estimates

Quarters	Revised Estimate Jul 27, 2012	Revised Estimate Jul 29, 2011	Earlier Estimate
2008
I		-1.8	-0.7
II		1.3	0.6
III		-3.7	-4.0
IV		-8.9	-6.8
2009
I	-5.3	-6.7	-4.9
II	-0.3	-0.7	-0.7
III	1.4	1.7	1.6
IV	4.0	3.8	5.0
2010
I	2.3	3.9	3.7
II	2.2	3.8	1.7
III	2.6	2.5	2.6
IV	2.4	2.3	3.1
2011
I	0.1	0.4	1.9
II	2.5
III	1.3
IV	4.1
2012
I	2.0
II	1.3
III	3.1
IV	0.4
2013
I	2.4

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Aggregate demand, personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and gross private domestic investment (GDI) were much stronger during the expansion phase in IQ1983 to IIQ1984 than in IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2012, as shown in Table I-8. GDI provided the impulse of growth in 1983 and 1984, which has not been the case from 2009 to 2013. The investment decision in the US economy has been frustrated in the current cyclical expansion. Growth of GDP in IQ2013 at seasonally-adjusted rate of 2.4 percent consisted of positive contribution of 2.40 percentage points of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) plus positive contribution of 1.16 percentage points of gross private domestic investment (GDI) of which 0.63 percentage points of inventory investment (∆PI), negative net exports (trade or exports less imports) of 0.21 percentage points and negative 0.97 percentage points of government consumption expenditures and gross investment (GOV) mostly because of one-time reduction of national defense expenditures of 0.63 percentage points. Growth of GDP in IVQ2012 at seasonally-adjusted rate of 0.4 percent consisted of positive contribution of 1.28 percentage points of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) plus positive contribution of 0.17 percentage points of gross private domestic investment (GDI) of which minus 1.52 percentage points of inventory divestment (∆PI), positive net exports (trade or exports less imports) of 0.33 percentage points and negative 1.41 percentage points of government consumption expenditures and gross investment (GOV) mostly because of one-time reduction of national defense expenditures of 1.28 percentage points. Growth of GDP in IIIQ2012 of 3.1 percent at seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) consisted of positive contributions of 1.12 percentage points of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) + 0.85 percentage points of gross domestic investment (GDI) but inventory change adding 0.73 percentage points (∆ PI) plus 0.38 percentage points of net exports (net trade or exports less imports) plus 0.75 percentage points of government consumption expenditures and gross investment (GOV) but national defense expenditures adding 0.64 percentage points. While the contribution of personal consumption expenditures decreased from 1.72 percentage points in IQ2012 to 1.06 percentage points in IIQ2012 and 1.12 percentage points in IIIQ2012, the contribution of government expenditures increased from deduction of 0.14 percentage points in IIQ2012 to adding 0.75 percentage points in IIIQ2012. The bulk of the contribution of government consisted of 0.64 percentage points of one-time national defense expenditures resulting from growth of national defense expenditures at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 12.9 percent in IIIQ2012. In IVQ2012, national defense expenditures fell at the SAAR of 22.1 percent, deducting 1.28 percentage points from GDP growth. The contribution of PCE fell from 1.72 percentage points in IQ2012 to 1.06 percentage points in IIQ2012 and 1.12 percentage points in IIIQ2012 as savings decreased but increased to contribution of 1.28 percentage points in IVQ2012 and 2.40 percentage points in IQ2013. The contribution of GDI decreased from 0.78 percentage points in IQ2012 to 0.09 percentage points in IIQ2012 and 0.85 percentage points in IIIQ2012 with inventory accumulation adding 0.73 percentage points in IIIQ2012 relative to deduction of 0.46 percentage points in IIQ2012. GDI added 0.17 percentage points to growth in IVQ2012 mostly because of inventory divestment of 1.52 percentage points. GDI contributed 1.16 percentage points in IQ2013 of which 0.63 percentage points contributed by inventory accumulation. Growth in IVQ2011 was driven mainly by increase in private inventories of 2.53 percentage points. The economy of the United States has lost the dynamic growth impulse of earlier cyclical expansions with mediocre growth resulting from consumption forced by one-time effects of financial repression, national defense expenditures and inventory accumulation.

Table I-8, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of GDP in Percentage Points

	GDP	PCE	GDI	∆ PI	Trade	GOV
2013
I	2.4	2.40	1.16	0.63	-0.21	-0.97
2012
I	2.0	1.72	0.78	-0.39	0.06	-0.60
II	1.3	1.06	0.09	-0.46	0.23	-0.14
III	3.1	1.12	0.85	0.73	0.38	0.75
IV	0.4	1.28	0.17	-1.52	0.33	-1.41
2011
I	0.1	2.22	-0.68	-0.54	0.03	-1.49
II	2.5	0.70	1.40	0.01	0.54	-0.16
III	1.3	1.18	0.68	-1.07	0.02	-0.60
IV	4.1	1.45	3.72	2.53	-0.64	-0.43
2010
I	2.3	1.72	2.13	2.23	-0.83	-0.69
II	2.2	1.81	1.65	0.07	-1.81	0.59
III	2.6	1.75	1.87	1.97	-0.95	-0.06
IV	2.4	2.84	-0.75	-1.61	1.24	-0.94
2009
I	-5.3	-1.06	-7.02	-2.29	2.45	0.37
II	-0.3	-1.21	-3.52	-1.03	2.47	1.94
III	1.4	1.50	-0.14	0.19	-0.70	0.79
IV	4.0	-0.01	3.85	4.55	-0.05	0.23
1982
I	-6.4	1.62	-7.50	-5.47	-0.49	-0.03
II	2.2	0.90	-0.05	2.35	0.84	0.50
III	-1.5	1.92	-0.72	1.15	-3.31	0.57
IV	0.3	4.64	-5.66	-5.48	-0.10	1.44
1983
I	5.1	2.54	2.20	0.94	-0.30	0.63
II	9.3	5.22	5.87	3.51	-2.54	0.75
III	8.1	4.66	4.30	0.60	-2.32	1.48
IV	8.5	4.20	6.84	3.09	-1.17	-1.35
1984
I	8.0	2.35	7.15	5.07	-2.37	0.86
II	7.1	3.75	2.44	-0.30	-0.89	1.79
III	3.9	2.02	1.67	0.21	-0.36	0.62
IV	3.3	3.38	-1.26	-2.50	-0.58	1.75
1985
I	3.8	4.34	-2.38	-2.94	0.91	0.95
II	3.4	2.35	1.24	0.35	-2.01	1.85
III	6.4	4.91	-0.68	-0.16	-0.01	2.18
IV	3.1	0.54	2.72	1.45	-0.68	0.50

Note: PCE: personal consumption expenditures; GDI: gross private domestic investment; ∆ PI: change in private inventories; Trade: net exports of goods and services; GOV: government consumption expenditures and gross investment; – is negative and no sign positive

GDP: percent change at annual rate; percentage points at annual rates

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (page 2 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp1q13_2nd.pdf) explains growth of GDP in IVQ2012 as follows:

“The acceleration in real GDP in the first quarter primarily reflected an upturn in private inventory investment, an acceleration in PCE, a smaller decrease in federal government spending and upturn in exports that were partly offset by an upturn in imports and a deceleration in nonresidential fixed investment. “

There are positive contributions to growth in IQ2013 shown in Table II-9:

• Personal consumption expenditures (PCE) growing at 3.4 percent with consumption of durable goods growing at 8.2 percent
• Residential fixed investment (RFI) growing at 12.1 percent
• Nonresidential fixed investment growing at 2.2 percent
• Private inventory investment contributing 0.63 percentage points

There were negative contributions in IVQ2012:

• Federal government expenditures declining at 8.7 percent mostly because of decline of national defense expenditures at 12.1 percent that deducted 0.63 percentage points from GDP growth
• Growth of imports, which are deduction to growth, at 1.9 percent while exports, which are a contribution to growth, grew at the lower rate of 0.8 percent
• Reduction of consumption expenditures and gross investment of state and local government at 2.4 percent

The BEA explains acceleration in real GDP growth in IQ2013 by:

• Increase in the rate of growth of PCE from 1.8 percent in IVQ2012 to 3.4 percent in IQ2013
• Change in private inventories of 0.63 percentage points in IQ2013 compared with decline of 1.52 percentage points in IV2012

An important aspect of growth in the US is the decline in growth of real disposable personal income, or what is left after taxes and inflation, which increased at the rate of 0.7 percent in IQ2013 compared with a year earlier. The effects of financial repression, or zero interest, are vividly shown in the decline of the savings rate, or personal saving as percent of disposable income from 5.3 percent in IVQ2012 to 2.3 percent in IQ2013. Zero interest rates induce risky investments with high leverage and can contract balance sheets of families, business and financial institutions when interest rates inevitably increase in the future. There is a tradeoff of weaker economy in the future when interest rates increase by meager growth in the present with forced consumption by zero interest rates.

Table I-9, US, Percentage Seasonally Adjusted Annual Equivalent Quarterly Rates of Increase, %

	IQ 2012	IIQ     2012	IIIQ  2012	IVQ  2012	IQ 2013
GDP	2.0	1.3	3.1	0.4	2.4
PCE	2.4	1.5	1.6	1.8	3.4
Durable Goods	11.5	-0.2	8.9	13.6	8.2
NRFI	7.5	3.6	-1.8	13.2	2.2
RFI	20.5	8.5	13.5	17.8	12.1
Exports	4.4	5.3	1.9	-2.8	0.8
Imports	3.1	2.8	-0.6	-4.2	1.9
GOV	-3.0	-0.7	3.9	-7.0	-4.9
Federal GOV	-4.2	-0.2	9.5	-14.8	-8.7
National Defense	-7.1	-0.2	12.9	-22.1	-12.1
Cont to GDP Growth % Points	-0.39	-0.01	0.64	-1.28	-0.63
State/Local GOV	-2.2	-1.0	0.3	-1.5	-2.4
∆ PI (PP)	-0.39	-0.46	0.73	-1.52	0.63
Final Sales of Domestic Product	2.4	1.7	2.4	1.9	1.8
Gross Domestic Purchases	1.8	1.0	2.6	0.0	2.5
Prices Gross Domestic Purchases	2.5	0.7	1.4	1.6	1.2
Prices of GDP	2.0	1.6	2.7	1.0	1.1
Prices of GDP Excluding Food and Energy	2.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.6
Prices of PCE	2.5	0.7	1.6	1.6	1.0
Prices of PCE Excluding Food and Energy	2.2	1.7	1.1	1.0	1.3
Prices of Market Based PCE	2.5	0.6	1.9	1.5	1.2
Prices of Market Based PCE Excluding Food and Energy	2.2	1.8	1.3	0.9	1.6
Real Disposable Personal Income*	0.2	1.1	1.6	3.8	0.7
Personal Savings As % Disposable Income	3.6	3.8	3.6	5.3	2.3

Note: PCE: personal consumption expenditures; NRFI: nonresidential fixed investment; RFI: residential fixed investment; GOV: government consumption expenditures and gross investment; ∆ PI: change in

private inventories; GDP - ∆ PI: final sales of domestic product; PP: percentage points; Personal savings rate: savings as percent of disposable income

*Percent change from quarter one year ago

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percentage shares of GDP are shown in Table I-10. PCE is equivalent to 71.1 percent of GDP and is under pressure with stagnant real disposable income, high levels of unemployment and underemployment and higher savings rates than before the global recession, temporarily interrupted by financial repression in the form of zero interest rates. Gross private domestic investment is also growing slowly even with about two trillions of dollars in cash holdings by companies. In a slowing world economy, it may prove more difficult to grow exports faster than imports to generate higher growth. Bouts of risk aversion revalue the dollar relative to most currencies in the world as investors increase their holdings of dollar-denominated assets.

Table I-10, US, Percentage Shares of GDP, %

	IQ2013
GDP	100.0
PCE	71.1
Goods	24.2
Durable	8.0
Nondurable	16.2
Services	46.9
Gross Private Domestic Investment	13.4
Fixed Investment	13.1
NRFI	10.5
Structures	3.0
Equipment & Software	7.5
RFI	2.7
Change in Private       Inventories	0.3
Net Exports of Goods and Services	-3.4
Exports	13.8
Goods	9.7
Services	4.1
Imports	17.2
Goods	14.3
Services	2.9
Government	18.9
Federal	7.4
National Defense	4.8
Nondefense	2.6
State and Local	11.5

PCE: personal consumption expenditures; NRFI: nonresidential fixed investment; RFI: residential fixed investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-11 shows percentage point (PP) contributions to the annual levels of GDP growth in the earlier recessions 1958-1959, 1975-1976, 1982-1983 and 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The data incorporate the new revisions released by the BEA on Jul 29, 2011 and Jul 27, 2012 and the second estimate of IQ2013 GDP released on May 30, 2013. The most striking contrast is in the rates of growth of annual GDP in the expansion phases of 7.2 percent in 1959, 4.5 percent in 1983 followed by 7.2 percent in 1984 and 4.1 percent in 1985 but only 2.4 percent in 2010 after six consecutive quarters of growth, 1.8 percent in 2011 after ten consecutive quarters of expansion and 2.2 percent in 2012 after 14 quarters of expansion. Annual levels also show much stronger growth of PCEs in the expansions after the earlier contractions than in the expansion after the global recession of 2007. Gross domestic investment was much stronger in the earlier expansions than in 2010, 2011 and 2012.

Table I-11, US, Percentage Point Contributions to the Annual Growth Rate of GDP

	GDP	PCE	GDI	∆ PI	Trade	GOV
1958	-0.9	0.54	-1.25	-0.18	-0.89	0.70
1959	7.2	3.61	2.80	0.86	0.00	0.76
1975	-0.2	1.40	-2.98	-1.27	0.89	0.48
1976	5.4	3.51	2.84	1.41	-1.08	0.10
1982	-1.9	0.86	-2.55	-1.34	-0.60	0.35
1983	4.5	3.65	1.45	0.29	-1.35	0.76
1984	7.2	3.43	4.63	1.95	-1.58	0.70
1985	4.1	3.32	-0.17	-1.06	-0.42	1.41
2009	-3.1	-1.36	-3.59	-0.78	1.14	0.74
2010	2.4	1.28	1.50	1.52	-0.52	0.14
2011	1.8	1.79	0.62	-0.14	0.07	-0.67
2012	2.2	1.32	1.19	0.14	0.04	-0.34

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-12 provides more detail of the contributions to growth of GDP from 2009 to 2012 using annual-level data. PCEs contributed 1.28 PPs to GDP growth in 2010 of which 0.82 percentage points (PP) in goods and 0.46 PP in services. Gross private domestic investment (GPDI) deducted 3.59 PPs of GDP growth in 2009 of which -2.80 PPs by fixed investment and -0.78 PPs of inventory change (∆PI) and added 1.50 PPs of GPDI in 2010 of which minus 0.03 PPs of fixed investment and 1.52 PPs of inventory accumulation (∆PI). Trade, or exports of goods and services net of imports, contributed 1.14 PPs in 2009 of which exports deducted 1.14 PPs and imports added 2.28 PPs. In 2010, trade deducted 0.52 PPs with exports contributing 1.29 PPs and imports deducting 1.81 PPs likely benefitting from dollar devaluation. In 2009, government added 0.74 PP of which 0.46 PPs by the federal government and 0.28 PPs by state and local government; in 2010, government added 0.14 PPs of which 0.37 PPs by the federal government with state and local government deducting 0.23 PPs. The final two columns of Table I-12 provide the estimates for 2011 and 2012. PCE contributed 1.79 PPs in 2011 after 1.28 PPs in 2010. The contribution of PCE fell to 1.32 points in 2012. The breakdown into goods and services is similar but with declining contributions in 2012 of goods, 0.74 PPs, and services, 0.58 PPs. Gross private domestic investment contributed 1.50 PPs in 2010 with addition of 1.52 PPs of change of private inventories but the contribution of gross private domestic investment was only 0.62 PPs in 2011. The contribution of GPDI in 2012 increased to 1.19 PPs with fixed investment increasing its contribution to 1.05 PPs and residential investment contributing 0.27 PPs for the first time since 2009. Net exports of goods and services contributed marginally in 2011 with 0.07 PPs and 0.04 PPs in 2012. The contribution of exports fell from 1.29 PPs in 2010 and 0.87 PPs in 2011 to only 0.47 PPs in 2012. Government deducted 0.67 PPs in 2011 and 0.34 PPs in 2012. The expansion since IIIQ2009 has been characterized by weak contributions of aggregate demand, which is the sum of personal consumption expenditures plus gross private domestic investment. The US did not recover strongly from the global recessions as typical in past cyclical expansions. Recoveries tend to be more sluggish as expansions mature. At the margin in IVQ2011, the acceleration of expansion was driven by inventory accumulation instead of aggregate demand of consumption and investment. Growth of PCE was partly the result of burning savings because of financial repression, which may not be sustainable in the future while creating multiple distortions of resource allocation and growth restraint.

Table I-12, US, Contributions to Growth of Gross Domestic Product in Percentage Points

	2009	2010	2011	2012
GDP Growth ∆%	-3.1	2.4	1.8	2.2
Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE)	-1.36	1.28	1.79	1.32
Goods	-0.69	0.82	0.89	0.74
Durable	-0.41	0.45	0.53	0.58
Nondurable	-0.28	0.37	0.36	0.15
Services	-0.67	0.46	0.90	0.58
Gross Private Domestic Investment (GPDI)	-3.59	1.50	0.62	1.19
Fixed Investment	-2.80	-0.03	0.76	1.05
Nonresidential	-2.08	0.07	0.80	0.78
Structures	-0.85	-0.50	0.07	0.29
Equipment, software	-1.23	0.56	0.72	0.49
Residential	-0.73	-0.09	-0.03	0.27
Change Private Inventories	-0.78	1.52	-0.14	0.14
Net Exports of Goods and Services	1.14	-0.52	0.07	0.04
Exports	-1.14	1.29	0.87	0.47
Goods	-1.05	1.11	0.65	0.41
Services	-0.10	0.18	0.22	0.06
Imports	2.28	-1.81	-0.80	-0.43
Goods	2.19	-1.74	-0.72	-0.31
Services	0.09	-0.07	-0.08	-0.12
Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment	0.74	0.14	-0.67	-0.34
Federal	0.46	0.37	-0.23	-0.18
National Defense	0.31	0.17	-0.15	-0.17
Nondefense	0.16	0.20	-0.09	-0.01
State and Local	0.28	-0.23	-0.43	-0.17

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Manufacturing jobs were unchanged in Apr 2013 relative to Mar 2013, seasonally adjusted and increased 15,000 in Apr 2013 relative to Mar 2013, not seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table II-3 (and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/thirty-million-unemployed-or.html). Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted increased 80,000 from Apr 2012 to Apr 2013 or at the average monthly rate of 6,667. There are effects of the weaker economy and international trade together with the yearly adjustment of labor statistics. In the six months ending in Apr 2013, United States national industrial production accumulated increase of 2.0 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.1 percent, which is higher than 1.9 percent growth in 12 months. Excluding 1.3 percent growth in Nov 2012 in the rebound from hurricane Sandy, growth in the five months from Dec 2012 to Apr 2013 accumulated to 0.7 percent or 1.7 percent annual equivalent. Business equipment decreased 0.5 percent in Apr 2013, growing 3.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013 and at the annual equivalent rate of 5.6 percent in the six months ending in Apr 2013 and 0.9 percent annual equivalent in the five months ending in Apr 2013. Capacity utilization of total industry is analyzed by the Fed in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “The rate of capacity utilization for total industry decreased 0.5 percentage point to 77.8 percent, a rate 0.1 percentage point above its level of a year earlier but 2.4 percentage points below its long-run (1972--2012) average.” United States industry is apparently decelerating with some strength at the margin.

Manufacturing decreased 0.1 percent in Mar 2013 seasonally adjusted, increasing 2.1 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months, and increased 2.3 percent in the six months ending in Mar 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.7 percent. Manufacturing decreased 0.4 percent in Apr 2013 seasonally adjusted, increasing 2.1 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months. Manufacturing grew cumulatively 2.1 percent in the six months ending in Apr 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 4.3 percent. Excluding the increase of 1.4 percent in Nov 2012 because of recovery from hurricane Sandy, manufacturing accumulated growth of 0.7 percent from Dec 2012 to Apr 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 1.7 percent. Manufacturing fell 21.9 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased 16.8 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2012. Manufacturing fell 7.0 percent from the peak in Jun 2007 to Mar 2013 and increased 19.4 from the trough in Apr 2008 to Mar 2013. Manufacturing grew 18.5 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Apr 2013. Manufacturing output in Apr 2013 is 7.4 percent below the peak in Jun 2007.

Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 86.4 percent in US national income in IVQ2012 and 86.4 percent in IIQ2013. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Apr 2013, there were 135.494 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 113.232 million NSA in Apr 2013 accounted for 83.6 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 135.494 million, of which 11.930 million, or 10.5 percent of total private jobs and 8.8 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-producing jobs were 94.803 million NSA in Apr 2013, or 70.0 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.7 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 11.2 percent in US national income in IVQ2011, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

	SAAR IVQ2012	% Total	SAAR IQ2013	% Total
National Income WCCA	14,230.5	100.0	14,300.3	100.0
Domestic Industries	13,963.9	97.9	14,068.1	98.3
Private Industries	12,300.8	86.4	12,406.5	86.4
Agriculture	138.6	1.0
Mining	221.7	1.6
Utilities	211.7	1.5
Construction	606.9	4.3
Manufacturing	1599.8	11.2
Durable Goods	921.3	6.5
Nondurable Goods	678.4	4.8
Wholesale Trade	857.2	6.0
Retail Trade	973.3	6.8
Transportation & WH	417.9	2.9
Information	496.2	3.5
Finance, Insurance, RE	2377.2	16.7
Professional, BS	2042.5	14.4
Education, Health Care	1402.0	9.9
Arts, Entertainment	548.3	3.9
Other Services	406.6	2.9
Government	1663.0	11.7	1661.6	11.9
Rest of the World	266.6	1.9	232.2	1.7

Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IA1. Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment. The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions. In cyclical expansions since 1950, US GDP has grown at the average rate of 7.8 percent in the first four quarters after the trough, moving the economy back to long-term trend. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). As a result, there are 28.6 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 17/6 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html).

Growth of GDP has been only 2.1 percent on average during the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013. Weakness in the current cyclical expansion has occurred in growth, labor markets and wealth, as analyzed in IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation incorporating additional data on private investment (IX Conclusion and extended analysis at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html). Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design. Table IA1-1 provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of growth of private fixed investment for the recessions of the 1980s and the current economic cycle. In the cyclical expansion beginning in IQ1983 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html), real private fixed investment in the United States grew at the average annual rate of 15.3 percent in the first eight quarters from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. Growth rates fell to an average of 1.6 percent in the following eight quarters from IQ1985 to IVQ1986. There were only four quarters of contraction of private fixed investment from IQ1983 to IVQ1986. There is quite different behavior of private fixed investment in the fifteen quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013. The average annual growth rate in the first eight quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2011 was 2.5 percent, which is significantly lower than 15.3 percent in the first eight quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1984. There is only strong growth of private fixed investment in the four quarters of expansion from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 at the average annual rate of 11.9 percent. Growth has fallen from the SAAR of 15.5 percent in IIIQ2011 to 0.9 percent in IIIQ2012, recovering to 14.0 percent in IVQ2012 and falling to 4.1 percent in IQ2013. Sudeep Reddy and Scott Thurm, writing on “Investment falls off a cliff,” on Nov 18, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123593211825394.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories) analyze the decline of private investment in the US and inform that a review by the Wall Street Journal of filing and conference calls finds that 40 of the largest publicly traded corporations in the US have announced intentions to reduce capital expenditures in 2012. The SAAR of real private fixed investment jumped to 14.0 percent in IVQ2012 but declined to 4.1 percent in IQ2013.

Table IA1-1, US, Quarterly Growth Rates of Real Private Fixed Investment, % Annual Equivalent SA

Q	1981	1982	1983	1984	2008	2009	2010
I	3.0	-11.6	9.0	13.1	-8.3	-30.2	-0.9
II	2.7	-13.3	16.4	17.5	-5.2	-18.5	14.5
III	0.0	-10.7	26.1	8.8	-12.3	-3.1	-1.0
IV	-1.4	0.6	25.6	7.4	-25.2	-6.0	7.6
				1985			2011
I				3.1			-1.3
II				5.1			12.4
III				-3.2			15.5
IV				7.8			10.0
				1986			2012
I				0.6			9.8
II				-1.0			4.5
III				-2.2			0.9
IV				2.7			14.0
				1987			2013
I				-7.7			4.1
II				7.4
III				8.8
IV				-0.1

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-1 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides seasonally adjusted annual rates of growth of real private fixed investment from 1981 to 1986. Growth rates recovered sharply during the first eight quarters, which was essential in returning the economy to trend growth and eliminating unemployment and underemployment accumulated during the contractions.

Chart IA1-1, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 1981-1986

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Weak behavior of real private fixed investment from 2007 to 2012 is shown in Chart IA1-2. Growth rates of real private fixed investment were much lower during the initial phase of expansion in the current economic cycle and have entered sharp trend of decline.

Chart IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates Percent Change from Prior Quarter, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-2 provides real private fixed investment at seasonally adjusted annual rates from IVQ2007 to IQ2013 or for the complete economic cycle. The first column provides the quarter, the second column percentage change relative to IVQ2007, the third column the quarter percentage change in the quarter relative to the prior quarter and the final column percentage change in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. In IQ1980, gross private domestic investment in the US was $778.3 billion of 2005 dollars, growing to $965.9 billion in IVQ1985 or 24.1 percent, as shown in Table IB-2 of IB Collapse of Dynamism of United States Income Growth and Employment Creation (IX Conclusion and extended analysis at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html). Gross private domestic investment in the US decreased 8.8 percent from $2,111.5 billion of 2005 dollars in IVQ2007 to $1,925.6 billion in IQ2013. As shown in Table IAI-2, real private fixed investment fell 8.8 percent from $2111.5 billion of 2005 dollars in IVQ2007 to $1925.6 billion in IQ2014. Growth of real private investment in Table IA1-2 is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012.

Table IA1-2, US, Real Private Fixed Investment and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%

	Real PFI, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars	∆% Relative to IVQ2007	∆% Relative to Prior Quarter	∆% over Year Earlier
IVQ2007	2111.5	NA	-1.2	-1.0
IQ2008	2066.4	-2.1	-2.1	-2.9
IIQ2008	2039.1	-3.4	-1.3	-5.0
IIIQ2008	1973.5	-6.5	-3.2	-7.7
IV2008	1835.4	-13.1	-7.0	-13.1
IQ2009	1677.3	-20.6	-8.6	-18.8
IIQ2009	1593.7	-24.5	-5.0	-21.8
IIIQ2009	1581.2	-25.1	-0.8	-19.9
IVQ2009	1556.8	-26.3	-1.5	-15.2
IQ2010	1553.1	-26.4	-0.2	-7.4
IIQ2010	1606.5	-23.9	3.4	0.8
IIIQ2010	1602.7	-24.1	-0.2	1.4
IVQ2010	1632.3	-22.7	1.8	4.8
IQ2011	1627.0	-22.9	-0.3	4.8
IIQ2011	1675.4	-20.7	3.0	4.3
IIIQ2011	1736.8	-17.7	3.7	8.4
IVQ2011	1778.7	-15.8	2.4	9.0
IQ2012	1820.6	-13.8	2.4	11.9
IIQ2012	1840.6	-12.8	1.1	9.9
IIIQ2012	1844.8	-12.6	0.2	6.2
IVQ2012	1906.3	-9.7	3.3	7.2
IQ2013	1925.6	-8.8	1.0	5.8

PFI: Private Fixed Investment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-3 provides real private fixed investment in billions of chained 2005 dollars from IV2007 to IQ2013. Real private fixed investment has not recovered, stabilizing at a level in IQ2013 that is 8.8 percent below the level in IVQ2007.

Chart IA1-3, US, Real Private Fixed Investment, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars, IQ2007 to IQ2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-4 provides real gross private domestic investment in chained dollars of 2005 from 1980 to 1986. Real gross private domestic investment climbed 24.1 percent in IVQ1985 above the level in IQ1980.

Chart IA1-4, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 1980-1986

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-5 provides real gross private domestic investment in the United States in billions of dollars of 2005 from 2006 to 2013. Gross private domestic investment reached a level in IQ2013 that was 6.9 percent lower than the level in IVQ2007 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Chart IA1-5, US, Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-3 provides percentage shares in GDP of gross private domestic investment and its components in IQ2013, IQ2006 and IQ2000. The share of gross private domestic investment in GDP has fallen from 17.4 percent in IQ2000 and 17.8 percent in IQ2006 to 13.4 percent in IQ2013. There are declines in percentage shares in GDP of all components with sharp reduction of residential investment from 4.6 percent in IQ2000 and 6.2 percent in IQ2006 to 2.7 percent in IQ2013. The share of fixed investment in GDP fell from 17.2 percent in IQ2000 and 17.3 percent in IQ2006 to 13.1 percent in IQ2013.

Table IA1-3, Percentage Shares of Gross Private Domestic Investment and Components in Gross Domestic Product, % of GDP, IQ2013

	IQ2013	IQ2006	IQ2000
Gross Private Domestic Investment	13.4	17.8	17.4
Fixed Investment	13.1	17.3	17.2
Nonresidential	10.5	11.1	12.6
Structures	3.0	3.0	3.1
Equipment and Software	7.5	8.1	9.5
Residential	2.7	6.2	4.6
Change in Private Inventories	0.3	0.5	0.2

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Broader perspective is provided in Chart IA1-6 with the percentage share of gross private domestic investment in GDP in annual data from 1929 to 2012. There was sharp drop during the current economic cycle with almost no recovery in contrast with sharp recovery after the recessions of the 1980s.

Chart IA1-6, US, Percentage Share of Gross Domestic Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-7 provides percentage shares of private fixed investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2012. The sharp contraction after the recessions of the 1980s was followed by sustained recovery while the sharp drop in the current economic cycle has not been recovered.

Chart IA1-7, US, Percentage Share of Private Fixed Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-8 provides percentage shares in GDP of nonresidential investment from 1929 to 2012. There is again recovery from sharp contraction in the 1980s but inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

Chart IA1-8, US, Percentage Share of Nonresidential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-9 provides percentage shares of business equipment and software in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2012. There is again inadequate recovery in the current economic cycle.

Chart IA1-9, US, Percentage Share of Business Equipment and Software in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-10 provides percentage shares of residential investment in GDP with annual data from 1929 to 2012. The salient characteristic of Chart IA1-10 is the vertical increase of the share of residential investment in GDP up to 2006 and subsequent collapse.

Chart IA1-10, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Annual, 1929-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Finer detail is provided by the quarterly share of residential investment in GDP from 1979 to 2012 in Chart IA1-11. There was protracted growth of that share that accelerated sharply into 2006 followed with nearly vertical drop. The explanation of the sharp contraction of United States housing can probably be found in the origins of the financial crisis and global recession. Let V(T) represent the value of the firm’s equity at time T and B stand for the promised debt of the firm to bondholders and assume that corporate management, elected by equity owners, is acting on the interests of equity owners. Robert C. Merton (1974, 453) states:

“On the maturity date T, the firm must either pay the promised payment of B to the debtholders or else the current equity will be valueless. Clearly, if at time T, V(T) > B, the firm should pay the bondholders because the value of equity will be V(T) – B > 0 whereas if they do not, the value of equity would be zero. If V(T) ≤ B, then the firm will not make the payment and default the firm to the bondholders because otherwise the equity holders would have to pay in additional money and the (formal) value of equity prior to such payments would be (V(T)- B) < 0.”

Pelaez and Pelaez (The Global Recession Risk (2007), 208-9) apply this analysis to the US housing market in 2005-2006 concluding:

“The house market [in 2006] is probably operating with low historical levels of individual equity. There is an application of structural models [Duffie and Singleton 2003] to the individual decisions on whether or not to continue paying a mortgage. The costs of sale would include realtor and legal fees. There could be a point where the expected net sale value of the real estate may be just lower than the value of the mortgage. At that point, there would be an incentive to default. The default vulnerability of securitization is unknown.”

There are multiple important determinants of the interest rate: “aggregate wealth, the distribution of wealth among investors, expected rate of return on physical investment, taxes, government policy and inflation” (Ingersoll 1987, 405). Aggregate wealth is a major driver of interest rates (Ibid, 406). Unconventional monetary policy, with zero fed funds rates and flattening of long-term yields by quantitative easing, causes uncontrollable effects on risk taking that can have profound undesirable effects on financial stability. Excessively aggressive and exotic monetary policy is the main culprit and not the inadequacy of financial management and risk controls.

The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Ibid). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:

W = Y/r (1)

Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞.

Lowering the interest rate near the zero bound in 2003-2004 caused the illusion of permanent increases in wealth or net worth in the balance sheets of borrowers and also of lending institutions, securitized banking and every financial institution and investor in the world. The discipline of calculating risks and returns was seriously impaired. The objective of monetary policy was to encourage borrowing, consumption and investment but the exaggerated stimulus resulted in a financial crisis of major proportions as the securitization that had worked for a long period was shocked with policy-induced excessive risk, imprudent credit, high leverage and low liquidity by the incentive to finance everything overnight at close to zero interest rates, from adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) to asset-backed commercial paper of structured investment vehicles (SIV).

The consequences of inflating liquidity and net worth of borrowers were a global hunt for yields to protect own investments and money under management from the zero interest rates and unattractive long-term yields of Treasuries and other securities. Monetary policy distorted the calculations of risks and returns by households, business and government by providing central bank cheap money. Short-term zero interest rates encourage financing of everything with short-dated funds, explaining the SIVs created off-balance sheet to issue short-term commercial paper to purchase default-prone mortgages that were financed in overnight or short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 50-1, Regulation of Banks and Finance, 59-60, Globalization and the State Vol. I, 89-92, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 198-9, Government Intervention in Globalization, 62-3, International Financial Architecture, 144-9). ARMS were created to lower monthly mortgage payments by benefitting from lower short-dated reference rates. Financial institutions economized in liquidity that was penalized with near zero interest rates. There was no perception of risk because the monetary authority guaranteed a minimum or floor price of all assets by maintaining low interest rates forever or equivalent to writing an illusory put option on wealth. Subprime mortgages were part of the put on wealth by an illusory put on house prices. The housing subsidy of $221 billion per year created the impression of ever increasing house prices. The suspension of auctions of 30-year Treasuries was designed to increase demand for mortgage-backed securities, lowering their yield, which was equivalent to lowering the costs of housing finance and refinancing. Fannie and Freddie purchased or guaranteed $1.6 trillion of nonprime mortgages and worked with leverage of 75:1 under Congress-provided charters and lax oversight. The combination of these policies resulted in high risks because of the put option on wealth by near zero interest rates, excessive leverage because of cheap rates, low liquidity because of the penalty in the form of low interest rates and unsound credit decisions because the put option on wealth by monetary policy created the illusion that nothing could ever go wrong, causing the credit/dollar crisis and global recession (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession, 157-66, Regulation of Banks, and Finance, 217-27, International Financial Architecture, 15-18, The Global Recession Risk, 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II, 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization, 182-4).

Chart IA1-11, US, Percentage Share of Residential Investment in Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, 1979-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-4 provides the seasonally adjusted annual rate of real GDP percentage change and contributions in percentage points in annual equivalent rate of gross domestic investment (GDI), real private fixed investment (PFI), nonresidential investment (NRES), business equipment and software (BES), residential investment (RES) and change in inventories (∆INV) for the cyclical expansions from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and from IIIQ2009 to IQ2013. GDI provided strong percentage points contributions to GDP growth in the critical first year of expansion in 1983 and also in several quarters in 1984 and 1985 while it has been muted in the cyclical expansion since IIIQ2009 with contributions largely only from IQ2010 to IVQ2011. Gross domestic investment added 1.56 percentage points to GDP growth of 2.4 percent in IQ2013 mostly because of change of inventories of 0.63 percentage points with PFI adding 0.53 percentage points. Nonresidential investment added 0.23 percentage points and residential investment added 0.30 percentage points to GDP growth of 2.4 percent in IQ2013. GDI added 0.17 percentage points in IVQ2012 mostly because of minus 1.52 percentage points of inventory divestment while private fixed investment contributed 1.69 percentage points, nonresidential investment 1.28 percentage points, business equipment and software 0.82 percentage points and residential investment 0.41 percentage points. Much of the strong performance of GDI in the cyclical expansion after IQ1983 originated in contributions by real private fixed investment (PFI). Nonresidential investment also contributed strongly to growth in the expansion of the 1980s but has been muted in the current expansion. The contribution of business equipment and software collapsed to negative 0.19 percentage points in IIIQ2012 as business scales down investment but rebounded with 0.82 percentage points in IVQ2012 and 0.34 percentage points in IQ2013. Residential investment (RES) was relatively strong in 1983 but was muted in following quarters. Residential investment only contributed significantly to growth of GDP in the four quarters of 2012 and IQ2013.

Table IA1-4, US, Contributions to the Rate of Growth of Real GDP in Percentage Points

	GDP	GDI	PFI	NRES	BES	RES	∆INV
2013
I	2.4	1.16	0.53	0.23	0.34	0.30	0.63
2012
I	2.0	0.78	1.18	0.74	0.39	0.43	-0.39
II	1.3	0.09	0.56	0.36	0.35	0.19	-0.46
III	3.1	0.85	0.12	-0.19	-0.19	0.31	0.73
IV	0.4	0.17	1.69	1.28	0.82	0.41	-1.52
2011
I	0.1	-0.68	-0.14	-0.11	0.72	-0.03	-0.54
II	2.5	1.40	1.39	1.30	0.53	0.09	0.01
III	1.3	0.68	1.75	1.71	1.20	0.03	-1.07
IV	4.1	3.72	1.19	0.93	0.62	0.26	2.53
2010
I	2.3	2.13	-0.10	0.20	0.90	-0.30	2.23
II	2.2	1.65	1.58	1.07	0.76	0.51	0.07
III	2.6	1.87	-0.10	0.70	0.76	-0.80	1.97
IV	2.4	-0.75	0.87	0.83	0.60	0.03	-1.61
2009
I	-5.3	-7.02	-4.73	-3.54	-2.16	-1.18	-2.29
II	-0.3	-3.52	-2.49	-1.86	-0.54	-0.63	-1.03
III	1.4	-0.14	-0.32	-0.73	0.25	0.40	0.19
IV	4.0	3.85	-0.69	-0.57	0.40	-0.12	4.55
1982
I	-6.4	-7.50	-2.04	-1.25	-0.47	-0.79	-5.47
II	2.2	-0.05	-2.40	-1.98	-1.19	-0.42	2.35
III	-1.5	-0.72	-1.87	-1.82	-0.57	-0.04	1.15
IV	0.3	-5.66	-0.18	-1.09	-0.60	0.92	-5.48
1983
I	5.1	2.20	1.26	-1.02	-0.18	2.28	0.94
II	9.3	5.87	2.36	0.52	1.40	1.84	3.51
III	8.1	4.30	3.70	2.02	1.62	1.68	0.60
IV	8.5	6.84	3.76	2.98	2.50	0.77	3.09
1984
I	8.0	7.15	2.08	1.55	0.57	0.52	5.07
II	7.1	2.44	2.74	2.39	1.50	0.35	-0.30
III	3.9	1.67	1.45	1.62	1.05	-0.17	0.21
IV	3.3	-1.26	1.24	1.22	1.03	0.02	-2.50
1985
I	3.8	-2.38	0.57	0.62	-0.16	-0.06	-2.94
II	3.4	1.24	0.88	0.74	0.75	0.14	0.35
III	6.4	-0.68	-0.53	-0.75	-0.37	0.23	-0.16
IV	3.1	2.72	1.27	0.85	0.62	0.42	1.45

GDP: Gross Domestic Product; GDI: Gross Domestic Investment; PFI: Private Fixed Investment; NRES: Nonresidential; BES: Business Equipment and Software; RES: Residential; ∆INV: Change in Private Inventories.

GDI = PFI + ∆INV, may not add exactly because of errors of rounding.

GDP: Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate of growth in a quarter; components: percentage points at annual rate.

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits. Table IA1-5 provides value added of corporate business, dividends and corporate profits in billions of current dollars at seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) in IVQ2007 and IQ2013 together with percentage changes. The last three rows of Table IA1-5 provide gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business, consumption of fixed capital and net value added in billions of chained 2005 dollars at SAARs. Deductions from gross value added of corporate profits down the rows of Table IA1-5 end with undistributed corporate profits. Profits after taxes with inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment (CCA) increased by 50.2 percent in nominal terms from IVQ2007 to IQ2013 while net dividends decreased 1.1 percent and undistributed corporate profits swelled 205 percent from $118.0 billion in IQ2007 to $359.9 billion in IQ2013 from minus $22.1 billion in current dollars in IVQ2007. The investment decision of United States corporations has been fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash. Gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business adjusted for inflation increased 4.2 percent from IVQ2007 to IQ2013, which is much lower than nominal increase of 12.4 percent in the same period for gross value added of total corporate business.

Table IA1-5, US, Value Added of Corporate Business, Corporate Profits and Dividends, IVQ2007-IQ2013

	IVQ2007	IQ2013	∆%
Current Billions of Dollars Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates (SAAR)
Gross Value Added of Corporate Business	7,975.6	9,103.0	14.1
Consumption of Fixed Capital	988.0	1,135.1	14.9
Net Value Added	6,987.6	7,967.8	14.0
Compensation of Employees	5,020.7	5,392.0	7.4
Taxes on Production and Imports Less Subsidies	659.7	715.7	8.5
Net Operating Surplus	1,307.2	1,860.1	42.3
Net Interest and Misc	202.4	187.6	-7.3
Business Current Transfer Payment Net	73.1	122.7	67.8
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustments	1,031.6	1,549.8	50.2
Taxes on Corporate Income	408.8	434.4	6.3
Profits after Tax with IVA and CCA Adjustment	622.9	1,115.4	79.1
Net Dividends	645.0	638.0	-1.1
Undistributed Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustment	-22.1	477.4	NA
Billions of Chained USD 2005 SAAR
Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporate Business	6,642.5	6,918.7	4.2
Consumption of Fixed Capital	801.6	859.9	7.3
Net Value Added	5,840.9	6,058.7	3.7

IVA: Inventory Valuation Adjustment; CCA: Capital Consumption Adjustment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-6 provides comparable United States value added of corporate business, corporate profits and dividends from IQ1980 to IVQ1985. There is significant difference both in nominal and inflation-adjusted data. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA increased 140.3 percent with dividends growing 112.7 percent and undistributed profits jumping 169.7 percent. There was much higher inflation in the 1980s than in the current cycle. For example, the consumer price index for all items not seasonally adjusted increased 36.5 percent between Mar 1980 and Dec 1985 but only 9.3 percent between Dec 2007 and Dec 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm). The comparison is still valid in terms of inflation-adjusted data: gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business adjusted for inflation increased 21.2 percent between IQ1980 and IVQ1985 but only 4.2 percent between IVQ2007 and IQ2013 while net value added adjusted for inflation increased 20.6 percent between IQ1980 and IVQ1985 but only 3.7 percent between IVQ2007 and IQ2013.

Table IA1-6, US, Value Added of Corporate Business, Corporate Profits and Dividends, IQ1980-IVQ1985

	IQ1980	IVQ1985	∆%
Current Billions of Dollars Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates (SAAR)
Gross Value Added of Corporate Business	1,619.3	2,576.1	59.1
Consumption of Fixed Capital	169.9	278.9	64.2
Net Value Added	1,449.4	2,297.1	58.5
Compensation of Employees	1,090.6	1,667.0	52.9
Taxes on Production and Imports Less Subsidies	121.5	213.3	75.6
Net Operating Surplus	237.3	416.9	75.7
Net Interest and Misc	49.0	96.8	97.6
Business Current Transfer Payment Net	12.1	30.0	147.9
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustments	176.3	290.0	64.5
Taxes on Corporate Income	97.0	99.7	2.8
Profits after Tax with IVA and CCA Adjustment	79.2	190.3	140.3
Net Dividends	40.9	87.0	112.7
Undistributed Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustment	38.3	103.3	169.7
Billions of Chained USD 2005 SAAR
Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporate Business	2,642.8	3,203.9	21.2
Consumption of Fixed Capital	223.2	286.6	28.4
Net Value Added	2,419.6	2,917.3	20.6

IVA: Inventory Valuation Adjustment; CCA: Capital Consumption Adjustment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-12 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides quarterly corporate profits after tax and undistributed profits with IVA and CCA from 1979 to 2012. There is tightness between the series of quarterly corporate profits and undistributed profits in the 1980s with significant gap developing from 1988 and to the present with the closest approximation peaking in IVQ2005 and surrounding quarters. These gaps widened during all recessions including in 1991 and 2001 and recovered in expansions with exceptionally weak performance in the current expansion.

Chart IA1-12, US, Corporate Profits after Tax and Undistributed Profits with Inventory Valuation Adjustment and Capital Consumption Adjustment, Quarterly, 1979-2012

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table IA1-7 provides price, costs and profit per unit of gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate income for IVQ2007 and IQ2013 in the upper block and for IQ1980 and IVQ1985 in the lower block. Compensation of employees or labor costs per unit of gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate income hardly changed from 0.667 in IVQ2007 to 0.693 in IQ2013 in a fractured labor market but increased from 0.386 in IQ1980 to 0.480 in IVQ1985 in a more vibrant labor market. Unit nonlabor costs increased mildly from 0.271 per unit of gross value added in IVQ2007 to 0.287 in IQ2013 but increased from 0.127 in IQ1980 to 0.175 in IVQ1985 in an economy closer to full employment of resources. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA per unit of gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate income increased from 0.076 in IVQ2007 to 0.114 in IQ2013 and from 0.025 in IQ1980 to 0.053 in IVQ1985.

Table IA1-7, US, Price, Costs and Profit per Unit of Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Domestic Corporate Income

	IVQ2007	IQ2013
Price per Unit of Real Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporate Business	1.056	1.140
Compensation of Employees (Unit Labor Cost)	0.667	0.693
Unit Nonlabor Cost	0.271	0.287
Consumption of Fixed Capital	0.128	0.138
Taxes on Production and Imports less Subsidies plus Business Current Transfer Payments (net)	0.103	0.110
Net Interest and Misc. Payments	0.040	0.039
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustment (Unit Profits from Current Production)	0.118	0.159
Taxes on Corporate Income	0.043	0.045
Profits after Tax with IVA and CCA Adjustment	0.076	0.114
	IQ1980	IVQ1985
Price per Unit of Real Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Corporate Business	0.566	0.730
Compensation of Employees (Unit Labor Cost)	0.386	0.480
Unit Nonlabor Cost	0.127	0.175
Consumption of Fixed Capital	0.060	0.078
Taxes on Production and Imports less Subsidies plus Business Current Transfer Payments (net)	0.047	0.068
Net Interest and Misc. Payments	0.020	0.029
Corporate Profits with IVA and CCA Adjustment (Unit Profits from Current Production)	0.054	0.075
Taxes on Corporate Income	0.029	0.022
Profits after Tax with IVA and CCA Adjustment	0.025	0.053

IVA: Inventory Valuation Adjustment; CCA: Capital Consumption Adjustment

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IA1-13 provides quarterly profits after tax with IVA and CCA per unit of gross value added of nonfinancial domestic corporate income from 1980 to 2013. In an environment of idle labor and other productive resources nonfinancial corporate income increased after tax profits with IVA and CCA per unit of gross value added at a faster pace in the weak economy from IVQ2007 to IQ2013 than in the vibrant expansion of the cyclical contractions of the 1980s. Part of the profits was distributed as dividends and significant part was retained as undistributed profits in the current economic cycle with frustrated investment decision.

Chart IA1-13, US, Profits after Tax with Inventory Valuation Adjustment and Capital Consumption Adjustment per Unit of Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Domestic Corporate Income, 1980-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IIA Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures. There are waves of changes in personal income and expenditures in Table IIA-1 that correspond somewhat to inflation waves observed worldwide (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html) because of the influence through price indexes. Data are distorted in Nov and Dec 2012 by the rush to realize income of all forms in anticipation of tax increases beginning in Jan 2013. There is major distortion in Jan 2013 because of higher contributions in payrolls to government social insurance that caused sharp reduction in personal income and disposable personal income. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) explains as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January [2013] changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December [2012] in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011 with relaxed risk aversion, nominal personal income (NPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 8.4 percent, nominal disposable personal income (NDPI) at 5.8 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures (NPCE) at 6.5 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased at the annual equivalent rate of 1.5 percent and real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) rose at annual equivalent 2.4 percent. In the second wave in May-Aug 2011 under risk aversion, NPI rose at annual equivalent 0.9 percent, NPDI at 1.2 percent and NPCE at 2.7 percent. RDPI contracted at 1.5 percent annual equivalent and RPCE crawled at 0.3 percent annual equivalent. With mixed shocks of risk aversion in the third wave from Sep to Dec 2011, NPI rose at 1.5 percent annual equivalent, NDPI at 0.9 percent and NPCE at 2.7 percent. RDPI increased at 0.3 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 1.8 percent annual equivalent. In the fourth wave from Jan to Mar 2012, NPI increased at 8.7 percent annual equivalent and NDPI at 8.3 percent. Real disposable income (RDPI) is more dynamic in the revisions, growing at 4.5 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 2.8 percent. The policy of repressing savings with zero interest rates stimulated growth of nominal consumption (NPCE) at the annual equivalent rate of 6.6 percent and real consumption (RPCE) at 2.8 percent. In the fifth wave in Apr-Jul 2012, NPI increased at annual equivalent 1.8 percent, NDPI at 1.5 percent and RDPI at 1.5 percent. Financial repression failed to stimulate consumption with NPCE growing at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and RPCE at 1.2 percent. In the sixth wave in Aug-Oct 2012, in another wave of carry trades into commodity futures, NPI increased at 3.7 percent annual equivalent and NDPI increased at 3.2 percent while real disposable income (RDPI) increased at 0.4 percent annual equivalent. Data for Nov-Dec 2012 have illusory increases: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). In the seventh wave, anticipations of tax increases in Jan 2013 caused exceptional income gains that increased personal income to annual equivalent 29.8 percent in Nov-Dec 2012, nominal disposable income at 30.6 percent and real disposable personal income at 31.3 percent with likely effects on nominal personal consumption that increased at 3.0 percent and real personal consumption at 4.3 percent with subdued prices. The numbers in parentheses show that without the exceptional effects NDPI (nominal disposable personal income) increased at 5.5 percent and RDPI (real disposable personal income) at 8.7 percent. In the eighth wave, nominal personal income fell 4.4 percent in Jan 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 41.7 percent; nominal disposable personal income fell 5.1 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of decline of 46.6 percent; real disposable income fell 5.2 percent or at the annual rate of decline of 47.3 percent; nominal personal consumption expenditures increased 0.3 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 3.7 percent; and real personal consumption expenditures increased 0.2 percent or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.4 percent. The savings rate fell significantly from 7.4 percent in Dec 2012 to 2.1 percent in Jan 2013. The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as follows (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf 3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income -- increased $126.7 billion in January, compared with an increase of $6.3 billion in December. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.8 billion to January. As noted above, employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, so the total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.8 billion”

Further explanation is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion. The January change in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates. Excluding these special factors and others, which are discussed more fully below, DPI increased $46.8 billion in February, or 0.4 percent, after increasing $15.8 billion, or 0.1 percent, in January.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf). In the ninth wave in Feb-Mar 2013, nominal personal income increased at 9.4 percent and nominal disposable income at 8.7 percent annual equivalent, while real disposable income increased at 6.8 percent annual equivalent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures grew at 5.5 annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures 3.7 percent annual equivalent. The savings rate collapsed from 3.7 percent in Oct 2012, 4.7 percent in Nov 2012 and 7.4 percent in Dec 2012 to 2.1 percent in Jan 2013, 2.4 percent in Feb 2013 and 2.5 percent in Mar 2013. In the tenth wave, personal income stagnated in Apr 2013, nominal disposable income fell at annual equivalent 1.2 percent and nominal personal consumption expenditures at 2.4 percent. Real disposable income grew at 1.2 percent annual equivalent and real personal consumption expenditures at 1.2 percent.

The economy of the US can be summarized in growth of economic activity or GDP as decelerating from mediocre growth of 2.4 percent on an annual basis in 2010 and 1.8 percent in 2011 to 2.2 percent in 2012. Calculations below show that actual growth is around 1.9 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). United States real GDP grew at the rate of 3.2 percent between 1929 and 2012 and at 3.2 percent between 1947 and 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/word-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html). Growth is not only mediocre but also sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 28.6 million people corresponding to 17.6 percent of the effective labor force of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). In the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013, US real GDP grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (IQ2011), 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, revised 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012, 0.4 percent in IVQ2012 and revised 2.4 percent in IQ2013. The annual equivalent rate of growth of GDP for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent, obtained as follows. Discounting 0.1 percent to one quarter is 0.025 percent {[(1.001)^1/4 -1]100 = 0.025}; discounting 2.5 percent to one quarter is 0.62 percent {[(1.025)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 4.1 percent to one quarter is 1.0 {[(1.04)^1/4 -1]100; discounting 2.0 percent to one quarter is 0.50 percent {[(1.020)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)^1/4 -1]100}; discounting 3.1 percent to one quarter is 0.77 {[(1.031)^1/4 -1]100); discounting 0.4 percent to one quarter is 0.1 percent {[(1.004)^1/4 – 1]100}; and discounting 2.4 percent to one quarter is 0.59 percent {[(1.024)^1/4 -1}100}. Real GDP growth in the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 accumulated to 4.3 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0059) - 1]100 = 4.3%}. This is equivalent to growth from IQ2011 to IQ2013 obtained by dividing the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of IQ2013 of $13,746.2 billion by the SAAR of IVQ2010 of $13,181.2 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 and Table I-6 below) and expressing as percentage {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2) - 1]100 = 4.3%}. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011, the four quarters of 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 is 1.9 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001 x 1.0059)^4/9 -1]100 = 1.9%], or {[($13,746.2/$13,181.2)]^4/9-1]100 = 1.9%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table I-6 below, obtaining the average for nine quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. Growth in the four quarters of 2012 accumulates to 1.7 percent {[(1.02)^1/4(1.013)^1/4(1.031)^1/4(1.004)^1/4 -1]100 = 1.7%}. This is equivalent to dividing the SAAR of $13,665.4 billion for IVQ2012 in Table I-6 by the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 except for a rounding discrepancy to obtain 1.7 percent {[($13,665.4/$13,441.0) – 1]100 = 1.7%}. The US economy is still close to a standstill especially considering the GDP report in detail.

RDPI stagnated in Jan-Dec 2011 with the latest revised data compared with growth of 3.3 percent in Jan-Dec 2010 but grew at annual equivalent 4.5 percent in Jan-Mar 2012 and 1.5 percent in Apr-Jul 2012. The salient deceleration is the decline of the annual equivalent rate of NPCE (nominal personal consumption expenditures) to 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Apr-Jul 2012 and of RPCE (real personal consumption expenditures) to 1.2 percent. A bump occurred in Aug 2012 with increases of commodity prices by the carry trade from zero interest rates to exposures in commodity futures and other risk financial assets. Real disposable income fell 0.2 percent in Aug 2012 or at annual equivalent minus 2.4 percent. Nominal personal consumption expenditures increased 0.3 percent in Aug 2012 or at annual equivalent 3.7 percent but stagnated in real terms. Both nominal personal income and nominal disposable income increased 0.1 percent in Aug 2012 or at 1.2 percent in annual equivalent. Real disposable income (RDPI) increased 0.2 percent in Oct 2012 while real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) contracted 0.2 percent. RDPI increased 1.5 percent in Nov 2012 and 3.1 percent in Dec 2012 because of realization of incomes in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2013 while RPCE increased 0.5 percent in Nov 2012 and 0.2 percent in Dec 2012. In Jan-Dec 2012, RDPI increased 6.4 percent and RPCE 2.1 percent. NPI contracted 4.4 percent in Jan 2013, NPI 5.1 percent and RDPI 5.2 percent but NPCE increased 0.3 percent and RPCE 0.2 percent, probably by drawing on savings. There is strong recovery in Feb-Mar 2013 and renewed weakness in Apr 2013.

Table IIA-1, US, Percentage Change from Prior Month Seasonally Adjusted of Personal Income, Disposable Income and Personal Consumption Expenditures %

	NPI	NDPI	RDPI	NPCE	RPCE
2013
Apr	0.0	-0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.1
AE ∆% Apr	0.0	-1.2	1.2	-2.4	1.2
Mar	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2
Feb	1.2	1.2	0.8	0.8	0.4
AE ∆% Feb-Mar	9.4	8.7	6.8	5.5	3.7
Jan	-4.4	-5.1 (0.1)a	-5.2	0.3	0.2
AE ∆% Jan	-41.7	-46.6 (3.7)a	-47.3	3.7	2.4
2012
∆% Jan-Dec 2012***	8.2	8.0	6.4	3.6	2.1
Dec	3.0	3.1 (0.3)*	3.1 (0.5)*	0.2	0.2
Nov	1.4	1.4 (0.6)*	1.5 (0.9)*	0.3	0.5
AE ∆% Nov-Dec	29.8	30.6 (5.5)*	31.3 (8.7)*	3.0	4.3
Oct	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.0	-0.2
Sep	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.8	0.5
Aug	0.1	0.1	-0.2	0.3	0.0
AE ∆% Aug-Oct	3.7	3.2	0.4	4.5	1.2
Jul	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.3
Jun	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	-0.1
May	0.1	0.1	0.3	-0.2	0.0
Apr	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
AE ∆% Apr-Jul	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.2	1.2
Mar	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.0
Feb	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.4
Jan	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.3
AE ∆% Jan-Mar	8.7	8.3	4.5	6.6	2.8
2011
∆% Jan-Dec 2011*	3.6	2.5	0.0	4.2	1.7
Dec	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0
Nov	-0.2	-0.3	-0.3	0.1	0.0
Oct	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
Sep	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.5	0.4
AE ∆% Sep-Dec	1.5	0.9	0.3	2.7	1.8
Aug	0.0	0.0	-0.3	0.2	-0.1
Jul	0.1	0.2	-0.1	0.7	0.5
Jun	0.2	0.2	0.1	-0.1	-0.2
May	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.1	-0.1
AE ∆% May-Aug	0.9	1.2	-1.5	2.7	0.3
Apr	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0
Mar	0.1	0.1	-0.3	0.7	0.3
Feb	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.3
Jan	1.9	1.1	0.8	0.4	0.2
AE ∆% Jan-Apr	8.4	5.8	1.5	6.5	2.4
2010
∆% Jan-Dec 2010**	5.3	4.9	3.3	4.4	2.8
Dec	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.2
Nov	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.4
Oct	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.4
IVQ2010∆%	1.3	1.2	0.6	1.6	1.0
IVQ2010 AE ∆%	5.3	4.9	2.4	6.6	4.1

Notes: *Excluding exceptional income gains in Nov and Dec 2012 because of anticipated tax increases in Jan 2013 ((page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). ^a Excluding employee contributions for government social insurance (pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf )Excluding NPI: current dollars personal income; NDPI: current dollars disposable personal income; RDPI: chained (2005) dollars DPI; NPCE: current dollars personal consumption expenditures; RPCE: chained (2005) dollars PCE; AE: annual equivalent; IVQ2010: fourth quarter 2010; A: annual equivalent

Percentage change month to month seasonally adjusted

*∆% Dec 2011/Dec 2010 **∆% Dec 2010/Dec 2009 *** ∆% Dec 2012/Dec 2011

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Further information on income and consumption is provided by Table IIA-2. The 12-month rates of increase of RDPI and RPCE in 2011 show sharp trend of deterioration of RDPI from over 3 percent in the final four months of 2010 to less than 3 percent at the end of IQ2011 and then collapsing to a range of 0.9 to 0.0 percent in Jun-Dec 2011. Revisions shows decline of RDPI of 0.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2012 and marginal increase of 0.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. The significant difference is continuing growth of 12-month percentage changes of RDPI with 1.3 percent in Jun 2012, 1.5 percent Jul 2012, 1.6 percent in Aug 2012, 1.7 percent in Sep 2012 but 1.6 percent in Oct 2012 followed by 3.5 percent in Nov 2012 and 6.4 percent in Dec 2012. Increases of RDPI in Nov-Dec 2012 are explained by the BEA as: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). The 12-month rate of growth of real disposable personal income fell from 6.4 percent in Dec 2012 to 0.3 percent in Jan 2013, increasing to 0.8 percent in Feb 2013, 0.9 percent in Mar 2013 and 1.0 percent in Apr 2013. Real disposable income fell 5.2 percent in Jan 2013, which is explained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis as follows (page 2 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf):

“The January change in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates. Excluding these special factors and others, which are discussed more fully below, DPI increased $46.8 billion in February, or 0.4 percent, after increasing $15.8 billion, or 0.1 percent, in January.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf)

RPCE growth decelerated less sharply from close to 3 percent in IVQ 2010 to 1.6 percent in Mar 2012, 1.5 percent in Oct 2012, 1.9 percent in Nov 2012, 2.1 percent in Dec 2012 perhaps also with some effects of anticipations of tax increases in Jan 2013, 2.0 percent in Jan 2013 by burning savings, 1.9 percent in Feb 2013 and 2.2 percent in Mar 2013. RPCE increased 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2013. Subdued growth of RPCE could affect revenues of business. Growth rates of personal consumption have weakened. Goods and especially durable goods have been driving growth of PCE as shown by the much higher 12-month rates of growth of real goods PCE (RPCEG) and durable goods real PCE (RPCEGD) than services real PCE (RPCES). Growth of consumption of goods and, in particular, of consumer durable goods drives the faster expansion of the economy while growth of consumption of services is much more moderate. The 12-month rates of growth of RPCEGD have fallen from around 10 percent and even higher in several months from Sep 2010 to Feb 2011 to the range of 6.4 to 9.5 percent from Jan 2012 to Apr 2013. RPCEG growth rates have fallen from around 5 percent late in 2010 and early Jan-Feb 2011 to the range of 2.4 to 3.9 percent from Jan 2012 to Apr 2013. There are limits to sustained growth based on financial repression in an environment of weak labor markets and real labor remuneration.

Table IIA-2, Real Disposable Personal Income and Real Personal Consumption Expenditures

Percentage Change from the Same Month a Year Earlier %

	RDPI	RPCE	RPCEG	RPCEGD	RPCES
2013
Apr	1.0	2.1	3.2	8.3	1.5
Mar	0.9	2.2	2.9	7.3	1.9
Feb	0.8	2.0	3.1	7.3	1.4
Jan	0.3	2.0	3.2	7.9	1.4
2012
Dec	6.4	2.1	3.9	9.5	1.1
Nov	3.5	1.9	3.4	9.0	1.2
Oct	1.6	1.5	2.4	6.4	1.1
Sep	1.7	1.9	3.7	8.9	1.1
Aug	1.6	1.9	3.7	8.9	0.9
Jul	1.5	1.9	3.1	7.3	1.2
Jun	1.3	2.0	3.5	8.6	1.3
May	1.3	1.9	3.0	7.4	1.4
Apr	0.7	1.8	2.4	6.5	1.5
Mar	0.7	1.6	2.6	6.6	1.1
Feb	0.1	1.9	2.7	7.4	1.5
Jan	-0.2	1.8	2.6	6.8	1.4
2011
Dec	0.0	1.7	2.5	6.0	1.3
Nov	0.3	1.9	2.6	5.8	1.5
Oct	0.7	2.3	3.2	5.9	1.8
Sep	0.5	2.4	3.4	7.0	2.0
Aug	0.4	2.1	2.6	5.3	1.9
Jul	0.9	2.8	4.1	6.4	2.1
Jun	0.9	2.4	3.4	5.3	1.9
May	1.0	2.6	3.9	6.5	2.0
Apr	1.8	3.0	4.7	8.2	2.1
Mar	2.6	3.0	4.2	7.8	2.4
Feb	3.4	3.1	5.5	11.3	1.9
Jan	3.5	3.1	5.5	11.0	1.9
2010
Dec	3.3	2.8	4.7	9.0	1.9
Nov	3.5	3.2	5.1	8.8	2.2
Oct	3.7	2.7	5.3	10.8	1.5
Sep	3.2	2.5	4.7	9.1	1.5

Notes: RDPI: real disposable personal income; RPCE: real personal consumption expenditures (PCE); RPCEG: real PCE goods; RPCEGD: RPCEG durable goods; RPCES: RPCE services

Numbers are percentage changes from the same month a year earlier

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-1 shows US real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) between 1995 and 2013. There is an evident drop in RPCE during the global recession in 2007 to 2009 but the slope is flatter during the current recovery than in the period before 2007.

Chart IIA-1, US, Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Percent changes from the prior period in seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent quarterly rates (SAAR) of real personal consumption expenditures (RPCE) are provided in Chart IIA-2 from 1995 to 2013. The average rate could be visualized as a horizontal line. Although there are not yet sufficient observations, it appears from Chart IIA-2 that the average rate of growth of RPCE was higher before the recession than during the past fifteen quarters of expansion that began in IIIQ2009.

Chart IIA-2, Percent Change from Prior Period in Real Personal Consumption Expenditure, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1995-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Personal income and its disposition are shown in Table IIA-3. The latest estimates and revisions have changed movements in four forms. (1) Negligible decline of personal income of $5.6 billion in Apr equivalent to stagnation and decline of $16.1 in DPI equivalent to 0.1 decline at 0.1 percent. (2) Increase of personal income by $36.2 billion in Mar or growth at 0.2 percent with increase of DPI by $25.3 billion or growth at 0.2 percent. (3) Increase of personal income by $162.1 billion in Feb 2013 or seasonally adjusted annual rate of 1.2 percent with increase of disposable income by $143.5 billion or growth at 1.2 percent. (4) Contraction of personal income by $621.7 billion from Jan 2013 or minus 4.4 percent and of disposable income by $645.1 billion at seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of minus 5.1 percent. (5) Increase of personal income in Dec 2012 by $413.7 billion and disposable income at $374.5 billion in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) or increase by 3.0 percent of personal income and 3.1 percent of disposable personal income, which the Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions for government social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9 billion. The January change in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates. Excluding these special factors and others, which are discussed more fully below, DPI increased $46.8 billion in February, or 0.4 percent, after increasing $15.8 billion, or 0.1 percent, in January.”

(5) The savings rate fell from 7.4 percent in Dec 2012 to 2.1 percent in Jan 2013, 2.4 percent in Feb 2013 and 2.5 percent in Mar-Apr 2013. Disposable personal income in current dollars or without adjusting for inflation increased from $11,841.3 billion in Apr 2012 to $12,046.8 billion in Apr 2013 by 1.7 percent or 1.0 percent adjusting for inflation (see Table IIA-2). Disposable personal income in current dollars or without adjusting for inflation increased from the annual rate of $11,609.1 billion in Dec 2011 to $12,539.1 billion in Dec 2012, by 8.0 percent and 6.4 percent adjusting for inflation (see Table IIA-2). Nominal wages and salaries fell $169.8 billion from Dec 2012 to Jan 2013 or by 2.4 percent and fell $102.6 billion or 1.4 percent from Dec 2012 to Apr 2013. Nominal wages and salaries increased 3.2 percent from the annual rate of $6848.9 billion in Apr 2012 to $7071.3 billion in Apr 2013. Nominal wage and salary disbursements increased from the annual rate of $6687.6 billion in Dec 2011 to $7173.9 billion in Dec 2012, by 7.3 percent. Anticipations of income in Nov-Dec 2012 because of tax increases in 2013 explain the surge in income. From Dec 2010 to Dec 2011, wage and salary disbursements increased 3.2 percent and disposable personal income 2.5 percent. Personal savings as percent of disposable personal income, or savings rate, fell from 4.9 percent in Dec 2010 to 3.4 percent in Dec 2011, climbing back to 4.1 percent in Jun 2012 but declined to 3.7 percent in Aug 2012 and 3.3 percent in Sep 2012, increasing marginally to 3.7 percent in Oct 2012, 4.7 percent in Nov 2012 and 7.4 percent in Dec 2012 probably propelled by realization of income in Nov-Dec 2012 in anticipation of higher tax rates in Jan 2013. The savings rate collapsed to 2.1 percent in Jan 2013 and 2.5 percent in Apr 2013. Revised data suggest that economic weakness originates in increasing savings but fractured labor markets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html) and weak hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/recovery-without-hiring-collapse-of.html) are ignored in such interpretation.

Table IIA-3, US, Personal Income and its Disposition, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates $ Billions

	Personal Income	Wages & Salaries	Personal Taxes	DPI	Savings Rate %
Apr 2013	13,675.1	7,071.3	1,628.2	12,046.8	2.5
Mar 2013	13,680.7	7,069.4	1,617.8	12,062.9	2.5
Change  Apr 2013/   Mar 2013	-5.6 ∆% 0.0	1.9 ∆% 0.0	10.4 ∆% 0.6	-16.1 ∆% -0.1
Feb 2013	13,644.5	7,053.4	1,607.0	12,037.5	2.4
Change Mar 2013/   Feb 2013	36.2 ∆% 0.3	16.0 ∆% 0.2	10.8 ∆% 0.7	25.3 ∆% 0.2
Jan 2013	13,482.4	7,004.1	1,588.5	11,894.0	2.1
Change Feb 2013/  Jan 2013	162.1 ∆% 1.2	49.3 ∆% 0.7	18.5 ∆% 1.2	143.5 ∆% 1.2
Dec 2012	14,104.1	7,173.9	1,565.0	12,539.1	7.4
Change Jan 2013/ Dec 2012	-621.7 ∆% -4.4	-169.8 ∆% -2.4	23.8 ∆% 1.5	-645.1 ∆% -5.1
Nov 2012	13,690.4	7,064.9	1,525.8	12,164.6	4.7
Change Dec/Nov	413.7 ∆% 3.0	109.0 ∆% 1.5	39.2 ∆% 2.6	374.5 ∆% 3.1
Oct 2012	13,498.2	6,941.9	1,496.4	12,001.9	3.7
Change Nov/Oct	192.2 ∆% 1.4	123.0 ∆% 1.8	29.4 ∆% 2.0	162.7 ∆% 1.4
Sep 2012	13,446.0	6,909.7	1,481.3	11,964.7	3.3
Change Oct/Sep	52.2 ∆% 0.4	32.2 ∆% 0.5	15.1 ∆% 1.0	37.2 ∆% 0.3
Aug 2012	13,395.7	6,883.4	1,475.4	11,920.3	3.7
Change Sep/Aug	50.3 ∆% 0.4	26.3 ∆% 0.4	5.9 ∆% 0.4	44.4 ∆% 0.4
Jul 2012	13,376.9	6,872.5	1,472.7	11,904.2	3.9
Change Aug/Jul	18.8 ∆% 0.1	10.9 ∆% 0.2	2.7 ∆% 0.2	16.1 ∆% 0.1
Jun 2012	13,355.9	6,858.5	1,470.0	11,885.9	4.1
Change Jul/Jun	21.0 ∆% 0.2	14.0 ∆% 0.2	2.7 ∆% 0.2	18.3 ∆% 0.2
May 2012	13,322.3	6,840.3	1,464.1	11,858.2	3.9
Change Jun/ May	33.6 ∆% 0.3	18.2 ∆% 0.3	5.9 ∆% 0.4	27.7 ∆% 0.2
Apr 2012	13,302.9	6,848.9	1,461.6	11,841.3	3.5
Change May/  Apr	19.4 ∆% 0.1	-8.6 ∆% -0.1	2.5 ∆% 0.2	16.9 ∆% 0.1
Mar	13,298.3	6,869.4	1,460.6	11,837.7	3.7
Change  Apr/ Mar	4.6 ∆% 0.0	-20.5 ∆% -0.3	1.0 ∆% 0.1	3.6 ∆% 0.0
Feb 2012	13,234.7	6,831.5	1,452.0	11,782.7	3.5
Change Mar/ Feb	63.6 ∆% 0.5	37.9 ∆% 0.6	8.6 ∆% 0.6	55.0 ∆% 0.5
Jan	13,148.4	6,776.7	1,439.6	11,708.8	3.7
Change Feb/Jan	86.3 ∆% 0.7	54.8 ∆% 0.8	12.4 ∆% 0.9	73.9 ∆% 0.6
Dec 2012	14,104.1	7,173.9	1,565.0	12,539.1	7.4
Change Dec 2012/ Dec 2011	1071.9 ∆% 8.2	486.3 ∆% 7.3	141.9 ∆% 10.0	930.0 ∆% 8.0
Dec 2011	13,032.2	6,687.6	1,423.1	11,609.1	3.4
Change Jan/Dec	116.2   ∆% 0.9	89.1        ∆% 1.3	16.5       ∆% 1.2	99.7 ∆% 0.9
Dec 2010	12,574.1	6,482.8	1,243.5	11,330.6	4.9
Change Dec 2011/ Dec 2010	458.1 ∆% 3.6	204.8   ∆% 3.2	179.6     ∆% 14.4	278.5    ∆% 2.5

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-3 provides personal income in the US between 1980 and 1989. These data are not adjusted for inflation that was still high in the 1980s in the exit from the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s. Personal income grew steadily during the 1980s after recovery from two recessions from Jan IQ1980 to Jul IIIQ1980 and from Jul IIIQ1981 to Nov IVQ1982 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) with combined drop of GDP by 4.8 percent.

Chart IIA-3, US, Personal Income, Billion Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

A different evolution of personal income is shown in Chart IIA-4. Personal income also fell during the recession from Dec IVQ2007 to Jun IIQ2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). Growth of personal income during the expansion has been tepid even with the new revisions. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 11.1 percent and real disposable personal income at 8.9 percent (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0413.pdf), which the BEA explains as: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf).

In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 4.6 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 7.5 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 8.4 percent (Table 6 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0413.pdf). The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

Chart IIA-4, US, Personal Income, Current Billions of Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Real or inflation-adjusted disposable personal income is provided in Chart IIA-5 from 1980 to 1989. Real disposable income after allowing for taxes and inflation grew steadily at high rates during the entire decade.

Chart IIA-5, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars, Quarterly Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 4.6 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 7.5 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 8.4 percent (Table 5 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0413.pdf). The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

This is the explanation for the decline in IQ2013 in Chart IIA-6.

Chart IIA-6, US, Real Disposable Income, Billions of Chained 2005 Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, 2007-2013

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-7 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally adjusted annual rates from 1980 to 1989. Rates of changes were high during the decade with few negative changes.

Chart IIA-7, US, Real Disposable Income Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Quarterly Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-8 provides percentage quarterly changes in real disposable income from the preceding period at seasonally-adjusted annual rates from 2007 to 2013. There has been a period of positive rates followed by decline of rates and then negative and low rates in 2011. Recovery in 2012 has not reproduced the dynamism of the brief early phase of expansion. In IVQ2012, nominal disposable personal income grew at the SAAR of 10.6 percent and real disposable personal income at 8.9 percent, which the BEA explains as: Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). In IQ2013, personal income fell at the SAAR of minus 4.6 percent; real personal income excluding current transfer receipts at minus 7.5 percent; and real disposable personal income at minus 8.4 percent (Table 6 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0413.pdf). The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

Chart, IIA-8, US, Real Disposable Income, Percentage Change from Preceding Period at Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rates, 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

In the latest available report, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates US personal income in Apr 2013 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate of $13,675.1 billion, as shown in Table IIA-3 above (see Table 1 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0413.pdf). The major portion of personal income is compensation of employees of $8,800.1 billion, or 64.3 percent of the total. Wage and salary disbursements are $7,071.3 billion, of which $5,865.0 billion by private industries and supplements to wages and salaries of $1,728.9 billion (employer contributions to pension and insurance funds are $1,197.2 billion and contributions to social insurance are $531.7 billion). In Dec 1985, US personal income was $3,596.4 billion at SAAR (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Compensation of employees was $2,498.5 billion, or 69.5 percent of the total. Wage and salary disbursement were $2.056.3 billion of which $1671.0 billion by private industries. Supplements to wages and salaries were $442.2 billion with employer contributions to pension and insurance funds of $289.4 billion and $152.9 billion to government social insurance. Chart IIA-9 provides US wage and salary disbursement by private industries in the 1980s. Growth was robust after the interruption of the recessions.

Chart IIA-9, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates Billions of Dollars, 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-10 shows US wage and salary disbursement of private industries from 2007 to 2012. There is a drop during the contraction followed by initial recovery in 2010 and then the current much weaker relative performance in 2011, 2012 and 2013.

Chart IIA-10, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-11 provides finer detail with monthly wage and salary disbursement of private industries from 2007 to 2013. There is decline during the contraction and a period of mild recovery followed by stagnation and recent recovery that is weaker than in earlier expansion periods of the business cycle. There is decline of 2.4 percent in Jan 2013 because of the higher contributions to government social insurance followed by recovery of 0.7 percent in Feb 2013 and 0.2 percent in Mar 2013. Wage and salary disbursements stagnated in Apr 2013.

Chart IIA-11, US, Wage and Salary Disbursement, Private Industries, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-12 provides monthly real disposable personal income per capita from 1980 to 1989. This is the ultimate measure of wellbeing in receiving income by obtaining the value per inhabitant. The measure cannot adjust for the distribution of income. Real disposable personal income per capita grew rapidly during the expansion after 1983 and continued growing during the rest of the decade.

Chart IIA-12, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 1980-1989

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-13 provides monthly real disposable personal per capita income from 2007 to 2013. There was initial recovery from the drop during the global recession followed by stagnation. Real per capita disposable income increased 1.4 percent from $32,703 in chained dollars of 2005 in Oct 2012 to $33,172 in Nov 2012 and 3.0 percent to $34,174 in Dec 2012 for cumulative increase of 4.5 percent from Oct 2012 to Dec 2012. Real per capita disposable income fell 5.3 percent from $34,174 in Dec 2012 to $32,378 in Jan 2013, increasing marginally 0.8 percent to $32,621 in Feb 2013 for cumulative change of minus 0.3 percent from Oct 2012 (data at http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). This increase is shown in a jump in the final segment in Chart IIA-13 with Nov-Dec 2012, decline in Jan 2013 and recovery in Feb 2013. Real per capita disposable income increased 0.3 percent from $32,621 in Feb 2013 in chained dollars of 2005 to $32,710 in Mar 2013 for cumulative gain of 0.0 percent relative to Oct 2012. Real per capital disposable income increased to $32,729 in Apr 2013 for gain of 0.1 percent relative to Feb 2013 and 0.1 percent from Oct 2012. BEA explains as: “Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf pages 1-2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf). The Bureau of Economic Analysis explains as (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf 2-3): “The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base.”

The increase was provided in the “fiscal cliff” law H.R. 8 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr8eas/pdf/BILLS-112hr8eas.pdf).

The BEA explains as follows (page 3 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0313.pdf):

“The February and January changes in disposable personal income (DPI) mainly reflected the effect of special factors in January, such as the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday” and the acceleration of bonuses and personal dividends to November and to December in anticipation of changes in individual tax rates.”

Chart IIA-13, US, Real Disposable Per Capita Income, Monthly, Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

IIA2 Financial Repression. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1974) argue that legal restrictions on financial institutions can be detrimental to economic development. “Financial repression” is the term used in the economic literature for these restrictions (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 81-6). Interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans have been commonly used. Prohibition of payment of interest on demand deposits and ceilings on interest rates on time deposits were imposed by the Banking Act of 1933. These measures were justified by arguments that the banking panic of the 1930s was caused by competitive rates on bank deposits that led banks to engage in high-risk loans (Friedman, 1970, 18; see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 74-5). The objective of policy was to prevent unsound loans in banks. Savings and loan institutions complained of unfair competition from commercial banks that led to continuing controls with the objective of directing savings toward residential construction. Friedman (1970, 15) argues that controls were passive during periods when rates implied on demand deposit were zero or lower and when Regulation Q ceilings on time deposits were above market rates on time deposits. The Great Inflation or stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s changed the relevance of Regulation Q.

Most regulatory actions trigger compensatory measures by the private sector that result in outcomes that are different from those intended by regulation (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Banks offered services to their customers and loans at rates lower than market rates to compensate for the prohibition to pay interest on demand deposits (Friedman 1970, 24). The prohibition of interest on demand deposits was eventually lifted in recent times. In the second half of the 1960s, already in the beginning of the Great Inflation (DeLong 1997), market rates rose above the ceilings of Regulation Q because of higher inflation. Nobody desires savings allocated to time or savings deposits that pay less than expected inflation. This is a fact currently with zero interest rates and consumer price inflation of 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013 (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/) but rising during waves of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures exposures (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html). Funding problems motivated compensatory measures by banks. Money-center banks developed the large certificate of deposit (CD) to accommodate increasing volumes of loan demand by customers. As Friedman (1970, 25) finds:

“Large negotiable CD’s were particularly hard hit by the interest rate ceiling because they are deposits of financially sophisticated individuals and institutions who have many alternatives. As already noted, they declined from a peak of $24 billion in mid-December, 1968, to less than $12 billion in early October, 1969.”

Banks created different liabilities to compensate for the decline in CDs. As Friedman (1970, 25; 1969) explains:

“The most important single replacement was almost surely ‘liabilities of US banks to foreign branches.’ Prevented from paying a market interest rate on liabilities of home offices in the United States (except to foreign official institutions that are exempt from Regulation Q), the major US banks discovered that they could do so by using the Euro-dollar market. Their European branches could accept time deposits, either on book account or as negotiable CD’s at whatever rate was required to attract them and match them on the asset side of their balance sheet with ‘due from head office.’ The head office could substitute the liability ‘due to foreign branches’ for the liability ‘due on CDs.”

Friedman (1970, 26-7) predicted the future:

“The banks have been forced into costly structural readjustments, the European banking system has been given an unnecessary competitive advantage, and London has been artificially strengthened as a financial center at the expense of New York.”

In short, Depression regulation exported the US financial system to London and offshore centers. What is vividly relevant currently from this experience is the argument by Friedman (1970, 27) that the controls affected the most people with lower incomes and wealth who were forced into accepting controlled-rates on their savings that were lower than those that would be obtained under freer markets. As Friedman (1970, 27) argues:

“These are the people who have the fewest alternative ways to invest their limited assets and are least sophisticated about the alternatives.”

Chart IIA-14 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides quarterly savings as percent of disposable income or the US savings rate from 1980 to 2013. There was a long-term downward sloping trend from 12 percent in the early 1980s to less than 2 percent in 2005-2006. The savings rate then rose during the contraction and also in the expansion. In 2011 and into 2012 the savings rate declined as consumption is financed with savings in part because of the disincentive or frustration of receiving a few pennies for every $10,000 of deposits in a bank. The savings rate increased in the final segment of Chart IIA-14 in 2012 followed by another decline because of the pain of the opportunity cost of zero remuneration for hard-earned savings. Swelling realization of income in Oct-Dec 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2012 caused the jump of the savings rate to 7.4 percent in Dec 2012. The BEA explains as: Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). The savings rate then collapsed to 2.1 percent in Jan 2013 in part because of the decline of 5.3 percent in real disposable personal income and to 2.4 percent with increase of real disposable income by 0.7 percent in Feb 2013. The savings rate remained at 2.5 percent in Mar 2013 with increase of real disposable income by 0.3 percent and at 2.5 percent in Apr 2013 with increase of per capita real disposable income by 0.1 percent. The decline of personal income was caused by increasing contributions to government social insurance (page 1 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0113.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf). The objective of monetary policy is to reduce borrowing rates to induce consumption but it has collateral disincentive of reducing savings and misallocating resources away from their best uses. The zero interest rate of monetary policy is a tax on saving. This tax is highly regressive, meaning that it affects the most people with lower income or wealth and retirees. The long-term decline of savings rates in the US has created a dependence on foreign savings to finance the deficits in the federal budget and the balance of payments.

Chart IIA-14, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, Quarterly, 1980-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Chart IIA-15 of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides personal savings as percent of personal disposable income, or savings ratio, from Jan 2007 to Mar 2013. The uncertainties caused by the global recession resulted in sharp increase in the savings ratio that peaked at 8.3 percent in May 2008 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The second highest ratio occurred at 6.7 percent in May 2009. There was another rising trend until 5.8 percent in Jun 2010 and then steady downward trend until trough of 3.2 percent in Nov 2011. This was followed by an upward trend with 4.1 percent in Jun 2012 but decline to 3.7 percent in Aug 2012, 3.3 percent in Sep 2012, 3.7 percent in Oct and increase to 4.7 percent in Nov 2012 followed by jump to 7.4 percent in Dec 2012. Swelling realization of income in Oct-Dec 2012 in anticipation of tax increases in Jan 2012 caused the jump of the savings rate to 7.4 percent in Dec 2012. The BEA explains as: Personal income in November and December was boosted by accelerated and special dividend payments to persons and by accelerated bonus payments and other irregular pay in private wages and salaries in anticipation of changes in individual income tax rates. Personal income in December was also boosted by lump-sum social security benefit payments” (page 2 at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi1212.pdf). There was a reverse effect in Jan 2013 with decline of the savings rate to 2.1 percent. Real disposable personal income fell 5.2 percent and real disposable per capita income fell from $34,174 in Dec 2012 to $32,378 in Jan 2013 or by 5.3 percent, which is explained by the Bureau of Economic Analysis as follows (page 3 http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0213.pdf):

“Contributions for government social insurance -- a subtraction in calculating personal income --increased $6.4 billion in February, compared with an increase of $126.8 billion in January. The

January estimate reflected increases in both employer and employee contributions forgovernment social insurance. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance reflected the expiration of the “payroll tax holiday,” that increased the social security contribution rate for employees and self-employed workers by 2.0 percentage points, or $114.1 billion at an annual rate. For additional information, see FAQ on “How did the expiration of the payroll tax holiday affect personal income for January 2013?” at www.bea.gov. The January estimate of employee contributions for government social insurance also reflected an increase in the monthly premiums paid by participants in the supplementary medical insurance program, in the hospital insurance provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and in the social security taxable wage base; together, these changes added $12.9 billion to January. Employer contributions were boosted $5.9 billion in January, which reflected increases in the social security taxable wage base (from $110,100 to $113,700), in the tax rates paid by employers to state unemployment insurance, and in employer contributions for the federal unemployment tax and for pension guaranty. The total contribution of special factors to the January change in contributions for government social insurance was $132.9billion.”

Consumption was maintained by burning savings because of the drain of decline of real disposable personal income by 5.2 percent and 5.3 percent in per capita terms. The savings rate rose to 2.4 percent in Feb 2013 with increase of real per capita income by 0.8 percent and remained at 2.5 percent in Mar 2013 with further increase of real per capita disposable income by 0.3 percent. The savings ratio remained at 2.5 percent in Apr 2013 with increase of real per capita disposable income by 0.1 percent. Permanent manipulation of the entire spectrum of interest rates with monetary policy measures distorts the compass of resource allocation with inferior outcomes of future growth, employment and prosperity and dubious redistribution of income and wealth worsening the most the personal welfare of people without vast capital and financial relations to manage their savings.

Chart IIA-15, US, Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable Income, Monthly 2007-2013

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013