Monday, April 8, 2013

Thirty Million Unemployed or Underemployed, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, Stagnating Real Wages, Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk: Part II

 

Thirty Million Unemployed or Underemployed, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, Stagnating Real Wages, Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

Executive Summary

I Thirty Million Unemployed or Underemployed

IA1 Summary of the Employment Situation

IA2 Number of People in Job Stress

IA3 Long-term and Cyclical Comparison of Employment

IA4 Job Creation

IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

II Stagnating Real Wages

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

Sunday, March 31, 2013

Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth, Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment, Swelling Undistributed Profits, Peaking Valuations of Risk Financial Assets, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

Executive Summary

I Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth

IA Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth

IA1 Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment

IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits

IIA Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IIA1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures

IIA2 Financial Repression

IIB United States Housing Collapse

IIB1 United States New House Sales

IIB2 United States House Prices

IIB3 Factors of United States Housing Collapse

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

III World Financial Turbulence. Financial markets are being shocked by multiple factors including (1) world economic slowdown; (2) slowing growth in China with political development and slowing growth in Japan and world trade; (3) slow growth propelled by savings/investment reduction in the US with high unemployment/underemployment, falling wages, hiring collapse, contraction of real private fixed investment, decline of wealth of households over the business cycle by 8.4 percent adjusted for inflation while growing 617.2 percent adjusted for inflation from IVQ1945 to IVQ2012 and unsustainable fiscal deficit/debt threatening prosperity that can cause risk premium on Treasury debt with Himalayan interest rate hikes; and (3) the outcome of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This section provides current data and analysis. Subsection IIIA Financial Risks provides analysis of the evolution of valuations of risk financial assets during the week. There are various appendixes for convenience of reference of material related to the euro area debt crisis. Some of this material is updated in Subsection IIIA when new data are available and then maintained in the appendixes for future reference until updated again in Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies discusses arguments and measures of currency intervention and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact provides analysis of the restructuring of the fiscal affairs of the European Union in the agreement of European leaders reached on Dec 9, 2011 and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort considers the policies of the European Central Bank and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Appendix IIIE Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the threats to survival of the European Monetary Union and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation provides more technical analysis and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis provides analysis of proposals to finance growth with budget deficits together with experience of the economic history of Brazil and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment.

IIIA Financial Risks. The past half year has been characterized by financial turbulence, attaining unusual magnitude in recent months. Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Fri Mar 29 and daily values throughout the week ending on Apr 5, 2013 of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at 5 PM. The first column provides the value on Fri Mar 29 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Mar 29, 2013”, first row “USD/EUR 1.2818 1.3%,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) appreciated 1.3 percent to USD 1.2818/EUR in the week ending on Fri Mar 29 relative to the exchange rate on Fri Mar 22. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. The most important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf).

The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per one euro EUR, USD 1.2818/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Fri Mar 29, depreciating to USD 1.2849/EUR on Mon Apr 1, 2013, or by 0.2 percent. The dollar depreciated because more dollars, $1.2849, were required on Mon Apr 1 to buy one euro than $1.2818 on Mar 29. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the exchange rate at 5 PM New York time, such as USD 1.2818/EUR on Mar 29; the second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Fri Mar 29, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Fri Apr 5, such as depreciation to USD 1.2995/EUR by Apr 5; and the third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD depreciated (denoted by negative sign) by 1.4 percent from the rate of USD 1.2818/EUR on Fri Mar 29 to the rate of USD 1.2995/EUR on Fri Apr 5 {[(1.2995/1.2818) – 1]100 = 1.4%} and depreciated (denoted by negative sign) by 0.5 percent from the rate of USD 1.2936 on Thu Apr 4 to USD 1.2995/EUR on Fri Apr 5 {[(1.2995/1.2936) -1]100 = 0.5%}. Other factors constant, appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro is caused by increasing risk aversion, with rising uncertainty on European sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. Funds move away from higher yielding risk

Table III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Assets Apr 1 to Apr 5, 2013

Fri Mar 29, 2013

M 1

Tue 2

W 3

Thu 4

Fri 5

USD/EUR

1.2818

1.3%

1.2849

-0.2%

-0.2%

1.2819

0.0%

0.2%

1.2849

-0.2%

-0.2%

1.2936

-0.9%

-0.7%

1.2995

-1.4%

-0.5%

JPY/  USD

94.22

0.3%

93.24

1.0%

1.0%

93.43

0.8%

-0.2%

93.05

1.2%

0.4%

96.34

-2.3%

-3.5%

97.55

-3.5%

-1.3%

CHF/  USD

0.9495

-0.9%

0.9466

0.3%

0.3%

0.9490

-0.1%

-0.3%

0.9452

0.5%

0.4%

0.9398

1.0%

0.6%

0.9344

1.6%

0.6%

CHF/ EUR

1.2169

0.4%

1.2164

0.0%

0.0%

1.2164

0.0%

0.0%

1.2142

0.2%

0.2%

1.2158

0.1%

-0.1%

1.2143

0.2%

0.1%

USD/  AUD

1.0419

0.9598

-0.3%

1.0423

0.9594

0.0%

0.0%

1.0449

0.9570

0.3%

0.3%

1.0461

0.9559

0.4%

0.1%

1.0435

0.9583

0.2%

-0.3%

1.0392

0.9623

-0.3%

-0.4%

10 Year  T Note

1.847

1.832

1.862

1.816

1.761

1.706

2 Year     T Note

0.244

0.238

0.24

0.228

0.228

0.228

German Bond

2Y -0.02 10Y 1.29

2Y -0.02 10Y 1.29

2Y -0.01 10Y 1.31

2Y 0.00 10Y 1.29

2Y -0.01 10Y 1.24

2Y 0.01 10Y 1.21

DJIA

14578.54

0.5%

14572.85

0.0%

0.0%

14662.01

0.6%

0.6%

14550.35

-0.2%

-0.8%

14608.11

0.2%

0.4%

14565.25

-0.1%

-0.3%

DJ Global

2111.96

-0.3%

2101.30

-0.5%

-0.5%

2105.56

-0.3%

0.2%

2092.51

-0.9%

-0.6%

2083.34

-1.4%

-0.4%

2079.02

-1.6%

-0.2%

DJ Asia Pacific

1385.32

0.9%

1370.43

-1.1%

-1.1%

1366.18

-1.4%

-0.3%

1377.52

-0.6%

0.8%

1364.38

-1.5%

-0.9%

1364.17

-1.5%

0.0%

Nikkei

12397.91

0.5%

12135.02

-2.1%

-2.1%

12003.43

-3.2%

-1.1%

12362.20

-0.3%

3.0%

12634.54

1.9%

2.2%

12833.64

3.5%

1.6%

Shanghai

2236.62

-3.9%

2234.40

-0.1%

-0.1%

2227.74

-0.4%

-0.3%

2227.74

-0.4%

0.0%

2225.29

-0.5%

-0.1%

2225.29

-0.5%

0.0%

DAX

7795.31

-1.5%

7795.31

0.0%

0.0%

7943.87

1.9%

1.9%

7874.75

1.0%

-0.9%

7817.39

0.3%

-0.7%

7658.75

-1.8%

-2.0%

DJ UBS

Comm.

137.48

-0.4%

136.36

-0.8%

-0.8%

135.52

-1.4%

-0.6%

133.93

-2.6%

-1.2%

133.64

-2.8%

-0.2%

134.08

-2.5%

0.3%

WTI $ B

97.23

3.6%

96.91

-0.3%

-0.3%

96.76

-0.5%

-0.2%

94.54

-2.8%

-2.3%

93.35

-4.0%

-1.3%

93.03

-4.3%

-0.3%

Brent    $/B

110.02

2.2%

110.94

0.8%

0.8%

110.38

0.3%

-0.5%

107.38

-2.4%

-2.7%

106.44

-3.3%

-0.9%

104.31

-5.2%

-2.0%

Gold  $/OZ

1595.7

-0.7%

1599.7

0.3%

0.3%

1575.2

-1.3%

-1.5%

1557.3

-2.4%

-1.1%

1553.6

-2.6%

-0.2%

1580.6

-0.9%

1.7%

Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss

Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce

Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

Discussion of current and recent risk-determining events is followed below by analysis of risk-measuring yields of the US and Germany and the USD/EUR rate. Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

  1. Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  2. Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html ), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
  3. Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  4. Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.

The European sovereign debt crisis continues to shake financial markets and the world economy. Debt resolution within the international financial architecture requires that a country be capable of borrowing on its own from the private sector. Mechanisms of debt resolution have included participation of the private sector (PSI), or “bail in,” that has been voluntary, almost coercive, agreed and outright coercive (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture: G7, IMF, BIS, Creditors and Debtors (2005), Chapter 4, 187-202). Private sector involvement requires losses by the private sector in bailouts of highly indebted countries. The essence of successful private sector involvement is to recover private-sector credit of the highly indebted country. Mary Watkins, writing on “Bank bailouts reshuffle risk hierarchy,” published on Mar 19, 2013, in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7666546a-9095-11e2-a456-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OSpbvCn8) analyzes the impact of the bailout or resolution of Cyprus banks on the hierarchy of risks of bank liabilities. Cyprus banks depend mostly on deposits with less reliance on debt, raising concerns in creditors of fixed-income debt and equity holders in banks in the euro area. Uncertainty remains as to the dimensions and structure of losses in private sector involvement or “bail in” in other rescue programs in the euro area. Alkman Granitsas, writing on “Central bank details losses at Bank of Cyprus,” on Mar 30, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324000704578392502889560768.html), analyzes the impact of the agreement with the €10 billion agreement with IMF and the European Union on the banks of Cyprus. The recapitalization plan provides for immediate conversion of 37.5 percent of all deposits in excess of €100,000 to shares of special class of the bank. An additional 22.5 percent will be frozen without interest until the plan is completed. The overwhelming risk factor is the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.

Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans.

A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 14565.25

on Fri Apr, 2013, which is higher by 2.8 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 2.6 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

An important risk event is the reduction of growth prospects in the euro zone discussed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in “Introductory statement to the press conference,” on Dec 6, 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is121206.en.html):

“This assessment is reflected in the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP growth in a range between -0.6% and -0.4% for 2012, between -0.9% and 0.3% for 2013 and between 0.2% and 2.2% for 2014. Compared with the September 2012 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges for 2012 and 2013 have been revised downwards.

The Governing Council continues to see downside risks to the economic outlook for the euro area. These are mainly related to uncertainties about the resolution of sovereign debt and governance issues in the euro area, geopolitical issues and fiscal policy decisions in the United States possibly dampening sentiment for longer than currently assumed and delaying further the recovery of private investment, employment and consumption.”

Reuters, writing on “Bundesbank cuts German growth forecast,” on Dec 7, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e845114-4045-11e2-8f90-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EMQxzs3u), informs that the central bank of Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank reduced its forecast of growth for the economy of Germany to 0.7 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.0 percent in Jun and to 0.4 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.6 percent while the forecast for 2014 is at 1.9 percent.

The major risk event during earlier weeks was sharp decline of sovereign yields with the yield on the ten-year bond of Spain falling to 5.309 percent and that of the ten-year bond of Italy falling to 4.473 percent on Fri Nov 30, 2012 and 5.366 percent for the ten-year of Spain and 4.527 percent for the ten-year of Italy on Fri Nov 14, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Vanessa Mock and Frances Robinson, writing on “EU approves Spanish bank’s restructuring plans,” on Nov 28, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146520774638316.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the European Union regulators approved restructuring of four Spanish banks (Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia), which helped to calm sovereign debt markets. Harriet Torry and James Angelo, writing on “Germany approves Greek aid,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578150532603095790.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the German parliament approved the plan to provide Greece a tranche of €44 billion in promised financial support, which is subject to sustainability analysis of the bond repurchase program later in Dec 2012. A hurdle for sustainability of repurchasing debt is that Greece’s sovereign bonds have appreciated significantly from around 24 percent for the bond maturing in 21 years and 20 percent for the bond maturing in 31 years in Aug 2012 to around 17 percent for the 21-year maturity and 15 percent for the 31-year maturing in Nov 2012. Declining years are equivalent to increasing prices, making the repurchase more expensive. Debt repurchase is intended to reduce bonds in circulation, turning Greek debt more manageable. Ben McLannahan, writing on “Japan unveils $11bn stimulus package,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/adc0569a-3aa5-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN

), informs that the cabinet in Japan approved another stimulus program of $11 billion, which is twice larger than another stimulus plan in late Oct and close to elections in Dec. Henry Sender, writing on “Tokyo faces weak yen and high bond yields,” published on Nov 29, 2012 in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a7178d0-393d-11e2-afa8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), analyzes concerns of regulators on duration of bond holdings in an environment of likelihood of increasing yields and yen depreciation.

First, Risk-Determining Events. The European Council statement on Nov 23, 2012 asked the President of the European Commission “to continue the work and pursue consultations in the coming weeks to find a consensus among the 27 over the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf) Discussions will continue in the effort to reach agreement on a budget: “A European budget is important for the cohesion of the Union and for jobs and growth in all our countries” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf). There is disagreement between the group of countries requiring financial assistance and those providing bailout funds. Gabrielle Steinhauser and Costas Paris, writing on “Greek bond rally puts buyback in doubt,” on Nov 23, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578136362599130992.html?mg=reno64-wsj) find a new hurdle in rising prices of Greek sovereign debt that may make more difficult buybacks of debt held by investors. European finance ministers continue their efforts to reach an agreement for Greece that meets with approval of the European Central Bank and the IMF. The European Council (2012Oct19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf ) reached conclusions on strengthening the euro area and providing unified financial supervision:

“The European Council called for work to proceed on the proposals on the Single Supervisory Mechanism as a matter of priority with the objective of agreeing on the legislative framework by 1st January 2013 and agreed on a number of orientations to that end. It also took note of issues relating to the integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks and democratic legitimacy and accountability which should be further explored. It agreed that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the EU's institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards non-euro area Member States and respect for the integrity of the Single Market. It looked forward to a specific and time-bound roadmap to be presented at its December 2012 meeting, so that it can move ahead on all essential building blocks on which a genuine EMU should be based.”

Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. The Bank of Spain released new data on doubtful debtors in Spain’s credit institutions (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/Agenda/Datos_de_credit_a6cd708c59cf931.html). In 2006, the value of doubtful credits reached €10,859 million or 0.7 percent of total credit of €1,508,626 million. In Aug 2012, doubtful credit reached €178,579 million or 10.5 percent of total credit of €1,698,714 million.

There are three critical factors influencing world financial markets. (1) Spain could request formal bailout from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that may also affect Italy’s international borrowing. David Roman and Jonathan House, writing on “Spain risks backlash with budget plan,” on Sep 27, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578021692765950384.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) analyze Spain’s proposal of reducing government expenditures by €13 billion, or around $16.7 billion, increasing taxes in 2013, establishing limits on early retirement and cutting the deficit by €65 billion through 2014. Banco de España, Bank of Spain, contracted consulting company Oliver Wyman to conduct rigorous stress tests of the resilience of its banking system. (Stress tests and their use are analyzed by Pelaez and Pelaez Globalization and the State Vol. I (2008b), 95-100, International Financial Architecture (2005) 112-6, 123-4, 130-3).) The results are available from Banco de España (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/infointeres/reestructuracion/ http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). The assumptions of the adverse scenario used by Oliver Wyman are quite tough for the three-year period from 2012 to 2014: “6.5 percent cumulative decline of GDP, unemployment rising to 27.2 percent and further declines of 25 percent of house prices and 60 percent of land prices (http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). Fourteen banks were stress tested with capital needs estimates of seven banks totaling €59.3 billion. The three largest banks of Spain, Banco Santander (http://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite/CFWCSancomQP01/es_ES/Corporativo.html), BBVA (http://www.bbva.com/TLBB/tlbb/jsp/ing/home/index.jsp) and Caixabank (http://www.caixabank.com/index_en.html), with 43 percent of exposure under analysis, have excess capital of €37 billion in the adverse scenario in contradiction with theories that large, international banks are necessarily riskier. Jonathan House, writing on “Spain expects wider deficit on bank aid,” on Sep 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444138104578028484168511130.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyzes the 2013 budget plan of Spain that will increase the deficit of 7.4 percent of GDP in 2012, which is above the target of 6.3 percent under commitment with the European Union. The ratio of debt to GDP will increase to 85.3 percent in 2012 and 90.5 percent in 2013 while the 27 members of the European Union have an average debt/GDP ratio of 83 percent at the end of IIQ2012. (2) Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even after the economy grows again at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now apparently open ended in perpetuity as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):

“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is the concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation.

(2) The European Central Bank (ECB) approved a new program of bond purchases under the name “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT). The ECB will purchase sovereign bonds of euro zone member countries that have a program of conditionality under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that is converting into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These programs provide enhancing the solvency of member countries in a transition period of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment. The purchase of bonds by the ECB would maintain debt costs of sovereigns at sufficiently low levels to permit adjustment under the EFSF/ESM programs. Purchases of bonds are not limited quantitatively with discretion by the ECB as to how much is necessary to support countries with adjustment programs. Another feature of the OMT of the ECB is sterilization of bond purchases: funds injected to pay for the bonds would be withdrawn or sterilized by ECB transactions. The statement by the European Central Bank on the program of OTM is as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html):

“6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions

As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework:

Conditionality

A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme.

The Governing Council will consider Outright Monetary Transactions to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme.

Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate.

Coverage

Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access.

Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.

No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.

Creditor treatment

The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.

Sterilisation

The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.

Transparency

Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis.

Securities Markets Programme

Following today’s decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be held to maturity.”

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed sets stage for stimulus,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577623220212805132.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the essay presented by Chairman Bernanke at the Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers, as defending past stimulus with unconventional measures of monetary policy that could be used to reduce extremely high unemployment. Chairman Bernanke (2012JHAug31, 18-9) does support further unconventional monetary policy impulses if required by economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm):

“Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”

Professor John H Cochrane (2012Aug31), at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, writing on “The Federal Reserve: from central bank to central planner,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577609384030304936.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_opinion), analyzes that the departure of central banks from open market operations into purchase of assets with risks to taxpayers and direct allocation of credit subject to political influence has caused them to abandon their political independence and accountability. Cochrane (2012Aug31) finds a return to the proposition of Milton Friedman in the 1960s that central banks can cause inflation and macroeconomic instability.

Mario Draghi (2012Aug29), President of the European Central Bank, also reiterated the need of exceptional and unconventional central bank policies (http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html):

“Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.

The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.”

Buiter (2011Oct31) analyzes that the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would need a “bigger bazooka” to bail out euro members in difficulties that could possibly be provided by the ECB. Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. Table III-7 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides the combined GDP in 2012 of the highly indebted euro zone members estimated in the latest World Economic Outlook of the IMF at $4167 billion or 33.1 percent of total euro zone GDP of $12,586 billion. Using the WEO of the IMF, Table III-8 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides debt of the highly indebted euro zone members at $3927.8 billion in 2012 that increases to $5809.9 billion when adding Germany’s debt, corresponding to 167.0 percent of Germany’s GDP. There are additional sources of debt in bailing out banks. The dimensions of the problem may require more firepower than a bazooka perhaps that of the largest conventional bomb of all times of 44,000 pounds experimentally detonated only once by the US in 1948 (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar-apr/coker.html).

Second, Risk-Measuring Yields and Exchange Rate. The ten-year government bond of Spain was quoted at 6.868 percent on Aug 10, 2012, declining to 6.447 percent on Aug 17 and 6.403 percent on Aug 24, 2012, and the ten-year government bond of Italy fell from 5.894 percent on Aug 10, 2012 to 5.709 percent on Aug 17 and 5.618 percent on Aug 24, 2012. The yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain traded at 4.767 percent on Apr 5, 2013 and that of the ten-year sovereign bond of Italy at 4.322 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Diminishing aversion is captured by increase of the yield of the two- and ten-year Treasury notes and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table III-1A provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.459 percent on Jul 20, 2012, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.17 percent. In the week of Apr 5, 2013, the yield of the two-year Treasury stabilized 0.228 percent and that of the ten-year Treasury decreased to 1.706 percent while the two-year bond of Germany stabilized at 0.01 percent and the ten-year decreased to 1.21 percent; and the dollar depreciated to USD 1.2995/EUR. The zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, carry trades ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield is about equal to consumer price inflation of 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury. The lower part of Table III-1A provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.

Table III-1A, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate

 

US 2Y

US 10Y

DE 2Y

DE 10Y

USD/ EUR

4/5/13

0.228

1.706

0.01

1.21

1.2995

3/29/13

0.244

1.847

-0.02

1.29

1.2818

3/22/13

0.242

1.931

0.03

1.38

1.2988

3/15/13

0.246

1.992

0.05

1.46

1.3076

3/8/13

0.256

2.056

0.09

1.53

1.3003

3/1/13

0.236

1.842

0.03

1.41

1.3020

2/22/13

0.252

1.967

0.13

1.57

1.3190

2/15/13

0.268

2.007

0.19

1.65

1.3362

2/8/13

0.252

1.949

0.18

1.61

1.3365

2/1/13

0.26

2.024

0.25

1.67

1.3642

1/25/13

0.278

1.947

0.26

1.64

1.3459

1/18/13

0.252

1.84

0.18

1.56

1.3321

1/11/13

0.247

1.862

0.13

1.58

1.3343

1/4/13

0.262

1.898

0.08

1.54

1.3069

12/28/12

0.252

1.699

-0.01

1.31

1.3218

12/21/12

0.272

1.77

-0.01

1.38

1.3189

12/14/12

0.232

1.704

-0.04

1.35

1.3162

12/7/12

0.256

1.625

-0.08

1.30

1.2926

11/30/12

0.248

1.612

0.01

1.39

1.2987

11/23/12

0.273

1.691

0.00

1.44

1.2975

11/16/12

0.24

1.584

-0.03

1.33

1.2743

11/9/12

0.256

1.614

-0.03

1.35

1.2711

11/2/12

0.274

1.715

0.01

1.45

1.2838

10/26/12

0.299

1.748

0.05

1.54

1.2942

10/19/12

0.296

1.766

0.11

1.59

1.3023

10/12/12

0.264

1.663

0.04

1.45

1.2953

10/5/12

0.26

1.737

0.06

1.52

1.3036

9/28/12

0.236

1.631

0.02

1.44

1.2859

9/21/12

0.26

1.753

0.04

1.60

1.2981

9/14/12

0.252

1.863

0.10

1.71

1.3130

9/7/12

0.252

1.668

0.03

1.52

1.2816

8/31/12

0.225

1.543

-0.03

1.33

1.2575

8/24/12

0.266

1.684

-0.01

1.35

1.2512

8/17/12

0.288

1.814

-0.04

1.50

1.2335

8/10/12

0.267

1.658

-0.07

1.38

1.2290

8/3/12

0.242

1.569

-0.02

1.42

1.2387

7/27/12

0.244

1.544

-0.03

1.40

1.2320

7/20/12

0.207

1.459

-0.07

1.17

1.2158

7/13/12

0.24

1.49

-0.04

1.26

1.2248

7/6/12

0.272

1.548

-0.01

1.33

1.2288

6/29/12

0.305

1.648

0.12

1.58

1.2661

6/22/12

0.309

1.676

0.14

1.58

1.2570

6/15/12

0.272

1.584

0.07

1.44

1.2640

6/8/12

0.268

1.635

0.04

1.33

1.2517

6/1/12

0.248

1.454

0.01

1.17

1.2435

5/25/12

0.291

1.738

0.05

1.37

1.2518

5/18/12

0.292

1.714

0.05

1.43

1.2780

5/11/12

0.248

1.845

0.09

1.52

1.2917

5/4/12

0.256

1.876

0.08

1.58

1.3084

4/6/12

0.31

2.058

0.14

1.74

1.3096

3/30/12

0.335

2.214

0.21

1.79

1.3340

3/2/12

0.29

1.977

0.16

1.80

1.3190

2/24/12

0.307

1.977

0.24

1.88

1.3449

1/6/12

0.256

1.957

0.17

1.85

1.2720

12/30/11

0.239

1.871

0.14

1.83

1.2944

8/26/11

0.20

2.202

0.65

2.16

1.450

8/19/11

0.192

2.066

0.65

2.11

1.4390

6/7/10

0.74

3.17

0.49

2.56

1.192

3/5/09

0.89

2.83

1.19

3.01

1.254

12/17/08

0.73

2.20

1.94

3.00

1.442

10/27/08

1.57

3.79

2.61

3.76

1.246

7/14/08

2.47

3.88

4.38

4.40

1.5914

6/26/03

1.41

3.55

NA

3.62

1.1423

Note: DE: Germany

Source:

http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm

http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_series_databases/Macro_economic_time_series/macro_economic_time_series_node.html?anker=GELDZINS

http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html

Chart III-1A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the ten-year, two-year and one-month Treasury constant maturity yields together with the overnight fed funds rate and the yield of the corporate bond with Moody’s rating of Baa. The riskier yield of the Baa corporate bond exceeds the relatively riskless yields of the Treasury securities. The beginning yields in Chart III-1A for July 31, 2001, are 3.67 percent for one month, 3.79 percent for two years, 5.07 percent for ten years, 3.82 percent for the fed funds rate and 7.85 percent for the Baa corporate bond. On July 30, 2007, yields inverted with the one month at 4.95 percent, the two-year at 4.59 percent and the ten year at 5.82 percent with the yield of the Baa corporate bond at 6.70 percent. Another interesting point is for Oct 31, 2008, with the yield of the Baa jumping to 9.54 percent and the Treasury yields declining: one month 0.12 percent, two years 1.56 percent and ten years 4.01 percent during a flight to the dollar and government securities analyzed by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). Another spike in the series is for Apr 4, 2006 with the yield of the corporate Baa bond at 8.63 and the Treasury yields of 0.12 percent for one month, 0.94 for two years and 2.95 percent for ten years. During the beginning of the flight from risk financial assets to US government securities (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009), the one-month yield was 0.07 percent, the two-year yield 1.64 percent and the ten-year yield 3.41. The combination of zero fed funds rate and quantitative easing caused sharp decline of the yields from 2008 and 2009. Yield declines have also occurred during periods of financial risk aversion, including the current one of stress of financial markets in Europe. The final point of Chart III1-A is for Apr 4, 2013, with the one-month yield at 0.07 percent, the two-year at 0.22 percent, the ten-year at 1.78 percent, the fed funds rate at 0.14 percent and the corporate Baa bond at 4.66 percent.

clip_image001

Chart III-1A, US, Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Overnight Fed Funds Rate and Yield of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond, Jul 31, 2001-Apr 4, 2013

Note: US Recessions in shaded areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

clip_image008[1]

Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

clip_image008[1]

declines.

There was mostly weak performance in equity indexes with many indexes declining in Table III-1 in the week ending on Apr 5, 2013. Stagnating revenues are causing reevaluation of discounted net earnings with deteriorating views on the world economy and United States fiscal sustainability but investors have been driving indexes higher. DJIA decreased 0.3 percent on Apr 5, decreasing 0.1 percent in the week. Germany’s Dax decreased 2.0 percent on Fri Apr 5 and decreased 1.8 percent in the week. Dow Global decreased 0.2 percent on Apr 5 and decreased 1.6 percent in the week. Japan’s Nikkei Average increased 1.6 percent on Fri Apr 5 and increased 3.5 percent in the week as the yen continues to be oscillating but relatively weaker and the stock market gains in expectations of fiscal stimulus by a new administration and monetary stimulus by a new board of the Bank of Japan. Dow Asia Pacific TSM changed 0.0 percent on Apr 5 and decreased 1.5 percent in the week while Shanghai Composite that decreased 0.2 percent on Mar 8 and decreased 1.7 percent in the week of Mar 8, falling below 2000 to close at 1980.13 on Fri Nov 30 but closing at 2225.29 on Thu Apr 5 for loss of 0.0 percent and loss of 0.5 percent in the week of Apr 5. There is evident trend of deceleration of the world economy that could affect corporate revenue and equity valuations, causing oscillation in equity markets with increases during favorable risk appetite.

Commodities were mostly weaker in the week of Apr 5, 2013. The DJ UBS Commodities Index increased 0.5 percent on Fri Apr 5 and decreased 2.5 percent in the week, as shown in Table III-1. WTI decreased 4.3 percent in the week of Apr 5 while Brent decreased 5.2 percent in the week. Gold increased 1.7 percent on Fri Apr 5 and decreased 0.9 percent in the week.

Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €879,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €903,619 million on Mar 29, 2013 with some repayment of loans already occurring. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has increased to €1,521,683 million in the statement of Mar 29, 2013, with marginal reduction. There is high credit risk in these transactions with capital of only €88,227 million as analyzed by Cochrane (2012Aug31).

Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR

 

Dec 31, 2010

Dec 28, 2011

Mar 29, 2013

1 Gold and other Receivables

367,402

419,822

435,316

2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency

223,995

236,826

254,369

3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency

26,941

95,355

31,563

4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro

22,592

25,982

22,101

5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro

546,747

879,130

903,619

6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro

45,654

94,989

88,538

7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro

457,427

610,629

618,064

8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro

34,954

33,928

29,894

9 Other Assets

278,719

336,574

264,663

TOTAL ASSETS

2,004, 432

2,733,235

2,648,126

Memo Items

     

Sum of 5 and  7

1,004,174

1,489,759

1,521,683

Capital and Reserves

78,143

85,748

88,917

Source: European Central Bank

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2013/html/fs130404.en.html

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone survival risk. Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. That success would be assured with growth of the Italian economy. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surplus that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. That success would be assured with growth of the Italian economy. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surplus that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15) argue that 55 percent of the exports of Italy are to countries outside the euro area such that devaluation of 15 percent would be effective in increasing export revenue. Newly available data in Table III-3 providing Italy’s trade with regions and countries supports the argument of Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15). Italy’s exports to the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, are only 40.5 percent of the total. Exports to the non-European Union area with share of 46.3 percent in Italy’s total exports are growing at 17.6 percent in Jan 2013 relative to Jan 2012 while those to EMU are growing at 1.7 percent.

Table III-3, Italy, Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, % Share and 12-Month ∆%

Jan 2013

Exports
% Share

∆% Jan- 2013/ Jan 2012

Imports
% Share

Imports
∆% Jan 2013/ Jan 2013

EU

53.7

2.6

52.9

2.4

EMU 17

40.5

1.7

42.7

3.3

France

11.1

4.0

8.3

0.0

Germany

12.5

0.3

14.6

-4.4

Spain

4.7

-8.6

4.4

2.3

UK

4.9

8.1

2.5

5.9

Non EU

46.3

17.6

47.1

-5.6

Europe non EU

13.9

10.7

11.3

19.9

USA

6.8

19.7

3.3

-16.9

China

2.3

24.6

6.5

-2.8

OPEC

5.7

26.1

10.8

-19.6

Total

100.0

8.7

100.0

-1.8

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/85204

Table III-4 provides Italy’s trade balance by regions and countries. Italy had trade surplus of €663 million with the 17 countries of the euro zone (EMU 17) in Jan 2013 and cumulative surplus of €663 million in Jan 2013. Depreciation to parity could permit greater competitiveness in improving the trade deficit of €193 million in Jan 2013 with Europe non-European Union and the trade surplus of €762 million with the US and trade with non-European Union of €2281 million in Jan 2013. There is significant rigidity in the trade deficits in Jan of €1619 million with China and €1143 million with members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Higher exports could drive economic growth in the economy of Italy that would permit less onerous adjustment of the country’s fiscal imbalances, raising the country’s credit rating.

Table III-4, Italy, Trade Balance by Regions and Countries, Millions of Euro 

Regions and Countries

Trade Balance Jan 2013 Millions of Euro

Trade Balance Cumulative Jan 2013 Millions of Euro

EU

663

663

EMU 17

-296

-296

France

1,002

1,002

Germany

-246

-246

Spain

156

156

UK

702

702

Non EU

-2,281

-2,281

Europe non EU

-193

-193

USA

762

762

China

-1,619

-1,619

OPEC

-1,435

-1,1435

Total

-1,619

-1,619

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/85204

Growth rates of Italy’s trade and major products are provided in Table III-5 for the period Jan 2013 relative to Jan 2012. Growth rates in 12 months of imports are negative for energy with minus 14.9 percent, minus 14.4 percent for durable goods, minus 5.0 percent for exports and minus 1.8 percent for total imports. The higher rate of growth of exports of 8.7 percent in Jan 2013/Jan 2012 relative to imports of minus 1.8 percent may reflect weak demand in Italy with GDP declining during six consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 through IVQ2012 together with softening commodity prices.

Table III-5, Italy, Exports and Imports % Share of Products in Total and ∆%

 

Exports
Share %

Exports
∆% Jan 2013/ Jan 2012

Imports
Share %

Imports
∆% Jan 2013/ Jan 2012

Consumer
Goods

29.3

15.2

25.6

5.2

Durable

5.8

14.5

2.9

-14.4

Non
Durable

23.5

15.3

22.7

7.7

Capital Goods

31.6

11.7

19.5

-5.0

Inter-
mediate Goods

33.6

6.9

32.6

5.5

Energy

5.5

-23.8

22.3

-14.9

Total ex Energy

94.5

11.0

77.7

2.7

Total

100.0

8.7

100.0

-1.8

Note: % Share for Jan-Nov 2012.

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/85204

Table III-6 provides Italy’s trade balance by product categories in Jan 2013 and cumulative Jan 2013. Italy’s trade balance excluding energy generated surplus of €3844 million in Jan 2013 and €3844 million cumulative in Jan 2013 but the energy trade balance created deficit of €5463 million in Jan 2013 and cumulative €63844 million in Jan 2013. The overall deficit in Jan 2013 was €1618 million with cumulative deficit of €1618 million in Jan 2013. Italy has significant competitiveness in various economic activities in contrast with some other countries with debt difficulties.

Table III-6, Italy, Trade Balance by Product Categories, € Millions

 

Jan 2013

Cumulative Jan 2013

Consumer Goods

996

996

  Durable

802

802

  Nondurable

194

194

Capital Goods

3,065

3,065

Intermediate Goods

-217

-217

Energy

-5,463

-5,463

Total ex Energy

3,844

3,844

Total

-1,619

-1,619

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/85204

Brazil faced in the debt crisis of 1982 a more complex policy mix. Between 1977 and 1983, Brazil’s terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated 47 percent and 36 percent excluding oil (Pelaez 1987, 176-79; Pelaez 1986, 37-66; see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 178-87). Brazil had accumulated unsustainable foreign debt by borrowing to finance balance of payments deficits during the 1970s. Foreign lending virtually stopped. The German mark devalued strongly relative to the dollar such that Brazil’s products lost competitiveness in Germany and in multiple markets in competition with Germany. The resolution of the crisis was devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent relative to the dollar and subsequent maintenance of parity by monthly devaluation equal to inflation and indexing that resulted in financial stability by parity in external and internal interest rates avoiding capital flight. With a combination of declining imports, domestic import substitution and export growth, Brazil followed rapid growth in the US and grew out of the crisis with surprising GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 1984.

The euro zone faces a critical survival risk because several of its members may default on their sovereign obligations if not bailed out by the other members. The valuation equation of bonds is essential to understanding the stability of the euro area. An explanation is provided in this paragraph and readers interested in technical details are referred to the Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. Contrary to the Wriston doctrine, investing in sovereign obligations is a credit decision. The value of a bond today is equal to the discounted value of future obligations of interest and principal until maturity. On Dec 30 the yield of the 2-year bond of the government of Greece was quoted around 100 percent. In contrast, the 2-year US Treasury note traded at 0.239 percent and the 10-year at 2.871 percent while the comparable 2-year government bond of Germany traded at 0.14 percent and the 10-year government bond of Germany traded at 1.83 percent. There is no need for sovereign ratings: the perceptions of investors are of relatively higher probability of default by Greece, defying Wriston (1982), and nil probability of default of the US Treasury and the German government. The essence of the sovereign credit decision is whether the sovereign will be able to finance new debt and refinance existing debt without interrupting service of interest and principal. Prices of sovereign bonds incorporate multiple anticipations such as inflation and liquidity premiums of long-term relative to short-term debt but also risk premiums on whether the sovereign’s debt can be managed as it increases without bound. The austerity measures of Italy are designed to increase the primary surplus, or government revenues less expenditures excluding interest, to ensure investors that Italy will have the fiscal strength to manage its debt of 120 percent of GDP, which is the third largest in the world after the US and Japan. Appendix IIIE links the expectations on the primary surplus to the real current value of government monetary and fiscal obligations. As Blanchard (2011SepWEO) analyzes, fiscal consolidation to increase the primary surplus is facilitated by growth of the economy. Italy and the other indebted sovereigns in Europe face the dual challenge of increasing primary surpluses while maintaining growth of the economy (for the experience of Brazil in the debt crisis of 1982 see Pelaez 1986, 1987).

Much of the analysis and concern over the euro zone centers on the lack of credibility of the debt of a few countries while there is credibility of the debt of the euro zone as a whole. In practice, there is convergence in valuations and concerns toward the fact that there may not be credibility of the euro zone as a whole. The fluctuations of financial risk assets of members of the euro zone move together with risk aversion toward the countries with lack of debt credibility. This movement raises the need to consider analytically sovereign debt valuation of the euro zone as a whole in the essential analysis of whether the single-currency will survive without major changes.

Welfare economics considers the desirability of alternative states, which in this case would be evaluating the “value” of Germany (1) within and (2) outside the euro zone. Is the sum of the wealth of euro zone countries outside of the euro zone higher than the wealth of these countries maintaining the euro zone? On the choice of indicator of welfare, Hicks (1975, 324) argues:

“Partly as a result of the Keynesian revolution, but more (perhaps) because of statistical labours that were initially quite independent of it, the Social Product has now come right back into its old place. Modern economics—especially modern applied economics—is centered upon the Social Product, the Wealth of Nations, as it was in the days of Smith and Ricardo, but as it was not in the time that came between. So if modern theory is to be effective, if it is to deal with the questions which we in our time want to have answered, the size and growth of the Social Product are among the chief things with which it must concern itself. It is of course the objective Social Product on which attention must be fixed. We have indexes of production; we do not have—it is clear we cannot have—an Index of Welfare.”

If the burden of the debt of the euro zone falls on Germany and France or only on Germany, is the wealth of Germany and France or only Germany higher after breakup of the euro zone or if maintaining the euro zone? In practice, political realities will determine the decision through elections.

The prospects of survival of the euro zone are dire. Table III-7 is constructed with IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO) for GDP in USD billions, primary net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP and general government debt as percent of GDP for selected regions and countries in 2010.

Table III-7, World and Selected Regional and Country GDP and Fiscal Situation

 

GDP 2012
USD Billions

Primary Net Lending Borrowing
% GDP 2012

General Government Net Debt
% GDP 2012

World

71,277

   

Euro Zone

12,065

-0.5

73.4

Portugal

211

-0.7

110.9

Ireland

205

-4.4

103.0

Greece

255

-1.7

170.7

Spain

1,340

-4.5

78.6

Major Advanced Economies G7

33,769

-5.1

89.0

United States

15,653

-6.5

83.8

UK

2,434

-5.6

83.7

Germany

3,367

1.4

58.4

France

2,580

-2.2

83.7

Japan

5,984

-9.1

135.4

Canada

1,770

-3.2

35.8

Italy

1,980

2.6

103.1

China

8,250

-1.3*

22.2**

*Net Lending/borrowing**Gross Debt

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO

The data in Table III-7 are used for some very simple calculations in Table III-8. The column “Net Debt USD Billions” in Table III-8 is generated by applying the percentage in Table III-7 column “General Government Net Debt % GDP 2010” to the column “GDP USD Billions.” The total debt of France and Germany in 2012 is $4155.8 billion, as shown in row “B+C” in column “Net Debt USD Billions” The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is $3975.1 billion, adding rows D+E+F+G+H in column “Net Debt USD billions.” There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic” in the two final columns of Table III-8. Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is shown in column “Debt as % of Germany plus France GDP” to reach $8130.8 billion, which would be equivalent to 136.7 percent of their combined GDP in 2012. Under this arrangement the entire debt of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. The final column provides “Debt as % of Germany GDP” that would exceed 241.5 percent if including debt of France and 177.4 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Wriston (1982) would prove to be wrong again that countries do not bankrupt but would have a consolation prize that similar to LBOs the sum of the individual values of euro zone members outside the current agreement exceeds the value of the whole euro zone. Internal rescues of French and German banks may be less costly than bailing out other euro zone countries so that they do not default on French and German banks.

Table III-8, Guarantees of Debt of Sovereigns in Euro Area as Percent of GDP of Germany and France, USD Billions and %

 

Net Debt USD Billions

Debt as % of Germany Plus France GDP

Debt as % of Germany GDP

A Euro Area

8,855.7

   

B Germany

1,996.3

 

$8130.9 as % of $3367 =241.5%

$5971.4 as % of $3367 =177.4%

C France

2,159.5

   

B+C

4,155.8

GDP $5,947.0

Total Debt

$8130.9

Debt/GDP: 136.7%

 

D Italy

2,041.4

   

E Spain

1,053.2

   

F Portugal

234.0

   

G Greece

435.3

   

H Ireland

211.2

   

Subtotal D+E+F+G+H

3,975.1

   

Source: calculation with IMF data http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO

There is extremely important information in Table III-9 for the current sovereign risk crisis in the euro zone. Table III-9 provides the structure of regional and country relations of Germany’s exports and imports with newly available data for Jan 2013. German exports to other European Union (EU) members are 58.7 percent of total exports in Jan 2013 and 58.7 percent in cumulative Jan 2013. Exports to the euro area are 38.7 percent in Jan and 38.7 percent cumulative in Jan. Exports to third countries are 41.3 percent of the total in Jan and 41.3 percent cumulative in Jan. There is similar distribution for imports. Exports to non-euro countries are increasing 5.5 percent in Jan 2013 and increasing 5.5 percent cumulative in Jan 2013 while exports to the euro area are increasing 0.4 percent in Jan and increasing 0.4 percent cumulative in Jan 2013. Exports to third countries, accounting for 44.3 percent of the total in Jan 2013, are increasing 4.5 percent in Jan and increasing 4.5 percent cumulative in Jan, accounting for 41.3 percent of the cumulative total in Jan 2013. Price competitiveness through devaluation could improve export performance and growth. Economic performance in Germany is closely related to its high competitiveness in world markets. Weakness in the euro zone and the European Union in general could affect the German economy. This may be the major reason for choosing the “fiscal abuse” of the European Central Bank considered by Buiter (2011Oct31) over the breakdown of the euro zone. There is a tough analytical, empirical and forecasting doubt of growth and trade in the euro zone and the world with or without maintenance of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro zone. Germany could benefit from depreciation of the euro because of high share in its exports to countries not in the euro zone but breakdown of the euro zone raises doubts on the region’s economic growth that could affect German exports to other member states.

Table III-9, Germany, Structure of Exports and Imports by Region, € Billions and ∆%

 

Jan 2013 
€ Billions

Jan 12-Month
∆%

Cumulative Jan 2012 € Billions

Cumulative

Jan 2013/
Jan 2012 ∆%

Total
Exports

88.6

3.1

88.6

3.1

A. EU
Members

52.0

% 58.7

2.1

52.0

% 58.7

2.1

Euro Area

34.3

% 38.7

0.4

34.3

% 38.7

0.4

Non-euro Area

17.7

% 20.0

5.5

17.7

% 20.0

5.5

B. Third Countries

36.6

% 41.3

4.5

36.6

% 41.3

4.5

Total Imports

74.9

2.9

74.9

2.9

C. EU Members

46.9

% 62.6

4.6

46.9

% 62.6

4.6

Euro Area

32.3

% 43.1

2.8

32.3

% 43.1

2.8

Non-euro Area

14.6

% 19.5

8.7

14.6

% 19.5

8.7

D. Third Countries

28.0

% 37.4

0.2

28.0

% 37.4

0.2

Notes: Total Exports = A+B; Total Imports = C+D

Source:

Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/03/PE13_094_51.html

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. There are two approaches to government finance and their implications: (1) simple unpleasant monetarist arithmetic; and (2) simple unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Both approaches illustrate how sovereign debt can be perceived riskier under profligacy.

First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:

D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)

Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,

{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:

N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)

The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:

B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)

On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.

Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:

(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+τ)stdτ (4)

Equation (4) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+τ, of the future primary surpluses st, which are equal to TtGt or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+τ. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:

MtV(it, ·) = PtYt (5)

Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):

“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”

An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.

There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:

(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress

(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality

(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.

IV Global Inflation. There is inflation everywhere in the world economy, with slow growth and persistently high unemployment in advanced economies. Table IV-1, updated with every blog comment, provides the latest annual data for GDP, consumer price index (CPI) inflation, producer price index (PPI) inflation and unemployment (UNE) for the advanced economies, China and the highly-indebted European countries with sovereign risk issues. The table now includes the Netherlands and Finland that with Germany make up the set of northern countries in the euro zone that hold key votes in the enhancement of the mechanism for solution of sovereign risk issues (Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, “Europe: Northern Exposures,” Financial Times, Mar 9, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55eaf350-4a8b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz1gAlaswcW). Newly available data on inflation is considered below in this section. Data in Table IV-1 for the euro zone and its members are updated from information provided by Eurostat but individual country information is provided in this section  as soon as available, following Table IV-1. Data for other countries in Table IV-1 are also updated with reports from their statistical agencies. Economic data for major regions and countries is considered in Section V World Economic Slowdown following with individual country and regional data tables.

Table IV-1, GDP Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in Selected Countries, Percentage Annual Rates

 

GDP

CPI

PPI

UNE

US

1.7

2.0

1.7

7.6

Japan

0.5

-0.7

-0.1

4.3

China

7.9

3.2

-1.6

 

UK

0.2

2.8* CPIH 2.6

2.3 output
1.3**
input
2.5

7.8

Euro Zone

-0.9

1.8

1.3

12.0

Germany

0.4

1.8

1.2

5.4

France

-0.3

1.2

1.9

10.8

Nether-lands

-0.9

3.2

0.4

6.2

Finland

-1.4

2.5

1.1

8.1

Belgium

-0.4

1.3

4.2

8.1

Portugal

-3.8

0.2

1.9

17.5

Ireland

0.8

1.2

1.5

14.2

Italy

-2.7

2.0

0.5

11.6

Greece

-6.0

0.1

1.0

NA

Spain

-1.9

2.9

2.1

26.3

Notes: GDP: rate of growth of GDP; CPI: change in consumer price inflation; PPI: producer price inflation; UNE: rate of unemployment; all rates relative to year earlier

*Office for National Statistics http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/consumer-price-indices/february-2013/index.html **Core

PPI http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ppi2/producer-price-index/february-2013/index.html

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/; country statistical sources http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html

Table IV-1 shows the simultaneous occurrence of low growth, inflation and unemployment in advanced economies. The US grew at 1.7 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011 (Table 8 in http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp4q12_3rd.pdf See I Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html). Japan’s GDP grew 0.3 percent in IVQ2011 relative to IVQ2010 and contracted 1.6 percent in IIQ2011 relative to IIQ2010 because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 but grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 10.6 percent in IIIQ2011, increasing at the SAAR of 0.4 percent in IVQ 2011, increasing at the SAAR of 6.1 percent in IQ2012 and decreasing at 0.9 percent in IIQ2012 but contracting at the SAAR of 3.7 percent in IIIQ2012 and increasing at the SAAR of 0.2 percent in IVQ2012 (see Section VB http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.htm and earlier at

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html); the UK grew at minus 0.3 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IIIQ2012 and GDP increased 0.2 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html); and the Euro Zone grew at minus 0.6 percent in IVQ2012 and minus 0.9 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011 (see Section VD http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.htm and earlier at

http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html). These are stagnating or “growth recession” rates, which are positive or about nil growth rates with some contractions that are insufficient to recover employment. The rates of unemployment are quite high: 7.6 percent in the US but 18.2 percent for unemployment/underemployment or job stress of 29.6 million (see Table I-4 Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.htm), 4.3 percent for Japan (see Section VB and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html), 7.8 percent for the UK with high rates of unemployment for young people (see the labor statistics of the UK in Subsection VH http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html). Twelve-month rates of inflation have been quite high, even when some are moderating at the margin: 2.0 percent in the US, -0.7 percent for Japan, 3.2 percent for China, 1.8 percent for the Euro Zone and 2.8 percent for the UK. Stagflation is still an unknown event but the risk is sufficiently high to be worthy of consideration (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html). The analysis of stagflation also permits the identification of important policy issues in solving vulnerabilities that have high impact on global financial risks. There are six key interrelated vulnerabilities in the world economy that have been causing global financial turbulence: (1) sovereign risk issues in Europe resulting from countries in need of fiscal consolidation and enhancement of their sovereign risk ratings (see Section III and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html); (2) the tradeoff of growth and inflation in China now with change in growth strategy to domestic consumption instead of investment and political developments in a decennial transition; (3) slow growth by repression of savings with de facto interest rate controls (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html), weak hiring with the loss of 10 million full-time jobs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html) and continuing job stress of 24 to 30 million people in the US and stagnant wages in a fractured job market (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.htm); (4) the timing, dose, impact and instruments of normalizing monetary and fiscal policies (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/united-states-gdp-growth-standstill.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/global-financial-risks-and-fed.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/policy-inflation-growth-unemployment.html) in advanced and emerging economies; (5) the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 that had repercussions throughout the world economy because of Japan’s share of about 9 percent in world output, role as entry point for business in Asia, key supplier of advanced components and other inputs as well as major role in finance and multiple economic activities (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216950927404360.html?mod=WSJ_business_AsiaNewsBucket&mg=reno-wsj); and (6) geopolitical events in the Middle East.

In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These projections and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.

Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):

“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.

Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.

The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”

Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:

“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):

“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.

Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.

Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at 1.5 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent on average during cyclical expansions in the postwar period while growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 14 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2012. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not provided the impulse for growth and were not required in past successful cyclical expansions.

First, the number of nonfarm jobs and private jobs created has been declining in 2012 from 311,000 in Jan 2012 to 87,000 in Jun, 138,000 in Sep, 160,000 in Oct, 247,000 in Nov and 219,000 in Dec 2012 for total nonfarm jobs and from 323,000 in Jan 2012 to 78,000 in Jun, 118,000 in Sep, 217,000 in Oct, 256,000 in Nov and 224,000 in Dec 2012 for private jobs. Average new nonfarm jobs in the quarter Dec 2011 to Feb 2012 were 270,667 per month, declining to average 159,909 per month in the eleven months from Mar 2012 to Jan 2013. Average new private jobs in the quarter Dec 2011 to Feb 2012 were 279,000 per month, declining to average 167,727 per month in the eleven months from Mar 2012 to Jan 2013. The number of 164,000 new private new jobs created in Jan 2013 is lower than the average 167,727 per month created from Mar 2012 to Jan 2013. New farm jobs created in Feb 2013 were 268,000 and 254,000 in private jobs, which exceeds the average for the prior eleven months. In Mar 2013 the US economy created 88,000 new farm jobs, which is 52 percent of the average of 169,000 jobs per month created in the past 12 months (page 2 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf). The US labor force increased from 153.617 million in 2011 to 154.975 million in 2012 by 1.358 million or 113,167 per month. The average increase of nonfarm jobs in the six months from Oct 2012 to Mar 2013 was 188,333, which is a rate of job creation inadequate to reduce significantly unemployment and underemployment in the United States because of 113,167 new entrants in the labor force per month with 29.6 million unemployed or underemployed. The difference between the average increase of 188,333 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Oct 2012 to Mar 2013 and the 113,167 average monthly increase in the labor force from 2011 to 2012 is 75,166 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 29.6 million in job stress in the US currently. The provision of 75,166 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 393 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (29.550 million divided by 75,166) or 32.8 years (393 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Mar 2013 not seasonally adjusted stood at 154.512 million with 11.815 million unemployed or effectively 19.490 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 162.187 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 1.1 years (1 million divided by product of 75,166 by 12, which is 901,992). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.726 million (0.05 times labor force of 154.512 million) for new net job creation of 4.089 million (11.815 million unemployed minus 7.726 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 4.5 years (4.089 million divided by 901.992). Under the calculation in this blog there are 19.490 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 162.187 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 11.381 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 12.6 years (19.490 million minus 0.05(162.187 million) or 11.381 million divided by 901,992, using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in the US fell from 147.118 million in Nov 2007 to 142.698 million in Mar 2013, by 4.420 million, or decline of 3.0 percent, while the noninstitutional population increased from 232.939 million in Nov 2007 to 244.995 million in Mar 2013, by 12.056 million or increase of 5.2 percent, using not seasonally adjusted data. There is actually not sufficient job creation to merely absorb new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs.

Second, calculations show that actual growth is around 1.6 to 2.1 percent per year. This rate is well below 3 percent per year in trend from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Growth is not only mediocre but sharply decelerating to a rhythm that is not consistent with reduction of unemployment and underemployment of 30.8 million people corresponding to 19.0 percent of the effective labor force of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). In the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012, US real GDP grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent rates of 0.1 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (IQ2011), 2.5 percent in IIQ2011, 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, revised 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012 and 0.4 percent in IVQ2012. GDP growth in IIIQ2012 was revised from 2.7 percent seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) to 3.1 percent but mostly because of contribution of 0.73 percentage points of inventory accumulation and one-time contribution of 0.64 percentage points of expenditures in national defense that without them would have reduced growth from 3.1 percent to 1.73 percent. Equally, GDP growth in IVQ2012 is measured in the third estimate as 0.4 percent but mostly because of deduction of divestment of inventories of 1.52 percentage points and deduction of one-time national defense expenditures of 1.28 percentage points. The annual equivalent rate of growth of GDP for the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 is 1.8 percent, obtained as follows. Discounting 0.1 percent to one quarter is 0.025 percent {[(1.001)1/4 -1]100 = 0.025}; discounting 2.5 percent to one quarter is 0.62 percent {[(1.025)1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)1/4 – 1]100}; discounting 4.1 percent to one quarter is 1.0 {[(1.04)1/4 -1]100; discounting 2.0 percent to one quarter is 0.50 percent {[(1.020)1/4 -1]100); discounting 1.3 percent to one quarter is 0.32 percent {[(1.013)1/4 -1]100}; discounting 3.1 percent to one quarter is 0.77 {[(1.031)1/4 -1]100); and discounting 0.4 percent to one quarter is 0.1 percent {[(1.004)1/4 – 1]100}. Real GDP growth in the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 accumulated to 3.7 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001) - 1]100 = 3.7%}. This is equivalent to growth from IQ2011 to IVQ2012 obtained by dividing the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of IVQ2012 of $13,665.4 billion by the SAAR of IVQ2010 of $13,181.2 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 and Table I-6 below) and expressing as percentage {[($13,665.4/$13,181.2) - 1]100 = 3.7%} with a minor rounding discrepancy. The growth rate in annual equivalent for the four quarters of 2011 and the four quarters of 2012 is 1.8 percent {[(1.00025 x 1.0062 x 1.0032 x 1.010 x 1.005 x 1.0032 x 1.0077 x 1.001)4/8 -1]100 = 1.8%], or {[($13,665.4/$13,181.2)]4/8-1]100 = 1.8%} dividing the SAAR of IVQ2012 by the SAAR of IVQ2010 in Table I-6 below, obtaining the average for eight quarters and the annual average for one year of four quarters. Growth in the four quarters of 2012 accumulates to 1.7 percent {[(1.02)1/4(1.013)1/4(1.031)1/4(1.004)1/4 -1]100 = 1.7%}. This is equivalent to dividing the SAAR of $13,665.4 billion for IVQ2012 in Table I-6 by the SAAR of $13,441.0 billion in IVQ2011 except for a rounding discrepancy to obtain 1.7 percent {[($13,665.4/$13,441.0) – 1]100 = 1.7%}. The US economy is still close to a standstill especially considering the GDP report in detail. Excluding growth at the SAAR of 2.5 percent in IIQ2011 and 4.1 percent in IVQ2011 while converting growth in IIIQ2012 to 1.73 percent by deducting from 3.1 percent one-time inventory accumulation of 0.73 percentage points and national defense expenditures of 0.64 percentage points and converting growth in IVQ2012 by adding 1.52 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions to obtain 3.2 percent, the US economy grew at 1.6 percent in the remaining six quarters {[(1.00025x1.0032x1.005x1.0032x1.0043x1.0079)4/6 – 1]100 = 1.6%} with declining growth trend in three consecutive quarters from 4.1 percent in IVQ2011, to 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012, 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012 that is more like 1.73 percent without inventory accumulation and national defense expenditures and 0.4 percent in IVQ2012 that is more likely 3.2 percent by adding 1.52 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditures. Weakness of growth is more clearly shown by adjusting the exceptional one-time contributions to growth from items that are not aggregate demand: 2.53 percentage points contributed by inventory change to growth of 4.1 percent in IVQ2011; 0.64 percentage points contributed by expenditures in national defense together with 0.73 points of inventory accumulation to growth of 3.1 percent in IIIQ2012; and deduction of 1.52 percentage points of inventory divestment and 1.28 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce released on Wed Jan 30, 2012, the third estimate of GDP for IVQ2012 at 0.4 percent seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp4q12_3rd.pdf). In the four quarters of 2012, the US economy is growing at the annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent {([(1.021/4(1.013)1/4(1.0173)1/4(1.032)1/4]-1)100 = 2.1%} by excluding inventory accumulation of 0.73 percentage points and exceptional defense expenditures of 0.64 percentage points from growth 3.1 percent at SAAR in IIIQ2012 to obtain adjusted 1.73 percent SSAR and adding 1.52 percentage points of national defense expenditure reductions and 1.28 percentage points of inventory divestment to growth of 0.4 percent SAAR in IVQ2012 to obtain 3.2 percent.

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QE→∞ cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.

The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm) practically unchanged in the statement at the conclusion of its meeting on Jan 30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130130a.htm) and at its meeting on Mar 20, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130320a.htm):

Release Date: Mar 20, 2013

For immediate release

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in January suggests a return to moderate economic growth following a pause late last year.  Labor market conditions have shown signs of improvement in recent months but the unemployment rate remains elevated.  Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has strengthened further, but fiscal policy has become somewhat more restrictive.  Inflation has been running somewhat below the Committee's longer-run objective, apart from temporary variations that largely reflect fluctuations in energy prices.  Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability.  The Committee expects that, with appropriate policy accommodation, economic growth will proceed at a moderate pace and the unemployment rate will gradually decline toward levels the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate.  The Committee continues to see downside risks to the economic outlook.  The Committee also anticipates that inflation over the medium term likely will run at or below its 2 percent objective.

To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month.  The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.  Taken together, these actions should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months.  The Committee will continue its purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until the outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability.  In determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will continue to take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases as well as the extent of progress toward its economic objectives.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.  In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.  In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments.  When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent. “

There are several important issues in this statement.

  1. Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

  1. Open-ended Quantitative Easing or QE. Earlier programs are continued with an additional open-ended $85 billion of bond purchases per month: “To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month.”
  1. Advance Guidance on “6 ¼ 2 ½ “Rule. Policy will be accommodative even after the economy recovers satisfactorily: “To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens.  In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”
  1. Monitoring and Policy Focus on Jobs. The FOMC reconsiders its policy continuously in accordance with available information: “In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments.  When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.”

Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness.

Table IV-2 provides economic projections of governors of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and regional presidents of Federal Reserve Banks released at the meeting of Mar 20, 2013. The Fed releases the data with careful explanations (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf). Columns “∆% GDP,” “∆% PCE Inflation” and “∆% Core PCE Inflation” are changes “from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated.” The GDP report for IVQ2012 is analyzed in Section I (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html) and the PCE inflation data from the report on personal income and outlays in Section IV (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html and earlier at (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides the third estimate of IVQ2012 GDP and annual for 2012 with the first estimate for IQ2013 be released on Apr 26 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm See Section I and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). PCE inflation is the index of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) of the report of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on “Personal Income and Outlays” (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm), which is analyzed in Section IV http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and the report for Nov 2012 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html. The next report on “Personal Income and Outlays” for Mar will be released at 8:30 AM on Apr 29, 2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm). PCE core inflation consists of PCE inflation excluding food and energy. Column “UNEMP %” is the rate of unemployment measured as the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the Employment Situation Report with the civilian unemployment rate in the first Friday of every month, which is analyzed in this blog. The report for Jan 2013 was released on Feb 1, 2013 and analyzed in this blog (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html). The report for Feb 2013 was released on Mar 8, 2013 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/) and analyzed in this blog on Mar 10, 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.htm). The report for Mar 2013 was released on Apr 5, 2013 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/) and analyzed in this blog in the comment on Apr 7. “Longer term projections represent each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf).

It is instructive to focus on 2013 as 2014, 2015 and longer term are too far away, and there is not much information even on what will happen in 2013 and beyond. The central tendency should provide reasonable approximation of the view of the majority of members of the FOMC but the second block of numbers provides the range of projections by FOMC participants. The first row for each year shows the projection introduced after the meeting of Mar 20, 2012 and the second row “PR” the projection of the Dec 12, 2012 meeting. There are three major changes in the view.

1. Growth “∆% GDP.” The FOMC has reduced the forecast of GDP growth in 2013 from 2.3 to 3.0 percent at the meeting in Dec 2012 to 2.3 to 2.8 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2013.

2. Rate of Unemployment “UNEM%.” The FOMC reduced the forecast of the rate of unemployment from 7.4 to 7.7 percent at the meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to 7.3 to 7.5 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2013.

3. Inflation “∆% PCE Inflation.” The FOMC changed the forecast of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation from 1.3 to 2.0 percent at the meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to 1.3 to 1.7 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2013.

4. Core Inflation “∆% Core PCE Inflation.” Core inflation is PCE inflation excluding food and energy. There is again not much of a difference of the projection that changed from 1.6 to 1.9 percent at the meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to 1.5 to 1.6 percent at the meeting on Mar 20, 2013.

Table IV-2, US, Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in FOMC, Dec 2012 and Mar 2012 

 

∆% GDP

UNEM %

∆% PCE Inflation

∆% Core PCE Inflation

Central
Tendency

       

2013 
Dec PR

2.3 to 2.8
2.3 to 3.0

7.3 to 7.5
7.4 to 7.7

1.3 to 1.7
1.3 to 2.0

1.5 to 1.6 1.6 to 1.9

2014 
Dec PR

2.9 to 3.4
3.0 to 3.5

6.7 to 7.0
6.8 to 7.3

1.5 to 2.0
1.5 to 2.0

1.7 to 2.0
1.6 to 2.0

2015
Dec

2.9 to 3.7

3.0 to 3.7

6.0 to 6.5

6.0 to 6.6

1.7 to 2.0

1.7 to 2.0

1.8 to 2.1

1.8 to 2.0

Longer Run

Sep PR

2.3 to 2.5

2.3 to 2.5

5.2 to 6.0

5.2 to 6.0

2.0

2.0

 

Range

       

2013
Dec PR

2.0 to 3.0
2.0 to 3.2

6.9 to 7.6
6.9 to 7.8

1.3 to 2.0
1.3 to 2.0

1.5 to 2.0
1.5 to 2.0

2014
Dec PR

2.6 to 3.8
2.8 to 4.0

6.1 to 7.1
6.1 to 7.4

1.4 to 2.1
1.4 to 2.2

1.5 to 2.1
1.5 to 2.0

2015

Dec PR

2.5 to 3.8

2.5 to 4.2

5.7 to 6.5

5.7 to 6.8

1.6 to 2.6

1.5 to 2.2

1.7 to 2.6

1.7 to 2.2

Longer Run

Dec PR

2.0 to 3.0

2.2 to 3.0

5.0 to 6.0

5.0 to 6.0

2.0

2.0

 

Notes: UEM: unemployment; PR: Projection

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf

Another important decision at the FOMC meeting on Jan 25, 2012, is formal specification of the goal of inflation of 2 percent per year but without specific goal for unemployment (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm):

“Following careful deliberations at its recent meetings, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reached broad agreement on the following principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. The Committee intends to reaffirm these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January.

The FOMC is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.

Inflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee's policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals.

The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.

The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the corresponding interval several years earlier.

In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary.  However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. ”

The probable intention of this specific inflation goal is to “anchor” inflationary expectations. Massive doses of monetary policy of promoting growth to reduce unemployment could conflict with inflation control. Economic agents could incorporate inflationary expectations in their decisions. As a result, the rate of unemployment could remain the same but with much higher rate of inflation (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html See Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-116). Strong commitment to maintaining inflation at 2 percent could control expectations of inflation.

The FOMC continues its efforts of increasing transparency that can improve the credibility of its firmness in implementing its dual mandate. Table IV-3 provides the views by participants of the FOMC of the levels at which they expect the fed funds rate in 2012, 2013, 2014 and the in the longer term. Table IV-3 is inferred from a chart provided by the FOMC with the number of participants expecting the target of fed funds rate (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf). There are 18 participants expecting the rate to remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2013 and one to be higher in the interval below 1.0 percent. The rate would still remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2014 for 14 participants with three expecting the rate to be in the range of 1.0 to 2.0 percent, one participant expecting rates at 0.5 to 1.0 percent and one participant expecting rates from 2.0 to 3.0. This table is consistent with the guidance statement of the FOMC that rates will remain at low levels until late in 2014. For 2015, nine participants expect rates to be below 1.0 percent while nine expect rates from 1.0 to 4.5 percent. In the long-run, all 19 participants expect rates to be between 3.0 and 4.5 percent.

Table IV-3, US, Views of Target Federal Funds Rate at Year-End of Federal Reserve Board

Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, June 20, 2012

 

0 to 0.25

0.5 to 1.0

1.0 to 1.5

1.0 to 2.0

2.0 to 3.0

3.0 to 4.5

2013

18

1

       

2014

14

1

 

3

1

 

2015

1

8

6

1

2

1

Longer Run

         

19

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf

Additional information is provided in Table IV-4 with the number of participants expecting increasing interest rates in the years from 2013 to 2015. It is evident from Table IV-4 that the prevailing view of the FOMC is for interest rates to continue at low levels in future years. This view is consistent with the economic projections of low economic growth, relatively high unemployment and subdued inflation provided in Table IV-2.

Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal

Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, June 20, 2012

Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Fed Funds Rate

Number of Participants

2013

1

2014

4

2015

13

2016

1

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf

The producer price index of the euro zone decreased 0.2 percent in Dec 2012 and decreased 0.2 percent in Nov 2012 but increased 0.4 percent in Jan 2013 and 0.2 percent in Feb 2013, as shown in Table IV-5. In Jan-Mar 2012, producer prices increased cumulatively 2.0 percent or at annual equivalent rate of 8.3 percent. Energy inflation has oscillated with the shocks of risk aversion that cause unwinding of carry trade positions from zero interest rates to commodity futures. Energy prices fell 0.8 percent in Dec 2012, 0.5 percent in Nov 2012 and fell 0.4 percent in Oct 2012 after -0.1 percent in Sep 2012, increased 2.4 percent in Aug, and 1.4 percent in Jul 2012 or at the annual equivalent rate of 16.2 percent in the quarter Jul-Sep 2012 and at 25.3 percent in Jul-Aug 2012. Energy prices increased 5.2 percent cumulatively in Jan-Mar 2012 or at the annual equivalent rate of 22.5 percent. During periods of relaxed risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity exposures drive high inflation waves. Prices of capital goods have barely moved. Prices of durable consumer goods accelerated at annual equivalent rate of 3.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2012 but were flat in every month from Apr to Jun 2012, increasing 0.1 percent in both Aug and Jul 2012 but then remained unchanged in Sep 2012, increasing at 0.1 percent in Oct 2012 and increasing 0.2 percent in Jan 2013 and 0.1 percent in Feb 2013. Purchasing managers’ indexes worldwide reflect increasing prices of inputs for business while sales prices are stagnant or declining. Unconventional monetary policy causes uncertainty in business decisions with shocks of declining net revenue margins during worldwide inflation waves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_18.html).

Table IV-5, Euro Zone, Industrial Producer Prices Month ∆%

 

Feb   2013

Jan 2013

Dec 
2012

Nov 
2012

Oct 2012

Sep  2012

Aug 2012

Industry ex
Construction

0.2

0.4

-0.2

-0.2

-0.1

0.2

0.9

Industry ex
Construction & Energy

0.1

0.2

0.0

-0.1

0.1

0.3

0.3

Intermediate
Goods

0.0

0.1

0.0

-0.2

0.0

0.4

0.5

Energy

0.4

0.8

-0.8

-0.5

-0.4

-0.1

2.4

Capital Goods

0.1

0.2

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.0

Durable Consumer Goods

0.1

0.2

-0.1

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

Nondurable Consumer Goods

0.1

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.2

0.4

0.4

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

Twelve-month percentage changes of industrial prices in the euro zone have moderated significantly, as shown in Table IV-6. The 12-month percentage change of industrial prices excluding construction fell from 4.5 percent in Dec 2011 to 2.0 percent in Jul 2012 but increased to 3.0 percent in Aug and 2.9 percent in Sep 2012, falling to 2.7 percent in Oct 2012, 2.3 percent in Nov 2012, 2.2 percent in Dec 2012, 1.7 percent in Jan 2013 and 1.3 percent in Feb 2013. Energy prices increased 9.7 percent in Dec 2011 and Jan 2011 but the rate fell to 4.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2012, increasing to 7.5 percent in Aug 2012 and 6.4 percent in Sep 2012 but falling to 5.2 percent in Oct 2012, 3.8 percent in Nov 2012, 3.6 percent in Dec 2012, 2.2 percent in Jan 2013 and 1.6 percent in Feb 2013. There is major vulnerability in producer price inflation that can return together with long positions in commodity futures with carry trades from zero interest during relaxation of risk aversion. Business net revenue or prices of sold goods less costs of inputs suffers wide oscillation preventing sound calculation of risk/returns and capital budgeting.

Table IV-6, Euro Zone, Industrial Producer Prices 12-Month ∆%

 

Feb 
2013

Jan  2013

Dec  2012

Nov 
2012

Oct 2012

Sep 2012

Aug 2012

Industry ex
Construction

1.3

1.7

2.2

2.3

2.7

2.9

3.0

Industry ex
Construction & Energy

1.2

1.5

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.3

1.1

Intermediate
Goods

0.7

1.3

1.6

1.4

1.2

0.7

0.3

Energy

1.6

2.2

3.6

3.8

5.2

6.4

7.5

Capital Goods

0.8

0.7

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

Durable Consumer Goods

0.7

0.8

1.0

1.1

1.3

1.3

1.6

Nondurable Consumer Goods

2.3

2.5

2.6

2.6

2.7

2.7

2.3

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

Industrial producer prices in the euro area are following similar inflation waves as in the rest of the world (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_18.html), as shown in Table IV-7. In the first wave in Jan-Apr 2011, annual equivalent producer price inflation was 11.4 percent driven by carry trades from zero interest rates into commodity futures. In the second wave in May-Jun 2011, annual equivalent producer price inflation declined at minus 1.2 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent inflation increased at 2.4 percent. In the third wave in Oct-Dec 2011, risk aversion originating in the European sovereign debt crisis interrupted commodity carry trades, resulting in annual equivalent inflation of only 0.4 percent. In the fifth wave in Jan-Mar 2012, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 8.3 percent with a high annual equivalent rate of 9.4 percent in Jan-Feb 2012. In the sixth wave, risk aversion from the European sovereign debt event caused reversal of commodity carry trades with equivalent annual inflation of minus 3.2 percent in Apr-Jun 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 7.4 percent in Jul-Aug 2012 while energy prices driven by carry trades increased at the annual equivalent rate of 25.3 percent. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation retreated to 1.2 percent in Sep-Oct 2012. In the ninth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Nov-Dec 2012. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 3.7 percent in Jan-Feb 2013. The bottom part of Table IV-7 provides 12-month percentage changes from 1999 to 2010. The final row of Table IV-7 provides the average annual rate of producer-price inflation in the euro area at 2.5 percent in Dec from 1999 to 2012.

Table IV-7, Euro Area, Industrial Producer Prices Excluding Construction, Month and 12-Month ∆%

 

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

Feb 2013

0.2

1.3

Jan

0.4

1.7

AE ∆% Jan-Feb

3.7

 

Dec 2012

-0.2

2.2

Nov

-0.2

2.3

AE ∆% Nov-Dec

-2.4

 

Oct

-0.1

2.7

Sep

0.2

2.9

AE ∆% Sep-Oct

1.2

 

Aug

0.9

3.0

Jul

0.3

2.0

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

7.4

 

Jun

-0.4

2.3

May

-0.4

2.7

Apr

0.2

3.0

AE ∆% Apr-Jun

-3.2

 

Mar

0.5

3.9

Feb

0.6

4.1

Jan

0.9

4.2

AE ∆% Jan-Mar

8.3

 

Dec 2011

-0.2

4.5

Nov

0.2

5.5

Oct

0.1

5.7

AE ∆% Oct-Dec

0.4

 

Sep

0.2

5.7

Aug

-0.1

5.8

Jul

0.6

6.0

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

2.4

 

Jun

0.0

5.7

May

-0.1

6.1

AE ∆% May-Jun

-1.2

 

Apr

1.0

6.6

Mar

0.7

6.4

Feb

0.7

6.2

Jan

1.2

5.6

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

11.4

 

Dec 2012

 

2.2

Dec 2011

 

4.5

Dec 2010

 

5.1

Dec 2009

 

-3.0

Dec 2008

 

1.5

Dec 2007

 

4.5

Dec 2006

 

3.8

Dec 2005

 

4.4

Dec 2004

 

3.7

Dec 2003

 

1.0

Dec 2002

 

1.5

Dec 2001

 

-0.5

Dec 2000

 

4.7

Dec 1999

 

2.6

Average ∆% 1999-2012

 

2.5

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

V World Economic Slowdown. Table V-1 is constructed with the database of the IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO) and the update of Jan 2013 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/update/01/index.htm) to show GDP in dollars in 2011 and the growth rate of real GDP of the world and selected regional countries from 2012 to 2015. The data illustrate the concept often repeated of “two-speed recovery” of the world economy from the recession of 2007 to 2009. The IMF has lowered its forecast of the world economy to 3.2 percent in 2012 but accelerating to 3.5 percent in 2013, 4.1 percent in 2014 and 4.4 percent in 2015. Slow-speed recovery occurs in the “major advanced economies” of the G7 that account for $33,697 billion of world output of $69,899 billion, or 48.2 percent, but are projected to grow at much lower rates than world output, 1.9 percent on average from 2012 to 2015 in contrast with 3.8 percent for the world as a whole. While the world would grow 16.1 percent in the four years from 2012 to 2015, the G7 as a whole would grow 7.6 percent. The difference in dollars of 2011 is rather high: growing by 16.1 percent would add $11.5 trillion of output to the world economy, or roughly two times the output of the economy of Japan of $5,867 but growing by 7.6 percent would add $5.3 trillion of output to the world, or somewhat below the output of Japan in 2011. The “two speed” concept is in reference to the growth of the 150 countries labeled as emerging and developing economies (EMDE) with joint output in 2011 of $25,438 billion, or 36.4 percent of world output. The EMDEs would grow cumulatively 24.6 percent or at the average yearly rate of 5.7 percent, contributing $6.3 trillion from 2012 to 2015 or the equivalent of 86.3 percent of $7,298 billion of China in 2011. The final four countries in Table V-1 often referred as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), are large, rapidly growing emerging economies. Their combined output adds to $13,468 billion, or 19.3 percent of world output, which is equivalent to 39.9 percent of the combined output of the major advanced economies of the G7.

Table V-1, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Real GDP Growth

 

GDP USD 2011

Real GDP ∆%
2012

Real GDP ∆%
2013

Real GDP ∆%
2014

Real GDP ∆%
2015

World

69,899

3.3

3.6

4.2

4.4

G7

33,697

1.4

1.5

2.2

2.5

Canada

1,739

1.9

2.0

2.4

2.4

France

2,778

0.1

0.4

1.1

1.5

DE

3,607

0.9

0.9

1.4

1.4

Italy

2,199

-2.3

-0.7

0.5

1.2

Japan

5,867

2.2

1.2

1.1

1.2

UK

2,431

-0.4

1.1

2.2

2.6

US

15,076

2.2

2.1

2.9

3.4

Euro Area

13,114

-0.4

0.2

1.2

1.5

DE

3,607

0.9

0.9

1.4

1.4

France

2,778

0.1

0.4

1.1

1.5

Italy

2,199

-2.3

-0.7

0.5

1.2

POT

238

-3.0

-1.0

1.2

1.9

Ireland

221

0.4

1.4

2.5

2.9

Greece

299

-6.0

-4.0

0.0

2.8

Spain

1,480

-1.5

-1.3

1.0

1.6

EMDE

25,438

5.3

5.6

5.9

6.1

Brazil

2,493

1.5

3.9

4.2

4.2

Russia

1,850

3.7

3.8

3.9

3.9

India

1,827

4.9

6.0

6.4

6.7

China

7,298

7.8

8.2

8.5

8.5

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries); POT: Portugal

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO

Table V-2 is constructed with the WEO database to provide rates of unemployment from 2011 to 2015 for major countries and regions. In fact, unemployment rates for 2011 in Table V-2 are high for all countries: unusually high for countries with high rates most of the time and unusually high for countries with low rates most of the time. Estimated rates of unemployment for 2012 are particularly high for the countries with sovereign debt difficulties in Europe: 15.5 percent for Portugal (POT), 14.8 percent for Ireland, 23.8 percent for Greece, 24.9 percent for Spain and 10.6 percent for Italy, which is lower but still high. The G7 rate of unemployment is estimated at 7.5 percent. Unemployment rates are not likely to decrease substantially if slow growth persists in advanced economies.

Table V-2, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Unemployment Rate as Percent of Labor Force

 

% Labor Force 2011

% Labor Force 2012

% Labor Force 2013

% Labor Force 2014

% Labor Force 2015

World

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

G7

7.7

7.5

7.5

7.3

6.9

Canada

7.5

7.3

7.3

7.1

6.9

France

9.6

10.1

10.5

10.3

9.8

DE

6.0

5.2

5.3

5.2

5.2

Italy

8.4

10.6

11.1

11.3

11.0

Japan

4.6

4.5

4.4

4.5

4.4

UK

8.0

8.1

8.1

7.9

7.6

US

8.9

8.2

8.1

7.7

7.1

Euro Area

10.2

11.2

11.5

11.2

10.8

DE

6.0

5.2

5.3

5.2

5.2

France

9.6

10.1

10.5

10.3

9.8

Italy

8.4

10.6

11.1

11.3

11.0

POT

12.7

15.5

16.0

15.3

14.7

Ireland

14.4

14.8

14.4

13.7

13.1

Greece

17.3

23.8

25.4

24.5

22.4

Spain

21.7

24.9

25.1

24.1

23.2

EMDE

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Brazil

6.0

6.0

6.5

7.0

7.0

Russia

6.5

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

India

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

China

4.1

4.1

4.1

4.1

4.1

Notes: DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries)

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO

Table V-3 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog for IQ2012, IIQ2012 and IVQ2012 available now for all countries. Growth is weak throughout most of the world. Japan’s GDP increased 1.5 percent in IQ2012 and 3.4 percent relative to a year earlier but part of the jump could be the low level a year earlier because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan is experiencing difficulties with the overvalued yen because of worldwide capital flight originating in zero interest rates with risk aversion in an environment of softer growth of world trade. Japan’s GDP fell 0.2 percent in IIQ2012 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of minus 0.9 percent, which is much lower than 6.1 percent in IQ2012. Growth of 3.9 percent in IIQ2012 in Japan relative to IIQ2011 has effects of the low level of output because of Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.9 percent in IIIQ2012 at the SAAR of minus 3.7 percent and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s GDP grew 0.0 percent in IVQ2012 at the SAAR of 0.2 percent and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.8 percent in IIQ2012, which annualizes to 7.4 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 2.2 percent in IIIQ2012, which annualizes at 9.1 percent and 7.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, China grew at 2.0 percent, which annualizes at 8.2 percent, and 7.9 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011. Xinhuanet informs that Premier Wen Jiabao considers the need for macroeconomic stimulus, arguing that “we should continue to implement proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy, while giving more priority to maintaining growth” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/20/c_131599662.htm). Premier Wen elaborates that “the country should properly handle the relationship between maintaining growth, adjusting economic structures and managing inflationary expectations” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/20/c_131599662.htm). There is decennial change in leadership in China (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/index.htm). China’s GDP grew 7.9 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IVQ2011. Growth rates of GDP of China in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier have been declining from 2011 to 2012. China’s GDP grew 8.1 percent in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier but only 7.6 percent in IIQ2012 relative to a year earlier, 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to IIIQ2011 and 7.9 percent in IVQ2012 relative to year earlier. GDP fell 0.1 percent in the euro area in IQ2012 and increased 0.3 in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP contracted 0.2 percent IIQ2012 and fell 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.1 percent and declined 0.8 percent relative to a year earlier. In IVQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.6 percent relative to the prior quarter and fell 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2012 and 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.3 percent and 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier but 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier when adjusted for calendar (CA) effects. In IIIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP contracted 0.6 percent in IVQ2012 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Growth of US GDP in IQ2012 was 0.5 percent, at SAAR of 2.0 percent and higher by 2.4 percent relative to IQ2011. US GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2012 at the SAAR of 2.0 percent and grew 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. US GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2012, 1.3 percent at SAAR and 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, GDP grew 0.8 percent, 3.1 percent at SAAR and 2.6 percent relative to IIIQ2011. In IVQ2012, GDP grew 0.0 percent,

0.4 percent at SAAR and 1.7 percent relative to IVQ2011 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html) and weak hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html). In IQ2012, UK GDP fell 0.1 percent, increasing 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP fell 0.4 percent in IIQ2012 and changed 0.0 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2012 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP fell 0.3 percent in IVQ2012 relative to IIIQ2012 and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy has experienced decline of GDP in six consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IVQ2012. Italy’s GDP fell 0.9 percent in IQ2012 and declined 1.6 percent relative to IQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell 0.7 percent in IIQ2012 and declined 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, Italy’s GDP fell 0.2 percent and declined 2.6 percent relative to a year earlier. The GDP of Italy contracted 0.9 percent in IVQ2012 and fell 2.8 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP fell 0.1 percent in IQ2012 and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2012 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP fell 0.3 percent in IVQ2012 and declined 0.3 percent relative to a year earlier.

Table V-3, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%

 

IQ2012/IVQ2011

IQ2012/IQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.5        SAAR: 2.0

2.4

Japan

QOQ: 1.5

SAAR: 6.1

3.4

China

1.8

8.1

Euro Area

-0.1

0.3

Germany

0.5

1.7

France

-0.1

0.5

Italy

-0.9

-1.6

United Kingdom

-0.1

0.3

 

IIQ2012/IQ2012

IIQ2012/IIQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.3         SAAR: 1.3

2.1

Japan

QOQ: -0.2
SAAR: -0.9

3.9

China

1.8

7.6

Euro Area

-0.2

-0.8

Germany

0.3

0.5 1.0 CA

France

-0.1

0.1

Italy

-0.7

-2.6

United Kingdom

-0.4

0.0

 

IIIQ2012/ IIQ2012

IIIQ2012/ IIIQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.8 
SAAR: 3.1

2.6

Japan

QOQ: –0.9
SAAR: –3.7

0.4

China

2.2

7.4

Euro Area

-0.1

-0.8

Germany

0.2

0.4

France

0.2

0.1

Italy

-0.2

-2.6

United Kingdom

0.9

0.4

 

IVQ2012/IIIQ2012

IVQ2012/IVQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.1
SAAR: 0.4

1.7

Japan

QOQ: 0.0

SAAR: 0.2

0.5

China

2.0

7.9

Euro Area

-0.6

-0.9

Germany

-0.6

0.1

France

-0.3

-0.3

Italy

-0.9

-2.8

United Kingdom

-0.3

0.2

QOQ: Quarter relative to prior quarter; SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate

Source: Country Statistical Agencies http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp

There is evidence of deceleration of growth of world trade and even contraction in more recent data. Table V-4 provides two types of data: growth of exports and imports in the latest available months and in the past 12 months; and contributions of net trade (exports less imports) to growth of real GDP. Japan provides the most worrisome data (Section VB http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_24.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real_25.html and for GDP Section VB http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/recovery-without-hiring-forecast-growth.html). In Feb 2013, Japan’s exports increased 2.9 percent in 12 months and imports increased 11.9 percent. The second part of Table V-4 shows that net trade deducted 1.1 percentage points from Japan’s growth of GDP in IIQ2012, deducted 2.8 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2012 and deducted 0.6 percentage points from GDP growth in IVQ2012. China’s exports fell 1.8 percent in the month of Jul and increased 1.0 percent in 12 months. In Aug 2012, China’s exports increased 0.6 percent and increased 2.7 percent in 12 months. Trade rebounded in China in Sep with growth of exports of 9.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep and 2.4 percent for imports. There was further growth in China’s exports of 11.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct while imports increased 2.4 percent. In Nov 2012, China’s exports increased 2.9 percent in 12 months and 7.3 percent in Jan-Nov 2012 while imports were unchanged in Nov 2012 and increased 4.1 percent in Jan-Nov 2012. In the 12 months ending in Dec 2012, China’s exports increased 14.1 percent and imports 6.0 while in Jan-Dec 2012 exports increased 7.9 percent and imports increased 4.3 percent. In Jan 2013, China exports increased 17.3 percent relative to a year earlier and imports 19.6 percent. Germany’s exports increased 1.4 percent in the month of Jan 2013 and increased 3.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan 2013 while imports increased 3.3 percent in the month of Jan and increased 3.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan. Net trade contributed 0.4 percentage points to growth of GDP in IQ2012, contributed 1.4 percentage points in IIQ2012, contributed 1.6 percentage points in IIIQ2012, contributed 0.8 percentage points in IVQ2012 and contributed 1.0 percentage points in 2012. Net trade deducted 0.7 percentage points from UK value added in IQ2012, deducted 0.8 percentage points in IIQ2012, added 0.4 percentage points in IIIQ2012 and subtracted 0.2 percentage points in IVQ2012. France’s exports decreased 2.4 percent in Jan while imports decreased 1.0 percent and net trade deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2012, adding 0.3 percentage points in IIIQ2012 and 0.2 percentage points in IVQ2012. US exports decreased 1.2 percent in Jan 2013 and goods exports increased 4.3 percent in Jan relative to a year earlier but net trade added 0.38 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2012 and added 0.33 percentage points in IVQ2012. US imports increased 1.8 percent in Jan 2013 and goods imports increased 0.9 percent in Jan 2013 relative to a year earlier. In the six months ending in Feb 2013, United States national industrial production accumulated increase of 2.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.1 percent, which is higher than 2.5 percent growth in 12 months. Business equipment decreased 0.4 percent in Sep, decreased 1.2 percent in Oct, increased 3.1 percent in Nov, increased 0.5 percent in Dec, fell 1.3 percent in Jan, and increased 2.5 percent in Feb 2013, growing 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013 and at the annual equivalent rate of 6.4 percent in the six months ending in Feb 2013. Capacity utilization of total industry is analyzed by the Fed in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/): “The capacity utilization rate for total industry increased to 79.6 percent [in Feb 2013], a rate that is 0.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972--2012) average.” United States industry is apparently decelerating with some strength at the margin. Manufacturing increased 0.8 percent in Feb 2013 seasonally adjusted, increasing 2.2 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months, and increased 3.0 percent in the six months ending in Feb 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 6.1 percent. Trade values incorporate both price and quantity effects that are difficult to separate. Data do suggest that world trade slowdown is accompanying world economic slowdown.

Table V-4, Growth of Trade and Contributions of Net Trade to GDP Growth, ∆% and % Points

 

Exports
M ∆%

Exports 12 M ∆%

Imports
M ∆%

Imports 12 M ∆%

USA

-1.2 Jan

4.3

Jan

1.8 Jan

0.9

Jan

Japan

 

Feb 2013

-2.9

Jan 2013 6.4

Dec -5.8

Nov -4.1

Oct -6.5

Sep -10.3

Aug -5.8

Jul -8.1

 

Feb 2013

11.9

Jan 2013 7.3

Dec 1.9

Nov 0.8

Oct -1.6

Sep 4.1

Aug -5.4

Jul 2.1

China

-1.8 Jul

0.6 Aug

4.7 Sep

-5.7 Oct

2.2 Nov

11.1 Dec

-11.7 Jan 13

-25.6 Feb

1.0 Jul

7.8 Jan-Jul

2.7 Aug

7.1 Jan-Aug

9.9 Sep

Jan-Sep 7.4

11.6 Oct

7.8 Jan-Oct

2.9 Nov

7.3 Jan-Nov

14.1 Dec

17.3 Jan 13

7.9 Jan-Dec

23.6 Jan-Feb

2.2 Jul

-0.3 Aug

4.9 Sep

-9.4 Oct

11.3 Oct

4.9 Dec

-12.5 Jan 13

-21.6 Feb

4.7 Jul

6.5 Jan-Jul

-2.6 Aug 5.2 Jan-Aug

2.4 Sep

4.8 Jan-Sep

2.4 Oct

4.6 Jan-Oct

0.0 Nov

4.1 Jan-Nov

6.0 Dec

19.6 Jan 13

4.3 Jan-Dec

5.1 Jan-Feb

Euro Area

5.2 12-M Jan

7.4 Jan-Dec

1.4 12-M Jan

1.8 Jan-Dec

Germany

1.4 Jan CSA

3.1 Jan

3.3 Jan CSA

3.3 Jan

France

Jan

-2.4

0.0

-1.0

0.7

Italy Jan

1.4

8.7

0.4

-1.8

UK

1.9 Dec

-3.9 Oct-Dec 12/Oct-Dec 11

0.9 Dec

-0.4 Oct-Dec 12/Oct-Dec 11

Net Trade % Points GDP Growth

% Points

     

USA

IVQ2012 +0.33

IIIQ2012 +0.38

     

Japan

-1.1 IIQ2012

-2.8 IIIQ2012

-0.6 IVQ2012

     

Germany

0.4 IQ2012

1.4 IIQ2012 1.6 IIIQ2012 0.8 IVQ2012

1.0 2012

     

France

-0.4 IIQ2012   0.3 IIIQ2012

0.2 IVQ2012

     

UK

-0.7 IQ2012

-0.8 IIQ2012

+0.4

IIIQ2012

-0.2 IVQ2012

     

Sources: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/latest/index_e.htm http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

http://english.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal191/ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2012/08/PE12_287_811.html;jsessionid=A761BC574543A771416A9CF81034F7BA.cae1 http://lekiosque.finances.gouv.fr/AppChiffre/Portail_default.asp

http://www.insee.fr/en/

http://www.istat.it/it/

http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/index.html

The geographical breakdown of exports and imports of Japan with selected regions and countries is provided in Table V-5 for Feb 2013. The share of Asia in Japan’s trade is more than one half, 52.2 percent of exports and 42.1 percent of imports. Within Asia, exports to China are 15.9 percent of total exports and imports from China 18.5 percent of total imports. While exports to China fell 15.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013, imports from China increased 22.0 percent. The second largest export market for Japan in Feb 2013 is the US with share of 19.1 percent of total exports and share of imports from the US of 7.9 percent in total imports. Western Europe has share of 10.6 percent in Japan’s exports and of 9.9 percent in imports. Rates of growth of exports of Japan in Feb 2013 are sharply negative for all countries and regions with the exception of growth of 5.7 percent for exports to the US and 1.3 percent for exports to Australia. Comparisons relative to 2011 may have some bias because of the effects of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Deceleration of growth in China and the US and threat of recession in Europe can reduce world trade and economic activity, which could be part of the explanation for the decline of Japan’s exports by 2.9 percent in Feb 2013 while imports increased 11.9 percent but higher levels after the earthquake and declining prices may be another factor. Growth rates of imports in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013 are positive for all trading partners. Imports from Asia increased 14.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013 while imports from China increased 22.0 percent. Data are in millions of yen, which has effects of recent depreciation of the yen relative to the United States dollar (USD).

Table V-5, Japan, Value and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, ∆% and Millions of Yens

Feb 2013

Exports
Millions Yen

12 months ∆%

Imports Millions Yen

12 months ∆%

Total

5,284,067

-2.9

6,061,534

11.9

Asia

2,757,508

-5.2

2,551,827

14.0

China

842,260

-15.8

1,119,981

22.0

USA

1,007,389

5.7

479,214

0.6

Canada

72,975

-17.2

77,539

22.2

Brazil

39,131

-1.8

97,131

15.1

Mexico

71,309

4.7

29,109

32.3

Western Europe

558,641

-9.0

600,914

11.3

Germany

136,919

-2.5

160,801

7.8

France

44,677

-15.1

80,966

8.9

UK

88,406

-16.7

49,949

19.9

Middle East

194,606

-6.9

1,358,008

14.4

Australia

136,255

1.3

352,350

1.9

Source: Japan, Ministry of Finance http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm

World trade projections of the IMF are in Table V-6. There is significantly slower growth of the volume of world trade of goods and services from 5.9 percent in 2011 to 2.8 percent in 2012 and 3.8 percent in 2013, increasing to 5.5 percent in 2014. World trade would slow sharply for advanced economies while emerging and developing economies (EMDE) experience slower growth. World economic slowdown is more challenging with lower growth of world trade.

Table V-6, IMF, Projections of World Trade, ∆%

 

2011

2012

2013

2014

World Trade Volume (Goods and Services)

5.9

2.8

3.8

5.5

Imports

       

AE

4.6

1.2

2.2

4.1

EMDE

8.4

6.1

6.5

7.8

Exports

       

AE

5.6

2.1

2.8

4.5

EMDE

6.6

3.6

5.5

6.9

Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook databank update http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/NEW012313A.htm http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/update/01/index.htm

The JP Morgan Global All-Industry Output Index of the JP Morgan Manufacturing and Services PMI, produced by JP Morgan and Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, with high association with world GDP, increased marginally to 53.1 in Mar from 52.9 in Feb, indicating expansion at a moderate rate (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10974).This index has remained above the contraction territory of 50.0 during 44 consecutive months and the average for IQ2013 at 53.0 is slightly higher than 52.9 in IVQ2012. The employment index decreased to 51.4 in Mar relative to 52.3 in Feb with input prices rising at slower rate (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10974) David Hensley, Director of Global Economic Coordination at JP Morgan, finds continuing growth with slowing new orders and slow employment growth raising doubts on the sustainability of growth (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10974). The JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI, produced by JP Morgan and Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, increased marginally to 51.2 in Mar from 50.9 in Feb, which is the third consecutive reading above 50 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10951). New export business increased marginally for the first month after eleven consecutive monthly declines. The HSBC Brazil Composite Output Index, compiled by Markit, decreased from 52.9 in Feb to 51.0 in Mar, indicating improvement but with business activity growing at lower rates in both manufacturing and services (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10948). The HSBC Brazil Services Business Activity index, compiled by Markit, decreased from 52.1 in Feb to 50.3 in Mar ((http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10948). Andre Loes, Chief Economist, Brazil, at HSBC, finds recovering economy but within a modest forecast for 2013 lowered from 3 percent to 2.6 percent ((http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10948). The HSBC Brazil Purchasing Managers’ IndexTM (PMI) decreased from a 22-month high in Jan 2012 at 53.2 to 52.5 in Feb 2013 and 51.2 in Mar 2013 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10871). The average of 52.5 in IQ2013 was higher than the average of 51.2 for IVQ2012. Andre Loes, Chief Economist, Brazil at HSBC, finds continuing expansion in Brazil’s manufacturing with greater strength in IQ2013 than in IVQ2012 and the highest reading in IQ2011, supporting the view that the economy of Brazil is experiencing moderate recovery (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10871).

VA United States. The Markit Flash US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) seasonally adjusted increased to 54.9 in Mar from 54.3 in Feb, continuing to suggest strengthening US manufacturing activity (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10868).

New export orders registered 51.2 in Mar from 48.5 in Feb, indicating expansion at a moderate rate while output continued growth after a high of eleven months in Feb. Chris Williams, Chief Economist at Markit, finds that the survey data are consistent with growth at 2.0 percent in IQ2013 that can provide impulse to US economic growth (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10868). The Markit US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) increased to 54.6 in Mar from 54.3 in Feb (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10933). The index of new exports orders increased from 48.5 in Feb 2013 to 51.8 in Mar 2013 while total new orders were unchanged from 54.4 in Feb to 55.4 in Mar. Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds that manufacturing in the US is moving to growth of 2 percent in IQ2013 and could support growth of the US economy (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10933). The purchasing managers’ index (PMI) of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Report on Business® decreased 2.9 percentage points from 54.2 in Feb to 51.3 in Mar (http://www.ism.ws/ISMReport/MfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=12942). The index of new orders decreased 6.4 percentage points from 57.8 in Feb to 51.4 in Mar. The index of exports increased 2.5 percentage points from 53.5 in Feb to 56.0 in Mar, remaining in expansion territory. The Non-Manufacturing ISM Report on Business® PMI decreased 1.6 percentage points from 56.0 in Feb to 54.4 in Mar, indicating production growth during 44 consecutive months, while the index of new orders decreased 3.6 percentage points from 58.2 in Feb to 54.6 in Mar (http://www.ism.ws/ISMReport/NonMfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=12943). Table USA provides the country economic indicators for the US.

Table USA, US Economic Indicators

Consumer Price Index

Feb 12 months NSA ∆%: 2.0; ex food and energy ∆%: 2.0 Feb month SA ∆%: 0.7; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.2
Blog 3/17/13

Producer Price Index

Feb 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.3; ex food and energy ∆% 1.3
Feb month SA ∆% = 0.4; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.1
Blog 3/31/13

PCE Inflation

Jan 12-month NSA ∆%: headline 1.2; ex food and energy ∆% 1.3
Blog 3/31/13

Employment Situation

Household Survey: Feb Unemployment Rate SA 7.6%
Blog calculation People in Job Stress Mar: 29.6 million NSA, 18.2% of Labor Force
Establishment Survey:
Nov Nonfarm Jobs +88,000; Private +95,000 jobs created 
Feb 12-month Average Hourly Earnings Inflation Adjusted ∆%: 0.1
Blog 4/5/13

Nonfarm Hiring

Nonfarm Hiring fell from 63.8 million in 2006 to 52.0 million in 2012 or by 11.8 million
Private-Sector Hiring Jan 2013 4.078 million lower by 1.082 million than 5.160 million in Jan 2006
Blog 3/17/13

GDP Growth

BEA Revised National Income Accounts
IQ2012/IQ2011 ∆%: 2.4

IIQ2012/IIQ2011 2.1

IIIQ2012/IIIQ2011 2.6

IVQ2012/IVQ2011 1.7

IQ2012 SAAR 2.0

IIQ2012 SAAR 1.3

IIIQ2012 SAAR 3.1

IVQ2012 SAAR 0.4
Blog 3/31/13

Real Private Fixed Investment

SAAR IVQ2012 9.7 ∆% IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012: minus 11.2% Blog 3/3/13

Personal Income and Consumption

Feb month ∆% SA Real Disposable Personal Income (RDPI) SA ∆% 0.7
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (RPCE): 0.3
12-month Feb NSA ∆%:
RDPI: 0.9; RPCE ∆%: 2.0
Blog 3/31/2013

Quarterly Services Report

IVQ12/IVQ11 SA ∆%:
Information 5.4

Financial & Insurance 6.2
Blog 3/10/13

Employment Cost Index

Compensation Private IVQ2012 SA ∆%: 0.5
Dec 12 months ∆%: 2.2
Blog 2/10/13

Industrial Production

Feb month SA ∆%: 0.7
Feb 12 months SA ∆%: 2.5

Manufacturing Feb SA ∆% 0.8 Feb 12 months SA ∆% 2.0, NSA 2.2
Capacity Utilization: 79.6
Blog 3/24/13

Productivity and Costs

Nonfarm Business Productivity IVQ2012∆% SAAE -1.9; IVQ2012/IVQ2011 ∆% 0.5; Unit Labor Costs SAAE IVQ2012 ∆% 4.6; IVQ2012/IVQ2011 ∆%: 2.1

Blog 3/10/2013

New York Fed Manufacturing Index

General Business Conditions From Feb 10.04 to Mar 9.24
New Orders: From Feb 13.31 to Mar +8.18
Blog 3/24/13

Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Index

General Index from Feb -12.5 to Mar 2.0
New Orders from Feb -7.8 to Mar 0.5
Blog 3/24/13

Manufacturing Shipments and Orders

New Orders SA Feb ∆% 3.0 Ex Transport 0.3

Jan-Feb NSA New Orders 0.7 Ex transport 0.9
Blog 4/5/13

Durable Goods

Feb New Orders SA ∆%: 5.7; ex transport ∆%: -0.5
Jan-Feb 13/Jan-Feb 12 New Orders NSA ∆%: 0.6; ex transport ∆% 1.2
Blog 3/31/13

Sales of New Motor Vehicles

Jan-Mar 2013 3,688,662; Jan-Mar 2012 3,467,496. Mar 13 SAAR 15.27 million, Feb 13 SAAR 15.38 million, Mar 2012 SAAR 14.12 million

Blog 4/5/13

Sales of Merchant Wholesalers

Jan 2013/Jan 2012 NSA ∆%: Total 5.9; Durable Goods: 5.4; Nondurable
Goods: 6.2
Blog 3/10/13

Sales and Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers

Jan 13/Jan 12 NSA ∆%: Sales Total Business 4.9; Manufacturers 3.1
Retailers 6.1; Merchant Wholesalers 5.9
Blog 3/17/13

Sales for Retail and Food Services

Feb 2013/Feb 2012 ∆%: Retail and Food Services 3.6; Retail ∆% 3.6
Blog 3/17/13

Value of Construction Put in Place

Feb SAAR month SA ∆%: 1.2 Feb 12-month NSA: 6.9 Jan-Feb 2013 ∆% 6.6
Blog 4/5/13

Case-Shiller Home Prices

Jan 2013/Jan 2012 ∆% NSA: 10 Cities 7.3; 20 Cities: 8.1
∆% Jan SA: 10 Cities 1.0 ; 20 Cities: 1.0
Blog 3/31/13

FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only

Jan SA ∆% 0.6;
12 month NSA ∆%: 6.5
Blog 3/31/13

New House Sales

Feb 2013 month SAAR ∆%: minus 4.6
Jan-Feb 2013/Jan-Feb 2012 NSA ∆%: 19.0
Blog 3/31/13

Housing Starts and Permits

Feb Starts month SA ∆%: 0.8 ; Permits ∆%: 4.6
Jan-Feb 2013/Jan-Feb 2012 NSA ∆% Starts 26.0; Permits  ∆% 32.8
Blog 3/24/13

Trade Balance

Balance Jan SA -$44,448 million versus Dec -$18144 million
Exports Jan SA ∆%: -1.2 Imports Jan SA ∆%: 1.8
Goods Exports Jan 2013/2012 NSA ∆%: 4.3
Goods Imports Jan 2013/2012 NSA ∆%: 0.9
Blog 3/10/13

Export and Import Prices

Feb 12-month NSA ∆%: Imports -0.3; Exports 1.5
Blog 3/17/13

Consumer Credit

Feb ∆% annual rate: 7.8
Blog 4/5/13

Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities

Jan Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities: $25.7 billion
Major Holders of Treasury Securities: China $1264 billion; Japan $1115 billion; Total Foreign US Treasury Holdings Jan $5616 billion
Blog 3/17/13

Treasury Budget

Fiscal Year 2013/2012 ∆% Feb: Receipts 13.1; Outlays 2.1; Individual Income Taxes 17.7
Deficit Fiscal Year 2011 $1,297 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2012 $1,089,353 million

Blog 3/17/2013

CBO Budget and Economic Outlook

2012 Deficit $1089 B 7.0% GDP Debt 11,280 B 72.5% GDP

2013 Deficit $845 B, Debt 12,229 B 76.3% GDP Blog 8/26/12 11/18/12 2/10/13

Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities

Feb 2013 SAAR ∆%: Securities -3.2 Loans 2.1 Cash Assets 66.6 Deposits 4.5

Blog 3/24/13

Flow of Funds

2012 ∆ since 2007

Assets -$868.9 MM

Real estate -$3562.7 MM

Financial +$2204.3 MM

Net Worth -$46.6 MM

Blog 3/17/13

Current Account Balance of Payments

IVQ2012 +$6793 MM

%GDP 2.8

Blog 3/17/13

Links to blog comments in Table USA:

03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

3/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

3/3/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/mediocre-gdp-growth-at-16-to-20-percent.html

2/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

11/18/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

8/26/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html

Motor vehicle sales and production in the US have been in long-term structural change. Table VA-1 provides the data on new motor vehicle sales and domestic car production in the US from 1990 to 2010. New motor vehicle sales grew from 14,137 thousand in 1990 to the peak of 17,806 thousand in 2000 or 29.5 percent. In that same period, domestic car production fell from 6,231 thousand in 1990 to 5,542 thousand in 2000 or -11.1 percent. New motor vehicle sales fell from 17,445 thousand in 2005 to 11,772 in 2010 or 32.5 percent while domestic car production fell from 4,321 thousand in 2005 to 2,840 thousand in 2010 or 34.3 percent. In Jan-Mar 2013, light vehicle sales accumulated to 3,688,662, which is higher by 6.4 percent relative to 3,467,496 a year earlier (http://motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html). The seasonally-adjusted annual rate of light vehicle sales in the US reached 15.27 million in Mar 2013, lower than 15.38 million in Feb 2013 and higher than 14.12 million in Mar 2012 (http://motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html).

Table VA-1, US, New Motor Vehicle Sales and Car Production, Thousand Units

 

New Motor Vehicle Sales

New Car Sales and Leases

New Truck Sales and Leases

Domestic Car Production

1990

14,137

9,300

4,837

6,231

1991

12,725

8,589

4,136

5,454

1992

13,093

8,215

4,878

5,979

1993

14,172

8,518

5,654

5,979

1994

15,397

8,990

6,407

6,614

1995

15,106

8,536

6,470

6,340

1996

15,449

8,527

6,922

6,081

1997

15,490

8,273

7,218

5,934

1998

15,958

8,142

7,816

5,554

1999

17,401

8,697

8,704

5,638

2000

17,806

8,852

8,954

5,542

2001

17,468

8,422

9,046

4,878

2002

17,144

8,109

9,036

5,019

2003

16,968

7,611

9,357

4,510

2004

17,298

7,545

9,753

4,230

2005

17,445

7,720

9,725

4,321

2006

17,049

7,821

9,228

4,367

2007

16,460

7,618

8,683

3,924

2008

13,494

6,814

6.680

3,777

2009

10,601

5,456

5,154

2,247

2010

11,772

5,729

6,044

2,840

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/wholesale_retail_trade/motor_vehicle_sales.html

Chart VA-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve provides output of motor vehicles and parts in the United States from 1972 to 2013. Output has stagnated since the late 1990s.

clip_image004

Chart VA-1, US, Motor Vehicles and Parts Output, 1972-2013

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/

Manufacturing jobs decreased 3,000 in Mar 2013 relative to Feb 2013, seasonally adjusted and increased 25,000 in Mar 2013 relative to Feb 2013, not seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-10. Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted increased 80,000 from Mar 2012 to Mar 2013 or at the average monthly rate of 6,667. There are effects of the weaker economy and international trade together with the yearly adjustment of labor statistics. In the six months ending in Feb 2013, United States national industrial production accumulated increase of 2.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.1 percent, which is higher than 2.5 percent growth in 12 months. Business equipment decreased 0.4 percent in Sep, decreased 1.2 percent in Oct, increased 3.1 percent in Nov, increased 0.5 percent in Dec, fell 1.3 percent in Jan, and increased 2.5 percent in Feb 2013, growing 3.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013 and at the annual equivalent rate of 6.4 percent in the six months ending in Feb 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html). Capacity utilization of total industry is analyzed by the Fed in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/): “The capacity utilization rate for total industry increased to 79.6 percent [in Feb 2013], a rate that is 0.6 percentage points below its long-run (1972--2012) average.” United States industry is apparently decelerating with some strength at the margin. Manufacturing increased 0.8 percent in Feb 2013 seasonally adjusted, increasing 2.2 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months, and increased 3.0 percent in the six months ending in Feb 2013 or at the annual equivalent rate of 6.1 percent. Table VA-2 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 86.3 percent in US national income in IVQ2012 and 86.4 percent in IIIQ2012. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Mar 2013, there were 134.485 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 112.205 million NSA in Mar 2013 accounted for 83.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 134.485 million, of which 11.902 million, or 10.6 percent of total private jobs and 8.9 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-producing jobs were 93.961 million NSA in Mar 2013, or 69.9 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.7 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 11.1 percent in US national income in IVQ2011 and 11.1 percent in IIIQ2012, as shown in Table VA-2. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.

Table VA-2, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total

 

SAAR
IIQ2012

% Total

SAAR IIIQ2012

% Total

National Income WCCA

13,833.6

100.0

13,976.7

100.0

Domestic Industries

13,586.3

98.2

13,733.6

98.3

Private Industries

11,933.2

86.3

12,075.0

86.4

    Agriculture

131.7

0.9

138.6

1.0

    Mining

208.3

1.5

205.3

1.5

    Utilities

214.6

1.6

216.6

1.6

    Construction

583.7

4.2

589.3

4.2

    Manufacturing

1548.1

11.2

1548.9

11.1

       Durable Goods

894.3

6.5

892.8

6.4

       Nondurable Goods

653.8

4.7

656.1

4.7

    Wholesale Trade

853.5

6.2

837.8

6.0

     Retail Trade

951.9

6.9

957.4

6.9

     Transportation & WH

414.5

3.0

415.5

3.0

     Information

499.1

3.6

504.4

3.6

     Finance, Insurance, RE

2237.5

16.2

2330.6

16.7

     Professional, BS

1971.7

14.3

2003.4

14.3

     Education, Health Care

1378.1

10.0

1385.6

9.9

     Arts, Entertainment

540.4

3.9

539.4

3.9

     Other Services

400.0

2.9

402.3

2.9

Government

1653.0

11.9

1658.6

11.9

Rest of the World

247.3

1.8

243.1

1.7

Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Manufacturers’ shipments increased 0.9 percent in Feb 2013 after increasing 0.4 percent in Jan 2013 and changing 0.0 percent in Dec 2012. New orders increased 3.0 percent in Feb 2013 following decrease by 1.0 percent in Jan 2013 and increase by 1.3 percent in Dec, as shown in Table VA-3. These data are very volatile. Volatility is illustrated by increase of 2642.2 percent of new orders of nondefense aircraft in Sep 2012 following decline by 97.2 percent in Aug. New orders excluding transportation equipment increased 0.3 percent in Feb 2013. Capital goods new orders, indicating investment, increased 13.4 percent in Feb 2013 after decreasing 11.4 percent in Jan and increasing 11.5 percent in Dec. New orders of nondefense capital goods increased 9.6 percent in Feb 2013, 2.0 percent in Jan and 1.0 percent in Dec. Excluding more volatile aircraft, capital goods orders decreased 3.2 percent in Feb 2013 after increasing 6.7 percent in Jan and decreasing 0.8 percent in Dec.

Table VA-3, US, Value of Manufacturers’ Shipments and New Orders, SA, Month ∆%

 

Feb 2013 ∆%

Jan 2013 
∆%

Dec 2012 
∆%

Total

     

   S

0.9

0.4

0.0

   NO

3.0

-1.0

1.3

Excluding
Transport

     

    S

0.8

0.8

-0.2

    NO

0.3

2.0

-0.1

Excluding
Defense

     

     S

0.9

0.7

-0.1

     NO

2.4

1.4

-0.2

Durable Goods

     

      S

1.0

-0.7

0.6

      NO

5.6

-3.7

3.6

Machinery

     

      S

2.5

0.4

-1.1

      NO

-2.5

15.8

-3.0

Computers & Electronic Products

     

      S

-0.5

-3.1

1.3

      NO

-0.5

-5.0

2.7

Computers

     

      S

-3.2

-26.8

23.4

      NO

9.1

-25.0

5.4

Transport
Equipment

     

      S

1.6

-1.8

0.8

      NO

21.8

-17.7

9.9

Automobiles

     

      S

6.6

1.5

2.2

Motor Vehicles

     

      S

1.1

-2.1

-1.5

      NO

1.4

-1.3

-1.5

Nondefense
Aircraft

     

      S

-10.3

-6.5

1.3

      NO

95.1

-23.8

-3.2

Capital Goods

     

      S

0.6

-2.7

1.1

      NO

13.4

-11.4

11.5

Nondefense Capital Goods

     

      S

0.1

-1.6

0.5

      NO

9.6

2.0

1.0

Capital Goods ex Aircraft

     

       S

1.9

-0.7

0.1

       NO

-3.2

6.7

-0.8

Nondurable Goods

     

       S

0.8

1.4

-0.6

       NO

0.8

1.4

-0.6

Note: Mfg: manufacturing; S: shipments; NO: new orders; Transport: transportation

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/

Chart VA-2 of the US Census Bureau provides new orders of manufacturers from Mar 2012 to Feb 2013. There is significant volatility that prevents discerning clear trends

clip_image006

Chart VA-2, US, Manufacturers’ New Orders 2010-2011 Seasonally Adjusted, Month ∆%

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/briefrm/esbr/www/esbr022.html

Chart VA-3 of the US Census Bureau provides total value of manufacturers’ new orders, seasonally adjusted, from 1992 to 2013. Seasonal adjustment reduces sharp oscillations. The series dropped nearly vertically during the global recession but rose along a path even steeper than in the high-growth period before the recession. The final segment suggests deceleration but similar segments are found in earlier periods followed with continuing growth and stability currently.

clip_image007

Chart VA-3, US, Value of Total Manufacturers’ New Orders, Seasonally Adjusted, 1992-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/

Additional perspective on manufacturers’ shipments and new orders is provided by Table VA-3. Values are cumulative millions of dollars in Jan-Feb 2013 not seasonally adjusted (NSA). Shipments of all manufacturing industries in Jan-Feb 2013 total $905.6 billion and new orders total $915.9 billion, growing respectively by 1.6 percent and 0.7 percent relative to the same period in 2012. Excluding transportation equipment, shipments grew 1.0 percent and new orders increased 0.9 percent. Excluding defense, shipments grew 1.7 percent and new orders grew 1.1 percent. Durable goods shipments reached $422.0 billion in Jan-Feb 2013, or 46.6 percent of the total, growing by 2.5 percent, and new orders $432.4 billion, or 47.2 percent of the total, growing by 0.7 percent. Important information in Table VA-4 is the large share of nondurable goods with shipments of $483.6 billion or 53.4 percent of the total, growing by 0.8 percent. Capital goods have relatively high value of $140.8 billion for shipments, growing 0.5 percent, and new orders $158.7 billion, declining 5.3 percent, which could be an indicator of future investment. Excluding aircraft, capital goods shipments reached $117.1 billion, growing 1.5 percent, and new orders $127.9 billion, increasing 0.3 percent. There is no suggestion in these data that the US economy is close to recession but manufacturing accounts for 11.1 percent of US national income in IVQ2012.

Table VA-4, US, Value of Manufacturers’ Shipments and New Orders, NSA, Millions of Dollars 

Jan-Feb 2013

Shipments

∆% 2013/
2012

New Orders

∆% 2013/
2012

Total

905,606

1.6

915,987

0.7

Excluding Transport

784,061

1.0

787,154

0.9

Excluding Defense

887,119

1.7

898,422

1.1

Durable Goods

422,011

2.5

432,392

0.7

Machinery

61,287

7.8

67,800

4.8

Computers & Electronic Products

48,712

-6.3

37,104

-11.2

Computers

1,356

-42.7

1,453

-36.7

Transport Equipment

121,545

5.7

128,833

-0.7

Automobiles

20,471

30.8

   

Motor Vehicles

36,490

0.9

128,833

-0.7

Nondefense Aircraft

15,186

-3.0

24,181

-19.4

Capital Goods

140,792

0.5

158,672

-5.3

Nondefense Capital Goods

126,044

0.7

145,150

-4.2

Capital Goods ex Aircraft

117,135

1.5

127,885

0.3

Nondurable Goods

483,595

0.8

483,395

0.8

Food Products

120,660

3.1

   

Petroleum Refineries

131,274

3.2

   

Chemical Products

117,989

-3.7

   

Note: Transport: transportation Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/

Chart VA-5 of the US Census Bureau provides value of manufacturer’s new orders not seasonally adjusted from Jan 1992 to Feb 2013. Fluctuations are evident, which are smoothed by seasonal adjustment in the earlier Chart VA-4. The series drops nearly vertically during the global contraction and then resumes growth in a steep upward trend, flattening recently.

clip_image008

Chart VA-4, US, Value of Total Manufacturers’ New Orders, Not Seasonally Adjusted, 1992-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/

Construction spending at seasonally-adjusted annualized rate (SAAR) reached $885.1 billion in Feb 2013, which was higher by 1.2 percent than in the prior month of Jan 2013, as shown in Table VA-5. Residential investment, with $309.6 billion accounting for 35.0 percent of total value of construction, increased 2.0 percent in Feb and nonresidential investment, with $575.6 billion accounting for 65.0 percent of the total, increased 0.7 percent. Public construction increased 0.9 percent while private construction increased 1.3 percent. Data in Table VA-5 show that nonresidential construction at $575.6 billion is much higher in value than residential construction at $309.6 billion while total private construction at $613.0 billion is much higher than public construction at $272.1 billion, all in SAAR. Residential and nonresidential construction contributed positively to growth of GDP in the US in all quarters in 2012 with exception of deduction of 0.19 percentage points by nonresidential construction in IIIQ2012. Nonresidential investment deducted 0.19 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2012 while residential construction added 0.31 percentage points and nonresidential construction added 1.28 percentage points in IVQ2012 with residential construction adding 0.41 percentage points. In 2012, residential construction added 0.27 percentage points to GDP growth while deducting 0.03 percentage points in 2011. Nonresidential construction added 0.78 percentage points to GDP growth in 2012 and 0.80 percentage points in 2011 (Section IA1 http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm).

Table VA-5, US, Value of Construction Put in Place in the United States Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate Million Dollars and Month and 12-Month ∆%  

 

Feb 2013   SAAR  $ Millions

Month ∆%

12-Month

∆%

Total

885,127

1.2

7.9

Residential

309,557

2.0

19.2

Nonresidential

575,569

0.7

2.6

Total Private

613,023

1.3

12.6

Private Residential

303,379

2.2

20.1

New Single Family

158,068

4.3

34.1

New Multi-Family

26,994

-2.2

51.8

Private Nonresidential

309,644

0.4

6.1

Total Public

272,104

0.9

-1.5

Public Residential

6,179

-4.9

-11.7

Public Nonresidential

265,925

1.1

-1.2

SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate; B: billions

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/c30index.html

Further information on construction spending is provided in Table VA-5. The original monthly estimates not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) and their 12-month rates of change are provided in the first two columns while the SAARs and their monthly changes are provided in the final two columns. There has been improvement in construction in the US in 2011 but another bump in early 2012. On a monthly basis, construction fell three consecutive months from Dec 2010 to Feb 2011, increasing in ten of the eleven months from Mar 2011 to Jan 2012, with sole decline of 3.0 percent in Jul 2011. Improvement was interrupted in 2012 with decline of 0.5 percent in Feb 2012, further decline of 0.3 percent in Mar and recovery of 0.9 percent in Apr, 1.7 percent in May and 0.8 percent in Jun with strong 1.1 percent in Aug and 1.6 percent in Oct 2012. The value of construction contracted 2.1 percent in Jan 2013, rebounding 1.2 percent in Feb 2013. The 12-month rates of change improved from minus 8.6 percent in Apr 2011 to the first positive 12-month percentage change of 0.7 percent in Nov 2011 and further improvement with 10.7 percent in Dec 2012, 6.4 percent in Jan 2013 and 6.9 percent in Feb 2013.

Table VA-6, US, Value and Percentage Change in Value of Construction Put in Place, Dollars Millions and ∆%

 

Value NSA
Month $ Millions

12-Month ∆% NSA

Value
SAAR
$ Millions

Month ∆% SA*

Feb 2013

59,970

6.9

885,127

1.2

Jan

60,132

6.4

874,811

-2.1

Dec 2012

69520

10.7

893,634

0.1

Nov

76,737

12.1

892,448

1.9

Oct

81,438

11.1

876,213

1.6

Sep

79,357

7.9

862,220

0.7

Aug

81,457

8.5

855,916

1.1

Jul

78,070

11.6

846,645

0.2

Jun

76,491

7.3

845,072

0.8

May

71,635

8.8

838,778

1.7

Apr

66,201

9.1

825,133

0.9

Mar

60,939

8.6

817,842

-0.3

Feb

56,108

11.8

820,677

-0.5

Jan

56,535

10.9

824,687

0.5

Dec 2011

62,825

4.4

820,614

2.1

Nov

68,476

0.7

804,046

1.0

Oct

73,282

-0.3

795,733

0.7

Sep

73,515

-1.7

790,294

0.5

Aug

75,101

-1.0

786,308

3.0

Jul

69,929

-4.3

763,468

-3.0

Jun

71,297

-3.7

786,784

1.4

May

65,845

-4.4

775,837

2.7

Apr

60,682

-8.6

755,420

0.3

Mar

56,130

-6.8

753,433

1.0

Feb

50,184

-7.1

746,056

-0.9

Jan

50,971

-8.3

752,638

-3.5

Dec 2010

60,202

-6.1

779,895

-2.3

SAAR: Seasonally-adjusted Annual Rate

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/c30index.html

The sharp contraction of the value of construction in the US is revealed by Table VA-7. Construction spending in Jan-Feb 2013, not seasonally adjusted, reached $120.1 billion, which is higher by 6.6 percent than $103.7 billion in the same period in 2012. The depth of the contraction is shown by the decline of construction spending from $163.8 billion in Jan-Feb 2006 to only $120.1 billion in the same period in 2013, or decline by minus 26.7 percent. The comparable decline from Jan-Feb 2005 to Jan-Feb 2013 is minus 19.4 percent. Construction spending in Jan-Feb 2013 increased by 0.2 percent relative to the same period in 2003. Construction spending is lower by 11.5 percent in Jan 2013-Feb relative to the same period in 2009. Construction has been weaker than the economy as a whole.

Table VA-7, US, Value of Construction Put in Place in the United States, Not Seasonally Adjusted, $ Millions and ∆%

Jan-Feb 2013 $ MM

120,102

Jan-Feb 2012

112,643

∆% to 2013

6.6

Jan-Feb 2011 $ MM

103,691

∆% to 2013

15.8

Jan-Feb 2010 $ MM

112,925

∆% to 2013

6.4

Jan-Feb 2009 $MM

135,692

∆% to 2013

-11.5

Jan-Feb 2006 $ MM

163,757

∆% to 2013

-26.7

Jan-Feb 2005 $ MM

148,950

∆% to 2013

-19.4

Jan-Feb 2003 $ MM

119,820

∆% to 2013

0.2

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/c30index.html

Chart VA-5 of the US Census Bureau provides value of construction spending in the US not seasonally adjusted from 2002 to 2013. There are wide oscillations requiring seasonal adjustment to compare adjacent data. There was sharp decline during the global recession followed in recent periods by a stationary series that may be moving upward again.

clip_image009

Chart VA-5, Value of Construction Spending not Seasonally Adjusted, Millions of Dollars, 2002-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/c30index.html

Monthly construction spending in the US in Jan-Feb 2013 and Nov-Dec not seasonally adjusted is shown in Table VA-8 for the years between 2002 and 2013. The value of $59.97 billion in Feb 2013 is just higher by 6.9 percent than $56.1 billion in Feb 2012. Construction fell by 26.4 percent from the peak of $81.5 billion in Feb 2006 to $59.97 billion in Feb 2013. The data are not adjusted for inflation or changes in quality.

Table VA-8, US, Value of Construction Spending Not Seasonally Adjusted, Millions of Dollars

Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

Nov

Dec

2002

59,516

58,588

63,782

71,362

63,984

2003

59,877

58,526

64,506

77,915

71,050

2004

64,934

64,138

73,238

86,394

77,733

2005

71,474

72,048

81,345

97,549

88,172

2006

81,058

81,478

92,855

95,339

86,436

2007

79,406

79,177

88,905

94,822

84,218

2008

77,349

77,227

82,779

86,067

76,645

2009

66,944

66,296

71,624

71,906

64,098

2010

55,586

54,019

60,228

68,019

60,202

2011

50,971

50,184

56,130

68,476

62,825

2012

56,535

56,108

60,939

76,737

69,520

2013

60,132

59,970

NA

NA

NA

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/c30index.html

Chart VA-6 of the US Census Bureau shows SAARs of construction spending for the US since 1993. Construction spending surged in nearly vertical slope after the stimulus of 2003 combining near zero interest rates and subsequent slow adjustment in 17 doses of increases by 25 basis points between Jun 2004 and Jun 2006 together with other housing subsidies. Construction spending collapsed after subprime mortgages defaulted with the fed funds rate increasing from 1.00 percent in Jun 2004 to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006. Subprime mortgages were programmed for refinancing in two years after increases in homeowner equity in the assumption that fed funds rates would remain low forever or increase in small increments (Gorton 2009EFM see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Price declines of houses or even uncertainty prevented refinancing of subprime mortgages that defaulted, causing the financial crisis that eventually triggered the global recession. Chart VA-6 shows a trend of increase in the final segment but it is difficult to assess if it will be sustained.

clip_image011

Chart VA-6, US, Construction Expenditures SAAR 1993-2012

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/briefrm/esbr/www/esbr050.html

Construction spending at SAARs in the four months Jan-Mar and Dec is shown in Table VA-9 for the years between 2002 and 2013. There is a peak in 2005 to 2007 with subsequent collapse of SAARs and rebound in 2011-2013.

Table VA-9, US, Value of Construction Spending SAAR Millions of Dollars

Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

Dec

2002

858,654

862,338

844,551

855,921

2003

863,855

859,225

851,132

948,491

2004

938,826

938,656

960,946

1,037,684

2005

1,036,187

1,056,492

1,065,262

1,178,305

2006

1,183,861

1,199,767

1,213,270

1,153,491

2007

1,149,899

1,156,008

1,167,402

1,108,958

2008

1,106,047

1,092,331

1,094,910

993,515

2009

962,704

959,907

954,984

832,565

2010

816,132

795,808

805,985

779,895

2011

752,638

746,056

753,433

820,614

2012

824,687

820,677

817,842

893,634

2013

874,811

885,127

NA

NA

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/c30index.html

Chart VA-7 of the US Census Bureau provides SAARs of value of construction from 2002 to 2013. There is clear acceleration after 2003 when fed funds rates were fixed in at 1.0 percent from Jun 2003 until Jun 2004. Construction peaked in 2005-2006, stabilizing in 2007 at a lower level and then collapsed in a nearly vertical drop until 2011 with increases into 2012 and marginal drop in Jan 2013 followed b increase in Feb 2013.

clip_image012

Chart VA-7, US, Construction Expenditures SAAR 2002-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/c30/c30index.html

Annual available data for the value of construction put in place in the US between 1993 and 2012 are provided in Table VA-10. Data from 1993 to 2001 are available for public and private construction with breakdown in residential and nonresidential only for private construction. Data beginning in 2002 provide aggregate residential and nonresidential values. Total construction value put in place in the US increased 76.0 percent between 1993 and 2012 but most of the growth, 65.3 percent, was concentrated in 1993 to 2000 with increase of 6.4 percent between 2000 and 2012. Total value of construction increased 0.8 percent between 2002 and 2012 with value of nonresidential construction increasing 28.4 percent while value of residential construction fell 29.8 percent. Value of total construction fell 25.0 percent between 2005 and 2012, with value of residential construction declining 54.3 percent while value of nonresidential construction rose 17.7 percent. Value of total construction fell 26.8 percent between 2006 and 2012, with value of nonresidential construction increasing 4.6 percent while value of residential construction fell 54.5 percent. In 2002, nonresidential construction had a share of 52.6 percent in total construction while the share of residential construction was 47.4 percent. In 2012, the share of nonresidential construction in total value rose to 67.0 percent while that of residential construction fell to 33.0 percent.

Table VA-10, Annual Value of Construction Put in Place 1993-2012, Millions of Dollars and ∆% 

 

Total

Private Nonresidential

Private Residential

1993

485,548

150,006

208,180

1994

531,892

160,438

241,033

1995

548,666

180,534

228,121

1996

599,693

195,523

257,495

1997

631,853

213,720

264,696

1998

688,515

237,394

296,343

1999

744,551

249,167

326,302

2000

802,756

275,293

346,138

2001

840,249

273,922

364,414

 

Total

Total Nonresidential

Total Residential

2002

847,874

445,914

401,960

2003

891,497

440,246

451,251

2004

991,356

452,948

538,408

2005

1,140,136

486,629

617,507

2006

1,167,222

547,408

619,814

2007

1,152,351

651,883

500,468

2008

1,067,564

709,818

357,746

2009

903,201

649,273

253,928

2010

804,561

555,449

249,112

2011

778,238

532,552

245,686

2012

854,490

572,443

282,047

∆% 1993-2012

76.0

   

∆% 1993-2000

65.3

   

∆% 2000-2012

6.4

   

∆% 2002-2012

0.8

28.4

-29.8

∆% 2005-2012

-25.0

17.7

-54.3

∆% 2006-2012

-26.8

4.6

-54.5

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/

Chart VA-8 shows sharp growth of residential construction spending in the US from 2002 to 2006. The value of construction spending dropped sharply during the global recession and has remained at a low plateau with an apparent increase in the final segment.

clip_image013

Chart, VA-8, US, Residential Construction, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Millions of Dollars, 2002-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/

Nonresidential construction has been more resilient. Chart VA-9 provides the value of nonresidential construction not seasonally adjusted. There was more moderate growth of nonresidential construction with more prudent business management and fewer subsidies. Nonresidential construction also declined during the global recession but less sharply than residential construction and has remained at a lower plateau.

clip_image014

Chart, VA-9, US, Nonresidential Construction, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Millions of Dollars, 2002-2013

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/m3/

The report of consumer credit outstanding of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is provided in Table VA-11. The data are in seasonally-adjusted annual rates both percentage changes and billions of dollars. The estimate of consumer credit “covers most short- and intermediate-term credit extended to individuals, excluding loans secured by real estate (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm). Consumer credit is divided into two categories. (1) Revolving consumer credit (REV in Table VA-11) consists mainly of unsecured credit cards. (2) Non-revolving consumer credit (NREV in Table VA-11) “includes automobile loans and all other loans not included in revolving credit, such as loans for mobile homes, education, boats, trailers or vacations” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm). In Feb 2013, revolving credit was $848 billion, or 30.3 percent of total consumer credit of $2799 billion, and non-revolving credit was $1951 billion, or 69.7 percent of total consumer credit outstanding. Consumer credit grew at relatively high rates before the recession beginning in IVQ2007 (Dec) and extending to IIQ2009 (Jun) as dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research or NBER (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Percentage changes of consumer credit outstanding fell already in 2009. Rates were still negative in 2010 with decline of 0.7 percent in annual data and sharp decline of 7.6 percent in revolving credit. In Dec 2012, total consumer credit grew at 6.3 percent with decrease of revolving credit at 3.0 percent and increase of non-revolving credit at 10.4 percent. Growth continued in Feb 2013 with total credit at 7.8 percent, revolving at 0.8 percent and non-revolving at 10.9 percent.

Table VA-11, US, Consumer Credit Outstanding, SA, Annual Rate and Billions of Dollars

 

Total ∆%

REV ∆%

NRV ∆%

Total $B

REV $B

NREV $B

2013

           

Feb

7.8

0.8

10.9

2799

848

1951

Jan

5.5

2.3

6.9

2781

847

1934

2012

           

Dec

6.3

-3.0

10.4

2768

846

1922

IVQ

6.5

0.3

9.3

2768

846

1922

IIIQ

4.9

0.4

6.9

2724

845

1879

IIQ

6.4

1.0

8.9

2691

844

1847

IQ

5.4

-0.1

8.0

2651

842

1809

2011

           

IVQ

5.4

1.7

7.2

2616

842

1773

2012

5.9

0.4

8.5

2768

846

1922

2011

3.7

0.2

5.5

2616

842

1773

2010

-0.7

-7.6

3.4

2522

841

1681

2009

-4.4

-8.8

-1.5

2420

917

1503

2008

0.8

0.2

1.2

2526

1005

1521

2007

5.9

8.5

4.3

2529

1008

1521

Note: REV: Revolving; NREV: Non-revolving; ∆%: simple annual rate from unrounded data; Total may not add exactly because of rounding

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm

Chart VA-10 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System total consumer credit outstanding in millions of dollars measured in the right axis and the finance rate on 24-month personal loans at commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, measured on the left axis. There was sharp decline of total consumer loans outstanding during the global recession followed by strong recovery. There is long-term decline of the financing rate.

clip_image015

Chart VA-10, US, Total Consumer Credit Owned and Securitized NSA and Financing Rate on 24-month Personal Loans at Commercial Banks NSA, Millions of Dollars and Percent, Feb 1972-Feb 2013

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm

Chart VA-11 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides percentage changes of total consumer credit outstanding in the US and the financing rate on 24-month personal consumer loans at commercial banks, since 1972. The shaded bars are the cyclical contraction dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Consumer credit is cyclical, declining during contractions as shown by negative percentage changes during economic contractions. There is clear upward trend in 2012-2013 but with significant fluctuations.

clip_image016

Chart VA-11, US, Percent Change of Total Consumer Credit, Seasonally Adjusted at an Annual Rate and Finance Rate on 24-month Personal Loans at Commercial Banks NSA, Feb 1972-Feb 2013

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm

VB Japan. Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1210a.pdf). For fiscal 2013, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 1.3 and 1.8 percent, with domestic producer price inflation (Corporate Goods Price Index, CGPI) in the range of 0.1 to 0.7 percent and the all items CPI less fresh food of 0.2 to 0.6 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct. The Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan released on Jan 22, 2013, a “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf) with the important change of increasing the inflation target of monetary policy from 1 percent to 2 percent:

“The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial system stability. The Bank aims to achieve price stability on a sustainable basis, given that there are various factors that affect prices in the short run.

The Bank recognizes that the inflation rate consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis will rise as efforts by a wide range of entities toward strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan's economy make progress. Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index.

Under the price stability target specified above, the Bank will pursue monetary easing and aim to achieve this target at the earliest possible time. Taking into consideration that it will take considerable time before the effects of monetary policy permeate the economy, the Bank will ascertain whether there is any significant risk to the sustainability of economic growth, including from the accumulation of financial imbalances.”

The Bank of Japan also provided explicit analysis of its view on price stability in a “Background note regarding the Bank’s thinking on price stability” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/data/rel130123a1.pdf http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130123a.htm/). The Bank of Japan also amended “Principal terms and conditions for the Asset Purchase Program” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130122a.pdf): “Asset purchases and loan provision shall be conducted up to the maximum outstanding amounts by the end of 2013. From January 2014, the Bank shall purchase financial assets and provide loans every month, the amount of which shall be determined pursuant to the relevant rules of the Bank.”

Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:

  1. Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  2. Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html ), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
  3. Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
  4. Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.

Table VB-BOJF, Bank of Japan, Forecasts of the Majority of Members of the Policy Board, % Year on Year

Fiscal Year
Date of Forecast

Real GDP

Domestic CGPI

CPI All Items Less Fresh Food

2011

     

Apr 2012

-0.2 to –0.2
[-0.2]

+1.7

0.0

Jan 2012

-0.4 to –0.3
[-0.4]

+1.8 to +1.9
[+1.8]

-0.1 to 0.0
[-0.1]

2012

     

Oct 2012

+1.4 to +1.6

[+1.5]

-1.2 to -0.9

[-1.1]

-0.1 to -0.1

[-0.1]

Jul 2012

+2.2 to +2.4

[+2.2]

-0.3 to 0.0

[-0.2]

+0.1 to +0.3

[+0.2]

Apr 2012

+2.1 to +2.4
[+2.3]

+0.4 to +0.7
[+0.6]

+0.1 to +0.4
[+0.3]

Jan 2012

+1.8 to +2.1
[+2.0]

-0.1 to +0.2
[+0.1]

0.0 to +0.2
[+0.1]

2013

     

Oct 2012

+1.3 to +1.8

[+1.6]

+0.1 to +0.7

[+0.5]

+0.2 to +0.6

[+0.4]

Jul 2012

+1.6 to +1.8

[+1.7]

+0.6 to +0.8

[+0.6]

+0.5 to +0.7

[+0.7]

Apr 2012

+1.6 to +1.8
[+1.7]

+0.7 to +0.9
[+0.8]

+0.5 to +0.7
[+0.7]

Jan 2012

+1.4 to +1.7
[+1.6]

+0.6 to 1.0
[+0.8]

+0.4 to +0.5
[+0.5]

2014

     

Oct 2012

+0.2 to +0.7]

[+0.6]

+3.7 to +4.4

[+4.2]

+2.4 to +3.0

[+2.8]

Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members

Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1210a.pdf

Private-sector activity in Japan expanded strongly with the Markit Composite Output PMI Index increasing from 50.2 in Feb to 53.2 in Mar, which is the highest reading in a year (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10950). Paul Smith, economist at Markit and author of the report, finds that the survey data suggest growth of the economy of Japan possibly even higher than 0,5 percent in IQ2013 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10824). The Markit Business Activity Index of Services increased from 51.1 in Feb to 54.0 in Mar, which is the highest level since Sep 2007 when the survey began (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10950). Paul Smith, Senior Economist at Markit and author of the report, finds signs of growth in the beginning of 2013 with confidence in demand for services (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10950). Markit/JMMA Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI™), seasonally adjusted, increased from 48.5 in Feb to 50.4 in Mar for the first reading above 50.0 since May 2012 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10885). Foreign business grew at the fastest rate in more than two years with respondents attributing growth to devaluation of the yen and strength in Asia. Andrew Harker, Senior Economist at Markit and author of the report, finds resumption of growth in manufacturing in Japan in Mar 2013 both in new orders and output (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10885).Table JPY provides the country data table for Japan.

Table JPY, Japan, Economic Indicators

Historical GDP and CPI

1981-2010 Real GDP Growth and CPI Inflation 1981-2010
Blog 8/9/11 Table 26

Corporate Goods Prices

Feb ∆% +0.4
12 months ∆% minus 0.1
Blog 3/17/13

Consumer Price Index

Feb NSA ∆% -0.2; Feb 12 months NSA ∆% -0.7
Blog 3/31/13

Real GDP Growth

IVQ2012 ∆%: 0.0 on IIIQ2012;  IVQ2012 SAAR 0.2;
∆% from quarter a year earlier: 0.5 %
Blog 3/10/13

Employment Report

Feb Unemployed 2.77 million

Change in unemployed since last year: minus 120 thousand
Unemployment rate: 4.2%
Blog 3/31/13

All Industry Indices

Jan month SA ∆% -1.4
12-month NSA ∆% -0.5

Blog 3/24/13

Industrial Production

Feb SA month ∆%: -0.1
12-month NSA ∆% -11.0
Blog 3/31/13

Machine Orders

Total Dec ∆% -1.6

Private ∆%: -9.8 Dec ∆% Excluding Volatile Orders 2.8
Blog 2/10/13

Tertiary Index

Jan month SA ∆% -1.1
Jan 12 months NSA ∆% 0.3
Blog 3/17/13

Wholesale and Retail Sales

Feb 12 months:
Total ∆%: -1.6
Wholesale ∆%: -1.3
Retail ∆%: -2.3
Blog 3/31/13

Family Income and Expenditure Survey

Feb 12-month ∆% total nominal consumption 0.1, real 0.8 Blog 3/31/13

Trade Balance

Exports Feb 12 months ∆%: -2.9 Imports Feb 12 months ∆% 11.9 Blog 3/24/13

Links to blog comments in Table JPY:

03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

3/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

2/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

8/9/11 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/turbulence-in-world-financial-markets.html

VC China. China estimates an index of nonmanufacturing purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 1200 nonmanufacturing enterprises across the country (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Table CIPMNM provides this index and components. The index fell from 58.0 in Mar to 55.2 in May but climbed to 56.7 in Jun, which is lower than 58.0 in Mar and 57.3 in Feb but higher than in any other of the months in 2012. In Jul 2012 the index fell marginally to 55.6 and then to 56.3 in Aug and 53.7 in Sep but rebounded to 55.5 in Oct and 55.6 in Nov 2012. Improvement continued with 56.1 in Dec 2012 and 56.2 in Jan 2013, declining marginally to 54.5 in Feb 2013 and 55.6 in Mar 2013.

Table CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

 

Total Index

New Orders

Interm.
Input Prices

Subs Prices

Exp

Mar 2013

55.6

52.0

55.3

50.0

62.4

Feb

54.5

51.8

56.2

51.1

62.7

Jan

56.2

53.7

58.2

50.9

61.4

Dec 2012

56.1

54.3

53.8

50.0

64.6

Nov

55.6

53.2

52.5

48.4

64.6

Oct

55.5

51.6

58.1

50.5

63.4

Sep

53.7

51.8

57.5

51.3

60.9

Aug

56.3

52.7

57.6

51.2

63.2

Jul

55.6

53.2

49.7

48.7

63.9

Jun

56.7

53.7

52.1

48.6

65.5

May

55.2

52.5

53.6

48.5

65.4

Apr

56.1

52.7

57.9

50.3

66.1

Mar

58.0

53.5

60.2

52.0

66.6

Feb

57.3

52.7

59.0

51.2

63.8

Jan

55.7

52.2

58.2

51.1

65.3

Notes: Interm.: Intermediate; Subs: Subscription; Exp: Business Expectations

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart CIPMNM provides China’s nonmanufacturing purchasing managers’ index. There was slowing of the general index in Apr 2012 after the increase in Jan-Mar 2012 and further decline to 55.2 in May 2012 but increase to 56.7 in Jun 2012 with marginal decline to 55.6 in Jul 2012 and 56.3 in Aug 2012 and sharper drop to 53.7 in Sep 2012, rebounding to 55.5 in Oct 2012, 55.6 in Nov 2012, 56.1 in Dec 2012 and 55.6 in Mar 2013.

clip_image017

Chart CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Table CIPMMFG provides the index of purchasing managers of manufacturing seasonally adjusted of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The general index (IPM) rose from 50.5 in Jan 2012 to 53.3 in Apr and declined to 50.1 in Jul and to the contraction zone at 49.2 in Aug and 49.8 in Sep, climbing above 50.0 to 50.2 in Oct, 50.6 in Nov-Dec 2012 and 50.9 in Mar 2013. The index of new orders (NOI) fell from 54.5 in Apr 2012 to 49.0 in Jul and 48.7 in Aug, climbing above 50.0, 51.2 in Nov 2012-Dec 2012 and 52.3 in Mar 2013. The index of employment also fell from 51.0 in Apr to 49.1 in Aug and further down to 48.7 in Nov 2012, 49.9 in Dec 2012 and 49.8 in Mar 2013.

Table CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

 

IPM

PI

NOI

INV

EMP

SDEL

Mar 2013

50.9

52.7

52.3

47.5

49.8

51.1

Feb

50.1

51.2

50.1

49.5

47.6

48.3

Jan

50.4

51.3

51.6

50.1

47.8

50.0

Dec 2012

50.6

52.0

51.2

47.3

49.0

48.8

Nov

50.6

52.5

51.2

47.9

48.7

49.9

Oct

50.2

52.1

50.4

47.3

49.2

50.1

Sep

49.8

51.3

49.8

47.0

48.9

49.5

Aug

49.2

50.9

48.7

45.1

49.1

50.0

Jul

50.1

51.8

49.0

48.5

49.5

49.0

Jun

50.2

52.0

49.2

48.2

49.7

49.1

May

50.4

52.9

49.8

45.1

50.5

49.0

Apr

53.3

57.2

54.5

48.5

51.0

49.6

Mar

53.1

55.2

55.1

49.5

51.0

48.9

Feb

51.0

53.8

51.0

48.8

49.5

50.3

Jan

50.5

53.6

50.4

49.7

47.1

49.7

IPM: Index of Purchasing Managers; PI: Production Index; NOI: New Orders Index; EMP: Employed Person Index; SDEL: Supplier Delivery Time Index

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

China estimates the manufacturing index of purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 820 enterprises (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Chart CIPMMFG provides the manufacturing index of purchasing managers. There is deceleration from 51.2 in Sep 2011 to marginal contraction at 49.0 in Nov 2011. Manufacturing activity recovered to 53.3 in Apr 2012 but then declined to 50.4 in May 2012 and 50.1 in Jun 2012, which is the lowest in a year with exception of contraction at 49.0 in Nov 2011. The index then fell to contraction at 49.2 in Aug 2012 and improved to 49.8 in Sep with movement to 50.2 in Oct 2012, 50.6 in Nov 2012 and 50.9 in Mar 2013 above the neutral zone of 50.0.

clip_image018

Chart CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Cumulative growth of China’s GDP in the four quarters of 2012 relative to the same period in 2011 was 7.8 percent, as shown in Table VC-GDP. Secondary industry accounts for 45.3 percent of GDP of which industry alone for 40.1 percent in the first three quarters of 2012 and construction with the remaining 6.7 percent in the first three quarters of 2012. Tertiary industry accounts for 43.8 percent of GDP in the first three quarters of 2012 and primary industry for 9.4 percent in the first three quarters of 2012. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The bottom block of Table VC-GDP provides quarter-on-quarter growth rates of GDP and their annual equivalent. China’s GDP growth decelerated significantly from annual equivalent 9.9 percent in IIIQ2011 to 7.0 percent in IVQ2011 and 6.1 percent in IQ2012, rebounding to 8.2 percent in IIQ2012, 9.1 percent in IIIQ2012 and 8.2 percent in IVQ2012.

Table VC-GDP, China, Cumulative and Quarterly Growth of GDP, Current CNY 100 Million and Inflation Adjusted ∆%

Cumulative GDP 2012

Value Current CNY Billion

2012 Year-on-Year ∆%

GDP

51,932.2

7.8

Primary Industry

5,237.7

4.5

  Farming IIIQ

33,088.0

4.2

Secondary Industry

23,531.9

8.1

  Industry IIIQ

141,641.5

7.9

  Construction IIIQ

23,787.0

9.2

Tertiary Industry

23,162.6

8.1

  Transport, Storage, Post IIIQ

18,941.0

6.7

  Wholesale, Retail Trades IIIQ

31,651.2

11.8

  Hotel & Catering Services IIIQ

7,015.6

7.6

  Financial Intermediation IIIQ

22,465.2

9.5

  Real Estate IIIQ

20,789.6

2.7

  Other IIIQ

54,101.0

7.7

Growth in Quarter Relative to Prior Quarter

∆% on Prior Quarter

∆% Annual Equivalent

2012

   

IVQ2012

2.0

8.2

IIIQ2012

2.2

9.1

IIQ2012

2.0

8.2

IQ2012

1.5

6.1

2011

   

IVQ2011

1.7

7.0

IIIQ2011

2.4

9.9

IIQ2011

2.5

10.4

IQ2011

2.2

9.1

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart VC-GDP of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides annual value and growth rates of GDP. China’s GDP growth in 2012 is still high at 7.8 percent but at the lowest rhythm in five years.

clip_image019

Chart VC-GDP, China, Gross Domestic Product, Million Yuan and ∆%, 2008-2012

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Table VC-GDPb provides growth of GDP in China relative to a year earlier and relative to prior quarter. Growth of GDP relative to a year earlier decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 to 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012 and 7.9 percent in IVQ2012. Growth of secondary industry decelerated from 14.5 percent in IQ2010 to 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012 and 7.9 percent in IVQ2012.

Table VC-GDPb, China, Growth Rate of GDP, ∆% Relative to a Year Earlier and ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

 

IQ 2011

IIQ 2011

IIIQ 2011

IVQ 2011

IQ     2012

IIQ 2012

IIIQ 2012

IVQ 2012

GDP

9.7

9.5

9.1

8.9

8.1

7.6

7.4

7.9

Primary Industry

3.5

3.2

3.8

4.5

3.8

4.3

4.2

4.5

Secondary Industry

11.1

11.0

10.8

10.6

9.1

8.3

8.1

8.1

Tertiary Industry

9.1

9.2

9.0

8.9

7.5

7.7

7.9

8.1

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

2.2

2.3

2.4

1.9

1.8

1.8

2.2

2.0

 

IQ 2010

IIQ 2010

IIIQ 2010

IVQ 2010

       

GDP

12.1

11.2

10.7

12.1

       

Primary Industry

3.8

3.6

4.0

3.8

       

Secondary Industry

14.5

13.3

12.6

14.5

       

Tertiary Industry

10.5

9.9

9.7

10.5

       

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Table VC-IND provides values and growth rates of important segments of economic activity in China. Value added by industry decelerated from 12.1 percent in 2010 to 7.9 percent in 2012. Construction growth also decelerated from 18.6 percent in 2009 during high stimulus to 9.3 percent in 2012. There is also deceleration of investment in fixed assets from growth of 30.0 percent in 2009 and 23.8 percent in 2011 to 20.2 percent in 2012. Growth of retail sales of consumer goods fell from 18.3 percent in 2010 to 14.3 percent in 2012.

Table VC-IND, China, Value Added by Industry, Construction, Investment in Fixed Assets and Retail Sales of Consumer Goods, Billions of Yuan and ∆%, 2008-2012

 

IND VA BY

∆%

CON BY

∆%

IFA BY

∆%

RSCG BY

∆%

2012

1999

7.9

355

9.3

3747

20.3

2103

14.3

2011

1885

10.4

319

9.7

3115

23.8

1839

17.1

2010

1607

12.1

267

13.5

2781

23.8

1570

18.3

2009

1352

8.7

224

18.6

2246

30.0

1327

15.5

2008

1303

9.9

187

9.5

1788

25.9

1148

22.7

Notes: IND VA: Value Added by Industry; CON: Construction; IFA: Investment in Fixed Assets; RSCG: Retail Sales of Consumer Goods; BY: Billions of Yuan

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Table VC-F provides China FX reserves, exports and imports from 2008 to 2012. Growth of exports and imports fell from high two-digit rates to 7.9 percent for exports and 4.3 percent for imports in 2012. Growth of China’s international reserves also fell from high two-digit rates to 4.1 percent in 2012 with the stock of reserves at a high level of $3.3 trillion.

Table VC-F, China, Foreign Exchange Reserves, Exports and Imports, USD Billions and ∆%

 

FX Reserves USD B

∆%

Exports USD B

∆%

Imports USD B

∆%

2012

3311.6

4.1

2048.9

7.9

1817.8

4.3

2011

3181.1

11.7

1898.4

20.3

1743.5

24.9

2010

2847.3

18.7

1577.8

31.3

1396.2

38.8

2009

2399.2

23.3

1201.6

19.5

1005.9

-6.8

2008

1946.0

27.3

1005.9

 

1132.6

 

Notes: USD B: US Dollar Billions

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

The HSBC Flash China Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) compiled by Markit (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10856) is improving. The overall Flash China Manufacturing PMI increased marginally from 50.4 in Feb to 51.7 in Mar while the Flash China Manufacturing Output Index increased from 50.8 in Feb to 52.8 in Mar, both in expansion territory above 50.0. Hongbin Qu, Chief Economist, China and Co-Head of Asian Economic Research at HSBC, finds that the economy of China is improving toward moderate growth (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10856).The HSBC China Services PMI, compiled by Markit, shows relative strength in business activity in China with the HSBC Composite Output, combining manufacturing and services, increasing from 51.4 in Feb to 53.5 in Mar for the seventh consecutive month of expansion (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10939). Hongbin Qu, Chief Economist, China and Co-Head of Asian Economic Research at HSBC, finds that combined manufacturing and services data suggest continuing growth supported by improving labor markets (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10939). The HSBC Business Activity index increased from 52.1 in Feb to 54.3 in Mar with continuing growth in services at the fastest rate in six months (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10939). Hongbin Ku, Chief Economist, China & Co-Head of Asian Economic Research at HSBC, finds strength in services with sound labor markets and continuing recovery in manufacturing (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10939). The HSBC Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), compiled by Markit, increased to 51.6 in Mar from 50.4 in Mar, indicating moderate activity in five consecutive months of improvement (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10883). New export orders increased marginally. Hongbin Qu, Chief Economist, China and Co-Head of Asian Economic Research at HSBC, finds manufacturing is gaining traction from internal demand (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10883). Table CNY provides the country data table for China.

Table CNY, China, Economic Indicators

Price Indexes for Industry

Feb 12-month ∆%: minus 1.6

Feb month ∆%: 0.2
Blog 3/17/13

Consumer Price Index

Feb month ∆%: 1.1 Feb 12 months ∆%: 3.2
Blog 3/17/13

Value Added of Industry

Feb month ∆%: 0.79

Jan-Feb 2013/Jan-Feb 2012 ∆%: 9.9
Blog 3/17/13

GDP Growth Rate

Year IVQ2012 ∆%: 7.9
Quarter IIQ2012 ∆%: 2.0
Blog 1/20/13

Investment in Fixed Assets

Feb month ∆%: -0.23

Total Jan-Feb 2012 ∆%: 21.2

Real estate development: 16.9
Blog 3/17/13

Retail Sales

Feb month ∆%: 0.99
Feb 12 month ∆%: 12.3

Jan-Feb ∆%: 12.3
Blog 3/17/13

Trade Balance

Feb balance $15.25 billion
Exports 12M ∆% 21.8
Imports 12M ∆% -15.0

Cumulative Feb: $44.40 billion
Blog 3/10/13

Links to blog comments in Table CNY:

3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

1/20/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/recovery-without-hiring-world-inflation.html

VD Euro Area. Table VD-EUR provides yearly growth rates of the combined GDP of the members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro area since 1996. Growth was very strong at 3.2 percent in 2006 and 3.0 percent in 2007. The global recession had strong impact with growth of only 0.4 percent in 2008 and decline of 4.4 percent in 2009. Recovery was at lower growth rates of 2.0 percent in 2010 and 1.4 percent in 2011. EUROSTAT forecasts growth of GDP of the euro area of minus 0.6 percent in 2012 and minus 0.3 percent in 2013 but 1.4 percent in 2014.

Table VD-EUR, Euro Area, Yearly Percentage Change of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, Unemployment and GDP ∆%

Year

HICP ∆%

Unemployment
%

GDP ∆%

1999

1.2

9.6

2.9

2000

2.2

8.7

3.8

2001

2.4

8.1

2.0

2002

2.3

8.5

0.9

2003

2.1

9.0

0.7

2004

2.2

9.3

2.2

2005

2.2

9.2

1.7

2006

2.2

8.5

3.2

2007

2.1

7.6

3.0

2008

3.3

7.6

0.4

2009

0.3

9.6

-4.4

2010

1.6

10.1

2.0

2011

2.7

10.1

1.4

2012*

2.5

11.4

-0.6

2013*

   

-0.3

2014*

   

1.4

*EUROSTAT forecast Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

The GDP of the euro area in 2011 in current US dollars in the dataset of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is $13,114.4 billion (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx). The sum of the GDP of France is $2778.1 billion with the GDP of Germany of $3607.4 billion, Italy of $2198.7 billion and Spain $1479.6 billion is $10,063.8 billion or 76.7 percent of total euro area GDP. The four largest economies account for slightly more than three quarters of economic activity of the euro area. Table VD-EUR1 is constructed with the dataset of EUROSTAT, providing growth rates of the euro area as a whole and of the largest four economies of Germany, France, Italy and Spain annually from 1996 to 2011 with the estimate of 2012 and forecasts for 2013 and 2014 by EUROSTAT. The impact of the global recession on the overall euro area economy and on the four largest economies was quite strong. There was sharp contraction in 2009 and growth rates have not rebounded to earlier growth with exception of Germany in 2010 and 2011.

Table VD-EUR1, Euro Area, Real GDP Growth Rate, ∆%

 

Euro Area

Germany

France

Italy

Spain

2014*

1.4

2.0

1.2

0.8

0.8

2013*

-0.3

0.5

0.1

-1.0

-1.4

2012

-0.6

0.7

0.0*

-2.2*

-1.4*

2011

1.4

3.0

1.7

0.4

0.4

2010

2.0

4.2

1.7

1.8

-0.3

2009

-4.4

-5.1

-3.1

-5.5

-3.7

2008

0.4

1.1

-0.1

-1.2

0.9

2007

3.0

3.3

2.3

1.7

3.5

2006

3.2

3.7

2.5

2.2

4.1

2005

1.7

0.7

1.8

0.9

3.6

2004

2.2

1.2

2.5

1.7

3.3

2003

0.7

-0.4

0.9

0.0

3.1

2002

0.9

0.0

0.9

0.5

2.7

2001

2.0

1.5

1.8

1.9

3.7

2000

3.8

3.1

3.7

3.7

5.0

1999

2.9

1.9

3.3

1.5

4.7

1998

2.8

1.9

3.4

1.4

4.5

1997

2.6

1.7

2.2

1.9

3.9

1996

1.5

0.8

1.1

1.1

2.5

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

The Flash Eurozone PMI Composite Output Index of the Markit Flash Eurozone PMI®, combining activity in manufacturing and services, decreased from 47.9 in Feb to 46.5 in Mar, for fourteen consecutive declines and seventeen drops in eighteen months with acceleration of the rate of contraction (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10860). Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds that the Markit Flash Eurozone PMI index is consistent with GDP declining in a fourth consecutive quarter but at a rate around 0.3 percent, which would be lower than the decline of 0.6 percent in IVQ2012 in EUROSTAT estimates (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10860). The Markit Eurozone PMI® Composite Output Index, combining services and manufacturing activity with close association with GDP, decreased from 47.9 in Feb to 46.5 in Mar, which is the nineteenth contraction in 19 months with only one marginal increase in the beginning of 2012 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10945). Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds that the data are consistent with milder contraction of GDP in IQ2013 in contrast with fall of 0.6 percent in IVQ2012 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10945). The Markit Eurozone Services Business Activity Index decreased from 48.6 in Jan to 47.9 in Feb (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10814). The Markit Eurozone Manufacturing PMI® decreased to 46.8 in Mar from 47.9 in Feb, which indicates contraction in twenty consecutive months of deterioration of manufacturing business in the euro zone since Aug 2011 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10921). Total orders contracted for the twenty second consecutive month with weakness at home and abroad. Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds weakness with accelerating pace of decline in Mar (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10921). Table EUR provides the regional data table for the euro area.

Table EUR, Euro Area Economic Indicators

GDP

IVQ2012 ∆% -0.6; IVQ2012/IVQ2011 ∆% -0.9 Blog 3/10/13

Unemployment 

Feb 2013: 12.0% unemployment rate Feb 2013: 10.071 million unemployed

Blog 4/5/13

HICP

Feb month ∆%: 0.4

12 months Feb ∆%: 1.8
Blog 3/17/13

Producer Prices

Euro Zone industrial producer prices Feb ∆%: 0.2
Feb 12-month ∆%: 1.3
Blog 4/5/13

Industrial Production

Jan month ∆%: -0.4; Jan 12 months ∆%: -1.3
Blog 3/17/13

Retail Sales

Feb month ∆%: -0.3
Feb 12 months ∆%: minus 1.4
Blog 4/5/13

Confidence and Economic Sentiment Indicator

Sentiment 90.0 Mar 2013

Consumer minus 23.5 Mar 2013

Blog 3/31/13

Trade

Jan-Dec 2012/Jan-Dec 2011 Exports ∆%: 7.4
Imports ∆%: 1.8

Jan 2013 12-month Exports ∆% 5.2 Imports ∆% 1.4
Blog 3/24/13

Links to blog comments in Table EUR:

03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

3/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

EUROSTAT confirmed GDP estimates without new report. Table VD-1 provides percentage changes of euro area real GDP in a quarter relative to the prior quarter. Real GDP fell 0.3 percent in IVQ2011, fell 0.1 IQ2012 and fell in the final three quarters of 2012: 0.2 percent in IIQ2012, 0.1 percent in IIIQ2012 and 0.6 percent in IVQ2012. The global recession manifested in the euro area in five consecutive quarterly declines from IIQ2008 to IIQ2009. The strongest impact was contraction of 2.8 percent in IQ2009. Recovery began in IIIQ2009 with cumulative growth of 3.8 percent to IQ2011 or at the annual equivalent rate of 2.1 percent. Growth was much more vigorous from IVQ2003 to IQ2008.

Table VD-1, Euro Area, Real GDP, Percentage Change from Prior Quarter, Calendar and Seasonally Adjusted ∆%

 

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IVQ

2012

-0.1

-0.2

-0.1

-0.6

2011

0.6

0.2

0.1

-0.3

2010

0.5

1.0

0.4

0.4

2009

-2.8

-0.3

0.4

0.4

2008

0.5

-0.4

-0.6

-1.7

2007

0.8

0.4

0.6

0.4

2006

0.9

1.1

0.7

1.0

2005

0.2

0.7

0.6

0.6

2004

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.3

2003

0.0

0.1

0.5

0.7

2002

0.2

0.6

0.3

0.0

2001

0.9

0.1

0.1

0.1

2000

1.3

0.8

0.4

0.7

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

Table VD-2 provides percentage change in real GDP in the euro area in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. Growth rates were quite strong from 2004 to 2007. There were five consecutive quarters of sharp declines in GDP in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier from IVQ2008 to IVQ2009 with sharp contractions of 5.6 percent in IQ2009, 5.8 percent in IIQ2009 and 4.2 percent in IIIQ2009. Growth rates decline in magnitude with 1.3 percent in IIIQ2011, 0.2 percent in IVQ211 and 0.3 percent in IQ2012 followed by contractions of 0.8 percent in IIQ2012, 0.8 percent in IIIQ2012 and 0.9 percent in IVQ2012.

Table VD-2, Euro Area, Real GDP Percentage Change in a Quarter Relative to Same Quarter a Year Earlier, Not Seasonally Adjusted ∆%

 

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IV

2012

0.3

-0.8

-0.8

-0.9

2011

2.6

1.7

1.3

0.2

2010

1.2

2.5

2.2

2.1

2009

-5.6

-5.8

-4.2

-2.0

2008

2.3

1.6

0.4

-2.1

2007

3.5

3.0

3.0

2.3

2006

3.5

2.6

3.7

3.5

2005

1.0

2.1

1.8

1.8

2004

2.0

2.5

2.1

2.0

2003

1.0

0.1

0.5

1.2

2002

0.0

1.1

1.4

0.9

2001

2.7

2.0

1.7

1.4

2000

4.9

4.3

3.3

2.7

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

Table VD-3 provides GDP growth in IVQ2012 and relative to the same quarter a year earlier for the euro zone, European Union, Japan and the US. The GDP of the euro zone fell 0.6 percent in IVQ2012 and declined 0.9 percent relative to a year earlier while the GDP of the European Union decreased 0.5 percent in IVQ2012 and decreased 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Growth in IVQ2012 was weak worldwide with somewhat stronger performance by the US but still insufficient to reduce unemployment and underemployment (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html) and motivate hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million_18.html).

Table VD-3, Euro Zone, European Union, Japan and USA, Real GDP Growth

 

∆% IVQ2012/ IIIQ2012

∆% IVQ2012/ IVQ2011

Euro Zone

-0.6

-0.9

European Union

-0.5

-0.6

Germany

-0.6

0.4

France

-0.3

-0.3

Netherlands

-0.2

-0.9

Finland

-0.5

-1.4

Belgium

-0.1

-0.4

Portugal

-1.8

-3.8

Ireland*

0.2

0.8

Italy

-0.9

-2.7

Greece

NA

-6.0

Spain

-0.8

-1.9

United Kingdom

-0.3

0.3

Japan

0.0

0.2

USA

0.0

1.6

*Calendar adjusted IIIQ2012

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

Chart VD-1 of EUROSTAT provides projected growth in 2014 relative to 2013 for a large variety of countries. There have been diverging experiences in growth in the world economy.

clip_image020

Chart VD-1, Euro Zone, European Union, Real GDP Growth 2014 EUROSTAT Forecast ∆% on Previous Year

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home

EUROSTAT estimates the rate of unemployment in the euro area at 12.0 percent in Feb 2013, as shown in Table VD-4. The number of unemployed in Feb 2013 was 19.071 million, which was 1.775 million higher than 17.296 million in Feb 2012. The rate of unemployment jumped from 10.9 percent in Feb 2012 to 12.0 percent in Feb 2013.

Table VD-4, Euro Area, Unemployment Rate and Number of Unemployed, % and Millions, SA 

 

Unemployment Rate %

Number Unemployed
Millions

Feb 2013

12.0

19.071

Jan

12.0

19.038

Dec 2012

11.8

18.816

Nov

11.8

18.762

Oct

11.7

18.658

Sep

11.6

18.444

Aug

11.5

18.262

Jul

11.4

18.182

Jun

11.4

18.088

May

11.3

17.887

Apr

11.2

17.753

Mar

11.0

17.498

Feb

10.9

17.296

Jan

10.8

17.080

Dec 2011

10.7

16.947

Nov

10.6

16.820

Oct

10.4

16.516

Sep

10.3

16.334

Aug

10.2

16.075

Jul 

10.1

15.927

Jun

10.0

15.709

May

9.9

15.655

Apr

9.9

15.522

Mar

9.9

15.603

Feb

9.9

15.639

Jan

10.0

15.718

Dec 2010

10.1

15.822

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

Table VD-5 shows the disparity in rates of unemployment in the euro area with 12.0 percent for the region as a whole and 19.071 million unemployed but 5.4 percent in Germany and 2.302 million unemployed. At the other extreme is Spain with rate of unemployment of 26.3 percent and 5.994 million unemployed. The rate of unemployment of the European Union in Feb 2013 is 10.9 percent with 26.338 million unemployed.

Table VD-5, Unemployed and Unemployment Rate in Countries and Regions, Millions and %

Feb 2013

Unemployment Rate %

Unemployed Millions

Euro Zone

12.0

19.071

Germany

5.4

2.302

France

10.8

3.209

Netherlands

6.2

0.550

Finland

8.1

0.219

Portugal

17.5

0.939

Ireland

14.2

0.305

Italy

11.6

2.971

Greece

NA

NA

Spain

26.3

5.994

Belgium

8.1

0.399

European Union

10.9

26.338

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

Chart VD-2 provides Eurosat estimates of unemployment rates in the European Union. There is significant diversity in the rates of unemployment in members of the euro zone and the European Union.

clip_image021

Chart VD-2, Unemployment Rate in Various Countries and Regions

Source: EUROSTAT

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

Advanced economies are experiencing weak demand. Table VD-6 provides month and 12-month percentage changes of the volume of retail sales in the euro zone from Jan 2011 to Feb 2013. Retail sales decreased 0.3 percent in Feb 2013 and fell 1.4 percent in 12 months. The 12-month rates of growth have become negative since Mar 2011 with exception of 1.1 percent in Apr 2011 and stability in Aug 2011. The lower part of Table VD-6 provides annual percentage changes of inflation-adjusted retail sales in the euro zone since 2001. Retail sales fell 0.8 percent in 2010 after falling 0.4 percent in 2009 and 1.8 percent in 2008 and fell again by 1.6 percent in 2011 and 3.0 percent in 2012.

Table VD-6, Euro Zone, Volume of Retail Sales, Deflated ∆%

 

Month ∆%

12-Month CA ∆%

Feb 2013

-0.3

-1.4

Jan

0.9

-1.9

Dec 2012

-0.7

-3.0

Nov

0.2

-2.2

Oct

-0.5

-3.4

Sep

-1.6

-2.1

Aug

0.6

-1.0

Jul

-0.2

-1.7

Jun

0.0

-1.1

May

1.2

-0.8

Apr

-1.7

-3.7

Mar

0.5

-0.1

Feb

-0.4

-2.3

Jan

-0.1

-1.2

Dec 2011

0.0

-1.6

Nov

-0.7

-1.2

Oct

0.2

-0.4

Sep

-0.4

-0.9

Aug

0.0

0.0

Jul

0.2

-0.1

Jun

0.7

-0.5

May

-1.4

-1.5

Apr

1.2

1.1

Mar

-1.4

-1.2

Feb

0.4

1.5

Jan

0.1

1.0

Dec ∆%

   

2012

 

-3.0

2011

 

-1.6

2010

 

-0.8

2009

 

-0.4

2008

 

-1.8

2007

 

-0.9

2006

 

2.5

2005

 

0.8

2004

 

2.3

2003

 

0.7

2002

 

-0.4

2001

 

1.9

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

Growth rates of retail sales of the euro zone by major segments are in Table VD-7. Total sales decreased 0.3 percent in Feb 2013 and declined 1.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2013. All 12-month and monthly percentage changes are negative.

Table VD-7, Euro Zone, Volume of Retail Sales by Products, ∆%

Feb 2013

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

Total

-0.3

-1.4

Food, Drinks, Tobacco

-0.1

-1.8

Nonfood Products ex Automotive Fuel

-1.1

-1.5

Automotive Fuel in Specialized Stores

-0.5

1.4

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

Month and 12-month percentage rates of change of retail sales by member countries of the euro zone are shown in Table VD-8 for Feb 2013. Retail sales are weak throughout the euro zone. The 12-month percentage changes are negative for some members in Table VD-8 with the exception of 2.1 percent for Germany and 1.1 percent for Ireland. The 12-month percentage change for the UK, which is not a member of the euro zone, was 3.8 percent. The European Union’s 12-month percentage change was minus 0.2 percent.

Table VD-8, Euro Zone, Volume of Retail Sales by Member Countries, ∆%

Feb 2013

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

Euro Zone

-0.3

-1.4

Germany

0.4

2.1

France

-2.2

-0.1

Netherlands

NA

NA

Finland

-0.8

-2.5

Belgium

-1.1

-0.5

Portugal

1.3

-5.3

Ireland

-0.1

1.1

Italy

NA

NA

Greece

NA

NA

Spain

0.6

-9.7

UK

1.2

3.8

European Union

0.0

-0.2

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

VE Germany. Table VE-DE provides yearly growth rates of the German economy from 1992 to 2012, price adjusted chain-linked and price and calendar-adjusted chain-linked. Germany’s GDP fell 5.1 percent in 2009 after growing below trend at 1.1 percent in 2008. Recovery has been robust in contrast with other advanced economy. The German economy grew at 3.7 percent in 2010, 3.0 percent in 2011 and 0.7 percent in 2012. Growth slowed in 2011 from 1.2 percent in IQ2011, 0.5 percent in IIQ2011 and 0.4 percent in IIIQ2011 to decline of 0.1 percent in IVQ2011 and growth of 0.5 percent in IQ2012, 0.3 percent in IIQ2012, 0.2 percent in IIIQ2012 and decline of 0.6 percent in IVQ2012.

The Federal Statistical Agency of Germany analyzes the fall and recovery of the German economy (http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Content/Statistics/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/Inlandsprodukt/Aktuell,templateId=renderPrint.psml):

“The German economy again grew strongly in 2011. The price-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 3.0% compared with the previous year. Accordingly, the catching-up process of the German economy continued during the second year after the economic crisis. In the course of 2011, the price-adjusted GDP again exceeded its pre-crisis level. The economic recovery occurred mainly in the first half of 2011. In 2009, Germany experienced the most serious post-war recession, when GDP suffered a historic decline of 5.1%. The year 2010 was characterised by a rapid economic recovery (+3.7%).”

Table VE-DE, Germany, GDP Year ∆%

 

Price Adjusted Chain-Linked

Price- and Calendar-Adjusted Chain Linked

2012

0.7

0.9

2011

3.0

3.1

2010

4.2

4.0

2009

-5.1

-5.1

2008

1.1

0.8

2007

3.3

3.4

2006

3.7

3.9

2005

0.7

0.8

2004

1.2

0.7

2003

-0.4

-0.4

2002

0.0

0.0

2001

1.5

1.6

2000

3.1

3.3

1999

1.9

1.8

1998

1.9

1.7

1997

1.7

1.8

1996

0.8

0.8

1995

1.7

1.8

1994

2.5

2.5

1993

-1.0

-1.0

1992

1.9

1.5

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Destatis) https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/02/PE13_066_811.html;jsessionid=59DE7E440F9F7393B12C16FDA63BEB66.cae1

The Flash Germany Composite Output Index of the Markit Flash Germany PMI®, combining manufacturing and services, decreased from 53.3 in Feb to 51.0 in Mar, which indicates moderate expansion with the decline of 2.3 points in one month being the sharpest since Jul 2011 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10862). New export orders for manufacturing decreased, with respondents finding soft demand in southern Europe but enhanced demand in Asia and North America. Tim Moore, Senior Economist at Markit and author of the report, finds strength in Germany’s private sector with potential to provide impulse to GDP growth in IQ2013 but with risks of moderation in the latest survey (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10862). The Markit Germany Composite Output Index of the Markit Germany Services PMI®, combining manufacturing and services with close association with Germany’s GDP, decreased from 53.3 in Feb to 50.6 in Mar (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10968). Tim Moore, Senior Economist at Markit and author of the report, finds that the economy of Germany will grow modestly in IQ2013 while the strength of the recovery is declining (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10968). The Germany Services Business Activity Index decreased from 54.7 in Feb to 50.9 in Mar (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10968). The Markit/BME Germany Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), showing close association with Germany’s manufacturing conditions, decreased from 50.3 in Feb to 49.0 in Mar, returned to contraction territory below 50.0 and below the long-term average of 51.9 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10931). New export orders decreased in Mar after the fastest rate in 12 months in Feb with broad geographical reach in Asia and outside Europe. Tim Moore, Senior Economist at Markit and author of the report, finds moderate deteriorating conditions in German manufacturing with weakness in export markets in the euro area after stronger demand from emerging Asian markets in Germany’s return to manufacturing growth in the prior month of Feb propelled by the fastest growth rate of new export orders in almost two years (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10931).Table DE provides the country data table for Germany.

Table DE, Germany, Economic Indicators

GDP

IVQ2012 -0.6 ∆%; IV/Q2012/IVQ2011 ∆% 0.1

2012/2011: 0.7%

GDP ∆% 1992-2012

Blog 8/26/12 5/27/12 11/25/12 2/17/13 2/24/13

Consumer Price Index

Feb month NSA ∆%: 0.6
Feb 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.5
Blog 3/17/13

Producer Price Index

Feb month ∆%: -0.1 CSA, 0.1 NSA
12-month NSA ∆%: 1.2
Blog 3/24/13

Industrial Production

Mfg Jan month CSA ∆%: -0.2
12-month NSA: 0.1
Blog 3/10/13

Machine Orders

MFG Feb month ∆%: 2.3
Feb 12-month ∆%: -2.9
Blog 4/5/13

Retail Sales

Feb Month ∆% 0.4

12-Month ∆% -2.2

Blog 3/31/13

Employment Report

Unemployment Rate SA Feb 5.4%
Blog 3/31/13

Trade Balance

Exports Jan 12-month NSA ∆%: 3.1
Imports Jan 12 months NSA ∆%: 3.3
Exports Jan month CSA ∆%: -1.4; Imports Jan month SA -3.3

Blog 3/17/13

Links to blog comments in Table DE:

03/31/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/04/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

3/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/united-states-commercial-banks-assets.html

3/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html

3/10/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html

2/24/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html

2/17/13 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html

11/25/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspotcom/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real.html

8/26/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with_26.html

Table VE-1 provides month and 12-month rates of growth of new orders of manufacturing in Germany from Jan 2010 to Feb 2013. There are fluctuations in both monthly rates and in the past 12 months. In the quarter Dec 2012 to Feb 2013, total orders for manufacturing grew cumulatively 1.8 percent for annual equivalent 7.3 percent. Foreign orders grew cumulatively 1.1 percent in Dec 2012-Feb 2013 or at annual equivalent 4.6 percent while domestic orders grew 2.6 percent or at annual equivalent 10.9 percent. Table VE-1 reveals strong fluctuations in an evident deceleration of total orders for industry of Germany. The same behavior is observed for total, foreign and domestic orders with decline in 12-month rates from two-digit levels to single digits and negative changes. An important aspect of Germany is that the bulk of orders is domestic or from other European countries while foreign orders have been growing rapidly. There is weakening world trade affecting export economies. As in other countries, data on orders for manufacturing are highly volatile. Most 12-month percentage changes from Jan 2012 to Sep 2012 in Table VE-1 are negative largely because of the unusual strength of the Germany economy in the beginning of 2011 but more recently because of slowing world economy in 2012.

Table VE-1, Germany, Volume of Orders Received in Manufacturing, Total, Domestic and Foreign, ∆%  

 

Total
12 M

Total
M

Foreign 12 M

Foreign M

Home
12 M

Home
M

2013

           

Feb

-2.9

2.3

-1.7

2.3

-4.4

2.2

Jan

-1.0

-1.6

0.5

-2.7

-2.7

0.1

2012

           

Dec

-9.1

1.1

-6.7

1.6

-12.6

0.3

Nov

-0.9

-2.7

2.4

-4.7

-5.1

-0.1

Oct

4.5

4.1

7.0

6.9

1.3

0.7

Sep

-8.9

-1.9

-6.6

-2.4

-11.7

-1.2

Aug

-4.4

-0.9

-2.1

-0.5

-7.1

-1.5

Jul

-1.6

0.2

0.6

-0.3

-4.2

0.2

Jun

-4.5

-1.3

-6.4

-0.9

-1.7

-1.9

May

-11.0

0.5

-3.7

1.3

-18.8

-0.7

Apr

-3.9

-2.1

-4.4

-3.1

-3.1

-0.9

Mar

-2.2

2.6

-1.2

3.5

-3.3

1.6

Feb

-4.3

0.2

-4.7

1.1

-3.8

-0.8

Jan

-2.6

-1.5

-4.6

-2.7

-0.2

0.0

2011

           

Dec

0.0

2.0

-0.3

4.2

0.5

-0.6

Nov

-4.8

-2.9

-8.2

-5.1

-0.3

-0.2

Oct

0.1

1.9

2.1

3.3

-2.1

0.3

Sep

2.2

-3.3

1.9

-3.6

2.6

-2.9

Aug

7.1

-0.8

5.2

0.1

9.4

-1.9

Jul

4.9

-2.6

4.6

-6.7

5.4

2.8

Jun

3.5

0.4

7.8

10.2

-2.0

-10.3

May

23.1

2.3

16.0

-4.5

31.8

10.9

Apr

6.7

1.5

9.6

2.0

3.0

0.9

Mar

9.8

-3.0

12.3

-3.0

6.9

-3.0

Feb

21.5

0.8

24.1

0.0

18.4

1.8

Jan

22.5

4.2

26.1

4.2

18.2

4.3

2010

           

Dec

21.8

-2.9

26.8

-4.1

15.4

-1.4

Nov

21.4

5.4

27.1

8.6

15.0

1.6

Oct

14.2

0.7

18.2

0.2

10.0

1.3

Sep

13.9

-1.2

15.6

-3.0

11.9

1.0

Aug

22.2

2.3

29.7

4.3

14.5

0.0

Jul

14.1

-1.1

21.4

-1.3

6.4

-0.9

Jun

27.6

3.3

30.6

4.4

24.2

1.9

May

24.8

-0.3

29.6

0.2

19.4

-1.1

Apr

29.9

2.8

34.0

2.9

25.7

2.9

Mar

29.4

5.0

32.9

5.1

25.8

5.0

Feb

24.0

-0.2

28.7

0.3

18.6

-0.9

Jan

17.0

4.1

23.8

4.7

9.8

3.3

Dec 2009

9.1

-1.7

10.5

-2.6

7.3

-0.5

Dec 2008

-28.3

-6.7

-31.5

-9.5

-23.7

-2.9

Dec 2007

7.1

-0.9

9.1

-2.0

4.4

0.2

Dec 2006

2.8

0.8

3.4

0.5

2.2

1.1

Dec 2005

5.0

-0.5

10.4

-1.1

-1.4

0.3

Dec 2004

12.7

6.5

13.0

8.5

12.7

4.9

Dec 2003

10.7

2.4

16.4

5.4

5.1

-0.8

Dec 2002

-0.2

-3.4

-0.8

-6.6

0.2

-0.3

Average ∆% 2003-2007

7.6

 

10.4

 

4.5

 

Average ∆% 2003-2012

2.3

 

3.9

 

0.3

 

Notes: AE: Annual Equivalent; M: Month; M: Calendar and seasonally-adjusted; 12 M: Non-adjusted Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Orders for capital goods of Germany are shown in Table VE-2. Total capital goods orders increased 3.5 percent in Feb 2013 with increases of 4.4 percent of domestic orders and 3.0 percent of foreign orders. The rates of decline in 12 months are: minus 0.3 percent for total, minus 4.0 percent for domestic and 2.0 percent for foreign. The quarter from Dec 2012 to Feb 2013 was quite strong with cumulative growth of total orders of 3.6 percent at annual equivalent 15.0 percent. There has been evident deceleration from 2010 and early 2011 with growth rates falling from two digit levels to single digits and multiple negative changes. An important aspect of Germany’s economy shown in Tables VE-5 and VE-6 is the success in increasing the competitiveness of its economic activities as shown by rapid growth of orders for industry after the recession of 2001 in the period before the global recession beginning in late 2007. Germany adopted fiscal and labor market reforms to increase productivity.

Table VE-2, Germany, Volume of Orders Received of Capital Goods Industries, Total, Foreign and Domestic, ∆%

 

Total 12 M

Total M

Foreign 12 M

Foreign M

Domestic 12 M

Domestic M

2013

           

Feb

-0.3

3.5

2.0

3.0

-4.0

4.4

Jan

1.3

-2.3

3.6

-3.0

-2.3

-1.1

2012

           

Dec

-7.7

2.4

-4.6

2.8

-13.3

1.8

Nov

-0.7

-3.9

3.1

-5.6

-6.5

-0.8

Oct

4.6

5.4

6.3

7.2

2.1

1.9

Sep

-7.5

-1.1

-4.8

-0.8

-11.6

-1.4

Aug

-4.6

-2.0

-2.6

-1.4

-7.4

-2.9

Jul

-0.3

0.1

1.2

0.2

-2.7

-0.3

Jun

-7.1

-0.8

-9.9

-0.4

-1.9

-1.3

May

-12.0

0.3

-2.8

0.7

-23.9

-0.4

Apr

-3.3

-3.9

-4.2

-4.7

-1.7

-2.3

Mar

2.2

5.4

3.3

7.6

0.2

1.9

Feb

-5.9

1.2

-7.0

1.2

-4.2

1.2

Jan

-3.7

-3.6

-6.5

-4.2

1.0

-2.8

2011

           

Dec

1.2

2.7

-0.1

4.1

3.5

0.6

Nov

-6.5

-3.6

-10.5

-6.8

0.7

1.8

Oct

3.1

3.3

6.2

5.3

-2.0

0.2

Sep

2.9

-3.6

2.2

-3.9

4.0

-3.0

Aug

6.7

-0.4

4.5

0.5

10.6

-1.6

Jul

7.2

-6.8

6.4

-10.9

8.8

0.6

Jun

9.1

2.6

13.3

16.2

2.0

-15.4

May

27.5

4.0

17.7

-5.7

43.5

20.5

Apr

11.0

3.3

14.1

4.3

6.3

1.4

Mar

12.0

-5.7

14.4

-5.3

8.5

-6.2

Feb

29.3

2.4

32.5

0.7

24.8

5.3

Jan

26.8

3.9

32.8

4.4

17.7

2.9

2010

           

Dec

27.4

-5.1

31.2

-6.8

21.1

-2.0

Nov

30.4

9.5

37.0

13.8

20.1

2.6

Oct

20.5

0.1

24.9

-1.4

14.3

2.5

Sep

18.2

-2.3

20.3

-4.0

14.7

0.7

Aug

27.5

5.3

40.0

7.1

11.5

2.3

Jul

14.1

-2.8

28.1

-3.0

-2.5

-2.5

Jun

32.0

4.8

38.7

7.2

22.1

1.2

May

26.2

1.1

36.6

0.7

12.8

1.6

Apr

31.0

2.6

41.4

3.2

18.1

1.6

Mar

25.8

6.5

33.8

7.4

15.7

5.1

Feb

21.2

-1.1

31.3

-0.1

8.3

-2.7

Jan

17.0

4.6

29.6

3.1

2.8

7.1

Dec 2009

8.1

-1.2

13.6

-1.5

0.3

-1.0

Dec 2008

-32.2

-7.2

-36.8

-10.0

-24.5

-3.6

Dec 2007

9.4

-0.6

11.6

-2.3

6.1

2.2

Dec 2006

3.5

2.2

3.9

2.9

2.9

1.2

Dec 2005

1.8

-2.1

9.7

-2.5

-8.4

-1.6

Dec 2004

19.5

11.2

18.6

12.2

20.6

9.7

Dec 2003

11.7

2.1

17.2

5.0

5.4

-1.6

Dec 2002

-2.8

-4.3

-3.7

-8.1

-1.8

0.2

Average ∆% 2003-2007

9.0

 

12.1

 

4.9

 

Average ∆% 2003-2012

3.0

 

4.7

 

0.5

 

Notes: AE: Annual Equivalent; M: Month; M: Calendar and seasonally-adjusted; 12 M: Non-adjusted https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Chart VE-1 of the German Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland shows the sharp upward trend of total orders in manufacturing before the global recession. There is also an obvious upward trend in the recovery from the recession with Germany’s economy being among the most dynamic in the advanced economies until the slowdown beginning in the final months of 2011 and what could be stationary series from late 2011 into 2012 but risk of decline in the final segment.

clip_image022

Chart VE-1, Germany, Volume of Total Orders in Manufacturing, Non-Adjusted, 2005=100

Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Chart VE-2 of the German Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland provides unadjusted volume of total orders in manufacturing and a trend curve. The final segment on the right could be the beginning of declining trend but it may be early to reach conclusions.

clip_image024

Chart VE-2, Germany, Volume of Total Orders in Manufacturing and Trend, Non-Adjusted, 2005=100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

No comments:

Post a Comment