Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth, Stagnating Real Disposable Income, Destruction of Household Wealth for Inflation Adjusted Loss, United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities, Housing Collapse, World Economic Slowdown and Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
Executive Summary
I Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth
IA Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth
IA1 Contracting Real Private Fixed Investment
IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits
IB Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures
IB1 Stagnating Real Disposable Income and Consumption Expenditures
IB2 Financial Repression
IIA Destruction of Household Wealth for Inflation Adjusted Loss
IIB United States Housing Collapse
IIC United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
IIC1 Transmission of Monetary Policy
IIC2 Functions of Banks
IIC3 United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities
IIC4 Theory and Reality of Economic History and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
IIB United States Housing Collapse. The objective of this section is to provide the latest data and analysis of US housing. Subsection IIB1 United New House Sales analyzes the collapse of US new house sales. Subsection IIB2 United States House Prices considers the latest available data on house prices. Subsection IIB3 Factors of US Housing Collapse provides the analysis of the causes of the housing crisis of the US.
IIB1 United States New House Sales. Data and other information continue to provide depressed conditions in the US housing market in a longer perspective, with recent improvement at the margin. Table IIB-1 shows sales of new houses in the US at seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rate (SAAR). House sales fell in fifteen of thirty-two months from Jan 2011 to Aug 2013 but mostly concentrated in Jan-Feb 2011 and May-Aug 2011. In Jan-Apr 2012, house sales increased at the annual equivalent rate of 10.3 percent and at 23.5 percent in May-Sep 2012. There was significant strength in Sep-Dec 2011 with annual equivalent rate of 48.4 percent. Sales of new houses fell 0.5 percent in Dec 2012 and 4.9 percent in Oct 2012 with increase of 9.0 percent in Nov 2012. Sales of new houses rebounded 15.7 percent in Jan 2013 with annual equivalent rate of 69.9 percent from Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 because of the increase of 15.7 percent in Jan 2013. New house sales fell at annual equivalent 17.7 percent in Feb-Mar 2013. New house sales weakened with decline of 11.3 percent in annual equivalent from Apr to Aug 2013, mostly because of the decline of 14.0 percent in Jul 2013. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), analyze how builders have provided financial assistance to home buyers, including those short of cash and with weaker credit background, explaining the rise in new home sales and the highest gap between prices of new and existing houses. The 30-year conventional mortgage rate increased from 3.40 on Apr 25, 2013 to 4.58 percent on Aug 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm), which could also be a factor in recent weakness. The conventional mortgage rate measured in a survey by Freddie Mac (http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/release.html) is the “contract interest rate on commitments for fixed-rate first mortgages” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm).
Table IIB-1, US, Sales of New Houses at Seasonally-Adjusted (SA) Annual Equivalent Rate, Thousands and %
| SA Annual Rate | ∆% | |
| Aug 2013 | 421 | 7.9 |
| Jul | 390 | -14.0 |
| Jun | 454 | 5.8 |
| May | 429 | -3.8 |
| Apr | 446 | 0.7 |
| AE ∆% Apr-Jul | -11.3 | |
| Mar | 443 | -0.4 |
| Feb | 445 | -2.8 |
| AE ∆% Feb-Mar | -17.7 | |
| Jan | 458 | 15.7 |
| Dec 2012 | 396 | -0.5 |
| Nov | 398 | 9.0 |
| Oct | 365 | -4.9 |
| AE ∆% Oct-Jan | 69.9 | |
| Sep | 384 | 2.7 |
| Aug | 374 | 1.4 |
| Jul | 369 | 2.5 |
| Jun | 360 | -2.4 |
| May | 369 | 4.8 |
| AE ∆% May-Sep | 23.5 | |
| Apr | 352 | 0.9 |
| Mar | 349 | -4.6 |
| Feb | 366 | 8.3 |
| Jan | 338 | -0.9 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Apr | 10.3 | |
| Dec 2011 | 341 | 4.0 |
| Nov | 328 | 3.8 |
| Oct | 316 | 3.9 |
| Sep | 304 | 1.7 |
| AE ∆% Sep-Dec | 48.4 | |
| Aug | 299 | -1.7 |
| Jul | 296 | -2.3 |
| Jun | 301 | -1.3 |
| May | 305 | -1.6 |
| AE ∆% May-Aug | -18.9 | |
| Apr | 310 | 3.3 |
| Mar | 300 | 11.1 |
| Feb | 270 | -12.1 |
| Jan | 307 | -5.8 |
| AE ∆% Jan-Apr | -14.2 | |
| Dec 2010 | 326 | 13.6 |
AE: Annual Equivalent
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
There is additional information of the report of new house sales in Table IIB-2. The stock of unsold houses stabilized in Apr-Aug 2011 at average 6.6 monthly equivalent sales at current sales rates and then dropped to 4.6 in Jul-Aug 2012, increasing to 4.8 in Oct 2012, 4.5 in Nov 2012 and 4.5 percent in Dec 2012. Inventories dropped to 3.9 in Jan 2013 and 4.1 in Feb 2013. Inventories stabilized at 4.2-4.5 in Mar-Jun 2013 and increased to 5.2 in Jul 2013. Inventories fell marginally to 5.0 in Aug 2013. Robbie Whelan and Conor Dougherty, writing on “Builders fuel home sale rise,” on Feb 26, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324338604578327982067761860.html), find that inventories of houses have declined as investors acquire distressed houses of higher quality. Median and average house prices oscillate. In Aug 2013, median prices of new houses sold not seasonally adjusted (NSA) decreased 0.7 percent. Average prices increased 6.0 percent in Jul 2013 and 0.1 percent in Aug 2013. Between Dec 2010 and Aug 2013 median prices increased 6.6 percent and average prices increased 10.6 percent. Between Dec 2010 and Dec 2012, median prices increased 5.6 percent and average prices increased 9.3 percent. Price increases concentrated in 2012 with increase of median prices of 18.2 percent from Dec 2011 to Dec 2012 and of average prices of 13.8 percent. Robbie Williams, writing on “New homes hit record as builders cap supply,” on May 24, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323475304578500973445311276.html?mod=WSJ_economy_LeftTopHighlights), finds that homebuilders are continuing to restrict the number of new homes for sale. Restriction of available new homes for sale increases prices paid by buyers.
Table IIB-2, US, New House Stocks and Median and Average New Homes Sales Price
| Unsold* | Median | Month | Average New House Sales Price USD | Month | |
| Aug 2013 | 5.0 | 254,600 | -0.7 | 318,900 | 0.1 |
| Jul | 5.2 | 256,300 | -0.1 | 318,500 | 6.0 |
| Jun | 4.3 | 256,600 | -2.7 | 300,500 | -4.3 |
| May | 4.5 | 263,700 | -5.6 | 314,000 | -6.8 |
| Apr | 4.3 | 279,300 | 8.5 | 337,000 | 12.3 |
| Mar | 4.2 | 257,500 | -2.9 | 300,200 | -3.9 |
| Feb | 4.1 | 265,100 | 5.4 | 312,500 | 1.8 |
| Jan | 3.9 | 251,500 | -2.6 | 306,900 | 2.6 |
| Dec 2012 | 4.5 | 258,300 | 5.4 | 299,200 | 2.9 |
| Nov | 4.5 | 245,000 | -0.9 | 290,700 | 1.9 |
| Oct | 4.8 | 247,200 | -2.9 | 285,400 | -4.1 |
| Sep | 4.5 | 254,600 | 0.6 | 297,700 | -2.6 |
| Aug | 4.6 | 253,200 | 6.7 | 305,500 | 8.2 |
| Jul | 4.6 | 237,400 | 2.1 | 282,300 | 3.9 |
| Jun | 4.8 | 232,600 | -2.8 | 271,800 | -3.2 |
| May | 4.7 | 239,200 | 1.2 | 280,900 | -2.4 |
| Apr | 4.9 | 236,400 | -1.4 | 287,900 | 1.5 |
| Mar | 5.0 | 239,800 | 0.0 | 283,600 | 3.5 |
| Feb | 4.8 | 239,900 | 8.2 | 274,000 | 3.1 |
| Jan | 5.3 | 221,700 | 1.4 | 265,700 | 1.1 |
| Dec 2011 | 5.3 | 218,600 | 2.0 | 262,900 | 5.2 |
| Nov | 5.7 | 214,300 | -4.7 | 250,000 | -3.2 |
| Oct | 6.0 | 224,800 | 3.6 | 258,300 | 1.1 |
| Sep | 6.3 | 217,000 | -1.2 | 255,400 | -1.5 |
| Aug | 6.5 | 219,600 | -4.5 | 259,300 | -4.1 |
| Jul | 6.7 | 229,900 | -4.3 | 270,300 | -1.0 |
| Jun | 6.6 | 240,200 | 8.2 | 273,100 | 3.9 |
| May | 6.6 | 222,000 | -1.2 | 262,700 | -2.3 |
| Apr | 6.7 | 224,700 | 1.9 | 268,900 | 3.1 |
| Mar | 7.2 | 220,500 | 0.2 | 260,800 | -0.8 |
| Feb | 8.1 | 220,100 | -8.3 | 262,800 | -4.7 |
| Jan | 7.3 | 240,100 | -0.5 | 275,700 | -5.5 |
| Dec 2010 | 7.0 | 241,200 | 9.8 | 291,700 | 3.5 |
*Percent of new houses for sale relative to houses sold
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
The depressed level of residential construction and new house sales in the US is evident in Table IIB-3 providing new house sales not seasonally adjusted in Jan-Aug of various years. Sales of new houses in Jan-Aug 2013 are substantially lower than in any year between 1963 and 2013 with the exception of the years from 2009 to 2012. There are only four increases of 20.4 percent relative to Jan-Aug 2012, 45.2 percent relative to Jan-Aug 2011, 31.5 percent relative to Jan-Aug 2010 and 16.9 percent relative to Jan-Aug 2009. Sales of new houses in Jan-Aug 2013 are lower by 16.4 percent relative to Jan-Aug 2008, 47.0 percent relative to 2007, 59.6 percent relative to 2006 and 66.3 percent relative to 2005. The housing boom peaked in 2005 and 2006 when increases in fed funds rates to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006 from 1.0 percent in Jun 2004 affected subprime mortgages that were programmed for refinancing in two or three years on the expectation that price increases forever would raise home equity. Higher home equity would permit refinancing under feasible mortgages incorporating full payment of principal and interest (Gorton 2009EFM; see other references in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html). Sales of new houses in Jan-Aug 2013 relative to the same period in 2004 fell 63.7 percent and 59.8 percent relative to the same period in 2003. Similar percentage declines are also observed for 2013 relative to years from 2000 to 2004. Sales of new houses in Jan-Aug 2013 fell 34.7 per cent relative to the same period in 1995. The population of the US was 179.3 million in 1960 and 281.4 million in 2000 (Hobbs and Stoops 2002, 16). Detailed historical census reports are available from the US Census Bureau at (http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscendata.html). The US population reached 308.7 million in 2010 (http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/). The US population increased by 129.4 million from 1960 to 2010 or 72.2 percent. The final row of Table IIB-3 reveals catastrophic data: sales of new houses in Jan-Aug 2013 of 305 thousand units are lower by 23.2 percent relative to 397 thousand units of houses sold in Jan-Aug 1963, the first year when data become available. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 122.667 million in Aug 1963 to 245.959 million in Aug 2013, or 100.5 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”
The civilian noninstitutional population is the universe of the labor force.
Table IIB-3, US, Sales of New Houses Not Seasonally Adjusted, Thousands and %
| Not Seasonally Adjusted Thousands | |
| Jan-Aug 2013 | 305 |
| Jan-Aug 2012 | 253 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/Jan-Aug 2012 | 20.4* |
| Jan-Aug 2011 | 210 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/Jan-Aug 2011 | 45.2 |
| Jan-Aug 2010 | 232 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | 31.5 |
| Jan-Aug 2009 | 261 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | 16.9 |
| Jan-Aug 2008 | 365 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | -16.4 |
| Jan-Aug 2007 | 576 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | -47.0 |
| Jan-Aug 2006 | 755 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/Jan-Aug 2006 | -59.6 |
| Jan-Aug 2005 | 906 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/Jan-Aug 2005 | -66.3 |
| Jan-Aug 2004 | 841 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/Jan-Aug 2004 | -63.7 |
| Jan-Aug 2003 | 758 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | -59.8 |
| Jan-Aug 2002 | 671 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | -54.5 |
| Jan-Aug 2001 | 643 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | -52.6 |
| Jan-Aug 2000 | 608 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | -49.8 |
| Jan-Aug 1995 | 467 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | -34.7 |
| Jan-Aug 1963 | 397 |
| ∆% Jan-Aug 2013/ | -23.2 |
*Computed using unrounded data
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
Table IIB-4 provides the entire available annual series of new house sales from 1963 to 2012. The revised level of 306 thousand new houses sold in 2011 is the lowest since 560 thousand in 1963 in the 48 years of available data while the level of 368 thousand in 2012 is only higher than 323 thousand in 2010. The population of the US increased 129.4 million from 179.3 million in 1960 to 308.7 million in 2010, or 72.2 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US increased from 122.416 million in 1963 to 243.284 million in 2012 or 98.7 percent (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines the civilian noninstitutional population (http://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm#cnp): “The civilian noninstitutional population consists of persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example, penal and mental facilities and homes for the aged) and who are not on active duty in the Armed Forces.”
The civilian noninstitutional population is the universe of the labor force. In fact, there is no year from 1963 to 2012 in Table IIA-4 with sales of new houses below 400 thousand with the exception of the immediately preceding years of 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.
Table IIB-4, US, New Houses Sold, NSA Thousands
| Year | Houses Sold |
| 1963 | 560 |
| 1964 | 565 |
| 1965 | 575 |
| 1966 | 461 |
| 1967 | 487 |
| 1968 | 490 |
| 1969 | 448 |
| 1970 | 485 |
| 1971 | 656 |
| 1972 | 718 |
| 1973 | 634 |
| 1974 | 519 |
| 1975 | 549 |
| 1976 | 646 |
| 1977 | 819 |
| 1978 | 817 |
| 1979 | 709 |
| 1980 | 545 |
| 1981 | 436 |
| 1982 | 412 |
| 1983 | 623 |
| 1984 | 639 |
| 1985 | 688 |
| 1986 | 750 |
| 1987 | 671 |
| 1988 | 676 |
| 1989 | 650 |
| 1990 | 534 |
| 1991 | 509 |
| 1992 | 610 |
| 1993 | 666 |
| 1994 | 670 |
| 1995 | 667 |
| 1996 | 757 |
| 1997 | 804 |
| 1998 | 886 |
| 1999 | 880 |
| 2000 | 877 |
| 2001 | 908 |
| 2002 | 973 |
| 2003 | 1,086 |
| 2004 | 1,203 |
| 2005 | 1,283 |
| 2006 | 1,051 |
| 2007 | 776 |
| 2008 | 485 |
| 2009 | 375 |
| 2010 | 323 |
| 2011 | 306 |
| 2012 | 368 |
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
Chart IIB-1 of the US Bureau of the Census shows the sharp decline of sales of new houses in the US. Sales rose temporarily until about mid 2010 but then declined to a lower plateau followed by increase and stability.
Chart IIB-1, US, New One-Family Houses Sold in the US, SAAR (Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate)
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/briefrm/esbr/www/esbr051.html
Chart IIA-2, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 1963-2013
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
Percentage changes and average rates of growth of new house sales for selected periods are shown in Table IIB-5. The percentage change of new house sales from 1963 to 2012 is minus 34.3 percent. Between 1991 and 2001, sales of new houses rose 78.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 5.9 percent. Between 1995 and 2005 sales of new houses increased 92.4 percent at the yearly rate of 6.8 percent. There are similar rates in all years from 2000 to 2005. The boom in housing construction and sales began in the 1980s and 1990s. The collapse of real estate culminated several decades of housing subsidies and policies to lower mortgage rates and borrowing terms (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009b), 42-8). Sales of new houses sold in 2012 fell 44.8 percent relative to the same period in 1995 and 71.3 percent relative to 2005.
Table IIB-5, US, Percentage Change and Average Yearly Rate of Growth of Sales of New One-Family Houses
| ∆% | Average Yearly % Rate | |
| 1963-2012 | -34.3 | NA |
| 1991-2001 | 78.4 | 5.9 |
| 1995-2005 | 92.4 | 6.8 |
| 2000-2005 | 46.3 | 7.9 |
| 1995-2012 | -44.8 | NA |
| 2000-2012 | -58.0 | NA |
| 2005-2012 | -71.3 | NA |
NA: Not Applicable
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
Chart IIB-2 of the US Bureau of the Census provides the entire monthly sample of new houses sold in the US between Jan 1963 and Aug 2013 without seasonal adjustment. The series is almost stationary until the 1990s. There is sharp upward trend from the early 1990s to 2005-2006 after which new single-family houses sold collapse to levels below those in the beginning of the series in the 1960s.
Chart IIB-2, US, New Single-family Houses Sold, NSA, 1963-2013
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
The available historical annual data of median and average prices of new houses sold in the US between 1963 and 2012 is provided in Table IIB-6. On a yearly basis, median and average prices reached a peak in 2007 and then fell substantially.
Table IIB-6, US, Median and Average Prices of New Houses Sold, Annual Data
| Year | Median Price | Average Price |
| 1963 | $18,000 | $19,300 |
| 1964 | $18,900 | $20,500 |
| 1965 | $20,000 | $21,500 |
| 1966 | $21,400 | $23,300 |
| 1967 | $22,700 | $24,600 |
| 1968 | $24,700 | $26,600 |
| 1969 | $25,600 | $27,900 |
| 1970 | $23,400 | $26,600 |
| 1971 | $25,200 | $28,300 |
| 1972 | $27,600 | $30,500 |
| 1973 | $32,500 | $35,500 |
| 1974 | $35,900 | $38,900 |
| 1975 | $39,300 | $42,600 |
| 1976 | $44,200 | $48,000 |
| 1977 | $48,800 | $54,200 |
| 1978 | $55,700 | $62,500 |
| 1979 | $62,900 | $71,800 |
| 1980 | $64,600 | $76,400 |
| 1981 | $68,900 | $83,000 |
| 1982 | $69,300 | $83,900 |
| 1983 | $75,300 | $89,800 |
| 1984 | $79,900 | $97,600 |
| 1985 | $84,300 | $100,800 |
| 1986 | $92,000 | $111,900 |
| 1987 | $104,500 | $127,200 |
| 1988 | $112,500 | $138,300 |
| 1989 | $120,000 | $148,800 |
| 1990 | $122,900 | $149,800 |
| 1991 | $120,000 | $147,200 |
| 1992 | $121,500 | $144,100 |
| 1993 | $126,500 | $147,700 |
| 1994 | $130,000 | $154,500 |
| 1995 | $133,900 | $158,700 |
| 1996 | $140,000 | $166,400 |
| 1997 | $146,000 | $176,200 |
| 1998 | $152,500 | $181,900 |
| 1999 | $161,000 | $195,600 |
| 2000 | $169,000 | $207,000 |
| 2001 | $175,200 | $213,200 |
| 2002 | $187,600 | $228,700 |
| 2003 | $195,000 | $246,300 |
| 2004 | $221,000 | $274,500 |
| 2005 | $240,900 | $297,000 |
| 2006 | $246,500 | $305,900 |
| 2007 | $247,900 | $313,600 |
| 2008 | $232,100 | $292,600 |
| 2009 | $216,700 | $270,900 |
| 2010 | $221,800 | $272,900 |
| 2011 | $227,200 | $267,900 |
| 2012 | $245,200 | $292,200 |
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
Percentage changes of median and average prices of new houses sold in selected years are shown in Table IIB-7. Prices rose sharply between 2000 and 2005. In fact, prices in 2012 are higher than in 2000. Between 2006 and 2012, median prices of new houses sold fell 0.5 percent and average prices fell 4.5 percent. Between 2011 and 2012, median prices increased 7.9 percent and average prices increased 9.1 percent.
Table IIB-7, US, Percentage Change of New Houses Median and Average Prices, NSA, ∆%
| Median New | Average New Home Sales Prices ∆% | |
| ∆% 2000 to 2003 | 15.4 | 18.9 |
| ∆% 2000 to 2005 | 42.5 | 43.5 |
| ∆% 2000 to 2012 | 45.1 | 41.2 |
| ∆% 2005 to 2012 | 1.8 | -1.6 |
| ∆% 2000 to 2006 | 45.9 | 47.8 |
| ∆% 2006 to 2012 | -0.5 | -4.5 |
| ∆% 2009 to 2012 | 13.2 | 7.9 |
| ∆% 2010 to 2012 | 10.6 | 7.1 |
| ∆% 2011 to 2012 | 7.9 | 9.1 |
Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
Chart IIB-3 of the US Census Bureau provides the entire series of new single-family sales median prices from Jan 1963 to Aug 2013. There is long-term sharp upward trend with few declines until the current collapse. Median prices increased sharply during the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s and paused during the savings and loans crisis of the late 1980s and the recession of 1991. Housing subsidies throughout the 1990s caused sharp upward trend of median new house prices that accelerated after the fed funds rate of 1 percent from 2003 to 2004. There was sharp reduction of prices after 2006 with recovery recently toward earlier prices.
Chart IIB-3, US, Median Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 1963-2013
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
Chart IIB-4 of the US Census Bureau provides average prices of new houses sold from the mid-1970s to Aug 2013. There is similar behavior as with median prices of new houses sold in Chart IIB-3. The only stress occurred in price pauses during the savings and loans crisis of the late 1980s and the collapse after 2006 with recent recovery.
Chart IIB-4, US, Average Sales Price of New Single-family Houses Sold, US Dollars, NSA, 1975-2013
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/
Chart IIA-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the rate for the 30-year conventional mortgage, the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond and the rate of the overnight federal funds rate, monthly, from 1971 to 2013. All rates decline throughout the period from the Great Inflation of the 1970s through the following Great Moderation and until currently. In Apr 1971, the fed funds rate was 4.15 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 7.31 percent. In November 2012, the fed funds rate was 0.16 percent, the yield of the 30-year Treasury 2.80 percent and the conventional mortgage rate 3.35. The final segment shows an increase in the yield of the 30-year Treasury to 3.61 percent in July 2013 with the fed funds rate at 0.09 percent and the conventional mortgage at 4.37 percent. The final data point shows increase of the conventional mortgage rate to 4.46 percent in Aug 2012 with the yield of the 30-year Treasury bond at 3.76 percent. The recent increase in interest rates if sustained could affect the US real estate market.
Chart IIB-5, US, Thirty-year Conventional Mortgage, Thirty-year Treasury Bond and Overnight Federal Funds Rate, Monthly, 1971-2013
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/default.htm
IIA2 United States House Prices. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, provides the FHFA House Price Index (HPI) that “is calculated using home sales price information from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-acquired mortgages” (http://fhfa.gov/webfiles/24216/q22012hpi.pdf 1). Table IIA2-1 provides the FHFA HPI for purchases only, which shows behavior similar to that of the Case-Shiller index but with lower magnitudes. House prices catapulted from 2000 to 2003, 2005 and 2006. From IIQ2000 to IIQ2006, the index for the US as a whole rose 59.5 percent, with 75.1 percent for New England, 79.1 percent for Middle Atlantic, 73.7 percent for South Atlantic but only by 31.6 percent for East South Central. Prices fell relative to 2013 for all years from 2005 and from 2006 with exception of 0.7 percent for Middle Atlantic from 2005. Prices for the US increased 7.3 percent in IIQ2013 relative to IIQ2012 and 11.0 percent from IIQ2011 to IIQ2013. From IIQ2000 to IIQ2013, prices rose for the US and the four regions in Table IIA2-1.
Table IIA2-1, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only NSA ∆%
| United States | New England | Middle Atlantic | South Atlantic | East South Central | |
| IIQ2000 | 22.9 | 40.7 | 34.0 | 24.3 | 9.9 |
| 1IQ2000 | 48.7 | 71.9 | 66.4 | 57.4 | 21.9 |
| IIQ2000 to | 59.5 | 75.1 | 79.1 | 73.7 | 31.6 |
| IIQ2005 t0 | -3.4 | -9.9 | 0.7 | -7.7 | 8.6 |
| IIQ2006 | -10.0 | -11.6 | -6.5 | -16.4 | 0.6 |
| IIQ2007 to | -11.1 | -10.2 | -8.1 | -18.0 | -3.9 |
| IIQ2011 to | 11.0 | 3.3 | 2.4 | 12.4 | 7.3 |
| IIQ2012 to | 7.3 | 3.9 | 2.6 | 7.5 | 3.5 |
| IIQ2000 to | 43.6 | 54.8 | 67.5 | 45.3 | 32.4 |
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14
Data of the FHFA HPI for the remaining US regions are in Table IIA2-2. Behavior is not very different from that in Table IIA2-1 with the exception of East North Central. House prices in the Pacific region doubled between 2000 and 2006. Although prices of houses declined sharply from 2005 and 2006 to 2013 with exception of South Central, there was still appreciation relative to 2000.
Table IIA2-2, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only NSA ∆%
| West South Central | West North Central | East North Central | Mountain | Pacific | |
| IIQ2000 | 12.0 | 18.1 | 14.6 | 17.4 | 40.7 |
| IIQ2000 | 22.4 | 31.8 | 25.2 | 50.7 | 104.7 |
| IIQ2000 to IIQ2006 | 31.2 | 37.1 | 27.9 | 69.9 | 125.0 |
| IIQ2005 to | 22.8 | 1.6 | -9.2 | -4.3 | -19.0 |
| IIQ2006 | 14.5 | -2.3 | -11.2 | -15.1 | -26.4 |
| IIQ2007 to | 8.7 | -3.9 | -10.4 | -17.7 | -24.3 |
| IIQ2011 to | 10.1 | 8.3 | 8.1 | 21.1 | 21.1 |
| IIQ2012 to | 5.9 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 12.5 | 16.3 |
| IIQ2000 to IIQ2013 | 50.3 | 33.9 | 13.6 | 44.2 | 65.7 |
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14
Chart IIA2-1 of the Federal Housing Finance Agency shows the Housing Price Index four-quarter price change from IIQ2003 to IIQ2013. House prices appreciated sharply from 1998 to 2005 and then fell rapidly. Recovery began already after IIQ2008 but there was another decline after IIIQ2010. The rate of decline improved in the second half of 2011 and into 2012 with movement into positive territory in IIQ2012, IIIQ2012, IVQ2012, IQ2013 and IIQ2013.
Chart IIA2-1, US, Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index Four Quarter Price Change
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency
http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14
Monthly and 12-month percentage changes of the FHFA House Price Index are in Table IIA2-3. Percentage monthly increases of the FHFA index were positive from Apr to Jul 2011 with exception of declines in May and Aug 2011 while 12 months percentage changes improved steadily from more or equal to minus 6 percent in Mar to May 2011 to minus 4.4 percent in Jun 2011. The FHFA house price index fell 0.7 percent in Oct 2011 and fell 3.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct. There was significant recovery in Nov 2012 with increase in the house price index of 0.5 percent and reduction of the 12-month rate of decline to 2.2 percent. The house price index rose 0.4 percent in Dec 2011 and the 12-month percentage change improved to minus 1.3 percent. There was further improvement with revised decline of 0.3 percent in Jan 2012 and decline of the 12-month percentage change to minus 1.1 percent. The index changed to positive change of 0.5 percent in Feb 2012 and increase of 0.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Feb 2012. There was strong improvement in Mar 2012 with gain in prices of 0.9 percent and 2.4 percent in 12 months. The house price index of FHFA increased 0.8 percent in Apr 2012 and 3.0 percent in 12 months and improvement continued with increase of 0.6 percent in May 2012 and 3.8 percent in the 12 months ending in May 2012. Improvement consolidated with increase of 0.5 percent in Jun 2012 and 3.9 percent in 12 months. In Jul 2012, the house price index increased 0.1 percent and 3.8 percent in 12 months. Strong increase of 0.6 percent in Aug 2012 pulled the 12-month change to 4.5 percent. There was another increase of 0.6 percent in Oct and 5.6 percent in 12 months followed by increase of 0.6 percent in Nov 2012 and 5.6 percent in 12 months. The FHFA house price index increased 0.6 percent in Jan 2013 and 6.6 percent in 12 months. Improvement continued with increase of 0.5 percent in Apr 2013 and 7.3 percent in 12 months. In May 2013, the house price indexed increased 0.9 percent and 7.6 percent in 12 months. The FHFA house price index increased 0.7 percent in Jun 2013 and 7.9 percent in 12 months. In Jul 2013, the FHFA house price index increased 1.0 percent and 8.8 percent in 12 months.
Table IIA2-3, US, FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only SA. Month and NSA 12-Month ∆%
| Month ∆% SA | 12 Month ∆% NSA | |
| Jul 2013 | 1.0 | 8.8 |
| Jun | 0.7 | 7.9 |
| May | 0.9 | 7.6 |
| Apr | 0.5 | 7.3 |
| Mar | 1.4 | 7.5 |
| Feb | 0.9 | 7.0 |
| Jan | 0.6 | 6.6 |
| Dec 2012 | 0.5 | 5.7 |
| Nov | 0.6 | 5.6 |
| Oct | 0.6 | 5.6 |
| Sep | 0.2 | 4.3 |
| Aug | 0.6 | 4.5 |
| Jul | 0.1 | 3.8 |
| Jun | 0.5 | 3.9 |
| May | 0.6 | 3.8 |
| Apr | 0.8 | 3.0 |
| Mar | 0.9 | 2.4 |
| Feb | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Jan | -0.3 | -1.1 |
| Dec 2011 | 0.4 | -1.3 |
| Nov 2011 | 0.5 | -2.2 |
| Oct 2011 | -0.6 | -3.1 |
| Sep 2011 | 0.4 | -2.4 |
| Aug 2011 | -0.1 | -3.7 |
| Jul 2011 | 0.2 | -3.5 |
| Jun 2011 | 0.4 | -4.4 |
| May 2011 | -0.1 | -5.9 |
| Apr 2011 | 0.2 | -5.8 |
| Mar 2011 | -0.9 | -6.0 |
| Feb 2011 | -1.1 | -5.1 |
| Jan 2011 | -0.6 | -4.6 |
| Dec 2010 | -3.8 | |
| Dec 2009 | -2.0 | |
| Dec 2008 | -9.9 | |
| Dec 2007 | -3.1 | |
| Dec 2006 | 2.5 | |
| Dec 2005 | 9.8 | |
| Dec 2004 | 10.2 | |
| Dec 2003 | 8.0 | |
| Dec 2002 | 7.8 | |
| Dec 2001 | 6.7 | |
| Dec 2000 | 7.2 | |
| Dec 1999 | 6.2 | |
| Dec 1998 | 5.9 | |
| Dec 1997 | 3.4 | |
| Dec 1996 | 2.8 | |
| Dec 1995 | 2.9 | |
| Dec 1994 | 2.6 | |
| Dec 1993 | 3.1 | |
| Dec 1992 | 2.4 |
Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14
The bottom part of Table IIA2-3 provides 12-month percentage changes of the FHFA house price index since 1992 when data become available for 1991. Table IIA2-4 provides percentage changes and average rates of percent change per year for various periods. Between 1992 and 2012, the FHFA house price index increased 84.6 percent at the yearly average rate of 3.1 percent. In the period 1992-2000, the FHFA house price index increased 39.4 percent at the average yearly rate of 4.2 percent. The rate of price increase accelerated to 7.5 percent in the period 2000-2003 and to 8.5 percent in 2000-2005 and 7.5 percent in 2000-2006. At the margin, the average rate jumped to 10.0 percent in 2003-2005 and 7.5 percent in 2003-2006. House prices measured by the FHFA house price index declined 14.2 percent between 2006 and 2012 and 12.0 percent between 2005 and 2012.
Table IIA2-4, US, FHFA House Price Index, Percentage Change and Average Rate of Percentage Change per Year, Selected Dates 1992-2012
| Dec | ∆% | Average ∆% per Year |
| 1992-2012 | 84.6 | 3.1 |
| 1992-2000 | 39.4 | 4.2 |
| 2000-2003 | 24.3 | 7.5 |
| 2000-2005 | 50.4 | 8.5 |
| 2003-2005 | 21.0 | 10.0 |
| 2005-2012 | -12.0 | NA |
| 2000-2006 | 54.3 | 7.5 |
| 2003-2006 | 24.1 | 7.5 |
| 2006-2012 | -14.2 | NA |
Source: Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=14
Table IIA2-5 shows the euphoria of prices during the housing boom and the subsequent decline. House prices rose 94.1 percent in the 10-city composite of the Case-Shiller home price index and 78.8 percent in the 20-city composite between Jul 2000 and Jul 2005. Prices rose around 100 percent from Jul 2000 to Jul 2006, increasing 107.5 percent for the 10-city composite and 91.6 percent for the 20-city composite. House prices rose 49.1 percent between Jul 2003 and Jul 2005 for the 10-city composite and 44.4 percent for the 20-city composite propelled by low fed funds rates of 1.0 percent between Jun 2003 and Jun 2004. Fed funds rates increased by 0.25 basis points at every meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) until Jun 2006, reaching 5.25 percent. Simultaneously, the suspension of auctions of the 30-year Treasury bond caused decline of yields of mortgage-backed securities with intended decrease in mortgage rates. Similarly, between Jul 2003 and Jul 2006, the 10-city index gained 49.1 percent and the 20-city index increased 44.4 percent. House prices have fallen from Jul 2006 to Jul 2013 by 22.0 percent for the 10-city composite and 21.3 percent for the 20-city composite. Measuring house prices is quite difficult because of the lack of homogeneity that is typical of standardized commodities. In the 12 months ending in Jul 2013, house prices increased 12.3 percent in the 10-city composite and increased 12.4 percent in the 20-city composite. Table IIA2-5 also shows that house prices increased 61.9 percent between Jul 2000 and Jul 2013 for the 10-city composite and increased 50.8 percent for the 20-city composite. House prices are close to the lowest level since peaks during the boom before the financial crisis and global recession. The 10-city composite fell 22.0 percent from the peak in Jul 2006 to Jul 2013 and the 20-city composite fell 21.3 percent from the peak in Jul 2006 to Jul 2013. The final part of Table IIA2-5 provides average annual percentage rates of growth of the house price indexes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller. The average annual growth rate between Dec 1987 and Dec 2012 for the 10-city composite was 3.3 percent. Data for the 20-city composite are available only beginning in Jan 2000. House prices accelerated in the 1990s with the average rate of the 10-city composite of 5.0 percent between Dec 1992 and Dec 2000 while the average rate for the period Dec 1987 to Dec 2000 was 3.8 percent. Although the global recession affecting the US between IVQ2007 (Dec) and IIQ2009 (Jun) caused decline of house prices of slightly above 30 percent, the average annual growth rate of the 10-city composite between Dec 2000 and Dec 2012 was 2.8 percent while the rate of the 20-city composite was 2.3 percent.
Table IIA2-5, US, Percentage Changes of Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%
| 10-City Composite | 20-City Composite | |
| ∆% Jul 2000 to Jul 2003 | 39.1 | 32.7 |
| ∆% Jul 2000 to Jul 2005 | 94.1 | 78.8 |
| ∆% Jul 2003 to Jul 2005 | 39.6 | 34.7 |
| ∆% Jul 2000 to Jul 2006 | 107.5 | 91.6 |
| ∆% Jul 2003 to Jul 2006 | 49.1 | 44.4 |
| ∆% Jul 2005 to Jul 2013 | -16.6 | -15.7 |
| ∆% Jul 2006 to Jul 2013 | -22.0 | -21.3 |
| ∆% Jul 2009 to Jul 2013 | 13.2 | 12.6 |
| ∆% Jul 2010 to Jul 2013 | 8.8 | 9.1 |
| ∆% Jul 2011 to Jul 2013 | 12.9 | 13.7 |
| ∆% Jul 2012 to Jul 2013 | 12.3 | 12.4 |
| ∆% Jul 2000 to Jul 2013 | 61.9 | 50.8 |
| ∆% Peak Jun 2006 Jul 2013 | -22.0 | |
| ∆% Peak Jul 2006 Jul 2013 | -21.3 | |
| Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2012 | 3.3 | NA |
| Average ∆% Dec 1987-Dec 2000 | 3.8 | NA |
| Average ∆% Dec 1992-Dec 2000 | 5.0 | NA |
| Average ∆% Dec 2000-Dec 2012 | 2.8 | 2.3 |
Source: http://www.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller
Monthly house prices increased sharply from Feb to Jul 2013 for both the 10- and 20-city composites. In Jul 2013, the seasonally adjusted 10-city composite increased 0.7 percent and the 20-city 0.6 percent while the 10-city not seasonally adjusted increased 1.9 percent and the 20-city 1.8 percent. House prices increased at high monthly percentage rates from Feb to Jul 2013. With the exception of Feb through Apr 2012, house prices seasonally adjusted declined in every month for both the 10-city and 20-city Case-Shiller composites from Dec 2010 to Jan 2012, as shown in Table IIA2-6. The most important seasonal factor in house prices is school changes for wealthier homeowners with more expensive houses. Without seasonal adjustment, house prices fell from Dec 2010 throughout Mar 2011 and then increased in every month from Apr to Aug 2011 but fell in every month from Sep 2011 to Feb 2012. The not seasonally adjusted index registers decline in Mar 2012 of 0.1 percent for the 10-city composite and is flat for the 20-city composite. Not seasonally adjusted house prices increased 1.4 percent in Apr 2012 and at high monthly percentage rates until Sep 2012. House prices not seasonally adjusted stalled from Oct 2012 to Jan 2013 and surged from Feb to Jul 2013. Declining house prices cause multiple adverse effects of which two are quite evident. (1) There is a disincentive to buy houses in continuing price declines. (2) More mortgages could be losing fair market value relative to mortgage debt. Another possibility is a wealth effect that consumers restrain purchases because of the decline of their net worth in houses.
Table IIA2-6, US, Monthly Percentage Change of S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, Seasonally Adjusted and Not Seasonally Adjusted, ∆%
| 10-City Composite SA | 10-City Composite NSA | 20-City Composite SA | 20-City Composite NSA | |
| Jul 2013 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 0.6 | 1.8 |
| Jun | 1.0 | 2.2 | 0.9 | 2.2 |
| May | 1.0 | 2.5 | 0.9 | 2.5 |
| Apr | 1.8 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 2.6 |
| Mar | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 1.4 |
| Feb | 1.3 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 0.3 |
| Jan | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.1 |
| Dec 2012 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.2 |
| Nov | 0.6 | -0.2 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Oct | 0.7 | -0.2 | 0.7 | -0.1 |
| Sep | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 |
| Aug | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| Jul | 0.3 | 1.5 | 0.3 | 1.6 |
| Jun | 0.9 | 2.1 | 1.0 | 2.3 |
| May | 0.8 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 2.4 |
| Apr | 0.6 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 1.4 |
| Mar | 0.5 | -0.1 | 0.6 | 0.0 |
| Feb | 0.1 | -0.9 | 0.1 | -0.8 |
| Jan | -0.3 | -1.1 | -0.1 | -1.0 |
| Dec 2011 | -0.5 | -1.2 | -0.4 | -1.2 |
| Nov | -0.6 | -1.4 | -0.5 | -1.3 |
| Oct | -0.5 | -1.3 | -0.5 | -1.3 |
| Sep | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.5 | -0.7 |
| Aug | -0.3 | 0.1 | -0.3 | 0.1 |
| Jul | -0.2 | 0.9 | -0.2 | 1.0 |
| Jun | -0.1 | 1.0 | -0.1 | 1.2 |
| May | -0.3 | 1.0 | -0.4 | 1.0 |
| Apr | -0.1 | 0.6 | -0.1 | 0.6 |
| Mar | -0.4 | -1.0 | -0.4 | -1.0 |
| Feb | -0.3 | -1.3 | -0.3 | -1.2 |
| Jan | -0.3 | -1.1 | -0.3 | -1.1 |
| Dec 2010 | -0.2 | -0.9 | -0.2 | -1.0 |
Source: http://www.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller
IIC United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities. Subsection IIC1 Transmission of Monetary Policy recapitulates the mechanism of transmission of monetary policy. Subsection IIC2 Functions of Banking analyzes the functions of banks in modern banking theory. Subsection IIC3 United States Commercial Bank Assets and Liabilities provides data and analysis of US commercial bank balance sheets in report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm). Subsection IIC4 Theory and Reality of Economic History and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation analyzes and compares unconventional monetary policy.
IIC1 Transmission of Monetary Policy. The critical fact of current world financial markets is the combination of “unconventional” monetary policy with intermittent shocks of financial risk aversion. There are two interrelated unconventional monetary policies. First, unconventional monetary policy consists primarily of reducing short-term policy interest rates toward the “zero bound” such as fixing the fed funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent by decision of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since Dec 16, 2008 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm). Fixing policy rates at zero is the strongest measure of monetary policy with collateral effects of inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets such as commodities, exchange rates, stocks and higher yielding fixed income. Second, unconventional monetary policy also includes a battery of measures in also reducing long-term interest rates of government securities and asset-backed securities such as mortgage-backed securities.
When inflation is low, the central bank lowers interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand in the economy, which consists of consumption and investment. When inflation is subdued and unemployment high, monetary policy would lower interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand, reducing unemployment. When interest rates decline to zero, unconventional monetary policy would consist of policies such as large-scale purchases of long-term securities to lower their yields. Long-term asset-backed securities finance a major portion of credit in the economy. Loans for purchasing houses, automobiles and other consumer products are bundled in securities that in turn are sold to investors. Corporations borrow funds for investment by issuing corporate bonds. Loans to small businesses are also financed by bundling them in long-term bonds. Securities markets bridge the needs of higher returns by savers obtaining funds from investors that are channeled to consumers and business for consumption and investment. Lowering the yields of these long-term bonds could lower costs of financing purchases of consumer durables and investment by business. The essential mechanism of transmission from lower interest rates to increases in aggregate demand is portfolio rebalancing. Withdrawal of bonds in a specific maturity segment or directly in a bond category such as currently mortgage-backed securities causes reductions in yields that are equivalent to increases in the prices of the bonds. There can be secondary increases in purchases of those bonds in private portfolios in pursuit of their increasing prices. Lower yields translate into lower costs of buying homes and consumer durables such as automobiles and also lower costs of investment for business. There are two additional intended routes of transmission.
1. Unconventional monetary policy or its expectation can increase stock market valuations (Bernanke 2010WP). Increases in equities traded in stock markets can augment perceptions of the wealth of consumers inducing increases in consumption.
2. Unconventional monetary policy causes devaluation of the dollar relative to other currencies, which can cause increases in net exports of the US that increase aggregate economic activity (Yellen 2011AS).
Monetary policy can lower short-term interest rates quite effectively. Lowering long-term yields is somewhat more difficult. The critical issue is that monetary policy cannot ensure that increasing credit at low interest cost increases consumption and investment. There is a large variety of possible allocation of funds at low interest rates from consumption and investment to multiple risk financial assets. Monetary policy does not control how investors will allocate asset categories. A critical financial practice is to borrow at low short-term interest rates to invest in high-risk, leveraged financial assets. Investors may increase in their portfolios asset categories such as equities, emerging market equities, high-yield bonds, currencies, commodity futures and options and multiple other risk financial assets including structured products. If there is risk appetite, the carry trade from zero interest rates to risk financial assets will consist of short positions at short-term interest rates (or borrowing) and short dollar assets with simultaneous long positions in high-risk, leveraged financial assets such as equities, commodities and high-yield bonds. Low interest rates may induce increases in valuations of risk financial assets that may fluctuate in accordance with perceptions of risk aversion by investors and the public. During periods of muted risk aversion, carry trades from zero interest rates to exposures in risk financial assets cause temporary waves of inflation that may foster instead of preventing financial instability. During periods of risk aversion such as fears of disruption of world financial markets and the global economy resulting from events such as collapse of the European Monetary Union, carry trades are unwound with sharp deterioration of valuations of risk financial assets. More technical discussion is in IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy.
Symmetric inflation targets appear are of secondary priority in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures, including zero interest rates and outright purchases of securities for the portfolio of the central bank, is now open ended in perpetuity, or QE→∞, as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):
“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”
Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):
“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.
Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.
The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”
Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:
“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”
Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at around 1.8 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 16 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_adv.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_2nd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0713.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0813.pdf http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0613.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html). As a result, there are 28.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 17.4 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html).
First, total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 169,000 in Aug 2013 and private payroll employment rose 152,000. The average number of nonfarm jobs created in Jan-Aug 2012 was 178,625 while the average number of private jobs created in Jan-Aug 2013 was 180,250, or increase by 0.9 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US in Jan-Aug 2012 was 181,750 while the average in Jan-Aug 2013 was 185,625, or increase by 2.1 percent. The US labor force increased from 153.617 million in 2011 to 154.975 million in 2012 by 1.358 million or 113,167 per month. The average increase of nonfarm jobs in the eight months from Jan to Aug 2013 was 178,625, which is a rate of job creation inadequate to reduce significantly unemployment and underemployment in the United States because of 113,167 new entrants in the labor force per month with 28.3 million unemployed or underemployed. The difference between the average increase of 178,625 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Jan to Aug 2013 and the 113,167 average monthly increase in the labor force from 2011 to 2012 is 65,458 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 28.3 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 65,458 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 433 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (28.348 million divided by 65,458) or 36 years (433 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Aug 2013 not seasonally adjusted stood at 155.971 million with 11.462 million unemployed or effectively 18.316 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 162.825 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 1.3 years (1 million divided by product of 65,458 by 12, which is 785,496). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.799 million (0.05 times labor force of 155.971 million) for new net job creation of 3.663 million (11.462 million unemployed minus 7.799 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 4.7 years (3.663 million divided by 0.785496). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 18.316 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 162.825 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 9.586 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 12.9 years (18.316 million minus 0.05(162.825 million) = 10.175 million divided by 0.785596, using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in the US fell from 147.315 million in Jul 2007 to 144.509 million in Aug 2013, by 2.806 million, or decline of 1.9 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional or economically active population increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 245.959 million in Aug 2013, by 14.001 million or increase of 6.0 percent, using not seasonally adjusted data. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs. The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.
Second, Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_adv.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_2nd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0713.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0813.pdf http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0613.pdf) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.
- Long-term. US GDP grew at the average yearly rate of 3.3 percent from 1929 to 2012 and at 3.2 percent from 1947 to 2012. There were periodic contractions or recessions in this period but the economy grew at faster rates in the subsequent expansions, maintaining long-term economic growth at trend.
- Cycles. The combined contraction of GDP in the two almost consecutive recessions in the early 1980s is 4.7 percent. The contraction of US GDP from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 during the global recession was 4.3 percent. The critical difference in the expansion is growth at average 7.8 percent in annual equivalent in the first four quarters of recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The average rate of growth of GDP in four cyclical expansions in the postwar period is 7.7 percent. In contrast, the rate of growth in the first four quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 was only 2.7 percent. Average annual equivalent growth in the expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was 5.7 percent. In contrast, average annual equivalent growth in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 was only 2.7 percent. The US appears to have lost its dynamism of income growth and employment creation.
Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita
| GDP | ||
| Long-Term | ||
| 1929-2012 | 3.3 | |
| 1947-2012 | 3.2 | |
| Cyclical Contractions ∆% | ||
| IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | -4.7 | |
| IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | -4.3 | |
| Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆% | ||
| IQ1983 to IQ1986 | 5.7 | |
| First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983 | 7.8 | |
| IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 | 2.2 | |
| First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 | 2.7 | |
| Real Disposable Income | Real Disposable Income per Capita | |
| Long-Term | ||
| 1929-2012 | 3.2 | 2.0 |
| 1947-1999 | 3.7 | 2.3 |
| Whole Cycles | ||
| 1980-1989 | 3.5 | 2.6 |
| 2006-2012 | 1.4 | 0.6 |
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0813.pdf
The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_adv.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_2nd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0713.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0813.pdf http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0613.pdf) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace from 1.8 to 1.9 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.
1. Average Annual Growth in the Past Six Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and the first two quarters of 2013 accumulated to 2.9 percent. This growth is equivalent to 1.9 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IIQ2013 of $15,679.7 by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,242.1 and compounding by 4/6: {[($15,679.7/$15,242.1)4/6 -1]100 = 1.9.
2. Average Annual Growth in the First Two Quarters of 2013. GDP growth in the first two quarters of 2013 accumulated to 0.9 percent that is equivalent to 1.8 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IIQ2013 of $15,679.7 by GDP in IVQ2012 of $15,539.6 and compounding by 4/2: {[($15,679.7/$15,539.6)4/2 -1]100 =1.8%}. The US economy grew 1.6 percent in IIQ2013 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IIQ2012. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is just at the borderline of contraction.
Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%
| Real GDP, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars | ∆% Relative to IVQ2007 | ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter | ∆% | |
| IVQ2007 | 14,996.1 | NA | NA | 1.9 |
| IVQ2011 | 15,242.1 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| IQ2012 | 15,381.6 | 2.6 | 0.9 | 3.3 |
| IIQ2012 | 15,427.7 | 2.9 | 0.3 | 2.8 |
| IIIQ2012 | 15,534.0 | 3.6 | 0.7 | 3.1 |
| IVQ2012 | 15,539.6 | 3.6 | 0.0 | 2.0 |
| IQ2013 | 15,583.9 | 3.9 | 0.3 | 1.3 |
| IIQ2013 | 15,679.7 | 4.6 | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IIQ2013 | 2.9 | 2.8 | ||
| Annual Equivalent ∆% | 1.9 | 1.9 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf
In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QE→∞ cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.
The major reason and channel of transmission of unconventional monetary policy is through expectations of inflation. Fisher (1930) provided theoretical and historical relation of interest rates and inflation. Let in be the nominal interest rate, ir the real or inflation-adjusted interest rate and πe the expectation of inflation in the time term of the interest rate, which are all expressed as proportions. The following expression provides the relation of real and nominal interest rates and the expectation of inflation:
(1 + ir) = (1 + in)/(1 + πe) (1)
That is, the nominal interest rate equals the real interest rate discounted by the expectation of inflation in time term of the interest rate. Fisher (1933) analyzed the devastating effect of deflation on debts. Nominal debt contracts remained at original principal interest but net worth and income of debtors contracted during deflation. Real interest rates increase during declining inflation. For example, if the interest rate is 3 percent and prices decline 0.2 percent, equation (1) calculates the real interest rate as:
(1 +0.03)/(1 – 0.02) = 1.03/(0.998) = 1.032
That is, the real rate of interest is (1.032 – 1) 100 or 3.2 percent. If inflation were 2 percent, the real rate of interest would be 0.98 percent, or about 1.0 percent {[(1.03/1.02) -1]100 = 0.98%}.
The yield of the one-year Treasury security was quoted in the Wall Street Journal at 0.114 percent on Fri May 17, 2013 (http://online.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_topnav_marketdata_main). The expected rate of inflation πe in the next twelve months is not observed. Assume that it would be equal to the rate of inflation in the past twelve months estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BLS) at 1.1 percent (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The real rate of interest would be obtained as follows:
(1 + 0.00114)/(1 + 0.011) = (1 + rr) = 0.9902
That is, ir is equal to 1 – 0.9902 or minus 0.98 percent. Investing in a one-year Treasury security results in a loss of 0.98 percent relative to inflation. The objective of unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates is to induce consumption and investment because of the loss to inflation of riskless financial assets. Policy would be truly irresponsible if it intended to increase inflationary expectations or πe. The result could be the same rate of unemployment with higher inflation (Kydland and Prescott 1977).
Friedman (1953) analyzed the effects of full-employment economic policy on economic stability. There are two critical issues. First, there are lags in effect of monetary policy on aggregate income and prices (Friedman 1961, Culbertson 1960, 1961, Batini and Nelson 2002, Romer and Romer 2004). Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Second, concrete knowledge on the functioning of the economy is inadequate. The result of shocking the economy with policies at the wrong time could be an increase in instability. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities).
Carry trades from zero interest rates to highly leveraged exposures in risk financial assets characterize the current environment. Some analytical aspects of the carry trade are instructive (Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 101-5, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 202-4), Government Intervention in Globalization: Regulation, Trade and Devaluation Wars (2008c), 70-4). Consider the following symbols: Rt is the exchange rate of a country receiving carry trade denoted in units of domestic currency per dollars at time t of initiation of the carry trade; Rt+τ is the exchange of the country receiving carry trade denoted in units of domestic currency per dollars at time t+τ when the carry trade is unwound; if is the domestic interest rate of the high-yielding country where investment will be made; iusd is the interest rate on short-term dollar debt assumed to be 0.5 percent per year; if >iusd, which expresses the fact that the interest rate on the foreign country is much higher than that in short-term USD (US dollars); St is the dollar value of the investment principal; and π is the dollar profit from the carry trade. The investment of the principal St in the local currency debt of the foreign country provides a profit of:
π = (1 + if)(RtSt)(1/Rt+τ) – (1 + iusd)St (2)
The profit from the carry trade, π, is nonnegative when:
(1 + if)/ (1 + iusd) ≥ Rt+τ/Rt (3)
In words, the difference in interest rate differentials, left-hand side of inequality (3), must exceed the percentage devaluation of the currency of the host country of the carry trade, right hand side of inequality (3). The carry trade must earn enough in the host-country interest rate to compensate for depreciation of the host-country at the time of return to USD. A simple example explains the vulnerability of the carry trade in fixed-income. Let if be 0.10 (10 percent), iusd 0.005 (0.5 percent), St USD100 and Rt CUR 1.00/USD. Adopt the fixed-income rule of months of 30 days and years of 360 days. Consider a strategy of investing USD 100 at 10 percent for 30 days with borrowing of USD 100 at 0.5 percent for 30 days. At time t, the USD 100 are converted into CUR 100 and invested at [(30/360)10] equal to 0.833 percent for thirty days. At the end of the 30 days, assume that the rate Rt+30 is still CUR 1/USD such that the return amount from the carry trade is USD 0.833. There is still a loan to be paid [(0.005)(30/360)USD100] equal to USD 0.042. The investor receives the net amount of USD 0.833 minus USD 0.042 or US 0.791. The rate of return on the investment of the USD 100 is 0.791 percent, which is equivalent to the annual rate of return of 9.49 percent {(0.791)(360/30)}. This is incomparably better than earning 0.5 percent. There are alternatives of hedging by buying forward the exchange for conversion back into USD.
What really matters in the statement of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 18, 2013, is interest rates of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for the foreseeable future, even with paring of purchases of longer term bonds for the portfolio of the Fed (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent” (emphasis added).
Another critical concern in the statement of the FOMC on Sep 18, 2013, is on the effects of tapering expectations on interest rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm):
“Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has been strengthening, but mortgage rates have risen further and fiscal policy is restraining economic growth” (emphasis added).
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
It may be quite painful to exit QE∞ or use of the balance sheet of the central bank together with zero interest rates forever. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:
![clip_image002[1]](https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg5XFr0-6yhMJXZtD_alsMkUE6YeENb2XtntOk6gbBS6r3PgbDVFJgfPN9c5iC8btlQnawTk0fyAvB9kvbF_vz0K_5-tNKi8jGLiTJJ7oHZcd0afEBXHF7D3TkDhjfdEgqwcQwMXrbO2eU/s1600-h/clip_image002%25255B1%25255D%25255B2%25255D.gif "clip_image002[1]"){kind=small}
Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that discount rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or
declines.
The net worth of the economy depends on interest rates. In theory, “income is generally defined as the amount a consumer unit could consume (or believe that it could) while maintaining its wealth intact” (Friedman 1957, 10). Income, Y, is a flow that is obtained by applying a rate of return, r, to a stock of wealth, W, or Y = rW (Friedman 1957, 10). According to a subsequent restatement: “The basic idea is simply that individuals live for many years and that therefore the appropriate constraint for consumption decisions is the long-run expected yield from wealth r*W. This yield was named permanent income: Y* = r*W” (Darby 1974, 229), where * denotes permanent. The simplified relation of income and wealth can be restated as:
W = Y/r (1)
Equation (1) shows that as r goes to zero, r →0, W grows without bound, W→∞. Equally, as r→∞, W→0. Monetary policy is constrained in a QE∞ trap with all adverse effects of financial repression and resource misallocation because an increase in interest rates causes contraction of wealth, which in the United States is concentrated in home ownership and stocks in own investment portfolios and pension funds that decline during interest rate increases.
IIC2 Functions of Banks. Modern banking theory analyzes three important functions provided by banks: monitoring of borrowers, provision of liquidity services and transformation of illiquid assets into immediately liquid assets (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 51-60). These functions require valuation of alternative investment projects that may be distorted by zero interest rates of monetary policy and artificially low long-term interest rates. The QE∞ trap frustrates essential banking functions.
- Monitoring. Banks monitor projects to ensure that funds are allocated to their intended projects (Diamond 1984, 1996). Banks issue deposits, which are secondary assets, to acquire loans, which are primary assets. Monitoring reduces costs of participating in business projects. Acting as delegated monitor, banks obtain information on the borrower, allowing less costly participation through the issue of unmonitored deposits. Monitoring of borrowers provides enhanced less costly participation by investors through the issue of deposits. There is significant reduction of monitoring costs by delegating to a bank. If there are many potential investors, monitoring by the bank of a credit name is less costly than the sum of individual monitoring of the same credit name by all potential investors. Banks permit borrowers to reach many investors for their projects while affording investors less costly participation in the returns of projects of bank borrowers.
- Transformation of Illiquid Loans into Liquid Deposits. Diamond and Dybvig (1986) analyze bank services through bank balance sheets.
i. Assets. Banks provide loans to borrowers. The evaluation of borrowers prevents “adverse selection,” which consists of banks choosing unsound projects and failing to finance sound projects. Monitoring of loans prevents “moral hazard,” which consists of borrowers using the funds of the loan for purposes other than the project for which they were lent, as for example, using borrowed bank funds for speculative real estate instead of for the intended industrial project. Relationship banking improves the information on borrowers and the monitoring function.
ii. Liabilities. Banks provide numerous services to their clients such as holding deposits, clearing transactions, currency inventory and payments for goods, services and obligations.
iii. Assets and Liabilities: Transformation Function. The transformation function operates through both sides of the balance sheet: banks convert illiquid loans in the asset side into liquid deposits in the liability side. There is rich theory of banking (Diamond and Rajan 2000, 2001a,b). Securitized banking provides the same transformation function by bundling mortgage and other consumer loans into securities that are then sold to investors who finance them in short-dated sale and repurchase agreements (Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 61-6).
Banking was important in facilitating economic growth in historical periods (Cameron 1961, 1967, 1972; Cameron et al. 1992). Banking is also important currently because small- and medium-size business may have no other form of financing than banks in contrast with many options for larger and more mature companies that have access to capital markets. Personal consumptions expenditures have share of 68.6 percent of GDP in IIQ2013 (Table I-10 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html). Most consumers rely on their banks for real estate loans, credit cards and personal consumer loans. Thus, it should be expected that success of monetary policy in stimulating the economy would be processed through bank balance sheets.
IIC3 United States Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities. Selected assets and liabilities of US commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, in billions of dollars, from Report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are in Table IIC-1. Data are not seasonally adjusted to permit comparison between Aug 2012 and Aug 2013. Total assets of US commercial banks grew 6.4 percent from $12,838.3 billion in Aug 2012 to $13,664.5 billion in Aug 2013. US GDP in IIQ2013 is estimated at $16,667.9 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Thus, total assets of US commercial banks are equivalent to around 82 percent of US GDP. Bank credit grew 2.0 percent from $9767.2 billion in Aug 2012 to $9962.1 billion in Aug 2013. Securities in bank credit increased 1.1 percent from $2646.9 billion in Aug 2012 to $2673.6 billion in Aug 2013. A large part of securities in banking credit consists of US Treasury and agency securities, falling 3.0 percent from $1837.9 billion in Aug 2012 to $1782.7 billion in Aug 2013. Credit to the government that issues or backs Treasury and agency securities of $1782.7 billion in Aug 2013 is about 17.9 percent of total bank credit of US commercial banks of $9962.1 billion. Mortgage-backed securities, providing financing of home loans, fell 1.1 percent, from $1332.8 billion in Aug 2012 to $1318.6 billion in Aug 2013. Loans and leases are relatively more dynamic, growing 2.4 percent from $7120.3 billion in Aug 2012 to $7288.5 billion in Aug 2013. The only dynamic class is commercial and industrial loans, growing 7.4 percent from Aug 2012 to Aug 2013 and providing $1563.0 billion or 21.4 percent of total loans and leases of $7288.5 billion in Aug 2013. Real estate loans decreased only 0.2 percent, providing $3517.1 billion in Aug 2013 or 48.3 percent of total loans and leases. Consumer loans increased 3.4 percent, providing $1145.4 billion in Aug 2013 or 15.7 percent of total loans. Cash assets are measured to “include vault cash, cash items in process of collection, balances due from depository institutions and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm). Cash assets in US commercial banks increased 42.5 percent from $1663.2 billion in Aug 2012 to $2370.3 billion in Aug 2013 but a single year of the series masks exploding cash in banks because of unconventional monetary policy, which is discussed below. Bank deposits increased 7.3 percent from $8824.7 billion to $9472.8 billion. The difference between bank deposits and total loans and leases in banks increased from $1704.4 billion in Aug 2012 to $2184.3 billion in Aug 2013 or by $479.9 billion, which is also similar to the increase in securities in bank credit by $26.7 billion from $2646.9 billion in Aug 2012 to $2673.6 billion in Aug 2013 and to the decrease in Treasury and agency securities by $55.2 billion from $1837.9 billion in Aug 2012 to $1782.7 billion in Aug 2013. Loans and leases increased $168.6 billion from $7120.3 billion in Aug 2012 to $7288.9 billion in Aug 2013. Banks expanded both lending and investment in lower risk securities partly because of the weak economy and credit disappointments during the global recession that has resulted in an environment of fewer sound lending opportunities. Investing in securities with high duration, or price elasticity of yields, is riskier because of the increase in yields that can cause loss of principal as investors shift away from bond funds into money market funds invested in short-term assets. Lower interest rates resulting from monetary policy may not necessarily encourage higher borrowing in the current loss of dynamism of the US economy with real disposable income per capita in IIQ2013 higher by only 3.4 percent than in IVQ2007 (Table IB-2 IX Conclusion and extended analysis in IB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation) in contrast with 12.1 percent higher if the economy had performed in long-term growth of per capita income in the United States at 2 percent per year from 1870 to 2010 (Lucas 2011May). In contrast, growth of real disposable income grew cumulatively 16.4 percent in the cycle from IQ1980 to IIIQ1986 that was higher than trend growth of 14.9 percent.
Table IIC-1, US, Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, NSA, Billions of Dollars
| Aug 2012 | Aug 2013 | ∆% | |
| Total Assets | 12,838.3 | 13,664.5 | 6.4 |
| Bank Credit | 9767.2 | 9962.1 | 2.0 |
| Securities in Bank Credit | 2646.9 | 2673.6 | 1.0 |
| Treasury & Agency Securities | 1837.9 | 1782.7 | -3.0 |
| Mortgage-Backed Securities | 1332.8 | 1318.6 | -1.1 |
| Loans & Leases | 7120.3 | 7288.5 | 2.4 |
| Real Estate Loans | 3524.3 | 3517.1 | -0.2 |
| Consumer Loans | 1107.8 | 1145.4 | 3.4 |
| Commercial & Industrial Loans | 1455.7 | 1563.0 | 7.4 |
| Other Loans & Leases | 1032.6 | 1063.1 | 2.9 |
| Cash Assets* | 1663.2 | 2370.3 | 42.5 |
| Total Liabilities | 11,355.7 | 12,168.6 | 7.2 |
| Deposits | 8824.7 | 9472.8 | 7.3 |
Note: balancing item of residual assets less liabilities not included
*”Includes vault cash, cash items in process of collection, balances due from depository institutions and balances due from Federal Reserve Banks.”
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Seasonally adjusted annual equivalent rates (SAAR) of change of selected assets and liabilities of US commercial banks from the report H.8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are in Table IIC-2 annually from 2008 to 2012 and for Jul 2013 and Aug 2013. The global recession had strong impact on bank assets as shown by declines of total assets of 6.0 percent in 2009 and 2.7 percent in 2010. Loans and leases fell 10.2 percent in 2009 and 5.8 percent in 2010. Commercial and industrial loans fell 18.6 percent in 2009 and 9.0 percent in 2010. Unconventional monetary policy caused an increase of cash assets of banks of 160.3 percent in 2008, 49.2 percent in 2009 and 48.4 percent in 2011 followed by decline by 2.0 percent in 2012. Cash assets of banks increased at the SAAR of 22.4 percent in Aug 2012 but contraction by 49.6 percent in Sep 2012 and 6.3 percent in Oct 2012. Cash assets of banks increased at 56.0 percent in Nov 2012, minus 7.8 percent in Dec 2012, 38.8 percent in Jan 2013, 66.2 percent in Feb 2013, 66.0 percent in Mar 2013 and 14.5 percent in Apr 2013. Cash assets of banks increased at the SAAR of 63.2 percent in May 2013, 46.6 percent in Jun 2013, 46.0 percent in Jul 2013 and 85.8 percent in Aug 2013. Acquisitions of securities for the portfolio of the central bank injected reserves in depository institutions that banks held as cash and reserves at the central bank because of the lack of sound lending opportunities and the adverse expectations in the private sector on doing business. The truly dynamic investment of banks has been in securities in bank credit: growing at the SAAR of 15.4 percent in Jul 2012, 2.6 percent in Aug 2012, 5.3 percent in Sep 2012, 4.7 percent in Oct 2012, 1.7 percent in Nov 2012 and 20.5 percent in Dec 2012. There were declines of securities in bank credit at 1.1 percent in Jan 2013, 3.2 percent in Feb 2013 and 2.7 percent in Mar 2013 but growth of 1.5 percent in Apr 2013. Securities in bank credit fell at the SAAR of 2.6 percent in May 2013 and 8.2 percent in Jun 2013. Securities in bank credit fell at the SAAR of 14.6 percent in Jul 2013 and at 11.0 in Aug 2013. Fear of loss of principal in securities with high duration or price elasticity of yield is shifting investments away from bonds into cash and other assets with less price risk. Positions marked to market in balance sheets experience sharp declines. Throughout the crisis banks allocated increasing part of their assets to the safety of Treasury and agency securities, or credit to the US government and government-backed credit: with growth of 13.4 percent in 2009 and 15.2 percent in 2010 and at the rate of 16.3 percent in Jul 2012, declining to the rate of 3.4 percent in Aug 2012, 2.1 percent in Sep 2012 and 0.7 percent in Oct 2012. Treasury and agency securities in bank credit fell at the rate of 0.8 percent in Nov 2012, increasing at 17.2 percent in Dec 2012. Treasury and agency securities in bank credit fell at 5.9 percent in Jan 2013, 3.1 percent in Feb 2013, 7.0 percent in Mar 2013 and 5.4 percent in Apr 2013 and 8.3 percent in May 2013. Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks fell at the SAAR of 7.0 percent in Jun 2013, 23.9 percent in Jul 2013 and 20.8 percent in Aug 2013. Increases in yield result in capital losses that may explain less interest in holding securities with higher duration. Deposits grew at the rate of 10.5 percent in Jul 2012, with the rate declining as for most assets of commercial banks to the rate of 6.2 percent in Aug 2012 but increasing to 7.2 percent in Sep 2012, 8.4 percent in Oct 2012, 5.7 percent in Nov 2012, 18.7 percent in Dec 2012, 2.7 percent in Jan 2013. Deposits grew at the rate of 4.4 percent in Feb 2013, 7.7 percent in Mar 2013, 3.5 percent in Apr 2013 and 2.4 percent in May 2013. Deposits increased at the SAAR of 6.3 percent in Jun 2013, 8.9 percent in Jul 2013 and 1.8 percent in Aug 2013. The credit intermediation function of banks is broken because of adverse expectations on future business and cannot be fixed by monetary and fiscal policy. Incentives to business and consumers are more likely to be effective in this environment in recovering willingness to assume risk on the part of the private sector, which is the driver of growth and job creation.
Table IIC-2, US, Selected Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, ∆%
| 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | Jul 2013 | Aug 2013 | |
| Total Assets | 7.9 | -6.0 | -2.7 | 5.4 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 8.2 |
| Bank Credit | 2.1 | -6.6 | -2.7 | 1.8 | 3.9 | -3.1 | -4.8 |
| Securities in Bank Credit | -1.9 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 1.8 | 7.4 | -14.6 | -11.0 |
| Treasury & Agency Securities | 2.6 | 13.4 | 15.2 | 3.0 | 8.5 | -23.9 | -20.8 |
| Other Securities | -7.7 | -3.1 | -7.1 | -0.7 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 9.2 |
| Loans & Leases | 3.3 | -10.2 | -5.8 | 1.9 | 2.7 | 1.2 | -2.6 |
| Real Estate Loans | -0.2 | -5.7 | -5.5 | -3.8 | -1.1 | -4.5 | -5.5 |
| Consumer Loans | 5.1 | -3.3 | -7.0 | -0.7 | 1.2 | 3.9 | 3.7 |
| Commercial & Industrial Loans | 12.9 | -18.6 | -9.0 | 9.6 | 11.0 | 10.7 | -0.1 |
| Other Loans & Leases | 1.7 | -23.1 | 0.4 | 19.2 | 6.8 | 3.8 | -3.0 |
| Cash Assets | 160.3 | 49.2 | -7.7 | 48.4 | -2.0 | 46.0 | 85.8 |
| Total Liabilities | 10.6 | -7.1 | -3.4 | 5.5 | 2.2 | 7.0 | 6.9 |
| Deposits | 5.4 | 5.2 | 2.4 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 8.9 | 1.8 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides quarterly seasonally adjusted annual rates (SAAR) of cash assets in US commercial banks from 1973 to 2013. Unconventional monetary policy caused an increase in cash assets in late 2008 of close to 500 percent at SAAR and also in following policy impulses. Such aggressive policies were not required for growth of GDP at the average rate of 5.2 percent in 16 quarters of cyclical expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986 while the average rate in 16 quarters of cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 has been at the rate of 2.2 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html). The difference in magnitude of the recessions is not sufficient to explain weakness of the current cyclical expansion. Bordo (2012Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) find that growth is higher after deeper contractions and contractions with financial crises. There were two consecutive contractions in the 1980s with decline of 2.2 percent in two quarters from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and 2.5 percent from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 that are almost identical to the contraction of 4.3 percent from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. There was also a decade-long financial and banking crisis during the 1980s. The debt crisis of 1982 (Pelaez 1986) wiped out a large part of the capital of large US money-center banks. Benston and Kaufman (1997, 139) find that there was failure of 1150 US commercial and savings banks between 1983 and 1990, or about 8 percent of the industry in 1980, which is nearly twice more than between the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1934 through 1983. More than 900 savings and loans associations, representing 25 percent of the industry, were closed, merged or placed in conservatorships (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2008b), 74-7). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) that received $150 billion of taxpayer funds to resolve insolvent savings and loans. The GDP of the US in 1989 was $5657.7 billion (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm), such that the partial cost to taxpayers of that bailout was around 2.65 percent of GDP in a year. US GDP in 2012 is estimated at $16,244.6 billion, such that the bailout would be equivalent to cost to taxpayers of about $430.5 billion in current GDP terms. A major difference with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for private-sector banks is that most of the costs were recovered with interest gains whereas in the case of savings and loans there was no recovery.
Chart IIC-1, US, Cash Assets, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides quarterly SAARs of bank credit at US commercial banks from 1973 to 2013. Rates collapsed sharply during the global recession as during the recessions of the 1980s and then rebounded. In both episodes, rates of growth of bank credit did not return to earlier magnitudes.
Chart IIC-2, US, Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1947-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides deposits at US commercial banks from 1973 to 2013. Deposits fell sharp during and after the global recession but then rebounded in the cyclical expansion.
Chart IIC-3, US, Deposits, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1973-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is similar behavior in the 1980s and in the current cyclical expansion of SAARs holdings of Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks provided in Chart IIC-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the period 1973 to 2013. Sharp reductions of holdings during the contraction were followed by sharp increases.
Chart IIC-4, US, Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1947-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides SAARs of change of total loans and leases in US commercial banks from 1973 to 2013. The decline of SAARs in the current cycle was much sharper and the rebound did not recover earlier growth rates. Part of the explanation originates in demand for loans that was high during rapid economic growth at 5.2 percent per year on average in the cyclical expansion of the 1980s in contrast with lower demand during tepid economic growth at 2.2 percent per year on average in the current weak expansion.
Chart IIC-5, US, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1947-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is significant difference in the two cycles of the 1980s and the current one in quarterly SAARs of real estate loans in US commercial banks provided in Chart IIC-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The difference is explained by the debacle in real estate after 2006 compared to expansion during the 1980s even in the midst of the crisis of savings and loans and real estate credit. In both cases, government policy tried to influence recovery and avoid market clearing.
Chart IIC-6, US, Real Estate Loans in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1947-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
There is significant difference in quarterly SAARs of change of consumer loans in US commercial banks in the 1980s and during the current cycle as shown in Chart IIC-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Quarterly SAARs of consumer loans in US commercial banks fell sharply during the contraction of 1980 and oscillated with upward trend during the contraction of 1983-1984 but increased sharply in the cyclical expansion. In contrast, SAARs of consumer loans in US commercial banks collapsed to high negative magnitudes during the contraction and have increased at very low magnitudes during the current cyclical expansion.
Chart IIC-7, US, Consumer Loans in Bank Credit, Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Monthly, 1958-2013, ∆%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
The average rate of growth of real GDP in expansions after recessions with financial crises was 8 percent but only 6.9 percent on average for recessions without financial crises (Bordo 2012Sep27). Real GDP declined 12 percent in the Panic of 1907 and increased 13 percent in the recovery, consistent with the plucking model of Friedman (Bordo 2012Sep27). Bordo (2012Sep27) finds two probable explanations for the weak recovery during the current economic cycle: (1) collapse of United States housing; and (2) uncertainty originating in fiscal policy, regulation and structural changes. There are serious doubts if monetary policy is adequate to recover the economy under these conditions.
Lucas (2011May) estimates US economic growth in the long-term at 3 percent per year and about 2 percent per year in per capita terms. There are displacements from this trend caused by events such as wars and recessions but the economy then returns to trend. Historical US GDP data exhibit remarkable growth: Lucas (2011May) estimates an increase of US real income per person by a factor of 12 in the period from 1870 to 2010. The explanation by Lucas (2011May) of this remarkable growth experience is that government provided stability and education while elements of “free-market capitalism” were an important driver of long-term growth and prosperity. Lucas sharpens this analysis by comparison with the long-term growth experience of G7 countries (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan) and Spain from 1870 to 2010. Countries benefitted from “common civilization” and “technology” to “catch up” with the early growth leaders of the US and UK, eventually growing at a faster rate. Significant part of this catch up occurred after World War II. Lucas (2011May) finds that the catch up stalled in the 1970s. The analysis of Lucas (2011May) is that the 20-40 percent gap that developed originated in differences in relative taxation and regulation that discouraged savings and work incentives in comparison with the US. A larger welfare and regulatory state, according to Lucas (2011May), could be the cause of the 20-40 percent gap. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in USD fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in Japan and France within the G7 in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. The key indicator of growth of real income per capita or what is earned per person after inflation, measures long-term economic growth and prosperity. A refined concept would include real disposable income per capita, which is what a person earns after inflation and taxes.
Table IIC-3 provides the data required for broader comparison of long-term and cyclical performance of the United States economy. Revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_adv.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_2nd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0713.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0813.pdf http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0613.pdf) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. First, Long-term performance. Using annual data, US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.3 percent per year from 1929 to 2012 and at 3.2 percent per year from 1947 to 2012. Real disposable income grew at the average yearly rate of 3.2 percent from 1929 to 2013 and at 3.7 percent from 1947 to 1999. Real disposable income per capita grew at the average yearly rate of 2.0 percent from 1929 to 2012 and at 2.3 percent from 1947 to 1999. US economic growth was much faster during expansions, compensating for the contraction in maintaining trend growth for whole cycles. Using annual data, US real disposable income grew at the average yearly rate of 3.5 percent from 1980 to 1980 and real disposable income per capita at 2.6 percent. The US economy has lost its dynamism in the current cycle: real disposable income grew at the yearly average rate of 1.4 percent from 2006 to 2012 and real disposable income per capita at 0.6 percent. Second, first four quarters of expansion. Growth in the first four quarters of expansion is critical in recovering loss of output and employment occurring during the contraction. In the first four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1983: GDP increased 7.8 percent, real disposable personal income 5.3 percent and real disposable income per capita 4.4 percent. In the first four quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010: GDP increased 2.7 percent, real disposable personal income 1.4 percent and real disposable income per capita 0.8 percent. Third, first 16 quarters of expansion. In the expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986: GDP grew 22.3 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 5.2 percent; real disposable income grew 17.3 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 4.1 percent; and real disposable income per capita grew 13.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.3 percent. In the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013: GDP grew 9.0 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.2 percent; real disposable income grew 6.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.6 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita grew 3.5 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.9 percent. Fourth, entire quarterly cycle. In the entire cycle combining contraction and expansion from IQ1980 to IIIQ1986: GDP grew 21.1 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.8 percent; real disposable personal income 24.7 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 3.2 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita 17.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 2.3 percent. In the entire cycle combining contraction and expansion from IVQ2007 to IIQ2013: GDP grew 4.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.7 percent; real disposable personal income 6.9 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent; and real disposable personal income per capita 2.4 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 0.4 percent. The United States grew during its history at high rates of per capita income that made its economy the largest in the world. That dynamism is disappearing. Bordo (2012 Sep27) and Bordo and Haubrich (2012DR) provide strong evidence that recoveries have been faster after deeper recessions and recessions with financial crises, casting serious doubts on the conventional explanation of weak growth during the current expansion allegedly because of the depth of the contraction of 4.3 percent from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 and the financial crisis.
Table IIC-3, US, GDP, Real Disposable Personal Income, Real Disposable Income per Capita and Population in 1983-85 and 2007-2013, %
| Long-term GDP | Average ∆% per Year | ||
| 1929-2012 | 3.3 | ||
| 1947-2012 | 3.2 | ||
| Long-term Average ∆% per Year | Real Disposable Income | Real Disposable Income per Capita | |
| 1929-2012 | 3.2 | 2.0 | |
| 1947-1999 | 3.7 | 2.3 | |
| Whole Cycles Average ∆% per Year | |||
| 1980-1989 | 3.5 | 2.6 | |
| 2006-2012 | 1.4 | 0.6 | |
| Comparison of Cycles | # Quarters | ∆% | ∆% Annual Equivalent |
| IQ1983 to IVQ1986 IQ1983 to IIIQ1986 | 4 16 | ||
| GDP IQ1983 to IVQ1983 IQ1983 to IIIQ1986 | 4 16 | 7.8 22.3 | 7.8 5.2 |
| RDPI IQ1983 to IVQ1983 IQ1983 to IIIQ1986 | 4 16 | 5.3 17.3 | 5.3 4.1 |
| RDPI Per Capita IQ1983 to IVQ1983 IQ1983 to IIIQ1986 | 4 16 | 4.4 13.7 | 4.4 3.3 |
| Whole Cycle IQ1980 to IIIQ1986 | |||
| GDP | 28 | 21.1 | 2.8 |
| RDPI | 28 | 24.7 | 3.2 |
| RDPI per Capita | 28 | 17.4 | 2.3 |
| Population | 28 | 6.3 | 0.9 |
| GDP First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 | 4 16 | 2.7 9.0 | 2.7 2.2 |
| RDPI IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 | 4 16 | 1.4 6.4 | 1.4 1.6 |
| RDPI per Capita IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 | 4 16 | 0.8 3.5 | 0.8 0.9 |
| Population IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 | 4 16 | 0.6 2.8 | 0.6 0.7 |
| IVQ2007 to IIQ2013 | 23 | ||
| GDP | 23 | 4.4 | 0.7 |
| RDPI | 23 | 6.9 | 1.2 |
| RDPI per Capita | 23 | 2.4 | 0.4 |
| Population | 23 | 4.4 | 0.8 |
RDPI: Real Disposable Personal Income
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Chart IIC-8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides cash assets in commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Increases in bank cash reserves processed acquisitions of securities for the portfolio of the central bank. There is no comparable experience in US economic history and such flood of money was never required to return US economic growth to trend of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita income after events such as recessions and wars (Lucas 2011May). It is difficult to argue that higher magnitudes of monetary and fiscal policy impulses would have been more successful. Discovery of such painless and fast adjustment by gigantic impulses of monetary policy of zero interest rates and trillions of dollars of bond buying would have occurred earlier with prior cases of successful implementation. Selective incentives to the private sector of a long-term nature could have been more effective.
Chart IIC-8, US, Cash Assets in Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-9 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides total assets of Federal Reserve Banks in millions of dollars on Wednesdays from Dec 18, 2002 to Sep 25, 2013. This is what is referred as the leverage of the central bank balance sheet in monetary policy (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-62, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b) 224-27). Consecutive rounds of unconventional monetary policy increased total assets by purchase of mortgage-backed securities, agency securities and Treasury securities. Bank reserves in cash and deposited at the central bank swelled as shown in Chart IIC-8. The central bank created assets in the form of securities financed with creation of liabilities in the form of reserves of depository institutions.
Chart IIC-9, US, Total Assets of Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday Level, Millions of Dollars, Dec 18, 2002 to Sep 25, 2013
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1
Chart IIC-10 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides deposits in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1973 to 2013. Deposit growth clearly accelerated after 2001 and continued during the current cyclical expansion after bumps during the global recession.
Chart IIC-10, US, Deposits in Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-11 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides Treasury and agency securities in US commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted, in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2013. Holdings stabilized between the recessions of 2001 and after IVQ2007. There was rapid growth during the global contraction especially after unconventional monetary policy in 2008 and nearly vertical increase without prior similar historical experience during the various bouts of unconventional monetary policy. Banks hoard cash and less risky Treasury and agency securities instead of risky lending because of the weakness of the economy and the lack of demand for financing sound business projects. Banks and investors in general are avoiding exposures to high-duration fixed-income securities because of possible price losses during increases in yields. There is decline of bank holdings of Treasury and agency securities in the final segment.
Chart IIC-11, US, Treasury and Agency Securities in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1947-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-12 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides total loans and leases in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2013. Total loans and leases of US commercial banks contracted sharply and have stalled during the cyclical expansion.
Chart IIC-12, US, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1947-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-13 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides real estate loans in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2013. Housing subsidies and low interest rates caused a point of inflexion to higher, nearly vertical growth until 2007. Real estate loans have contracted in downward trend partly because of adverse effects of uncertainty on the impact on balance sheets of the various mechanisms of resolution imposed by policy. Nick Timiraos, writing on “Push for cheaper credit hits wall,” on Dec 24, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324660404578197782701079650.html), provides important information and analysis on housing finance. Quantitative easing consists of withdrawing supply of mortgage-backed securities by acquiring them as assets in the Fed balance sheet. Lending banks obtain funds for mortgages by bundling them according to risk and other characteristics and selling them to investors, using the proceeds from the sale to provide the loans to homebuyers or refinancing homeowners. Banks earn net revenue to remunerate capital required for operations from the spread between the rate received from mortgage debtors and the rate implicit in the yield of the mortgage-backed securities. Nick Timiraos (Ibid) finds that the spread was around 0.5 percentage points before the financial crisis of 2007, widening to 1 percentage point after the crisis but jumping to 1.6 percentage points after the Fed engaged in another program of buying mortgage-backed securities, oscillating currently around 1.3 percentage points. The spread has widened because banks have higher costs originating in regulation, litigation on repurchasing defaulted mortgages, loss in case of default and more prudent but more costly scrutiny of property appraisals and income verification. As a result, even if quantitative easing does lower yields of mortgage-backed securities there would not be proportionate reduction in mortgage rates and even less likely construction and sales of houses.
Chart IIC-13, US, Real Estate Loans in Bank Credit, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1947-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-14 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides consumer loans in US commercial banks not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2013. Consumer loans even increased during the contraction then declined and increased vertically to decline again. There was high demand for reposition of durable goods that exhausted and limited consumption again with increase in savings rates in recent periods.
Chart IIC-14, US, Consumer Loans in Bank Credit, Not Seasonally Adjusted, US Commercial Banks, Monthly, 1947-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-15 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides commercial and industrial loans not seasonally adjusted in billions of dollars from 1947 to 2013. Commercial and industrial loans fell sharply during both contractions in 2001 and after IVQ2007 and then rebounded with accelerated growth. Commercial and industrial loans have not reached again the peak during the global recession.
Chart IIC-15, US, Commercial and Industrial Loans in Bank Credit, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1947-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
Chart IIC-16 is quite revealing in analyzing the state of bank credit in the US economy. The upper curves are (1) deposits and (2) loans and leases in bank credit. Historically since 1973, the level and rate of change of deposits and loans and leases in bank credit were almost identical. The lower two curves are Treasury and agency securities in bank credit and cash assets with treasury and agency securities moving closely with cash assets until the 1990s when Treasury and agency securities exceeded cash assets. The shaded area of the recession from IV2007 to IIQ2009 shows a break in the level and rate of movement of the series. Deposits continued to expand rapidly through the recession and the following expansion period. Loans and leases fell and barely recovered the level before the recession while deposits moved nearly vertically well above the level before the recession. While Treasury and agency securities in bank credit continued to expand at a higher rate, reaching a level well above that before the recession, cash assets jumped as the counterpart of excess reserves in banks that financed quantitative easing or massive outright purchases of securities for the balance sheet of the Fed. Unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and outright purchases of securities caused sharp increases of deposits, cash assets and Treasury and agency securities in bank credit but not in loans and leases. There is much discussion about the almost impossible task of evaluating monetary policy in terms of costs and benefits. Before the financial crisis, Chairman Greenspan (2004) analyzes monetary policy and its limitations (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 13-4, 212-13) that do not differ from those of private financial institutions:
“The Federal Reserve's experiences over the past two decades make it clear that uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape. The term "uncertainty" is meant here to encompass both "Knightian uncertainty," in which the probability distribution of outcomes is unknown, and "risk," in which uncertainty of outcomes is delimited by a known probability distribution. In practice, one is never quite sure what type of uncertainty one is dealing with in real time, and it may be best to think of a continuum ranging from well-defined risks to the truly unknown.
As a consequence, the conduct of monetary policy in the United States has come to involve, at its core, crucial elements of risk management. This conceptual framework emphasizes understanding as much as possible the many sources of risk and uncertainty that policymakers face, quantifying those risks when possible, and assessing the costs associated with each of the risks. In essence, the risk management approach to monetary policymaking is an application of Bayesian decision making.
This framework also entails devising, in light of those risks, a strategy for policy directed at maximizing the probabilities of achieving over time our goals of price stability and the maximum sustainable economic growth that we associate with it. In designing strategies to meet our policy objectives, we have drawn on the work of analysts, both inside and outside the Fed, who over the past half century have devoted much effort to improving our understanding of the economy and its monetary transmission mechanism. A critical result has been the identification of a relatively small set of key relationships that, taken together, provide a useful approximation of our economy's dynamics. Such an approximation underlies the statistical models that we at the Federal Reserve employ to assess the likely influence of our policy decisions.
However, despite extensive efforts to capture and quantify what we perceive as the key macroeconomic relationships, our knowledge about many of the important linkages is far from complete and, in all likelihood, will always remain so. Every model, no matter how detailed or how well designed, conceptually and empirically, is a vastly simplified representation of the world that we experience with all its intricacies on a day-to-day basis.
Given our inevitably incomplete knowledge about key structural aspects of an ever-changing economy and the sometimes asymmetric costs or benefits of particular outcomes, a central bank needs to consider not only the most likely future path for the economy but also the distribution of possible outcomes about that path. The decision makers then need to reach a judgment about the probabilities, costs, and benefits of the various possible outcomes under alternative choices for policy.”
“Whale” trades at official institutions causing wide swings of financial and economic variables do not receive the same media attention as those in large private banking institutions such as the teapot storm over JP Morgan Chase.
Chart IIC-16, US, Deposits, Treasury and Government Securities in Bank Credit, Loans and Leases in Bank Credit and Cash Assets, US Commercial Banks, Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 1973-2013, Billions of Dollars
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/default.htm
IIC4 Theory and Reality of Economic History and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation. Fear of deflation as had occurred during the Great Depression and in Japan was used as an argument for the first round of unconventional monetary policy with 1 percent interest rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 and quantitative easing in the form of withdrawal of supply of 30-year securities by suspension of the auction of 30-year Treasury bonds with the intention of reducing mortgage rates (for fear of deflation see Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture (2005), 18-28, and Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 83-95). The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html
If the forecast of the central bank is of recession and low inflation with controlled inflationary expectations, monetary policy should consist of lowering the short-term policy rate of the central bank, which in the US is the fed funds rate. The intended effect is to lower the real rate of interest (Svensson 2003LT, 146-7). The real rate of interest, r, is defined as the nominal rate, i, adjusted by expectations of inflation, π*, with all variables defined as proportions: (1+r) = (1+i)/(1+π*) (Fisher 1930). If i, the fed funds rate, is lowered by the Fed, the numerator of the right-hand side is lower such that if inflationary expectations, π*, remain unchanged, the left-hand (1+r) decreases, that is, the real rate of interest, r, declines. Expectations of lowering short-term real rates of interest by policy of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) fixing a lower fed funds rate would lower long-term real rates of interest, inducing with a lag investment and consumption, or aggregate demand, that can lift the economy out of recession. Inflation also increases with a lag by higher aggregate demand and inflation expectations (Fisher 1933). This reasoning explains why the FOMC lowered the fed funds rate in Dec 2008 to 0 to 0.25 percent and left it unchanged.
The fear of the Fed is expected deflation or negative π*. In that case, (1+ π*) < 1, and (1+r) would increase because the right-hand side of the equation would be divided by a fraction. A simple numerical example explains the effect of deflation on the real rate of interest. Suppose that the nominal rate of interest or fed funds rate, i, is 0.25 percent, or in proportion 0.25/100 = 0.0025, such that (1+i) = 1.0025. Assume now that economic agents believe that inflation will remain at 1 percent for a long period, which means that π* = 1 percent, or in proportion 1/100 =0.01. The real rate of interest, using the equation, is (1+0.0025)/(1+0.01) = (1+r) = 0.99257, such that r = 0.99257 - 1 = -0.00743, which is a proportion equivalent to –(0.00743)100 = -0.743 percent. That is, Fed policy has created a negative real rate of interest of 0.743 percent with the objective of inducing aggregate demand by higher investment and consumption. This is true if expected inflation, π*, remains at 1 percent. Suppose now that expectations of deflation become generalized such that π* becomes -1 percent, that is, the public believes prices will fall at the rate of 1 percent in the foreseeable future. Then the real rate of interest becomes (1+0.0025) divided by (1-0.01) equal to (1.0025)/(0.99) = (1+r) = 1.01263, or r = (1.01263-1) = 0.01263, which results in positive real rate of interest of (0.01263)100 = 1.263 percent.
Irving Fisher also identified the impact of deflation on debts as an important cause of deepening contraction of income and employment during the Great Depression illustrated by an actual example (Fisher 1933, 346):
“By March, 1933, liquidation had reduced the debts about 20 percent, but had increased the dollar about 75 percent, so that the real debt, that is the debt measured in terms of commodities, was increased about 40 percent [100%-20%)X(100%+75%) =140%]. Unless some counteracting cause comes along to prevent the fall in the price level, such a depression as that of 1929-1933 (namely when the more the debtors pay the more they owe) tends to continue, going deeper, in a vicious spiral, for many years. There is then no tendency of the boat to stop tipping until it has capsized”
The nominal rate of interest must always be nonnegative, that is, i ≥ 0 (Hick 1937, 154-5):
“If the costs of holding money can be neglected, it will always be profitable to hold money rather than lend it out, if the rate of interest is not greater than zero. Consequently the rate of interest must always be positive. In an extreme case, the shortest short-term rate may perhaps be nearly zero. But if so, the long-term rate must lie above it, for the long rate has to allow for the risk that the short rate may rise during the currency of the loan, and it should be observed that the short rate can only rise, it cannot fall”
The interpretation by Hicks of the General Theory of Keynes is the special case in which at interest rates close to zero liquidity preference is infinitely or perfectly elastic, that is, the public holds infinitely large cash balances at that near zero interest rate because there is no opportunity cost of foregone interest. Increases in the money supply by the central bank would not decrease interest rates below their near zero level, which is called the liquidity trap. The only alternative public policy would consist of fiscal policy that would act similarly to an increase in investment, increasing employment without raising the interest rate.
An influential view on the policy required to steer the economy away from the liquidity trap is provided by Paul Krugman (1998). Suppose the central bank faces an increase in inflation. An important ingredient of the control of inflation is the central bank communicating to the public that it will maintain a sustained effort by all available policy measures and required doses until inflation is subdued and price stability is attained. If the public believes that the central bank will control inflation only until it declines to a more benign level but not sufficiently low level, current expectations will develop that inflation will be higher once the central bank abandons harsh measures. During deflation and recession the central bank has to convince the public that it will maintain zero interest rates and other required measures until the rate of inflation returns convincingly to a level consistent with expansion of the economy and stable prices. Krugman (1998, 161) summarizes the argument as:
“The ineffectuality of monetary policy in a liquidity trap is really the result of a looking-glass version of the standard credibility problem: monetary policy does not work because the public expects that whatever the central bank may do now, given the chance, it will revert to type and stabilize prices near their current level. If the central bank can credibly promise to be irresponsible—that is, convince the market that it will in fact allow prices to rise sufficiently—it can bootstrap the economy out of the trap”
This view is consistent with results of research by Christina Romer that “the rapid rates of growth of real output in the mid- and late 1930s were largely due to conventional aggregate demand stimulus, primarily in the form of monetary expansion. My calculations suggest that in the absence of these stimuli the economy would have remained depressed far longer and far more deeply than it actually did” (Romer 1992, 757-8, cited in Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 210-2). The average growth rate of the money supply in 1933-1937 was 10 percent per year and increased in the early 1940s. Romer calculates that GDP would have been much lower without this monetary expansion. The growth of “the money supply was primarily due to a gold inflow, which was in turn due to the devaluation in 1933 and to capital flight from Europe because of political instability after 1934” (Romer 1992, 759). Gold inflow coincided with the decline in real interest rates in 1933 that remained negative through the latter part of the 1930s, suggesting that they could have caused increases in spending that was sensitive to declines in interest rates. Bernanke finds dollar devaluation against gold to have been important in preventing further deflation in the 1930s (Bernanke 2002):
“There have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from US history is Franklin Roosevelt’s 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the US deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934. The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market”
Fed policy is seeking what Irving Fisher proposed “that great depressions are curable and preventable through reflation and stabilization” (Fisher 1933, 350).
The President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago argues that (Charles Evans 2010):
“I believe the US economy is best described as being in a bona fide liquidity trap. Highly plausible projections are 1 percent for core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) inflation at the end of 2012 and 8 percent for the unemployment rate. For me, the Fed’s dual mandate misses are too large to shrug off, and there is currently no policy conflict between improving employment and inflation outcomes”
There are two types of monetary policies that could be used in this situation. First, the Fed could announce a price-level target to be attained within a reasonable time frame (Evans 2010):
“For example, if the slope of the price path is 2 percent and inflation has been underunning the path for some time, monetary policy would strive to catch up to the path. Inflation would be higher than 2 percent for a time until the path was reattained”
Optimum monetary policy with interest rates near zero could consist of “bringing the price level back up to a level even higher than would have prevailed had the disturbance never occurred” (Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford 2003, 207). Bernanke (2003JPY) explains as follows:
“Failure by the central bank to meet its target in a given period leads to expectations of (and public demands for) increased effort in subsequent periods—greater quantities of assets purchased on the open market for example. So even if the central bank is reluctant to provide a time frame for meetings its objective, the structure of the price-level objective provides a means for the bank to commit to increasing its anti-deflationary efforts when its earlier efforts prove unsuccessful. As Eggertsson and Woodford show, the expectations that an increasing price level gap will give rise to intensified effort by the central bank should lead the public to believe that ultimately inflation will replace deflation, a belief that supports the central bank’s own objectives by lowering the current real rate of interest”
Second, the Fed could use its balance sheet to increase purchases of long-term securities together with credible commitment to maintain the policy until the dual mandates of maximum employment and price stability are attained.
In the restatement of the liquidity trap and large-scale policies of monetary/fiscal stimulus, Krugman (1998, 162) finds:
“In the traditional open economy IS-LM model developed by Robert Mundell [1963] and Marcus Fleming [1962], and also in large-scale econometric models, monetary expansion unambiguously leads to currency depreciation. But there are two offsetting effects on the current account balance. On one side, the currency depreciation tends to increase net exports; on the other side, the expansion of the domestic economy tends to increase imports. For what it is worth, policy experiments on such models seem to suggest that these effects very nearly cancel each other out.
Krugman (1998) uses a different dynamic model with expectations that leads to similar conclusions.
The central bank could also be pursuing competitive devaluation of the national currency in the belief that it could increase inflation to a higher level and promote domestic growth and employment at the expense of growth and unemployment in the rest of the world. An essay by Chairman Bernanke in 1999 on Japanese monetary policy received attention in the press, stating that (Bernanke 2000, 165):
“Roosevelt’s specific policy actions were, I think, less important than his willingness to be aggressive and experiment—in short, to do whatever it took to get the country moving again. Many of his policies did not work as intended, but in the end FDR deserves great credit for having the courage to abandon failed paradigms and to do what needed to be done”
Quantitative easing has never been proposed by Chairman Bernanke or other economists as certain science without adverse effects. What has not been mentioned in the press is another suggestion to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) by Chairman Bernanke in the same essay that is very relevant to current events and the contentious issue of ongoing devaluation wars (Bernanke 2000, 161):
“Because the BOJ has a legal mandate to pursue price stability, it certainly could make a good argument that, with interest rates at zero, depreciation of the yen is the best available tool for achieving its mandated objective. The economic validity of the beggar-thy-neighbor thesis is doubtful, as depreciation creates trade—by raising home country income—as well as diverting it. Perhaps not all those who cite the beggar-thy-neighbor thesis are aware that it had its origins in the Great Depression, when it was used as an argument against the very devaluations that ultimately proved crucial to world economic recovery. A yen trading at 100 to the dollar is in no one’s interest”
Chairman Bernanke is referring to the argument by Joan Robinson based on the experience of the Great Depression that: “in times of general unemployment a game of beggar-my-neighbour is played between the nations, each one endeavouring to throw a larger share of the burden upon the others” (Robinson 1947, 156). Devaluation is one of the tools used in these policies (Robinson 1947, 157). Banking crises dominated the experience of the United States, but countries that recovered were those devaluing early such that competitive devaluations rescued many countries from a recession as strong as that in the US (see references to Ehsan Choudhri, Levis Kochin and Barry Eichengreen in Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 205-9; for the case of Brazil that devalued early in the Great Depression recovering with an increasing trade balance see Pelaez, 1968, 1968b, 1972; Brazil devalued and abandoned the gold standard during crises in the historical period as shown by Pelaez 1976, Pelaez and Suzigan 1981). Beggar-my-neighbor policies did work for individual countries but the criticism of Joan Robinson was that it was not optimal for the world as a whole.
Chairman Bernanke (2013Mar 25) reinterprets devaluation and recovery from the Great Depression:
“The uncoordinated abandonment of the gold standard in the early 1930s gave rise to the idea of "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies. According to this analysis, as put forth by important contemporary economists like Joan Robinson, exchange rate depreciations helped the economy whose currency had weakened by making the country more competitive internationally. Indeed, the decline in the value of the pound after 1931 was associated with a relatively early recovery from the Depression by the United Kingdom, in part because of some rebound in exports. However, according to this view, the gains to the depreciating country were equaled or exceeded by the losses to its trading partners, which became less internationally competitive--hence, ‘beggar thy neighbor.’ Economists still agree that Smoot-Hawley and the ensuing tariff wars were highly counterproductive and contributed to the depth and length of the global Depression. However, modern research on the Depression, beginning with the seminal 1985 paper by Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs, has changed our view of the effects of the abandonment of the gold standard. Although it is true that leaving the gold standard and the resulting currency depreciation conferred a temporary competitive advantage in some cases, modern research shows that the primary benefit of leaving gold was that it freed countries to use appropriately expansionary monetary policies. By 1935 or 1936, when essentially all major countries had left the gold standard and exchange rates were market-determined, the net trade effects of the changes in currency values were certainly small. Yet the global economy as a whole was much stronger than it had been in 1931. The reason was that, in shedding the strait jacket of the gold standard, each country became free to use monetary policy in a way that was more commensurate with achieving full employment at home.”
Nurkse (1944) raised concern on the contraction of trade by competitive devaluations during the 1930s. Haberler (1937) dwelled on the issue of flexible exchange rates. Bordo and James (2001) provide perceptive exegesis of the views of Haberler (1937) and Nurkse (1944) together with the evolution of thought by Haberler. Policy coordination among sovereigns may be quite difficult in practice even if there were sufficient knowledge and sound forecasts. Friedman (1953) provided strong case in favor of a system of flexible exchange rates.
Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) argue theoretically with measurements using a two-sector model that it is possible for series of devaluations to improve the welfare of all countries. There were adverse effects of depreciation on other countries but depreciation by many countries could be beneficial for all. The important counterfactual is if depreciations by many countries would have promoted faster recovery from the Great Depression. Depreciation in the model of Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) affected domestic and foreign economies through real wages, profitability, international competitiveness and world interest rates. Depreciation causes increase in the money supply that lowers world interest rates, promoting growth of world output. Lower world interest rates could compensate contraction of output from the shift of demand away from home goods originating in neighbor’s exchange depreciation. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985, 946) conclude:
“This much, however, is clear. We do not present a blanket endorsement of the competitive devaluations of the 1930s. Though it is indisputable that currency depreciation conferred macroeconomic benefits on the initiating country, because of accompanying policies the depreciations of the 1930s had beggar-thy-neighbor effects. Though it is likely that currency depreciation (had it been even more widely adopted) would have worked to the benefit of the world as a whole, the sporadic and uncoordinated approach taken to exchange-rate policy in the 1930s tended, other things being equal, to reduce the magnitude of the benefits.”
There could major difference in the current world economy. The initiating impulse for depreciation originates in zero interest rates on the fed funds rate. The dollar is the world’s reserve currency. Risk aversion intermittently channels capital flight to the safe haven of the dollar and US Treasury securities. In the absence of risk aversion, zero interest rates induce carry trades of short positions in dollars and US debt (borrowing) together with long leveraged exposures in risk financial assets such as stocks, emerging stocks, commodities and high-yield bonds. Without risk aversion, the dollar depreciates against every currency in the world. The dollar depreciated against the euro by 39.3 percent from USD 1.1423/EUR con Jun 26, 2003 to USD 1.5914/EUR on Jun 14, 2008 during unconventional monetary policy before the global recession (Table VI-1). Unconventional monetary policy causes devaluation of the dollar relative to other currencies, which can increases net exports of the US that increase aggregate economic activity (Yellen 2011AS). The country issuing the world’s reserve currency appropriates the advantage from initiating devaluation that in policy intends to generate net exports that increase domestic output.
Pelaez and Pelaez (Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 208-209) summarize the experience of Brazil as follows:
“During 1927–9, Brazil accumulated ￡30 million of foreign exchange of which ￡20 million were deposited at its stabilization fund (Pelaez 1968, 43–4). After the decline in coffee prices and the first impact of the Great Depression in Brazil a hot money movement wiped out foreign exchange reserves. In addition, capital inflows stopped entirely. The deterioration of the terms of trade further complicated matters, as the value of exports in foreign currency declined abruptly. Because of this exchange crisis, the service of the foreign debt of Brazil became impossible. In August 1931, the federal government was forced to cancel the payment of principal on certain foreign loans. The balance of trade in 1931 was expected to yield ￡20 million whereas the service of the foreign debt alone amounted to ￡22.6 million. Part of the solution given to these problems was typical of the 1930s. In September 1931, the government of Brazil required that all foreign transactions were to be conducted through the Bank of Brazil. This monopoly of foreign exchange was exercised by the Bank of Brazil for the following three years. Export permits were granted only after the exchange derived from sales abroad was officially sold to the Bank, which in turn allocated it in accordance with the needs of the economy. An active black market in foreign exchange developed. Brazil was in the first group of countries that abandoned early the gold standard, in 1931, and suffered comparatively less from the Great Depression. The Brazilian federal government, advised by the BOE, increased taxes and reduced expenditures in 1931 to compensate a decline in custom receipts (Pelaez 1968, 40). Expenditures caused by a revolution in 1932 in the state of Sao Paulo and a drought in the northeast explain the deficit. During 1932–6, the federal government engaged in strong efforts to stabilize the budget. Apart from the deliberate efforts to balance the budget during the 1930s, the recovery in economic activity itself may have induced a large part of the reduction of the deficit (Ibid, 41). Brazil’s experience is similar to that of the United States in that fiscal policy did not promote recovery from the Great Depression.”
Is depreciation of the dollar the best available tool currently for achieving the dual mandate of higher inflation and lower unemployment? Bernanke (2002) finds dollar devaluation against gold to have been important in preventing further deflation in the 1930s (http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm):
“Although a policy of intervening to affect the exchange value of the dollar is nowhere on the horizon today, it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934.17 The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.”
Should the US devalue following Roosevelt? Or has monetary policy intended devaluation? Fed policy is seeking, deliberately or as a side effect, what Irving Fisher proposed “that great depressions are curable and preventable through reflation and stabilization” (Fisher, 1933, 350). The Fed has created not only high volatility of assets but also what many countries are regarding as a competitive devaluation similar to those criticized by Nurkse (1944). Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment.
The producer price index of the US from 1947 to 2013 in Chart IIC-17 shows various periods of more rapid or less rapid inflation but no bumps. The major event is the decline in 2008 when risk aversion because of the global recession caused the collapse of oil prices from $148/barrel to less than $80/barrel with most other commodity prices also collapsing. The event had nothing in common with explanations of deflation but rather with the concentration of risk exposures in commodities after the decline of stock market indexes. Eventually, there was a flight to government securities because of the fears of insolvency of banks caused by statements supporting proposals for withdrawal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as explained by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). The bump in 2008 with decline in 2009 is consistent with the view that zero interest rates with subdued risk aversion induce carry trades into commodity futures.
Chart IIC-17, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, NSA, 1947-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-7 provides 12-month percentage changes of the producer price index from 1948 to 2013. The distinguishing event in Chart I-7 is the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The shape of the two-hump Bactrian camel of the 1970s resembles the double hump from 2007 to 2013.
Chart IIC-18, US, Producer Price Index, Finished Goods, 12-Month Percentage Change, NSA, 1948-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Annual percentage changes of the producer price index from 1948 to 2012 are shown in Table IIC-4. The producer price index fell 2.8 percent in 1949 following the adjustment to World War II and fell 0.6 percent in 1952 and 1.0 percent in 1953 around the Korean War. There are two other mild decline of 0.3 percent in 1959 and 0.3 percent in 1963. There are only few subsequent and isolated declines of the producer price index of 1.4 percent in 1986, 0.8 percent in 1998, 1.3 percent in 2002 and 2.6 percent in 2009. The decline of 2009 was caused by unwinding of carry trades in 2008 that had lifted oil prices to $140/barrel during deep global recession because of the panic of probable toxic assets in banks that would be removed with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There is no evidence in this history of 65 years of the US producer price index suggesting that there is frequent and persistent deflation shock requiring aggressive unconventional monetary policy. The design of such anti-deflation policy could provoke price and financial instability because of lags in effect of monetary policy, model errors, inaccurate forecasts and misleading analysis of current economic conditions.
Table IIC-4, US, Annual PPI Inflation ∆% 1948-2012
| Year | Annual |
| 1948 | 8.0 |
| 1949 | -2.8 |
| 1950 | 1.8 |
| 1951 | 9.2 |
| 1952 | -0.6 |
| 1953 | -1.0 |
| 1954 | 0.3 |
| 1955 | 0.3 |
| 1956 | 2.6 |
| 1957 | 3.8 |
| 1958 | 2.2 |
| 1959 | -0.3 |
| 1960 | 0.9 |
| 1961 | 0.0 |
| 1962 | 0.3 |
| 1963 | -0.3 |
| 1964 | 0.3 |
| 1965 | 1.8 |
| 1966 | 3.2 |
| 1967 | 1.1 |
| 1968 | 2.8 |
| 1969 | 3.8 |
| 1970 | 3.4 |
| 1971 | 3.1 |
| 1972 | 3.2 |
| 1973 | 9.1 |
| 1974 | 15.4 |
| 1975 | 10.6 |
| 1976 | 4.5 |
| 1977 | 6.4 |
| 1978 | 7.9 |
| 1979 | 11.2 |
| 1980 | 13.4 |
| 1981 | 9.2 |
| 1982 | 4.1 |
| 1983 | 1.6 |
| 1984 | 2.1 |
| 1985 | 1.0 |
| 1986 | -1.4 |
| 1987 | 2.1 |
| 1988 | 2.5 |
| 1989 | 5.2 |
| 1990 | 4.9 |
| 1991 | 2.1 |
| 1992 | 1.2 |
| 1993 | 1.2 |
| 1994 | 0.6 |
| 1995 | 1.9 |
| 1996 | 2.7 |
| 1997 | 0.4 |
| 1998 | -0.8 |
| 1999 | 1.8 |
| 2000 | 3.8 |
| 2001 | 2.0 |
| 2002 | -1.3 |
| 2003 | 3.2 |
| 2004 | 3.6 |
| 2005 | 4.8 |
| 2006 | 3.0 |
| 2007 | 3.9 |
| 2008 | 6.3 |
| 2009 | -2.6 |
| 2010 | 4.2 |
| 2011 | 6.0 |
| 2012 | 1.9 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart IIC-19 provides the consumer price index NSA from 1914 to 2013. The dominating characteristic is the increase in slope during the Great Inflation from the middle of the 1960s through the 1970s. There is long-term inflation in the US and no evidence of deflation risks.
Chart IIC-19, US, Consumer Price Index, NSA, 1914-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Chart IIC-20 provides 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index from 1914 to 2013. The only episode of deflation after 1950 is in 2009, which is explained by the reversal of speculative commodity futures carry trades that were induced by interest rates driven to zero in a shock of monetary policy in 2008. The only persistent case of deflation is from 1930 to 1933, which has little if any relevance to the contemporary United States economy. There are actually three waves of inflation in the second half of the 1960s, in the mid-1970s and again in the late 1970s. Inflation rates then stabilized in a range with only two episodes above 5 percent.
Chart IIC-20, US, Consumer Price Index, All Items, 12- Month Percentage Change 1914-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Table IIC-5 provides annual percentage changes of United States consumer price inflation from 1914 to 2013. There have been only cases of annual declines of the CPI after wars: (1) World War I minus 10.5 percent in 1921 and minus 6.1 percent in 1922 following cumulative increases of 83.5 percent in four years from 1917 to 1920 at the average of 16.4 percent per year; (2) World War II: minus 1.2 percent in 1949 following cumulative 33.9 percent in three years from 1946 to 1948 at average 10.2 percent per year (3) minus 0.4 percent in 1955 two years after the end of the Korean War; and (4) minus 0.4 percent in 2009. The decline of 0.4 percent in 2009 followed increase of 3.8 percent in 2008 and is explained by the reversal of speculative carry trades into commodity futures that were created in 2008 as monetary policy rates were driven to zero. The reversal occurred after misleading statement on toxic assets in banks in the proposal for TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009). There were declines of 1.7 percent in both 1927 and 1928 during the episode of revival of rules of the gold standard. The only persistent deflationary period since 1914 was during the Great Depression in the years from 1930 to 1933 and again in 1938-1939. Fear of deflation on the basis of that experience does not justify unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates that has failed to stop deflation in Japan. Financial repression causes far more adverse effects on allocation of resources by distorting the calculus of risk/returns than alleged employment-creating effects or there would not be current recovery without jobs and hiring after zero interest rates since Dec 2008 and intended now forever in a self-imposed forecast growth and employment mandate of monetary policy.
Table IIC-5, US, Annual CPI Inflation ∆% 1914-2012
| Year | Annual ∆% |
| 1914 | 1.0 |
| 1915 | 1.0 |
| 1916 | 7.9 |
| 1917 | 17.4 |
| 1918 | 18.0 |
| 1919 | 14.6 |
| 1920 | 15.6 |
| 1921 | -10.5 |
| 1922 | -6.1 |
| 1923 | 1.8 |
| 1924 | 0.0 |
| 1925 | 2.3 |
| 1926 | 1.1 |
| 1927 | -1.7 |
| 1928 | -1.7 |
| 1929 | 0.0 |
| 1930 | -2.3 |
| 1931 | -9.0 |
| 1932 | -9.9 |
| 1933 | -5.1 |
| 1934 | 3.1 |
| 1935 | 2.2 |
| 1936 | 1.5 |
| 1937 | 3.6 |
| 1938 | -2.1 |
| 1939 | -1.4 |
| 1940 | 0.7 |
| 1941 | 5.0 |
| 1942 | 10.9 |
| 1943 | 6.1 |
| 1944 | 1.7 |
| 1945 | 2.3 |
| 1946 | 8.3 |
| 1947 | 14.4 |
| 1948 | 8.1 |
| 1949 | -1.2 |
| 1950 | 1.3 |
| 1951 | 7.9 |
| 1952 | 1.9 |
| 1953 | 0.8 |
| 1954 | 0.7 |
| 1955 | -0.4 |
| 1956 | 1.5 |
| 1957 | 3.3 |
| 1958 | 2.8 |
| 1959 | 0.7 |
| 1960 | 1.7 |
| 1961 | 1.0 |
| 1962 | 1.0 |
| 1963 | 1.3 |
| 1964 | 1.3 |
| 1965 | 1.6 |
| 1966 | 2.9 |
| 1967 | 3.1 |
| 1968 | 4.2 |
| 1969 | 5.5 |
| 1970 | 5.7 |
| 1971 | 4.4 |
| 1972 | 3.2 |
| 1973 | 6.2 |
| 1974 | 11.0 |
| 1975 | 9.1 |
| 1976 | 5.8 |
| 1977 | 6.5 |
| 1978 | 7.6 |
| 1979 | 11.3 |
| 1980 | 13.5 |
| 1981 | 10.3 |
| 1982 | 6.2 |
| 1983 | 3.2 |
| 1984 | 4.3 |
| 1985 | 3.6 |
| 1986 | 1.9 |
| 1987 | 3.6 |
| 1988 | 4.1 |
| 1989 | 4.8 |
| 1990 | 5.4 |
| 1991 | 4.2 |
| 1992 | 3.0 |
| 1993 | 3.0 |
| 1994 | 2.6 |
| 1995 | 2.8 |
| 1996 | 3.0 |
| 1997 | 2.3 |
| 1998 | 1.6 |
| 1999 | 2.2 |
| 2000 | 3.4 |
| 2001 | 2.8 |
| 2002 | 1.6 |
| 2003 | 2.3 |
| 2004 | 2.7 |
| 2005 | 3.4 |
| 2006 | 3.2 |
| 2007 | 2.8 |
| 2008 | 3.8 |
| 2009 | -0.4 |
| 2010 | 1.6 |
| 2011 | 3.2 |
| 2012 | 2.1 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/cpi/data.htm
Friedman (1969) finds that the optimal rule for the quantity of money is deflation at a rate that results in a zero nominal interest rate (see Ireland 2003 and Cole and Kocherlakota 1998). Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) argue that central bankers are not inclined to implement policies that could result in deflation because of the interpretation of the Great Depression as closely related to deflation. They use panel data on inflation and growth of real output for 17 countries over more than 100 years. The time-series data for each individual country are broken into five-year events with deflation measured as average negative inflation and depression as average negative growth rate of real output. Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) find that the Great Depression from 1929 to 1934 is the only case of association between deflation and depression without any evidence whatsoever of such relation in any other period. Their conclusion is (Atkeson and Kehoe 2004, 99): “Our finding thus suggests that policymakers’ fear of anticipated policy-induced deflation that would result from following, say, the Friedman rule is greatly overblown.” Their conclusion on the experience of Japan is (Atkeson and Kehoe 2004, 99):
“Since 1960, Japan’s average growth rates have basically fallen monotonically, and since 1970, its average inflation rates have too. Attributing this 40-year slowdown to monetary forces is a stretch. More reasonable, we think, is that much of the slowdown is the natural pattern for a country that was far behind the world leaders and had begun to catch up.”
In the sample of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), there are only eight five-year periods besides the Great Depression with both inflation and depression. Deflation and depression is shown in 65 cases with 21 of depression without deflation. There is no depression in 65 of 73 five-year periods and there is no deflation in 29 episodes of depression. There is a remarkable result of no depression in 90 percent of deflation episodes. Excluding the Great Depression, there is virtually no relation of deflation and depression. Atkeson and Kehoe (2004, 102) find that the average growth rate of Japan of 1.41 percent in the 1990s is “dismal” when compared with 3.20 percent in the United States but is not “dismal” when compared with 1.61 percent for Italy and 1.84 percent for France, which are also catch-up countries in modern economic growth (see Atkeson and Kehoe 1998). The conclusion of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), without use of controls, is that there is no association of deflation and depression in their dataset.
Benhabib and Spiegel (2009) use a dataset similar to that of Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) but allowing for nonlinearity and inflation volatility. They conclude that in cases of low and negative inflation an increase of average inflation of 1 percent is associated with an increase of 0.31 percent of average annual growth. The analysis of Benhabib and Spiegel (2009) leads to the significantly different conclusion that inflation and economic performance are strongly associated for low and negative inflation. There is no claim of causality by Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) and Benhabib and Spiegel (2009).
Delfim Netto (1959) partly reprinted in Pelaez (1973) conducted two classical nonparametric tests (Mann 1945, Wallis and Moore 1941; see Kendall and Stuart 1968) with coffee-price data in the period of free markets from 1857 to 1906 with the following conclusions (Pelaez, 1976a, 280):
“First, the null hypothesis of no trend was accepted with high confidence; secondly, the null hypothesis of no oscillation was rejected also with high confidence. Consequently, in the nineteenth century international prices of coffee fluctuated but without long-run trend. This statistical fact refutes the extreme argument of structural weakness of the coffee trade.”
In his classic work on the theory of international trade, Jacob Viner (1937, 563) analyzed the “index of total gains from trade,” or “amount of gain per unit of trade,” denoted as T:
T= (∆Pe/∆Pi)∆Q
Where ∆Pe is the change in export prices, ∆Pi is the change in import prices and ∆Q is the change in export volume. Dorrance (1948, 52) restates “Viner’s index of total gain from trade” as:
“What should be done is to calculate an index of the value (quantity multiplied by price) of exports and the price of imports for any country whose foreign accounts are to be analysed. Then the export value index should be divided by the import price index. The result would be an index which would reflect, for the country concerned, changes in the volume of imports obtainable from its export income (i.e. changes in its "real" export income, measured in import terms). The present writer would suggest that this index be referred to as the ‘income terms of trade’ index to differentiate it from the other indexes at present used by economists.”
What really matters for an export activity especially during modernization is the purchasing value of goods that it exports in terms of prices of imports. For a primary producing country, the purchasing power of exports in acquiring new technology from the country providing imports is the critical measurement. The barter terms of trade of Brazil improved from 1857 to 1906 because international coffee prices oscillated without trend (Delfim Netto 1959) while import prices from the United Kingdom declined at the rate of 0.5 percent per year (Imlah 1958). The accurate measurement of the opportunity afforded by the coffee exporting economy was incomparably greater when considering the purchasing power in British prices of the value of coffee exports, or Dorrance’s (1948) income terms of trade.
The conventional theory that the terms of trade of Brazil deteriorated over the long term is without reality (Pelaez 1976a, 280-281):
“Moreover, physical exports of coffee by Brazil increased at the high average rate of 3.5 per cent per year. Brazil's exchange receipts from coffee-exporting in sterling increased at the average rate of 3.5 per cent per year and receipts in domestic currency at 4.5 per cent per year. Great Britain supplied nearly all the imports of the coffee economy. In the period of the free coffee market, British export prices declined at the rate of 0.5 per cent per year. Thus, the income terms of trade of the coffee economy improved at the relatively satisfactory average rate of 4.0 per cent per year. This is only a lower bound of the rate of improvement of the terms of trade. While the quality of coffee remained relatively constant, the quality of manufactured products improved significantly during the fifty-year period considered. The trade data and the non-parametric tests refute conclusively the long-run hypothesis. The valid historical fact is that the tropical export economy of Brazil experienced an opportunity of absorbing rapidly increasing quantities of manufactures from the "workshop" countries. Therefore, the coffee trade constituted a golden opportunity for modernization in nineteenth-century Brazil.”
Imlah (1958) provides decline of British export prices at 0.5 percent in the nineteenth century and there were no lost decades, depressions or unconventional monetary policies in the highly dynamic economy of England that drove the world’s growth impulse. Inflation in the United Kingdom between 1857 and 1906 is measured by the composite price index of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) at minus 7.0 percent or average rate of decline of 0.2 percent per year.
Simon Kuznets (1971) analyzes modern economic growth in his Lecture in Memory of Alfred Nobel:
“The major breakthroughs in the advance of human knowledge, those that constituted dominant sources of sustained growth over long periods and spread to a substantial part of the world, may be termed epochal innovations. And the changing course of economic history can perhaps be subdivided into economic epochs, each identified by the epochal innovation with the distinctive characteristics of growth that it generated. Without considering the feasibility of identifying and dating such economic epochs, we may proceed on the working assumption that modern economic growth represents such a distinct epoch - growth dating back to the late eighteenth century and limited (except in significant partial effects) to economically developed countries. These countries, so classified because they have managed to take adequate advantage of the potential of modern technology, include most of Europe, the overseas offshoots of Western Europe, and Japan—barely one quarter of world population.”
Cameron (1961) analyzes the mechanism by which the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain spread throughout Europe and Cameron (1967) analyzes the financing by banks of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) provide consumer price inflation in England since 1750 and MacFarlane and Mortimer-Lee (1994) analyze inflation in England over 300 years. Lucas (2004) estimates world population and production since the year 1000 with sustained growth of per capita incomes beginning to accelerate for the first time in English-speaking countries and in particular in the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. The conventional theory is unequal distribution of the gains from trade and technical progress between the industrialized countries and developing economies (Singer 1950, 478):
“Dismissing, then, changes in productivity as a governing factor in changing terms of trade, the following explanation presents itself: the fruits of technical progress may be distributed either to producers (in the form of rising incomes) or to consumers (in the form of lower prices). In the case of manufactured commodities produced in more developed countries, the former method, i.e., distribution to producers through higher incomes, was much more important relatively to the second method, while the second method prevailed more in the case of food and raw material production in the underdeveloped countries. Generalizing, we may say -that technical progress in manufacturing industries showed in a rise in incomes while technical progress in the production of food and raw materials in underdeveloped countries showed in a fall in prices”
Temin (1997, 79) uses a Ricardian trade model to discriminate between two views on the Industrial Revolution with an older view arguing broad-based increases in productivity and a new view concentration of productivity gains in cotton manufactures and iron:
“Productivity advances in British manufacturing should have lowered their prices relative to imports. They did. Albert Imlah [1958] correctly recognized this ‘severe deterioration’ in the net barter terms of trade as a signal of British success, not distress. It is no surprise that the price of cotton manufactures fell rapidly in response to productivity growth. But even the price of woolen manufactures, which were declining as a share of British exports, fell almost as rapidly as the price of exports as a whole. It follows, therefore, that the traditional ‘old-hat’ view of the Industrial Revolution is more accurate than the new, restricted image. Other British manufactures were not inefficient and stagnant, or at least, they were not all so backward. The spirit that motivated cotton manufactures extended also to activities as varied as hardware and haberdashery, arms, and apparel.”
Phyllis Deane (1968, 96) estimates growth of United Kingdom gross national product (GNP) at around 2 percent per year for several decades in the nineteenth century. The facts that the terms of trade of Great Britain deteriorated during the period of epochal innovation and high rates of economic growth while the income terms of trade of the coffee economy of nineteenth-century Brazil improved at the average yearly rate of 4.0 percent from 1857 to 1906 disprove the hypothesis of weakness of trade as an explanation of relatively lower income and wealth. As Temin (1997) concludes, Britain did pass on lower prices and higher quality the benefits of technical innovation. Explanation of late modernization must focus on laborious historical research on institutions and economic regimes together with economic theory, data gathering and measurement instead of grand generalizations of weakness of trade and alleged neocolonial dependence (Stein and Stein 1970, 134-5):
“Great Britain, technologically and industrially advanced, became as important to the Latin American economy as to the cotton-exporting southern United States. [After Independence in the nineteenth century] Latin America fell back upon traditional export activities, utilizing the cheapest available factor of production, the land, and the dependent labor force.”
The experience of the United Kingdom with deflation and economic growth is relevant and rich. Table IA-6 provides yearly percentage changes of the composite index of prices of the United Kingdom of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004). There are 73 declines of inflation in the 145 years from 1751 to 1896. Prices declined in 50.3 percent of 145 years. Some price declines were quite sharp and many occurred over several years. Table IA-6 also provides yearly percentage changes of the UK composite price index of O’Donoghue and Goulding (2004) from 1929 to 1934. Deflation was much sharper in continuous years in earlier periods than during the Great Depression. The United Kingdom could not have led the world in modern economic growth if there were meaningful causality from deflation to depression.
Table IA-6, United Kingdom, Negative Percentage Changes of Composite Price Index, 1751-1896, 1929-1934, Yearly ∆%
| Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% | Year | ∆% |
| 1751 | -2.7 | 1797 | -10.0 | 1834 | -7.8 | 1877 | -0.7 |
| 1753 | -2.7 | 1798 | -2.2 | 1841 | -2.3 | 1878 | -2.2 |
| 1755 | -6.0 | 1802 | -23.0 | 1842 | -7.6 | 1879 | -4.4 |
| 1758 | -0.3 | 1803 | -5.9 | 1843 | -11.3 | 1881 | -1.1 |
| 1759 | -7.9 | 1806 | -4.4 | 1844 | -0.1 | 1883 | -0.5 |
| 1760 | -4.5 | 1807 | -1.9 | 1848 | -12.1 | 1884 | -2.7 |
| 1761 | -4.5 | 1811 | -2.9 | 1849 | -6.3 | 1885 | -3.0 |
| 1768 | -1.1 | 1814 | -12.7 | 1850 | -6.4 | 1886 | -1.6 |
| 1769 | -8.2 | 1815 | -10.7 | 1851 | -3.0 | 1887 | -0.5 |
| 1770 | -0.4 | 1816 | -8.4 | 1857 | -5.6 | 1893 | -0.7 |
| 1773 | -0.3 | 1819 | -2.5 | 1858 | -8.4 | 1894 | -2.0 |
| 1775 | -5.6 | 1820 | -9.3 | 1859 | -1.8 | 1895 | -1.0 |
| 1776 | -2.2 | 1821 | -12.0 | 1862 | -2.6 | 1896 | -0.3 |
| 1777 | -0.4 | 1822 | -13.5 | 1863 | -3.6 | 1929 | -0.9 |
| 1779 | -8.5 | 1826 | -5.5 | 1864 | -0.9 | 1930 | -2.8 |
| 1780 | -3.4 | 1827 | -6.5 | 1868 | -1.7 | 1931 | -4.3 |
| 1785 | -4.0 | 1828 | -2.9 | 1869 | -5.0 | 1932 | -2.6 |
| 1787 | -0.6 | 1830 | -6.1 | 1874 | -3.3 | 1933 | -2.1 |
| 1789 | -1.3 | 1832 | -7.4 | 1875 | -1.9 | 1934 | 0.0 |
| 1791 | -0.1 | 1833 | -6.1 | 1876 | -0.3 |
Source:
O’Donoghue, Jim and Louise Goulding, 2004. Consumer Price Inflation since 1750. UK Office for National Statistics Economic Trends 604, Mar 2004, 38-46.
Nicholas Georgescu-Rogen (1960, 1) reprinted in Pelaez (1973) argues that “the agrarian economy has to this day remained a reality without theory.” The economic history of Latin America shares with the relation of deflation and unconventional monetary policy a more frustrating intellectual misfortune: theory without reality. MacFarlane and Mortimer-Lee (1994, 159) quote in a different context a phrase by Thomas Henry Huxley in the President’s Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science on Sep 14, 1870 that is appropriate to these issues: “The great tragedy of science—the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.”
III World Financial Turbulence. Financial markets are being shocked by multiple factors including:
(1) World economic slowdown
(2) Slowing growth in China with political development and slowing growth in Japan and world trade
(3) Slow growth propelled by savings/investment reduction in the US with high unemployment/underemployment, falling wages, hiring collapse, contraction of real private fixed investment, decline of wealth of households over the business cycle by 5.2 percent adjusted for inflation while growing 651.8 percent adjusted for inflation from IVQ1945 to IVQ2012 and unsustainable fiscal deficit/debt threatening prosperity that can cause risk premium on Treasury debt with Himalayan interest rate hikes
(4) Outcome of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.
This section provides current data and analysis. Subsection IIIA Financial Risks provides analysis of the evolution of valuations of risk financial assets during the week. There are various appendixes for convenience of reference of material related to the debt crisis of the euro area. Some of this material is updated in Subsection IIIA when new data are available and then maintained in the appendixes for future reference until updated again in Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies discusses arguments and measures of currency intervention and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact provides analysis of the restructuring of the fiscal affairs of the European Union in the agreement of European leaders reached on Dec 9, 2011 and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort considers the policies of the European Central Bank and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Appendix IIIE Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the threats to survival of the European Monetary Union and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation provides more technical analysis and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis provides analysis of proposals to finance growth with budget deficits together with experience of the economic history of Brazil and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment.
IIIA Financial Risks. Financial turbulence, attaining unusual magnitude in recent months, characterized the expansion from the global recession since IIIQ2009. Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Fri Sep 20 and daily values throughout the week ending on Sep 27, 2013 of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at 5 PM. The first column provides the value on Fri Sep 20 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Sep 20, 2013”, first row “USD/EUR 1.3526 -1.7 %,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) depreciated 1.7 percent to USD 1.3526/EUR in the week ending on Fri Sep 20 relative to the exchange rate on Fri Sep 13. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. An important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf). The most important source of financial turbulence is shifting toward increasing interest rates. The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per one euro EUR, USD 1.3526/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Fri Sep 20, appreciating to USD 1.3493/EUR on Mon Sep 23, 2013, or by 0.2 percent. The dollar appreciated because fewer dollars, $1.3493, were required on Mon Sep 23 to buy one euro than $1.3526 on Fri Sep 20. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the exchange rate at 5 PM New York time, such as USD 1.3526/EUR on Sep 20. The second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Fri Sep 20, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Fri Sep 27, such as change by 0.0 percent to USD 1.3523/EUR by Sep 27. The third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD appreciated (denoted by positive sign) by 0.3 percent from the rate of USD 1.3526/EUR on Fri Sep 20 to the rate of USD 1.3489/EUR on Thu Sep 26 {[(1.3489/1.3526) – 1]100 = -0.3%}. The dollar depreciated (denoted by negative sign) by 0.3 percent from the rate of USD 1.3489 on Thu Sep 26 to USD 1.3523/EUR on Fri Sep 27 {[(1.3523/1.3489) -1]100 = 0.3%}. Other factors constant, appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro is caused by increasing risk aversion, with rising uncertainty on European sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. Funds move away from higher yielding risk assets to the safety of dollar-denominated assets during risk aversion and return to higher yielding risk assets during risk appetite.
III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Assets Sep 23 to Sep 27, 2013
| Fri Sep 20, 2013 | Mon 23 | Tue 24 | Wed 25 | Thu 26 | Fri 27 |
| USD/EUR 1.3526 -1.7% | 1.3493 0.2% 0.2% | 1.3473 0.4% 0.1% | 1.3526 0.0% -0.4% | 1.3489 0.3% 0.3% | 1.3523 0.0% -0.3% |
| JPY/ USD 99.33 0.0% | 98.84 0.5% 0.5% | 98.75 0.6% 0.1% | 98.44 0.9% 0.3% | 98.99 0.3% -0.6% | 98.24 1.0% 0.8% |
| CHF/ USD 0.9105 2.0% | 0.9109 0.0% 0.0% | 0.9128 -0.3% -0.2% | 0.9092 0.1% 0.4% | 0.9102 0.0% -0.1% | 0.9059 0.5% 0.5% |
| CHF/ EUR 1.2315 0.4% | 1.2291 0.2% 0.2% | 1.2297 0.1% 0.0% | 1.2299 0.1% 0.0% | 1.2278 0.3% 0.2% | 1.2251 0.5% 0.2% |
| USD/ AUD 0.9397 1.0642 1.6% | 0.9430 1.0645 0.0% 0.0% | 0.9390 1.0649 -0.1% 0.0% | 0.9367 1.0676 -0.3% -0.3% | 0.9362 1.0682 -0.4% -0.1% | 0.9317 1.0733 -0.9% -0.5% |
| 10 Year T Note 2.734 | 2.703 | 2.654 | 2.619 | 2.645 | 2.626 |
| 2 Year T Note 0.333 | 0.332 | 0.328 | 0.335 | 0.335 | 0.335 |
| German Bond 2Y 0.21 10Y 1.94 | 2Y 0.19 10Y 1.92 | 2Y 0.18 10Y 1.84 | 2Y 0.19 10Y 1.82 | 2Y 0.19 10Y 1.83 | 2Y 0.16 10Y 1.78 |
| DJIA 15451.09 0.5% | 15401.38 -0.3% -0.3% | 15334.59 -0.8% -0.4% | 15273.26 -1.2% -0.4% | 15328.30 -0.8% 0.4% | 15258.24 -1.2% -0.5% |
| DJ Global 2347.66 2.1% | 2340.60 -0.3% -0.3% | 2336.79 -0.5% -0.2% | 2331.78 -0.7% -0.2% | 2335.53 -0.5% 0.2% | 2332.38 -0.7% -0.1% |
| DJ Asia Pacific 1437.84 2.6% | 1443.46 0.4% 0.4% | 1436.76 -0.1% -0.5% | 1435.55 -0.2% -0.1% | 1438.31 0.0% 0.2% | 1441.40 0.2% 0.2% |
| Nikkei 14742.42 2.3% | 14742.42 0.0% 0.0% | 14732.61 -0.1% -0.1% | 14620.53 -0.8% -0.8% | 14799.12 0.4% 1.2% | 14760.07 0.1% -0.3% |
| Shanghai 2191.85 -2.0% | 2221.04 1.3% 1.3% | 2207.53 0.7% -0.6% | 2198.52 0.3% -0.4% | 2155.81 -1.6% -1.9% | 2160.03 -1.5% 0.2% |
| DAX 8675.73 2.0% | 8635.29 -0.5% -0.5% | 8664.60 -0.1% 0.3% | 8665.63 -0.1% 0.0% | 8664.10 -0.1% 0.0% | 8661.51 -0.2% 0.0% |
| DJ UBS Comm. 128.29 -0.8% | 127.59 -0.5% -0.5% | 126.85 -1.1% -0.6% | 127.45 -0.7% 0.5% | 127.81 -0.4% 0.3% | 128.01 -0.2% 0.2% |
| WTI $ B 104.67 -3.5% | 103.42 -1.2% -1.2% | 103.34 -1.3% -0.1% | 102.25 -2.3% -1.1% | 102.91 -1.7% 0.6% | 102.78 -1.8% 0.1% |
| Brent $/B 109.28 -3.1% | 108.06 -1.1% -1.1% | 108.77 -0.5% 0.7% | 107.94 -1.2% -0.7% | 109.17 -0.1% 1.1% | 108.35 -0.9% -0.8% |
| Gold $/OZ 1325.8 0.1% | 1322.3 -0.3% -0.3% | 1323.8 -0.2% 0.1% | 1333.6 0.6% 0.8% | 1324.0 -0.1% -0.7% | 1336.9 0.8% 1.0% |
Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss
Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce
Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
There is initial discussion of current and recent risk-determining events followed below by analysis of risk-measuring yields of the US and Germany and the USD/EUR rate.
First, risk determining events. Prior risk determining events are in an appendix below following Table III-1A. Current focus is on “tapering” quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “tapering” of outright purchases of $85 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight. What really matters in the statement of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 18, 2013, is interest rates of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for the foreseeable future, even with paring of purchases of longer term bonds for the portfolio of the Fed (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent” (emphasis added).
Another critical concern in the statement of the FOMC on Sep 18, 2013, is on the effects of tapering expectations on interest rates (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm):
“Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has been strengthening, but mortgage rates have risen further and fiscal policy is restraining economic growth” (emphasis added).
In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:
“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.
The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”
Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities).
The President of the European Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi explained the indefinite period of low policy rates during the press conference following the meeting on Jul 4, 2013 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130704.en.html):
“Yes, that is why I said you haven’t listened carefully. The Governing Council has taken the unprecedented step of giving forward guidance in a rather more specific way than it ever has done in the past. In my statement, I said “The Governing Council expects the key…” – i.e. all interest rates – “…ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.” It is the first time that the Governing Council has said something like this. And, by the way, what Mark Carney [Governor of the Bank of England] said in London is just a coincidence.”
The statement of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England on Jul 4, 2013, may be leading toward the same forward guidance (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/007.aspx):
“At its meeting today, the Committee noted that the incoming data over the past couple of months had been broadly consistent with the central outlook for output growth and inflation contained in the May Report. The significant upward movement in market interest rates would, however, weigh on that outlook; in the Committee’s view, the implied rise in the expected future path of Bank Rate was not warranted by the recent developments in the domestic economy.”
A competing event is the high level of valuations of risk financial assets (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/peaking-valuation-of-risk-financial.html). Matt Jarzemsky, writing on Dow industrials set record,” on Mar 5, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324156204578275560657416332.html), analyzes that the DJIA broke the closing high of 14,164.53 set on Oct 9, 2007, and subsequently also broke the intraday high of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. The DJIA closed at 15,258.24
on Fri Sep 27, 2013, which is higher by 7.7 percent than the value of 14,164.53 reached on Oct 9, 2007 and higher by 7.5 percent than the value of 14,198.10 reached on Oct 11, 2007. Values of risk financial are approaching or exceeding historical highs.
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. There are high costs and risks of this policy because indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
Second, Risk-Measuring Yields and Exchange Rate. The ten-year government bond of Spain was quoted at 6.868 percent on Aug 10, 2012, declining to 6.447 percent on Aug 17 and 6.403 percent on Aug 24, 2012, and the ten-year government bond of Italy fell from 5.894 percent on Aug 10, 2012 to 5.709 percent on Aug 17 and 5.618 percent on Aug 24, 2012. The yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain traded at 4.358 percent on Sep 27, 2013, and that of the ten-year sovereign bond of Italy at 4.424 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Diminishing aversion is captured by increase of the yield of the two- and ten-year Treasury notes and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table III-1A provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.459 percent on Jul 20, 2012, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.17 percent. In the week of Sep 27, 2013, the yield of the two-year Treasury increased to 0.335 percent and that of the ten-year Treasury decreased to 2.626 percent while the two-year bond of Germany decreased to 0.16 percent and the ten-year decreased to 1.78 percent; and the dollar appreciated to USD 1.3523/EUR. The zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, induce carry trades that ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield of 2.743 is higher than consumer price inflation of 1.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug 2013 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations_18.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. The one-year Treasury yield of 0.107 percent is well below the 12-month consumer price inflation of 1.5 percent. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury. The lower part of Table III-1A provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.
Table III-1A, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate
| US 2Y | US 10Y | DE 2Y | DE 10Y | USD/ EUR | |
| 9/27/13 | 0.335 | 2.626 | 0.16 | 1.78 | 1.3523 |
| 9/20/13 | 0.333 | 2.734 | 0.21 | 1.94 | 1.3526 |
| 9/13/13 | 0.433 | 2.890 | 0.22 | 1.97 | 1.3297 |
| 9/6/13 | 0.461 | 2.941 | 0.26 | 1.95 | 1.3179 |
| 8/23/13 | 0.401 | 2.784 | 0.23 | 1.85 | 1.3221 |
| 8/23/13 | 0.374 | 2.818 | 0.28 | 1.93 | 1.3380 |
| 8/16/13 | 0.341 | 2.829 | 0.22 | 1.88 | 1.3328 |
| 8/9/13 | 0.30 | 2.579 | 0.16 | 1.68 | 1.3342 |
| 8/2/13 | 0.299 | 2.597 | 0.15 | 1.65 | 1.3281 |
| 7/26/13 | 0.315 | 2.565 | 0.15 | 1.66 | 1.3279 |
| 7/19/13 | 0.300 | 2.480 | 0.08 | 1.52 | 1.3141 |
| 7/12/13 | 0.345 | 2.585 | 0.10 | 1.56 | 1.3068 |
| 7/5/13 | 0.397 | 2.734 | 0.11 | 1.72 | 1.2832 |
| 6/28/13 | 0.357 | 2.486 | 0.19 | 1.73 | 1.3010 |
| 6/21/13 | 0.366 | 2.542 | 0.26 | 1.72 | 1.3122 |
| 6/14/13 | 0.276 | 2.125 | 0.12 | 1.51 | 1.3345 |
| 6/7/13 | 0.304 | 2.174 | 0.18 | 1.54 | 1.3219 |
| 5/31/13 | 0.299 | 2.132 | 0.06 | 1.50 | 1.2996 |
| 5/24/13 | 0.249 | 2.009 | 0.00 | 1.43 | 1.2932 |
| 5/17/13 | 0.248 | 1.952 | -0.03 | 1.32 | 1.2837 |
| 5/10/13 | 0.239 | 1.896 | 0.05 | 1.38 | 1.2992 |
| 5/3/13 | 0.22 | 1.742 | 0.00 | 1.24 | 1.3115 |
| 4/26/13 | 0.209 | 1.663 | 0.00 | 1.21 | 1.3028 |
| 4/19/13 | 0.232 | 1.702 | 0.02 | 1.25 | 1.3052 |
| 4/12/13 | 0.228 | 1.719 | 0.02 | 1.26 | 1.3111 |
| 4/5/13 | 0.228 | 1.706 | 0.01 | 1.21 | 1.2995 |
| 3/29/13 | 0.244 | 1.847 | -0.02 | 1.29 | 1.2818 |
| 3/22/13 | 0.242 | 1.931 | 0.03 | 1.38 | 1.2988 |
| 3/15/13 | 0.246 | 1.992 | 0.05 | 1.46 | 1.3076 |
| 3/8/13 | 0.256 | 2.056 | 0.09 | 1.53 | 1.3003 |
| 3/1/13 | 0.236 | 1.842 | 0.03 | 1.41 | 1.3020 |
| 2/22/13 | 0.252 | 1.967 | 0.13 | 1.57 | 1.3190 |
| 2/15/13 | 0.268 | 2.007 | 0.19 | 1.65 | 1.3362 |
| 2/8/13 | 0.252 | 1.949 | 0.18 | 1.61 | 1.3365 |
| 2/1/13 | 0.26 | 2.024 | 0.25 | 1.67 | 1.3642 |
| 1/25/13 | 0.278 | 1.947 | 0.26 | 1.64 | 1.3459 |
| 1/18/13 | 0.252 | 1.84 | 0.18 | 1.56 | 1.3321 |
| 1/11/13 | 0.247 | 1.862 | 0.13 | 1.58 | 1.3343 |
| 1/4/13 | 0.262 | 1.898 | 0.08 | 1.54 | 1.3069 |
| 12/28/12 | 0.252 | 1.699 | -0.01 | 1.31 | 1.3218 |
| 12/21/12 | 0.272 | 1.77 | -0.01 | 1.38 | 1.3189 |
| 12/14/12 | 0.232 | 1.704 | -0.04 | 1.35 | 1.3162 |
| 12/7/12 | 0.256 | 1.625 | -0.08 | 1.30 | 1.2926 |
| 11/30/12 | 0.248 | 1.612 | 0.01 | 1.39 | 1.2987 |
| 11/23/12 | 0.273 | 1.691 | 0.00 | 1.44 | 1.2975 |
| 11/16/12 | 0.24 | 1.584 | -0.03 | 1.33 | 1.2743 |
| 11/9/12 | 0.256 | 1.614 | -0.03 | 1.35 | 1.2711 |
| 11/2/12 | 0.274 | 1.715 | 0.01 | 1.45 | 1.2838 |
| 10/26/12 | 0.299 | 1.748 | 0.05 | 1.54 | 1.2942 |
| 10/19/12 | 0.296 | 1.766 | 0.11 | 1.59 | 1.3023 |
| 10/12/12 | 0.264 | 1.663 | 0.04 | 1.45 | 1.2953 |
| 10/5/12 | 0.26 | 1.737 | 0.06 | 1.52 | 1.3036 |
| 9/28/12 | 0.236 | 1.631 | 0.02 | 1.44 | 1.2859 |
| 9/21/12 | 0.26 | 1.753 | 0.04 | 1.60 | 1.2981 |
| 9/14/12 | 0.252 | 1.863 | 0.10 | 1.71 | 1.3130 |
| 9/7/12 | 0.252 | 1.668 | 0.03 | 1.52 | 1.2816 |
| 8/31/12 | 0.225 | 1.543 | -0.03 | 1.33 | 1.2575 |
| 8/24/12 | 0.266 | 1.684 | -0.01 | 1.35 | 1.2512 |
| 8/17/12 | 0.288 | 1.814 | -0.04 | 1.50 | 1.2335 |
| 8/10/12 | 0.267 | 1.658 | -0.07 | 1.38 | 1.2290 |
| 8/3/12 | 0.242 | 1.569 | -0.02 | 1.42 | 1.2387 |
| 7/27/12 | 0.244 | 1.544 | -0.03 | 1.40 | 1.2320 |
| 7/20/12 | 0.207 | 1.459 | -0.07 | 1.17 | 1.2158 |
| 7/13/12 | 0.24 | 1.49 | -0.04 | 1.26 | 1.2248 |
| 7/6/12 | 0.272 | 1.548 | -0.01 | 1.33 | 1.2288 |
| 6/29/12 | 0.305 | 1.648 | 0.12 | 1.58 | 1.2661 |
| 6/22/12 | 0.309 | 1.676 | 0.14 | 1.58 | 1.2570 |
| 6/15/12 | 0.272 | 1.584 | 0.07 | 1.44 | 1.2640 |
| 6/8/12 | 0.268 | 1.635 | 0.04 | 1.33 | 1.2517 |
| 6/1/12 | 0.248 | 1.454 | 0.01 | 1.17 | 1.2435 |
| 5/25/12 | 0.291 | 1.738 | 0.05 | 1.37 | 1.2518 |
| 5/18/12 | 0.292 | 1.714 | 0.05 | 1.43 | 1.2780 |
| 5/11/12 | 0.248 | 1.845 | 0.09 | 1.52 | 1.2917 |
| 5/4/12 | 0.256 | 1.876 | 0.08 | 1.58 | 1.3084 |
| 4/6/12 | 0.31 | 2.058 | 0.14 | 1.74 | 1.3096 |
| 3/30/12 | 0.335 | 2.214 | 0.21 | 1.79 | 1.3340 |
| 3/2/12 | 0.29 | 1.977 | 0.16 | 1.80 | 1.3190 |
| 2/24/12 | 0.307 | 1.977 | 0.24 | 1.88 | 1.3449 |
| 1/6/12 | 0.256 | 1.957 | 0.17 | 1.85 | 1.2720 |
| 12/30/11 | 0.239 | 1.871 | 0.14 | 1.83 | 1.2944 |
| 8/26/11 | 0.20 | 2.202 | 0.65 | 2.16 | 1.450 |
| 8/19/11 | 0.192 | 2.066 | 0.65 | 2.11 | 1.4390 |
| 6/7/10 | 0.74 | 3.17 | 0.49 | 2.56 | 1.192 |
| 3/5/09 | 0.89 | 2.83 | 1.19 | 3.01 | 1.254 |
| 12/17/08 | 0.73 | 2.20 | 1.94 | 3.00 | 1.442 |
| 10/27/08 | 1.57 | 3.79 | 2.61 | 3.76 | 1.246 |
| 7/14/08 | 2.47 | 3.88 | 4.38 | 4.40 | 1.5914 |
| 6/26/03 | 1.41 | 3.55 | NA | 3.62 | 1.1423 |
Note: DE: Germany
Source:
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/
http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata
Appendix: Prior Risk Determining Events. Current risk analysis concentrates on deciphering what the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may decide on quantitative easing. The week of May 24 was dominated by the testimony of Chairman Bernanke to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress on May 22, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm), followed by questions and answers and the release on May 22, 2013 of the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from Apr 30 to May 1, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm). Monetary policy emphasizes communication of policy intentions to avoid that expectations reverse outcomes in reality (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “In bid for clarity, Fed delivers opacity,” on May 23, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath), analyzes discrepancies in communication by the Fed. The annotated chart of values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) during trading on May 23, 2013 provided by Hinselrath, links the prepared testimony of Chairman Bernanke at 10:AM, following questions and answers and the release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM. Financial markets strengthened between 10 and 10:30AM on May 23, 2013, perhaps because of the statement by Chairman Bernanke in prepared testimony (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm):
“A premature tightening of monetary policy could lead interest rates to rise temporarily but would also carry a substantial risk of slowing or ending the economic recovery and causing inflation to fall further. Such outcomes tend to be associated with extended periods of lower, not higher, interest rates, as well as poor returns on other assets. Moreover, renewed economic weakness would pose its own risks to financial stability.”
In that testimony, Chairman Bernanke (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20130522a.htm) also analyzes current weakness of labor markets:
“Despite this improvement, the job market remains weak overall: The unemployment rate is still well above its longer-run normal level, rates of long-term unemployment are historically high, and the labor force participation rate has continued to move down. Moreover, nearly 8 million people are working part time even though they would prefer full-time work. High rates of unemployment and underemployment are extraordinarily costly: Not only do they impose hardships on the affected individuals and their families, they also damage the productive potential of the economy as a whole by eroding workers' skills and--particularly relevant during this commencement season--by preventing many young people from gaining workplace skills and experience in the first place. The loss of output and earnings associated with high unemployment also reduces government revenues and increases spending on income-support programs, thereby leading to larger budget deficits and higher levels of public debt than would otherwise occur.”
Hilsenrath (op. cit. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323336104578501552642287218.html?KEYWORDS=articles+by+jon+hilsenrath) analyzes the subsequent decline of the market from 10:30AM to 10:40AM as Chairman Bernanke responded questions with the statement that withdrawal of stimulus would be determined by data but that it could begin in one of the “next few meetings.” The DJIA recovered part of the losses between 10:40AM and 2PM. The minutes of the FOMC released at 2PM on May 23, 2013, contained a phrase that troubled market participants (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20130501.htm): “A number of participants expressed willingness to adjust the flow of purchases downward as early as the June meeting if the economic information received by that time showed evidence of sufficiently strong and sustained growth; however, views differed about what evidence would be necessary and the likelihood of that outcome.” The DJIA closed at 15,387.58 on May 21, 2013 and fell to 15,307.17 at the close on May 22, 2013, with the loss of 0.5 percent occurring after release of the minutes of the FOMC at 2PM when the DJIA stood at around 15,400. The concern about exist of the Fed from stimulus affected markets worldwide as shown in declines of equity indexes in Table III-1 with delays because of differences in trading hours. This behavior shows the trap of unconventional monetary policy with no exit from zero interest rates without risking financial crash and likely adverse repercussions on economic activity.
Financial markets worldwide were affected by the reduction of policy rates of the European Central Bank (ECB) on May 2, 2013. (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130502.en.html):
“2 May 2013 - Monetary policy decisions
At today’s meeting, which was held in Bratislava, the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary policy decisions:
- The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 25 basis points to 0.50%, starting from the operation to be settled on 8 May 2013.
- The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 50 basis points to 1.00%, with effect from 8 May 2013.
- The interest rate on the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 0.00%.”
Financial markets in Japan and worldwide were shocked by new bold measures of “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing” by the Bank of Japan (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The objective of policy is to “achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two years” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf). The main elements of the new policy are as follows:
- Monetary Base Control. Most central banks in the world pursue interest rates instead of monetary aggregates, injecting bank reserves to lower interest rates to desired levels. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) has shifted back to monetary aggregates, conducting money market operations with the objective of increasing base money, or monetary liabilities of the government, at the annual rate of 60 to 70 trillion yen. The BOJ estimates base money outstanding at “138 trillion yen at end-2012) and plans to increase it to “200 trillion yen at end-2012 and 270 trillion yen at end 2014” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Maturity Extension of Purchases of Japanese Government Bonds. Purchases of bonds will be extended even up to bonds with maturity of 40 years with the guideline of extending the average maturity of BOJ bond purchases from three to seven years. The BOJ estimates the current average maturity of Japanese government bonds (JGB) at around seven years. The BOJ plans to purchase about 7.5 trillion yen per month (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/rel130404d.pdf). Takashi Nakamichi, Tatsuo Ito and Phred Dvorak, wiring on “Bank of Japan mounts bid for revival,” on Apr 4, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578401633067110420.html ), find that the limit of maturities of three years on purchases of JGBs was designed to avoid views that the BOJ would finance uncontrolled government deficits.
- Seigniorage. The BOJ is pursuing coordination with the government that will take measures to establish “sustainable fiscal structure with a view to ensuring the credibility of fiscal management” (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130404a.pdf).
- Diversification of Asset Purchases. The BOJ will engage in transactions of exchange traded funds (ETF) and real estate investment trusts (REITS) and not solely on purchases of JGBs. Purchases of ETFs will be at an annual rate of increase of one trillion yen and purchases of REITS at 30 billion yen.
The European sovereign debt crisis continues to shake financial markets and the world economy. Debt resolution within the international financial architecture requires that a country be capable of borrowing on its own from the private sector. Mechanisms of debt resolution have included participation of the private sector (PSI), or “bail in,” that has been voluntary, almost coercive, agreed and outright coercive (Pelaez and Pelaez, International Financial Architecture: G7, IMF, BIS, Creditors and Debtors (2005), Chapter 4, 187-202). Private sector involvement requires losses by the private sector in bailouts of highly indebted countries. The essence of successful private sector involvement is to recover private-sector credit of the highly indebted country. Mary Watkins, writing on “Bank bailouts reshuffle risk hierarchy,” published on Mar 19, 2013, in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7666546a-9095-11e2-a456-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OSpbvCn8) analyzes the impact of the bailout or resolution of Cyprus banks on the hierarchy of risks of bank liabilities. Cyprus banks depend mostly on deposits with less reliance on debt, raising concerns in creditors of fixed-income debt and equity holders in banks in the euro area. Uncertainty remains as to the dimensions and structure of losses in private sector involvement or “bail in” in other rescue programs in the euro area. Alkman Granitsas, writing on “Central bank details losses at Bank of Cyprus,” on Mar 30, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324000704578392502889560768.html), analyzes the impact of the agreement with the €10 billion agreement with IMF and the European Union on the banks of Cyprus. The recapitalization plan provides for immediate conversion of 37.5 percent of all deposits in excess of €100,000 to shares of special class of the bank. An additional 22.5 percent will be frozen without interest until the plan is completed. The overwhelming risk factor is the unsustainable Treasury deficit/debt of the United States (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):
“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans.
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.
An important risk event is the reduction of growth prospects in the euro zone discussed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in “Introductory statement to the press conference,” on Dec 6, 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is121206.en.html):
“This assessment is reflected in the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP growth in a range between -0.6% and -0.4% for 2012, between -0.9% and 0.3% for 2013 and between 0.2% and 2.2% for 2014. Compared with the September 2012 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges for 2012 and 2013 have been revised downwards.
The Governing Council continues to see downside risks to the economic outlook for the euro area. These are mainly related to uncertainties about the resolution of sovereign debt and governance issues in the euro area, geopolitical issues and fiscal policy decisions in the United States possibly dampening sentiment for longer than currently assumed and delaying further the recovery of private investment, employment and consumption.”
Reuters, writing on “Bundesbank cuts German growth forecast,” on Dec 7, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e845114-4045-11e2-8f90-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EMQxzs3u), informs that the central bank of Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank reduced its forecast of growth for the economy of Germany to 0.7 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.0 percent in Jun and to 0.4 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.6 percent while the forecast for 2014 is at 1.9 percent.
The major risk event during earlier weeks was sharp decline of sovereign yields with the yield on the ten-year bond of Spain falling to 5.309 percent and that of the ten-year bond of Italy falling to 4.473 percent on Fri Nov 30, 2012 and 5.366 percent for the ten-year of Spain and 4.527 percent for the ten-year of Italy on Fri Nov 14, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Vanessa Mock and Frances Robinson, writing on “EU approves Spanish bank’s restructuring plans,” on Nov 28, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146520774638316.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the European Union regulators approved restructuring of four Spanish banks (Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia), which helped to calm sovereign debt markets. Harriet Torry and James Angelo, writing on “Germany approves Greek aid,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578150532603095790.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the German parliament approved the plan to provide Greece a tranche of €44 billion in promised financial support, which is subject to sustainability analysis of the bond repurchase program later in Dec 2012. A hurdle for sustainability of repurchasing debt is that Greece’s sovereign bonds have appreciated significantly from around 24 percent for the bond maturing in 21 years and 20 percent for the bond maturing in 31 years in Aug 2012 to around 17 percent for the 21-year maturity and 15 percent for the 31-year maturing in Nov 2012. Declining years are equivalent to increasing prices, making the repurchase more expensive. Debt repurchase is intended to reduce bonds in circulation, turning Greek debt more manageable. Ben McLannahan, writing on “Japan unveils $11bn stimulus package,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/adc0569a-3aa5-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), informs that the cabinet in Japan approved another stimulus program of $11 billion, which is twice larger than another stimulus plan in late Oct and close to elections in Dec. Henry Sender, writing on “Tokyo faces weak yen and high bond yields,” published on Nov 29, 2012 in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a7178d0-393d-11e2-afa8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), analyzes concerns of regulators on duration of bond holdings in an environment of likelihood of increasing yields and yen depreciation.
First, Risk-Determining Events. The European Council statement on Nov 23, 2012 asked the President of the European Commission “to continue the work and pursue consultations in the coming weeks to find a consensus among the 27 over the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf) Discussions will continue in the effort to reach agreement on a budget: “A European budget is important for the cohesion of the Union and for jobs and growth in all our countries” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf). There is disagreement between the group of countries requiring financial assistance and those providing bailout funds. Gabrielle Steinhauser and Costas Paris, writing on “Greek bond rally puts buyback in doubt,” on Nov 23, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578136362599130992.html?mg=reno64-wsj) find a new hurdle in rising prices of Greek sovereign debt that may make more difficult buybacks of debt held by investors. European finance ministers continue their efforts to reach an agreement for Greece that meets with approval of the European Central Bank and the IMF. The European Council (2012Oct19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf ) reached conclusions on strengthening the euro area and providing unified financial supervision:
“The European Council called for work to proceed on the proposals on the Single Supervisory Mechanism as a matter of priority with the objective of agreeing on the legislative framework by 1st January 2013 and agreed on a number of orientations to that end. It also took note of issues relating to the integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks and democratic legitimacy and accountability which should be further explored. It agreed that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the EU's institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards non-euro area Member States and respect for the integrity of the Single Market. It looked forward to a specific and time-bound roadmap to be presented at its December 2012 meeting, so that it can move ahead on all essential building blocks on which a genuine EMU should be based.”
Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. The Bank of Spain released new data on doubtful debtors in Spain’s credit institutions (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/Agenda/Datos_de_credit_a6cd708c59cf931.html). In 2006, the value of doubtful credits reached €10,859 million or 0.7 percent of total credit of €1,508,626 million. In Aug 2012, doubtful credit reached €178,579 million or 10.5 percent of total credit of €1,698,714 million.
There are three critical factors influencing world financial markets. (1) Spain could request formal bailout from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that may also affect Italy’s international borrowing. David Roman and Jonathan House, writing on “Spain risks backlash with budget plan,” on Sep 27, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578021692765950384.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) analyze Spain’s proposal of reducing government expenditures by €13 billion, or around $16.7 billion, increasing taxes in 2013, establishing limits on early retirement and cutting the deficit by €65 billion through 2014. Banco de España, Bank of Spain, contracted consulting company Oliver Wyman to conduct rigorous stress tests of the resilience of its banking system. (Stress tests and their use are analyzed by Pelaez and Pelaez Globalization and the State Vol. I (2008b), 95-100, International Financial Architecture (2005) 112-6, 123-4, 130-3).) The results are available from Banco de España (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/infointeres/reestructuracion/ http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). The assumptions of the adverse scenario used by Oliver Wyman are quite tough for the three-year period from 2012 to 2014: “6.5 percent cumulative decline of GDP, unemployment rising to 27.2 percent and further declines of 25 percent of house prices and 60 percent of land prices (http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). Fourteen banks were stress tested with capital needs estimates of seven banks totaling €59.3 billion. The three largest banks of Spain, Banco Santander (http://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite/CFWCSancomQP01/es_ES/Corporativo.html), BBVA (http://www.bbva.com/TLBB/tlbb/jsp/ing/home/index.jsp) and Caixabank (http://www.caixabank.com/index_en.html), with 43 percent of exposure under analysis, have excess capital of €37 billion in the adverse scenario in contradiction with theories that large, international banks are necessarily riskier. Jonathan House, writing on “Spain expects wider deficit on bank aid,” on Sep 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444138104578028484168511130.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyzes the 2013 budget plan of Spain that will increase the deficit of 7.4 percent of GDP in 2012, which is above the target of 6.3 percent under commitment with the European Union. The ratio of debt to GDP will increase to 85.3 percent in 2012 and 90.5 percent in 2013 while the 27 members of the European Union have an average debt/GDP ratio of 83 percent at the end of IIQ2012. (2) Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even after the economy grows again at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now apparently open ended in perpetuity as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):
“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.
To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”
In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is the concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation.
(2) The European Central Bank (ECB) approved a new program of bond purchases under the name “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT). The ECB will purchase sovereign bonds of euro zone member countries that have a program of conditionality under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that is converting into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These programs provide enhancing the solvency of member countries in a transition period of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment. The purchase of bonds by the ECB would maintain debt costs of sovereigns at sufficiently low levels to permit adjustment under the EFSF/ESM programs. Purchases of bonds are not limited quantitatively with discretion by the ECB as to how much is necessary to support countries with adjustment programs. Another feature of the OMT of the ECB is sterilization of bond purchases: funds injected to pay for the bonds would be withdrawn or sterilized by ECB transactions. The statement by the European Central Bank on the program of OTM is as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html):
“6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions
As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework:
Conditionality
A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme.
The Governing Council will consider Outright Monetary Transactions to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme.
Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate.
Coverage
Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access.
Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.
No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.
Creditor treatment
The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.
Sterilisation
The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.
Transparency
Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis.
Securities Markets Programme
Following today’s decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be held to maturity.”
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed sets stage for stimulus,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577623220212805132.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the essay presented by Chairman Bernanke at the Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers, as defending past stimulus with unconventional measures of monetary policy that could be used to reduce extremely high unemployment. Chairman Bernanke (2012JHAug31, 18-9) does support further unconventional monetary policy impulses if required by economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm):
“Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”
Professor John H Cochrane (2012Aug31), at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, writing on “The Federal Reserve: from central bank to central planner,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577609384030304936.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_opinion), analyzes that the departure of central banks from open market operations into purchase of assets with risks to taxpayers and direct allocation of credit subject to political influence has caused them to abandon their political independence and accountability. Cochrane (2012Aug31) finds a return to the proposition of Milton Friedman in the 1960s that central banks can cause inflation and macroeconomic instability.
Mario Draghi (2012Aug29), President of the European Central Bank, also reiterated the need of exceptional and unconventional central bank policies (http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html):
“Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.
The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.”
Buiter (2011Oct31) analyzes that the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would need a “bigger bazooka” to bail out euro members in difficulties that could possibly be provided by the ECB. Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. Table III-7 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides the combined GDP in 2012 of the highly indebted euro zone members estimated in the latest World Economic Outlook of the IMF at $4167 billion or 33.1 percent of total euro zone GDP of $12,586 billion. Using the WEO of the IMF, Table III-8 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides debt of the highly indebted euro zone members at $3927.8 billion in 2012 that increases to $5809.9 billion when adding Germany’s debt, corresponding to 167.0 percent of Germany’s GDP. There are additional sources of debt in bailing out banks. The dimensions of the problem may require more firepower than a bazooka perhaps that of the largest conventional bomb of all times of 44,000 pounds experimentally detonated only once by the US in 1948 (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar-apr/coker.html).
Chart III-1A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the ten-year, two-year and one-month Treasury constant maturity yields together with the overnight fed funds rate, and the yield of the corporate bond with Moody’s rating of Baa. The riskier yield of the Baa corporate bond exceeds the relatively riskless yields of the Treasury securities. The beginning yields in Chart III-1A for Jan 2, 1962, are 2.75 percent for the fed fund rates and 4.06 percent for the ten-year Treasury constant maturity. On July 31, 2001, the yields in Chart III-1A are 3.67 percent for one month, 3.79 percent for two years, 5.07 percent for ten years, 3.82 percent for the fed funds rate and 7.85 percent for the Baa corporate bond. On July 30, 2007, yields inverted with the one month at 4.95 percent, the two-year at 4.59 percent and the ten year at 5.82 percent with the yield of the Baa corporate bond at 6.70 percent. Another interesting point is for Oct 31, 2008, with the yield of the Baa jumping to 9.54 percent and the Treasury yields declining: one month 0.12 percent, two years 1.56 percent and ten years 4.01 percent during a flight to the dollar and government securities analyzed by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). Another spike in the series is for Apr 4, 2006 with the yield of the corporate Baa bond at 8.63 and the Treasury yields of 0.12 percent for one month, 0.94 for two years and 2.95 percent for ten years. During the beginning of the flight from risk financial assets to US government securities (see Cochrane and Zingales 2009), the one-month yield was 0.07 percent, the two-year yield 1.64 percent and the ten-year yield 3.41. The combination of zero fed funds rate and quantitative easing caused sharp decline of the yields from 2008 and 2009. Yield declines have also occurred during periods of financial risk aversion, including the current one of stress of financial markets in Europe. The final point of Chart III1-A is for Sep 19, 2013, with the one-month yield at 0.04 percent, the two-year at 0.34 percent, the ten-year at 2.66 percent, the fed funds rate at 0.08 percent and the corporate Baa bond at 5.38 percent. There is an evident increase in the yields of the 10-year Treasury constant maturity and the Moody’s Baa corporate bond with marginal reduction.
Chart III-1A, US, Ten-Year, Two-Year and One-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Yields, Overnight Fed Funds Rate and Yield of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond, Jan 2, 1962-Sep 26, 2013
Note: US Recessions in shaded areas
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/
Alexandra Scaggs, writing on “Tepid profits, roaring stocks,” on May 16, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323398204578487460105747412.html), analyzes stabilization of earnings growth: 70 percent of 458 reporting companies in the S&P 500 stock index reported earnings above forecasts but sales fell 0.2 percent relative to forecasts of increase of 0.5 percent. Paul Vigna, writing on “Earnings are a margin story but for how long,” on May 17, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/17/earnings-are-a-margin-story-but-for-how-long/), analyzes that corporate profits increase with stagnating sales while companies manage costs tightly. More than 90 percent of S&P components reported moderate increase of earnings of 3.7 percent in IQ2013 relative to IQ2012 with decline of sales of 0.2 percent. Earnings and sales have been in declining trend. In IVQ2009, growth of earnings reached 104 percent and sales jumped 13 percent. Net margins reached 8.92 percent in IQ2013, which is almost the same at 8.95 percent in IIIQ2006. Operating margins are 9.58 percent. There is concern by market participants that reversion of margins to the mean could exert pressure on earnings unless there is more accelerated growth of sales. Vigna (op. cit.) finds sales growth limited by weak economic growth. Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. Future company cash flows derive from investment projects. In IQ1980, gross private domestic investment in the US was $951.6 billion of 2009 dollars, growing to $1,143.0 billion in IVQ1986 or 20.1 percent. Real gross private domestic investment in the US decreased 3.1 percent from $2,605.2 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,524.9 billion in IIQ2013. Real private fixed investment fell 4.9 percent from $2,586.3 billion of 2009 dollars in IVQ2007 to $2,458.4 billion in IIQ2013. Growth of real private investment in is mediocre for all but four quarters from IIQ2011 to IQ2012 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html). The investment decision of United States corporations has been fractured in the current economic cycle in preference of cash. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA fell $26.6 billion in IQ2013 after increasing $34.9 billion in IVQ2012 and $13.9 billion in IIIQ2012. Corporate profits with IVA and CCA rebounded with $66.8 billion in IIQ2013. Profits after tax with IVA and CCA fell $1.7 billion in IQ2013 after increasing $40.8 billion in IVQ2012 and $4.5 billion in IIIQ2012. In IIQ2013, profits after tax with IVA and CCA increased $56.9 billion. Anticipation of higher taxes in the “fiscal cliff” episode caused increase of $120.9 billion in net dividends in IVQ2012 followed with adjustment in the form of decrease of net dividends by $103.8 billion in IQ2013, rebounding with $273.5 billion in IIQ2013. There is similar decrease of $80.1 billion in undistributed profits with IVA and CCA in IVQ2012 followed by increase of $102.1 billion in IQ2013 and decline of $216.6 billion in IIQ2013. Undistributed profits of US corporations swelled 263.4 percent from $107.7 billion IQ2007 to $391.4 billion in IIQ2013 and changed signs from minus $55.9 billion in billion in IVQ2007 (Section IA2). In IQ2013, corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment fell $26.6 billion relative to IVQ2012, from $2047.2 billion to $2020.6 billion at the quarterly rate of minus 1.3 percent. In IIQ2013, corporate profits with IVA and CCA increased $66.8 billion from $2020.6 billion in IQ2013 to $2087.4 billion at the quarterly rate of 3.3 percent (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf). Uncertainty originating in fiscal, regulatory and monetary policy causes wide swings in expectations and decisions by the private sector with adverse effects on investment, real economic activity and employment. The investment decision of US business is fractured. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:
Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or
declines.
There was mixed performance in equity indexes with several indexes in Table III-1 decreasing in the week ending on Sep 27, 2013, after wide swings caused by reallocations of investment portfolios worldwide. Stagnating revenues, corporate cash hoarding and declining investment are causing reevaluation of discounted net earnings with deteriorating views on the world economy and United States fiscal sustainability but investors have been driving indexes higher. DJIA decreased 0.5 percent on Sep 27, decreasing 1.2 percent in the week. Germany’s Dax changed 0.0 percent on Fri Sep 27 and decreased 0.0 percent in the week. Dow Global decreased 0.1 percent on Sep 27 and increased 0.7 percent in the week. Japan’s Nikkei Average decreased 0.3 percent on Fri Sep 27 and increased 2.1 percent in the week as the yen continues oscillating but relatively weaker and the stock market gains in expectations of fiscal stimulus by a new administration and monetary stimulus by a new board of the Bank of Japan. Dow Asia Pacific TSM increased 0.2 percent on Sep 27 and increased 0.2 percent in the week. Shanghai Composite that decreased 0.2 percent on Mar 8 and decreased 1.7 percent in the week of Mar 8, falling below 2000 to close at 1980.13 on Fri Nov 30 but closing at 2160.03 on Fri Sep 27 for increase of 0.2 percent and decrease of 1.5 percent in the week of Sep 27. There is deceleration of the world economy that could affect corporate revenue and equity valuations, causing oscillation in equity markets with increases during favorable risk appetite.
Commodities were weaker in the week of Sep 27, 2013. The DJ UBS Commodities Index increased 0.2 percent on Fri Sep 27 and decreased 0.2 percent in the week, as shown in Table III-1. WTI decreased 1.8 percent in the week of Sep 27 while Brent decreased 0.9 percent in the week. Gold increased 1.0 percent on Fri Sep 27 and increased 0.8 percent in the week.
Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €879,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €775,417 million on Sep 20, 2013 with some repayment of loans already occurring. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has reached €1,379,460 million in the statement of Sep 20, 2013, with marginal reduction. There is high credit risk in these transactions with capital of only €90,419 million as analyzed by Cochrane (2012Aug31).
Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR
| Dec 31, 2010 | Dec 28, 2011 | Sep 20, 2013 | |
| 1 Gold and other Receivables | 367,402 | 419,822 | 319,969 |
| 2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 223,995 | 236,826 | 250,695 |
| 3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency | 26,941 | 95,355 | 22,654 |
| 4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 22,592 | 25,982 | 23,136 |
| 5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro | 546,747 | 879,130 | 775,417 |
| 6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro | 45,654 | 94,989 | 76,116 |
| 7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro | 457,427 | 610,629 | 604,043 |
| 8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro | 34,954 | 33,928 | 28,361 |
| 9 Other Assets | 278,719 | 336,574 | 246,198 |
| TOTAL ASSETS | 2,004, 432 | 2,733,235 | 2,346,591 |
| Memo Items | |||
| Sum of 5 and 7 | 1,004,174 | 1,489,759 | 1,379,460 |
| Capital and Reserves | 78,143 | 81,481 | 90,420 |
Source: European Central Bank
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/wfs/2013/html/fs130924.en.html
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk. Resolution of the European sovereign debt crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. That success would be assured with growth of the Italian economy. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness. Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. Growth of the Italian economy would ensure that success. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surpluses that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15) argue that 55 percent of the exports of Italy are to countries outside the euro area such that devaluation of 15 percent would be effective in increasing export revenue. Newly available data in Table III-3 providing Italy’s trade with regions and countries supports the argument of Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15). Italy’s exports to the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, are only 40.5 percent of the total in Jan-Jul 2013. Exports to the non-European Union area with share of 46.3 percent in Italy’s total exports are growing at 3.2 percent in Jan-Jul 2013 relative to Jan-Jul 2012 while those to EMU are growing at minus 3.2 percent.
Table III-3, Italy, Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, % Share and 12-Month ∆%
| Jul 2013 | Exports | ∆% Jan-Jul 2013/ Jan-Jul 2012 | Imports | ∆% Jan-Jul 2013/ Jan-Jul 2012 |
| EU | 54.2 | -2.3 | 53.2 | -2.4 |
| EMU 17 | 40.5 | -3.2 | 42.7 | -2.7 |
| France | 11.1 | -2.4 | 8.3 | -6.0 |
| Germany | 12.5 | -3.5 | 14.6 | -6.5 |
| Spain | 4.7 | -7.7 | 4.4 | -2.5 |
| UK | 4.9 | 1.6 | 2.5 | -0.2 |
| Non EU | 46.3 | 3.2 | 46.8 | -10.0 |
| Europe non EU | 13.4 | 0.3 | 11.0 | 7.7 |
| USA | 6.8 | -2.0 | 3.3 | -14.6 |
| China | 2.3 | 9.3 | 6.5 | -9.9 |
| OPEC | 5.7 | 10.7 | 10.8 | -27.5 |
| Total | 100.0 | 0.2 | 100.0 | -6.0 |
Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/98796
Table III-4 provides Italy’s trade balance by regions and countries. Italy had trade surplus of €1335 million with the 17 countries of the euro zone (EMU 17) in Jul 2013 and cumulative deficit of €1058 million in Jan-Jul 2013. Depreciation to parity could permit greater competitiveness in improving the trade surplus of 4657 million in Jan-Jul 2013 with Europe non European Union, the trade surplus of €8930 million with the US and trade surplus with non-European Union of €10,497 million in Jan-Jul 2013. There is significant rigidity in the trade deficits in Jan-Jul 2013 of €8066 million with China and €4366 million with members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Higher exports could drive economic growth in the economy of Italy that would permit less onerous adjustment of the country’s fiscal imbalances, raising the country’s credit rating.
Table III-4, Italy, Trade Balance by Regions and Countries, Millions of Euro
| Regions and Countries | Trade Balance Jul 2013 Millions of Euro | Trade Balance Cumulative Jan-Jul 2013 Millions of Euro |
| EU | 3,152 | 7,739 |
| EMU 17 | 1,335 | -1,058 |
| France | 1,640 | 7,846 |
| Germany | 151 | -2,286 |
| Spain | 153 | 544 |
| UK | 1,083 | 5,756 |
| Non EU | 2,796 | 10,497 |
| Europe non EU | 1,224 | 4,657 |
| USA | 1,336 | 8,930 |
| China | -1,339 | -8,066 |
| OPEC | -368 | -4,366 |
| Total | 5,948 | 18,237 |
Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/98796
Growth rates of Italy’s trade and major products are in Table III-5 for the period Jan-Jul 2013 relative to Jan-Jul 2012. Growth rates of cumulative imports relative to a year earlier are negative for energy with minus 15.2 percent and minus 9.9 percent for durable goods. The higher rate of growth of exports of 0.2 percent in Jan-Jul 2013/Jan-Jul 2012 relative to imports of minus 6.0 percent may reflect weak demand in Italy with GDP declining during eight consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 through IIQ2013 together with softening commodity prices.
Table III-5, Italy, Exports and Imports % Share of Products in Total and ∆%
| Exports | Exports | Imports | Imports | |
| Consumer | 29.3 | 6.4 | 25.6 | 1.2 |
| Durable | 5.8 | 1.4 | 2.9 | -9.9 |
| Non-Durable | 23.5 | 7.7 | 22.7 | 2.7 |
| Capital Goods | 31.6 | 1.3 | 19.5 | -7.2 |
| Inter- | 33.6 | -3.3 | 32.6 | -4.6 |
| Energy | 5.5 | -18.0 | 22.3 | -15.2 |
| Total ex Energy | 94.5 | 1.2 | 77.7 | -3.4 |
| Total | 100.0 | 0.2 | 100.0 | -6.0 |
Note: % Share for 2012 total trade.
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/98796
Table III-6 provides Italy’s trade balance by product categories in Jul 2013 and cumulative Jan-Jul 2013. Italy’s trade balance excluding energy generated surplus of €10,928 million in Jul 2013 and €50,616 million cumulative in Jan-Jul 2013 but the energy trade balance created deficit of €4980 million in Jul 2013 and cumulative €32,379 million in Jan-Jul 2013. The overall surplus in Jul 2013 was €5948 million with cumulative surplus of €18,237 million in Jan-Jul 2013. Italy has significant competitiveness in various economic activities in contrast with some other countries with debt difficulties.
Table III-6, Italy, Trade Balance by Product Categories, € Millions
| Jul 2013 | Cumulative Jan-Jul 2013 | |
| Consumer Goods | 2,899 | 13,160 |
| Durable | 1,374 | 7,697 |
| Nondurable | 1,524 | 5,463 |
| Capital Goods | 6,255 | 32,428 |
| Intermediate Goods | 1,775 | 5,028 |
| Energy | -4,980 | -32,379 |
| Total ex Energy | 10,928 | 50,616 |
| Total | 5,948 | 18,237 |
Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/98796
Brazil faced in the debt crisis of 1982 a more complex policy mix. Between 1977 and 1983, Brazil’s terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated 47 percent and 36 percent excluding oil (Pelaez 1987, 176-79; Pelaez 1986, 37-66; see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 178-87). Brazil had accumulated unsustainable foreign debt by borrowing to finance balance of payments deficits during the 1970s. Foreign lending virtually stopped. The German mark devalued strongly relative to the dollar such that Brazil’s products lost competitiveness in Germany and in multiple markets in competition with Germany. The resolution of the crisis was devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent relative to the dollar and subsequent maintenance of parity by monthly devaluation equal to inflation and indexing that resulted in financial stability by parity in external and internal interest rates avoiding capital flight. With a combination of declining imports, domestic import substitution and export growth, Brazil followed rapid growth in the US and grew out of the crisis with surprising GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 1984.
The euro zone faces a critical survival risk because several of its members may default on their sovereign obligations if not bailed out by the other members. The valuation equation of bonds is essential to understanding the stability of the euro area. An explanation is provided in this paragraph and readers interested in technical details are referred to the Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. Contrary to the Wriston doctrine, investing in sovereign obligations is a credit decision. The value of a bond today is equal to the discounted value of future obligations of interest and principal until maturity. On Dec 30, 2011, the yield of the 2-year bond of the government of Greece was quoted around 100 percent. In contrast, the 2-year US Treasury note traded at 0.239 percent and the 10-year at 2.871 percent while the comparable 2-year government bond of Germany traded at 0.14 percent and the 10-year government bond of Germany traded at 1.83 percent. There is no need for sovereign ratings: the perceptions of investors are of relatively higher probability of default by Greece, defying Wriston (1982), and nil probability of default of the US Treasury and the German government. The essence of the sovereign credit decision is whether the sovereign will be able to finance new debt and refinance existing debt without interrupting service of interest and principal. Prices of sovereign bonds incorporate multiple anticipations such as inflation and liquidity premiums of long-term relative to short-term debt but also risk premiums on whether the sovereign’s debt can be managed as it increases without bound. The austerity measures of Italy are designed to increase the primary surplus, or government revenues less expenditures excluding interest, to ensure investors that Italy will have the fiscal strength to manage its debt exceeding 100 percent of GDP, which is the third largest in the world after the US and Japan. Appendix IIIE links the expectations on the primary surplus to the real current value of government monetary and fiscal obligations. As Blanchard (2011SepWEO) analyzes, fiscal consolidation to increase the primary surplus is facilitated by growth of the economy. Italy and the other indebted sovereigns in Europe face the dual challenge of increasing primary surpluses while maintaining growth of the economy (for the experience of Brazil in the debt crisis of 1982 see Pelaez 1986, 1987).
Much of the analysis and concern over the euro zone centers on the lack of credibility of the debt of a few countries while there is credibility of the debt of the euro zone as a whole. In practice, there is convergence in valuations and concerns toward the fact that there may not be credibility of the euro zone as a whole. The fluctuations of financial risk assets of members of the euro zone move together with risk aversion toward the countries with lack of debt credibility. This movement raises the need to consider analytically sovereign debt valuation of the euro zone as a whole in the essential analysis of whether the single-currency will survive without major changes.
Welfare economics considers the desirability of alternative states, which in this case would be evaluating the “value” of Germany (1) within and (2) outside the euro zone. Is the sum of the wealth of euro zone countries outside of the euro zone higher than the wealth of these countries maintaining the euro zone? On the choice of indicator of welfare, Hicks (1975, 324) argues:
“Partly as a result of the Keynesian revolution, but more (perhaps) because of statistical labours that were initially quite independent of it, the Social Product has now come right back into its old place. Modern economics—especially modern applied economics—is centered upon the Social Product, the Wealth of Nations, as it was in the days of Smith and Ricardo, but as it was not in the time that came between. So if modern theory is to be effective, if it is to deal with the questions which we in our time want to have answered, the size and growth of the Social Product are among the chief things with which it must concern itself. It is of course the objective Social Product on which attention must be fixed. We have indexes of production; we do not have—it is clear we cannot have—an Index of Welfare.”
If the burden of the debt of the euro zone falls on Germany and France or only on Germany, is the wealth of Germany and France or only Germany higher after breakup of the euro zone or if maintaining the euro zone? In practice, political realities will determine the decision through elections.
The prospects of survival of the euro zone are dire. Table III-7 is constructed with IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx) for GDP in USD billions, primary net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP and general government debt as percent of GDP for selected regions and countries in 2013.
Table III-7, World and Selected Regional and Country GDP and Fiscal Situation
| GDP 2013 | Primary Net Lending Borrowing | General Government Net Debt | |
| World | 74,172 | ||
| Euro Zone | 12,752 | -0.04 | 73.9 |
| Portugal | 218 | -1.4 | 115.0 |
| Ireland | 222 | -3.2 | 106.2 |
| Greece | 244 | -- | 155.4 |
| Spain | 1,388 | -3.5 | 79.1 |
| Major Advanced Economies G7 | 34,068 | -3.8 | 91.5 |
| United States | 16,238 | -4.6 | 89.0 |
| UK | 2,423 | -5.0 | 86.1 |
| Germany | 3,598 | 1.8 | 54.1 |
| France | 2,739 | -1.4 | 86.5 |
| Japan | 5,150 | -9.0 | 143.4 |
| Canada | 1,844 | -2.4 | 35.9 |
| Italy | 2,076 | 2.7 | 102.3 |
| China | 9,020 | -2.1* | 21.3** |
*Net Lending/borrowing**Gross Debt
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx
The data in Table III-7 are used for some very simple calculations in Table III-8. The column “Net Debt USD Billions” in Table III-8 is generated by applying the percentage in Table III-7 column “General Government Net Debt % GDP 2013” to the column “GDP USD Billions.” The total debt of France and Germany in 2013 is $4315.7 billion, as shown in row “B+C” in column “Net Debt USD Billions” The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is $4087.3 billion, adding rows D+E+F+G+H in column “Net Debt USD billions.” There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic” in the two final columns of Table III-8. Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is shown in column “Debt as % of Germany plus France GDP” to reach $8403.0 billion, which would be equivalent to 132.6 percent of their combined GDP in 2013. Under this arrangement, the entire debt of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. The final column provides “Debt as % of Germany GDP” that would exceed 233.5 percent if including debt of France and 167.7 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Wriston (1982) would prove to be wrong again that countries do not bankrupt but would have a consolation prize that similar to LBOs the sum of the individual values of euro zone members outside the current agreement exceeds the value of the whole euro zone. Internal rescues of French and German banks may be less costly than bailing out other euro zone countries so that they do not default on French and German banks.
Table III-8, Guarantees of Debt of Sovereigns in Euro Area as Percent of GDP of Germany and France, USD Billions and %
| Net Debt USD Billions | Debt as % of Germany Plus France GDP | Debt as % of Germany GDP | |
| A Euro Area | 9,423.7 | ||
| B Germany | 1,946.5 | $8403.0 as % of $3598 =233.5% $6033.8 as % of $3598 =167.7% | |
| C France | 2,369.2 | ||
| B+C | 4,315.7 | GDP $6,337.0 Total Debt $8403.0 Debt/GDP: 132.6% | |
| D Italy | 2,123.7 | ||
| E Spain | 1,097.9 | ||
| F Portugal | 250.7 | ||
| G Greece | 379.2 | ||
| H Ireland | 235.8 | ||
| Subtotal D+E+F+G+H | 4,087.3 |
Source: calculation with IMF data IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/index.aspx
There is extremely important information in Table III-9 for the current sovereign risk crisis in the euro zone. Table III-9 provides the structure of regional and country relations of Germany’s exports and imports with newly available data for Jul 2013. German exports to other European Union (EU) members are 56.0 percent of total exports in Jul 2013 and 57.3 percent in cumulative Jan-Jul 2013. Exports to the euro area are 36.0 percent in Jul and 37.2 percent cumulative in Jan-Jul. Exports to third countries are 44.1 percent of the total in Jul and 42.7 percent cumulative in Jan-Jul. There is similar distribution for imports. Exports to non-euro countries are increasing 3.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013, increasing 1.5 percent cumulative in Jan-Jul 2013 while exports to the euro area are decreasing 0.7 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and decreasing 2.9 percent cumulative in Jan-Jul 2013. Exports to third countries, accounting for 44.1 percent of the total in Jun 2013, are decreasing 1.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2013 and decreasing 0.7 percent cumulative in Jan-Jul 2013, accounting for 42.7 percent of the cumulative total in Jan-Jul 2013. Price competitiveness through devaluation could improve export performance and growth. Economic performance in Germany is closely related to its high competitiveness in world markets. Weakness in the euro zone and the European Union in general could affect the German economy. This may be the major reason for choosing the “fiscal abuse” of the European Central Bank considered by Buiter (2011Oct31) over the breakdown of the euro zone. There is a tough analytical, empirical and forecasting doubt of growth and trade in the euro zone and the world with or without maintenance of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro zone. Germany could benefit from depreciation of the euro because of high share in its exports to countries not in the euro zone but breakdown of the euro zone raises doubts on the region’s economic growth that could affect German exports to other member states.
Table III-9, Germany, Structure of Exports and Imports by Region, € Billions and ∆%
| Jul 2013 | Jun 12-Month | Cumulative Jan-Jul 2012 € Billions | Cumulative Jan-Jul 2013/ | |
| Total | 93.4 | 0.0 | 640.8 | -0.5 |
| A. EU | 52.3 % 56.0 | 0.8 | 367.1 % 57.3 | -1.4 |
| Euro Area | 33.6 % 36.0 | -0.7 | 238.5 % 37.2 | -2.9 |
| Non-euro Area | 18.6 % 19.9 | 3.6 | 128.6 % 20.1 | 1.5 |
| B. Third Countries | 41.2 % 44.1 | -1.0 | 273.8 % 42.7 | 0.7 |
| Total Imports | 77.3 | 0.9 | 526.8 | -1.3 |
| C. EU Members | 49.6 % 64.2 | 0.6 | 340.8 % 64.7 | 0.1 |
| Euro Area | 35.3 % 45.7 | 1.5 | 238.8 % 45.3 | -0.4 |
| Non-euro Area | 14.3 % 18.5 | -1.7 | 102.0 % 19.4 | 1.4 |
| D. Third Countries | 27.7 % 35.8 | 1.6 | 186.1 % 35.3 | -3.7 |
Notes: Total Exports = A+B; Total Imports = C+D
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2013/09/PE13_298_51.html
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. There are two approaches to government finance and their implications: (1) simple unpleasant monetarist arithmetic; and (2) simple unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Both approaches illustrate how sovereign debt can be perceived riskier under profligacy.
First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:
D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)
Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,
{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:
N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)
The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:
B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)
On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.
Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:
(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+τ)st+τdτ (4)
Equation (4) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+τ, of the future primary surpluses st+τ, which are equal to Tt+τ – Gt+τ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+τ. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:
MtV(it, ·) = PtYt (5)
Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):
“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”
An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.
There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:
(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress
(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality
(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.
IV Global Inflation. There is inflation everywhere in the world economy, with slow growth and persistently high unemployment in advanced economies. Table IV-1, updated with every blog comment, provides the latest annual data for GDP, consumer price index (CPI) inflation, producer price index (PPI) inflation and unemployment (UNE) for the advanced economies, China and the highly indebted European countries with sovereign risk issues. The table now includes the Netherlands and Finland that with Germany make up the set of northern countries in the euro zone that hold key votes in the enhancement of the mechanism for solution of sovereign risk issues (Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, “Europe: Northern Exposures,” Financial Times, Mar 9, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55eaf350-4a8b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz1gAlaswcW). Newly available data on inflation is considered below in this section. Data in Table IV-1 for the euro zone and its members are updated from information provided by Eurostat but individual country information is provided in this section as soon as available, following Table IV-1. Data for other countries in Table IV-1 are also updated with reports from their statistical agencies. Economic data for major regions and countries is considered in Section V World Economic Slowdown following with individual country and regional data tables.
Table IV-1, GDP Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in Selected Countries, Percentage Annual Rates
| GDP | CPI | PPI | UNE | |
| US | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 7.3 |
| Japan | 1.2 | 0.9 | 2.4 | 3.8 |
| China | 7.5 | 2.6 | -1.6 | |
| UK | 1.3 | 2.7* CPIH 2.5 | 1.6 output | 7.7 |
| Euro Zone | -0.5 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 12.1 |
| Germany | 0.5 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 5.3 |
| France | 0.3 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 11.0 |
| Nether-lands | -1.8 | 2.8 | -0.4 | 7.0 |
| Finland | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 7.9 |
| Belgium | -0.1 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 8.9 |
| Portugal | -2.0 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 16.5 |
| Ireland | NA | 0.0 | 3.1 | 13.8 |
| Italy | -2.0 | 1.2 | -1.0 | 12.0 |
| Greece | -4.6 | -1.0 | -0.4 | NA |
| Spain | -1.6 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 26.3 |
Notes: GDP: rate of growth of GDP; CPI: change in consumer price inflation; PPI: producer price inflation; UNE: rate of unemployment; all rates relative to year earlier
*Office for National Statistics http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/consumer-price-indices/august-2013/index.html **Core
PPI http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ppi2/producer-price-index/august-2013/index.html
Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/; country statistical sources http://www.census.gov/aboutus/stat_int.html
Table IV-1 shows the simultaneous occurrence of low growth, inflation and unemployment in advanced economies. The US grew at 1.6 percent in IIQ2013 relative to IIQ2012 (Table 8 in http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html). Japan’s GDP grew 0.9 percent in IIQ2013 relative to IQ2013 and 1.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Japan’s grew at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 3.8 percent in IIQQ2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations_3896.html). The UK grew at 0.7 percent in IIQ2013 relative to IQ2013 and GDP increased 1.3 percent in IIQ2013 relative to IIQ2012 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/interest-rate-risks-duration-dumping.html). The Euro Zone grew at 0.3 percent in IIQ2013 and minus 0.5 percent in IIQ2013 relative to IIQ2012 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations_3896.html). These are stagnating or “growth recession” rates, which are positive or about nil growth rates with some contractions that are insufficient to recover employment. The rates of unemployment are quite high: 7.3 percent in the US but 17.4 percent for unemployment/underemployment or job stress of 28.3 million (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html), 3.8 percent for Japan (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/recovery-without-hiring-loss-of-full.html), 7.7 percent for the UK with high rates of unemployment for young people (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations_3896.html). Twelve-month rates of inflation have been quite high, even when some are moderating at the margin: 1.5 percent in the US, 0.9 percent for Japan, 2.6 percent for China, 1.3 percent for the Euro Zone and 2.7 percent for the UK. Stagflation is still an unknown event but the risk is sufficiently high to be worthy of consideration (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html). The analysis of stagflation also permits the identification of important policy issues in solving vulnerabilities that have high impact on global financial risks. Six key interrelated vulnerabilities in the world economy have been causing global financial turbulence. (1) Sovereign risk issues in Europe resulting from countries in need of fiscal consolidation and enhancement of their sovereign risk ratings (see Section III and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html). (2) The tradeoff of growth and inflation in China now with change in growth strategy to domestic consumption instead of investment and political developments in a decennial transition. (3) Slow growth by repression of savings with de facto interest rate controls (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html), weak hiring with the loss of 10 million full-time jobs (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/recovery-without-hiring-ten-million.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/recovery-without-hiring-loss-of-full.html) and continuing job stress of 24 to 30 million people in the US and stagnant wages in a fractured job market (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html); (4) The timing, dose, impact and instruments of normalizing monetary and fiscal policies (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/united-states-gdp-growth-standstill.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/global-financial-risks-and-fed.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/policy-inflation-growth-unemployment.html) in advanced and emerging economies. (5) The Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 had repercussions throughout the world economy. Japan has share of about 9 percent in world output, role as entry point for business in Asia, key supplier of advanced components and other inputs as well as major role in finance and multiple economic activities (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216950927404360.html?mod=WSJ_business_AsiaNewsBucket&mg=reno-wsj); and (6) geopolitical events in the Middle East.
In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These projections and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.
Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):
“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.
Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.
The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”
Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:
“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”
Another rising risk is division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on risks and benefits of current policies as expressed in the minutes of the meeting held on Jan 29-30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20130130.pdf 13):
“However, many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability. Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound, but others pointed to offsetting factors and one noted that losses would not impede the effective operation of monetary policy.
Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed maps exit from stimulus,” on May 11, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324744104578475273101471896.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the development of strategy for unwinding quantitative easing and how it can create uncertainty in financial markets. Jon Hilsenrath and Victoria McGrane, writing on “Fed slip over how long to keep cash spigot open,” published on Feb 20, 2013 in the Wall street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323511804578298121033876536.html), analyze the minutes of the Fed, comments by members of the FOMC and data showing increase in holdings of riskier debt by investors, record issuance of junk bonds, mortgage securities and corporate loans. Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Jobs upturn isn’t enough to satisfy Fed,” on Mar 8, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582804578348293647760204.html), finds that much stronger labor market conditions are required for the Fed to end quantitative easing. Unconventional monetary policy with zero interest rates and quantitative easing is quite difficult to unwind because of the adverse effects of raising interest rates on valuations of risk financial assets and home prices, including the very own valuation of the securities held outright in the Fed balance sheet. Gradual unwinding of 1 percent fed funds rates from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004 by seventeen consecutive increases of 25 percentage points from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006 to reach 5.25 percent caused default of subprime mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages linked to the overnight fed funds rate. The zero interest rate has penalized liquidity and increased risks by inducing carry trades from zero interest rates to speculative positions in risk financial assets. There is no exit from zero interest rates without provoking another financial crash.
Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE→∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE→∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at around 1.8 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that US economic growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 16 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_adv.pdf http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0613.pdf) and the second estimate of GDP for IIQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html). As a result, there are 28.3 million unemployed or underemployed in the United States for an effective unemployment rate of 17.4 percent (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html).Zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not provided the impulse for growth and were not required in past successful cyclical expansions.
First, total nonfarm payroll employment seasonally adjusted (SA) increased 169,000 in Aug 2013 and private payroll employment rose 152,000. The average number of nonfarm jobs created in Jan-Aug 2012 was 178,625 while the average number of private jobs created in Jan-Aug 2013 was 180,250, or increase by 0.9 percent. The average number of private jobs created in the US in Jan-Aug 2012 was 181,750 while the average in Jan-Aug 2013 was 185,625, or increase by 2.1 percent. The US labor force increased from 153.617 million in 2011 to 154.975 million in 2012 by 1.358 million or 113,167 per month. The average increase of nonfarm jobs in the eight months from Jan to Aug 2013 was 178,625, which is a rate of job creation inadequate to reduce significantly unemployment and underemployment in the United States because of 113,167 new entrants in the labor force per month with 28.3 million unemployed or underemployed. The difference between the average increase of 178,625 new private nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Jan to Aug 2013 and the 113,167 average monthly increase in the labor force from 2011 to 2012 is 65,458 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 28.3 million in job stress in the US currently. Creation of 65,458 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 433 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (28.348 million divided by 65,458) or 36 years (433 divided by 12). The civilian labor force of the US in Aug 2013 not seasonally adjusted stood at 155.971 million with 11.462 million unemployed or effectively 18.316 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them for effective labor force of 162.825 million. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 1.3 years (1 million divided by product of 65,458 by 12, which is 785,496). Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.799 million (0.05 times labor force of 155.971 million) for new net job creation of 3.663 million (11.462 million unemployed minus 7.799 million unemployed at rate of 5 percent) that at the current rate would take 4.7 years (3.663 million divided by 0.785496). Under the calculation in this blog, there are 18.316 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them and effective labor force of 162.825 million. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 9.586 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 12.9 years (18.316 million minus 0.05(162.825 million) = 10.175 million divided by 0.785596, using LF PART 66.2% and Total UEM in Table I-4). These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply. The number employed in the US fell from 147.315 million in Jul 2007 to 144.509 million in Aug 2013, by 2.806 million, or decline of 1.9 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional or economically active population increased from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 245.959 million in Aug 2013, by 14.001 million or increase of 6.0 percent, using not seasonally adjusted data. There is actually not sufficient job creation in merely absorbing new entrants in the labor force because of those dropping from job searches, worsening the stock of unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs. The United States economy has grown at the average yearly rate of 3 percent per year and 2 percent per year in per capita terms from 1870 to 2010, as measured by Lucas (2011May). An important characteristic of the economic cycle in the US has been rapid growth in the initial phase of expansion after recessions. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.
Second, revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_adv.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_2nd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0713.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0813.pdf http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0613.pdf) provide important information on long-term growth and cyclical behavior. Table Summary provides relevant data.
- Long-term. US GDP grew at the average yearly rate of 3.3 percent from 1929 to 2012 and at 3.2 percent from 1947 to 2012. There were periodic contractions or recessions in this period but the economy grew at faster rates in the subsequent expansions, maintaining long-term economic growth at trend.
- Cycles. The combined contraction of GDP in the two almost consecutive recessions in the early 1980s is 4.7 percent. The contraction of US GDP from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 during the global recession was 4.3 percent. The critical difference in the expansion is growth at average 7.8 percent in annual equivalent in the first four quarters of recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The average rate of growth of GDP in four cyclical expansions in the postwar period is 7.7 percent. In contrast, the rate of growth in the first four quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 was only 2.7 percent. Average annual equivalent growth in the expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was 5.7 percent. In contrast, average annual equivalent growth in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 was only 2.7 percent. The US appears to have lost its dynamism of income growth and employment creation.
Table Summary, Long-term and Cyclical Growth of GDP, Real Disposable Income and Real Disposable Income per Capita
| GDP | ||
| Long-Term | ||
| 1929-2012 | 3.3 | |
| 1947-2012 | 3.2 | |
| Cyclical Contractions ∆% | ||
| IQ1980 to IIIQ1980, IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | -4.7 | |
| IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | -4.3 | |
| Cyclical Expansions Average Annual Equivalent ∆% | ||
| IQ1983 to IQ1986 | 5.7 | |
| First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983 | 7.8 | |
| IIIQ2009 to IIQ2013 | 2.2 | |
| First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 | 2.7 | |
| Real Disposable Income | Real Disposable Income per Capita | |
| Long-Term | ||
| 1929-2012 | 3.2 | 2.0 |
| 1947-1999 | 3.7 | 2.3 |
| Whole Cycles | ||
| 1980-1989 | 3.5 | 2.6 |
| 2006-2012 | 1.4 | 0.6 |
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0813.pdf
The revisions and enhancements of United States GDP and personal income accounts by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_adv.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_2nd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0713.pdf http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0813.pdf http://bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2013/pdf/pi0613.pdf) also provide critical information in assessing the current rhythm of US economic growth. The economy appears to be moving at a pace from 1.8 to 1.9 percent per year. Table Summary GDP provides the data.
3. Average Annual Growth in the Past Six Quarters. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and the first two quarters of 2013 accumulated to 2.9 percent. This growth is equivalent to 1.9 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IIQ2013 of $15,679.7 by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,242.1 and compounding by 4/6: {[($15,679.7/$15,242.1)4/6 -1]100 = 1.9.
4. Average Annual Growth in the First Two Quarters of 2013. GDP growth in the first two quarters of 2013 accumulated to 0.9 percent that is equivalent to 1.8 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IIQ2013 of $15,679.7 by GDP in IVQ2012 of $15,539.6 and compounding by 4/2: {[($15,679.7/$15,539.6)4/2 -1]100 =1.8%}. The US economy grew 1.6 percent in IIQ2013 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IIQ2012. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is just at the borderline of contraction.
Table Summary GDP, US, Real GDP and Percentage Change Relative to IVQ2007 and Prior Quarter, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars and ∆%
| Real GDP, Billions Chained 2005 Dollars | ∆% Relative to IVQ2007 | ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter | ∆% | |
| IVQ2007 | 14,996.1 | NA | NA | 1.9 |
| IVQ2011 | 15,242.1 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| IQ2012 | 15,381.6 | 2.6 | 0.9 | 3.3 |
| IIQ2012 | 15,427.7 | 2.9 | 0.3 | 2.8 |
| IIIQ2012 | 15,534.0 | 3.6 | 0.7 | 3.1 |
| IVQ2012 | 15,539.6 | 3.6 | 0.0 | 2.0 |
| IQ2013 | 15,583.9 | 3.9 | 0.3 | 1.3 |
| IIQ2013 | 15,679.7 | 4.6 | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| Cumulative ∆% IQ2012 to IIQ2013 | 2.9 | 2.8 | ||
| Annual Equivalent ∆% | 1.9 | 1.9 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2013/pdf/gdp2q13_3rd.pdf
In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation, QE→∞ cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.
The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec 12, 2012, revealed policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm) practically unchanged in the statement at the conclusion of its meeting on Jan 30, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130130a.htm) and at its meeting on Sep 18, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm):
“Press Release
Release Date: September 18, 2013
For immediate release
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in July suggests that economic activity has been expanding at a moderate pace. Some indicators of labor market conditions have shown further improvement in recent months, but the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has been strengthening, but mortgage rates have risen further and fiscal policy is restraining economic growth. Apart from fluctuations due to changes in energy prices, inflation has been running below the Committee's longer-run objective, but longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects that, with appropriate policy accommodation, economic growth will pick up from its recent pace and the unemployment rate will gradually decline toward levels the Committee judges consistent with its dual mandate. The Committee sees the downside risks to the outlook for the economy and the labor market as having diminished, on net, since last fall, but the tightening of financial conditions observed in recent months, if sustained, could slow the pace of improvement in the economy and labor market. The Committee recognizes that inflation persistently below its 2 percent objective could pose risks to economic performance, but it anticipates that inflation will move back toward its objective over the medium term.
Taking into account the extent of federal fiscal retrenchment, the Committee sees the improvement in economic activity and labor market conditions since it began its asset purchase program a year ago as consistent with growing underlying strength in the broader economy. However, the Committee decided to await more evidence that progress will be sustained before adjusting the pace of its purchases. Accordingly, the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these actions should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative, which in turn should promote a stronger economic recovery and help to ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with the Committee's dual mandate.
The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months and will continue its purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until the outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability. In judging when to moderate the pace of asset purchases, the Committee will, at its coming meetings, assess whether incoming information continues to support the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective. Asset purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on the Committee's economic outlook as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.
To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; James Bullard; Charles L. Evans; Jerome H. Powell; Eric S. Rosengren; Jeremy C. Stein; Daniel K. Tarullo; and Janet L. Yellen. Voting against the action was Esther L. George, who was concerned that the continued high level of monetary accommodation increased the risks of future economic and financial imbalances and, over time, could cause an increase in long-term inflation expectations.”
There are several important issues in this statement.
- Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):
“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”
- Open-ended Quantitative Easing or QE∞. Earlier programs are continued with an additional open-ended $85 billion of bond purchases per month: “However, the Committee decided to await more evidence that progress will be sustained before adjusting the pace of its purchases. Accordingly, the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these actions should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative, which in turn should promote a stronger economic recovery and help to ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with the Committee's dual mandate.”
- Advance Guidance on “6 ¼ 2 ½ “Rule. Policy will be accommodative even after the economy recovers satisfactorily: “To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”
- Monitoring and Policy Focus on Jobs. The FOMC reconsiders its policy continuously in accordance with available information: “In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.”
- No Present Course of Asset Purchases. Market participants focused on slightly different wording about asset purchases: “In judging when to moderate the pace of asset purchases, the Committee will, at its coming meetings, assess whether incoming information continues to support the Committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in labor market conditions and inflation moving back toward its longer-run objective. Asset purchases are not on a preset course, and the Committee's decisions about their pace will remain contingent on the Committee's economic outlook as well as its assessment of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.”
- Concern with Mortgage Rates. “Household spending and business fixed investment advanced, and the housing sector has been strengthening, but mortgage rates have risen further and fiscal policy is restraining economic growth.”
Current focus is on tapering quantitative easing by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). There is sharp distinction between the two measures of unconventional monetary policy: (1) fixing of the overnight rate of fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent; and (2) outright purchase of Treasury and agency securities and mortgage-backed securities for the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve. Market are overreacting to the so-called “paring” of outright purchases of $85 billion of securities per month for the balance sheet of the Fed. What is truly important is the fixing of the overnight fed funds at 0 to ¼ percent for which there is no end in sight as evident in the FOMC statement for Sep 18, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm):
“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee today reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored” (emphasis added).
There is a critical phrase in the statement of Sep 19, 2013 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130918a.htm): “but mortgage rates have risen further.” Did the increase of mortgage rates influence the decision of the FOMC not to taper? Is FOMC “communication” and “guidance” successful?
In delivering the biannual report on monetary policy (Board of Governors 2013Jul17), Chairman Bernanke (2013Jul17) advised Congress that:
“Instead, we are providing additional policy accommodation through two distinct yet complementary policy tools. The first tool is expanding the Federal Reserve's portfolio of longer-term Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS); we are currently purchasing $40 billion per month in agency MBS and $45 billion per month in Treasuries. We are using asset purchases and the resulting expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet primarily to increase the near-term momentum of the economy, with the specific goal of achieving a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. We have made some progress toward this goal, and, with inflation subdued, we intend to continue our purchases until a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook has been realized. We are relying on near-zero short-term interest rates, together with our forward guidance that rates will continue to be exceptionally low--our second tool--to help maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation for an extended period after asset purchases end, even as the economic recovery strengthens and unemployment declines toward more-normal levels. In appropriate combination, these two tools can provide the high level of policy accommodation needed to promote a stronger economic recovery with price stability.
The Committee's decisions regarding the asset purchase program (and the overall stance of monetary policy) depend on our assessment of the economic outlook and of the cumulative progress toward our objectives. Of course, economic forecasts must be revised when new information arrives and are thus necessarily provisional.”
Friedman (1953) argues there are three lags in effects of monetary policy: (1) between the need for action and recognition of the need; (2) the recognition of the need and taking of actions; and (3) taking of action and actual effects. Friedman (1953) finds that the combination of these lags with insufficient knowledge of the current and future behavior of the economy causes discretionary economic policy to increase instability of the economy or standard deviations of real income σy and prices σp. Policy attempts to circumvent the lags by policy impulses based on forecasts. We are all naïve about forecasting. Data are available with lags and revised to maintain high standards of estimation. Policy simulation models estimate economic relations with structures prevailing before simulations of policy impulses such that parameters change as discovered by Lucas (1977). Economic agents adjust their behavior in ways that cause opposite results from those intended by optimal control policy as discovered by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Advance guidance attempts to circumvent expectations by economic agents that could reverse policy impulses but is of dubious effectiveness. There is strong case for using rules instead of discretionary authorities in monetary policy (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/search?q=rules+versus+authorities).
The key policy is maintaining fed funds rate between 0 and ¼ percent. An increase in fed funds rates could cause flight out of risk financial markets worldwide. There is no exit from this policy without major financial market repercussions. Indefinite financial repression induces carry trades with high leverage, risks and illiquidity.
Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness.
Table IV-2 provides economic projections of governors of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and regional presidents of Federal Reserve Banks released at the meeting of Mar 20, 2013. The Fed releases the data with careful explanations (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf). Columns “∆% GDP,” “∆% PCE Inflation” and “∆% Core PCE Inflation” are changes “from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated.” The GDP report for IIQ2013 is analyzed in Section I (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html) and the PCE inflation data from the report on personal income and outlays in Section IV (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html). The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides the third estimate of IIQ2013 GDP released on Aug Sep 26 with revisions since 1929 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). PCE inflation is the index of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) of the report of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on “Personal Income and Outlays” (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm), which is analyzed in Section IV (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html
http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/tapering-quantitative-easing-policy-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/mediocre-united-states-economic-growth.html). The report on “Personal Income and Outlays” for Jul was released at 8:30 AM on Aug 27, 2013 and the report for Jul 2013 was released on
Aug 30, 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/increasing-interest-rate-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm) and the report for Aug 2012 was released on. PCE core inflation consists of PCE inflation excluding food and energy. Column “UNEMP %” is the rate of unemployment measured as the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the Employment Situation Report with the civilian unemployment rate in the first Friday of every month, which is analyzed in this blog. The report for Jul 2013 was released on Aug 2 and analyzed in this blog and the report for Aug 2013 was released on Sep 6, 2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html
and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/08/risks-of-steepening-yield-curve-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html). “Longer term projections represent each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf).
It is instructive to focus on 2013 as 2014 because 2015, 2016 and longer term are too far away, and there is not much information even on what will happen in 2013-2014 and beyond. The central tendency should provide reasonable approximation of the view of the majority of members of the FOMC but the second block of numbers provides the range of projections by FOMC participants. The first row for each year shows the projection introduced after the meeting of Sep 18, 2013 and the second row “PR” the projection of the Jun 19, 2013 meeting. There are three major changes in the view.
1. Growth “∆% GDP.” The FOMC has reduced the forecast of GDP growth in 2013 from 2.3 to 2.6 percent at the meeting in Jun 2013 to 2.0 to 2.3 percent at the meeting on Sep 18, 2013. The FOMC decreased GDP growth in 2014 from 3.0 to 3.5 percent at the meeting in Jun 2013 to 2.9 to 3.1 percent at the meeting in Sep 2013.
2. Rate of Unemployment “UNEM%.” The FOMC reduced the forecast of the rate of unemployment from 7.2 to 7.3 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2013 to 7.1 to 7.3 percent at the meeting on Sep 18, 2013. The projection for 2014 decreased to the range of 6.4 to 6.8 in Sep 2013 from 6.5 to 6.8 in Jun 2013. Projections of the rate of unemployment are moving closer to the desire 6.5 percent or lower with 5.9 to 6.2 percent in 2015 after the meeting on Sep 18, 2013.
3. Inflation “∆% PCE Inflation.” The FOMC changed the forecast of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation from 0.8 to 1.2 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2012 to 1.1 to 1.2 percent at the meeting on Sep 18, 2013. There are no projections exceeding 2.0 percent in the central tendency but some in the range reach 2.3 percent in 2015 and 2015. The longer run projection is at 2.0 percent.
4. Core Inflation “∆% Core PCE Inflation.” Core inflation is PCE inflation excluding food and energy. There is again not much of a difference of the projection, changing from 1.2 to 1.3 percent at the meeting on Jun 19, 2013 to 1.2 to 1.3 percent at the meeting Sep 13, 2013. In 2014, there is minor change in the projection from 1.5 to 1.8 percent in Jun 19, 2013 to 1.5 to 1.7 percent in Sep 18, 2013. The rate of change of the core PCE is below 2.0 percent in the central tendency with 2.3 percent at the top of the range in 2015 and 2016.
Table IV-2, US, Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in FOMC, Mar 2013 and Jun 19, 2013
| ∆% GDP | UNEM % | ∆% PCE Inflation | ∆% Core PCE Inflation | |
| Central | ||||
| 2013 | 2.0 to 2.3 | 7.1 to 7.3 | 1.1 to 1.2 | 1.2 to 1.3 1.2 to 1.3 |
| 2014 | 2.9 to 3.1 | 6.4 to 6.8 | 1.3 to 1.8 | 1.5 to 1.7 |
| 2015 Jun PR | 3.0 to 3.5 2.9 to 3.6 | 5.9 to 6.2 5.8 to 6.2 | 1.6 to 2.0 1.7 to 2.0 | 1.7 to 2.0 1.7 to 2.0 |
| 2016 Jun PR | 2.5 to 3.3 NA | 5.4 to 5.9 NA | 1.7 to 2.0 NA | 1.9 to 2.0 NA |
| Longer Run Jun PR | 2.2 to 2.5 2.3 to 2.5 | 5.2 to 5.8 5.2 to 6.0 | 2.0 2.0 | |
| Range | ||||
| 2013 | 1.8 to 2.4 | 6.9 to 7.3 | 1.0 to 1.3 | 1.2 to 1.4 |
| 2014 | 2.2 to 3.3 | 6.2 to 6.9 | 1.2 to 2.0 | 1.4 to 2.0 |
| 2015 Jun PR | 2.2 to 3.7 2.3 to 3.8 | 5.3 to 6.3 5.7 to 6.4 | 1.4 to 2.3 1.6 to 2.3 | 1.6 to 2.3 1.7 to 2.3 |
| 2016 Jun PR | 2.2 to 3.5 NA | 5.2 to 6.0 NA | 1.5 to 2.3 NA | 1.7 to 2.3 NA |
| Longer Run Jun PR | 2.1 to 2.5 2.0 to 3.0 | 5.2 to 6.0 5.0 to 6.0 | 2.0 2.0 |
Notes: UEM: unemployment; PR: Projection
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130918.pdf
Another important decision at the FOMC meeting on Jan 25, 2012, is formal specification of the goal of inflation of 2 percent per year but without specific goal for unemployment (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm):
“Following careful deliberations at its recent meetings, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reached broad agreement on the following principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. The Committee intends to reaffirm these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January.
The FOMC is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decision making by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.
Inflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee's policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals.
The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.
The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the corresponding interval several years earlier.
In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary. However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. ”
The probable intention of this specific inflation goal is to “anchor” inflationary expectations. Massive doses of monetary policy of promoting growth to reduce unemployment could conflict with inflation control. Economic agents could incorporate inflationary expectations in their decisions. As a result, the rate of unemployment could remain the same but with much higher rate of inflation (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html See Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 99-116). Strong commitment to maintaining inflation at 2 percent could control expectations of inflation.
The FOMC continues its efforts of increasing transparency that can improve the credibility of its firmness in implementing its dual mandate. Table IV-3 provides the views by participants of the FOMC of the levels at which they expect the fed funds rate in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and the in the longer term. Table IV-3 is inferred from a chart provided by the FOMC with the number of participants expecting the target of fed funds rate (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130320.pdf). There are 17 participants expecting the rate to remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2013. The rate would still remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2014 for 13 participants with three expecting the rate to be in the range of 0.5 to 1.0 percent and one participant expecting rates at 1.0 to 1.5 percent. This table is consistent with the guidance statement of the FOMC that rates will remain at low levels. For 2015, eight participants expect rates to be below or at 1.0 percent while six expect rates from 1.0 to 1.5 percent and three expecting rates in excess of 2.0 percent. For 2016, nine participants expect rates between 1.0 and 2.0 percent, four between 2.0 and 3.0 percent and three between 3.0 and 4.4 percent. In the long term, all 17 participants expect the fed funds rate in the range of 3.0 to 4.5 percent.
Table IV-3, US, Views of Target Federal Funds Rate at Year-End of Federal Reserve Board
Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, Jun 19, 2013
| 0 to 0.25 | 0.5 to 1.0 | 1.0 to 1.5 | 1.0 to 2.0 | 2.0 to 3.0 | 3.0 to 4.5 | |
| 2013 | 17 | |||||
| 2014 | 13 | 3 | 1 | |||
| 2015 | 8 | 6 | 3 | |||
| 2016 | 1 | 9 | 4 | 3 | ||
| Longer Run | 17 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130918.pdf
Additional information is provided in Table IV-4 with the number of participants expecting increasing interest rates in the years from 2013 to 2016. It is evident from Table IV-4 that the prevailing view of the FOMC is for interest rates to continue at low levels in future years. This view is consistent with the economic projections of low economic growth, relatively high unemployment and subdued inflation provided in Table IV-2. The FOMC states that rates will continue to be low even after return of the economy to potential growth.
Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal
Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, June 19, 2013
| Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Fed Funds Rate | Number of Participants |
| 2014 | 3 |
| 2015 | 12 |
| 2016 | 2 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20130918.pdf
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
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