Exchange Rate and Financial Asset Turbulence, Recovery without Hiring, Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs, Rules, Discretionary Authorities and Slow Productivity Growth, United States Industrial Production, Youth and Middle Age Unemployment, United States Producer Prices, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk
Carlos M. Pelaez
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015
I Recovery without Hiring
IA1 Hiring Collapse
IA2 Labor Underutilization
ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs
IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and
Middle-Age Unemployment
IIA Rules, Discretionary Authorities and Slow Productivity Growth
IIB United States Industrial Production
IIC United States Producer Prices
III World Financial Turbulence
IIIA Financial Risks
IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk
IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation
IV Global Inflation
V World Economic Slowdown
VA United States
VB Japan
VC China
VD Euro Area
VE Germany
VF France
VG Italy
VH United Kingdom
VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets
VII Economic Indicators
VIII Interest Rates
IX Conclusion
References
Appendixes
Appendix I The Great Inflation
IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies
IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact
IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort
IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis
IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth
IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s
I Recovery without Hiring. Professor Edward P. Lazear (2012Jan19) at Stanford University finds that recovery of hiring in the US to peaks attained in 2007 requires an increase of hiring by 30 percent while hiring levels increased by only 4 percent from Jan 2009 to Jan 2012. The high level of unemployment with low level of hiring reduces the statistical probability that the unemployed will find a job. According to Lazear (2012Jan19), the probability of finding a new job in early 2012 is about one third of the probability of finding a job in 2007. Improvements in labor markets have not increased the probability of finding a new job. Lazear (2012Jan19) quotes an essay coauthored with James R. Spletzer in the American Economic Review (Lazear and Spletzer 2012Mar, 2012May) on the concept of churn. A dynamic labor market occurs when a similar amount of workers is hired as those who are separated. This replacement of separated workers is called churn, which explains about two-thirds of total hiring. Typically, wage increases received in a new job are higher by 8 percent. Lazear (2012Jan19) argues that churn has declined 35 percent from the level before the recession in IVQ2007. Because of the collapse of churn, there are no opportunities in escaping falling real wages by moving to another job. As this blog argues, there are meager chances of escaping unemployment because of the collapse of hiring and those employed cannot escape falling real wages by moving to another job (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html). Lazear and Spletzer (2012Mar, 1) argue that reductions of churn reduce the operational effectiveness of labor markets. Churn is part of the allocation of resources or in this case labor to occupations of higher marginal returns. The decline in churn can harm static and dynamic economic efficiency. Losses from decline of churn during recessions can affect an economy over the long-term by preventing optimal growth trajectories because resources are not used in the occupations where they provide highest marginal returns. Lazear and Spletzer (2012Mar 7-8) conclude that: “under a number of assumptions, we estimate that the loss in output during the recession [of 2007 to 2009] and its aftermath resulting from reduced churn equaled $208 billion. On an annual basis, this amounts to about .4% of GDP for a period of 3½ years.”
There are two additional facts discussed below: (1) there are about ten million fewer full-time jobs currently than before the recession of 2008 and 2009; and (2) the extremely high and rigid rate of youth unemployment is denying an early start to young people ages 16 to 24 years while unemployment of ages 45 years or over has swelled. There are four subsections. IA1 Hiring Collapse provides the data and analysis on the weakness of hiring in the United States economy. IA2 Labor Underutilization provides the measures of labor underutilization of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Statistics on the decline of full-time employment are in IA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment provides the data on high unemployment of ages 16 to 24 years and of ages 45 years or over.
IA1 Hiring Collapse. An important characteristic of the current fractured labor market of the US is the closing of the avenue for exiting unemployment and underemployment normally available through dynamic hiring. Another avenue that is closed is the opportunity for advancement in moving to new jobs that pay better salaries and benefits again because of the collapse of hiring in the United States. Those who are unemployed or underemployed cannot find a new job even accepting lower wages and no benefits. The employed cannot escape declining inflation-adjusted earnings because there is no hiring. The objective of this section is to analyze hiring and labor underutilization in the United States.
Blanchard and Katz (1997, 53 consider an appropriate measure of job stress:
“The right measure of the state of the labor market is the exit rate from unemployment, defined as the number of hires divided by the number unemployed, rather than the unemployment rate itself. What matters to the unemployed is not how many of them there are, but how many of them there are in relation to the number of hires by firms.”
The natural rate of unemployment and the similar NAIRU are quite difficult to estimate in practice (Ibid; see Ball and Mankiw 2002).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) created the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) with the purpose that (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/jltover.htm#purpose):
“These data serve as demand-side indicators of labor shortages at the national level. Prior to JOLTS, there was no economic indicator of the unmet demand for labor with which to assess the presence or extent of labor shortages in the United States. The availability of unfilled jobs—the jobs opening rate—is an important measure of tightness of job markets, parallel to existing measures of unemployment.”
The BLS collects data from about 16,000 US business establishments in nonagricultural industries through the 50 states and DC. The data are released monthly and constitute an important complement to other data provided by the BLS (see also Lazear and Spletzer 2012Mar, 6-7).
There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:
- Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP two trillion dollars below trend (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.3 percent per year from 1929 to 2014 with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions but only at 1.1 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2014. GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent
- Private fixed investment stagnating at increase of 4.7 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html)
- Twenty five million or 14.8 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with stagnating or declining real wages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
- Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)
- Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
- Productivity growth fell from 2.2 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2014 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2014, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (Section II and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)
- Output of manufacturing in Jul 2015 at 24.0 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 18.2 percent below trend since 1986 (Section II and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)
- Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Worldwide waves of inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
- Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)
- Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
- 45 million in poverty and 41 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1995 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 13.2 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2015 when it would have grown over 24.8 percent at trend of 3.1 percent per year in real terms from 1945 to 2014 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html). Financial assets increased $16.4 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $1.5 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation fell 8.1 percent from 2007 to IQ2015
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised on Mar 10, 2015 “Effective with this release, revisions to data from January 2010 forward incorporate annual updates to| the Current Employment Statistics employment estimates and the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey seasonal adjustment factors.” (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/). Hiring in the nonfarm sector (HNF) has declined from 63.327 million in 2006 to 58.657 million in 2014 or by 4.670 million while hiring in the private sector (HP) has declined from 59.128 million in 2006 to 55.048 million in 2014 or by 4.080 million, as shown in Table I-1. The ratio of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) has fallen from 47.0 in 2005 to 42.2 in 2014 and in the private sector (RHP) from 52.7 in 2005 to 47.0 in 2014. Hiring has not recovered as in previous cyclical expansions because of the low rate of economic growth in the current cyclical expansion. The civilian noninstitutional population or those in condition to work increased from 228.815 million in 2006 to 247.947 million in 2014 or by 19.132 million. Hiring has not recovered precession levels while needs of hiring multiplied because of growth of population by more than 19 million. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 24 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2015. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2015/pdf/gdp2q15_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates ( and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 would have accumulated to 24.8 percent. GDP in IIQ2015 would be $18,712.5 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,442.1 billion than actual $16,270.4 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.8 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html). US GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,270.4 billion in IIQ2015 or 8.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2015. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 136.6407 in Jul 2015. The actual index NSA in Jul 2015 is 103.7999, which is 24.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 126.9147 in Jul 2015. The output of manufacturing at 103.7999 in Jul 2015 is 18.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-1, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in Thousands and Percentage of Total Employment
HNF | Rate RNF | HP | Rate HP | |
2001 | 62,633 | 47.4 | 58,501 | 52.7 |
2002 | 58,479 | 44.8 | 54,665 | 50.1 |
2003 | 56,949 | 43.7 | 53,584 | 49.3 |
2004 | 60,263 | 45.7 | 56,573 | 51.4 |
2005 | 62,951 | 47.0 | 59,179 | 52.7 |
2006 | 63,327 | 46.4 | 59,128 | 51.7 |
2007 | 62,104 | 45.0 | 57,797 | 49.9 |
2008 | 54,745 | 39.9 | 51,316 | 44.8 |
2009 | 45,931 | 35.0 | 42,703 | 39.3 |
2010 | 48,740 | 37.4 | 44,903 | 41.7 |
2011 | 50,283 | 38.1 | 47,179 | 43.0 |
2012 | 52,367 | 39.0 | 48,916 | 43.6 |
2013 | 54,241 | 39.8 | 50,787 | 44.3 |
2014 | 58,657 | 42.2 | 55,048 | 47.0 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-1 shows the annual level of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) that collapsed during the global recession after 2007 in contrast with milder decline in the shallow recession of 2001. Nonfarm hiring has not recovered, remaining at a depressed level. The civilian noninstitutional population or those in condition to work increased from 228.815 million in 2006 to 247.947 million in 2014 or by 19.132 million. Hiring has not recovered precession levels while needs of hiring multiplied because of growth of population by more than 19 million.
Chart I-1, US, Level Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-2 shows the ratio or rate of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) that also fell much more in the recession of 2007 to 2009 than in the shallow recession of 2001. Recovery is weak in the current environment of cyclical slow growth.
Chart I-2, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Yearly percentage changes of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) are provided in Table I-2. There were much milder declines in 2002 of 6.6 percent and 2.6 percent in 2003 followed by strong rebounds of 5.8 percent in 2004 and 4.5 percent in 2005. In contrast, the contractions of nonfarm hiring in the recession after 2007 were much sharper in percentage points: 1.9 in 2007, 11.8 in 2008 and 16.1 percent in 2009. On a yearly basis, nonfarm hiring grew 6.1 percent in 2010 relative to 2009, 3.2 percent in 2011, 4.1 percent in 2012 and 3.6 percent in 2013. Nonfarm hiring grew 8.1 percent in 2014. The relatively large length of 24 quarters of the current expansion reduces the likelihood of significant recovery of hiring levels in the United States because lower rates of growth and hiring in the final phase of expansions.
Table I-2, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual Percentage Change, 2002-2014
Year | Annual ∆% |
2002 | -6.6 |
2003 | -2.6 |
2004 | 5.8 |
2005 | 4.5 |
2006 | 0.6 |
2007 | -1.9 |
2008 | -11.8 |
2009 | -16.1 |
2010 | 6.1 |
2011 | 3.2 |
2012 | 4.1 |
2013 | 3.6 |
2014 | 8.1 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total private hiring (HP) 12-month percentage changes of annual data are provided in Chart I-4. There has been sharp contraction of total private hiring in the US and only milder recovery from 2010 to 2014.
Chart I-4, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring Level, Annual, ∆%, 2001-2014
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-5 plots the rate of total private hiring relative to employment (RHP). The rate collapsed during the global recession after 2007 with insufficient recovery.
Chart I-5, US, Total Private Hiring, Annual, 2001-2014
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-5A plots the rate of total private hiring relative to employment (RHP). The rate collapsed during the global recession after 2007 with insufficient recovery.
Chart I-5A, US, Rate Total Private Hiring Level, Annual, 2001-2014
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total nonfarm hiring (HNF), total private hiring (HP) and their respective rates are provided for the month of May in the years from 2001 to 2015 in Table I-3. Hiring numbers are in thousands. There is recovery in HNF from 4264 thousand (or 4.3 million) in Jun 2009 to 4703 thousand in 2010, 4962 thousand in Jun 2011, 5013 thousand in Jun 2012, 5079 thousand in Jun 2013, 5510 thousand in Jun 2014 and 5939 thousand in Jun 2015 for cumulative gain of 39.3 percent at average rate of 5.7 percent per year. HP rose from 3925 thousand in Jun 2009 to 4332 thousand in Jun 2010, 4601 thousand in Jun 2011, 4626 thousand in Jun 2012, 4738 thousand in Jun 2013, 5110 thousand in Jun 2014 and 5501 thousand in Jun 2015 for cumulative gain of 40.2 percent at the average yearly rate of 5.8 percent. HNF has fallen from 6045 thousand in Jun 2006 to 5939 thousand in Jun 2015 or by 1.8 percent. HP has fallen from 5567 thousand in Jun 2006 to 5501 thousand in Jun 2015 or by 1.2 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working, rose from 228.671 million in Jun 2006 to 250.663 million in Jun 2015, by 21.992 million or 9.6 percent. There is often ignored ugly fact that hiring fell by around 1.2 percent while population available for working increased around 9.6 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or individuals in condition to work, rose from 228.815 million in 2006 to 247.947 million in 2014 or by 19.132 million and the civilian labor force from 151.428 million in 2006 to 155.922 million in 2014 or by 4.494 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The number of nonfarm hires in the US fell from 63.327 million in 2006 to 58.657 million in 2014 or by 4.670 million and the number of private hires fell from 59.128 million in 2006 to 55.048 million in 2014 or by 4.080 million (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/). Private hiring of 59.128 million in 2006 was equivalent to 25.8 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, falling to 55.048 million in 2014 or 22.2 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 247.947 million in 2014. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 25.8 percent in 2006 would correspond to 63.970 million of hiring in 2014, which would be 8.922 million higher than actual 55.048 million in 2014. Cyclical slow growth over the entire business cycle from IVQ2007 to the present in comparison with earlier cycles and long-term trend (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html) explains the fact that there are many million fewer hires in the US than before the global recession. The labor market continues to be fractured, failing to provide an opportunity to exit from unemployment/underemployment or to find an opportunity for advancement away from declining inflation-adjusted earnings.
Table I-3, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in
Thousands and in Percentage of Total Employment Not Seasonally Adjusted
HNF | Rate RNF | HP | Rate HP | |
2001 Jun | 5762 | 4.3 | 5274 | 4.7 |
2002 Jun | 5468 | 4.2 | 5052 | 4.6 |
2003 Jun | 5440 | 4.1 | 5039 | 4.6 |
2004 Jun | 5678 | 4.3 | 5289 | 4.8 |
2005 Jun | 6069 | 4.5 | 5675 | 5.0 |
2006 Jun | 6045 | 4.4 | 5567 | 4.8 |
2007 Jun | 5992 | 4.3 | 5509 | 4.7 |
2008 Jun | 5513 | 4.0 | 5109 | 4.4 |
2009 Jun | 4264 | 3.2 | 3925 | 3.6 |
2010 Jun | 4703 | 3.6 | 4332 | 4.0 |
2011 Jun | 4962 | 3.7 | 4601 | 4.2 |
2012 Jun | 5013 | 3.7 | 4626 | 4.1 |
2013 Jun | 5079 | 3.7 | 4738 | 4.1 |
2014 Jun | 5510 | 3.9 | 5110 | 4.3 |
2015 Jun | 5939 | 4.2 | 5501 | 4.5 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-6 provides total nonfarm hiring on a monthly basis from 2001 to 2015. Nonfarm hiring rebounded in early 2010 but then fell and stabilized at a lower level than the early peak not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) of 4830 in May 2010 until it surpassed it with 4962 in Jun 2011 but declined to 3114 in Dec 2012. Nonfarm hiring fell to 3025 in Dec 2011 from 3809 in Nov 2011 and to revised 3626 in Feb 2012, increasing to 4195 in Mar 2012, 3114 in Dec 2012 and 4232 in Jan 2013 and declining to 3828 in Feb 2014. Nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted increased to 4273 in Nov 2013 and 3263 in Dec 2013. Nonfarm hires reached 3750 in Dec 2014 and 5939 in Jun 2015. Chart I-6 provides seasonally adjusted (SA) monthly data. The number of seasonally-adjusted hires in Oct 2011 was 4217 thousand, increasing to revised 4451 thousand in Feb 2012, or 5.5 percent, moving to 4361 in Dec 2012 for cumulative increase of 2.5 percent from 4254 in Dec 2011 and 4545 in Dec 2013 for increase of 4.2 percent relative to 4361 in Dec 2012. The number of hires not seasonally adjusted was 4962 in Jun 2011, falling to 3025 in Dec 2011 but increasing to 4135 in Jan 2012 and declining to 3114 in Dec 2012. The number of nonfarm hiring not seasonally adjusted fell by 39.0 percent from 4962 in Jun 2011 to 3025 in Dec 2011 and fell 37.9 percent from 5013 in Jun 2012 to 3114 in Dec 2012 in a yearly-repeated seasonal pattern. The number of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5079 in Jun 2013 to 3263 in Dec 2013, or decline of 35.8 percent, showing strong seasonality. The number of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5459 in Jul 2014 to 3750 in Dec 2014 or 31.3 percent.
Chart I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), 2001-2015 Month SA
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Similar behavior occurs in the rate of nonfarm hiring in Chart I-7. Recovery in early 2010 was followed by decline and stabilization at a lower level but with stability in monthly SA estimates of 3.2 in Aug 2011 to 3.2 in Jan 2012, increasing to 3.3 in May 2012 and falling to 3.2 in Jun 2012. The rate stabilized at 3.2 in Jul 2012, increasing to 3.3 in Aug 2012 but falling to 3.2 in Dec 2012 and 3.3 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Jun 2011 to 2.3 in Dec 2011, climbing to 3.7 in Jun 2012 but falling to 2.3 in Dec 2012. The rate of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Jun 2013 to 2.4 in Dec 2013. The NSA rate of nonfarm hiring fell from 3.9 in Jun 2014 to 2.7 in Dec 2014. Rates of nonfarm hiring NSA were in the range of 2.7 (Dec) to 4.4 (Jun) in 2006. The rate of nonfarm hiring SA stood at 3.7 in Jun 2015 and at 4.2 NSA.
Chart I-7, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring, Month SA 2001-2015
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
There is only milder improvement in total private hiring shown in Chart I-8. Hiring private (HP) rose in 2010 with stability and renewed increase in 2011 followed by almost stationary series in 2012. The number of private hiring seasonally adjusted fell from 4056 thousand in Sep 2011 to 3961 in Dec 2011 or by 2.3 percent, decreasing to 4018 in Jan 2012 or decline by 0.9 percent relative to the level in Sep 2011. Private hiring fell to 3947 in Sep 2012 or lower by 2.7 percent relative to Sep 2011, moving to 4073 in Dec 2012 for increase of 1.4 percent relative to 4018 in Jan 2012. The number of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 4601 in Jun 2011 to 2844 in Dec 2011 or by 38.2 percent, reaching 3874 in Jan 2012 or decline of 15.8 percent relative to Jun 2011 and moving to 2935 in Dec 2012 or 36.6 percent lower relative to 4626 in Jun 2012. Hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 4738 in Jun 2013 to 3090 in Dec 2013. The level of private hiring NSA fell from 5110 in Jun 2014 to 3549 in Dec 2014 or 30.5 percent. Companies reduce hiring in the latter part of the year that explains the high seasonality in year-end employment data. For example, NSA private hiring fell from 5567 in Jun 2006 to 3568 in Dec 2006 or by 35.9 percent. Private hiring NSA data are useful in showing the huge declines from the period before the global recession. In Aug 2006, private hiring NSA was 5115, declining to 4182 in Aug 2011 or by 18.2 percent and to 4392 in Aug 2012 or lower by 14.1 percent relative to Aug 2006. Private hiring NSA fell from 5501 in Jul 2006 to 5139 in Jul 2014 or 6.6 percent. Private hiring fell from 3568 in Dec 2006 to 3090 in Dec 2013 or 13.4 percent and to 3549 in Dec 2014 or decline of 0.5 percent. The conclusion is that private hiring in the US is around 3 percent below the hiring before the global recession while the noninstitutional population of the United States has grown from 228.815 million in 2006 to 247.947 million in 2014, by 19.132 million or 8.4 percent. Private hiring of 59.128 million in 2006 was equivalent to 25.8 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, falling to 55.048 million in 2014 or 22.2 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 247.947 million in 2014. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 25.8 percent in 2006 would correspond to 63.970 million of hiring in 2014, which would be 8.922 million higher than actual 55.048 million in 2014. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
Chart I-8, US, Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2015
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-9 shows similar behavior in the rate of private hiring. The rate in 2011 in monthly SA data did not rise significantly above the peak in 2010. The rate seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Sep 2011 to 3.6 in Dec 2011 and reached 3.6 in Dec 2012 and 3.7 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted (NSA) fell from 3.7 in Sep 2011 to 2.6 in Dec 2011, increasing to 3.8 in Oct 2012 but falling to 2.6 in Dec 2012 and 3.4 in Mar 2013. The NSA rate of private hiring fell from 4.8 in Jul 2006 to 3.4 in Aug 2009 but recovery was insufficient to only 3.9 in Aug 2012, 2.6 in Dec 2012 and 2.7 in Dec 2013. The NSA rate increased to 4.5 in Jun 2015.
Chart I-9, US, Rate Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2015
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The JOLTS report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides total nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB), TNF JOB rate and TNF LD (layoffs and discharges) shown in Table I-4 for the month of Jun from 2001 to 2015. The final column provides annual TNF LD for the years from 2001 to 2014. Nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB) increased from a peak of 4580 in Jun 2007 to 5250 in Jun 2015 or by 14.6 percent while the rate increased from 3.2 to 3.5. This was mediocre performance because the civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working, rose from 228.671 million in Jun 2006 to 250.663 million in Jun 2015, by 21.992 million or 9.6 percent. Nonfarm layoffs and discharges (TNF LD) rose from 1604 in Jun 2006 to 2001 in Jun 2009 or by 24.8 percent. The annual data show layoffs and discharges rising from 20.9 million in 2006 to 26.4 million in 2009 or by 26.3 percent. Business pruned payroll jobs to survive the global recession but there has not been hiring because of the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions.
Table I-4, US, Total Nonfarm Job Openings and Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands NSA
TNF JOB | TNF JOB | TNF LD | TNF LD | |
Jun 2001 | 4155 | 3.0 | 1774 | 24138 |
Jun 2002 | 3257 | 2.4 | 1716 | 22706 |
Jun 2003 | 3276 | 2.4 | 1987 | 23490 |
Jun 2004 | 3298 | 2.4 | 1759 | 22668 |
Jun 2005 | 3911 | 2.8 | 1841 | 22243 |
Jun 2006 | 4260 | 3.0 | 1604 | 20896 |
Jun 2007 | 4580 | 3.2 | 1735 | 21958 |
Jun 2008 | 3638 | 2.6 | 1874 | 24028 |
Jun 2009 | 2372 | 1.8 | 2001 | 26444 |
Jun 2010 | 2705 | 2.0 | 1934 | 21827 |
Jun 2011 | 3175 | 2.3 | 1770 | 20801 |
Jun 2012 | 3758 | 2.7 | 1728 | 20872 |
Jun 2013 | 3860 | 2.7 | 1610 | 19889 |
Jun 2014 | 4717 | 3.3 | 1640 | 20418 |
Jun 2015 | 5250 | 3.5 | 1709 |
Notes: TNF JOB: Total Nonfarm Job Openings; LD: Layoffs and Discharges
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-10 shows monthly job openings rising from the trough in 2009 to a high in the beginning of 2010. Job openings then stabilized into 2011 but have surpassed the peak of 3097 seasonally adjusted in Apr 2010 with 3640 seasonally adjusted in Dec 2012, which is higher by 17.5 percent relative to Apr 2010 but lower by 2.7 percent relative to 3741 in Nov 2012 and lower by 5.1 percent than 3837 in Mar 2012. Nonfarm job openings increased from 3640 in Dec 2012 to 3977 in Dec 2013 or by 9.3 percent and to 4877 in 2014 or 22.6 percent relative to 2013. The high of job openings not seasonally adjusted was 3428 in Apr 2010 that was surpassed by 3671 in Jul 2011, increasing to 3942 in Oct 2012 but declining to 3189 in Dec 2012 and increasing to 3507 in Dec 2013. The level of job opening NSA increased to 5250 in Jun 2015. The level of job openings not seasonally adjusted fell to 3189 in Dec 2012 or by 21.3 percent relative to 3988 in Apr 2012. There is here again the strong seasonality of year-end labor data. Job openings fell from 4215 in Apr 2013 to 3507 in Dec 2013 and from 4816 in Apr 2014 to 4373 in Dec 2014, showing strong seasonal effects. Nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB) increased from a peak of 4580 in Jun 2007 to 5250 in Jun 2015 or by 14.6 percent while the rate increased from 3.2 to 3.5. This was mediocre performance because the civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or those in condition of working, rose from 228.671 million in Jun 2006 to 250.663 million in Jun 2015, by 21.992 million or 9.6 percent. Nonfarm layoffs and discharges (TNF LD) rose from 1604 in Jun 2006 to 2001 in Jun 2009 or by 24.8 percent. The main problem in recovery of the US labor market has been the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 24 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2015. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2015/pdf/gdp2q15_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates ( and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 would have accumulated to 24.8 percent. GDP in IIQ2015 would be $18,712.5 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,442.1 billion than actual $16,270.4 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.8 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html). US GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,270.4 billion in IIQ2015 or 8.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2015. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 136.6407 in Jul 2015. The actual index NSA in Jul 2015 is 103.7999, which is 24.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 126.9147 in Jul 2015. The output of manufacturing at 103.7999 in Jul 2015 is 18.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart I-10, US Job Openings, Thousands NSA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The rate of job openings in Chart I-11 shows similar behavior. The rate seasonally adjusted increased from 2.2 in Jan 2011 to 2.6 in Dec 2011, 2.6 in Dec 2012, 2.8 in Dec 2013 and 3.4 in Dec 2014. The rate seasonally adjusted stood at 3.6 in Jun 2015. The rate not seasonally adjusted rose from the high of 2.6 in Apr 2010 to 3.0 in Apr 2013, easing to 2.5 in Dec 2013. The rate of job openings NSA fell from 3.3 in Jul 2007 to 1.6 in Nov-Dec 2009, recovering to 3.5 in Jun 2015.
Chart I-11, US, Rate of Job Openings, NSA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Total separations are shown in Chart I-12. Separations are much lower in 2012-15 than before the global recession but hiring has not recovered.
Chart I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Separations, Month Thousands SA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-13 provides annual total separations. Separations fell sharply during the global recession but hiring has not recovered relative to population growth.
Chart I-13, US, Total Separations, Annual, Thousands, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table I-5 provides total nonfarm total separations from 2001 to 2014. Separations fell from 61.1 million in 2006 to 47.8 million in 2010 or by 13.3 million and 48.2 million in 2011 or by 12.9 million. Total separations increased from 48.2 million in 2011 to 51.8 million in 2013 or by 3.6 million and to 55.5 million in 2014 or by 7.3 million relative to 2011.
Table I-5, US, Total Nonfarm Total Separations, Thousands, 2001-2014
Year | Annual Thousands |
2001 | 64472 |
2002 | 59003 |
2003 | 56970 |
2004 | 58238 |
2005 | 60494 |
2006 | 61117 |
2007 | 60838 |
2008 | 58227 |
2009 | 51127 |
2010 | 47752 |
2011 | 48227 |
2012 | 50047 |
2013 | 51783 |
2014 | 55524 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Monthly data of layoffs and discharges reach a peak in early 2009, as shown in Chart I-14. Layoffs and discharges dropped sharply with the recovery of the economy in 2010 and 2011 once employers reduced their job count to what was required for cost reductions and loss of business. Weak rates of growth of GDP (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html) frustrated employment recovery. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
Chart I-14, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Monthly Thousands SA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Layoffs and discharges in Chart I-15 rose sharply to a peak in 2009. There was pronounced drop into 2010 and 2011 with mild increase into 2012 and renewed decline into 2013. There is mild increase into 2014.
Chart I-15, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Annual, 2001-2014
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Annual layoff and discharges are in Table I-6. Layoffs and discharges increased sharply from 20.896 million in 2006 to 26.444 million in 2009 or 26.6 percent. Layoff and discharges fell to 19.889 million in 2013 or 24.8 percent relative to 2009 and increased to 20.418 million in 2014 or 2.7 percent relative to 2013.
Table I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands, 2001-2014
Year | Annual Thousands |
2001 | 24138 |
2002 | 22706 |
2003 | 23490 |
2004 | 22668 |
2005 | 22243 |
2006 | 20896 |
2007 | 21958 |
2008 | 24028 |
2009 | 26444 |
2010 | 21827 |
2011 | 20801 |
2012 | 20872 |
2013 | 19889 |
2014 | 20418 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
IA2 Labor Underutilization. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides alternative measures of labor underutilization shown in Table I-7. The most comprehensive measure is U6 that consists of total unemployed plus total employed part time for economic reasons plus all marginally attached workers as percent of the labor force. U6 not seasonally adjusted has risen from 8.2 percent in 2006 to 10.7 percent in Jul 2015.
Table I-7, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization NSA %
U1 | U2 | U3 | U4 | U5 | U6 | |
2015 | ||||||
Jul | 2.0 | 2.7 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.7 | 10.7 |
Jun | 2.1 | 2.5 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 10.8 |
May | 2.4 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 10.4 |
Apr | 2.4 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6.4 | 10.4 |
Mar | 2.6 | 2.9 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 11.0 |
Feb | 2.7 | 3.0 | 5.8 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 11.4 |
Jan | 2.7 | 3.1 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 7.4 | 12.0 |
2014 | ||||||
Dec | 2.5 | 2.8 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 11.1 |
Nov | 2.7 | 2.7 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 11.0 |
Oct | 2.7 | 2.6 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 11.1 |
Sep | 2.7 | 2.7 | 5.7 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 11.3 |
Aug | 2.8 | 3.0 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.0 |
Jul | 2.8 | 3.1 | 6.5 | 7.0 | 7.8 | 12.6 |
Jun | 2.8 | 3.0 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.4 |
May | 3.1 | 3.0 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 11.7 |
Apr | 3.3 | 3.2 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 7.2 | 11.8 |
Mar | 3.7 | 3.7 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 12.8 |
Feb | 3.6 | 3.9 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.4 | 13.1 |
Jan | 3.5 | 4.0 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.6 | 13.5 |
2013 | ||||||
Dec | 3.5 | 3.5 | 6.5 | 7.0 | 7.9 | 13.0 |
Nov | 3.7 | 3.5 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 12.7 |
Oct | 3.7 | 3.6 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 8.3 | 13.2 |
Sep | 3.7 | 3.5 | 7.0 | 7.5 | 8.4 | 13.1 |
Aug | 3.7 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 13.6 |
Jul | 3.7 | 3.8 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.1 | 14.3 |
Jun | 3.9 | 3.8 | 7.8 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 14.6 |
May | 4.1 | 3.7 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 8.5 | 13.4 |
Apr | 4.3 | 3.9 | 7.1 | 7.6 | 8.5 | 13.4 |
Mar | 4.3 | 4.3 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 9.0 | 13.9 |
Feb | 4.3 | 4.6 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 14.9 |
Jan | 4.3 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 9.0 | 9.9 | 15.4 |
2012 | ||||||
Dec | 4.2 | 4.3 | 7.6 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
Nov | 4.2 | 3.9 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 13.9 |
Oct | 4.3 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 13.9 |
Sep | 4.2 | 4.0 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 14.2 |
Aug | 4.3 | 4.4 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.7 | 14.6 |
Jul | 4.3 | 4.6 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 15.2 |
Jun | 4.5 | 4.4 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 9.9 | 15.1 |
May | 4.7 | 4.3 | 7.9 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 14.3 |
Apr | 4.8 | 4.3 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.1 | 14.1 |
Mar | 4.9 | 4.8 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 9.7 | 14.8 |
Feb | 4.9 | 5.1 | 8.7 | 9.3 | 10.2 | 15.6 |
Jan | 4.9 | 5.4 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.5 | 16.2 |
2011 | ||||||
Dec | 4.8 | 5.0 | 8.3 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 15.2 |
Nov | 4.9 | 4.7 | 8.2 | 8.9 | 9.7 | 15.0 |
Oct | 5.0 | 4.8 | 8.5 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 15.3 |
Sep | 5.2 | 5.0 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.2 | 15.7 |
Aug | 5.2 | 5.1 | 9.1 | 9.6 | 10.6 | 16.1 |
Jul | 5.2 | 5.2 | 9.3 | 10.0 | 10.9 | 16.3 |
Jun | 5.1 | 5.1 | 9.3 | 9.9 | 10.9 | 16.4 |
May | 5.5 | 5.1 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 10.0 | 15.4 |
Apr | 5.5 | 5.2 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 15.5 |
Mar | 5.7 | 5.8 | 9.2 | 9.7 | 10.6 | 16.2 |
Feb | 5.6 | 6.0 | 9.5 | 10.1 | 11.1 | 16.7 |
Jan | 5.6 | 6.2 | 9.8 | 10.4 | 11.4 | 17.3 |
Dec 2010 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 9.1 | 9.9 | 10.7 | 16.6 |
Annual | ||||||
2014 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 12.0 |
2013 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 13.8 |
2012 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.5 | 14.7 |
2011 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 8.9 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 15.9 |
2010 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 9.6 | 10.3 | 11.1 | 16.7 |
2009 | 4.7 | 5.9 | 9.3 | 9.7 | 10.5 | 16.2 |
2008 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.8 | 10.5 |
2007 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 8.3 |
2006 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 8.2 |
2005 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 8.9 |
2004 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.5 | 9.6 |
2003 | 2.3 | 3.3 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 7.0 | 10.1 |
2002 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.7 | 9.6 |
2001 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 8.1 |
2000 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 7.0 |
Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Monthly seasonally adjusted measures of labor underutilization are provided in Table I-8. U6 climbed from 16.1 percent in Aug 2011 to 16.3 percent in Sep 2011 and then fell to 14.5 percent in Mar 2012, reaching 10.4 percent in Jul 2015. Unemployment is an incomplete measure of the stress in US job markets. A different calculation in this blog is provided by using the participation rate in the labor force before the global recession. This calculation shows 24.7 million in job stress of unemployment/underemployment in Jun 2015, not seasonally adjusted, corresponding to 14.8 percent of the labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html).
Table I-8, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization SA %
U1 | U2 | U3 | U4 | U5 | U6 | |
Jul 2015 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 10.4 |
Jun | 2.2 | 2.6 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 10.5 |
May | 2.4 | 2.7 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 10.8 |
Apr | 2.3 | 2.6 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 6.7 | 10.8 |
Mar | 2.4 | 2.7 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 6.7 | 10.9 |
Feb | 2.6 | 2.7 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 11.0 |
Jan | 2.7 | 2.7 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 11.3 |
Dec 2014 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.9 | 11.2 |
Nov | 2.7 | 2.9 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 11.4 |
Oct | 2.8 | 2.8 | 5.7 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 11.5 |
Sep | 2.8 | 2.9 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 11.7 |
Aug | 2.9 | 3.1 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 7.4 | 12.0 |
July | 2.9 | 3.1 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 12.2 |
Jun | 2.9 | 3.1 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 12.0 |
May | 3.1 | 3.2 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.1 |
Apr | 3.2 | 3.3 | 6.2 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.3 |
Mar | 3.4 | 3.5 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 12.6 |
Feb | 3.5 | 3.5 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 8.0 | 12.6 |
Jan | 3.4 | 3.4 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 8.1 | 12.7 |
Dec 2013 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 13.1 |
Nov | 3.7 | 3.7 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 8.2 | 13.1 |
Oct | 3.8 | 4.0 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 13.7 |
Sep | 3.8 | 3.8 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 13.6 |
Aug | 3.9 | 3.8 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 13.6 |
Jul | 3.9 | 3.8 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 13.8 |
Jun | 4.0 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.1 | 9.0 | 14.2 |
May | 4.1 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 8.8 | 13.8 |
Apr | 4.1 | 4.1 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 8.9 | 14.0 |
Mar | 4.1 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 8.9 | 13.8 |
Feb | 4.1 | 4.1 | 7.7 | 8.2 | 9.2 | 14.3 |
Jan | 4.2 | 4.3 | 8.0 | 8.5 | 9.4 | 14.5 |
Dec 2012 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 9.4 | 14.4 |
Nov | 4.2 | 4.2 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
Oct | 4.4 | 4.2 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 14.4 |
Sep | 4.4 | 4.2 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 9.3 | 14.7 |
Aug | 4.4 | 4.5 | 8.0 | 8.5 | 9.5 | 14.6 |
Jul | 4.5 | 4.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.8 |
Jun | 4.6 | 4.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.8 |
May | 4.6 | 4.5 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.8 |
Apr | 4.6 | 4.4 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.6 |
Mar | 4.6 | 4.5 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 14.5 |
Feb | 4.7 | 4.6 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 9.8 | 15.0 |
Jan | 4.8 | 4.7 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 9.9 | 15.2 |
Dec 2011 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 8.5 | 9.0 | 10.0 | 15.2 |
Nov | 5.0 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 9.3 | 10.1 | 15.5 |
Oct | 5.1 | 5.1 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 10.3 | 15.8 |
Sep | 5.4 | 5.2 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.5 | 16.3 |
Aug | 5.4 | 5.2 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.5 | 16.1 |
Jul | 5.3 | 5.3 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.6 | 15.9 |
Jun | 5.3 | 5.3 | 9.1 | 9.7 | 10.7 | 16.1 |
May | 5.3 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 10.3 | 15.8 |
Apr | 5.2 | 5.4 | 9.1 | 9.7 | 10.5 | 16.1 |
Mar | 5.3 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 15.9 |
Feb | 5.3 | 5.5 | 9.0 | 9.6 | 10.6 | 16.0 |
Jan | 5.5 | 5.5 | 9.2 | 9.7 | 10.8 | 16.2 |
Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-16 provides U6 on a monthly basis from 2001 to 2015. There was a steep climb from 2007 into 2009 and then this measure of unemployment and underemployment stabilized at that high level but declined into 2012. The low of U6 SA was 8.0 percent in Mar 2007 and the peak was 17.1 percent in Apr 2010. The low NSA was 7.6 percent in Oct 2006 and the peak was 18.0 percent in Jan 2010.
Chart I-16, US, U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Month, SA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-17 provides the number employed part-time for economic reasons or who cannot find full-time employment. There are sharp declines at the end of 2009, 2010 and 2011 but an increase in 2012 followed by relative stability in 2013-2015.
Chart I-17, US, Working Part-time for Economic Reasons
Thousands, Month SA 2001-2015
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. There is strong seasonality in US labor markets around the end of the year.
- Seasonally adjusted part-time for economic reasons. The number employed part-time for economic reasons because they could not find full-time employment fell from 9.109 million in Sep 2011 to 7.808 million in Mar 2012, seasonally adjusted, or decline of 1.301 million in six months, as shown in Table I-9. The number employed part-time for economic reasons rebounded to 8.600 million in Sep 2012 for increase of 603,000 in one month from Aug to Sep 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons declined to 8.195 million in Oct 2012 or by 405,000 again in one month, further declining to 8.156 million in Nov 2012 for another major one-month decline of 39,000 and 7.926 million in Dec 2012 or fewer 230,000 in just one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 8.055 million in Jan 2013 or 129,000 more than in Dec 2012 and to 8.064 million in Feb 2013, declining to 7.947 million in May 2013 but increasing to 8.124 million in Jun 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.843 million in Aug 2013 for decline of 244,000 in one month from 8.087 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased 96,000 from 7.843 million in Aug 2013 to 7.939 million in Sep 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons rose to 7.982 million in Oct 2013, falling by 267,000 to 7.715 million in Nov 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.776 million in Dec 2013, decreasing to 7.274 million in Jan 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell from 7.274 million in Jan 2014 to 7.204 million in Feb 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.449 million in Mar 2014 and 7.460 million in Apr 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.268 million in May 2014, increasing to 7.496 million in Jun 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.433 million in Jul 2014 and 7.223 million in Aug 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.058 million in Sep 2014, 7.012 million in Oct 2014 and 6.851 million in Nov 2014. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.790 million in Dec 2014, increasing to 6.810 million in Jan 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.635 million in Feb 2015, increasing to 6.705 million in Mar 2015. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.580 million in Apr 2015, increasing to 6.652 million in May 2015. The level employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.605 million in Jun 2015 and 6.325 million in Jul 2015. There is an increase of 198,000 in part-time for economic reasons from Aug 2012 to Oct 2012 and of 159,000 from Aug 2012 to Nov 2012.
- Seasonally adjusted full-time. The number employed full-time increased from 112.891 million in Oct 2011 to 115.086 million in Mar 2012 or 2.195 million but then fell to 114.245 million in May 2012 or 0.841 million fewer full-time employed than in Mar 2012. The number employed full-time increased from 114.735 million in Aug 2012 to 115.514 million in Oct 2012 or increase of 0.779 million full-time jobs in two months and further to 115.807 million in Jan 2013 or increase of 1.072 million more full-time jobs in five months from Aug 2012 to Jan 2013. The number of full time jobs decreased slightly to 115.751 million in Feb 2013, increasing to 116.244 million in May 2013 and 116.143 million in Jun 2013. Then number of full-time jobs increased to 116.147 million in Jul 2013, 116.453 million in Aug 2013 and 116.869 million in Sep 2013. The number of full-time jobs fell to 116.293 million in Oct 2013 and increased to 116.946 in Nov 2013. The level of full-time jobs fell to 117.240 million in Dec 2013, increasing to 117.650 million in Jan 2014 and 117.859 million in Feb 2014. The level of employment full-time increased to 118.062 million in Mar 2014 and 118.458 million in Apr 2014. The level of full-time employment reached 118.790 million in May 2014, decreasing to 118.252 million in Jun 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 118.448 million in Jul 2014 and 118.758 million in Aug 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 119.310 million in Sep 2014, 119.681 million in Oct 2014 and 119.507 million in Nov 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 119.934 million in Dec 2014 and 120.711 million in Jan 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 120.834 million in Feb 2015 and 121.024 million in Mar 2015. The level of full-time jobs decreased to 120.772 million in Apr 2015, increasing to 121.402 million in May 2015 and decreasing to 121.053 million in Jun 2015. The level of full-time jobs increased to 121.589 million in Jul 2015. Adjustments of benchmark and seasonality-factors at the turn of every year could affect comparability of labor market indicators (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html).
- Not seasonally adjusted part-time for economic reasons. The number of employed part-time for economic reasons actually increased without seasonal adjustment from 8.271 million in Nov 2011 to 8.428 million in Dec 2011 or by 157,000 and then to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 or by an additional 490,000 for cumulative increase from Nov 2011 to Jan 2012 of 647,000. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons then fell from 8.918 million in Jan 2012 to 7.867 million in Mar 2012 or by 1.051 million and to 7.694 million in Apr 2012 or 1.224 million fewer relative to Jan 2012. In Aug 2012, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.842 million NSA or 148,000 more than in Apr 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased from 7.842 million in Aug 2012 to 8.110 million in Sep 2012 or by 3.4 percent. The number part-time for economic reasons fell from 8.110 million in Sep 2012 to 7.870 million in Oct 2012 or by 240.000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA increased to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 or 758,000 more than in Oct 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.298 million in Feb 2013, which is lower by 330,000 relative to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 but higher by 428,000 relative to 7.870 million in Oct 2012. The number employed part time for economic reasons fell to 7.734 million in Mar 2013 or 564,000 fewer than in Feb 2013 and fell to 7.709 million in Apr 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.618 million in May 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons jumped from 7.618 million in May 2013 to 8.440 million in Jun 2013 or 822,000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.324 million in Jul 2013 and 7.690 million in Aug 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA fell to 7.522 million in Sep 2013, increasing to 7.700 million in Oct 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.563 million in Nov 2013 and increased to 7.990 million in Dec 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.771 million in Jan 2014 and 7.397 million in Feb 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.455 million in Mar 2014 and fell to 7.243 million in Apr 2014. The number of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.960 million in May 2014, increasing to 7.805 million in Jun 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.665 million in Jul 2014 and 7.083 million in Aug 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.711 million in Sep 2014 and increased to 6.787 million in Oct 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons reached 6.713 million in Nov 2014 and 6.970 million in Dec 2014, increasing to 7.269 million in Jan 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons fell to 6.772 million in Feb 2015 and 6.672 million in Mar 2015, falling to 6.356 million in Apr 2015. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 6.363 million in May 2015 and to 6.776 million in Jun 2015, decreasing to 6.511 million in Jul 2015.
- Not seasonally adjusted full-time. The number employed full time without seasonal adjustment fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 113.050 million in Dec 2011 or by 88,000 and fell further to 111.879 in Jan 2012 for cumulative decrease of 1.259 million. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 112.587 million in Feb 2012 or by 551.000 but increased to 116.214 million in Aug 2012 or 3.076 million more full-time jobs than in Nov 2011. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted decreased from 116.214 million in Aug 2012 to 115.678 million in Sep 2012 for loss of 536,000 full-time jobs and rose to 116.045 million in Oct 2012 or by 367,000 full-time jobs in one month relative to Sep 2012. The number employed full-time NSA fell from 116.045 million in Oct 2012 to 115.515 million in Nov 2012 or decline of 530.000 in one month. The number employed full-time fell from 115.515 in Nov 2012 to 115.079 million in Dec 2012 or decline by 436,000 in one month. The number employed full time fell from 115.079 million in Dec 2012 to 113.868 million in Jan 2013 or decline of 1.211 million in one month. The number of full time jobs increased to 114.191 in Feb 2012 or by 323,000 in one month and increased to 114.796 million in Mar 2013 for cumulative increase from Jan by 928,000 full-time jobs but decrease of 283,000 from Dec 2012. The number employed full time reached 117.400 million in Jun 2013 and increased to 117.688 in Jul 2013 or by 288,000. The number employed full-time reached 117.868 million in Aug 2013 for increase of 180,000 in one month relative to Jul 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 117.308 million in Sep 2013 or by 560,000. The number employed full-time fell to 116.798 million in Oct 2013 or decline of 510.000 in one month. The number employed full-time rose to 116.875 million in Nov 2013, falling to 116.661 million in Dec 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 115.744 million in Jan 2014 but increased to 116.323 million in Feb 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 116.985 in Mar 2014 and 118.073 million in Apr 2014. The number of full-time jobs increased to 119.179 million in May 2014, increasing to 119.472 million in Jun 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 119.900 million in Jul 2014. Comparisons over long periods require use of NSA data. The number with full-time jobs fell from a high of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to 108.777 million in Jan 2010 or by 14.442 million. The number with full-time jobs in Jun 2015 is 123.142 million, which is lower by 0.077 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007.
- Loss of full-time jobs. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 250.876 million in Jul 2015 or by 18.918 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/) while in the same period the number of full-time jobs fell 0.077 million. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 133.215 million full-time jobs with population of 250.876 million in Jul 2015 (0.531 x 250.876) or 10.073 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 123.142 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 18 million. Mediocre GDP growth is the main culprit of the fractured US labor market. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 24 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2015. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2015/pdf/gdp2q15_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates ( and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 would have accumulated to 24.8 percent. GDP in IIQ2015 would be $18,712.5 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,442.1 billion than actual $16,270.4 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.8 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html). US GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,270.4 billion in IIQ2015 or 8.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2015. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 136.6407 in Jul 2015. The actual index NSA in Jul 2015 is 103.7999, which is 24.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 126.9147 in Jul 2015. The output of manufacturing at 103.7999 in Jul 2015 is 18.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-9, US, Employed Part-time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, and Full-time, Millions
Part-time Thousands | Full-time Millions | |
Seasonally Adjusted | ||
Jul 2015 | 6.325 | 121.589 |
Jun 2015 | 6,605 | 121.053 |
May 2015 | 6,652 | 121.402 |
Apr 2015 | 6,580 | 120.772 |
Mar 2015 | 6,705 | 121.024 |
Feb 2015 | 6,635 | 120.834 |
Jan 2015 | 6,810 | 120.711 |
Dec 2014 | 6,790 | 119.934 |
Nov 2014 | 6,851 | 119.507 |
Oct 2014 | 7,012 | 119.681 |
Sep 2014 | 7,058 | 119.310 |
Aug 2014 | 7,223 | 118.758 |
Jul 2014 | 7,433 | 118.448 |
Jun 2014 | 7,496 | 118.252 |
May 2014 | 7,268 | 118.790 |
Apr 2014 | 7,460 | 118.458 |
Mar 2014 | 7,449 | 118.062 |
Feb 2014 | 7,204 | 117.859 |
Jan 2014 | 7,274 | 117.650 |
Dec 2013 | 7,776 | 117.240 |
Nov 2013 | 7,715 | 116.946 |
Oct 2013 | 7,982 | 116.293 |
Sep 2013 | 7,939 | 116.869 |
Aug 2013 | 7,843 | 116.453 |
Jul 2013 | 8,087 | 116.147 |
Jun 2013 | 8,124 | 116.143 |
May 2013 | 7,947 | 116.244 |
Apr 2013 | 7,933 | 116.018 |
Mar 2013 | 7,699 | 115.877 |
Feb 2013 | 8,064 | 115.751 |
Jan 2013 | 8,055 | 115.807 |
Dec 2012 | 7,926 | 115.724 |
Nov 2012 | 8,156 | 115.592 |
Oct 2012 | 8,195 | 115.514 |
Sep 2012 | 8,600 | 115.227 |
Aug 2012 | 7,997 | 114.735 |
Jul 2012 | 8,087 | 114.571 |
Jun 2012 | 8,098 | 114.764 |
May 2012 | 8,163 | 114.245 |
Apr 2012 | 7,915 | 114.365 |
Mar 2012 | 7,808 | 115.086 |
Feb 2012 | 8,193 | 114.186 |
Jan 2012 | 8,291 | 113.789 |
Dec 2011 | 8,174 | 113.740 |
Nov 2011 | 8,450 | 113.177 |
Oct 2011 | 8,637 | 112.891 |
Sep 2011 | 9,109 | 112.527 |
Aug 2011 | 8,781 | 112.715 |
Jul 2011 | 8,277 | 112.191 |
Not Seasonally Adjusted | ||
Jul 2015 | 6,511 | 123.142 |
Jun 2015 | 6,776 | 122.268 |
May 2015 | 6,363 | 121.863 |
Apr 2015 | 6,356 | 120.402 |
Mar 2015 | 6,672 | 119.981 |
Feb 2015 | 6,772 | 119.313 |
Jan 2015 | 7,269 | 118.840 |
Dec 2014 | 6,970 | 119.394 |
Nov 2014 | 6,713 | 119.441 |
Oct 2014 | 6,787 | 120.176 |
Sep 2014 | 6,711 | 119.791 |
Aug 2014 | 7,083 | 120.110 |
Jul 2014 | 7,665 | 119.900 |
Jun 2014 | 7,805 | 119.472 |
May 2014 | 6,960 | 119.179 |
Apr 2014 | 7,243 | 118.073 |
Mar 2014 | 7,455 | 116.985 |
Feb 2014 | 7,397 | 116.323 |
Jan 2014 | 7,771 | 115.744 |
Dec 2013 | 7,990 | 116.661 |
Nov 2013 | 7,563 | 116.875 |
Oct 2013 | 7,700 | 116.798 |
Sep 2013 | 7,522 | 117.308 |
Aug 2013 | 7,690 | 117.868 |
Jul 2013 | 8,324 | 117.688 |
Jun 2013 | 8,440 | 117.400 |
May 2013 | 7,618 | 116.643 |
Apr 2013 | 7,709 | 115.674 |
Mar 2013 | 7,734 | 114.796 |
Feb 2013 | 8,298 | 114.191 |
Jan 2013 | 8,628 | 113.868 |
Dec 2012 | 8,166 | 115.079 |
Nov 2012 | 7,994 | 115.515 |
Oct 2012 | 7,870 | 116.045 |
Sep 2012 | 8,110 | 115.678 |
Aug 2012 | 7,842 | 116.214 |
Jul 2012 | 8,316 | 116.131 |
Jun 2012 | 8,394 | 116.024 |
May 2012 | 7,837 | 114.634 |
Apr 2012 | 7,694 | 113.999 |
Mar 2012 | 7,867 | 113.916 |
Feb 2012 | 8,455 | 112.587 |
Jan 2012 | 8,918 | 111.879 |
Dec 2011 | 8,428 | 113.050 |
Nov 2011 | 8,271 | 113.138 |
Oct 2011 | 8,258 | 113.456 |
Sep 2011 | 8,541 | 112.980 |
Aug 2011 | 8,604 | 114.286 |
Jul 2011 | 8,514 | 113.759 |
Jun 2011 | 8,738 | 113.255 |
May 2011 | 8,270 | 112.618 |
Apr 2011 | 8,425 | 111.844 |
Mar 2011 | 8,737 | 111.186 |
Feb 2011 | 8,749 | 110.731 |
Jan 2011 | 9,187 | 110.373 |
Dec 2010 | 9,205 | 111.207 |
Nov 2010 | 8,670 | 111.348 |
Oct 2010 | 8,408 | 112.342 |
Sep 2010 | 8,628 | 112.385 |
Aug 2010 | 8,628 | 113.508 |
Jul 2010 | 8,737 | 113.974 |
Jun 2010 | 8,867 | 113.856 |
May 2010 | 8,513 | 112.809 |
Apr 2010 | 8,921 | 111.391 |
Mar 2010 | 9,343 | 109.877 |
Feb 2010 | 9,282 | 109.100 |
Jan 2010 | 9,290 | 108.777 (low) |
Dec 2009 | 9,354 (high) | 109.875 |
Nov 2009 | 8,894 | 111.274 |
Oct 2009 | 8,474 | 111.599 |
Sep 2009 | 8,255 | 111.991 |
Aug 2009 | 8,835 | 113.863 |
Jul 2009 | 9,103 | 114.184 |
Jun 2009 | 9,301 | 114.014 |
May 2009 | 8,785 | 113.083 |
Apr 2009 | 8,648 | 112.746 |
Mar 2009 | 9,305 | 112.215 |
Feb 2009 | 9,170 | 112.947 |
Jan 2009 | 8,829 | 113.815 |
Dec 2008 | 8,250 | 116.422 |
Nov 2008 | 7,135 | 118.432 |
Oct 2008 | 6,267 | 120.020 |
Sep 2008 | 5,701 | 120.213 |
Aug 2008 | 5,736 | 121.556 |
Jul 2008 | 6,054 | 122.378 |
Jun 2008 | 5,697 | 121.845 |
May 2008 | 5,096 | 120.809 |
Apr 2008 | 5,071 | 120.027 |
Mar 2008 | 5,038 | 119.875 |
Feb 2008 | 5,114 | 119.452 |
Jan 2008 | 5,340 | 119.332 |
Dec 2007 | 4,750 | 121.042 |
Nov 2007 | 4,374 | 121.846 |
Oct 2007 | 4,028 | 122.006 |
Sep 2007 | 4,137 | 121.728 |
Aug 2007 | 4,494 | 122.870 |
Jul 2007 | 4,516 | 123.219 (high) |
Jun 2007 | 4,469 | 122.150 |
May 2007 | 4,315 | 120.846 |
Apr 2007 | 4,205 | 119.609 |
Mar 2007 | 4,384 | 119.640 |
Feb 2007 | 4,417 | 119.041 |
Jan 2007 | 4,726 | 119.094 |
Dec 2006 | 4,281 | 120.371 |
Nov 2006 | 4,054 | 120.507 |
Oct 2006 | 4,010 | 121.199 |
Sep 2006 | 3,735 (low) | 120.780 |
Aug 2006 | 4,104 | 121.979 |
Jul 2006 | 4,450 | 121.951 |
Jun 2006 | 4,456 | 121.070 |
May 2006 | 3,968 | 118.925 |
Apr 2006 | 3,787 | 118.559 |
Mar 2006 | 4,097 | 117.693 |
Feb 2006 | 4,403 | 116.823 |
Jan 2006 | 4,597 | 116.395 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
People lose their marketable job skills after prolonged unemployment and face increasing difficulty in finding another job. Chart I-18 shows the sharp rise in unemployed over 27 weeks and stabilization at an extremely high level.
Chart I-18, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or Over, Thousands SA Month 2001-2015
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Another segment of U6 consists of people marginally attached to the labor force who continue to seek employment but less frequently on the frustration there may not be a job for them. Chart I-19 shows the sharp rise in people marginally attached to the labor force after 2007 and subsequent stabilization.
Chart I-19, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, NSA Month, Thousands, 2001-2015
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
The number with full-time jobs fell from a high of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to 108.777 million in Jan 2010 or by 14.442 million. The number with full-time jobs in Jun 2015 is 123.142 million, which is lower by 0.077 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 250.876 million in Jul 2015 or by 18.918 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/) while in the same period the number of full-time jobs fell 0.077 million. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 133.215 million full-time jobs with population of 250.876 million in Jul 2015 (0.531 x 250.876) or 10.073 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 123.142 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 18 million. Mediocre GDP growth is the main culprit of the fractured US labor market.
Chart I-20 provides unadjusted full-time jobs in the US from 2001 to 2015 with sharp drop and incomplete recovery. There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:
“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”
The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals.
Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets, during cyclical slow growth not secular stagnation, is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.
Chart I-20, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2015
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20A provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 2001 to 2015. There is clear trend of increase of the population while the number of full-time jobs collapsed after 2008 without sufficient recovery as shown in the preceding Chart I-20.
Chart I-20A, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 2001-2015
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20B provides number of full-time jobs in the US from 1968 to 2015. There were multiple recessions followed by expansions without contraction of full-time jobs and without recovery as during the period after 2008. The problem is specific of the current cycle and not secular.
Chart I-20B, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 1968-2015
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Chart I-20C provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 1968 to 2015. Population expanded at a relatively constant rate of increase with the assurance of creation of full-time jobs that has been broken since 2008.
Chart I-20C, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 1968-2015
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
IA4 Theory and Reality of Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment. Three tables support the argument that the proper comparison of the business cycle is between the recessions of the 1980s and the global recession after IVQ2007 and not as argued erroneously with the Great Depression of the 1930s. Table I-5 provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.7 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.2 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.3 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987 and 4.2 percent in 1988. In contrast, GDP grew 2.5 percent in 2010, 1.6 percent in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.5 percent in 2013 and 2.4 percent in 2014. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, and ten quarters from IQ2013 to IIQ2015 is 2.0 percent and 2.3 percent in the four quarters ending in IIQ2015. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985, 3.5 percent in 1986, 3.5 percent in 1987 and 4.2 percent in 1988. The forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 1.8 to 2.0 percent in 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150617.pdf) with less reliable forecast of 2.4 to 2.7 percent in 2016 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20150617.pdf). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2015 has been at average 2.1 percent in annual equivalent.
Table I-5, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%
Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% | Year | GDP ∆% |
1930 | -8.5 | 1980 | -0.2 | 2000 | 4.1 |
1931 | -6.4 | 1981 | 2.6 | 2001 | 1.0 |
1932 | -12.9 | 1982 | -1.9 | 2002 | 1.8 |
1933 | -1.3 | 1983 | 4.6 | 2003 | 2.8 |
1934 | 10.8 | 1984 | 7.3 | 2004 | 3.8 |
1935 | 8.9 | 1985 | 4.2 | 2005 | 3.3 |
1936 | 12.9 | 1986 | 3.5 | 2006 | 2.7 |
1937 | 5.1 | 1987 | 3.5 | 2007 | 1.8 |
1938 | -3.3 | 1988 | 4.2 | 2008 | -0.3 |
1930 | 8.0 | 1989 | 3.7 | 2009 | -2.8 |
1940 | 8.8 | 1990 | 1.9 | 2010 | 2.5 |
1941 | 17.7 | 1991 | -0.1 | 2011 | 1.6 |
1942 | 18.9 | 1992 | 3.6 | 2012 | 2.2 |
1943 | 17.0 | 1993 | 2.7 | 2013 | 1.5 |
1944 | 8.0 | 1994 | 4.0 | 2014 | 2.4 |
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-6 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.7 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.2 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.
Table I-6, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions
Number of Quarters | Cumulative Percentage Contraction | Average Percentage Rate | |
IIQ1953 to IIQ1954 | 3 | -2.4 | -0.8 |
IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958 | 3 | -3.0 | -1.0 |
IVQ1973 to IQ1975 | 5 | -3.1 | -0.6 |
IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 | 2 | -2.2 | -1.1 |
IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 | 4 | -2.5 | -0.64 |
IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 | 6 | -4.2 | -0.72 |
Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table I-7 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.1 percent of the US economy in the twenty-four quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2015. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was:
- 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986
- 5.4 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986
- 5.2 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986
- 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987
- 5.0 percent in the first eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987
- 4.9 percent in the first nineteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987
- 5.0 percent in the first twenty quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1987
- 4.9 percent in the first twenty-first quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1988
- 4.9 percent in the first twenty-two quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1988
- 4.8 percent in the first twenty-three quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988
- 4.8 percent in the first twenty-four quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1988
1. The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.5 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.6 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.2 percent in 2012, 1.5 percent in 2013 and 2.4 percent in 2014 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1988, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988. 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. GDP grew 2.7 percent in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012, the four quarters of 2013, the four quarters of 2014 and two quarters of Q2015 accumulated to 7.1 percent. This growth is equivalent to 2.0 percent per year, obtained by dividing GDP in IIQ2015 of $16,270.4 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,190.3 billion and compounding by 4/14: {[($16,270.4/$15,190.3)4/14 -1]100 = 2.0 percent.
Table I-7, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions
Number | Cumulative Growth ∆% | Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate | |
IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957 | 11 | 12.8 | 4.5 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955 | 4 | 7.8 | |
IIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 5 | 10.0 | 7.9 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959 | 4 | 9.2 | |
IIQ1975 to IVQ1976 | 8 | 8.3 | 4.1 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 | 4 | 6.1 | |
IQ1983-IQ1986 IQ1983-IIIQ1986 IQ1983-IVQ1986 IQ1983-IQ1987 IQ1983-IIQ1987 IQ1983 to IIIQ1987 IQ1983 to IVQ1987 IQ1983 to IQ1988 IQ1983 to IIQ1988 IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 IQ1983 to IVQ1988 | 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | 19.9 21.6 22.3 23.1 24.5 25.6 27.7 28.4 30.1 30.9 32.6 | 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 |
First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983 | 4 | 7.8 | |
Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions* | 7.7 | ||
IIIQ2009 to IIQ2015 | 24 | 13.3 | 2.1 |
First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 | 2.7 |
*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Table EMP provides the comparison between the labor market in the current whole cycle from 2007 to 2014 and the whole cycle from 1979 to 1988. In the entire cycle from 2007 to 2014, the number employed increased 0.258 million, full-time employed fell 2.373 million, part-time for economic reasons increased 2.812 million and population increased 16.080 million. The number employed increased 0.2 percent, full-time employed fell 2.0 percent, part-time for economic reasons increased 63.9 percent and population increased 6.9 percent. There is sharp contrast with the contractions of the 1980s and with most economic history of the United States. In the whole cycle from 1979 to 1988, the number employed increased 16.144 million, full-time employed increased 12.560 million, part-time for economic reasons 1.629 million and population 19.750 million. In the entire cycle from 1979 to 1988, the number employed increased 16.3 percent, full-time employed 15.2 percent, part-time for economic reasons 45.5 percent and population 12.0 percent. The difference between the 1980s and the current cycle after 2007 is in the high rate of growth after the contraction that maintained trend growth around 3.0 percent for the entire cycle and per capital growth at 2.0 percent. The evident fact is that current weakness in labor markets originates in cyclical slow growth and not in imaginary secular stagnation.
Table EMP, US, Annual Level of Employed, Full-Time Employed, Employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons and Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Millions
Employed | Full-Time Employed | Part Time Economic Reasons | Noninstitutional Civilian Population | |
2000s | ||||
2000 | 136.891 | 113.846 | 3.227 | 212.577 |
2001 | 136.933 | 113.573 | 3.715 | 215.092 |
2002 | 136.485 | 112.700 | 4.213 | 217.570 |
2003 | 137.736 | 113.324 | 4.701 | 221.168 |
2004 | 139.252 | 114.518 | 4.567 | 223.357 |
2005 | 141.730 | 117.016 | 4.350 | 226.082 |
2006 | 144.427 | 119.688 | 4.162 | 228.815 |
2007 | 146.047 | 121.091 | 4.401 | 231.867 |
2008 | 145.362 | 120.030 | 5.875 | 233.788 |
2009 | 139.877 | 112.634 | 8.913 | 235.801 |
2010 | 139.064 | 111.714 | 8.874 | 237.830 |
2011 | 139.869 | 112.556 | 8.560 | 239.618 |
2012 | 142.469 | 114.809 | 8.122 | 243.284 |
2013 | 143.929 | 116.314 | 7.935 | 245.679 |
2014 | 146.305 | 118.718 | 7.213 | 247.947 |
∆2007-2014 | 0.258 | -2,373 | 2.812 | 16.080 |
∆% 2007-2013 | 0.2 | -2.0 | 63.9 | 6.9 |
1980s | ||||
1979 | 98.824 | 82.654 | 3.577 | 164.863 |
1980 | 99.303 | 82.562 | 4.321 | 167.745 |
1981 | 100.397 | 83.243 | 4.768 | 170.130 |
1982 | 99.526 | 81.421 | 6.170 | 172.271 |
1983 | 100.834 | 82.322 | 6.266 | 174.215 |
1984 | 105.005 | 86.544 | 5.744 | 176.383 |
1985 | 107.150 | 88.534 | 5.590 | 178.206 |
1986 | 109.597 | 90.529 | 5.588 | 180.587 |
1987 | 112.440 | 92.957 | 5.401 | 182.753 |
1988 | 114.968 | 95.214 | 5.206 | 184.613 |
1989 | 117.342 | 97.369 | 4.894 | 186.393 |
∆1979-1988 | 16.144 | 12.560 | 1.629 | 19.750 |
∆% 1979-88 | 16.3 | 15.2 | 45.5 | 12.0 |
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. There are accentuated cyclic factors for both the entire population and the young population of ages 16 to 24 years. Table Summary Total provides the total noninstitutional population (ICP) of the US, full-time employment level (FTE), employment level (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP), employment/population ratio (EPOP) and unemployment level (UNE). Secular stagnation would spread over long periods instead of immediately. All indicators of the labor market weakened sharply during the contraction and did not recover. Population continued to grow but all other variables collapsed and did not recover. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-16). Hansen (1938, 1939) finds secular stagnation in lower growth of an aging population. In the current US economy, Table Summary shows that population is dynamic while the labor market is fractured. There is key explanation in the behavior of the civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and the employment population ratio (EPOP) that collapsed during the global recession with inadequate recovery. Abandoning job searches are difficult to capture in labor statistics but likely explain the decline in the participation of the population in the labor force. Allowing for abandoning job searches, the total number of people unemployed or underemployed is 25.0 million or 15.1 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html).
Table Summary Total, US, Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Millions and Percent
ICP | FTE | EMP | CLF | CLFP | EPOP | UNE | |
2006 | 228.8 | 119.7 | 144.4 | 151.4 | 66.2 | 63.1 | 7.0 |
2009 | 235.8 | 112.6 | 139.9 | 154.1 | 65.4 | 59.3 | 14.3 |
2012 | 243.3 | 114.8 | 142.5 | 155.0 | 63.7 | 58.6 | 12.5 |
2013 | 245.7 | 116.3 | 143.9 | 155.4 | 63.2 | 58.6 | 11.5 |
2014 | 247.9 | 118.7 | 146.3 | 155.9 | 62.9 | 59.0 | 9.6 |
12/07 | 233.2 | 121.0 | 146.3 | 153.7 | 65.9 | 62.8 | 7.4 |
9/09 | 236.3 | 112.0 | 139.1 | 153.6 | 65.0 | 58.9 | 14.5 |
7/15 | 250.9 | 123.1 | 149.7 | 158.5 | 63.2 | 59.7 | 8.8 |
ICP: Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population; FT: Full-time Employment Level, EMP: Total Employment Level; CLF: Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The same situation is present in the labor market for young people in ages 16 to 24 years with data in Table Summary Youth. The youth noninstitutional civilian population (ICP) continued to increase during and after the global recession. There is the same disastrous labor market with decline for young people in employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and employment population ratio (EPOP). There are only increases for unemployment of young people (UNE) and youth unemployment rate (UNER). If aging were a factor of secular stagnation, growth of population of young people would attract a premium in remuneration in labor markets. The sad fact is that young people are also facing tough labor markets. The application of the theory of secular stagnation to the US economy and labor markets is void of reality in the form of key facts, which are best explained by accentuated cyclic factors analyzed by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22).
Table Summary Youth, US, Youth, Ages 16 to 24 Years, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Millions and Percent
ICP | EMP | CLF | CLFP | EPOP | UNE | UNER | |
2006 | 36.9 | 20.0 | 22.4 | 60.6 | 54.2 | 2.4 | 10.5 |
2009 | 37.6 | 17.6 | 21.4 | 56.9 | 46.9 | 3.8 | 17.6 |
2012 | 38.8 | 17.8 | 21.3 | 54.9 | 46.0 | 3.5 | 16.2 |
2013 | 38.8 | 18.1 | 21.4 | 55.0 | 46.5 | 3.3 | 15.5 |
2014 | 38.7 | 18.4 | 21.3 | 55.0 | 47.6 | 2.9 | 13.4 |
12/07 | 37.5 | 19.4 | 21.7 | 57.8 | 51.6 | 2.3 | 10.7 |
9/09 | 37.6 | 17.0 | 20.7 | 55.2 | 45.1 | 3.8 | 18.2 |
7/15 | 38.6 | 20.3 | 23.2 | 60.0 | 52.7 | 2.8 | 12.2 |
ICP: Youth Noninstitutional Civilian Population; EMP: Youth Employment Level; CLF: Youth Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Youth Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Youth Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment; UNER: Youth Unemployment Rate
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
The United States is experiencing high youth unemployment as in European economies. Table I-10 provides the employment level for ages 16 to 24 years of age estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. On an annual basis, youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 17.362 million in 2011 or 2.679 million fewer youth jobs and to 17.834 million in 2012 or 2.207 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.057 million in 2013 or 1.984 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.442 million in 2014 or 1.599 million. The level of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.347 million in Dec 2014 for 1.782 million fewer youth jobs. The level of youth jobs fell from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 20.333 million in Jul 2015 or 1.581 million fewer jobs. During the seasonal peak months of youth employment in the summer from Jun to Aug, youth employment has fallen by more than two million jobs relative to 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 18.972 million in Aug 2014 for 2.195 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 20.085 million in Jul 2014 for 1.829 million fewer youth jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 million to 19.421 million in Jun 2014 or 1.847 million fewer youth jobs. The number of jobs ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 18.636 million in Aug 2013 or by 2.531 million. The number of youth jobs fell from 19.604 million in Sep 2006 to 18.043 million in Sep 2013 or 1.561 million fewer youth jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.106 million in Dec 2013 or 2.023 million fewer jobs. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 2.058 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 while jobs for ages 16 to 24 years decreased 1.599 million from 19.538 million in Mar 2007 to 17.939 million in Mar 2014. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased 1.410 million from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.347 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.379 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.128 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.330 million from 37.410 million in Jun 2007 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.847 million from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 to 19.421 million in Jun 2014. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased by 1.292 million from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.632 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.445 million in Aug 2007 to 38.706 million in Aug 2014 or 1.251 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.441 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.500 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.072 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.327 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.782 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.971 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.091 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.960 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.215 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.165 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.060 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.479 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.581 million. The hardship does not originate in low growth of population but in underperformance of the economy in the expansion from the business cycle. There are two hardships behind these data. First, young people cannot find employment after finishing high school and college, reducing prospects for achievement in older age. Second, students with more modest means cannot find employment to keep them in college.
Table I-10, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA
Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Nov | Dec |
2001 | 19678 | 19745 | 19800 | 19778 | 19648 | 21212 | 22042 | 19675 | 19547 |
2002 | 18653 | 19074 | 19091 | 19108 | 19484 | 20828 | 21501 | 19397 | 19394 |
2003 | 18811 | 18880 | 18709 | 18873 | 19032 | 20432 | 20950 | 19163 | 19136 |
2004 | 18852 | 18841 | 18752 | 19184 | 19237 | 20587 | 21447 | 19615 | 19619 |
2005 | 18858 | 18670 | 18989 | 19071 | 19356 | 20949 | 21749 | 19750 | 19733 |
2006 | 19003 | 19182 | 19291 | 19406 | 19769 | 21268 | 21914 | 19903 | 20129 |
2007 | 19407 | 19415 | 19538 | 19368 | 19457 | 21098 | 21717 | 19660 | 19361 |
2008 | 18724 | 18546 | 18745 | 19161 | 19254 | 20466 | 21021 | 18454 | 18378 |
2009 | 17467 | 17606 | 17564 | 17739 | 17588 | 18726 | 19304 | 16689 | 16615 |
2010 | 16166 | 16412 | 16587 | 16764 | 17039 | 17920 | 18564 | 16946 | 16727 |
2011 | 16512 | 16638 | 16898 | 16970 | 17045 | 18180 | 18632 | 17402 | 17234 |
2012 | 16944 | 17150 | 17301 | 17387 | 17681 | 18907 | 19461 | 17877 | 17604 |
2013 | 17183 | 17257 | 17271 | 17593 | 17704 | 19125 | 19684 | 18104 | 18106 |
2014 | 17372 | 17357 | 17939 | 18021 | 18329 | 19421 | 20085 | 18576 | 18347 |
2015 | 17912 | 18222 | 18076 | 18241 | 18709 | 19789 | 20333 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21 provides US employment level ages 16 to 24 years from 2002 to 2015. Employment level is sharply lower in Jul 2015 relative to the peak in 2007. The following Chart I-21A relates youth employment and youth civilian noninstitutional population.
Chart I-21, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21A provides the US civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted from 2001 to 2015. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 2.058 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 while jobs for ages 16 to 24 years decreased 1.599 million from 19.538 million in Mar 2007 to 17.939 million in Mar 2014. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased 1.410 million from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.347 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.379 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.128 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.330 million from 37.410 million in Jun 2007 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.847 million from 21.268 million in Jun 2006 to 19.421 million in Jun 2014. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased by 1.292 million from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.632 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.445 million in Aug 2007 to 38.706 million in Aug 2014 or 1.251 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.441 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.500 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.072 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.327 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.782 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.971 million from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.091 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 0.960 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.215 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.165 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.060 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.479 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.581 million. The hardship does not originate in low growth of population but in underperformance of the economy in the expansion from the business cycle. There are two hardships behind these data. First, young people cannot find employment after finishing high school and college, reducing prospects for achievement in older age. Second, students with more modest means cannot find employment to keep them in college.
Chart I-21A, US, Civilian Noninstitutional Population Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21B provides the civilian labor force of the US ages 16 to 24 years NSA from 2001 to 2015. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 24.339 million in Jul 2007 to 23.506 million in Jul 2013, by 0.833 million or decline of 3.4 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population NSA increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013, by 1.418 million or 3.8 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 fell from 22.801 million in Aug 2007 to 22.089 million in Aug 2013, by 0.712 million or 3.1 percent, while the noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013, by 1.386 million or 3.7 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.917 million in Sep 2007 to 21.183 million in Sep 2013, by 0.734 million or 3.3 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 by 1.355 million or 3.6 percent. The US civilian labor force fell from 21.821 million in Oct 2007 to 21.003 million in Oct 2013, by 0.818 million or 3.7 percent while the noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013, by 1.324 million or 3.5 percent. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.909 million in Nov 2007 to 20.825 million in Nov 2013, by 1.084 million or 4.9 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.684 million in Dec 2007 to 20.642 million in Dec 2013, by 1.042 million or 4.8 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013, by 1.272 million or 3.4 percent. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell from 21.770 million in Jan 2007 to 20.423 million in Jan 2014, by 1.347 million or 6.2 percent while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014, by 1.488 million or 4.0 percent. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell 1.255 million from 21.645 million in Feb 2007 to 20.390 million in Feb 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 million in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell 0.693 million from 21.634 million in Mar 2007 to 20.941 million in Mar 2014 or 3.2 person while the youth noninstitutional civilian population 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 or 3.9 percent. The US youth civilian labor force fell 981 thousand from 21.442 million in Apr 2007 to 20.461 million in Apr 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.349 million in Apr 2007 to 38.759 million in Apr 2014 by 1.410 thousand or 3.8 percent. The youth civilian labor force decreased from 21.659 million in May 2007 to 21.160 million in May 2014 by 499 thousand or 2.3 percent while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.370 million from 37.739 million in May 2007 to 38.749 million in May 2007 or by 2.7 percent. The youth civilian labor force decreased from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.851 million in Jun 2014 by 1.277 million or 5.3 percent while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.740 million in Jun 2014 by 1.797 million or 4.9 percent. The youth civilian labor force fell from 24.664 million in Jul 2006 to 23.437 million in Jul 2014 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.735 million in Jul 2014. The youth civilian labor force fell 1.818 million from 23.634 million in Aug 2006 to 21.816 million in Aug 2014 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.008 million in Aug 2006 to 38.706 million in Aug 2914 or 1.698 million. The youth civilian labor force fell 0.942 million from 21.901 million in Sep 2006 to 20.959 million in Sep 2014 while the noninstitutional population increased 1.652 million from 37.027 million in Sep 2006 to 38.679 million in Sep 2014. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.702 million from 22.105 million in Oct 2006 to 21.403 million in Oct 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.047 million in Oct 2006 to 38.650 million in Oct 2014 or 1.603 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.111 million from 22.145 million in Nov 2006 to 21.034 million in Nov 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.628 million in Nov 2014 or 1.552 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.472 million from 22.136 million in Dec 2006 to 20.664 million in Dec 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.100 million in Dec 2006 to 38.606 million in Dec 2014 or 1.506 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.831 million from 21.368 million in Jan 2006 to 20.555 million in Jan 2015 while the youth noninstitutional population increased from 36.761 million in Jan 2006 to 38.732 million in Jan 2015 or 1.971 million. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.864 million from 21.615 million in Feb 2006 to 20.751 million in Feb 2015 while the youth noninstitutional population increased 1.914 million from 36.791 million in Feb 2006 to 38.705 million in Feb 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.907 million from 21.507 million in Mar 2006 to 20.600 million in Mar 2015 while the civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.858 million from 36.821 million in Mar 2006 to 38.679 million in Mar 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.082 million from 21.498 million in Apr 2006 to 20.416 million in Apr 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.800 million from 36.854 million in Apr 2006 to 38.654 million in Apr 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 0.681 million from 22.023 million in May 2006 to 21.342 million in May 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1,733 million from 36.897 million in May 2006 to 38.630 million in May 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.202 million from 24.128 million in Jun 2006 to 22.926 million in Jun 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.666 million from 36.943 million in Jun 2006 to 38.609 million in Jun 2015. The youth civilian labor force decreased 1.502 million from 24.664 million in Jul 2007 to 23.162 million in Jul 2015 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.600 million from 36.989 million in Jul 2006 to 38.589 million in Jul 2015. Youth in the US abandoned their participation in the labor force because of the frustration that there are no jobs available for them.
Chart I-21B, US, Civilian Labor Force Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-21C provides the ratio of labor force to noninstitutional population or labor force participation of ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted. The US labor force participation rates for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.5 in Jul 2013 because of the frustration of young people who believe there may not be jobs available for them. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 56.9 in Aug 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.1 percent in Sep 2006 to 54.6 percent in Sep 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Oct 2006 to 54.1 in Oct 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Nov 2006 to 53.7 percent in Nov 2013. The US labor force participation rate fell from 57.8 in Dec 2007 to 53.2 in Dec 2013. The youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.4 in Jan 2007 to 52.7 in Jan 2014. The US youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.0 percent in Feb 2007 to 52.6 percent in Feb 2013. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 58.0 in Mar 2007 to 54.0 in Mar 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.4 in Apr 2007 to 52.8 in Apr 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.9 in May 2007 to 54.6 in May 2014. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.0 in Jun 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.5 in Jul 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 56.4 in Aug 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.1 in Sep 2006 to 54.2 in Sep 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.7 in Oct 2006 to 55.4 in Oct 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.7 in Nov 2006 to 54.5 in Nov 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.7 in Dec 2006 to 53.5 in Dec 2014. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.1 in Jan 2006 to 53.1 in Jan 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 58.8 in Feb 2006 to 53.6 in Feb 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 58.4 in Mar 2006 to 53.3 in Mar 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 58.7 in Apr 2005 to 52.8 in Apr 2006. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 59.7 in May 2006 to 55.2 in May 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 64 fell from 65.3 in Jun 2006 to 59.4 in Jun 2015. The labor force participation rate ages 16 to 24 fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.0 in Jul 2014. Many young people abandoned searches for employment, dropping from the labor force.
Chart I-21C, US, Labor Force Participation Rate Ages 16 to 24 Years, NSA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
An important measure of the job market is the number of people with jobs relative to population available for work (civilian noninstitutional population) or employment/population ratio. Chart I-21D provides the employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years. The US employment/population ratio NSA for ages 16 to 24 years collapsed from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 50.7 in Jul 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years dropped from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 48.0 in Aug 2013. The employment population ratio for ages to 16 to 24 years declined from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 46.5 in Sep 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 46.3 in Oct 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.7 in Nov 2007 to 46.7 in Nov 2013. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.6 in Dec 2007 to 46.7 in Dec 2013. The US employment population ratio fell from 52.1 in Jan 2007 to 44.8 in Jan 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.0 in Feb 2007 to 44.8 in Feb 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.3 in Mar 2007 to 46.3 in Mar 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.9 in Apr 2007 to 46.5 in Apr 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.1 in May 2007 to 47.3 in May 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 50.1 in Jun 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 50.1 in Jul 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 49.0 in Aug 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 46.8 in Sep 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 48.6 in Oct 2014. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.7 in Nov 2006 to 48.1 in Nov 2014. The employment population ration for ages 16 to 24 fell from 54.3 in Dec 2006 to 47.5 in Dec 2014. The employment population ration for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.7 in Jan 2006 to 46.2 in Jan 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.1 in Feb 2006 to 47.1 in Feb 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.4 in Mar 2006 to 46.7 in Mar 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.7 in Apr 2006 to 47.2 in Apr 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 53.6 in May 206 to 48.4 in May 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 57.6 in Jun 2006 to 51.3 in Jun 2015. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 52.7 in Jul 2015. Chart I-21D shows vertical drop during the global recession without recovery.
Chart I-21D, US, Employment Population Ratio Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table I-11 provides US unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years. The number unemployed ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 3634 thousand in 2011 or by 1.292 million and 3451 thousand in 2012 or by 1.109 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 in 2007 to 3324 thousand in 2013 or by 0.982 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 2853 thousand in 2014 or by 0.511 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2.750 million in Jul 2006 in to 2.829 million in Jul 2015 or increase by 0.079 million. This situation may persist for many years.
Table I-11, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, NSA, Thousands
Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Dec | Annual |
2001 | 2250 | 2258 | 2253 | 2095 | 2171 | 2775 | 2585 | 2412 | 2371 |
2002 | 2754 | 2731 | 2822 | 2515 | 2568 | 3167 | 3034 | 2374 | 2683 |
2003 | 2748 | 2740 | 2601 | 2572 | 2838 | 3542 | 3200 | 2248 | 2746 |
2004 | 2767 | 2631 | 2588 | 2387 | 2684 | 3191 | 3018 | 2294 | 2638 |
2005 | 2661 | 2787 | 2520 | 2398 | 2619 | 3010 | 2688 | 2055 | 2521 |
2006 | 2366 | 2433 | 2216 | 2092 | 2254 | 2860 | 2750 | 2007 | 2353 |
2007 | 2363 | 2230 | 2096 | 2074 | 2203 | 2883 | 2622 | 2323 | 2342 |
2008 | 2633 | 2480 | 2347 | 2196 | 2952 | 3450 | 3408 | 2928 | 2830 |
2009 | 3278 | 3457 | 3371 | 3321 | 3851 | 4653 | 4387 | 3532 | 3760 |
2010 | 3983 | 3888 | 3748 | 3803 | 3854 | 4481 | 4374 | 3352 | 3857 |
2011 | 3851 | 3696 | 3520 | 3365 | 3628 | 4248 | 4110 | 3161 | 3634 |
2012 | 3416 | 3507 | 3294 | 3175 | 3438 | 4180 | 4011 | 3153 | 3451 |
2013 | 3674 | 3449 | 3261 | 3129 | 3478 | 4198 | 3821 | 2536 | 3324 |
2014 | 3051 | 3033 | 3002 | 2440 | 2831 | 3429 | 3353 | 2317 | 2853 |
2015 | 2644 | 2529 | 2524 | 2175 | 2633 | 3138 | 2829 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-22 provides the unemployment level for ages 16 to 24 from 2001 to 2015. The level rose sharply from 2007 to 2010 with tepid improvement into 2012 and deterioration into 2013-2014 with recent marginal improvement iin 2015 alternating with deterioration.
Chart I-22, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Table I-12 provides the rate of unemployment of young peoples in ages 16 to 24 years. The annual rate jumped from 10.5 percent in 2007 to 18.4 percent in 2010, 17.3 percent in 2011 and 16.2 percent in 2012. The rate of youth unemployment fell marginally to 15.5 percent in 2013, declining to 13.4 percent in Dec 2014. During the seasonal peak in Jul, the rate of youth unemployed was 18.1 percent in Jul 2011, 17.1 percent in Jul 2012 and 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 compared with 10.8 percent in Jul 2007. The rate of youth unemployment rose from 11.2 percent in Jul 2006 to 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and likely higher if adding those who ceased searching for a job in frustration none may be available. The rate of youth unemployment rose from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 14.3 in Jul 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.1 percent in Dec 2006 to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.9 percent in Jan 2007 to 14.9 percent in Jan and Feb 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 percent in Mar 2007 to 14.3 percent in Mar 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 percent in Apr 2007 to 11.9 percent in Apr 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.2 percent in May 2007 to 13.4 percent in May 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 12.0 percent in Jun 2007 to 15.0 percent in Jun 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 14.3 in Jul 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.5 in Aug 2007 to 13.0 in Aug 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 11.0 in Sep 2007 to 13.6 in Sep 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 12.2 in Oct 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Nov 2007 to 11.7 in Nov 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.7 in Dec 2007 to 11.2 in Dec 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.9 in Jan 2007 to 12.9 in Jan 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 percent in Feb 2007 to 12.2 percent in Feb 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Mar 2007 to 12.3 in Mar 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Apr 2007 to 10.7 in Apr 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.2 in May 2007 to 12.3 in May 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 11.9 in Jun 2006 to 13.7 in Jun 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 12.2 in Jul 2015. The actual rate is higher because of the difficulty in counting those dropping from the labor force because they believe there are no jobs available for them.
Table I-12, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA
Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Annual |
2001 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.2 | 9.6 | 10.0 | 11.6 | 10.5 | 10.7 | 10.5 | 11.0 | 11.2 | 11.0 | 10.6 |
2002 | 12.9 | 12.5 | 12.9 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 13.2 | 12.4 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 10.9 | 12.0 |
2003 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 12.2 | 12.0 | 13.0 | 14.8 | 13.3 | 11.9 | 12.5 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 10.5 | 12.4 |
2004 | 12.8 | 12.3 | 12.1 | 11.1 | 12.2 | 13.4 | 12.3 | 11.1 | 11.5 | 11.6 | 11.1 | 10.5 | 11.8 |
2005 | 12.4 | 13.0 | 11.7 | 11.2 | 11.9 | 12.6 | 11.0 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 9.4 | 11.3 |
2006 | 11.1 | 11.3 | 10.3 | 9.7 | 10.2 | 11.9 | 11.2 | 10.4 | 10.5 | 10.2 | 10.1 | 9.1 | 10.5 |
2007 | 10.9 | 10.3 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 10.2 | 12.0 | 10.8 | 10.5 | 11.0 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 10.5 |
2008 | 12.3 | 11.8 | 11.1 | 10.3 | 13.3 | 14.4 | 14.0 | 13.0 | 13.4 | 13.2 | 13.3 | 13.7 | 12.8 |
2009 | 15.8 | 16.4 | 16.1 | 15.8 | 18.0 | 19.9 | 18.5 | 18.0 | 18.2 | 18.5 | 18.1 | 17.5 | 17.6 |
2010 | 19.8 | 19.2 | 18.4 | 18.5 | 18.4 | 20.0 | 19.1 | 17.8 | 17.6 | 18.1 | 17.4 | 16.7 | 18.4 |
2011 | 18.9 | 18.2 | 17.2 | 16.5 | 17.5 | 18.9 | 18.1 | 17.5 | 17.0 | 16.2 | 15.9 | 15.5 | 17.3 |
2012 | 16.8 | 17.0 | 16.0 | 15.4 | 16.3 | 18.1 | 17.1 | 16.8 | 15.2 | 15.5 | 14.8 | 15.2 | 16.2 |
2013 | 17.6 | 16.7 | 15.9 | 15.1 | 16.4 | 18.0 | 16.3 | 15.6 | 14.8 | 14.4 | 13.1 | 12.3 | 15.5 |
2014 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 14.3 | 11.9 | 13.4 | 15.0 | 14.3 | 13.0 | 13.6 | 12.2 | 11.7 | 11.2 | 13.4 |
2015 | 12.9 | 12.2 | 12.3 | 10.7 | 12.3 | 13.7 | 12.2 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-23 provides the BLS estimate of the not-seasonally-adjusted rate of youth unemployment for ages 16 to 24 years from 2001 to 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased sharply during the global recession of 2008 and 2009 but has failed to drop to earlier lower levels because of low growth of GDP. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E. Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.
Chart I-23, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent, NSA, 2001-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-24 provides longer perspective with the rate of youth unemployment in ages 16 to 24 years from 1948 to 2015. The rate of youth unemployment rose to 20 percent during the contractions of the early 1980s and also during the contraction of the global recession in 2008 and 2009. The data illustrate again the argument in this blog that the contractions of the early 1980s are the valid framework for comparison with the global recession of 2008 and 2009 instead of misleading comparisons with the 1930s. During the initial phase of recovery, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years NSA fell from 18.9 percent in Jun 1983 to 14.5 percent in Jun 1984. In contrast, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years was nearly the same during the expansion after IIIQ2009: 17.5 percent in Dec 2009, 16.7 percent in Dec 2010, 15.5 percent in Dec 2011, 15.2 percent in Dec 2012, 17.6 percent in Jan 2013, 16.7 percent in Feb 2013, 15.9 percent in Mar 2013, 15.1 percent in Apr 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 16.4 percent in May 2013, 18.0 percent in Jun 2013, 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and 15.6 percent in Aug 2013. In Sep 2006, the rate of youth unemployment was 10.5 percent, increasing to 14.8 percent in Sep 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 in Oct 2007, increasing to 14.4 percent in Oct 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Nov 2007, increasing to 13.1 percent in Nov 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.7 percent in Dec 2013, increasing to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.9 percent in Jan 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Jan 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Feb 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Feb 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 9.7 percent in Mar 2007, increasing to 14.3 percent in Mar 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 9.7 percent in Apr 2007, increasing to 11.9 percent in Apr 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.2 percent in May 2007, increasing to 13.4 percent in May 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 12.0 percent in Jun 2007, increasing to 15.0 percent in Jun 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.8 percent in Jul 2007, increasing to 14.3 percent in Jul 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.5 percent in Aug 2007, increasing to 13.0 percent in Aug 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 11.0 percent in Sep 2007, increasing to 13.6 percent in Sep 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 in Oct 2007 to 12.2 in Oct 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.3 percent in Nov 2007 to 11.7 percent in Nov 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.7 in Dec 2007 to 11.2 in Dec 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Mar 2007 to 12.3 in Mar 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 in Apr 2007 to 10.7 in Apr 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.2 in May 2007 to 12.3 in May 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 12.0 in Jun 2007 to 13.7 in Jun 2015. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.8 in Jul 2007 to 12.2 in Jul 2015. The actual rate is higher because of the difficulty in counting those dropping from the labor force because they believe there are no jobs available for them. The difference originates in the vigorous seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent average rate of GDP growth of 5.9 percent during the recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988 compared with 2.2 percent on average during the first 23 quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IQ2015. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 24 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2015. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2015/pdf/gdp2q15_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates ( and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 would have accumulated to 24.8 percent. GDP in IIQ2015 would be $18,712.5 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,442.1 billion than actual $16,270.4 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.8 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html). US GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,270.4 billion in IIQ2015 or 8.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2015. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 136.6407 in Jul 2015. The actual index NSA in Jul 2015 is 103.7999, which is 24.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 126.9147 in Jul 2015. The output of manufacturing at 103.7999 in Jul 2015 is 18.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart I-24, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent NSA, 1948-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
It is more difficult to move to other jobs after a certain age because of fewer available opportunities for mature individuals than for new entrants into the labor force. Middle-aged unemployed are less likely to find another job. Table I-13 provides the unemployment level ages 45 years and over. The number unemployed ages 45 years and over rose from 1.607 million in Oct 2006 to 4.576 million in Oct 2010 or by 184.8 percent. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over declined to 3.800 million in Oct 2012 that is still higher by 136.5 percent than in Oct 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over increased from 1.704 million in Nov 2006 to 3.861 million in Nov 2012, or 126.6 percent. The number unemployed age 45 and over is still higher by 98.5 percent at 3.383 million in Nov 2013 than 1.704 million in Nov 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over jumped from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 4.762 million in Dec 2010 or 165.4 percent. At 3.927 million in Dec 2012, mature unemployment is higher by 2.133 million or 118.9 percent higher than 1.794 million in Dec 2006. The level of unemployment of those aged 45 year or more of 3.632 million in Oct 2013 is higher by 2.025 million than 1.607 million in Oct 2006 or higher by 126.0 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 3.378 million in Nov 2013 or 88.3 percent. The annual number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.848 million in 2006 to 3.719 million in 2013 or 101.2 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 4.394 million in Jan 2013, by 2.618 million or 106.7 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over rose from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 3.508 million in Jan 2014, by 1.382 million or 65.0 percent. The level of unemployed 45 years or older increased 2.051 million or 99.8 percent from 2.056 million in Feb 2006 to 4.107 million in Feb 2013 and at 3.490 million in Feb 2014 is higher by 69.7 percent than in Feb 2006. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased 2.048 million or 108.9 percent from 1.881 million in Mar 2006 to 3.929 million in Mar 2013 and at 3.394 million in Mar 2014 is higher by 80.4 percent than in Mar 2006. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased 1.846 million or 100.2 percent from 1.843 million in Apr 2006 to 3.689 million in Apr 2013 and at 3.006 million in Apr 2014 is higher by 1.163 million or 63.1 percent. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 102.1 percent from 1.784 million in May 2006 to 3.605 million in May 2014 and at 2.913 million in May 2014 is higher by 63.3 percent than in May 2007.
The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 102.1 percent from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 3.648 million in Jun 2013 and at 2.832 million in Jun 2014 is higher by 56.9 percent than in Jun 2007. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 81.5 percent from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 3.727 million in Jul 2013 and at 3.083 million in Jul 2014 is higher by 50.2 percent than in Jul 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 84.4 percent from 1.956 million in Aug 2007 to 3.607 million in Aug 2013 and at 3.037 million in Aug 2014 is 55.2 percent higher than in Aug 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 90.7 percent from 1.854 million in Sep 2007 to 3.535 million in Sep 2013 and at 2.640 million in Sep 2014 is 42.4 percent higher than in Sep 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.747 million from 1.885 million in Oct 2007 to 3.632 million in Oct 2013 and at 2.606 million in Oct 2014 is 38.2 percent higher than in Oct 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.458 million from 1.925 million in Nov 2007 to 3.383 million in Nov 2013 and at 2.829 million in Nov 2014 is 47.0 percent higher than in Nov 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.258 million from Dec 2007 to Dec 2013 and at 2.667 million in Dec 2014 is 25.8 higher than in Dec 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.353 million from Jan 2007 to Jan 2015 and at 3.077 million in Jan 2015 is 42.8 percent higher than in Jan 2007. The level unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.352 million from 2.138 million in Feb 2007 to 3.490 million in Feb 2014 and at 2.991 million in Feb 2015 is 39.9 percent higher than in Feb 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased 1.363 million from 2.031 million in Mar 2007 to 3.394 million in Mar 2014 and at 2.724 million in Mar 2015 is 34.1 percent higher than in Mar 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.871 million in Apr 2007 to 3.006 million in Apr 2014 and at 2.579 million in Apr 2015 is 37.8 higher than in Apr 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.803 million in May 2007 to 2.913 million in Jun 2014 and at 2.457 million in May 2015 is 36.3 percent higher than in May 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 1.805 million in Jun 2007 to 2.832 million in Jun 2014 and at 2.359 million in Jun 2015 is 30.7 percent higher than in Jun 2007. The level of unemployed ages 45 years and over increased from 2.053 million in Jul 2007 to 3.083 million in Jul 2014 and at 2.666 million in Jul 2015 is 30.0 percent higher than in Jul 2007. The actual number unemployed is likely much higher because many are not accounted who abandoned job searches in frustration there may not be a job for them. Recent improvements may be illusory.
Table I-13, US, Unemployment Level 45 Years and Over, Thousands NSA
Year | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Dec | Annual |
2000 | 1498 | 1392 | 1291 | 1062 | 1074 | 1163 | 1253 | 1217 | 1249 |
2001 | 1572 | 1587 | 1533 | 1421 | 1259 | 1371 | 1539 | 1901 | 1576 |
2002 | 2235 | 2280 | 2138 | 2101 | 1999 | 2190 | 2173 | 2210 | 2114 |
2003 | 2495 | 2415 | 2485 | 2287 | 2112 | 2212 | 2281 | 2130 | 2253 |
2004 | 2453 | 2397 | 2354 | 2160 | 2025 | 2182 | 2116 | 2086 | 2149 |
2005 | 2286 | 2286 | 2126 | 1939 | 1844 | 1868 | 2119 | 1963 | 2009 |
2006 | 2126 | 2056 | 1881 | 1843 | 1784 | 1813 | 1985 | 1794 | 1848 |
2007 | 2155 | 2138 | 2031 | 1871 | 1803 | 1805 | 2053 | 2120 | 1966 |
2008 | 2336 | 2336 | 2326 | 2104 | 2095 | 2211 | 2492 | 3485 | 2540 |
2009 | 4138 | 4380 | 4518 | 4172 | 4175 | 4505 | 4757 | 4960 | 4500 |
2010 | 5314 | 5307 | 5194 | 4770 | 4565 | 4564 | 4821 | 4762 | 4879 |
2011 | 5027 | 4837 | 4748 | 4373 | 4356 | 4559 | 4772 | 4182 | 4537 |
2012 | 4458 | 4472 | 4390 | 4037 | 4083 | 4084 | 4405 | 3927 | 4133 |
2013 | 4394 | 4107 | 3929 | 3689 | 3605 | 3648 | 3727 | 3378 | 3719 |
2014 | 3508 | 3490 | 3394 | 3006 | 2913 | 2832 | 3083 | 2667 | 3000 |
2015 | 3077 | 2991 | 2724 | 2579 | 2457 | 2359 | 2666 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
Chart I-25 provides the level unemployed ages 45 years and over. There was an increase in the recessions of the 1980s, 1991 and 2001 followed by declines to earlier levels. The current expansion of the economy after IIIQ2009 has not been sufficiently vigorous to reduce significantly middle-age unemployment. Recent improvements could be illusory because many abandoned job searches in frustration that there may not be jobs for them and are not counted as unemployed.
Chart I-25, US, Unemployment Level Ages 45 Years and Over, Thousands, NSA, 1976-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/
II Rules, Discretionary Authorities and Slow Productivity Growth. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the Department of Labor provides the quarterly report on productivity and costs. The operational definition of productivity used by the BLS is (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/prod2.pdf 1): “Labor productivity, or output per hour, is calculated by dividing an index of real output by an index of hours worked of all persons, including employees, proprietors, and unpaid family workers.” The BLS has revised the estimates for productivity and unit costs. Table II-1 provides the revised estimate for IIQ2015 and revision of the estimates for IQ2015 and IVQ2014 together with data for nonfarm business sector productivity and unit labor costs in seasonally adjusted annual equivalent (SAAE) rate and the percentage change from the same quarter a year earlier. Reflecting increase in output of 2.8 percent and increase of 1.5 percent in hours worked, nonfarm business sector labor productivity increased at the SAAE rate of 1.3 percent in IIQ2015, as shown in column 2 “IIQ2015 SAEE.” The increase of labor productivity from IIQ2014 to IIQ2015 was 0.3 percent, reflecting increases in output of 2.8 percent and of hours worked of 2.6 percent, as shown in column 3 “IIQ2015 YoY.” Hours worked changed from 4.9 percent in IVQ2014 in SAAE to 1.6 percent in IQ2014 and decreased to 1.5 percent in IIQ2015 while output growth decreased from 2.6 percent in IVQ2014 to 0.5 percent in IQ2015, increasing to 2.8 percent in IIQ2015. The BLS defines unit labor costs as (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/prod2.pdf 1): “BLS calculates unit labor costs as the ratio of hourly compensation to labor productivity; increases in hourly compensation tend to increase unit labor costs and increases in output per hour tend to reduce them.” Unit labor costs increased at the SAAE rate of 0.5 percent in IIQ2015 and increased 2.1 percent in IIQ2015 relative to IIQ2014. Hourly compensation increased at the SAAE rate of 1.8 percent in IIQ2015, which deflating by the estimated consumer price increase SAAE rate in IIQ2015 results in decrease of real hourly compensation at 1.1 percent. Real hourly compensation increased 2.3 percent in IIQ2015 relative to IIQ2014.
Table II-1, US, Nonfarm Business Sector Productivity and Costs %
II 2015 SAAE | IIQ 2015 YoY | IQ 2015 SSAE | IQ 2015 YOY | IVQ | IVQ | |
Productivity | 1.3 | 0.3 | -1.1 | 0.6 | -2.2 | 0.0 |
Output | 2.8 | 2.8 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 3.0 |
Hours | 1.5 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 4.9 | 3.0 |
Hourly | 1.8 | 2.4 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 3.4 | 2.8 |
Real Hourly Comp. | -1.1 | 2.3 | 4.2 | 1.8 | 4.2 | 1.6 |
Unit Labor Costs | 0.5 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 5.7 | 2.8 |
Unit Nonlabor Payments | 4.7 | -0.4 | -1.8 | -0.7 | -8.1 | -1.0 |
Implicit Price Deflator | 2.2 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 0.9 | -0.5 | 1.1 |
Notes: SAAE: seasonally adjusted annual equivalent; Comp.: compensation; YoY: Quarter on Same Quarter Year Earlier
The analysis by Kydland (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/kydland-bio.html) and Prescott (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/prescott-bio.html) (1977, 447-80, equation 5) uses the “expectation augmented” Phillips curve with the natural rate of unemployment of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), which in the notation of Barro and Gordon (1983, 592, equation 1) is:
Ut = Unt – α(πt – πe) α > 0 (1)
Where Ut is the rate of unemployment at current time t, Unt is the natural rate of unemployment, πt is the current rate of inflation and πe is the expected rate of inflation by economic agents based on current information. Equation (1) expresses unemployment net of the natural rate of unemployment as a decreasing function of the gap between actual and expected rates of inflation. The system is completed by a social objective function, W, depending on inflation, π, and unemployment, U:
W = W(πt, Ut) (2)
The policymaker maximizes the preferences of the public, (2), subject to the constraint of the tradeoff of inflation and unemployment, (1). The total differential of W set equal to zero provides an indifference map in the Cartesian plane with ordered pairs (πt, Ut - Un) such that the consistent equilibrium is found at the tangency of an indifference curve and the Phillips curve in (1). The indifference curves are concave to the origin. The consistent policy is not optimal. Policymakers without discretionary powers following a rule of price stability would attain equilibrium with unemployment not higher than with the consistent policy. The optimal outcome is obtained by the rule of price stability, or zero inflation, and no more unemployment than under the consistent policy with nonzero inflation and the same unemployment. Taylor (1998LB) attributes the sustained boom of the US economy after the stagflation of the 1970s to following a monetary policy rule instead of discretion (see Taylor 1993, 1999). It is not uncommon for effects of regulation differing from those intended by policy. Professors Edward C. Prescott and Lee E. Ohanian (2014Feb), writing on “US productivity growth has taken a dive,” on Feb 3, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303942404579362462611843696?KEYWORDS=Prescott), argue that impressive productivity growth over the long-term constructed US prosperity and wellbeing. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) measure US productivity growth at 2.5 percent per year since 1948. Average US productivity growth has been only 1.1 percent since 2011. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) argue that living standards in the US increased at 28 percent in a decade but with current slow growth of productivity will only increase 12 percent by 2024. There may be collateral effects on productivity growth from policy design similar to those in Kydland and Prescott (1977). The Bureau of Labor Statistics important report on productivity and costs released on Jun 4, 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/lpc/) supports the argument of decline of productivity growth in the US analyzed by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb). Table II-2 provides the annual percentage changes of productivity, real hourly compensation and unit labor costs for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2014. The estimates incorporate the yearly revision of the US national accounts (Preview of the 2015 Annual Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts by Stephanie H. McCulla and Shelly Smith at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2015/06%20June/0615_preview_of_2015_annual_revision_of_national_income_and_product_accounts.pdf). The data confirm the argument of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb): productivity increased cumulatively 1.8 percent from 2011 to 2014 at the average annual rate of 0.4 percent. The situation is direr by excluding growth of 0.9 percent in 2012, which leaves an average of 0.3 percent for 2011, 2012 and 2013. Average productivity growth for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2014 is only 1.3 percent. The argument by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is proper in choosing the tail of the business cycle because the increase in productivity in 2009 of 3.2 percent and 3.3 percent in 2010 consisted of reducing labor hours.
Table II-2, US, Revised Nonfarm Business Sector Productivity and Costs Annual Average, ∆% Annual Average
2014 ∆% | 2013 ∆% | 2012 ∆% | 2011 ∆% | 2010 ∆% | 2009 ∆% | 2008 ∆% | 2007 ∆% | |
Productivity | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 0.8 | 1.6 |
Real Hourly Compensation | 1.1 | -0.4 | 0.6 | -0.9 | 0.3 | 1.4 | -1.1 | 1.4 |
Unit Labor Costs | 2.0 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 2.1 | -1.3 | -2.0 | 2.0 | 2.7 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Productivity jumped in the recovery after the recession from Mar IQ2001 to Nov IVQ2001 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). Table II-3 provides quarter on quarter and annual percentage changes in nonfarm business output per hour, or productivity, from 1999 to 2015. The annual average jumped from 2.7 percent in 2001 to 4.3 percent in 2002. Nonfarm business productivity increased at the SAAE rate of 9.4 percent in the first quarter after the recession in IQ2002. Productivity increases decline later in the expansion period. Productivity increases were mediocre during the recession from Dec IVQ2007 to Jun IIIQ2009 (http://www.nber.org/cycles.html) and increased during the first phase of expansion from IIQ2009 to IQ2010, trended lower and collapsed in 2011 and 2012 with sporadic jumps and declines. Productivity increased at 3.5 percent in IVQ2013 and contracted at 3.5 percent in IQ2014. Productivity increased at 2.8 percent in IIQ2014 and at 3.1 percent in IIIQ2014. Productivity contracted at 2.2 percent in IVQ2014 and contracted at 1.1 percent in IQ2015. Productivity grew at 1.3 percent in IIQ2015.
Table II-3, US, Nonfarm Business Output per Hour, Percent Change from Prior Quarter at Annual Rate, 1999-2015
Year | Qtr1 | Qtr2 | Qtr3 | Qtr4 | Annual |
1999 | 3.8 | 0.7 | 3.4 | 6.8 | 3.3 |
2000 | -1.4 | 8.6 | 0.1 | 4.1 | 3.3 |
2001 | -1.2 | 6.8 | 2.2 | 5.0 | 2.7 |
2002 | 9.4 | 0.3 | 3.1 | -0.6 | 4.3 |
2003 | 4.0 | 5.6 | 9.0 | 3.9 | 3.7 |
2004 | -0.1 | 4.0 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 3.1 |
2005 | 4.4 | -0.4 | 3.0 | 0.2 | 2.1 |
2006 | 2.5 | -0.3 | -1.8 | 3.2 | 0.9 |
2007 | 0.4 | 2.6 | 4.6 | 1.8 | 1.6 |
2008 | -3.9 | 4.0 | 1.0 | -2.5 | 0.8 |
2009 | 3.2 | 7.9 | 6.0 | 4.8 | 3.2 |
2010 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 3.3 |
2011 | -3.3 | 1.5 | -0.8 | 3.0 | 0.2 |
2012 | 0.6 | 2.5 | -0.8 | -2.2 | 0.9 |
2013 | -0.1 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 3.5 | 0.0 |
2014 | -3.5 | 2.8 | 3.1 | -2.2 | 0.7 |
2015 | -1.1 | 1.3 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Chart II-1 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides SAAE rates of nonfarm business productivity from 1999 to 2015. There is a clear pattern in both episodes of economic cycles in 2001 and 2007 of rapid expansion of productivity in the transition from contraction to expansion followed by more subdued productivity expansion. Part of the explanation is the reduction in labor utilization resulting from adjustment of business to the sudden shock of collapse of revenue. Productivity rose briefly in the expansion after 2009 but then collapsed and moved to negative change with some positive changes recently at lower rates. Contractions in the cycle from 2007 to 2015 have been more frequent and sharper.
Chart II-1, US, Nonfarm Business Output per Hour, Percent Change from Prior Quarter at Annual Rate, 1999-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Percentage changes from prior quarter at SAAE rates and annual average percentage changes of nonfarm business unit labor costs are provided in Table II-4. Unit labor costs fell during the contractions with continuing negative percentage changes in the early phases of the recovery. Weak labor markets partly explain the decline in unit labor costs. As the economy moves toward full employment, labor markets tighten with increase in unit labor costs. The expansion beginning in IIIQ2009 has been characterized by high unemployment and underemployment. Table II-4 shows continuing subdued increases in unit labor costs in 2011 but with increase at 8.9 percent in IQ2012 followed by decrease at 0.1 percent in IIQ2012, increase at 1.1 percent in IIIQ2012 and increase at 13.1 percent in IVQ2012. Unit labor costs decreased at 9.1 percent in IQ2013 and increased at 6.2 percent in IIQ2013. Unit labor costs decreased at 0.5 percent in IIIQ2013 and decreased at 1.2 percent in IVQ2013. Unit labor costs increased at 9.3 percent in IQ2014 and at minus 3.5 percent in IIQ2014. Unit labor costs increased at 0.1 percent in IIIQ2014 and increased at 5.7 percent in IVQ2014. Unit labor costs increased at 2.3 percent in IQ2015 and increased at 0.5 percent in IIQ2015.
Table II-4, US, Nonfarm Business Unit Labor Costs, Percent Change from Prior Quarter at Annual Rate 1999-2015
Year | Qtr1 | Qtr2 | Qtr3 | Qtr4 | Annual |
1999 | 2.8 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 0.9 |
2000 | 17.4 | -6.8 | 8.2 | -1.7 | 4.0 |
2001 | 11.4 | -5.4 | -1.7 | -1.4 | 1.6 |
2002 | -6.6 | 3.3 | -1.1 | 1.7 | -2.0 |
2003 | -1.5 | 1.6 | -2.6 | 1.5 | 0.1 |
2004 | -0.5 | 3.9 | 5.6 | 0.5 | 1.4 |
2005 | -1.3 | 2.6 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 1.6 |
2006 | 6.1 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 3.0 |
2007 | 9.8 | -2.7 | -3.2 | 2.6 | 2.7 |
2008 | 8.2 | -3.6 | 2.4 | 7.1 | 2.0 |
2009 | -12.3 | 2.1 | -3.0 | -2.3 | -2.0 |
2010 | -4.8 | 3.2 | -0.2 | 0.2 | -1.3 |
2011 | 11.0 | -3.5 | 3.3 | -7.7 | 2.1 |
2012 | 8.9 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 13.1 | 1.7 |
2013 | -9.1 | 6.2 | -0.5 | -1.2 | 1.1 |
2014 | 9.3 | -3.5 | 0.1 | 5.7 | 2.0 |
2015 | 2.3 | 0.5 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Chart II-2 provides change of unit labor costs at SAAE from 1999 to 2015. There are multiple oscillations recently with negative changes alternating with positive changes.
Chart II-2, US, Nonfarm Business Unit Labor Costs, Percent Change from Prior Quarter at Annual Rate 1999-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Table II-5 provides percentage change from prior quarter at annual rates for nonfarm business real hourly worker compensation. The expansion after the contraction of 2001 was followed by strong recovery of real hourly compensation. Real hourly compensation increased at the rate of 2.9 percent in IQ2011 but fell at annual rates of 6.4 percent in IIQ2011 and 6.6 percent in IVQ2011. Real hourly compensation increased at 7.2 percent in IQ2012, increasing at 1.4 percent in IIQ2012, declining at 1.5 percent in IIIQ2012 and increasing at 7.9 percent in IVQ2012. Real hourly compensation fell at 0.9 percent in 2011 and increased at 0.6 percent in 2012. Real hourly compensation fell at 10.5 percent in IQ2013 and increased at 6.5 percent in IIQ2013, falling at 1.4 percent in IIIQ2013. Real hourly compensation increased at 0.9 percent in IVQ2013 and at 3.4 percent in IQ2014. Real hourly compensation decreased at 3.1 percent in IIQ2014. Real hourly compensation increased at 2.0 percent in IIIQ2014. The annual rate of increase of real hourly compensation for 2013 is minus 0.4 percent. Real hourly compensation increased at 4.2 percent in IVQ2014. The annual rate of increase of real hourly compensation in 2014 is 1.1 percent. Real hourly compensation increased at 4.2 percent in IQ2015 and fell at 1.1 percent in IIQ2015.
Table II-5, Nonfarm Business Real Hourly Compensation, Percent Change from Prior Quarter at Annual Rate 1999-2015
Year | Qtr1 | Qtr2 | Qtr3 | Qtr4 | Annual |
1999 | 5.0 | -1.9 | 0.3 | 5.4 | 2.0 |
2000 | 11.3 | -1.8 | 4.4 | -0.5 | 3.9 |
2001 | 6.0 | -1.7 | -0.7 | 4.0 | 1.5 |
2002 | 0.7 | 0.4 | -0.2 | -1.4 | 0.7 |
2003 | -1.5 | 8.0 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 1.5 |
2004 | -4.0 | 4.8 | 4.3 | -2.5 | 1.8 |
2005 | 1.2 | -0.6 | -1.1 | -1.1 | 0.2 |
2006 | 6.4 | -3.3 | -3.3 | 9.2 | 0.7 |
2007 | 5.9 | -4.5 | -1.2 | -0.6 | 1.4 |
2008 | -0.4 | -4.7 | -2.6 | 14.5 | -1.1 |
2009 | -7.0 | 7.8 | -0.6 | -0.7 | 1.4 |
2010 | -3.3 | 4.9 | 0.7 | -1.5 | 0.3 |
2011 | 2.9 | -6.4 | -0.2 | -6.6 | -0.9 |
2012 | 7.2 | 1.4 | -1.5 | 7.9 | 0.6 |
2013 | -10.5 | 6.5 | -1.4 | 0.9 | -0.4 |
2014 | 3.4 | -3.1 | 2.0 | 4.2 | 1.1 |
2015 | 4.2 | -1.1 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Chart II-3 provides percentage change from prior quarter at annual rate of nonfarm business real hourly compensation. There have been multiple negative percentage quarterly changes in the current cycle since IVQ2007.
Chart II-3, US, Nonfarm Business Real Hourly Compensation, Percent Change from Prior Quarter at Annual Rate 1999-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Chart II-4 provides percentage change of nonfarm business output per hour in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier. As in most series of real output, productivity increased sharply in 2010 but the momentum was lost after 2011 as with the rest of the real economy.
Chart II-4, US, Nonfarm Business Output per Hour, Percent Change from Same Quarter a Year Earlier 1999-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Chart II-5 provides percentage changes of nonfarm business unit labor costs relative to the same quarter a year earlier. Softening of labor markets caused relatively high yearly percentage changes in the recession of 2001 repeated in the recession in 2009. Recovery was strong in 2010 but then weakened.
Chart II-5, US, Nonfarm Business Unit Labor Costs, Percent Change from Same Quarter a Year Earlier 1999-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Chart II-6 provides percentage changes in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier for nonfarm business real hourly compensation. Labor compensation eroded sharply during the recession with brief recovery in 2010 and another fall until recently.
Chart II-6, US, Nonfarm Business Real Hourly Compensation, Percent Change from Same Quarter a Year Earlier 1999-2015
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 3) of secular stagnation, economic progress consists of growth of real income per person driven by growth of productivity. The “constituent elements” of economic progress are “(a) inventions, (b) the discovery and development of new territory and new resources, and (c) the growth of population” (Hansen 1939, 3). Secular stagnation originates in decline of population growth and discouragement of inventions. According to Hansen (1939, 2), US population grew by 16 million in the 1920s but grew by one half or about 8 million in the 1930s with forecasts at the time of Hansen’s writing in 1938 of growth of around 5.3 million in the 1940s. Hansen (1939, 2) characterized demography in the US as “a drastic decline in the rate of population growth.” Hansen’s plea was to adapt economic policy to stagnation of population in ensuring full employment. In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 8), population caused half of the growth of US GDP per year. Growth of output per person in the US and Europe was caused by “changes in techniques and to the exploitation of new natural resources.” In this analysis, population caused 60 percent of the growth of capital formation in the US. Declining population growth would reduce growth of capital formation. Residential construction provided an important share of growth of capital formation. Hansen (1939, 12) argues that market power of imperfect competition discourages innovation with prolonged use of obsolete capital equipment. Trade unions would oppose labor-savings innovations. The combination of stagnating and aging population with reduced innovation caused secular stagnation. Hansen (1939, 12) concludes that there is role for public investments to compensate for lack of dynamism of private investment but with tough tax/debt issues.
The current application of Hansen’s (1938, 1939, 1941) proposition argues that secular stagnation occurs because full employment equilibrium can be attained only with negative real interest rates between minus 2 and minus 3 percent. Professor Lawrence H. Summers (2013Nov8) finds that “a set of older ideas that went under the phrase secular stagnation are not profoundly important in understanding Japan’s experience in the 1990s and may not be without relevance to America’s experience today” (emphasis added). Summers (2013Nov8) argues there could be an explanation in “that the short-term real interest rate that was consistent with full employment had fallen to -2% or -3% sometime in the middle of the last decade. Then, even with artificial stimulus to demand coming from all this financial imprudence, you wouldn’t see any excess demand. And even with a relative resumption of normal credit conditions, you’d have a lot of difficulty getting back to full employment.” The US economy could be in a situation where negative real rates of interest with fed funds rates close to zero as determined by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) do not move the economy to full employment or full utilization of productive resources. Summers (2013Oct8) finds need of new thinking on “how we manage an economy in which the zero nominal interest rates is a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economy activity holding our economies back to their potential.”
Former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (2014Jan8) finds three major risks in prolonged unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing: (1) incentive of delaying action by political leaders; (2) “financial moral hazard” in inducing excessive exposures pursuing higher yields of risker credit classes; and (3) major risks in exiting unconventional policy. Rubin (2014Jan8) proposes reduction of deficits by structural reforms that could promote recovery by improving confidence of business attained with sound fiscal discipline.
Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) provides clear thought on the lack of relevance of Hansen’s contention of secular stagnation to current economic conditions. The application of secular stagnation argues that the economy of the US has attained full-employment equilibrium since around 2000 only with negative real rates of interest of minus 2 to minus 3 percent. At low levels of inflation, the so-called full-employment equilibrium of negative interest rates of minus 2 to minus 3 percent cannot be attained and the economy stagnates. Taylor (2014Jan01) analyzes multiple contradictions with current reality in this application of the theory of secular stagnation:
- Secular stagnation would predict idle capacity, in particular in residential investment when fed fund rates were fixed at 1 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. Taylor (2014Jan01) finds unemployment at 4.4 percent with house prices jumping 7 percent from 2002 to 2003 and 14 percent from 2004 to 2005 before dropping from 2006 to 2007. GDP prices doubled from 1.7 percent to 3.4 percent when interest rates were low from 2003 to 2005.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the application of secular stagnation based on low interest rates because of savings glut and lack of investment opportunities. Taylor (2009) shows that there was no savings glut. The savings rate of the US in the past decade is significantly lower than in the 1980s.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the low ratio of investment to GDP currently and reduced investment and hiring by US business firms.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the financial crisis and global recession were caused by weak implementation of existing regulation and departure from rules-based policies.
- Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the recovery from the global recession was constrained by a change in the regime of regulation and fiscal/monetary policies.
The analysis by Kydland (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/kydland-bio.html) and Prescott (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/prescott-bio.html) (1977, 447-80, equation 5) uses the “expectation augmented” Phillips curve with the natural rate of unemployment of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), which in the notation of Barro and Gordon (1983, 592, equation 1) is:
Ut = Unt – α(πt – πe) α > 0 (1)
Where Ut is the rate of unemployment at current time t, Unt is the natural rate of unemployment, πt is the current rate of inflation and πe is the expected rate of inflation by economic agents based on current information. Equation (1) expresses unemployment net of the natural rate of unemployment as a decreasing function of the gap between actual and expected rates of inflation. The system is completed by a social objective function, W, depending on inflation, π, and unemployment, U:
W = W(πt, Ut) (2)
The policymaker maximizes the preferences of the public, (2), subject to the constraint of the tradeoff of inflation and unemployment, (1). The total differential of W set equal to zero provides an indifference map in the Cartesian plane with ordered pairs (πt, Ut - Un) such that the consistent equilibrium is found at the tangency of an indifference curve and the Phillips curve in (1). The indifference curves are concave to the origin. The consistent policy is not optimal. Policymakers without discretionary powers following a rule of price stability would attain equilibrium with unemployment not higher than with the consistent policy. The optimal outcome is obtained by the rule of price stability, or zero inflation, and no more unemployment than under the consistent policy with nonzero inflation and the same unemployment. Taylor (1998LB) attributes the sustained boom of the US economy after the stagflation of the 1970s to following a monetary policy rule instead of discretion (see Taylor 1993, 1999). It is not uncommon for effects of regulation differing from those intended by policy. Professors Edward C. Prescott and Lee E. Ohanian (2014Feb), writing on “US productivity growth has taken a dive,” on Feb 3, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303942404579362462611843696?KEYWORDS=Prescott), argue that impressive productivity growth over the long-term constructed US prosperity and wellbeing. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) measure US productivity growth at 2.5 percent per year since 1948. Average US productivity growth has been only 1.1 since 2011. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) argue that living standards in the US increased at 28 percent in a decade but with current slow growth of productivity will only increase 12 percent by 2024. There may be collateral effects on productivity growth from policy design similar to those in Kydland and Prescott (1977). The Bureau of Labor Statistics important report on productivity and costs released on Jun 4, 2015 (http://www.bls.gov/lpc/) supports the argument of decline of productivity in the US analyzed by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb). Table II-2 provides the annual percentage changes of productivity, real hourly compensation and unit labor costs for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2014. The data confirm the argument of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb): productivity increased cumulatively 2.8 percent from 2011 to 2014 at the average annual rate of 0.7 percent. The situation is direr by excluding growth of 1.0 percent in 2012, which leaves an average of 0.6 percent for 2011, 2013 and 2014. Average productivity growth for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2014 is only 1.5 percent. The argument by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is proper in choosing the tail of the business cycle because the increase in productivity in 2009 of 3.2 percent and 3.3 percent in 2013 consisted on reducing labor hours.
In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share si of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate yi of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):
Y = ∑isiyi (1)
This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):
∆Y = ∑i∆siy*i + ∑i∆yis*i (2)
The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆si multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*i , or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆yi, multiplied by the average share of the group s*i, or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:
“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”
The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-6). Simon Kuznets (1971) analyzes modern economic growth in his Lecture in Memory of Alfred Nobel:
“The major breakthroughs in the advance of human knowledge, those that constituted dominant sources of sustained growth over long periods and spread to a substantial part of the world, may be termed epochal innovations. And the changing course of economic history can perhaps be subdivided into economic epochs, each identified by the epochal innovation with the distinctive characteristics of growth that it generated. Without considering the feasibility of identifying and dating such economic epochs, we may proceed on the working assumption that modern economic growth represents such a distinct epoch - growth dating back to the late eighteenth century and limited (except in significant partial effects) to economically developed countries. These countries, so classified because they have managed to take adequate advantage of the potential of modern technology, include most of Europe, the overseas offshoots of Western Europe, and Japan—barely one quarter of world population.”
Chart II-7 provides nonfarm-business labor productivity, measured by output per hour, from 1947 to 2015. The rate of productivity increase continued in the early part of the 2000s but then softened and fell during the global recession. The interruption of productivity increases occurred exclusively in the current business cycle. Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) find “primarily cyclic” factors in explaining the frustration of currently depressed labor markets in the United States. Stagnation of productivity is another cyclic event and not secular trend. The theory and application of secular stagnation to current US economic conditions is void of reality.
Chart II-7, US, Nonfarm Business Labor Productivity, Output per Hour, 1947-2015, Index 2005=100
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Table II-6 expands Table II-2 providing more complete measurements of the Productivity and Cost research of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The proper emphasis of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is on the low productivity increases from 2011 to 2014. Labor productivity increased 3.3 percent in 2010 and 3.2 percent in 2009. There is much stronger yet not sustained performance in 2010 with productivity growing 3.3 percent because of growth of output of 3.2 percent with decline of hours worked of 0.1 percent. Productivity growth of 3.2 percent in 2009 consists of decline of output by 4.3 percent while hours worked collapsed 7.2 percent, which is not a desirable route to progress. The expansion phase of the economic cycle concentrated in one year, 2010, with underperformance in the remainder of the expansion from 2011 to 2014 of productivity growth at average 0.4 percent per year.
Table II-6, US, Productivity and Costs, Annual Percentage Changes 2007-2014
2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | |
Productivity | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 0.8 | 1.6 |
Output | 3.0 | 1.7 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 3.2 | -4.3 | -1.3 | 2.3 |
Hours Worked | 2.3 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.0 | -0.1 | -7.2 | -2.0 | 0.7 |
Employment | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.6 | -1.2 | -5.7 | -1.5 | 0.9 |
Average Weekly Hours Worked | 0.2 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.1 | -1.6 | -0.6 | -0.2 |
Unit Labor Costs | 2.0 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 2.1 | -1.3 | -2.0 | 2.0 | 2.7 |
Hourly Compensation | 2.7 | 1.1 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.1 | 2.7 | 4.3 |
Consumer Price Inflation | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 1.6 | -0.4 | 3.8 | 2.8 |
Real Hourly Compensation | 1.1 | -0.4 | 0.6 | -0.9 | 0.3 | 1.4 | -1.1 | 1.4 |
Non-labor Payments | 3.9 | 3.8 | 5.3 | 3.7 | 7.5 | 0.0 | -0.4 | 3.4 |
Output per Job | 0.9 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 4.5 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 1.4 |
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Productivity growth can bring about prosperity while productivity regression can jeopardize progress. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in USD fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in Japan and France within the G7 in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Table II-7 provides average growth rates of indicators in the research of productivity and growth of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. There is dramatic decline of productivity growth from 2.2 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2014 to 1.3 percent per year on average in the whole cycle from 2007 to 2014. Productivity increased at the average rate of 2.3 percent from 1947 to 2007. There is profound drop in the average rate of output growth from 3.4 percent on average from 1947 to 2014 to 1.1 percent from 2007 to 2014. Output grew at 3.7 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. US economic growth has been at only 2.1 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 24 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2015. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the first estimate of GDP for IIQ2015 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2015/pdf/gdp2q15_adv.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,745.9 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,355.6 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,745.9/$14,355.6 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates ( and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1987, 4.9 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1988, 4.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1988 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 would have accumulated to 24.8 percent. GDP in IIQ2015 would be $18,712.5 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,442.1 billion than actual $16,270.4 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.8 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html). US GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,270.4 billion in IIQ2015 or 8.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2015. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 136.6407 in Jul 2015. The actual index NSA in Jul 2015 is 103.7999, which is 24.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 126.9147 in Jul 2015. The output of manufacturing at 103.7999 in Jul 2015 is 18.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table II-7, US, Productivity and Costs, Average Annual Percentage Changes 2007-2014 and 1947-2014
Average Annual Percentage Rate 2007-2014 | Average Annual Percentage Rate 1947-2007 | Average Annual Percentage Rate 1947-2014 | |
Productivity | 1.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 |
Output | 1.1 | 3.7 | 3.4 |
Hours | -1.5* | 1.4 | 1.2 |
Employment | -1.2* | 1.6 | 1.5 |
Average Weekly Hours | -0.3* | -14.6* | -14.8* |
Hourly Compensation | 1.9 | 5.4 | 5.0 |
Consumer Price Inflation | 1.9 | 3.8 | 3.6 |
Real Hourly Compensation | 0.1 | 1.7 | 1.5 |
Unit Labor Costs | 0.8 | 3.0 | 2.8 |
Unit Non-labor Payments | 2.3 | 3.5 | 3.3 |
Output per Job | 1.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 |
* Percentage Change
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Unit labor costs increased sharply during the Great Inflation from the late 1960s to 1981 as shown by sharper slope in Chart II-8. Unit labor costs continued to increase but at a lower rate because of cyclic factors and not because of imaginary secular stagnation.
Chart II-8, US, Nonfarm Business, Unit Labor Costs, 1947-2015, Index 2009=100
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
Real hourly compensation increased at relatively high rates after 1947 to the early 1970s but reached a plateau that lasted until the early 1990s, as shown in Chart II-9. There were rapid increases until the global recession. Cyclic factors and not alleged secular stagnation explain the interruption of increases in real hourly compensation.
Chart II-9, US, Nonfarm Business, Real Hourly Compensation, 1947-2015, Index 2009=100
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/
IIA United States Industrial Production. There is socio-economic stress in the combination of adverse events and cyclical performance:
- Mediocre economic growth below potential and long-term trend, resulting in idle productive resources with GDP two trillion dollars below trend (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html). US GDP grew at the average rate of 3.3 percent per year from 1929 to 2014 with similar performance in whole cycles of contractions and expansions but only at 1.1 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2014. GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than what it would have been had it grown at trend of 3.0 percent
- Private fixed investment stagnating at increase of 4.7 percent in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html)
- Twenty five million or 14.8 percent of the effective labor force unemployed or underemployed in involuntary part-time jobs with stagnating or declining real wages (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html)
- Stagnating real disposable income per person or income per person after inflation and taxes (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html)
- Depressed hiring that does not afford an opportunity for reducing unemployment/underemployment and moving to better-paid jobs (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/oscillating-valuations-of-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/volatility-of-financial-asset.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/dollar-revaluation-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-exchange-rate-struggle-recovery.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/g20-monetary-policy-recovery-without.html)
- Productivity growth fell from 2.2 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2014 and average 2.3 percent per year from 1947 to 2007 to 1.3 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2014, deteriorating future growth and prosperity (Section II and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/quite-high-equity-valuations-and.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/financial-risks-twenty-six-million.html)
- Output of manufacturing in Jul 2015 at 24.0 percent below long-term trend since 1919 and at 18.2 percent below trend since 1986 (Section II and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/fluctuating-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)
- Unsustainable government deficit/debt and balance of payments deficit (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/valuation-risks-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/theory-and-reality-of-cyclical-slow.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/interest-rate-risks-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/tapering-quantitative-easing-mediocre.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Worldwide waves of inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/interest-rate-policy-and-dollar.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/irrational-exuberance-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/competitive-currency-conflicts-world.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/financial-oscillations-world-inflation.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/monetary-policy-world-inflation-waves.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/world-inflation-waves-united-states.html)
- Deteriorating terms of trade and net revenue margins of production across countries in squeeze of economic activity by carry trades induced by zero interest rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/global-portfolio-reallocations-squeeze.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/impatience-with-monetary-policy-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/world-financial-turbulence-squeeze-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/01/exchange-rate-conflicts-squeeze-of.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/patience-on-interest-rate-increases.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/squeeze-of-economic-activity-by-carry.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/imf-view-squeeze-of-economic-activity.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/world-inflation-waves-squeeze-of.html)
- Financial repression of interest rates and credit affecting the most people without means and access to sophisticated financial investments with likely adverse effects on income distribution and wealth disparity (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/international-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/higher-volatility-of-asset-prices-at.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/dollar-devaluation-and-carry-trade.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/04/volatility-of-valuations-of-financial.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/global-competitive-devaluation-rules.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/02/job-creation-and-monetary-policy-twenty.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/11/growth-uncertainties-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/10/world-financial-turbulence-twenty-seven.html)
- 45 million in poverty and 41 million without health insurance with family income adjusted for inflation regressing to 1995 levels (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/duration-dumping-and-peaking-valuations.html)
- Net worth of households and nonprofits organizations increasing by 13.2 percent after adjusting for inflation in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IQ2015 when it would have grown over 24.8 percent at trend of 3.1 percent per year in real terms from 1945 to 2014 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/fluctuating-financial-asset-valuations.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/03/dollar-revaluation-and-financial-risk.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/12/valuations-of-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/09/financial-volatility-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/06/financial-indecision-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/12/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html). Financial assets increased $16.4 trillion while nonfinancial assets increased $1.5 trillion with likely concentration of wealth in those with access to sophisticated financial investments. Real estate assets adjusted for inflation fell 8.1 percent from 2007 to IQ2015
Industrial production increased 0.6 percent in Jul 2015 and increased 0.1 percent in Jun 2015 after decreasing 0.3 percent in May 2015, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Jul 21, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. Total IP is now reported to have increased slightly less than 2 1/2 percent per year, on average, from 2011 through 2013 before advancing about 4 1/2 percent in 2014 and falling back somewhat in the first half of 2015. Relative to earlier reports, the current rates of change are lower---especially for 2012 and 2013. For the most recent recession, total IP still shows a peak-to-trough decline of about 17 percent, and the dates for the peak and trough are unaltered. However, the lower rates of change for recent years indicate that the recovery in the industrial sector since the trough has been slower than reported earlier. Total IP is now estimated to have returned to its pre-recession peak in May 2014, seven months later than previously estimated.”
The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm):
“Industrial production increased 0.6 percent in July after moving up 0.1 percent in June. In July, manufacturing output advanced 0.8 percent primarily because of an increase in motor vehicle assemblies. The output of motor vehicles and parts jumped 10.6 percent, and production elsewhere in manufacturing edged up 0.1 percent. The index for mining rose 0.2 percent, while the index for utilities fell 1.0 percent. At 107.5 percent of its 2012 average, total industrial production in July was 1.3 percent above its year-earlier level. (The comparison base year for industrial production was advanced to 2012 in the annual revision to the statistics published on July 21, 2015.) Capacity utilization for the industrial sector increased 0.3 percentage point in July to 78.0 percent, a rate that is 2.1 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2014) average.” In the six months ending in Jul 2015, United States national industrial production accumulated change of minus 0.2 percent at the annual equivalent rate of minus 0.4 percent, which is lower than growth of 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015. Excluding growth of 0.6 percent in Jul 2015, growth in the remaining five months from Feb 2014 to Jul 2015 accumulated to minus 0.8 percent or minus 1.9 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production declined in four of the past six months and changed 0.1 percent in one month. Industrial production expanded at annual equivalent 1.6 percent in the most recent quarter from May 2015 to Jul 2015 and contracted at 2.4 percent in the prior quarter Feb 2015 to Apr 2015. Business equipment accumulated increase of 0.4 percent in the six months from Feb 2015 to Jul 2015 at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent, which is lower than growth of 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “Capacity utilization for the industrial sector increased 0.3 percentage point in July to 78.0 percent, a rate that is 2.1 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2014) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration and weakening growth in past months.
Table I-1, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, SA, ∆%
Jul 15 | Jun 15 | May 15 | Apr 15 | Mar 15 | Feb 15 | Jul 15/ Jul 14 | |
Total | 0.6 | 0.1 | -0.3 | -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 1.3 |
Market | |||||||
Final Products | 0.8 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 0.7 |
Consumer Goods | 1.2 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.2 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 2.3 |
Business Equipment | 0.1 | -0.2 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.4 | 1.1 |
Non | -0.1 | 0.6 | -0.4 | 0.3 | -0.7 | -0.2 | 1.1 |
Construction | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | -1.3 | -0.9 | 1.0 |
Materials | 0.6 | 0.2 | -0.4 | -0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.9 |
Industry Groups | |||||||
Manufacturing | 0.8 | -0.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | -0.4 | 1.5 |
Mining | 0.2 | 0.7 | -2.0 | -1.7 | 0.4 | -1.7 | -2.0 |
Utilities | -1.0 | 2.3 | -0.6 | -2.7 | -2.5 | 3.5 | 4.6 |
Capacity | 78.0 | 77.7 | 77.7 | 78.0 | 78.3 | 78.4 | 1.7 |
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Manufacturing increased 0.8 percent in Jul 2015 after decreasing 0.3 percent in Jun 2015 and increasing 0.1 percent in May 2015 seasonally adjusted, increasing 1.5 percent not seasonally adjusted in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015, as shown in Table I-2. Manufacturing grew cumulatively 0.7 percent in the six months ending in Jul 2015 or at the annual equivalent rate of 1.4 percent. Excluding the increase of 0.8 percent in Jul 2015, manufacturing contracted 0.1 percent from Feb 2015 to Jul 2015 or at the annual equivalent rate of minus 0.2 percent. Table I-2 provides a longer perspective of manufacturing in the US. There has been evident deceleration of manufacturing growth in the US from 2010 and the first three months of 2011 with recovery followed by renewed deterioration in more recent months as shown by 12 months rates of growth. Growth rates appeared to be increasing again closer to 5 percent in Apr-Jun 2012 but deteriorated. The rates of decline of manufacturing in 2009 are quite high with a drop of 18.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Apr 2009. Manufacturing recovered from this decline and led the recovery from the recession. Rates of growth appeared to be returning to the levels at 3 percent or higher in the annual rates before the recession but the pace of manufacturing fell steadily with some strength at the margin. There is renewed deterioration. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Jul 21, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. Total IP is now reported to have increased slightly less than 2 1/2 percent per year, on average, from 2011 through 2013 before advancing about 4 1/2 percent in 2014 and falling back somewhat in the first half of 2015. Relative to earlier reports, the current rates of change are lower---especially for 2012 and 2013. For the most recent recession, total IP still shows a peak-to-trough decline of about 17 percent, and the dates for the peak and trough are unaltered. However, the lower rates of change for recent years indicate that the recovery in the industrial sector since the trough has been slower than reported earlier. Total IP is now estimated to have returned to its pre-recession peak in May 2014, seven months later than previously estimated.”
The bottom part of Table I-2 shows decline of manufacturing by 22.2 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increase by 19.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2014. Manufacturing grew 19.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jul 2015. Manufacturing output in Jul 2015 is 7.2 percent below the peak in Jun 2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 would have accumulated to 24.8 percent. GDP in IIQ2015 would be $18,712.5 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,442.1 billion than actual $16,270.4 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.8 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html). US GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,270.4 billion in IIQ2015 or 8.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2015. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 136.6407 in Jul 2015. The actual index NSA in Jul 2015 is 103.7999, which is 24.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 126.9147 in Jul 2015. The output of manufacturing at 103.7999 in Jul 2015 is 18.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-2, US, Monthly and 12-Month Rates of Growth of Manufacturing ∆%
Month SA ∆% | 12-Month NSA ∆% | |
Jul 2015 | 0.8 | 1.5 |
Jun | -0.3 | 1.4 |
May | 0.1 | 2.2 |
Apr | 0.3 | 2.2 |
Mar | 0.2 | 2.4 |
Feb | -0.4 | 2.9 |
Jan | -0.3 | 4.2 |
Dec 2014 | 0.0 | 3.8 |
Nov | 0.9 | 3.8 |
Oct | 0.3 | 2.8 |
Sep | 0.2 | 2.8 |
Aug | -0.4 | 2.9 |
Jul | 0.7 | 3.6 |
Jun | 0.4 | 2.7 |
May | 0.2 | 2.5 |
Apr | 0.3 | 1.9 |
Mar | 0.7 | 2.3 |
Feb | 1.1 | 0.9 |
Jan | -0.8 | 0.0 |
Dec 2013 | 0.0 | 0.5 |
Nov | -0.1 | 1.3 |
Oct | 0.2 | 1.9 |
Sep | 0.2 | 1.3 |
Aug | 0.9 | 1.3 |
Jul | -0.8 | 0.2 |
Jun | 0.2 | 0.7 |
May | 0.2 | 0.8 |
Apr | -0.3 | 0.8 |
Mar | -0.3 | 0.5 |
Feb | 0.4 | 0.6 |
Jan | -0.2 | 0.8 |
Dec 2012 | 0.7 | 1.6 |
Nov | 0.7 | 1.9 |
Oct | -0.2 | 0.9 |
Sep | 0.0 | 1.6 |
Aug | -0.3 | 2.2 |
Jul | 0.0 | 2.6 |
Jun | 0.1 | 3.4 |
May | -0.5 | 3.5 |
Apr | 0.7 | 3.9 |
Mar | -0.6 | 2.8 |
Feb | 0.3 | 4.2 |
Jan | 1.0 | 3.5 |
Dec 2011 | 0.7 | 3.0 |
Nov | -0.3 | 2.6 |
Oct | 0.6 | 2.7 |
Sep | 0.4 | 2.6 |
Aug | 0.3 | 2.1 |
Jul | 0.7 | 2.3 |
Jun | 0.0 | 1.9 |
May | 0.2 | 1.6 |
Apr | -0.6 | 2.9 |
Mar | 0.5 | 4.6 |
Feb | 0.0 | 5.1 |
Jan | 0.3 | 5.2 |
Dec 2010 | 0.4 | 5.9 |
Nov | 0.0 | 5.0 |
Oct | 0.1 | 6.2 |
Sep | 0.1 | 6.6 |
Aug | 0.2 | 7.1 |
Jul | 0.7 | 7.6 |
Jun | -0.1 | 9.4 |
May | 1.4 | 8.9 |
Apr | 0.9 | 7.2 |
Mar | 1.2 | 4.9 |
Feb | -0.1 | 1.4 |
Jan | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Dec 2009 | -0.2 | -3.2 |
Nov | 0.9 | -6.1 |
Oct | 0.2 | -9.1 |
Sep | 0.8 | -10.5 |
Aug | 1.1 | -13.5 |
Jul | 1.4 | -15.3 |
Jun | -0.4 | -17.8 |
May | -1.1 | -17.8 |
Apr | -0.8 | -18.4 |
Mar | -1.9 | -17.3 |
Feb | -0.2 | -16.2 |
Jan | -3.0 | -16.5 |
Dec 2008 | -3.4 | -14.0 |
Nov | -2.4 | -11.3 |
Oct | -0.6 | -8.8 |
Sep | -3.4 | -8.5 |
Aug | -1.2 | -5.1 |
Jul | -1.1 | -3.6 |
Jun | -0.5 | -3.2 |
May | -0.5 | -2.5 |
Apr | -1.1 | -1.2 |
Mar | -0.3 | -0.7 |
Feb | -0.6 | 0.8 |
Jan | -0.4 | 2.1 |
Dec 2007 | 0.1 | 1.8 |
Nov | 0.5 | 3.3 |
Oct | -0.4 | 2.7 |
Sep | 0.4 | 2.9 |
Aug | -0.3 | 2.7 |
Jul | 0.1 | 3.6 |
Jun | 0.3 | 3.1 |
May | -0.1 | 3.2 |
Apr | 0.7 | 3.7 |
Mar | 0.8 | 2.6 |
Feb | 0.4 | 1.7 |
Jan | -0.5 | 1.3 |
Dec 2006 | 2.8 | |
Dec 2005 | 3.6 | |
Dec 2004 | 3.8 | |
Dec 2003 | 2.1 | |
Dec 2002 | 2.4 | |
Dec 2001 | -5.6 | |
Dec 2000 | 0.8 | |
Dec 1999 | 5.3 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2014 | 2.2 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 2013 | 2.2 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1986-Dec 1999 | 4.3 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2006 | 1.4 | |
Average ∆% Dec 1999-Dec 2014 | 0.5 | |
∆% Peak 111.9005 in 06/2007 to 103.7457 in 12/2014 | -7.3 | |
∆% Peak 111.9005 in 06/2007 to Trough 87.0586 in 4/2009 | -22.2 | |
∆% Trough 87.0586 in 04/2009 to 103.7457 in 12/2014 | 19.2 | |
∆% Trough 87.0586 in 04/2009 to 103.7999 in 7/2015 | 19.2 | |
∆% Peak 111.9005 on 06/2007 to 103.7999 in 7/2015 | -7.2 |
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides industrial production, manufacturing and capacity since the 1970s. There was acceleration of growth of industrial production, manufacturing and capacity in the 1990s because of rapid growth of productivity in the US (Cobet and Wilson (2002); see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 135-44). The slopes of the curves flatten in the 2000s. Production and capacity have not recovered sufficiently above levels before the global recession, remaining like GDP below historical trend. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977).
Chart I-1, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg1.gif
The modern industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is captured in Chart I-2 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (for the literature on M&A and corporate control see Pelaez and Pelaez, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009a), 143-56, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 49-59, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 46-49). The slope of the curve of total industrial production accelerates in the 1990s to a much higher rate of growth than the curve excluding high-technology industries. Growth rates decelerate into the 2000s and output and capacity utilization have not recovered fully from the strong impact of the global recession. Growth in the current cyclical expansion has been more subdued than in the prior comparably deep contractions in the 1970s and 1980s. Chart II-2 shows that the past recessions after World War II are the relevant ones for comparison with the recession after 2007 instead of common comparisons with the Great Depression (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/turbulence-of-valuations-of-financial.html). The bottom left-hand part of Chart II-2 shows the strong growth of output of communication equipment, computers and semiconductor that continued from the 1990s into the 2000s. Output of semiconductors has already surpassed the level before the global recession.
Chart I-2, US, Industrial Production, Capacity and Utilization of High Technology Industries
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg3.gif
Additional detail on industrial production and capacity utilization is provided in Chart I-3 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Production of consumer durable goods fell sharply during the global recession by more than 30 percent and is oscillating above the level before the contraction. Output of nondurable consumer goods fell around 10 percent and is some 5 percent below the level before the contraction. Output of business equipment fell sharply during the contraction of 2001 but began rapid growth again after 2004. An important characteristic is rapid growth of output of business equipment in the cyclical expansion after sharp contraction in the global recession. Output of defense and space only suffered reduction in the rate of growth during the global recession and surged ahead of the level before the contraction. Output of construction supplies collapsed during the global recession and is well below the level before the contraction. Output of energy materials was stagnant before the contraction but has recovered sharply above the level before the contraction.
Chart I-3, US, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/ipg2.gif
United States manufacturing output from 1919 to 2015 on a monthly basis is in Chart I-4 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The second industrial revolution of Jensen (1993) is quite evident in the acceleration of the rate of growth of output given by the sharper slope in the 1980s and 1990s. Growth was robust after the shallow recession of 2001 but dropped sharply during the global recession after IVQ2007. Manufacturing output recovered sharply but has not reached earlier levels and is losing momentum at the margin. Current output is well extrapolation of trend. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2015. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 136.6407 in Jul 2015. The actual index NSA in Jul 2015 is 103.7999, which is 24.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 126.9147 in Jul 2015. The output of manufacturing at 103.7999 in Jul 2015 is 18.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Chart I-4, US, Manufacturing Output, 1919-2015
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Manufacturing jobs not seasonally adjusted increased 150,000 from Jul 2014 to
Jul 2015 or at the average monthly rate of 12,500. There are effects of the weaker economy and international trade together with the yearly adjustment of labor statistics. Industrial production increased 0.6 percent in Jul 2015 and increased 0.1 percent in Jun 2015 after decreasing 0.3 percent in May 2015, with all data seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table I-1. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System conducted the annual revision of industrial production released on Jul 21, 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/revisions/Current/DefaultRev.htm):
“The Federal Reserve has revised its index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity and capacity utilization. Total IP is now reported to have increased slightly less than 2 1/2 percent per year, on average, from 2011 through 2013 before advancing about 4 1/2 percent in 2014 and falling back somewhat in the first half of 2015. Relative to earlier reports, the current rates of change are lower---especially for 2012 and 2013. For the most recent recession, total IP still shows a peak-to-trough decline of about 17 percent, and the dates for the peak and trough are unaltered. However, the lower rates of change for recent years indicate that the recovery in the industrial sector since the trough has been slower than reported earlier. Total IP is now estimated to have returned to its pre-recession peak in May 2014, seven months later than previously estimated.”
The report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm):
“Industrial production increased 0.6 percent in July after moving up 0.1 percent in June. In July, manufacturing output advanced 0.8 percent primarily because of an increase in motor vehicle assemblies. The output of motor vehicles and parts jumped 10.6 percent, and production elsewhere in manufacturing edged up 0.1 percent. The index for mining rose 0.2 percent, while the index for utilities fell 1.0 percent. At 107.5 percent of its 2012 average, total industrial production in July was 1.3 percent above its year-earlier level. (The comparison base year for industrial production was advanced to 2012 in the annual revision to the statistics published on July 21, 2015.) Capacity utilization for the industrial sector increased 0.3 percentage point in July to 78.0 percent, a rate that is 2.1 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2014) average.” In the six months ending in Jul 2015, United States national industrial production accumulated change of minus 0.2 percent at the annual equivalent rate of minus 0.4 percent, which is lower than growth of 1.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015. Excluding growth of 0.6 percent in Jul 2015, growth in the remaining five months from Feb 2014 to Jul 2015 accumulated to minus 0.8 percent or minus 1.9 percent annual equivalent. Industrial production declined in four of the past six months and changed 0.1 percent in one month. Industrial production expanded at annual equivalent 1.6 percent in the most recent quarter from May 2015 to Jul 2015 and contracted at 2.4 percent in the prior quarter Feb 2015 to Apr 2015. Business equipment accumulated increase of 0.4 percent in the six months from Feb 2015 to Jul 2015 at the annual equivalent rate of 0.8 percent, which is lower than growth of 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul 2015. The Fed analyzes capacity utilization of total industry in its report (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm): “Capacity utilization for the industrial sector increased 0.3 percentage point in July to 78.0 percent, a rate that is 2.1 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2014) average.” United States industry apparently decelerated to a lower growth rate followed by possible acceleration and weakening growth in past months.
Manufacturing fell 22.2 from the peak in Jun 2007 to the trough in Apr 2009 and increased by 19.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Dec 2014. Manufacturing grew 19.2 percent from the trough in Apr 2009 to Jul 2015. Manufacturing output in Jul 2015 is 7.2 percent below the peak in Jun 2007. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth at trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IIQ2015 would have accumulated to 24.8 percent. GDP in IIQ2015 would be $18,712.5 billion (in constant dollars of 2009) if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,442.1 billion than actual $16,270.4 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than at trend, explaining the 24.7 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment/underemployment of 14.8 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/08/fluctuating-risk-financial-assets.html and earlier (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/turbulence-of-financial-asset.html). US GDP in IIQ2015 is 13.1 percent lower than at trend. US GDP grew from $14,991.8 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $16,270.4 billion in IIQ2015 or 8.5 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.1 percent. Cochrane (2014Jul2) estimates US GDP at more than 10 percent below trend. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because growth rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. There is similar behavior in manufacturing. There is classic research on analyzing deviations of output from trend (see for example Schumpeter 1939, Hicks 1950, Lucas 1975, Sargent and Sims 1977). The long-term trend is growth of manufacturing at average 3.2 percent per year from Jul 1919 to Jul 2015. Growth at 3.2 percent per year would raise the NSA index of manufacturing output from 107.6075 in Dec 2007 to 136.6407 in Jul 2015. The actual index NSA in Jul 2015 is 103.7999, which is 24.0 percent below trend. Manufacturing output grew at average 2.2 percent between Dec 1986 and Dec 2014. Using trend growth of 2.2 percent per year, the index would increase to 126.9147 in Jul 2015. The output of manufacturing at 103.7999 in Jul 2015 is 18.2 percent below trend under this alternative calculation.
Table I-13 provides national income by industry without capital consumption adjustment (WCCA). “Private industries” or economic activities have share of 87.1 percent in IQ2015. Most of US national income is in the form of services. In Jun 2015, there were 142.817 million nonfarm jobs NSA in the US, according to estimates of the establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm Table B-1). Total private jobs of 121.139 million NSA in Jul 2015 accounted for 85.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs of 141.794 million, of which 12.413 million, or 10.2 percent of total private jobs and 8.8 percent of total nonfarm jobs, were in manufacturing. Private service-providing jobs were 101.231 million NSA in Jul 2015, or 71.4 percent of total nonfarm jobs and 83.6 percent of total private-sector jobs. Manufacturing has share of 11.3 percent in US national income in IQ2015 and durable goods 6.5 percent, as shown in Table I-13. Most income in the US originates in services. Subsidies and similar measures designed to increase manufacturing jobs will not increase economic growth and employment and may actually reduce growth by diverting resources away from currently employment-creating activities because of the drain of taxation.
Table I-13, US, National Income without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates, Billions of Dollars, % of Total
SAAR | % Total | SAAR IQ2015 | % Total | |
National Income WCCA | 15,314.2 | 100.0 | 15,577.7 | 100.0 |
Domestic Industries | 15,049.5 | 98.3 | 15,350.2 | 98.5 |
Private Industries | 13,277.9 | 86.7 | 13,566.0 | 87.1 |
Agriculture | 173.5 | 1.1 | 161.7 | 1.0 |
Mining | 264.7 | 1.7 | 255.7 | 1.6 |
Utilities | 169.6 | 1.1 | 190.8 | 1.2 |
Construction | 690.1 | 4.5 | 696.9 | 4.5 |
Manufacturing | 1678.3 | 11.0 | 1759.2 | 11.3 |
Durable Goods | 966.1 | 6.3 | 1005.7 | 6.5 |
Nondurable Goods | 712.2 | 4.7 | 753.4 | 4.8 |
Wholesale Trade | 932.9 | 6.1 | 947.3 | 6.1 |
Retail Trade | 1065.0 | 7.0 | 1074.0 | 6.9 |
Transportation & WH | 453.5 | 3.0 | 492.0 | 3.2 |
Information | 542.0 | 3.5 | 577.3 | 3.7 |
Finance, Insurance, RE | 2659.4 | 17.4 | 2723.1 | 17.5 |
Professional & Business Services | 2067.9 | 13.5 | 2083.8 | 13.4 |
Education, Health Care | 1515.2 | 9.9 | 1521.6 | 9.8 |
Arts, Entertainment | 623.6 | 4.1 | 641.3 | 4.1 |
Other Services | 442.4 | 2.9 | 441.3 | 2.8 |
Government | 1771.6 | 11.6 | 1784.2 | 11.5 |
Rest of the World | 264.7 | 1.7 | 227.5 | 1.5 |
Notes: SSAR: Seasonally-Adjusted Annual Rate; WCCA: Without Capital Consumption Adjustment by Industry; WH: Warehousing; RE, includes rental and leasing: Real Estate; Art, Entertainment includes recreation, accommodation and food services; BS: business services
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm
Motor vehicle sales and production in the US have been in long-term structural change. Table VA-1 provides the data on new motor vehicle sales and domestic car production in the US from 1990 to 2010. New motor vehicle sales grew from 14,137 thousand in 1990 to the peak of 17,806 thousand in 2000 or 29.5 percent. In that same period, domestic car production fell from 6,231 thousand in 1990 to 5,542 thousand in 2000 or -11.1 percent. New motor vehicle sales fell from 17,445 thousand in 2005 to 11,772 in 2010 or 32.5 percent while domestic car production fell from 4,321 thousand in 2005 to 2,840 thousand in 2010 or 34.3 percent. In Jul 2015, light vehicle sales accumulated to 10,032,521, which is higher by 4.5 percent relative to 9,599,284 a year earlier (http://motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html). The seasonally adjusted annual rate of light vehicle sales in the US reached 17.55 million in Jul 2015, higher than 17.00 million in Jun 2015 and higher than 16.53 million in Jul 2014 (http://motorintelligence.com/m_frameset.html).
Table VA-1, US, New Motor Vehicle Sales and Car Production, Thousand Units
New Motor Vehicle Sales | New Car Sales and Leases | New Truck Sales and Leases | Domestic Car Production | |
1990 | 14,137 | 9,300 | 4,837 | 6,231 |
1991 | 12,725 | 8,589 | 4,136 | 5,454 |
1992 | 13,093 | 8,215 | 4,878 | 5,979 |
1993 | 14,172 | 8,518 | 5,654 | 5,979 |
1994 | 15,397 | 8,990 | 6,407 | 6,614 |
1995 | 15,106 | 8,536 | 6,470 | 6,340 |
1996 | 15,449 | 8,527 | 6,922 | 6,081 |
1997 | 15,490 | 8,273 | 7,218 | 5,934 |
1998 | 15,958 | 8,142 | 7,816 | 5,554 |
1999 | 17,401 | 8,697 | 8,704 | 5,638 |
2000 | 17,806 | 8,852 | 8,954 | 5,542 |
2001 | 17,468 | 8,422 | 9,046 | 4,878 |
2002 | 17,144 | 8,109 | 9,036 | 5,019 |
2003 | 16,968 | 7,611 | 9,357 | 4,510 |
2004 | 17,298 | 7,545 | 9,753 | 4,230 |
2005 | 17,445 | 7,720 | 9,725 | 4,321 |
2006 | 17,049 | 7,821 | 9,228 | 4,367 |
2007 | 16,460 | 7,618 | 8,683 | 3,924 |
2008 | 13,494 | 6,814 | 6.680 | 3,777 |
2009 | 10,601 | 5,456 | 5,154 | 2,247 |
2010 | 11,772 | 5,729 | 6,044 | 2,840 |
Source: US Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/wholesale_retail_trade/motor_vehicle_sales.html
Chart I-5 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve provides output of motor vehicles and parts in the United States from 1972 to 2015. Output virtually stagnated since the late 1990s.
Chart I-5, US, Motor Vehicles and Parts Output, 1972-2015
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-6 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides output of computers and electronic products in the United States from 1972 to 2015. Output accelerated sharply in the 1990s and 2000s and has surpassed the level before the global recession beginning in IVQ2007.
Chart I-6, US, Output of Computers and Electronic Products, 1972-2015
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-7 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shows that output of durable manufacturing accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s with slower growth in the 2000s perhaps because processes matured. Growth was robust after the major drop during the global recession but appears to vacillate in the final segment.
Chart I-7, US, Output of Durable Manufacturing, 1972-2015
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
Chart I-8 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides output of aerospace and miscellaneous transportation equipment from 1972 to 2015. There is long-term upward trend with oscillations around the trend and cycles of large amplitude.
Chart I-8, US, Output of Aerospace and Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment, 1972-2015
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/Current/default.htm
© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015.
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