Sunday, April 13, 2014

Global Financial Instability, Recovery without Hiring, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk: Part II

 

Global Financial Instability, Recovery without Hiring, Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation, World Cyclical Slow Growth and Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

Executive Summary

I Recovery without Hiring

IA1 Hiring Collapse

IA2 Labor Underutilization

ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs

IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and

Middle-Age Unemployment

II Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

I Recovery without Hiring. Professor Edward P. Lazear (2012Jan19) at Stanford University finds that recovery of hiring in the US to peaks attained in 2007 requires an increase of hiring by 30 percent while hiring levels increased by only 4 percent from Jan 2009 to Jan 2012. The high level of unemployment with low level of hiring reduces the statistical probability that the unemployed will find a job. According to Lazear (2012Jan19), the probability of finding a new job in early 2012 is about one third of the probability of finding a job in 2007. Improvements in labor markets have not increased the probability of finding a new job. Lazear (2012Jan19) quotes an essay coauthored with James R. Spletzer in the American Economic Review (Lazear and Spletzer 2012Mar, 2012May) on the concept of churn. A dynamic labor market occurs when a similar amount of workers is hired as those who are separated. This replacement of separated workers is called churn, which explains about two-thirds of total hiring. Typically, wage increases received in a new job are higher by 8 percent. Lazear (2012Jan19) argues that churn has declined 35 percent from the level before the recession in IVQ2007. Because of the collapse of churn, there are no opportunities in escaping falling real wages by moving to another job. As this blog argues, there are meager chances of escaping unemployment because of the collapse of hiring and those employed cannot escape falling real wages by moving to another job (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/global-financial-risks-recovery-without.html). Lazear and Spletzer (2012Mar, 1) argue that reductions of churn reduce the operational effectiveness of labor markets. Churn is part of the allocation of resources or in this case labor to occupations of higher marginal returns. The decline in churn can harm static and dynamic economic efficiency. Losses from decline of churn during recessions can affect an economy over the long-term by preventing optimal growth trajectories because resources are not used in the occupations where they provide highest marginal returns. Lazear and Spletzer (2012Mar 7-8) conclude that: “under a number of assumptions, we estimate that the loss in output during the recession [of 2007 to 2009] and its aftermath resulting from reduced churn equaled $208 billion. On an annual basis, this amounts to about .4% of GDP for a period of 3½ years.”

There are two additional facts discussed below: (1) there are about ten million fewer full-time jobs currently than before the recession of 2008 and 2009; and (2) the extremely high and rigid rate of youth unemployment is denying an early start to young people ages 16 to 24 years while unemployment of ages 45 years or over has swelled. There are four subsections. IA1 Hiring Collapse provides the data and analysis on the weakness of hiring in the United States economy. IA2 Labor Underutilization provides the measures of labor underutilization of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Statistics on the decline of full-time employment are in IA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. IA4 Theory and Reality of Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment provides the data on high unemployment of ages 16 to 24 years and of ages 45 years or over.

IA1 Hiring Collapse. An important characteristic of the current fractured labor market of the US is the closing of the avenue for exiting unemployment and underemployment normally available through dynamic hiring. Another avenue that is closed is the opportunity for advancement in moving to new jobs that pay better salaries and benefits again because of the collapse of hiring in the United States. Those who are unemployed or underemployed cannot find a new job even accepting lower wages and no benefits. The employed cannot escape declining inflation-adjusted earnings because there is no hiring. The objective of this section is to analyze hiring and labor underutilization in the United States.

Blanchard and Katz (1997, 53 consider an appropriate measure of job stress:

“The right measure of the state of the labor market is the exit rate from unemployment, defined as the number of hires divided by the number unemployed, rather than the unemployment rate itself. What matters to the unemployed is not how many of them there are, but how many of them there are in relation to the number of hires by firms.”

The natural rate of unemployment and the similar NAIRU are quite difficult to estimate in practice (Ibid; see Ball and Mankiw 2002).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) created the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) with the purpose that (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/jltover.htm#purpose):

“These data serve as demand-side indicators of labor shortages at the national level. Prior to JOLTS, there was no economic indicator of the unmet demand for labor with which to assess the presence or extent of labor shortages in the United States. The availability of unfilled jobs—the jobs opening rate—is an important measure of tightness of job markets, parallel to existing measures of unemployment.”

The BLS collects data from about 16,000 US business establishments in nonagricultural industries through the 50 states and DC. The data are released monthly and constitute an important complement to other data provided by the BLS (see also Lazear and Spletzer 2012Mar, 6-7).

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) revised on Mar 11, 2014 “job openings, hires and separations data to incorporate the annual update to the Current Employment Statistics employment estimates and the JOLTS seasonal adjustment factors. Unadjusted data and seasonally adjusted data from December 2000 forward are subject to revisions” (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/). Hiring in the nonfarm sector (HNF) has declined from 63.3 million in 2006 to 54.2 million in 2013 or by 9.1 million while hiring in the private sector (HP) has declined from 59.1 million in 2006 to 50.7 million in 2013 or by 8.4 million, as shown in Table I-1. The ratio of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) has fallen from 47.0 in 2005 to 39.7 in 2013 and in the private sector (RHP) from 52.7 in 2005 to 44.3 in 2013. Hiring has not recovered as in previous cyclical expansions because of the low rate of economic growth in the current cyclical expansion. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,098.0 billion than actual $15,942.3 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 28.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 17.2 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,942.3 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.

Table I-1, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in Thousands and Percentage of Total Employment

 

HNF

Rate RNF

HP

Rate HP

2001

62,633

47.4

58,501

52.7

2002

58,479

44.8

54,665

50.1

2003

56,949

43.7

53,584

49.3

2004

60,263

45.7

56,573

51.4

2005

62,951

47.0

59,179

52.7

2006

63,327

46.4

59,128

51.7

2007

62,104

45.0

57,797

49.9

2008

54,745

39.9

51,316

44.8

2009

45,931

35.0

42,703

39.3

2010

48,743

37.4

44,914

41.7

2011

50,295

38.1

47,183

43.0

2012

52,360

39.0

48,915

43.6

2013

54,191

39.7

50,718

44.3

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Chart I-1 shows the annual level of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) that collapsed during the global recession after 2007 in contrast with milder decline in the shallow recession of 2001. Nonfarm hiring has not recovered, remaining at a depressed level.

clip_image001

Chart I-1, US, Level Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Chart I-2 shows the ratio or rate of nonfarm hiring to employment (RNF) that also fell much more in the recession of 2007 to 2009 than in the shallow recession of 2001. Recovery is weak in the current environment of cyclical slow growth.

clip_image002

Chart I-2, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual, 2001-2015

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Yearly percentage changes of total nonfarm hiring (HNF) are provided in Table I-2. There were much milder declines in 2002 of 6.6 percent and 2.6 percent in 2003 followed by strong rebounds of 5.8 percent in 2004 and 4.5 percent in 2005. In contrast, the contractions of nonfarm hiring in the recession after 2007 were much sharper in percentage points: 1.9 in 2007, 11.8 in 2008 and 16.1 percent in 2009. On a yearly basis, nonfarm hiring grew 6.1 percent in 2010 relative to 2009, 3.2 percent in 2011, 4.1 percent in 2012 and 3.5 percent in 2013. The relatively large length of 18 quarters of the current expansion reduces the likelihood of significant recovery of hiring levels in the United States because lower rates of growth and hiring in the final phase of expansions.

Table I-2, US, Annual Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), Annual Percentage Change, 2002-2013

Year

Annual ∆%

2002

-6.6

2003

-2.6

2004

5.8

2005

4.5

2006

0.6

2007

-1.9

2008

-11.8

2009

-16.1

2010

6.1

2011

3.2

2012

4.1

2013

3.5

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Total private hiring (HP) yearly data are provided in Chart I-4. There has been sharp contraction of total private hiring in the US and only milder recovery from 2010 to 2013.

clip_image003

Chart I-4, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring Level, Annual, ∆%, 2001-2013

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Chart I-5 plots the rate of total private hiring relative to employment (RHP). The rate collapsed during the global recession after 2007 with insufficient recovery.

clip_image004

Chart I-5, US, Total Private Hiring, Annual, 2001-2013

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Chart I-5A plots the rate of total private hiring relative to employment (RHP). The rate collapsed during the global recession after 2007 with insufficient recovery.

clip_image005

Chart I-5A, US, Rate Total Private Hiring Level, Annual, 2001-2013

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Total nonfarm hiring (HNF), total private hiring (HP) and their respective rates are provided for the month of Feb in the years from 2001 to 2014 in Table I-3. Hiring numbers are in thousands. There is moderate recovery in HNF from 3275 thousand (or 3.3 million) in Feb 2009 to 3099 thousand in Feb 2010, 3396 thousand in Feb 2011, 3614 thousand in Feb 2012, 3699 thousand in Feb 2013 and 3750 thousand in Feb 2014 for cumulative gain of 14.5 percent. HP rose from 3098 thousand in Feb 2009 to 2902 thousand in Feb 2010, 3142 thousand in Feb 2011, 3402 thousand in Feb 2012, 3469 thousand in Feb 2013 and 3527 thousand in Fed 2014 for cumulative gain of 13.8 percent. HNF has fallen from 4393 thousand in Feb 2006 to 3750 thousand in Feb 2014 or by 14.6 percent. HP has fallen from 4154 thousand in Feb 2006 to 3527 thousand in Feb 2014 or by 15.1 percent. The civilian noninstitutional population of the US, or individuals in condition to work, rose from 228.815 million in 2006 to 245.679 million in 2013 or by 16.864 million and the civilian labor force from 151.428 million in 2006 to 155.389 million in 2013 or by 3.961 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/). The number of nonfarm hires in the US fell from 63.327 million in 2006 to 54.191 million in 2013 or by 9.136 million and the number of private hires fell from 59.128 million in 2006 to 50.718 million in 2013 or by 8.410 million (http://www.bls.gov/jlt/). Private hiring of 59.128 million in 2006 was equivalent to 25.8 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 228.815, or those in condition of working, falling to 50.718 million in 2013 or 20.6 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population of 245.679 million in 2013. The percentage of hiring in civilian noninstitutional population of 25.8 percent in 2006 would correspond to 63.385 million of hiring in 2013, which would be 12.667 million higher than actual 50.718 million in 2013. Cyclical slow growth over the entire business cycle from IVQ2007 to the present in comparison with earlier cycles and long-term trend (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html) explains the fact that there are many million fewer hires in the US than before the global recession. The labor market continues to be fractured, failing to provide an opportunity to exit from unemployment/underemployment or to find an opportunity for advancement away from declining inflation-adjusted earnings.

Table I-3, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF) and Total Private Hiring (HP) in the US in

Thousands and in Percentage of Total Employment Not Seasonally Adjusted

 

HNF

Rate RNF

HP

Rate HP

2001 Feb

4448

3.4

4182

3.8

2002 Feb

3998

3.1

3779

3.5

2003 Feb

3821

3.0

3625

3.4

2004 Feb

3825

3.0

3608

3.4

2005 Feb

4270

3.2

4056

3.7

2006 Feb

4393

3.3

4154

3.7

2007 Feb

4257

3.1

3997

3.5

2008 Feb

3990

2.9

3778

3.3

2009 Feb

3275

2.5

3098

2.8

2010 Feb

3099

2.4

2902

2.8

2011 Feb

3296

2.5

3142

2.9

2012 Feb

3614

2.7

3402

3.1

2013 Feb

3699

2.8

3469

3.1

2014 Feb

3750

2.8

3527

3.1

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Chart I-6 provides total nonfarm hiring on a monthly basis from 2001 to 2014. Nonfarm hiring rebounded in early 2010 but then fell and stabilized at a lower level than the early peak not-seasonally adjusted (NSA) of 4841 in May 2010 until it surpassed it with 4975 in Jun 2011 but declined to 3084 in Dec 2012. Nonfarm hiring fell to 3012 in Dec 2011 from 3810 in Nov and to revised 3614 in Feb 2012, increasing to 4220 in Mar 2012, 3084 in Dec 2012 and 4223 in Jan 2013 and declining to 3699 in Feb 2013. Nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted increased to 4165 in Nov 2013 and 3271 in Dec 2013. Nonfarm hires reached 3750 in Feb 2014. Chart I-6 provides seasonally adjusted (SA) monthly data. The number of seasonally-adjusted hires in Oct 2011 was 4237 thousand, increasing to revised 4446 thousand in Feb 2012, or 4.9 percent, moving to 4343 in Dec 2012 for cumulative increase of 2.0 percent from 4256 in Dec 2011 and 4578 in Dec 2013 for increase of 5.4 percent relative to 4343 in Dec 2012. The number of hires not seasonally adjusted was 4975 in Jun 2011, falling to 3012 in Dec 2011 but increasing to 4112 in Jan 2012 and declining to 3084 in Dec 2012. The number of nonfarm hiring not seasonally adjusted fell by 39.5 percent from 4975 in Jun 2011 to 3012 in Dec 2011 and fell 38.7 percent from 5035 in Jun 2012 to 3084 in Dec 2012 in a yearly-repeated seasonal pattern. The number of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 5095 in Jun 2013 to 3271 in Dec 2013, or decline of 35.8 percent, showing strong seasonality.

clip_image006

Chart I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Hiring (HNF), 2001-2014 Month SA

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Similar behavior occurs in the rate of nonfarm hiring in Chart I-7. Recovery in early 2010 was followed by decline and stabilization at a lower level but with stability in monthly SA estimates of 3.2 in Aug 2011 to 3.2 in Jan 2012, increasing to 3.3 in May 2012 and falling to 3.2 in Jun 2012. The rate stabilized at 3.2 in Jul 2012, increasing to 3.3 in Aug 2012 but falling to 3.2 in Dec 2012 and 3.3 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Jun 2011 to 2.3 in Dec 2011, climbing to 3.7 in Jun 2012 but falling to 2.3 in Dec 2012. The rate of nonfarm hires not seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Jun 2013 to 2.4 in Dec 2013. Rates of nonfarm hiring NSA were in the range of 2.7 (Dec) to 4.4 (Jun) in 2006.

clip_image007

Chart I-7, US, Rate Total Nonfarm Hiring, Month SA 2001-2014

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

There is only milder improvement in total private hiring shown in Chart I-8. Hiring private (HP) rose in 2010 with stability and renewed increase in 2011 followed by almost stationary series in 2012. The number of private hiring seasonally adjusted fell from 4057 thousand in Sep 2011 to 3962 in Dec 2011 or by 2.3 percent, decreasing to 3998 in Jan 2012 or decline by 1.5 percent relative to the level in Sep 2011. Private hiring fell to 3959 in Sep 2012 or lower by 2.4 percent relative to Sep 2011, moving to 4061 in Dec 2012 for increase of 1.6 percent relative to 3998 in Jan 2012. The number of private hiring not seasonally adjusted fell from 4600 in Jun 2011 to 2833 in Dec 2011 or by 38.4 percent, reaching 3853 in Jan 2012 or decline of 16.2 percent relative to Jun 2011 and moving to 2911 in Dec 2012 or 37.1 percent lower relative to 4629 in Jun 2012. Hires fell from 4706 in Jun 2013 to 3098 in Dec 2013. Companies reduce hiring in the latter part of the year that explains the high seasonality in year-end employment data. For example, NSA private hiring fell from 5567 in Jun 2006 to 3568 in Dec 2006 or by 35.9 percent. Private hiring NSA data are useful in showing the huge declines from the period before the global recession. In Jul 2006, private hiring NSA was 5501, declining to 4326 in Jul 2011 or by 21.4 percent and to 4354 in Jul 2012 or lower by 20.9 percent relative to Jul 2006. Private hiring NSA fell from 4154 in Feb 2006 to 3527 in Feb 2014 or 15.1 percent. Private hiring fell from 5501 in Jul 2006 to 4632 in Jul 2013 or 15.8 percent. The conclusion is that private hiring in the US is around 20 percent below the hiring before the global recession while the noninstitutional population of the United States has grown from 228.815 million in 2006 to 245.679 million in 2013, by 16.864 million or 7.4 percent. The main problem in recovery of the US labor market has been the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.

clip_image008

Chart I-8, US, Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2014

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Chart I-9 shows similar behavior in the rate of private hiring. The rate in 2011 in monthly SA data did not rise significantly above the peak in 2010. The rate seasonally adjusted fell from 3.7 in Sep 2011 to 3.6 in Dec 2011 and reached 3.6 in Dec 2012 and 3.7 in Dec 2013. The rate not seasonally adjusted (NSA) fell from 3.7 in Sep 2011 to 2.5 in Dec 2011, increasing to 3.8 in Oct 2012 but falling to 2.6 in Dec 2012 and 3.4 in Mar 2013. The NSA rate of private hiring fell from 4.8 in Jul 2006 to 3.4 in Aug 2009 but recovery was insufficient to only 3.8 in Aug 2012, 2.5 in Dec 2012 and 2.6 in Dec 2013. The rate of private hires fell from 4.8 in Jul 2006 to 4.0 in Jul 2013. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,098.0 billion than actual $15,942.3 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 28.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 17.2 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,942.3 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.

clip_image009

Chart I-9, US, Rate Total Private Hiring Month SA 2001-2014

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

The JOLTS report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides total nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB), TNF JOB rate and TNF LD (layoffs and discharges) shown in Table I-4 for the month of Feb from 2001 to 2014. The final column provides annual TNF LD for the years from 2001 to 2013. Nonfarm job openings (TNF JOB) fell from a peak of 4256 in Feb 2007 to 4008 in Feb 2014 or by 5.8 percent while the rate stabilized from 2.9 to 2.9. Nonfarm layoffs and discharges (TNF LD) rose from 1408 in Feb 2006 to 2018 in Feb 2009 or by 43.3 percent. The annual data show layoffs and discharges rising from 20.9 million in 2006 to 26.4 million in 2009 or by 26.3 percent. Business pruned payroll jobs to survive the global recession but there has not been hiring because of the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,098.0 billion than actual $15,942.3 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 28.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 17.2 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,942.3 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.

Table I-4, US, Total Nonfarm Job Openings and Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands NSA

 

TNF JOB

TNF JOB
Rate

TNF LD

TNF LD
Annual

Feb 2001

4381

3.2

1461

24138

Feb 2002

3172

2.4

1617

22706

Feb 2003

3149

2.4

1596

23490

Feb 2004

3207

2.4

1523

22668

Feb 2005

3603

2.7

1568

22243

Feb 2006

4079

2.9

1408

20896

Feb 2007

4256

3.0

1436

21958

Feb 2008

3844

2.7

1520

24028

Feb 2009

2620

2.0

2018

26444

Feb 2010

2384

1.8

1431

21829

Feb 2011

2874

2.2

1301

20805

Feb 2012

3314

2.4

1373

20892

Feb 2013

3769

2.7

1266

19964

Feb 2014

4008

2.9

1239

 

Notes: TNF JOB: Total Nonfarm Job Openings; LD: Layoffs and Discharges

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Chart I-10 shows monthly job openings rising from the trough in 2009 to a high in the beginning of 2010. Job openings then stabilized into 2011 but have surpassed the peak of 3080 seasonally adjusted in Apr 2010 with 3646 seasonally adjusted in Dec 2012, which is higher by 18.4 percent relative to Apr 2010 but lower by 2.9 percent relative to 3755 in Nov 2012 and lower by 4.7 percent than 3827 in Mar 2012. Nonfarm job openings increased from 3646 in Dec 2012 to 3914 in Dec 2013 or by 7.4 percent. The high of job openings not seasonally adjusted was 3428 in Apr 2010 that was surpassed by 3661 in Jul 2011, increasing to 3939 in Oct 2012 but declining to 3152 in Dec 2012 and decreasing to 3387 in Dec 2013. The level of job openings not seasonally adjusted fell to 3152 in Dec 2012 or by 21.3 percent relative to 4005 in Apr 2012. There is here again the strong seasonality of year-end labor data. Job openings fell from 4209 in Apr 2013 to 3387 in Dec 2013, showing strong seasonal effects. The level of job openings of 4008 in Feb 2014 NSA is lower by 5.8 percent relative to 4256 in Feb 2007. The main problem in recovery of the US labor market has been the low rate of GDP growth. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.

clip_image010

Chart I-10, US Job Openings, Thousands NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

The rate of job openings in Chart I-11 shows similar behavior. The rate seasonally adjusted increased from 2.2 in Jan 2011 to 2.6 in Dec 2011, 2.6 in Dec 2012 and 2.8 in Dec 2013. The rate seasonally adjusted stood at 2.9 in Feb 2014. The rate not seasonally adjusted rose from the high of 2.6 in Apr 2010 to 3.0 in Apr 2013 and 2.6 in Nov 2013. The rate of job openings NSA fell from 3.3 in Jul 2007 to 1.6 in Nov-Dec 2009, recovering insufficiently to 2.9 in Feb 2014. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,098.0 billion than actual $15,942.3 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 28.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 17.2 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,942.3 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.

clip_image011

Chart I-11, US, Rate of Job Openings, NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Total separations are shown in Chart I-12. Separations are much lower in 2012-14 than before the global recession but hiring has not recovered.

clip_image012

Chart I-12, US, Total Nonfarm Separations, Month Thousands SA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Annual total separations are shown in Chart I-13. Separations are much lower in 2011-2014 than before the global recession but without recovery in hiring.

clip_image013

Chart I-13, US, Total Separations, Annual, Thousands, 2001-2013

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Table I-5 provides total nonfarm total separations from 2001 to 2013. Separations fell from 61.1 million in 2006 to 47.8 million in 2010 or by 13.3 million and 48.2 million in 2011 or by 12.9 million. Total separations increased from 48.2 million in 2011 to 51.8 million in 2013 or by 3.6 million.

Table I-5, US, Total Nonfarm Total Separations, Thousands, 2001-2013

Year

Annual

2001

64472

2002

59003

2003

56970

2004

58238

2005

60494

2006

61117

2007

60838

2008

58227

2009

51127

2010

47750

2011

48220

2012

50070

2013

51837

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Monthly data of layoffs and discharges reach a peak in early 2009, as shown in Chart I-14. Layoffs and discharges dropped sharply with the recovery of the economy in 2010 and 2011 once employers reduced their job count to what was required for cost reductions and loss of business. Weak rates of growth of GDP (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html) frustrated employment recovery. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.

clip_image014

Chart I-14, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Monthly Thousands SA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Layoffs and discharges in Chart I-15 rose sharply to a peak in 2009. There was pronounced drop into 2010 and 2011 with mild increase into 2012 and renewed decline into 2013.

clip_image015

Chart I-15, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Annual, 2001-2012

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

Table I-6 provides annual nonfarm layoffs and discharges from 2001 to 2013. Layoffs and discharges peaked at 26.4 million in 2009 and then fell to 20.8 million in 2011, by 5.6 million, or 21.2 percent. Total nonfarm layoffs and discharges increased mildly to 20.9 million in 2012, falling to 19.9 million in 2013.

Table I-6, US, Total Nonfarm Layoffs and Discharges, Thousands, 2001-2013

Year

Annual

2001

24138

2002

22706

2003

23490

2004

22668

2005

22243

2006

20896

2007

21958

2008

24028

2009

26444

2010

21829

2011

20805

2012

20892

2013

19964

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/jlt/

IA2 Labor Underutilization. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also provides alternative measures of labor underutilization shown in Table I-7. The most comprehensive measure is U6 that consists of total unemployed plus total employed part time for economic reasons plus all marginally attached workers as percent of the labor force. U6 not seasonally annualized has risen from 8.2 percent in 2006 to 12.8 percent in Mar 2014.

Table I-7, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization NSA %

 

U1

U2

U3

U4

U5

U6

2014

           

Mar

3.7

3.7

6.8

7.2

8.1

12.8

Feb

3.6

3.9

7.0

7.5

8.4

13.1

Jan

3.5

4.0

7.0

7.5

8.6

13.5

2013

           

Dec

3.5

3.5

6.5

7.0

7.9

13.0

Nov

3.7

3.5

6.6

7.1

7.9

12.7

Oct

3.7

3.6

7.0

7.4

8.3

13.2

Sep

3.7

3.5

7.0

7.5

8.4

13.1

Aug

3.7

3.8

7.3

7.9

8.7

13.6

Jul

3.7

3.8

7.7

8.3

9.1

14.3

Jun

3.9

3.8

7.8

8.4

9.3

14.6

May

4.1

3.7

7.3

7.7

8.5

13.4

Apr

4.3

3.9

7.1

7.6

8.5

13.4

Mar

4.3

4.3

7.6

8.1

9.0

13.9

Feb

4.3

4.6

8.1

8.6

9.6

14.9

Jan

4.3

4.9

8.5

9.0

9.9

15.4

2012

           

Dec

4.2

4.3

7.6

8.3

9.2

14.4

Nov

4.2

3.9

7.4

7.9

8.8

13.9

Oct

4.3

3.9

7.5

8.0

9.0

13.9

Sep

4.2

4.0

7.6

8.0

9.0

14.2

Aug

4.3

4.4

8.2

8.7

9.7

14.6

Jul

4.3

4.6

8.6

9.1

10.0

15.2

Jun

4.5

4.4

8.4

8.9

9.9

15.1

May

4.7

4.3

7.9

8.4

9.3

14.3

Apr

4.8

4.3

7.7

8.3

9.1

14.1

Mar

4.9

4.8

8.4

8.9

9.7

14.8

Feb

4.9

5.1

8.7

9.3

10.2

15.6

Jan

4.9

5.4

8.8

9.4

10.5

16.2

2011

           

Dec

4.8

5.0

8.3

8.8

9.8

15.2

Nov

4.9

4.7

8.2

8.9

9.7

15.0

Oct 

5.0

4.8

8.5

9.1

10.0

15.3

Sep

5.2

5.0

8.8

9.4

10.2

15.7

Aug

5.2

5.1

9.1

9.6

10.6

16.1

Jul

5.2

5.2

9.3

10.0

10.9

16.3

Jun

5.1

5.1

9.3

9.9

10.9

16.4

May

5.5

5.1

8.7

9.2

10.0

15.4

Apr

5.5

5.2

8.7

9.2

10.1

15.5

Mar

5.7

5.8

9.2

9.7

10.6

16.2

Feb

5.6

6.0

9.5

10.1

11.1

16.7

Jan

5.6

6.2

9.8

10.4

11.4

17.3

Dec  2010

5.4

5.9

9.1

9.9

10.7

16.6

Annual

           

2013

3.9

3.9

7.4

7.9

8.8

13.8

2012

4.5

4.4

8.1

8.6

9.5

14.7

2011

5.3

5.3

8.9

9.5

10.4

15.9

2010

5.7

6.0

9.6

10.3

11.1

16.7

2009

4.7

5.9

9.3

9.7

10.5

16.2

2008

2.1

3.1

5.8

6.1

6.8

10.5

2007

1.5

2.3

4.6

4.9

5.5

8.3

2006

1.5

2.2

4.6

4.9

5.5

8.2

2005

1.8

2.5

5.1

5.4

6.1

8.9

2004

2.1

2.8

5.5

5.8

6.5

9.6

2003

2.3

3.3

6.0

6.3

7.0

10.1

2002

2.0

3.2

5.8

6.0

6.7

9.6

2001

1.2

2.4

4.7

4.9

5.6

8.1

2000

0.9

1.8

4.0

4.2

4.8

7.0

Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

Monthly seasonally adjusted measures of labor underutilization are provided in Table I-8. U6 climbed from 16.1 percent in Aug 2011 to 16.3 percent in Sep 2011 and then fell to 14.5 percent in Mar 2012, reaching 12.7 percent in Mar 2014. Unemployment is an incomplete measure of the stress in US job markets. A different calculation in this blog is provided by using the participation rate in the labor force before the global recession. This calculation shows 28.2 million in job stress of unemployment/underemployment in Mar 2013, not seasonally adjusted, corresponding to 17.2 percent of the labor force (Table I-4 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html).

Table I-8, US, Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization SA %

 

U1

U2

U3

U4

U5

U6

Mar 2014

3.5

3.5

6.7

7.1

8.0

12.7

Feb

3.5

3.5

6.7

7.2

8.1

12.6

Jan

3.4

3.5

6.6

7.1

8.1

12.7

Dec 2013

3.6

3.5

6.7

7.2

8.1

13.1

Nov

3.7

3.7

7.0

7.4

8.2

13.1

Oct

3.8

4.0

7.2

7.7

8.6

13.7

Sep

3.8

3.7

7.2

7.7

8.6

13.6

Aug

3.8

3.8

7.2

7.8

8.6

13.6

Jul

3.9

3.8

7.3

7.9

8.7

13.9

Jun

4.0

3.9

7.5

8.1

9.0

14.2

May

4.0

3.9

7.5

8.0

8.8

13.8

Apr

4.1

4.1

7.5

8.0

8.9

13.9

Mar

4.1

4.1

7.5

8.0

8.9

13.8

Feb

4.2

4.2

7.7

8.3

9.3

14.3

Jan

4.2

4.3

7.9

8.4

9.3

14.4

Dec 2012

4.3

4.2

7.9

8.5

9.4

14.4

Nov

4.2

4.1

7.8

8.3

9.2

14.4

Oct

4.4

4.2

7.8

8.3

9.2

14.4

Sep

4.3

4.2

7.8

8.3

9.3

14.7

Aug

4.4

4.5

8.1

8.6

9.6

14.7

Jul

4.5

4.6

8.2

8.7

9.7

14.9

Jun

4.6

4.6

8.2

8.7

9.6

14.8

May

4.6

4.5

8.2

8.7

9.6

14.8

Apr

4.6

4.4

8.2

8.7

9.5

14.6

Mar

4.7

4.6

8.2

8.7

9.6

14.5

Feb

4.8

4.6

8.3

8.9

9.8

15.0

Jan

4.8

4.7

8.2

8.8

9.8

15.1

Dec 2011

4.9

4.9

8.5

9.1

10.0

15.2

Nov

5.0

5.0

8.6

9.3

10.2

15.6

Oct

5.1

5.1

8.8

9.4

10.3

15.9

Sep

5.4

5.2

9.0

9.6

10.5

16.3

Aug

5.3

5.2

9.0

9.6

10.5

16.1

Jul

5.3

5.3

9.0

9.7

10.6

16.0

Jun

5.3

5.3

9.1

9.7

10.7

16.1

May

5.3

5.4

9.0

9.5

10.3

15.8

Apr

5.2

5.4

9.1

9.7

10.5

16.1

Mar

5.3

5.4

9.0

9.5

10.4

15.9

Feb

5.4

5.5

9.0

9.6

10.6

16.0

Jan

5.5

5.5

9.1

9.7

10.7

16.1

Note: LF: labor force; U1, persons unemployed 15 weeks % LF; U2, job losers and persons who completed temporary jobs %LF; U3, total unemployed % LF; U4, total unemployed plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers; % LF plus discouraged workers; U5, total unemployed, plus discouraged workers, plus all other marginally attached workers % LF plus all marginally attached workers; U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed part time for economic reasons % LF plus all marginally attached workers

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

Chart I-16 provides U6 on a monthly basis from 2001 to 2014. There was a steep climb from 2007 into 2009 and then this measure of unemployment and underemployment stabilized at that high level but declined into 2012. The low of U6 SA was 8.0 percent in Mar 2007 and the peak was 17.1 percent in Apr 2010. The low NSA was 7.6 percent in Oct 2006 and the peak was 18.0 percent in Jan 2010.

clip_image016

Chart I-16, US, U6, total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers, plus total employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons, Month, SA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

Chart I-17 provides the number employed part-time for economic reasons or who cannot find full-time employment. There are sharp declines at the end of 2009, 2010 and 2011 but an increase in 2012 followed by stability in 2013-2014.

clip_image017

Chart I-17, US, Working Part-time for Economic Reasons

Thousands, Month SA 2001-2014

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

ICA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Jobs. There is strong seasonality in US labor markets around the end of the year.

  • Seasonally adjusted part-time for economic reasons. The number employed part-time for economic reasons because they could not find full-time employment fell from 9.068 million in Sep 2011 to 7.780 million in Mar 2012, seasonally adjusted, or decline of 1.288 million in six months, as shown in Table I-9. The number employed part-time for economic reasons rebounded to 8.572 million in Sep 2012 for increase of 527,000 in one month from Aug to Sep 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons declined to 8.231 million in Oct 2012 or by 341,000 again in one month, further declining to 8.164 million in Nov 2012 for another major one-month decline of 67,000 and 7.929 million in Dec 2012 or fewer 235,000 in just one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.983 million in Jan 2013 or 54,000 more than in Dec 2012 and to 7,991 million in Feb 2013, declining to 7.917 million in May 2013 but increasing to 8.194 million in Jun 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.898 million in Aug 2013 for decline of 282,000 in one month from 8.180 million in Jul 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased 16,000 from 7.898 million in Aug 2013 to 7.914 million in Sep 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons rose to 8.016 million in Oct 2013, falling by 293,000 to 7.723 million in Nov 2013. The number part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.771 million in Dec 2013, decreasing to 7.257 million in Jan 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell from 7.257 million in Jan 2014 to 7.186 million in Feb 2014. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.411 million in Mar 2014. There is an increase of 186,000 in part-time for economic reasons from Aug 2012 to Oct 2012 and of 119,000 from Aug 2012 to Nov 2012.
  • Seasonally adjusted full-time. The number employed full-time increased from 112.906 million in Oct 2011 to 115.114 million in Mar 2012 or 2.208 million but then fell to 114.279 million in May 2012 or 0.835 million fewer full-time employed than in Mar 2012. The number employed full-time increased from 114.626 million in Aug 2012 to 115.531 million in Oct 2012 or increase of 0.905 million full-time jobs in two months and further to 115.821 million in Jan 2013 or increase of 1.195 million more full-time jobs in five months from Aug 2012 to Jan 2013. The number of full time jobs decreased slightly to 115.785 million in Feb 2013, increasing to 116.288 million in May 2013 and 116.087 million in Jun 2013. Then number of full-time jobs increased to 116.156 million in Jul 2013, 116.301 million in Aug 2013 and 116.883 million in Sep 2013. The number of full-time jobs fell to 116.306 million in Oct 2013 and increased to 116.951 in Nov 2013. The level of full-time jobs fell to 117.278 million in Dec 2013, increasing to 117.656 million in Jan 2014 and 117.819 million in Feb 2014. The number employment full-time increased to 118.003 million in Mar 2014. Benchmark and seasonality-factors adjustments at the turn of every year could affect comparability of labor market indicators (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html).
  • Not seasonally adjusted part-time for economic reasons. The number of employed part-time for economic reasons actually increased without seasonal adjustment from 8.271 million in Nov 2011 to 8.428 million in Dec 2011 or by 157,000 and then to 8.918 million in Jan 2012 or by an additional 490,000 for cumulative increase from Nov 2011 to Jan 2012 of 647,000. The level of employed part-time for economic reasons then fell from 8.918 million in Jan 2012 to 7.867 million in Mar 2012 or by 1.051 million and to 7.694 million in Apr 2012 or 1.224 million fewer relative to Jan 2012. In Aug 2012, the number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.842 million NSA or 148,000 more than in Apr 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons increased from 7.842 million in Aug 2012 to 8.110 million in Sep 2012 or by 3.4 percent. The number part-time for economic reasons fell from 8.110 million in Sep 2012 to 7.870 million in Oct 2012 or by 240.000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA increased to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 or 758,000 more than in Oct 2012. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.298 million in Feb 2013, which is lower by 330,000 relative to 8.628 million in Jan 2013 but higher by 428,000 relative to 7.870 million in Oct 2012. The number employed part time for economic reasons fell to 7.734 million in Mar 2013 or 564,000 less than in Feb 2013 and fell to 7.709 million in Apr 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons reached 7.618 million in May 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons jumped from 7.618 million in May 2013 to 8.440 million in Jun 2013 or 822,000 in one month. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 8.324 million in Jul 2013 and 7.690 million in Aug 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons NSA fell to 7.522 million in Sep 2013, increasing to 7.700 million in Oct 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.563 million in Nov 2013 and increased to 7.990 million in Dec 2013. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell to 7.771 million in Jan 2014 and 7.397 million in Feb 2014. The level of part-time for economic reasons increased to 7.455 million in Mar 2014.
  • Not seasonally adjusted full-time. The number employed full time without seasonal adjustment fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 113.050 million in Dec 2011 or by 88,000 and fell further to 111.879 in Jan 2012 for cumulative decrease of 1.259 million. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted fell from 113.138 million in Nov 2011 to 112.587 million in Feb 2012 or by 551.000 but increased to 116.214 million in Aug 2012 or 3.076 million more full-time jobs than in Nov 2011. The number employed full-time not seasonally adjusted decreased from 116.214 million in Aug 2012 to 115.678 million in Sep 2012 for loss of 536,000 full-time jobs and rose to 116.045 million in Oct 2012 or by 367,000 full-time jobs in one month relative to Sep 2012. The number employed full-time NSA fell from 116.045 million in Oct 2012 to 115.515 million in Nov 2012 or decline of 530.000 in one month. The number employed full-time fell from 115.515 in Nov 2012 to 115.079 million in Dec 2012 or decline by 436,000 in one month. The number employed full time fell from 115.079 million in Dec 2012 to 113.868 million in Jan 2013 or decline of 1.211 million in one month. The number of full time jobs increased to 114.191 in Feb 2012 or by 323,000 in one month and increased to 114.796 million in Mar 2013 for cumulative increase from Jan by 928,000 full-time jobs but decrease of 283,000 from Dec 2012. The number employed full time reached 117.400 million in Jun 2013 and increased to 117.688 in Jul 2013 or by 288,000. The number employed full-time reached 117.868 million in Aug 2013 for increase of 180,000 in one month relative to Jul 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 117.308 million in Sep 2013 or by 560,000. The number employed full-time fell to 116.798 million in Oct 2013 or decline of 510.000 in one month. The number employed full-time rose to 116.875 million in Nov 2013, falling to 116.661 million in Dec 2013. The number employed full-time fell to 115.744 million in Jan 2014 but increased to 116.323 million in Feb 2014. The level of full-time jobs increased to 116.985 in Mar 2014. Comparisons over long periods require use of NSA data. The number with full-time jobs fell from a high of 123.219 million in Jul 2007 to 108.777 million in Jan 2010 or by 14.442 million. The number with full-time jobs in Mar 2014 is 116.985 million, which is lower by 6.234 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007.
  • Loss of full-time jobs. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 247.258 million in Mar 2014 or by 15.300 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/) while in the same period the number of full-time jobs fell 6.234 million. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 131.294 million full-time jobs with population of 247.258 million in Mar 2014 (0.531 x 247.258) or 14.309 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 116.985 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 15 million. Mediocre GDP growth is the main culprit of the fractured US labor market. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent. US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,098.0 billion than actual $15,942.3 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 28.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 17.2 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,942.3 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.

Table I-9, US, Employed Part-time for Economic Reasons, Thousands, and Full-time, Millions

 

Part-time Thousands

Full-time Millions

Seasonally Adjusted

   

Mar 2014

7,411

118.003

Feb 2014

7,186

117.819

Jan 2014

7,257

117.656

Dec 2013

7,771

117.278

Nov 2013

7,723

116.951

Oct 2013

8,016

116.306

Sep 2013

7,914

116.883

Aug 2013

7,898

116.301

Jul 2013

8,180

116.156

Jun 2013

8,194

116.087

May 2013

7,917

116.288

Apr 2013

7,929

116.062

Mar 2013

7,663

115.901

Feb 2013

7,991

115.785

Jan 2013

7,983

115.821

Dec 2012

7,929

115.735

Nov 2012

8,164

115.581

Oct 2012

8,231

115.531

Sep 2012

8,572

115.229

Aug 2012

8,045

114.626

Jul 2012

8,163

114.589

Jun 2012

8,154

114.728

May 2012

8,138

114.279

Apr 2012

7,913

114.398

Mar 2012

7,780

115.114

Feb 2012

8,133

114.210

Jan 2012

8,228

113.790

Dec 2011

8,177

113.740

Nov 2011

8,457

113.158

Oct 2011

8,675

112.906

Sep 2011

9,068

112.523

Aug 2011

8,820

112.643

Jul 2011

8,342

112.209

Not Seasonally Adjusted

   

Mar 2014

7,455

116.985

Feb 2014

7,397

116.323

Jan 2014

7,771

115.744

Dec 2013

7,990

116.661

Nov 2013

7,563

116.875

Oct 2013

7,700

116.798

Sep 2013

7,522

117.308

Aug 2013

7,690

117.868

Jul 2013

8,324

117.688

Jun 2013

8,440

117.400

May 2013

7,618

116.643

Apr 2013

7,709

115.674

Mar 2013

7,734

114.796

Feb 2013

8,298

114.191

Jan 2013

8,628

113.868

Dec 2012

8,166

115.079

Nov 2012

7,994

115.515

Oct 2012

7,870

116.045

Sep 2012

8,110

115.678

Aug 2012

7,842

116.214

Jul 2012

8,316

116.131

Jun 2012

8,394

116.024

May 2012

7,837

114.634

Apr 2012

7,694

113.999

Mar 2012

7,867

113.916

Feb 2012

8,455

112.587

Jan 2012

8,918

111.879

Dec 2011

8,428

113.050

Nov 2011

8,271

113.138

Oct 2011

8,258

113.456

Sep 2011

8,541

112.980

Aug 2011

8,604

114.286

Jul 2011

8,514

113.759

Jun 2011

8,738

113.255

May 2011

8,270

112.618

Apr 2011

8,425

111.844

Mar 2011

8,737

111.186

Feb 2011

8,749

110.731

Jan 2011

9,187

110.373

Dec 2010

9,205

111.207

Nov 2010

8,670

111.348

Oct 2010

8,408

112.342

Sep 2010

8,628

112.385

Aug 2010

8,628

113.508

Jul 2010

8,737

113.974

Jun 2010

8,867

113.856

May 2010

8,513

112.809

Apr 2010

8,921

111.391

Mar 2010

9,343

109.877

Feb 2010

9,282

109.100

Jan 2010

9,290

108.777 (low)

Dec 2009

9,354 (high)

109.875

Nov 2009

8,894

111.274

Oct 2009

8,474

111.599

Sep 2009

8,255

111.991

Aug 2009

8,835

113.863

Jul 2009

9,103

114.184

Jun 2009

9,301

114.014

May 2009

8,785

113.083

Apr 2009

8,648

112.746

Mar 2009

9,305

112.215

Feb 2009

9,170

112.947

Jan 2009

8,829

113.815

Dec 2008

8,250

116.422

Nov 2008

7,135

118.432

Oct 2008

6,267

120.020

Sep 2008

5,701

120.213

Aug 2008

5,736

121.556

Jul 2008

6,054

122.378

Jun 2008

5,697

121.845

May 2008

5,096

120.809

Apr 2008

5,071

120.027

Mar 2008

5,038

119.875

Feb 2008

5,114

119.452

Jan 2008

5,340

119.332

Dec 2007

4,750

121.042

Nov 2007

4,374

121.846

Oct 2007

4,028

122.006

Sep 2007

4,137

121.728

Aug 2007

4,494

122.870

Jul 2007

4,516

123.219 (high)

Jun 2007

4,469

122.150

May 2007

4,315

120.846

Apr 2007

4,205

119.609

Mar 2007

4,384

119.640

Feb 2007

4,417

119.041

Jan 2007

4,726

119.094

Dec 2006

4,281

120.371

Nov 2006

4,054

120.507

Oct 2006

4,010

121.199

Sep 2006

3,735 (low)

120.780

Aug 2006

4,104

121.979

Jul 2006

4,450

121.951

Jun 2006

4,456

121.070

May 2006

3,968

118.925

Apr 2006

3,787

118.559

Mar 2006

4,097

117.693

Feb 2006

4,403

116.823

Jan 2006

4,597

116.395

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

People lose their marketable job skills after prolonged unemployment and face increasing difficulty in finding another job. Chart I-18 shows the sharp rise in unemployed over 27 weeks and stabilization at an extremely high level.

clip_image018

Chart I-18, US, Number Unemployed for 27 Weeks or Over, Thousands SA Month 2001-2014

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/data/

Another segment of U6 consists of people marginally attached to the labor force who continue to seek employment but less frequently on the frustration there may not be a job for them. Chart I-19 shows the sharp rise in people marginally attached to the labor force after 2007 and subsequent stabilization.

clip_image019

Chart I-19, US, Marginally Attached to the Labor Force, NSA Month, Thousands, 2001-2014

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/data/

The number with full-time jobs in Mar 2014 is 116.985 million, which is lower by 6.234 million relative to the peak of 123.219 million in Jul 2007. The magnitude of the stress in US labor markets is magnified by the increase in the civilian noninstitutional population of the United States from 231.958 million in Jul 2007 to 247.258 million in Mar 2014 or by 15.300 million (http://www.bls.gov/data/) while in the same period the number of full-time jobs fell 6.234 million. The ratio of full-time jobs of 123.219 million Jul 2007 to civilian noninstitutional population of 231.958 million was 53.1 percent. If that ratio had remained the same, there would be 131.294 million full-time jobs with population of 247.258 million in Mar 2014 (0.531 x 247.258) or 14.309 million fewer full-time jobs relative to actual 116.985 million. There appear to be around 10 million fewer full-time jobs in the US than before the global recession while population increased around 15 million. Chart I-20 provides unadjusted full-time jobs in the US from 2001 to 2014 with sharp drop and incomplete recovery. There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:

“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals.

Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets, during cyclical slow growth not secular stagnation, is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.

clip_image020

Chart I-20, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 2001-2014

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-20A provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 2001 to 2013. There is clear trend of increase of the population while the number of full-time jobs collapsed after 2008 without sufficient recovery as shown in the preceding Chart I-20.

clip_image021

Chart I-20A, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 2001-2014

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-20B provides number of full-time jobs in the US from 1968 to 2013. There were multiple recessions followed by expansions without contraction of full-time jobs and without recovery as during the period after 2008. The problem is specific of the current cycle and not secular.

clip_image022

Chart I-20B, US, Full-time Employed, Thousands, NSA, 1968-2014

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-20C provides the noninstitutional civilian population of the United States from 1968 to 2013. Population expanded at a relatively constant rate of increase with the assurance of creation of full-time jobs that has been broken since 2008.

clip_image023

Chart I-20C, US, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Thousands, 1968-2014

Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/data/

IA4 Theory and Reality of Secular Stagnation: Youth and Middle-Age Unemployment. Three tables support the argument that the proper comparison of the business cycle is between the recessions of the 1980s and the global recession after IVQ2007 and not as argued erroneously with the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Table I-5 provides percentage change of real GDP in the United States in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s. The recession in 1981-1982 is quite similar on its own to the 2007-2009 recession. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). Data are available for the 1930s only on a yearly basis. US GDP fell 4.7 percent in the two recessions (1) from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and (2) from III1981 to IVQ1981 to IVQ1982 and 4.3 percent cumulatively in the recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. It is instructive to compare the first three years of the expansions in the 1980s and the current expansion. GDP grew at 4.6 percent in 1983, 7.3 percent in 1984, 4.2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while GDP grew, 2.5 percent in 2010, 1.8 percent in 2011, 2.8 percent in 2012 and 1.9 percent in 2013. Actual annual equivalent GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and first four quarters of 2013 is 2.3 percent and 2.6 percent in the four quarters of 2013 but only 2.2 percent discounting contribution of 1.67 percentage points of inventory accumulation to growth in IIIQ2013. GDP grew at 4.2 percent in 1985 and 3.5 percent in 1986 while the forecasts of the central tendency of participants of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are in the range of 2.8 to 3.0 percent in 2014 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140319b.htm) with less reliable forecast of 3.0 to 3.2 percent in 2015 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140319b.htm). Growth of GDP in the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 has been at average 2.4 percent in annual equivalent.

Table I-5, US, Percentage Change of GDP in the 1930s, 1980s and 2000s, ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

Year

GDP ∆%

1930

-8.5

1980

-0.2

2000

4.1

1931

-6.4

1981

2.6

2001

1.0

1932

-12.9

1982

-1.9

2002

1.8

1933

-1.3

1983

4.6

2003

2.8

1934

10.8

1984

7.3

2004

3.8

1935

8.9

1985

4.2

2005

3.4

1936

12.9

1986

3.5

2006

2.7

1937

5.1

1987

3.5

2007

1.8

1938

-3.3

1988

4.2

2008

-0.3

1930

8.0

1989

3.7

2009

-2.8

1940

8.8

1990

1.9

2010

2.5

1941

17.7

1991

-0.1

2011

1.8

1942

18.9

1992

3.6

2012

2.8

1943

17.0

1993

2.7

2013

1.9

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Characteristics of the four cyclical contractions are provided in Table I-6 with the first column showing the number of quarters of contraction; the second column the cumulative percentage contraction; and the final column the average quarterly rate of contraction. There were two contractions from IQ1980 to IIIQ1980 and from IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982 separated by three quarters of expansion. The drop of output combining the declines in these two contractions is 4.7 percent, which is almost equal to the decline of 4.3 percent in the contraction from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. In contrast, during the Great Depression in the four years of 1930 to 1933, GDP in constant dollars fell 26.4 percent cumulatively and fell 45.3 percent in current dollars (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 150-2, Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2009b), 205-7 and revisions in http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm). The comparison of the global recession after 2007 with the Great Depression is entirely misleading.

Table I-6, US, Number of Quarters, GDP Cumulative Percentage Contraction and Average Percentage Annual Equivalent Rate in Cyclical Contractions   

 

Number of Quarters

Cumulative Percentage Contraction

Average Percentage Rate

IIQ1953 to IIQ1954

3

-2.4

-0.8

IIIQ1957 to IIQ1958

3

-3.0

-1.0

IVQ1973 to IQ1975

5

-3.1

-0.6

IQ1980 to IIIQ1980

2

-2.2

-1.1

IIIQ1981 to IVQ1982

4

-2.5

-0.64

IVQ2007 to IIQ2009

6

-4.3

-0.72

Sources: Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table I-7 shows the mediocre average annual equivalent growth rate of 2.3 percent of the US economy in the eighteen quarters of the current cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013. In sharp contrast, the average growth rate of GDP was: 5.7 percent in the first thirteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986, 5.4 percent in the first fifteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent in the first sixteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent in the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1987 and 5.0 percent in the eighteen quarters of expansion from IQ1983 to IIQ1987. The line “average first four quarters in four expansions” provides the average growth rate of 7.7 percent with 7.8 percent from IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955, 9.2 percent from IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959, 6.1 percent from IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976 and 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. The United States missed this opportunity of high growth in the initial phase of recovery. BEA data show the US economy in standstill with annual growth of 2.4 percent in 2010 decelerating to 1.8 percent annual growth in 2011, 2.8 percent in 2012 and 1.9 percent in 2013 (http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) The expansion from IQ1983 to IQ1986 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983. GDP growth in the four quarters of 2012 and 2013 accumulated to 4.6 percent that is equivalent to 2.4 percent in a year. This is obtained by dividing GDP in IVQ2013 of $15,942.3 billion by GDP in IVQ2011 of $15,242.1 billion and compounding by 4/8: {[($15,942.3/$15,242.1)4/8 -1]100 = 2.3%}. The US economy grew 2.6 percent in IVQ2013 relative to the same quarter a year earlier in IVQ2012. Another important revelation of the revisions and enhancements is that GDP was flat in IVQ2012, which is just at the borderline of contraction. The rate of growth of GDP in the third estimate of IIIQ2013 is 4.1 percent in seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR). Inventory accumulation contributed 1.67 percentage points to this rate of growth. The actual rate without this impulse of unsold inventories would have been 2.43 percent, or 0.6 percent in IIIQ2013, such that annual equivalent growth in 2013 is closer to 2.1 percent {[(1.003)(1.006)(1.006)(1.007)4/4-1]100 = 2.2%}, compounding the quarterly rates and converting into annual equivalent.

Table I-7, US, Number of Quarters, Cumulative Growth and Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate in Cyclical Expansions

 

Number
of
Quarters

Cumulative Growth

∆%

Average Annual Equivalent Growth Rate

IIIQ 1954 to IQ1957

11

12.8

4.5

First Four Quarters IIIQ1954 to IIQ1955

4

7.8

 

IIQ1958 to IIQ1959

5

10.0

7.9

First Four Quarters

IIIQ1958 to IIQ1959

4

9.2

 

IIQ1975 to IVQ1976

8

8.3

4.1

First Four Quarters IIIQ1975 to IIQ1976

4

6.1

 

IQ1983-IQ1986

IQ1983-IIIQ1986

IQ1983-IVQ1986

IQ1983-IQ1987

IQ1983-IIQ1987

13

15

16

17

18

19.9

21.6

22.3

23.1

24.5

5.7

5.4

5.2

5.0

5.0

First Four Quarters IQ1983 to IVQ1983

4

7.8

 

Average First Four Quarters in Four Expansions*

 

7.7

 

IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013

18

11.0

2.4

First Four Quarters IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010

 

2.7

 

*First Four Quarters: 7.8% IIIQ1954-IIQ1955; 9.2% IIIQ1958-IIQ1959; 6.1% IIIQ1975-IIQ1976; 7.8% IQ1983-IVQ1983

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table EMP provides the comparison between the labor market in the current whole cycle from 2007 to 2013 and the whole cycle from 1979 to 1986. In the entire cycle from 2007 to 2013, the number employed fell 2.118 million, full-time employed fell 4.777 million, part-time for economic reasons increased 3.534 and population increased 13.812 million. The number employed fell 1.5 percent, full-time employed fell 3.9 percent, part-time for economic reasons increased 80.3 percent and population increased 6.0 percent. There is sharp contrast with the contractions of the 1980s and with most economic history of the United States. In the whole cycle from 1979 to 1986, the number employed increased 10.773 million, full-time employed increased 7.875 million, part-time for economic reasons 2.011 million and population 15.724 million. In the entire cycle from 1979 to 1986, the number employed increased 10.9 percent, full-time employed 9.5 percent, part-time for economic reasons 56.2 percent and population 9.5 million. The difference between the 1980s and the current cycle after 2007 is in the high rate of growth after the contraction that maintained trend growth around 3.0 percent for the entire cycle and per capital growth at 2.0 percent. The evident fact is that current weakness in labor markets originates in cyclical slow growth and not in imaginary secular stagnation.

Table EMP, US, Annual Level of Employed, Full-Time Employed, Employed Part-Time for Economic Reasons and Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Millions

 

Employed

Full-Time Employed

Part Time Economic Reasons

Noninstitutional Civilian Population

2000s

       

2000

136.891

113.846

3.227

212.577

2001

136.933

113.573

3.715

215.092

2002

136.485

112.700

4.213

217.570

2003

137.736

113.324

4.701

221.168

2004

139.252

114.518

4.567

223.357

2005

141.730

117.016

4.350

226.082

2006

144.427

119.688

4.162

228.815

2007

146.047

121.091

4.401

231.867

2008

145.362

120.030

5.875

233.788

2009

139.877

112.634

8.913

235.801

2010

139.064

111.714

8.874

237.830

2011

139.869

112.556

8.560

239.618

2012

142.469

114.809

8.122

243.284

2013

143.929

116.314

7.935

245.679

∆2007-2013

-2.118

-4.777

3.534

13.812

∆% 2007-2013

-1.5

-3.9

80.3

6.0

1980s

       

1979

98.824

82.654

3.577

164.863

1980

99.303

82.562

4.321

167.745

1981

100.397

83.243

4.768

170.130

1982

99.526

81.421

6.170

172.271

1983

100.834

82.322

6.266

174.215

1984

105.005

86.544

5.744

176.383

1985

107.150

88.534

5.590

178.206

1986

109.597

90.529

5.588

180.587

1987

112.440

92.957

5.401

182.753

1988

114.968

95.214

5.206

184.613

1989

117.342

97.369

4.894

186.393

∆1979-1986

10.773

7.875

2.011

15.724

∆% 1979-86

10.9

9.5

56.2

9.5

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

There is current interest in past theories of “secular stagnation.” Alvin H. Hansen (1939, 4, 7; see Hansen 1938, 1941; for an early critique see Simons 1942) argues:

“Not until the problem of full employment of our productive resources from the long-run, secular standpoint was upon us, were we compelled to give serious consideration to those factors and forces in our economy which tend to make business recoveries weak and anaemic (sic) and which tend to prolong and deepen the course of depressions. This is the essence of secular stagnation-sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which feed on them-selves and leave a hard and seemingly immovable core of unemployment. Now the rate of population growth must necessarily play an important role in determining the character of the output; in other words, the com-position of the flow of final goods. Thus a rapidly growing population will demand a much larger per capita volume of new residential building construction than will a stationary population. A stationary population with its larger proportion of old people may perhaps demand more personal services; and the composition of consumer demand will have an important influence on the quantity of capital required. The demand for housing calls for large capital outlays, while the demand for personal services can be met without making large investment expenditures. It is therefore not unlikely that a shift from a rapidly growing population to a stationary or declining one may so alter the composition of the final flow of consumption goods that the ratio of capital to output as a whole will tend to decline.”

The argument that anemic population growth causes “secular stagnation” in the US (Hansen 1938, 1939, 1941) is as misplaced currently as in the late 1930s (for early dissent see Simons 1942). Youth workers would obtain employment at a premium in an economy with declining population. In fact, there is currently population growth in the ages of 16 to 24 years but not enough job creation and discouragement of job searches for all ages. This is merely another case of theory without reality with dubious policy proposals. Inferior performance of the US economy and labor markets is the critical current issue of analysis and policy design.

In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share si of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate yi of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):

Y = ∑isiyi (1)

This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):

Y = ∑isiy*i + ∑iyis*i (2)

The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆si multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*i , or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆yi, multiplied by the average share of the group s*i, or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:

“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”

The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. There are accentuated cyclic factors for both the entire population and the young population of ages 16 to 24 years. Table Summary provides the total noninstitutional population (ICP) of the US, full-time employment level (FTE), employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP), employment/population ratio (EPOP) and unemployment level (UNE). Secular stagnation would not be secular but immediate. All indicators of the labor market weakened sharply during the contraction and did not recover. Population continued to grow but all other variables collapsed and did not recover. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-6). Hansen (1938, 1939) finds secular stagnation in lower growth of an aging population. In the current US economy, Table Summary shows that population is dynamic while the labor market is fractured. There is key explanation in the behavior of the civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and the employment population ratio (EPOP) that collapsed during the global recession with inadequate recovery. Abandoning job searches are difficult to capture in labor statistics but likely explain the decline in the participation of the population in the labor force. Allowing for abandoning job searches, the total number of people unemployed or underemployed is 28.2 million or 17.2 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html).

Table Summary Total, US, Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Thousands and Percent

 

ICP

FTE

EMP

CLF

CLFP

EPOP

UNE

2006

228.8

119.7

144.4

151.4

66.2

63.1

7.0

2009

235.8

112.6

139.9

154.1

65.4

59.3

14.3

2012

243.3

114.8

142.5

155.0

63.7

58.6

12.5

2013

245.7

116.3

143.9

155.4

63.2

58.6

11.5

12/07

233.2

121.0

146.3

153.7

65.9

62.8

7.4

9/09

236.3

112.0

139.1

153.6

65.0

58.9

14.5

3/14

247.3

117.0

145.1

155.6

62.79

58.7

10.5

ICP: Total Noninstitutional Civilian Population; FT: Full-time Employment Level, EMP: Total Employment Level; CLF: Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

The same situation is present in the labor market for young people in ages 16 to 24 years with data in Table Summary Youth. The youth noninstitutional civilian population (ICP) continued to increase during and after the global recession. There is the same disastrous labor market with decline for young people in employment (EMP), civilian labor force (CLF), civilian labor force participation rate (CLFP) and employment population ratio (EPOP). There are only increases for unemployment of young people (UNE) and youth unemployment rate (UNER). If aging were a factor of secular stagnation, growth of population of young people would attract a premium in remuneration in labor markets. The sad fact is that young people are also facing tough labor markets. The application of the theory of secular stagnation to the US economy and labor markets is void of reality in the form of key facts.

Table Summary Youth, US, Youth, Ages 16 to 24 Years, Noninstitutional Civilian Population, Full-time Employment, Employment, Civilian Labor Force, Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate, Employment Population Ratio, Unemployment, NSA, Thousands and Percent

 

ICP

EMP

CLF

CLFP

EPOP

UNE

UNER

2006

36.9

20.0

22.4

60.6

54.2

2.4

10.5

2009

37.6

16.9

21.4

56.9

46.9

3.8

17.6

2012

38.7

17.8

21.3

54.9

46.0

3.5

16.2

2013

38.8

18.1

21.4

55.0

46.5

3.3

15.5

12/07

37.5

19.4

21.7

57.8

51.6

2.3

10.7

9/09

37.6

17.0

20.7

55.2

45.1

3.8

18.2

3/14

38.8

17.9

20.9

54.0

46.3

3.0

14.3

ICP: Youth Noninstitutional Civilian Population; EMP: Youth Employment Level; CLF: Youth Civilian Labor Force; CLFP: Youth Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate; EPOP: Youth Employment Population Ratio; UNE: Unemployment; UNER: Youth Unemployment Rate

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

The United States is experiencing high youth unemployment as in European economies. Table I-10 provides the employment level for ages 16 to 24 years of age estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. On an annual basis, youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 17.362 million in 2011 or 2.679 million fewer youth jobs and to 17.834 million in 2012 or 2.207 million fewer jobs. Youth employment fell from 20.041 million in 2006 to 18.057 million in 2013 or 1.984 million fewer jobs. During the seasonal peak months of youth employment in the summer from Jun to Aug, youth employment has fallen by more than two million jobs relative to 21.914 million in Jul 2006 with 19.684 million in Jul 2013 for 2.230 million fewer youth jobs. The number of jobs ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.167 million in Aug 2006 to 18.636 million in Aug 2013 or by 2.531 million. The number of youth jobs fell from 19.604 million in Sep 2006 to 18.043 million in Sep 2013 or 1.561 million fewer youth jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 20.129 million in Dec 2006 to 18.106 million in Dec 2013 or 2.023 million fewer jobs. The number of youth jobs fell from 19.538 million in Mar 2007 to 17.939 million in Mar 2014 or 1.599 million fewer youth jobs. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 2.058 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 while jobs for ages 16 to 24 years decreased 1.599 million from 19.538 million in Mar 2007 to 17.939 million in Mar 2014. The hardship does not originate in low growth of population but in underperformance of the economy in the expansion from the business cycle. There are two hardships behind these data. First, young people cannot find employment after finishing high school and college, reducing prospects for achievement in older age. Second, students with more modest means cannot find employment to keep them in college.

Table I-10, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA

Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

Oct

Nov

Dec

2001

19678

19745

19800

19694

19675

19547

2002

18653

19074

19091

19542

19397

19394

2003

18811

18880

18709

19139

19163

19136

2004

18852

18841

18752

19609

19615

19619

2005

18858

18670

18989

19794

19750

19733

2006

19003

19182

19291

19853

19903

20129

2007

19407

19415

19538

19564

19660

19361

2008

18724

18546

18745

18757

18454

18378

2009

17467

17606

17564

16671

16689

16615

2010

16166

16412

16587

16867

16946

16727

2011

16512

16638

16898

17532

17402

17234

2012

16944

17150

17301

17842

17877

17604

2013

17183

17257

17271

17976

18104

18106

2014

17372

17357

17939

     

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/

Chart I-21 provides US employment level ages 16 to 24 years from 2002 to 2014. Employment level is sharply lower in Feb 2014 relative to the peak in 2007. The following Chart I-21A relates youth employment and youth noninstitutional civilian population.

clip_image024

Chart I-21, US, Employment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-21A provides the US civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted from 2001 to 2014. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013 or by 1.418 million while the number of jobs for ages 16 to 24 years fell by 2.230 million from 21.914 million in Jul 2006 to 19.684 million in Jul 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013 or by 1.386 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.777 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 or by 1.355 million while the number of youth jobs fell by 1.455 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013 or by 1.324 million while the number of youth jobs decreased 1.877 million from Oct 2006 to Oct 2013. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million while the number of youth jobs fell 1.799 million. The civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013 or by 1.272 million while the number of youth jobs fell 2.023 million from Dec 2006 to Dec 2013. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.488 million from 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 2.035 million. The youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014 while the number of youth jobs decreased 2.058 million. The civilian noninstitutional population ages 16 to 24 years increased 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 while the number of youth jobs fell 1.599 million.

clip_image025

Chart I-21A, US, Civilian Noninstitutional Population Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-21B provides the civilian labor force of the US ages 16 to 24 years NSA from 2001 to 2014. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 24.339 million in Jul 2007 to 23.506 million in Jul 2013, by 0.833 million or decline of 3.4 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population NSA increased from 37.443 million in Jul 2007 to 38.861 million in Jul 2013, by 1.418 million or 3.8 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 fell from 22.801 million in Aug 2007 to 22.089 million in Aug 2013, by 0.712 million or 3.1 percent, while the noninstitutional population for ages 16 to 24 years increased from 37.455 million in Aug 2007 to 38.841 million in Aug 2013, by 1.386 million or 3.7 percent. The US civilian labor force ages 16 to 24 years fell from 21.917 million in Sep 2007 to 21.183 million in Sep 2013, by 0.734 million or 3.3 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.467 million in Sep 2007 to 38.822 million in Sep 2013 by 1.355 million or 3.6 percent. The US civilian labor force fell from 21.821 million in Oct 2007 to 21.003 million in Oct 2013, by 0.818 million or 3.7 percent while the noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.480 million in Oct 2007 to 38.804 million in Oct 2013, by 1.324 million or 3.5 percent. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.909 million in Nov 2007 to 20.825 million in Nov 2013, by 1.084 million or 4.9 percent while the civilian noninstitutional youth population increased from 37.076 million in Nov 2006 to 38.798 million in Nov 2013 or by 1.722 million. The US youth civilian labor force fell from 21.684 million in Dec 2007 to 20.642 million in Dec 2013, by 1.042 million or 4.8 percent, while the civilian noninstitutional population increased from 37.518 million in Dec 2007 to 38.790 million in Dec 2013, by 1.272 million or 3.4 percent. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell from 21.770 million in Jan 2007 to 20.423 million in Jan2014, by 1.347 million or 6.2 percent while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 37.282 million in Jan 2007 to 38.770 million in Jan 2014, by 1.488 million or 4.0 percent. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell 1.255 million from 21.645 million in Feb 2007 to 20.390 million in Feb 2014 while the youth civilian noninstitutional population increased 1.464 million from 37.302 million in Feb 2007 to 38.766 million in Feb 2014. The youth civilian labor force of the US fell 0.693 million from 21.634 million in Mar 2007 to 20.941 million in Mar 2014 or 3.2 person while the youth noninstitutional civilian population 1.437 million from 37.324 million in Mar 2007 to 38.761 million in Mar 2014 or 3.9 percent. Youth in the US abandoned their participation in the labor force because of the frustration that there are no jobs available for them.

clip_image026

Chart I-21B, US, Civilian Labor Force Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-21C provides the ratio of labor force to noninstitutional population or labor force participation of ages 16 to 24 years not seasonally adjusted. The US labor force participation rates for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 66.7 in Jul 2006 to 60.5 in Jul 2013 because of the frustration of young people who believe there may not be jobs available for them. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 63.9 in Aug 2006 to 56.9 in Aug 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.1 percent in Sep 2006 to 54.6 percent in Sep 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Oct 2006 to 54.1 in Oct 2013. The US labor force participation rate of young people fell from 59.7 percent in Nov 2006 to 53.7 percent in Nov 2013. The US labor force participation rate fell from 57.8 in Dec 2007 to 53.2 in Dec 2013. The youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.4 in Jan 2007 to 52.7 in Jan 2014. The US youth labor force participation rate fell from 58.0 percent in Feb 2007 to 52.6 percent in Feb 2013. The labor force participation rate of ages 16 to 24 years fell from 58.0 in Mar 2007 to 54.0 in Mar 2014. Many young people abandoned searches for employment, dropping from the labor force.

clip_image027

Chart I-21C, US, Labor Force Participation Rate Ages 16 to 24 Years, NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

An important measure of the job market is the number of people with jobs relative to population available for work or civilian noninstitutional population or employment/population ratio. Chart I-21D provides the employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years. The US employment/population ratio NSA for ages 16 to 24 years collapsed from 59.2 in Jul 2006 to 50.7 in Jul 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years dropped from 57.2 in Aug 2006 to 48.0 in Aug 2013. The employment population ratio for ages to 16 to 24 years declined from 52.9 in Sep 2006 to 46.5 in Sep 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.6 in Oct 2006 to 46.3 in Oct 2013. The employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 53.7 in Nov 2007 to 46.7 in Nov 2013. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 51.6 in Dec 2007 to 46.7 in Dec 2013. The US employment population ratio fell from 52.1 in Jan 2007 to 44.8 in Jan 2014. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 fell from 52.0 in Jan 2007 to 44.8 in Jan 2-14. The US employment population ratio for ages 16 to 24 years fell from 52.3 in Mar 2007 to 46.3 in Mar 2014. Chart I-21D shows vertical drop during the global recession without recovery.

clip_image028

Chart I-21D, US, Employment Population Ratio Ages 16 to 24 Years, Thousands NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Table I-11 provides US unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years. The number unemployed ages 16 to 24 years increased from 2342 thousand in 2007 to 3634 thousand in 2011 or by 1.292 million and 3451 thousand in 2012 or by 1.109 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 23 years increased from 2342 in 2007 to 3324 thousand in 2013 or by 0.982 million. The unemployment level ages 16 to 24 years rose from 2.096 million in Mar 2007 to 3.002 million in Mar 2014 or by 0.906 million. This situation may persist for many years.

Table I-11, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, NSA, Thousands

Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

Oct

Nov

Dec

Annual

2001

2250

2258

2253

2424

2470

2412

2371

2002

2754

2731

2822

2468

2570

2374

2683

2003

2748

2740

2601

2522

2522

2248

2746

2004

2767

2631

2588

2572

2448

2294

2638

2005

2661

2787

2520

2285

2369

2055

2521

2006

2366

2433

2216

2252

2242

2007

2353

2007

2363

2230

2096

2258

2250

2323

2342

2008

2633

2480

2347

2842

2833

2928

2830

2009

3278

3457

3371

3789

3699

3532

3760

2010

3983

3888

3748

3731

3561

3352

3857

2011

3851

3696

3520

3386

3287

3161

3634

2012

3416

3507

3294

3285

3102

3153

3451

2013

3674

3449

3261

3028

2721

2536

3324

2014

3051

3033

3002

       

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-22 provides the unemployment level for ages 16 to 24 from 2001 to 2014. The level rose sharply from 2007 to 2010 with tepid improvement into 2012 and deterioration into 2013-2014 with recent marginal improvement alternating with deterioration.

clip_image029

Chart I-22, US, Unemployment Level 16-24 Years, Thousands SA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Table I-12 provides the rate of unemployment of young peoples in ages 16 to 24 years. The annual rate jumped from 10.5 percent in 2007 to 18.4 percent in 2010, 17.3 percent in 2011 and 16.2 percent in 2012. The rate of youth unemployment fell marginally to 15.5 percent in 2013. During the seasonal peak in Jul, the rate of youth unemployed was 18.1 percent in Jul 2011, 17.1 percent in Jul 2012 and 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 compared with 10.8 percent in Jul 2007. The rate of youth unemployment rose from 11.2 percent in Jul 2006 to 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and likely higher if adding those who ceased searching for a job in frustration none may be available. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.1 percent in Dec 2006 to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 10.9 percent in Jan 2007 to 14.9 percent in Jan and Feb 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased from 9.7 percent in Mar 2007 to 14.3 percent in Mar 2014. The actual rate is higher because of the difficulty in counting those dropping from the labor force because they believe there are no jobs available for them.

Table I-12, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Thousands, NSA

Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Annual

2001

10.3

10.3

10.2

10.5

10.7

10.5

11.0

11.2

11.0

10.6

2002

12.9

12.5

12.9

12.4

11.5

11.4

11.2

11.7

10.9

12.0

2003

12.7

12.7

12.2

13.3

11.9

12.5

11.6

11.6

10.5

12.4

2004

12.8

12.3

12.1

12.3

11.1

11.5

11.6

11.1

10.5

11.8

2005

12.4

13.0

11.7

11.0

10.8

10.7

10.3

10.7

9.4

11.3

2006

11.1

11.3

10.3

11.2

10.4

10.5

10.2

10.1

9.1

10.5

2007

10.9

10.3

9.7

10.8

10.5

11.0

10.3

10.3

10.7

10.5

2008

12.3

11.8

11.1

14.0

13.0

13.4

13.2

13.3

13.7

12.8

2009

15.8

16.4

16.1

18.5

18.0

18.2

18.5

18.1

17.5

17.6

2010

19.8

19.2

18.4

19.1

17.8

17.6

18.1

17.4

16.7

18.4

2011

18.9

18.2

17.2

18.1

17.5

17.0

16.2

15.9

15.5

17.3

2012

16.8

17.0

16.0

17.1

16.8

15.2

15.5

14.8

15.2

16.2

2013

17.6

16.7

15.9

16.3

15.6

14.8

14.4

13.1

12.3

15.5

2014

14.9

14.9

14.3

             

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-23 provides the BLS estimate of the not-seasonally-adjusted rate of youth unemployment for ages 16 to 24 years from 2001 to 2014. The rate of youth unemployment increased sharply during the global recession of 2008 and 2009 but has failed to drop to earlier lower levels because of low growth of GDP. Long-term economic performance in the United States consisted of trend growth of GDP at 3 percent per year and of per capita GDP at 2 percent per year as measured for 1870 to 2010 by Robert E Lucas (2011May). The economy returned to trend growth after adverse events such as wars and recessions. The key characteristic of adversities such as recessions was much higher rates of growth in expansion periods that permitted the economy to recover output, income and employment losses that occurred during the contractions. Over the business cycle, the economy compensated the losses of contractions with higher growth in expansions to maintain trend growth of GDP of 3 percent and of GDP per capita of 2 percent.

clip_image030

Chart I-23, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent, NSA, 2001-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-24 provides longer perspective with the rate of youth unemployment in ages 16 to 24 years from 1948 to 2014. The rate of youth unemployment rose to 20 percent during the contractions of the early 1980s and also during the contraction of the global recession in 2008 and 2009. The data illustrate again the argument in this blog that the contractions of the early 1980s are the valid framework for comparison with the global recession of 2008 and 2009 instead of misleading comparisons with the 1930s. During the initial phase of recovery, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years NSA fell from 18.9 percent in Jun 1983 to 14.5 percent in Jun 1984. In contrast, the rate of youth unemployment 16 to 24 years was nearly the same during the expansion after IIIQ2009: 17.5 percent in Dec 2009, 16.7 percent in Dec 2010, 15.5 percent in Dec 2011, 15.2 percent in Dec 2012, 17.6 percent in Jan 2013, 16.7 percent in Feb 2013, 15.9 percent in Mar 2013, 15.1 percent in Apr 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 16.4 percent in May 2013, 18.0 percent in Jun 2013, 16.3 percent in Jul 2013 and 15.6 percent in Aug 2013. In Sep 2006, the rate of youth unemployment was 10.5 percent, increasing to 14.8 percent in Sep 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 in Oct 2007, increasing to 14.4 percent in Oct 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Nov 2007, increasing to 13.1 percent in Nov 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.7 percent in Dec 2013, increasing to 12.3 percent in Dec 2013. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.9 percent in Jan 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Jan 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 10.3 percent in Feb 2007, increasing to 14.9 percent in Feb 2014. The rate of youth unemployment was 9.7 percent in Mar 2007, increasing to 14.3 percent in Mar 2014. The difference originates in the vigorous seasonally-adjusted annual equivalent average rate of GDP growth of 5.7 percent during the recovery from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 and 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986 compared with 2.4 percent on average during the first seventeen quarters of expansion from IIIQ2009 to IVQ2013 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html). US economic growth has been at only 2.4 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 18 quarters from IVQ2009 to IVQ2013. Boskin (2010Sep) measures that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent in the first four quarters and 4.5 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the second quarter of 1975; and at 7.7 percent in the first four quarters and 5.8 percent in the first 12 quarters after the trough in the first quarter of 1983 (Professor Michael J. Boskin, Summer of Discontent, Wall Street Journal, Sep 2, 2010 http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882304575465462926649950.html). There are new calculations using the revision of US GDP and personal income data since 1929 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (http://bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm) and the second estimate of GDP for IVQ2013 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2014/pdf/gdp4q13_2nd.pdf). The average of 7.7 percent in the first four quarters of major cyclical expansions is in contrast with the rate of growth in the first four quarters of the expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIQ2010 of only 2.7 percent obtained by diving GDP of $14,738.0 billion in IIQ2010 by GDP of $14,356.9 billion in IIQ2009 {[$14,738.0/$14,356.9 -1]100 = 2.7%], or accumulating the quarter on quarter growth rates (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The expansion from IQ1983 to IVQ1985 was at the average annual growth rate of 5.9 percent, 5.4 percent from IQ1983 to IIIQ1986, 5.2 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1986, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IQ1987, 5.0 percent from IQ1983 to IIQ1987 and at 7.8 percent from IQ1983 to IVQ1983 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-uncertainty-mediocre-cyclical.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/financial-risks-slow-cyclical-united.html). The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth under trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,098.0 billion than actual $15,942.3 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than under trend, explaining the 28.2 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 17.2 percent of the effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/interest-rate-risks-twenty-eight.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/03/rules-discretionary-authorities-and.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,942.3 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.3 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation.

clip_image031

Chart I-24, US, Unemployment Rate 16-24 Years, Percent NSA, 1948-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

It is more difficult to move to other jobs after a certain age because of fewer available opportunities for mature individuals than for new entrants into the labor force. Middle-aged unemployed are less likely to find another job. Table I-13 provides the unemployment level ages 45 years and over. The number unemployed ages 45 years and over rose from 1.607 million in Oct 2006 to 4.576 million in Oct 2010 or by 184.8 percent. The number of unemployed ages 45 years and over declined to 3.800 million in Oct 2012 that is still higher by 136.5 percent than in Oct 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over increased from 1.704 million in Nov 2006 to 3.861 million in Nov 2012, or 126.6 percent. The number unemployed age 45 and over is still higher by 98.5 percent at 3.383 million in Nov 2013 than 1.704 million in Nov 2006. The number unemployed age 45 and over jumped from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 4.762 million in Dec 2010 or 165.4 percent. At 3.927 million in Dec 2012, mature unemployment is higher by 2.133 million or 118.9 percent higher than 1.794 million in Dec 2006. The level of unemployment of those aged 45 year or more of 3.632 million in Oct 2013 is higher by 2.025 million than 1.607 million in Sep 2006 or higher by 126.0 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.794 million in Dec 2006 to 3.378 million in Nov 2013 or 88.3 percent. The annual number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 1.848 million 2006 to 3.719 million in 2013 or 101.2 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 4.394 million in Jan 2013, by 2.618 million or 106.7 percent. The number of unemployed 45 years and over rose from 2.126 million in Jan 2006 to 3.508 million in Jan 2014, by 1.382 million or 65.0 percent. The level of unemployed 45 years or older increased 2.051 million or 99.8 percent from 2.056 million in Feb 2006 to 4.107 million in Feb 2013 and at 3.490 million in Feb 2014 is higher by 69.7 percent than in Feb 2006. The number of unemployed 45 years and over increased 2.048 million or 108.9 percent from 1.881 million in Mar 2006 to 3.929 million in Mar 2013 and at 3.394 million in Mar 2014 is higher by 80.4 percent than in Mar 2006. The actual number unemployed is likely much higher because many are not accounted who abandoned job searches in frustration there may not be a job for them. Recent improvements may be illusory.

Table I-13, US, Unemployment Level 45 Years and Over, Thousands NSA

Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

Oct

Nov

Dec

Annual

2000

1498

1392

1291

1202

1242

1217

1249

2001

1572

1587

1533

1722

1786

1901

1576

2002

2235

2280

2138

1945

2013

2210

2114

2003

2495

2415

2485

2032

2132

2130

2253

2004

2453

2397

2354

1931

2053

2086

2149

2005

2286

2286

2126

1875

1920

1963

2009

2006

2126

2056

1881

1607

1704

1794

1848

2007

2155

2138

2031

1885

1925

2120

1966

2008

2336

2336

2326

2728

3078

3485

2540

2009

4138

4380

4518

4492

4655

4960

4500

2010

5314

5307

5194

4576

4909

4762

4879

2011

5027

4837

4748

4375

4195

4182

4537

2012

4458

4472

4390

3800

3861

3927

4133

2013

4394

4107

3929

3632

3383

3378

3719

2014

3508

3490

3394

       

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

Chart I-25 provides the level unemployed ages 45 years and over. There was an increase in the recessions of the 1980s, 1991 and 2001 followed by declines to earlier levels. The current expansion of the economy after IIIQ2009 has not been sufficiently vigorous to reduce significantly middle-age unemployment. Recent improvements could be illusory because many abandoned job searches in frustration that there may not be jobs for them and are not counted as unemployed.

clip_image032

Chart I-25, US, Unemployment Level Ages 45 Years and Over, Thousands, NSA, 1976-2014

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/data/

The analysis by Kydland (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/kydland-bio.html) and Prescott (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/prescott-bio.html) (1977, 447-80, equation 5) uses the “expectation augmented” Phillips curve with the natural rate of unemployment of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), which in the notation of Barro and Gordon (1983, 592, equation 1) is:

Ut = Unt – α(πtπe) α > 0 (1)

Where Ut is the rate of unemployment at current time t, Unt is the natural rate of unemployment, πt is the current rate of inflation and πe is the expected rate of inflation by economic agents based on current information. Equation (1) expresses unemployment net of the natural rate of unemployment as a decreasing function of the gap between actual and expected rates of inflation. The system is completed by a social objective function, W, depending on inflation, π, and unemployment, U:

W = W(πt, Ut) (2)

The policymaker maximizes the preferences of the public, (2), subject to the constraint of the tradeoff of inflation and unemployment, (1). The total differential of W set equal to zero provides an indifference map in the Cartesian plane with ordered pairs (πt, Ut - Un) such that the consistent equilibrium is found at the tangency of an indifference curve and the Phillips curve in (1). The indifference curves are concave to the origin. The consistent policy is not optimal. Policymakers without discretionary powers following a rule of price stability would attain equilibrium with unemployment not higher than with the consistent policy. The optimal outcome is obtained by the rule of price stability, or zero inflation, and no more unemployment than under the consistent policy with nonzero inflation and the same unemployment. Taylor (1998LB) attributes the sustained boom of the US economy after the stagflation of the 1970s to following a monetary policy rule instead of discretion (see Taylor 1993, 1999). It is not uncommon for effects of regulation differing from those intended by policy. Professors Edward C. Prescott and Lee E. Ohanian (2014Feb), writing on “US productivity growth has taken a dive,” on Feb 3, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303942404579362462611843696?KEYWORDS=Prescott), argue that impressive productivity growth over the long-term constructed US prosperity and wellbeing. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) measure US productivity growth at 2.5 percent per year since 1948. Average US productivity growth has been only 1.1 percent on average since 2011. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) argue that living standards in the US increased at 28 percent in a decade but with current slow growth of productivity will only increase 12 percent by 2024. There may be collateral effects on productivity growth from policy design similar to those in Kydland and Prescott (1977). The Bureau of Labor Statistics important report on productivity and costs released on Mar 6, 2014 (http://www.bls.gov/lpc/) supports the argument of decline of productivity in the US analyzed by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb). Table II-2 provides the annual percentage changes of productivity, real hourly compensation and unit labor costs for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2013. The data confirm the argument of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb): productivity increased cumulatively 2.5 percent from 2011 to 2013 at the average annual rate of 0.8 percent. The situation is direr by excluding growth of 1.5 percent in 2013, which leaves an average of 0.5 percent for 2011 and 2013. Average productivity growth for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2013 is only 1.6 percent. The argument by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is proper in choosing the tail of the business cycle because the increase in productivity in 2009 of 3.1 percent and 3.3 percent in 2013 consisted on reducing labor hours.

Table II-2, US, Revised Nonfarm Business Sector Productivity and Costs Annual Average, ∆% Annual Average 

 

2013

∆%

2012 ∆%

2011 ∆%

2010 ∆%

2009 ∆%

2008  ∆%   

2007 ∆%

Productivity

0.5

1.5

0.5

3.3

3.1

0.8

1.6

Real Hourly Compensation

0.1

0.5

-0.7

0.4

1.5

-1.1

1.4

Unit Labor Costs

1.1

1.2

2.0

-1.2

-2.0

2.0

2.6

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/lpc/

In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 3) of secular stagnation, economic progress consists of growth of real income per person driven by growth of productivity. The “constituent elements” of economic progress are “(a) inventions, (b) the discovery and development of new territory and new resources, and (c) the growth of population” (Hansen 1939, 3). Secular stagnation originates in decline of population growth and discouragement of inventions. According to Hansen (1939, 2), US population grew by 16 million in the 1920s but grew by one half or about 8 million in the 1930s with forecasts at the time of Hansen’s writing in 1938 of growth of around 5.3 million in the 1940s. Hansen (1939, 2) characterized demography in the US as “a drastic decline in the rate of population growth.” Hansen’s plea was to adapt economic policy to stagnation of population in ensuring full employment. In the analysis of Hansen (1939, 8), population caused half of the growth of US GDP per year. Growth of output per person in the US and Europe was caused by “changes in techniques and to the exploitation of new natural resources.” In this analysis, population caused 60 percent of the growth of capital formation in the US. Declining population growth would reduce growth of capital formation. Residential construction provided an important share of growth of capital formation. Hansen (1939, 12) argues that market power of imperfect competition discourages innovation with prolonged use of obsolete capital equipment. Trade unions would oppose labor-savings innovations. The combination of stagnating and aging population with reduced innovation caused secular stagnation. Hansen (1939, 12) concludes that there is role for public investments to compensate for lack of dynamism of private investment but with tough tax/debt issues.

The current application of Hansen’s (1938, 1939, 1941) proposition argues that secular stagnation occurs because full employment equilibrium can be attained only with negative real interest rates between minus 2 and minus 3 percent. Professor Lawrence H. Summers (2013Nov8) finds that “a set of older ideas that went under the phrase secular stagnation are not profoundly important in understanding Japan’s experience in the 1990s and may not be without relevance to America’s experience today” (emphasis added). Summers (2013Nov8) argues there could be an explanation in “that the short-term real interest rate that was consistent with full employment had fallen to -2% or -3% sometime in the middle of the last decade. Then, even with artificial stimulus to demand coming from all this financial imprudence, you wouldn’t see any excess demand. And even with a relative resumption of normal credit conditions, you’d have a lot of difficulty getting back to full employment.” The US economy could be in a situation where negative real rates of interest with fed funds rates close to zero as determined by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) do not move the economy to full employment or full utilization of productive resources. Summers (2013Oct8) finds need of new thinking on “how we manage an economy in which the zero nominal interest rates is a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economy activity holding our economies back to their potential.”

Former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (2014Jan8) finds three major risks in prolonged unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing: (1) incentive of delaying action by political leaders; (2) “financial moral hazard” in inducing excessive exposures pursuing higher yields of risker credit classes; and (3) major risks in exiting unconventional policy. Rubin (2014Jan8) proposes reduction of deficits by structural reforms that could promote recovery by improving confidence of business attained with sound fiscal discipline.

Professor John B. Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) provides clear thought on the lack of relevance of Hansen’s contention of secular stagnation to current economic conditions. The application of secular stagnation argues that the economy of the US has attained full-employment equilibrium since around 2000 only with negative real rates of interest of minus 2 to minus 3 percent. At low levels of inflation, the so-called full-employment equilibrium of negative interest rates of minus 2 to minus 3 percent cannot be attained and the economy stagnates. Taylor (2014Jan01) analyzes multiple contradictions with current reality in this application of the theory of secular stagnation:

  • Secular stagnation would predict idle capacity, in particular in residential investment when fed fund rates were fixed at 1 percent from Jun 2003 to Jun 2004. Taylor (2014Jan01) finds unemployment at 4.4 percent with house prices jumping 7 percent from 2002 to 2003 and 14 percent from 2004 to 2005 before dropping from 2006 to 2007. GDP prices doubled from 1.7 percent to 3.4 percent when interest rates were low from 2003 to 2005.
  • Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the application of secular stagnation based on low interest rates because of savings glut and lack of investment opportunities. Taylor (2009) shows that there was no savings glut. The savings rate of the US in the past decade is significantly lower than in the 1980s.
  • Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) finds another contradiction in the low ratio of investment to GDP currently and reduced investment and hiring by US business firms.
  • Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the financial crisis and global recession were caused by weak implementation of existing regulation and departure from rules-based policies.
  • Taylor (2014Jan01, 2014Jan3) argues that the recovery from the global recession was constrained by a change in the regime of regulation and fiscal/monetary policies.

The analysis by Kydland (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/kydland-bio.html) and Prescott (http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2004/prescott-bio.html) (1977, 447-80, equation 5) uses the “expectation augmented” Phillips curve with the natural rate of unemployment of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), which in the notation of Barro and Gordon (1983, 592, equation 1) is:

Ut = Unt – α(πtπe) α > 0 (1)

Where Ut is the rate of unemployment at current time t, Unt is the natural rate of unemployment, πt is the current rate of inflation and πe is the expected rate of inflation by economic agents based on current information. Equation (1) expresses unemployment net of the natural rate of unemployment as a decreasing function of the gap between actual and expected rates of inflation. The system is completed by a social objective function, W, depending on inflation, π, and unemployment, U:

W = W(πt, Ut) (2)

The policymaker maximizes the preferences of the public, (2), subject to the constraint of the tradeoff of inflation and unemployment, (1). The total differential of W set equal to zero provides an indifference map in the Cartesian plane with ordered pairs (πt, Ut - Un) such that the consistent equilibrium is found at the tangency of an indifference curve and the Phillips curve in (1). The indifference curves are concave to the origin. The consistent policy is not optimal. Policymakers without discretionary powers following a rule of price stability would attain equilibrium with unemployment not higher than with the consistent policy. The optimal outcome is obtained by the rule of price stability, or zero inflation, and no more unemployment than under the consistent policy with nonzero inflation and the same unemployment. Taylor (1998LB) attributes the sustained boom of the US economy after the stagflation of the 1970s to following a monetary policy rule instead of discretion (see Taylor 1993, 1999). It is not uncommon for effects of regulation differing from those intended by policy. Professors Edward C. Prescott and Lee E. Ohanian (2014Feb), writing on “US productivity growth has taken a dive,” on Feb 3, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303942404579362462611843696?KEYWORDS=Prescott), argue that impressive productivity growth over the long-term constructed US prosperity and wellbeing. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) measure US productivity growth at 2.5 percent per year since 1948. Average US productivity growth has been only 1.1 since 2011. Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) argue that living standards in the US increased at 28 percent in a decade but with current slow growth of productivity will only increase 12 percent by 2024. There may be collateral effects on productivity growth from policy design similar to those in Kydland and Prescott (1977). The Bureau of Labor Statistics important report on productivity and costs released on Mar 6, 2014 (http://www.bls.gov/lpc/) supports the argument of decline of productivity in the US analyzed by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb). Table II-2 provides the annual percentage changes of productivity, real hourly compensation and unit labor costs for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2013. The data confirm the argument of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb): productivity increased cumulatively 2.5 percent from 2011 to 2013 at the average annual rate of 0.8 percent. The situation is direr by excluding growth of 1.5 percent in 2013, which leaves an average of 0.5 percent for 2011 and 2013. Average productivity growth for the entire economic cycle from 2007 to 2013 is only 1.6 percent. The argument by Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is proper in choosing the tail of the business cycle because the increase in productivity in 2009 of 3.1 percent and 3.3 percent in 2013 consisted on reducing labor hours.

In revealing research, Edward P. Lazear and James R. Spletzer (2012JHJul22) use the wealth of data in the valuable database and resources of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/data/) in providing clear thought on the nature of the current labor market of the United States. The critical issue of analysis and policy currently is whether unemployment is structural or cyclical. Structural unemployment could occur because of (1) industrial and demographic shifts and (2) mismatches of skills and job vacancies in industries and locations. Consider the aggregate unemployment rate, Y, expressed in terms of share si of a demographic group in an industry i and unemployment rate yi of that demographic group (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 5-6):

Y = ∑isiyi (1)

This equation can be decomposed for analysis as (Lazear and Spletzer 2012JHJul22, 6):

Y = ∑isiy*i + ∑iyis*i (2)

The first term in (2) captures changes in the demographic and industrial composition of the economy ∆si multiplied by the average rate of unemployment y*i , or structural factors. The second term in (2) captures changes in the unemployment rate specific to a group, or ∆yi, multiplied by the average share of the group s*i, or cyclical factors. There are also mismatches in skills and locations relative to available job vacancies. A simple observation by Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) casts intuitive doubt on structural factors: the rate of unemployment jumped from 4.4 percent in the spring of 2007 to 10 percent in October 2009. By nature, structural factors should be permanent or occur over relative long periods. The revealing result of the exhaustive research of Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) is:

“The analysis in this paper and in others that we review do not provide any compelling evidence that there have been changes in the structure of the labor market that are capable of explaining the pattern of persistently high unemployment rates. The evidence points to primarily cyclic factors.”

The theory of secular stagnation cannot explain sudden collapse of the US economy and labor markets. The theory of secular stagnation departs from an aggregate production function in which output grows with the use of labor, capital and technology (see Pelaez and Pelaez, Globalization and the State, Vol. I (2008a), 11-6). Simon Kuznets (1971) analyzes modern economic growth in his Lecture in Memory of Alfred Nobel:

“The major breakthroughs in the advance of human knowledge, those that constituted dominant sources of sustained growth over long periods and spread to a substantial part of the world, may be termed epochal innovations. And the changing course of economic history can perhaps be subdivided into economic epochs, each identified by the epochal innovation with the distinctive characteristics of growth that it generated. Without considering the feasibility of identifying and dating such economic epochs, we may proceed on the working assumption that modern economic growth represents such a distinct epoch - growth dating back to the late eighteenth century and limited (except in significant partial effects) to economically developed countries. These countries, so classified because they have managed to take adequate advantage of the potential of modern technology, include most of Europe, the overseas offshoots of Western Europe, and Japan—barely one quarter of world population.”

Chart II-7 provides nonfarm-business labor productivity, measured by output per hour, from 1947 to 2013. The rate of productivity increase continued in the early part of the 2000s but then softened and fell during the global recession. The interruption of productivity increases occurred exclusively in the current business cycle. Lazear and Spletzer (2012JHJul22) find “primarily cyclic” factors in explaining the frustration of currently depressed labor markets in the United States. Stagnation of productivity is another cyclic event and not secular trend. The theory and application of secular stagnation to current US economic conditions is void of reality.

clip_image033

Chart II-7, US, Nonfarm Business Labor Productivity, Output per Hour, 1947-2013, Index 2005=100

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/

Table II-6 expands Table II-2 providing more complete measurements of the Productivity and Cost research of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The proper emphasis of Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) is on the low productivity increases from 2011 to 2013. Labor productivity increased 3.3 percent in 2010 and 3.1 percent in 2009. There is much stronger yet not sustained performance in 2010 with productivity growing 3.3 percent because of growth of output of 3.2 percent with decline of hours worked of 0.1 percent. Productivity growth of 3.1 percent in 2009 consists of decline of output by 4.3 percent while hours worked collapsed 7.2 percent, which is not a desirable route to progress. The expansion phase of the economic cycle concentrated in one year, 2010, with underperformance in the remainder of the expansion from 2011 to 2013 of productivity growth at average 0.8 percent per year.

Table II-6, US, Productivity and Costs, Annual Percentage Changes 2007-2013

 

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

Productivity

0.5

1.5

0.5

3.3

3.1

0.8

1.6

Output

2.2

3.7

2.5

3.2

-4.3

-1.3

2.3

Hours Worked

1.7

2.2

2.0

-0.1

-7.2

-2.0

0.7

Employment

1.8

2.0

1.5

-1.2

-5.7

-1.5

0.9

Average Weekly Hours Worked

-0.1

0.2

0.5

1.1

-1.6

-0.6

-0.2

Hourly Compensation

1.6

2.6

2.5

2.1

1.1

2.7

4.3

Consumer Price Inflation

1.5

2.1

3.2

1.6

-0.4

3.8

2.8

Real Hourly Compensation

0.1

0.5

-0.7

0.4

1.5

-1.1

1.4

Non-labor Payments

3.7

6.5

4.0

7.3

-0.1

-0.4

3.4

Output per Job

0.3

1.7

1.0

4.4

1.5

0.2

1.4

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/

Productivity growth can bring about prosperity while productivity regression can jeopardize progress. Cobet and Wilson (2002) provide estimates of output per hour and unit labor costs in national currency and US dollars for the US, Japan and Germany from 1950 to 2000 (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 137-44). The average yearly rate of productivity change from 1950 to 2000 was 2.9 percent in the US, 6.3 percent for Japan and 4.7 percent for Germany while unit labor costs in USD increased at 2.6 percent in the US, 4.7 percent in Japan and 4.3 percent in Germany. From 1995 to 2000, output per hour increased at the average yearly rate of 4.6 percent in the US, 3.9 percent in Japan and 2.6 percent in Germany while unit labor costs in USD fell at minus 0.7 percent in the US, 4.3 percent in Japan and 7.5 percent in Germany. There was increase in productivity growth in Japan and France within the G7 in the second half of the 1990s but significantly lower than the acceleration of 1.3 percentage points per year in the US. Table II-7 provides average growth rates of indicators in the research of productivity and growth of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. There is dramatic decline of productivity growth in the whole cycle from 2.2 percent per year on average from 1947 to 2013 to 1.6 percent per year on average from 2007 to 2013. There is profound drop in the average rate of output growth from 3.4 percent on average from 1947 to 2013 to 1.0 percent from 2007 to 2013. The US maintained growth at 3.0 percent on average over entire cycles with expansions at higher rates compensating for contractions. Growth on trend in the entire cycle from IVQ2007 to IV2013 would have accumulated to 20.3 percent. GDP in IVQ2013 would be $18,040.3 billion if the US had grown at trend, which is higher by $2,107.4 billion than actual $15,932.9 billion. There are about two trillion dollars of GDP less than on trend, explaining the 29.1 million unemployed or underemployed equivalent to actual unemployment of 17.8 percent of the effective labor force (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/financial-instability-rules.html). US GDP grew from $14,996.1 billion in IVQ2007 in constant dollars to $15,932.9 billion in IVQ2013 or 6.2 percent at the average annual equivalent rate of 1.0 percent. The US missed the opportunity to grow at higher rates during the expansion and it is difficult to catch up because rates in the final periods of expansions tend to decline. The US missed the opportunity for recovery of output and employment always afforded in the first four quarters of expansion from recessions. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing were not required or present in successful cyclical expansions and in secular economic growth at 3.0 percent per year and 2.0 percent per capita as measured by Lucas (2011May). There is cyclical uncommonly slow growth in the US instead of allegations of secular stagnation. Real hourly compensation collapsed from average 1.6 percent per year from 1947 to 2013 to 0.3 percent per year from 2007 to 2013. The antithesis of secular stagnation is cyclical slow growth. The policy design deserves consideration of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Prescott and Ohanian (2014Feb) to induce productivity growth for future progress. Hourly compensation increased at the average yearly rate of 5.1 percent from 1947 to 2013 and consumer price inflation at 3.6 percent with real hourly compensation increasing at the average yearly rate of 1.6 percent. Hourly compensation increased at the average yearly rate of 2.1 percent from 2007 to 2013 while consumer price inflation increased at 2.0 percent with real hourly compensation changing at the average yearly rate of 0.0 percent. While hours worked increased at the average yearly rate of 1.2 percent from 1947 to 2013, hours worked fell 3.7 percent from 2007 to 2013. While employment increased at the average yearly rate of 1.4 percent from 1947 to 2013, employment fell 3.3 percent from 2007 to 2013.

Table II-7, US, Productivity and Costs, Average Annual Percentage Changes 2007-2013 and 1947-2013

 

Average Annual Percentage Rate 2007-2013

Average Annual Percentage Rate  1947-2013

Productivity

1.6

2.2

Output

1.0

3.4

Hours

-3.7*

1.2

Employment

-3.3*

1.4

Average Weekly Hours

-0.5*

-15.0*

Hourly Compensation

2.1

5.1

Consumer Price Inflation

2.0

3.6

Real Hourly Compensation

0.0

1.6

Unit Non-labor Payments

2.5

3.4

Output per Job

1.5

2.0

* Percentage Change

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/

Unit labor costs increased sharply during the Great Inflation from the late 1960s to 1981 as shown by sharper slope in Chart II-8. Unit labor costs continued to increase but at a lower rate because of cyclic factors and not because of imaginary secular stagnation.

clip_image034

Chart II-8, US, Nonfarm Business, Unit Labor Costs, 1947-2013, Index 2005=100

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/

Real hourly compensation increased at relatively high rates after 1947 to the early 1970s but reached a plateau that lasted until the early 1990s, as shown in Chart VA-22. There were rapid increases until the global recession. Cyclic factors and not alleged secular stagnation explain the interruption of increases in real hourly compensation.

clip_image035

Chart II-9, US, Nonfarm Business, Real Hourly Compensation, 1947-2013, Index 2005=100

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/lpc/

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014.

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