US GDP Growing Continuing Recovery In the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Real Private Fixed Investment, Corporate Profits, United States Terms of International Trade, Destruction of Household Nonfinancial Wealth with Stagnating Total Real Wealth, United States Housing, United States House Prices, World Inflation Waves, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization: Part VII-A

 

US GDP Growing Continuing Recovery In the Global Recession, with Output in the US Reaching a High in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the Lockdown of Economic Activity in the COVID-19 Event, Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth in the Lost Economic Cycle of the Global Recession with Economic Growth Underperforming Below Trend Worldwide, Real Private Fixed Investment, Corporate Profits, United States Terms of International Trade, Destruction of Household Nonfinancial Wealth with Stagnating Total Real Wealth, United States Housing, United States House Prices, World Inflation Waves, World Cyclical Slow Growth, and Government Intervention in Globalization

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021.

IA Mediocre Cyclical United States Economic Growth

IA1 Stagnating Real Private Fixed Investment

IA2 Swelling Undistributed Corporate Profits

IID United States Terms of International Trade

IIA United States Housing Collapse

IIA1 Sales of New Houses

IIA2 United States House Prices

II Destruction of Household Nonfinancial Wealth with Stagnating Total Real Wealth

I World Inflation Waves

IA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IB1 Theory

IB2 Policy

IB3 Evidence

IB4 Unwinding Strategy

IC United States Inflation

IC Long-term US Inflation

ID Current US Inflation

IE Theory and Reality of Economic History, Cyclical Slow Growth Not Secular Stagnation and Monetary Policy Based on Fear of Deflation

III World Financial Turbulence

IV Global Inflation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets. The financial crisis and global recession were caused by interest rate and housing subsidies and affordability policies that encouraged high leverage and risks, low liquidity and unsound credit (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html

Table VI-1 shows the phenomenal impulse to valuations of risk financial assets originating in the initial shock of near zero interest rates in 2003-2004 with the fed funds rate at 1 percent, in fear of deflation that never materialized, and quantitative easing in the form of suspension of the auction of 30-year Treasury bonds to lower mortgage rates. World financial markets were dominated by monetary and housing policies in the US. Between 2002 and 2008, the DJ UBS Commodity Index rose 165.5 percent largely because of unconventional monetary policy encouraging carry trades from low US interest rates to long leveraged positions in commodities, exchange rates and other risk financial assets. The charts of risk financial assets show sharp increase in valuations leading to the financial crisis and then profound drops that are captured in Table VI-1 by percentage changes of peaks and troughs. The first round of quantitative easing and near zero interest rates depreciated the dollar relative to the euro by 39.3 percent between 2003 and 2008, with revaluation of the dollar by 25.1 percent from 2008 to 2010 in the flight to dollar-denominated assets in fear of world financial risks. The dollar depreciated 0.2 percent by Jun 25, 2021. Dollar devaluation is a major vehicle of monetary policy in reducing the output gap that is implemented in the probably erroneous belief that devaluation will not accelerate inflation, misallocating resources toward less productive economic activities and disrupting financial markets. The last row of Table VI-1 shows CPI inflation in the US rising from 1.9 percent in 2003 to 4.1 percent in 2007 even as monetary policy increased the fed funds rate from 1 percent in Jun 2004 to 5.25 percent in Jun 2006.

Table VI-1, Volatility of Assets

DJIA	10/08/02-10/01/07	10/01/07-3/4/09	3/4/09- 4/6/10
∆%	87.8	-51.2	60.3
NYSE Financial	1/15/04- 6/13/07	6/13/07- 3/4/09	3/4/09- 4/16/07
∆%	42.3	-75.9	121.1
Shanghai Composite	6/10/05- 10/15/07	10/15/07- 10/30/08	10/30/08- 7/30/09
∆%	444.2	-70.8	85.3
STOXX EUROPE 50	3/10/03- 7/25/07	7/25/07- 3/9/09	3/9/09- 4/21/10
∆%	93.5	-57.9	64.3
UBS Com.	1/23/02- 7/1/08	7/1/08- 2/23/09	2/23/09- 1/6/10
∆%	165.5	-56.4	41.4
10-Year Treasury	6/10/03	6/12/07	12/31/08	4/5/10
%	3.112	5.297	2.247	3.986
USD/EUR	6/26/03	7/14/08	6/07/10	06/25/2021
Rate	1.1423	1.5914	1.192	1.1938
CNY/USD	01/03 2000	07/21 2005	7/15 2008	06/25/ 2021
Rate	8.2798	8.2765	6.8211	6.4562
New House	1963	1977	2005	2009
Sales 1000s	560	819	1283	375
New House	2000	2007	2009	2010
Median Price $1000	169	247	217	222
	2003	2005	2007	2010
CPI	2.3	3.4	2.8	1.6

Sources: https://www.wsj.com/market-data

https://www.census.gov/construction/nrs/index.html

https://www.federalreserve.gov/data.htm

Table VI-2 provides the Euro/Dollar (EUR/USD) exchange rate and Chinese Yuan/Dollar (CNY/USD) exchange rate that reveal pursuit of exchange rate policies resulting from monetary policy in the US and capital control/exchange rate policy in China. The ultimate intentions are the same: promoting internal economic activity at the expense of the rest of the world. The easy money policy of the US was deliberately or not but effectively to devalue the dollar from USD 1.1423/EUR on Jun 26, 2003 to USD 1.5914/EUR on Jul 14, 2008, or by 39.3 percent. The flight into dollar assets after the global recession caused revaluation to USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010, or by 25.1 percent. After the temporary interruption of the sovereign risk issues in Europe from Apr to Jul 2010, shown in Table VI-4 below, the dollar has devalued to USD 1.1938/EUR on Jun 25, 2021 or by 0.2 percent {[(1.1938/1.192)-1]100 = 0.2%}. Yellen (2011AS, 6) admits that Fed monetary policy results in dollar devaluation with the objective of increasing net exports, which was the policy that Joan Robinson (1947) labeled as “beggar-my-neighbor” remedies for unemployment. Risk aversion erodes devaluation of the dollar. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues. China fixed the CNY to the dollar for an extended period at a highly undervalued level of around CNY 8.2765/USD subsequently revaluing to CNY 6.8211/USD until Jun 7, 2010, or by 17.6 percent. After fixing again the CNY to the dollar, China revalued to CNY 6.4562/USD on Fri Jun 25, 2021, or by 5.3 percent, for cumulative revaluation of 22.0 percent. The final row of Table VI-2 shows devaluation of 0.4 percent in the week of Jun 4, 2021; devaluation of 0.1 percent in the week of Jun 11, 2021; devaluation of 0.9 percent in the week of Jun 18, 2021; and change of 0.0 percent in the week of Jun 25, 2021. There could be reversal of revaluation to devalue the Yuan, but the outcome depends on ongoing negotiations.

Table VI-2, Dollar/Euro (USD/EUR) Exchange Rate and Chinese Yuan/Dollar (CNY/USD) Exchange Rate

USD/EUR	12/26/03	7/14/08	6/07/10	06/25/21
Rate	1.1423	1.5914	1.192	1.1938
CNY/USD	01/03 2000	07/21 2005	7/15 2008	06/25/21
Rate	8.2765	6.8211	6.8211	6.4562
Weekly Rates	06/04/2021	06/11/2021	06/18/2021	06/25/21
CNY/USD	6.3952	6.3987	6.4531	6.4562
∆% from Earlier Week*	-0.4%	-0.1%	-0.9%	0.0%

*Negative sign is depreciation; positive sign is appreciation

Source: http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_currencies.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000

Bob Davis and Lingling Wei, writing on “China shifts course, lets Yuan drop,” on Jul 25, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444840104577548610131107868.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), find that China is depreciating the CNY relative to the USD in an effort to diminish the impact of appreciation of the CNY relative to the EUR. Table VI-2A provides the CNY/USD rate from Oct 28, 2011 to Jun 25, 2021 in selected intervals on Fridays. The CNY/USD revalued by 0.9 percent from Oct 28, 2012 to Apr 27, 2012. The CNY was virtually unchanged relative to the USD by Aug 24, 2012 to CNY 6.3558/USD from the rate of CNY 6.3588/USD on Oct 28, 2011 and then revalued slightly by 1.1 percent to CNY 6.2858/USD on Sep 28, 2012. Devaluation of 0.6 percent from CNY 6.2858/USD on Sep 28, 2012 to CNY 6.3240/USD on Oct 5, 2012, reduced to 0.5 percent the cumulative revaluation from Oct 28, 2011 to Oct 5, 2012. Revaluation by 0.2 percent to CNY 6.2546/USD on Oct 12, 2012 and revalued the CNY by 1.6 percent relative to the dollar from CNY 6.3588/USD on Oct 29, 2011. By Jun 25, 2021, the CNY devalued 1.5 percent to CNY 6.4562/USD relative to CNY 6.3588/USD on Oct 28, 2011. There could be reversal of revaluation in favor of devaluation. Robin Harding and Josh Noble, writing on “US warns China after renminbi depreciation,” on Apr 8, 2014, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3355dc74-bed7-11e3-a1bf-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2ynwr9l6s), quote concerns of a senior US Treasury official on possible change in China’s policy of revaluation. Meanwhile, the Senate of the US periodically considers a bill on China’s trade that could create a confrontation but may not be approved by the entire Congress. An important statement by the People’s Bank of China (PBC), China’s central bank, on Apr 14, 2012, announced the widening of the daily maximum band of fluctuation of the renminbi (RMB) yuan (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2012/20120414090756030448561/20120414090756030448561_.html):

“Along with the development of China’s foreign exchange market, the pricing and risk management capabilities of market participants are gradually strengthening. In order to meet market demands, promote price discovery, enhance the flexibility of RMB exchange rate in both directions, further improve the managed floating RMB exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies, the People’s Bank of China has decided to enlarge the floating band of RMB’s trading prices against the US dollar and is hereby making a public announcement as follows:

Effective from April 16, 2012 onwards, the floating band of RMB’s trading prices against the US dollar in the inter-bank spot foreign exchange market is enlarged from 0.5 percent to 1 percent, i.e., on each business day, the trading prices of the RMB against the US dollar in the inter-bank spot foreign exchange market will fluctuate within a band of ±1 percent around the central parity released on the same day by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System. The spread between the RMB/USD selling and buying prices offered by the foreign exchange-designated banks to their customers shall not exceed 2 percent of the central parity, instead of 1 percent, while other provisions in the Circular of the PBC on Relevant Issues Managing the Trading Prices in the Inter-bank Foreign Exchange Market and Quoted Exchange Rates of Exchange-Designated Banks (PBC Document No.[2010]325) remain valid.”

Table VI-2A, Renminbi Yuan US Dollar Rate

	CNY/USD	∆% from CNY 6.3588/USD 0n 10/28/2011
06/25/21	6.4562	-1.5
06/18/21	6.4531	-1.5
06/11/21	6.3987	-0.6
06/04/21	6.3952	-0.6
05/28/21	6.3684	-0.2
05/21/21	6.4342	-1.2
05/14/21	6.4371	-1.2
05/07/21	6.4325	-1.2
04/30/21	6.4745	-1.8
04/23/21	6.4954	-2.1
04/16/21	6.5209	-2.5
04/09/21	6.5530	-3.1
04/02/21	6.5675	-3.3
03/26/21	6.5415	-2.9
03/19/21	6.5090	-2.4
03/12/21	6.5085	-2.4
03/05/21	6.4968	-2.2
02/26/21	6.4752	-1.8
02/19/21	6.4869	-2.0
02/12/21	6.4582	-1.6
02/05/21	6.4667	-1.7
01/29/21	6.4277	-1.1
01/22/21	6.4819	-1.9
01/15/21	6.4808	-1.9
01/08/20	6.4754	-1.8
01/01/21	6.5327	-2.7
12/25/20	6.5301	-2.7
12/18/20	6.5370	-2.8
12/11/20	6.5467	-3.0
12/04/20	6.5316	-2.7
11/27/20	6.5770	-3.4
11/20/20	6.5630	-3.2
11/13/20	6.6064	-3.9
11/06/20	6.6114	-4.0
10/30/20	6.6927	-5.3
10/23/20	6.6868	-5.2
10/16/20	6.6976	-5.3
10/09/20	6.6947	-5.3
10/02/20	6.7909	-6.8
09/25/20	6.8238	-7.3
09/18/20	6.7690	-6.5
09/11/20	6.8344	-7.5
09/04/20	6.8425	-7.6
08/28/20	6.8654	-8.0
08/21/20	6.9195	-8.8
08/14/20	6.9503	-9.3
08/07/20	6.9678	-9.6
07/31/20	6.9752	-9.7
07/24/20	7.0173	-10.4
07/17/20	6.9922	-10.0
07/10/20	7.0018	-10.1
07/03/20	7.0664	-11.1
06/26/20	7.0784	-11.3
06/19/20	7.0723	-11.2
06/12/20	7.0834	-11.4
06/05/20	7.0820	-11.4
05/29/20	7.1373	-12.2
05/22/20	7.1304	-12.1
05/15/20	7.1021	-11.7
05/08/20	7.0741	-11.2
05/01/20	7.0623	-11.1
04/24/20	7.0819	-11.4
04/17/20	7.0732	-11.2
04/10/20	7.0361	-10.7
04/03/20	7.0923	-11.5
03/27/20	7.0964	-11.6
03/20/20	7.0958	-11.6
03/13/20	7.0082	-10.2
03/06/20	6.9320	-9.0
02/28/20	6.9919	-10.0
02/21/20	7.0272	-10.5
02/14/20	6.9871	-9.9
02/07/20	7.0016	-10.1
01/31/20	6.9367	-9.1
01/24/20	6.9367	-9.1
01/17/20	6.8597	-7.9
01/10/20	6.9197	-8.8
01/03/20	6.9655	-9.5
12/27/19	6.9958	-10.0
12/20/19	7.0067	-10.2
12/13/19	6.9729	-9.7
12/06/19	7.0353	-10.6
11/29/19	7.0326	-10.6
11/22/19	7.0392	-10.7
11/15/19	7.0084	-10.2
11/08/19	6.9960	-10.0
11/01/19	7.0374	-10.7
10/25/19	7.0657	-11.1
10/18/19	7.0817	-11.4
10/11/19	7.0882	-11.5
10/04/19	7.1485	-12.4
09/27/19	7.1228	-12.0
09/20/19	7.0916	-11.5
09/13/19	7.0795	-11.3
09/06/19	7.1157	-11.9
08/30/19	7.1567	-12.5
08/23/19	7.0960	-11.6
08/16/19	7.0429	-10.8
08/09/19	7.0624	-11.1
08/02/19	6.9402	-9.1
07/26/19	6.8792	-8.2
07/19/19	6.8819	-8.2
07/12/19	6.8808	-8.2
07/05/19	6.8936	-8.4
06/28/19	6.8668	-8.0
06/21/19	6.8699	-8.0
06/14/19	6.9254	-8.9
06/07/19	6.9098	-8.7
05/31/19	6.9051	-8.6
05/24/19	6.9002	-8.5
05/17/19	6.9186	-8.8
05/10/19	6.8241	-7.3
05/03/19	6.7346	-5.9
04/26/19	6.7297	-5.8
04/19/19	6.7044	-5.4
04/12/19	6.7042	-5.4
04/05/19	6.7179	-5.6
03/29/19	6.7121	-5.6
03/22/19	6.7181	-5.7
03/15/19	6.7135	-5.6
03/08/19	6.7216	-5.7
03/01/19	6.7064	-5.5
02/22/19	6.7142	-5.6
02/15/19	6.7731	-6.5
02/08/19	6.7448	-6.1
02/01/19	6.7449	-6.1
01/25/19	6.7487	-6.1
01/18/19	6.7788	-6.6
01/11/19	6.7627	-6.4
01/04/19	6.8694	-8.0
12/28/18	6.8782	-8.2
12/21/18	6.9064	-8.6
12/14/18	6.9076	-8.6
12/07/18	6.8744	-8.1
11/30/18	6.9590	-9.4
11/23/18	6.9485	-9.3
11/16/18	6.9380	-9.1
11/09/18	6.9569	-9.4
11/02/18	6.8909	-8.4
10/26/18	6.9435	-9.2
10/19/18	6.9296	-9.0
10/12/18	6.9222	-8.9
10/05/18	6.8689	-8.0
09/28/18	6.8690	-8.0
09/21/18	6.8568	-7.8
09/14/18	6.8705	-8.0
09/07/18	6.8448	-7.6
08/31/18	6.8316	-7.4
08/24/18	6.8077	-7.1
08/17/18	6.8776	-8.2
08/10/18	6.8469	-7.7
08/03/18	6.8306	-7.4
07/27/18	6.8137	-7.2
07/20/18	6.7709	-6.5
07/13/18	6.6908	-5.2
07/06/18	6.6434	-4.5
06/29/18	6.6225	-4.1
06/22/18	6.5059	-2.3
06/15/18	6.4389	-1.3
06/08/18	6.4065	-0.8
06/01/18	6.4204	-1.0
05/25/18	6.3919	-0.5
05/18/18	6.3780	-0.3
05/11/18	6.3341	0.4
05/04/18	6.3627	-0.1
04/27/18	6.3336	0.4
04/20/18	6.2965	1.0
04/13/18	6.2788	1.3
04/06/18	6.3044	0.9
03/30/18	6.2911	1.1
03/23/18	6.3157	0.7
03/16/18	6.3346	0.4
03/09/18	6.3346	0.4
03/02/18	6.3485	0.2
02/23/18	6.3358	0.4
02/16/18	6.3458	0.2
02/09/18	6.2890	1.1
02/02/18	6.3033	0.9
01/26/18	6.3154	0.7
01/19/18	6.4058	-0.7
01/12/18	6.4518	-1.5
01/05/18	6.4891	-2.0
12/29/17	6.5030	-2.3
12/22/17	6.5744	-3.4
12/15/17	6.5989	-3.8
12/08/17	6.6179	-4.1
12/01/17	6.6134	-4.0
11/24/17	6.5983	-3.8
11/17/17	6.6287	-4.2
11/10/17	6.6415	-4.4
11/03/17	6.6387	-4.4
10/27/17	6.6507	-4.6
10/20/17	6.6221	-4.1
10/13/17	6.5901	-3.6
10/06/17	6.6534	-4.6
09/29/17	6.6366	-4.4
09/22/17	6.5935	-3.7
09/15/17	6.5537	-3.1
09/08/17	6.4817	-1.9
09/01/17	6.5591	-3.1
08/25/17	6.6482	-4.6
08/18/17	6.6719	-4.9
08/11/17	6.6647	-4.8
08/04/17	6.7305	-5.8
07/28/17	6.7374	-6.0
07/21/17	6.7670	-6.4
07/14/17	6.7840	-6.7
07/07/17	6.8128	-7.1
06/30/17	6.7787	-6.6
06/23/17	6.8359	-7.5
06/16/17	6.8103	-7.1
06/09/17	6.7987	-6.9
06/02/17	6.8105	-7.1
05/26/17	6.8556	-7.8
05/19/17	6.8839	-8.3
05/12/17	6.8998	-8.5
05/05/17	6.9031	-8.6
04/28/17	6.8940	-8.4
04/21/17	6.8848	-8.3
04/14/17	6.8854	-8.3
04/07/17	6.9044	-8.6
03/31/17	6.8866	-8.3
03/24/17	6.8772	-8.2
03/17/17	6.9093	-8.7
03/10/17	6.9071	-8.6
03/03/17	6.8955	-8.4
02/24/17	6.8668	-8.0
02/17/17	6.8650	-8.0
02/10/17	6.8776	-8.2
02/03/17	6.8661	-8.0
01/27/17	6.8811	-8.2
01/20/17	6.8765	-8.1
01/13/17	6.8998	-8.5
01/06/17	6.9185	-8.8
12/30/16	6.9448	-9.2
12/23/16	6.9463	-9.2
12/16/16	6.9593	-9.4
12/09/16	6.9077	-8.6
12/02/16	6.8865	-8.3
11/25/16	6.9236	-8.9
11/18/16	6.8883	-8.3
11/11/16	6.8151	-7.2
11/04/16	6.7540	-6.2
10/28/16	6.7983	-6.9
10/21/16	6.7624	-6.3
10/14/16	6.7296	-5.8
10/07/16	6.6728	-4.9
09/30/16	6.6711	-4.9
09/23/16	6.6724	-4.9
09/16/16	6.6701	-4.9
09/09/16	6.6876	-5.2
09/02/16	6.6822	-5.1
08/26/16	6.6685	-4.9
08/19/16	6.6523	-4.6
08/12/16	6.6408	-4.4
08/05/16	6.6438	-4.5
07/29/16	6.6550	-4.7
07/22/16	6.6819	-5.1
07/15/16	6.6924	-5.2
07/08/16	6.6881	-5.2
07/01/16	6.6564	-4.7
06/24/16	6.6128	-4.0
06/17/16	6.5836	-3.5
06/10/16	6.5720	-3.4
06/03/16	6.5518	-3.0
05/27/16	6.5630	-3.2
05/20/16	6.5464	-3.0
05/13/16	6.5319	-2.7
05/06/16	6.4965	-2.2
04/29/16	6.4741	-1.8
04/22/16	6.5068	-2.3
04/15/16	6.4781	-1.9
04/08/16	6.4673	-1.7
04/01/16	6.4787	-1.9
03/25/16	6.5204	-2.5
03/18/16	6.4716	-1.8
03/11/16	6.4961	-2.2
03/04/16	6.5027	-2.3
02/26/16	6.5433	-2.9
02/19/16	6.5225	-2.6
02/12/16	6.5733	-3.4
02/05/16	6.5736	-3.4
01/29/16	6.5761	-3.4
01/22/16	6.5789	-3.5
01/15/16	6.5836	-3.5
01/08/16	6.5934	-3.7
01/01/16	6.4931	-2.1
12/25/15	6.4801	-1.9
12/18/15	6.4827	-1.9
12/11/15	6.4558	-1.5
12/04/15	6.4006	-0.7
11/27/15	6.3964	-0.6
11/20/15	6.3885	-0.5
11/13/15	6.3738	-0.2
11/06/15	6.3515	0.1
10/30/15	6.3161	0.7
10/23/15	6.3542	0.1
10/16/15	6.3529	0.1
10/09/15	6.3447	0.2
10/02/15	6.3552	0.1
09/25/15	6.3754	-0.3
09/18/15	6.3639	-0.1
09/11/15	6.3734	-0.2
09/04/15	6.3701	-0.2
08/28/15	6.3872	-0.4
08/21/15	6.3870	-0.4
08/14/15	6.3907	-0.5
08/07/15	6.2097	2.3
07/31/15	6.2077	2.4
07/24/15	6.2085	2.4
07/17/15	6.2110	2.3
07/10/15	6.2115	2.3
07/03/15	6.2048	2.4
06/26/15	6.2090	2.4
06/19/15	6.2098	2.3
06/12/15	6.2068	2.4
06/05/15	6.2016	2.5
05/29/15	6.2004	2.5
05/22/15	6.1974	2.5
05/15/15	6.2054	2.4
05/08/15	6.2143	2.3
05/01/15	6.2134	2.3
04/24/15	6.1935	2.6
04/17/15	6.1953	2.6
04/10/15	6.2063	2.4
04/03/15	6.1466	3.3
03/27/15	6.2150	2.3
03/20/15	6.2046	2.4
03/13/15	6.2599	1.6
03/06/15	6.2644	1.5
02/27/1 5	6.2671	1.4
02/20/15	6.2546	1.6
02/13/2015	6.2446	1.8
02/06/2015	6.2445	1.8
01/30/2015	6.2543	1.6
01/23/2015	6.2309	2.0
01/16/2015	6.2063	2.4
01/09/2015	6.2045	2.4
01/02/2015	6.2063	2.4
12/26/2014	6.2276	2.1
12/19/2014	6.2226	2.1
12/12/2014	6.1852	2.7
12/05/2014	6.1502	3.3
11/28/2014	6.1431	3.4
11/21/2014	6.1228	3.7
11/14/2014	6.1313	3.6
11/07/2014	6.1238	3.7
10/31/2014	6.1133	3.9
10/24/2014	6.1181	3.8
10/17/2014	6.1246	3.7
10/10/2014	6.1299	3.6
0/03/2014	6.1363	3.5
9/26/2014	6.1272	3.6
9/19/2014	6.1412	3.4
9/12/2014	6.1334	3.5
9/05/2014	6.1406	3.4
8/29/2014	6.1457	3.4
8/22/2014	6.1522	3.2
8/15/2014	6.1463	3.3
8/8/2014	6.1548	3.2
8/1/2014	6.1781	2.8
7/25/2014	6.1923	2.6
7/18/2014	6.2074	2.4
7/11/2014	6.2040	2.4
7/4/2014	6.2036	2.4
6/27/2014	6.2189	2.2
6/20/14	6.2238	2.1
6/13/2014	6.2097	2.3
6/6/2014	6.2507	1.7
5/30/2014	6.2486	1.7
5/23/2014	6.2354	1.9
5/16/2014	6.2340	2.0
5/9/2014	6.2281	2.1
5/3/2014	6.2595	1.6
4/28/2014	6.2539	1.6
4/18/2014	6.2377	1.9
4/11/2014	6.2111	2.3
4/4/2014	6.2102	2.3
3/28/2014	6.2130	2.3
3/21/2014	6.2247	2.1
3/14/2014	6.1496	3.3
3/7/2014	6.1260	3.7
2/28/2014	6.1481	3.3
2/21/2014	6.0913	4.2
2/14/2014	6.0670	4.6
2/7/2014	6.0634	4.6
1/31/2014	6.0589	4.7
1/24/2014	6.0472	4.9
1/17/2014	6.0503	4.9
1/10/2014	6.0503	4.9
1/3/2014	6.0516	4.8
12/27/2013	6.0678	4.6
12/20/2013	6.0725	4.5
12/13/2013	6.0691	4.6
12/6/2013	6.0801	4.4
11/29/2013	6.0914	4.2
11/22/2013	6.0911	4.2
11/15/2013	6.0928	4.2
11/8/2013	6.0912	4.2
11/1/2013	6.0996	4.1
10/25/2013	6.0830	4.3
10/18/2013	6.0973	4.1
10/11/2013	6.1210	3.7
10/4/2013	6.1226	3.7
9/27/2013	6.1196	3.8
9/20/2013	6.1206	3.7
9/13/2013	6.1190	3.8
9/6/2013	6.1209	3.7
8/30/2013	6.1178	3.8
8/23/2013	6.1211	3.7
8/16/2013	6.1137	3.9
8/9/2013	6.1225	3.7
8/2/2013	6.1295	3.6
7/26/2013	6.1305	3.6
7/19/2013	6.1380	3.5
7/12/2013	6.1382	3.5
7/5/2013	6.1316	3.6
6/28/2013	6.1910	2.6
6/21/2013	6.1345	3.5
6/14/2013	6.1323	3.6
6/7/2013	6.1334	3.5
5/31/2013	6.1347	3.5
5/24/2013	6.1314	3.6
5/17/2013	6.1395	3.4
5/10/2013	6.1395	3.4
5/3/2013	6.1553	3.2
4/26/2013	6.1636	3.1
4/19/13	6.1788	2.8
4/12/2013	6.1947	2.6
4/5/2013	6.2051	2.4
3/29/2013	6.2119	2.3
3/22/2013	6.2112	2.3
3/15/2013	6.2131	2.3
3/8/2013	6.2142	2.3
3/1/2013	6.2221	2.1
2/22/2013	6.2350	1.9
2/15/2013	6.2328	2.0
2/8/2013	6.2323	2.0
2/1/2013	6.2316	2.0
1/25/2013	6.2228	2.1
1/18/2013	6.2182	2.2
1/11/2013	6.2168	2.2
1/4/2013	6.2316	2.0
12/28/2012	6.2358	1.9
12/21/2012	6.2352	1.9
12/14/2012	6.2460	1.8
12/7/2012	6.2254	2.1
11/30/2012	6.2310	2.0
11/23/2012	6.2328	2.0
11/16/2012	6.2404	1.9
11/9/2012	6.2452	1.8
11/2/2012	6.2458	1.8
10/26/2012	6.2628	1.5
10/19/2012	6.2546	1.6
10/12/2012	6.2670	1.4
10/5/2012	6.3240	0.5
9/28/2012	6.2858	1.1
9/21/2012	6.3078	0.8
9/14/2012	6.3168	0.7
9/7/2012	6.3438	0.2
8/31/2012	6.3498	0.1
8/24/2012	6.3558	0.0
8/17/2012	6.3589	0.0
8/10/2012	6.3604	0.0
8/3/2012	6.3726	-0.2
7/27/2012	6.3818	-0.4
7/20/2012	6.3750	-0.3
7/13/2012	6.3868	-0.4
7/6/2012	6.3658	-0.1
6/29/2012	6.3552	0.1
6/22/2012	6.3650	-0.1
6/15/2012	6.3678	-0.1
6/8/2012	6.3752	-0.3
6/1/2012	6.3708	-0.2
4/27/2012	6.3016	0.9
3/23/2012	6.3008	0.9
2/3/2012	6.3030	0.9
12/30/2011	6.2940	1.0
11/25/2011	6.3816	-0.4
10/28/2011	6.3588	-

Source:

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/mdc_currencies.html?mod=mdc_topnav_2_3000

http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/dat00_ch.htm

Professor Edward P Lazear (2013Jan7), writing on “Chinese ‘currency manipulation’ is not the problem,” on Jan 7, 2013, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578213203581231448.html), provides clear thought on the role of the yuan in trade between China and the United States and trade between China and Europe. There is conventional wisdom that Chinese exchange rate policy causes the loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States, which is shown by Lazear (2013Jan7) to be erroneous. The fact is that manipulation of the CNY/USD rate by China has only minor effects on US employment. Lazear (2013Jan7) shows that the movement of monthly exports of China to its major trading partners, United States and Europe, since 1995 cannot be explained by the fixing of the CNY/USD rate by China. The period is quite useful because it includes rapid growth before 2007, contraction until 2009 and weak subsequent expansion. Professor Charles W. Calomiris, at Columbia University, writing in the Wall Street Journal on Apr 17, 2017, provides perceptive analysis of China’s exchange rate. According to Calomiris (2017Apr), long-run exchange rate appreciation in China originates in productivity growth in accordance with Harrod (1939), Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). In this view, reforms allowing increasing participation of private economic activity caused an increase in productivity measured by Calomiris (2017Apr) as only about 3 percent of US productivity around 1978 to current 13 percent of US productivity. Calomiris (2017Apr) attributes recent depreciation of the Yuan to rapidly increasing debt, slowing growth and inflation motivating capital flight. Chart VI-1 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the CNY/USD exchange rate from Jan 3, 1995 to Jun 18, 2021 together with US recession dates in shaded areas. China fixed the CNY/USD rate for an extended period as shown in the horizontal segment from 1995 to 2005. There was systematic revaluation of 17.6 percent from CNY 8.2765 on Jul 21, 2005 to CNY 6.8211 on Jul 15, 2008. China fixed the CNY/USD rate until Jun 7, 2010, to avoid adverse effects on its economy from the global recession, which is shown as a horizontal segment from 2009 until mid-2010. China then continued the policy of appreciation of the CNY relative to the USD with oscillations until the beginning of 2012 when the rate began to move sideways followed by a final upward slope of devaluation that is measured in Table VI-2A but virtually disappeared in the rate of CNY 6.3589/USD on Aug 17, 2012 and was nearly unchanged at CNY 6.3558/USD on Aug 24, 2012. China then appreciated 0.2 percent in the week of Dec 21, 2012, to CNY 6.2352/USD for cumulative 1.9 percent revaluation from Oct 28, 2011 and left the rate virtually unchanged at CNY 6.2316/USD on Jan 11, 2013, moving to CNY 6.4525/USD on Jun 18, 2021, which is the last data point in Chart VI-1. Revaluation of the CNY relative to the USD of 22.0 percent by Jun 25, 2021 has not reduced the trade surplus of China but reversal of the policy of revaluation could result in international confrontation. The interruption with upward slope in the final segment on the right of Chart VI-I is measured as virtually stability in Table VI-2A followed with decrease or revaluation and subsequent increase or devaluation. The final segment shows decline or revaluation with another upward move or devaluation. Linglin Wei, writing on “China intervenes to lower yuan,” on Feb 26, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304071004579406810684766716?KEYWORDS=china+yuan&mg=reno64-wsj), finds from informed sources that the central bank of China conducted the ongoing devaluation of the yuan with the objective of driving out arbitrageurs to widen the band of fluctuation. There is concern if the policy of revaluation is changing to devaluation.

Chart VI-1, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (USD), Business Days, Jan 3, 1995-Jun 18, 2021

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=h10

Chart VI-1A provides the daily CNY/USD rate from Jan 5, 1981 to Jun 18, 2021. The exchange rate was CNY 1.5418/USD on Jan 5, 1981. There is sharp cumulative depreciation of 107.8 percent to CNY 3.2031 by Jul 2, 1986, continuing to CNY 5.8145/USD on Dec 29, 1993 for cumulative 277.1 percent since Jan 5, 1981. China then devalued sharply to CNY 8.7117/USD on Jan 7, 1994 for 49.8 percent relative to Dec 29, 1993 and cumulative 465.0 percent relative to Jan 5, 1981. China then fixed the rate at CNY 8.2765/USD until Jul 21, 2005 and revalued as analyzed in Chart VI-1. The final data point in Chart VI-1A is CNY 6.4525/USD on Jun 18, 2021. To be sure, China fixed the exchange rate after substantial prior devaluation. It is unlikely that the devaluation could have been effective after many years of fixing the exchange rate with high inflation and multiple changes in the world economy. The argument of Lazear (2013Jan7) is still valid in view of the lack of association between monthly exports of China to the US and Europe since 1995 and the exchange rate of China.

Chart VI-1A, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (USD), Business Days, Jan 5, 1981-Jun 18, 2021

Note: US Recessions in Shaded Areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=h10

Chart VI-1B provides finer details with the rate of Chinese Yuan (CNY) to the US Dollar (USD) from Oct 28, 2011 to Jun 18, 2021. There have been alternations of revaluation and devaluation. The initial data point is CNY 6.5370 on Nov 3, 2011. There is an episode of devaluation from CNY 6.2790 on Apr 30, 2012 to CNY 6.3879 on Jul 25, 2012, or devaluation of 1.4 percent. Another devaluation is from CNY 6.0402/USD on Jan 21, 2014 to CNY 6.4525/USD on Jun 18, 2021, or devaluation of 6.8 percent. Calomiris (2017Apr) attributes recent depreciation of the Yuan to rapidly increasing debt, slowing growth and inflation motivating capital flight. China is the second largest holder of US Treasury securities with $1096.1 billion in Apr 2021, decreasing 0.4 percent from $1100.4 billion in Mar 2021 while increasing $23.3 billion from Apr 2020 or 2.2 percent. The United States Treasury estimates US government debt held by private investors at $16,431 billion in Mar 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021). China’s holding of US Treasury securities in Apr 2021 represents 6.7 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing debt held by private investors (https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/). Min Zeng, writing on “China plays a big role as US Treasury yields fall,” on Jul 16, 2014, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-plays-a-big-role-as-u-s-treasury-yields-fall-1405545034?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj), finds that acceleration in purchases of US Treasury securities by China has been an important factor in the decline of Treasury yields in 2014. Japan increased its holdings from $1266.5 billion in Apr 2020 to $1276.7 billion in Apr 2021 or 0.8 percent. The combined holdings of China and Japan in Apr 2020 add to $2372.8 billion, which is equivalent to 14.4 percent of US government marketable interest-bearing securities held by investors of $16,431 billion in Mar 2021 (Fiscal Year 2021) (https://www.fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/treasury-bulletin/). Total foreign holdings of Treasury securities increased from $6903.1 billion in Apr 2020 to $7070.2 billion in Apr 2021, or 2.4 percent. The US continues to finance its fiscal and balance of payments deficits with foreign savings (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007). Professor Martin Feldstein, at Harvard University, writing on “The Debt Crisis Is Coming Soon,” published in the Wall Street Journal on Mar 20, 2019 (https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-debt-crisis-is-coming-soon-11553122139?mod=hp_opin_pos3), foresees a US debt crisis with deficits moving above $1 trillion and debt above 100 percent of GDP. A point of saturation of holdings of US Treasury debt may be reached as foreign holders evaluate the threat of reduction of principal by dollar devaluation and reduction of prices by increases in yield, including possibly risk premium. Shultz et al (2012) find that the Fed financed three-quarters of the US deficit in fiscal year 2011, with foreign governments financing significant part of the remainder of the US deficit while the Fed owns one in six dollars of US national debt. Concentrations of debt in few holders are perilous because of sudden exodus in fear of devaluation and yield increases and the limit of refinancing old debt and placing new debt. In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

Chart VI-1B, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (US), Business Days, Oct 28, 2011-Jun 18, 2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=h10

Chart VI-1C provides two exchange rates. Measured on the left axis is the Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (US) rate and measured on the right axis is the US Dollar (US) per Euro rate from Jan 2, 2019 to Jun 18, 2021. In multiple months since May 2020, the Yuan revalued relative to the dollar while the dollar has devalued relative to the euro with recent partial reversals. On Aug 27, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee changed its Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, including the following (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm): “The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.” The new policy can affect relative exchange rates depending on relative inflation rates and country risk issues. Jon Sindreu, in an article on “The Dollar Helped Fuel an ‘Everything Rally—But It could Bite Back,” published in the Wall Street Journal, on Sep 30, 2020, analyzes the impact of the weakening dollar on valuations of risk financial assets. Caitlin Ostroff, in an article on “Dollar Regains Appeal in Carry Trades,” published in the Wall Street Journal, on Sep 29, 2020, analyzes the carry trade of borrowing in dollars to invest in higher risk assets in countries such as Brazil with positions also in gaining from relative revaluation of the Chinese yuan.

Chart VI-1C, Chinese Yuan (CNY) per US Dollar (US) and US Dollar (US) per Euro, Business Days, Jan 2, 2019-Jun 18, 2021

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=h10

Inflation and unemployment in the period 1966 to 1985 is analyzed by Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) by means of a Phillips circuit joining points of inflation and unemployment. Chart VI-1B for Brazil in Pelaez (1986, 94-5) was reprinted in The Economist in the issue of Jan 17-23, 1987 as updated by the author. Cochrane (2011Jan, 23) argues that the Phillips circuit shows the weakness in Phillips curve correlation. The explanation is by a shift in aggregate supply, rise in inflation expectations or loss of anchoring. The case of Brazil in Chart VI-1B cannot be explained without taking into account the increase in the fed funds rate that reached 22.36 percent on Jul 22, 1981 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) in the Volcker Fed that precipitated the stress on a foreign debt bloated by financing balance of payments deficits with bank loans in the 1970s. The loans were used in projects, many of state-owned enterprises with low present value in long gestation. The combination of the insolvency of the country because of debt higher than its ability of repayment and the huge government deficit with declining revenue as the economy contracted caused adverse expectations on inflation and the economy.  This interpretation is consistent with the case of the 24 emerging market economies analyzed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010GTD, 4), concluding that “higher debt levels are associated with significantly higher levels of inflation in emerging markets. Median inflation more than doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 percent) as debt rises frm the low (0 to 30 percent) range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a plausible interpretation of this pattern.”

The reading of the Phillips circuits of the 1970s by Cochrane (2011Jan, 25) is doubtful about the output gap and inflation expectations:

“So, inflation is caused by ‘tightness’ and deflation by ‘slack’ in the economy. This is not just a cause and forecasting variable, it is the cause, because given ‘slack’ we apparently do not have to worry about inflation from other sources, notwithstanding the weak correlation of [Phillips circuits]. These statements [by the Fed] do mention ‘stable inflation expectations. How does the Fed know expectations are ‘stable’ and would not come unglued once people look at deficit numbers? As I read Fed statements, almost all confidence in ‘stable’ or ‘anchored’ expectations comes from the fact that we have experienced a long period of low inflation (adaptive expectations). All these analyses ignore the stagflation experience in the 1970s, in which inflation was high even with ‘slack’ markets and little ‘demand, and ‘expectations’ moved quickly. They ignore the experience of hyperinflations and currency collapses, which happen in economies well below potential.”

Yellen (2014Aug22) states that “Historically, slack has accounted for only a small portion of the fluctuations in inflation. Indeed, unusual aspects of the current recovery may have shifted the lead-lag relationship between a tightening labor market and rising inflation pressures in either direction.”

Chart VI-1B provides the tortuous Phillips Circuit of Brazil from 1963 to 1987. There were no reliable consumer price index and unemployment data in Brazil for that period. Chart VI-1B used the more reliable indicator of inflation, the wholesale price index, and idle capacity of manufacturing as a proxy of unemployment in large urban centers.

Chart VI1-B, Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987

Source: ©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.

Chart VI1-B, Brazil, Phillips Circuit, 1963-1987

Source:

©Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo: Editora Atlas, 1986, pages 94-5. Reprinted in: Brazil. Tomorrow’s Italy, The Economist, 17-23 January 1987, page 25.

The key to success in stabilizing an economy with significant risk aversion is finding parity of internal and external interest rates. Brazil implemented fiscal consolidation and reforms that are advisable in explosive foreign debt environments. In addition, Brazil had the capacity to find parity in external and internal interest rates to prevent capital flight and disruption of balance sheets (for analysis of balance sheets, interest rates, indexing, devaluation, financial instruments and asset/liability management in that period see Pelaez and Pelaez (2007), The Global Recession Risk: Dollar Devaluation and the World Economy, 178-87). Table VI-2C provides monthly percentage changes of inflation, devaluation and indexing and the monthly percent overnight interest rate. Parity was attained by means of a simple inequality:

Cost of Domestic Loan ≥ Cost of Foreign Loan

This ordering was attained in practice by setting the domestic interest rate of the overnight interest rate plus spread higher than indexing of government securities with lower spread than loans in turn higher than devaluation plus spread of foreign loans. Interest parity required equality of inflation, devaluation and indexing. Brazil devalued the cruzeiro by 30 percent in 1983 because the depreciation of the German mark DM relative to the USD had eroded the competitiveness of Brazil’s products in Germany and in competition with German goods worldwide. The database of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System quotes DM 1.7829/USD on Mar 3 1980 and DM 2.4425/USD on Mar 15, 1983 (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat89_ge.htm) for devaluation of 37.0 percent. Parity of costs and rates of domestic and foreign loans and assets required ensuring that there would not be appreciation of the exchange rate, inducing capital flight in expectation of future devaluation that would have reversed stabilization. Table VI-2C provides inflation, devaluation, overnight interest rate and indexing. One of the main problems of adjustment of members of the euro area with high debts is that they cannot adjust the exchange rate because of the common euro currency. This is not an argument in favor of breaking the euro area because there would be also major problems of adjustment such as exiting the euro in favor of a new Drachma in the case of Greece. Another hurdle of adjustment in the euro area is that Brazil could have moved swiftly to adjust its economy in 1983 but the euro area has major sovereignty and distribution of taxation hurdles in moving rapidly.

Table VI-2C, Brazil, Inflation, Devaluation, Overnight Interest Rate and Indexing, Percent per Month, 1984

1984	Inflation IGP ∆%	Devaluation ∆%	Overnight Interest Rate %	Indexing ∆%
Jan	9.8	9.8	10.0	9.8
Feb	12.3	12.3	12.2	12.3
Mar	10.0	10.1	11.3	10.0
Apr	8.9	8.8	10.1	8.9
May	8.9	8.9	9.8	8.9
Jun	9.2	9.2	10.2	9.2
Jul	10.3	10.2	11.9	10.3
Aug	10.6	10.6	11.0	10.6
Sep	10.5	10.5	11.9	10.5
Oct	12.6	12.6	12.9	12.6
Nov	9.9	9.9	10.9	9.9
Dec	10.5	10.5	11.5	10.5

Source: Carlos Manuel Pelaez, O Cruzado e o Austral: Análise das Reformas Monetárias do Brasil e da Argentina. São Paulo, Editora Atlas, 1986, 86.

The G7 meeting in Washington on Apr 21, 2006 of finance ministers and heads of central bank governors of the G7 established the “doctrine of shared responsibility” (G7 2006Apr):

“We, Ministers and Governors, reviewed a strategy for addressing global imbalances. We recognized that global imbalances are the product of a wide array of macroeconomic and microeconomic forces throughout the world economy that affect public and private sector saving and investment decisions. We reaffirmed our view that the adjustment of global imbalances:

• Is shared responsibility and requires participation by all regions in this global process;
• Will importantly entail the medium-term evolution of private saving and investment across countries as well as counterpart shifts in global capital flows; and
• Is best accomplished in a way that maximizes sustained growth, which requires strengthening policies and removing distortions to the adjustment process.

In this light, we reaffirmed our commitment to take vigorous action to address imbalances. We agreed that progress has been, and is being, made. The policies listed below not only would be helpful in addressing imbalances, but are more generally important to foster economic growth.

• In the United States, further action is needed to boost national saving by continuing fiscal consolidation, addressing entitlement spending, and raising private saving.
• In Europe, further action is needed to implement structural reforms for labor market, product, and services market flexibility, and to encourage domestic demand led growth.
• In Japan, further action is needed to ensure the recovery with fiscal soundness and long-term growth through structural reforms.

Others will play a critical role as part of the multilateral adjustment process.

• In emerging Asia, particularly China, greater flexibility in exchange rates is critical to allow necessary appreciations, as is strengthening domestic demand, lessening reliance on export-led growth strategies, and actions to strengthen financial sectors.

• In oil-producing countries, accelerated investment in capacity, increased economic diversification, enhanced exchange rate flexibility in some cases.

• Other current account surplus countries should encourage domestic consumption and investment, increase micro-economic flexibility and improve investment climates.

We recognized the important contribution that the IMF can make to multilateral surveillance.”

The concern at that time was that fiscal and current account global imbalances could result in disorderly correction with sharp devaluation of the dollar after an increase in premiums on yields of US Treasury debt (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007)). The IMF was entrusted with monitoring and coordinating action to resolve global imbalances. The G7 was eventually broadened to the formal G20 in the effort to coordinate policies of countries with external surpluses and deficits.

The database of the WEO (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx) is used to construct Table VI-3 with fiscal and current account imbalances projected for 2018 and 2019. The WEO finds the need to rebalance external and domestic demand (IMF 2011WEOSep xvii):

“Progress on this front has become even more important to sustain global growth. Some emerging market economies are contributing more domestic demand than is desirable (for example, several economies in Latin America); others are not contributing enough (for example, key economies in emerging Asia). The first set needs to restrain strong domestic demand by considerably reducing structural fiscal deficits and, in some cases, by further removing monetary accommodation. The second set of economies needs significant currency appreciation alongside structural reforms to reduce high surpluses of savings over investment. Such policies would help improve their resilience to shocks originating in the advanced economies as well as their medium-term growth potential.”

The IMF (2012WEOApr, XVII) explains decreasing importance of the issue of global imbalances as follows:

“The latest developments suggest that global current account imbalances are no longer expected to widen again, following their sharp reduction during the Great Recession. This is largely because the excessive consumption growth that characterized economies that ran large external deficits prior to the crisis has been wrung out and has not been offset by stronger consumption in .surplus economies. Accordingly, the global economy has experienced a loss of demand and growth in all regions relative to the boom years just before the crisis. Rebalancing activity in key surplus economies toward higher consumption, supported by more market-determined exchange rates, would help strengthen their prospects as well as those of the rest of the world.”

The IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/pdf/c4.pdf) analyzes global imbalances as:

• Global current account imbalances have narrowed by more than a third from

their peak in 2006. Key imbalances—the large deficit of the United States and

the large surpluses of China and Japan—have more than halved.

• The narrowing in imbalances has largely been driven by demand contraction

(“expenditure reduction”) in deficit economies.

• Exchange rate adjustment has facilitated rebalancing in China and the United

States, but in general the contribution of exchange rate changes (“expenditure

switching”) to current account adjustment has been relatively modest.

• The narrowing of imbalances is expected to be durable, as domestic demand in

deficit economies is projected to remain well below pre-crisis trends.

• Since flow imbalances have narrowed but not reversed, net creditor and debtor

positions have widened further. Weak growth has also contributed to still high

ratios of net external liabilities to GDP in some debtor economies.

• Risks of a disruptive adjustment in global current account balances have

decreased, but global demand rebalancing remains a policy priority. Stronger

external demand will be instrumental for reviving growth in debtor countries and

reducing their net external liabilities.”

Table VI-3, Fiscal Deficit, Current Account Deficit and Government Debt as % of GDP and 2016 Dollar GDP

	GDP $B 2018	FD %GDP 2018	CAD %GDP 2018	Debt %GDP 2018	FD%GDP 2019	CAD%GDP 2019	Debt %GDP 2019
US	20580	-3.5	-2.4	80.0	-3.6	-2.5	80.9
Japan	4972	-2.9	3.5	153.2	-2.9	3.3	153.8
UK	2829	0.1	-3.9	77.5	0.0	-3.5	76.1
Euro	13639	1.1	2.9	70.0	0.7	2.8	68.9
Ger	3951	2.6	7.3	42.7	1.8	7.0	40.1
France	2780	-0.9	-0.6	89.5	-1.8	-0.5	90.4
Italy	2076	1.4	2.5	120.2	1.4	2.9	121.3
Can	1712	-0.1	-2.6	26.8	-0.5	-1.9	26.4
China	13368	-3.8	1.4	50.6	-5.0	0.4	55.6
Brazil	1868	-1.7	-0.8	54.2	-1.9	-1.2	58.1

Note: GER = Germany; Can = Canada; FD = fiscal deficit; CAD = current account deficit

FD is primary except total for China; Debt is net except gross for China

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx

United States Current Account of Balance of Payments and International Investment Position. The current account of the US balance of payments is in Table VI-3A for IIIQ2020 and IIIQ2019. The Bureau of Economic Analysis analyzes as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/trans420.pdf):

“The U.S. current account deficit, which reflects the combined balances on trade in goods and services and income flows between U.S. residents and residents of other countries, widened by $7.6 billion, or 4.2 percent, to $188.5 billion in the fourth quarter of 2020, according to statistics released by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The revised third quarter deficit was $180.9 billion. The fourth quarter deficit was 3.5 percent of current dollar gross domestic product (GDP), up from 3.4 percent in the third quarter. The $7.6 billion widening of the current account deficit in the fourth quarter primarily reflected an expanded deficit on goods and a reduced surplus on services that were partly offset by a reduced deficit on secondary income.”

The US has a large deficit in goods or exports less imports of goods but it has a surplus in services that helps to reduce the trade account deficit or exports less imports of goods and services. The current account deficit of the US not seasonally adjusted increased from $101.8 billion in IVQ2019 to $189.8 billion in IVQ2020. The current account deficit seasonally adjusted at annual rate increased from 1.9 percent of GDP in IVQ2019 to 3.4 percent of GDP in IIIQ2020, increasing at 3.5 percent of GDP in IVQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event. The ratio of the current account deficit to GDP has stabilized below 3 percent of GDP compared with much higher percentages before the recession but is combined now with much higher imbalance in the Treasury budget (see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State, Vol. II (2008b), 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). There is still a major challenge in the combined deficits in current account and in federal budgets.

Table VI-3A, US, Balance of Payments, Millions of Dollars NSA

	IVQ2019	IVQ2020	Difference
Goods Balance	-208,907	-258,389	-49,482
X Goods	416,713	393,017	-5.7 ∆%
M Goods	-625,620	-651,406	-0.2 ∆%
Services Balance	82,290	58,232	-76,458
X Services	227,342	176,160	-22.5 ∆%
M Services	-145,052	-117,928	-18.7 ∆%
Balance Goods and Services	-126,617	-200,157	-73,540
Exports of Goods and Services and Income Receipts	962,008	853,697	-108,311
Imports of Goods and Services and Income Payments	-1,063,789	-1,043,467	-20,322
Current Account Balance	-101,782	-189,770	-87,988
% GDP	IVQ2019	IVQ2020	IIIQ2020
	1.9	3.5	3.4

X: exports; M: imports

Balance on Current Account = Exports of Goods and Services – Imports of Goods and Services and Income Payments

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/data/economic-accounts/international#bop

The following chart of the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) provides the US current account and component balances through IVQ2020. There is deterioration in IVQ2020 in the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart VI-3B1*, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/trans420.pdf

Chart VI-3B1*, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/trans420.pdf

The following chart of the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) provides the US current account and component balances through IIIQ2020. There is deterioration in IIIQ2020 the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event.

Chart VI-3B1*, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/trans320_0.pdf

The BEA analyzes the impact on data of the global recession, with output in the US reaching a high in Feb 2020 (https://www.nber.org/cycles.html), in the lockdown of economic activity in the COVID-19 event:

“Coronavirus (COVID-19) Impact on Second Quarter 2020 International Transactions

All major categories of current account transactions declined in the second quarter of 2020 resulting in part from the impact of COVID-19, as many businesses were operating at limited capacity or ceased operations completely, and the movement of travelers across borders was restricted. In the financial account, the ending of some currency swaps between the U.S. Federal Reserve System and some central banks in Europe and Japan contributed to U.S. withdrawal of deposit assets and U.S. repayment of deposit liabilities. The full economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be quantified in the statistics because the impacts are generally embedded in source data and cannot be separately identified. For more information on the impact of COVID-19 on the statistics, see the technical note that accompanies this release.”

Chart VI-3B1*, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-transactions-second-quarter-2020

Chart VI-3B1*, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-transactions-second-quarter-2020

Chart VI-3B1*, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-transactions-first-quarter-2020-and-annual-update

Chart VI-3B1*, US, Current Account Transactions, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-transactions-first-quarter-2020-and-annual-update

Chart VI-3B1, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/us-international-transactions-first-quarter-2019-and-annual-update

Chart VI-3B1, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-transactions-fourth-quarter-and-year-2019

Chart VI-3B2, US, Current Account and Components Balances, Quarterly SA

Source: https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-transactions-fourth-quarter-and-year-2019

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides analytical insight and data on the 2017 Tax Cuts and Job Act:

“In the international transactions accounts, income on equity, or earnings, of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational enterprises consists of a portion that is repatriated to the parent company in the United States in the form of dividends and a portion that is reinvested in foreign affiliates. In response to the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which generally eliminated taxes on repatriated earnings, some U.S. multinational enterprises repatriated accumulated prior earnings of their foreign affiliates. In the first, second, and fourth quarters of 2018, the repatriation of dividends exceeded current-period earnings, resulting in negative values being recorded for reinvested earnings. In the first quarter of 2019, dividends were $100.2 billion while reinvested earnings were $40.2 billion (see table below). The reinvested earnings are also reflected in the net acquisition of direct investment assets in the financial account (table 6). For more information, see "How does the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act affect BEA’s business income statistics?" and "How are the international transactions accounts affected by an increase in direct investment dividend receipts?"”

Chart VI-3B, US, Direct Investment Earnings Receipts and Components

Source: https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/us-international-transactions-first-quarter-2019-and-annual-update

In their classic work on “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,” Sargent and Wallace (1981, 2) consider a regime of domination of monetary policy by fiscal policy (emphasis added):

“Imagine that fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The fiscal authority independently sets its budgets, announcing all current and future deficits and surpluses and thus determining the amount of revenue that must be raised through bond sales and seignorage. Under this second coordination scheme, the monetary authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds, for it must try to finance with seignorage any discrepancy between the revenue demanded by the fiscal authority and the amount of bonds that can be sold to the public. Suppose that the demand for government bonds implies an interest rate on bonds greater than the economy’s rate of growth. Then if the fiscal authority runs deficits, the monetary authority is unable to control either the growth rate of the monetary base or inflation forever. If the principal and interest due on these additional bonds are raised by selling still more bonds, so as to continue to hold down the growth of base money, then, because the interest rate on bonds is greater than the economy’s growth rate, the real stock of bonds will growth faster than the size of the economy. This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy. Once that limit is reached, the principal and interest due on the bonds already sold to fight inflation must be financed, at least in part, by seignorage, requiring the creation of additional base money.”

The alternative fiscal scenario of the CBO (2012NovCDR, 2013Sep17) resembles an economic world in which eventually the placement of debt reaches a limit of what is proportionately desired of US debt in investment portfolios. This unpleasant environment is occurring in various European countries.

The current real value of government debt plus monetary liabilities depends on the expected discounted values of future primary surpluses or difference between tax revenue and government expenditure excluding interest payments (Cochrane 2011Jan, 27, equation (16)). There is a point when adverse expectations about the capacity of the government to generate primary surpluses to honor its obligations can result in increases in interest rates on government debt.

First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:

D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)

Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,

{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:

N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)

The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:

B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)

On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.

Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:

(M_t + B_t)/P_t = E_t∫(1/R_{t, t+τ})s_t+τdτ (4)

Equation (4) expresses the monetary, M_t, and debt, B_t, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, P_t, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, R_{t, t+τ}, of the future primary surpluses s_t+τ, which are equal to T_t+τ – G_t+τ or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post R_{t, t+τ}. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:

M_tV(i_t, ·) = P_tY_t (5)

Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):

“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”

An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.

There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:

(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress

(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality

(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.

This analysis suggests that there may be a point of saturation of demand for United States financial liabilities without an increase in interest rates on Treasury securities. A risk premium may develop on US debt. Such premium is not apparent currently because of distressed conditions in the world economy and international financial system. Risk premiums are observed in the spread of bonds of highly indebted countries in Europe relative to bonds of the government of Germany.

The issue of global imbalances centered on the possibility of a disorderly correction (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b) 183-94, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 167-71). Such a correction has not occurred historically but there is no argument proving that it could not occur. The need for a correction would originate in unsustainable large and growing United States current account deficits (CAD) and net international investment position (NIIP) or excess of financial liabilities of the US held by foreigners net relative to financial liabilities of foreigners held by US residents. The IMF estimated that the US could maintain a CAD of two to three percent of GDP without major problems (Rajan 2004). The threat of disorderly correction is summarized by Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 15):

“It is possible that foreigners may be unwilling to increase their positions in US financial assets at prevailing interest rates. An exit out of the dollar could cause major devaluation of the dollar. The depreciation of the dollar would cause inflation in the US, leading to increases in American interest rates. There would be an increase in mortgage rates followed by deterioration of real estate values. The IMF has simulated that such an adjustment would cause a decline in the rate of growth of US GDP to 0.5 percent over several years. The decline of demand in the US by four percentage points over several years would result in a world recession because the weakness in Europe and Japan could not compensate for the collapse of American demand. The probability of occurrence of an abrupt adjustment is unknown. However, the adverse effects are quite high, at least hypothetically, to warrant concern.”

The United States could be moving toward a situation typical of heavily indebted countries, requiring fiscal adjustment and increases in productivity to become more competitive internationally. The CAD and NIIP of the United States are not observed in full deterioration because the economy is well below trend. There are two complications in the current environment relative to the concern with disorderly correction in the first half of the past decade. In the release of Jun 14, 2013, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2013/pdf/trans113.pdf) informs of revisions of US data on US international transactions since 1999:

“The statistics of the U.S. international transactions accounts released today have been revised for the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2012 to incorporate newly available and revised source data, updated seasonal adjustments, changes in definitions and classifications, and improved estimating methodologies.”

The BEA introduced new concepts and methods (http://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm) in comprehensive restructuring on Jun 18, 2014 (http://www.bea.gov/international/modern.htm):

“BEA introduced a new presentation of the International Transactions Accounts on June 18, 2014 and will introduce a new presentation of the International Investment Position on June 30, 2014. These new presentations reflect a comprehensive restructuring of the international accounts that enhances the quality and usefulness of the accounts for customers and bring the accounts into closer alignment with international guidelines.”

Table IIA2-3 provides data on the US fiscal and balance of payments imbalances incorporating all revisions and methods. In 2007, the federal deficit of the US was $161 billion corresponding to 1.1 percent of GDP while the Congressional Budget Office estimates the federal deficit in 2012 at $1077 billion or 6.7 percent of GDP. The estimate of the deficit for 2013 is $680 billion or 4.1 percent of GDP. The combined record federal deficits of the US from 2009 to 2012 are $5094 billion or 31.6 percent of the estimate of GDP for fiscal year 2012 implicit in the CBO (CBO 2013Sep11) estimate of debt/GDP. The deficits from 2009 to 2012 exceed one trillion dollars per year, adding to $5.084 trillion in four years, using the fiscal year deficit of $1077 billion for fiscal year 2012, which is the worst fiscal performance since World War II. Federal debt in 2007 was $5035 billion, slightly less than the combined deficits from 2009 to 2012 of $5084 billion. Federal debt in 2012 was 70.3 percent of GDP (CBO 2015Jan26) and 72.2 percent of GDP in 2013, as shown in Table VI-3B with the latest revisions (https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#2) . This situation may worsen in the future (CBO 2013Sep17):

“Between 2009 and 2012, the federal government recorded the largest budget deficits relative to the size of the economy since 1946, causing federal debt to soar. Federal debt held by the public is now about 73 percent of the economy’s annual output, or gross domestic product (GDP). That percentage is higher than at any point in U.S. history except a brief period around World War II, and it is twice the percentage at the end of 2007. If current laws generally remained in place, federal debt held by the public would decline slightly relative to GDP over the next several years, CBO projects. After that, however, growing deficits would ultimately push debt back above its current high level. CBO projects that federal debt held by the public would reach 100 percent of GDP in 2038, 25 years from now, even without accounting for the harmful effects that growing debt would have on the economy. Moreover, debt would be on an upward path relative to the size of the economy, a trend that could not be sustained indefinitely.

The gap between federal spending and revenues would widen steadily after 2015 under the assumptions of the extended baseline, CBO projects. By 2038, the deficit would be 6½ percent of GDP, larger than in any year between 1947 and 2008, and federal debt held by the public would reach 100 percent of GDP, more than in any year except 1945 and 1946. With such large deficits, federal debt would be growing faster than GDP, a path that would ultimately be unsustainable.

Incorporating the economic effects of the federal policies that underlie the extended baseline worsens the long-term budget outlook. The increase in debt relative to the size of the economy, combined with an increase in marginal tax rates (the rates that would apply to an additional dollar of income), would reduce output and raise interest rates relative to the benchmark economic projections that CBO used in producing the extended baseline. Those economic differences would lead to lower federal revenues and higher interest payments. With those effects included, debt under the extended baseline would rise to 108 percent of GDP in 2038.”

The most recent CBO long-term budget on Jun 25, 2019 projects US federal debt at 144.0 percent of GDP in 2049 (Congressional Budget Office, The 2019 long-term budget outlook. Washington, DC, Jun 25 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55331). Table VI-3B provides the balance of payments and net international investment position together with the fiscal imbalances of the US that were critical at the onset of the global recession after 2007 (Pelaez and Pelaez, Financial Regulation after the Global Recession (2009a), 157-66, Regulation of Banks and Finance (2009b), 217-27, International Financial Architecture (2005), 15-18, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 221-5, Globalization and the State Vol. II (2008b), 197-213, Government Intervention in Globalization (2008c), 182-4). Several past comments of this blog elaborate on these arguments, among which: http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/causes-of-2007-creditdollar-crisis.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/professor-mckinnons-bubble-economy.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/world-inflation-quantitative-easing.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/01/treasury-yields-valuation-of-risk.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/quantitative-easing-theory-evidence-and.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html ) and are exploding again with the fiscal stimulus of the COVID-19 event.

Table VI-3B, US, Current Account, NIIP, Fiscal Balance, Nominal GDP, Federal Debt and Direct Investment, Dollar Billions and %

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Goods & Services	-705	-709	-384	-495	-549
Exports Goods & Services & Income Receipts	2559.3	2742.3	2283.1	2624.0	2981.5
Imports Goods & Services & Income Payments	-3270.4	-3423.6	-2655.6	-3055.3	-3427.2
Current Account	-711	-681	-373	-431	-445
NGDP	14452	14713	14449	14992	15543
Current Account % GDP	-4.9	-4.6	-2.6	-2.9	-2.9
NIIP	-1279	-3995	-2628	-2512	-4455
US Owned Assets Abroad	20705	19423	19426	21767	22209
Foreign Owned Assets in US	21984	23418	22054	24279	26664
NIIP % GDP	-8.8	-27.2	-18.2	-16.8	-28.7
Exports Goods, Services and Income Receipts	2559	2742	2283	2624	2982
NIIP % Exports Goods, Services and Income Payments	-50	-146	-115	-96	-149
DIA MV	5858	3707	4945	5486	5215
DIUS MV	4134	3091	3619	4099	4199
Fiscal Balance	-161	-459	-1413	-1294	-1300
Fiscal Balance % GDP	-1.1	-3.1	-9.8	-8.7	-8.4
Federal   Debt	5035	5803	7545	9019	10128
Federal Debt % GDP	35.2	39.4	52.3	60.8	65.8
Federal Outlays	2729	2983	3518	3457	3603
∆%	2.8	9.3	17.9	-1.7	4.2
% GDP	19.1	20.2	24.4	23.3	23.4
Federal Revenue	2568	2524	2105	2163	2303
∆%	6.7	-1.7	-16.6	2.7	6.5
% GDP	18.0	17.1	14.6	14.6	15.0

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Goods & Services	-537	-461	-490	-499	-503
Exports Goods & Services & Income Receipts	3095.0	3213.0	3341.8	3207.3	3188.5
Exports Goods & Services & Income Receipts	3521.9	3561.8	3707.0	-3615.1	3616.9
Current Account	-426	-349	-365	-408	-428
NGDP	16197	16785	17527	18225	18715
Current Account % GDP	-2.6	-2.1	-2.1	-2.2	-2.3
NIIP	-4518	-5369	-6945	-7462	-8192
US Owned Assets Abroad	22562	24145	24883	23431	24060
Foreign Owned Assets in US	27080	29513	31828	30892	32252
NIIP % GDP	-27.9	-32.0	-39.6	-40.9	-43.8
Exports Goods, Services and Income	3095	3213	3342	3207	3189
NIIP % Exports Goods, Services and Income	-146	-167	-208	-233	-257
DIA MV	5969	7121	72421	7057	7422
DIUS MV	4662	5815	6370	6729	7596
Fiscal Balance	-1077	-680	-485	-442	-585
Fiscal Balance % GDP	-6.7	-4.1	-2.8	-2.4	-3.2
Federal   Debt	11281	11983	12780	13117	14168
Federal Debt % GDP	70.3	72.2	73.7	72.5	76.4
Federal Outlays	3527	3455	3506	3692	3853
∆%	-2.1	-2.0	1.5	5.3	4.4
% GDP	22.0	20.8	20.2	20.4	20.8
Federal Revenue	2450	2775	3022	3250	3268
∆%	6.4	13.3	8.9	7.6	0.6
% GDP	15.3	16.7	17.4	18.0	17.6
	2017	2018	2019
Goods & Services	-550	-628	-616
Exports Goods & Services & Income Receipts	3444.8	3735.7	3763.9
Imports Goods & Services & Income Payments	3884.5	4226.7	4262.3
Current Account	-440	-491	-498
NGDP	19519	20580	21428
Current Account % GDP	2.3	2.4	2.3
NIIP	-7743	-9555	-10991
US Owned Assets Abroad	27773	25241	29317
Foreign Owned Assets in US	35516	34796	40309
NIIP % GDP	-39.7	-46.4	-51.3
Exports Goods, Services and Income	3445	3736	3764
NIIP % Exports Goods, Services and Income	-225	-256	-292
DIA MV	8910	7504	8838
DIUS MV	8925	8483	10581
Fiscal Balance	-665	-779	-984
Fiscal Balance % GDP	-3.5	-3.8	-4.6
Federal   Debt	14665	15750	16803
Federal Debt % GDP	76.0	77.4	79.2
Federal Outlays	3982	4109	4447
∆%	3.3	3.2	8.2
% GDP	20.6	20.2	21.0
Federal Revenue	3316	3330	3462
∆%	1.5	0.4	4.0
% GDP	17.2	16.4	16.3

Sources:

Notes: NGDP: nominal GDP or in current dollars; NIIP: Net International Investment Position; DIA MV: US Direct Investment Abroad at Market Value; DIUS MV: Direct Investment in the US at Market Value. There are minor discrepancies in the decimal point of percentages of GDP between the balance of payments data and federal debt, outlays, revenue and deficits in which the original number of the CBO source is maintained. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, US International Economic Accounts: Concepts and Methods. 2014. Washington, DC: BEA, Department of Commerce, Jun 2014 http://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm These discrepancies do not alter conclusions. Budget http://www.cbo.gov/

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#6

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#3

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#2

https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#2 Balance of Payments and NIIP http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#bop Gross Domestic Product, , Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

Table VI-3C provides quarterly estimates NSA of the external imbalance of the United States. The current account deficit as percent of GDP at 2.3 percent in IIIQ2019 decreases to 1.9 percent in IVQ2019. The current account deficit increases to 2.1 percent in IQ2020. The current account deficit increases to 3.3 percent in IIQ2020. The current account deficit increases to 3.4 percent in IIIQ2020. The current account deficit increases to 3.5 percent of GDP in IVQ2020. The absolute value of the net international investment position increases to $10.9 trillion in IIIQ2019. The absolute value of the net international investment position increases to $11.1 trillion in IVQ2019. The absolute value of the net international investment position increases to $12.2 trillion in IQ2020. The absolute value of the net international investment position increases at $13.1 trillion in IIQ2020. The absolute value of the net international investment position increases to $13.95 trillion in IIIQ2020. The absolute value of the net international position increases to $14.1 trillion in IVQ2020. The BEA explains as follows (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/intinv220_0.pdf):

“The U.S. net international investment position, the difference between U.S. residents' foreign financial assets and liabilities, was –$14.09 trillion at the end of the fourth quarter of 2020, according to statistics released by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Assets totaled $32.16 trillion and liabilities were $46.25 trillion.

At the end of the third quarter, the net investment position was –$13.86 trillion (Table 1).”

The BEA explains further (https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/intinv220_0.pdf):

“The –$227.5 billion change in the net investment position from the third quarter to the fourth quarter came from net financial transactions of –$287.1 billion and net other changes in position, such as price and exchange rate changes, of $59.6 billion (Table A).

COVID-19 Impact on Fourth Quarter 2020 International Investment Position

The global pandemic and the economic recovery continued to impact the IIP in the fourth quarter of 2020. The economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be quantified in the IIP statistics because the impacts are generally embedded in source data and cannot be separately identified.”

Table VI-3C, US, Current Account, Net International Investment Position and Direct Investment, Dollar Billions, NSA

	IVQ2019	IQ2020	IIQ2020	IIIQ2020	IVQ2020
Goods & Services	-127	-114	-160	-207	-200
Primary Income	62	53	33	48	47
Secondary Income	-37	-37	-36	-38	-37
Current Account	-102	-98	-163	-197	-190
Current Account % GDP SA	1.9	2.1	3.3	3.4	3.5
NIIP	-11050	-12163	-13085	-13865	-14092
US Owned Assets Abroad	29153	26921	28779	29516	32156
Foreign Owned Assets in US	-40203	-39085	-41864	-43381	-46248
DIA MV	8799	7004	7945	8340	9296
DIUS MV	10547	8762	10091	10847	1197

Notes: NIIP: Net International Investment Position; DIA MV: US Direct Investment Abroad at Market Value; DIUS MV: Direct Investment in the US at Market Value. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, US International Economic Accounts: Concepts and Methods. 2014. Washington, DC: BEA, Department of Commerce, Sep 2014

https://www.bea.gov/international/concepts_methods.htm

Chart VI-3CA of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis provides the quarterly and annual US net international investment position (NIIP) NSA in billion dollars. The NIIP deteriorated in 2008, improving in 2009-2011 followed by deterioration after 2012. There is improvement in 2017 and deterioration in 2018.

Chart VI-3CA, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm

Chart VI-3C, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm

Chart VI-3C1 provides the quarterly NSA NIIP.

Chart VI-3C1, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm

Chart VI-3C2 updates annual and quarterly estimates of the US Net International Investment Position. There is continuing deterioration.

Chart VI-3C2, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm

Chart VI-3C2 updates quarterly estimates of the US Net International Investment Position. There is continuing deterioration.

Chart VI-3C3, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm

Chart VI-3C3, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/news/2019/us-international-investment-position-third-quarter-2019

Chart VI-3C4, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-investment-position-fourth-quarter-and-year-2019

Chart VI-3C4, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-investment-position-first-quarter-2020-year-2019-and-annual-update

Chart VI-3C4, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-investment-position-second-quarter-2020

Chart VI-3C4, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-investment-position-third-quarter-2020

Chart VI-3C4, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/us-international-investment-position-third-quarter-2020

Chart VI-3C4, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/us-international-investment-position-fourth-quarter-and-year-2020

Chart VI-3C4, US Net International Investment Position, NSA, Billion US Dollars

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/us-international-investment-position-fourth-quarter-and-year-2020

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021.