Sunday, December 16, 2012

Recovery without Hiring, Forecast Growth Mandate of Monetary Policy or QE∞, World Inflation Waves, United States International Trade, World Financial Turbulence and Economic Slowdown with Global Recession Risk: Part II

 

Recovery without Hiring, Forecast Growth Mandate of Monetary Policy or QE∞, World Inflation Waves, United States International Trade, World Financial Turbulence and Economic Slowdown with Global Recession Risk

Carlos M. Pelaez

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012

Executive Summary

I Recovery without Hiring

IA1 Hiring Collapse

IA2 Labor Underutilization

IA3 Ten Million Fewer Full-time Job

IA4 Youth and Middle-Aged Unemployment

II World Inflation Waves

IIA Appendix: Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy

IIA1 Theory

IIA2 Policy

IIA3 Evidence

IIA4 Unwinding Strategy

IIB United States Inflation

IIC Long-term US Inflation

IID Current US Inflation

IIE United States International Trade

IIE1 United States International Trade Deficit and Fiscal Imbalance

IIE2 Import Export Prices

III World Financial Turbulence

IIIA Financial Risks

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation

V World Economic Slowdown

VA United States

VB Japan

VC China

VD Euro Area

VE Germany

VF France

VG Italy

VH United Kingdom

VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets

VII Economic Indicators

VIII Interest Rates

IX Conclusion

References

Appendixes

Appendix I The Great Inflation

IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies

IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact

IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort

IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis

IIIGA Monetary Policy with Deficit Financing of Economic Growth

IIIGB Adjustment during the Debt Crisis of the 1980s

III World Financial Turbulence. Financial markets are being shocked by multiple factors including (1) world economic slowdown; (2) slowing growth in China with political development and slowing growth in Japan and world trade; (3) slow growth propelled by savings/investment reduction in the US with high unemployment/underemployment, falling wages, hiring collapse, contraction of real private fixed investment, decline of wealth and households over the business cycle by 10.9 percent adjusted for inflation while growing 617.2 percent adjusted for inflation from IVQ1945 to IIIQ2012 and unsustainable fiscal deficit/debt threatening prosperity; and (3) the outcome of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This section provides current data and analysis. Subsection IIIA Financial Risks provides analysis of the evolution of valuations of risk financial assets during the week. There are various appendixes for convenience of reference of material related to the euro area debt crisis. Some of this material is updated in Subsection IIIA when new data are available and then maintained in the appendixes for future reference until updated again in Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIB Appendix on Safe Haven Currencies discusses arguments and measures of currency intervention and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact provides analysis of the restructuring of the fiscal affairs of the European Union in the agreement of European leaders reached on Dec 9, 2011 and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Subsection IIID Appendix on European Central Bank Large Scale Lender of Last Resort considers the policies of the European Central Bank and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment. Appendix IIIE Euro Zone Survival Risk analyzes the threats to survival of the European Monetary Union and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation provides more technical analysis and is available following Subsection IIIA. Subsection IIIG Appendix on Deficit Financing of Growth and the Debt Crisis provides analysis of proposals to finance growth with budget deficits together with experience of the economic history of Brazil and is available in the Appendixes section at the end of the blog comment.

IIIA Financial Risks. The past half year has been characterized by financial turbulence, attaining unusual magnitude in recent months. Table III-1, updated with every comment in this blog, provides beginning values on Fr Nov 30 and daily values throughout the week ending on Dec 14 of various financial assets. Section VI Valuation of Risk Financial Assets provides a set of more complete values. All data are for New York time at 5 PM. The first column provides the value on Fri Dec 7 and the percentage change in that prior week below the label of the financial risk asset. For example, the first column “Fri Dec 7, 2012”, first row “USD/EUR 1.2926 0.5 %,” provides the information that the US dollar (USD) appreciated 0.5 percent to USD 1.2926/EUR in the week ending on Fri Dec 7 relative to the exchange rate on Fri Nov 30. The first five asset rows provide five key exchange rates versus the dollar and the percentage cumulative appreciation (positive change or no sign) or depreciation (negative change or negative sign). Positive changes constitute appreciation of the relevant exchange rate and negative changes depreciation. Financial turbulence has been dominated by reactions to the new program for Greece (see section IB in http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/debt-and-financial-risk-aversion-and.html), modifications and new approach adopted in the Euro Summit of Oct 26 (European Commission 2011Oct26SS, 2011Oct26MRES), doubts on the larger countries in the euro zone with sovereign risks such as Spain and Italy but expanding into possibly France and Germany, the growth standstill recession and long-term unsustainable government debt in the US, worldwide deceleration of economic growth and continuing waves of inflation. The most important current shock is that resulting from the agreement by European leaders at their meeting on Dec 9 (European Council 2911Dec9), which is analyzed in IIIC Appendix on Fiscal Compact. European leaders reached a new agreement on Jan 30 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127631.pdf) and another agreement on Jun 29, 2012 (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf).

The dollar/euro rate is quoted as number of US dollars USD per one euro EUR, USD 1.2926/EUR in the first row, first column in the block for currencies in Table III-1 for Fri Dec 7, depreciating to USD 1.2941/EUR on Mon Dec 10, or by 0.1 percent. The dollar depreciated because more dollars, $1.2941, were required on Mon Dec 10 to buy one euro than $1.2926 on Dec 7. Table III-1 defines a country’s exchange rate as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. USD/EUR would be the definition of the exchange rate of the US and the inverse [1/(USD/EUR)] is the definition in this convention of the rate of exchange of the euro zone, EUR/USD. A convention used throughout this blog is required to maintain consistency in characterizing movements of the exchange rate such as in Table III-1 as appreciation and depreciation. The first row for each of the currencies shows the exchange rate at 5 PM New York time, such as USD 1.2926/EUR on Dec 7; the second row provides the cumulative percentage appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate from the rate on the last business day of the prior week, in this case Fri Dec 7, to the last business day of the current week, in this case Fri Dec 14, such as depreciation by 1.8 percent to USD 1.3162/EUR by Dec 14; and the third row provides the percentage change from the prior business day to the current business day. For example, the USD depreciated (denoted by negative sign) by 1.8 percent from the rate of USD 1.2926/EUR on Fri Dec 7 to the rate of USD 1.3162/EUR on Fri Dec 14 {[(1.3162/1.2926) – 1]100 = 1.8%} and depreciated (denoted by negative sign) by 0.7 percent from the rate of USD 1.3077 on Thu Dec 13 to USD 1.3162/EUR on Fri Dec 14 {[(1.3162/1.3077) -1]100 = 0.7%}. Other factors constant, appreciation of the dollar relative to the euro is caused by increasing risk aversion, with rising uncertainty on European sovereign risks increasing dollar-denominated assets with sales of risk financial investments. Funds move away from higher yielding risk financial assets to the safety of dollar investments. When risk aversion declines, funds have been moving away from safe assets in dollars to risk financial assets, depreciating the dollar.

Table III-I, Weekly Financial Risk Assets Dec 10 to Dec 14, 2012

Fri Dec 7, 2012

M 10

Tue 11

W 12

Thu 13

Fr 14

USD/EUR

1.2926

0.5%

1.2941

-0.1%

-0.1%

1.3006

-0.6%

-0.5%

1.3074

-1.1%

-0.5%

1.3077

-1.2%

0.0%

1.3162

-1.8%

-0.7%

JPY/  USD

82.49

0.0%

82.36

0.2%

0.2%

82.51

0.0%

-0.2%

83.27

-0.9%

-0.9%

83.65

-1.4%

-0.5%

83.51

-1.2%

0.2%

CHF/  USD

0.9346

-0.7%

0.9336

0.1%

0.1%

0.9323

0.2%

0.1%

0.9263

0.9%

0.6%

0.9236

1.2%

0.3%

0.9179

1.8%

0.6%

CHF/ EUR

1.2080

-0.2%

1.2081

0.0%

0.0%

1.2125

-0.4%

-0.4%

1.2111

-0.3%

0.1%

1.2079

0.0%

0.3%

1.2081

0.0%

0.0%

USD/  AUD

1.0487

0.9536

1.0489

0.9534

0.0%

0.0%

1.0529

0.9498

0.4%

0.4%

1.0554

0.9475

0.6%

0.2%

1.0528

0.9498

0.4%

-0.2%

1.0565

0.9465

0.7%

0.3%

10 Year  T Note

1.625

1.615

1.656

1.701

1.723

1.704

2 Year     T Note

0.256

0.236

0.236

0.24

0.248

0.232

German Bond

2Y -0.08 10Y 1.30

2Y -0.07 10Y 1.31

2Y -0.07 10Y 1.32

2Y -0.06 10Y 1.34

2Y -0.06 10Y 1.35

2Y -0.04 10Y 1.35

DJIA

13155.13

1.0%

13169.88

0.1%

0.1%

13248.44

0.7%

0.6%

13245.45

0.7%

0.0%

13170.73

0.1%

-0.6%

13135.01

-0.2%

-0.3%

DJ Global

1955.63

0.7%

1956.11

0.0%

0.0%

1970.41

0.7%

0.7%

1976.46

1.1%

0.3%

1973.77

0.9%

-0.1%

1973.39

0.9%

0.0%

DJ Asia Pacific

1281.33

1.1%

1282.05

0.1%

0.1%

1282.85

0.1%

0.1%

1288.72

0.6%

0.5%

1291.12

0.8%

0.2%

1293.46

0.9%

0.2%

Nikkei

9527.39

0.9%

9533.75

0.1%

0.1%

9525.32

0.0%

-0.1%

9581.46

0.6%

0.6%

9742.73

2.3%

1.7%

9737.56

2.2%

-0.1%

Shanghai

2061.79

4.1%

2083.77

1.1%

1.1%

2074.70

0.6%

-0.4%

2082.73

1.0%

0.4%

2061.48

0.0%

-1.0%

2150.63

4.3%

4.3%

DAX

7517.80

1.5%

7530.92

0.2%

0.2%

7589.75

1.0%

0.8%

7614.79

1.3%

0.3%

7581.98

0.9%

-0.4%

7596.47

1.0%

0.2%

DJ UBS

Comm.

141.51

-0.9%

141.17

-0.2%

-0.2%

140.62

-0.6%

-0.4%

140.90

-0.4%

0.2%

139.63

-1.3%

-0.9%

140.54

-0.7%

0.7%

WTI $ B

85.93

-3.4%

85.67

-0.3%

-0.3%

85.68

-0.3%

0.0%

86.76

1.0%

1.3%

86.11

0.2%

0.2%

86.73

0.9%

0.7%

Brent    $/B

107.23

-3.6%

107.43

0.2%

0.2%

108.15

0.9%

0.7%

109.57

2.2%

1.3%

108.10

0.8%

-1.3%

109.15

1.8%

1.0%

Gold  $/OZ

1705.50

-0.7%

1714.30

0.5%

0.5%

1711.20

0.3%

-0.2%

1712.80

0.4%

0.1%

1698.60

-0.4%

-0.8%

1697.0

-0.5%

-0.1%

Note: USD: US dollar; JPY: Japanese Yen; CHF: Swiss

Franc; AUD: Australian dollar; Comm.: commodities; OZ: ounce

Sources: http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

Discussion of current and recent risk-determining events is followed below by analysis of risk-measuring yields of the US and Germany and the USD/EUR rate. An important risk event is the reduction of growth prospects in the euro zone discussed by European Central Bank President Mario Draghi in “Introductory statement to the press conference,” on Dec 6, 2012 (http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is121206.en.html):

“This assessment is reflected in the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP growth in a range between -0.6% and -0.4% for 2012, between -0.9% and 0.3% for 2013 and between 0.2% and 2.2% for 2014. Compared with the September 2012 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges for 2012 and 2013 have been revised downwards.

The Governing Council continues to see downside risks to the economic outlook for the euro area. These are mainly related to uncertainties about the resolution of sovereign debt and governance issues in the euro area, geopolitical issues and fiscal policy decisions in the United States possibly dampening sentiment for longer than currently assumed and delaying further the recovery of private investment, employment and consumption.”

Reuters, writing on “Bundesbank cuts German growth forecast,” on Dec 7, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e845114-4045-11e2-8f90-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EMQxzs3u), informs that the central bank of Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank reduced its forecast of growth for the economy of Germany to 0.7 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.0 percent in Jun and to 0.4 percent in 2012 from an earlier forecast of 1.6 percent while the forecast for 2014 is at 1.9 percent.

The major risk event during earlier weeks was sharp decline of sovereign yields with the yield on the ten-year bond of Spain falling to 5.309 percent and that of the ten-year bond of Italy falling to 4.473 percent on Fri Nov 30, 2012 and 5.366 percent for the ten-year of Spain and 4.527 percent for the ten-year of Italy on Fri Nov 14, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Vanessa Mock and Frances Robinson, writing on “EU approves Spanish bank’s restructuring plans,” on Nov 28, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146520774638316.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the European Union regulators approved restructuring of four Spanish banks (Bankia, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc and Banco de Valencia), which helped to calm sovereign debt markets. Harriet Torry and James Angelo, writing on “Germany approves Greek aid,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578150532603095790.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), inform that the German parliament approved the plan to provide Greece a tranche of €44 billion in promised financial support, which is subject to sustainability analysis of the bond repurchase program later in Dec 2012. A hurdle for sustainability of repurchasing debt is that Greece’s sovereign bonds have appreciated significantly from around 24 percent for the bond maturing in 21 years and 20 percent for the bond maturing in 31 years in Aug 2012 to around 17 percent for the 21-year maturity and 15 percent for the 31-year maturing in Nov 2012. Declining years are equivalent to increasing prices, making the repurchase more expensive. Debt repurchase is intended to reduce bonds in circulation, turning Greek debt more manageable. Ben McLannahan, writing on “Japan unveils $11bn stimulus package,” on Nov 30, 2012, published in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/adc0569a-3aa5-11e2-baac-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN

), informs that the cabinet in Japan approved another stimulus program of $11 billion, which is twice larger than another stimulus plan in late Oct and close to elections in Dec. Henry Sender, writing on “Tokyo faces weak yen and high bond yields,” published on Nov 29, 2012 in the Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a7178d0-393d-11e2-afa8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DibFFquN), analyzes concerns of regulators on duration of bond holdings in an environment of likelihood of increasing yields and yen depreciation.

First, Risk-Determining Events. The European Council statement on Nov 23, 2012 asked the President of the European Commission “to continue the work and pursue consultations in the coming weeks to find a consensus among the 27 over the Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf) Discussions will continue in the effort to reach agreement on a budget: “A European budget is important for the cohesion of the Union and for jobs and growth in all our countries” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133723.pdf). There is disagreement between the group of countries requiring financial assistance and those providing bailout funds. Gabrielle Steinhauser and Costas Paris, writing on “Greek bond rally puts buyback in doubt,” on Nov 23, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324352004578136362599130992.html?mg=reno64-wsj) find a new hurdle in rising prices of Greek sovereign debt that may make more difficult buybacks of debt held by investors. European finance ministers continue their efforts to reach an agreement for Greece that meets with approval of the European Central Bank and the IMF. The European Council (2012Oct19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/133004.pdf ) reached conclusions on strengthening the euro area and providing unified financial supervision:

“The European Council called for work to proceed on the proposals on the Single Supervisory Mechanism as a matter of priority with the objective of agreeing on the legislative framework by 1st January 2013 and agreed on a number of orientations to that end. It also took note of issues relating to the integrated budgetary and economic policy frameworks and democratic legitimacy and accountability which should be further explored. It agreed that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the EU's institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards non-euro area Member States and respect for the integrity of the Single Market. It looked forward to a specific and time-bound roadmap to be presented at its December 2012 meeting, so that it can move ahead on all essential building blocks on which a genuine EMU should be based.”

Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. The Bank of Spain released new data on doubtful debtors in Spain’s credit institutions (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/Agenda/Datos_de_credit_a6cd708c59cf931.html). In 2006, the value of doubtful credits reached €10,859 million or 0.7 percent of total credit of €1,508,626 million. In Aug 2012, doubtful credit reached €178,579 million or 10.5 percent of total credit of €1,698,714 million.

There are three critical factors influencing world financial markets. (1) Spain could request formal bailout from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) that may also affect Italy’s international borrowing. David Roman and Jonathan House, writing on “Spain risks backlash with budget plan,” on Sep 27, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443916104578021692765950384.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection) analyze Spain’s proposal of reducing government expenditures by €13 billion, or around $16.7 billion, increasing taxes in 2013, establishing limits on early retirement and cutting the deficit by €65 billion through 2014. Banco de España, Bank of Spain, contracted consulting company Oliver Wyman to conduct rigorous stress tests of the resilience of its banking system. (Stress tests and their use are analyzed by Pelaez and Pelaez Globalization and the State Vol. I (2008b), 95-100, International Financial Architecture (2005) 112-6, 123-4, 130-3).) The results are available from Banco de España (http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/prensa/infointeres/reestructuracion/ http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). The assumptions of the adverse scenario used by Oliver Wyman are quite tough for the three-year period from 2012 to 2014: “6.5 percent cumulative decline of GDP, unemployment rising to 27.2 percent and further declines of 25 percent of house prices and 60 percent of land prices (http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20120928/informe_ow280912e.pdf). Fourteen banks were stress tested with capital needs estimates of seven banks totaling €59.3 billion. The three largest banks of Spain, Banco Santander (http://www.santander.com/csgs/Satellite/CFWCSancomQP01/es_ES/Corporativo.html), BBVA (http://www.bbva.com/TLBB/tlbb/jsp/ing/home/index.jsp) and Caixabank (http://www.caixabank.com/index_en.html), with 43 percent of exposure under analysis, have excess capital of €37 billion in the adverse scenario in contradiction with theories that large, international banks are necessarily riskier. Jonathan House, writing on “Spain expects wider deficit on bank aid,” on Sep 30, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444138104578028484168511130.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), analyzes the 2013 budget plan of Spain that will increase the deficit of 7.4 percent of GDP in 2012, which is above the target of 6.3 percent under commitment with the European Union. The ratio of debt to GDP will increase to 85.3 percent in 2012 and 90.5 percent in 2013 while the 27 members of the European Union have an average debt/GDP ratio of 83 percent at the end of IIQ2012. (2) Symmetric inflation targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even after the economy grows again at or close to potential output. Monetary easing by unconventional measures is now apparently open ended in perpetuity as provided in the statement of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on Sep 13, 2012 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm):

“To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities. These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.”

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is the concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation.

(2) The European Central Bank (ECB) approved a new program of bond purchases under the name “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMT). The ECB will purchase sovereign bonds of euro zone member countries that have a program of conditionality under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that is converting into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These programs provide enhancing the solvency of member countries in a transition period of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment. The purchase of bonds by the ECB would maintain debt costs of sovereigns at sufficiently low levels to permit adjustment under the EFSF/ESM programs. Purchases of bonds are not limited quantitatively with discretion by the ECB as to how much is necessary to support countries with adjustment programs. Another feature of the OMT of the ECB is sterilization of bond purchases: funds injected to pay for the bonds would be withdrawn or sterilized by ECB transactions. The statement by the European Central Bank on the program of OTM is as follows (http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html):

“6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions

As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework:

Conditionality

A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM) programme. Such programmes can take the form of a full EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line), provided that they include the possibility of EFSF/ESM primary market purchases. The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme.

The Governing Council will consider Outright Monetary Transactions to the extent that they are warranted from a monetary policy perspective as long as programme conditionality is fully respected, and terminate them once their objectives are achieved or when there is non-compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary programme.

Following a thorough assessment, the Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion and acting in accordance with its monetary policy mandate.

Coverage

Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes as specified above. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access.

Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.

No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.

Creditor treatment

The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.

Sterilisation

The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.

Transparency

Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis.

Securities Markets Programme

Following today’s decision on Outright Monetary Transactions, the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) is herewith terminated. The liquidity injected through the SMP will continue to be absorbed as in the past, and the existing securities in the SMP portfolio will be held to maturity.”

Jon Hilsenrath, writing on “Fed sets stage for stimulus,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443864204577623220212805132.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection), analyzes the essay presented by Chairman Bernanke at the Jackson Hole meeting of central bankers, as defending past stimulus with unconventional measures of monetary policy that could be used to reduce extremely high unemployment. Chairman Bernanke (2012JHAug31, 18-9) does support further unconventional monetary policy impulses if required by economic conditions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm):

“Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.”

Professor John H Cochrane (2012Aug31), at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, writing on “The Federal Reserve: from central bank to central planner,” on Aug 31, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577609384030304936.html?mod=WSJ_hps_sections_opinion), analyzes that the departure of central banks from open market operations into purchase of assets with risks to taxpayers and direct allocation of credit subject to political influence has caused them to abandon their political independence and accountability. Cochrane (2012Aug31) finds a return to the proposition of Milton Friedman in the 1960s that central banks can cause inflation and macroeconomic instability.

Mario Draghi (2012Aug29), President of the European Central Bank, also reiterated the need of exceptional and unconventional central bank policies (http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html):

“Yet it should be understood that fulfilling our mandate sometimes requires us to go beyond standard monetary policy tools. When markets are fragmented or influenced by irrational fears, our monetary policy signals do not reach citizens evenly across the euro area. We have to fix such blockages to ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures. But this is our responsibility as the central bank of the euro area as a whole.

The ECB is not a political institution. But it is committed to its responsibilities as an institution of the European Union. As such, we never lose sight of our mission to guarantee a strong and stable currency. The banknotes that we issue bear the European flag and are a powerful symbol of European identity.”

Buiter (2011Oct31) analyzes that the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would need a “bigger bazooka” to bail out euro members in difficulties that could possibly be provided by the ECB. Buiter (2012Oct15) finds that resolution of the euro crisis requires full banking union together with restructuring the sovereign debt of at least four and possibly total seven European countries. Table III-7 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides the combined GDP in 2012 of the highly indebted euro zone members estimated in the latest World Economic Outlook of the IMF at $4167 billion or 33.1 percent of total euro zone GDP of $12,586 billion. Using the WEO of the IMF, Table III-8 in IIIE Appendix Euro Zone Survival Risk below provides debt of the highly indebted euro zone members at $3927.8 billion in 2012 that increases to $5809.9 billion when adding Germany’s debt, corresponding to 167.0 percent of Germany’s GDP. There are additional sources of debt in bailing out banks. The dimensions of the problem may require more firepower than a bazooka perhaps that of the largest conventional bomb of all times of 44,000 pounds experimentally detonated only once by the US in 1948 (http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar-apr/coker.html).

Second, Risk-Measuring Yields and Exchange Rate. The ten-year government bond of Spain was quoted at 6.868 percent on Aug 10, declining to 6.447 percent on Aug 17 and 6.403 percent on Aug 24, and the ten-year government bond of Italy fell from 5.894 percent on Aug 10 to 5.709 percent on Aug 17 and 5.618 percent on Aug 24. On Aug 31, the yield of the 10-year sovereign bond of Italy rose to 5.787 percent and that of Spain to 6.832 percent. The announcement of the OMT of bond-buying by the ECB together with weak employment creation in the US created risk appetite with the yield of the ten-year government bond of Spain collapsing to 5.708 percent on Sep 7 and the yield of the ten-year government bond of Italy to 5.008 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). The yield of the ten-year government bond of Spain traded at 5.770 percent on Sep 14 and at 5.739 percent on Sep 21 and ten-year government of Italy traded at 4.953 percent on Sep 14 and 4.982 on Sep 21. The imminence of a bailout of Spain drove the yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain to 5.979 percent on Fri Sep 28 and that of Italy to 5.031 percent but both traded higher during the day. Sovereign yields continued to decline by Oct 5 with the yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain trading at 5.663 percent and that of Italy at 4.922 percent. On Oct 12, 2012, the yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain traded at 5.612 percent and that of Italy at 4.856 percent. Sovereign bonds continued to decline in the week of Oct 19 with the ten-year government bond Spain trading at 5.289 percent and that of Italy at 4.655 percent. On Oct 26, the yield of the ten-year government bond of Spain traded at 5.574 percent and that of Italy at 4.838 percent. On Nov 2, the ten-year government bond of Spain traded at 5.649 percent, increasing to 5.820 percent on Nov 9 while the ten-year bond of Italy traded at 4.879 percent on Nov 2, increasing o 4.898 percent on Nov 9 under renewed concerns about Greece. The ten-year bond of Italy traded at 4.816 percent on Nov 16 while the yield of the ten-year bond of Spain traded at 5.864 percent. The ten-year yield of the government of Spain traded at 5.603 percent on Nov 23 while the ten-year yield of the government of Italy traded at 4.696 percent. Discussion of current and recent risk-determining events is followed below by analysis of risk-measuring yields of the US and Germany and the USD/EUR rate. The major risk event during the week was sharp decline of sovereign yields with the yield on the ten-year bond of Spain falling to 5.309 percent and that of the ten-year bond of Italy falling to 4.473 percent on Fri Nov 30, 2012 (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). Doubts of repurchase of Greek sovereign bonds, turmoil in Italian politics and reduction of growth forecasts by the European Central Bank and the Deutsche Bundesbank contributed to increase of the yield of the ten-year sovereign bond of Spain to 5.454 percent on Dec 7, 2012 and of the ten-year sovereign bond of Italy to 4.471 percent (http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_PRO_hps_marketdata). On Fri Dec 14, the yield of the ten-year bond of Spain traded at 5.366 percent and that of Italy at 4.527 percent. Risk aversion is captured by flight of investors from risk financial assets to the government securities of the US and Germany. Diminishing aversion is captured by increase of the yield of the two- and ten-year Treasury notes and the two- and ten-year government bonds of Germany. Table III-1A provides yields of US and German governments bonds and the rate of USD/EUR. Yields of US and German government bonds decline during shocks of risk aversion and the dollar strengthens in the form of fewer dollars required to buy one euro. The yield of the US ten-year Treasury note fell from 2.202 percent on Aug 26, 2011 to 1.459 percent on Jul 20, 2012, reminiscent of experience during the Treasury-Fed accord of the 1940s that placed a ceiling on long-term Treasury debt (Hetzel and Leach 2001), while the yield of the ten-year government bond of Germany fell from 2.16 percent to 1.17 percent. Under increasing risk appetite, the yield of the ten-year Treasury rose to 1.544 on Jul 27, 2012 and 1.569 percent on Aug 3, 2012, while the yield of the ten-year Government bond of Germany rose to 1.40 percent on Jul 27 and 1.42 percent on Aug 3. Yields moved on an increasing trend with the US ten-year note at 1.814 percent on Aug 17 and the German ten-year bond at 1.50 percent with sharp decline on Aug 24 to 1.684 percent for the yield of the US ten-year note and 1.35 for the yield of the German ten-year bond. The trend was interrupted with decline of the yield of the ten-year Treasury note to 1.543 percent on Aug 31, 2012, and of the ten-year German bond to 1.33 percent. The US dollar strengthened significantly from USD 1.450/EUR on Aug 26, 2011, to USD 1.2158 on Jul 20, 2012, or by 16.2 percent, but depreciated to USD 1.2320/EUR on Jul 27, 2012 and 1.2387 on Aug 3, 2012 in expectation of massive support of highly indebted euro zone members. Doubts returned at the end of the week of Aug 10, 2012 with appreciation to USD 1.2290/EUR and decline of the yields of the two-year government bond of Germany to -0.07 percent and of the ten-year to 1.38 percent. On Aug 17, the US dollar depreciated by 0.4 percent to USD 1.2335/EUR and the ten-year bond of Germany yielded -0.04 percent. Risk appetite returned in the week of Aug 24 with depreciation by 1.4 percent to USD 1.2512/EUR and lower yield of the German two-year bond to -0.01 percent and of the US two-year note to 0.266 percent. Further risk aversion is captured by decline of yield of the two-year Treasury note to 0.225 percent on Aug 31, 2012, and to -0.03 percent for the two-year sovereign bond of Germany while the USD moved in opposite direction, depreciating to USD 1.2575/EUR. The almost simultaneous announcement of the bond-buying OMT of the ECB on Sep 6 and the weak employment report on Sep 7 suggesting further easing by the FOMC caused risk appetite shown by the increase in yields of government bonds of the US on Sep 7 to 1.668 percent for the ten-year note and 0.252 percent for the two-year while the two-year yield of Germany rose from -0.03 percent to 0.03 percent and the ten-year yield from 1.33 percent to 1.52 percent. Risk aversion retreated again on Sep 14, 2012 because of the open-ended monetary policy of the FOMC with the dollar devaluing to USD 1.3130 and the ten-year yield of the US Treasury note increasing to 1.863 percent (also in part because of bond buying by the Fed at shorter maturities) and the yield of the ten-year German bond increasing to 1.71 percent. Risk aversions returned because of weak flash purchasing managers indices with appreciation to USD1.2981 in the week of Sep 21 and declines of the yield of the ten-year Treasury note to 1.753 percent and of the yield of the ten-year government bond to 1.60 percent. Risk aversion because of the potential bailout of Spain drove down the US ten-year yield to 1.631 and the ten-year yield of Germany to 1.44 percent while the dollar appreciated to USD 1.2859/EUR. Increasing risk appetite drove the yield of the ten-year Treasury to 1.737 percent on Oct 5, 2012 and depreciated the dollar to USD 1.3036 with more muted response in the yield of the ten-year bond of Germany rising to 1.52 percent and the two-year yield to 0.06 percent. There is indication of some risk aversion in the week of Oct 12, 2012, with decline of the yield of the ten-year Treasury to 1.663 percent and that of Germany to 1.45 percent, stability of the two-year Treasury yield at 0.264 percent and marginal decline of the yield of the two-year German bond to 0.04 percent while the dollar appreciated to USD 1.2953/EUR. Risk aversion fluctuated in the week of Oct 19 but the week ended with the increase of the yield of the two-year note of the US to 0.296 percent and of the ten-year note to 1.766 percent; there was similar increase of the yield of the two-year government bond of Germany to 0.11 percent and of the ten-year yield to 1.59 percent; and the dollar depreciated 0.5 percent to USD 1.3023 percent. Mild risk aversion returned in the week of Oct 26, with the 10-year Treasury yield declining marginally to 1.748 percent and that of Germany to 1.54 percent while the dollar appreciated to USD 1.2942/EUR. Mild risk aversion continued in the week of Nov 2 with declines in the yield of the ten-year Treasury note to 1.715 percent and of the ten-year government bond of Germany to 1.45 percent while the dollar appreciated to USD 1.2838/EUR. Risk aversion deepened in the week of Nov 9 with the two-year Treasury trading at 0.256 percent and the ten-year at 1.614 percent while the two-year government bond of Germany traded at minus 0.03 percent and the ten-year at 1.35 percent while the dollar strengthened to USD 1.2711/EUR. There is continuing risk aversion in the week of Nov 16, with the yields of the two-year Treasury at 0.24 percent and of the ten-year Treasury at 1.584, the yield of the two-year government bond at minus 0.03 percent and of the ten-year German government bond at 1.33 percent and the rate of USD 1.2743/EUR. Expectations of an agreement on US fiscal affairs and Greece’s bailout improved risk appetite in the holiday week of Nov 23 with the US two-year yield rising to 0.273 percent and the ten-year yield to 1.691, less pronounced improvement with the two-year yield of Germany at 0.00 percent and ten-year yield at 1.44 percent but depreciation of the dollar to USD 1.2975/EUR while stock markets soared. While yields of sovereign bonds of Spain and Italy fell sharply in the week of Nov 30, yields of US and German bonds traded down to 0.248 for two years and 1.612 for ten years for the US and 0.01 percent for two years and 1.39 percent for ten years for Germany. The dollar remained almost unchanged at USD 1.2987/EUR. Reductions of growth forecasts by the European Central Bank and Deutsche Bundesbank together with doubts on sovereign bond repurchase by Greece and Italian political turmoil contributed to decrease of the yield of the two-year government bond of Germany to minus 0.008 on Dec 7, 2012, and of the ten-year yield to 1.39 while the dollar appreciated to USD 1.2026/EUR while risk aversion continued in the US with the two-year Treasury yield at 0.256 percent and the ten-year yield at 1.625 percent. Yields backed up to 1.704 for the ten-year US Treasury and 1.35 for the ten-year German bond in the week of Dec 14, 2012, while the dollar depreciated to USD 1.3162/EUR. The zero interest rates for the monetary policy rate of the US, or fed funds rate, carry trades ensure devaluation of the dollar if there is no risk aversion but the dollar appreciates in flight to safe haven during episodes of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policy induces significant global financial instability, excessive risks and low liquidity. The ten-year Treasury yield is below consumer price inflation of 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html) and the expectation of higher inflation if risk aversion diminishes. Treasury securities continue to be safe haven for investors fearing risk but with concentration in shorter maturities such as the two-year Treasury. The lower part of Table III-1A provides the same flight to government securities of the US and Germany and the USD during the financial crisis and global recession and the beginning of the European debt crisis in the spring of 2010 with the USD trading at USD 1.192/EUR on Jun 7, 2010.

Table III-1A, Two- and Ten-Year Yields of Government Bonds of the US and Germany and US Dollar/EUR Exchange rate

 

US 2Y

US 10Y

DE 2Y

DE 10Y

USD/ EUR

12/14/12

0.232

1.704

-0.04

1.35

1.3162

12/7/12

0.256

1.625

-0.08

1.30

1.2926

11/30/12

0.248

1.612

0.01

1.39

1.2987

11/23/12

0.273

1.691

0.00

1.44

1.2975

11/16/12

0.24

1.584

-0.03

1.33

1.2743

11/9/12

0.256

1.614

-0.03

1.35

1.2711

11/2/12

0.274

1.715

0.01

1.45

1.2838

10/26/12

0.299

1.748

0.05

1.54

1.2942

10/19/12

0.296

1.766

0.11

1.59

1.3023

10/12/12

0.264

1.663

0.04

1.45

1.2953

10/5/12

0.26

1.737

0.06

1.52

1.3036

9/28/12

0.236

1.631

0.02

1.44

1.2859

9/21/12

0.26

1.753

0.04

1.60

1.2981

9/14/12

0.252

1.863

0.10

1.71

1.3130

9/7/12

0.252

1.668

0.03

1.52

1.2816

8/31/12

0.225

1.543

-0.03

1.33

1.2575

8/24/12

0.266

1.684

-0.01

1.35

1.2512

8/17/12

0.288

1.814

-0.04

1.50

1.2335

8/10/12

0.267

1.658

-0.07

1.38

1.2290

8/3/12

0.242

1.569

-0.02

1.42

1.2387

7/27/12

0.244

1.544

-0.03

1.40

1.2320

7/20/12

0.207

1.459

-0.07

1.17

1.2158

7/13/12

0.24

1.49

-0.04

1.26

1.2248

7/6/12

0.272

1.548

-0.01

1.33

1.2288

6/29/12

0.305

1.648

0.12

1.58

1.2661

6/22/12

0.309

1.676

0.14

1.58

1.2570

6/15/12

0.272

1.584

0.07

1.44

1.2640

6/8/12

0.268

1.635

0.04

1.33

1.2517

6/1/12

0.248

1.454

0.01

1.17

1.2435

5/25/12

0.291

1.738

0.05

1.37

1.2518

5/18/12

0.292

1.714

0.05

1.43

1.2780

5/11/12

0.248

1.845

0.09

1.52

1.2917

5/4/12

0.256

1.876

0.08

1.58

1.3084

4/6/12

0.31

2.058

0.14

1.74

1.3096

3/30/12

0.335

2.214

0.21

1.79

1.3340

3/2/12

0.29

1.977

0.16

1.80

1.3190

2/24/12

0.307

1.977

0.24

1.88

1.3449

1/6/12

0.256

1.957

0.17

1.85

1.2720

12/30/11

0.239

1.871

0.14

1.83

1.2944

8/26/11

0.20

2.202

0.65

2.16

1.450

8/19/11

0.192

2.066

0.65

2.11

1.4390

6/7/10

0.74

3.17

0.49

2.56

1.192

3/5/09

0.89

2.83

1.19

3.01

1.254

12/17/08

0.73

2.20

1.94

3.00

1.442

10/27/08

1.57

3.79

2.61

3.76

1.246

7/14/08

2.47

3.88

4.38

4.40

1.5914

6/26/03

1.41

3.55

NA

3.62

1.1423

Note: DE: Germany

Source:

http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/

http://professional.wsj.com/mdc/page/marketsdata.html?mod=WSJ_hps_marketdata

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm

http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_series_databases/Macro_economic_time_series/macro_economic_time_series_node.html?anker=GELDZINS

http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html

Chart III-1A of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System provides the ten-year and two-year Treasury constant maturity yields. The combination of zero fed funds rate and quantitative easing caused sharp decline of the yields from 2008 and 2009. Yield declines have also occurred during periods of financial risk aversion, including the current one of stress of financial markets in Europe.

clip_image002

Chart III-1A, US, Ten-Year and Two-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yields Jul 31, 2001-Dec 6, 2012

Note: US Recessions in shaded areas

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/

Kate Linebaugh, writing on “Falling revenue dings stocks,” on Oct 20, 2012, published in the Wall Street Journal (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444592704578066933466076070.html?mod=WSJPRO_hpp_LEFTTopStories), identifies a key financial vulnerability: falling revenues across markets for United States reporting companies. Global economic slowdown is reducing corporate sales and squeezing corporate strategies. Linebaugh quotes data from Thomson Reuters that 100 companies of the S&P 500 index have reported declining revenue only 1 percent higher in Jun-Sep 2012 relative to Jun-Sep 2011 but about 60 percent of the companies are reporting lower sales than expected by analysts with expectation that revenue for the S&P 500 will be lower in Jun-Sep 2012 for the entities represented in the index. Results of US companies are likely repeated worldwide. The basic valuation equation that is also used in capital budgeting postulates that the value of stocks or of an investment project is given by:

clip_image004

Where Rτ is expected revenue in the time horizon from τ =1 to T; Cτ denotes costs; and ρ is an appropriate rate of discount. In words, the value today of a stock or investment project is the net revenue, or revenue less costs, in the investment period from τ =1 to T discounted to the present by an appropriate rate of discount. In the current weak economy, revenues have been increasing more slowly than anticipated in investment plans. An increase in interest rates would affect discount rates used in calculations of present value, resulting in frustration of investment decisions. If V represents value of the stock or investment project, as ρ → ∞, meaning that interest rates increase without bound, then V → 0, or

clip_image004[1]

declines.

Equity indexes in Table III-1 continued to trend upward in the week ending on Dec 14, 2012. Stagnating revenues are causing reevaluation of discounted net earnings with deteriorating views on the world economy and United States fiscal sustainability but investors are driving indexes higher. DJIA decreased 0.3 percent on Dec 14, decreasing 0.2 percent in the week. Germany’s Dax increased 0.2 percent on Fri Dec 14 and increased 1.0 percent in the week. Dow Global increased 0.0 percent on Dec 14 and 0.9 percent in the week. Japan’s Nikkei Average decreased 0.1 percent on Fri Dec 14 and increased 2.2 percent in the week as the yen continues to be oscillating but relatively weaker and the stock market gains in expectations of fiscal stimulus by a new administration already anticipated by the current administration. Dow Asia Pacific TSM increased 0.2 percent on Dec 14 and increased 0.9 percent in the week while Shanghai Composite increased 4.3 percent on Dec 14 and increased 4.4 percent in the week supported by a fourteen-month high of the HSBC flash manufacturing index (available through Markit at http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10452), falling below 2000 to close at 1980.13 on Fri Nov 30 but closing at 2150.63 on Fri Dec 14. There is evident trend of deceleration of the world economy that could affect corporate revenue and equity valuations, causing oscillation in equity markets with increases during favorable risk appetite.

Commodities were mixed in the week of Dec 14, 2012. The DJ UBS Commodities Index increased 0.7 percent on Fri Dec 14 and decreased 0.7 percent in the week, as shown in Table III-1. WTI increased 0.9 percent in the week of Dec 14 while Brent increased 1.8 percent in the week even with conflicts in the Middle East. Gold decreased 0.1 percent on Fri Dec 14 and decreased 0.5 percent in the week.

Table III-2 provides an update of the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem. The balance sheet has swollen with the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs). Line 5 “Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy” increased from €546,747 million on Dec 31, 2010, to €879,130 million on Dec 28, 2011 and €1,112,129 million on Dec 7, 2012. The sum of line 5 and line 7 (“Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro”) has increased to €1,698,048 million in the statement of Dec 7. There is high credit risk in these transactions with capital of only €85,552 million as analyzed by Cochrane (2012Aug31).

Table III-2, Consolidated Financial Statement of the Eurosystem, Million EUR

 

Dec 31, 2010

Dec 28, 2011

Dec 7, 2012

1 Gold and other Receivables

367,402

419,822

479,113

2 Claims on Non Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency

223,995

236,826

259,571

3 Claims on Euro Area Residents Denominated in Foreign Currency

26,941

95,355

36,875

4 Claims on Non-Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro

22,592

25,982

17,660

5 Lending to Euro Area Credit Institutions Related to Monetary Policy Operations Denominated in Euro

546,747

879,130

1,112,129

6 Other Claims on Euro Area Credit Institutions Denominated in Euro

45,654

94,989

229,504

7 Securities of Euro Area Residents Denominated in Euro

457,427

610,629

585,919

8 General Government Debt Denominated in Euro

34,954

33,928

30,011

9 Other Assets

278,719

336,574

279,641

TOTAL ASSETS

2,004, 432

2,733,235

3,030,432

Memo Items

     

Sum of 5 and  7

1,004,174

1,489,759

1,698,048

Capital and Reserves

78,143

85,748

85,552

Source: European Central Bank

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs110105.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2011/html/fs111228.en.html

http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs/2012/html/fs121211.en.html

IIIE Appendix Euro Zone survival risk. Professors Ricardo Caballero and Francesco Giavazzi (2012Jan15) find that the resolution of the European sovereign crisis with survival of the euro area would require success in the restructuring of Italy. That success would be assured with growth of the Italian economy. A critical problem is that the common euro currency prevents Italy from devaluing the exchange rate to parity or the exchange rate that would permit export growth to promote internal economic activity, which could generate fiscal revenues for primary fiscal surplus that ensure creditworthiness. Fiscal consolidation and restructuring are important but of long-term gestation. Immediate growth of the Italian economy would consolidate the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15) argue that 55 percent of the exports of Italy are to countries outside the euro area such that devaluation of 15 percent would be effective in increasing export revenue. Newly available data in Table III-3 providing Italy’s trade with regions and countries supports the argument of Caballero and Giavazzi (2012Jan15). Italy’s exports to the European Monetary Union (EMU), or euro area, are only 42.6 percent of the total. Exports to the non-European Union area with share of 44.0 percent in Italy’s total exports are growing at 9.1 percent in Jan-Sep 2012 relative to Jan-Sep 2011 while those to EMU are falling at 1.8 percent.

Table III-3, Italy, Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, % Share and 12-Month ∆%

Sep 2012

Exports
% Share

∆% Jan-Aug 2012/ Jan-Sep 2011

Imports
% Share

Imports
∆% Jan-Sep 2012/ Jan-Sep 2011

EU

56.0

-0.7

53.7

-8.1

EMU 17

42.6

-1.8

43.4

-8.0

France

11.6

-0.6

8.4

-7.0

Germany

13.1

-0.7

15.5

-11.2

Spain

5.3

-8.6

4.5

-8.4

UK

4.7

9.2

2.7

-14.5

Non EU

44.0

9.1

46.3

-3.7

Europe non EU

13.3

9.3

10.8

-3.0

USA

6.1

18.7

3.2

1.1

China

2.7

-12.2

7.4

-16.6

OPEC

4.7

23.2

8.5

22.7

Total

100.0

3.5

100.0

-6.0

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/74537

Table III-4 provides Italy’s trade balance by regions and countries. Italy had trade deficit of €156 million with the 17 countries of the euro zone (EMU 17) in Sep 2012 and deficit of €1283 million in Jan-Sep 2012. Depreciation to parity could permit greater competitiveness in improving the trade surpluses of €8217 million in Jan-Sep with Europe non European Union and of €10124 million with the US and in reducing the deficit with non European Union of €688 million in Sep and €4577 million in Jan-Sep 2012. There is significant rigidity in the trade deficits in Jan-Sep of €12,923 million with China and €15,725 million with members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Higher exports could drive economic growth in the economy of Italy that would permit less onerous adjustment of the country’s fiscal imbalances, raising the country’s credit rating.

Table III-4, Italy, Trade Balance by Regions and Countries, Millions of Euro 

Regions and Countries

Trade Balance Sep 2012 Millions of Euro

Trade Balance Cumulative Jan-Sep 2012 Millions of Euro

EU

1,002

8,652

EMU 17

-156

-1,283

France

1,185

9,143

Germany

-563

-4,465

Spain

94

1,217

UK

839

7,076

Non EU

-594

-4,577

Europe non EU

688

8,217

USA

1,149

10,124

China

-1,483

-12,923

OPEC

-1,607

-15,725

Total

408

4,075

Notes: EU: European Union; EMU: European Monetary Union (euro zone)

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/74537

Growth rates of Italy’s trade and major products are provided in Table III-5 for the period Jan-Sep 2012 relative to Jan-Sep 2011. Growth rates in 12 months of imports are negative with the exception of 9.8 percent for energy. The higher rate of growth of exports of 3.5 percent in Jan-Sep 2012/Jan-Sep 2011 relative to imports of minus 6.0 percent may reflect weak demand in Italy with GDP declining during five consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 through IIIQ2012.

Table III-5 Italy, Exports and Imports % Share of Products in Total and ∆%

 

Exports
Share %

Exports
∆% Jan-Sep 2012/ Jan-Sep 2011

Imports
Share %

Imports
∆% Jan-Sep 2012/ Jan-Sep 2011

Consumer
Goods

28.9

4.6

25.0

-3.4

Durable

5.9

1.7

3.0

-6.7

Non
Durable

23.0

5.3

22.0

-3.0

Capital Goods

32.3

1.6

21.1

-13.0

Inter-
mediate Goods

34.2

2.5

34.3

-12.5

Energy

4.7

18.1

19.6

9.8

Total ex Energy

95.3

2.8

80.4

-9.8

Total

100.0

3.5

100.0

-6.0

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/74537

Table III-6 provides Italy’s trade balance by product categories in Aug 2012 and cumulative Jan-Aug 2012. Italy’s trade balance excluding energy generated surplus of €5163 million in Aug 2012 and €47,109 million in Jan-Aug 2012 but the energy trade balance created deficit of €5761 million in Aug 2012 and €43,284 million in Jan-Aug 2012. The overall deficit in Aug 2012 was €598 million with surplus of €3825 million in Jan-Aug 2012. Italy has significant competitiveness in various economic activities in contrast with some other countries with debt difficulties.

Table III-6, Italy, Trade Balance by Product Categories, € Millions

 

Sep 2012

Cumulative Jan-Sep 2012

Consumer Goods

1,292

11,563

  Durable

885

8,296

  Nondurable

407

3,267

Capital Goods

3,964

35,918

Intermediate Goods

163

5,110

Energy

-5,011

-48,517

Total ex Energy

5,419

52,591

Total

408

4,075

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/74537

Brazil faced in the debt crisis of 1982 a more complex policy mix. Between 1977 and 1983, Brazil’s terms of trade, export prices relative to import prices, deteriorated 47 percent and 36 percent excluding oil (Pelaez 1987, 176-79; Pelaez 1986, 37-66; see Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 178-87). Brazil had accumulated unsustainable foreign debt by borrowing to finance balance of payments deficits during the 1970s. Foreign lending virtually stopped. The German mark devalued strongly relative to the dollar such that Brazil’s products lost competitiveness in Germany and in multiple markets in competition with Germany. The resolution of the crisis was devaluation of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent relative to the dollar and subsequent maintenance of parity by monthly devaluation equal to inflation and indexing that resulted in financial stability by parity in external and internal interest rates avoiding capital flight. With a combination of declining imports, domestic import substitution and export growth, Brazil followed rapid growth in the US and grew out of the crisis with surprising GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 1984.

The euro zone faces a critical survival risk because several of its members may default on their sovereign obligations if not bailed out by the other members. The valuation equation of bonds is essential to understanding the stability of the euro area. An explanation is provided in this paragraph and readers interested in technical details are referred to the Subsection IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. Contrary to the Wriston doctrine, investing in sovereign obligations is a credit decision. The value of a bond today is equal to the discounted value of future obligations of interest and principal until maturity. On Dec 30 the yield of the 2-year bond of the government of Greece was quoted around 100 percent. In contrast, the 2-year US Treasury note traded at 0.239 percent and the 10-year at 2.871 percent while the comparable 2-year government bond of Germany traded at 0.14 percent and the 10-year government bond of Germany traded at 1.83 percent. There is no need for sovereign ratings: the perceptions of investors are of relatively higher probability of default by Greece, defying Wriston (1982), and nil probability of default of the US Treasury and the German government. The essence of the sovereign credit decision is whether the sovereign will be able to finance new debt and refinance existing debt without interrupting service of interest and principal. Prices of sovereign bonds incorporate multiple anticipations such as inflation and liquidity premiums of long-term relative to short-term debt but also risk premiums on whether the sovereign’s debt can be managed as it increases without bound. The austerity measures of Italy are designed to increase the primary surplus, or government revenues less expenditures excluding interest, to ensure investors that Italy will have the fiscal strength to manage its debt of 120 percent of GDP, which is the third largest in the world after the US and Japan. Appendix IIIE links the expectations on the primary surplus to the real current value of government monetary and fiscal obligations. As Blanchard (2011SepWEO) analyzes, fiscal consolidation to increase the primary surplus is facilitated by growth of the economy. Italy and the other indebted sovereigns in Europe face the dual challenge of increasing primary surpluses while maintaining growth of the economy (for the experience of Brazil in the debt crisis of 1982 see Pelaez 1986, 1987).

Much of the analysis and concern over the euro zone centers on the lack of credibility of the debt of a few countries while there is credibility of the debt of the euro zone as a whole. In practice, there is convergence in valuations and concerns toward the fact that there may not be credibility of the euro zone as a whole. The fluctuations of financial risk assets of members of the euro zone move together with risk aversion toward the countries with lack of debt credibility. This movement raises the need to consider analytically sovereign debt valuation of the euro zone as a whole in the essential analysis of whether the single-currency will survive without major changes.

Welfare economics considers the desirability of alternative states, which in this case would be evaluating the “value” of Germany (1) within and (2) outside the euro zone. Is the sum of the wealth of euro zone countries outside of the euro zone higher than the wealth of these countries maintaining the euro zone? On the choice of indicator of welfare, Hicks (1975, 324) argues:

“Partly as a result of the Keynesian revolution, but more (perhaps) because of statistical labours that were initially quite independent of it, the Social Product has now come right back into its old place. Modern economics—especially modern applied economics—is centered upon the Social Product, the Wealth of Nations, as it was in the days of Smith and Ricardo, but as it was not in the time that came between. So if modern theory is to be effective, if it is to deal with the questions which we in our time want to have answered, the size and growth of the Social Product are among the chief things with which it must concern itself. It is of course the objective Social Product on which attention must be fixed. We have indexes of production; we do not have—it is clear we cannot have—an Index of Welfare.”

If the burden of the debt of the euro zone falls on Germany and France or only on Germany, is the wealth of Germany and France or only Germany higher after breakup of the euro zone or if maintaining the euro zone? In practice, political realities will determine the decision through elections.

The prospects of survival of the euro zone are dire. Table III-7 is constructed with IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO) for GDP in USD billions, primary net lending/borrowing as percent of GDP and general government debt as percent of GDP for selected regions and countries in 2010.

Table III-7, World and Selected Regional and Country GDP and Fiscal Situation

 

GDP 2012
USD Billions

Primary Net Lending Borrowing
% GDP 2012

General Government Net Debt
% GDP 2012

World

71,277

   

Euro Zone

12,065

-0.5

73.4

Portugal

211

-0.7

110.9

Ireland

205

-4.4

103.0

Greece

255

-1.7

170.7

Spain

1,340

-4.5

78.6

Major Advanced Economies G7

33,769

-5.1

89.0

United States

15,653

-6.5

83.8

UK

2,434

-5.6

83.7

Germany

3,367

1.4

58.4

France

2,580

-2.2

83.7

Japan

5,984

-9.1

135.4

Canada

1,770

-3.2

35.8

Italy

1,980

2.6

103.1

China

8,250

-1.3*

22.2**

*Net Lending/borrowing**Gross Debt

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO

The data in Table III-7 are used for some very simple calculations in Table III-8. The column “Net Debt USD Billions” in Table III-8 is generated by applying the percentage in Table III-7 column “General Government Net Debt % GDP 2010” to the column “GDP USD Billions.” The total debt of France and Germany in 2012 is $4155.8 billion, as shown in row “B+C” in column “Net Debt USD Billions” The sum of the debt of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland is $3975.1 billion, adding rows D+E+F+G+H in column “Net Debt USD billions.” There is some simple “unpleasant bond arithmetic” in the two final columns of Table III-8. Suppose the entire debt burdens of the five countries with probability of default were to be guaranteed by France and Germany, which de facto would be required by continuing the euro zone. The sum of the total debt of these five countries and the debt of France and Germany is shown in column “Debt as % of Germany plus France GDP” to reach $8130.8 billion, which would be equivalent to 136.7 percent of their combined GDP in 2012. Under this arrangement the entire debt of the euro zone including debt of France and Germany would not have nil probability of default. The final column provides “Debt as % of Germany GDP” that would exceed 241.5 percent if including debt of France and 177.4 percent of German GDP if excluding French debt. The unpleasant bond arithmetic illustrates that there is a limit as to how far Germany and France can go in bailing out the countries with unsustainable sovereign debt without incurring severe pains of their own such as downgrades of their sovereign credit ratings. A central bank is not typically engaged in direct credit because of remembrance of inflation and abuse in the past. There is also a limit to operations of the European Central Bank in doubtful credit obligations. Wriston (1982) would prove to be wrong again that countries do not bankrupt but would have a consolation prize that similar to LBOs the sum of the individual values of euro zone members outside the current agreement exceeds the value of the whole euro zone. Internal rescues of French and German banks may be less costly than bailing out other euro zone countries so that they do not default on French and German banks.

Table III-8, Guarantees of Debt of Sovereigns in Euro Area as Percent of GDP of Germany and France, USD Billions and %

 

Net Debt USD Billions

Debt as % of Germany Plus France GDP

Debt as % of Germany GDP

A Euro Area

8,855.7

   

B Germany

1,996.3

 

$8130.9 as % of $3367 =241.5%

$5971.4 as % of $3367 =177.4%

C France

2,159.5

   

B+C

4,155.8

GDP $5,947.0

Total Debt

$8130.9

Debt/GDP: 136.7%

 

D Italy

2,041.4

   

E Spain

1,053.2

   

F Portugal

234.0

   

G Greece

435.3

   

H Ireland

211.2

   

Subtotal D+E+F+G+H

3,975.1

   

Source: calculation with IMF data http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO

There is extremely important information in Table III-9 for the current sovereign risk crisis in the euro zone. Table III-9 provides the structure of regional and country relations of Germany’s exports and imports with newly available data for Oct 2012. German exports to other European Union (EU) members are 57.3 percent of total exports in Oct 2012 and 57.2 percent in Jan-Oct 2012. Exports to the euro area are 37.6 percent in Oct and 37.6 percent in Jan-Oct. Exports to third countries are 42.7 percent of the total in Oct and 42.8 percent in Jan-Oct. There is similar distribution for imports. Exports to non-euro countries are decreasing 2.7 percent in Oct 2012 and increasing 4.4 percent in Jan-Oct 2012 while exports to the euro area are increasing 7.0 percent in Oct and decreasing 1.2 percent in Jan-Oct 2012. Exports to third countries, accounting for 42.7 percent of the total in Oct 2012, are increasing 1.8 percent, and 10.9 percent in Jan-Oct, accounting for 42.8 percent of the cumulative total in Jan-Oct 2012. Price competitiveness through devaluation could improve export performance and growth. Economic performance in Germany is closely related to its high competitiveness in world markets. Weakness in the euro zone and the European Union in general could affect the German economy. This may be the major reason for choosing the “fiscal abuse” of the European Central Bank considered by Buiter (2011Oct31) over the breakdown of the euro zone. There is a tough analytical, empirical and forecasting doubt of growth and trade in the euro zone and the world with or without maintenance of the European Monetary Union (EMU) or euro zone. Germany could benefit from depreciation of the euro because of high share in its exports to countries not in the euro zone but breakdown of the euro zone raises doubts on the region’s economic growth that could affect German exports to other member states.

Table III-9, Germany, Structure of Exports and Imports by Region, € Billions and ∆%

 

Oct 2012 
€ Billions

Oct 12-Month
∆%

Jan–Oct 2012 € Billions

Jan-Oct 2012/
Jan-Oct 2011 ∆%

Total
Exports

98.5

10.6

924.4

4.8

A. EU
Members

56.4

% 57.3

7.8

528.6

% 57.2

0.6

Euro Area

37.0

% 37.6

7.0

347.8

% 37.6

-1.2

Non-euro Area

19.3

% 19.7

-2.7

180.7

% 19.6

4.4

B. Third Countries

42.1

% 42.7

1.8

395.8

% 42.8

10.9

Total Imports

82.7

6.0

765.1

1.7

C. EU Members

51.9

% 62.8

5.4

484.4

% 63.3

1.7

Euro Area

35.5

% 42.9

-5.7

339.4

% 44.4

1.4

Non-euro Area

16.4

% 19.8

-2.8

145.0

% 18.9

2.5

D. Third Countries

30.8

% 37.2

6.9

280.7

% 36.7

1.7

Notes: Total Exports = A+B; Total Imports = C+D

Source:

Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2012/12/PE12_432_51.html;jsessionid=5B7D9B7A67D38989763779A0A5711A66.cae4

IIIF Appendix on Sovereign Bond Valuation. There are two approaches to government finance and their implications: (1) simple unpleasant monetarist arithmetic; and (2) simple unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Both approaches illustrate how sovereign debt can be perceived riskier under profligacy.

First, Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Fiscal policy is described by Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) as a time sequence of D(t), t = 1, 2,…t, …, where D is real government expenditures, excluding interest on government debt, less real tax receipts. D(t) is the real deficit excluding real interest payments measured in real time t goods. Monetary policy is described by a time sequence of H(t), t=1,2,…t, …, with H(t) being the stock of base money at time t. In order to simplify analysis, all government debt is considered as being only for one time period, in the form of a one-period bond B(t), issued at time t-1 and maturing at time t. Denote by R(t-1) the real rate of interest on the one-period bond B(t) between t-1 and t. The measurement of B(t-1) is in terms of t-1 goods and [1+R(t-1)] “is measured in time t goods per unit of time t-1 goods” (Sargent and Wallace 1981, 3). Thus, B(t-1)[1+R(t-1)] brings B(t-1) to maturing time t. B(t) represents borrowing by the government from the private sector from t to t+1 in terms of time t goods. The price level at t is denoted by p(t). The budget constraint of Sargent and Wallace (1981, 3, equation 1) is:

D(t) = {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)} + {B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]} (1)

Equation (1) states that the government finances its real deficits into two portions. The first portion, {[H(t) – H(t-1)]/p(t)}, is seigniorage, or “printing money.” The second part,

{B(t) – B(t-1)[1 + R(t-1)]}, is borrowing from the public by issue of interest-bearing securities. Denote population at time t by N(t) and growing by assumption at the constant rate of n, such that:

N(t+1) = (1+n)N(t), n>-1 (2)

The per capita form of the budget constraint is obtained by dividing (1) by N(t) and rearranging:

B(t)/N(t) = {[1+R(t-1)]/(1+n)}x[B(t-1)/N(t-1)]+[D(t)/N(t)] – {[H(t)-H(t-1)]/[N(t)p(t)]} (3)

On the basis of the assumptions of equal constant rate of growth of population and real income, n, constant real rate of return on government securities exceeding growth of economic activity and quantity theory equation of demand for base money, Sargent and Wallace (1981) find that “tighter current monetary policy implies higher future inflation” under fiscal policy dominance of monetary policy. That is, the monetary authority does not permanently influence inflation, lowering inflation now with tighter policy but experiencing higher inflation in the future.

Second, Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic. The tool of analysis of Cochrane (2011Jan, 27, equation (16)) is the government debt valuation equation:

(Mt + Bt)/Pt = Et∫(1/Rt, t+τ)stdτ (4)

Equation (4) expresses the monetary, Mt, and debt, Bt, liabilities of the government, divided by the price level, Pt, in terms of the expected value discounted by the ex-post rate on government debt, Rt, t+τ, of the future primary surpluses st, which are equal to TtGt or difference between taxes, T, and government expenditures, G. Cochrane (2010A) provides the link to a web appendix demonstrating that it is possible to discount by the ex post Rt, t+τ. The second equation of Cochrane (2011Jan, 5) is:

MtV(it, ·) = PtYt (5)

Conventional analysis of monetary policy contends that fiscal authorities simply adjust primary surpluses, s, to sanction the price level determined by the monetary authority through equation (5), which deprives the debt valuation equation (4) of any role in price level determination. The simple explanation is (Cochrane 2011Jan, 5):

“We are here to think about what happens when [4] exerts more force on the price level. This change may happen by force, when debt, deficits and distorting taxes become large so the Treasury is unable or refuses to follow. Then [4] determines the price level; monetary policy must follow the fiscal lead and ‘passively’ adjust M to satisfy [5]. This change may also happen by choice; monetary policies may be deliberately passive, in which case there is nothing for the Treasury to follow and [4] determines the price level.”

An intuitive interpretation by Cochrane (2011Jan 4) is that when the current real value of government debt exceeds expected future surpluses, economic agents unload government debt to purchase private assets and goods, resulting in inflation. If the risk premium on government debt declines, government debt becomes more valuable, causing a deflationary effect. If the risk premium on government debt increases, government debt becomes less valuable, causing an inflationary effect.

There are multiple conclusions by Cochrane (2011Jan) on the debt/dollar crisis and Global recession, among which the following three:

(1) The flight to quality that magnified the recession was not from goods into money but from private-sector securities into government debt because of the risk premium on private-sector securities; monetary policy consisted of providing liquidity in private-sector markets suffering stress

(2) Increases in liquidity by open-market operations with short-term securities have no impact; quantitative easing can affect the timing but not the rate of inflation; and purchase of private debt can reverse part of the flight to quality

(3) The debt valuation equation has a similar role as the expectation shifting the Phillips curve such that a fiscal inflation can generate stagflation effects similar to those occurring from a loss of anchoring expectations.

IV Global Inflation. There is inflation everywhere in the world economy, with slow growth and persistently high unemployment in advanced economies. Table IV-1, updated with every blog comment, provides the latest annual data for GDP, consumer price index (CPI) inflation, producer price index (PPI) inflation and unemployment (UNE) for the advanced economies, China and the highly-indebted European countries with sovereign risk issues. The table now includes the Netherlands and Finland that with Germany make up the set of northern countries in the euro zone that hold key votes in the enhancement of the mechanism for solution of sovereign risk issues (Peter Spiegel and Quentin Peel, “Europe: Northern Exposures,” Financial Times, Mar 9, 2011 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55eaf350-4a8b-11e0-82ab-00144feab49a.html#axzz1gAlaswcW). Newly available data on inflation is considered below in this section. Data in Table IV-1 for the euro zone and its members are updated from information provided by Eurostat but individual country information is provided in this section  as soon as available, following Table IV-1. Data for other countries in Table IV-1 are also updated with reports from their statistical agencies. Economic data for major regions and countries is considered in Section V World Economic Slowdown following with individual country and regional data tables.

Table IV-1, GDP Growth, Inflation and Unemployment in Selected Countries, Percentage Annual Rates

 

GDP

CPI

PPI

UNE

US

2.5

1.8

1.5

7.7

Japan

0.5

-0.4

-0.9

4.2

China

7.4

2.0

-2.2

 

UK

-0.1

2.7*
RPI 3.2

2.5* output
1.4**
input
0.1*

7.8

Euro Zone

-0.6

2.2

2.6

11.7

Germany

0.9

1.9

1.5

5.4

France

0.1

1.6

2.9

10.7

Nether-lands

-1.4

3.2

4.5

5.5

Finland

-1.1

3.2

2.8

7.7

Belgium

-0.3

2.2

4.5

7.5

Portugal

-3.4

1.9

4.6

16.3

Ireland

-0.5

1.6

3.0

14.7

Italy

-2.4

2.6

2.6

11.1

Greece

-7.2

0.4

4.1

NA

Spain

-1.6

3.0

3.5

26.2

Notes: GDP: rate of growth of GDP; CPI: change in consumer price inflation; PPI: producer price inflation; UNE: rate of unemployment; all rates relative to year earlier

*Office for National Statistics http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cpi/consumer-price-indices/october-2012/index.html **Core

PPI http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ppi2/producer-price-index/october-2012/index.html

Table IV-1 shows the simultaneous occurrence of low growth, inflation and unemployment in advanced economies. The US grew at 2.5 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to IIIQ2011 (Table 8 in http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2012/pdf/gdp3q12_2nd.pdf See I Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html). Japan’s GDP fell 0.2 percent in IVQ2011 relative to IVQ2010 and contracted 1.6 percent in IIQ2011 relative to IIQ2010 because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 but grew at the seasonally-adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of 10.4 percent in IIIQ2011, increasing at the SAAR of 0.3 percent in IVQ 2011, increasing at the SAAR of 5.7 percent in IQ2012 and decreasing at 0.1 percent in IIQ2012 but contracting at the SAAR of 3.5 percent in IIIQ2012 (see Section VB and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal_18.html ); the UK grew at 1.0 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to IIQ2012 and GDP fell 0.1 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to IIIQ2011 (see Section VH at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_2.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html); and the Euro Zone grew at minus 0.1 percent in IIIQ2012, minus 0.2 percent in IIQ2012, 0.0 percent in IQ2012 relative to IVQ2011 and fell 0.6 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to IIIQ2011 (see Section VD at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html

and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal_18.html ). These are stagnating or “growth recession” rates, which are positive or about nil growth rates with some contractions that are insufficient to recover employment. The rates of unemployment are quite high: 7.7 percent in the US but 17.7 percent for unemployment/underemployment or job stress of 28.6 million (see Table I-4 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html

and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html ), 4.2 percent for Japan (see Section VB at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_2.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html), 7.8 percent for the UK with high rates of unemployment for young people (see the labor statistics of the UK at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/december-2012/index.html and earlier in Subsection VH http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal_192.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/world-inflation-waves-stagnating-united_21.html). Twelve-month rates of inflation have been quite high, even when some are moderating at the margin: 1.8 percent in the US, -0.4 percent for Japan, 2.0 percent for China, 2.2 percent for the Euro Zone and 2.7 percent for the UK. Stagflation is still an unknown event but the risk is sufficiently high to be worthy of consideration (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-aversion-and-stagflation.html). The analysis of stagflation also permits the identification of important policy issues in solving vulnerabilities that have high impact on global financial risks. There are six key interrelated vulnerabilities in the world economy that have been causing global financial turbulence:

(1) sovereign risk issues in Europe resulting from countries in need of fiscal consolidation and enhancement of their sovereign risk ratings (see Section III and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html);

(2) the tradeoff of growth and inflation in China now with change in growth strategy to domestic consumption instead of investment and political developments in a decennial transition;

(3) slow growth by repression of savings with de facto interest rate controls (see IIA2 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/historically-sharper-recoveries-from.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/collapse-of-united-states-dynamism-of.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html), weak hiring with the loss of 10 million full-time jobs (see Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html) and continuing job stress of 24 to 30 million people in the US and stagnant wages in a fractured job market (see http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html);

(4) the timing, dose, impact and instruments of normalizing monetary and fiscal policies (see Section I http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/thirty-one-million-unemployed-or.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/united-states-gdp-growth-standstill.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/global-financial-risks-and-fed.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/policy-inflation-growth-unemployment.html) in advanced and emerging economies; (5) the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 that had repercussions throughout the world economy because of Japan’s share of about 9 percent in world output, role as entry point for business in Asia, key supplier of advanced components and other inputs as well as major role in finance and multiple economic activities (http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704461304576216950927404360.html?mod=WSJ_business_AsiaNewsBucket&mg=reno-wsj); and (6) geopolitical events in the Middle East.

In the effort to increase transparency, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides both economic projections of its participants and views on future paths of the policy rate that in the US is the federal funds rate or interest on interbank lending of reserves deposited at Federal Reserve Banks. These projections and views are discussed initially followed with appropriate analysis.

Charles Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, proposed an “economic state-contingent policy” or “7/3” approach (Evans 2012 Aug 27):

“I think the best way to provide forward guidance is by tying our policy actions to explicit measures of economic performance. There are many ways of doing this, including setting a target for the level of nominal GDP. But recognizing the difficult nature of that policy approach, I have a more modest proposal: I think the Fed should make it clear that the federal funds rate will not be increased until the unemployment rate falls below 7 percent. Knowing that rates would stay low until significant progress is made in reducing unemployment would reassure markets and the public that the Fed would not prematurely reduce its accommodation.

Based on the work I have seen, I do not expect that such policy would lead to a major problem with inflation. But I recognize that there is a chance that the models and other analysis supporting this approach could be wrong. Accordingly, I believe that the commitment to low rates should be dropped if the outlook for inflation over the medium term rises above 3 percent.

The economic conditionality in this 7/3 threshold policy would clarify our forward policy intentions greatly and provide a more meaningful guide on how long the federal funds rate will remain low. In addition, I would indicate that clear and steady progress toward stronger growth is essential.”

Evans (2012Nov27) modified the “7/3” approach to a “6.5/2.5” approach:

“I have reassessed my previous 7/3 proposal. I now think a threshold of 6-1/2 percent for the unemployment rate and an inflation safeguard of 2-1/2 percent, measured in terms of the outlook for total PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index) inflation over the next two to three years, would be appropriate.”

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided at its meeting on Dec 12, 2012 to implement the “6.5/2.5” approach (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):

“To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

Unconventional monetary policy will remain in perpetuity, or QE∞, changing to a “growth mandate.” There are two reasons explaining unconventional monetary policy of QE∞: insufficiency of job creation to reduce unemployment/underemployment at current rates of job creation; and growth of GDP at 1.5 percent, which is well below 3.0 percent estimated by Lucas (2011May) from 1870 to 2010. Unconventional monetary policy interprets the dual mandate of low inflation and maximum employment as mainly a “growth mandate” of forcing economic growth in the US at a rate that generates full employment. A hurdle to this “growth mandate” is that the US economy grew at 6.2 percent on average during cyclical expansions in the postwar period while growth has been at only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion in the 13 quarters from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2012. Zero interest rates and quantitative easing have not provided the impulse for growth and were not required in past successful cyclical expansions.

First, reduction of the unemployment rate to normal would take between 15 and 43.3 years depending on the definition (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html). The US labor force stood at 154.088 million in Oct 2011 and at 155.779 million in Oct 2012, not seasonally adjusted, for increase of 1.691 million, or 140,917 per month. The US labor force stood at 153.683 million in Nov 2011 and 154.953 million in Nov 2012, not seasonally adjusted, for increase of 1.270 million or 105,833 per month. The average increase of 125,778 new nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Mar to Oct 2012 is insufficient even to absorb 140,917 new entrants per month into the labor force. The difference between the average increase of 125,778 new nonfarm jobs per month in the US from Mar to Oct 2012 and the 105,833 average monthly increase in the labor force from Nov 2011 to Nov 2012 is 19,945 monthly new jobs net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force. There are 28.6 million in job stress in the US currently. The provision of 19,945 new jobs per month net of absorption of new entrants in the labor force would require 1434 months to provide jobs for the unemployed and underemployed (28.6 million divided by 19,945) or 119 years (1434 divided by 12). Net job creation of 19,945 jobs per month only adds 239,340 jobs in a year. The civilian labor force of the US in Nov 2012 not seasonally adjusted stood at 154.953 million with 11.404 million unemployed or effectively 18.094 million unemployed in this blog’s calculation by inferring those who are not searching because they believe there is no job for them. Reduction of one million unemployed at the current rate of job creation without adding more unemployment requires 4.2 years. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would be equivalent to unemployment of only 7.748 million for new net job creation of 3.656 million that at the current rate would take 15 years. Under the calculation in this blog there are 18.094 million unemployed by including those who ceased searching because they believe there is no job for them. Reduction of the rate of unemployment to 5 percent of the labor force would require creating 10.346 million jobs net of labor force growth that at the current rate would take 43.2 years. These calculations assume that there are no more recessions, defying United States economic history with periodic contractions of economic activity when unemployment increases sharply.

Second, calculations show that actual US GDP growth is around 1.5 percent per year that will perpetuate unemployment/underemployment (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html). This rate of 1.5 percent is well below trend growth of 3 percent per year from 1870 to 2010, which has been always recovered after events such as wars and recessions (Lucas 2011May). Weakness of growth is shown by the exceptional one-time contributions to growth from items that are not aggregate demand, 2.53 percentage points contributed by inventory change to growth of 4.1 percent in IVQ2011 and 0.64 percentage points contributed by expenditures in national defense together with 0.77 points of inventory accumulation to growth of 2.7 percent in IIIQ2012. Deducting inventory accumulation and one-time national defense expenditures adjusts IIIQ2012 growth to annual 1.3 percent. Cumulative growth of 2.0 percent in IQ2012, 1.3 percent in IIQ2012 and adjusted 1.3 percent in IIIQ2012 annualizes to 1.5 percent in the first three quarters of 2012 {([(1.02)1/4(1.013)1/4(1.0131/4]4/3 -1)100 = 1.5%}. The actual rate required to reduce unemployment/underemployment to normal is even higher than 3 percent in historical trend.

In fact, it is evident to the public that this policy will be abandoned if inflation costs rise. There is concern of the production and employment costs of controlling future inflation. Even if there is no inflation QE∞ cannot be abandoned because of the fear of rising interest rates. The economy would operate in an inferior allocation of resources and suboptimal growth path, or interior point of the production possibilities frontier where the optimum of productive efficiency and wellbeing is attained, because of the distortion of risk/return decisions caused by perpetual financial repression. Not even a second-best allocation is feasible with the shocks to efficiency of financial repression in perpetuity.

The statement of the FOMC at the conclusion of its meeting on Dec, 2012, revealed the following policy intentions (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm):

Release Date: December 12, 2012

For immediate release

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in October suggests that economic activity and employment have continued to expand at a moderate pace in recent months, apart from weather-related disruptions. Although the unemployment rate has declined somewhat since the summer, it remains elevated. Household spending has continued to advance, and the housing sector has shown further signs of improvement, but growth in business fixed investment has slowed. Inflation has been running somewhat below the Committee’s longer-run objective, apart from temporary variations that largely reflect fluctuations in energy prices. Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee remains concerned that, without sufficient policy accommodation, economic growth might not be strong enough to generate sustained improvement in labor market conditions. Furthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. The Committee also anticipates that inflation over the medium term likely will run at or below its 2 percent objective.

To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee will continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will purchase longer-term Treasury securities after its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of Treasury securities is completed at the end of the year, initially at a pace of $45 billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and, in January, will resume rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. Taken together, these actions should maintain downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial developments in coming months. If the outlook for the labor market does not improve substantially, the Committee will continue its purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until such improvement is achieved in a context of price stability. In determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will, as always, take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of such purchases.

To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. The Committee views these thresholds as consistent with its earlier date-based guidance. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.””

There are several important issues in this statement.

1. Mandate. The FOMC pursues a policy of attaining its “dual mandate” of (http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm):

“Conducting the nation's monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates”

2. Open-ended Quantitative Easing or QE. Earlier programs are continued with an additional open-ended $85 billion of bond purchases per month: “To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee will continue purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will purchase longer-term Treasury securities after its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of Treasury securities is completed at the end of the year, initially at a pace of $45 billion per month.”

3. Advance Guidance on “6 ¼ 2 ½ “ Rule. Policy will be accommodative even after the economy recovers satisfactorily: “o support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.”

4. Monitoring and Policy Focus on Jobs. The FOMC reconsiders its policy continuously in accordance with available information: “The Committee views these thresholds as consistent with its earlier date-based guidance. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent.”

Unconventional monetary policy drives wide swings in allocations of positions into risk financial assets that generate instability instead of intended pursuit of prosperity without inflation. There is insufficient knowledge and imperfect tools to maintain the gap of actual relative to potential output constantly at zero while restraining inflation in an open interval of (1.99, 2.0). Symmetric targets appear to have been abandoned in favor of a self-imposed single jobs mandate of easing monetary policy even with the economy growing at or close to potential output that is actually a target of growth forecast. The impact on the overall economy and the financial system of errors of policy are magnified by large-scale policy doses of trillions of dollars of quantitative easing and zero interest rates. The US economy has been experiencing financial repression as a result of negative real rates of interest during nearly a decade and programmed in monetary policy statements until 2015 or, for practical purposes, forever. The essential calculus of risk/return in capital budgeting and financial allocations has been distorted. If economic perspectives are doomed until 2015 such as to warrant zero interest rates and open-ended bond-buying by “printing” digital bank reserves (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-fed-printing-money-what-are.html; see Shultz et al 2012), rational investors and consumers will not invest and consume until just before interest rates are likely to increase. Monetary policy statements on intentions of zero interest rates for another three years or now virtually forever discourage investment and consumption or aggregate demand that can increase economic growth and generate more hiring and opportunities to increase wages and salaries. The doom scenario used to justify monetary policy accentuates adverse expectations on discounted future cash flows of potential economic projects that can revive the economy and create jobs. If it were possible to project the future with the central tendency of the monetary policy scenario and monetary policy tools do exist to reverse this adversity, why the tools have not worked before and even prevented the financial crisis? If there is such thing as “monetary policy science”, why it has such poor record and current inability to reverse production and employment adversity? There is no excuse of arguing that additional fiscal measures are needed because they were deployed simultaneously with similar ineffectiveness.

Table IV-2 provides economic projections of governors of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and regional presidents of Federal Reserve Banks released at the meeting of Dec 12, 2012. The Fed releases the data with careful explanations (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf). Columns “∆% GDP,” “∆% PCE Inflation” and “∆% Core PCE Inflation” are changes “from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated.” The GDP report for IIIQ2012 is analyzed in I Mediocre and Decelerating United States Economic Growth at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html) and the PCE inflation data from the report on personal income and outlays (Section IV at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or_4.html). The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides the second estimate of IIIQ2012 GDP with the third estimate of IIIQ2012 to be released on Dec 20 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html). PCE inflation is the index of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) of the report of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on “Personal Income and Outlays” (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm), which is analyzed in sections IIA and IV in this blog for Oct 2012 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html. The next report on “Personal Income and Outlays” for Nov will be released at 8:30 AM on Dec 21, 2012 (http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/pinewsrelease.htm). PCE core inflation consists of PCE inflation excluding food and energy. Column “UNEMP %” is the rate of unemployment measured as the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the Employment Situation Report with the civilian unemployment rate in the first Friday of every month, which is analyzed in this blog (the Nov report at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html;the Oct report is analyzed in this blog at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html; the Sep report is analyzed in this blog at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or_7.html; the Aug report is in Section I at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html and the Jul report is analyzed at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/twenty-nine-million-unemployed-or.html). The report for Nov was released on Fri Dec 7, 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/ces/) and analyzed in this blog in Section I (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html). “Longer term projections represent each participant’s assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf).

It is instructive to focus on 2012 and 2013 as 2014, 2015 and longer term are too far away, and there is not much information even on what will happen in 2013 and beyond. The central tendency should provide reasonable approximation of the view of the majority of members of the FOMC but the second block of numbers provides the range of projections by FOMC participants. The first row for each year shows the projection introduced after the meeting of Dec 12, 2012 and the second row “PR” the projection of the Sep 13, 2012 meeting. There are three major changes in the view.

1. Growth “∆% GDP.” The FOMC has reduced the forecast of GDP growth in 2012 from 3.3 to 3.7 percent in Jun 2011 to 2.5 to 2.9 percent in Nov 2011 and 2.2 to 2.7 percent at the Jan 25 meeting but increased it to 2.4 to 2.9 percent at the Apr 25, 2012 meeting, reducing it to 1.9 to 2.4 percent at the Jun 20, 2012 meeting and further to 1.7 to 2.0 percent at the Sep 13, 2012 meeting and 1.7 to 1.8 percent at the Dec 12, 2012 meeting. GDP growth in 2013 has been increased to 2.5 to 3.0 percent at the meeting on Sep 13

2012 from 2.2 to 2.8 percent at the meeting on Jun 20, 2012 but reduced to 2.3 to 3.0 percent at the Dec 12, 2012 meeting.

2. Rate of Unemployment “UNEM%.” The FOMC increased the rate of unemployment from 7.8 to 8.2 percent in Jun 2011 to 8.5 to 8.7 percent in Nov 2011 but has reduced it to 8.2 to 8.5 percent at the Jan 25 meeting and further down to 7.8 to 8.0 percent at the Apr 25, 2012 meeting but increased it to 8.0 to 8.2 percent at the Jun 20, 2012 meeting and did not change it at 8.0 to 8.2 at the meeting on Sep 13, 2012, lowering the projection to 7.8 to 7.9 percent at the Dec 12, 2012 meeting. The rate of unemployment for 2013 has been changed to 7.6 to 7.9 percent at the Sep 13 meeting compared with 7.5 to 8.0 percent at the Jun 20 meeting and reduced to 7.4 to 7.7 percent at the Dec 12 meeting.

3. Inflation “∆% PCE Inflation.” The FOMC changed the forecast of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation from 1.5 to 2.0 percent in Jun 2011 to virtually the same of 1.4 to 2.0 percent in Nov 2011 but has reduced it to 1.4 to 1.8 percent at the Jan 25 meeting but increased it to 1.9 to 2.0 percent at the Apr 25, 2012 meeting, reducing it to 1.2 to 1.7 percent at the Jun 20, 2012 meeting. The interval was increased to 1.7 to 1.8 percent at the Sep 13, 2012 meeting and 1.6 to 1.7 percent at the Dec 12, 2012 meeting.

4. Core Inflation “∆% Core PCE Inflation.” Core inflation is PCE inflation excluding food and energy. There is again not much of a difference of the projection for 2012 in Jun 2011 of 1.4 to 2.0 percent and the Nov 2011 projection of 1.5 to 2.0 percent, which has been reduced slightly to 1.5 to 1.8 percent at the Jan 25 meeting but increased to 1.8 to 2.0 percent at the Apr 25, 2012 meeting, reducing it to 1.7 to 2.0 percent at the Jun 20, 2012 meeting. The projection was virtually unchanged at 1.7 to 1.9 percent at the Sep 13 meeting. For 2013, the projection for core inflation was changed from 1.6 to 2.0 percent at the Jun 20, 2012 meeting to 1.7 to 2.0 percent at the Sep 13, 2012 meeting. And lowered to 1.7 to 1.9 percent at the Dec 12, 2012 meeting.

Table IV-2, US, Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents in FOMC, June 2012 and Sep 2012 

 

∆% GDP

UNEM %

∆% PCE Inflation

∆% Core PCE Inflation

Central
Tendency

       

2012 

Sep PR

1.7 to 1.8

1.7 to 2.0

7.8 to 7.9

8.0 to 8.2

1.6 to 1.7

1.7. to 1.8

1.6 to 1.7

1.7 to 1.9

2013 
Sep PR

2.3 to 3.0
2.5 to 3.0

7.4 to 7.7
7.6 to 7.9

1.3 to 2.0
1.6 to 2.0

1.6 to 1.9 1.7 to 2.0

2014 
Sep PR

3.0 to 3.5
3.0 to 3.8

6.8 to 7.3
6.7 to 7.3

1.5 to 2.0
1.6 to 2.0

1.6 to 2.0
1.8 to 2.0

2015
Sep

3.0 to 3.7

3.0 to 3.8

6.0 to 6.6

6.0 to 6.8

1.7 to 2.0

1.8 to 2.0

1.8 to 2.0

1.9 to 2.0

Longer Run

Sep PR

2.3 to 2.5

2.3 to 2.5

5.2 to 6.0

5.2 to 6.0

2.0

2.0

 

Range

       

2012
Sep PR

1.6 to 2.0
1.6 to 2.0

7.7 to 8.0
8.0 to 8.3

1.6 to 1.8
1.5 to 1.9

1.6 to 1.8
1.6 to 2.0

2013
Sep PR

2.0 to 3.2
2.3 to 3.5

6.9 to 7.8
7.0 to 8.0

1.3 to 2.0
1.5 to 2.1

1.5 to 2.0
1.6 to 2.0

2014
Sep PR

2.8 to 4.0
2.7 to 4.1

6.1 to 7.4
6.3 to 7.5

1.4 to 2.2
1.6 to 2.2

1.5 to 2.0
1.6 to 2.2

2015

Sep PR

2.5 to 4.2

2.5 to 4.2

5.7 to 6.8

5.7 to 6.9

1.5 to 2.2

1.8 to 2.3

1.7 to 2.2

1.8 to 2.3

Longer Run

Sep PR

2.2 to 3.0

2.2 to 3.0

5.0 to 6.0

5.0 to 6.3

2.0

2.0

 

Notes: UEM: unemployment; PR: Projection

Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf

Another important decision at the FOMC meeting on Jan 25, 2012, is formal specification of the goal of inflation of 2 percent per year but without specific goal for unemployment (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm):

“Following careful deliberations at its recent meetings, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reached broad agreement on the following principles regarding its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy. The Committee intends to reaffirm these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January.

The FOMC is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decisionmaking by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.

Inflation, employment, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Moreover, monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity and prices with a lag. Therefore, the Committee's policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee's goals.

The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. Communicating this inflation goal clearly to the public helps keep longer-term inflation expectations firmly anchored, thereby fostering price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee's ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.

The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. Information about Committee participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections. For example, in the most recent projections, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the corresponding interval several years earlier.

In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary.  However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. ”

The probable intention of this specific inflation goal is to “anchor” inflationary expectations. Massive doses of monetary policy of promoting growth to reduce unemployment could conflict with inflation control. Economic agents could incorporate inflationary expectations in their decisions. As a result, the rate of unemployment could remain the same but with much higher rate of inflation (see Kydland and Prescott 1977 and Barro and Gordon 1983; http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html). Strong commitment to maintaining inflation at 2 percent could control expectations of inflation.

The FOMC continues its efforts of increasing transparency that can improve the credibility of its firmness in implementing its dual mandate. Table IV-3 provides the views by participants of the FOMC of the levels at which they expect the fed funds rate in 2012, 2013, 2014 and the in the longer term. Table IV-3 is inferred from a chart provided by the FOMC with the number of participants expecting the target of fed funds rate (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf). There are 19 participants expecting the rate to remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2012 and none to be higher. Not much change is expected in 2013 either with 17 participants anticipating the rate at the current target of 0 to ¼ percent and only two expecting higher rates. The rate would still remain at 0 to ¼ percent in 2014 for 14 participants with three expecting the rate to be in the range of 1.0 to 2.0 percent, one participant expecting rates at 0.5 to 1.0 percent and one participant expecting rates from 2.0 to 3.0. This table is consistent with the guidance statement of the FOMC that rates will remain at low levels until late in 2014. For 2015, nine participants expect rates to be below 1.0 percent while nine expect rates from 1.0 to 4.5 percent. In the long-run, all 19 participants expect rates to be between 3.0 and 4.5 percent.

Table IV-3, US, Views of Target Federal Funds Rate at Year-End of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, June 20, 2012

 

0 to 0.25

0.5 to 1.0

1.0 to 1.5

1.0 to 2.0

2.0 to 3.0

3.0 to 4.5

2012

19

         

2013

17

1

 

1

   

2014

14

1

 

3

1

 

2015

1

8

 

6

1

3

Longer Run

         

19

Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf

Additional information is provided in Table IV-4 with the number of participants expecting increasing interest rates in the years from 2012 to 2015. It is evident from Table IV-4 that the prevailing view in the FOMC is for interest rates to continue at low levels in future years. This view is consistent with the economic projections of low economic growth, relatively high unemployment and subdued inflation provided in Table IV-2.

Table IV-4, US, Views of Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Federal Funds Rate of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents Participating in FOMC, June 20, 2012

Appropriate Year of Increasing Target Fed Funds Rate

Number of Participants

2012

1

2013

2

2014

3

2015

13

2016

1

Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20121212.pdf

Inflation in advanced economies has been fluctuating in waves at the production level with alternating surges and moderation of commodity price shocks. Table IV-5 provides month and 12-month percentage rates of inflation of Japan’s corporate goods price index (CGPI). Inflation measured by the CGPI decreased 0.0 percent in Nov 2012 and fell 0.9 percent in 12 months. Measured by 12-month rates, CGPI inflation increased from minus 0.2 percent in Jul 2010 to a high of 2.2 percent in Jul 2011 and declined to minus 0.9 percent in Nov 2012. Calendar-year inflation for 2011 is 1.5 percent, which is the highest after declines in 2009 and 2010 but lower than 4.6 percent in the commodity shock driven by zero interest rates during the global recession in 2008. Inflation of the corporate goods prices follows waves similar to those in other indices around the world (Section II and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation reached 5.9 percent in Jan-Apr 2011, driven by commodity price shocks of the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures. In the second wave, carry trades were unwound because of risk aversion caused by the European debt crisis, resulting in average annual equivalent inflation of minus 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2011. In the third wave, renewed risk aversion caused annual equivalent decline of the CGPI of minus 2.2 percent in Jul-Nov 2011. In the fourth wave, continuing risk aversion resulted in annual equivalent inflation of minus 0.6 percent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, renewed risk appetite resulted in annual equivalent inflation of 2.4 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation dropped to minus 5.8 percent in May-Jul 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 2.4 percent in Aug-Sep 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 1.8 percent in Oct-Nov 2012 in a new round of risk aversion. Unconventional monetary policies of zero interest rates and quantitative easing have created a difficult environment for economic and financial decisions with significant inflation volatility.

Table IV-5, Japan, Corporate Goods Price Index (CGPI) ∆%

 

Month

Year

Nov 2012

0.0

-0.9

Oct

-0.3

-1.0

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

-1.8

 

Sep

0.2

-1.5

Aug

0.2

-1.9

AE ∆% Aug-Sep

2.4

 

Jul

-0.4

-2.2

Jun

-0.7

-1.5

May

-0.4

-0.8

AE ∆% May-Jul

-5.8

 

Apr

-0.1

-0.6

Mar

0.5

0.3

Feb 2012

0.2

0.4

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

2.4

 

Jan

-0.1

0.3

Dec 2011

0.0

0.8

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

-0.6

 

Nov

-0.1

1.3

Oct

-0.8

1.3

Sep

-0.2

2.0

Aug

-0.1

2.2

Jul

0.3

2.2

AE ∆% Jul-Nov

-2.2

 

Jun

0.0

1.9

May

-0.2

1.6

AE ∆% May-Jun

-1.2

 

Apr

0.8

1.8

Mar

0.6

1.3

Feb

0.1

0.7

Jan

0.4

0.6

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

5.9

 

Dec 2010

0.5

1.2

Nov

-0.1

0.9

Oct

-0.1

0.9

Sep

0.0

-0.1

Aug

-0.1

0.0

Jul

0.0

-0.2

Calendar Year

   

2011

 

1.5

2010

 

-0.1

2009

 

-5.3

2008

 

4.6

AE: annual equivalent

Source: Bank of Japan http://www.boj.or.jp/en/

Chart IV-1 of the Bank of Japan provides year-on-year percentage changes of the domestic and services Corporate Goods Price Index (CGPI) of Japan. Percentage changes of inflation of services are not as sharp as those of goods. Japan had the same sharp waves of inflation during the 1970s as in the US (see Table IV-7 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real_09.html). Inflation also collapsed in the beginning of the 1980s as a result of tight monetary policy in the US with focus on inflation instead of on the gap of actual relative to potential output. The areas in shade correspond to the dates of cyclical recessions. The salient event is the sharp rise of inflation of the domestic goods CGPI in 2008 during the global recession that was mostly the result of carry trades from fed funds rates collapsing to zero to long positions in commodity futures in an environment of relaxed financial risk appetite. The panic of toxic assets in banks to be withdrawn by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Cochrane and Zingales 2009) drove unusual risk aversion with unwinding of carry trades of exposures in commodities and other risk financial assets. Carry trades returned once TARP was clarified as providing capital to financial institutions and stress tests verified the soundness of US banks. The return of carry trades explains the rise of CGPI inflation after mid 2009. Inflation of the CGPI fluctuated with zero interest rates in alternating episodes of risk aversion and risk appetite.

clip_image006

Chart IV-1, Japan, Domestic Corporate Goods Price and Services Index, Year-on-Year Percentage Change, 1980-2012

Notes: Blue: Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index All Commodities; Red: Corporate Price Services Index

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html#

There is similar behavior of year-on-year percentage changes of the US producer price index from 1980 to 2012 in Chart IV-2 of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics as in Chart IV-1 with the domestic goods CGPI. The US producer price index increased together with the CGPI driven by the period of one percent fed funds rates from 2003 to 2004 inducing carry trades into commodity futures and other risk financial assets and the slow adjustment in increments of 25 basis points at every FOMC meeting from Jun 2004 to Jun 2006. There is also the same increase in inflation in 2008 during the global recession followed by collapse because of unwinding positions during risk aversion and new rise of inflation during risk appetite.

clip_image008

Chart IV-2, US, Producer Price Index Finished Goods, Year-on-Year Percentage Change, 1980-2012

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/data.htm

Finer detail is provided by Chart IV-3 of the domestic CGPI from 2008 to 2012. The CGPI rose almost vertically in 2008 as the collapse of fed funds rates toward zero drove exposures in commodities and other risk financial assets because of risk appetite originating in the belief that the financial crisis was restricted to structured financial products and not to contracts negotiated in commodities and other exchanges. The panic with toxic assets in banks to be removed by TARP (Cochrane and Zingales 2009) caused unwinding carry trades in flight to US government obligations that drove down commodity prices and price indexes worldwide. Apparent resolution of the European debt crisis of 2010 drove risk appetite in 2011 with new carry trades from zero fed funds rates into commodity futures and other risk financial assets. Domestic CGPI inflation returned in waves with upward slopes during risk appetite and downward slopes during risk aversion.

clip_image010

Chart IV-3, Japan, Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, 2008-2012

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/index_en.html#

There is similar behavior of the US producer price index from 2008 to 2012 in Chart IV-4 as in the domestic CGPI in Chart IV-3. A major difference is the strong long-term trend in the US producer price index with oscillations originating mostly in bouts of risk aversion such as the downward slope in the final segment in Chart IV-4 followed by increasing slope during periods of risk appetite. Carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures and other risk financial assets drive the upward trend of the US producer price index while oscillations originate in alternating episodes of risk aversion and risk appetite.

clip_image012

Chart IV-4, US, Producer Price Index Finished Goods, Monthly, 2008-2012

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/data.htm

There was milder increase in Japan’s export corporate goods price index during the global recession in 2008 but similar sharp decline during the bank balance sheets effect in late 2008, as shown in Chart IV-5 of the Bank of Japan. Japan exports industrial goods whose prices have been less dynamic than those of commodities and raw materials. As a result, the export CGPI in Chart IV-5 trends down with oscillations after a brief rise in the final part of the recession in 2009.

clip_image014

Chart IV-5, Japan, Export Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, 2008-2012

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi=$graphwnd_en

Japan imports primary commodities and raw materials. As a result, the import corporate goods price index in Chart IV-6 shows an upward trend after the rise during the global recession in 2008 driven by carry trades from fed funds rates collapsing to zero into commodity futures and decline during risk aversion from late 2008 into beginning of 2008 originating in doubts about soundness of US bank balance sheets. More careful measurement should show that the terms of trade of Japan, export prices relative to import prices, declined during the commodity shocks originating in unconventional monetary policy. The decline of the terms of trade restricted potential growth of income in Japan.

clip_image016

Chart IV-6, Japan, Import Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, 2008-2012

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi=$graphwnd_en

Chart IV-7 provides the monthly corporate goods price index (CGPI) of Japan from 1970 to 2012. Japan also experienced sharp increase in inflation during the 1970s as in the episode of the Great Inflation in the US. Monetary policy focused on accommodating higher inflation, with emphasis solely on the mandate of promoting employment, has been blamed as deliberate or because of model error or imperfect measurement for creating the Great Inflation (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/05/slowing-growth-global-inflation-great.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/new-economics-of-rose-garden-turned.html http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/03/is-there-second-act-of-us-great.html and Appendix I The Great Inflation). A remarkable similarity with US experience is the sharp rise of the CGPI of Japan in 2008 driven by carry trades from interest rapidly falling to zero to exposures in commodity futures during a global recession. Japan had the same sharp waves of consumer price inflation during the 1970s as in the US (see Table IV-7 at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/recovery-without-jobs-stagnating-real_09.html).

clip_image018

Chart IV-7, Japan, Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index, Monthly, 1970-2012

Source: Bank of Japan

http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi=$graphwnd_en

The producer price index of the US from 19700 to 2012 in Chart IV-8 shows various periods of more rapid or less rapid inflation but no bumps. The major event is the decline in 2008 when risk aversion because of the global recession caused the collapse of oil prices from $148/barrel to less than $80/barrel with most other commodity prices also collapsing. The event had nothing in common with explanations of deflation but rather with the concentration of risk exposures in commodities after the decline of stock market indexes. Eventually, there was a flight to government securities because of the fears of insolvency of banks caused by statements supporting proposals for withdrawal of toxic assets from bank balance sheets in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as explained by Cochrane and Zingales (2009). The bump in 2008 with decline in 2009 is consistent with the view that zero interest rates with subdued risk aversion induce carry trades into commodity futures.

clip_image020

Chart IV-8, US, Producer Price Index Finished Goods, Monthly, 1970-2012

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.bls.gov/ppi/data.htm

Further insight into inflation of the corporate goods price index (CGPI) of Japan is provided in Table IV-6. Petroleum and coal with weight of 5.7 percent decreased 0.6 percent in Nov and increased 1.8 percent in 12 months. Japan exports manufactured products and imports raw materials and commodities such that the country’s terms of trade, or export prices relative to import prices, deteriorate during commodity price increases. In contrast, prices of production machinery, with weight of 3.1 percent, decreased 0.4 percent in Nov and increased 0.9 percent in 12 months. In general, most manufactured products have been experiencing negative or low increases in prices while inflation rates have been high in 12 months for products originating in raw materials and commodities. Ironically, unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing that intended to increase aggregate demand and GDP growth deteriorated the terms of trade of advanced economies with adverse effects on real income.

Table IV-6, Japan, Corporate Goods Prices and Selected Components, % Weights, Month and 12 Months ∆%

Nov 2012

Weight

Month ∆%

12 Month ∆%

Total

1000.0

0.0

-0.9

Food, Beverages, Tobacco, Feedstuffs

137.5

0.0

0.7

Petroleum & Coal

57.4

-0.6

1.8

Production Machinery

30.8

-0.2

0.9

Electronic Components

31.0

0.0

-3.3

Electric Power, Gas & Water

52.7

0.4

5.8

Iron & Steel

56.6

-0.3

-9.8

Chemicals

92.1

0.2

-1.5

Transport
Equipment

136.4

0.0

-1.5

Source: Bank of Japan http://www.boj.or.jp/en/ http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/pi/cgpi_release/cgpi1211.pdf

Percentage point contributions to change of the corporate goods price index (CGPI) in Sep 2012 are provided in Table IV-7 divided into domestic, export and import segments. In the domestic CGPI, changing 0.0 percent in Nov, the energy shock resulting from carry trades is evident in the deduction of 0.04 percentage points by petroleum and coal products in reversal of exposures in commodity futures. The exports CGPI decreased 0.2 percent on the basis of the contract currency with deduction of 0.08 percentage points by chemical and related products that are rich in raw materials. The imports CGPI decreased 0.5 percent on the contract currency basis. Petroleum, coal & natural gas deducted 0.33 percentage points because of winding carry trades into energy commodity exposures, metals & related products deducted 0.11 percentage points and electric and electronic products deducted 0.04 percentage points. Shocks of risk aversion cause unwinding carry trades that result in declining commodity prices with resulting downward pressure on price indexes. The volatility of inflation adversely affects financial and economic decisions.

Table IV-7, Japan, Percentage Point Contributions to Change of Corporate Goods Price Index

Groups Nov 2012

Contribution to Change Percentage Points

A. Domestic Corporate Goods Price Index

Monthly Change: 
0.0%

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products

0.08

Electric Power, Gas & Water

0.02

Scrap & Waste

0.02

Petroleum & Coal Products

-0.04

Nonferrous Metals

-0.02

Iron & Steel

-0.01

B. Export Price Index

Monthly Change: 
-0.2% contract currency

Chemicals & Related Products

-0.08

Metals & Related Products

-0.08

C. Import Price Index

Monthly Change:

-0.5 % contract currency basis

Petroleum, Coal & Natural Gas

-0.33

Metals & Related Products

-0.11

Electric & Electronic Products

-0.04

Source: Bank of Japan

Source: Bank of Japan http://www.boj.or.jp/en/ http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/pi/cgpi_release/cgpi1211.pdf

China is experiencing similar inflation behavior as the advanced economies in prior months in the form of declining commodity prices but differs in decreasing inflation of producer prices in Nov 2012 and in declining prices relative to a year earlier. As shown in Table IV-8, inflation of the price indexes for industry in Nov 2012 is minus 0.1 percent; 12-month inflation is minus 2.2 percent in Nov; and inflation in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to Jan-Nov 2011 is minus 1.7 percent. Inflation of segments in Nov 2012 in China is provided in Table IV-8 in column “Month Nov ∆%.” There were decreases of prices of mining & quarrying of 0.2 percent in Nov but decrease of 5.3 percent in 12 months. Prices of consumer goods changed 0.0 percent in Nov and increased 0.3 percent in 12 months. Prices of inputs in the purchaser price index decreased 0.2 percent in Nov and declined 2.8 percent in 12 months. Fuel and power decreased 0.2 percent in Nov and declined 1.6 percent in 12 months. An important category of inputs for exports is textile raw materials, changing 0.0 percent in Nov and declining 1.8 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-8, China, Price Indexes for Industry ∆%

 

Month     Nov ∆%

12-Month Nov ∆%

Jan-Nov 2012/Jan-Nov 2011 ∆%

I Producer Price Indexes

-0.1

-2.2

-1.7

Means of Production

-0.1

-3.0

-2.5

Mining & Quarrying

-0.2

-5.3

-2.1

Raw Materials

-0.3

-2.7

-1.9

Processing

-0.1

-2.9

-2.8

Consumer Goods

0.0

0.3

0.8

Food

0.0

0.5

1.5

Clothing

0.1

1.5

2.1

Daily Use Articles

-0.2

0.6

0.9

Durable Consumer Goods

0.0

-0.9

-0.9

II Purchaser Price Indexes

-0.2

-2.8

-1.8

Fuel and Power

-0.2

-1.6

1.2

Ferrous Metals

0.1

-9.5

-6.9

Nonferrous Metals

-1.3

-3.9

-5.8

Raw Chemical Materials

-0.3

-4.5

-4.0

Wood & Pulp

-0.1

-1.1

0.2

Building Materials

0.3

-1.4

-0.2

Other Industrial Raw Materials

-0.2

-1.4

-1.0

Agricultural

-0.2

0.6

0.1

Textile Raw Materials

0.0

-1.8

-0.9

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

China’s producer price inflation follows waves similar to those around the world but with declining trend since May 2012, as shown in Table IV-9. In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation was 6.4 percent in Jan-Jun 2011, driven by carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. In the second wave, risk aversion unwound carry trades, resulting in annual equivalent inflation of minus 3.1 percent in Jul-Nov 2011. In the third wave, renewed risk aversion resulted in annual equivalent inflation of minus 2.4 percent in Dec 2011-Jan 2012. In the fourth wave, new carry trades resulted in annual equivalent inflation of 2.4 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent is minus 5.8 percent in May-Sep 2012. There are declining producer prices in China in Aug-Sep in contrast with increases worldwide. In a sixth wave, producer prices increased 0.2 percent in Oct 2012, which is equivalent to 2.4 percent in a year and annual equivalent inflation in Oct-Nov 2012 is 0.6 percent.

Table IV-9, China, Month and 12-Month Rate of Change of Producer Price Index, ∆%

 

12-Month ∆%

Month ∆%

Nov 2012

-2.2

-0.1

Oct

-2.8

0.2

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

 

0.6

Sep

-3.6

-0.1

Aug

-3.5

-0.5

Jul

-2.9

-0.8

Jun

-2.1

-0.7

May

-1.4

-0.4

AE ∆% May-Sep

 

-5.8

Apr

-0.7

0.2

Mar

-0.3

0.3

Feb

0.0

0.1

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

 

2.4

Jan

0.7

-0.1

Dec 2011

1.7

-0.3

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

 

-2.4

Nov

2.7

-0.7

Oct

5.0

-0.7

Sep

6.5

0.0

Aug

7.3

0.1

Jul

7.5

0.0

AE ∆% Jul-Nov

 

-3.1

Jun

7.1

0.0

May

6.8

0.3

Apr

6.8

0.5

Mar

7.3

0.6

Feb

7.2

0.8

Jan

6.6

0.9

AE ∆% Jan-Jun

 

6.4

Dec 2010

5.9

0.7

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart IV-9 of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides monthly and 12-month rates of inflation of the price indexes for the industrial sector. Negative monthly rates in Oct, Nov, Dec 2011, Jan, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep and Nov 2012 pulled down the 12-month rates to 5.0 percent in Oct 2011, 2.7 percent in Nov, 1.7 percent in Dec, 0.7 percent in Jan 2012, 0.0 percent in Feb, minus 0.3 percent in Mar, minus 0.7 percent in Apr, minus 1.4 percent in May, 2.1 in Jun, minus 2.9 percent in Jul, minus 3.5 percent in Aug, minus 3.6 percent in Sep. The increase of 0.2 percent in Oct 2012 pulled up the 12-month rate to minus 2.8 percent and the rate eased to minus 2.2 percent in Nov 2012.

clip_image021

Chart IV-9, China, Producer Prices for the Industrial Sector Month and 12 months ∆%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

Chart IV-10 of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides monthly and 12-month inflation of the purchaser product indices for the industrial sector. Decreasing monthly inflation with four successive contractions from Oct 2011 to Jan 2012 and May-Aug 2012 pulled down the 12-month rate to minus 4.1 percent in Aug and Sep. Consecutive increases of 0.1 percent in Sep and Oct 2012 raised the 12-month rate to 3.3 percent in Oct 2012. The rate eased to minus 2.8 in Nov 2012 with decrease of 0.2 percent in Nov 2012.

clip_image022

Chart IV-10, China, Purchaser Product Indices for Industrial Sector

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

China is highly conscious of food price inflation because of its high weight in the basket of consumption of the population. Consumer price inflation in China in Nov was 0.1 percent and 2.0 percent in 12 months, as shown in Table IV-10. Food prices increased 0.4 percent in Nov, increasing 3.0 percent in 12 months and 4.9 percent in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to Jan-Nov 2011. Another area of concern is housing inflation which was 0.2 in Nov but increased 2.6 percent in 12 months. Prices of services decreased 0.3 percent in Nov and gained 2.3 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-10, China, Consumer Price Index

2012

Nov 12 Month   ∆%

Nov 12 Month  ∆%

Jan-Nov 2012   ∆% Jan-Nov 2011

Consumer Prices

0.1

2.0

2.7

Urban

0.1

2.1

2.7

Rural

0.2

1.9

2.5

Food

0.4

3.0

4.9

Non-food

0.0

1.6

1.6

Consumer Goods

0.3

1.9

3.0

Services

-0.3

2.3

1.9

Commodity Categories:

     

Food

0.4

3.0

4.9

Tobacco, Liquor

0.1

1.7

3.0

Clothing

1.0

2.3

3.2

Household

0.3

1.5

2.0

Healthcare & Personal Articles

0.1

1.6

2.0

Transportation & Communication

-0.3

0.0

-0.1

Recreation, Education, Culture & Services

-0.9

0.9

0.5

Residence

0.2

2.6

2.1

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Month and 12-month rates of change of consumer prices are provided in Table IV-11. There are waves of consumer price inflation in China similar to those around the world (Section II and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). In the first wave, consumer prices increased at the annual equivalent rate of 8.3 percent in Jan-Mar 2011, driven by commodity price increases resulting from unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates. In the second wave, risk aversion unwound carry trades with annual equivalent inflation falling to the rate of 2.0 percent in Apr-Jun 2011. In the third wave, inflation returned at 2.9 percent with renewed interest in commodity exposures in Jul-Nov 2011. In the fourth wave, inflation returned at a high 5.8 percent annual equivalent in Dec 2011 to Mar 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 3.9 percent in Apr to Jun 2012. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 4.1 percent in Jul-Sep 2012. In the seventh wave, inflation was minus 1.2 percent annual equivalent in Oct 2012 and 0.0 percent in Oct-Nov 2012. Inflation volatility originating in unconventional monetary policy clouds investment and consumption decisions by business and households.

Table IV-11, China, Month and 12-Month Rates of Change of Consumer Price Index ∆%

 

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

Nov 2012

0.1

2.0

Oct

-0.1

1.7

AE ∆% Oct

0.0

 

Sep

0.3

1.9

Aug

0.6

2.0

Jul

0.1

1.8

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

4.1

 

Jun

-0.6

2.2

May

-0.3

3.0

Apr

-0.1

3.4

AE ∆% Apr to Jun

-3.9

 

Mar

0.2

3.6

Feb

-0.1

3.2

Jan

1.5

4.5

Dec 2011

0.3

4.1

AE ∆% Dec to Mar

5.8

 

Nov

-0.2

4.2

Oct

0.1

5.5

Sep

0.5

6.1

Aug

0.3

6.2

Jul

0.5

6.5

AE ∆% Jul to Nov

2.9

 

Jun

0.3

6.4

May

0.1

5.5

Apr

0.1

5.3

AE ∆% Apr to Jun

2.0

2.0

Mar

-0.2

5.4

Feb

1.2

4.9

Jan

1.0

4.9

AE ∆% Jan to Mar

8.3

 

Dec 2010

0.5

4.6

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart IV-11 of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides monthly and 12-month rates of consumer price inflation. In contrast with producer prices, consumer prices had not moderated at the monthly marginal rates. Consumer prices fell 0.2 percent in Nov 2011 after increasing only 0.1 percent in Oct but increased 0.3 percent in Dec and a high 1.5 percent in Jan 2012, declining 0.1 percent in Feb, rising 0.2 percent in Mar and declining 0.1 percent in Apr, 0.3 percent in May and 0.6 percent in Jun 2012 but increasing 0.1 percent in Jul, 0.6 percent in Aug 2012 and 0.3 percent in Sep 2012. Consumer prices fell 0.1 percent in Oct 2012. The decline of 0.1 percent in Feb 2012 pulled down the 12-month rate to 3.2 percent, which bounced back to 3.6 percent in Mar with the monthly increase of 0.2 percent and fell to 2.2 percent in Jun with increasing pace of monthly decline from Apr to Jun 2012. Even with increase of 0.1 percent in Jul 2012, consumer price inflation in 12 months fell to 1.8 percent in Jul 2012 but bounced back to 2.0 percent with increase of 0.6 percent in Aug. In Sep, increase of 0.3 percent still maintained 12-month inflation at 1.9 percent. The decline of 0.1 percent in Oct 2012 pulled down the 12-month rate to 1.7 percent, which is the lowest in Chart IV-11. Increase of 0.1 percent in Nov 2012 pulled up the 12-month rate to 2.0 percent.

clip_image023

Chart IV-11, China, Consumer Prices ∆% Month and 12 Months Oct 2011 to Oct 2012

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

The harmonized index of consumer prices of the euro area in Table IV-12 has similar inflation waves as in most countries (see Section II World Inflation Waves and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). In the first wave, consumer prices in the euro area increased at the annual equivalent rate of 5.2 percent in Jan-Apr 2011. In the second wave, risk aversion caused unwinding of commodity carry trades with inflation decreasing at the annual equivalent rate of minus 2.4 percent in May-Jul 2011. In the third wave, improved risk appetite resulted in annual equivalent inflation in Aug-Dec at 4.3 percent. In the fourth wave, return of risk aversion caused decline of consumer prices at the annual equivalent rate of minus 3.0 percent in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, improved attitudes toward risk aversion resulted in higher consumer price inflation at the high annual equivalent rate of 9.6 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the sixth wave, equivalent inflation fell to minus 2.8 percent in May-Jul 2012. In the seventh wave, increasing risk appetite caused new carry trade exposures that resulted in annual equivalent inflation of 6.8 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 5.3 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. In the eighth wave, annual-equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Nov 2012. Inflation volatility around the world is confusing the information required in investment and consumption decisions.

Table IV-12, Euro Area Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices Month and 12 Months ∆%

 

Month ∆%

12 Months ∆%

Nov

-0.2

2.2

AE ∆% Nov

-2.4

 

Oct

0.2

2.5

Sep

0.7

2.6

Aug

0.4

2.6

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

5.3

 

Jul 2012

-0.5

2.4

Jun

-0.1

2.4

May

-0.1

2.4

AE ∆% May-Jul

-2.8

 

Apr

0.5

2.6

Mar

1.3

2.7

Feb

0.5

2.7

AE ∆%  Feb-Apr

9.6

 

Jan

-0.8

2.7

Dec 2011

0.3

2.7

AE ∆%  Dec-Jan

-3.0

 

Nov

0.1

3.0

Oct

0.4

3.0

Sep

0.7

3.0

Aug

0.2

2.6

AE ∆%  Aug-Nov

4.3

 

Jul

-0.6

2.6

Jun

0.0

2.7

May

0.0

2.7

AE ∆%  May-Jul

-2.4

 

Apr

0.6

2.8

Mar

1.4

2.7

Feb

0.4

2.4

Jan

-0.7

2.3

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

5.2

 

Dec 2010

0.6

2.2

AE: annual equivalent

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

Table IV-13 provides inflation, unemployment and real GDP growth in the euro area yearly from 1999 to 2011 together with growth forecasts of EUROSTAT for 2012, 2013 and 2014. Inflation in the euro zone remained subdued around 2 percent in the first five years of the euro zone from 1999 to 2004, as shown in Table IV-13. Inflation climbed above 2.0 percent after 2005, peaking at 3.3 percent in 2008 with the surge in commodity prices but falling to 0.3 percent in 2009 with the collapse of commodity prices. Inflation climbed back to 1.6 percent in 2010 and 2.7 percent in 2011. Under the regime of zero interest rates inflation returns worldwide during relaxation of risk aversion.

Table IV-13, Euro Area, Yearly Percentage Change of Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices, ∆%

Year

HICP ∆%

Unemployment
%

GDP ∆%

1999

1.2

9.6

2.9

2000

2.2

8.7

3.8

2001

2.4

8.1

2.0

2002

2.3

8.5

0.9

2003

2.1

9.0

0.7

2004

2.2

9.3

2.2

2005

2.2

9.2

1.7

2006

2.2

8.5

3.2

2007

2.1

7.6

3.0

2008

3.3

7.6

0.4

2009

0.3

9.6

-4.4

2010

1.6

10.1

2.0

2011

2.7

10.1

1.4

2012*

   

-0.4

2013*

   

0.1

2014*

   

1.4

*EUROSTAT forecast Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

EUROSTAT provides the decomposition in percentage point contributions of the rate of inflation of 2.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2012 relative to Nov 2011 shown in Table IV-14. Energy-rich components dominate the 12-month rate of inflation with percentage point contributions: 0.14 by fuel for transport, 0.10 by electricity and 0.08 by gas. Table IV-12 only lists highest magnitudes of positive and negative contributions.

Table IV-14, Euro Area, Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices Sub-Indices with Most Important Impact %

Nov 2012/ Nov  2011   ∆% 2.2

Weight 2012 %

Rate ∆%

Impact
Percentage
Points PP

Positive Contribution

     

Fuel for Transport

48.5

5.0

0.14

Electricity

26.4

5.9

0.10

Gas

18.3

6.3

0.08

Meat

35.8

3.6

0.05

Fruit

11.8

6.5

0.05

Tobacco

23.4

4.2

0.05

Negative Contribution

     

Audio-visual Equipment

5.0

-7.1

-0.05

IT Equipment

5.1

-7.4

-0.05

Garments

50.7

1.2

-0.05

Financial Services

6.8

-6.7

-0.06

Cars

36.2

0.5

-0.06

Telecom

29.8

-4.4

-0.20

PP: percentage points

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-14122012-AP/EN/2-14122012-AP-EN.PDF

EUROSTAT provides the decomposition in percentage point contributions of the rate of inflation of minus 0.2 percent in Nov 2012 relative to Oct 2012 shown in Table IV-15. Decrease of the HIPC by 0.2 percent was largely dominated by increase of prices of garments by 0.4 percent that added 0.03 percentage points, meat increasing 0.6 percent for contribution of 0.03 percentage points and fuel for transport decreasing 3.0 percent with deduction of 0.15 percentage points.

Table IV-15, Euro Area, Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices Sub-Indices with Most Important Impact %

Nov 2012/Oct 2012  ∆ % -0.2

Weight 2012 %

Rate ∆%

Impact Percentage Points

Positive Contribution

     

Garments

50.7

0.4

0.03

Meat

35.8

0.6

0.03

Restaurants and Cafés

68.8

0.1

0.02

Gardens, Plants and Flowers

6.1

3.3

0.02

Vegetables

14.0

1.0

0.02

Rents

60.5

0.1

0.02

Negative Contribution

     

Telecommunications

29.8

-0.7

-0.01

Heating Oil

8.9

-2.2

-0.02

Package Holidays

14.2

-2.4

-0.03

Air Transport

6.3

-5.7

-0.03

Accommodation Services

16.5

-4.0

-0.06

Fuels for Transport

48.5

-3.0

-0.15

Source: EUROSTAT http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-14122012-AP/EN/2-14122012-AP-EN.PDF

The estimate of consumer price inflation in Germany in Table IV-16 is 1.9 percent in 12 months ending in Nov 2012, -0.1 percent NSA in Nov 2012 relative to Nov 2012 and 0.1 percent SA in Nov 2012 relative to Nov 2012. There are waves of consumer price inflation in Germany similar to those worldwide (Section II and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html), as shown in Table IV-12. In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation was 4.9 percent in Feb-Apr 2011 NSA and 2.4 percent SA during risk appetite in carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures. In the second wave, annual equivalent consumer price inflation collapsed to 0.6 percent NSA and 2.4 percent SA in May-Jun 2011 because of risk aversion caused by European sovereign debt event. In the third wave, annual equivalent consumer price inflation was 1.2 percent NSA and 1.9 percent SA in Jul-Nov 2011 as a result of relaxed risk aversion. In the fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.8 percent NSA and 1.8 percent SA in Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 4.9 percent NSA and 2.4 percent SA in Feb-Apr 2012 during another energy-commodity carry trade shock. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation in May-Jun 2012 is minus 1.8 percent NSA and 1.2 percent SA. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation NSA is 4.9 percent in Jul-Aug 2012 and 3.7 percent SA. In the eighth wave in Sep-Nov 2012, annual equivalent inflation is minus 0.4 percent NSA and 1.6 percent SA. Under unconventional monetary policy of zero interest rates and quantitative easing inflation becomes highly volatile during alternative shocks of risk aversion and risk appetite, preventing sound investment and consumption decisions.

Table IV-16, Germany, Consumer Price Index ∆%

 

12-Month ∆%

Month ∆% NSA

Month ∆% CSA

Nov 2012

1.9

-0.1

0.1

Oct

2.0

0.0

0.2

Sep

2.0

0.0

0.1

AE ∆% Sep-Nov

 

-0.4

1.6

Aug

2.1

0.4

0.4

Jul

1.7

0.4

0.2

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

 

4.9

3.7

Jun

1.7

-0.1

0.1

May

1.9

-0.2

0.1

AE ∆% May-Jun

 

-1.8

1.2

Apr

2.1

0.2

0.2

Mar

2.1

0.3

0.1

Feb

2.3

0.7

0.3

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

 

4.9

2.4

Jan

2.1

-0.4

0.2

Dec 2011

2.1

0.7

0.1

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

 

1.8

1.8

Nov

2.4

0.0

0.2

Oct

2.5

0.0

0.2

Sep

2.6

0.1

0.2

Aug

2.4

0.0

0.1

Jul

2.4

0.4

0.2

AE ∆% Jul-Nov

 

1.2

2.2

Jun

2.3

0.1

0.2

May

2.3

0.0

0.2

AE ∆% May-Jun

 

0.6

2.4

Apr

2.4

0.2

0.2

Mar

2.1

0.5

0.2

Feb

2.1

0.5

0.2

Jan

2.0

-0.4

0.2

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

 

4.9

2.4

Dec 2010

1.7

1.0

0.3

Nov

1.5

0.1

0.2

Oct

1.3

0.1

0.2

Sep

1.3

-0.1

0.2

Aug

1.0

0.0

0.1

Annual Average ∆%

     

2011

2.3

   

2010

1.1

   

2009

0.4

   

2008

2.6

   

Dec 2009

0.9

   

Dec 2008

1.1

   

Dec 2007

3.1

   

Dec 2006

1.4

   

Dec 2005

1.4

   

Dec 2004

2.3

   

Dec 2003

1.0

   

Dec 2002

1.2

   

Dec 2001

1.6

   

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Chart IV-12, of the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, or Federal Statistical Agency of Germany, provides the unadjusted consumer price index of Germany from 2004 to 2012. There is an evident acceleration in the form of sharper slope in the first months of 2011 and then a flattening in subsequent months with renewed strength in Dec, decline in Jan 2012 and another upward spike from Feb to Apr 2012, new drop in May-Jun 2012 and increases in Jul and Aug 2012 relaxed in Sep-Nov 2012. If risk aversion declines, new carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity futures could again result in higher inflation.

clip_image025

Chart IV-12, Germany, Consumer Price Index, Unadjusted, 2005=100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Chart IV-13, of the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, or Federal Statistical Agency of Germany, provides the unadjusted consumer price index and trend of Germany from 2008 to 2012. Chart IV-13 captures inflation waves with alternation of periods of positive and negative slopes resulting from zero interest rates with shocks of risk appetite and risk aversion. For example, the negative slope of decline of inflation by 0.2 percent in May 2012 and 0.1 percent in Jun 2012 follows an upward slope of price increases in Feb-Apr 2012 after decline of inflation by 0.4 percent in Jan 2012. The final segment shows another positive slope caused by inflation of 0.4 percent in Jul 2012, which is followed by 0.4 percent in Aug 2012 and flattening segment as inflation remains unchanged in both Sep and Oct 2012, declining in Nov 2012. The waves occur around an upward trend of prices, disproving the proposition of fear of deflation.

clip_image027

Chart IV-13, Germany, Consumer Price Index, Unadjusted and Trend, 2005=100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland

https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/ShortTermIndicators/ShortTermIndicators.html

Table IV-17 provides the monthly and 12-month rate of inflation for segments of the consumer price index of Germany in Nov 2012. Inflation excluding energy increased 0.0 percent in Nov 2012 and rose 1.6 percent in 12 months. Excluding household energy inflation was -0.1 percent in Nov and rose 1.6 percent in 12 months. Food prices increased 1.4 percent in Nov and increased 4.2 percent in 12 months. There were differences in inflation of energy-related prices. Heating oil rose 4.0 percent in 12 months and decreased 2.4 percent in Nov. Motor fuels decreased 2.7 percent in Nov and increased 3.0 percent in 12 months.

Table IV-17, Germany, Consumer Price Index ∆%

Nov 2012

Weight

12- Month ∆%

Month   ∆%

Total

1,000.00

1.9

-0.1

Excluding heating oil and motor fuels

955.42

1.8

0.1

Excluding household energy

940.18

1.6

-0.1

Excluding Energy

904.81

1.6

0.0

Total Goods

493.00

2.5

0.0

Nondurable Consumer Goods

305.11

3.2

0.1

Medium-Term Life Consumer Goods

95.24

2.1

0.1

Durable Consumer Goods

92.65

0.2

-0.1

Services

507.00

1.2

-0.2

Energy Components

     

Motor Fuels

35.37

3.0

-2.7

Household Energy

59.82

4.1

-0.3

Heating Oil

9.21

4.0

-2.4

Food

89.99

4.2

1.4

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2012/12/PE12_436_611.html;jsessionid=8CE8AEAC42EB29A28CE81D1CA952326A.cae4

Table IV-18 provides monthly and 12 months consumer price inflation in France. There are the same waves as in inflation worldwide (see Section II and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html). In the first wave, annual equivalent inflation in Jan-Apr 2011 was 4.3 percent driven by the carry trade from zero interest rates to commodity futures positions in an environment of risk appetite. In the second wave, risk aversion caused the reversal of carry trades into commodity futures, resulting in the fall of the annual equivalent inflation rate to minus 0.8 percent in May-Jul 2011. In the third wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 2.7 percent in Aug-Nov 2011 with alternations of risk aversion and risk appetite. In the fourth wave, risk aversion originating in the European debt crisis caused annual equivalent inflation of 0.0 percent from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012. In the fifth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 5.3 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.0 percent in May-Jul 2012 during another bout of risk aversion causing reversal of carry trades from zero interest rates to commodity price futures exposures. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation jumped to 8.7 percent in Aug 2012, 2.4 percent in Aug-Sep 2012 and 2.4 percent in Aug-Oct 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation was minus 2.4 percent in Nov 2012.

Table IV-18, France, Consumer Price Index, Month and 12-Month ∆%

 

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

Nov 2012

-0.2

1.4

AE ∆% Nov

-2.4

 

Oct

0.2

1.9

Sep

-0.3

1.9

Aug

0.7

2.1

AE ∆% Aug-Oct

2.4

 

Jul

-0.4

1.9

Jun

0.0

1.9

May

-0.1

2.0

AE ∆% May-Jul

-2.0

 

Apr

0.1

2.1

Mar

0.8

2.3

Feb

0.4

2.3

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

5.3

 

Jan

-0.4

2.3

Dec 2011

0.4

2.5

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

0.0

 

Nov

0.3

2.5

Oct

0.2

2.3

Sep

-0.1

2.2

Aug

0.5

2.2

AE ∆% Aug-Nov

2.7

 

Jul

-0.4

1.9

Jun

0.1

2.1

May

0.1

2.0

AE ∆% May-Jul

-0.8

 

Apr

0.3

2.1

Mar

0.8

2.0

Feb

0.5

1.7

Jan

-0.2

1.8

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

4.3

 

Dec 2010

0.5

1.8

Annual

   

2011

 

2.1

2010

 

1.5

2009

 

0.1

2008

 

2.8

2007

 

1.5

2006

 

1.6

2005

 

1.8

2004

 

2.1

2003

 

2.1

2002

 

1.9

2001

 

1.7

2000

 

1.7

1999

 

0.5

1998

 

0.7

1997

 

1.2

1996

 

2.0

1995

 

1.8

1994

 

1.6

1993

 

2.1

1992

 

2.4

1991

 

3.2

AE: Annual Equivalent

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=29&date=20121212

Table IV-18 provides in the lower panel the estimates of inflation by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) for the years from 1991 to 2011. Inflation has been relatively moderate in France. The rise of inflation to 2.8 percent in 2008 was caused by the commodity price shock as investment funds shifted from other risk financial assets into carry trades driven by interest rates falling toward zero. INSEE estimates 2011 inflation at 2.1 percent.

Chart IV-14 of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) of France shows headline and core consumer price inflation of France. Inflation rose during the commodity price shock of unconventional monetary policy. Risk aversion in late 2008 and beginning of 2009 caused collapse of valuation of commodity futures with resulting decline in inflation. Unconventional monetary policy with alternations of risk aversion resulted in higher inflation in France that stabilized in recent months until the increase of 0.2 percent in Oct 2011, 0.3 percent in Nov and 0.4 percent in Dec that were followed by decline of 0.4 percent in Jan 2012 and increases of 0.4 percent in Feb and 0.8 percent in Mar followed by 0.1 percent in Apr minus 0.1 percent in May and no change in Jun 2012 with marginal decline of 0.4 percent in Jul. Inflation returned with 0.7 percent in Aug 2012 but decline of 0.3 percent in Sep 2012 followed with increase of 0.2 percent in Oct 2012 and decrease of 0.2 percent in Nov 2012. Both the headline and core indexes are showing negative slopes in the new environment of risk aversion that causes reversals of carry trades into commodity futures prices. The 12-month rate of inflation has declined from 2.5 percent in Dec 2011 to 1.4 percent in Nov 2012.

clip_image029

Chart IV-14, France, Consumer Price Index (IPC) and Core Consumer Price Index (ISJ) 12 Months Rates of Change

Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=29&date=20121212

The first wave of commodity price increases in the first four months of Jan-Apr 2011 also influenced the surge of consumer price inflation in Italy shown in Table IV-19. Annual equivalent inflation in the first four months of 2011 was 4.9 percent. The crisis of confidence or risk aversion resulted in reversal of carry trades on commodity positions. Consumer price inflation in Italy was subdued in the second wave in Jun and May 2011 at 0.1 percent for annual equivalent 1.2 percent. In the third wave in Jul-Sep 2011, annual equivalent inflation increased to 2.4 percent. In the fourth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Oct-Nov 2011 jumped again at 3.0 percent. Inflation returned in the fifth wave from Dec 2011 to Jan 2012 at annual equivalent 4.3 percent. In the sixth wave, annual equivalent inflation rose to 5.7 percent in Feb-Apr 2012. In the seventh wave, annual equivalent inflation was 1.2 percent in May-Jun 2012. In the eighth wave, annual equivalent inflation increased to 3.0 percent in Jul-Aug 2012. In the ninth wave, inflation collapsed to zero in Sep-Oct 2012. In the tenth wave, annual equivalent inflation in Nov 2012 was minus 2.4 percent. Economies are shocked worldwide by intermittent waves of inflation originating in combination of zero interest rates and quantitative easing with alternation of risk appetite and risk aversion.

Table IV-19, Italy, Consumer Price Index

 

Month

12 Months

Nov 2012

-0.2

2.5

AE ∆% Nov

-2.4

 

Oct

0.0

2.6

Sep

0.0

3.2

AE ∆% Sep-Oct

0.0

 

Aug

0.4

3.2

Jul

0.1

3.1

AE ∆% Jul-Aug

3.0

 

June

0.2

3.3

May

0.0

3.2

AE ∆% May-Jun

1.2

 

Apr

0.5

3.3

Mar

0.5

3.3

Feb

0.4

3.3

AE ∆% Feb-Apr

5.7

 

Jan

0.3

3.2

Dec 2011

0.4

3.3

AE ∆% Dec-Jan

4.3

 

Nov

-0.1

3.3

Oct

0.6

3.4

AE ∆% Oct-Nov

3.0

 

Sep

0.0

3.0

Aug

0.3

2.8

Jul

0.3

2.7

AE ∆% Jul-Sep

2.4

 

Jun

0.1

2.7

May

0.1

2.6

AE ∆% May-Jun

1.2

 

Apr

0.5

2.6

Mar

0.4

2.5

Feb

0.3

2.4

Jan

0.4

2.1

AE ∆% Jan-Apr

4.9

 

Dec 2010

0.4

1.9

Annual

   

2011

 

2.8

2010

 

1.5

2009

 

0.8

2008

 

3.3

2007

 

1.8

2006

 

2.1

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/77374

Consumer price inflation in Italy by segments in the estimate by ISTAT for Nov 2012 is provided in Table IV-20. Total consumer price inflation in Nov 2012 was minus 0.2 percent and 2.5 percent in 12 months. Inflation of goods was minus 0.1 percent in Nov and 2.9 percent in 12 months. Prices of durable goods increased 0.2 percent in Nov and decreased 0.3 percent in 12 months, as typical in most countries. Prices of energy decreased 1.2 percent in Nov and increased 11.5 percent in 12 months. Food prices increased 0.4 percent in Nov and increased 2.4 percent in 12 months. Prices of services fell 0.5 percent in Nov and rose 1.9 percent in 12 months. Transport prices, also influenced by commodity prices, decreased 0.8 percent in Nov and increased 3.7 percent in 12 months. Carry trades from zero interest rates to positions in commodity futures cause increases in commodity prices. Waves of inflation originate in periods when there is no risk aversion and commodity prices decline during periods of risk aversion (Section II and earlier at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.htm).

Table IV-20, Italy, Consumer Price Index and Segments, Month and 12-Month ∆%

Nov 2012

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

General Index

-0.2

2.5

I Goods

-0.1

2.9

Food

0.4

2.4

Energy

-1.2

11.5

Durable

0.2

-0.3

Nondurable

0.1

0.4

II Services

-0.5

1.9

Housing

0.2

2.6

Communications

0.1

0.0

Transport

-0.8

3.7

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/77374

Chart IV-15 of the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica shows moderation in 12-month percentage changes of the consumer price index of Italy with marginal increase followed by decline to 2.5 percent in Nov 2012

clip_image030

Chart, IV-15, Italy, Consumer Price Index, 12-Month Percentage Changes

Source: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica

http://www.istat.it/en/

V World Economic Slowdown. Table V-1 is constructed with the database of the IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO) to show GDP in dollars in 2011 and the growth rate of real GDP of the world and selected regional countries from 2012 to 2015. The data illustrate the concept often repeated of “two-speed recovery” of the world economy from the recession of 2007 to 2009. The IMF has lowered its forecast of the world economy to 3.3 percent in 2012 but accelerating to 3.6 percent in 2013, 4.2 percent in 2014 and 4.4 percent in 2015. Slow-speed recovery occurs in the “major advanced economies” of the G7 that account for $33,697 billion of world output of $69,899 billion, or 48.2 percent, but are projected to grow at much lower rates than world output, 1.9 percent on average from 2012 to 2015 in contrast with 3.9 percent for the world as a whole. While the world would grow 16.4 percent in the four years from 2012 to 2015, the G7 as a whole would grow 7.8 percent. The difference in dollars of 2011 is rather high: growing by 16.4 percent would add $11.5 trillion of output to the world economy, or roughly two times the output of the economy of Japan of $5,867 but growing by 7.8 percent would add $5.2 trillion of output to the world, or somewhat below the output of Japan in 2011. The “two speed” concept is in reference to the growth of the 150 countries labeled as emerging and developing economies (EMDE) with joint output in 2011 of $25,438 billion, or 36.4 percent of world output. The EMDEs would grow cumulatively 24.9 percent or at the average yearly rate of 5.7 percent, contributing $6.3 trillion from 2012 to 2015 or the equivalent of 86.8 percent of $7,298 billion of China in 2011. The final four countries in Table V-1 often referred as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China), are large, rapidly growing emerging economies. Their combined output adds to $13,468 billion, or 19.3 percent of world output, which is equivalent to 39.9 percent of the combined output of the major advanced economies of the G7.

Table V-1, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Real GDP Growth

 

GDP USD 2011

Real GDP ∆%
2012

Real GDP ∆%
2013

Real GDP ∆%
2014

Real GDP ∆%
2015

World

69,899

3.3

3.6

4.2

4.4

G7

33,697

1.4

1.5

2.2

2.5

Canada

1,739

1.9

2.0

2.4

2.4

France

2,778

0.1

0.4

1.1

1.5

DE

3,607

0.9

0.9

1.4

1.4

Italy

2,199

-2.3

-0.7

0.5

1.2

Japan

5,867

2.2

1.2

1.1

1.2

UK

2,431

-0.4

1.1

2.2

2.6

US

15,076

2.2

2.1

2.9

3.4

Euro Area

13,114

-0.4

0.2

1.2

1.5

DE

3,607

0.9

0.9

1.4

1.4

France

2,778

0.1

0.4

1.1

1.5

Italy

2,199

-2.3

-0.7

0.5

1.2

POT

238

-3.0

-1.0

1.2

1.9

Ireland

221

0.4

1.4

2.5

2.9

Greece

299

-6.0

-4.0

0.0

2.8

Spain

1,480

-1.5

-1.3

1.0

1.6

EMDE

25,438

5.3

5.6

5.9

6.1

Brazil

2,493

1.5

3.9

4.2

4.2

Russia

1,850

3.7

3.8

3.9

3.9

India

1,827

4.9

6.0

6.4

6.7

China

7,298

7.8

8.2

8.5

8.5

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries); POT: Portugal

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO

Continuing high rates of unemployment in advanced economies constitute another characteristic of the database of the WEO (http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO). Table V-2 is constructed with the WEO database to provide rates of unemployment from 2011 to 2015 for major countries and regions. In fact, unemployment rates for 2011 in Table V-2 are high for all countries: unusually high for countries with high rates most of the time and unusually high for countries with low rates most of the time. Estimated rates of unemployment for 2012 are particularly high for the countries with sovereign debt difficulties in Europe: 15.5 percent for Portugal (POT), 14.8 percent for Ireland, 23.8 percent for Greece, 24.9 percent for Spain and 10.6 percent for Italy, which is lower but still high. The G7 rate of unemployment is estimated at 7.5 percent. Unemployment rates are not likely to decrease substantially if slow growth persists in advanced economies.

Table V-2, IMF World Economic Outlook Database Projections of Unemployment Rate as Percent of Labor Force

 

% Labor Force 2011

% Labor Force 2012

% Labor Force 2013

% Labor Force 2014

% Labor Force 2015

World

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

G7

7.7

7.5

7.5

7.3

6.9

Canada

7.5

7.3

7.3

7.1

6.9

France

9.6

10.1

10.5

10.3

9.8

DE

6.0

5.2

5.3

5.2

5.2

Italy

8.4

10.6

11.1

11.3

11.0

Japan

4.6

4.5

4.4

4.5

4.4

UK

8.0

8.1

8.1

7.9

7.6

US

8.9

8.2

8.1

7.7

7.1

Euro Area

10.2

11.2

11.5

11.2

10.8

DE

6.0

5.2

5.3

5.2

5.2

France

9.6

10.1

10.5

10.3

9.8

Italy

8.4

10.6

11.1

11.3

11.0

POT

12.7

15.5

16.0

15.3

14.7

Ireland

14.4

14.8

14.4

13.7

13.1

Greece

17.3

23.8

25.4

24.5

22.4

Spain

21.7

24.9

25.1

24.1

23.2

EMDE

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

Brazil

6.0

6.0

6.5

7.0

7.0

Russia

6.5

6.0

6.0

6.0

6.0

India

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

China

4.1

4.1

4.1

4.1

4.1

Notes; DE: Germany; EMDE: Emerging and Developing Economies (150 countries)

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook databank http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php?db=WEO

Table V-3 provides the latest available estimates of GDP for the regions and countries followed in this blog for IQ2012, IIQ2012 and IIIQ2012 available now for all countries. Growth is weak throughout most of the world. Japan’s GDP increased 1.4 percent in IQ2012 and 3.4 percent relative to a year earlier but part of the jump could be the low level a year earlier because of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan is experiencing difficulties with the overvalued yen because of worldwide capital flight originating in zero interest rates with risk aversion in an environment of softer growth of world trade. Japan’s GDP grew 0.0 percent in IIQ2012 at the seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of minus 0.1 percent, which is much lower than 5.7 percent in IQ2012. Growth of 3.9 percent in IIQ2012 in Japan relative to IIQ2011 has effects of the low level of output because of Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Japan’s GDP contracted 0.9 percent in IIIQ2012 at the SAAR of minus 3.5 percent and increased 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. China grew at 1.8 percent in IIQ2012, which annualizes to 7.4 percent. China grew at 2.2 percent in IIIQ2012, which annualizes at 7.4 percent. Xinhuanet informs that Premier Wen Jiabao considers the need for macroeconomic stimulus, arguing that “we should continue to implement proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy, while giving more priority to maintaining growth” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/20/c_131599662.htm). Premier Wen elaborates that “the country should properly handle the relationship between maintaining growth, adjusting economic structures and managing inflationary expectations” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/20/c_131599662.htm). There is decennial change in leadership in China (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/index.htm). China’s GDP grew 7.6 percent in IIQ2012 relative to IIQ2011. Growth rates of GDP of China in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier have been declining from 2011 to 2012. China’s GDP grew 8.1 percent in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier but only 7.6 percent in IIQ2012 relative to a year earlier and 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to IIIQ2011. GDP was flat in the euro area in IQ2012 and fell 0.1 in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Euro area GDP contracted 0.2 percent IIQ2012 and fell 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, euro area GDP fell 0.1 percent and declined 0.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Germany’s GDP increased 0.5 percent in IQ2012 and 1.7 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.3 percent and 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier but 1.0 percent relative to a year earlier when adjusted for calendar (CA) effects. In IIIQ2012, Germany’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Growth of US GDP in IQ2012 was 0.5 percent, at SAAR of 2.0 percent and higher by 2.4 percent relative to IQ2011. US GDP increased 0.3 percent in IIQ2012, 1.3 percent at SAAR and 2.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, GDP grew 0.7 percent, 2.7 percent at SAAR and 2.5 percent relative to IIIQ2011 (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html) but with substantial unemployment and underemployment (Section I) and weak hiring (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html). In IQ2012, UK GDP fell 0.3 percent, declining 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP fell 0.4 percent in IIQ2012 and 0.5 percent relative to a year earlier. UK GDP increased 1.0 percent in IIIQ2012 and fell 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. Italy has experienced decline of GDP in five consecutive quarters from IIIQ2011 to IIIQ2012. Italy’s GDP fell 0.8 percent in IQ2012 and declined 1.4 percent relative to IQ2011. Italy’s GDP fell 0.7 percent in IIQ2012 and declined 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, Italy’s GDP fell 0.2 percent and declined 2.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP stagnated in IQ2012 and increased 0.4 percent relative to a year earlier. France’s GDP decreased 0.1 percent in IIQ2012 and increased 0.1 percent relative to a year earlier. In IIIQ2012, France’s GDP increased 0.2 percent and increased 0.2 percent relative to a year earlier.

Table V-3, Percentage Changes of GDP Quarter on Prior Quarter and on Same Quarter Year Earlier, ∆%

 

IQ2012/IVQ2011

IQ2012/IQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.5        SAAR: 2.0

2.4

Japan

QOQ: 1.4

SAAR: 5.7

3.4

China

1.8

8.1

Euro Area

0.0

-0.1

Germany

0.5

1.7

France

0.0

0.4

Italy

-0.8

-1.4

United Kingdom

-0.3

-0.1

 

IIQ2012/IQ2012

IIQ2012/IIQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.3         SAAR: 1.3

2.1

Japan

QOQ: 0.0
SAAR: -0.1

3.9

China

1.8

7.6

Euro Area

-0.2

-0.5

Germany

0.3

0.5 1.0 CA

France

-0.1

0.1

Italy

-0.7

-2.4

United Kingdom

-0.4

-0.5

 

IIIQ2012/ IIQ2012

IIIQ2012/ IIIQ2011

United States

QOQ: 0.7 
SAAR: 2.7

2.5

Japan

QOQ: –0.9
SAAR: –3.5

0.5

China

2.2

7.4

Euro Area

-0.1

-0.6

Germany

0.2

0.4

France

0.2

0.2

Italy

-0.2

-2.4

United Kingdom

1.0

-0.1

QOQ: Quarter relative to prior quarter; SAAR: seasonally adjusted annual rate

Source: Country Statistical Agencies

http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp

There is evidence of deceleration of growth of world trade and even contraction in more recent data. Table V-4 provides two types of data: growth of exports and imports in the latest available months and in the past 12 months; and contributions of net trade (exports less imports) to growth of real GDP. Japan provides the most worrisome data (Section VB at http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real_25.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states_28.html and for GDP Section VB and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal_18.html ). Japan’s exports decreased 6.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct, 10.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep, 5.8 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug and 8.1 percent in 12 months ending in Jul while imports decreased 1.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct, increased 4.1 in the 12 months ending in Sep, decreased 5.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug and increased 2.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Jul. The second part of Table V-4 shows that net trade deducted 0.3 percentage points from Japan’s growth of GDP in IIQ2012 and deducted 2.9 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2012. China’s exports fell 1.8 percent in the month of Jul and increased 1.0 percent in 12 months. In Aug 2012, China’s exports increased 0.6 percent and increased 2.7 percent in 12 months. Trade rebounded in China in Sep with growth of exports of 9.9 percent in the 12 months ending in Sep and 2.4 percent for imports. There was further growth in China’s exports of 11.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct while imports increased 2.4 percent. In Nov 2012, China’s exports increased 2.9 percent in 12 months and 7.3 percent in Jan-Nov 2012 while imports were unchanged in Nov 2012 and increased 4.1 percent in Jan-Nov 2012. Germany’s exports increased 0.3 percent in the month of Oct and increased 10.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct while imports increased 2.5 percent in the month of Oct and increased 6.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct. Net trade contributed 1.4 percentage points to growth of Germany’s GDP in IIQ2012 and contributed 1.4 percentage points in IIIQ2012. The Markit/BME Germany Purchasing Managers’ Index® (PMI®), showing close association with Germany’s manufacturing output, fell from 47.4 in Sep to 46.0 in Oct for the eighth consecutive month in contraction territory below 50.0 and much lower than the long-term average of the index of 52.0 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10278). New export orders fell for sixteen consecutive months at the fastest rate of decline since Apr 2009. UK’s exports increased 0.6 percent in Sep and decreased 0.7 percent in Jul-Sep 2012 relative to a year earlier while imports decreased 3.1 percent in Sep and 0.3 percent in Jul-Sep 2012 relative to a year earlier. Net trade deducted 0.8 percentage points from UK GDP growth in IIQ2012 and added 0.7 percentage points in IIIQ2012. France’s exports decreased 1.5 percent in Sep while imports decreased 1.9 percent and net trade deducted 0.4 percentage points from GDP growth in IIQ2012, adding 0.3 percentage points in IIIQ2012. US exports decreased 3.6 percent in Oct 2012 and goods exports increased 4.7 percent in Jan-Oct relative to a year earlier but net trade added 0.14 percentage points to GDP growth in IIIQ2012. The Markit Flash US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) seasonally adjusted increased to 52.4 in Nov from 51.0 in Oct, which was the sharpest improvement in five months, indicating mild expansion of manufacturing (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10327).

New export orders registered 48.9 in Nov nearly still in neutral territory with 47.2 in Oct, indicating stability after contraction during five consecutive months. The Markit US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) declined to 51.0 in Oct from 51.1 in Sep, which is the weakest reading since Oct 2009 when recovery began (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10255). New export orders declined at the highest rate in 12 months with the index of new exports orders falling from 48.0 in Sep to 47.2 in Oct while total new orders decreased from 52.3 in Sep to 51.1 in Oct because of orders from the internal market. In the six months ending in Oct, United States national industrial production accumulated decrease of 0.6 percent at the annual equivalent rate of 1.2 percent, which is much lower than 1.7 percent growth in 12 months. Capacity utilization for total industry in the United States fell 0.4 percentage points in Oct to 77.8 percent from 78.2 percent in Sep, which is 2.5 percentage points lower than the long-run average from 1972 to 2011. Manufacturing decreased 0.9 percent in Oct seasonally adjusted, increasing 1.8 percent not seasonally adjusted in 12 months, and decreased 1.8 percent in the six months ending in Oct or at the annual equivalent rate of 3.6 percent (Section VA http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal_18.html and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/world-inflation-waves-stagnating-united_21.html). The report on industry by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System states estimates that hurricane Sandy could have “reduced the rate of change in total output by nearly 1 percentage points” (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/). Trade values incorporate both price and quantity effects that are difficult to separate. Data do suggest that world trade slowdown is accompanying world economic slowdown.

Table V-4, Growth of Trade and Contributions of Net Trade to GDP Growth, ∆% and % Points

 

Exports
M ∆%

Exports 12 M ∆%

Imports
M ∆%

Imports 12 M ∆%

USA

-3.6 Oct

4.7

Jan-Oct

-2.1 Oct

3.8

Jan-Oct

Japan

 

Oct -6.5

Sep -10.3

Aug -5.8

Jul -8.1

 

Oct -1.6

Sep 4.1

Aug -5.4

Jul 2.1

China

-1.8 Jul

0.6 Aug

4.7 Sep

-5.7 Oct

1.0 Jul

7.8 Jan-Jul

2.7 Aug

7.1 Jan-Aug

9.9 Sep

Jan-Sep 7.4

11.6 Oct

7.8 Jan-Oct

2.9 Nov

7.3 Jan-Nov

2.2 Jul

-0.3 Aug

4.9 Sep

-9.4 Oct

4.7 Jul

6.5 Jan-Jul

-2.6 Aug 5.2 Jan-Aug

2.4 Sep

4.8 Jan-Sep

2.4 Oct

4.6 Jan-Oct

0.0 Nov

4.1 Jan-Nov

Euro Area

10.4 12-M Aug

9.0 Jan-Aug

1.3 12-M Aug

2.5 Jan-Aug

Germany

0.3 Oct CSA

10.6 Oct

2.5 Oct CSA

6.0 Oct

France

Sep

-1.5

5.2

-1.9

0.0

Italy

Sep

-2.0

-4.2

-4.2

-10.6

UK

-0.8 Oct

-2.7 Aug-Oct 12/Aug-Oct 11

1.9 Oct

-0.1 Aug-Oct 12/Aug-Oct 11

Net Trade % Points GDP Growth

% Points

     

USA

IIIQ2012

0.14

     

Japan

-0.3 IIQ2012

-2.9 IIIQ2012

     

Germany

1.4 IIQ2012 1.4 IIIQ2012

     

France

-0.4 IIQ2012   0.3 IIIQ2012

     

UK

-0.8 IIQ2012 0.7 IIIQ2012

     

Sources: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/ http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm

http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/latest/index_e.htm http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

http://english.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal191/ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home

https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2012/08/PE12_287_811.html;jsessionid=A761BC574543A771416A9CF81034F7BA.cae1 http://lekiosque.finances.gouv.fr/AppChiffre/Portail_default.asp

http://www.insee.fr/en/

http://www.istat.it/it/

http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/index.html

The geographical breakdown of exports and imports of Japan with selected regions and countries is provided in Table V-5 for Oct 2012. The share of Asia in Japan’s trade is more than one half, 55.2 percent of exports and 47.1 percent of imports. Within Asia, exports to China are 18.4 percent of total exports and imports from China 23.8 percent of total imports. The second largest export market for Japan in Oct 2012 is the US with share of 17.9 percent of total exports and share of imports from the US of 8.9 percent in total imports. Western Europe has share of 10.2 percent in Japan’s exports and of 11.0 percent in imports. Rates of growth of exports of Japan in Oct are sharply negative for all countries and regions with the exception of 3.1 percent for exports to the US, 8.0 percent for Canada, 8.5 percent for Mexico and 0.1 percent for the Middle East. Comparisons relative to 2011 may have some bias because of the effects of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Deceleration of growth in China and the US and threat of recession in Europe can reduce world trade and economic activity, which could be part of the explanation for the decline of Japan’s exports by 6.5 percent in Oct 2012 while imports decreased by 1.6 percent but higher levels after the earthquake and declining prices may be another factor. Growth rates of imports in the 12 months ending in Oct are negative for some trading partners: minus 12.2 percent for Brazil, minus 14.0 percent for the Middle East and minus 0.9 percent for Australia. Imports from Asia increased 2.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct while imports from China increased 3.6 percent.

Table V-5, Japan, Value and 12-Month Percentage Changes of Exports and Imports by Regions and Countries, ∆% and Millions of Yens

Oct 2012

Exports
Millions Yens

12 months ∆%

Imports Millions Yens

12 months ∆%

Total

5,149,993

-6.5

5,698,965

-1.6

Asia

2,840,904

-4.9

2,684,524

2.0

China

947,766

-11.6

1,354,298

3.6

USA

921,094

3.1

504,661

0.1

Canada

68,425

8.0

95,185

3.7

Brazil

40,816

-9.9

86,524

-12.2

Mexico

72,546

8.5

33,040

27.5

Western Europe

526,663

-23.5

628,625

5.7

Germany

132,834

-17.2

169,561

6.2

France

40,252

-28.3

89,505

11.6

UK

85,584

-12.6

49,634

2.2

Middle East

189,249

0.1

870,364

-14.0

Australia

109,197

-25.5

369,236

-0.9

Source: Japan, Ministry of Finance, http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/latest/index_e.htm

Table V-6 of the World Trade Organization provides actual volume of world trade from 2008 to 2011 and projections of the World Trade Organization Secretariat for 2012 and 2013. Trade was weak during the global recession, increasing 2.3 percent in 2008 and decreasing 12.5 percent in 2009. Trade growth was 13.8 percent in 2010 and 5.0 percent in 2011. The World Trade Organization has reduced its projection of growth of world trade in 2012 to 2.5 percent.

Table V-6, World Trade Organization Projections of Growth of Volume of World Merchandise Trade and GDP, ∆%, 2008-2013

 

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012*

2013*

World
Trade Volume

2.3

-12.5

13.9

5.0

2.5

4.5

Exports

           

DE

0.9

-15.2

13.0

4.6

1.5

3.3

DINGE

4.3

-7.8

15.3

5.3

3.5

5.7

Imports

           

DE

-1.1

-14.4

11.0

2.9

0.4

3.4

DINGE

8.6

-10.5

18.3

8.3

5.4

6.1

Real GDP**

1.3

-2.4

3.8

2.4

2.1

2.4

DE

0.0

-3.8

2.7

1.5

1.2

1.5

DINGE

5.6

2.2

7.3

5.3

4.9

5.2

Notes: World Trade Volume: average of exports and imports; *Projections; **At market exchange rates; DE: Developed economies; DINGE: developing economies

Source: World Trade Organization Secretariat for trade, Consensus estimates of GDP forecasts

http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres12_e/pr676_e.htm

The JP Morgan Global All-Industry Output Index of the JP Morgan Manufacturing and Services PMI, produced by JP Morgan and Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, with high association with world GDP, increased to 53.7 in Nov from 51.0 in Oct, indicating expansion at a moderate rate (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10439). This index has remained above the contraction territory of 50.0 during 40 consecutive months. Both global manufacturing and services have slowed down considerably with services accelerating while manufacturing stabilized (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10439). The employment index fell from 50.8 in Oct to 50.0 in Nov with continuing increases in input prices but at slower pace. David Hensley, Director of Global Economic Coordination at JP Morgan, finds encouraging signs in services while manufacturing could grow again toward the end of 2012 but employment may be restrained by cost restraint (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10439). The JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI, produced by JP Morgan and Markit in association with ISM and IFPSM, increased to 49.7 in Nov from 48.8 in Oct, for the highest reading in five month and just below the neutral 50.0 level (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10408). New export business declined for the eighth consecutive month in Nov, mixing growth in China and stability in the US with decreases in Europe and Japan. David Hensley, Director of Global Economics Coordination at JP Morgan, finds improving global manufacturing at the end of the year (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10408). The HSBC Brazil Composite Output Index, compiled by Markit, increased to 53.0 in Nov from 50.7 in Oct, indicating solid expansion at the fastest rate in eight months (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10409). The HSBC Brazil Services Business Activity index, compiled by Markit, increased from 50.4 in Oct to 52.5 in Nov (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10409). Andre Loes, Chief Economist, Brazil, at HSBC, finds consolidation of the recovery of economic activity in Brazil (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10409). The HSBC Brazil Purchasing Managers’ IndexTM (PMI) increased from 50.2 in Oct to 52.2 in Nov, indicating improvement of business conditions in Brazilian manufacturing (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10395). Andre Loes, Chief Economist, Brazil at HSBC, finds recovery improving with gains in both output and new orders at the fastest pace since IQ2011 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10395).

VA United States. The Markit Flash US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) seasonally adjusted increased to 52.4 in Nov from 51.0 in Oct, which was the sharpest improvement in five months, indicating mild expansion of manufacturing (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10327).

New export orders registered 48.9 in Nov nearly still in neutral territory with 47.2 in Oct, indicating stability after contraction during five consecutive months. Chris Williams, Chief Economist at Markit, finds that the survey data are consistent with that the index is consistent with output growth in Nov at an annual rate of 1.0 percent (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10327). The Markit US Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) increased to 52.8 in Nov from 51.0 in Oct, indicating marginal improvement in manufacturing sector conditions (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10399). The index of new exports orders increased from 47.2 in Oct to 50.3 in Nov while total new orders increased from 51.1 in Oct to 53.6 in Nov. The increase in new export orders was the first in six months. Chris Williamson, Chief Economist at Markit, finds that manufacturing continue to be weak in output and creation of jobs; the increase of the index is partly due to new work resulting from Hurricane Sandy; and manufacturing is likely to make only marginal contribution to growth that is weakening when considering consumer spending (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10399). The purchasing managers’ index (PMI) of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Report on Business® decreased 2.2 percentage points from 51.7 in Oct to 49.5 in Nov, which is the lowest level since 49.2 in Jul 2009 (http://www.ism.ws/ISMReport/MfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=12942). The index of new orders decreased 3.9 percentage points from 54.2 in Oct to 50.3 in Nov. The index of exports decreased 1.0 percentage points from 48.0 in Oct to 47.0 in Nov, remaining in mild contraction territory. The Non-Manufacturing ISM Report on Business® PMI increased 0.5 percentage points from 54.2 in Oct to 54.7 in Nov, indicating growth during 40 consecutive months, while the index of new orders increased 3.3 percentage points from 54.8 in Oct to 58.1 in Nov (http://www.ism.ws/ISMReport/NonMfgROB.cfm?navItemNumber=12943). Table USA provides the country economic indicators for the US.

Table USA, US Economic Indicators

Consumer Price Index

Nov 12 months NSA ∆%: 1.8; ex food and energy ∆%: 1.9 Nov month ∆%: -0.3; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.1
Blog12/16/12

Producer Price Index

Nov 12-month NSA ∆%: 1.5; ex food and energy ∆% 2.2
Nov month SA ∆% = -0.8; ex food and energy ∆%: 0.1
Blog 12/16/12

PCE Inflation

Oct 12-month NSA ∆%: headline 1.7; ex food and energy ∆% 1.6
Blog 12/2/12

Employment Situation

Household Survey: Nov Unemployment Rate SA 7.7%
Blog calculation People in Job Stress Nov: 28.4 million NSA, 18.2% of Labor Force
Establishment Survey:
Nov Nonfarm Jobs +146,000; Private +147,000 jobs created 
Oct 12-month Average Hourly Earnings Inflation Adjusted ∆%: -1.3
Blog 12/9/12

Nonfarm Hiring

Nonfarm Hiring fell from 63.8 million in 2006 to 50.1 million in 2011 or by 13.7 million
Private-Sector Hiring Oct 2012 4.352 million lower by 0.912 million than 5.264 million in Oct 2005
Blog 12/16/12

GDP Growth

BEA Revised National Income Accounts
IQ2012/IQ2011 ∆%: 2.4

IIQ2012/IIQ2011 2.1

IIIQ2012/IIIQ2012 2.5

IQ2012 SAAR 2.0

IIQ2012 SAAR 1.3

IIIQ2012 SAAR 2.7
Blog 12/2/12

Real Private Fixed Investment

SAAR IIIQ2012 0.7 ∆% IVQ2007 to IIIQ2012: minus 12.7% Blog 12/2/12

Personal Income and Consumption

Oct month ∆% SA Real Disposable Personal Income (RDPI) SA ∆% minus 0.1
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures (RPCE): minus 0.3
12-month Oct NSA ∆%:
RDPI: 1.9; RPCE ∆%: 1.2
Blog 12/2/2012

Quarterly Services Report

IIIQ12/IIIQ11 SA ∆%:
Information 2.1
Professional 6.0
Administrative 3.9
Hospitals 7.4

Financial & Insurance 6.5
Blog 12/9/12

Employment Cost Index

Compensation Private IIIQ2012 SA ∆%: 0.5
Sep 12 months ∆%: 2.0
Blog 11/4/12

Industrial Production

Oct month SA ∆%: minus 0.4
Oct 12 months SA ∆%: 1.7

Manufacturing Oct SA ∆% minus 0.9 Oct 12 months SA ∆% 1.8, NSA 3.2
Capacity Utilization: 77.8
Blog 11/18/12

Productivity and Costs

Nonfarm Business Productivity IIIQ2012∆% SAAE 2.9; IIIQ2012/IIIQ2011 ∆% 1.7; Unit Labor Costs SAAE IIIQ2012 ∆% -1.9; IIIQ2012/IIIQ2011 ∆%: 0.1

Blog 12/9/2012

New York Fed Manufacturing Index

General Business Conditions From Oct -6.16 to Nov -5.22
New Orders: From Oct -8.97 to Nov 3.08
Blog 11/18/12

Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Index

General Index from Oct 5.7 to Nov minus Oct 10.7
New Orders from Oct minus 0.6 to Nov minus 4.6
Blog 11/18/12

Manufacturing Shipments and Orders

New Orders SA Oct ∆% 0.8 Ex Transport 1.3 Jan-Oct NSA New Orders 3.5 Ex transport 2.6
Blog 12/9/12

Durable Goods

Oct New Orders SA ∆%: 0.0; ex transport ∆%: 1.5
Jan-Oct New Orders NSA ∆%: 4.9; ex transport ∆% 3.0
Blog 12/2/12

Sales of New Motor Vehicles

Jan-Nov 2012 13,135,576; Jan-Nov 2011 11,534,206. Nov SAAR 15.54 million, Oct SAAR 14.29 million, Nov 2011 SAAR 13.55 million

Blog 12/9/12

Sales of Merchant Wholesalers

Jan-Oct 2012/Jan-Oct 2011 NSA ∆%: Total 5.5; Durable Goods: 6.4; Nondurable
Goods: 4.8
Blog 12/16/12

Sales and Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers

Oct 12/Oct 11 NSA ∆%: Sales Total Business 6.3; Manufacturers 5.4
Retailers 5.4; Merchant Wholesalers 8.2
Blog 12/16/12

Sales for Retail and Food Services

Jan-Nov 2012/Jan-Nov 2011 ∆%: Retail and Food Services 5.5; Retail ∆% 5.2
Blog 12/16/12

Value of Construction Put in Place

Oct SAAR month SA ∆%: 1.4 Oct 12-month NSA: 10.8 Jan-Oct 2012 ∆% 9.3
Blog 12/9/12

Case-Shiller Home Prices

Sep 2012/Sep 2011 ∆% NSA: 10 Cities 2.1; 20 Cities: 3.0
∆% Sep SA: 0.3 Cities 0.4 ; 20 Cities: 0.4
Blog 12/2/12

FHFA House Price Index Purchases Only

Sep SA ∆% 0.2;
12 month NSA ∆%: 4.5
Blog 12/2/12

New House Sales

Oct 2012 month SAAR ∆%: minus 0.3
Jan-Oct 2012/Jan-Oct 2011 NSA ∆%: 20.5
Blog 12/2/12

Housing Starts and Permits

Oct Starts month SA ∆%: 3.6 ; Permits ∆%: -2.7
Jan-Oct 2012/Jan-Oct 2011 NSA ∆% Starts 28.2; Permits  ∆% 33.2
Blog 11/25/12

Trade Balance

Balance Oct SA -$44240 million versus Sep -$40277 million
Exports Oct SA ∆%: -3.6 Imports Oct SA ∆%: -2.1
Goods Exports Jan-Oct 2012/2011 NSA ∆%: 4.7
Goods Imports Jan-Oct 2012/2011 NSA ∆%: 3.8
Blog 12/16/12

Export and Import Prices

Nov 12-month NSA ∆%: Imports -1.6; Exports 0.7
Blog 12/16/12

Consumer Credit

Oct ∆% annual rate: 6.2
Blog 12/9/12

Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities

Sep Net Foreign Purchases of Long-term Treasury Securities: $3.3 billion
Major Holders of Treasury Securities: China $1156 billion; Japan $1131 billion; Total Foreign US Treasury Holdings Aug $5455 billion
Blog 11/18/12

Treasury Budget

Fiscal Year 2013/2012 ∆% Nov: Receipts 9.7; Outlays 15.8; Individual Income Taxes 12.5
Deficit Fiscal Year 2011 $1,297 billion

Deficit Fiscal Year 2012 $1,089,353 million

Blog 12/16/2012

CBO Budget and Economic Outlook

2012 Deficit $1128 B 7.3% GDP Debt 11,318 B 72.8% GDP 2013 Deficit $614 B, Debt 12,064 B 76.1% GDP Blog 8/26/12 11/18/12

Commercial Banks Assets and Liabilities

Oct 2012 SAAR ∆%: Securities 8.3 Loans 4.4 Cash Assets -66.6 Deposits 7.3

Blog 11/25/12

Flow of Funds

IIIQ2012 ∆ since 2007

Assets -$2059B

Real estate -$4035B

Financial +$1529 MM

Net Worth -$1232B

Blog 12/9/12

Current Account Balance of Payments

IIQ2012 -$1285 B

%GDP 3.0

Blog 9/23/12

Links to blog comments in Table USA:

12/9/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html

12/2/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

11/25/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real.html

11/18/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/united-states-unsustainable-fiscal.html

11/4/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html

9/23/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/09/collapse-of-united-states-creation-of.html

8/26/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/expanding-bank-cash-and-deposits-with_26.html

Growth rates and levels of sales in millions of dollars of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers are provided in Table VA-1. Total business sales decreased 4.4 percent in Oct after increasing 1.2 percent in Sep and increased 6.3 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct. Sales of manufacturers increased 0.4 percent in Oct after increasing 0.7 percent in Sep and increased 5.4 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct. Retailers’ sales decreased 0.4 percent in Oct, increased 1.2 percent in Sep and increased 5.4 percent in 12 months ending in Oct. Sales of merchant wholesalers decreased 1.2 percent in Oct, falling 1.9 percent in Sep and increased 8.2 percent in 12 months ending in Oct. These data are not adjusted for price changes such that they reflect increases in both quantities and prices

Table VA-1, US, Percentage Changes for Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers

 

Oct 12/   Sep 12
∆% SA

Oct 2012
Millions of Dollars NSA

Sep 12/ Aug 12  ∆% SA

Oct 12/ Oct 11
∆% NSA

Total Business

-0.4

1,289,593

1.2

6.3

Manufacturers

0.4

496,503

0.7

5.4

Retailers

-0.4

360,301

1.2

5.4

Merchant Wholesalers

-1.2

432,789

1.9

8.2

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-1 of the US Census Bureau provides total US sales of manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers seasonally adjusted (SA) in millions of dollars. Seasonal adjustment softens adjacent changes for purposes of comparing short-term variations free of seasonal factors. There was sharp drop in the global recession followed by sharp recovery with decline and recovery in the final segment above the peak before the global recession. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

clip_image031

Chart VA-1, US, Total Business Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, SA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Oct 2012

US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-2 of the US Census Bureau provides total US sales of manufacturing, retailers and wholesalers not seasonally adjusted (NSA) in millions of dollars. The series without adjustment shows sharp jagged behavior because of monthly fluctuations following seasonal patterns. There is sharp recovery from the global recession in a robust trend, which is mixture of price and quantity effects because data are not adjusted for price changes. There is stability in the final segment.

clip_image032

Chart VA-2, US, Total Business Sales of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, NSA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Oct 2012

US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Businesses added cautiously to inventories to replenish stocks. Retailers added 0.6 percent to inventories in Oct 2012 and 0.3 percent in Sep with growth of 7.9 percent in 12 months, as shown in Table VA-2. Total business increased inventories by 0.4 percent in Oct, 0.7 percent in Sep and 5.6 percent in 12 months. Inventories sales/ratios of total business continued at a level close to 1.29 under judicious management to avoid costs and risks. Inventory/sales ratios of manufacturers and retailers are higher than for merchant wholesalers. There is stability in inventory/sales ratios in individual months and relative to a year earlier.

Table VA-2, US, Percentage Changes for Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers and Inventory/Sales Ratios

Inventory Change

Oct 12
Millions of Dollars NSA

Oct12/ Sep 12 ∆% SA

Sep 12/  Aug 12 ∆% SA

Oct 12/  Oct 11 ∆% NSA

Total Business

1,649,468

0.4

0.7

5.6

Manufacturers

618,736

0.1

0.6

3.0

Retailers

530,465

0.6

0.3

7.9

Merchant
Wholesalers

500,267

0.6

1.1

6.6

Inventory/
Sales Ratio NSA

Oct 12
Billions of Dollars NSA

Oct 2012 SA

Sep 2012 SA

Oct 2011 SA

Total Business

1,649,468

1.29

1.28

1.26

Manufacturers

618,736

1.28

1.28

1.28

Retailers

530,465

1.38

1.37

1.32

Merchant Wholesalers

500,267

1.22

1.20

1.17

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-3 of the US Census Bureau provides total business inventories of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers seasonally adjusted (SA) in millions of dollars from Jan 1992 to Oct 2012. The impact of the two recessions of 2001 and IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 is evident in the form of sharp reductions in inventories. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

clip_image033

Chart VA-3, US, Total Business Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, SA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Oct 2012

US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Chart VA-4 provides total business inventories of manufacturers, retailers and merchant wholesalers not seasonally adjusted (NSA) from Jan 1992 to Oct 2012 in millions of dollars. The recessions of 2001 and IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 are evident in the form of sharp reductions of inventories. There is sharp upward trend of inventory accumulation after both recessions.

clip_image034

Chart VA-4, US, Total Business Inventories of Manufacturers, Retailers and Merchant Wholesalers, NSA, Millions of Dollars, Jan 1992-Oct 2012

US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/mtis/

Inventories follow business cycles. When recession hits sales inventories pile up, declining with expansion of the economy. In a fascinating classic opus, Lloyd Meltzer (1941, 129) concludes:

“The dynamic sequences (I) through (6) were intended to show what types of behavior are possible for a system containing a sales output lag. The following conclusions seem to be the most important:

(i) An economy in which business men attempt to recoup inventory losses will always undergo cyclical fluctuations when equilibrium is disturbed, provided the economy is stable.

This is the pure inventory cycle.

(2) The assumption of stability imposes severe limitations upon the possible size of the marginal propensity to consume, particularly if the coefficient of expectation is positive.

(3) The inventory accelerator is a more powerful de-stabilizer than the ordinary acceleration principle. The difference in stability conditions is due to the fact that the former allows for replacement demand whereas the usual analytical formulation of the latter does not. Thus, for inventories, replacement demand acts as a de-stabilizer. Whether it does so for all types of capital goods is a moot question, but I believe cases may occur in which it does not.

(4) Investment for inventory purposes cannot alter the equilibrium of income, which depends only upon the propensity to consume and the amount of non-induced investment.

(5) The apparent instability of a system containing both an accelerator and a coefficient of expectation makes further investigation of possible stabilizers highly desirable.”

Chart VA-5 shows the increase in the inventory/sales ratios during the recession of 2007-2009. The inventory/sales ratio fell during the expansions. The inventory/sales ratio declined to a trough in 2011, climbed and then stabilized at current levels in 2012.

clip_image036

Chart VA-5, Total Business Inventories/Sales Ratios 2002 to 2011

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/mtis/img/mtisbrf.gif

Sales and inventories of merchant wholesalers except manufacturers’ sales branches and offices are shown in Table VA-3 for Oct 2012 and percentage changes from the prior month and for Jan-Oct 2012 relative to Jan-Oct 2011. These data are volatile aggregating diverse categories of durable and nondurable goods without adjustment for price changes. Total sales for the US rose 5.5 percent in Jan-Oct 2012 relative to Jan-Oct 2011 and decreased 1.2 percent in Oct 2012 relative to Sep 2012. The value of total sales is quite high at $4099.1 billion, exceeding four trillion dollars in a year. Value in the breakdown is useful in identifying relative importance of individual categories. Sales of durable goods in Jan-Oct 2012 reached $1841.6 billion, over two trillion dollars for a year, decreasing 0.9 percent in Oct relative to Sep and increasing 6.4 percent in Jan-Oct 2012 relative to Jan-Oct 2011. Sales of automotive products reached $315.4 billion in Jan-Oct 2012, decreasing 3.1 percent in the month and increasing 23.4 percent relative to a year earlier. There is strong performance of 10.4 percent in machinery but much lower of 1.6 percent in electrical products. Sales of nondurable goods rose 4.8 percent over a year earlier. The influence of commodity prices moderated as shown by decrease of 1.2 percent in farm products but increase of 7.1 percent in petroleum products with decrease of 5.7 percent in Oct. The final three columns in Table VA-11 provide the value of inventories and percentage changes from the prior month and relative to the same month a year earlier. US total inventories of wholesalers increased 0.6 percent in Oct and increased 6.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Inventories of durable goods of $297.2 billion are 59.4 percent of total inventories of $500.3 billion and rose 8.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Automotive inventories increased 5.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Machinery inventories of $82.4 billion rose 19.3 percent relative to a year earlier. Inventories of nondurable goods of $203.1 billion are 40.6 percent of the total and increased 4.2 percent relative to a year earlier. Inventories of farm products increased 4.4 percent in Oct relative to Sep and increased 22.6 percent relative to a year earlier. Inventories of petroleum products decreased 3.1 percent in Oct and increased 2.0 percent relative to a year earlier.

Table VA-3, US, Sales and Inventories of Merchant Wholesalers except Manufacturers’ Sales Branches and Offices, Month ∆%

2012

Sales $ Billions Jan-Oct 2012
NSA

Sales Sep ∆% SA

Sales∆% Jan-Oct 2012 from Jan-Oct 2011  NSA

INV $ Billions Oct 2012 NSA

INV  Oct ∆% SA

INV  ∆% Oct 2012 from Oct 2011 NSA

US Total

4099.1

-1.2

5.5

500.3

0.6

6.6

Durable

1841.6

-0.9

6.4

297.2

1.0

8.3

Automotive

333.4

-3.1

23.4

46.3

0.4

5.4

Prof. Equip.

315.4

-0.7

2.0

33.9

1.1

2.4

Computer Equipment

159.2

-1.1

-0.7

13.6

3.0

2.5

Electrical

313.0

0.0

1.6

42.9

0.7

1.3

Machinery

320.3

-0.4

10.4

82.4

1.1

19.3

Not Durable

2257.6

-1.4

4.8

203.1

-0.1

4.2

Drugs

354.5

-0.3

0.4

33.8

-2.1

3.1

Apparel

121.2

-3.3

6.1

21.4

0.1

-2.9

Groceries

481.4

1.5

6.8

36.0

0.7

2.9

Farm Products

180.6

2.0

-1.2

28.2

4.4

22.6

Petroleum

645.9

-5.7

7.1

24.9

-3.1

2.0

Note: INV: inventories

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/wholesale/index.html

Chart VA-6 of the US Census Bureau provides wholesale trade sales without adjustment for seasonality or price changes from Jan 1992 to Oct 2012. The jagged curve of wholesale trade sales without adjustment shows strong seasonal variations. There is a strong long-term trend interrupted by sharp drop during the global recession. Growth resumed along a stronger upward trend and the level in Oct 2012 surpasses the peak before the global recession.

clip_image037

Chart VA-6, US, Wholesale Trade Sales, Monthly, NSA, Jan 1992-Oct 2012, Millions of Dollars

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/wholesale/index.html

Chart VA-7 of the US Census Bureau provides US wholesale trade sales with seasonal adjustment from Jan 1992 to Oct 2012. The elimination of seasonality permits enhanced comparison of adjacent sales. The final segment identifies another drop followed by incomplete increase.

clip_image038

Chart VA-7, US, Wholesale Trade Sales, Monthly, SA, Jan 1992-Oct 2012, Millions of Dollars

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/wholesale/index.html

Inventory/sales ratios of merchant wholesalers except manufacturers’ sales branches and offices are shown in Table VA-4. The total for the US has remained almost without change at 1.22 in Oct 2012, 1.20 in Sep 2012 and 1.17 in Oct 2011. Inventory/sales ratios are higher in durable goods industries but still remain relatively stable with 1.61 in Oct 2012, 1.58 in Sep 2012 and 1.51 in Oct 2011. Computer equipment operates with low inventory/sales ratios of 0.81 in Oct 2012, 0.77 in Sep 2012 and 0.76 in Oct 2011 because of the capacity to fill orders on demand. As expected because of perishable nature, nondurable inventory/sales ratios are quite low with 0.90 in Oct 2012 and 0.88 in Sep 2012 which is almost equal to 0.89 in Oct 2011. There are exceptions such as 1.81 in Oct 2012 in apparel that is almost equal to 1.75 in Sep 2012 and lower than 1.88 in Oct 2011.

Table VA-4, Inventory/Sales Ratios of Merchant Wholesalers except Manufacturers’ Sales Branches and Offices, % SA

 

Oct 2012

Sep 2012

Oct 2011

US Total

1.22

1.20

1.17

Durable

1.61

1.58

1.51

Automotive

1.38

1.33

1.42

Prof. Equip.

1.05

1.03

1.03

Comp. Equip.

0.81

0.77

0.76

Electrical

1.30

1.29

1.31

Machinery

2.61

2.58

2.21

Not Durable

0.90

0.88

0.89

Drugs

1.00

1.02

0.90

Apparel

1.81

1.75

1.88

Groceries

0.73

0.73

0.73

Farm Products

1.30

1.27

1.17

Petroleum

0.42

0.40

0.43

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/wholesale/index.html

Chart VA-8 provides the chart of the US Census Bureau with inventories/sales ratios of merchant wholesalers from 2002 to 2012 seasonally adjusted. Inventory/sales ratios rise during contractions as merchants are caught with increasing inventories because of weak sales and fall during expansions as merchants attempt to fill sales with existing stocks. There is an increase in the inventory/sales ratio in 2012 but not yet significantly higher with declining trend in the final segment followed by an increase.

clip_image040

Chart VA-8, US, Monthly Inventories/Sales Ratios of Merchant Wholesalers, SA, 2003-2012

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www2.census.gov/wholesale/img/mwtsbrf.jpg

Sales of retail and food services increased 0.3 percent in Nov after decreasing 0.3 percent in Oct seasonally adjusted (SA), growing 5.5 percent in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to Jan-Nov 2011 not seasonally adjusted (NSA), as shown in Table VA-5. Excluding motor vehicles and parts, retail sales increased 0.0 percent in Nov 2012, increasing 0.2 percent in Oct 2012 SA and increasing 4.9 percent NSA in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to a year earlier. Sales of motor vehicles and parts increased 1.4 percent in Nov 2012 after decreasing 1.9 percent in Oct SA and increasing 8.0 percent NSA in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to a year earlier. Gasoline station sales decreased 4.0 percent SA in Nov 2012 after increasing 1.0 percent in Oct 2012 in increasing prices of gasoline that are moderating, increasing 4.1 percent in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to a year earlier.

Table VA-5, US, Percentage Change in Monthly Sales for Retail and Food Services, ∆%

 

Nov/ Oct ∆% SA

Oct/Sep ∆% SA

Jan-Nov 2012 Million Dollars NSA

Jan-Nov 2012 from Jan-Nov 2011 ∆% NSA

Retail and Food Services

0.3

-0.3

4,418,874

5.5

Excluding Motor Vehicles and Parts

0.0

0.0

3,603,573

4.9

Motor Vehicles & Parts

1.4

-1.9

815,301

8.0

Retail

0.2

-0.4

3,935,161

5.2

Building Materials

1.6

-1.2

272,297

6.0

Food and Beverage

-0.3

0.6

576,812

3.5

Grocery

-0.5

0.6

518,451

3.3

Health & Personal Care Stores

0.6

-0.1

249,921

1.2

Clothing & Clothing Accessories Stores

0.9

0.3

208,195

6.3

Gasoline Stations

-4.0

1.0

503,885

4.1

General Merchandise Stores

-0.9

-0.2

559,979

1.0

Food Services & Drinking Places

0.8

0.2

483,713

7.4

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/retail/

Chart VA-37 of the US Bureau of the Census shows percentage change of retail and food services sales. Auto sales have been increasing strongly monthly, and particularly relative to a year earlier, but with weakness in the total excluding auto sales and declines or mild growth in general merchandise with decline of 1.5 percent in autos in Oct 2012.

clip_image042

Chart VA-9, US, Percentage Change of Retail and Food Services Sales

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/marts/img/martsbrf.gif

Chart VA-10 of the US Census Bureau provides total sales of retail trade and food services seasonally adjusted (SA) from Jan 1992 to Nov 2012 in millions of dollars. The impact on sales of the shallow recession of 2001 was much milder than the sharp contraction in the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009. There is flattening in the final segment of the series followed by another increase. Data are not adjusted for price changes.

clip_image043

Chart VA-10, US, Total Sales of Retail Trade and Food Services, SA, Jan 1992-Nov 2012, Millions of Dollars

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/retail/

Chart VA-11 of the US Census Bureau provides total sales of retail trade and food services not seasonally adjusted (NSA) in millions of dollars from Jan 1992 to Nov 2012. Data are not adjusted for seasonality, which explains sharp jagged behavior, or price changes. There was contraction during the global recession from IVQ2007 to IIQ2009 with strong rebound to a higher level and stability in the final segment.

clip_image044

Chart VA-11, US, Total Sales of Retail Trade and Food Services, NSA, Jan 1992-Nov 2012, Millions of Dollars

Source: US Census Bureau

http://www.census.gov/retail/

Twelve-month rates of growth of US sales of retail and food services in Nov from 2000 to 2012 are shown in Table VA-6. Nominal sales have been dynamic in 2012, 2011 and 2010 after decline of 11.0 percent in 2008 and increase of 1.2 percent in 2009. It is difficult to separate price and quantity effects in these nominal data.

Table VA-6, US, Percentage Change in 12-Month Sales for Retail and Food Services, ∆% NSA

Nov

12 Months ∆%

2012

4.8

2011

7.5

2010

8.2

2009

1.2

2008

-11.0

2007

5.9

2006

3.9

2005

6.0

2004

7.6

2003

3.6

2002

1.1

2001

4.0

2000

4.7

Source: US Census Bureau http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/77374

The US Treasury budget for fiscal years 2013 and 2012 is shown in Table VA-7. Receipts increased 9.7 percent in the cumulative fiscal year 2013 for Nov 2012 relative to the cumulative in fiscal year 2012. Individual income taxes increased 12.5 percent relative to the same period a year earlier. Outlays increased 15.8 percent relative to a year earlier. Table VA-7 provides additional information required for understanding the deficit/debt situation of the United States. The table is divided into three parts: federal fiscal data for the years from 2009 to 2012; federal fiscal data for the years from 2005 to 2008; and Treasury debt held by the public from 2005 to 2012. Total revenues of the US from 2009 to 2012 accumulate to $9019 billion, or $9.0 trillion, while expenditures or outlays accumulate to $14,111 billion, or $14.1 trillion, with the deficit accumulating to $5092 billion, or $5.1 trillion. Revenues decreased 6.6 percent from $9653 billion in the four years from 2005 to 2008 to $9019 billion in the years from 2009 to 2012. Decreasing revenues were caused by the global recession from IVQ2007 (Dec) to IIQ2009 (Jun) and also by growth of only 2.2 percent on average in the cyclical expansion from IIIQ2009 to IIIQ2012, which is much lower than 6.2 percent on average in cyclical expansions since the 1950s (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html). Weakness of growth and employment creation is analyzed Subsection IIB Collapse of United States Dynamism of Income Growth and Employment Creation http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html. There are 28.6 million people without jobs or underemployed that is equivalent to 17.7 percent of the US effective labor force (http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/twenty-eight-million-unemployed-or.html) and hiring is significantly below the earlier cyclical expansion before 2007 (Section I and earlier http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/recovery-without-hiring-united-states.html). In contrast with the decline of revenue, outlays or expenditures increased 30.2 percent from $10,839 billion, or $10.8 trillion, in the four years from 2005 to 2008, to $14,111 billion, or $14.1 trillion, in the four years from 2009 to 2012. Increase in expenditures by 30.2 percent while revenue declined by 6.6 percent caused the increase in the federal deficit from $1186 billion in 2005-2008 to $5092 billion in 2009-2012. Federal revenue was 15.4 percent of GDP on average in the years from 2009 to 2012, which is well below 18.0 percent of GDP on average from 1970 to 2010. Federal outlays were 24.1 percent of GDP on average from 2009 to 2012, which is well above 21.9 percent of GDP on average from 1970 to 2010. The lower part of Table VA-7 shows that debt held by the public swelled from $5803 billion in 2008 to $11,280 billion in 2012, by $5477 billion or 94.3 percent. Debt held by the public as percent of GDP or economic activity jumped from 40.5 percent in 2008 to 72.6 percent in 2012, which is well above the average of 37.0 percent from 1970 to 2010. The United States faces tough adjustment because growth is unlikely to recover, creating limits on what can be obtained by increasing revenues, while continuing stress of social programs restricts what can be obtained by reducing expenditures.

Table VA-7, US, Treasury Budget in Fiscal Year to Date Million Dollars

Nov 2012

Fiscal Year 2013

Fiscal Year 2012

∆%

Receipts

346,045

315,474

9.7

Outlays

638,152

551,243

15.8

Deficit

-292,107

-235,769

NA

Individual Income Taxes

177,066

157,418

12.5

Social Insurance

83,319

81,359

2.4

 

Receipts

Outlays

Deficit (-), Surplus (+)

$ Billions

     

2012

2,449

3,538

-1,089

Fiscal Year 2011

2,302

3,599

-1,297

Fiscal Year 2010

2,163

3,456

-1,293

Fiscal Year 2009

2,105

3,518

-1,413

Total 2009-2012

9,019

14,111

-5,092

Average % GDP 2009-2012

15.4

24.1

-8.7

Fiscal Year 2008

2,524

2,983

-459

Fiscal Year 2007

2,568

2,729

-161

Fiscal Year 2006

2,407

2,655

-248

Fiscal Year 2005

2,154

2,472

-318

Total 2005-2008

9,653

10,839

-1,186

Average % GDP 2005-2008

17.9

20.1

-2.2

Debt Held by the Public

Billions of Dollars

Percent of GDP

 

2005

4,592

36.9

 

2006

4,829

36.6

 

2007

5,035

36.3

 

2008

5,803

40.5

 

2009

7,545

54.1

 

2010

9,019

62.8

 

2011

10,128

67.7

 

2012

11,280

72.6

 

Source: http://www.fms.treas.gov/mts/index.html CBO (2012NovMBR). CBO (2011AugBEO); Office of Management and Budget. 2011. Historical Tables. Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: OMB; CBO. 2011JanBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Jan. CBO. 2012AugBEO. Budget and Economic Outlook. Washington, DC, Aug 22. CBO. 2012Jan31. Historical budget data. Washington, DC, Jan 31. CBO. 2012NovCDR. Choices for deficit reduction. Washington, DC. Nov.

VB Japan. Table VB-BOJF provides the forecasts of economic activity and inflation in Japan by the majority of members of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, which is part of their Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1210a.pdf). For fiscal 2013, the forecast is of growth of GDP between 1.3 and 1.8 percent, with domestic producer price inflation (Corporate Goods Price Index, CGPI) in the range of 0.1 to 0.7 percent and the all items CPI less fresh food of 0.2 to 0.6 percent. These forecasts are biannual in Apr and Oct.

Table VB-BOJF, Bank of Japan, Forecasts of the Majority of Members of the Policy Board, % Year on Year

Fiscal Year
Date of Forecast

Real GDP

Domestic CGPI

CPI All Items Less Fresh Food

2011

     

Apr 2012

-0.2 to –0.2
[-0.2]

+1.7

0.0

Jan 2012

-0.4 to –0.3
[-0.4]

+1.8 to +1.9
[+1.8]

-0.1 to 0.0
[-0.1]

2012

     

Oct 2012

+1.4 to +1.6

[+1.5]

-1.2 to -0.9

[-1.1]

-0.1 to -0.1

[-0.1]

Jul 2012

+2.2 to +2.4

[+2.2]

-0.3 to 0.0

[-0.2]

+0.1 to +0.3

[+0.2]

Apr 2012

+2.1 to +2.4
[+2.3]

+0.4 to +0.7
[+0.6]

+0.1 to +0.4
[+0.3]

Jan 2012

+1.8 to +2.1
[+2.0]

-0.1 to +0.2
[+0.1]

0.0 to +0.2
[+0.1]

2013

     

Oct 2012

+1.3 to +1.8

[+1.6]

+0.1 to +0.7

[+0.5]

+0.2 to +0.6

[+0.4]

Jul 2012

+1.6 to +1.8

[+1.7]

+0.6 to +0.8

[+0.6]

+0.5 to +0.7

[+0.7]

Apr 2012

+1.6 to +1.8
[+1.7]

+0.7 to +0.9
[+0.8]

+0.5 to +0.7
[+0.7]

Jan 2012

+1.4 to +1.7
[+1.6]

+0.6 to 1.0
[+0.8]

+0.4 to +0.5
[+0.5]

2014

     

Oct 2012

+0.2 to +0.7]

[+0.6]

+3.7 to +4.4

[+4.2]

+2.4 to +3.0

[+2.8]

Figures in brackets are the median of forecasts of Policy Board members

Source: Policy Board, Bank of Japan

http://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1210a.pdf

Private-sector activity in Japan contracted at a marginal rate with the Markit Composite Output PMI Index increasing from 48.9 in Oct to 49.9 in Nov, which is nearly equal 50 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10394). Paul Smith, economist at Markit and author of the report, finds that growth in services could raise hopes for avoiding contraction in IVQ2012 but that activity in services originated mostly in clearing existing contracts, raising doubts on sustained recovery (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10394). The Markit Business Activity Index of Services increased from 50.0 in Oct to 51.4 in Nov, the first increase in services activity in seven months (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10394). The Markit/JMMA Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI™), seasonally adjusted, decreased from 46.9 in Oct to 46.5 in Nov for the lowest reading in 19 months and the six consecutive month of contraction below 50.0 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10339). Foreign orders fell for the eighth consecutive month at a faster rate. Paul Smith, economist at Markit and author of the report, finds the data consistent with quarterly contraction of manufacturing output at a quarterly rate in excess of 3 percent in Nov that could affect GDP with weak internal and external demand, particularly in foreign markets (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10339 ).Table JPY provides the country data table for Japan.

Table JPY, Japan, Economic Indicators

Historical GDP and CPI

1981-2010 Real GDP Growth and CPI Inflation 1981-2010
Blog 8/9/11 Table 26

Corporate Goods Prices

Nov ∆% 0.0
12 months ∆% minus 0.9
Blog 12/16/12

Consumer Price Index

Oct NSA ∆% 0.0; Oct 12 months NSA ∆% -0.4
Blog 12/2/12

Real GDP Growth

IIIQ2012 ∆%: minus 0.9 on IIQ2012;  IIIQ2012 SAAR minus 3.5;
∆% from quarter a year earlier: 0.5 %
Blog 12/16/12

Employment Report

Oct Unemployed 2.71 million

Change in unemployed since last year: minus 180 thousand
Unemployment rate: 4.2%
Blog 12/2/12

All Industry Indices

Sep month SA ∆% -0.3
12-month NSA ∆% -1.1

Blog 11/25/12

Industrial Production

Oct SA month ∆%: 1.8
12-month NSA ∆% -4.3
Blog 12/2/12

Machine Orders

Total Oct ∆% -1.6

Private ∆%: -10.7
Oct ∆% Excluding Volatile Orders 2.8
Blog 12/16/12

Tertiary Index

Oct month SA ∆% minus 0.1
Oct 12 months NSA ∆% 1.1
Blog 12/16/12

Wholesale and Retail Sales

Oct 12 months:
Total ∆%: -1.7
Wholesale ∆%: -1.8
Retail ∆%: -1.2
Blog 12/2/12

Family Income and Expenditure Survey

Oct 12-month ∆% total nominal consumption -0.5, real -0.1 Blog 12/2/12

Trade Balance

Exports Oct 12 months ∆%: minus 6.5 Imports Oct 12 months ∆% minus 1.6 Blog 11/25/12

Links to blog comments in Table JPY:

12/2/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/12/mediocre-and-decelerating-united-states.html

11/25/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/contraction-of-united-states-real.html

8/9/11 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/turbulence-in-world-financial-markets.html

Japan’s GDP decreased 0.9 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to IIQ2012, seasonally adjusted, as shown in Table VB-1 that incorporates the latest revisions. IQ2012 GDP growth was revised to 1.4 percent and IIQGDP growth was revised to 0.0 percent. The economy of Japan had already weakened in IVQ2010 when GDP fell revised 0.4 percent. As in other advanced economies, Japan’s recovery from the global recession has not been robust. GDP fell in IQ2011 by 1.9 percent and fell again 0.7 percent in IIQ2011 as a result of the disruption of the tragic Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. Recovery was robust in the first two quarters of 2010 but GDP growth grew at 1.3 percent in IIIQ2010 and fell 0.4 percent in IVQ2010. The deepest quarterly contractions in the recession were 3.3 percent in IVQ2008 and 4.0 percent in IQ2009.

Table VB-1, Japan, Real GDP ∆% Changes from the Previous Quarter Seasonally Adjusted ∆%

 

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IVQ

2012

1.4

0.0

-0.9

 

2011

-1.9

-0.7

2.5

0.1

2010

1.4

1.1

1.3

-0.4

2009

-4.0

1.7

0.1

1.8

2008

0.7

-1.3

-1.0

-3.3

2007

1.0

0.1

-0.3

0.9

2006

0.5

0.4

-0.1

1.3

2005

0.2

1.3

0.3

0.2

2004

1.0

0.0

0.1

-0.2

2003

-0.5

1.3

0.4

1.1

2002

-0.2

1.0

0.6

0.4

2001

0.7

-0.2

-1.1

-0.2

2000

1.7

0.1

-0.2

0.6

1999

-0.9

0.4

-0.1

0.4

Source: http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

Table VB-2 provides contributions to real GDP at seasonally-adjusted annual rates (SAAR). The SAAR of GDP in IIIQ2012 was -3.5 percent {[(1-0.009)4 – 1]100 = -3.5%}: minus 1.0 percentage points from growth of personal consumption expenditures (PC) less 1.2 percentage points of gross fixed capital formation (CFCF) less 2.8 percentage points of net trade (exports less imports) plus 1.0 percentage points of private inventory investment (PINV) plus 0.5 percentage points of government consumption. The SAAR of GDP in IIIQ2011 was revised to a high 10.4 percent. Net trade deducted from GDP growth in three quarters of 2011 and provided the growth impulse of 3.2 percentage points in IIIQ2011. Growth in 2011 and IQ2012 was driven by personal consumption expenditures that deducted 1.0 percentage points from GDP growth in IIIQ2012.

Table VB-2, Japan, Contributions to Changes in Real GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates (SAAR), %

 

GDP

PC

GFCF

Trade

PINV

GOVC

2012

           

I

5.7

2.8

-0.1

0.4

1.4

1.1

II

-0.1

0.2

1.2

-0.7

-1.2

0.4

III

-3.5

-1.0

-1.2

-2.8

1.0

0.5

2011

           

I

-7.3

-3.2

-0.4

-1.1

-2.7

0.0

II

-2.8

2.1

-0.3

-3.8

-1.1

0.3

III

10.4

3.5

1.3

3.2

2.2

0.1

IV

0.3

1.2

3.6

-3.0

-1.8

0.4

2010

           

I

5.8

1.6

0.2

2.2

2.2

-0.5

II

4.4

0.0

0.8

0.3

2.2

1.1

III

5.5

3.2

0.9

0.1

1.2

0.2

IV

-1.6

-0.8

-0.8

-0.4

-0.1

0.4

2009

           

I

-15.1

-2.0

-2.0

-4.3

-7.5

0.8

II

6.8

4.0

-3.2

7.2

-1.9

0.6

III

0.2

0.1

-1.4

2.0

-1.5

0.9

IV

7.5

3.5

0.2

2.8

0.5

0.4

2008

           

I

2.9

1.4

0.4

1.4

-0.4

0.0

II

-5.1

-3.2

-2.3

0.1

1.2

-0.8

III

-3.9

-0.4

-1.0

0.0

-2.6

-0.1

IV

-12.4

-2.8

-4.5

-11.3

5.7

0.4

2007

           

I

4.2

0.8

0.5

1.4

1.2

0.4

II

0.2

0.5

-1.5

0.4

0.1

0.5

III

-1.3

-0.9

-1.7

2.0

-0.6

-0.2

IV

3.6

0.3

0.3

1.5

0.9

0.6

Note: PC: Private Consumption; GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation; PINV: Private Inventory; Trade: Net Exports; GOVC: Government Consumption

Source: http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

Long-term economic growth in Japan was significantly improved by increasing competitiveness in world markets. Net trade of exports and imports is an important component of the GDP accounts of Japan. Table VB-3 provides quarterly data for net trade, exports and imports of Japan. Net trade had strong positive contributions to GDP growth in Japan in all quarters from IQ2007 to IIQ2009 with exception of IVQ2008. The US recession is dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) as beginning in IVQ2007 (Dec) and ending in IIQ2009 (Jun) (http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html). Net trade contributions helped to cushion the economy of Japan from the global recession. Net trade has deducted from GDP growth in six of the eight quarters from IVQ2010 IIIQ2012. The only strong contribution of net trade was 3.2 percent in IIIQ2011. Private consumption assumed the role of driver of Japan’s economic growth but should moderate as in most mature economies.

Table VB-3, Japan, Contributions to Changes in Real GDP, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates (SAAR), %

 

Net Trade

Exports

Imports

2012

     

I

0.4

2.0

-1.5

II

-0.7

0.5

-1.2

III

-2.8

-3.1

0.3

2011

     

I

-1.1

-0.3

-0.8

II

-3.8

-4.0

0.2

III

3.2

5.2

-2.1

IV

-3.0

-2.4

-0.6

2010

     

I

2.2

3.4

-1.2

II

0.3

3.1

-2.8

III

0.1

1.2

-1.1

IV

-0.4

-0.3

-0.1

2009

     

I

-4.3

-16.3

12.0

II

7.2

4.7

2.5

III

2.0

5.3

-3.2

IV

2.8

3.9

-1.1

2008

     

I

1.4

2.3

-0.9

II

0.1

-1.8

1.9

III

0.0

0.3

-0.3

IV

-11.3

-10.3

-1.0

2007

     

I

1.4

1.8

-0.5

II

0.4

1.3

-0.9

III

2.0

1.5

0.5

IV

1.5

2.1

-0.5

Source: http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

Japan’s percentage growth of GDP not seasonally-adjusted in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier is shown in Table VB-4. Contraction of GDP in a quarter relative to the same quarter a year earlier extended over seven quarters from IIQ2008 through IVQ2009. Contraction was sharpest in IQ2009 with output declining 9.4 percent relative to a year earlier. Yearly quarterly rates of growth of Japan were relatively high for a mature economy through the decade with the exception of the contractions from IVQ2001 to IIQ2002 and after 2007. The Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 caused flat GDP in IQ2011 relative to the same quarter a year earlier and decline of 1.6 percent in IIQ2011. GDP fell 0.5 percent in IIIQ2011 relative to a year earlier and fell 0.2 percent in IVQ2011 relative to a year earlier. Growth resumed with 3.4 percent in IQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Growth of 3.9 percent in IIQ2012 is largely caused by the low level in IIQ2011 resulting from the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011. GDP increased 0.5 percent in IIIQ2012 relative to a year earlier. Japan faces the challenge of recovery from the devastation of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 in an environment of declining world trade and bouts of risk aversion that cause appreciation of the Japanese yen that erode the country’s competitiveness in world markets.

Table VB-4, Japan, Real GDP ∆% Changes from Same Quarter Year Earlier, NSA ∆%

 

IQ

IIQ

IIIQ

IVQ

2012

3.4

3.9

0.5

 

2011

0.0

-1.6

-0.5

-0.2

2010

5.0

4.5

6.0

3.3

2009

-9.4

-6.6

-5.6

-0.5

2008

1.4

-0.1

-0.6

-4.7

2007

2.8

2.3

2.0

1.6

2006

2.6

1.3

0.9

2.0

2005

0.4

1.4

1.5

1.9

2004

4.0

2.6

2.2

0.7

2003

1.7

1.8

1.5

1.8

2002

-1.6

-0.2

1.4

1.6

2001

1.6

0.9

0.0

-1.0

2000

2.7

2.4

2.2

1.8

1999

-0.3

0.1

-0.1

-0.5

Source: http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/sokuhou/sokuhou_top.html

The tertiary activity index of Japan decreased 0.1 percent SA in Oct 2012 and increased 1.1 percent NSA in the 12 months ending in Oct 2012, as shown in Table VB-5. The tertiary activity index of Japan seasonally adjusted fell at the annual equivalent rate of minus 4.1 percent in Jan-Apr 2012 for cumulative decline of 1.4 percent but increased 2.6 percent not seasonally adjusted in the 12 months ending in Apr 2012, as shown in Table VB-5. The tertiary activity index fell 0.6 percent in the first nine months of 2012 or at the annual equivalent rate of minus 0.7 percent. There was strong impact from the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 in the decline of the tertiary activity index by 5.4 percent in Mar 2011 and 3.4 percent in 12 months. The performance of the tertiary sector in the quarter Jul-Sep 2011 was weak: increase of 0.4 percent in Jul, increase of 0.1 percent in Aug and decline of 0.2 percent in Sep, after increasing 1.2 percent in Jun. The not seasonally adjusted index increased 4.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Mar 2012 but the 12-month percentage rate dropped to 0.1 percent in Sep 2012, increasing 1.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct 2012. Most of the growth occurred in the quarter from Apr to Jun 2011 with gain of 4.3 percent or at annual equivalent rate of 18.1 percent.

Table VB-5, Japan, Tertiary Activity Index, ∆%

 

Month ∆% SA

12 Months ∆% NSA

Oct 2011

-0.1

1.1

Sep

0.2

0.1

Aug

0.3

0.6

Jul

-0.6

0.9

Jun

0.1

0.8

May

0.9

3.2

Apr

-0.2

2.6

Mar

-0.6

4.2

Feb

0.0

2.4

Jan

-0.6

0.4

Dec 2011

1.6

1.2

Nov

-0.8

-0.3

Oct

0.6

0.9

Sep

-0.2

0.1

Aug

0.1

0.8

Jul

0.4

0.1

Jun

1.2

1.0

May

0.9

-0.2

Apr

2.1

-2.3

Mar

-5.4

-3.4

Feb

0.3

2.0

Jan

0.5

1.0

Dec 2010

-0.2

1.8

Nov

0.6

2.5

Oct

0.2

0.5

Sep

-0.4

1.3

Aug

0.1

2.3

Jul

0.7

1.6

Jun

0.1

1.0

May

-0.3

1.2

Dec 2009

 

-5.2

Dec 2008

 

-3.3

Dec 2007

 

-0.3

Dec 2006

 

0.6

Dec 2005

 

2.6

Dec 2004

 

1.6

Calendar Year

   

2011

 

0.1

2010

 

1.3

2009

 

-5.2

2008

 

-1.0

2007

 

1.0

2006

 

1.8

2005

 

1.9

2004

 

1.8

Source: http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/index.html

Month and 12-month rates of growth of the tertiary activity index of Japan and components in Sep are provided in Table VB-6. Electricity, gas, heat supply and water decreased 0.6 percent in Oct and decreased 1.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Oct. Wholesale and retail trade decreased 0.6 percent in the month of Oct and decreased 0.7 percent in 12 months. Information and communications decreased 0.2 percent Oct and increased 0.0 percent in 12 months.

Table VB-6, Japan, Tertiary Index and Components, Month and 12-Month Percentage Changes ∆%

Oct 2012

Weight

Month ∆% SA

12 Months ∆% NSA

Tertiary Index

10,000.0

-0.1

0.1

Electricity, Gas, Heat Supply & Water

372.9

-0.6

-1.2

Information & Communications

951.2

-0.2

0.0

Wholesale & Retail Trade

2,641.2

-0.6

-0.7

Finance & Insurance

971.1

-0.1

4.5

Real Estate & Goods Rental & Leasing

903.4

-0.2

0.2

Scientific Research, Professional & Technical Services

551.3

0.6

4.6

Accommodations, Eating, Drinking

496.0

-0.4

-1.5

Living-Related, Personal, Amusement Services

552.7

-0.7

-4.7

Learning Support

116.9

0.2

0.5

Medical, Health Care, Welfare

921.1

-0.2

5.3

Miscellaneous ex Government

626.7

4.4

3.4

Source: http://www.meti.go.jp/english/statistics/index.html

Japan’s total machinery orders seasonally adjusted in Table VB-7 decreased 1.6 percent in Oct 2012 after increasing 9.6 percent in Sep and falling in three of the four months May-Aug 2012. Total private sector orders decreased 10.7 percent in Oct 2012 after increasing 15.4 percent in Sep and falling 13.7 percent in Aug. Private-sector orders excluding volatile orders, which are closely watched, increased 2.6 percent in Oct but decreased 4.3 percent in Sep after decreasing 3.3 percent in Aug. Orders for manufacturing decreased 3.6 percent in Oct after growing 2.8 percent in Sep 2012, falling 15.1 percent in Aug following increase of 12.0 percent in Jul with declines 2.9 percent in Jun and 8.0 percent in May. Overseas orders increased 9.4 percent in Oct and were unchanged in Sep 2012 but decreased 14.7 percent in Aug and 9.8 percent in Jun and increased 3.0 percent in Jul. There is significant volatility in industrial orders in advanced economies.

Table VB-7, Japan, Machinery Orders, Month ∆%, SA 

2012

Oct

Sep

Aug

Jul

Total

-1.6

9.6

-12.6

-2.6

Private Sector

-10.7

15.4

-13.7

4.3

Excluding Volatile Orders

2.6

-4.3

-3.3

4.6

Mfg

-3.6

2.8

-15.1

12.0

Non Mfg ex Volatile

2.8

1.3

3.6

-2.1

Government

-18.7

22.4

-7.1

-13.5

From Overseas

9.4

0.0

-14.7

3.0

Through Agencies

-2.5

4.0

-22.0

14.1

Note: Mfg: manufacturing

Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html

Total orders for machinery and total private-sector orders excluding volatile orders for Japan are shown in Chart VB-1 of Japan’s Economic and Social Research Institute at the Cabinet Office. The trend of private-sector orders excluding volatile orders was showing recovery from the drop after Mar 2011 because of the earthquake/tsunami. There was reversal of the trend of increase in total orders with recent decreases. Fluctuations still prevent detecting longer term trends but recovery is still evident from the global recession. There was a major setback by the declines in May 2012 shown in the final segment of Chart VB-1 with partial recovery in Jun 2012, decline again in Jul and Aug 2012 and rebound in total orders in Sep but decline in orders excluding volatile segments with another decline in Oct 2012.

clip_image045

Chart VB-1, Japan, Machinery Orders

Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office

http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/stat/juchu/1210juchu-e.html

Table VB-8 provides values and percentage changes from a year earlier of Japan’s machinery orders without seasonal adjustment. Total orders of JPY 1,548,219 million in Oct 2012 are divided between JPY 595,251 million overseas orders, or 38.5 percent of the total, and domestic orders of JPY 867,272 million, or 56.0 percent of the total, with orders through agencies of JPY 85,696 million, or 5.5 percent of the total. Orders through agencies are not shown in the table because of the minor value. Twelve-month percentages changes in Oct 2012 continued to reverse increases in Jul 2012: minus 6.9 percent for total orders, minus 12.8 percent for overseas orders, minus 2.6 percent for domestic orders and increase of 1.2 percent for private orders excluding volatile items. Sep 2012 was also weak with declines of 7.8 percent of total orders, 18.4 percent of overseas orders, 1.8 percent of domestic orders and 7.8 percent of private orders excluding volatile items. Total orders fell 18.6 percent in the 12 months ending in Aug with declines of 31.1 percent in overseas orders and 1.8 percent of domestic orders. Performance was strong in Apr with growth of total orders of 7.5 percent mostly because of growth of domestic orders by 23.0 percent and also in Mar with growth of total orders of 8.1 percent and of domestic orders of 19.0 percent. Percentage growth of overseas orders was negative in eight consecutive months from Feb to Sep 2012. Performance in Feb 2012 was weak with growth of total orders of minus 9.3 percent, minus 8.9 percent of overseas orders, minus 11.2 percent of domestic orders and 8.9 percent of private orders excluding volatile items. Jan 2012 was quite strong with growth of total orders of 9.8 percent driven by growth of overseas orders of 18.3 percent. There is sharp reversal of 12-month percentage changes in Nov with increase of 11.0 percent in total orders, 8.0 percent in overseas orders, 13.5 percent in domestic orders and 12.5 percent in private orders excluding volatile items. The pace of increase declined in Dec with growth in 12 months of 0.8 percent for total orders, 12.6 percent for overseas orders, decline of 8.5 percent for domestic orders and growth of private orders excluding volatile items of 6.3 percent. There was strong impact from the global recession with total orders falling 23.3 percent in 2008, overseas orders dropping 29.4 percent and domestic orders decreasing 17.4 percent. Recovery was vigorous in 2010 with increase of total orders by 9.4 percent, overseas orders by 3.5 percent and domestic orders by 14.1 percent. The heavy impact of the Tōhoku or Great East Earthquake and Tsunami of Mar 11, 2011 also affected machinery orders.

Table VB-8, Japan, Machinery Orders, 12 Months ∆% and Million Yen, Original Series  

 

Total

Overseas

Domestic

Private ex Volatile

Value Oct 2012

1,548,219

595,251

867,272

623,340

% Total

100.0

38.5

56.0

40.3

Value Oct 2011

1,662,200

682,437

890,844

615,785

% Total

100.0

41.1

53.6

37.1

12-month ∆%

       

Oct 2012

-6.9

-12.8

-2.6

1.2

Sep 2012

-7.8

-18.4

-1.8

-7.8

Aug 2012

-18.6

-31.1

-10.2

-6.1

Jul 2012

2.6

-1.9

3.2

1.7

Jun 2012

-10.9

-11.3

-12.4

-9.9

May 2012

-6.8

-7.0

-8.6

1.0

Apr 2012

7.5

-9.6

23.0

6.6

Mar 2012

8.1

-10.0

19.0

-1.1

Feb 2012

-9.3

-8.9

-11.2

8.9

Jan 2012

9.8

18.3

0.5

5.7

Dec 2011

0.8

12.6

-8.5

6.3

Nov 2011

11.0

8.0

13.5

12.5

Oct 2011

-6.8

-15.6

-1.0

1.5

Dec 2010

9.4

3.5

14.1

-0.6

Dec 2009

1.8

0.4

3.6

-1.9

Dec 2008

-23.3

-29.4

-17.4

-24.7

Dec 2007

1.3

9.8

-4.3

-6.4

Dec 2006

0.8

0.9

-0.1

0.1

Note: Total machinery orders = overseas + domestic demand + orders through agencies. Orders through agencies in Oct 2012 were JPY 85,696 million, or 5.5 percent of the total and 5.4 percent of the total in Oct 2011, and are not shown in the table. The data are the original numbers without any adjustments and differ from the seasonally-adjusted data.

Source: Japan Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html

VC China. China estimates an index of nonmanufacturing purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 1200 nonmanufacturing enterprises across the country (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Table CIPMNM provides this index and components from Jan to No 2012. The index fell from 58.0 in Mar to 55.2 in May but climbed to 56.7 in Jun, which is lower than 58.0 in Mar and 57.3 in Feb but higher than in any other of the months in 2012. In Jul 2012 the index fell marginally to 55.6 and then to 56.3 in Aug and 53.7 in Sep but rebounded to 55.5 in Oct and 55.6 in Nov 2012.

Table CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

2012

Total Index

New Orders

Interm.
Input Prices

Subs Prices

Exp

Nov

55.6

53.2

52.5

48.4

64.6

Oct

55.5

51.6

58.1

50.5

63.4

Sep

53.7

51.8

57.5

51.3

60.9

Aug

56.3

52.7

57.6

51.2

63.2

Jul

55.6

53.2

49.7

48.7

63.9

Jun

56.7

53.7

52.1

48.6

65.5

May

55.2

52.5

53.6

48.5

65.4

Apr

56.1

52.7

57.9

50.3

66.1

Mar

58.0

53.5

60.2

52.0

66.6

Feb

57.3

52.7

59.0

51.2

63.8

Jan

55.7

52.2

58.2

51.1

65.3

Notes: Interm.: Intermediate; Subs: Subscription; Exp: Business Expectations

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart CIPMNM provides China’s nonmanufacturing purchasing managers’ index from Nov 2011 to Nov 2012. There was slowing of the general index in Apr 2012 after the increase in Jan-Mar 2012 and further decline to 55.2 in May 2012 but increase to 56.7 in Jun 2012 with marginal decline to 55.6 in Jul 2012 and 56.3 in Aug 2012 and sharper drop to 53.7 in Sep 2012, rebounding to 55.5 in Oct 2012 and 55.6 in Nov 2012.

clip_image046

Chart CIPMNM, China, Nonmanufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Table CIPMMFG provides the index of purchasing managers of manufacturing seasonally adjusted of the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The general index (IPM) rose from 50.5 in Jan 2012 to 53.3 in Apr and declined to 50.1 in Jul and to the contraction zone at 49.2 in Aug and 49.8 in Sep, climbing above 50.0 to 50.2 in Oct and 50.6 in Nov. The index of new orders (NOI) fell from 54.5 in Apr 2012 to 49.0 in Jul and 48.7 in Aug, climbing above 50.0 to 51.2 in Nov 2012. The index of employment also fell from 51.0 in Apr to 49.1 in Aug and further down to 48.7 in Nov 2012.

Table CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, %, Seasonally Adjusted

2012

IPM

PI

NOI

INV

EMP

SDEL

Nov

50.6

52.5

51.2

47.9

48.7

49.9

Oct

50.2

52.1

50.4

47.3

49.2

50.1

Sep

49.8

51.3

49.8

47.0

48.9

49.5

Aug

49.2

50.9

48.7

45.1

49.1

50.0

Jul

50.1

51.8

49.0

48.5

49.5

49.0

Jun

50.2

52.0

49.2

48.2

49.7

49.1

May

50.4

52.9

49.8

45.1

50.5

49.0

Apr

53.3

57.2

54.5

48.5

51.0

49.6

Mar

53.1

55.2

55.1

49.5

51.0

48.9

Feb

51.0

53.8

51.0

48.8

49.5

50.3

Jan

50.5

53.6

50.4

49.7

47.1

49.7

IPM: Index of Purchasing Managers; PI: Production Index; NOI: New Orders Index; EMP: Employed Person Index; SDEL: Supplier Delivery Time Index

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

China estimates the manufacturing index of purchasing managers on the basis of a sample of 820 enterprises (http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/pressrelease/t20121009_402841094.htm). Chart CIPMMFG provides the manufacturing index of purchasing managers from Nov 2011 to Nov 2012. There is deceleration from 51.2 in Sep 2011 to marginal contraction at 49.0 in Nov 2011. Manufacturing activity recovered to 53.3 in Apr 2012 but then declined to 50.4 in May 2012 and 50.1 in Jun 2012, which is the lowest in a year with exception of contraction at 49.0 in Nov 2011. The index then fell to contraction at 49.2 in Aug 2012 and improved to 49.8 in Sep with movement to 50.2 in Oct 2012 and 50.6 in Nov 2012 above the neutral zone of 50.0.

clip_image047

Chart CIPMMFG, China, Manufacturing Index of Purchasing Managers, Seasonally Adjusted

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Cumulative growth in the first three quarters of 2012 relative to the same period in 2011 was 7.7 percent. Secondary industry accounts for 46.8 percent of GDP of which industry alone for 40.1 percent and construction with the remaining 6.7 percent. Tertiary industry accounts for 43.8 percent of GDP and primary industry for 9.4 percent. China’s growth strategy consisted of rapid increases in productivity in industry to absorb population from agriculture where incomes are lower (Pelaez and Pelaez, The Global Recession Risk (2007), 56-80). The bottom block of Table VC-GDP provides quarter-on-quarter growth rates of GDP and their annual equivalent. China’s GDP growth decelerated significantly from annual equivalent 9.9 percent in IIIQ2011 to 7.0 percent in IVQ2011 and 6.1 percent in IQ2012, rebounding to 8.2 percent in IIQ2012 and 9.1 percent in IIIQ2012.

Table VC-GDP, China, Cumulative and Quarterly Growth of GDP, Current CNY 100 Million and Inflation Adjusted ∆%

Cumulative GDP

Value Current CNY 100 Million

Cumulative Three First Quarters of 2012 Relative to Cumulative Three First Quarters of 2012 ∆% Inflation Adjusted

GDP

353,480.0

7.7

Primary Industry

33,088.0

4.2

  Farming

33,088.0

4.2

Secondary Industry

165,428.5

8.1

  Industry

141,641.5

7.9

  Construction

23,787.0

9.2

Tertiary Industry

154,963.5

7.9

  Transport, Storage, Post

18,941.0

6.7

  Wholesale, Retail Trades

31,651.2

11.8

  Hotel & Catering Services

7,015.6

7.6

  Financial Intermediation

22,465.2

9.5

  Real Estate

20,789.6

2.7

  Other

54,101.0

7.7

Growth in Quarter Relative to Prior Quarter

∆% on Prior Quarter

∆% Annual Equivalent

2012

   

IIIQ2012

2.2

9.1

IIQ2012

2.0

8.2

IQ2012

1.5

6.1

2011

   

IVQ2011

1.7

7.0

IIIQ2011

2.4

9.9

IIQ2011

2.5

10.4

IQ2011

2.2

9.1

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Table VD-GDPb provides growth of GDP in China relative to a year earlier and relative to prior quarter. Growth of GDP relative to a year earlier decelerated from 12.1 percent in IQ2010 to 7.4 percent in IIIQ2012. Growth of secondary industry decelerated from 14.5 percent in IQ2010 to 7.9 percent in IIIQ2012.

Table VC-GDPb, China, Growth Rate of GDP, ∆% Relative to a Year Earlier and ∆% Relative to Prior Quarter

 

IQ 2011

IIQ 2011

IIIQ 2011

IVQ 2011

IQ     2012

IIQ 2012

IIIQ 2012

GDP

9.7

9.5

9.1

8.9

8.1

7.6

7.4

Primary Industry

3.5

3.2

3.8

4.5

3.8

4.3

4.2

Secondary Industry

11.1

11.0

10.8

10.6

9.1

8.3

8.1

Tertiary Industry

9.1

9.2

9.0

8.9

7.5

7.7

7.9

GDP ∆% Relative to a Prior Quarter

2.2

2.3

2.4

1.9

1.8

1.8

2.2

 

IQ 2010

IIQ 2010

IIIQ 2010

IVQ 2010

     

GDP

12.1

11.2

10.7

12.1

     

Primary Industry

3.8

3.6

4.0

3.8

     

Secondary Industry

14.5

13.3

12.6

14.5

     

Tertiary Industry

10.5

9.9

9.7

10.5

     

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH

The HSBC Flash China Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) compiled by Markit (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10452) is improving. The overall Flash China Manufacturing PMI increased marginally from 50.5 in Nov to 50.9 in Dec for a fourteen-month high while the Flash China Manufacturing Output Index decreased from 51.3 in Nov to 50.5 in Dec, both in expansion territory above 50.0. Hongbin Qu, Chief Economist, China and Co-Head of Asian Economic Research at HSBC, finds that the economy of China is improving because of internal demand while still requiring further easing policy (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10452).The HSBC China Services PMI, compiled by Markit, shows marginally improving business activity in China with the HSBC Composite Output, combining manufacturing and services, increasing from 50.5 in Oct to 51.6 in Nov for the third consecutive month of increasing output at the fastest rate since Jul 2012 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10434). Hongbin Qu, Chief Economist, China and Co-Head of Asian Economic Research at HSBC, finds marginal improvement in business conditions in China but that services entities increased employment and feel more optimistic about the economy in the next year (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10434). The HSBC Business Activity index decreased from 53.5 in Oct to 52.1 in Nov with continuing growth in services at a slower rate (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10434). Hongbin Ku, Chief Economist, China & Co-Head of Asian Economic Research at HSBC, finds that services activity will benefit from growth in manufacturing promoted by higher internal demand resulting from easier policies (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10434). The HSBC Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), compiled by Markit, increased to 50.5 in Nov from 49.5 in Oct, indicating moderate activity and the first monthly improvement of the index in 13 months (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10391). New exports orders registered the first increase since Apr 2012 at marked rate, with strength in foreign demand from Europe and the US. Hongbin Qu, Chief Economist, China and Co-Head of Asian Economic Research at HSBC, finds gradual improvement of the economy of China consistent with probable growth of GDP at 8 percent in IVQ2012 (http://www.markiteconomics.com/MarkitFiles/Pages/ViewPressRelease.aspx?ID=10391).

Wang Xiaotian, writing on China Daily, on “China cuts its reserve ratio again,” published by Xinhuanet on May 13, 2012 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-05/13/c_131584252.htm), informs that the People’s Bank of China (PBC) (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/963/index.html) reduced the reserve requirement imposed on Chinese lenders by 50 basis points with the objective of injecting liquidity to strengthen the economy. This is the second such reduction of reserve requirements in 2012. The reduction is estimated to release CNY 400 in China’s money market. The reserve requirement will be 20 percent for larger banks and 16.5 percent for smaller banks. The measures are intended to strengthen the economy. Xinhuanet, writing on “China announces surprise rate cuts amid economic downshift,” on Jun 5, 2012 (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-07/05/c_131697843.htm), informs that the central bank of China People’s Bank of China reduced the one year deposit rate by 25 basis points and the one year lending rate by 31 basis points effective Jun 6, 2012. The People’s Bank of China posts the new rates (http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2012/20120608171005950734495/20120608171005950734495_.html). Table CNY provides the country data table for China.

Table CNY, China, Economic Indicators

Price Indexes for Industry

Nov 12-month ∆%: minus 2.2

Nov month ∆%: minus 0.1
Blog 12/16/12

Consumer Price Index

Nov month ∆%: 0.1 Nov 12 months ∆%: 2.0
Blog 12/16/12

Value Added of Industry

Nov month ∆%: 0.86

Jan-Nov 2012/Jan-Nov 2011 ∆%: 10.0
Blog 12/16/12

GDP Growth Rate

Year IIIQ2012 ∆%: 7.4
Quarter IIQ2012 ∆%: 2.2
Blog 10/21/12

Investment in Fixed Assets

Nov month ∆%: 1.26

Total Jan-Nov 2012 ∆%: 20.7

Real estate development: 16.7
Blog 12/16/12

Retail Sales

Nov month ∆%: 1.47
Nov 12 month ∆%: 14.9

Jan-Nov ∆%: 14.2
Blog 12/16/12

Trade Balance

Nov balance $19.6 billion
Exports ∆% 2.9
Imports ∆% 0.0

Cumulative Nov: $199.54 billion
Blog 12/16/12

Links to blog comments in Table CNY:

10/21/12 http://cmpassocregulationblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/world-inflation-waves-stagnating-united.html

Cumulative and 12-months rates of value added of industry in China are provided in Table VC-1. Value added in total industry in Jan-Nov 2012 increased 10.0 percent relative to a year earlier and 10.1 percent in the 12 months ending in Nov 2012. Heavy industry had been the driver of growth with a cumulative rate of 11.0 percent relative to a year earlier in Jan-Mar 2012 that declined to 10.5 percent in Jan-Apr 2012 relative to the same period a year earlier and further down to 10.1 percent in Jan-Jun 2012, 9.9 percent in Jan-Jul 2012, 9.8 percent in Jan-Aug 2012, 9.7 percent in Jan-Sep 2012, 9.7 percent in Jan-Oct 2012 and 9.8 percent in Jan-Nov 2012. Light industry grew 10.2 percent in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to a year earlier and 9.2 percent in 12 months ending in Nov 2012. Growth of total industry decelerated from cumulative 14.4 percent in Jan-Mar 2011 to 10.0 percent in Jan-Nov 2012.

Table VC-1, China, Growth Rate of Value Added of Industry ∆%

 

Industry

Light Industry

Heavy
Industry

State
Owned

Private

2012

         

Jan-Nov

10.0

10.2

9.8

6.3

11.8

12 M Nov

10.1

9.2

10.5

7.2

11.8

Jan-Oct

10.0

10.3

9.7

6.4

11.8

12 M Oct

9.6

9.1

9.7

7.0

11.7

Jan-Sep

10.0

10.4

9.7

6.3

11.8

12 M  Sep

9.2

9.0

9.3

6.3

11.0

Jan-Aug

10.1

10.5

9.8

6.3

15.4

12 M Aug

8.9

8.6

9.0

5.3

14.3

Jan-Jul

10.3

10.8

9.9

6.6

12.1

12 M Jul

9.2

10.1

8.8

4.8

10.9

Jan-Jun

10.5

11.1

10.1

7.0

12.4

12 M Jun

9.5

9.0

9.6

6.5

11.5

Jan-May

10.7

11.5

10.3

6.7

12.4

12 M May

9.6

9.1

9.8

6.6

11.0

Jan-Apr

11.0

12.3

10.5

6.6

12.9

12 M Apr

9.3

10.3

8.9

4.3

10.7

Jan-Mar

11.6

13.2

11.0

7.2

13.8

12 M Mar

11.9

13.9

11.2

8.0

13.7

Jan-Feb

11.4

12.7

10.9

7.3

13.9

2011

         

Jan-Dec

13.9

13.0

14.3

9.9

15.8

12 M Dec

12.8

12.6

13.0

9.2

14.7

Jan-Nov

14.0

13.0

14.4

9.9

16.0

12 M Nov

12.4

12.4

12.4

7.8

14.4

Jan-Oct

14.1

13.0

14.5

10.1

9.1

12 M Oct

13.2

12.1

13.7

8.9

15.1

Jan-Sep

14.2

13.1

14.6

10.4

16.1

12 M Sep

13.8

12.8

14.3

9.9

16.0

Jan-Aug

14.2

13.1

14.6

10.4

16.1

12 M Aug

13.5

13.4

13.5

9.4

15.5

Jan-Jul

14.3

       

12 M
Jul

14.0

12.8

14.5

9.5

 

Jan-Jun

14.3

13.1

14.7

10.7

19.7

12 M
Jun

15.1

13.9

15.6

10.7

20.8

Jan-May

14.0

12.9

14.4

10.7

19.3

12 M May

13.3

12.9

13.5

8.9

18.7

Jan-Apr

14.2

12.9

14.7

11.2

19.5

12 M Apr

13.4

11.9

14.0

10.4

18.0

Jan-Mar

14.4

13.1

14.9

11.4

19.8

12 M Mar

14.8

12.8

15.6

12.9

19.2

12 M Feb

14.9

13.1

15.6

10.5

21.7

Jan-Feb

14.1

13.3

14.4

10.6

20.3

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart VC-1 provides 12-month percentage changes of value added of industry in 2011 and from Jan to Nov 2012. Growth rates of value added of industry in the first five months of 2010 were higher than in 2011 as would be expected in an earlier phase of recovery from the global recession. Growth rates have converged in the second half of 2011 to lower percentages with further decline into 2012 to single digit percentage changes and 10.1 percent in Nov 2012.

clip_image048

Chart VC-1, China, Growth Rate of Total Value Added of Industry, 12-Month ∆%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Yearly rates of growth for the past 12 months and cumulative relative to the earlier year of various segments of industrial production in China are provided in Table VC-2. Rates from Jan to Dec 2011 relative to the same period a year earlier fluctuated but remained mostly above 10 percent with the exception of motor vehicles and crude oil. There is deceleration in Jan-Nov 2012 of percentage change with no segment showing growth exceeding 10 percent with exception of 12-month growth of 16.5 percent for pig iron and 15.2 percent for nonferrous metals. Electricity fell from growth of 16.2 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2011 to 0.0 percent in the 12 months ending in Jun 2012, rebounding to 4.8 percent in Aug 2012 but declining to 1.5 percent in Sep 2012, increasing to 3.9 percent in Oct 2012 and 7.9 percent in Nov 2012.

Table VC-2, China, Industrial Production Operation ∆%

 

Elec-
tricity

Pig Iron

Cement

Crude
Oil

Non-
ferrous
Metals

Autos

2012

           

Jan-Nov

4.4

7.2

7.5

3.2

8.4

6.5

12 M Nov

7.9

16.5

9.4

9.1

15.2

3.9

Jan-Oct

3.9

6.3

6.7

2.6

7.7

6.9

12 M Oct

6.4

11.7

11.5

6.7

14.0

3.8

Jan-Sep

3.6

5.7

6.7

2.2

7.1

7.3

12 M Sep

1.5

4.9

12.0

7.0

7.1

6.3

Jan-Aug

3.8

-0.5

8.7

2.5

13.8

10.4

12 M Aug

4.8

2.6

5.9

-0.4

13.8

9.7

Jan-Jul

3.8

6.1

5.3

1.6

6.7

7.4

12M Jul

2.1

6.5

6.1

1.1

4.1

12.3

Jan-Jun

3.7

6.1

5.5

1.7

6.7

6.7

12 M Jun

0.0

6.7

6.5

-0.6

5.8

13.8

Jan-May

4.7

6.3

5.0

2.2

5.1

6.2

12 M May

2.7

6.3

4.3

0.7

6.6

18.5

Jan-Apr

5.0

6.2

5.5

2.9

4.6

3.1

12 M Apr

0.7

7.9

4.9

-0.3

2.3

10.7

Jan-Mar

7.1

6.5

7.3

3.1

5.8

0.0

12 M Mar

7.2

10.2

7.9

2.0

3.3

5.1

Jan-Feb

7.1

4.6

4.8

4.0

8.4

-1.8

2011

           

Jan-Dec

12.0

8.4

16.1

4.9

10.6

3.0

12 M Dec

9.7

3.7

7.0

4.0

13.2

-6.5

Jan-Nov

12.0

13.1

17.2

5.3

10.2

3.9

12 M Nov

8.5

7.8

11.2

3.2

8.2

-1.3

Jan-Oct

12.3

13.7

18.0

5.4

10.4

5.2

12 M
Oct

9.3

13.4

16.5

-0.9

3.7

1.3

Jan-Sep

12.7

13.9

18.1

6.0

11.2

5.5

12 M Sep

11.5

18.8

15.7

1.5

13.9

2.5

Jan-Aug

13.0

13.1

18.4

6.6

 

4.7

12 M Aug

10.0

12.9

12.8

4.5

15.6

9.5

Jan-Jul

13.3

13.0

19.2

6.9

9.9

4.0

12 M
Jul

13.2

14.9

16.8

5.9

9.8

-1.3

12 M
Jun

16.2

14.8

19.9

-0.7

9.8

3.6

12 M
May

12.1

10.6

19.2

6.0

14.2

-1.9

12 M Apr

11.7

8.3

22.4

6.8

6.1

-1.6

12 M Mar

14.8

13.7

29.8

8.0

11.6

9.9

12 M Feb

11.7

14.5

9.1

10.9

14.4

10.3

12 M Jan

5.1

3.5

16.4

12.2

1.4

23.9

12 M Dec 2010

5.6

4.6

17.3

10.3

-1.9

27.6

M: month

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Monthly growth rates of industrial production in China are provided in Table VC-3. Monthly rates have fluctuated around 1 percent. Jan and Feb 2012 are somewhat weaker but there was improvement to 1.20 percent in Mar. The rate of 0.38 percent in Apr is the lowest in the monthly series from Feb 2011 to Nov 2012. Monthly sales growth remained below 1 percent in all the first eleven months of 2012 with the exception of Mar 2012.

Table VC-3, China, Industrial Production Operation, Month ∆%

2011

Month ∆%

Feb

0.93

Mar

0.99

Apr

1.32

May

0.79

Jun

1.30

Jul

0.82

Aug

0.85

Sep

0.95

Oct

0.71

Nov

0.68

Dec

0.99

Jan 2012

0.49

Feb

0.64

Mar

1.20

Apr

0.38

May

0.91

Jun

0.79

Jul

0.72

Aug

0.76

Sep

0.84

Oct

0.83

Nov

0.86

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Table VC-4 provides cumulative growth of investment in fixed assets in China in 2011 relative to 2010 and in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to a year earlier. Total fixed investment has grown at a high rate fluctuating around 25 percent and fixed investment in real estate development has grown at rates in excess of 30 percent. In Jan-Nov 2012 investment in fixed assets in China grew 20.7 percent relative to a year earlier and 16.7 percent in real estate development. There was slight deceleration in the final two months of 2011 that continued into Jan-Nov 2012.

Table VC-4, China, Investment in Fixed Assets ∆% Relative to a Year Earlier

 

Total

State

Real Estate Development

Jan-Nov 2012

20.7

14.5

16.7

Jan-Oct

20.7

14.2

16.7

Jan-Sep

20.5

13.6

15.4

Jan-Aug

20.2

12.9

15.6

Jan-Jul

20.4

12.6

15.4

Jan-Jun

20.4

13.8

16.6

Jan-May

20.1

10.0

18.5

Jan-Apr

20.2

9.5

18.7

Jan-Mar

20.9

9.0

23.5

Jan-Feb

21.5

8.8

27.8

Jan-Dec 2011

23.8

11.1

27.9

Jan-Nov

24.5

11.7

29.9

Jan-Oct

24.9

12.4

31.1

Jan-Sep

24.9

12.7

32.0

Jan-Aug

25.0

12.1

33.2

Jan-Jul

25.4

13.6

33.6

Jan-Jun

25.6

14.6

32.9

Jan-May

25.8

14.9

34.6

Jan-Apr

25.4

16.6

34.3

Jan-Mar

25.0

17.0

34.1

Jan-Feb

24.9

15.6

35.2

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart VC-2 provides cumulative fixed asset investment in China relative to a year earlier. Growth rose to 25.8 percent in Jan-May 2011 and then fell back to 24.9 percent in Sep and Oct 2011, declining further to 24.5 percent in Nov and 23.8 percent in Dec 2011 with deeper drop in Jan-Feb 2012 to 21.5 percent, 20.9 percent in Jan-Mar, 20.2 percent in Jan-Apr 2012, 20.1 percent in Jan-Apr 2012, 20.4 percent in both Jan-Jun 2012 and Jan-Jul 2012, 20.2 percent in Jan-Aug 2012, 20.5 percent in Jan-Sep 2012, 20.7 percent in Jan-Oct 2012 and 20.7 percent in Jan-Nov 2012.

clip_image049

Chart VC-2, China, Investment in Fixed Assets, ∆% Cumulative over Year Earlier

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

Monetary policy has been used in China in the form of increases in interest rates and required reserves of banks to moderate real estate investment. These policies have been reversed because of lower inflation and weakening economic growth. Chart VC-3 shows decline of fluctuating cumulative growth rates of investment in real estate development relative to a year earlier from 35.2 percent in Jan-Feb 2011 to 31.1 percent in Jan-Oct 2011, 29.9 percent in Jan-Nov 2011, 27.9 percent in Jan-Dec 2011, 27.8 percent in Jan-Feb 2012 and sharper decline to 23.5 percent in Jan-Mar 2012, 18.7 percent in Jan-Apr 2012 and 18.5 percent in Jan-May 2012. The trend of decline continued with 16.6 percent in Jan-Jun 2012, 15.4 percent in Jan-Jul 2012, 15.6 percent in Jan-Aug 2012, 15.4 percent in Jan-Sep 2012, 16.7 percent in Jan-Oct 2012 and 16.7 percent in Jan-Nov 2012.

clip_image050

Chart VC-3, China, Investment in Real Estate Development, ∆% Cumulative over Year Earlier

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

Table VC-5 provides monthly growth rates of investment in fixed assets in China from Feb 2011 to Nov 2012. Growth rates moderated from Nov 2011 to May 2012. The rate of 0.99 percent in Mar 2012 is the lowest for any month after Mar 2011 but rates rebounded to 1.80 percent in May 2012, 1.75 percent in Jun, 1.50 percent in Jul 2012, 1.40 percent in Aug 2012, 1.79 percent in Sep 2012, 1.90 percent in Oct 2012 and 1.26 percent in Nov 2012.

Table VC-5, China, Investment in Fixed Assets, Month ∆%

 

Month ∆%

Feb 2011

-0.23

Mar

2.45

Apr

2.22

May

1.68

Jun

1.48

Jul

1.58

Aug

1.62

Sep

1.88

Oct

1.42

Nov

1.43

Dec

1.52

Jan 2012

1.20

Feb

2.03

Mar

0.99

Apr

1.22

May

1.80

Jun

1.75

Jul

1.50

Aug

1.40

Sep

1.79

Oct

1.90

Nov

1.26

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Growth rates of retail sales in China monthly, 12 months and cumulative relative to a year earlier are in Table VC-6. There is decline of growth rates to cumulative 14.7 percent in Feb 2012, 14.8 percent in Mar, 14.7 percent in Apr, 14.5 percent in May, 14.4 percent in Jun, 14.2 percent in Jul, 14.1 percent in Aug to Oct 2012 and 14.2 percent in Nov 2012. Percentage growth rates have declined in Jan-Nov 2012 relative to earlier months.

Table VC-6, China, Total Retail Sales of Consumer Goods ∆%

 

Month ∆%

12-Month ∆%

Cumulative ∆%/
Cumulative
Year Earlier

2012

     

Nov

1.47

14.9

14.2

Oct

1.35

14.5

14.1

Sep

1.65

14.2

14.1

Aug

1.34

13.2

14.1

Jul

1.25

13.1

14.2

Jun

1.47

13.7

14.4

May

1.34

13.8

14.5

Apr

1.16

14.1

14.7

Mar

1.55

15.2

14.8

Feb

1.33

14.7

14.7

Jan

0.21

   

2011

     

Dec

1.49

18.1

17.1

Nov

1.26

17.3

17.0

Oct

1.36

17.2

17.0

Sep

1.33

17.7

17.0

Aug

1.50

17.0

16.9

Jul

1.57

17.2

16.8

Jun

1.49

17.7

16.8

May

1.39

16.9

16.6

Apr

1.30

17.1

16.5

Mar

1.26

17.4

17.4

Feb

1.35

11.6

15.8

Jan

 

19.9

19.9

Note: there are slight revisions of month relative to earlier month data but not of the month on the same month year earlier or cumulative relative to cumulative year earlier in the databank

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Chart VC-4 of the National Bureau of Statistics of China provides 12-month rates of growth of retail sales in 2011 and 2012. There is again a drop into 2012 with the lowest percentages in Chart VC-4 followed by increases.

clip_image051

Chart VC-4, China, Total Retail Sales of Consumer Goods 12-Month ∆%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

http://www.stats.gov.cn/enGliSH/

Table VC-7 provides monthly percentage changes of retail sales in China. Although the rate of 0.21 percent in Jan 2012 is the lowest in Table VC-7, the rate of 1.65 percent in Sep is relatively high and 1.47 percent in Nov 2012 is closer to rates in 2011.

Table VC-7, China, Retail Sales, Month ∆%

2011

Month ∆%

Feb

1.35

Mar

1.26

Apr

1.30

May

1.39

Jun

1.49

Jul

1.57

Aug

1.50

Sep

1.33

Oct

1.36

Nov

1.26

Dec

1.49

2012

 

Jan

0.21

Feb

1.33

Mar

1.55

Apr

1.16

May

1.34

Jun

1.47

Jul

1.25

Aug

1.34

Sep

1.65

Oct

1.35

Nov

1.47

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/

Table VC-8 provides China’s exports, imports, trade balance and percentage changes from Dec 2010 to Nov 2012. China’s trade growth weakened again in Nov 2012 with growth of exports of 2.9 percent and no change in imports. China’s trade growth rebounded with growth of exports in 12 months of 11.6 percent in Oct 2012 and 9.9 percent in Sep 2012 after 2.7 percent in Aug 2012 and 1.0 percent in Jul 2012 while imports grew 2.4 percent in both Sep and Oct 2012, stagnating in Nov 2012. As a result, the monthly trade surplus increased from $25.2 billion in Jul 2012 to $31.9 billion in Oct 2012, declining to $19.6 billion in Nov 2012. China’s trade growth rebounded in Oct 2012 with growth of exports of 11.6 percent in 12 months and 2.4 percent for imports and trade surplus of $31.9 billion. The number that caught attention in financial markets was growth of 1.0 percent in exports in the 12 months ending in Jul 2012. Imports were also weak, growing 4.7 percent in 12 months ending in Jul 2012. Exports increased 11.3 percent in Jun 2012 relative to a year earlier while imports grew 6.3 percent. The rate of growth of exports fell to 4.9 percent in Apr 2012 relative to a year earlier and imports increased 0.3 percent but export growth was 15.3 percent in May and imports increased 12.7 percent. China reversed the large trade deficit of USD 31.48 billion in Feb 2012 with a surplus of $5.35 billion in Mar 2012, $18.42 billion in Apr 2012, $18.7 billion in May 2012, $31.7 billion in Jun 2012, $25.2 billion in Jul 2012, $26.7 billion in Aug 2012, $27.7 billion in Sep 2012, $31.9 billion in Oct 2012 and $19.6 billion in Nov 2012. Exports fell 0.5 percent in the 12 months ending in Jan while imports fell 15.3 percent for a still sizeable trade surplus of $27.3 billion. In Feb, exports increased 18.4 percent while imports jumped 39.6 percent for a sizeable deficit of $31.48 billion. There are distortions from the New Year holidays.

Table VC-8, China, Exports, Imports and Trade Balance USD Billion and ∆%

 

Exports
USD
Billion

∆% Relative
Year Earlier

Imports USD
Billion

∆% Relative
Year Earlier

Balance
USD
Billion

Nov 2012

179.4

2.9

159.8

0.0

19.6

Oct

175.57

11.6

143.58

2.4

31.99

Sep

186.35

9.9

158.68

2.4

27.67

Aug

177.97

2.7

151.31

-2.6

26.66

Jul

176.94

1.0

151.79

4.7

25.15

Jun

180.20

11.3

148.48

6.3

31.72

May

181.1

15.3

162.4

12.7

18.7

Apr

163.25

4.9

144.83

0.3

18.42

Mar

165.66

8.9

160.31

5.3

5.35

Feb

114.47

18.4

145.95

39.6

-31.48

Jan

149.94

-0.5

122.66

-15.3

27.28

Dec 2011

174.72

13.4

158.20

11.8

16.52

Nov

174.46

13.8

159.94

22.1

14.53

Oct

157.49

15.9

140.46

28.7

17.03

Sep

169.67

17.1

155.16

20.9

14.51

Aug

173.32

24.5

155.56

30.2

17.76

Jul

175.13

20.4

143.64

22.9

31.48

Jun

161.98

17.9

139.71

19.3

22.27

May

157.16

19.4

144.11

28.4

13.05

Apr

155.69

29.9

144.26

21.8

11.42

Mar

152.20

35.8

152.06

27.3

0.14

Feb

96.74

2.4

104.04

19.4

-7.31

Jan

150.73

37.7

144.27

51.0

6.46

Dec 2010

154.15

17.9

141.07

25.6

13.08

Source: http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/statistic/BriefStatistics.html/1

Table VC-9 provides cumulative exports, imports and the trade balance of China together with percentage growth of exports and imports. The trade balance in 2011 of $155.14 billion is lower than those from 2008 to 2010. China’s trade balance reached $199.54 billion in Jan-Nov 2012 with cumulative growth of exports of 7.3 percent and 4.1 percent of imports. There is a rare cumulative deficit of $4.2 billion in Feb 2012 reversed to a small surplus in Mar 2012 and a higher surplus of $19.3 billion in Apr 2012, increasing to $37.9 billion in May, $68.9 billion in Jun 2012, $94.1 billion in Jul 2012, $120.8 billion in Aug 2012, $148.3 billion in Sep 2012, $180.24 billion in Oct 2012 and $199.54 billion in Nov 2012. More observations are required to detect trends of Chinese trade but available data suggest deceleration that would be expected from the large share of trade with Europe.

Table VC-9, China, Year to Date Exports, Imports and Trade Balance USD Billion and ∆%

 

Exports
USD
Billion

∆% Relative
Year Earlier

Imports USD
Billion

∆% Relative
Year Earlier

Balance
USD
Billion

Nov 2012

1850.3

7.3

1650.5

4.1

199.54

Oct

1670.90

7.8

1490.67

4.6

180.24

Sep

1495.39

7.4

1347.08

4.8

148.31

Aug

1309.11

7.1

1188.51

5.1

120.61

Jul

1131.24

7.8

1037.14

6.4

94.10

Jun

954.38

9.2

885.46

6.7

68.91

May

774.4

8.7

736.5

6.7

37.9

Apr

593.24

6.9

573.94

5.1

19.3

Mar

430.02

7.6

429.36

6.6

0.66

Feb

264.40

6.9

268.64

7.7

-4.24

Jan

149.94

-0.5

122.66

-15.3

27.28

Dec 2011

1,898.60

20.3

1,743.46

24.9

155.14

Nov

1,724.01

21.1

1585.61

26.4

138.40

Oct

1,549.71

22.0

1,425.68

26.9

124.03

Sep

1,392.27

22.7

1,285.17

26.7

107.10

Aug

1,222.63

23.6

1,129.90

27.5

92.73

Jul

1,049.38

23.4

973.17

26.9

76.21

Jun

874.3

24.0

829.37

27.6

44.93

May

712.37

25.5

689.41

29.4

22.96

Apr

555.30

27.4

545.02

29.6

10.28

Mar

399.64

26.5

400.66

32.6

-1.02

Feb

247.47

21.3

248.36

36.0

-0.89

Jan

150.7

37.7

144.27

51.0

6.46

Dec 2010

1577.93

31.3

1394.83

38.7

183.10

Source: http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/statistic/BriefStatistics.html/1

© Carlos M. Pelaez, 2010, 2011, 2012

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